Fraser - Rethinking The Public Sphere PDF

Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy
Author(s): Nancy Fraser

Source: Social Text, No. 25/26 (1990), pp. 56-80
Published by: Duke University Press
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thePublicSphere:
Rethinking
A Contribution
to the Critiqueof ActuallyExisting
Democracy'
NANCY FRASER
Introduction
Todayin theU.S. we heara greatdeal ofballyhooabout"thetriumph of

liberaldemocracy" andeven"theendofhistory." Yet thereis stilla great
deal toobjecttoinourown"actuallyexistingdemocracy," andtheproject
of a criticalsocial theoryof thelimitsof democracyin late capitalist
societiesremainsas relevantas ever.In fact,thisprojectseemsto me to
haveacquireda newurgency at a timewhen"liberaldemocracy" is being
toutedas theneplus ultraofsocial systemsforcountries thatare emerg-
ing fromSoviet-style statesocialism,LatinAmericanmilitary dictator-
ships,and southern Africanregimesofracialdomination.
Those of us whoremaincommitted to theorizing
thelimitsof democ-
racyin late capitalistsocietieswill findin theworkofJiirgen Habermas
an indispensableresource.I meantheconceptof "thepublic sphere,"
originallyelaborated in his 1962 book, The StructuralTransformation
of
thePublicSphere,andsubsequently resituated
butneverabandonedinhis
laterwork.2
The politicalandtheoretical ofthisidea is easyto explain.
importance
Habermas'sconceptofthepublicsphereprovidesa wayofcircumventing
someconfusions thathaveplaguedprogressive social movements and the
politicaltheoriesassociatedwiththem.Take,forexample,thelongstand-
ing failurein thedominant wingof thesocialistand Marxisttradition to
appreciatethefullforceofthedistinction betweentheapparatuses ofthe
state,on theone hand,and publicarenasofcitizendiscourseand associ-
ation,on theother.All too oftenit was assumedin thistradition thatto
subjecttheeconomyto thecontrolof thesocialiststatewas to subjectit
to thecontrolofthesocialistcitizenry.Ofcoursethatwas notso. Butthe
conflation of thestateapparatuswiththepublicsphereof discourseand
associationprovidedballast to processeswherebythe socialistvision
becameinstitutionalized in an authoritarian
statistforminsteadof in a
participatorydemocratic form.Theresulthasbeentojeopardizethevery
idea of socialistdemocracy.
A secondproblem, albeitonethathasso farbeenmuchless historically
momentousand certainlyless tragic, is a confusion one encountersat
56

NancyFraser 57
timesin contemporary feminisms. I meana confusionthatinvolvesthe

use oftheverysameexpression"thepublicsphere,"butin a sensethatis
less preciseand less usefulthanHabermas's.This expressionhas been
usedbymanyfeminists torefertoeverything thatis outsidethedomestic
or familialsphere.Thus,"thepublicsphere"in thisusage conflatesat
leastthreeanalytically distinctthings:thestate,theofficial-economy of
paid employment, and arenasofpublicdiscourse.3 Now,it shouldnotbe
thought thattheconflation of thesethreethingsis a "merelytheoretical"
issue. On thecontrary, it has practicalpoliticalconsequences,forexam-
ple, whenagitationalcampaignsagainstmisogynist culturalrepresenta-
tions are confoundedwithprogrammes forstatecensorship,or when
struggles to deprivatizehousework and childcare are equatedwiththeir
commodification. In boththesecases,theresultis tooccludethequestion
whether to subjectgenderissuesto thelogic ofthemarketor theadmin-
istrativestateis topromotetheliberation of women.
The idea of "thepublicsphere"in Habermas'ssense is a conceptual
resourcethatcan helpovercomesuchproblems. It designatesa theater in
modernsocietiesin whichpoliticalparticipation is enactedthrough the
mediumof talk.It is thespace in whichcitizensdeliberateabouttheir
commonaffairs,hence,an institutionalized arenaof discursiveinterac-
tion.This arenais conceptually distinctfromthestate;it a site forthe
production and circulation of discoursesthatcan in principlebe critical
of thestate.The publicspherein Habermas'ssenseis also conceptually
distinctfromtheofficial-economy; it is notan arenaof market relations
butratherone of discursiverelations, a theaterfordebatingand deliber-
atingratherthanforbuyingand selling.Thus,thisconceptof thepublic
spherepermitsus to keepin view thedistinctions betweenstateappara-
tuses,economicmarkets, and democratic associations,distinctions that
are essentialto democratic theory.
For thesereasons,I am goingto takeas a basic premiseforthisessay
thatsomething likeHabermas'sidea ofthepublicsphereis indispensable
tocriticalsocial theory andtodemocratic politicalpractice.I assumethat
no attemptto understand the limitsof actuallyexistinglate capitalist
democracy can succeedwithout in somewayoranothermakinguse ofit.
I assumethatthesame goes forurgently neededconstructive effortsto
projectalternative modelsof democracy.
If you will grantme thatthe generalidea of the public sphereis
indispensableto criticaltheory,thenI shall go on to argue thatthe
specific formin which Habermas has elaborated this idea is not wholly
satisfactory.On the contrary,I contend that his analysis of the public
sphere needs to undergosome criticalinterrogationand reconstructionif
it is to yield a categorycapable of theorizingthe limitsof actually
existingdemocracy.

58 thePublicSphere
Rethinking
Let me remindyou thatthesubtitleofStructuralTransformation

is "An
Inquiryintoa Categoryof BourgeoisSociety."The objectof theinquiry
is therise and declineof a historically specificand limitedformof the
publicsphere, which Habermas calls the "liberalmodelofthebourgeois
publicsphere." The aim is to identify conditionsthatmadepossible
the
thistypeofpublicsphereand to charttheirdevolution. The upshotis an
argument under
that, altered conditions of latetwentiethcentury "welfare
state mass democracy,"the bourgeoisor liberalmodel of the public
sphereis no longerfeasible.Some newformofpublicsphereis required
to salvagethatarena'scriticalfunction andtoinstitutionalize democracy.
Oddly,Habermasstops shortof developinga new,post-bourgeois
modelof thepublicsphere.Moreover, he neverexplicitly problematizes
somedubiousassumptions thatunderliethebourgeoismodel.As a result,
we are leftat theendof Structural Transformation without a conception
of thepublicspherethatis sufficiently distinctfromthebourgeoiscon-
ceptionto servetheneedsofcriticaltheory today.
That,at anyrate,is thethesisI intendto argue.In orderto makemy
case, I shallproceedas follows:I shallbegin,in sectionone,byjuxtapos-
ing Habermas'saccountof the structural transformationof the public
sphere to an alternative account that can be piecedtogether fromsome
recentrevisionist historiography. Then, I shall four
identify assumptions
underlying thebourgeoisconceptionof publicsphere,as Habermasde-
scribesit,whichthisnewerhistoriography renderssuspect.Next,in the
following four sections,I shall examine each oftheseassumptions inturn.
Finally,in a briefconclusion,I shall drawtogether some strandsfrom
thesecriticaldiscussionsthatpointtowardan alternative, post-bourgeois
conceptionof thepublicsphere.
Thepublicsphere:Alternative
histories, conceptions
competing
Let mebeginbysketching somehighlights ofHabermas'saccountofthe

structuraltransformation
of thepublicsphere.Accordingto Habermas,
theidea of a publicsphereis thatof a bodyof "privatepersons"assem-
bled to discussmattersof "publicconcern"or "commoninterest." This
idea acquiredforceandrealityin earlymodernEuropein theconstitution
of "bourgeoispublics spheres"as counterweights to absolutiststates.
Thesepublicsaimedto mediatebetween"society"and thestatebyhold-
ingthestateaccountableto "society"via "publicity."
At firstthismeant
requiringthatinformationaboutstatefunctioning be madeaccessibleso
thatstate activities would be subject to critical scrutinyand the force of
"public opinion." Later, it meant transmitting the considered "general
interest"of "bourgeois society" to the state via formsof legally guaran-
teed freespeech, freepress,and freeassembly,and eventuallythroughthe
parliamentaryinstitutionsof representativegovernment.

NancyFraser 59
Thus,at one level,theidea of thepublicspheredesignatedan institu-

tionalmechanismfor"rationalizing" politicaldomination by rendering
statesaccountableto (some of) thecitizenry. At anotherlevel, it desig-
nateda specifickindof discursiveinteraction. Here thepublic sphere
connotedan ideal of unrestricted rationaldiscussionof publicmatters.
The discussionwas to be open and accessible to all; merelyprivate
interestswereto be inadmissible; inequalitiesof statuswereto be brack-
eted; and discussants were to deliberate as peers. The resultof such
be
discussionwould "publicopinion" in the strongsenseof a consensus
aboutthecommongood.
Accordingto Habermas,the fullutopianpotentialof the bourgeois
conceptionofthepublicspherewas neverrealizedin practice.The claim
to openaccess in particular was notmadegood.Moreover, thebourgeois
conceptionof thepublicspherewas premisedon a social orderin which
the statewas sharplydifferentiated fromthe newlyprivatizedmarket
economy; it was this clear separationof "society"and statethatwas
to
supposed underpin a form of publicdiscussionthatexcluded"private
interests."But theseconditions eventually erodedas nonbourgeois strata
gained access to thepublicsphere.Then, "the social question" came to
the fore;societywas polarizedby class struggle;and thepublic frag-
mentedintoa massof competing interestgroups.Streetdemonstrations
and back room, brokered compromises amongprivateinterests replaced
reasonedpublicdebateaboutthecommongood.Finally,withtheemer-
genceof "welfarestatemassdemocracy," societyand thestatebecame
mutually intertwined; publicity inthesenseofcriticalscrutiny ofthestate
gave way to public relations,mass-mediated stageddisplays,and the
manufacture and manipulation ofpublicopinion.
Now,letmejuxtaposetothissketchofHabermas'saccountan alterna-
tive accountthatI shall piece togetherfromsome recentrevisionist
historiography. Briefly, scholarslikeJoanLandes,MaryRyan,andGeoff
Eley contend that Habermas's accountidealizestheliberalpublicsphere.
Theyarguethat,despite the rhetoric of publicityand accessibility, that
officialpublicsphere rested on, indeed was importantly constitutedby,a
number ofsignificant exclusions.ForLandes,thekeyaxis ofexclusionis
gender;she arguesthattheethosof thenewrepublicanpublicspherein
Francewas constructed in deliberate oppositionto thatofa morewoman-
friendlysalon culturethatthe republicansstigmatizedas "artificial,"
"effeminate," and "aristocratic." Consequently, a new,austerestyleof
public speech and behavior was promoted, a styledeemed"rational,"
"virtuous,"and "manly."In thisway, masculinistgenderconstructswere
built into the veryconception of the republicanpublic sphere, as was a
logic thatled, at the heightof Jacobinrule, to the formalexclusion from
political life of women.4Here therepublicansdrewon classical traditions
thatcast femininity and publicityas oxymorons;the depthof such tradi-

