Muhammad Rizky Anugerah 44151438

anugerahmuhammadrizky@gmail.com

Macquarie University

Sydney, Australia

9 November 2016
 Muhammad Rizky Anugerah - 44151438

2016

THE ISLAMIC STATE

MUHAMMAD RIZKY ANUGERAH

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Introduction

The Islamic State has been prominently troubling in Iraq and Syria. It causes grave instability

in these and neighbouring countries. Although internationally it has been designated as a

terrorist organisation, the Islamic State functions quite differently than a conventional

terrorist group. The group has strong intelligence capability, economic facility, and

organisational aptitude that support its military efforts. As such, this paper is purposed to

assess its overall abilities and forecast its future course of actions. Beginning with

environmental assessment in Iraq and Syria, this paper will examine geographical aspects of

the country and its implications. It will subsequently go to the adversarial assessment,

focusing on the Islamic State's tactics, technology, training, and finance which in overall

incorporate its organisational and military capabilities. The last part of the paper will assess

its centre of gravity based on the environmental feature of Syria and Iraq, and the groups

strengths and weaknesses. It will also present possible future forecasts under the most-

likely and most-dangerous course of actions which are assessed from quadrant crunching

matrix.

Environmental Assessment

The Islamic State's principal areas of operation remain largely within the sovereign border of

Iraq and Syria. The group operates mainly in the significant parts of Iraq and Syria that are

highly relevant to its continuation. Iraq borders six countries Jordan, Iran, Kuwait, Saudi

Arabia, Syria, and Turkey (Palka, et al., 2006, p. 381; Central Intelligence Agency, 2016). Iraq

is formed like a basin, comprising of an alluvial plain of the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers,

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with generally a subtropical semi-arid climate (Frenken, 2009, p. 199). Iraq is divided into

three main geographical regions (Palka, et al., 2006, p. 380). Region one encompasses the

subtropical desert of Iraq and borders with Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait

(pp. 380-381). Region two is the sedimentary basin of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers and

situated in and around the centre of Iraq with rich alluvial soils and water (pp. 380-382).

Region three is Iraq's northern mountains near Kirkuk and Irbil bordering Turkey and Iran

some of Iraq's most significant petroleum deposits are located here (pp. 381-382).

The Islamic State's control in Iraq has been predominantly focused on central Iraq around

Baghdad through north and north-western Iraq in Mosul, and the border with Syria (IHS

Conflict Monitor, 2016). Since Iraq mainly consists of sandy desert plains, the Islamic State

has limited means to mobilise and concealing movements. To lessen this problem, its areas

of operation have been noticeable along transportation routes and urban areas to ensure

movement safety and control in populated areas. This also safeguards its mobility and

access to other important places which would impact the stream of revenues and operation

ability. Moreover, urban areas also function as a stronghold, a source of income, and a

strategic advantage against the larger and stronger state adversaries.

The environment and climate of Iraq produce two primary natural hazards, droughts and

sandstorms, which potentially hinder land movement and air mobility (Palka, et al., 2006, p.

383). Iraqs significant size forces military units to manoeuvre over long distances making

them vulnerable because the nature of micro-terrain is useless in concealing large modern

forces, but provide satisfactory camouflage throughout the region for small and fast-moving

insurgent forces (p. 383-384). Moreover, the dusty and dry sandy soils in the desert are

particularly challenging for transportation instruments since they are highly damaging to

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engines, and when mixed with various lubricants are destructive to rifles, machine guns, and

helicopters (p. 384).

Somewhat similar to Iraq, Syria is typically hot and dry with largely semi-arid terrain and

desert highland (Central Intelligence Agency, 2016). In Syria, the Islamic State is situated in

the east, bordering and connecting with Iraq; the centre, around Palmyra; and through to

the north to Raqqa, Aleppo, and the border with Turkey near Kobane (IHS Conflict Monitor,

2016). It has expanded successfully in two directions, to the east and north of Syria.

Eastwardly, it has established control in the Jazeera region of Deir ez Zour, Hasaka, and

Raqqa (Zisser, 2016, p. 126). In the north, it tried to institute itself in the rural areas of north

and east Aleppo (p. 126). The Islamic State has significance presence in Raqqa, Deir ez Zour,

Hasaka, and the Euphrates province of the Syrian city of Abu Kamal and the Iraqi town of

Qaimthe new province that was meant to break Iraq-Syria border created by the Sykes-

Picot (p. 127).

