Leibniz Determinist, Theist, Idealist - Robert Merrihew Adams PDF

LEIBNIZ
Determinist,Theist,Idealist
ROBERTMERRIHEWADAMS
NewYorkOxford
OXFORDUNIVERSITYPRESS
1994
iii
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ISBN0195084608
1.Leibniz,GottfriedWilhelm,16461716.
I.Title.
24689753
PrintedintheUnitedStatesofAmericaonacidfreepaper
iv
Formymother,MargaretBakerAdams,thehistorianofourfamily
[Thispageintentionallyleftblank.]
vi
Preface
IdidnotsetouttowriteabookonLeibniz.ThroughmorethantwentyyearsIhavetaughtgraduate
andundergraduatecoursesonthephilosophyofLeibnizonceattheUniversityofMichigan,and
moretimesthanIcannowenumerateatUCLA,usuallyatintervalsoftwoorthreeyears.Mydebt
tothestudents,andsometimescolleagues,whoattendedthoseclassesisenormous,andnolonger
specifiableindetail.AboutfifteenyearsagoIbegantopublisharticlesonLeibniz.Eventually,at
thesuggestionofcolleagues,IbegantothinkaboutpublishingacollectionofpapersonLeibniz,
andsetouttowriteacoupleofnewonestocompletethecollection.Thesegrew,andtheolder
pieceswerethoroughlyrevised,andinlargepartreorganizedandrewritten,andallthepieces
acquiredmultiplecrossreferencestoeachother.Theresultisabook,andnolongeracollectionof
papers.
Themajorityofthematerialisnew.Chapter1isareworkingof"Leibniz'sTheoriesof
Contingency,"RiceUniversityStudies,63,No.4(Fall1977),pp.141.Chapter2andmuchof
Chapter3areareworkingof"Predication,Truth,andTransWorldIdentityinLeibniz,"whichwas
publishedinHowThingsAre:StudiesinPredicationandtheHistoryandPhilosophyofScience,
editedbyJamesBogenandJamesE.McGuire(Dordrecht:Reidel,1985),pp.23583.Some
materialinChapter8comesfrom"PresumptionandtheNecessaryExistenceofGod,"Nos22
(1988):1932.Chapters9and10containmuchmaterialfrom"PhenomenalismandCorporeal
SubstanceinLeibniz,"MidwestStudiesinPhilosophy8(1983):21757.AGermanversion(notin
allpartsexactlyatranslation)ofmuchofthematerialofChapter11isforthcominginStudia
Leibnitiana,vol.25(1993),underthetitle,"FormundMateriebeiLeibniz:diemittlerenJahre."I
amgratefultothepublishersofthesepiecesfortheirpermissiontoreprintthematerialhere.
IamgratefulalsotothemanyscholarswithwhomIhavediscussedLeibnizandrelatedtopics,
orallyandinwriting,overtheyears,particularlytoMarilynMcCordAdams,WallaceAnderson,
DavidBlumenfeld,HerbertBreger,TylerBurge,JohnCarriero,KeithDeRose,JohnEarman,
UrsulaFranke,AmosFunkenstein,DanielGarber,GlennHartz,PaulHoffman,JeremyHyman,
WilliamIrvine,NicholasJolley,MarianneKooij,MarkKulstad,MarcLange,MarianneLaori,
LouisLoeb,J.E.McGuire,FabrizioMondadori,MassimoMugnai,AlanNelson,DerkPereboom,
AyvalRamati,NicholasRescher,MarleenRozemond,DonaldRutherford,HeinrichSchepers,
RobertC.Sleigh,Jr.,
vii
HoustonSmit,MargaretWilson,NortonWise,andRobertYost.JohnCarriero,DanielGarber,and
PaulHoffmanprovidedextremelyvaluablewrittencommentsonpartofthework.
MarleenRozemondandlaterAyvalRamatigaveimportanthelpasmyresearchassistants.Ihave
benefitedfromtheextraordinaryscholarlygenerosityofHeinrichSchepersandassociatesatthe
LeibnizForschungsstelleoftheUniversityofMnsterandthelateAlbertHeinekampand
associatesattheLeibnizArchiveoftheNiederschsischeLandesbibliothekinHannover,who
madethedocumentsonwhichtheyareworkingavailabletomeandotherscholars.Professor
Scheperswasparticularlyhelpfulwithadviceaboutthedatingoftexts.RobertSleighandMassimo
Mugnaiwerealsogenerousinsharingtexts.
IamgratefultoUCLAforsabbaticalsupportduringthefirstwritingofChapters9and10andfor
fundingresearchassistanceinthelaterstages,butmainlyforprovidingtheenvironmentfor
researchandespeciallyforteachinginwhichthisbookdeveloped.Iwasinspiredbygenerous
encouragementoftheprojectfrommycolleaguesAlanNelson,DavidKaplan,RobertYost,and
thelateMontgomeryForth.Thebookwouldbemuchpoorer,ifitwouldexistatall,withoutthe
stimulusofthesplendidgraduatestudentswehavehadinourdepartment.
Itisapleasuretorecordthesedebtsofgratitude.
LosAngeles,CaliforniaR.M.A.June1993
viii
Contents
Introduction,
3
I.Determinism:ContingencyandIdentity
1.Leibniz'sTheoriesofContingency,
9
1.Leibniz'sFirstMainSolution,
10
2.Leibniz'sSecondMainSolution,
22
3.LeibnizandPossibleWorldsSemantics,
46
4.OnLeibniz'sSincerity,
50
2.TheLogicofCounterfactualNonidentity,
53
1.ProblemsofTransworldIdentity,
53
2.TheConceptualContainmentTheoryofTruth,
57
3.ActualityintheConceptualContainmentTheory,
63
4.AnAntiSemanticalTheoryofTruth,
65
5.WhyDidLeibnizHoldtheConceptualContainmentTheory?,
67
6.ConceptualContainmentandTransworldIdentity,
71
3.TheMetaphysicsofCounterfactualNonidentity,
75
1.SubstanceandLaw,
77
2.SubstanceandMiracle,
81
3.PerceptionandRelations,
102
4.Conclusions,
106
Appendix:APrioriandAPosteriori,
109
II.Theism:GodandBeing
4.TheEnsPerfectissimum,
113
1.AbsoluteQualitiesas"Requirements"ofThings,
115
2.SensibleQualities,Knowledge,andPerfection,
119
3.IsLeibniz'sConceptionofGodSpinozistic?,
123
ix
5.TheOntologicalArgument,
135
1.TheIncompleteProof,
136
2.ProofofPossibility,
141
6.ExistenceandEssence,
157
1.IsExistenceanEssentialQualityofGod?,
158
2.DefiningExistence,
164
3.ExistenceIrreducible,
170
7.TheRootofPossibility,
177
1.TheProofoftheExistenceofGodfromtheRealityofEternalTruths,
177
2.Leibniz'sTheoryExamined,
184
8.PresumptionofPossibility,
192
1.JurisprudenceandPragmatisminTheology,
194
2.JurisprudenceandtheLogicofProbability,
198
3.AProofforthePresumptionofPossibility,
202
4.PresumingthePossibilityofBeingsasSuch,
206
5.ObjectionsConsidered,
209
III.Idealism:MonadsandBodies
9.Leibniz'sPhenomenalism,
217
1.Phenomena,
219
2.EsseIsPercipi,
235
3.Aggregates,
241
4.TheRealityofPhenomena,
255
10.CorporealSubstance,
262
1.BodiesandCorporealSubstances,
262
2.TheStructureofaCorporealSubstance:AlternativeInterpretations,
265
3.TheStructureofaCorporealSubstance:SomeTexts,
274
4.MonadicDomination,
285
5.PrinciplesofUnity,
291
11.FormandMatterinLeibniz'sMiddleYears,
308
1.Form,
309
2.Matter,
324
3.Realism,
338
12.PrimaryMatter,
341
1.ThreeSensesof"Matter"inaLettertoArnauld,
341
2.MatterandtheEucharist,
349
3.Bernoulli'sQuestions,
361
4.TheDebateaboutThinkingMatter,
364
5.Conclusions,
375
13.PrimitiveandDerivativeForces,
378
1.The"Mixed"CharacterofDerivativeForces,
378
2.PrimaryMatterandQuantity,
393
Bibliography,
401
IndexofLeibnizTextsCited,
411
GeneralIndex,
423
xi
xii
LEIBNIZ
1
Introduction
ThelasttwentyyearsorsohaveseenafloweringofLeibnizstudies.Theorganizersofarecent
1IntheUnitedStatesinterestinthe
internationalworkshopcalledit"theLeibnizrenaissance."
philosophyofGottfriedWilhelmLeibniz(16461716)wasenhancedinthe1970sbythe
excitementovermodallogicand"modalmetaphysics."Theideaofapossibleworldwascentralto
thesedevelopments,andthatgavethemanobviousconnectionwithLeibniz.Ithinktherewasalso
asubtleranddeeper,thoughperhapsmoredebatable,connectionbetweenLeibnizandthenew
workinmodalmetaphysics.Fromitsbeginning,partlythroughtheinfluenceoftheViennaCircle,
analyticalphilosophyhadbeenKantianratherthanLeibnizianinitsmethodology.BythatImean
thatitstreatmentofphilosophicaltopics,especiallyinmetaphysics,tendedtobegovernedby
epistemologicalviewsandsubjecttostrict,priorepistemologicalconstraints.Itwascharacteristic
ofmuchearlymodernphilosophy,andespeciallythecriticalphilosophyofKant,toassigna
dominantroletoepistemology.Ofthegreatearlymodernphilosophers,however,Leibnizwas
probablytheleastpreoccupiedwithepistemology.Hewastypicallywillingtobeginanargument
withwhateverseemedtruetohimandmightseemtruetohisaudience,withoutworryingtoomuch
aboutwhetherepistemologywouldpresentitassomethingwecanreallyknow.Muchofthe
developmentofmodalmetaphysicsinthe1970sandsincehasproceededinthisLeibnizianway
perhapsbecauseofthestrengthofthegripthatcertain"intuitions"havehadonmanyofthe
philosophersinvolvedinthemovement.
TheLeibnizianapproachtometaphysicsmightseemembarrassinglyuncritical,andperhapsit
wouldbeifstrongconstraintsonmetaphysicscouldbederivedfromanepistemologythatdeserved
ourfullconfidence.Ifweviewavailableepistemologiesmoreskeptically,however,wemaythink
thattheyarenotgenerallymorereliablethanour"intuitions,"andthatwecannotusuallydobetter
thantobeginourthinkingwithwhatseemsrighttous.OurinterpretationofLeibnizneednot
dependonourownstanceonthisissue.Excellentworkonhisthoughthasbeendoneby
philosopherswhoseviewsonmethodologyinmeta
____________________
1
CentroFiorentino,LeibnizRenaissance.Igiveallreferencesbyabbreviationsorbyshortnames
andtitles;fulldetailsarefoundinthebibliography.
3
2Forbetterorworse,however,thisisapointonwhichmyown
physicsarequiteopposedtohis.
viewsaresupportiveofLeibniz.
Leibniz:Determinist,Theist,IdealistisnotanintroductiontoLeibniz'sphilosophy,norevenafully
comprehensiveaccountofhismetaphysics.Itisapieceofresearchintothreeareasrelatedtothe
3Thethreetopicsareconnected,asiseverythinginLeibniz's
threeattributesmentionedinthetitle.
thought.Mydevelopmentofthefirstispresupposedinmytreatmentoftheothertwo.ThatLeibniz
wasatheistishardlydebatable.Howmuchadeterministandhowmuchanidealisthewasare
morecontroversial;Ibelievehewasmoreofboththansomeinterpretershavethought.Iamnot
sympatheticwithhisdeterminism,butamverymuchinsympathy(thoughnotindetailed
agreement)withhistheismandhisidealism.
ThequestionofLeibniz'sdeterminismhasdrawnmuchrecentattention,inlargepartbecauseofits
connectionwithtwothesesrelatedtomodalmetaphysics.OneisLeibniz'sdoctrinethatevery
predicatetrueofanysubstanceiscontainedintheindividualconceptofthatsubstance.Theotheris
hiscloselyrelateddenialofcounterfactualindividualidentitieshisdenialthatAntoineArnauld,
forexample,wouldhaveexisted,andbeenthesameindividual,ifhehadmarried.Thesetheses
haveheldfascinationforstudentsinterestedintherelationoflogictometaphysics.Thesecondhas
beenseenasarejectionofwhathasbeenknowninrecentmodalmetaphysicsas"transworld
identity."Thefirsthasbeenoneofthegroundsforsuspicionthatnotruthsatallcanbecontingent
forLeibniz.Theseissues,andothersconnectedwiththem,formthesubjectofPartIofthebook.
Onethemethatemergesfrommyargumentthere(athemeintunewithmuchofthemostrecent
Leibnizscholarship)isthatLeibniz'sviewsonthesetopicsarelessdominatedbyhislogical
doctrinesthanwasthoughtbyBertrandRussellandLouisCouturat,themostinfluentialLeibniz
scholarsoftheearlypartofourcentury.Leibniz'sviewoftheproblemswaslargelyshapedbyhis
theology,andhisuseoflogicaldoctrinesindealingwiththemcannotbeunderstoodapartfrom
suchmetaphysicalconceptionsasthatofsubstantialform.
ThemetaphysicalcoreofLeibniz'sphilosophicaltheologyhasattractedlessattentionthanits
intrinsicinterestdeserves.Insomewaysitisalsothecoreofhismetaphysics.Itisintricately
connectedwithhislogicaldoctrinesandisthecontextforhisfullestreflectionsaboutthenatureof
existenceandofessence,andalsoaboutthemostgeneralstructuralrelationshipsoftheproperties
ofthings.ThesetopicsarediscussedinPartIIofthebook,intheframeworkofacomprehensive
studyofLeibniz'streatmentoftheontologicalargumentfortheexistenceofGod,whichIregardas
exceptionallyinteresting.IdonotthinkLeibniz'soranyotherversionoftheontologicalargument
islikelytoconvincemanypeopleoftheexistenceofGod,butarelatedargument,whichseemsto
metohavemorepersuasiveforce,andperhapstobethemostpromisingofallaprioriarguments
fortheexistenceofGod,isdiscussedinChapter7.Onereasonfortheneglectofthispartof
Leibniz'sthought
____________________
2
Forsuchdisagreementbyfinescholars,see,e.g.,Mates,PhilosopbyofLeibniz,p.51,andC.
Wilson,"CriticalandConstructiveAspectsofLeibniz'sMonadology,"p.293.
3
WhatIhavetosayaboutanothermajortopicofLeibniz'smetaphysics,theidentityof
indiscernibles,hasbeensaidinamuchlesshistoricalcontextinR.Adams,"PrimitiveThisnessand
PrimitiveIdentity."
4
isthatitsfullestdevelopment,inmostrespects,cameinhisearlyyears,andmanyofthemost
importanttextswerequiteinaccessibleuntiltherelevantvolumeoftheAcademyeditionof
Leibniz'sworks(AVI,iii)waspublishedin1980.Ihavetriedtogiveafullaccountofthemost
importanttexts.
Leibniz'sdoctrineofmonadsandhistheoryofthephysicalworldmayhavebeenovershadowedat
timesbytheinterestinhisphilosophyoflogic,buttheycanhardlybesaidtohavebeenneglected.
Howcouldtheybeneglected?InteachingaboutLeibnizIhavealwaysfoundthatstudentsare
instantlyfascinatedbythemonads,andfullofquestionsaboutthem.Atthesametime,Russell's
wellknownreportthatheinitially"felt...theMonadologywasakindoffantasticfairytale,
coherentperhaps,butwhollyarbitrary," 4resonateswiththefirstimpressionsofmanystudents.In
fact,IbelievethatLeibniz'stheoryofmonads,initsessentials,thoughnotinallitsdetails,
representsanimportant,permanentmetaphysicalalternative,oneofthehandfuloffundamental
viewsinthisareathathasarealchanceofbeingtrue.Iwouldnotclaimtoprovethatmuchhere,
butIwilltrytogiveinPartIIIafullaccountofLeibniz'sview,includingthoseofhisarguments
thatseemtomeofmostpermanentimportance,andthoseaspectsofhisviewthatmaycommendit
aspreferabletootherformsofidealismorphenomenalism.
Iarguethatthroughoutthematureperiodofhisthought(16861716),hisviewisasidealisticasis
impliedinhisstatementof1704that"thereisnothinginthingsexceptsimplesubstances,andin
themperceptionandappetite"(GII,270/L537).Someinterpretershavetriedtofindmorerealistic
commitmentsinsomeperiodorstrandofhismaturephilosophy,andsomeoftheseattemptsare
addressedinPartIII.Particularattentionispaidtointerpretationsthatfindmorerealistic
implicationsinLeibniz'seffortstorehabilitatecertainAristotelianScholasticconceptions;Iargue
thattheAristotelianconceptionsthatLeibnizundoubtedlydoesuseareemployedintheserviceof
hisidealism.
Ihavetriedthroughouttomaintainarigorouslyhistoricalapproach,attemptingtoestablishas
accuratelyaspossible,andwiththebestevidencepossible,whatLeibnizactuallysaidandmeant.
Thisisnottosaythatmyapproachisunphilosophical.Ibelievethathistoricalaccuracyandcareful
attentiontothehistoricalcontextareimportanttothephilosophicalaswellasthehistoricalvalue
ofworkinthehistoryofphilosophyand,conversely,thatphilosophicalargumentandcritiqueare
importantforhistoricalunderstandinginphilosophy.
Onereasonforthephilosophicalimportanceofpatientandcarefulattentiontotheactualmeaning
ofLeibniz'swritingsintheirhistoricalcontextisthathewasindeedagreatphilosopher,great
enoughthatanarbitraryinterpretationofhiswork,morerelevanttoourhistoricalcontextthanto
his,isunlikelytobeasinterestingphilosophicallyinthelongrunaswhatheactuallythought.
Indeed,theverystrangenessofhiscontext,andofsomeofhisthoughts,isaboonforphilosophy.
Progressinphilosophyismorelikelytoconsistinunderstandingpossiblealternativesthanarriving
atsettledconclusions.Andwearefamiliarenoughwiththefamiliar;partofwhatthegreatdead
philosophersofferusisalternativestoourusualwayofthinkingalternativesthoughtoutingreat
____________________
4
Russell,PhilosophyofLeibniz,p.xiii.
5
depthandwithuncommonrationalsensitivity.Partofwhatwearedoinginstudyingthehistoryof
philosophy,moreover,isplacingourownphilosophizinginitslargestcontextinaconversation
thathasbeengoingonformanyhundredsofyears.Justaswearelikelytounderstandbetterwhat
wearedoinginanydiscussionifweaccuratelyrememberandunderstandhowithasgone,sowe
arelikelytounderstandourownphilosophizingbetterifourconceptionofitslongerhistorical
contextisaccurate.
Asforthevaluethatphilosophicalargumentandcritiquehaveforhistoricalunderstanding,I
believethatR.G.Collingwood'sview,thatthepropermethodofhistoryisthatofrethinkingpast
thoughtsinone'sownmind,5islargelytrueofthehistoryofphilosophy.Theaimoftherethinking
istodiscovertheinnerrationaleofthethoughtsonestudies.AsCollingwoodrecognized,this
methodcanbefruitfullyappliedonlytothoughts(andactions)thatlendthemselvesto
understandingintermsofarationale.Itthereforemaynotbeapplicabletoasmuchofhistoryas
Collingwoodmayhavehoped.Butifapplicableanywhere,itissurelyapplicableinthehistoryof
philosophy,wheretheobjectsselectedforstudy,forphilosophicalreasons,arealwayspeople
whosethoughtsarebelievedtohavehadanotablerationale.Therationaleisastructurethatthereis
apermanentpossibilityofrecreatinginthoughtapointthatfitsnicelywithCollingwood's
idealism.Thehistoricalquestioninthehistoryofphilosophyiswhattheactualrationalewas.Itisa
questionwecannotverywellanswerwithoutattainingagoodphilosophicalunderstandingofthe
rationale.Todothat,wemusttrytodeveloptheargumentsinvolvedintherationale,andwemust
subjecttherationale,asweunderstandit,tosearchingcriticism.Foritisapieceofphilosophywe
aretryingtounderstand,andargumentandcriticismareessentialtophilosophy.
Thisapproachmaysound,andmypracticeofitmayseem,tooetherealforsomehistorians.Other
approachesmaybemoreappropriateforotherhistoricalsubjects,butIthinkthisoneisappropriate
forthehistoryofphilosophy.IhavetriedtopayattentiontotherelationofLeibniz'smetaphysicsto
itsintellectualcontext,includingthescientificandespeciallythereligiousthoughtofhistime,and
thesocialpressuresatworkinthediscussionshewasinvolvedin.Yetmyprincipalconcerniswith
theintrinsicrationaleofhisthought.Ihavemadenogeneralapplicationofahermeneuticsof
suspicion.NotthatIthink(norwouldLeibnizhimselfhavethought)thathewasfreeofhiddenand
unconsciousmotives.Onsomepoints,theprojectofunderstandinghisrationaleitselfrequires
someattentiontosuspicionsofinsincerityinhisstatements.Intheend,however,Leibniz'sreasons
aremoreinterestingthanhismotives.Hehadoneofthemostbrilliantintellectsofalltime,buthe
wasnotparticularlyimpressiveinthemorepracticalaspectsofhislife.Hiswritingscontaina
reasonedstructureofthought(atleastone)thathasapermanentclaimontheattentionof
philosophers,whetherornotitaccuratelyreflectsallthemotivesthatmayhaveunderlainhis
writingaswellashisotherconduct.Whatismostinterestingaboutsuchapersonislikelytobe
bestunderstoodbyahistorianwhosetrainingandinterestsareprimarilyphilosophical.
____________________
5
Collingwood,IdeaofHistory,pp.20531.
6
I
Determinism:ContingencyandIdentity
7
I
Leibniz'sTheoriesofContingency
ThereisafamiliarconceptionofLeibniz'sviewsaboutthenatureofnecessityandcontingencythat
portrayshimasasortofgrandfatherofpossibleworldssemanticsformodallogic.Accordingto
thisconception,Leibnizenvisagesaninfinityofpossibleworlds,ofwhichGod(whoexists
necessarily)choosesandactualizesone(thebest).Necessarytruthsarepropositionsthataretruein
allpossibleworlds.Contingenttruthsarepropositionsthataretrueintheactualworldbutfalsein
atleastoneotherpossibleworld.Whichworldsarepossible,whatwouldhappeninthem,andhow
theyarerelatedtooneanotherassimilarordissimilar,betterorworse,donotchangefromone
worldtoanother;therefore,alltruthsaboutwhatispossiblearenecessary.(ThisLeibnizis,tobe
precise,agrandfatherofpossibleworldssemanticsforS5,thestrongestoftheusualsystemsof
modallogic.)Forthisreasonalsothepropertyofbeingthebestpossibleworldbelongsnecessarily
totheworldthathasit.Therootofcontingencyisthatitisnotnecessarybutonlycontingentthat
Godchoosestoactualizethebest.Allandonlythosetruthsarecontingentwhosetruthdependson
God'sfreechoiceofthebest.
WemeetthisLeibnizinchapter3ofBertrandRussellCriticalExpositionofthePhilosophyof
Leibniz.AnimportantpartofRussell'sinterpretationisthefamousexceptionhemakesinLeibniz's
principlethatineverytruepropositiontheconceptofthepredicateiscontainedintheconceptof
thesubject."Theassertionofexistence,aloneamongpredicates,issynthetic,"Russellsays,"and
1Allotherpredicatesarecontainedintheconceptsofthe
therefore,inLeibniz'sview,contingent."
subjectsthathavethem;existenceisnot,however,exceptinthecaseofGod.Therefore,truths
aboutwhatanypossibleindividualorpossibleworldislike,orwouldbelikeifitexistedorwere
actual,areallnecessary,buttruthsaboutwhichpossibleworldisactual,andthereforewhich
possibleindividualsexist,arecontingent.
RussellgaveuptheseviewsafterreadingLouisCouturat."Recentdiscussions,"reportedE.M.
Curley,accurately,in1974,"havetendedinsomemeasuretogobacktoRussell'soriginalview
(beforeCouturat)that,apartfromthepropositionthatGodexists,existentialtruthsarenot
2Ithinkthistendencyleadsbackward,notonlyintimebutalsoinourunderstandingof
analytic."
____________________
1
Russell,PhilosophyofLeibniz,p.27.Theviewsdiscussedherebelongtothefirstedition,however,
andwereretractedintheprefacetothesecondedition.
2
Curley,"RecentWorkon17thCenturyContinentalPhilosophy,"p.242.
9
Leibniz.ForthefamiliarLeibnizdescribedaboveisinlargepartacreatureofmisunderstanding,
thoughnotexactlyoffiction.
Avarietyofconceptionsoftheproblemofcontingency,andsolutionstoit,canbefoundin
Leibniz'swritings.Therewasdevelopmentinhisthoughtonit,andheheldmorethanonesolution
atonce.(Thetwomainsolutionsaresetoutinsections1and2ofthischapter.)Anaccurate
accountofLeibniz'stheoriesofcontingencywillthereforeberathercomplex.Wewillcome
towardtheendofit,ratherthanatthebeginning,tothequestionwhetherheregardedexistenceasa
predicatecontainedintheconceptsofthingsthatexist.
1.Leibniz'sFirstMainSolution
Evenbeforehethoughtoftheproblemofcontingencyintermsofhisconceptualcontainment
theoryoftruth,Leibnizhad"found[himself]veryclosetotheopinionofthosewhohold
everythingtobeabsolutelynecessary,"but"waspulledbackfromthisprecipicebyconsidering
thosepossiblethingswhichneitherarenorwillbenorhavebeen"(FC178/L263).Justhowclose
hewastothecliff,weshallseeinsection1.1;insections1.21.5weshallconsiderthewayin
whichhesayshewasrescuedfromit.
1.1OntheBrinkofthePrecipice
InMay1671LeibnizwrotealettertothelegalscholarMagnusWedderkopfabout"thenecessity
3Hebeginsbyarguingthateverythingthathappensisdetermined
ofevents"(AII,i,117f./L146f.).
byGod'sdecreeandadmittingthatthisisa"hard"conclusion.HethentracesthecauseofPontius
Pilate'sdamnationfromhislackoffaith,tohisfailuretopayattention,tohisfailuretounderstand
theutilityofpayingattention,toalackofcausesofsuchunderstanding.
Foritisnecessarytoanalyzeeverythingintosomereason,andnottostopuntilwe
arriveatafirstreasonorelseitmustbeadmittedthatsomethingcanexistwithouta
sufficientreasonforitsexistence,andthisadmissiondestroysthedemonstrationofthe
existenceofGodandofmanyPhilosophicaltheorems.Whatthenistheultimatereason
ofthedivinewill?Thedivineintellect.ForGodwillsthosethingsthatheunderstands
tobebestandmostharmonious,andselectsthem,asitwere,fromaninfinitenumber
ofallpossibles.
Leibnizgoesontostatethattheultimatereasonofthingsisfoundintheessences,possibilities,or
ideasofthings,which"coincidewithGodhimself,"areunderstoodbyGod,andhavenoreason
outsidethemselves.Leibnizdrawsastronglynecessitarianconclusion:
SinceGodisthemostperfectmind,however,itisimpossibleforhimnottobeaffected
bythemostperfectharmony,andthustobenecessitatedtothebestbytheveryideality
ofthings....Henceitfollowsthatwhateverhashappend,ishappening,orwillhappen
isbestandthereforenecessary,but...
____________________
3
Allquotationsinthissectionarefromthisletter,unlessotherwiseindicated.
10
withanecessitythattakesnothingawayfromfreedombecauseittakesnothingaway
fromthewillandtheuseofreason.
Threepointsdeservecommenthere.
Leibnizhasalreadyslippedovertheedgeoftheprecipiceinthisletter.Hestatesflatlyand
withoutqualificationthateverythingthateverhappensisnecessary.Thisishissimplestsolution
totheproblemofcontingency.Ifthereisnocontingency,thereisnoneedtoaccountforitor
explainitsnature.Leibnizdidnotremaincontentwiththisposition,however.Onhisowncopy
ofthelettertoWedderkopfhelaterwrote,"Ihavesincecorrectedthis;foritisonethingforsins
tobeinfalliblygoingtohappen,andanotherthingforthemtobegoingtohappennecessarily."
Hecontinuedtoascribenecessitytoallthings,butonlywithsomequalification.In1679he
wrote,"Whatisactualisinsomewaynecessary"[italicsadded](Gr536).Eveninfreeactions
thereisallowed(in1710)tobe"hypothetical"and"moral"necessity,butnot"absolute"or
"metaphysical"necessity(GVI,37).
Leibnizwasacompatibilist,maintainingtotheendofhislife(LCV,3)thateveryeventis
determinedbutsomeactsarenonethelessfree.Accordingtotheformulaofhismaturity,freedom
consistsinintelligence(understandingtheobjectofdeliberation),spontaneity(insofarasthe
sourceoftheactioniswithintheagent),andcontingency(whichexcludesabsolute,logical,or
metaphysicalnecessity,butnothypotheticalormoralnecessity)(T28890,302;cf.GVII,10811).
InthelettertoWedderkopf,however,wemeetamoreextremecompatibilism,whichdoesnot
makecontingencyanecessaryconditionoffreedom.Inthisearlyworkvoluntarinessand
intelligenceseemtosufficeforfreedom:necessity"takesnothingawayfromfreedombecauseit
takesnothingfromthewillandtheuseofreason."Thelateradditionofcontingencyasa
conditionoffreedomissurelyrelatedtothechangeinLeibniz'swillingnesstoadmitwithout
qualificationthenecessityofallevents,butthelatterdevelopmentinhisthoughtcomessooner
thantheformer.Inaworkof1673,inwhichhearguesvigorouslyagainsttheclaimthatsinsare
(unqualifiedly)necessary(AVI,iii,124ff.),hestillsays,"Topreservetheprivilegeoffreewill,it
isenoughthatwehavebeensoplacedataforkintheroadoflife,thatwecandoonlywhatwe
will,andcanwillonlywhatwebelievetobegood;butcantraceout,bythefullestgivenuseof
reason,whatshouldberegardedasgood"(AVI,iii,133).Similarly,inhisnotesonaconversation
withBishopNicolausSteno(NielsStensen),27November1677,hedefinedfreedomsimplyas
"rationalspontaneity"(VE302=LHIV,4,3C,1214).Andinapaperfrom167882heopposes
freedomtoconstraintandtoignorance,butsaysnothingbywayofopposingittonecessity(
VE710=LH1,3,5,2324).Later,however,Leibnizdistinguishedasenseinwhichfreedomis
opposedtonecessityandasenseinwhichitisopposedonlytocompulsion(B121);inseveral
textsfromtheyears168187(Gr299,308,229;cf.GVII,108111;Gr381f.)andlater(Gr421,G
III,58f.)heascribesbothkindsoffreedomtohumanagentsthougheveninhislastyearshe
coulddefinethefreeas"thespontaneouswithchoice"(VE1088=LHIV,8,6061).
InthelettertoWedderkopftheargumentforthenecessityofalleventsisnotbasedonthe
conceptualcontainmenttheoryoftruth,butratheronthenature
11
ofGodandtheprincipleofsufficientreason.Thislatter,moretheologicalargumentagainst
contingencyisbyfartheonemostoftenaddressedbyLeibnizinhiswritings;andweshallbe
concernedwithitinmostofthischapter.
ThelettertoWedderkopfisanexceptionaltext.Itishardtoregardasmerelytentativeaviewthat
Leibnizcommunicatedtoaneminentpersonwithwhomhewasbynomeansintimate.Buthemay
nothaveheldtheextremenecessitarianpositionforanylengthoftime.Itseemsnottohavebeen
4
heldinafragmentonfreewillwrittenjustafewmonthsbeforeoraftertheletter(AVI,i,540f.).
1.2ThingsPossibleinTheirOwnNature
By1677thenecessitarianpositionwasreplacedbyatheoryLeibnizfrequentlyrepeated,publicly
andprivately,totheendofhiscareer,whichmustberegardedashisprincipal(andmostconfident)
solutiontotheproblemofcontingency.Thebasicideaofthissolutionisbrieflystatedina
commentonSpinozafromabout1678:"Onthehypothesisofthedivinewillchoosingthebest,or
operatingmostperfectly,certainlynothingbutthesethingscouldhavebeenproduced;but
accordingtotheverynatureofthingsconsideredinitself[perse],thingscouldhavebeenproduced
otherwise"(GI,149/L204).Wefinditmorefullystatedinapaperonfreedom,probablywrittenin
theearly1680s.