60 thePublicSphere
Rethinking
tionscan be gaugedin theetymological connection between"public"and

"pubic,"a graphictraceofthefactthatin theancientworldpossessionof
a penis was a requirement forspeakingin public. (A similarlink is
preserved,incidentally, in the etymological connectionbetween"testi-
and
mony" "testicle.")5
ExtendingLandes's argument, GeoffEley contendsthatexclusionary
operations were essential to liberal publicspheresnotonlyin Francebut
also in Englandand Germany,and thatin all thesecountriesgender
exclusionswerelinkedto otherexclusionsrootedin processesof class
formation. In all thesecountries, he claims,thesoil thatnourishedthe
liberalpublicspherewas "civil society,"theemerging newcongeriesof
voluntary associationsthatsprungup in whatcame to be knownas "the
age of societies."But thisnetworkof clubs and associations-philan-
thropic, civic,professional, and cultural-wasanything butaccessibleto
everyone.On the contrary, it was thearena,the trainingground,and
eventuallythe powerbase of a stratumof bourgeoismen,who were
comingto see themselves as a "universalclass" and preparing to assert
theirfitnessto govern.Thus,theelaborationof a distinctive cultureof
civil societyand of an associatedpublic spherewas implicatedin the
processofbourgeoisclass formation; itspracticesandethosweremarkers
of"distinction" inPierreBourdieu'ssense,6waysofdefining an emergent
elite, setting it off from the older aristocratic elites it was intenton
displacing, on the one hand, and from thevariouspopularand plebeian
stratait aspiredto rule,on theother.Thisprocessof distinction, more-
over,helpsexplaintheexacerbation ofsexismcharacteristic oftheliberal
publicsphere;new gendernormsenjoiningfeminine domesticity and a
sharpseparation ofpublicandprivatespheresfunctioned as keysignifiers
of bourgeoisdifference frombothhigherand lowersocial strata.It is a
measureoftheeventualsuccessofthisbourgeoisprojectthatthesenorms
laterbecamehegemonic, sometimes imposedon,sometimes embraced by,
broadersegments of society.7
Now,thereis a remarkable ironyhere,one thatHabermas'saccountof
the rise of the public spherefails fullyto appreciate.sA discourseof
publicitytoutingaccessibility, rationality,and thesuspensionof status
hierarchies is itselfdeployedas a strategy ofdistinction. Ofcourse,inand
ofitself,thisironydoesnotfatallycompromise thediscourseofpublicity;
thatdiscoursecan be, indeedhas been,differently deployedin different
circumstances and contexts.Nevertheless, it does suggestthattherela-
tionshipbetweenpublicityand statusis morecomplexthanHabermas
intimates, thatdeclaringa deliberative arenato be a space whereextant
statusdistinctionsare bracketedand neutralizedis not sufficientto make
it so.
Moreover,the problemis not only thatHabermas idealizes the liberal
public sphere but also that he fails to examine other,nonliberal,non-

NancyFraser 61
bourgeois,competing publicspheres.Orrather, it is preciselybecausehe

failsto examinetheseotherpublicspheresthathe endsup idealizingthe
liberalpublicsphere.9 MaryRyandocuments thevariety ofwaysin which
nineteenthcenturyNorthAmericanwomen of various classes and
ethnicitiesconstructed access routesto publicpoliticallife,evendespite
theirexclusionfromtheofficialpublicsphere.In thecase of elitebour-
geoiswomen,thisinvolvedbuildinga counter-civil societyofalternative
woman-only voluntary associations,includingphilanthropic and moral
reformsocieties;in somerespects,theseassociationsaped theall-male
societiesbuiltby thesewomen'sfathersand grandfathers; yetin other
respectsthewomenwereinnovating, sincetheycreatively usedthehere-
toforequintessentially "private"idiomsof domesticity and motherhood
preciselyas springboards forpublicactivity.Meanwhile,forsomeless
privilegedwomen,access to public life came through participationin
supporting rolesin male-dominated working class protestactivities.Still
otherwomenfoundpublicoutletsin streetprotests and parades.Finally,
women'srightsadvocatespubliclycontestedbothwomen'sexclusion
fromtheofficialpublicsphereandtheprivatization of genderpolitics.10
Ryan'sstudy shows that,even in theabsence of formal politicalincor-
porationthroughsuffrage, there were a of
variety ways of accessing
public lifeand a of
multiplicity public arenas.Thus,theviewthatwomen
wereexcludedfromthepublicsphereturnsoutto be ideological;itrests
on a class- and gender-biased notionof publicity, one whichacceptsat
face value the bourgeoispublic's claim to be the public. In fact,the
historiography ofRyanandothersdemonstrates thatthebourgeoispublic
was neverthepublic.On thecontrary, virtuallycontemporaneous withthe
bourgeoispublictherearosea hostofcompeting counterpublics, includ-
ing nationalist publics,popularpeasantpublics,elite women'spublics,
and workingclass publics.Thus,therewerecompeting publicsfromthe
start,not just fromthe late nineteenthand twentiethcenturies,as
Habermasimplies."
Moreover,notonlyweretherewerealwaysa plurality of competing
publics but the relationsbetweenbourgeoispublicsand otherpublics
were always conflictual.Virtuallyfromthe beginning,counterpublics
contestedthe exclusionary normsof the bourgeoispublic,elaborating
alternative stylesof politicalbehaviorand alternative normsof public
speech.Bourgeoispublics,in turn,excoriatedthesealternatives and de-
liberatelysoughtto block broaderparticipation. As Eley putsit, "the
emergenceof a bourgeoispublic was neverdefinedsolely by the struggle
against absolutismand traditionalauthority,but...addressedthe problem
of popular containmentas well. The public spherewas always constituted
by conflict."'2
In general,thisrevisionisthistoriographysuggestsa muchdarkerview
of thebourgeoispublic spherethantheone thatemergesfromHabermas's

62 thePublicSphere
Rethinking
study.The exclusionsandconflictsthatappearedas accidentaltrappings

fromhis perspective, in therevisionists'
view becomeconstitutive. The
resultis a gestaltswitchthatalterstheverymeaning of thepublicsphere.
We can no longerassumethatthebourgeoisconceptionof thepublic
spherewas simplyan unrealizedutopianideal; it was also a masculinist
ideologicalnotionthatfunctioned tolegitimatean emergent formofclass
rule.Therefore, Eleydrawsa Gramscian moralfromthestory:theofficial
bourgeoispublicsphereis theinstitutional vehiclefora majorhistorical
transformation inthenatureofpoliticaldomination. Thisis theshiftfrom
a repressivemodeof domination to a hegemonicone, fromrulebased
primarily on acquiescenceto superiorforceto rulebased primarily on
consentsupplemented withsomemeasureofrepression."The important
pointis thatthisnew modeof politicaldomination, like theolderone,
securestheabilityof one stratum of societyto ruletherest.The official
publicsphere,then,was-indeed, is-the primeinstitutional siteforthe
construction of the consentthatdefinesthe new,hegemonicmode of
domination.14
Now,whatconclusionsshouldwe drawfromthisconflictofhistorical
interpretations? Shouldwe concludethattheveryconceptof thepublic
sphere is a piece of bourgeoismasculinist ideology,so thoroughly com-
promised that it can no shedno genuinely criticallighton the limits of
actuallyexistingdemocracy? Or, should we conclude, rather, that the
public spherewas a good idea thatunfortunately was not realized in
practicebut that retainssome emancipatory force? In short,is theidea of
thepublicspherean instrument ofdomination or a utopianideal?
Well,perhapsboth.But actuallyneither. I contendthatbothof those
conclusionsaretooextreme andunsuppletodo justicethematerialI have
been discussing.15 Insteadof endorsingeitherone of them,I wantto
proposea morenuancedalternative. I shall arguethatthe revisionist
historiography neitherundermines nor vindicates"the conceptof the
publicsphere"simpliciter, butthatitcalls intoquestionfourassumptions
thatare centralto a specific-bourgeois masculinist-conception of the
publicsphere,at leastas Habermasdescribesit.Theseare:
1. theassumptionthatitis possibleforinterlocutors ina publicsphere
to bracketstatusdifferentialsand to deliberate"as if' theyweresocial
equals; theassumption,therefore,thatsocietalequalityis nota necessary
conditionforpoliticaldemocracy;
2. theassumption thattheproliferationofa multiplicity of competing
publics is necessarilya step away from,ratherthantoward,greater
democracy,and that a single, comprehensivepublic sphere is always
preferableto a nexus of multiplepublics;
3. the assumptionthatdiscourse in public spheresshould be restricted
to deliberationabout the commongood, and thatthe appearance of "pri-
vate interests"and "privateissues" is always undesirable;