The control over these areas in Syria is meant for ensuring safety and stability as well as

supporting logistical and administrative function. Particularly in Syria, the control of Raqqa,

Aleppo, and Kobane, are the Islamic States critical grounds for its governance project to

survive (IHS Conflict Monitor, 2016). Raqqa is the centre of the Islamic States leadership

with a model city for its governance project while Kobane and other areas bordering Turkey

give access to logistical and human resource support from Europe smuggled through Turkey.

Turkey is the Islamic States main route for foreign volunteers joining the organisation, and

source of income from trade and its supply of weapons (Zeidel, 2016, p. 121). Another

important area to the Islamic State is the Euphrates province, which allows safe mobilisation

between Syria and Iraq, particularly to Raqqa and Mosul.

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Since both countries have extremely hot temperatures, fluvial topographies play a critical

role in the Islamic States need for water provision and urban tactics (Palka, et al., 2006, p.

386). Fluvial topographies sustain a living population; thus, helps create urban parts of the

countries. For the reason of sustaining everyday life, and the concealment mentioned

above, and operational ability, the Islamic State is mostly concentrated in urban areas.

Moreover, these Insurgents favour fighting in cities because the advantage of a

technologically superior adversary is likely to be diminished (p. 393). In this setting,

distances are reduced, communication is difficult, and the risk of causing civilian casualties

by the use of weaponed drones increases for their adversary (p. 393). Hence, the urbanised

population of Iraq and Syria has been profitable for the Islamic State's military operations (p.

392).

An example of the environmental importance of the urban area in assessing the strengths

and weaknesses of the Islamic State would be the significance of Mosul. Mosul is the hub of

Iraq in connecting the country with Turkey and Syria especially Raqqa and Kobane. It holds a

strategic position, which provides proximity to Erbil, and particularly Kirkuk, where

petroleum deposits are located (Palka, et al., 2006, p. 388). The infrastructure in and around

Mosul allows the Islamic State to mobilise and manoeuvre effectively. The nature of the

urban area that may conceal small insurgent group, while hardening the movement for large

military, favours the Islamic State in the battle against the adversaries. As recently

demonstrated by the Islamic State, it uses the advantage of an urban area by barricading

itself in the stronghold of Mosul. It destroyed building around outskirts of Mosul and

barricaded the roads leading to the centre of Mosul to create a wall that could hinder

tactical and operational force of adversaries (STRATFOR, 2016).

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The Islamic State Assessment

The Islamic State was founded in Iraq in October 2004 as Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and led by

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. It changed its name to Islamic State in 2014 when it established the

caliphate in the Syrian governorate of Aleppo to the Iraqi province of Diyala (Jane's World

Insurgency and Terrorism, 2016). It was able to flourish due to major disorders in the region

that caused a state failure process and an ideological vacuum (Michael, 2016, p. 15). The

upheavals questioned the geopolitical logic that defined the contemporary region where

various ethnic groups and contending religions were brought together into single states with

loose identities and without shared national character (pp. 16-17). Subsequently, the Arab

Spring and the weakness of numerous Arab nations further created the environments for

the rise of the Islamic State (p. 18).

The Islamic State is a Sunni Islamist and very much against Shia communities. It relies on the

constant ethnoreligious conflict in Iraq and Syria to create a stronger hold. It has exploited

the processes of state failure in Syria and Iraq to establish itself in a caliphate (Michael,

2016, p. 20). In Iraq, the fragmented cultural landscape of Sunni, Shia, and the Kurds was

exploited (Palka, et al., 2006, p. 387). The profound difference between Sunni, Shia, and

Kurds impacted on government's performance (Michael, 2016, p. 21). In Syria, it exploited

its revolution and civil war (Lister, 2014, p. 12). Thus, it can be regarded that the regions

grave instability created the Islamic (p. 15). In both cases, the group has taken advantage of

the situation where there was a vacuum to fill and benefited from profound instability in the

region (p. 30).

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To maintain the condition of vacuum, the Islamic State has to proliferate the ethnoreligious

conflict in Iraq and Syria. To achieve this, it typically carries out urban assaults in civilian

areas, which targets Shia Muslims and other minorities (Lister, 2014, p. 17). This strategy

aims to spark or maintain sectarian conflict, thus provoking minorities to commit similar

actions against Sunnis (Zelin, 2014). Consequently, the Islamic State comes to the rescue of

the Sunni population and eventually presents itself as the guardian of the Sunnis (Lister,

2014, p. 18). It also uses propaganda efforts to depict international intervention as an act of

aggression, thus exploiting anger for recruitment purposes (p. 32). Consequently, this

further weakens the government and its institutions (Michael, 2016, p. 15).