ButwemustsaythatGodwillsthebestbyhisownnature.Thereforehewills
necessarily,youwillsay.IshallsaywithSt.Augustinethatthatnecessityishappy.But
surelyitfollowsfromthisthatthingsexistnecessarily.Howso?Becausea
contradictionisimpliedbythenonexistenceofthatwhichGodwillstoexist?Ideny
thatthatpropositionisabsolutelytrue.OtherwisethosethingswhichGoddoesnotwill
wouldnotbepossible.Fortheyremainpossible,eveniftheyarenotchosenbyGod.It
ispossibleindeedforeventhattoexistwhichGoddoesnotwilltoexist,becauseit
wouldbeabletoexistofitsownnatureifGodwilledthatitexist.ButGodcannotwill
thatitexist.Iagree;yetitremainspossibleinitsownnature,evenifitisnotpossiblein
respecttothedivinewill.Forwehavedefinedpossibleinitsownnatureasthatwhich
doesnotimplyacontradictioninitselfevenifitscoexistencewithGodcanbesaidin
somewaytoimplyacontradiction.5...
ThereforeIsay:thatispossible,ofwhichthereissomeessenceorreality,orwhichcan
bedistinctlyunderstood....IfGodhaddecreedthatnoreallinemustbefoundwhich
shouldbeincommensurablewithotherreallines(Icallrealalinethatactuallybounds
somebody),itwouldnotthereforefollowthattheexistenceofanincommensurable
lineimpliesacontradiction,evenifGod,fromtheprincipleofperfection,couldnotfail
toordaininthisway.(Gr289f./AG2022)
Onthisview,theactualworld,andthethingsthatexistinit,arenotnecessarybutcontingent,
becauseotherworldsarepossibleinwhichthosethingswouldnotexist.Thepossibilityofthose
otherworldsdoesnotdependonthe
____________________
4
Onthedating,seeAVI,i,537andii,579,andKabitz,DiePhilosophiedesjungenLeibniz,pp.
12126.
5
HereGruainadvertentlyomitstheclause,etsieiuscoexistentiacumDeoaliquomododicipossit
implicarecontradictionem.SeeVE277.
12
possibilityofGod'schoosingthem.Itisenough,forthecontingencyoftheactualworld,ifthe
otherpossibleworldsare"possibleintheirownnature"or"donotimplyacontradictionin
themselves,"consideredapartfromGod'schoice.
LeibnizstilltakesthispositionintheTheodicy.HereportsthatAbelardagreed"thatitcanwellbe
saidthatthatman[whoinfactwillbedamned]canbesaved,inrespecttothepossibilityofhuman
nature,whichiscapableofsalvation,butthatitcannotbesaidthatGodcansavehim,inrespectto
Godhimself,becauseitisimpossibleforGodtodothatwhichheoughtnottodo."Hecomments
thatAbelardthereforeneednothaveheld,ashedid,that"Godcannotdoanythingbutthatwhich
hedoes,"for"theothers...donotmeananythingelsewhentheysaythatGodcansavethatman,
andthathecandothatwhichhedoesnotdo"(T171).Thepossibilityofthealternativesamong
whichGodchoosesisinternaltothem,andthisinternalpossibilityofthealternativesisenoughto
makeGod'schoicefree.
Inaword,whenonespeaksofthepossibilityofathingitisnotaquestionofthecauses
thatcanbringaboutorpreventitsactualexistence;otherwiseonewouldchangethe
natureofthetermsandrenderuselessthedistinctionbetweenthepossibleandthe
actual,asAbelarddid....Thatiswhy,whenoneasksifathingispossibleor
necessary,andbringsintheconsiderationofwhatGodwillsorchooses,onechanges
thequestion.ForGodchoosesamongthepossibles,andforthatveryreasonhechooses
freely,andisnotnecessitated;therewouldbeneitherchoicenorfreedomiftherewere
butonechoicepossible.(T235;cf.T44,45,228,23032,234,367) 6
Thefirstproblemaboutthistheoryistounderstandwhatismeantby"possibleinitsownnature."
IfacertainworldisinferiorandsocannotbechosenbyGod,isthatnotbyvirtueofitsown
nature?Why,then,shouldwenotsaythatitisimpossibleinitsownnature?
Thetheoryrequiresarelativelynarrowunderstandingofthenature,essence,orconceptofathing
oraworld.Theessenceofasubstance,inthenarrowsense,containsinformationaboutsuchthings
astheperceptionsthesubstancehas,andperhapsthegeometricalconfigurationsandmotions
expressedbythoseperceptions,andaboutthesubstance'spowersandtendenciestoproduce
7ItisinthissensethatLeibnizcansay,"That
perceptionsinitselfbutnotaboutothersubstances.
ispossibleofwhichthereissomeessence,"evenifGodcould
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6
RobertSleigh,inhissuperbbookonLeibnizandArnauld,pp.82f.,doubtsthatLeibnizstilladheres
tothe"possibleinitsownnature"theoryofcontingencyintheTheodicy,andoffersaningenious
interpretationofT235,whereitdoesnotimplythattheory.Iamnotpersuaded,however,becauseI
thinktherearetoomanypassagesoftheTheodicy,manyofthemcitedhereandinsections1.4and
1.5,thataremostnaturallyinterpretedonthebasisofthe"possibleinitsownnature"theory.There
isalsoaletterofMarch1713toChristianGoldbachinwhichLeibnizgivesanextendedtreatment
oftheproblemofcontingency,usingonlyideasbelongingtothe"possibleinitsownnature"
theory,andidentifiesthisastheviewdefendedintheTheodicy(LG189).
7
Thispresupposesthatinformationaboutasubstance'sperceptionsandtheir(internal)con?tent
doesnotofitselfcontaininformation,intherelevantsense,aboutothersubstancesthatapartfrom
considerationsofintersubstantialharmony,itdoesnotentailtheexistenceofthesubstances
perceived.IbelievethatLeibnizwascommitted,onthewhole,tothispresupposition;thereare
thingsinhiswritingsfrom1686andlater,however,whichcouldbetakenassuggestingthe
opposite.SeeChapter3,section3.
13
notchoosetoactualizeit(Gr289).Necessityaswellaspossibilitycanbeviewedasinternalto
essencesinthenarrowsense;indeed,whatLeibnizmeansbynecessaryexistenceisprecisely
existencethatfollowsfromtheessenceofasubstancewithoutconsiderationoftheessenceofany
othersubstance(seeChapter5,section1).Conversely,onemainsenseinwhichthingsare
contingent,forLeibniz,isthattheydependonGod'swill(andpower)fortheirexistence(or
nonexistence).
Ofcourse,Leibnizfamouslyspeaksofeachsubstanceashavinganindividualconceptinamuch
broadersenseinwhichitis"complete"andcontainsmuchinformationaboutothersubstances
indeed,perhapsitcontainsalltruths.Thiscompleteconcept,Ibelieve,issupposedtofollowfrom
thesubstance'sessenceinthenarrowersense,butonlyincombinationwithtruthsthatfollowfrom
theessencesofothersubstancesandtheirinterrelations.IntheDiscourseonMetaphysics
"essences"seemtobeequivalenttocompleteconcepts(DM16),butLeibniz'suseoftheterm
'essence'isquitefluid.
Thenatureofapossibleworld,inthenarrowsense,isconstructedfromtheessences,inthenarrow
sense,ofthesubstancesthatwouldexistinit.Leibnizmayindeedhavethoughtofitasthesumof
thoseessences.Butwemaythinkofitascontainingalsoallsortsofrelationsamongthe
substanceswhicharemoreperfectthanwhich,howtheyperceiveorexpresseachother,andso
forth.Thusisbuiltupwhatwemaycallthebasicconceptofapossibleworld.Itistocontain
informationabouteverythingthathappensinthatworld,butnoteverythingthatistrueaboutits
relationtoGod'swill.
Byanalogywiththecompleteconceptofanindividual,wecanalsospeakofthecompleteconcept
ofapossibleworld,whichistobefullerthanthebasicconceptandcontaininformationabout
everythingthatistrueaboutthatpossibleworld,includingwhetheritisthebest,ornearlythebest,
8We
orfarfromthebest,ofallpossibleworlds,andwhetherGodthereforechoosesorrejectsit.
maytakeittobeLeibniz'spositionthataworldispossibleinitsownnatureifitsbasicconcept
containsnointernalcontradictions,andnothingthatisincompatiblewithitsactualitysolongas
certaindeterminantsofGod'schoicearekeptoutofthepicture;itscompleteconceptmaycontain
God'srejectingit,butthatdoesnotkeepitfrombeing"possibleinitsownnature."
Questionsremainaboutjustwhatistobeexcludedfromaworld'sbasicconcept.
1.Doesitincludeanyconceptsofotherpossibleworlds?Itseemsnaturaltoexcludethem,since
wearetryingtocapturetheideaofapossibilitythatisinternaltoonepossibleworld.Andby
excludingthemwecanbecertainofnotincludingenoughinformationtoimplyGod'srejectionof
theworldrepresentedbythebasicconcept.Ontheotherhand,thesolutionoftheproblemof
contingencydoesnotstrictlyrequiretheexclusionofthisinformationiftherightinformationabout
Godisexcluded.Andifrationalcreatureswouldexistintheworld
____________________
8
ThedistinctionbetweenbasicandcompleteconceptsofapossibleworldisnotexplicitinLeibniz.
Hedoesspeakoftheconceptofapossibleworld,butwithoutmakingthedistinction:"thisuniverse
hasacertainprincipalorprimitiveconcept,ofwhichparticulareventsareonlyconsequences"(
LA41).
14
ofthebasicconcept,theywouldpresumablythinkaboutalternativepossibilities;sobycontaining
theirthoughts,thebasicconceptwouldcontainpartialconceptsofalternativepossibleworlds.But
thisdoesnotprovethatthebasicconceptofapossibleworldmustincludecompleteconceptsof
otherworlds.Fornocreature,nobeingotherthanGod,accordingtoLeibniz,conceivespossible
worldsinenoughdetailtodeterminewhichisthebest.
2.DobasicconceptsofpossibleworldsincludeanyfactsaboutGod?Leibnizseemsflatlyto
excludeGodfromtheworldwhen,indiscussionwithGabrielWagner,3March1698,herejects
someofWagner'ssuggestions,saying,"Thesethingswouldbetrue,takingtheword'World'sothat
itincludesGodtoo.Butthisusageisnotappropriate.Bythename'World'isnormallyunderstood
theaggregateofthingsthatarechangeableorliabletoimperfection"(Gr396).Similarly,Leibniz
referstotheworldin1697as"theAggregateoffinitethings"(GVII,302/L486),andintheearlyto
mid1680sas"thecompositeofallcreatures"(VE166=LHIV,7C,70)or,withanunusual
restriction,"theAggregateofallbodies"(VE418=LHIV,7C,11114). 9IfLeibnizconceivesofthe
basicconceptofapossibleworldasasumofessencesof(possible)substances,God'sessencewill
beexcludedfromthesum.Ontheotherhand,Leibnizspeaksofthepossiblethingsthatarethe
alternativesforGod'schoiceascontainingintheirconceptscertaindecisionsofGod,consideredas
possible,sothatGodchoosesamongcertainpossibledivineactions,aswellasamongpossible
creatures(C23f.;LA4951;cf.GI,360).Thiscausesnoproblemforthetheoryofcontingency,
providedthatthedivinedecisionsthatareincludedinthealternativesforGod'schoiceare
noncomparativedecisionsconcernedonlywiththelawsororderoftheworldtowhichtheybelong.
WhatisimportantforLeibniz'streatmentofcontingencyisthatthebasicconceptsofpossible
worldsdonotincludeGod'schoiceamongpossibleworlds.Inordertoexcludeit,theymust
excludesomeinformationeitheraboutGodoraboutotherpossibleworlds.Anditisnotclearthat
excludinginformationaboutotherworldswillalwaysbeenough.If"thedamnationofaninnocent
is...possibleinitself,"anddoesnot"Implyacontradictioninterms,"asLeibnizwroteintexts
datingfrom1677andtheearly1680s,thebasicconceptofsuchathingmayverywellhaveto
excludeinformationaboutGod'sjustice,forLeibnizdoesnotseemtothinkonehastocompare
possibleworldsinordertodeterminethatajustGodwouldnotchoosesuchastateofaffairs.
Indeed,theinformationthatLeibnizinvokesfromoutsidetheconceptofthisstatetoexplainthe
wayinwhichitisnotpossibleisnotaboutotherpossibleworlds,butonlyaboutGod:itcannot
actuallyexist"becauseitisincompatiblewiththepresupposedexistenceofGod,whoseperfection
(fromwhichjusticefollows)cannotpermitsuchathing"(Gr300,271).
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9
Theseformulationssuggestaconceptionofpossibleworldsaslesscompletethantheyarenormally
conceivedtobetoday.AsimilarlyrestrictedconceptionpersistedinpostLeibnizianGerman
philosophy.Thus"theworld"isdefinedbyWolff(VernnftigeGedanken,544)asaconnected
"seriesofchangeablethings"andbyCrusiusas(EntwurfdernothwendigenVernunftWahrheiten,
204)as"thewholeaggregateofallfinitethings."
15
1.3HypotheticalNecessity
Evenifasatisfactoryexplanationcanbegivenofwhatitisforathingoraworldtobepossiblein
itsownnature,thereremainsanimportantobjectiontoLeibniz'suseofthisnotioninaccounting
forcontingency.Hisclaimisthattheactualityofthisworldiscontingentbecauseotherworldsare
stillpossibleintheirownnatureseveniftheyarenotpossibleinrelationtoGod'swill.Butin
presentingthistheoryofcontingency,insomeoftheearliertexts(Gr289f.;AVI,iii,127f.),Leibniz
seemstoadmitthatitisnecessarythatGodchoosesthisworld.AndifitisnecessarythatGod
choosesthisworld,anditfollowsnecessarilyfromthatthatthisworldisactual,mustnotthe
actualityofthisworldbenecessaryandnotcontingent?AsCurleyputsit:
Itisanuncontroversialtruthofmodallogicthatifpisnecessaryandentailsq,thenqis
necessary.Soifitis(absolutely)necessarythatGodchoosethebest,andifthe
existenceofthebestworldis(hypothetically)necessaryinrelationtohischoice,thenit
is(absolutely)necessarythatthebestworldexist.10
Leibnizmakesmuchuseoftheterm'hypotheticallynecessary',whichCurleyrightlybringsinhere.
Leibnizsaysrepeatedly(e.g.,inDM13)thatcontingenttruthsarehypotheticallybutnotabsolutely
necessary.'Hypotheticalnecessity'isnormally,asherecognized(GIII,400/AG193),asynonym
for'necessityoftheconsequence'.Soheseemstobeusingthetraditionaldistinctionbetween
necessityoftheconsequenceandnecessityoftheconsequent:'Ifpthennecessarilyq'11canmean
eitherthat'Ifpthenq'isnecessary(necessityoftheconesquence),orthatif'p'istruethen'q'is
necessary(necessityoftheconsequent).Butthennecessityoftheconsequence(hypothetical
necessity)combinedwithnecessityoftheantecedentimpliesnecessityoftheconsequent.If'p'and
'Ifpthenq'arebothnecessary,then'q'isnecessary.
Leibnizraisedthisveryobjectionagainsthimselfinhis"firstTheodicy,"writtenindialogueform
in1673asThePhilosopher'sConfession,andgiventoAntoineArnauldandothers.12
God'sexistenceisnecessary.Fromitfollowthesinsthatarecontainedin[thisactual]
seriesofthings.Whatfollowsfromthenecessaryisnecessary.Thereforethesinsare
necessary.(AVI,iii,127)
TheanswerthatLeibnizfirstwrotewasasfollows:
Ireplythatitisfalsethatwhateverfollowsfromwhatisnecessaryisnecessary.From
truths,tobesure,nothingfollowsthatisnottrue.Yetsinceaparticular[conclusion]
canfollowfrompurelyuniversal[premises],asin[the
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10
Curley,"RecentWorkon17thCenturyContinentalPhilosophy,"p.243.Substantiallythesame
objectionwasraisedbya"RomanCatholicTheologian"whomDesBossesconsultedandquotedin
anoteto201ofhisLatintranslationofLeibnizTheodicy(Dutens1,273).
11
Iuseordinary(single)quotationmarksinplaceofcornerquotes,sincethelatterarenotuniversally
understood.
12
Iowethisinformation,andthephrase"firstTheodicy,"totheintroductiontoSaame,14,16,22.
Saame'sexcellenteditionisnowsupersededbyAVI,iii,asastandardreference,buthis
introductionandnotesremainextremelyvaluable.
16
syllogisticfigures]DaraptiandFelapton,whynotsomethingcontingentfrom
somethingnecessary?(AVI,iii,127)13
Thusbaldlystated,Leibniz'sanswerseemssimplytoignorethemodalaxiomtowhichCurley
appeals.Leibnizacknowledgedtheaxiom,however,atleastby1675,whenhewrote,"Whateveris
incompatiblewithsomethingnecessaryisimpossible"(AVI,iii,464).Hethereforedistinguished
twotypesofnecessityandimpossibility."Theconceptoftheimpossibleistwofold:thatwhichhas
noEssence;andthatwhichhasnoExistenceorwhichneitherwasnorisnorwillbe,whichis
incompatiblewithGodorwithexistenceorwiththereasonwhichmakesthingstoberatherthan
not"(AVI,iii,463).LeibnizaccordinglycorrectedhisanswerinthemanuscriptofThe
Philosopher'sConfession(verylikelyabouttheendof1677),14toincorporatesuchadistinction:
Ireplythatitisfalsethatwhateverfollowsfromwhatisnecessarythroughitselfis
necessarythroughitself.Fromtruths,tobesure,nothingfollowsthatisnottrue.Yet
sinceaparticular[conclusion]canfollowfrompurelyuniversal[premises],asin[the
syllogisticfigures]DaraptiandFelapton,whymaynotsomethingcontingent,or
necessaryonthehypothesisofsomethingelse,followfromsomethingthatisnecessary
throughitself?(AVI,iii,127f.)15
Healsoadded:
Inthisplacewecallnecessaryonlythatwhichisnecessarythroughitselfthatis,which
hasthereasonofitsexistenceandtruthwithinitself.SucharetheGeometricaltruths,
andofexistingthingsonlyGod.Theothers,whichfollowfromthesuppositionofthis
seriesofthingsthatis,fromtheharmonyofthingsorfromtheExistenceofGod,are
contingentthroughthemselvesandonlyhypotheticallynecessary.(AVI,iii,128)16
Hereitisclearthatinspiteofthetraditionalterminologyofhypotheticalnecessity,theabsoluteor
persenecessitythatLeibnizdeniesinaffirmingcontingencyissomethingmorethanthetraditional
necessityoftheconsequent.17InLeibniz'sconceptionofhypotheticalnecessity,theabsolute
necessityorcontingencyoftheantecedentisnomoreimportantthantheexternalityofthe
____________________
13
HereItranslatethetextofAVI,iii,minusLeibniz'slateradditions.
14
Additionstoamanuscriptarehardtodate,butweknowthatLeibnizwasworkingonthistext,and
thinkingalongtheselines,atthistime.ThemanuscriptbearsmarginalcommentsbyNicolaus
Steno,inSteno'shand,andresponsestotheminLeibniz'shand,whichsurelydatefromtheperiod
ofSteno'sresidenceinHannover,fromlate1677to1680.StenoandLeibnizhadalongdiscussion
onthesubjecton27November/7December1677.Leibniz'srecordofhisownviewsinthat
discussionexpressthesametheoryofcontingencyastheseadditionstoThePhilosopher's
Confession,asIwillshortlyexplain.Onthesematters,seeAVI,iii,115andtheintroductionto
Saame,2023.
15
HereItranslatethefulltextofAVI,iii,italicizingLeibniz'sprincipaladditions.
16
HeretheitalicizedwordswereunderlinedbyLeibniz.WhatLeibnizsayshereisimportantforhis
conceptionofGodasanecessarybeing;seeChapter5,section1.
17
Conversely,'hypotheticalnecessity'couldmeanforLeibnizsomethingstrongerthanittraditionally
meant,somethingthatexcludesonlypersenecessity.FabrizioMondadoriarguesalongdifferent
linesforasimilarconclusioninhisverythoroughandilluminatingstudyofLeibniz'streatmentof
thistopic;seeMondadori,"NecessityexHypothesi,"esp.pp.196205.
17
antecedenttotheconsequent.Whatfollowsnecessarilyfromwhatisnecessarythroughitselfis
certainlynecessarybynecessityoftheconsequent,inthetraditionalsense.Itisnotnecessary
throughitself,however,butonlyhypotheticallynecessary,andcontingent,inLeibniz'ssense,ifthe
antecedentfromwhichitfollowsisexternaltoit,andnotcontainedinitsownnature.Thephrase
Leibnizuseshere,'necessaryexalteriushypothesi'[necessaryonthehypothesisofsomethingelse],
expresseshismeaningbetterthanthemoreusual'necessaryexhypothesi'.
Thisconceptionofhypotheticalnecessityisexpressedonlyslightlylessclearlyinanotherearly
passage.InLeibniz'srecordofhissideofhisconversationon27November1677withNicholas
Steno,whoreadThePhilosopher'sConfessionandcommentedonit,hesaysthat"thereisan
absolutenecessitywhenathingcannotevenbeunderstood,butimpliesacontradictioninterms,"
and"thereisahypotheticalnecessitywhenathing'sbeingsomeotherwaycanindeedbe
understoodthroughitself,butitisnecessarilythisway,nonessentially[peraccidens],onaccount
ofotherthingsoutsideitselfalreadypresupposed"(Gr270f.).
InhislaterwritingsLeibnizisusuallylessexplicitabouthisinterpretationofhypothetical
necessity,andindeeditmaybequestionedwhetherheadheredconsistentlytohisaccountof
contingencyintermsofthingspossibleintheirownnature.Theevidencethathisadherencetoit
wasnotconsistentandunwaveringhastodowiththequestionwhethereffectsthatarecontingent
inthesenseofbeingonlyhypotheticallynecessarymusthavecontingentcauses,andlikewise
whethereffectsthatarepossibleinthemselvesmusthavepossiblecauses.Therearepassages,both
earlyandlate,inwhichLeibnizsaysthatthepossibilityoressence,asdistinctfromtheactual
existence,ofanybeingdependsonthepossibilityofacauseorreasonofitsexistence,which
seemstoimplythattheconceptsofcreaturesaspossibledependontheconceptofGodaspossibly
causingthem.
Thusin1676,inconnectionwiththeontologicalargumentfortheexistenceofGod,Leibnizwrote
thatamostperfectBeing"cannotbeunlessithasareasonofexistingfromitselforfromsomething
else"(AVI,iii,572).18WhileitisGodwhosepossibilityLeibnizisdiscussinghere,heisclearly
relyingonageneralprinciplethatwouldmakethepossibilityofanybeingdependonthe
possibilityofareasonforitsexistence.Thisthreatenstounderminethedistinctionbetweeninternal
andexternalpossibilityonwhichhisfirstmaintheoryofcontingencyisbased.
Ofcoursethistextmaywellhavepreceded,bysomemonths,Leibniz'sfulldevelopmentofthat
theoryofcontingency.Andby1678or1679Leibnizhimselfwasusingadistinctionbetween
internalandexternalpossibilitytocriticizeaSpinozisticproofthatwasbasedonanassumption
verysimilartohisownassumptionof1676.Heendorsesaproofthatasubstanceconceived
throughitselfispossibleinthesensethatit"canbeconceived,"butwithareservation:
Butthusfaritcanstillbedoubtedwhetheritisthereforepossibleinthewayinwhich
possibleistakeninthiscontextthatis,notforwhatcanbecon
____________________
18
ThispassageispartofanargumentdiscussedatlengthinChapter5,section2.3.
18
ceived,butforthatofwhichsomecause,analyzableultimatelyintothefirstcause,can
beconceived.Fornotallofthethingswecanconceivecanthereforebeproduced,on
accountofother,superiorthingswithwhichtheyareincompatible.(GI,143/L199)
Beingunabletobeproduced(byaperfectlywiseandgoodGod)onaccountofincompatibilitywith
superiorthingsisexactlythewayinwhichLeibnizthoughtthatsomethingpossibleinitsown
naturemightnonethelesslackamoreexternalsortofpossibility.In1678or1679heseesthatthis
pointinvalidatesanexistenceproofthatdependsoninferringthepossibilityofacausefromthe
possibilityofathinginitsownnature.Thatin1676heproposed(tohimself,atleast)aproofthat
dependsontheconverseinferencefromimpossibilityofacausetowhatappearstobeunderstood
asimpossibilityofathinginitsownnaturemaybetakenassuggestingthatby1676hehadnotyet
workedoutthedistinctionbetweeninternalandexternalmodalitiesorthetheoryofcontingency
thatdependsonthedistinction.
Perhapshehadnot.Buttheviewexpressedin1676recursatintervalsthroughLeibniz'smiddleand
lateryears.Thereisapaperfromthemid1680s(Gr310f.),forexample,thathints,thoughitdoes
notunambiguouslyimply,thateffectsthatarecontingentinthesenseofbeingonlyhypothetically
necessarymusthavecontingentcauses.WritingtoArnauldin1686,Leibnizsaysthat"the
possibilitiesofindividualsorofcontingenttruthscontainintheirconceptthepossibilityoftheir
causes,namelyofthefreedecisionsofGod"(LA51).Inaletterof1701toBurcherDeVolder,
Leibnizsays,"forconceivingoftheessenceof[asubstance],theconceptofapossiblecauseis
required;forconceivingofitsexistence,theconceptofanactualcauseisrequired"(GII,225/
L524).Similarly,Leibnizseemstothinkthatthepossibilityofaneffectrequiresthepossibility,
thoughnottheactuality,ofsomecauseofit,whenhesays,inaletterof1714toLouisBourguet,
"Generallyspeaking,inorderforathingtobepossible,itsufficesthatitsefficientcausebe
possible;Iexceptthesupremeefficientcause,whichmustexistinfact"(GIII,572/L661).19In
someofthesepassagesitisnotexplicitthatthepossibilityofathinginitselfisatissue;butthe
statementof1701toDeVolderaboutessenceissurelyaboutinternalpossibility.
Iamnotpersuadedbythisevidence,however,thatLeibnizeverabandonedthedistinctionbetween
internalandexternalpossibility,orthetheoryofcontingencybasedonit.ForintheTheodicyof
1710hestillsaysthatconsiderationsaboutwhatGodchooses,andingeneralaboutthecausesofa
thing,arenotrelevanttothequestionofthething'spossibility(T235,quotedearlierinsection1.2).
AnditwouldnotbeplausibletointerpretLeibnizthereasmeaningonlythattheactualityofthe
causesisirrelevant,whiletacitlyassumingthatthepossibilityofthecausesisrelevant.Forheis
explicitlyattackingAbelard,whomhereads(T171)asarguing,notmerelyfromthenonactuality,
butfromtheallegedimpossibilityofGod'shavingchosenotherwisethanGodactuallydid.The
ideathatitisenoughforcontingencythatthereareapluralityofalternativesforGod'schoicethat
arepossibleinthemselvesismoreclearlyand
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19
TwoofthepassagesquotedherewerecalledtomyattentionbyDavidBlumenfeld,whoalso
pointedouttheproblemtheycauseformyinterpretation.
19
emphaticallypresentedintheTheodicythananyotherwellarticulatedsolutiontotheproblemof
contingency.20BythetimeofwritingtheTheodicy,asweshallsee,Leibnizhaddevelopedamore
ambitioustheoryofcontingencythatenabledhimtoholdthatGod'schoiceofthisworldto
actualizeiscontingent,andthereforethatcontingentexistencesdohaveacontingentcauseinGod;
thismoreambitioustheoryisnotclearlypresentedintheTheodicy,however.
PerhapsthereissomevacillationorinconsistencyinLeibniz'streatmentofhypotheticalnecessity
andtherelationofathing'spossibilitytothepossibilityofacauseofit.Butwemaybeableto
obtainaconsistentreadingofall(oralmostall)thetextsifwedrawtherightlinebetween
attributesofGodthatare,andthatarenot,tobetakenintoaccountinthebasicconceptsofpossible
worlds.Inparticular,weshouldconsiderthehypothesisthatLeibnizconsistently(andpersistently)
supposedthattheinternalpossibilityofcreatedthingsdependsonGod'somnipotenceorpowerto
createthem,butnotonGod'sjustice,bywhichGoddiscriminatesamongtheinternallypossible
creatures.
1.4TheRealityofChoice
Wemaybetemptedtoobjectthattheconceptionofthecontingentasthatwhichhassome
alternativethatispossibleinitself(ifnotinrelationtoGod,orGod'sjustice)doesnotreallyshow
howtherecanbeanycontingencyintheLeibnizianuniverse,norhowGod'schoiceamong
possibleworldscanbefree.ForwhatiscontingentinthisLeibniziansensemaystillbenecessary
bynecessityoftheconsequentthatis,absolutelynecessaryinthetraditional(and
twentiethcentury)sense.AndthechoiceofthisworldtoactualizemaybenecessitatedbyGod's
natureasperfectlygood,evenifotherworldsremainpossibleinthemselves.Ifthisisallthat
Leibnizhastoofferindefenseofcontingency,hissystemmaybethoughtasnecessitarianas
Spinoza's.
Mostofwhatissaidinthisobjectionisright,inaway,butitoverlooksthenatureofLeibniz's
interestinfreewillandcontingency,alongwithhisstatedviewofthedifferencebetweenhis
determinismandSpinoza's.Hisinterestincontingencyisrootedinhisinterestindivineandhuman
freewillwithrespecttowhichheis,afterall,acompatibilist.Wemustlethimdefineforhimself
whatkindofcompatibilistheis.Atonetime,aswehaveseen,heregardedunqualifiednecessityas
compatiblewithfreedom.Laterhisprincipalreasonforinsistingonsomesortofcontingencyin
connectionwithfreeactionseemstohavebeentoensuretherealityofchoicetoensurethatwhat
happensisreallyinfluencedbyfinalcausesandjudgmentsofvalue.
ThisisthepointthatLeibnizmostofteninsistsonindistinguishinghisviewsaboutnecessityfrom
Spinoza's.Spinozaheldthattherearenofinalcausesinnature,thatGoddoesnotactforanend,
andthatthingsarecalledgoodorbadwithregardonlytohowtheyaffectus,beingquite
indifferenttoGod(Ethics,I,Appendix).Hesaidthatactualintellectandwillmustbereferredto
Godasaneffect[naturanaturata]andnottoGodasacause[naturanaturans](Ethics,I,
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20
Istillholdthisview,despiteSleigh'sargumentstothecontrary;seeSleigh,LeibnizandArnauld,
pp.82f.,andnote6above.
20
prop.31),anddeniedthatadivineintellectorwillcouldresembleoursinanythingmorethanname
alone(Ethics,I,prop.17,schol.).IndeedthereisnoroominSpinoza'ssystemforGodtochoose,
forthereisnothingtobeexcludedbyGod'schoice.Bythenecessityofthedivinenature,sinceitis
infiniteinSpinoza'ssense,absolutelyeverythingpossiblemustbeactual(Ethics,I,prop.16).