NancyFraser 63
4. theassumption
thata functioningdemocratic
publicsphererequires
betweencivil societyandthestate.
a sharpseparation
Let meconsidereach of thesein turn.
Openaccess,participatory andsocialequality
parity,
Habermas'saccountof the bourgeoisconceptionof the public sphere
stressesitsclaimtobe openandaccessibletoall. Indeed,thisidea ofopen
access is one ofthecentralmeaningsofthenormofpublicity. Of course,
we know,bothfromtherevisionist historyandfromHabermas'saccount,
thatthe bourgeoispublic's claim to full accessibilitywas not in fact
realized.Womenofall classesandethnicities wereexcludedfromofficial
politicalparticipation preciselyon thebasis of ascribedgenderstatus,
whileplebeianmenwereformally excludedby property qualifications.
Moreover,in manycases, womenand menofracializedethnicities ofall
classes wereexcludedon racialgrounds.
Now,whatare we to makeofthishistorical factofthenon-realization
in practiceof thebourgeoispublicsphere'sideal of open access? One
approachis toconcludethattheideal itselfremainsunaffected, sinceit is
in
possible principle to overcome these exclusions.And, in fact,it was
only a matter of timebeforeformal exclusionsbasedon gender, property,
and racewereeliminated.
This is convincingenoughas faras it goes, but it does not go far
enough.Thequestionofopenaccess cannotbe reducedwithout remainder
tothepresenceorabsenceofformalexclusions.It requiresus tolookalso
at theprocessof discursiveinteraction withinformally inclusivepublic
arenas.Herewe shouldrecallthatthebourgeoisconception ofthepublic
sphererequiresbracketing inequalitiesof status.This publicspherewas
to be an arenain whichinterlocutors wouldsetaside suchcharacteristics
as differences inbirthandfortune andspeaktooneanother as iftheywere
social and economicpeers.The operativephrasehereis "as if."In fact,
thesocial inequalitiesamongtheinterlocutors werenoteliminated, but
only bracketed.
Butweretheyreallyeffectively bracketed?Therevisionist historiogra-
phy suggeststhey were not. Rather,discursiveinteraction withinthe
bourgeoispublicspherewas governedbyprotocolsofstyleanddecorum
thatwerethemselves correlatesand markers of statusinequality.These
functioned informallytomarginalize womenandmembers oftheplebeian
classes and to preventthemfromparticipating as peers.
Here we are talkingabout informalimpedimentsto participatory parity
that can persist even aftereveryone is formallyand legally licensed to
participate.That these constitutea more serious challenge to the bour-
geois conceptionof thepublic spherecan be seen froma familiarcontem-
poraryexample. Feministresearchhas documenteda syndromethatmany
of us have observed in facultymeetingsand othermixed sex deliberative

64 thePublicSphere
Rethinking
bodies: mentendto interrupt womenmorethanwomeninterrupt men;

menalso tendto speakmorethanwomen,takingmoreturnsand longer
turns;andwomen'sinterventions aremoreoftenignoredornotresponded
to thanmen's.In responseto thesortsofexperiencesdocumented in this
research, an important strandoffeminist politicaltheory hasclaimedthat
deliberationcan serve as a mask fordomination.Theoristslike Jane
Mansbridge havearguedthat"thetransformation of 'I' into'we' brought
about throughpoliticaldeliberationcan easily mask subtleformsof
control.Even thelanguagepeople use as theyreasontogether usually
favorsone way of seeing thingsand discouragesothers.Subordinate
groupssometimescannotfindtherightvoice or wordsto expresstheir
thoughts, and whentheydo, theydiscovertheyare notheard.[They]are
silenced,encouragedtokeeptheirwantsinchoate,andheardto say 'yes'
whenwhattheyhave said is 'no.''""6Mansbridge rightly notesthatmany
of thesefeminist into
insights ways in which deliberation can serveas a
mask fordomination extendbeyondgenderto otherkindsof unequal
relations,likethosebasedon class or ethnicity. Theyalertus to theways
in whichsocial inequalitiescan infectdeliberation, even in theabsence
ofanyformalexclusions.
HereI thinkwe encounter a veryseriousdifficulty withthebourgeois
conception of the publicsphere. Insofar as the bracketing of social ine-
qualitiesin deliberation means as
proceeding theyif don't existwhenthey
do, thisdoes notfoster participatoryparity.On thecontrary, suchbrack-
etingusuallyworkstotheadvantageofdominant groupsinsocietyandto
thedisadvantage of subordinates. In mostcases, itwouldbe moreappro-
priateto unbracket inequalitiesin the sense of explicitlythematizing
them-a pointthataccordswiththespiritofHabermas'slater"communi-
cativeethics."
The misplacedfaithin theefficacy ofbracketing suggestsanotherflaw
inthebourgeoisconception. Thisconception assumesthata publicsphere
is orcan be a spaceofzerodegreeculture, so utterlybereft ofanyspecific
ethosas to accommodate withperfectneutrality andequal ease interven-
tionsexpressiveof anyand everyculturalethos.But thisassumption is
counterfactual, and not forreasons that
are merely In
accidental. stratified
societies,unequallyempowered social groupstendto developunequally
valuedculturalstyles.Theresultis thedevelopment ofpowerful informal
pressuresthatmarginalize thecontributions of members of subordinated
groupsbothin everydaylife contextsand in officialpublic spheres.7
Moreover, these pressures are amplified,ratherthan mitigated,by the
peculiar political economyof the bourgeoispublic sphere. In this public
sphere,the media thatconstitutethe materialsupportforthe circulation
of views are privately owned and operated for profit. Consequently,
subordinated social groups usually lack equal access to the material

NancyFraser 65
meansofequal participation.'"Thus,politicaleconomyenforcesstructur-
allywhatcultureaccomplishesinformally.
If we take theseconsiderations seriously,thenwe shouldbe led to
entertainseriousdoubtsabout a conceptionof the public spherethat
purports tobracket,ratherthantoeliminate, social inequalities.
structural
We shouldquestionwhether it is possibleeveninprincipleforinterlocu-
torsto deliberateas if theywere social peers in speciallydesignated
discursivearenas,whenthesediscursivearenasare situatedin a larger
societalcontextthatis pervadedbystructural relationsofdominance and
subordination.
Whatis at stakehereis theautonomy of specificallypoliticalinstitu-
tions thesurrounding societalcontext.Now,one salientfeature
vis-,i-vis liberalismfromsomeotherpolitical-theoretical
thatdistinguishes orien-
tationsis thatliberalismassumestheautonomy of thepoliticalin a very
strongform.Liberalpoliticaltheoryassumesthatit is possibleto orga-
nizea democratic formofpoliticallifeon thebasisofsocio-economic and
socio-sexualstructures thatgeneratesystemicinequalities.For liberals,
then,theproblemofdemocracy becomestheproblemof howto insulate
politicalprocessesfromwhatareconsidered tobe non-politicalorpre-po-
liticalprocesses,thosecharacteristic, forexample,of theeconomy,the
family, andinformal everyday life.Theproblemforliberals,thus,is how
to strengthen thebarriersseparatingpoliticalinstitutions thatare sup-
posed to instantiaterelationsof equalityfromeconomic,cultural,and
socio-sexualinstitutions thatare premisedon systemicrelationsof in-
equality.'9Yettheweightofcircumstance suggeststhatinordertohavea
public spherein whichinterlocutors can deliberateas peers,it is not
sufficient merelyto bracketsocial inequality.Instead,it is a necessary
conditionforparticipatory paritythatsystemicsocial inequalitiesbe
eliminated. Thisdoes notmeanthateveryonemusthaveexactlythesame
income,butit does requirethesortof roughequalitythatis inconsistent
withsystemically-generated relationsof dominanceand subordination.
Pace liberalism,then,politicaldemocracyrequiressubstantivesocial
equality.20
So far,I havebeenarguingthatthebourgeoisconception ofthepublic
is
sphere inadequate insofaras it supposesthatsocial equalityis not a
necessary conditionforparticipatory in
parity publicspheres.Whatfol-
lows fromthisforthecritiqueof actuallyexistingdemocracy? One task
forcriticaltheoryis torendervisiblethewaysin whichsocietalinequal-
ityinfectsformally inclusiveexistingpublicspheresandtaintsdiscursive
interactionwithinthem.
and multiplepublics
Equality,diversity,
So farI have been discussing what we mightcall "intrapublicrelations,"

thatis, thecharacterand qualityof discursiveinteractionswithina given

66 thePublicSphere
Rethinking
publicsphere.Now I wantto considerwhatwe mightcall "interpublic

relations,"thatis, thecharacter ofinteractions amongdifferent publics.
Let mebeginbyrecallingthatHabermas'saccountstressesthesingu-
larityofthebourgeoisconception ofthepublicsphere,itsclaimtobe the
public arena in thesingular. In addition,hisnarrative tendsinthisrespect
to be faithfulto thatconception,castingthe emergenceof additional
publicsas a latedevelopment tobe readunderthesignfragmentation and
decline. This narrative,then,like the bourgeoisconceptionitself,is
informed by an underlying evaluativeassumption, namely,thattheinsti-
tutionalconfinement ofpubliclifeto a single,overarching publicsphere
is a positiveand desirablestateofaffairs, whereastheproliferation of a
multiplicity ofpublicsrepresents a departurefrom, rather thanan advance
toward,democracy. It is thisnormative assumption thatI now wantto
scrutinize.In thissection,I shall assess the relativemeritsof single,
comprehensive publicsversusmultiplepublicsin twokindsof modern
societies-stratified societiesand egalitarian multi-cultural societies.21
First,let meconsiderthecase of stratified societies,by whichI mean
societieswhosebasic institutional framework generatesunequalsocial
groups in structural relations of dominance and subordination.I have
alreadyargued thatin such full of in
societies, parity participation public
debateanddeliberation is notwithinthereachofpossibility. The question
to be addressedhere,then,is: whatformof publiclifecomesclosestto
approachingthatideal? Whatinstitutional arrangements will best help
narrowthegap in participatory paritybetweendominant andsubordinate
groups?
I contendthat,in stratified societies,arrangements thataccommodate
contestation amonga plurality of competing publicsbetterpromotethe
ideal ofparticipatory paritythandoes a single,comprehensive, overarch-
ingpublic.Thisfollowsfromtheargument oftheprevioussection.There
I arguedthatit is notpossibleto insulatespecialdiscursivearenasfrom
theeffectsof societalinequality;and thatwheresocietalinequality per-
sists,deliberative processesin publicsphereswill tendto operateto the
advantageof dominant groupsand to thedisadvantage of subordinates.
Now I wantto add thattheseeffectswill be exacerbatedwherethereis
only a single,comprehensive public sphere.In thatcase, membersof
subordinated groupswouldhaveno arenasfordeliberation amongthem-
selvesabouttheirneeds,objectives,and strategies. Theywouldhave no
venuesin whichto undertake communicative processesthatwerenot,as
it were, underthe supervisionof dominantgroups.In this situation,they
would be less likely thanotherwiseto "find the rightvoice or words to
express theirthoughts,"and more likely than otherwise"to keep their
wants inchoate." This, would renderthem less able than otherwise to
articulateand defendtheirinterestsin the comprehensivepublic sphere.
They would be less able thanotherwiseto expose modes of deliberation

