Is Alvin Plantingas Free Will Defence a satisfying response to David

Humes formulation of The Epicurean Paradox?

In 1779, David Hume questioned how it could be that an all-powerful and all-

loving God allows evil to exist in the world as this is surely in some way

contradictory to His nature. Hume concluded that as one cannot deny the

existence of evil in the world, it logically follows that one must instead accept

that the traditional monotheistic concept of God is false. Whilst this argument

succeeded unscathed for centuries, the contempory philosopher Alvin

Plantinga is seen by many to have successful solved the problem. Plantinga

argues that it can still be logical to ascribe infinitely divine properties to God; if

one accepts that evil is the result of human freewill which we all possess as

a result of Gods benevolent creation. I will seek to outline the problem

formulated by Hume, and Plantingas subsequent response; before analysing

the Freewill Defence in light of criticism by J.L. Mackie and myself, then I shall

ultimately conclude that the Defence is not a satisfactory response to Humes

formulation of the Epicurean paradox.

In Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, David Hume rearticulated a

problem first outlined by Epicurus circa 300 BCE.1 In a discussion regarding

the nature of evil, the character Philo challenges his peer Cleanthes to explain

how an omnipotent and omnibenevolent creator could allow the existence of

evil in the world. Philo asks: Is he willing to prevent evil but not able? Then is

he impotent. Is he able but not willing? Then is he malevolent. Is he both able

and willing? Whence then is the evil?2 Hume uses his character Philo to

outline what he sees as a logical contradiction in the theistic interpretation of

divine properties. Monotheistic theologians traditionally characterise God as

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possessing such properties as omniscience, omnipotence and

omnibenevolence.3 However, it seems that the latter two of these properties

form a contradiction when one considers the existence of evil in the world. If

God is all-powerful, then He must hold dominion over all of creation, will all

events and be able to perform any action. If God is all-loving, then He must

love all within creation, wish only good for them and care for them as much as

possible. However, for these two properties to logically coexist, the world

would have to be a place wherein God uses his infinite power to show infinite

love for humanity. Yet, this is clearly not the case, as innumerable evils are

constantly enacted upon the human race, causing us to suffer and experience

pain. As Demea colourfully illustrates in the Dialogues: Entrance into life

gives anguish to the newborn infant and its wretched parent. Weakness,

impotence and distress attend each stage of that life; and it is at last finished

in agony and horror.4

Humes outlining of the Epicurean paradox poses a great problem for the

monotheist. How can one successfully defend the idea of an omnipotent and

omnibenevolent God in the light of evil? As it is a certain a posteriori truth that

evil exists in the world, a monotheist must surely therefore concede that God

is either indifferent to human suffering or incapable of preventing it. This

problem is made even more difficult when one considers the sheer scale of

evil that exists. Why would an all-powerful and all-loving God allow the spread

of The Black Death, and fail to intervene in The Holocaust? The character

Cleanthes attempts to respond to Philos assertions in the Dialogues, by

arguing that the quantity of good outweighs that of evil. He claims that:

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[Philos] representations are exaggerated Health is more common than

sickness, pleasure more common than pain.5 Whilst Philo outwardly rejects

Cleanthes claim, instead favouring the view that nature is a constant struggle

between predator and prey, he does entertain the possibility for a moment.

Philo postulates: Even allowing what will never be believed Why is there

any misery at all in the world, then? Not by chance surely. From some cause

then. Is it from the intention of the Deity?6 Through Philo, Hume outlines here

the central question posed by the Epicurean paradox in regard to evil. What is

the cause of suffering, if not God?

The contempory philosopher Alvin Plantinga sought to provide an alternative

answer to Humes question. In God, Freedom and Evil, Plantinga outlines how

God does not directly cause the evil in the world, but that it is instead a result

of human freewill.7 Plantinga attempts to explain why evil exists in the world,

whilst still maintaining the traditional monotheistic concept of God, and thus

illustrates his position under the assumption that God is omnipotent and

omnibenevolent. He argues that a world created by God in which people have

freewill is more loving than a world in which they do not. Plantinga postulates

that in order for people to be free, God cannot casually determine them to

perform good actions as this would undermine their freedom. Therefore, to

create creatures capable of moral good, He must create creatures capable of

moral evil; and He can't give these creatures the freedom to perform evil and

at the same time prevent them from doing so.8 Plantinga explains the moral

evil in the world as a result of where sadly enough, some of the free

creatures God created went wrong in the exercise of their freedom.9 He thus

concludes that his explanation of evil dodges the Epicurean paradox as: the

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fact that free creatures sometimes go wrong counts neither against God's