OnallofthesepointsLeibnizdisagreedwithSpinoza.Eveninthemostextremelynecessitarian
interpretationofLeibniz'ssystem,God'schoicehasarealandimportantroletoplay.Forevenif
God'schoiceofthisworldisnecessary,otherworldsarepossibleintheirownnatureandarenot
excludedwithoutGod'schoicebutonlythrough(thenecessityof)God'schoosingthisone.God's
choiceisanindispensablelinkinthechainofexplanationfortheactualityofthisworld."The
natureofthings,takenwithoutintelligenceandwithoutchoice,hasnothingsufficiently
determining"(T350).Thecomparativevalueofthedifferentworldsalsohasacrucialexplanatory
role,inwhichLeibnizemploysanotionoffinalcause.21
LeibnizemphasizesthisdisagreementinhisdiscussionsofSpinoza,earlyandlate.Intheperiod
167678,nearthetimeofSpinoza'sdeath,Leibnizcommented,"Butitisnotatalltobethought
thatallthingsfollowfromGod'snaturewithoutanyinterventionofthewill"(AVI,iii,364;cf.Gr
279),and"Evenifitistruethatnoteverythinghappensforthesakeofhumanbeings,itstilldoes
notfollowthat[God]actswithoutwillorunderstandingofthegood"(GI,150/L205).Inthe
Theodicyhewrote:
Spinoza...appearstohaveexplicitlytaughtablindnecessity,havingdeniedtothe
authorofthingsunderstandingandwill,andimaginingthatgoodandperfectionrelate
onlytousandnottohim.ItistruethatSpinoza'sopiniononthissubjectissomewhat
obscure....Nevertheless,asfarasonecanunderstandhim,heacknowledgesno
goodnessinGod,properlyspeaking,andheteachesthatallthingsexistbythe
necessityoftheDivinenature,withoutGodmakinganychoice.Wewillnotamuse
ourselveshererefutinganopinionsobad,andindeedsoinexplicable.Ourownis
foundedonthenatureofthepossiblesthatistosay,ofthethingsthatdonotimply
anycontradiction.(T173;cf.T174,37174;RS4850/AG277f.)
IfwewillallowLeibniztodisagreewithSpinozainhisownway,ratherthaninsomewaythatwe
mightimposeonhim,thisshouldbeenoughtoshowthathisdeterminismisnotproperlycalled
Spinozistic.
1.5MoralNecessity
WhenLeibnizsaysthatheopposesa"brute"or"blind"necessity(T174,349),hemeans
(sometimeswithexplicitreferencetoSpinoza)anecessitythatdenies
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21
AsimilarpointismadebyMargaretWilson,inherinterestingpaper,"Leibniz'sDynamicsand
ContingencyinNature,"pp.284f.:"Evenifoneshouldconcludethatthedenialofatruthoffact
mustleadtocontradictiononLeibniz'spremises,thereremainvastdifferencesbetweenhissystem
andthenecessitarianismofSpinoza.Themainpointcanbeexpressedverysimply:Leibniz's
philosophyrequiresthattheexplanationofanyexistentialpropositioninvolvereferencetovalue,
purpose,perfection."
21
toGodintelligenceandchoice(T37172).Similarly,intheTheodicy22headmitsa"moral"butnot
a"metaphysical"necessityofGod'schoosingthebest.Leibnizusuallygiveslittleornoexplanation
ofthisdistinction,andonemightbetemptedtotakeitasapromissorynoteforalessstrongly
necessitariantheorythathewasunabletoprovideindetail.Butinfact'morallynecessary'hada
precisemeaning.Themorallynecessaryiswhatonemorallyoughttodo.Inhisearlywritingson
jurisprudence(167178)Leibnizenunciatedasystemofmoralmodalities(averyrudimentary
deonticlogic)intermsofwhatispossible,impossible,necessary,orcontingent(i.e.,omissibleor
notnecessary)"tobedonebyagoodman"(AVI,i,465ff.)."Icallmorallyimpossiblethatwhichit
isnotpossibletodowithoutcommittingasin"(AIV,i,471)."Obligation...isamoralnecessity
thatis,anecessityimposedonhimwhowantstokeepthenameof'agoodman'"(Gr608).
Similarly,"duty[officium]iswhateverisnecessaryintheperfectlyjust"(C517).Accordingly,
whenLeibnizsaysthatGod'schoiceofthebestismorallynecessary,wemusttakehimtomean
thatitisnecessarythatifGoddidnotchoosethebest,Godwouldnotbeperfectlygood.Itis
noteworthythatSamuelClarke,hiscontemporary,didtakethistobeLeibniz'smeaning.Clarke's
examplesofmoralnecessityare"thatagoodBeing,continuingtobeGood,cannotdoEvil;ora
wiseBeing,continuingtobeWise,cannotactunwisely;oraveraciousPerson,continuingtobe
veracious,cannottellaLie"(GVII,423).(Clarkealsothoughtthisa"figurative"and
philosophicallyuninterestingsenseof'necessity'.)
ItisinkeepingwiththisconceptionthattheTbeodicyspeaksofbeing"necessitatedmorallyby
wisdom"(T237),identifiesmoralnecessitywith"thechoiceofthewise,worthyofhiswisdom"(
Tpd2),andsaysthat"itisamoralnecessitythatthewisestisobligedtochoosethebest"(T230).
InsomeofhisdiscussionsofmoralnecessityLeibniz'sconcernfortherealityofchoicecomes
togetherprettyexplicitlywithhisideaofthecontingentasthatwhichreceivesnecessityonlyfrom
outsideitselfandhasalternativesthatarepossibleinthemselves.Hedistinguishesbetween
"metaphysicalnecessity,whichleavesnoplaceforanychoice,presentingonlyonepossibleobject,
andmoralnecessity,whichobligesthewisesttochoosethebest"(T367),andsays:
Butthatsortofnecessitywhichdoesnotdestroythepossibilityofthecontraryhasthat
nameonlybyanalogy.Itbecomeseffective,notbytheessenceofthingsalone,butby
thatwhichisoutsidethemandabovethem,namelybythewillofGod.Thisnecessityis
calledmoral,becausewiththewise,whatisnecessaryandwhatoughttobeare
equivalentthings.[TaVIII(GVI,386)]
2.Leibniz'sSecondMainSolution
WehavenowexploredthesetofideasthatconstitutetheinnermostandsurestbastionofLeibniz's
defensesagainstthedenialofcontingency.Evenifeverythingactualisnecessarilyactualizedby
Godonaccountofthedivinegoodness,
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22
Leibnizusedtheconceptofmoralnecessitymuchearlier,buthadappliedittoGod'schoiceofthe
bestonlysince1707,accordingtoGrua,Jurisprudence,p.235.
22
thethingsthatGodchoosesarenotnecessarythroughthemselves,butonlyonthehypothesisof
somethingexternaltothem,andtheyhavealternativesthatarepossibleinthemselves.Theyare
thereforeinacertainsensecontingent,andonlyhypotheticallynecessary.Leibnizfinds
contingencyinthissenseworthdefending,becauseitpreservestherealityofGod'schoice,
distinguishingthe"moral"necessitythatheascribestoGod'sactionfromthe"brute"or"blind"
necessitythathethinksbelongstoitinSpinoza'ssystem.Leibnizadheredtotheseviewsfrom
1677totheendofhislife.
Butwehaveyettoexaminetheouterwallsofhiscastleofcontingency.Intheend,Leibniznot
onlydeniedthatthisworld,whichinfactisactual,isnecessarythroughitself;healsodeniedthatit
isnecessarilyactualizedbyGod.Inseveralpapersfromthe1680sweseehimstrugglingtojustify
thisdenialandfititintohisphilosophy.By1690hehadmademuchprogressinunderstandingthe
problemandhadattainedasolutionthatseemstohavesatisfiedhimfairlywell.
2.1TheContingencyofWhichWorldIsBest
AccordingtoLeibniz,thisworld,ratherthananyotherpossibleworld,isactualbecauseGod
choosestoactualizewhateverisbest,andthisisthebestofallpossibleworlds.Therefore,ifitis
contingentthatthisworldisactual,itmusteitherbecontingentthatGodchooseswhateverisbest
orbecontingentthatthisisthebest.Whichisitthatiscontingent?Leibnizexplicitlyraisedthis
questioninseveralpaperswrittenbetween1689and1706;hetendedtofavortheanswerthatwhat
iscontingentisthatthisworldisthebest.
Inonenotefromabout1695heraisesthequestionwithoutansweringit:
Theformalcause[oftheknowabilityoffuturecontingents]isthecoherenceofterms,
orthefactthatthepredicateinheresinthesubject,evenifthecausewhyitinheres
dependsontwothings,theuniversalbestnessandGod'sdecisiontochoosethebest.Or
isGod'sgeneraldecisionnecessary?230risitnotthat'Thisisthebest'istrue,butnot
necessary;itistruebutnotdemonstrableapriori.Isitnotthereforecontingent?(
Gr351)
Althoughthequestionisnotansweredhere,Leibniz'sinclinationisclear.
Itisexplicitinothertexts,includinganimportantpaperfrom1689or1690,theearliestwork
knowntomeinwhichLeibnizdefinedthealternatives:24
Wemustseewhetherifwesupposethatthispropositionisnecessary:theproposition
whichhasthegreaterreasonforexistingexists,itfollowsthatthepropositionwhich
hasthegreaterreasonforexistingisnecessary.Buttheinferenceisrightlyrejected.For
ifthedefinitionofanecessarypropositionis,thatitstruthcanbedemonstratedwith
geometricalrigor,thenitcanindeed
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23
Leibnizfirstwrote"God'sgeneraldecisionisnecessary"thenchangedit,producingasentence
thatisquiteawkwardintheoriginal.
24
ThedateisthatofLeibniz'sItaliantour;themanuscriptiswrittenonItalianpaper(VE1763).The
textbelongstoaperiodwhenLeibnizwasincomfortablepossessionoftheinfiniteanalysistheory
ofcontingency,butseemsstilltohavebeenworkingouttheideasexpressedinthequotedpassage.
InmytranslationIomitthemanyphrasescrossedoutbyLeibniz.
23
happenthatthispropositioncanbedemonstrated:everytruth,andonlyatruth,hasthe
greaterreason,orthisone:Godalwaysactsmostwisely.Butitwillnotthereforebe
possibletodemonstratethisproposition:contingentpropositionAhasthegreater
reason,orcontingentpropositionAisconformedtothedivinewisdom.Andtherefore
alsoitdoesnotfollowthatcontingentpropositionAisnecessary.Andthereforeevenif
itwereconcededthatitisnecessarythatGodchoosesthebest,orthatthebestis
necessary,stillitdoesnotfollowthatthatwhichischosenisnecessary,sinceno
demonstrationthatitisthebestisgiven.(Gr305f./AG30)
HereLeibnizisrathercarefulnottoassertthatitisnecessarythatGodchoosesthebest.Buthe
doescommithimselftotheviewthatitisnotnecessarythatthis(whichGodhaschosen)isthe
best,althoughitisinfactthebest.OfthetwowaysinwhichthenecessityofthatwhichGodhas
chosencouldbedenied,Leibnizisreadierheretodenythenecessityof'Thisisthebest'thanthe
necessityof'Godchoosesthebest'.
Hisstanceisthesameinanotewrittenintheearly1690s:
Ordoesthisfollow:'Thispropositionisnecessary:Goddoesthebest.Thereforethat
whichGoddoesisnecessary'?Theinferenceisnotvalid.Fortheconclusionfollows
theweakerpart.Butitisnotdemonstrablethatacertainthingisthebest,nor,therefore,
[canitbedemonstrated]whatmustbedone.Orshallwerathersaythatthisproposition
too,'Goddoesthebest',isnotnecessarybutonlycertain?Thepreviousopinionappears
tobebest,sincethisproposition:Aisthebest,iscertain,butisnotnecessarysinceit
cannotbedemonstrated.(Gr336)
Wedonothavetodenythenecessityof'Goddoesthebest',sincethatwhichisthebestisnot
necessarilythebest.
Inanothertext,thelatestandmostrevealingoftheseries,Leibnizbeginsbystatingagainthat'This
isthebest'isnotnecessaryevenif'Thatwhichisthebestischosen'isnecessary.Hesaysthathe
doesnotknowwhetherGod'snotchoosingthebestimpliesacontradiction.Butheassertsflatly
that"Thisisthebest,"thoughtrue,"isnotdemonstrablebyademonstrationthatshowsthatthe
contraryimpliesacontradiction."Thenheseemstochangehismindandshiftstoalesscautious
positiononthenecessityofGod'schoosingthebest:
Itisthesameargument:Godwillsnecessarilytheworkthatismostworthyofhis
wisdom.Isaythathewillsit,butnotnecessarily,becausealthoughthisworkisthe
mostworthy,thatisnotanecessarytruth.25Itistruethatthisproposition:Godwills
theworkthatismostworthyofhim,isnecessary.Butitisnottruethathewillsit
necessarily.Forthisproposition:Thisworkisthemostworthy,isnotanecessarytruth;
itisindemonstrable,contingent,atruthoffact.(Gr493)
Theargumenthereturnsonanambiguityof'necessarily'.Leibnizsawitasanambiguityofscope.
Heacceptsthe'necessarily'as"appliedtothecopula"(thatis,tothewholeproposition),butnotas
appliedto"whatiscontainedinthecopula"(thatis,asinternaltothepredicate).Hewillaffirmthat
"Godis
____________________
25
Vrit.Grua,bymistake,hassuite.Gruahasalsoinsertedquotationmarksinthetextofthis
passage.
24
necessarilytheonewhowillsthebest.Butnottheonewhonecessarilywillsthebest"(Gr494).It
ismisleading,however,forLeibniztomakeanissueofwhichverb'necessarily'modifies.The
crucialpointintheambiguityiswhetherthenecessityappliesderetotheobjectthatGodinfact
wills.Thispointcouldbebroughtoutbydistinguishingwidefromnarrowscopeofthedefinite
descriptionoperatorin"Godnecessarilywillstheworkthatismostworthyofhiswisdom."Ifithas
widescope,thenecessityappliesderetothework,andthesenseofthepropositionis,'Thework
thatismostworthyofGod'swisdomissuchthatitisnecessarythatGodwillsit'whichLeibniz
denies.Butifthedefinitedescriptionoperatorhasnarrowscope,thesenseisrather,'Itisnecessary
thatGodwillswhateverworkismostworthyofGod'swisdom'whichLeibnizhereaccepts.Of
courseitwouldbeanachronistictoexpectLeibniztohavemadethepointthatway.
Thedateofthistextdeservescomment.Itcannotpossiblyhavebeenwrittenbefore1706,because
itisanotemadeinreadingthethirdvolumeofPierreBayle'sRponsesauxquestionsd'un
provincial,whichwaspublishedattheendofthepreviousyear.26ThisrefutesNicholasRescher's
suggestionthatitwasonly"untiltheyear1686,whenhismaturephilosophytookform"that
Leibnizpreferreddenyingthenecessityof'Thisisthebest'todenyingthenecessityof'God
choosesthebest'.27
Itshouldalsobenotedthattheproposition,"Godwillsnecessarilytheworkthatismostworthyof
hiswisdom,"whichisquotedfromBayle,isdiscussedagain(withthesamereferencetoBayle)in
theTheodicy,whereitisdenied(T237).Leibnizdoesnotmaketherethedistinctionsthathehad
madeinthenotefrom1706,butonlyappealstothedifferencebetweenmetaphysicalandmoral
necessity.WhatheisdenyingintheTheodicy,however,shouldprobablybeunderstoodinlightof
theearliernote.
2.2Necessity,Demonstrability,andInfiniteAnalysis
Thethesisthatthepropertyofbeingthebestofallpossibleworldsbelongsonlycontingentlytothe
worldthathasithasseemedsoevidentlyfalsetosomerecentphilosophersthattheyhavebeen
unwillingtoregarditasapartofLeibniz'smaturephilosophy."Thatthisworldisthebestpossible
worldispresumablyanecessaryfact,"accordingtoCurley;28Reschersays,"itisdifficulttosee
howwhatisbestcouldavoidbeingdeterminedwithnecessitationwhenthesubstancesare
conceivedsubrationepossibilitatis."29Thatthisworldisthebestdoesnotdependonwhichworld
exists,orisactual,orischosenbyGod.Leibnizinsiststhatthevaluesofthingsarecompletely
independentofGod'sWill.30The"bestness"ofthisworldisratherthegroundofitsbeingchosen
byGodandhenceactualandexistent.
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26
December1705,dated1706.SeeLabrousse,PierreBayle,vol.I,p.259,n.88.Leibnizhadseen
thevolumebyFebruary1706(GIII,143).
27
Rescher,PhilosophyofLeibniz,pp.69f.
28
Curley,"RootofContingency,"p.94.
29
Rescher,PhilosophyofLeibniz,pp.69f.
30
AspointedoutinthisconnectionbyLovejoy,GreatChainofBeing,p.173.
25
Inseveralofhismaturewritings,however,Leibnizdidassertthatthebestnessofthatwhichisbest
iscontingent,aswehaveseen,andIdonotknowofanytextfromthematureperiodofhis
philosophyinwhichheassertsorimpliestheopposite.Howcanhehavethoughtwhatheappears
tohavethought?Theexplanationistobesoughtintheidea,whichoccursinallofthecrucial
passages,thatitcannotbedemonstratedwhatisbest.Leibnizbringsinhere,implicitly,hisvery
formalidealofdemonstrationbyanalysisInafinitenumberofsteps.Forofallhissolutionstothe
theologicalversionoftheproblemofcontingency,thatwhichproceedsbydenyingthenecessityof
factsaboutwhichthingsarebestisthemostclearlyconnectedwithhisconceptionofcontingency
intermsofinfiniteanalysis.
Thisconceptionisindeedratherfullystatedintheearliestofthepapersinwhichwehavefound
Leibnizsayingthatitiscontingentwhatisthebest.
Andhere31isuncoveredthesecretdistinctionbetweenNecessaryandContingent
Truths,whichnoonewilleasilyunderstandunlesshehassometinctureof
Mathematicsnamelythatinnecessarypropositionsonearrives,byananalysis
continuedtosomepoint,atanidenticalequation(andthisverythingistodemonstrate
atruthingeometricalrigor);butincontingentpropositionstheanalysisproceedsto
infinitybyreasonsofreasons,sothatindeedoneneverhasafulldemonstration,
althoughthereisalways,underneath,areasonforthetruth,evenif32itisperfectly
understoodonlybyGod,whoalonegoesthroughaninfiniteseriesinoneactofthe
mind.(Gr303/AG28)
ThisisLeibniz'ssolutiontotheversionoftheproblemofcontingencythathasfascinatedhis
twentiethcenturyreaders,theversionthatasks,"iftheconceptofhavingthepredicateatagiven
timeinheresintheconceptofthesubject,howcanthesubjectthenlackthepredicatewithout
contradictionand33impossibility,andwithoutlossofitsconcept?"(FC179/L264)Thesolutionis
thatapredicatecanbecontainedintheconceptofasubjectwithoutthiscontainmentbeing
provablebyanalysisinafinitenumberofsteps.Leibnizwillsaythatinsuchacasethesubject's
lackingthepredicatedoesnot"implyacontradiction,"andthatitshavingthepredicatecannotbe
"demonstrated"andiscontingent(FC181/L264).34
Anexamplemayhelpusunderstandhowsuchcasesmayarise.Itmaybethatthereisaproperty,,
suchthatforeverynaturalnumber,n,itcanbeprovedthatnhas,buttheuniversalgeneralization
thateverynhascannotbeprovedexceptbyprovingthat7has,that4has,andsoonuntil
everynhasbeenaccountedforataskthatcanneverbecompleted.Inthiscaseitisapurely
mathematicaltruththateverynhas,butitcannotbedemonstrated.Anditis
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31
GruahasEthocarcanowherethemanuscriptreadsEthicarcanum.SeeVE1763.AGfollows
Grua.
32
Etsi;Gruahaset.
33
FC'sabisamisreadingofatque.SeeVE1768.
34
Thistextisprobablyfrom1689(VE1767).Forsimilarstatementsfrom1686orearlier,seeC17/
MP97;GI74,130;andfrom1715,GIII,582/L664.NotethatinGr303/AG28,asinC1f./AG
98f.,finitedemonstrabilityispresentedasanecessary,andnotjustasufficient,conditionof
necessity,contrarytotheclaimofCastaeda,"Leibniz'sViewofContingentTruthintheLate
1680's,"pp.266f.
26
apurelymathematicalfalsehoodthatsomenlacks,butnocontradictioncanbederivedfromitin
afinitenumberofsteps.AlfredTarskidecidedtosaythatasystemofwhichtheseconditionshold,
butinwhich'Somenaturalnumberlacks'canbeproved,isconsistent,butnotwconsistent.35He
thusreservedtheuseof'inconsistent',withoutqualification,toexpressaprooftheoreticalnotion
ratherthanthenotionofmathematicalfalsity.Similarly,Leibnizreserves'impliesacontradiction'
toexpressaprooftheoreticalnotionratherthanthenotionofconceptualfalsityorbeingfalse
purelybyvirtueoftherelationsofconcepts.Hethinks,ofcourse,thatthelatternotionisexpressed
simplyby'false'.
Itisnotdifficulttoseehowitwouldfollow,fromthisconceptionofcontingency,thatitis
contingentwhichpossibleworldisthebest.Foronewouldpresumablyhavetoconsiderinfinitely
manyaspectsofaworldinordertoassignavaluetoitasawhole.Andthenonewouldhaveto
compareinfinitelymanyworldsinordertodeterminewhichisthebest.Itcouldnotbedetermined
byanyfiniteanalysis;hence,itiscontingent.SeveralcommentatorshaveexplainedLeibniz's
reasoningalongtheselines,36andLeibnizhimselfdidso.Inapaperon"NecessaryandContingent
Truths"(Couturat'stitle),whichcontainswhatseemstomeanearlystatementofhisinfinite
analysisconceptionofcontingency,Leibnizpointsoutthattheuniversehasinfinitelymany
aspects,andadds:
Indeed,evenifonecouldknowthewholeseriesoftheuniverse,onestillcouldnotgive
thereasonforit,unlessonehadsetupacomparisonofitwithalltheotherpossible
[series].Fromthisitisclearwhynodemonstrationofanycontingentpropositioncan
befound,nomatterhowfartheanalysisofconceptsiscontinued.(C19/MP99;cf.
Gr343fromtheearly1690s)
Thereremaindifficultquestions,neverresolvedbyLeibnizorhiscommentators,aboutjusthow
analysisissupposedtoworkintherelevantcases.Analysis,forLeibnizandtheseventeenth
century,wasamethodofproofbeginningwiththeconclusiontobeprovedandworkingbacktothe
axiomsfromwhichitfollowsthoughinaninfiniteanalysistheaxiomsareneverreached.The
methodthatbeginsattheotherend,withtheaxioms,wascalledsynthesis.37Inconformitywith
thisdistinction,Leibnizdescribedfiniteandinfiniteanalysesasproceedingfromthepropositionto
beproved,bysubstitutingdefinitions,orpartsofdefinitions,foritsterms(FC181f./L264f.).But
theprocessofdeterminingwhichisthebestofallpossibleworldsbycomparingthevaluesofall
theworldsseemslikelytobeasynthesis,ratherthanananalysis,inthissense.IndeedLeibnizgives
usnoideahowonewouldevenbeginananalysis,finiteorinfinite,todeterminewhichworldisthe
bestpossible,althoughitisclearthathethoughttheinfinitenumberofworldstobecomparedis
onegroundofthecontingencyofGod'schoiceofthisworld.Perhapssomethinglikethefollowing
formofanalysisisintended.Let'W*'beapropernameoftheworldthathappenstobeactual.An
analysisof'W*=thebestofallpossibleworlds'willrequirethere
____________________
35
Tarski,"EinigeBetrachtungen."
36
Couturat,"OnLeibniz'sMetaphysics,"p.31;Rescher,PhilosophyofLeibniz,pp.38f.;Abraham,
"CompleteConcepts,"p.278;Broad,Leibniz:AnIntroduction,p.35;cf.Curley,"Rootof
Contingency,"p.94.
37
Cf.Hacking,"InfiniteAnalysis,"pp.127f.
27
placementofoneorbothsidesoftheequationbyananalysans.Toreducetheequationtoidentities
bysuchreplacement,wewouldneedontherighthandsideananalysansincludingastatementof
thecomplete(oratleastthebasic)conceptsofallthepossibleworlds,butthatisnotfinitely
statable.
Anotherdifficultyisthatwhileitdoesseemthatitcouldnotbeprovedinafinitenumberofsteps
thatacertainworldisthebestpossible,theremightperhapsbeafiniteproofthatacertainworld,
oranyworldofacertainsort,isnotthebestpossible.Leibnizhimselfseemstohavethoughtit
couldbedemonstratedthatnoworldinwhichGoddamnstheinnocentisthebest.
Thedamnationoftheinnocentisindeedpossibleinitself,orsomethingthatdoesnot
implyacontradiction;butitisnotpossibleforGod....Forwedonotneedtoexamine
thewholeharmonyofthingsinordertoknowwhetherGodisgoingtodamnsomeone
innocenteternally.(Gr300;cf.Gr271)
HereLeibnizseemstobeconfrontedwithatruth,'Nooneinnocentwillbedamnedeternally',
whichsatisfiesoneofhiscriteriaforcontingency(itscontraryispossibleinitself),butnotthe
other(itwouldnotrequireaninfiniteanalysistoproveit).Leibnizdoesnottellushowtoresolve
thisconflict;indeed,Idoubtthatherealizeditsexistence.
Wemayalsobetemptedtoobjectthattheinfiniteanalysisconceptionofcontingencyrepresents
contingencyasillusory,oratbestmerelyrelativetoourintellectualincapacity(asSpinozahad
regardedit:Ethics,I,prop.33,schol.1).ItisnaturaltoconcludethatforLeibniz,asA.O.Lovejoy
putit,"thoughweareunabletoattainanintuitiveapprehensionofthenecessity[ofajudgment
whichappearstousascontingent],...wecanneverthelessbesurethatthenecessityisthere,and
isrecognizedbythemindofGod."38Russelltookasimilarviewin1903,whenhewrote,"Where
aninfiniteanalysis,whichonlyGodcanperform,isrequiredtoexhibitthecontradiction,the
oppositewillseemnottobecontradictory";hedidnotthinkthealternativesuggestion,"thatthe
denialofananalytictruthmightnotbeselfcontradictory,"wouldcommenditselftoLeibniz.39
ThisobjectionrestsonafundamentalmisunderstandingofLeibniz'sconceptionofnecessityand
contingency.Thedistinctionbetweenthem"isdrawnonlogicalgroundsalone,"asRescherrightly
pointsout.40Itisnotanepistemologicaldistinction,anditisnotbasedonarelationinwhich
contingentpropositionsstandtousbutnottoGod.Itisbasedonadifferenceinthelogicalformof
thereasonsbyvirtueofwhichpropositionsofthetwosortsaretrue.Contingenttruthsarejustas
contingentforGodastheyareforus,andGodcannomoredemonstratethemthanwecan;fornot
evenGodcan"see...theendoftheanalysis,sincethereisnoend"(FC182,184/L26Sf.).41
Leibnizdoessaythat
____________________
38
Lovejoy,GreatChainofBeing,p.175.Cf.Copleston,HistoryofPhilosophy,vol.4,p.286.
39
Russell,"RecentWorkonthePhilosophyofLeibniz,"p.378,n.8.
40
Rescher,PhilosophyofLeibniz,p.44,n.24.
41
lnDM13,andinGI131andperhapsGI74,allfrom1686,Leibnizseemstospeakofa
"demonstration"ofcontingenttruthsthatisbeyondthepowersoffinitemindstoaccomplish.And
inanearlytext,probablyfrom1677to1680(VE115=GVII,194)hespeaksofalltruthsas
"demonstrable."Thismaybedueeithertocarelessnessor,morelikely,tounclarityorvariationin
histerminologyduringaformativeperiodofhisthought.Usually,atleastfrom1689on(e.g.,VE
28
Godcanknowcontingenttruthsapriori(thatis,throughtheirreasons),andthatwecannot.But
theseepistemologicalrelationsarenotconstitutiveofcontingency;theyareonlyconsequencesof
thelogicalpropertythatisconstitutiveofcontingency.
Twoinitiallyplausibleprinciplesabout(logical)necessityarethatwhateveristruepurelybyvirtue
oftherelationsofconceptsisnecessary,andthatwhateverisnecessarymustbelogically
demonstrable.Leibnizseemsatfirsttohaveassumedbothprinciples.Thelightthatwaskindledfor
himbytheknowledgeoftheanalysisofinfinites(C18/MP97)wastherealizationthatthetwo
assumptionsareincompatiblebecausesomepropositionsthataretruesolelybyvirtueofthe
relationsofconceptsarenonethelessnotprovablebyanythingthathewouldcountasa
demonstration.Leibnizheldconsistentlytothesecondprinciple.Hisusualdefinitionofthe
logicallynecessaryisthatitisthatwhosecontraryimpliesacontradiction(e.g.,Tpd2).Andwe
haveseenthatLeibniztreats'impliesacontradiction'asexpressingaprooftheoreticalpropertythat
doesnotbelongtopropositionswhosefalsitycanbediscoveredapriorionlythroughaninfinite
analysis(FC181/L264;cf.C17/MP96f.).Therealizationoftheincompatibilityofthetwo
principlesthereforeenabledLeibnizwithaclearconsciencetogiveupthefirstprinciple,which
hadmadehistheoryoftruthseemtoleavenoroomforcontingency.
WhenRussellchargedthattheinfiniteanalysisconceptionofcontingencywouldatmostyield
truthsthatonlyseemtobecontingent,hewasexplicitlyandmistakenlyassumingthatwhateveris
falsepurelybyvirtueoftherelationsofconceptsmustbeselfcontradictoryforLeibniz.Similarly,
Curleyseemstobeassumingaconceptionofnecessityintermsofconceptualtruth,ratherthanin
termsofdemonstrability,whenhesaysthatthebestnessofthisworld"isnotrenderedanytheless
necessarybythenumberofotherpossibleworldsbeinginfiniteratherthanfinite."42Forourown
use,ofcourse,wemaywellpreferaconceptualtruthconceptionofnecessitytoademonstrability
conception.IfsowewillrightlyconcludethatLeibniz'sinfiniteanalysistheorydoesnotgiveus
realcontingency.Ibelievethatconclusionissubstantiallycorrect,asIthinkthedemonstrability
conceptionofnecessityisfundamentallymisguided.43Butthatpresentsnointernalobjectionto
Leibniz'ssystem.Thecontingencywearedemanding,hecanonlyregardasabrutefactanda
violationoftheprincipleofsufficientreason,whichhehasnointentionofadmittinginhismature
philosophy.
Itisjustasclearintheessay"OntheRadicalOriginationofThings"of23November1697(G
VII,3028/L48691)asinthelettertoWedderkopfofMay1671(AII,i,117f./L146f.)thatLeibniz
thinksofeverythingintheworldasdeterminedultimatelybythedivinenature,andparticularlyby
therelationsofconceptsinGod'sintellect.Fromthispointofviewtheproblemofcontingencyisto
findadifferencebetweenwaysinwhichfactsaredeterminedbyrelations
____________________
41
1775f.=C1f./AG98f.),heiscarefulnottosaythatcontingenttruthshave"demonstrations"though
theyhave"proofs"apriorithatareknowntoGod.
42
43
SeeR.Adams,"DivineNecessity."Asindicatedthere,Iwouldnotexactlyendorseaconceptual
truthconceptionofnecessity,either.
29
ofconceptsadifferencethatisbothimportantandplausiblyrelatedtothepreanalyticnotionsof
logicalormetaphysicalnecessityandcontingency.Thedifferencebetweentruthsthatareandare
notdemonstrableinafinitenumberofstepsisLeibniz'scandidateforthisrole.
Ifthislookslikeanattempttosolveaphilosophicalproblembydefinition,thereissomeevidence
thatthatiswhatLeibnizmeanttodo.WritinginFebruary1698toG.W.Molanusaboutwhathe
regardedasexcessivelynecessitarianexplanationsoftheoccurrenceofsins,hesaid:
ButthemoreIconsiderthematter,themoremanifestlyIseemtomyselftoseethatthe
error[peccatum]wasnotsomuchinrealitiesasinformulas,onaccountofassumed
definitionsoffreedom,necessity,will,andrightthatarenotonlylessphilosophical,
andlessfamiliar,butalsolesssuitedtoedification.Fromthemwaysofspeakingwere
boundtoarisethatareoffensivetopiousears.Bythesewaysofspeaking,tobesure,
thegreatnessofGodisextolled,andhumanprideputdown(whichseemstohavebeen
theaimofthosespeakingmorerigidly);butontheotherhand,inadequateprovision
wasmadeforcelebratingGod'sgoodness,andarousingourlovetowardhim.Whatif
therefore,asIamalmostpersuaded,bymerelydevelopingdefinitionsallthatharshness
couldbesoftened,anditispermittedtoremovethecontroversyaboutwhichpeople
havesoundedsotragic;doyouthinkthisshouldbeneglected?(Schrecker84)
2.3ContingentConnectionsamongPossiblesasSuch
Asaconsequenceofhisinfiniteanalysistheoryofcontingency,Leibnizacceptedanotherthesis,
whichsomecommentatorshavebeenmostreluctanttoadmitaspartofhisphilosophy.Russell
notedin1903that"theviewthatinfinitecomplexityisthedefiningpropertyofthecontingenthas
thecuriousconsequencethattruthsaboutpossiblesubstancesarecontingent."44BothC.D.Broad
andCurleyhaveclaimedthatLeibnizdidnotacceptthisconsequence,45buttheirclaimis
untenable.Thatyouexistinthebestpossibleworldisafactaboutyouconceivedasapossible
substance;itscontingencyfollowsfromwhatLeibnizwroteinseveralplacesaboutthecontingency
ofwhichworldisbest.