NancyFraser 67
thatmaskdomination by "absorbingtheless powerfulintoa false 'we'

thatreflectsthemorepowerful."
This argumentgains additional support from the revisionist
historiography of the public sphere,up to and includingveryrecent
This
developments. history recordsthatmembers of subordinated social
groups-women, workers, peoples of and
color, gays and lesbians-have
repeatedly foundit advantageous to constitute alternative publics.I pro-
pose to call thesesubaltern counterpublics in order to signalthattheyare
parallel discursive arenas where members of subordinated social groups
inventand circulatecounterdiscourses, in
which turnpermitthemto
formulate oppositionalinterpretations of theiridentities, interests,and
needs.22Perhapsthemoststriking exampleis thelate-twentieth century
U.S. feminist subaltern counterpublic, withits variegatedarrayofjour-
nals,bookstores, publishing companies,filmand video distribution net-
works,lectureseries,researchcenters,academicprograms, conferences,
conventions, festivals,and local meetingplaces. In thispublicsphere,
feminist womenhave inventednew termsfordescribingsocial reality,
including"sexism,""thedoubleshift,"sexualharassment," and"marital,
date,and acquaintancerape."Armedwithsuchlanguage,we haverecast
ourneedsand identities, thereby reducing, althoughnoteliminating, the
extentof ourdisadvantage in officialpublicspheres.23
Let me notbe misunderstood. I do notmeanto suggestthatsubaltern
counterpublics are alwaysnecessarilyvirtuous;someof them,alas, are
explicitlyanti-democratic andanti-egalitarian; andeventhosewithdem-
ocraticand egalitarianintentions are notalwaysabove practicing their
own modesof informal exclusionand marginalization. Still,insofaras
thesecounterpublics emergein responseto exclusionswithindominant
publics,theyhelpexpanddiscursivespace.In principle, assumptions that
werepreviouslyexemptfromcontestation will nowhave to be publicly
argued out. In general,the proliferation of subalterncounterpublics
meansa wideningof discursivecontestation, and thatis a good thingin
stratified societies.
I amemphasizing thecontestatory functionofsubaltern counterpublics
in stratified societiesin partin orderto complicatetheissue of separat-
ism.In myview,theconceptof a counterpublic militatesin thelongrun
againstseparatismbecause it assumesan orientation thatis publicist.
Insofaras thesearenasarepublicstheyare bydefinition notenclaves-
whichis notto denythattheyareofteninvoluntarily enclaved.Afterall,
to interactdiscursivelyas a memberof a public - subalternor otherwise
- is to disseminateone's discourse intoever wideningarenas. Habermas
captureswell this aspect of the meaningof publicitywhen he notes that
however limited a public may be in its empirical manifestationat any
given time, its membersunderstandthemselvesas part of a potentially
widerpublic, thatindeterminate, empiricallycounterfactualbody we call

68 thePublicSphere
Rethinking
"thepublic-at-large." The pointis that,in stratified societies,subaltern

counterpublics havea dual character. On theone hand,theyfunction as
spaces of withdrawaland regroupment; on the otherhand,theyalso
function as bases and training groundsforagitationalactivitiesdirected
towardwiderpublics.It is preciselyin thedialecticbetweenthesetwo
functions thattheiremancipatory potential resides.Thisdialecticenables
subaltern counterpublics to
partially offset, althoughnotwhollytoeradi-
the
cate, unjustparticipatory privilegesenjoyedbymembers ofdominant
in
social groups stratified societies.
So far,I have been arguingthat,althoughin stratified societiesthe
ideal of participatory parityis not fullyrealizable,it is moreclosely
approximated byarrangements thatpermit contestation amonga plurality
of competing publicsthanby a single,comprehensive publicsphere.Of
course,contestation amongcompeting publicssupposesinter-public dis-
cursiveinteraction. How, then,shouldwe understand such interaction?
GeoffEley suggestswe thinkofthepublicsphere[instratified societies]
as "thestructured settingwhere cultural and ideological contest or nego-
tiationamonga varietyof publicstakesplace."24This formulation does
justice to the of
multiplicity public arenas in stratifiedsocietiesby ex-
the and
presslyacknowledging presence activity of "a of
variety publics."
Atthesametime,italso doesjusticetothefactthatthesevariouspublics
are situatedin a single"structured setting"thatadvantagessome and
disadvantages others.Finally,Eley's formulation doesjusticeto thefact
that,in stratifiedsocieties,thediscursiverelationsamongdifferentially
empowered publicsare as likelyto taketheformof contestation as that
ofdeliberation.
Let me nowconsidertherelativemeritsof multiplepublicsversusa
singularpublic foregalitarian,multi-cultural societies.By egalitarian
societiesI meannonstratified societies,societieswhosebasic framework
does notgenerateunequalsocial groupsin structural relationsof domi-
nance and subordination. Egalitariansocieties,therefore, are classless
societieswithout or
gender racialdivisionsof labor.However,theyneed
notbe culturally homogeneous. On thecontrary, providedsuchsocieties
permitfreeexpression andassociation,theyare likelytobe inhabited by
social groupswithdiversevalues,identities, andculturalstyles,henceto
be multi-cultural. My questionis: underconditions of culturaldiversity
in the absenceof structural inequality, woulda single,comprehensive
publicspherebe preferable to multiplepublics?
To answerthisquestionwe needtotakea closerlookattherelationship
between public discourse and social identities.Pace the bourgeois con-
ception,public spheresare notonlyarenas fortheformationof discursive
opinion; in addition,theyare arenas forthe formationand enactmentof
social identities.25This means thatparticipationis not simplya matterof
being able to state propositionalcontentsthatare neutralwithrespectto

NancyFraser 69
formofexpression. Rather,as I arguedin theprevioussection,participa-

tionmeansbeingable to speak"in one's own voice," thereby simulta-
neouslyconstructing andexpressing one's culturalidentity throughidiom
and style.26 Moreover, as I also suggested, publicspheres themselves are
notspacesofzerodegreeculture, to
equallyhospitable anypossible form
of culturalexpression.Rather,theyconsistin culturally specificinstitu-
for
tions-including, example, various journals and various social geog-
raphies of urban space. These institutionsmay be understood as culturally
specificrhetorical lensesthatfilterand altertheutterances theyframe;
theycan accommodate someexpressivemodesandnotothers.27
It followsthatpubliclifeinegalitarian, multi-cultural societiescannot
consistexclusivelyin a single,comprehensive publicsphere.Thatwould
be tantamount tofiltering diverserhetorical andstylistic normsthrough a
single,overarching lens.Moreover,sincetherecan be no suchlens that
is genuinely culturally neutral,it wouldeffectively privilegetheexpres-
sive normsof one culturalgroupoverothers,thereby makingdiscursive
assimilationa conditionforparticipation in public debate.The result
wouldbe thedemiseofmulti-culturalism (andthelikelydemiseofsocial
In
equality). general, then, we can conclude thattheidea ofan egalitarian,
multi-cultural societyonly makes senseifwe supposea plurality ofpublic
arenasin whichgroupswithdiversevaluesand rhetorics participate.
By
definition, sucha societymustcontaina multiplicity ofpublics.
However,thisneednotprecludethepossibility of an additional,more
comprehensive arenain whichmembers ofdifferent,morelimitedpublics
talkacrosslines of culturaldiversity. On thecontrary, our hypothetical
egalitarian, multi-cultural societywouldsurelyhaveto entertain debates
overpoliciesand issuesaffecting everyone.The questionis: wouldpar-
ticipantsin suchdebatesshareenoughin theway of values,expressive
norms,and, therefore, protocolsof persuasionto lend theirtalk the
quality of deliberations aimed at reachingagreement through givingrea-
sons?
In myview,thisis bettertreatedas an empiricalquestionthanas a
conceptualquestion.I see noreasontoruleoutinprinciplethepossibility
of a societyin whichsocial equalityand culturaldiversity coexistwith
participatory democracy. I certainly hopetherecanbe sucha society.That
hopegainssomeplausibility ifwe considerthat,howeverdifficult it may
be, communication acrosslinesof culturaldifference is notin principle
impossible-although itwillcertainly becomeimpossibleifone imagines
that it requires bracketingof differences.Grantedsuch communication
requires multi-culturalliteracy, but that, I believe, can be acquired
throughpractice. In fact,the possibilities expand once we acknowledge
the complexityof culturalidentities.Pace reductive,essentialistconcep-
tions,culturalidentitiesare woven of manydifferent strands,and some of
these strandsmay be common to people whose identitiesotherwisedi-

70 thePublicSphere
Rethinking
verge,evenwhenit is thedivergences thatare mostsalient.28