omnipotence nor against His goodness; for He could have forestalled the

occurrence of moral evil only by removing the possibility of moral good.10

Plantingas Freewill Defence attempts to justify the existence of evil by

appealing to the consequences of the divine characteristics of

omnibenevolence and omnipotence. First, he argues that humans have the

freewill to choose to do evil as a result of Gods all-loving nature. Whilst it

would have been benevolent for God to create a perfect world in which no

person harms another, such a determined world would not be as virtuous as

the imperfect world we inhabit, in which people are free to choose between

committing good or evil. He therefore sees freewill as the ultimate good,

overriding any evil that humans may choose to perform. Second, Plantinga

seeks to clarify the definition of Gods omnipotence, in order to explain why

the creation of a world in which people always choose to do good is

impossible. He argues that God is all-powerful in the sense that he can do

anything that is logically possible. However, there exists a logical contradiction

in the actualisation of a world in which people only freely choose to do good.

For if it was the case that God used His infinite power to create a world where

people always chose to do good, he would not be omnibenevolent as He

would be depriving them of the gift of freewill. God could not have

actualised worlds containing moral good but no evil11

Plantinga therefore concludes that the existence of evil in a world created by

an omnipotent, omnibenevolent God is possible; as God can only actualise

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logically possible worlds and it would be impossible for creatures in our world

not to have freewill, as this is the greatest good that his omnibenevolence

gives us. Thus, evil is not directly caused by God - but is rather a by-product

of the gift of human freewill.

Although many philosophers consider Plantingas Freewill Defence a

successful response to the Epicurean paradox, I feel that the Defence is

unsatisfactory due to its limited scope in addressing metaphysical challenges,

as well as Plantingas preconceptions regarding the nature of divine

properties being ill thought out. Firstly though, I would like to briefly address a

problem regarding the Freewill Defences inability to successfully explain

natural evil.

Whilst Plantinga posits a possible solution to the moral evil implied by the

Epicurean paradox he fails to illustrate why an omnipotent and

omnibenevolent God would allow the sort of pain described by Demea in

Dialogues, as mentioned above. How can human freewill be responsible for

the suffering caused by disease, disability and natural disasters? Especially

considering that natural evils inflict most upon those without freewill. Most

nonhuman animals will suffer grievous amounts of pain without the ability to

make a free choice. Countless human infants have been born with disabilities,

illnesses or die in childbirth. How can Plantinga explain such pain as the result

of free human action? His only attempts to address such concerns are as

callous and unsympathetic as they are philosophically dissatisfactory. He first

implies that the suffering caused by natural disasters is the fault of those living

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in danger zones by commenting: earthquakes, tidal waves, and virulent

diseases are evils that result from human stupidity.12 He then invokes St.

Augustine to argue that: Satan rebelled against God and has since been

wreaking whatever havoc he can... So the natural evil we find is due to free

actions of nonhuman spirits.13 In attempting to quell the problem of natural

evil, Plantinga instead endorses a proposition that does not only support

Humes position, by supposing the existence of a wholly malicious being that

God cannot subdue; but also raises several metaphysical questions regarding

the nature of nonhuman, nonphysical moral agents that Plantinga fails to

address.

A further metaphysical concern with the Freewill Defence is its inherent

incompatibilism. As mentioned above, Plantinga seems to assume an freewill

and determinism are necessarily incompatible. Whilst it is possible that God

cannot determine us to freely choose to do good, Plantinga fails to

convincingly argue that compatibilism is necessarily false. This causes a

problem for the Freewill Defence, as several philosophers, such as J.L.

Mackie, have argued for the possible compatibility of freewill and determinism.

Moreover, in Evil and Omnipotence, Mackie argues that if it is logically

possible for freewill and determinism to be compatible a claim that Plantinga

fails to refute then there cannot be a logical impossibility in [humans] freely

choosing the good on every occasion, there was open to [God] the obviously

better possibility of making beings who would act freely but always go right.14

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Mackies point here also raises an interesting question to do with Plantingas

conception of Gods omnipotence. In God, Freedom and Evil, Plantinga

argues that it would have been logically impossible for God to have created a

world wherein people only chose to do good. Yet, this seems a somewhat

unsatisfactory proposition considering that traditional monotheistic theology

teaches that God created the world ex nihilo. If one regards Gods

omnipotence as constrained by logic, then by whom was logic created?