Indeed,theideathattherearecontingentconnectionsamongthingsconsideredaspossiblebecomes
quiteimportanttoLeibnizintheDiscourseonMetaphysicsandthecorrespondencewithArnauld.
Thisistobeexpected,inviewofLeibniz'sinsistencethatalloftheactsofanyindividualfollow
fromtheconceptofthatindividualconsideredaspossible.Itiscrucialtohistheodicythatthe
connectionbetweenournaturesorconceptsandoursinsandotherevilsbeonethatwouldhave
beenthere,noweakerandnostronger,evenifGodhadnotcreatedus(cf.DM30).Soifitis
importanttoourfreedomthatwebecontingentlyconnectedwithouractions,thisfollowingofour
actionsfromourconceptsmustsomehowbeacontingentconnectionbetweenthemandus
consideredaspossible.Accordingly,Leibnizsaysin13oftheDiscoursethat
____________________
44
Russell,"RecentWorkonthePhilosophyofLeibniz,"p.374,n.5;cf.Russell,Philosophyof
Leibniz,p.26.
45
Broad,Leibniz:AnIntroduction,p.36;Curley,"RootofContingency,"pp.92f.
30
therearetwosortsofconnection,oneabsolutelynecessarybuttheothercontingent,bywhich
differenteventsfollowfromthecompleteconceptofacreatedperson.46Arnauldwasperhapsthe
firsttofindthisstrange.Hearguedthat,onLeibniz'sview,theconnectionbetweenAdamand
everything"thathashappenedandwillhappentohimandhisposterity"mustbenecessary,
"because,"asLeibnizputit,"IconsidertheindividualconceptofAdamaspossible,"and"possible
conceptsinthemselvesdonotdependonthefreedecisionsofGod"(LA2830,40).Therearetwo
mainpointsinLeibniz'sreplytothisobjection.
1.
"ThepossiblesarepossiblebeforealltheactualdecisionsofGod,butnotwithoutpresupposing
sometimesthesamedecisionstakenaspossible"(LA51).Thisisbecausethecompleteconceptof
anypossiblethinginvolves(aspossible)somedecisionsthatGodwouldmake(forinstance,in
establishinglawsofnature)ifGodactualizedtheworldtowhichthatthingbelongs.HereLeibniz
clingstotheideathattruthsinvolvingGod'sdecisionsarecontingent.Butnowitseemstheyneed
notdependonwhatGodactuallydecides;itisenoughiftheyinvolvedivinedecisionsconsidered
aspossible.Wemaywonderwhythemerelypossibledivinedecisionsshouldbethoughttohave
thisrelevance.
2.
Theconnectionbetweenacreatedperson,consideredaspossible,andtheeventsofhisorher
possibleworldis"intrinsic"(LA51)and"certain"butnot"necessary,"althoughthefailureofthe
connectionwoulddestroytheindividualconceptofthatperson(LA52;cf.LA41).Hereitseems
clearthatLeibniz'spositioninvolvescontingentconnectionswithinpossibleworlds,andhence
contingenttruthsthatdonotdependonwhichworldisactual.47
ThesameviewisexpressedbyLeibnizinothertexts:
Itisofthenatureofanindividualsubstancethatitsconceptbeperfectandcomplete,
andcontainallitsindividualcircumstances,evencontingentones,downtotheleast
detail....Yettheseindividual[circumstances]arenotthereforenecessary,anddonot
dependonthedivineintellectalone,butalsoondecisionsofthedivinewill,insofaras
thedecisionsthemselvesareconsideredaspossiblebythedivineintellect.(Gr311)
____________________
46
HectorNeriCastaeda,inhisinterestingarticleon"Leibniz'sViewofContingentTruthintheLate
1680's,"proposesaninterpretationofthetwotypesofconnectionthatisquitedifferentfrommine.
IfIunderstandhim,heidentifiesthetwotypesofconnectionwiththeexistentialandessentialuses
ofthecopula'is'thatLeibnizdistinguishes(GI144).FabrizioMondadorihaspointedouttomethat
suchadistinctionwascurrentinLeibniz'stime,andcanbefound,forexample,inFranciscoSurez
MetaphysicalDisputations,XXXI,xii,4445.Thesubstanceofthisdistinction,however,issimply
thatthetruthofan"existential"predicationdependsontheactualexistenceofitssubjectand
predicateterms,whereasthetruthofan"essential"predicationdoesnot.Since,accordingto
Castaeda'sLeibniz,"everycontingenttruth"involvingtheexistentialcopula"isunderlainbyits
correspondingnecessarytruth"involvingtheessentialcopula(Castaeda,"Leibniz'sViewof
ContingentTruthintheLate1680's,"p.264),allthatiscontingent,intuitively,insuchacase,is
theexistenceofthesubjectand/orpredicate,nottheconnectionbetweenthem.Speaking,
technically,ofadifferentcopulawhentheexistenceofthetermsisimplieddoesnot,intuitively,
makethecontingencyoftheexistenceruboffontheconnection.Inthisrespecttheposition
CastaedaascribestoLeibnizisnomoreintuitivethantheoneIattributetohim.
47
Mondadori,in"LeibnizandtheDoctrineofInterWorldIdentity,"pp.32f.,takesitthatwhatisnot
necessaryhereistheactualizationoftheindividual;butthatdoesnotadequatelyexplainwhy
Leibnizshouldcalltheconnectioncontingent.Cf.note46above.
31
Goddecidedtocreateacreaturewhosefullconceptinvolvessuchaseriesofgraces
andfreeactions,althoughnotnecessarilybutbysuchaconnectionasthenatureofthe
thinginvolves.(Gr383)
Thesequotationsareprobablyfromthemid1680s(VE1105,1122).Fromabout1695,according
toGrua,isareadingnoteinwhichLeibnizstatesflatly,"Therearesomeindemonstrabletruths
eveninpossiblethingsnamelyaboutcontingentthingsregardedaspossible"(Gr353).Howcan
theconnectionbetweenanindividualsubstanceandsomeofthepropertiesoreventsinvolvedinits
conceptbecontingent?Leibnizoffershintsofsomeanswerstothisquestion,buttheyarebyno
meansasclearashisbestworkedoutanswerstothequestionofhowtheexistenceofthose
creaturesthatareactualcanbecontingent.Threeanswersmaybedistinguished.
1.In13oftheDiscourseLeibnizsaysthatthepredicateofdecidingtocrosstheRubiconand
winningthebattleofPharsalusiscontainedintheconceptofJuliusCaesar,butthatitisnot
"necessaryinitself"thatthosethingshappentohim.ThissuggeststhatLeibnizthoughtofCaesar's
decidingnottocrosstheRubicon,orhislosingatPharsalus,asthingsthatarepossiblein
themselves,insomethinglikethewaythatnonactualpossibleworldsarepossibleinthemselves
althoughtheyareimpossibleonthehypothesisofsomethingelse.Buthowcanwemakesenseof
thissuggestion,ifthesourceofthethreateningnecessityisintheconceptofCaesarhimself?That
mightbethoughttoconstituteanecessityinternaltoCaesar'sdecidingandwinning,sincehe
himselfisaconstituentofthoseevents.
ItmaybeimportantherethatLeibnizdistinguishes,withinanindividual'scompleteconcept,
betweenfeaturesthatareparticulartotheindividual,andthelawsofthatindividual'suniverse,
whichalsoenterintotheconceptoftheindividual.ToArnauldhesays:
Thusallhumaneventscouldnotfalltooccurastheyhaveactuallyoccurred,giventhat
thechoiceofAdamwasmade;butnotsomuchbecauseoftheindividualconceptof
Adam,althoughthatconceptcontainsthem,butbecauseofthedesignsofGod,which
alsoenterintothatindividualconceptofAdam,andwhichdeterminethatofthatwhole
universe.(LA51)
ItseemsclearthatintheDiscourseLeibnizisthinkingoftheintrinsicbutnotnecessaryconnection
betweenCaesarandhisdecisiontocrosstheRubiconasdependingonlawsthatgovernCaesar's
world.
[T]hispredicateofCaesarisnotsoabsoluteasthoseofnumbersorofgeometry,
but...itpresupposesthesequenceofthingsthatGodhaschosenfreely,andthatis
foundedonthefirstfreedecisionofGod,theimportofwhichistodoalwaysthat
whichismostperfect,andonthedecisionthatGodmade(inconsequenceofthefirst)
withregardtohumannature,whichisthatahumanbeingwilldoalways(though
freely)whatseemsthebest.(DM13)
ThissuggeststhehypothesisthatCaesar'sdecidingnottocrosstheRubiconisviewedbyLeibniz
aspossibleinitselfbecauseitisexcludedbyCaesar'sindividualconceptonlyinvirtueofthelaws
ofCaesar'suniverse,andnotpurelybywhatisparticulartoCaesarinCaesar'sconcept.Thiswould
explainthecontin
32
gencyofconnectionsdependingonmerelypossibledivinedecisions,ifthosepossibledecisions
areidentifiedwithlawsofauniverse.48
Thisisapossibleinterpretation,butnotwithoutproblems,ofwhichthechiefisthat,asweshall
seeinChapter3,section1,Leibniz'sviewsimplythatthelawsofCaesar'suniverseare
incorporatednotonlyinCaesar'sindividualconcept,butalso,concretely,intheprimitiveforces
thatconstituteCaesar'sverysubstance.CanCaesar'sdoingsomethingprecludedbylawsso
incorporatedinhisverysubstancebepossibleinitself?Anadequatelyinformedjudgmentonthis
questionmustawaitChapter3,wherewewillexploreavarietyofconsiderationsbearingonthe
tightnessoftheconnectionbetweenanindividualsubstance'sprimitiveforcesandtheeventsthat
happentoit.
2.Analternativereadingispossibleofthestatement,in13oftheDiscourse,thatifsomeone
didtheoppositeofsomethingthatisinvolvedinhiscompleteconcept,"hewoulddonothing
impossibleinitself,althoughitisimpossible(exhypothesi)forthattohappen."Maybejustas
GodchoosesfreelybecauseGodchoosesamongapluralityofpossibleworlds,eachofwhichis
possibleinitselfevenifitisimpossibleinrelationtoGod,soacreaturecanactfreelyby
choosingamongapluralityofactions,eachofwhichispossibleinitsownnatureevenifitis
impossibleinrelationtothecompleteconceptofthechoosingcreature.In1697,atanyrate,
LeibnizwasexplicitlywillingtoexplicatethefreedomofcreaturesaswellasofGodintermsof
thepluralityofalternativesforchoice:
ItismoreexacteventosaythatthegoodactionsofGod,theAngelsconfirmed[in
good],andtheglorifiedSaintsarenotnecessary,althoughtheyareassured;andthe
reasonisbecausetheyaredonebychoice,whereasthereisnecessitywhenthereis
nochoicetomake.Whenthereareseveralpaths,onehasthefreedomtochoose,and
althoughonemaybebetterthananother,that'sjustwhatmakesthechoice....[I]tis
notindifferenceofequilibrium,sotospeak,thatconstitutesfreedom,butthefaculty
ofchoosingamongseveralpossibles,eventhoughtheyarenotallequallyfeasibleor
convenientfortheonewhoacts.(Schrecker97)
Leibnizhereidentifiesonewayinwhichhethinksthestructureofcreatures'choicesislikethat
ofGod'schoices.Inbothcasestheagent'schoiceamongapluralityofalternativesisanessential
partofthemetaphysicalreasonfortheactuality,orthenonactuality,ofeachalternative.This
seemstobeenoughtoestablishtherealityofchoice,butintuitivelyIwouldnotsaythatit
establishestheinternalcontingencyofthealternativesforchoice.
Ifthelatteristobeestablishedbythisapproach,thealternativesamongwhichcreatureschoose
mustprobablyberegardedassomewhatgeneral,ratherthanascompletelyindividual,actions.
Caesar'salternativesonthebankoftheRubicon,forexample,mustbecrossingandnotcrossing,
ratherthanCaesar'scrossingandCaesar'snotcrossing.Individualconceptsmustbekeptoutof
theobjectsofchoice.Thislineofthought,therefore,seemsnottoprovideanexpla
____________________
48
Foraveryinterestingdiscussionoftherelationoflawsandpossibledivinedecreesto
contingency,andingeneralamuchfullerandricheraccountofcontingentconnectionswithina
singlepossibleworldthanIattempthere,seeCarriero,"LeibnizonInfiniteResolutionandIntra
MundaneContingency."
33
nationofthecontingencyofCaesar'sdecidingtocrosstheRubicon.Butitdoesshowusawayin
whichLeibnizcouldsaythattherealityofCaesar'schoiceispreserved.
3.Contingentconnectionsbetweenpossiblescanbeexplainedintermsoftheinfiniteanalysis
theoryofcontingency.Leibnizgivessuchanexplanationofthecontingencyof'Peterdenies'."The
conceptofPeteriscomplete,andsoinvolvesinfinitethings;thereforeoneneverarrivesataperfect
demonstration"(GI74).'Peterdenies'isunderdiscussioninthistextasanexistentialproposition,
buttheargumentevidentlyworksjustaswellifthesubjectisconsideredonlyasapossible
personasRussellperceivedwithdismay.
Thereareevenmoredifficultproblems,however,abouthowinfiniteanalysisissupposedtowork
inthiscasethaninthecaseofbestnessamongpossibleworlds.Leibnizmostlyignoresthese
difficulties,andIwillnottrytodomuchmoreherethanpointthemout.Thefirstistheproblemof
theLuckyProof.49Evenifinfinitelymanypropertiesandeventsarecontainedinthecomplete
conceptofPeter,atleastoneofthemwillbeprovedinthefirststepofanyanalysis.Whycouldn't
itbePeter'sdenial?Whycouldn'twebegintoanalyzePeter'sconceptbysaying,'Peterisadenier
ofJesusand...'?PresumablysuchaLuckyProofmustberuledoutbysomesortofrestrictionon
whatcountsasastepinananalysisofanindividualconcept,butsofarasIknow,Leibnizdoesnot
explainhowthisistobedone.Ontheotherhand,wemaywonderhowwecanevenbeginan
analysisoftheindividualconceptofanyperson,asLeibnizseemstoimplythatwecan.Forsucha
concept,beingcomplete,isnotourconceptbutGod's,andwedonotseemtohaveadefinitionwith
whichtobegintoreplaceit.50
2.4ReasonsThatInclinewithoutNecessitating
OneofthethingsLeibniznevertiredofsayingaboutfreechoicesisthattheircauses,motives,or
reasons"incline"butdonot"necessitate."Lovejoycallsthis"misleadingifedifyingphraseology"
anda"verbaldistinction,absolutelymeaninglessinthelightof[Leibniz's]otherdoctrines."51One
istemptedtoagreewiththisharshjudgment,forLeibnizdoesnotgivemuchexplanationofthe
differencebetweenincliningandnecessitating.ButIthinkthedistinctionhasaplaceinthe
interpretationofLeibnizIhavebeendeveloping.
Leibnizpresentstheideaofreasonsthatinclinewithoutnecessitating,sometimesinconnection
withthenotionofachoiceamongalternativesthatarepossibleinthemselves(T45,230;LCV,89),
andsometimesinconnectionwiththeinfiniteanalysistheoryofcontingency.Inthelatter
connection,whichseemstomethemoreilluminatingofthetwo,Leibnizsays,"Thereisthesame
proportionbetweennecessityandinclinationthatthereisintheMathematicians'Analysisbetween
exactequationandlimitsthatgiveanapproximation"(Gr479;cf.Gr303,Tk14).Thisstatement
waswrittenintheyearsaround1700inamemorandumthatalsomakesclearhowinfinityis
supposedtoenterinto
____________________
49
1amindebtedtoWilliamIrvineforthisnameforit.
50
Cf.Broad,Leibniz:AnIntroduction,p.27.
51
Lovejoy,GreatChainofBeing,p.174.
34
theinfluenceofreasonsonthewill.Theword'incline'suggeststheimageofabalancethatis
tippedorinclinedtoonesideortheotherbythepreponderanceofweights;and'balance'(nounand
verb)occurs,atleastfiguratively,severaltimesinthememorandum.Leibnizlikedmechanical
analogiesofvolition(T22,GVII,304/L488),andinparticularthatofthebalance(cf.NE193).He
laterwrotetoClarke(V,3)that"reasonsinthemindofawisebeing,andmotivesinanymind
whatsoever,dothatwhichanswerstotheeffectproducedbyweightsinabalance."Thoughnot
necessitating,thebalanceofmotivesdeterminesascertainlyasthebalanceofweights:"Wealways
followthedirectiontowardwhichthereismoreinclinationordisposition"(Gr479);weneverfail
todoso(T43).
Themotivesthatplaytheroleofweightsinthescalesofvolitionincludeallourperceptions,
subconsciousaswellasconscious,accordingtoLeibniz."Severalperceptionsandinclinations
contributetothecompletevolition,whichistheresultoftheirconflict.Someofthemare
separatelyimperceptible;themassofthesemakesanuneasinesswhichpushesuswithoutthe
subjectofitbeingseen"(NE192;cf.Gr480).
Heretheinfinitemakesitsappearance.ForinLeibniz'ssystemthemassofsubconscious
perceptionsinafinitespiritisaconfusedperceptionofthewholeuniverse,inallitsinfinite
complexity.Everyfactabouttheworldisperceived,andourperceptionofithassomeinfluenceon
ourwill;thoseperceptionsofwhichwearenotconsciousarenonethelessweighedinthebalance
enmasse,byvirtueoftheircontributiontoourfeelings.Ourminds,beingfinite,cannotcompletely
understandthemotivesofourchoices,becausetheyareinfinitelycomplex.Onthesameground,
theconnectionbetweenafreedecisionanditsultimatereasonsormotiveswillbecontingent,and
cannotbedemonstrated,inthesenseslaiddownintheinfiniteanalysistheoryofcontingency.
Muchofthis,includingsomeconnectionbetweencontingencyandtheinfinityofinfluences,is
explicitinthememorandumquotedearlier.Leibnizspeaksthereofourignorance"ofaninfinityof
littleinfluencesonusofwhichwearenotconscious,"whichsometimesletsushavetheillusion
thatthefactorsmovingourwillareequallybalanced.Andheimmediatelyadds:
Thatshowsthatitisindeedalwaystruethatourfreedom,andthatofallother
intelligentsubstancesrightuptoGodhimself,isaccompaniedbyacertaindegreeof
indifferenceorcontingency,whichhasbeendefinedinsuchawaythatweandthose
substancesarenevernecessitated,sincethecontraryofthatwhichhappensalways
remainspossibleorimpliesnocontradiction.(Gr480f.)
ThereferencetoGodshouldnotbetakenassuggestingthatGodhassubconsciousmotives,for
Leibniz'sGodperceiveseverythingdistinctly.ButLeibnizdidsaythat"Godhadinfinitereasons
competingwitheachother,whichheconsideredwhenhejudgedthispossibleuniverseworthyto
bechosen";heoffereditasanexplanationofwhythetruthof"Thisseriesoftheuniverseisthe
best"cannotbeknownaprioribyus(Gr343).God'sreasons,likeours,inclinebutdonot
necessitate,becausetheyareinvolvedinaconflictofsuchinfinitecomplexitythattheresulting
volitioncannotbedemonstrated(inthestrictsense)fromthem.
35
LeibnizhimselfseemsstrangelytogetthispointwronginalettertoJaquelotof1704,wherehe
explicitlylinksthenotionofincliningwiththingsbeingtoocomplexforustounderstandthem.He
saysthat"futurethingsarecontainedinthesoulevenlessthaninGod,becausetheyareinthesoul
distinctlyonlyinanincliningandconfusedway,andnotexplicitlyandperfectlyasintheDivine
ideas"(GIII,472).Thislinkageofthemesisrevealing,butLeibnizhastheshoeonthewrongfoot
inthistext(evenapartfromthepuzzlingsuggestionofaconfusedwayofbeinginthesoul
distinctly).ForhethinksthatGod,too,isonlyinclined,notnecessitated,byreasons(T230),
althoughGod'sperceptionsareinnowayconfused.Whatisessentialtoinclination,therefore,is
notconfusion,buttheinfinityoffactorsthatinourfinitemindsgivesrisetoconfusion.
2.5Is'GodChoosesWhatIsBest'Contingent?
Thecontingencyof'Godchoosesthisworld'couldbeexplainedanddefendedbyholdingeither
that'Godchooseswhatisbest'iscontingentorthat'Thisworldisthebest'iscontingent.Wehave
seenthatLeibnizprefersthelatteralternative,butheexplicitlyrejectstheotherinonlyoneofthe
textsweexamined.Moreoftenheleavesopenthepossibilityofholdingthatbotharecontingent.
ThereseemstohavebeenmorevacillationanduncertaintyinLeibniz'smindaboutwhetheritis
necessaryorcontingentthatGodchooseswhatisbestthanaboutanyothermainissueinthe
problemofcontingency.Ishallargue,however,thattheviewthatitisnecessaryisrequiredby
otherfeaturesofLeibniz'sphilosophy.
ManypassagesinwhichLeibnizappearstoaddressthisissueyieldnosolidevidenceonit,inview
ofsomeofthesubtletiesthatwehavealreadyseeninhisposition.Whenhesays,forexample,
"God'sdecisionsaboutcontingentscertainlyarenotnecessary"(Gr385),theclaimcanbetakende
rewithrespecttothecontingents:foranycontingent,whatGoddecidesaboutitisnotnecessary
(becauseittakesaninfiniteanalysistodeterminewhatisbest).Itmaynotbeimplied,therefore,
thatitisnotnecessarythatGoddecidestoordercontingentthingsaswellaspossible.Similarly,
whenLeibnizsaysthat"Godwasinfalliblyledbyhiswisdomandgoodness...togive[theworld]
thebestformpossible;buthewasnotledtoitnecessarily"(Tk14),theexpression"toit"[French
y]doesnotmakeclearwhetherthedenialofnecessityappliesderetothatformwhichisinfactthe
bestpossiblefortheworld,orwhetheritappliesdedictotoGod'sgivingtheworldwhateverform
isbest.WehavetobearinmindLeibniz'ssayingthat"itisanecessaryproposition"thatGodwills
thebest,butthatGoddoesnotwillit"necessarily,"becausewhatisbestisnotnecessarilyso(
Gr493f.).
Ontheotherhand,ourpresentquestionremainsequallyunansweredwhenLeibnizsays,asheoften
does,suchthingsas"Godcannotfailtochoosethebest,"forLeibnizhasdistinguishedseveralsorts
ofinabilityandnecessity.Hemaymeanonlyamoralnecessity(ashesaysinsuchacontextatT
aVIII),whereasweareinterestedinlogicalormetaphysicalnecessity.
AndwhenLeibnizsaysthat"Godwillsthebestbyhisownnature"(Gr289),orthatthereason
forGod'seternalfreeactionis"thedivinenatureorperfectionitself"(C405),hesaysnothingmore
thanisimpliedbyhisanalytictheoryoftruth.WhatwewanttoknowiswhetherGod'svoluntary
optimizingis
36
demonstrablethatis,whetheritfollowsbyafiniteoronlybyaninfiniteanalysisfromthedivine
nature.Infact,inboththetextsIhavejustquotedonthispoint,itisstatedorsuggestedthatitis
notdemonstrable(Gr288,C405).
Firstofall,therefore,wemustseektextsinwhichnecessityisassertedordenied,dedicto,ofsome
suchpropositionas'Godchooseswhatisbest',andinwhichthenecessityisexplicitlyor
contextuallyindicatedaslogicalormetaphysical,orisstatedorexplainedintermsof
demonstrability.Thereareseveralsuchtexts,andtheyspeakonbothsidesofthequestion.
Themostexplicittextsfortheindemonstrabilityandhencethecontingencyofthecrucial
propositionsdateprobablyfromtheearly1680s,whenLeibnizwasactivelyengagedinformative
workonavarietyofsolutionstotheproblemofcontingency.Inonehedeniesflatlythatthe
proposition'Godchoosesthebest,'or'Godwillsthebest,'canbedemonstrated(Gr301).52A
contrastisintroducedinasimilardenial:"Thus,thatGodloveshimselfisnecessary,foritis
demonstrablefromthedefinitionofGod.ButthatGoddoeswhatismostperfectcannotbe
demonstrated,forthecontrarydoesnotimplyacontradiction"(Gr288).53
Thecontrastrecursinsomelatertexts.Intheearly1690sLeibniznotedwithapprovalThomas
Aquinas'sopinionthat"God'sattitudetowardhimselfisnecessaryandnatural,buthisattitude
towardotherthingsisnotnecessary,norforced,butvoluntary"(Gr333).54AndintheTheodicyhe
says,"ThelovethatGodhasforhimselfisessentialtohim;buttheloveofhisglory,orthewillto
obtainit,isnotessentialtohimatall"(T233;cf.T175,230).(HereGod'sgloryisconceivedasan
externalattribute,"thereflectionofthedivineperfectionincreatedbeings."55)
Thecontingencyof'Godchooseswhatisbest'seemsmorefavoredintheTheodicythaninthe
privatepapersLeibnizwrotewhilepreparingthebook.Inadditiontothepassagejustcited,thereis
alistofthingssaidtobenecessary"inacertainsense,"butnot"logically,geometrically,or
metaphysically";amongthemisthat"Godhimselfchoosesthebest"(T282;itwouldnotbe
plausibletoreadthisdenialoflogicalnecessityasderewithrespecttothebest).IftheTheodicy
wereouronlysourceforLeibniz'sopinions,Ithinkwewouldfindnothingincompatiblewiththe
impressionthatLeibnizthinksitcontingent,dedicto,thatGodchooseswhatisbest.Thegeneral
tenorofthebookwouldleaveuswiththatimpression,althoughmostpassagesinitcanbe
interpretedotherwiseinlightofLeibniz'sotherworks.
____________________
52
Leibnizmuddiedthewatersalittlebyadding"oridentical"totheclaimthatthefirstoftheseis"a
firstproposition";butthecontextmakesclearthatwhathereallywantedtosayisthatitislikean
identicalpropositioninbeingatruthbutindemonstrable.Inanotherrelevanttextfrommoreorless
thesameperiodLeibnizsaysthat"inacertainwayitisofphysicalnecessity[heredistinguished
frommetaphysicalnecessity]thatGoddoesallthingsaswellashecan"(C21/MP101).
53
Thispaper(quotedinsection1.2)isalsoanimportantsourcefortheviewthatnonactualthings
remainpossibleintheirownnatureseveniftheyarenotpossibleinrespecttothedivinewill.It
mightbequibbledwhetherinthequotedpassagedemonstrabilityisdeniedonlydere,withrespect
tothatwhichismostperfect,butIthinkthatwouldbeanunnaturalreadingofthetext.
54
Thesamesetofnotes,however,expressestheviewthatitisdemonstrablethatGodcannotdo
evils,whichIwilldiscusslaterinthischapter.ThereferencetoAquinasisgivenasSummacontra
gentiles,1,82ff.;thecorrectcitationwouldbe1,80ff.
55
Grua,Jurisprudence,p.307.
37
Section13oftheDiscourseonMetaphysicsgivesasimilarimpression.Probablythemost
importantutterancebearingontheissuethereisthementionof"thefirstfreedecisionofGod,the
importofwhichistodoalwaysthatwhichismostperfect."Forifthisdecisionisfreeandfreedom
impliescontingency,itwillfollowthat'Goddecidestodowhatisbest'iscontingent.
Thestrongesttextsontheothersidearethosealreadydiscussedinsection2.1ofthischapter,56in
whichLeibnizpointedlyrefrainsfromdenying,andin1706affirms,that'Godchoosesthebest'is
necessaryinthesenseofbeingdemonstrable.Thosetextsdatefromabout1689to1706;butthere
isanote,probablyfromtheearly1680s,inwhichLeibnizsays,"FromGod'sessenceorsupreme
perfectionitfollows,certainlyand,sotospeak,byanecessaryimplication,thatGodchoosesthe
best"(Gr297).HegoesontoexplainGod'sfreedomintermsofthepluralityofalternatives
possibleintheirownnature.Thephrase"byanecessaryimplication"isimportanthere.When
Leibnizwrotein1698that"itfollowsfromthenatureofGodthatheprefersthemostperfect"(
Gr393),heleftsomeambiguity.Forhealsosaidthatalltruths,evencontingentones,followfrom
God,whoisthehighesttruth(Gr347).MightGod'spreferenceforperfectionfollowfromthe
divinenaturebyaninfiniteratherthanafiniteanalysis,andthereforecontingently?Butwhat
followsfromGod'sessence"byanecessaryimplication"mustbenecessarythoughthe
qualification"sotospeak"or"ifyouwill"[siitaloquiplacet]stillleavesalittleuncertainty.
Inreadingnotesfromthe1690sLeibnizheldthat"theinabilitytodoevilscanbedemonstratedof
God"(G333)and"rigorously,itcanbesaidthatthegoodAngelscansin,andthatdoesnotimplya
contradiction,butinGoditdoesimplyone"(Gr360).Leibnizheldmoreconsistentlytothisthesis
thantothemoregeneralclaimthatitisdemonstrablethatGodchoosesthebest.Eveninoneofthe
papersfromtheearly1680sinwhichhesaysflatlythat'Godchoosesthebest'isnotdemonstrable,
LeibnizsaysthatdamningtheinnocenteternallyisnotpossibleforGodandisthereforeoneof
thosethings"whose...existenceimpliesacontradiction"(Gr300).
TheonlytextagainstthisofwhichIamawareisintheTheodicy:"Howeveritdoesnotimplya
contradictionforGodtowill(directlyorpermissively)athingthatdoesnotimplyacontradiction"
(T234).Nothingissaidhereexplicitlyaboutwhetheritiscontingent,dedicto,thatGoddoesno
evilorthatGodchoosesthebest.Forthepossibilitythatisassertedisprettyclearlyderewith
respecttotheobjectsofGod'schoice:itisclaimedabouteverything,thatifitispossibleinitself,
consideredwithoutregardtoitsrelationtoGod'swill(cf.T235),thenitisalsopossibleforGodto
willtoactualizeit.ButsinceLeibnizthoughttheeternaldamnationoftheinnocentispossiblein
itself(Gr300),itdoesseemtofollowthatitispossibleforGodtodamntheinnocenteternally
whichisnotfarremovedfromtheconclusionthatitispossibleforGodtodoevil.
Ingeneral,however,LeibnizseemsinclinedtotheviewthatitisdemonstrablethatGoddoesno
evil,whetherornotitisdemonstrablethatGodchoosesthe
____________________
56
1nanothertext,from1677,Leibnizwrotethat"Godnecessarilyandyetfreelychoosesthemost
perfect"(VE305=LHIV,4,3C,1214);butthisseemsnottobeintheframeworkoftheinfinite
analysisconceptionofcontingency.
38
best.Indeed,evenhis1706readingnoteonBayleinwhichhesaysthat"Godwillstheworkthatis
mostworthyofhim"isanecessarypropositionendswithahintthatGod"cannotdoorwillmoral
evil"insomesensestrongerthanthatinwhichGodcannotfailtocreatethebestpossibleworld(
Gr494).
ButifLeibnizholdsthatitisdemonstrablethatGoddoesnoevil,howcanheavoidtheconclusion
thatitisdemonstrablethatGoddoesnotpreferthelessperfect?"Forasalesserevilisakindof
good,bythesametokenalessergoodisakindofevil,ifitformsanobstacletoagreatergood"(
T8).Andinmaintainingtheaxiom,Minusbonumhabetrationemmali(Alessergoodhasthe
characterofanevil](T194,DM3,GIII,33),Leibnizdoesnotsuggestthatitiscontingent.Sohe
seemscommittedtoholdingthatpreferringthelessperfectwouldnecessarilybedoingsomething
evil.