Likewise,
underconditionsof social equality,theporousness,outer-directedness,
and open-endedness of publicscouldpromoteinter-cultural communica-
tion.Afterall, theconceptofa publicpresupposes a plurality
ofperspec-
tivesamongthosewhoparticipate withinit,therebyallowingforinternal
differences andantagonisms, andlikewisediscouraging reifiedblocs.29In
addition,the unboundedcharacterand publicistorientation of publics
allows forthefactthatpeopleparticipate in morethanone public,and
thatthememberships of differentpublicsmaypartiallyoverlap.This in
turnmakesinter-cultural communication conceivablein principle.All
told,then,theredo notseemto be anyconceptual(as opposedtoempiri-
cal) barriersto the possibilityof a sociallyegalitarian,multi-cultural
societythatis also a participatorydemocracy. Butthiswillnecessarily be
a societywithmanydifferent publics,includingat least one publicin
whichparticipants candeliberate as peersacrosslinesofdifferenceabout
policythatconcernsthemall.
In general,I havebeenarguingthattheidealofparticipatory parityis
betterachievedbya multiplicity ofpublicsthanbya singlepublic.This
is trueboth forstratified societiesand foregalitarian,multi-cultural
societies,albeit fordifferent reasons.In neithercase is my argument
intended as a simplepostmodern celebrationofmultiplicity.
Rather,inthe
case of stratifiedsocieties,I am defendingsubalterncounterpublics
formedunderconditionsof dominanceand subordination. In theother
case, by contrast,I am defendingthe possibilityof combiningsocial
equality,culturaldiversity,andparticipatory democracy.
Whatare theimplications ofthisdiscussionfora criticaltheoryof the
publicspherein actuallyexistingdemocracy? we needa critical
Briefly,
politicalsociologyofa formofpubliclifein whichmultiple butunequal
publicsparticipate. Thismeanstheorizing thecontestatoryinteractionof
different publicsand identifying the mechanisms thatrendersome of
themsubordinate to others.
Publicspheres,
common andprivateinterests
concerns,
I have arguedthatin stratifiedsocieties,like it or not, subaltern
stand
counterpublics in a contestatory
relationshipto dominant publics.
One importantobjectof suchinterpubliccontestation is theappropriate
boundariesof thepublic sphere.Here the centralquestionsare, what
countsas a public matterand what,in contrast,is private?This bringsme
to a thirdset of problematicassumptionsunderlyingthe bourgeois con-
ception of the public sphere,namely,assumptionsconcerningthe appro-
priatescope of publicityin relationto privacy.
Let me remindyou that it is central to Habermas's account thatthe
bourgeois public sphere was to be a discursive arena in which "private
persons" deliberatedabout "public matters."There are several different

NancyFraser 71
sensesofprivacyandpublicity inplayhere."Publicity," forexample,can

mean1) state-related; 2) accessibleto everyone;3) of concernto every-
one; and4) pertaining toa commongoodorsharedinterest. Each ofthese
to a
corresponds contrasting sense of"privacy." In addition,therearetwo
othersensesof"privacy"hovering justbelow thesurface here:5) pertain-
ingtoprivateproperty ina market economy;and6) pertaining tointimate
domesticorpersonallife,includingsexuallife.
I havealreadytalkedat lengthaboutthesenseof "publicity"as open
or accessibleto all. Now I wantto examinesomeof theothersenses,3O
beginningwith3) of concernto everyone.This is ambiguousbetween
whatobjectivelyaffectsor has an impacton everyone, as seen froman
outsider'sperspective,on the one hand,and whatis recognizedas a
matterof commonconcernby participants, on theotherhand.Now,the
idea of a publicsphereas an arenaof collectiveself-determination does
notsitwellwithapproachesthatwouldappealtoan outsiderperspective
to delimitits properboundaries.Thus, it is the second,participant's
perspectiveis thatis relevanthere.Only participants themselvescan
decide whatis and whatis notof commonconcernto them.However,
thereis no guarantee thatall ofthemwillagree.Forexample,untilquite
recently,feminists were intheminority inthinking thatdomesticviolence
against women was a matter of common concern and thusa legitimate
of
topic public discourse.The greatmajority people consideredthis
of
issuetobe a privatematter betweenwhatwasassumedtobe a fairly small
number of heterosexual couples(andperhapsthesocial and legalprofes-
sionalswhoweresupposedto deal withthem).Then,feminists formeda
subaltern counterpublic fromwhichwe disseminated a viewofdomestic
violenceas a widespreadsystemicfeatureof male-dominated societies.
Eventually, aftersustaineddiscursivecontestation, we succeededin mak-
ingita commonconcern.
The pointis thatthereareno naturally given,a prioriboundaries here.
Whatwillcountas a matter ofcommonconcernwillbe decidedprecisely
through discursivecontestation. It followsthatno topicsshouldbe ruled
offlimitsin advanceof such contestation. On thecontrary, democratic
publicityrequirespositiveguarantees of opportunitiesforminorities to
convinceothersthatwhatin thepastwas notpublicin thesenseofbeing
a matter of commonconcernshouldnowbecomeso."
What,then,ofthesenseof"publicity" as pertainingtoa commongood
or sharedinterest?This is the sense thatis in play when Habermas
characterizes thebourgeoispublicsphereas an arenain whichthetopic
of discussion is restrictedto the"commongood" and in whichdiscussion
of "privateinterests"is ruled out.
This is a view of the public sphere that we would today call civic
republican,as opposed to liberal-individualist.Briefly,the civic republi-
can model stresses a view of politics as people reasoning togetherto

72 thePublicSphere
Rethinking
promotea commongood thattranscendsthe meresum of individual

preferences. The idea is thatthroughdeliberation the membersof the
public can come to discover or createsuch a common good.In theprocess
of theirdeliberations, participants are transformed from a collectionof
self-seeking, private individuals into a public-spirited collectivity,capa-
ble of actingtogetherin the commoninterest.On this view,private
interestshaveno properplace in thepoliticalpublicsphere.Atbest,they
are thepre-political starting pointof deliberation, to be transformed and
transcended in thecourseofdebate.32
Now,thiscivicrepublicanviewof thepublicsphereis in one respect
an improvement overtheliberal-individualist alternative. Unlikethelat-
ter,it does notassumethatpeople'spreferences, interests, and identities
are givenexogenously in advanceofpublicdiscourseanddeliberation. It
appreciates, rather,thatpreferences, interests, and identities areas much
outcomesas antecedents of publicdeliberation, indeedare discursively
constituted in and through it. However,as JaneMansbridge has argued,
thecivic republicanview containsa veryseriousconfusion, one which
bluntsitscriticaledge.This viewconflatestheideas ofdeliberation and
the commongood by assumingthatdeliberationmustbe deliberation
about the commongood. Consequently, it limitsdeliberationto talk
framedfromthestandpoint of a single,all-encompassing "we," thereby
rulingclaimsof self-interest and groupinterestout of order.Yet, this
worksagainstone of theprincipalaimsof deliberation, namely,helping
participants clarifytheirinterests, evenwhenthoseinterests turnout to
conflict."Rulingself-interest [andgroupinterest] out of ordermakesit
harderforanyparticipant to sortoutwhatis goingon. In particular, the
less powerful maynotfindwaysto discoverthattheprevailingsenseof
"we" does notadequatelyincludethem."33
In general,thereis no waytoknowin advancewhether theoutcomeof
a deliberative process will be thediscovery of a common good in which
conflictsofinterest as
evaporate merely apparent or,rather, thediscovery
thatconflicts ofinterests arerealandthecommongoodis chimerical. But
if theexistenceof a commongoodcannotbe presumedin advance,then
thereis no warrantforputtingany strictures on whatsortsof topics,
interests,andviewsare admissiblein deliberation.34
This argument holdsevenin thebestcase scenarioof societieswhose
basic institutional
frameworks do notgenerate systemic inequalities;even
in suchrelatively egalitarian societies, we cannot assume in advancethat
therewill be no real conflictsof interests. How muchmorepertinent,
then, is the argumentto stratifiedsocieties, which are traversedwith
pervasive relationsof dominanceand subordination.Afterall, when so-
cial arrangementsoperateto the systemicprofitof some groupsof people
and to the systemicdetrimentof others,thereare primafacie reasons for
thinkingthatthe postulationof a commongood sharedby exploitersand

NancyFraser 73
exploitedmay well be a mystification. Moreover,any consensusthat

purports to represent thecommongood in thissocial contextshouldbe
regardedwithsuspicion,since this consensuswill have been reached
through deliberative processestaintedby theeffectsof dominanceand
subordination.
In general,criticaltheory needsto takea harder, morecriticallook at
theterms"private"and "public."These terms,afterall, are notsimply
straightforward designations of societalspheres;theyare culturalclassi-
ficationsand rhetorical labels. In politicaldiscourse,theyare powerful
termsthatare frequently deployedto delegitimate someinterests, views,
and topicsand to valorizeothers.
This bringsme to two othersensesof privacy,whichoftenfunction
ideologicallyto delimittheboundariesof thepublicspherein waysthat
disadvantage subordinate social groups.These are sense5) pertaining to
privateproperty in a market economy;andsense6) pertaining to intimate
domesticorpersonallife,includingsexuallife.Each ofthesesensesis at
the centerof a rhetoricof privacythathas historically been used to
restricttheuniverseof legitimate public contestation.
The rhetoricof domesticprivacyseeks to excludesome issues and
interestsfrompublicdebatebypersonalizing and/orfamilializing them;
it caststheseas private-domestic or personal-familial matters in contra-
distinction topublic,politicalmatters. Therhetoric ofeconomicprivacy,
in contrast,seeksto excludesomeissuesandinterests frompublicdebate
by economizing them;theissuesin questionhereare cast as impersonal
market imperatives oras "private"ownership prerogatives oras technical
problemsformanagersand planners,all in contradistinction to public,
politicalmatters. In bothcases, theresultis to enclavecertainmatters in
specializeddiscursivearenasand therebyto shieldthemfromgeneral
public debateand contestation. This usuallyworksto the advantageof
dominant groups and individuals and to thedisadvantage of theirsubor-
dinates.35If wife for
battering, example, is labelled a "personal"or
"domestic"matterand if public discourseabout this phenomenonis
canalizedintospecializedinstitutions associatedwith,say,familylaw,
social work,and thesociologyand psychology of "deviance,"thenthis
servesto reproducegenderdominanceand subordination. Similarly,if
questionsof workplacedemocracy are labelled"economic"or "manage-
rial" problemsand if discourseabout thesequestionsis shuntedinto
specializedinstitutions associatedwith,say,"industrial relations"sociol-
ogy, labor law, and "management science," then thisservestoperpetuate
class (and usually also genderand race) dominanceand subordination.
This shows once again thatthe liftingof formalrestrictionson public
sphere participationdoes not sufficeto ensure inclusion in practice. On
the contrary,even afterwomen and workershave been formallylicensed
to participate,theirparticipationmay be hedged by conceptions of eco-

74 thePublicSphere
Rethinking
nomicprivacyand domesticprivacythatdelimitthe scope of debate.