To accomplish its vision of a state, the Islamic State applies consolidation strategy of nation-

building process, which is based on three concepts of the idea, utility, and coercion. On the

ideological level, the Islamic State operates through a range of mechanisms that help spread

its ideology and implement sharia law (Valensi, 2016, pp. 82-83). Courts and schools are the

Islamic States instruments in establishing its religious ideology (p. 82). As an effective tool,

the Islamic State offers material rewards to confirm legitimacy and win support from the

population (p. 83). However, these carrots are closely identified with the Islamic States

tactics of coercion, fear, and violence. To ensure further obedience and influence, it applies

the strategy of using local leaders to fill bureaucratic positions making them appear more

legitimate (p. 84).

By perceiving and presenting itself as a state, the Islamic State has taken control and

governs territories by incorporating military, civil, political, and financial affairs with the

implementation of a strict form of sharia law (Lister, 2014, p. 26). However, the group is not

only focused on disciplinary justice. It also controls industries and services to ensure a more

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efficient provision of services (p. 27). This translates to its control over electricity, water and

gas supplies, as well as local factories and bakeries, providing the group with total control

over the primary needs of the population (pp. 27-28).

The Islamic State governance is primarily separated into three main subgroups. The core,

franchises or affiliated groups, and grassroots supporters (Stewart, 2016). Within the core

itself, it operates as a highly controlled bureaucratic organisation (Lister, 2014, p. 21). It

maintains a cabinet composed of ministers, a personal advisor to the leadership, two

deputies each for Syria and Iraq, an eight-man cabinet, and a military council of at most

thirteen men (p. 21).

Apart from its state-building capacity and organisational structure, the Islamic State is

militarily strong in many areas: tactics, technology, training and finance. To support its

caliphate vision, it mainly targets military and security personnel and employs brutal

assassinations directed at individual soldiers and police (Jane's World Insurgency and

Terrorism, 2016; Knights, 2014, p. 2). Known tactics that it has employed are the ambush,

assault, stand-off attack, assassination, raid, engagement, kidnap, siege, hostage, and hijack

(Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism, 2016). These intense and wide-ranging attacks are

aimed at not only inflicting material damage but also to diminish the morale of security

forces (Lister, 2014, p. 11). In Iraq, these activities have focused primarily on Sunni urban

centres and transport routes, while in Syria, it is directed at resource-rich regions and the

borders with Turkey and Iraq (p. 18).

Likewise, the Islamic State is technologically progressive in contemporary warfare. The

Internet and modern weaponry are its distinguishing aspects. Twitter and Facebook play an

integral role as the source of information and inspiration for its fighters (Carter, et al., 2014,

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p. 1). Through a network of provincial-level accounts and several central media

departments, it is capable of exploiting international media attention. (Lister, 2014, p. 24).

Moreover, it has also attempted to perform small-scale cyber-attacks through the Internet,

though, with no sufficient evidence to claim that the group has the capabilities to physically

harm or cause substantial financial damage (STRATFOR, 2015). Concurrently, the Islamic

State media output is declining (Zelin, et al., 2015). In more modern weaponry, the group is

vigorously pursuing to use weapons of mass destruction (Hummel, 2016, p. 18). However,

similar to its cyber efforts, it has no considerable success in using them due to lack of high-

quality human resources and essential materials needed.

Apart from military tactics and technology, the Islamic States increase in force is obtained

from doctrine and training (Siboni, 2016, p. 65). Operational actions are designed by the

shock doctrine, which consists of three stages in The Management of Savagery (p. 65). The

Management of Savagery is an organised plan for disseminating jihadist ideas and

establishing an Islamic caliphate (Valensi, 2016, p. 81). It refers to a chaotic transitional

situation between the decline of one ruler and the rise of another (p. 81). In summary, the

doctrine emphasises on brutality to inflict shock and fear, a terror to the population, and

implementation of sharia law (Siboni, 2016, p. 66). Further, this doctrine is substantiated

within the three principles of cruelty, extensive psychological warfare, and rapid

mobilisation (p. 66). On the training side, the Islamic State also has adequately

professionalised its fighters (Lister, 2014, p. 17). On several occasions, the group has also

trained children and indoctrinated them at the training camp (Siboni, 2016, p. 65). Most of

these programs incorporate the groups ideology of Islamic faith along with basic military

training (p. 69).

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Additionally, the Islamic State has been almost entirely self-financed with Mosul as its

principal source of income (Lister, 2014, p. 22). The groups financial capacities have

provided a social leverage to encourage popular support through various subsidies (p. 24).