Godismorethansinless.That"Godisanabsolutelyperfectbeing,"morallyaswellas
metaphysically,isvirtuallyadefinitionforLeibniz(DM1),andsofarasIknowheneversuggests
thatitiscontingent.Ifitisnottruebydefinition,oratleastdemonstrable,howishesoconfident
thatitistrueatall?Surelyhedoesnotknowitbyexperience.Andhedeniesthatitisknownonly
byfaith(Tpd44).BothRescherandCurleyseemtometoerrinsayingthatLeibnizwouldsolve
theproblemofcontingencybyholdingthatGod'sgoodnessiscontingent.57
ButthatisnottheonlywayinwhichhecoulddenythatitisnecessarythatGoddoeswhatisbest,
forthebeliefthatGoddoeswhatisbestisbasedontwopremises:thatGodis"amostperfect
Being,"andthat"theoperationofamostperfectBeingismostperfect"(Gr16).Once,probablyin
theearly1680s,Leibnizdidsaythatthesecondoftheseiscontingent:"God'schoosingaless
perfectfromamongmanyperfectthingsdoesnotimplyanimperfectioninGod"(Gr300).Iagree
withthisstatement,58butfinditastonishinglyunLeibniziananddonotthinkitfitsintohis
philosophicalsystem.
Oneobjectiontoincludingitinthesystemisinconclusive.Leibnizsaysitismorallynecessaryfor
Godtochoosethebest.ThismeansthatitisnecessarythataperfectlygoodagentinGod'sposition
wouldchoosethebest(seesection1.5ofthischapter).ItfollowsthatitisnecessarythatifGod
choosesthelessperfect,Godisimperfect(cf.GIII,33).Butthecrucialquestionhereishowstrong
thisnecessityis.Isthemorallynecessaryonlywhatitisdemonstrablethataperfectlygoodagent
woulddo?Orisitenoughformoralnecessityiftheactioniscontainedintheconceptofaperfectly
goodagent,eventhoughaninfiniteanalysiswouldbeneededtoshowthereasonofthe
containment?TheweakerrequirementseemstometobetheoneassumedinLeibniz'smature
writings:heappearstoregardGod'schoiceofthisworldasmorallynecessary(cf.Tpd2),butitis
notdemonstrablethataperfectlygoodagentwouldchoosethisworld,sinceitisnotdemonstrable
thatitisthebest.
Otherarguments,however,showthatLeibnizcannotconsistentlyholdthatitiscontingentthata
supremelyperfectbeingwouldchoosethemoreperfect.Forsupposethatiscontingent.Theneither
itmustbecontingentthatasupremelyperfectbeingisperfectlygood,wise,andjust,orelseitmust
becontingentthat
____________________
57
Rescher,PhilosophyofLeibniz,p.45;Curley,"RootofContingency,"p.95.
58
R.Adams,"MustGodCreatetheBest?"
39
aperfectlygood,wise,andjustbeingwouldchoosethemoreperfect.Neitheroftheseiscontingent
forLeibniz,forthefollowingreasons.
Leibnizregardsjusticeas"anessentialattributeofGod"(DutensIV,iii,280,wherethisisnot
asserted,butcontextuallyimplied).AndsinceGod'sjustice,forLeibniz,"dependsonwisdomand
goodness"(DutensIV,iii,261;cf.GIII,34),thelatterperfectionsmustpresumablyberegardedas
essentialtoGod,too.
Leibnizwouldhavetoadmitthatitcanbedemonstrated,fromacceptabledefinitionsofthese
perfections,thattheyimplyapreferenceforthebest.
Theendofgoodnessisthegreatestgood,butinordertorecognizeit,wisdomis
needed,whichisnothingotherthanknowledgeofthegood,asgoodnessisnothing
otherthantheinclinationtodogoodtoall,andtopreventevilunlessitisnecessaryfor
agreatergoodortopreventagreaterevil.59
ThusLeibnizseemsunabletoescapetheconclusionthatitisdemonstrable,andhencelogically
necessary,thatGod,asanabsolutelyperfectbeing,doeswhatisbest.
TheconflictinLeibniz'sthoughtisreflectedindivergentpronouncementsabout"therootof
contingency."Inthemid1680shesetout,somewhattentatively,theideathatindealingwith
problemsofcontingencywemust"haverecoursetothatonethingwhichisnotessentialinGod,
butfreenamely,thedecisionofthewill,fromwhichaloneasourceofcontingencyinthingscan
besought"(Gr311).Thisisnotunambiguous,butseemstoagreewithRescher'sjudgmentthatfor
Leibniz"theultimatesourceofcontingenttruthisclearly"inGod'schoosing"toactinthemost
perfectway,"ratherthaninthebestnessofthatwhichischosen.60ElsewhereLeibnizlocatesthe
rootofcontingencynotinthedivinewill,butintheobjectsamongwhichGodchooses.Intheearly
1680shewrote,"TherootoffreedominGodisthepossibilityorcontingencyofthings"bywhich
hemeansthepluralityofalternativespossibleinthemselves,asthecontextshows(Gr298).About
1696,likewise,hewrotenotesontheviews,ascribedtoScotusandAquinas,respectively,thatthe
rootofcontingencyisinthewillofGodasfreeandasefficacious.Leibnizcommentedthatthe
formerviewwascircular.Astothelatter,"contingencyisinthenatureitselfoftruth,orofthe
object,asofpossibility,asofexistence"(Gr348;cf.Gr353).HereperhapswhatLeibnizhasin
mindisthatcontingenttruthscannotbeprovedbyafiniteanalysis.
ThecirclewithwhichLeibnizchargedScotushastodo,presumably,withseekingtheultimate
reasonforallcontingentfactsinadivinedecisionwhichisitselfoneofthecontingentfactstobe
explained.OftenLeibnizseesaninfiniteregressinplaceofthiscircle,andalmostalwayshe
condemnsitasvicious.Thereisonetextfromtheearly1680s,however,inwhichheacceptsthe
infiniteregress;andthisacceptanceassumesgreatimportancefortheinterpretationsofRescher
andCurley.
____________________
59
QuotedbyGrua,Jurisprudence,pp.212f.,fromMittheilungenausLeibnizensungedruckten
Schriften,ed.byG.Mollat(Leipzig:1883),p.48.Gruasaysthetextisfrom17011705.Onthis
subjectseeingeneralGrua,Jurisprudence,pp.198222.
60
Rescher,PhilosophyofLeibniz,p.39.
40
ThefirstprincipleaboutExistencesisthisproposition:Godwillstochoosethemost
perfect.Thispropositioncannotbedemonstrated;itisthefirstofallpropositionsof
fact,ortheoriginofeverycontingentexistence....ForifanyoneasksmewhyGod
decidedtocreateAdam,Isay:becausehedecidedtodowhatismostperfect.Ifyouask
menowwhyhedecidedtodowhatismostperfect,...Ianswerthathewilleditfreely,
orbecausehewilledto.Thereforehewilledbecausehewilledtowill,andsoonto
infinity.(Gr301f.)
Curleysaysthatthistextpresents"theonlyoneofthevariouswaysinwhichLeibnizinvokes
infiniteprocesseswhichseems...tohaveanybearingontheproblemofcontingency."61Rescher
doesnotcitethispassage,butdoespropose,asLeibniz'smainsolutiontotheproblemof
contingency,that"God'smoralperfectionfollowsfromHismetaphysicalperfection,butdeduction
wouldrequireaninfinityofsteps."62Somethingofthissortisrequired,ofcourse,ifthesupposed
contingencyof'Godchooseswhatisbest'istobereconciledwithLeibniz'sconceptualcontainment
theoryoftruthandinfiniteanalysistheoryofcontingency.
Rescher'sformulationdeftlyavoidstheobviousobjectionthattheinfiniteregressofreasons
violatestheprincipleofsufficientreason.Leibniz'suseoftheprincipleinprovingtheexistenceof
Godrequireshimtorefusetoacceptaninfiniteregressofreasonsasitselfconstitutingasufficient
reason.Furthermore,Leibnizhadsaid,"itisabsurd[tosuppose]thatafreewillisanultimate
reason,sincethefreewillitselfhasitsrequirements[requisital,foritisnotanindependentBeing
[Ensase]"(AVI,iii,120).63Asufficientreasonmustbefoundinsomethingofmetaphysical
necessity;theultimatereasonfortheexistenceofallthingsistobefoundinthedivineessenceand
intellect.Rescherrecognizesandacceptsthis.Inhisinterpretationtheultimatesufficientreasonis
foundinGod'smetaphysicalperfection;ifthereisaninfiniteregressofvolitions,ithasareason
outsideitselfinGod'snature.Butinconformitywiththeinfiniteanalysistheoryofcontingency,
thisreasoncannotbeprovedbyafiniteanalysis.
Inthepaperinwhichheacceptstheregress,however,LeibnizwasnotasdeftasRescher,forhe
refusedtogroundtheinfiniteregressofvolitionsinGod'sessence."Nootherreasoncanbegiven
whyGodchoosesthemostperfectthanbecausehewillsto....Andcertainlyhewillsfreely,
becauseoutsidehiswillnootherreasoncanbegiventhanthewill."Hegoesontoclaimthat
"nothingisthereforegivenwithoutareason,butthatreasonisintrinsictothewill"(Gr301).The
infiniteregressofreasonshedescribescertainlydoesnotsatisfyhisprincipleofsufficientreason.
Itisnoteworthy,moreover,thatthisratherearlypapercontainsnoexplicitappealtotheinfinite
analysistheoryofcontingency.IknowofnoworkinwhichLeibnizdevelopstheinfiniteregressof
volitionsintothesortofsolutionthatRescherproposesforhim.
____________________
61
62
Rescher,PhilosophyofLeibniz,p.45.
63
ThisisaresponsetooneofSteno'scommentsinthemanuscriptofThePhilosopher'sConfession,
andthereforecomesprobablyfromabouttheendof1677,asexplainedinnote14.OnLeibniz's
useofrequisita[requirements]asatermfornecessaryconditions,seeChapter4,section1.
41
Thistext,asGruasays(Gr259),isexceptional.ItisthesameshortpaperinwhichLeibnizdenied
thatchoosingthelessperfectwouldimplyanimperfectioninGod.Theinfiniteregressofvolitions,
andthewholeideaofwillingtowill,wereexplicitlyrejectedbyLeibnizataboutthesametime,as
wellasbothearlierandlater.Inanotherpaperprobablyfromtheearly1680shewrote,"Indeed
Godcannotwillvoluntarily;otherwisetherewouldbeawilltowill[andsoon]toinfinity"(
Gr289).InthelettertoWedderkopfandinThePhilosopher'sConfessionhehaddenied,with
explicitreferencetoGod,thatanyonewillswhattowill(AII,i,117/L147)orwillsbecausehewills
(AVI,iii,124).IntheNewEssaysLeibnizsays,"Wedonotwilltowill,butwewilltodo;andifwe
willedtowill,wewouldwilltowilltowill,andthatwouldgotoinfinity"(NE182).Herenothingis
saidexplicitlyaboutGod.ThereisanexplicitreferencetoGodintheTheodicy,however:"Itis,in
asense,anabuseoftermstosayhere:onecanwill,onewillstowill;powerisrelatedheretothe
actionsthatonewills"(T234).Thereare,itmustbegranted,twotextsthatsupporttheideathat
divinedecisions,consideredaspossible,arepartoftheobjectofotherdivinedecisions(C24),or
morevaguely,that"Godexecutesallreflexactsatonceandonceforall"(Gr345).Indeed,Leibniz
thoughtofpossibledivinedecisionsasinvolvedintheconceptsofpossiblecreaturesamongwhich
Godchooses,butinthesetextsitisnotstatedorsuggestedthatGod'sgeneraldecisiontodowhatis
bestistheobjectofapriordecision,northattheregressofdecisionsprovidesthereasonforthe
decisiontoact.Atanyrate,theinfiniteregressofvolitionsisclearlynotakeystoneofLeibniz's
positiononcontingency.Onthisandothergroundsthatwehavereviewed,itisfairtosaythatthe
viewthat'Godchooseswhatisbest'iscontingentmustnotberegardedasathesisofLeibniz's
philosophy,muchlessasabasisofoneofhisprincipalsolutionstotheproblemofcontingency.
2.6AnExceptionforExistence?
WearenowinapositiontodealwiththequestionwhetherLeibnizmeanttosolvetheproblemof
contingencybymakingexistenceanexceptiontotherulethatthepredicateofatrueproposition
mustbecontainedintheconceptofthesubject.Thereareseveralcompellingargumentsfora
negativeanswer.
1.
Leibnizsayssomethingthatlooksverymuchlikeanexplicitnegativeanswer,intheNewEssays:
Butwhenonesaysthatathingexists,orthatithasrealexistence,thisexistenceitselfis
thepredicatethatistosay,ithasaconceptlinkedwiththeideathatisinquestion,and
thereisaconnectionbetweenthesetwoconcepts.(NE358)64
2.
InmanyformulationsofhisconceptualcontainmenttheoryoftruthLeibnizsaysexplicitlythatthe
conceptofthepredicateiscontainedintheconceptofthesubjectincontingentaswellasnecessary
truths(FC179/L263f.;LA
____________________
64
IamindebtedtoW.E.Abraham,"CompleteConcepts,"p.278,forcallingthisreferencetomy
attention.
42
56;C16/MP96;C519/L267f.;C272;GVII,199f.;Gr303/AG28).Inviewofthesestatements,it
seemsperversetosupposethatLeibnizmeanttoexplainthepossibilityofcontingencybymaking
anexceptiontothetheoryforthosepropositionsthatheregardedascontingent.
3.
Leibnizmadeanumberofattemptstoexplainhowexistenceiscontainedintheconceptsofthose
thingsthatexist.Theseattemptstypicallyinvolvesomeorallofthefollowingclaims.The
predicateofexistenceisinsomewayequivalentto"enteringintothemostperfectseriesofthings"
(C9)ortopleasingGod(C405).65Theanalysisofconceptswouldhavetobecarriedtoinfinity,
however,toprovetheexistenceofanycontingentthing(GI74;cf.Gr304f./AG29).The
underlyingidea,ofcourse,isthatexistenceiscontainedintheconceptsofexistingthings,not
directly,butbyvirtueofthefactorsthatdetermineGodtocreatethosethings.
4.
AsCouturatpointedout,"existentialpropositionsarenottheonlycontingentpropositions"for
Leibniz.66Couturatchoseanunfortunateexample:lawsofnature,whichareindeedcontingent,
butarealsoexistentialaccordingtoLeibniz,asCurleyhaspointedout.67Insections2.1and2.3of
thischapter,however,wehaveseenbetterexamplesofcontingentpropositionswhosetruth,
accordingtoLeibniz,doesnotdependonwhatexistsnamely,thepropositionsassertingthe
bestnessofthispossibleworld68andthecontingentconnectionswithinpossibleworlds.
5.
TheversionoftheproblemofcontingencythattroubledLeibnizmostpersistentlythroughouthis
lifedoesnotdependonhisconceptionofthenatureoftruth,anditcannotbesolvedbymakingthe
predicateofexistenceanexceptiontothatconception.Fortheproblemisthattheexistenceofall
actualthingsseemstofollownotjustfromtheirownconcepts,butfromtheconceptofGod,whose
existenceLeibnizalwaysregardedasabsolutelynecessary.Theprincipleofcharityfavorsan
interpretationaccordingtowhichaproblemsoimportantforLeibnizisaddressedbyhistheoriesof
contingency.
SomeofLeibniz'stextsmayseemtospeakontheothersideofthequestion,butIamnot
persuadedthattheyseriouslyunderminemyinterpretation.Oneisapassageneartheendofapaper
commonlyknownas"NecessaryandContingentTruths,"whereLeibnizsaysthat"thepossibility
orConceptofacreatedminddoesnotinvolveexistence"(C23/MP104).Thisstatement,however,
seemsflatlyinconsistentwithwhatheassertsatthebeginningofthesamepaperabout
____________________
65
FortheformerequivalenceseealsoGr325;B119f.;C405,360,376/P51,65f.;forthelatterseealso
GI73;onbothseeChapter6,section2.
66
Couturat,"OnLeibniz'sMetaphysics,"p.28.
67
68
Objectingtotherelevanceofthisevidence,Castaedaarguesthat"Leibnizmayhavehadbotha
coherentandexcitingmetaphysicaltheoryofcontingency,andaproblematictheologicalextension
ofit"(Castaeda,"Leibniz'sViewofContingentTruthintheLate1680's,"p.270).Butthe
contingencyofwhichworldisbestseemstobeastraightforwardconsequenceofLeibniz'sinfinite
analysistheoryofcontingency,ratherthanaproblematicextensionofit.Itdoesnothavethe
characteristicsoftheclearlyproblematictheologicalextensionsofhismetaphysicsthathewas
willingtoentertaininhislastyears(seeChapter10,section5.4);hedoesnotcharacterizeitas
"abovereason"orasinaccessibletohisusualphilosophicalapproaches.Leibnizcertainlydidnot
regardthetheologicalingeneralasproblematic,andhismetaphysicsispervasivelytheological.
43
existences,insayingthat"alltheknowledgeofpropositionsthatisinGod,whetheritbeofsimple
understanding,abouttheEssencesofthings,orofvisionabouttheexistencesofthings,ormiddle
knowledgeaboutconditionedexistences,69resultsimmediatelyfromtheperfectunderstandingof
eachtermthatcanbethesubjectorpredicateofanyproposition"(C17/MP96).Thebestconsistent
readingofthepaper,Ithink,isoneonwhichthecompleteconceptofanyexistentthingdoes
involveitsexistence,and"thepossibilityorConceptofacreatedmind"that"doesnotinvolve
existence"isunderstoodinanarrowsense,asdiscussedearlierinsection1.2.Thisreadingis
suggestedbythetheologicalcontextoftheproblematicstatement,whichisimmediatelypreceded
bythestatementthatGod"firstconsidersaMindaspossible,beforehedecidesthatitought
actuallytoexist"(C23/MP104).Thepossibility(orconcept)ofacreatedmindishereconsidered
asanalternativeforGod'schoice,andthereforeinabstractionfromthoseotherfactorsinGodthat
determineGod'schoiceamongthingsthatare"possibleinthemselves."Anditisbyvirtueofthose
factorsinGodthattheexistenceofanexistentcreaturefollowsfromitsconceptinthewider
sensethatis,fromitscompleteconcept.
Thispaperon"NecessaryandContingentTruths"containsimportantdevelopmentsoftheinfinite
analysistheoryofcontingency.Itisundated,anditswatermarkhasnotyetbeenconnectedwith
anyparticulardates(seeVE455).Butlikethepartsof"GeneralInquiries"devotedtothetheory(
GI6075,13037;dated1686),itseemstometohaveanexperimentalqualitynotpresentin
statementsofthetheoryfrom1689(FC17985/L26466,Gr303f./AG28f.).Onesignofits
experimentalcharacteristheintriguingpassageinwhichLeibnizsaysthat"Freeorintelligent
Substances"havetheprivilege"thattheyarenotboundtoanycertainsubordinateLawsofthe
universe,butactspontaneouslyfromtheirownpoweralone,asifbyasortofprivatemiracle,and
bylookingtosomefinalcausetheyinterrupttheconnectionandcourseofefficientcauses
operatingontheirwill"(C20/MP100).Underlyingthisstatementisthethoughtthatfreechoices
cannotbepredictedbyanylawsofnaturethatcanbeunderstoodbyafinitemind.Thisthoughtcan
besupportedbyreflectionsoninfiniteanalysis,andconnectswiththingsLeibnizsaysabout
miracleinDM16.Butspeakingoffreechoicesasroutinelyinterruptingtheconnectionofefficient
causesseemsquitecontrarytoLeibniz'susualviewsaboutthepreestablishedharmony,inwhich
finalcausesdonotdisturbtheorderofefficientcauses.AsearlyasJuly1686hewritestoArnauld
abouttheagreementofmindandbody,"eachonefollowingitslaws,andtheoneactingfreely,the
otherwithoutchoice,"andcontraststhiswiththechangesin"thelawsofbodies"andin"the
regularcourseofthoughtsofthesoul"thatareinvolvedintheoccasionalisthypothesis(LA57f.;cf.
LA74f.,93f.;E127f./L457f.;and,muchlater,G111,657).Ithereforethinkthat"Necessaryand
ContingentTruths"waswritteninafairlyearlyperiodof
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69
'Middleknowledge'signifiesGod'sknowledgeofcounterfactualconditionaltruths.Thetermwas
originatedbythesixteenthcenturyJesuittheologianLuisdeMolina,whosehighlycontroversial
theoryonthesubject,however,isinconsistentwiththeimplicationsofwhatLeibnizassertshere.
Cf.R.Adams,"MiddleKnowledgeandtheProblemofEvil."
44
thedevelopmentoftheinfiniteanalysistheory,notlaterthanJuly1686andperhapsconsiderably
earlier.70
Itcontainsapassage(C18/MP98)inwhichLeibniztreats'essential'and'existential'asequivalent,
respectively,to'necessary'and'contingent'.Itisnottheonlytextinwhichhedoesthis,soitis
possiblethatthesetextsrepresentavarietyofviews.Butwemustbecautiousaboutdrawing
metaphysicalimplicationsfromthisratherconventionalusage.71Twotextsmaybecitedas
evidencethat,inspeakingthisway,Leibnizdid'notnecessarilymeantoimplythatallcontingent
truthsdependonwhichfinitethingsactuallyexist.(Hedidofcoursethinkthatnonecessarytruths
dependontheexistenceofanybeingexceptGod.)
"Necessary[truths]areofEssences,contingent[truths]ofExistences"(Gr354),wroteLeibniz,
probablyinthemid1690s,withoutofferinganyexplanationofaspecialsenseof'essence'or
'existence'.72Butthisisinthesamesetofreadingnotesinwhichhestatesflatly,"Therearesome
indemonstrabletruthseveninpossiblethingsnamelyaboutcontingentthingsregardedas
possible"(Gr353).Iftheseindemonstrable,andhencecontingent,truthsare"of"existences,they
mustpresumablybe"of"merelypossibleexistencesassuch.
Fromthemid1680scomesevenclearerevidenceonthispoint,inatextinwhich"essential"is
equatedwith"necessary"and"existential"with"contingent"(Gr311).Herethesetermsareusedto
assertthat"notonlyessentialornecessary[truths]...butalsoexistential,sotospeak,or
contingent[truths]arecontainedinthiscompleteconceptofPeter[as]possible."Andsince"this
completeconcept"referstoonethatLeibnizhassaidGodunderstoodperfectly"evenbeforehe
decidedthatthisPeterwhoafterwardsdeniedoughttoexist,"the"existential"truthsmentioned
herecannotbeunderstoodasdependingontheactualexistenceofthecreaturestheyareabouta
pointperhapspartlyacknowledgedbythequalifier,'sotospeak[utitadicam]"attachedtotheterm
"existential"here.Correspondingtothisbroadsenseof'existential'isanarrowsenseof'essential',
andpresumablyalsoofessence'(cf.section2.3ofthischapter).Foronlyaportionofthetruths
containedinthecompleteconceptofPeteraresaidheretobe"essential."Incasethenarrowsense
of'essential'wasnotclearenoughfromthecontext,Leibnizaddedaqualifyingclausetooneofthe
statementsIhavequotedfromthistext:essentialtruthsare'those,namely,thatflowfrom
incompleteorspecificconcepts,andthereforearedemonstratedfromthe
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70
HeinrichSchepersproposed1678asitsapproximatedateinhispaper,"ZumProblemder
KontingenzbelLeibniz,"pp.344,350n;1686isfavoredbybothG.H.R.Parkinson(MP96)and
RobertSleigh("TruthandSufficientReasoninthePhilosophyofLeibniz,"p.210).Massimo
Mugnaiconsiders168486tobetheprobableperiodofcomposition("'Necessit0exhypothesi'e
analisiinfinitainLeibniz,"p.153).
71
Thedistinctionbetweenexistentialandessentialpropositionsplaysacentralroleinthe
interpretationofferedinBensonMates,PhilosophyofLeibniz.IhaverespondedtoMates
argumentsinareviewofhisbookinMind97(1988):299302.Thedistinctionisconcerned,inthe
firstinstance,withactualexistenceasenteringornotenteringintothetruthconditionsfor
categoricalpropositions,andIcannotseethatLeibnlzusedittoframeatheoryofcontingency,
thoughitdoesoccurinhiswritings.(Seenote46above.)
72
Asregards'essential',cf.Gr373,probablyofthesameperiodandsimilarlywithoutexplanation.
45
terms,insuchawaythatthecontraryimpliesacontradiction"(Gr311).Theimplicationisclear
thatnoteverytruthflowingfromanindividual'scompleteconceptisnecessary,or"essential"inthe
relevantsense.
AllinterpretersagreethatLeibnizalwaysbelievedthereisatleastonenecessaryexistentialtruth:
thatGodexists.Buthedoesnotnormallymentionthisasanexceptionwhenequatingexistential
withcontingentpropositions.73Thereis,Ithink,noreasontotakethese(usuallyrathercasual)
identificationsmorestrictlyintheotherdirectionasexcludingcontingentpropositionsthatarenot
existentialintheusualsensegiventhatLeibnizsaystherearesuchpropositions,aswehaveseen,
andthathismostfullydevelopedtheoryofcontingencyimpliesthereare.
3.LeibnizandPossibleWorldsSemantics
Ithasbeendiscoveredthatbybeginningwiththeideathatthepossibleiswhatistrueinsome
possibleworldandthenecessaryiswhatistrueinallpossibleworlds,andvaryingourassumptions
abouttherelationsofpossibleworldstoeachother,wecanobtainmodelsthatvalidatedifferent
systemsofmodallogic.Thisdiscoveryhasgivenbirthtopossibleworldssemanticsthe
interpretationofmodalnotionsintermsoftruthandfalsityin(orat)possibleworlds.Ithasshedso
muchlightonmodallogic,andhassoaffectedourinterestinthenotionofpossibleworlds,thatit
isespeciallynaturalforustoassumethatLeibnizalsoconceivedofnecessityastruthinallpossible
worldsandcontingencyastruthinsomebutnotallpossibleworlds.Itisnotatallclearthathedid,
however.
TheclosestIhaveseenhimcometoexpressingthisconceptionisinthepaperon"Necessaryand
ContingentTruths,"whichIhavearguedinsection2.6isnotlaterthan1686,wherehesaysthat
necessarytruths,"whichcanbedemonstratedbyanalysisofTerms...notonlywillobtainwhile
theWorldstands,butwouldstillhaveobtainedifGodhadcreatedtheWorldonadifferentplan
[aliaratione]"(C18/MP98).Thisissuggestive,butnotconclusive,foronanyreasonable
interpretationLeibnizregardsnoworldaspossibleinwhichsomethingdemonstrableisfalse(ifwe
overlooktheproblemaboutthedamnationoftheinnocentasdiscussedinsection2.2).Whatwe
wanttoknowiswhetherhethoughtthatallthetruthsthatdonotdependonwhichworldGod
createdarenecessary.In"NecessaryandContingentTruths"heatleastcomesclosetoholdingthat
theyare.Hesaysthatcontingenttruths,which"cannotbedemonstratedbyanyanalysis....not
onlyexpresswhatpertainstothepossibilityofthings,butalsowhatactuallyexists,orwouldexist
contingentlyoncertainconditions"74(C18/MP98).
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73
Butcf.Gr386,whereanexplanationofthenecessityofeternaltruths,"becausethereitisnota
matterofexistence,butonlyofHypotheticalpropositions,"isimmediatelyfollowedbyjustthis
qualification:"Henceitmustbesaidthatnoabsolute[i.e.,unconditional]propositionisnecessary
exceptthatwhichfollowsfromthenatureofGod.CertainlynoBeingexistsbyitsownessenceor
necessarilyexceptGod."
74
InthiscontextLeibnizalsosaysthat"existentialorcontingent"truths"aretrueforacertaintime,"
andhegivesinterestingreasonsforthinkingitwouldtakeaninfiniteanalysistoestab
46
Eveninthesamepaper,however,Leibnizalsosayssomethinginconsistentwiththisview;thisis
onesignoftheexperimentalcharacterofthetext.Forthetextitselfexpressesthepointthatit
wouldtakeaninfinitecomparisonofpossibleworldstodeterminethereasonfortheexistenceof
theonethatisactual(C19/MP99).Fromthisonecaninfer,asLeibnizdidin1689(Gr305f./
AG30)thatitiscontingentthatthisisthebestofallpossibleworlds.Andthiswillbeacontingent
truthwhich"wouldstillhaveobtainedifGodhadcreatedtheWorldonadifferentplan."Ihave
arguedthatLeibniz'sinfiniteanalysistheoryofcontingencyrequirestheretobesuchtruths.
ThefirststepindealingwiththisissueistodistinguishtwothingsLeibnizmaymeanby'possible
world'.Hemaymeanaworldwhoseconceptisnotdemonstrablyinconsistent,orhemaymeana
worldwhosebasicconcept(asIhaveputitinsection1.2)doesnotinvolve,demonstrablyor
otherwise,acontradictionorconceptualfalsehood.
ThefirstoftheseinterpretationsfitswithLeibniz'susualconceptionofnecessityintermsof
demonstrability,andindeedyieldsapossibleworldssemanticsforit.Giventheplausible
assumptionthatnotallconceptualtruthsaredemonstrable,theconceptualtruthanddemonstrability
conceptionsofnecessitydemanddifferentmodallogics.ThestrongsystemS5seemstobetheright
modallogicfortheconceptualtruthconceptionofnecessity.75ButthecharacteristicaxiomofS5,
'NpNNp'(ifnotnecessarilyp,thennecessarilynotnecessarilyp),isnotvalidonthe
demonstrabilityconceptionofnecessity.Forapropositionmaybeindemonstrablewithoutbeing
demonstrablyindemonstrable.(Inrejectingthisaxiom,itshouldbenoted,onerejectsthe
assumptionthatalltruthsaboutthepossibleassucharenecessary.)TheweakersystemS4seemsto
betherightsystemforthedemonstrabilityconceptionofnecessity.Itscharacteristicaxiom,
'NpNNp'(ifnecessarilyp,thennecessarilynecessarilyp),willbevalidunderthatconception,for
whatcanbedemonstratedcantherebybedemonstratedtobedemonstrable.
Bythesametoken,ifweassumethataworldw2ispossiblerelativetoaworldw1ifandonlyif
nothingistrueinw2whosefalsitycanbedemonstratedinw1,weobtaintheresultthatthe
relationofrelativepossibilityamongpossibleworldsisreflexiveandtransitivebutnot
symmetrical.Itisreflexive,ifwerestrictconsiderationtoworldsthatarepossible(thatis,possible
relativetotheactualworld),forLeibnizwillsurelyholdthat'Somethingistruewhichis
demonstrablyfalse'is(intheactualworld)demonstrablyfalse,butitmustbetrueinanyworldthat
isnotpossiblerelativetoitself.Thetransitivityoftherelationofrelativepossibilityisprovedas
follows.Supposeitisnottransitive.Thentheremustbeaworldw2whichispossiblerelativetoa
worldw1,andaworldw3whichispossiblerelativetow2butnottow1.Theremustbesome
propositionpwhichistrueinw3butwhosefalsitycanbedemonstratedinw1,thoughnotin
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74
lishwhatisthestateofthingsatanygiventime.Butsurelynotallcontingentorexistentialtruths
havereferencetoaparticulartime.Forinstance,thetruththatthisworld,asawhole,isactual,does
not.Thefactthatnosuchexceptionisnotedinthistextisonemoresignofitsrough,experimental
character.
75
SeeR.Adams,"LogicalStructureofAnselm'sArguments,"pp.45f.,forabriefargumentonthis
point.
47
w2.Butthenthereisaproposition(thatpisnotdemonstrablyfalse)whichistrueinw2but
demonstrablyfalseinw1;itsfalsityisdemonstratedinw1bydemonstratingthefalsityofp.Sow
2isnotpossiblerelativetow1,contrarytothehypothesis,andtherelationofrelativepossibility
mustbetransitiveafterall.Itisnotsymmetrical,however.Forthereis,asLeibnizsupposes,atleast
onepropositionpwhichispossible,andactuallytrue,butnotdemonstrablypossible.Aworldin
whichitistruethatpisdemonstrablyfalsewillthereforebepossiblerelativetotheactualworld,
buttheactualworldwillnotbepossiblerelativetosuchaworld.