These notions,therefore,are vehiclesthrough
whichgenderand class
disadvantages and informally,
maycontinueto operatesubtextually even
afterexplicit,formalrestrictions
havebeenrescinded.
weakpublics:On civilsociety
Strongpublics, andthestate
Let me turnnowto myfourth and last assumption underlying thebour-

geois conception of the public sphere, namely, the assumptionthata
functioning democratic a
publicsphererequires sharpseparation ofcivil
society and the state.This is
assumption susceptible to two different
interpretations,depending on howone understands theexpression"civil
society."If one takes that expression to mean a privately-ordered, capi-
talisteconomy,thento insiston itsseparation fromthestateis to defend
classicalliberalism. The claimwouldbe thata systemoflimitedgovern-
mentand laissez-fairecapitalismis a necessaryprecondition fora well
functioning publicsphere.
We can disposeof this(relativelyuninteresting) claimfairlyquickly
by drawing on some arguments of the previous sections. I have already
shownthatparticipatory parity is essential to a democratic publicsphere
and thatroughsocio-economic equalityis a precondition ofparticipatory
parity.Now I needonlyadd thatlaissez-faire capitalismdoes notfoster
socio-economic equality and that some form of politicallyregulatedeco-
nomicreorganization and redistribution is neededto achievethatend.
Likewise,I have also shownthatefforts to "privatize"economicissues
and to castthemas off-limits withrespectto stateactivity impede,rather
thanpromote, thesortoffullandfreediscussionthatis builtintotheidea
of a public sphere.It followsfromtheseconsiderations thata sharp
of
separation (economic) civil society and the state is not a necessary
conditionfora wellfunctioning publicsphere. On the contrary, andpace
thebourgeoisconception, itis preciselysomesortofinter-imbrication of
theseinstitutions thatis needed.36
However,thereis also a second,moreinteresting, interpretation ofthe
bourgeoisassumption thata sharpseparation ofcivilsocietyandthestate
is necessaryto a workingpublicsphere,one whichwarrants moreex-
tendedexamination.In this interpretation, "civil society"means the
nexusof nongovernmental or "secondary"associationsthatare neither
economic nor administrative. We can best appreciatethe forceof the
claim thatcivil society in thissenseshouldbe separatefromthestateif
we recall Habermas's definitionof the liberalpublic sphereas a "body of
privatepersons assembled to forma public." The emphasis here on "pri-
vate persons" signals (among otherthings)thatthe membersof thebour-
geois public are notstateofficialsand thattheirparticipationin thepublic
sphere is not undertakenin any officialcapacity. Accordingly,theirdis-
course does noteventuatein binding,sovereigndecisions authorizingthe

NancyFraser 75
use of statepower;on thecontrary, it eventuatesin "publicopinion,"

criticalcommentary on authorizeddecision-making thattranspires else-
where.The public sphere,in short,is not the state; it is ratherthe
informally mobilizedbodyof nongovernmental discursiveopinionthat
can serveas a counterweight tothestate.Indeed,inthebourgeoisconcep-
tion,it is preciselythisextragovernmental character ofthepublicsphere
thatconfersan aura of independence, autonomy, legitimacyon the
and
"publicopinion"generated in it.
Thus, the bourgeoisconceptionof the public spheresupposes the
desirability of a sharpseparationof (associational)civil societyand the
state.As a result,it promoteswhatI shall call weakpublics,publics
whosedeliberative practiceconsistsexclusively inopinion-formation and
does notalso encompassdecision-making. Moreover,thebourgeoiscon-
ceptionseems to implythatan expansionof such publics' discursive
authority toencompassdecision-making as wellas opinion-making would
threatenthe autonomyof public opinion-forthenthe public would
effectively becomethestate,and thepossibilityof a criticaldiscursive
checkon thestatewouldbe lost.
That,at least,is suggestedby Habermas'sinitialformulation of the
In
bourgeoisconception. fact,the issue becomesmorecomplicatedas
soon as we considertheemergenceof parliamentary sovereignty. With
thatlandmark development inthehistory ofthepublicsphere,we encoun-
tera majorstructural transformation, since sovereignparliament func-
tionsas a publicspherewithinthestate.Moreover, sovereign parliaments
arewhatI shallcall strong publics,publicswhosediscourseencompasses
bothopinion-formation anddecision-making. As a locus ofpublicdelib-
erationculminating inlegallybindingdecisions(orlaws),parliament was
to be thesite forthediscursiveauthorization of theuse of statepower.
Withthe achievement of parliamentary sovereignty, therefore, theline
separating (associational) civil societyand thestate is blurred.
Clearly,the emergenceof parliamentary sovereignty and the conse-
quentblurring of the(associational)civil society/state separationrepre-
sentsa democratic advanceoverearlierpoliticalarrangements. This is
because, as the terms"strongpublic" and "weak public" suggest,the
"forceof publicopinion"is strengthened whena bodyrepresenting it is
empowered to translate such"opinion" into authoritative decisions. At the
same time,thereremainimportant questions about the relationbetween
parliamentary strongpublics and the weak publics to whichtheyare
supposedto be accountable.In general,thesedevelopments raise some
interestingand importantquestions about therelativemeritsof weak and
strongpublics and about the respective roles that institutionsof both
kinds mightplay in a democraticand egalitariansociety.
One set of questions concerns the possible proliferationof strong
publics in the formof self-managinginstitutions.In self-managedwork-

76 thePublicSphere
Rethinking
places,childcarecenters, orresidential communities, forexample,inter-

nal institutionalpublicspheres could be arenas both of opinionformation
and decision-making. This wouldbe tantamount to constituting sitesof
directorquasi-direct democracy wherein all those engaged in a collective
undertaking wouldparticipate indeliberations todetermine itsdesignand
operation."However, thiswould stillleave the
open relationship between
such internalpublicspheres-cum-decision-making-bodies and thoseex-
ternalpublics to whichtheymightalso be deemedaccountable.The
questionof thatrelationship becomesimportant whenwe considerthat
peoplewhoare affected by an undertaking in whichtheydo notdirectly
participateas agentsmaynonetheless havea stakein itsmodusoperandi;
theytherefore also havea legitimate claimto a say,through someother
(weakeror stronger) publicsphere, in its institutional designand opera-
tion.
Herewe are againbroaching theissueof accountability. Whatinstitu-
tionalarrangements best ensuretheaccountability of democraticdeci-
sion-making bodies(strongpublics)to their(external, weakor,giventhe
of
possibility hybrid cases, weaker ) publics?38 in
Where societyaredirect
democracyarrangements called forand whereare representative forms
moreappropriate? How are theformer best articulated withthelatter?
Moregenerally, whatdemocratic arrangements bestinstitutionalize coor-
dinationamongdifferent institutions, includingamongtheirvariousco-
implicatedpublics?Shouldwe thinkof centralparliament as a strong
super-public with authoritative discursive sovereignty over basic societal
ground rules and coordination arrangements? If so, does that requirethe
of a
assumption singleweak(er) external super-public (in addition to,not
insteadof,variousothersmallerpublics)?In anyevent,giventheines-
capable globalinterdependence manifest in theinternational divisionof
laborwithina singlesharedplanetary biosphere, does it make sense to
understand thenationstateas theappropriate unitof sovereignty?
I do notknowtheanswersto mostofthesequestionsandI am unable
to explorethemfurther in thisessay.However,thepossibility of posing
them,evenin theabsenceoffull,persuasiveanswers,enablesus to draw
one salientconclusion:anyconception of thepublicspherethatrequires
a sharpseparation between(associational)civilsocietyandthestatewill
be unableto imaginetheformsof self-management, inter-public coordi-
nation,andpoliticalaccountability thatare essentialto a democratic and
The
egalitariansociety. bourgeoisconception of the publicsphere, there-
fore,is notadequateforcontemporary criticaltheory.Whatis needed,
rather,is a post-bourgeois conceptionthatcan permitus to envisiona
greaterrole for (at least some) public spheres than mere autonomous
opinion formationremovedfromauthoritativedecision-making.A post-
bourgeois conception would enable us to thinkabout strongand weak
publics, as well as about various hybridforms.In addition,it would allow

NancyFraser 77
us to theorizetherangeofpossiblerelationsamongsuchpublics,thereby
expandingourcapacityto envisiondemocratic possibilitiesbeyondthe
limitsof actuallyexistingdemocracy.
Conclusion: thepublicsphere
Rethinking
Let meconcludebyrecapitulating whatI believeI haveaccomplishedin
this essay. I have shownthatthe bourgeoisconceptionof thepublic
sphere,as describedby Habermas,is notadequateforthecritiqueof the
limitsof actuallyexistingdemocracyin late capitalistsocieties.At one
level,myargument undermines thebourgeoisconceptionas a normative
ideal.I haveshown,first, thatan adequateconception ofthepublicsphere
not the
requires merely bracketing, but ratherthe elimination, of social
inequality. Second,I have shown thata of is
multiplicity publics prefera-
ble to a singlepublicspherebothin stratified societiesand egalitarian
societies.Third,I have shownthata tenableconceptionof thepublic
spherewouldcountenance nottheexclusion,buttheinclusion,of inter-
ests and issues thatbourgeoismasculinist ideologylabels "private"and
treatsas inadmissible. Finally,I haveshownthata defensible conception
wouldallowbothforstrong publicsandforweakpublicsandthatitwould
theorizetherelationsamongthem.In sum,I have arguedagainstfour
constitutiveassumptionsof the bourgeoisconceptionof the public
sphere;at thesametime,I haveidentified somecorresponding elements
of a new,post-bourgeois conception.
Atanotherlevel,myargument enjoinsfourcorresponding taskson the
criticaltheoryof actuallyexistingdemocracy. First,thistheoryshould
rendervisible the ways in whichsocial inequalitytaintsdeliberation
withinpublicsin late capitalistsocieties.Second,it shouldshow how
inequality affectsrelationsamongpublicsin latecapitalistsocieties,how
publics are differentiallyempoweredor segmented, and how some are
involuntarily enclaved and subordinatedto others.Next, a criticaltheory
shouldexposewaysinwhichthelabellingofsomeissuesand interests as
"private" limits the of
range problems, and of to
approaches problems,
thatcan be widelycontestedin contemporary societies.Finally,our
theory should show how the overlyweak characterofsomepublicspheres
in late-capitalistsocietiesdenudes"publicopinion"ofpracticalforce.
In all theseways,thetheoryshouldexposethelimitsof thespecific
formofdemocracy we enjoyin contemporary capitalistsocieties.Perhaps
it can thereby helpinspireus to tryto pushbackthoselimits,whilealso
cautioningpeople in otherpartsof theworldagainstheedingthecall to
install them.
Notes
withpermission
1. ONancy Fraser.Reprinted fromHabermasand thePublic Sphere,ed. Craig
Calhoun(CambridgeMA: M.I.T.Press,1991).1am grateful
forhelpfulcomments
fromCraigCalhoun,
JoshuaCohen,TomMcCarthy, MoishePostone,BaukjePrins,DavidSchweikart,
andRianVoet.I also