Surely, if God created the world from nothing, there must not have been

previous logical rules to obey. Plantingas claim that it was logically impossible

for God to have created a world in which people chose to only do good

therefore seems to undermine Gods omnipotence and thus fails to solve

the Epicurean paradox. As Mackie states: [Gods] failure to avail Himself of

this possibility is inconsistent with His being both omnipotent and wholly

good.15

Mackie develops this point further by querying that if Plantinga views the

concept of a world where people always choose to freely do good as absurd,

and not a truly free world, what is it then that constitutes freedom? If it is that

the making of some wrong choices is logically necessary for freedom, it would

seem that [human] choices and consequent actions can be free only if they

are not determined by their characters.16 To clarify Mackies point, he is

asking us here to consider a world in which all people are created morally

good, and so always freely choose to help one another and not cause

suffering. Mackie argues that there is no logical contradiction implied by such

a possible world, and if one believes that such a world would be devoid of

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freedom, then they are classifying freedom merely as the chance that

someone may go wrong. Mackie furthers this point by asking: What value or

merit would there be in free choices if [they] were random actions which were

not determined by the nature of the agent?17 However, I wish to develop this

argument in different way. For if one defends Plantingas view, and the

consequence that evil actions are either a result of a persons character or of

chance, then does this not lay the blame for evil with God?

The classical monotheistic concept, which Plantinga seeks to defend, defines

God as an omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent being who created the

world ex nihilo. Yet, if evil is a result of a persons character, then was that

person not created by an omniscient God who, at the point of creation,

already knew everything that person would think and do? I am not attempting

to form an argument for the compatibilism of freewill and determinism, but

merely seek to question the consequences that belief in an omniscient creator

would have on the nature and origin of moral evil. If one assumes that God is

all-knowing, then He must have known at the point of creation the consequent

repercussions of every action that every person would ever freely choose to

do. Plantingas argument that freewill was Gods greatest gift, and one that

does not contradict any of his other divine properties therefore seems flawed

as does his preconception that incompatibilism is logically necessary. As if

God is truly omniscient, He must necessarily know every action people will

perform before they even make a decision. Simply put, for any action P, a

person has the choice to P or to P. However, if God were omniscient, He

would know before the person chose exactly which option they would pick.

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Due to the nature of omniscience, it would not only be logically impossible for

God to know a falsehood, as then he would not know all truths, but it would

also be logically impossible for the moral agent to P, as such an action would

make Gods knowledge fallible. Thus, returning to Mackies previous criticism,

one cannot coherently defend Plantingas claim that freewill entails the

possibility to choose between right and wrong as if one accepts Gods

omniscience one must also accept that it is logically impossible for an agent to

choose to perform any action other than that which God has known they will

perform since the point of creation.

This objection has even more salience when considered alongside the divine

properties of omnipotence and omnibenevolence. If it is logically necessary

that we choose to do what an omniscient God knows we will do, is it not also

the case that an omnipotent God would be willing us to carry out such an

action? For if God were truly omnipotent, and knew all we would do, He must

surely also be willing us to carry out what he knows will occur otherwise he

would not be all-powerful. Yet, surely a God who wills evil cannot be

omnibenevolent? Conversely, if God were omnibenevolent, and knew all the

evil that humans were going to choose to carry out surely he must not have

the power to prevent or change the actions his knowledge necessarily

determines we will perform? He therefore cannot be omnipotent.

Gods knowledge of human action must therefore either result in God knowing

and willing the evils humans perform, and not caring about the suffering they

will cause; or lovingly knowing the evils we will perform, and not being able to

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prevent them. I can therefore only conclude that Plantingas Freewill Defence

is an unsatisfactory response to Humes formulation of the problem of evil.

Whilst it may seem to provide an alternative answer to the initial logical

problem, the repercussions of Plantingas position only lead to the creation of

another logical problem regarding Gods omniscience and its relation to an

persons free choice to commit evil. Considering his further inability to account

for natural evil, his lack of a convincing proof of the necessity of

incompatibilism, and his lackluster definition of freewill, Plantingas Freewill

Defence cannot be considered a satisfying response to Humes formulation of

the Epicurean paradox.

References:

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1. John Hospers, An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis (London, 1990)

p.310

2. David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (New York, 1989) p.84

3. Graham Oppy and Michael Scott, Reading Philosophy of Religion (Sussex,

2010) p.237

4. Hume, Dialogues, p.80

5. Hume, Dialogues, p.86

6. Hume, Dialogues, p.87

7. Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom and Evil (New York, 2002) pp.29-34

8. Plantinga, God, p.30

9. Plantinga, God, p.30

10. Plantinga, God, p.30

11. Plantinga, God, p.45

12. Plantinga, God, p.8

13. Plantinga, God, p.58

14. J.L. Mackie, Evil and Omnipotence, Mind 254 (1955), p.209

15. Mackie, Evil and Omnipotence, p.209

16. Mackie, Evil and Omnipotence, p.209

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17. Mackie, Evil and Omnipotence, p.209

Word Count: 2,669

Bibliography:

Hospers, John. An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis (London, 1990)

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Hume, David. Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (New York, 1989)

Mackie, J.L. Evil and Omnipotence, Mind 254 (1955) pp.200-212

Oppy, Graham. Scott, Michael. Reading Philosophy of Religion (Sussex,

2010)

Plantinga, Alvin. God, Freedom and Evil (New York, 2002)

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