Itisknownthatarelationofrelativepossibilitythatisreflexiveandtransitivebutnotsymmetrical
istheprincipalfeaturethatasystemofpossibleworldsshouldhaveifitistoprovideasemantics
forS4butnotforS5.76Thusthepossibleworldssemanticsbasedonthedemonstrability
conceptionofpossibleworldsseemstofitthemodallogicsuggestedbythedemonstrability
conceptionofnecessity.
ButdoesLeibnizholdthisconceptionofpossibleworlds?CertainlyhedoesnotworkoutanS4
semantics;hedoesnotevenraisethequestionofarelationofrelativepossibilityamongpossible
worlds.Thecrucialquestioniswhetherheunderstands'possible'in'possibleworlds'intermsof
demonstrabilityandindemonstrability.
Heseemstoimplythathedoes,whenhesaysinMarch1698,"Thereareasmanypossibleworlds
asthereareseriesofthingsthatcanbethoughtupwhichdonotimplyacontradiction.Thisthesisis
identicalwithme,forIcallpossiblethatwhichdoesnotimplyacontradiction,andsointhissense
itcannotberefuted"(Gr390).1assumethat"doesnotimplyacontradiction"expressesaproof
theoreticalnotionhere,asitusuallydoesinLeibniz.OnthisinterpretationLeibnizhereletsa
consistent,univocaluseofmodaltermscarrytheprooftheoreticalnotionofpossibilityintohis
conceptionofpossibleworlds.
Ontheotherhand,thedemonstrabilityconceptionofpossibleworldshassomestrikinglyun
Leibnizianconsequences.First,apossibleindividualwillingeneralexistinmorethanonepossible
world.Leibnizholdsthatmanyofthepropertiescontainedinanindividual'scompleteconcept
cannotbedemonstratedfromtheconcept.Worldsinwhichtheindividuallacksvariousofthose
propertieswillthereforenotbedemonstrablyinconsistent.Second,eachactualindividualwillbe
compossiblewithindividualsofalmosteverypossiblesort,inthesenseofcoexistinginsome
possibleworldwithanindividualofthatsort.Forthecoexistenceofacertainactualindividualwith
mostpossiblesortsofindividualwillnotbedemonstrablyinconsistent.Third,therewillbe
possibleworldsinwhichdifferentworldswillbethebestpossible,forthebestnessofthisworldis
notdemonstrable.Fourth,therewillbepossibleworldsthathave(withoneexception)allthe
perfectionthattheactualworld(consideredaspossible)has,andmore.Therewillbe,forexample,
aworldasgoodastheactualworldinotherrespects,fromwhichthehorrorsoftheThirtyYears
Warareabsent.Leibnizsurelydidnotthinkitcouldbedemonstratedthattheworldwouldbeless
perfectwithouttheThirtyYearsWar.Theexception,theperfectionthattheactual
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76
Kripke,"SemanticalAnalysisofModalLogicI."
48
worldhasbutthoseworldslack,isconceptualconsistency,aswemaycallthepropertyofnot
involving,notevenindemonstrably,acontradiction.
Leibnizneveracceptstheseconsequences.Indeed,heexplicitlyrejectstheideaofanindividual
existinginmorethanonepossibleworld(T414).77Andforhistheodicyandtheoryofcreationhe
needsmodalitiesquitedifferentfromthosegeneratedbythedemonstrabilityconceptionof
necessity.Forexample,hemustclaimthatGodcouldn'thavecreatedaworldasgoodastheactual
worldinotherrespectsbutlackingthehorrorsoftheThirtyYearsWar.This'couldn't'cannotbe
explainedintermsofdemonstrability.AndLeibnizcertainlydoesnotmeanthatGodwas
preventedbydivinegoodnessfromchoosingsuchaworld,havingjudgedthatthehorrorsofthe
ThirtyYearsWararebetterthanconceptualinconsistency.Rather,itisnotwithinGod'spowerto
createsuchaworld,becauseitisnotpossibleinitsownnature.
Theclaimthattwopossiblesubstancesarecompossible,likewise,issurelynotjusttheclaimthat
theyarenotdemonstrablyincompatible,inspiteofthefactthatLeibnizdefined"compossible"as
"thatwhichwithanotherdoesnotimplyacontradiction"(Gr325).Foritisthelackof
compossibilitythatkeepsadditionalexcellentsubstancesfromexistingintheactualworld(G
111,572f.,C534),buttheadditionofsuchsubstancesissurelynotdemonstrablyinconsistentwith
theconceptsofactualthings.
OnemaybetemptedtoaccuseLeibnizofcheatinginhistheodicybyusingmodalterms
equivocally.ThereisasenseinwhichGodcouldn'thavecreatedabetterworldthanthisone(itis
conceptuallyfalsethatthereissuchaworld),butinthatsenseGodalsocouldn'thavedone
anythingdifferentatall(itisconceptuallyfalsethatGoddoesanythingdifferent).Thereisalsoa
senseinwhichGodcouldhavedonesomethingdifferent(itisnotdemonstrablethatGoddoesnot,
say,omittocreategiraffes),butinthissenseGodcouldalsohavemadesomethingbetterthanthis
world(itisnotdemonstrablethatnopossiblealternativeisbetter).
Thereisyetanothersenseof'could'and'couldn't'availabletoLeibniz,however,inwhichhecan
say,withoutequivocation,bothofthethingshewantstosay.Godcouldhavedonesomething
different,inthesensethatonlythedivinegoodnesskeepsGodfromdoingso.ButGodcouldn't
havecreatedabetterworldthanthis,inthesensethatitisnotonlyGod'sgoodnessthatkeepsa
betteralternativefrombeingpossible.Wecouldsystematizethesemodalities(althoughLeibnizdid
not)byusing'Itispossiblethatp'tomeanroughlythatifitwerenotaconceptualtruththatGodis
perfectlygood,itwouldnotbeaconceptualfalsehoodthatp.78
Leibniz'schiefuseoftheimageryofpossibleworldsisatthosepointsinhistheoryofcreationthat
requirethislastsortofmodality."ThereareseveralpossibleUniverses,eachcollectionof
compossiblesmakingoneofthem"(G111,573).Thepossibleworldsarethealternativesamong
whichGodchooses,withonly
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77
Ourinvestigationofthesenseinwhichhecanhavedonethis(andhenceouraccountofpossible
worlds)willnotbecompleteuntiltheendofChapter3,however.
78
Iassumeherethatacounterfactualconditionalwithaconceptuallyfalseantecedentneednotbe
vacuouslytrueorvacuouslyfalse.Ithinkthisassumptioncouldbejustifiedwithintheframework
ofLeibniz'sconceptualcontainmenttheoryoftruth.
49
thedivinegoodnesskeepingGodfromchoosingoneoftheworldsthatareinfactrejected.There
mustnotbeamongthemaworldasgoodinotherwaysastheactualworldbutlackingthehorrors
oftheThirtyYearsWar.Theconceptionofapossibleworldimpliedbythisimagery,whichmust
thereforebereckonedLeibniz'sprincipalconception,isnotthatofaworldthatisnotdemonstrably
inconsistent.Itis,rather,thatofaworldwhosebasicconceptdoesnotinvolve(demonstrablyor
otherwise)acontradictionorconceptualfalsehood,aworldwhosebasicconceptisconceptually
consistent.79
IfweadmittothebasicconceptsofworldsinformationabouteverythingexceptGod'sgoodness
andGod'schoiceamongworlds(seesection1.2),thisconceptionofpossibleworldsprobably
yieldsasatisfactorysemanticsfor'Itispossiblethatp',interpretedasmeaningthatifitwerenota
conceptualtruththatGodisperfectlygood,itwouldnotbeaconceptualfalsehoodthatp.Helpful
thoughitwouldbeinexplainingthetheoryofcreation,Leibnizdoesnotreallydevelopthis
interpretation,anddoesnotusuallyuse'itispossiblethat'inthissense.Hismainconceptionof
possibilityistheprooftheoreticalonethatcanbeanalyzedintermsofindemonstrabilityof
falsehood.ThusLeibniz'smainconceptionofpossibleworldsdoesnotprovideapossibleworlds
semanticsforhismainconceptionofpossibility.Ifweputthetwoconceptionstogether,wegetthe
resultthattherearepropositionswhicharepossiblebutarenottrueinanypossibleworld.'Itwould
bebestiftherewereneveranywars'issuchaproposition.'JudasexistswithoutbetrayingJesus'
maybeanother(cf.DM30).80
IdonotmeantosuggestthatLeibnizwasfullyawareofthediversityofsortsofmodalityatwork
inhisphilosophy.Hadhebeenconsciousofit,hewouldpresumablyhavearticulatedtherelevant
distinctionsmoreclearlyandavoidedsomeapparentinconsistencies.Hemightalsohaveexplored
therelationsbetweenthedifferentsortsofmodalityandthenotionofapossibleworld.Buthedid
not,anditisquitemisleadingtothinkofhimasagrandfatherofpossibleworldssemantics,given
thebadfitbetweenhisprincipalconceptionofpossibleworldsandhisprincipalmodalconcepts.81
4.OnLeibniz'sSincerity
OnnopointhasmoresuspicionofacleavagebetweenapublicandaprivateLeibnizianphilosophy
arisenthanontheproblemofcontingency.Leibniz'ssincerityintheTheodicyhasoftenbeen
impugned,andoftendefended.Themostspectacularchargeofduplicitywasoneoftheearliest,but
itisnotwidelyaccepted.In1728,twelveyearsaftertheevent,andafterLeibniz'sdeath,a
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79
Cf.Schepers,"ZumProblemderKontingenzbetLeibniz,"pp.345f.
80
Whetheritisdependsonconsiderations,andpossiblefurtherrefinementsinthenotionofa
possibleworld,whichwillbetakenupattheendofChapter3.
81
ItshouldalsobenotedthatLeibnizwasnotuniqueinhisowntimeinusingthenotionofpossible
worlds.NicolasMalebranche,inhisTreatiseofNatureandGrace(1680),I,13(OMV,28),
speaksof"aninfinityofpossibleWorlds,"ofwhichGodchose"themostperfect,inrelationtothe
simplicityofthewaysnecessaryforitsproductionorforitsconservation."Iknowofnoevidence
thatMalebranchewasinfluencedonthispointbyLeibnizatthisearlydate.
50
Lutherantheologian,ChristopherMatthusPfaff,publishedanaccount(butnotthecompletetexts)
oflettersexchangedbetweenhimandLeibniz.HeclaimedthathehadsaidhethoughtLeibnizwas
beingplayfulintheTheodicy,pretendingtoopposeBayle'sskepticismwhilereallyconfirmingit,
andthatLeibnizreplied,inaletterof2May1716,"Youhavehitthenailonthehead.AndIam
amazedtherehasbeennoonehithertowhohassensedthatthisismygame.Foritisnotfor
philosophersalwaystotakethingsseriously.Inframinghypotheses,asyourightlypointout,they
tryouttheforceoftheirmentaltalents."82IfwebelievePfaff'sreport,wemaysuppose(asPfaff
didnot)thatLeibnizwasbeingironicorplayfulwithhim.83Inanyevent,itishardtoknowwhat
tomakeofLeibnizifhewasnotseriousinhisdefenseofthethesisthattheactualworldwas
chosenasthebestpossiblebyaperfectdeity.TheLeibnizianphilosophythathasheldtheinterest
ofposteritydependsinmostofitspartsonthatthesis,andLeibnizhasnotleftusevenasketchofa
philosophythatdoesnotdependonit.
Withregardtosubtlerdevelopmentsofhissystem,however,therecanstillbedoubtsabout
Leibniz'ssincerity,especiallyintheTheodicy.Itispartlybutnotentirelyvindicatedbytheresults
ofthepresentinvestigation.ItisemphaticallyclearintheTheodicy,asintherestofhiswork,that
Leibnizisacompatibilistandadeterminist.Thesolutionoftheproblemofcontingencythatis
mostclearlydevelopedintheTheodicy,thatnonactualthingsarepossibleinthemselvesevenif
theyarenotpossibleinrelationtoGod'swill,isonethatLeibnizalsoheld,andneverabandoned,in
hisprivatepapersfrom1673on.Itisasolutionthatimposesaminimumofqualificationonthe
necessityofallthings.
TheinfiniteanalysistheoryofcontingencyispartlystatedintheTheodicy,in14oftheremarks
onKing:
Foronemaysayinawaythatthesetwoprinciples[ofcontradictionandsufficient
reason]arecontainedinthedefinitionofTrueandFalse.Nevertheless,wheninmaking
theanalysisofthetruththathasbeenproposedoneseesitdependingontruthswhose
contraryimpliesacontradiction,onemaysaythatitisabsolutelynecessary.Butwhen
inpushingtheanalysisasfarasonepleasesoneisneverabletoarriveatsuchelements
ofthegiventruth,onemustsaythatitiscontingent,andthatithasitsoriginfroma
prevailingreasonthatinclineswithoutnecessitating.(GVI,414)
Here,asinalettertoLouisBourguetin1715(GIII,582/L664),Leibnizsaysthatnecessarytruths
receiveafiniteanalysisandcontingenttruthsdonot,butwithoutstatingthatthisiswhat
contingencyconsistsin,orthattheconceptofthepredicateiscontainedintheconceptofthe
subjectevenincontingenttruths.84
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82
Pfaff,"FragmentumEpistolae,"p.127
83
AsarguedinBlondel,Unenigmehistorique,pp.115.AccordingtoPfaff'sownaccount,atleast
oneofhiscontemporariestookthisview,andsomedoubtedtheaccuracyofPfaff'sreportof
Leibniz'sstatement.
84
0nlyslightlymorerevealing,Ithink,isatextwrittenquitelikelyabout1710forLeibniz'sownuse,
inwhichhesaysthatsomethingfollows"infallibly"but"notnecessarily;thatis,notinsuchaway
thatitcouldeverbedemonstratedthatthecontraryImpliesacontradiction,"andgivesasareason,
"becausetheanalysisgoestoinfinity"(RML412).
51
Wehaveseenthattheviewthat'Godchooseswhatisbest'iscontingent,aboutwhichLeibnizwas
veryhesitantinhisprivatepapers,seemstooccurinoneortwopassagesoftheTheodicy.This
mightbeduetosomedevelopmentofhisthought,butnosuchexplanationisplausibleforthe
Theodicy'sstrikingomissionofanymentionoftheviewthatitiscontingentthatthisworldisthe
best.Thelatterviewwaswellworkedout,affirmed,andneverrejectedinLeibniz'sprivatepapers;
anditisplausiblyinferredfromhisinfiniteanalysistheoryofcontingency,whichheclearly
continuedtobelievewhenhewrotetheTheodicy.
Moreover,thefrequentandunelucidatedusethatthebookmakesoftheterms'moralnecessity',
'hypotheticalnecessity',and'Inclinewithoutnecessitating'leavesthereaderwithaless
necessitarianimpressionofLeibniz'sthoughtthanthesetermswouldleaveiftheywere
accompaniedbytheexplanationsoftheirmeaningthatarepresentedorsuggestedbyhislesspublic
writings.OneisnotreassuredaboutLeibniz'ssinceritywhenonereads,inaletterfromLeibnizto
BartholomewDesBossesdiscussingtheuseof'moralnecessity'intheTheodicy,thecommentthat
"ingeneralIshouldpreferthewordstobeinterpretedinsuchawaythatnothingbadsounding
follows"(GII,419f.).85
ThelackofcandorintheTheodicyisevident;themotivesforit,whetherpedagogicalorself
protective,arenot.ItisinterestingthatLeibnizhadwrittenonce,probablyin1676:
Metaphysicsshouldbewrittenwithaccuratedefinitionsanddemonstrations,but
nothingshouldbedemonstratedinitthatconflictstoomuchwithreceivedopinions.
Forthusthismetaphysicswillbeabletobereceived.Ifitisonceapproved,then
afterwards,ifanyexamineitmoreprofoundly,theywilldrawthenecessary
consequencesthemselves.(AVI,iii,573)
OneofthedifficultiesintheTheodicy,however,isthatsomanyofLeibniz's"accuratedefinitions"
areomittedthatonemustturntootherworkstofindthematerialnecessaryforamoreprofound
examination.
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85
DesBosses,aRomanCatholic,waspreparingaLatintranslationofLeibnizTheodicy.Inthe
RomanCatholicChurchpropositionscouldbeofficiallycensuredas"badsounding[male
sonans],"whichisweakerthancondemningthemas"false";see,e.g.,Denzinger,Enchiridion,p.
370(following1340).
52
2
TheLogicofCounterfactualNonidentity
1.ProblemsofTransworldIdentity
AmongthethesesthatLeibnizsenttoAntoineArnauldinFebruary1686,theonethataroused
Arnauld'sinitialobjectionwasthefollowingstatement:
Sincetheindividualconceptofeachpersoncontainsonceforalleverythingthatwill
everhappentohim,oneseesinittheproofsaprioriorreasonsforthetruthofeach
event,orwhyonehasoccurredratherthananother.(LA12)
Allthepredicatesofanindividualsubstancearecontainedintheconceptofthatindividual,
accordingtoLeibniz.Thisthesisgivesrisetomanyquestionsabouttherelationofindividualsto
theirpredicates.Whyshouldthepredicatesbecontainedintheconceptoftheindividual,andnot
justintheindividualitself?WhydoesLeibnizinferfromtheconceptualcontainmentthesis,ashe
does(DM14),thatallthestatesofanindividualsubstancearecausedbypreviousstatesofthat
individualalone?Wewillcometothesequestions,inthecourseofthischapterandthenext,but
thepresentinvestigationisorganizedaroundanotherissue.Itisanissueofcounterfactualidentity;
Arnauldraiseditinthesewords:
SinceitisimpossiblethatIshouldnotalwayshaveremainedmyself,whetherIhad
marriedorlivedincelibacy,theindividualconceptofmyselfcontainedneitherofthese
twostates;justasitiswelltoinfer:thisblockofmarbleisthesamewhetheritbeat
restorbemoved;thereforeneitherrestnormotioniscontainedinitsindividual
concept.(LA30)
ArnauldaffirmstransworldorcounterfactualidentityasareasonforrejectingLeibniz'sconceptual
containmentthesis.Hedeniesthathisactualpredicateoflifelongcelibacyiscontainedinhis
individualconcept,onthegroundthatheisthesameindividualasonewhowould,undersome
possiblecircumstances,havemarried.Inhisresponse,asinanumberofotherplacesinhis
writings,LeibnizmadeclearthathedidnotacceptArnauld'sassumptionofcounterfactualidentity.
Heheldthatnoactualindividualcreaturewouldhaveexistedifanythingatallhadgonedifferently
fromthewaythingsgointheactualworldthatifArnauld,forexample,hadmarried,hewouldnot
havebeenArnauld[ormoreprecisely,thatanyonewhogotmarriedwouldnothavebeenArnauld
(cf.
53
Gr358)].WhydidLeibnizholdthis?Thatisthecentralquestionofthischapterandthenext.
Asittouchesonanissuethatisverymuchalivetoday,thisaspectofLeibniz'sphilosophyhas
1Inrecentdiscussionstheissuehasbeencouched
receivedmuchattentionfromrecentinterpreters.
intermsoftransworldidentity.Weaskabouttheidentityornonidentityofindividualsindifferent
possibleworlds;thisconceptualapparatusaffordsconvenientwaysofmakingsuchissuesprecise.
Leibnizhimselfcasttheissueinverysimilartermsatleastonce(T414).Atthesametime,we
shouldnotethathenormallyusedcounterfactualconditionalstoframetheissueratherthanputting
itintermsofpossibleworlds.Thisisimportantbecausecounterfactualconditionalshaveawell
knownrelativitytocontextwhichmaybelostfromviewinthinkingintermsofpossibleworlds.I
thinkwecansafelyusetheapparatusofpossibleworldsindealingwiththerelativelyformal
considerationsthatwilloccupyusinthischapter.Butthemoremetaphysicalargumentsstudiedin
Chapter3willleadmetoconcludeintheendthatLeibnizisprobablycommittedtoasweeping
denialoftransworldidentityonlyunderanunderstandingof'possibleworld'thatdiffersfromour
usualpresentunderstandingsevenmorewidelythanIsuggestedinChapter1,section3.
Attheoutset,weshouldnoteanimportantdifferencebetweenLeibnizandpresentday
philosopherswhoareinterestedintransworldidentity.Forthelatter,talkaboutpossibleworlds
servestoexplicatethestructure,ifnotthebasis,oflogicalpossibilityandnecessity.Whatis
possibleiswhatistruein(orat)somepossibleworld;whatisnecessaryiswhatistruein(orat)all
possibleworlds.Fromthispointofview,thedenialoftransworldidentityseemstoentailthatno
actualindividualcouldpossiblyhavehaddifferentpropertiesfromthoseitactuallyhas.Tosaythat
Caesar,forexample,couldhaveturnedbackfromtheRubiconistosaythatthereisapossible
worldinwhichhedoes,andthatobviouslymustbeapossibleworldinwhichheexists.Butifthere
isnotransworldidentity,thenCaesarexistsonlyintheactualworld,inwhichhecrossesthe
Rubicon.Soitseemstofollowthathecouldnothaveturnedback.Leibnizemphaticallyrejectsthis
conclusion,however.Muchof13ofhisDiscourseonMetaphysicsisdevotedtodevelopingthe
thesisthat,whilethecrossingoftheRubiconiscontainedintheindividualconceptofJulius
Caesar,itfollows"thatitwasreasonableandconsequentlyassuredthatthatwouldhappen,butnot
thatitisnecessaryinitself,northatthecontraryimpliesacontradiction."
DavidLewishasdevelopedhiswellknown"counterparttheory"asawayofrejectingtransworld
identitywithoutdenyingthatwecouldhavehadsomewhatdifferentpropertiesfromthosewe
actuallyhave.AccordingtoLewis,noindividualexistsinmorethanonepossibleworld,butthere
isa"counterpartrelation"thatobtainsamongsufficientlysimilarindividualsindifferentpossible
worlds.Yourcounterpartsare"peopleyoumighthavebeen,"sotospeak.Tosaythatitwouldhave
beenpossibleforyoutohavedoneacertainthingthatyoudidnotdoistosaythatthereisa
possibleworldinwhichacounterpartof
____________________
1
SeeMates,"IndividualsandModalityinthePhilosophyofLeibniz";Mondadori,"Leibnizandthe
DoctrineofInterWorldIdentity,""Reference,Essentialism,andModalityinLeibniz's
Metaphysics,"and"UnderstandingSuperessentialism";M.Wilson,"PossibleGods";Mates,
PhilosophyofLeibniz,ch.8;Sleigh,LeibnizandArnauld,ch.4.
54
2Severalrecentinterpreters
yoursdoesit. 3havepointedoutthatLeibnizhasauseofpropernames
thatsuggestssomethinglikeLewis'scounterparttheory.Hespeaks,forexample,of"possible
Adams"intheplural,meaning"possiblepersons,differentfromeachother,whofit"ageneral
descriptionconsistingofapartofthepredicatesofthefirstmanintheactualworld(LA41f.;cf.
LA20).
MargaretWilsonhasarguedconvincingly, 4however,thatitisamistaketoascribetoLeibniza
counterparttheoreticalaccountofpossibilityandnecessitydereintermsofalternativepossible
Adams,alternativepossibleCaesars,alternativepossibleArnaulds,andsoforth.Leibniznever(so
farasIknow)givessuchanaccount.Forhimtodoso,asWilsonpointsout,wouldbeinconsistent
withhisconceptionofGod'sfreedom.ForLeibnizholdsthatthereareinfinitelymanypossible
worldsthatGodcouldpossiblyhavecreated,andheneverspeaksofalternative"possibleGods"
whocouldhavecreatedthedifferentworlds.Heseemstobecommitted,notonlybythissilence,
butalsobythedoctrineofGod'snecessaryexistence,totheviewthatitwouldhavebeenthesame
Godthatcreatedwhateverpossibleworldwascreated.Inotherwords,Leibnizseemstohave
acceptedtransworldidentityforGodwhilerejectingitforeveryotherindividual.
TheseapparentinconsistenciescanberemovedbyunderstandingLeibnizianpossibleworldsasI
proposedinChapter1.IarguedtherethatLeibniz'sprincipalconceptionofpossibleworldscanbe
capturedbysayingthatapossibleworldisaworldthatGodcouldhavecreatedwereitnotforthe
goodnessthatispartofthedivinenature.ThisistheconceptiononwhichLeibnizdependsinhis
theodicyandhisaccountofcreation.Heiscommittedtotheviewthatthechoiceofthisworldthat
Godhasactuallycreated,andGod'snotcreatinganyotherpossibleworld,arecontainedinthe
conceptofGod.ButitispreciselybecausethisistheworldthatGodwouldfindtobebest,in
comparingallpossibleworlds,thatthesechoicesfollowfromGod'sessentialwisdomand
goodness.OneofLeibniz'smainconcernsinhisthinkingaboutpossibleworldsistomaintainthe
realityofGod'schoice.Andthecruxofthismatter,asLeibnizperceivedit,isthatGod(oneand
thesameGod,presumably)shouldhavehadapluralityofinternallyconsistentworldstochoose
5WhichworldGodchoosesisdeterminedbythedivinewisdomandgoodness,in
from.
conjunctionwiththevalueoftheworlds,andinthatwayfollowsfromtheconceptofGod.Butthe
worldsarerealalternativesforGodinthatGodcouldhavechosenanyoneofthemwereitnotfor
thedivinegoodness.
ThisenablesustounderstandwhyLeibnizallowedGodtohavetransworldidentity.Heisprepared
tosaythatthesameindividualGodcouldhavebeenthecreatorofdifferentpossibleworlds
becausethesenseinwhichGod"could"haveisthatwereitnotforGod'swisdomandgoodness,or
wereitnotforthoseworlds'inferiority,GodcouldhavenotthatGod'screatingthemwouldhave
beenperfectlyconsistentwiththedivinenature.Butthisverysameconceptionofthesense
____________________
2
Lewis,"CounterpartTheoryandQuantifiedModalLogic."
3
EspeciallyMondadori,"Reference,Essentialism,andModalityinLeibniz'sMetaphysics,"pp.
94101.
4
M.Wilson,"PossibleGods."
5
SeeChapter1,section1.4.
55
inwhichGodcouldhavecreatedadifferentworldrequiresthatnocreatureoccurinanypossible
worldinwhichsomethingoccurswhichiscontrarytothenatureofthatcreature(consideredapart
fromthereasonsforGod'schoiceamongworlds).Forthenitwouldnotbebecauseofits
inferiority,andGod'swisdomandgoodness,butbecauseofaninternalconceptualinconsistencyin
thatworld,thatGodcouldnotcreateit.(Bya"conceptuallyinconsistent"propositionImeanone
whosenegationiscontainedintheconceptofitssubject,whetherornotanyfiniteanalysisor
demonstrationwouldrenderthatcontainmentexplicit.Aconceptuallyinconsistentpropositionmay
thereforebepossibleintheLeibniziansense,explainedinChapter1,ofnotbeingdemonstrably
false.)
ThereismuchmoretobesaidaboutLeibniz'sreasonsfordenyingtransworldorcounterfactual
identitytocreatures.AsWilsonhasremarked,"weknowwhatuseLeibnizwantstomakeof"this
doctrine,theologically:"HewantstouseitasabasisfordenyingthatGodisresponsiblefora
createdindividual'smisfortunesorbadchoices,sincethatindividualcouldn'thaveexistedunless
hemadethosechoicesandexperiencedwhateverheinfactexperiences." 6LeibnizsaysthatGod
"didnotmakeSextuswicked....Allhedidwasgranthimexistence,whichhiswisdomcouldnot
refusetotheworldinwhichheisincluded"(T416).Leibnizthoughtthatthisentitledhimtohold
thatevilisnotcausedbyGod,butbythelimitationsinherentintheconceptsofthecreaturesthatit
wasbest,onthewhole,forGodtocreate(DM30,T20).Healsothoughtitprovidesananswerto
complaintsthatindividualsmightbetemptedtomakeagainstGod:"Youwillinsistthatyoucan
complain,whydidGodnotgiveyoumorestrength.Ireply:ifhehaddonethat,youwouldnotbe,
forhewouldhaveproducednotyoubutanothercreature"(Gr327;cf.AVl,iii,148).7
ThesetheologicalmotivesareimportantforunderstandingLeibniz'sdenialofcounterfactual
identity,but,asWilsonsuggests,heundoubtedlythoughthecouldgiveotherreasonsforit.Twoof
themwilldetainusonlybriefly.AparticularlybadargumentisfoundinaletterthatLeibnizsentto
ArnauldinJuly1686,butismissing(whetherasaresultofalatercorrection,Idonotknow)from
thecopyretainedbyLeibnizatHannover.RespondingtoArnauld'sclaim,asformulatedby
Leibniz,"IfindclearlyintheindividualconceptthatIhaveofmyselfthatIshallbemyselfwhether
ornotItakethetripthatIhaveplanned"(LA52),Leibnizsays:
IfitiscertainthatAisB,whateverisnotAisnotBeither.SoifAsignifiesMe,andB
signifiestheonewhowilltakethistrip,itcanbeconcludedthatwhoeverwillnottake
thistripisnotme;andthisconclusioncanbedrawnfromthecertitudealoneofmy
8
futuretrip,withouthavingtoimputeittothepropositioninquestion.(RL39)
____________________
6
M.Wilson,"PossibleGods,"p.729.AswillbeclearfromChapter3,IagreewithWilson's
statementonlysubjecttosomequalificationsofthesenseof"couldn't"init.
7
IhavediscussedthisreplyatsomelengthinR.Adams,"Existence,SelfInterest,andtheProblem
ofEvil."
8
Theconcluding"without..."phraseinthispassageisobscure.Withoutimputingwhattowhat
proposition?MyguessisthatLeibniz'smeaningwasthattheconclusioncanbedrawnonthe
groundsstatedinthispassagewithoutimputingcertainty,asapremise,toanythingassweepingas
thepredicatecontainmenttheoryoftruth.
56
Leibnizseemstobearguingherethatacontradictionwouldbeinvolvedincounterfactualidentity
ofanindividual,onthegroundthatI,whoamgoingtotakeacertaintrip,cannotalsohavethe
propertyofnottakingthattrip.ButofcoursethequestionisnotwhetherIcouldalsohavethe
propertyofnottakingthetrip,butwhetherIcouldhavehadthatpropertyinsteadofmyactual
propertyoftakingthetrip.
Adifferentargumentissuggestedbythestatement,"Itfollowsalsothatitwouldnothavebeenour
Adam,butanother,ifhehadhadotherevents,fornothingpreventsusfromsayingthatitwouldbe
another.Henceitisanother"(LA42).ThislookslikeanappealtothePrincipleofSufficient
Reason:thereisnocompellingreasontosayitwouldbethesameindividualifdifferentevents
happenedtohim;therefore,itwouldnotbethesameindividual.Thisisaweakargument.Itleaps
overvaststretchesofdisputedterritory.Arnauldwasatleastinitiallyinclinedtosay,forexample,
thatourordinaryconceptionofapersonkeepsusfromsayingitwouldhavebeenanotherAdamif
hehadneversinned.Onewonders,moreover,whethertheargumentdoesnotcutbothways.As
Wilsonsays,"Thequestionpresentsitselfinsistently:whatpreventsusfromdenyingitwouldbea
differentAdamifcircumstanceshadbeendifferent...?"9Woulditbeanyeasiertofinda
sufficientreasonfordenyingcounterfactualidentitythanforaffirmingit?Leibnizseemstoassume
herethatpresumptionfavorsnonidentitythatidentityneedstobeexplainedinawaythat
distinctnessdoesnot,andhencethatthereismoreneedofreasonsforaffirmingthanfordenying
identity.Perhapsthatiscorrect.Ithinkitisnotwithoutplausibilityinsomecases.Butnotseeing
howLeibnizwoulddefendit,Iwillpassontootherarguments.
2.TheConceptualContainmentTheoryofTruth
Itisnaturaltoturnnexttotheargumentthathasdrawnthemostdiscussion.