78 thePublicSphere
Rethinking
benefitted fromtheinspiration andstimulation ofparticipants intheconference on "Habermasandthe

PublicSphere,"University ofNorthCarolina,ChapelHill,September 1989.
2. JiirgenHabermas,TheStructural Transformation ofthePublicSphere:AnInquiryintoa Category
ofBourgeoisSociety,tr.ThomasBurgerwithFrederick Lawrence(Cambridge MA: TheM. I. T. Press,
1989).ForHabermas'slateruse ofthecategory ofthepublicsphere,see Jiirgen Habermas, TheTheory
ofCommunicative Action,vol2, Lifeworld andSystem: A CritiqueofFunctionalist Reason,tr.Thomas
McCarthy(Boston:BeaconPress,1987).Fora iticalsecondary discussionofHabermas'slateruse of
theconcept,see NancyFraser,"What'sCriticalaboutCriticalTheory?The Case of Habermasand
Gender,in Fraser,UnrulyPractices:Power,Discourseand Genderin Contemporary Social Theory
(University ofMinnesotaPress,1989).
3. Throughout thispaper,I referto paid workplaces, markets, creditsystems, etc.as "official-eco-
nomicsysteminstitutions" so as toavoidtheandrocentric implication thatdomesticinstitutions arenot
also "economic."For a discussionof thisissue,see NancyFraser,"What'sCriticalAboutCritical
Theory?The Case ofHabermasandGender,"op. cit.
4. JoanLandes,Women and thePublicSphereintheAgeoftheFrenchRevolution (IthacaNY: Cornell
University Press,1988).
5. For the"public"/'pubic" connection, see theOxfordEnglishDictionary(secondedition,1989),
entry for"public."Forthe"testimony"/"testicle" connection see LucieWhite,"Subordination, Rhetor-
ical SurvivalSkillsandSundayShoes:NotesontheHearingofMrs.G.,"Buffalo Law Review,vol. 38,
no. 1 (Winter1990)p. 6.
6. PierreBourdieu,Distinction: A Social CritiqueoftheJudgment ofPure Taste(Cambridge, MA:
HarvardUniversity Press,1979).
7' GeoffEley, "Nations,Publics,and PoliticalCultures:PlacingHabermasin the Nineteenth
Century," in Habermasand thePublic Sphere,ed. CraigCalhoun.See also LeonoreDavidoffand
Catherine Hall,FamilyFortunes:Men and WomenoftheEnglishMiddleClass, 1780-1850(Chicago:
The University ofChicagoPress,1987).
8. Habermasdoesrecognize thattheissueofgenderexclusionis connected toa shift fromaristocratic
to bourgeoispublicspheres,but,as I arguebelow,he failsto noticethefullimplications of this
recognition.
9. I do notmeanto suggestthatHabermasis unawareoftheexistenceofpublicspheresotherthan
thebourgeoisone;onthecontrary, inthe"Preface"toStructural Transformation (p. xviii),he explicitly
statesthathisobjectis theliberalmodelofthebourgeois publicsphereandthattherefore he willdiscuss
neither "theplebeianpublicsphere"(whichhe understands as an ephemeral phenomenon thatexisted
"forjust one moment"duringthe FrenchRevolution)nor "the plebiscitary-acclamatory formof
regimented publicspherecharacterizing dictatorships in highlydevelopedindustrial societies."My
pointis that,althoughHabermasacknowledges thattherewerealternative publicspheres, he assumes
thatitis possibletounderstand thecharacter ofthebourgeois publicbylookingat italone,inisolation
fromits relationsto other,competingpublics.This assumption is problematic. In fact,as I shall
demonstrate, an examination ofthebourgeois public'srelations toalternativecounterpublics challenges
thebourgeoisconception ofthepublicsphere.
10. MaryP. Ryan,Women inPublic:BetweenBannersandBallots,1825-1880(Baltimore: TheJohn
HopkinsUniversity Press,1990) and "Genderand PublicAccess: Women'sPoliticsin Nineteenth
Century America,"inHabermasand thePublicSphere,ed. CraigCalhoun.
11. GeoffEley,"Nations,Publics,and PoliticalCultures."
12. GeoffEley,"Nations,Publics,andPoliticalCultures."
13. I am leavingaside whetherone shouldspeak here not of consenttoutcourtbut ratherof
"something approaching consent," or"something appearing as consent," or"something constructedas
consent"in orderto leave openthepossibility ofdegreesofconsent.
14. The publicsphereproducesconsentvia circulation of discoursesthatconstruct the"common
sense"ofthedayandrepresent theexisting orderas natural and/or just,butnotsimplyas a rusethatis
imposed.Rather, thepublicspherein itsmatureformincludessufficient participation and sufficient
representation ofmultiple interestsandperspectives topermit mostpeoplemostofthetimetorecognize
themselvesin itsdiscourses.People who are ultimately disadvantaged by thesocial construction of
consentnonetheless manageto findin thediscoursesof thepublicsphererepresentations of their
interests,aspirations,life-problems, andanxietiesthatarecloseenoughtoresonate withtheirownlived
self-representations, identities,and feelings.Theirconsentto hegemonicruleis securedwhentheir
culturally constructed perspectives are takenup and articulated withotherculturally constructed
perspectives inhegemonic socio-political projects.
15. HereI wantto distancemyselffroma certainoverlyfacileline of argument thatis sometimes
madeagainstHabermas.Thisis thelinethatideologicalfunctions ofthepublicspheresinclasssocieties
simplyundermine thenormative notionas an ideal.ThisI taketobe a nonsequitur, sinceitis always
possibleto replythatunderotherconditions, say,theabolitionofclasses,genders, andotherpervasive
axes of inequality, the publicspherewouldno longerhave thisfunction, butwouldinsteadbe an
institutionalization of democratic interaction. Moreover, as Habermashas himselfoftenpointedout,
even in existingclass societies,thesignificance of thepublicsphereis notentirely exhaustedby its
class function. On thecontrary, theidea ofthepublicspherealso functions hereandnowas a normnn of
democratic interaction we use tocriticizethelimitations ofactuallyexistingpublicspheres.The point

NancyFraser 79
hereis thateventherevisionist storyandtheGramscian theory thatcauseus to doubtthevalueofthe

publicspherearethemselves onlypossiblebecauseofit.Itis theideaofthepublicspherethatprovides
theconceptualcondition ofpossibility fortherevisionist critiqueofitsimperfect realization.
16. JaneMansbridge, "FeminismandDemocracy," TheAmerican Prospect,no. 1 (Spring1990)p.
127.
17. In Distinction PierreBourdieuhas theorized theseprocessesin an illuminating wayin termsof
theconceptof"classhabitus."
18. As Habermasnotes,thistendency is exacerbated withtheconcentration ofmediaownership in
latecapitalist societies.Forthesteepincreaseinconcentration intheU.S. in thelatetwentieth century,
see Ben H. Bagdikian,TheMediaMonopoly(Boston:BeaconPress,1983).Thissituation contrastsin
somerespectswithcountries withstate-owned andoperatedtelevision.Buteventhereit is doubtful
thatsubordinated groupshave equal access. Moreover,political-economic pressureshave recently
encouragedprivatization ofmediain severalofthesecountries. In part,thisreflects theproblemsof
statenetworks havingto competefor"market share"withprivatechannelsairingU.S. producedmass
entertainment.
19. This is thespiritbehind,forexample,proposalsforelectoralcampaignfinancing reforms aimed
at preventing theintrusion of economicdominanceintothepublicsphere.Needlessto say,withina
contextof massivesocietalinequality, it is farbetterto have such reforms thannotto have them.
However,in lightof thesortsof informal effects of dominanceand inequality discussedabove,one
oughtnotto expecttoomuchfromthem.Themostthoughtful recentdefenseoftheliberalviewcomes
fromsomeonewhoinotherrespects is nota liberal.See MichaelWalzer,SpheresofJustice: A Defense
ofPluralismandEquality(New York:Basic Books,1983).Another veryinteresting approachhasbeen
suggested byJoshuaCohen.In response toan earlierdraft ofthisessay,hearguedthatpoliciesdesigned
to facilitate theformation of social movements, secondaryassociations, and politicalpartieswould
better foster participatoryparity thanwouldpoliciesdesignedtoachievesocialequality, sincethelatter
would requireredistributive efforts thatcarry"deadweight losses." I certainly supportthe sortof
policiesthatCohenrecommends, as wellas hismoregeneralaimofan "associativedemocracy"--the
sectionsof thispaperon multiplepublicsand strongpublicsmakea case forrelatedarrangements.
However,I am notpersuadedbytheclaimthatthesepoliciescan achieveparticipatory parityunder
conditions ofsocialinequality. Thatseemstomebe another variant oftheliberalviewoftheautonomy
of thepolitical,whichCohenotherwise claimsto reject.See JoshuaCohen,"Commentson Nancy
Fraser's'Rethinking thePublicSphere,"'(unpublished manuscript presented at themeetingsof the
AmericanPhilosophical Association, CentralDivision,New Orleans,April1990).
20. My argument drawson KarlMarx'sstillunsurpassed critiqueofliberalismin PartI of"On the
JewishQuestion."Hence,theallusionto Marxinthetitleofthisessay.
21. My argument is thissectionis deeplyindebtedto JoshuaCohen'sperceptive comments on an
earlierdraftofthispaperin"Comments on NancyFraser's'Rethinking thePublicSphere."'
22. I havecoinedthisexpression bycombining twotermsthatothertheorists haverecently usedwith
verygoodeffects forpurposesthatareconsonant withmyown.I taketheterm"subaltem"fromGayatri
Spivak,"Can theSubaltern Speak?"inMarxismand theInterpretation ofCulture, ed. CaryNelsonand
LarryGrossberg (Chicago:University ofIllinoisPress,1988)pp.271-313.I taketheterm"counterpub-
lic" fromRitaFelski,BeyondFeminist Aesthetics (Cambridge MA: HarvardUniversity Press,1989).
23. Foran analysisofthepoliticalimport ofoppositionalfeminist discourses aboutneeds,see Nancy
Fraser, "Struggle overNeeds:Outlineofa Socialist-feminist CriticalTheoryofLate-Capitalist Political
Culture," in Fraser,UnrulyPractices.
24. GeoffEley,"Nations,Publics,and PoliticalCultures."Eley goes on to explainthatthisis
tantamount to"extend[ing] Habermas'sideaofthepublicspheretowardthewiderpublicdomainwhere
authority is notonlyconstituted as rational andlegitimate, butwhereitstermsarecontested, modified,
andoccasionallyoverthrown bysubaltemgroups."
25. It seemstomethatpublicdiscursive arenasareamongthemostimportant andunder-recognized
sitesin whichsocial identities are constructed, deconstructed, and reconstructed. My view standsin
contrast tovariouspsychoanalytic accountsofidentity formation, whichneglecttheformative impor-
tanceof post-Oedipaldiscursiveinteraction outsidethenuclearfamilyand whichtherefore cannot
explainidentity shiftsovertime.It strikes me as unfortunate thatso muchof contemporary feminist
theory has takenitsunderstanding of socialidentity frompsychoanalytic models,whileneglecting to
studyidentity construction in relationto publicspheres.The revisionist historiography ofthepublic
spherediscussedearliercan helpredressthebalanceby identifying publicspheresas loci ofidentity
reconstruction. Foran accountofthediscursive characterof socialidentity anda critiqueofpsychoan-
alyticapproachto identity see NancyFraser,"The Uses andAbusesofFrenchDiscourseTheoriesfor
FeministPolitics,"Boundary 2, vol. 17,no. 2 (1990).
26. Foranother statement ofthisposition, see NancyFraser, "Towarda DiscourseEthicofSolidarity,"
PraxisInternational, vol. 5, no. 4 (January 1986)pp. 425-429.See also IrisYoung,"Impartiality and
theCivicPublic:SomeImplications ofFeminist CritiquesofMoralandPoliticalTheory"inFeminism
as Critique,ed. SeylaBenhabibandDrucillaComrnell (Minneapolis: TheUniversity ofMinnesota Press,
1987) pp.56-76.