The resources at its disposal allowed the group to spread at a rapid pace and further control

other resources (Even & Valensi, 2016, p. 74). Its finances have been reliant on oil and gas,

but agriculture, cotton, water, and electricity are also being exploited (p. 23). The group has

managed to gain control over various economic assets, including oil wells and gas fields,

cement and phosphate industries, farmlands, and food storehouses in both Iraq and Syria

(Brisard & Martinez, 2014, pp. 4-9). Its control over water supplies in the Tigris and

Euphrates rivers also plays a significant role in its financial efforts since it is critical to Iraqi

and Syrian water, industry, oil, farming, and electricity production (Even & Valensi, 2016, p.

76). Furthermore, organised taxation system is also in place to targets trucks transporting

food and electronics from Syria and Jordan via Iraqs al-Waleed and al-Tanif crossings (Lister,

2014, p. 23). Overall, around fifty percent of the Islamic States revenue comes from

taxation and repossession, and around forty-three percent comes from its oil revenue, while

the other seven percent comes from drug smuggling, electricity, and donations (IHS Conflict

Monitor, 2016).

Centre of Gravity Assessment

Sound intelligence framework on the national level is required to understand the relevant

phenomena of religious, historical, and cultural backgrounds relating to the Islamic State

(Siman-Tov & Hacohen, 2016, p. 59). Moreover, the economy of the Islamic State is vital to

assess its viability and locate the sources of its power, which serve as potential military

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targets to be attacked (p. 60). Identifying centres of gravity is essential to damage the

groups overall performance. All of the above elements are substantial to indicate the

groups weak points, which would undermine the Islamic States activity if attacked.

Financial support is required to support both the daily needs of a state and operational

requirements (Even & Valensi, 2016, p. 77). Creating and sustaining governance system

require a considerable amount of resources. Similarly, maintaining a conventional territorial

warfare is also costly (Shapiro, 2016, p. 30). As an organisation, the Islamic State has

profited extensively from its financial and structural capabilities. However, they also serve

as a critical weakness that can be exploited (Lister, 2014, p. 16). Moreover, its governance

ambition is also proven to be a significant asset. However, as the Islamic State slowly

transforms, it could expose its leaderships as targets for attack (Valensi, 2016, p. 85).

Therefore, while its ambition to govern is an expression of its strength and power, it may

become its Achilles heel (p. 85).

Since financial capabilities are crucial to the continuation of the group, the targeting of the

Islamic State economic capabilities are vital. Shapiro (2016, p. 29) reports that the Islamic

States $1billion total revenue in 2015, has declined to $440 million a year in July 2016.

Economic warfare strategies of attacking financial assets, increased monitoring of money

and resources transfer to and from Islamic State-controlled areas, and internal financial

system disruption are needed (Even & Valensi, 2016, p. 78). For instance, its oil revenue

dropped significantly since the coalition have been targeting its oil infrastructures (Centre

for the Analysis of Terrorism, 2016, p. 1). Moreover, territories controlled, such as Raqqa

and Mosul, need to be recaptured, and its leaderships need also be eliminated. Strategically

in the long term, better policies are required to address the issue of failed states through

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nation- and state-building efforts that necessarily take into account the historical and

identity background of the people to avoid the influence of non-state actors, such as the

Islamic State.

Although environment evaluation, adversary assessment, and the identification of the

centre of gravity have respectively been discussed, future events could unfold unexpectedly.

For this reason, intelligence needs to take into account all of the elements above to forecast

most-likely and most-dangerous course of actions. In regards to this particular case, the

most-likely and most-dangerous course of actions are:

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Conclusion

The Islamic State has benefited from the geographical environment of urban areas in Iraq

and Syria. It has also controlled significant parts of Iraq and Syria that are critical to the

countries, such as the rivers, oil and gas deposits, and countries borders. Strategically and

operationally profited from the environment, the group also has considerable proficiencies

in itself through its organisational, military, and financial capabilities. The most notable

aspect of each of these elements is its leadership structure and members, brutal tactics and

doctrine, and impressive financial resources. More importantly, however, the most

profound factors that enable the Islamic State to flourish in the first place are the disorderly

within the region, and the embellishment of states' weaknesses, which eventually caused

states to fail. Thus, the understanding of political vacuum and the targeting of such political

issue, while at the same time recognising the regions historical and cultural backgrounds,

are required to enact suitable policies that may necessarily undermine the influence of the

Islamic State in the future.

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Quadrant Crunch Matrix.

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