Finally[hewrotetoArnauld]Ihavegivenadecisivereason,whichinmyopinionranks
asademonstration;itisthatalways,ineverytrueaffirmativeproposition,necessaryor
contingent,universalorsingular,theconceptofthepredicateisincludedinsomeway
inthatofthesubject,praedicatuminestsubjecto[thepredicateinheresinthesubject];
orelseIdonotknowwhattruthis.(LA56)
ThisistheargumentbywhichArnauldconfessedhimselfespeciallyimpressedwhenhegaveup
thedebatewithLeibnizaboutindividualconcepts(LA64).Weshallconsiderwhatisthetheoryof
truthtowhichLeibnizhereappeals,whatwerehisreasonsforholdingit,andwhetheritdoesentail
hisdenialoftransworldorcounterfactualidentity.
AsusuallystatedbyLeibniz,theconceptualcontainmenttheoryoftruthappliestocategorical
propositionsthatis,topropositionsofsubjectpredicateform.Hesometimesapplieditto
conditionalpropositions,holdingthattheyaretrueifandonlyiftheconsequentiscontainedinthe
antecedent(e.g.,C401);
____________________
9
M.Wilson,"PossibleGods,"p.729.
57
butthatneednotconcernushere.Thesixtraditionaltypesofcategoricalproposition,withan
exampleofeach,are:
universalaffirmative:
Allmenaremarried.
universalnegative:
Nomanismarried.
particularaffirmative:
Somemanismarried.
particularnegative:
Somemanisnotmarried.
singularaffirmative:
Arnauldismarried.
singularnegative:
Arnauldisnotmarried.
Onlytwoofthesetypes,theuniversalandsingularaffirmatives,arementionedintheformulation
ofthetheorythatIhavequoted(asalsoinC16f.,519/MP96,L268).Thisisnoaccident,for
Leibnizappliesthetheorymorestraightforwardlytothesetypesthantotheotherfour.
Nevertheless,itisclearthathesometimesexpressesitinamoresweepingform,claimingthatin
everytrueproposition,withoutrestrictionastotype,theconceptofthepredicateiscontainedinthe
conceptofthesubject(DM8;GI132).
TheconceptualcontainmenttheoryiscloselyassociatedwithLeibniz'spreferenceforwhatis
nowadayscalledan"intensional"asopposedtoan"extensional"interpretationofthecategorical
propositions.(Perhapsinsomesenseitisthatpreference.)Roughly,anextensionalinterpretationis
onethattreatsthetruthorfalsityofpropositionsasdependingonrelationsamongtheextensionsof
theterms,wheretheextensionofatermistheclassofthingsthatsatisfyit,orwhichit
characterizes.10Anintensionalinterpretationisonethattreatsthetruthorfalsityofpropositionsas
dependingonrelationsamongtheintensionsthatis,theconceptsoftheirterms.
SinceLeibniz'sdiscussionpartner,Arnauld,wascoauthorofafamouslogictext,thePortRoyal
Logic,itisofinteresttonotethatasimilardistinctionismadeinthatbookbetweenthe
comprehension[comprhension]andtheextension[tendueorextension]ofanidea.The
comprehensionofanideaconsistsof"theattributeswhichitincludesinitself,andwhichcannotbe
takenawayfromitwithoutdestroyingit."Theextensionofanideaconsistsof"thesubjectswith
whichthatideaagrees,"orwhichcontainit.11Theextensionofageneralterm,however,maybe
viewedinthePortRoyalLogicasconstitutedbyboththespeciesandtheindividualsthatfallunder
it.Bothrelationsofthecomprehensionsoftermsandrelationsoftheextensionsoftermsareused
inthePortRoyalLogicinjustifyingthebasicrulesoftraditionallogic.12
ScholarshavenotedthatLeibnizworkedoutquiteavarietyofbothintensionalandextensional
treatmentsofthelogicofpredicates,andthathepreferredtheintensionalapproach.13Forthesake
ofbrevity,Iwillabstractsomewhatfrom
____________________
10
SeeRailliKauppi,berdieleibnizscheLogik,pp.25456,foracomparisonofLeibnizianand
modernconceptionsofclasses.
11
ArnauldandNicole,PortRoyalLogic,1,6;11.17.
12
ArnauldandNicole,PortRoyalLogic,11,1720.
13
TheinterpretertowhomIowethemostonthissubjectisKauppi.Thewholeofherexcellentbook,
berdieleibnizscheLogik,isastudyoftheintensionalandextensionalapproachesinLeibniz's
logic.Sheseemstomecorrectinherreply(pp.210,251f.)tothechargeofCouturatthatLeibniz
oughttohavepreferredtheextensionalinterpretation.(SeeCouturat,LalogiquedeLeibniz,pp.
1932.)
58
thisvarietyanddiscussonlytheoneintensionalandtheoneextensionalinterpretationthataremost
closelyrelatedtothecontroversybetweenLeibnizandArnauld.Leibnizdidnothavefixed
terminologycorrespondingto'intensional'and'extensional';soIwillusethesemoremodernterms.
Hedistinguishedthetwoprincipaltypesoftreatmentvariouslyasintermsofideas[secundum
ideasorperideas]ontheonehandandintermsofinstances[perexemplasubjecta]orindividuals
belongingtotheterms[perindividuisterminorum]ontheotherhand(C300;GVII,215/P119f.;
cf.C53/P20).InLeibniz,unlikethePortRoyalLogic,theextensionaltreatmentisalmostalways
intermsoftheindividuals,notthespecies,thatfallunderthegeneralterms.14
Thecontrastbetweenthetwointerpretationsiseasiestinthecaseofuniversalaffirmative
propositions.Asanexample,taketheproposition,'Allgoldismetal'.Extensionallyinterpreted,it
meansthattheextensionof'gold'iscontainedintheextensionof'metal':theclassofgoldthingsis
containedorincludedintheclassofmetalthings.Intensionallyinterpreted,itmeansthatthe
conceptofmetaliscontainedintheconceptofgold.Extensionally,thesubjectiscontainedinthe
predicateinthistypeofproposition,ifthepropositionistrue.Intensionally,thepredicateis
containedinthesubject.Leibniznotedthis"inversion"ofthecontainmentrelation,contrastinghis
ownintensionalinterpretationwiththeextensionalinterpretationof"theSchools,"who
saythatmetaliswiderthangold,andifwewishedtoenumeratetheindividualsofgold
ontheonehandandtheindividualsofmetalontheother,thelatterwouldcertainlybe
morethantheformer,whichwillthereforebecontainedinthelatterasapartinthe
whole.(C53/P20)
'Somemetalisgold'isaparticularaffirmativeproposition.Extensionallyinterpreted,itmeansthat
theextensionof'metal'intersectstheextensionof'gold':theclassofmetalthingsandtheclassof
goldthingshaveatleastonememberincommon.Theintensionalinterpretationofparticular
affirmativesislessobvious.Leibnizwantstosaythatinthesepropositions,too,"theconceptofthe
predicateiscontainedinsomewayintheconceptofthesubject"butinwhatway?Itdoesnot
seemtobetruethattheconceptofgoldisincludedintheconceptofmetal.Forsomethingcanbe
metalwithoutbeinggold.
Leibniz'ssolutiontothisproblemisthat"inaparticularaffirmativepropositionitisenoughthatthe
thingshouldfollowwhensomethingisadded."Hegivesanexampletoshowwhatsortofaddition
hemeans:"althoughmetaldoesnotbyitselfcontaingold,neverthelesssomemetal,withan
additionorspecification(forexample,thatwhichmakesupthegreaterpartofaHungarianducat)
isofsuchanatureastoinvolvethenatureofgold"(C51/P19).Thischoiceofanexampleisnota
happyone.Foritseemsdoubtfulthattheconceptofgoldiscontainedintheconceptofmetalthat
makesupthegreaterpartofaHungarianducat.
Leibnizgivesabetterexampleelsewhere,suggestingthat'Somemanisalaugher'couldbe
understoodas'Alaughermanisalaugher.'Herethe"addition"ofthespecification'laugher'tothe
conceptofmanyieldsasubjectcon
____________________
14
GVII,244/P141seemstopresentanexception,asnoticedbyKauppi,berdieleibnizscheLogik,
p.43.
59
cept(oflaugherman)whichmanifestlydoescontainthepredicateofbeingalaugher.Itmight
seemthatthismethodofintensionalinterpretationhastheunacceptableresultthatallparticular
affirmativesturnouttobetrue,sincewecanalways"add"thepredicateconcepttothesubject
concept.ButLeibnizdeniesthatwecanalwaysmakesuchanaddition.Thequalifiedsubject
conceptresultingfromtheadditionmustbeconsistentinordertoverifyaparticularaffirmative
proposition,onhisinterpretation.Thus,hesaysthat"alaugherstonewouldnotbealaughersince
alaugherstoneinvolvesacontradiction"(GVII,214/P118).Intensionallyinterpreted,therefore,
'SomeAisB'meansthattheconceptofA,withsomeconsistentaddition,includestheconceptof
B.
Different(thoughequivalent)treatmentsofthenegativepropositionsarefoundinLeibniz.Hesays
that"negativepropositionsmerelycontradicttheaffirmatives,andassertthattheyarefalse."A
particularnegativedoesnothingbutdenyauniversalaffirmative,and"auniversalnegative
propositionmerelycontradictsaparticularaffirmative"(C52/P19f.).Thistreatmentofthe
negativepropositions,asnegationsoftheaffirmatives,can,ofcourse,beappliedtoboththe
intensionalandtheextensionalinterpretations.Sincetheparticularaffirmative'SomeAisB',
intensionallyinterpreted,means'TheconceptofA,withsomeconsistentaddition,containsthe
conceptofB',theuniversalnegative,'NoAisB',willmean'TheconceptofA,withanyconsistent
addition,doesnotcontaintheconceptofB'.Inthistreatmentnegativepropositionsareviewedas
casesofexclusionratherthaninclusionofconcepts,andLeibnizcommonlystatestheconceptual
containmenttheoryoftruthaccordingly,asapplyingonlytoaffirmativepropositions(e.g.,LA56;
C519/L268;GVII,208/P112).
Amorenaturalandperspicuousintensionalinterpretationofthenegativepropositionsresultsif
theyareformedbynegatingthepredicateintheaffirmativepropositionofthesamequantity,rather
thanbynegatingtheoppositeaffirmativeproposition."InaNegativeProposition,whenwedeny
thatapredicateisinthesubjectinthiswaythatIhavesaid,bythatveryactweaffirmthatthe
negationofthepredicate,oratermthatiscontradictorytothepredicate,isinthesubject"(C
86/AG11).Inthisapproach,theuniversalnegative,'NoAisB',means'TheconceptofAcontains
theconceptofnotB'.Thisrendersthenegativepropositionasacaseofconceptinclusionrather
thanexclusion,thoughtheconceptincludedisthenegationoftheonetraditionallyidentifiedasthe
predicate"term"oftheproposition,ratherthanthatconceptitself.InthepaperfromwhichIhave
citedthisapproach,accordingly,Leibnizcrossedouttheword"affirmative"fromthestatementthat
"Ineveryaffirmativeproposition...thenotionofthepredicateisinvolvedinthenotionofthe
subject"(C85/AG11).Ananalogoustreatmentcanbeappliedtotheextensionalinterpretation.
Iusethetraditionalsquareofoppositiontosummarize(1)theextensionaland(2)theintensional
interpretationoftheuniversalandparticularpropositions,asfollows:
AllAisB.
NoAisB.
(1)TheclassofBcontains
theclassofA.
(1)TheclassofnotBcontains
theclassofA.
(2)TheconceptofAcontains
theconceptofB.
(2)TheconceptofAcontains
theconceptofnotB.
60
SomeAisB.
SomeAisnotB.
(1)TheclassofBintersects
theclassofA.
(1)TheclassofnotBintersects
theclassofA.
(2)TheconceptofA,withsome
consistentaddition,contains
theconceptofB.
(2)TheconceptofA,withsome
consistentaddition,contains
theconceptofnotB.
Withregardtouniversalandparticularcategoricalpropositionsatleast,theintensional
interpretationissubstantiallyequivalenttotheconceptualcontainmenttheoryoftruth.
Theintensionalinterpretationofsingularpropositions,however,isbothmoreproblematicand
morerelevanttoourpresentinvestigation.Atthispointitwillbehelpfultotakeupsome
terminologyfromtheLeibnizArnauldcorrespondence.ArnauldagreedwithLeibnizthatthereisa
completeconceptwhichGodformsofeveryindividualandwhichcontainsalloftheindividual's
predicateseverythingthatwilleverhappentothatindividual.Thatmuchclearlyfollowsfromthe
doctrineofdivineomnisciencethatwascommonpropertytothetwothinkers.Theyagreedthat
completeconceptsofindividualsareknownonlytoGod,nottous;wehavetothinkofindividuals
throughincompleteconcepts.Theyalsospokeofanindividualconceptofeachindividual,whichis
minimallycharacterizedbyArnauldinthefollowingwords:
ItseemstomethatIoughttoregardascontainedintheindividualconceptofmeonly
whatissuchthatIwouldnolongerbemeifitwerenotinme;andthateverythingthat
isonthecontrarysuchthatitcouldbeinmeornotbeinme,withoutmyceasingtobe
me,cannotbeconsideredasbeingcontainedinmyindividualconcept.(LA30f.)
Leibnizmaintainedthattheindividualconceptofeverycreatedindividualisitscompleteconcept.
Arnaulddisputedthis,atleastpartlyonthegroundthatitseemedtoimplythedenialof
counterfactualidentity,foritfollowsfromthedefinitionofanindividualconceptthatIcouldnot
bemeifIlackedanypredicatecontainedinmyindividualconcept.Soifmycompleteconceptis
myindividualconcept,itseemstofollowthatIcouldnotbemeifIlackedanyofmyactual
predicates.
InthisdiscussionLeibniztakesthesubjectconceptofasingularpropositiontobeanindividual
conceptandseemstogivesuchpropositionsanintensionaltreatmentofthesamesortasuniversal
propositions.15Forinstance,'Arnauldismarried'wouldmeanthattheconceptofbeingmarriedis
containedintheindividualconceptofArnauld,whilethetruth,'Arnauldisnotmarried',meansthat
theconceptofnotbeingmarriediscontainedinArnauld'sindividualconcept.
xisF.
xisnotF.
Theindividualconceptofx
containstheconceptofF.
containstheconceptofnotF.
Thequestionnaturallyarises,however,whysingularpropositionsshouldnotbetreatedinthesame
wayasparticularratherthanuniversalpropositions.Leibniz'sintensionalinterpretationdemandsof
particularpropositionsonlythattheconceptofthesubjectwithsomeconsistentadditioncontain
theconceptof
____________________
15
Cf.ArnauldandNicole,PortRoyalLogic,II,3.
61
thepredicate(orofthepredicate'snegation).Whyshouldmorebedemandedofsingular
propositions?Whyshouldn't'Arnauldismarried'meanthattheindividualconceptofArnauld,
withsomeconsistentaddition,containstheconceptofbeingmarried?Andwhywouldn'tArnauld
becorrectinsayingthattheconceptofmarriedArnauldishisindividualconceptwithaconsistent
addition?
ThesequestionsappearevenmorepressingwhenwerecallthatforLeibnizanegativeproposition
isthecontradictoryofthesingularaffirmative(C52/P19f.).Now,supposethesingularaffirmative
istreatedonthemodeloftheuniversalaffirmativeandmeansthattheindividualconceptofthe
subjectcontainstheconceptofthepredicate.Thenitsnegationwillbetreatedasanalogoustoa
particularnegative,whichisthecontradictoryofauniversalaffirmative,andwillmeanthatthe
individualconceptofthesubject,withsomeconsistentaddition,containsthecomplementofthe
conceptofthepredicate.Thus'Arnauldisnotmarried'willmeanthatnottheindividualconceptof
Arnauld,butthatconceptwithsomeconsistentaddition(say,theconceptofcelibateArnauld),
containstheconceptofnotbeingmarried.
Suppose,ontheotherhand,thatthesingularaffirmativeistreatedonthemodeloftheparticular
affirmativeandmeansthattheindividualconceptofthesubject,withsomeconsistentaddition,
containstheconceptofthepredicate.Inthatcaseitsnegation,byanalogywiththeuniversal
negative,mustmeanthattheindividualconceptofthesubject,assuch,containsthenegationofthe
conceptofthepredicate.Onthisreading,'Arnauldisnotmarried'willmeanthattheindividual
conceptofArnaulditselfcontainstheconceptofnotbeingmarried.
Leibnizianprinciplesthusseemtogenerateacompletenewsquareofopposition,withfourtypesof
proposition,outofthetwooriginaltypesofsingularproposition:
xisF.
xisnotF.
xisF.
xisnotF.
Theindividualconceptofx,
withsomeconsistentaddition,
withsomeconsistentaddition,
Inthissquare,asinthetraditionalsquareofuniversalandparticularpropositions,thediagonally
oppositepropositionsaremutuallycontradictory.Allthelogicalrelationshipsofthesquareof
oppositionarereproduced.
Thisisastrangeresult.Leibnizcertainlywantstohavetwointensionaltypesofsingular
propositioninsteadoffour.Yetanychoiceofonlytwooutofthefourtypesinthesquareseemsto
runsomeriskofbeingarbitrary.Leibnizhimselfseemsinclinedtochoosethetoptwotypesinthe
square,thetwothatcorrespondtouniversalpropositions.Thereisaseriousobjectiontothat
choice,however,inthatthosetwotypesarenotcontradictoriesbutcontraries,whichcanbothbe
falsetogether.Ontheotherhand,ifherefusedtochoose,hewouldbeleftwithfourtypesof
singularproposition,andwouldhavetoregardthetwoordinaryformsofsingularproposition('xis
F'and'xisnotF')asambiguouswhichalsoseemsundesirable.
62
WedonothavetoguesswhatLeibniz'ssolutiontothisproblemwouldbe,foraconsiderablepart
oftheproblemoccurredtohimandwasdiscussedbyhim.
SomeLogicaldifficultiesworthsolvinghaveoccurred[tome].Howdoesitcomeabout
thatoppositionworksin[thecaseof]thesingular[propositions],'TheApostlePeterisa
soldier'and'TheApostlePeterisnotasoldier',whereasotherwiseauniversal
affirmativeandaparticularnegativeareopposed?Shallwesaythatasingular
[proposition]isequivalenttoauniversalandtoaparticular?That'sright....Forsome
ApostlePeterandeveryApostlePetercoincide,sincethetermissingular.(GVII,211/
P115)
HereLeibnizseesthatthereisaproblemabouttreatingthesingularnegativeasthecontradictoryof
thesingularaffirmative,andthattheproblemarisesfromthepossibilityofinterpretingthesingular
propositionseitherasanalogoustouniversalpropositionsorasanalogoustoparticular
propositions.Hissolutionistoinsistthatthetwointerpretationsofeachsingularpropositionare
equivalent,"coincide,"andsocollapseintoone.
Buthowisthatequivalencepossible,withintheframeworkofaLeibnizianintensional
interpretation?Inspectionoftheapparentsquareofoppositionforsingularpropositionswillshow
thatthereductionofthefourtypestothetwodesiredtypesrequiresthattheindividualconceptofx
withanyconsistentadditionbeequivalenttotheindividualconceptofx.Thisrequirementwillbe
satisfiedifandonlyifthereisnopredicatenotalreadycontainedintheindividualconceptofx
whichcanconsistentlybeaddedtoit.Whatisrequired,inotherwords,ispreciselythatthe
individualconceptofxbeacompleteconcept.16Foracompleteconcept,asweshallseeinsection
6,isonetowhichnonewpredicatecanconsistentlybeadded.
3.ActualityintheConceptualContainmentTheory
Leibnizsaysthat,asopposedtoanextensionalcalculusbasedonrelationsofclassesofindividuals,
"Ihavepreferredtoconsideruniversalconcepts,orideas,andtheircombinations,becausetheydo
notdependontheexistenceofindividuals"(C53/P20).Ithinkwecanguesswhattheadvantageis
thatLeibnizthusclaimsfortheintensionalinterpretation.Therearewellknowndifficultiesin
maintainingthevalidityofthetraditionalinferencesinthesquareofopposition,underan
extensionalinterpretation,ifthesubjectorthepredicateconcept(oroneoftheircomplements)has
anemptyextension,becauseofthewayinwhichthetruthofthepropositions,extensionally
interpreted,dependsontheexistenceofindividualssatisfying(ornotsatisfying)theconcepts.
Leibnizcouldjustifyallthetraditionalinferences,underhisintensionalinterpretation,without
assuminganythingabouttheactualexistenceofindividuals,butassumingonlythatthesubjectand
predicateconcepts(andtheircomplements)areconsistent(andhencepossiblyexemplified).
____________________
16
Theconnectionofthissolutionwiththedoctrinethatindividualconceptsarecompleteisnotedby
Kauppi,berdieleibnizscheLogik,p.213.
63
Fromanotherpointofview,however,thetactthatunderanintensionalinterpretation,thetruthof
thecategoricalpropositionsdoesnotdependontheexistenceofindividualscanbeseenasaserious
disadvantage.Manyofthepropositionstobeinterpretedarenormallyunderstoodtobeaboutthe
universeofactuallyexistingthingsinsuchawaythattheirtruthorfalsityoughttodependonthe
existenceofindividuals.Fromthestandpointofcommonsense,itmaybeimplausibletosay(asthe
usualextensionalinterpretationdoes)that'Allcentaursaremadeofmetal'istrueifnocentaurs
exist,butitisatleastasimplausibletosay(inaccordancewiththeintensionalinterpretation)that
'Somedogsaregreen'istrueiftheconceptofagreendogisconsistent.
Leibnizwillnotbespeechlessinthefaceofthisproblem.Hehadamethodfordealingwithit.If
'Somepioushumanbeingispoor'meansthatpovertyofapioushumanbeingisnotjustpossible
butactual,Leibnizwillstateitas'Apoorpioushumanbeingisexistent',where'existent'means
existingintheactualworld(C27073).Intensionallyinterpreted,thisyields'Theconceptofapoor
pioushumanbeing,withsomeconsistentaddition,containstheconceptofexistingintheactual
world.'Herewemustthinkmoreaboutwhatismeantby'consistentaddition'.Doesitmean(1)an
additionthatcouldbemadewithoutengenderingademonstrableinconsistencythatis,an
inconsistencythatcouldbeprovedbyafiniteanalysis?Ordoesitmean(2)anadditionthatwould
notresultinanyconceptualinconsistencyatall?Orperhaps(3)anadditionthatwouldnotresultin
anyconceptualinconsistencyinthebasicconcept17ofapossibleworldinwhichtheamplifed
conceptwouldbeexemplified?Thefirstofthesecannotbewhatismeant.Fortheinterpretationis
intendedtoapplytocontingentpropositions,whichitwouldtakeaninfiniteanalysistoproveor
disprove(cf.C272).Indeed,'Apoorpioushumanbeingisexistent'issuchaproposition.And
whilethethirdsense,invokingbasicconceptsofworlds,maybewhatismeantinsomecontexts,I
thinkthesecondsensemustbeintendedwhere'existent'isbeingtreatedasapredicate,sinceone
mustgooutsidethebasicconceptofanypossibleworldtodeterminewhichworldisactual.
Interpretedwiththissortofexistentialimport,'Somepioushumanbeingispoor'willbetrueifand
onlyiftheconceptofexistingintheactualworldcanbeaddedtotheconceptofapoorpious
humanbeingwithoutgeneratinganyconceptualinconsistency.Andthatwillbetrueifandonlyifa
poorpioushumanbeingexistsinthebestofallpossibleworlds.Forgiventhenecessaryexistence
ofaGodofperfectwisdom,power,andgoodness,aconceptualinconsistencyisinvolvedinthe
actualityofanyworldbutthebest.ThisinterpretationisborneoutbyLeibniz'seffortstodefine
'existence'and'existent'intermsofenteringintothemostperfectseriesofthings,orbeing
compatiblewithmorethingsthananythingincompatiblewithitis,orbeingpleasingtoGod.18As
definitions,theseareproblematic,butitisclearthatLeibniz'sintensionalinterpretationof
propositionsintendedtobeaboutthewaythingsactuallyarewillworkonlyontheassumptionthat
theconceptofexistingintheactualworldandtheconceptofexistinginthebestofallpossible
worldscanbeadded,withoutanyconceptualinconsistency,toexactlythesameconcepts.
____________________
17
ThisterminologyisintroducedandexplainedinChapter1,section1.2.
18
C9,360,376,405/P51,65f.;cf.Gr325andChapter6,section2inthisvolume.
64
Universalpropositionscanbetreatedinananalogousway.Forexample,if'Everyhumanbeing
sins'meansnotthatsinlessnessisconceptuallyinconsistentwithhumanity,butonlythatsinis
actuallyuniversalamonghumanbeings,itcanberenderedas'Theconceptofahumanbeingthat
doesnotsincontainstheconceptofnotexistingintheactualworld'(cf.C271).Asforsingular
propositions,'Arnauldis(actually)celibate'canpresumablyberenderedas'Theconceptof
celibateArnauldcontainstheconceptofexistingintheactualworld'whichwillbetrueifandonly
ifArnauldexists,andiscelibate,inthebestofallpossibleworlds.
4.AnAntiSemanticalTheoryofTruth
Leibnizheldaveryaustereviewofconceptualcontainment.Hethoughtthatalltruepropositions
areeither"identities"orreducibleby(aperhapsinfinite)analysisoftermstoidentities.Among
categoricalpropositions,identitieshavesuchformsas'AisA','AisnotnonA',and'ABisA'(
C518,369/L267,P59).Reductionbyanalysisoftermsproceedsbytheuseofdefinitions,orby
substitutionof(morecomplex)equivalenttermsfortheoriginaltermsoftheproposition(see
C518,68/L267;GVII,44).Itakeitfromthisthatintruthsthatarenotexplicitlyidentical,
conceptualcontainmentissupposedtobebasedonaformal(thoughperhapsnotfinite)logical
constructionofthetermsofthepropositionoutofsimplerconcepts.Andthisconstruction,atleast
insofarasitisrelevanttothetruthoftheproposition,proceedsbythesimplelogicaloperationsof
conjunctionandnegation.
Leibnizdoesspeakofother"simpleparticlesorprimitivesyncategorematicterms,"suchas'in'(
C358/P49),whichplayapartinthecompositionofconcepts,butconceptualcontainmentand
exclusionseemalwaystoturnonconjunctionandnegation.Ifapredicateiscontainedinasubject
concept,itisbecausetheyareidenticalorthesubjectconceptisaconjunctiononeofwhose
conjunctsisidenticalwiththepredicate.Ifthesubjectexcludesthepredicate,thatisbecauseitis
thenegationofthepredicate(orviceversa),orbecausethesubjectorpredicateorbothare
conjunctionsofconceptsandoneofthemis,orincludesasaconjunct,aconceptthatisthe
negationoftheotherorofoneoftheother'sconjuncts.Leibniz'sgeneralstatementsofhistheoryof
conceptualcontainmentseemnottoallowforanyotherrelationofimplicationorinconsistency
betweenconceptsthanthese.
Thismaynotbeconsistentwithallhisapplicationsofthetheory.19Forinstance,Ihavearguedin
section3thatactualexistenceiscontainedintheconceptsofthosethingsthatactuallyexist,on
Leibniz'sview,byvirtueoftheirbelongingtothebestofallpossibleworlds.Butistherelationof
betterthanbetweenpossibleworldsreducibletopurelysyntacticalrelationsamongconcepts?
PerhapsLeibnizthoughtso,butit'sfarfromobviousthatitisso,andhehasnotleftusany
demonstrationthatitis.Hehasleftusgeneralstatements,however,thatseemtoimplyapurely
syntacticaltheoryoftruth.
____________________
19
IamindebtedtoMarianneKooijforpressingmeonthispoint.SimilarissueswillariseinChapters
5and6.
65
LeibnizmaybecontrastedwithDescartesonthispoint.InhisearlyRulesfortheDirectionofthe
Mind,Descartesheldthatweareacquaintedwithanumberof"simplenatures,"whichcannotbe
analyzedintoanythingsimpler.Inspiteoftheirsimplicity,hethoughtthesenaturesmayhavea
necessaryconnectionwitheachother;onemaybe
soimpliedintheconceptofanother,bysomeconfusedreason,thatwecannotconceive
eitherdistinctlyifwejudgethattheyareseparatedfromeachother.Itisinthiswaythat
shapeisconjoinedwithextension,motionwithdurationortime,andsoon,becauseit
isimpossibletoconceiveofashapethathasnoextensionatall,oramotionthathasno
durationatall.(ATX,421)
DescartescouldnotexplaintheseimplicationsinthewayproposedbyLeibniz,forDescartes
maintainedthatshape,extension,motion,anddurationaresimpleandexplicitlydeniedthatthey
canbeanalyzed.Hecouldnot,therefore,regardthemasconjunctionsofsimplerproperties.In
otherwords,Descartessupposedthatthereareprimitivenecessaryimplicationsbetweenconcepts,
whicharenottobeexplainedbystructuresofconjunctionandnegationwithintheconcepts.He
waslessexplicitaboutprimitiveinconsistenciesbetweenconcepts,buthedidsaythatthesimple
naturescanbesortedintothosethatareascribedtotheintellect,thosethatareascribedtobodies,
andthosethatareascribedtoboth(ATX,419).Implicitinthisdivision,Ithink,istheassumption
thatthereissomesortofnecessaryincompatibilitybetweenthepurelyintellectualandthepurely
materialnatures,eventhoughtheyaresimple.Knowledgeanddoubt,forinstance,cannothavea
shape.
Descartes'spositionisplausible.Ifthereareanysimpleconcepts,Ishouldthinkthereprobablyare
primitiveimplicationsandinconsistenciesbetweenthem.Leibnizwillhavenoneofit,however.He
maintainsanaccountofconceptualimplicationandinconsistencythatisanancestoroftheattempt
toexplainalllogicalnecessityandalllogicalimplicationintermsofanalyticity.Oneplaceinhis
philosophywheresomethinghangsonthisisinhisversionoftheontologicalproofoftheexistence
ofGod.Earlyandlatehegivesanargument(discussedinChapters5and6inthisvolume)forthe
possibilityofGod'sexistencethatpresupposesthatconceptualinconsistencycannotariseexceptby
aconjunctionofconceptsinwhichoneconceptisanegationoftheother.
Theconsequenceofdefiningtruthintermsofconceptualcontainment,soformallyunderstood,isa
radicallyantisemanticaltheoryoftruth.Thatis,itisatheoryinwhichthetruthorfalsityofa
propositiondoesnotdependatallonwhatobjects,orevenwhatproperties,arerepresentedbythe
simpleconceptsthatenterintotheproposition.Truthorfalsitydependsonlyonthelogical
structureofthepropositionandtheinternallogicalstructureofitsconcepts.Inthissense,truthis
notasemanticalbutapurelysyntacticalpropertyofpropositions,accordingtoLeibniz'stheory.
Thepointisunderlinedbytwoconsequencesthatfollowfromthetheory,althoughLeibnizmaynot
haverecognizedthem.First,suppose,asLeibnizdid,thatallconceptsareultimatelycomposedof
simpleconcepts.ItfollowsfromLeibniz'stheorythatGoddoesnotneedtoknowwhatsimple
conceptsareinvolvedinapropositionP,orwhatpropertiesarerepresentedbythesimple
66
conceptsinP,inordertoknowwhetherPistrueorfalse.Godhasonlytoknowthelogical
structureofPinordertoknowwhetherPistrue.Suppose,forexample,thatGodintuitsa
representationofacompleteanalysisofP,inwhicheachsimpleconceptisrepresentedconsistently
anduniquelybyasymbol.Godcouldknowwhethertherepresentedpropositionistrueorfalse
withoutknowingwhatthesymbolsstandfor.Ofcourse,LeibnizwouldinsistthatGoddoesknow
whatsimpleconceptsareinvolvedineveryproposition(andwhatpropertiestheyrepresent,ifthat
isdifferent);butGod'sknowledgeofthetruthandfalsityofpropositionsdoesnotdependonthat.
Second,ifLeibniz'stheoryoftruthiscorrect,theactualworldisperfectlysymmetricalwithrespect
tosimpleconcepts.TakeanytruepropositionP.SupposeAisacompleteanalysisofP;perhapsA
isinfinitelycomplex.AndletFandGbetwosimpleconceptsoccurringinA.Nowconsiderthe
propositionQformedbyinterchangingFandGatalloftheiroccurrencesinA.Itfollowsfrom
Leibniz'stheorythatQistrueifPis,because,whenfullyanalyzed,theyhaveexactlythesame
logicalstructure,andthereforeQ'ssubjectconceptwillcontainQ'spredicateifandonlyifP's
subjectconceptcontainsP'spredicate.