80 thePublicSphere
Rethinking
27. Foran analysisoftherhetorical specificity ofonehistorical publicsphere,see MichaelWarner,

The Lettersof theRepublic:Publicationand thePublic Spherein Eighteenth CenturyAmerica
(Cambridge MA: HarvardUniversity Press,forthcoming).
28. One could say thatat thedeepestlevel,everyoneis mestizo.The bestmetaphor heremaybe
Wittgenstein's ideaoffamnily resemblances, ornetworks ofcriss-crossing, overlapping differences and
similarities, no singlethreadof whichrunscontinuously throughout thewhole.For an accountthat
stressesthecomplexity of culturalidentities and thesalienceof discoursein theirconstruction, see
NancyFraser,"TheUsesandAbusesofFrenchDiscourseTheoriesforFeminist Politics."Foraccounts
thatdraw on conceptsof mdtissage,see Gloria Anzaldda,Borderlands:La Frontera(1987) and
FrangoiseLionnet,Autobiographical Voices:Race, Gender,Self-Portraiture (Ithaca NY: Comell
University Press,1989).
29. Intheserespects, theconceptofa publicdiffers from thatofa community. "Community" suggests
a boundedand fairlyhomogeneous group,and it oftenconnotesconsensus."Public,"in contrast,
emphasizes discursive interaction that is in principle unbounded and open-ended, and this in turn
impliesa plurality of perspectives. Thus,theidea of a public,betterthanthatof a community, can
accommodate internaldifferences, antagonisms, anddebates.Foran accountoftheconnection between
publicity andplurality,seeHannahArendt, TheHumanCondition (Chicago:TheUniversity ofChicago
Press,1958).Fora critiqueoftheconceptofcommunity, see IrisYoung,"TheIdealofCommunity and
the Politicsof Difference" in Feminismand Postmodernism, ed. Linda J. Nicholson(New York:
Routledge, ChapmanandHall, 1989)pp. 300-323.
30. In thisessay,I do notdirectly discusssense1) state-related. However,inthenextsectionofthis
essayI considersomeissuesthattouchonthatsense.
31. This is theequivalentin democratic theoryof a pointthatPaul Feyerabend has arguedin the
philosophy ofscience.See Feyerabend, AgainstMethod(New York:Verso,1988).
32. In contrast, the liberal-individualist model stressesa view of politicsas the aggregation of
self-interested, individualpreferences. Deliberation in thestrictsensedropsoutaltogether. Instead,
politicaldiscourseconsistsinregistering individual preferences andinbargaining, lookingforformulas
thatsatisfy as manyprivateinterests as possible.Itis assumedthatthereis nosuchthingas thecommon
good overand above thesum of all thevariousindividualgoods,and so privateinterests are the
legitimate stuffofpoliticaldiscourse.
33. JaneMansbridge, "Feminism andDemocracy," p. 131.
34. This point,incidentally, is in thethespiritof a morerecentstrandof Habermas'snormative
thought, whichstresses theprocedural, as opposedtothesubstantive, definitionofa democratic public
sphere;here,thepublicsphereis defined as an arenafora certain typeofdiscursive interaction,notas
an arenafordealingwithcertaintypesoftopicsandproblems. Thereareno restrictions, therefore, on
whatmaybecomea topicofdeliberation. See SeylaBenhabib'saccountofthisradicalproceduralist
strandof Habermas'sthought andherdefenseof it as thestrandthatrendershis view of thepublic
spheresuperior toalternative views.Benhabib, "ModelsofPublicSpace: HannahArendt, theLiberal
Tradition, andJiirgen Habermas," inHabermasand thePublicSphere,ed. CraigCalhoun.
35. Usually,butnotalways.As JoshCohenhas argued,exceptions aretheuses ofprivacyinRoe v.
Wade,the U.S. SupremeCourtdecisionlegalizingabortion, and in JusticeBlackmun'sdissentin
Bowers,thedecisionupholding stateanti-sodomy laws.Theseexamplesshowthattheprivacyrhetoric
is multivalent rather thanunivocally andnecessarily harmful. On theotherhand,thereis no question
butthatthe weightier tradition of privacyargument has buttressed inequality by restrictingdebate.
Moreover, manyfeminists havearguedthateventhe"good"privacyuseshavesomeseriousnegative
consequencesin thecurrent context andthatgenderdomination is betterchallengedinthiscontexton
otherdiscursivegrounds.Fora defenseof "privacy"talk,see JoshuaCohen,"Comments on Nancy
Fraser's'Rethinking thePublicSphere."'
36. Therearemanypossibilities here,including suchmixedformsas market socialism.
37. I use theexpression "quasi-direct democracy" inordertosignalthepossibility ofhybrid formsof
self-management involving the democratic of
designation representatives, managers, orplanners held
to strictstandards ofaccountability through, forexample,recall.
38. Byhybrid possibilitiesI meanarrangements involving verystrict ofrepresentative
accountability
decision-making bodiestotheir external publicsthrough vetoandrecallrights. Suchhybrid forms might
in some,thoughcertainly notall, circumstances be desirable.


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Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy

Author(s): Nancy Fraser

This content downloaded from 138.87.151.140 on Wed, 9 Oct 2013 17:51:08 PM

Todayin theU.S. we heara greatdeal ofballyhooabout"thetriumph of

This content downloaded from 138.87.151.140 on Wed, 9 Oct 2013 17:51:08 PM

timesin contemporary feminisms. I meana confusionthatinvolvesthe

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Let me remindyou thatthesubtitleofStructuralTransformation

Let mebeginbysketching somehighlights ofHabermas'saccountofthe

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Thus,at one level,theidea of thepublicspheredesignatedan institu-

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tionscan be gaugedin theetymological connection between"public"and

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bourgeois,competing publicspheres.Orrather, it is preciselybecausehe

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study.The exclusionsandconflictsthatappearedas accidentaltrappings

This content downloaded from 138.87.151.140 on Wed, 9 Oct 2013 17:51:08 PM

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bodies: mentendto interrupt womenmorethanwomeninterrupt men;

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So farI have been discussing what we mightcall "intrapublicrelations,"

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publicsphere.Now I wantto considerwhatwe mightcall "interpublic

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thatmaskdomination by "absorbingtheless powerfulintoa false 'we'

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"thepublic-at-large." The pointis that,in stratified societies,subaltern

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formofexpression. Rather,as I arguedin theprevioussection,participa-

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verge,evenwhenit is thedivergences thatare mostsalient.28

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sensesofprivacyandpublicity inplayhere."Publicity," forexample,can

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promotea commongood thattranscendsthe meresum of individual

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exploitedmay well be a mystification. Moreover,any consensusthat

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nomicprivacyand domesticprivacythatdelimitthe scope of debate.

Let me turnnowto myfourth and last assumption underlying thebour-

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use of statepower;on thecontrary, it eventuatesin "publicopinion,"

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places,childcarecenters, orresidential communities, forexample,inter-

This content downloaded from 138.87.151.140 on Wed, 9 Oct 2013 17:51:08 PM

This content downloaded from 138.87.151.140 on Wed, 9 Oct 2013 17:51:08 PM

benefitted fromtheinspiration andstimulation ofparticipants intheconference on "Habermasandthe

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hereis thateventherevisionist storyandtheGramscian theory thatcauseus to doubtthevalueofthe

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27. Foran analysisoftherhetorical specificity ofonehistorical publicsphere,see MichaelWarner,

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