The present text is a critical sum up of the course Logica y Lenguaje taught by

Porfessor Juan Barba for the inter-university Spanish Master in Logica y Filosofa
de la Ciencia during the academic year 2015-2016. In the first part I will discuss
the themes and the related ideas that arose during the presential lessons in Sala-
manca, in the October of 2015. In the second part I will briefly discuss the subjects
of the articles written for the course and the sparks came out in the scholar forum
with my fellow students.

Montagues semantics, Generalized Quantifiers, Cate-

gorial Grammar
The basic theme throughout the course was to analyzed natural language with
logical tools and to study the resulting formal language from different prospectives.
We have seen Montague formal semantics: every sentence has a (unique) struc-
ture given by recursive laws; the meaning of a sentence coincides with its structure;
a structure coincides with a model and an interpretation over the model. We have
discussed its advantages, for example is now easy to obtain a recursive function to
let us decide whether a formula is true or not in a model, or whether a formula is
well formed or not, yet we have encountered few limitations: fails in recognizing
contradictions and it is not able to formulate passive forms.
Montagues intensional grammar is based on Kripkes notion of possible world.
While usual semantics, those founded on first order predicate calculus, can at most
express the extension of words, an intensional semantics can specify also its inten-
sion, the internal content of a term or concept that constitutes its formal definition.
The intension of a word, or expression, is defined as a function that results in the
extension of the same word in any possible world. For instance, expression like
the elephant flies or The actual king of Italy in a conventional semantics would
be regarded as impossible or at least vague. An intensional semantics establishes,
instead, that their extensions in the real world is the same (it is the value 0), but
that it could be otherwise in other possible worlds. Therefore, such a semantics,
can grab the difference of meaning of expressions that can not be depicted by an
extensional semantics.
On the other hand, intensional semantics fails in distinguishing contradictions,

1
because on this perspective every contradictions has the same meaning (squared
circle, dark light, etc...)
In general terms, an intensional logic expression is a function of function, in
turn function of functions and there are not limits to its embedding and nesting.
For example, take the verb to be: it is defined as a function from the set of possible
worlds, at a specific time, to the set of entities, and equivalently in a function from
the set of possible world, at a specific time, into a set of (other) possible worlds,
at (another) specific time, which is again a function to the set of entities, into
the set of truth values. Hence Montagues grammar is one of the first practical
attempts to calculate higher order predicate. Its effect is to maintain constant
the extension of the description but constantly increasing its intension. The order
of the predicate calculus on which we rely establish the degree of comprehension
reached, for those predicates. Take for example the predicate to not exist: it
describes something, but a predicate of this predicate could precise it could exist,
or even under which circumstances. Every order refines the level of knowledge.
To solve the issues of passive forms (it is clear that in natural language P
knows M and M is known by P are equivalent) we have then used the abstractor
lambda. Adopting the tool of generalized quantifier to express nominal sintagmas
we arrived to generate a significant fragment of Spanish language. A generalized
quantifier corresponds to a set of subsets, in the sense that it associates a truth
value to every subset of a set of properties.
Standard quantifiers of first order predicate logic are related to sentences such
as the following:
(x)(John loves x)
However, it is still possible to reinterpret the predicates as expressions denoting
properties of set of individuals. Let express the property of a set to be not empty
and express the property denoting the whole domain D (equivalent to say the
set of all elements). They became now unary predicates of type << e, t >, t >, to
which we can apply a predicate of type < e, t > to obtain a well formed sentences
of type < t >. Example:

= f D<e,t> .{x : f (x) = 1} =

6 (f characterizes a non-empty set)

2
 (x.John loves x) = 1 iff {x :John loves(x) = 1} =
6

Following this approach the standard quantifiers are of the same logical type of
generalized quantifiers. It remains a gap, thou: combines only with the predicate
type < e, t > and it gives a truth value; instead, generalized quantifiers express a
relation between two sets and it can be infinitely nesting.
We could be tempted to reduce the generalized quantifiers of natural language
into unary quantifiers of classical logic. Actually, the normal translation of sen-
tences like the following are of these sorts:

Some cat is ginger iff x((cat(x) ginger(x))

Every cat is ginger iff x(cat(x) ginger(x))

To which it comes a natural objection: this kind of translation is not compo-

sitional. In fact we introduce logical connectives ( and ) that dont reflect any
syntactical visible element.
Moreover the complexity the formalism can get to, seems to obscure the innate
simplicity of the original words.
In the last two lessons we have discussed another tool, Categorial Grammar.
Following this approach to any word it correspond a category and it goes step by
step with the intensional theory of types. With the latter we generate recursive
rules to identify what sort of argument falls under the lambda abstraction, whether
individual, truth values or properties.
As we have seen, most issues arise when compositionality is involved. It is a
natural attitude in natural languages but yet, when we analyze the language with
intensional logic, even if it looks admissible, we get into troubles.

Compositionality, Time and Situations.

Compositionality Principle (CP) claims that the meaning of an complex ex-
pression is determined by the meaning of its constituents and by the syntactical
structure of the same expression. It is broadly considered one of the basic princi-
ple of natural language semantics: the majority of semantics theories are, in fact,
compositional semantics. The agreement on the validity of CP is, therefore, wide,
yet there are many controversial aspects.

3
 First, given the fact that CP has a specified content only if encored in synctactical-
semantics theories which bind their theoretic terms (meaning, constituent, syn-
tactical structure, and determine), there is still no unanimity on what should
be the right formulation of CP. Second, we still dont have a formal proof of the
validity of CP. Third, there is not yet an agreement on which role CP should cover
in the semantics of natural language: it is not clear yet, for example, wether CP
should be considered as an empirical hypothesis, to be discussed and analyzed on
the light of empirical datas and linguistic intuitions, or rather as a methodological
principle, as theoretical bind on the construction of semantics theories.
Consider the following example: suppose that the meaning of a linguistic ex-
pression is the Fregean Bedeutung; thus, suppose that the meaning of proper names
and definite descriptions is the object to which they refer; suppose furthermore
that the meaning of a predicate is a function and that the meaning of a declarative
sentence is its truth value. In this case the content of CP is specified as: the refer-
ence of a complex sentence is determined by the reference of its constituent and its
syntactical structure. But this formulation clearly fails in metaphoric expression.
The second reflection goes on the nature of CP: is it an empirical hypothesis
or a methodological principle? If we admit the former then we accept it or deny
it, like any other empirical hypothesisi; if we accept the latter there is no reason
to commit to such a drastic perspective: we will just adapt our theories in such a
way that it conform to CP.

Another theme of the course was the one regarding time, tense and aspect in
natural and formal languages. This subject let the discussion turn to the problem
of the principle of causality. The issue of time made logicians develop a more com-
plex model theory, which include the time specification. About this, except for the
little more complicated logical formalism, there is nothing obscure. The problem
arises trying to characterize perfective and imperfective aspect, say Simple Past
and Past Progressive. Think on the following two sentences:

1. When I was in the class, Juan explained the -abstraction.

2. When I was in the class, Juan was explaining the - abstraction.

4
 In the first situation the explanation of Juan is a completed action, while in the
second the explanation is still happening and it might be not over yet. Whether the
predicate of the sentence is in perfective or imperfective aspect also affect when
the predication can be understood to hold of the subject. Unfortunately Tense
Logic Semantics doest have the tool to differentiate the two situations. To avoid
this problem we have seen two solutions: Vendlers Aktionsarten and Shanahans
Event Calculus.

Strictly connected with the conception of event as ordered triple is the one of situ-
ations. Situations, just like events, can be formulated in a partial model theory. In
opposition to Montagues grammar based on a possible worlds semantics, Barwise
and Perry attempted to characterize expressions with respect to partial, rather
than complete, worlds. With this approach we can include more phenomenolog-
ical aspect of an utterance, since the expression is always strictly related to a
situation, a subset of a possible world. Hence to provide interesting sparks to the
solution of ambiguities and vagueness main residents of our natural language.

Rebecca Cacioli