ThisisnottosaythatthereisnoplaceinLeibniz'sphilosophyforasemanticsthatis,foratheory
ofhowthoughtand/orlanguagerepresentthingsdistinctfromthemselves.Onthecontrary,Leibniz
believedthateachofushasinfinitelymanythoughtsthat"express,"andconstitute"perceptions
of,"thingsoutsideourownminds,andhedevotedalotofattentiontothisrelation,whichis,ina
broadsense,asemanticalrelation.Itisjustthatinhisphilosophythetruthandfalsityof
propositionsaredeterminedindependentlyofthissemanticalrelation(orperhapsmoreaccurately,
priortoit).Thismakesitallthemoredifficulttoanswerthequestiontowhichweturnnext.
5.WhyDidLeibnizHoldtheConceptualContainmentTheory?
Clearly,theconceptualcontainmenttheoryoftruthisanextraordinarydoctrine.WhydidLeibniz
believeit?Hesawsomeadvantagesforformallogicinanintensionalinterpretationofthelogicof
predicates,butthoseformalconsiderationsareinconclusive,andLeibnizknewit.20RobertSleigh
hasproposed"Leibniz'sefforttoexplainpossibleindividuals,possibleworlds,andcreationin
termsofGodandhisconcepts"asthesourceoftheconceptualcontainmenttheoryoftruth.21Iam
surethatLeibniz'sdoctrineofcreationisatleastamajorpartofthesourceoftheconceptual
containmenttheory.Specifically,IdonotbelieveLeibnizwouldhaveadoptedtheconceptual
containmenttheoryoftruthhaditnotbeenforhisprioradherencetoaformofthePrincipleof
SufficientReasonthatmakeseverytruthfollow,insomesense,fromthenecessaryexistenceand
natureofGod.
Intheworksofthe1680sandlater,LeibnizsometimesproposesaderivationofthePrincipleof
SufficientReasonfromtheconceptualcontainmenttheory
____________________
20
SeeespeciallyKauppi,berdieleibnizscheLogik,pp.24752.
21
Sleigh,"TruthandSufficientReasoninthePhilosophyofLeibniz,"p.236.
67
oftruth(C519/L268;cf.Tk14).LouisCouturatevenheldthatLeibnizidentifiedtheprinciple
withthetheory.22ButitisnotplausibletosupposethatLeibnizacceptedthePrincipleof
SufficientReasonbecausehebelievedtheconceptualcontainmenttheoryoftruth.Theprinciple
wasoneofhisfirstmetaphysicalcommitments.Inhisletterof1671toMagnusWedderkopfandin
ThePhilosopher'sConfessionofayearortwolaterweseetheyoungLeibnizwrestlingwiththe
apparentlydeterministicimplicationsoftheprinciple,buttheconceptualcontainmenttheoryof
truthmakesnoappearancethere(AII,i,117f./L146f.;AVI,iii,11549).Intheearly1670sLeibniz
evenwroteoutaproofofthePrincipleofSufficientReasonthatisnotbasedonanytheoryoftruth,
butonhisconceptionofa"requirement[requisitum":23
Proposition:Nothingiswithoutareason,orwhateverishasasufficientreason.
Definition1.Asufficientreasonisthatwhichissuchthatifitispositedthethingis.
Definition2.Arequirementisthatwhichissuchthatifitisnotpositedthethingisnot.
Demonstration:Whateveris,hasall[its]requirements.Forifone[ofthem]isnot
positedthethingisnotbydef.2.
Ifall[its]requirementsareposited,thethingis.Forifitisnot,itwillbekeptfrom
beingbythelackofsomething,thatis,arequirement.
ThereforealltheRequirementsareasufficientreasonbydef.1.
Thereforewhateverishasasufficientreason.
Q.E.D.(AVI,ii,483)
Thecrucialpremiseoftheproofisthatnothingcanfailtoexistexceptforlackofarequirement
(i.e.,anecessarycondition)ofitsexistence.Thisseemstobegthequestion,sinceanyonewho
deniesthePrincipleofSufficientReasonwillsupposethatwhenallthenecessaryconditionsofa
thing'sexistencearegiven,theremightstillremainbothapossibilityofitsexistinganda
possibilityofitsnotexistingunlesstriviallynecessaryconditions(suchasthething'sexistence
itself)areincludedhereamongitsrequirements,inwhichcasethesumoftherequirementswill
constituteasufficientreasononlyinaveryuninterestingsenseof'reason'.Leibnizclearlylikedthis
argument,however.ItisrepeatedinThePhilosopher'sConfession(AVI,iii,118)andseemsto
cometomuchbrieferexpressionin1716inLeibniz'slastlettertoSamuelClarke(LCV,18).
ThusLeibnizwouldhavebelievedinthePrincipleofSufficientReasonevenifhehadnever
thoughtoftheconceptualcontainmenttheoryoftruth.Butthetheorydoesprovideanexplanation
ofhowthereisasufficientreasonforeverytruth.Forinanytruepropositionthewayinwhichthe
predicateiscontainedintheconceptofthesubject,withorwithoutinvolvementofGod'schoiceof
thebest,willexpressthereasonforthattruth.Ithinkthatisthepointofthepas
____________________
22
Couturat,"OnLeibniz'sMetaphysics,"pp.20f.
23
Formoreonthisconception,seeChapter4,section1.
68
sagesinwhichLeibnizseemstoderivethePrincipleofSufficientReasonfromthetheory.24
Perhapsthetheorywaspracticallyforcedonhimbyhiscommitmenttotheprinciple.Hemayhave
beenunabletoseeanyreasonassufficientthatwasnotgroundedinconceptualrelations.Thatis
nottheonlywayinwhichthePrincipleofSufficientReasoncanbeunderstood,butitisoneway.
Historically,themostimportantalternative,Ithink,istosupposethatthedecisionofafreewillcan
constituteasufficientreasonforatruththatdoesnotfollowfromconcepts,butLeibnizfirmly
rejectedthisviewwhenitwasproposedtohimbyClarke(LCIII,2;IV,12).25
LeibnizpresentedhisconceptualcontainmenttheorytoArnauld,however,notasaconsequenceof
thePrincipleofSufficientReason,butasananalysisofthenotionoftruth.Apartfromthetheory,
hesays,"Idonotknowwhattruthis"(LA56).Sowestillwantanexplanationofwhyhethought
thetheoryisrequiredforanunderstandingofthenotionoftruth.Andthefirstquestionthatwill
occurtomostofusinthisconnectionis,Whydidn'tLeibnizdefinethetruthofpropositionsin
termsoftheircorrespondencewithfacts?Afterall,asInotedattheendofsection4,Leibnizdid
believethatourconceptsandtruebeliefsexpressthingsdistinctfromus.
SomeremarksofMichaelDummettaboutFregemayshedlightonthisaspectofLeibniz'sthought:
Frege,althougharealist,didnotbelieveinthecorrespondencetheoryoftruth....The
truthofa(complete)sentenceorofthethoughtwhichitexpressesisnotrelational:
thereisnoquestionofourhavingfirsttodiscoverthestateofaffairswhichthe
sentenceisintendedtodescribe,andthentocomparethesentencewithittosee
whetherornotitcorresponds;thesentenceissimplytrueorfalsewithout
qualifications.Facts,inFrege'sontology,arenotfurtherconstituentsofreality,...
alongsideobjects,truthvalues,concepts,relations,andfunctions.Theyare,rather,to
beidentifiedwithtruethoughts.26
MuchofwhatDummettsayshereaboutFregecouldalsobesaidaboutLeibniz.Factshaveno
moreindependentaplaceinLeibniz'sontologythaninFrege's.Thisworld,forLeibniz,isthe
totalityof(finite)things,notoffacts.Itisvirtuallydefinedasaggregatumrerumfinitarum[the
aggregateoffinitethings](GVII,302/L486).Ifrealityiscomposedofthingsratherthanoffacts,it
fallsprimarilytoconceptsratherthantopropositionstocorrespondwithreality,foritisconcepts
thatexpress(orfailtoexpress)things.ThatmaybewhyitwasnaturalforLeibniztothinkofa
propositionasacomplexofconceptsortermsaconceptionofthepropositionforwhichtherewas
alsoprecedentinmedievallogic.And,giventhatwhatoneisdoinginframingorassertinga
propositionisconnectingconceptsortermsinacertainway,therealist'sdemandthateverytruth
shouldhave"somefoundationinthenatureofthings"(DM8)naturallycomestoexpressionasa
demandthatthereshouldbe"somerealconnection
____________________
24
Forasimilarverdict,seeBrody,"Leibniz'sMetaphysicalLogic,"pp.53f.
25
Leibnizisrespondingto1ofClarke'ssecondletterand2ofClarke'sthirdletter(seeG
VII,359f.,363,367,371f.).Cf.Rowe,CosmologicalArgument,Ch.2,andR.Adams,reviewof
Rowe.
26
Dummett,Frege:PhilosophyofLanguage,p.442.
69
between"thetermsofthepropositionthatistrue(GVII,300/L226;cf.C518f./L267f.,LA56).
Whathasjustbeensaidisindeedimportantforanappreciationoftheconceptualframeworkin
whichLeibnizsawtheissue,buttheobjectionthatwasraisedintermsofacorrespondencetheory
oftruthcanstillberaisedinthesenewterms.Atleastforpropositionsaboutactualthings,wemay
ask,Whycan'ttherealconnectionbetweenthetermsofthepropositionbeacontainmentofthe
predicateintheconcretethingtowhichthesubjectconceptcorresponds?Isn'tthatindeedthe
normalunderstandingoftheAristotelianformulapraedicatuminestsubjecto[thepredicateinheres
inthesubject]towhichLeibnizsooftenappeals?Whymustthepredicatebecontainedinthe
conceptofthesubject?
PrecedentshavebeensoughtforLeibniz'stheory.Leibnizhimselfinseveralplacesascribesto
Aristotletheviewthatthepredicateofatruepropositioninheresinthesubject.27Sometimesthat
theoreticallyambiguousclaimisallthatheascribestoAristotle(GI16,132).Butatleastoncehe
saysthat"Aristotleobserved"that"thenatureoftruthuniversallyconsistsin"thisinherence(
C518f./L267).AndatleastonceheseemstoascribetoAristotlethethoughtthattheinherenceisa
conceptualcontainment.ContrastingAristotle'swayofstatingpropositionsas'BisinA',insteadof
theordinary'AisB',Leibnizsaysthat"thepopularwayofstating[propositions]regardsratherthe
individuals,butAristotle'shasmoreregardtotheideasoruniversals"(NE486).
Descartescouldbereadasassertingtheconceptualcontainmenttheoryoftruthwhenheproposes
thefollowingdefinition:"Whenwesaythatsomethingiscontainedinthenatureorconceptofa
thing,itisthesameasifwehadsaidthatitistrueofthatthingorcanbeaffirmedofit"(AT
VII,162).Butitseemstobethecontainment,ratherthantruth,thatDescartesisdefininghere.And
CharlesJarretthaspointedoutthatwhileDescartesiscommittedbyhisargumenttotheinference
fromconceptualcontainmenttotruth,hedoesnotexplicitlyendorsetheinferencefromtruthto
conceptualcontainment.28
ThePortRoyalLogic,whichwaslargelyArnauld'swork,seemstoholdtheviewthatthepredicate
ofatruepropositioniscontainedintheconcretesubject,withoutimplyingthatitiscontainedin
theconceptofthesubject.Itstates,forexample,that"itistruethatlionsareallanimals,thatisto
say,thateachoneofthelionsincludestheideaofanimal."29Thisstatementpresentsaneasy
targetforLeibniz.Forhowdoesanindividual,concretelionincludetheideaofanimal?
Presumablylionsdonotconceiveorunderstandtheideaofanimal.Andwewhodohavetheidea
inthesenseofconceivingorunderstandingitarenotanimalsbecauseweconceiveorunderstand
it;wealsounderstandtheideaoflion,butarenotthereforelions.Iflionsareanimalsbecausethe
ideaofanimaliscontainedinsomething,theideaorconceptoflionseemstobethelikeliest
____________________
27
IntheirtranslationofNE486,PeterRemnantandJonathanBennettsuggestPriorAnalyticsI,
25b32,asapossiblesourceinAristotleforthisview.ButIdonotwishheretoenterintoany
discussionoftheinterpretationofAristotle.
28
Jarrett,"LeibnizonTruthandContingency,"pp.88f.;citedbySleigh,"TruthandSufficient
ReasoninthePhilosophyofLeibniz,"p.234.
29
ArnauldandNicole,PortRoyalLogic,II,17.
70
container.Andindeedtheconceptofliondoesintherelevantsenseincludetheconceptofanimal.
Butiflionsareanimalsbyvirtueofcontainingsomethingotherthantheideaofanimal,what
woulditbe?Twocandidatescometomind.First,coulditbetheuniversalproperty,animality?
Likeotherearlymodernphilosophers,LeibnizwasnoPlatonistaboutuniversals.Theonly
universalsherecognizedwereconceptsand"possibilitiesinresemblances"(NE323f.).30And
sincehethoughtthatrelationsbetweensubstancesexistonlyinthemind,hewouldhavetosaythat
alion'sresemblancetootheranimalsiscontained,strictlyspeaking,intheconceptthatamind
formsoflionsbycomparingthemwithotheranimals,ratherthaninthelionitself.
Second,thereare,ofcourse,concreteparticularanimals;andifidentitycanberegardedasa
(degenerate)caseofcontainment,wecouldsaythateachofthelionscontainsananimalnamely,
itself.ButLeibnizmightwellhavethoughtthistoodegenerateacaseofcontainmenttosatisfyhis
beliefthatpredicationshouldbeexplainedintermsofcontainment.Theseconsiderationsmayalso
besomepartoftheexplanationofArnauld'sreadyapprovalofLeibniz'sconceptualcontainment
theoryoftruth.
Thesearetechnicalities,however,andweoughtnottolaytoomuchweightonthem.IfLeibnizhad
wantedtoavoidtheconceptualcontainmenttheoryoftruth,hecouldhavesaidthat(atleastin
somecases)therealconnectionbetweenthetermsofanaffirmativepropositiononwhichitstruth
dependsisthatitspredicatecorrespondswith,orexpresses,theconcreteindividualthingsthatits
subjectconceptcorrespondswithorexpresses(orsomeofthem,ifthepropositionisparticular).
Besideswhich,weshallinthenextchaptershowthatthecontainmentofpredicatesinconcrete
individualsubstanceswasnotforLeibnizarejectedalternativetotheconceptualcontainment
theoryoftruth;thereisasenseinwhichhewouldaffirmitasaconcomitantofthetheory.Infact,I
believeitwaslargelybecauseofhisviewsaboutthestructureofconcreteindividualsubstances
thathefounditplausibletoincludealltheirpredicatesintheirconcepts.
6.ConceptualContainmentandTransworldIdentity
Beforetakinguptheseconsiderationsaboutthestructureofindividualsubstances,however,Iwant
topointoutanimportantflawintheargumentagainsttransworldidentityfromtheconceptual
containmenttheoryoftruth.LeibnizandArnauldappeartohaveassumedthatthedenialof
transworldorcounterfactualidentityfollowsfromLeibniz'stheoryoftruth.Thisisanatural
assumptiontomake,butitisincorrect.Thetwodoctrinesarelogicallyindependent:neitherentails
theother.
Letusnotefirstthatthedenialoftransworldidentitydoesnotentailthefullconceptual
containmenttheoryoftruth.Ifeachpossibleindividualexistsinonlyonepossibleworld,Ithinkit
doesfollowthattheconceptofeachpossibleindi
____________________
30
Leibniz'sviewsabouttheontologyoflogicarediscussedmorefullyinChapter7.
71
vidualcontains(insomerelevantsense)itswholehistoryintheonepossibleworldinwhichit
occurs.Butitdoesnotfollowthattheconceptofeachpossibleindividualcontainsananswertothe
questionwhetherthatindividual(actually)existsorwhetheritspossibleworldisactual.Forthere
wouldbenoinconsistencyindenyingtransworldidentity(inagreementwithLeibniz)while
holdingavoluntaristicviewofcreation(insharpdisagreementwithLeibniz).Insucha
voluntaristicdoctrineitwouldbeheldthatGodcouldcreateaninferiorworld(indeed,anyworldat
all)withoutdoinganythingconceptuallyinconsistent;andhencethatnoanswertothequestion
whichpossibleworldisactual,orwhichpossiblecreaturesexists,iscontainedinanyconcepts.So
farasIcansee,thatisperfectlycompatiblewiththeclaimthateachpossiblecreatureexistsin
exactlyonepossibleworld.ButitisnotconsistentwithLeibniz'sconceptualcontainmenttheoryof
truth,whichisexplicitlyappliedtoallpropositions,includingexistentialpropositions(asIhave
arguedinChapter1,section2.6).
Moreimportantforourpresentpurposeisthefactthatthedenialoftransworldidentitydoesnot
followfromtheconceptualcontainmenttheoryoftruth.Ishalltrytoestablishthisfactbysketching
aviewinwhichboththeconceptualcontainmenttheoryandthetransworldidentityofindividuals
areaffirmed.ThisviewstartswithLeibniz'sthesisthatindividualconceptsarecompleteconcepts.
Completenesscanbeunderstoodhereasapurelylogicalpropertyofconcepts."Anindividualor
completeterm"maybedefinedasonetowhichitis"superfluous"toaddanyotherterm
whatsoever(GI7172).31Acompleteconcept,inotherwords,isonetowhichnopredicatenot
alreadycontainedinitcanbeadded(withoutconceptualinconsistency).Orwhatcomestothe
samething,itisaconceptthatcontainsonememberofeverypairofmutuallycontradictory
predicates.Suchaconceptobviouslywillcontainallthepredicatesofanythingthatsatisfiesit.
Completenessisaveryinterestingpropertyofconceptsfromalogicalpointofview.Thepartof
logicthatconcernsushereisthelogicofpredicates.Leibnizthoughtofallconceptsasgenerated,
principallybyconjunctionandnegation,frompredicatesthatareabsolutelysimple.Inthis
generationtwotypesofconceptsaredistinguishedfromallothers:theextremecasesofsimplicity
andcomplexity.BothtypesareassociatedwithdistinguishedfeaturesofLeibniz'smetaphysics.At
oneextreme,heassociatedtheabsolutelysimpleconceptswithGod,identifyingthemwiththe
definitiveattributesofGod(AVI,iii,578f./L167f.).32Attheotherextremearethecomplete
concepts,whicharereachedbyconjoiningmoreandmorepredicatesuntilnonewpredicatecanbe
addedwithoutsomeconceptualinconsistency;thesecompleteconceptsareassociatedwith
individuals.Indeed,Leibnizusestheideaofcompletenesstoprovideapurelylogical
characterizationofindividualsubstance.Hevirtuallydefinesanindividualsubstanceasathing
whosedefinitiveconceptiscomplete(DM8;cf.GI71).
Whatarethepredicateswithrespecttowhichindividualconceptsarecomplete?Thatis,whatare
thepredicateswithrespecttowhichanindividualconcept,accordingtoLeibniz,containsone
memberofeverymutuallycontradic
____________________
31
Cf.Kauppi,berdieleibnizscheLogik,pp.168,231.
32
ThispointisdiscussedmorefullyinChapter4.
72
torypair?DoestheindividualconceptofLeibniz,forinstance,containexactlyoneofthe
predicates'morethanonemetertall'and'notmorethanonemetertall'?Apparentlynot,forLeibniz
waslessthanonemetertallin1647andmorethanonemetertallin1670.Forthisreason,perhaps
thepredicateswithrespecttowhichLeibnizianindividualconceptsarecompletemustingeneralbe
indexedtotimes,asproposedin1972byBensonMates.33
Matespointsout,however,thatwemustbecarefulaboutthesortofindexingtobeascribedto
Leibniz.HearguespersuasivelythatLeibnizsawthefundamentalattributesofthingsastemporally
unqualified,andthereforewouldnotwishtoseereferencestotimessimplyincorporatedinthe
propertiesfromwhichindividualconceptsareconstructed.Inamorerecenttreatmentofthesubject
Matesproposesasolutionthat,ineffect,incorporatestimereferencesinthesubjectratherthanthe
predicate.Thus,insteadofsayingthatthecompleteconceptofAlexandertheGreatcontainsthe
predicate,'kingin335B.C.',MateswillnowhaveLeibnizsaythat"any335B.C.stageof
AlexandertheGreat...contains...theattributeKing."34Butreplacingenduringsubstanceswith
theirmomentarystagesastheprimarysubjectsofpropertiesisascontrarytoLeibniz'swayof
speakingasimposingatemporalqualificationontheproperties.Iaminclinedthereforetothinkthe
bestsolutionwouldassignatimeindextothecopulabywhichthepredicateisattachedtothe
subject.Neither'AisBt'nor'AtisB',but'AistB',wouldexpressthedeepstructureofatypical
Leibnizianpredication.
Howeverthedetailsareworkedout,inconsistencywillbeavoidedbysayingthattheindividual
conceptofLeibnizcontainsinsomewaythepredicates'morethanonemetertall'and'notmore
thanonemetertall',butonlywithrespecttodifferenttimes.Inawaythatisintendedtobeneutral
amongthedifferentwaysinwhichthetimeindexcouldattachtothestructureofapredication,we
maysaythatitiswithrespectto"timeindexedpredications"thataLeibnizianindividualconceptis
complete.Andthatistheimportantpointforourpresentpurpose.For,asMatesalsopointsout:
IfLeibnizconsidered[anindividual]conceptascontainingatimeparameter,itishard
toseewhyhedidnotalsobuildinaparameterrelatingtothedifferentpossibleworlds.
ThusthecompleteindividualconceptofAdamwouldnotonlyindicatewhatattributes
hehadatwhattime,butwhatattributesatwhattime(orothertimelikerelation)in
whatworld.
Inthisway,Matessuggests,Leibnizcouldaccepttransworldidentity
andyetcouldretaintheprinciplesoimportanttohimthateveryindividualconcept
involvesallthatwouldeverhappentoacorrespondingindividualandreflectsallthe
otherindividualconceptsthatarecompossiblewithit.35
Inotherwords,theindividualconceptofanindividualthatexistsinmorethanonepossibleworld
couldbecompletecompletewithrespecttoworldindexedpredications.
____________________
33
Mates,"IndividualsandModalityinthePhilosophyofLeibniz,"pp.108f.
34
Mates,PhilosophyofLeibniz,pp.88f.
35
Mates,"IndividualsandModalityinthePhilosophyofLeibniz,"p.109.
73
CompletenesswithrespecttoworldindexedpredicationsisnotinitselfenoughforLeibniz's
conceptualcontainmenttheoryoftruth.ForiftheindividualconceptofArnauldcontainsbothof
thepredications'Arnauldis(atsometimeinsomepossibleworld)married'and'Arnauldis(atall
timesinsomepossibleworld)celibate',theconceptualcontainmenttheorywillrequirethatthe
individualconceptofArnauldalsocontainananswertothequestionwhethertheactualworldis
oneinwhichArnauldissometimesmarriedoralwayscelibate.Andtheworldindexedpredications
donotdirectlytellusthat.ThesolutiontothisproblemwouldbeeasyforLeibniz,however.Itis
essentiallythesameashissolutiontotheproblemofaccountingforactualexistenceandactual
nonexistenceintermsofconceptualcontainment.OntheviewsuggestedbyMatestherewouldbe
nointernalconceptualinconsistencyinapossibleworldinwhichArnauldmarries,butLeibniz
couldstillsaythattherewouldbeanexternalconceptualinconsistencyinGod'sactualizingit,
becauseitisaninferiorworld.Thepredicationofactualmarriageisthereforenotcontainedin
Arnauld'sindividualconcept,whichcontainsratherthepredicationofactualperpetualcelibacy,
becauseitcontainsahistoryofperpetualcelibacyforArnauld,notastheonlypossiblehistoryfor
him,notastheonlyhistoryinwhichhewouldstrictlybehimself,butasthehistorythatisindexed
totheworldthatisinfactthebestofallpossibleworlds.36Thusactualcelibacyandactual
existencewouldbecontainedinArnauld'sindividualconceptinexactlythesameway.
Thusworldindexedpredicationwouldseemabletoaccountforthosecounterfactualidentitiesthat
Leibnizmostclearlymeanstodeny.Sinceanaccountoftransworldorcounterfactualidentityin
termsofworldindexedpredicationscansatisfytheconceptualcontainmenttheoryoftruthinthis
way,thetheorydoesnotrequireadenialoftransworldorcounterfactualidentity.Therejectionof
counterfactualidentity,liketheconceptualcontainmenttheoryoftruthitself,doesnotseem
adequatelysupportedbythemoreabstractlylogicalreasonsthatLeibnizprovides.
____________________
36
ThissolutiondoesrequirearevisionofArnauld'sdefinition(orpartialdefinition)of'Individual
concept'(LA30f.,quotedinsection2ofthischapter).Inthissolutionthepredicationofperpetual
celibacy(i.e.,ofactualperpetualcelibacy)issupposedtobecontainedinArnauld'sindividual
concept,althoughtherearepossibleworldsinwhichArnauldwouldnotbeperpetuallycelibateand
wouldstillbehimself.WhatremainstrueinthissolutionisthatnothingiscontainedinArnauld's
individualconcept,independentlyofthequestionwhichworldwouldbechosenbyGodasthebest
possible,exceptpredicatessuchthatArnauldwouldnotbehimselfiftheywerenottrueofhim.
74
3
TheMetaphysicsofCounterfactualNonidentity
TherichlydeservedprestigeofBertrandRussell'sandLouisCouturat'sworksonLeibnizseta
fashionoftryingtoseehisphilosophyasprincipallyderivedfromhislogicandphilosophyof
logic.MuchinLeibniz'sownworkseemstoinvitethisapproach.Butthedeductiveorderinwhich
Leibnizpresentshisdoctrines,especiallyinhiswritingsofthe1680s,ismisleading.Anadequate
foundationofthesystemorevenafullyadequateexplanationofhishavinghelditcannotbe
foundinhisphilosophyoflogic.Wehavetoturntohislessformalviews,notonlyaboutGodand
creation,butalsoaboutcausationandperception,inordertounderstandthemotivationforhis
philosophyoflogic,whichwasasmuchshapedbythemastheybyit. 1Inparticular,itisclearthat
hefoundinhisviewsaboutcausationandperceptionreasonsfordenyingtransworldor
counterfactualidentity.
TryingtorespondtothecommonsenseappealofAntoineArnauld'saffirmationofcounterfactual
identity,Leibnizwrote:
ItseemstousindeedthatthisblockofmarblebroughtfromGenoawouldhavebeen
exactlythesameifithadbeenleftthere,becauseoursensesmakeusjudgeonly
superficially,butatbottombecauseoftheconnectionofthingsthewholeuniversewith
2partswouldbeentirelydifferent,andwouldhavebeenanother[universe]from
allits
thebeginning,iftheleastthinginitwentotherwisethanitdoes.(LA42)
Thispassagedoesnotpresentafullyarticulatedargument.ButItakeitLeibnizmeansthatifwe
combinedourordinaryconceptionsofindividualityandindividualidentitywithacorrect
understandingoftheconnectionsofthings,wewouldnotmakethe"superficial"judgmentsof
counterfactualidentitythatcommonsenseinfactmakes,butwouldconcludethatnoactual
individualwouldexistiftheuniversehaddifferedfromtheactualworldinrespectof"theleast
thing."
Ifweputthematterintermsofpossibleworlds,wemaysaythatLeibniz'sargumentfindsatarget
inArnauld,ifArnauld'sbeliefthathecouldhavebeenmarriedandwouldstillhavebeenhimselfis
basedontheassumptionthat
____________________
1
Cf.Mondadori,"Leibnizian'Circle'."
2
HereIcorrectGerhardt'sreading,nos(GII,42),toses,inaccordancewithLeRoy,109.
75
(1)Insomepossibleworld,w,thereexistsamanwhosecharacteristicsandhistoryareexactlylike
thoseofAntoineArnauldintheactualworlduntilsometimeatwhich,inw,themanmarries.
Leibnizseemstobedenying(1)andalsocommittinghimselfto
(2)Therearenotwopossibleworldsthatarequalitativelyidenticalbeforeacertaintimebut
differentthereafter.
and
(3)Noindividualsubstancesin(qualitatively)differentpossibleworldsareexactlyalike,
qualitatively,duringaninitialportionoftheirhistories.
Leibnizstillseemstobecommittedto(3)twentyfouryearslaterintheTheodicy,wherehesays
thatamongthosepossibleworldsthat"differfromtheactualworldonlyinoneparticularthingand
itsconsequences"thereareworlds
inwhichwillbefound,notexactlythesameSextusthatyouhaveseen[intheactual
world](thatisimpossible;healwayscarrieswithhimwhathewillbe),butsimilar
Sextuses,whowillhaveeverythingthatyoualreadyknowoftherealSextus,butnot
everythingthatisalreadyinhimwithoutbeingnoticed,norconsequentlyeverything
thatwillyethappentohim.(T414,myitalics)
Itfollowsfrom(3)thatanArnauldwhomarried,inanotherpossibleworld,musthavehadthere,
fromtheverybeginningofhisexistence,differentcharacteristicsfromthoseoftheactualArnauld.
Leibnizevidentlythinksthatthosedifferenceswouldbesufficientgroundsfordenyingtransworld
identity.Thisisnottheplacetodiscussatlengthwhethertransworldidentitymustindeedbe
deniedif(3)isacceptedand(1)isrejected.IthinkLeibniz'sinferenceatthispointisatleast
plausible.Ourstrongestintuitionsoftransworldidentityareofindividualidentityinalternative
possiblecontinuationsofthehistoryofaworldthatis,inalternativepossiblecontinuationsof
exactlythesamehistory,oftheworldandoftheindividual,untilthetimeatwhichthealternatives
diverge.Aconvincingargumentagainstthepossibilityofsuchalternativecontinuationsofthe
samehistorywouldgreatlyweakentheintuitivesupportfortransworldidentity,inmyopinion.
ButdoesLeibnizhaveaconvincingargumentagainstthatpossibility?Heseemstorejectit
"becauseoftheconnectionofthings."Butthe"connection"referredtoispresumablyafeatureof
theactualworldthelawsororderinaccordancewithwhicheveryactualeventhasalwaysbeen
prefiguredinitscausesandwillalwaysberecordedinitseffects,asLeibnizbelieves.Whycouldn't
someotherpossibleworld,byvirtueofadifferenceinitslaws,orbyamiracle,diverge
qualitativelyfromtheactualworldonlyafteracertaintime?Andwhywouldn'tthatpermit
transworldidentity?Ourtaskinthischapteristoinvestigatethesequestions,consideringhow
individualsubstanceisrelatedtolawsofnature(section1)andtothepossibilityofmiracle(section
2).Then,insection3,weshallconsidertheextenttowhichthe"connectionofthings"referredto
hereistobe
76
understoodintermsofperception.Intheend,insection4,IwillconcludethatLeibniz'sphilosophy
supportsproposition(3)onlyunderanunderstandingof'possibleworld'thatdiffersmorewidely
frompresentdayunderstandingsthanwesawhimtodifferinChapter1.
1.SubstanceandLaw
Tothequestionofwhytherecouldn'tbeapossibleworldthatisjustliketheactualworldupto
sometimebutdivergesqualitativelythereafterduetosomedifferenceinthelawsofthatpossible
world,I,thinkLeibnizwouldreplythatanydifferenceinthelawsoftheuniversewouldimplya
qualitativedifferencebetweenthepossibleworldsfromtheverybeginningindeed,thatitwould
implyaqualitativedifferenceineveryindividualsubstancefromtheverybeginning.Thisis
connectedwithLeibniz'sviewsabouttranstemporalidentity.Almostimmediatelyafterthepassage
IhavequotedaboutthemarblefromGenoa,Leibnizgoesontosay:
Since,then,onesupposes...thatitisIwhosubsistduringthetimeABandwhoam
theninParis,andthatitisstillIwhosubsistduringthetimeBCandwhoamthenin
Germany,theremustnecessarilybeareasonthatmakesittruetosaythatweendure
thatistosay,thatI,whohavebeeninParis,amnowinGermany.Forifthereisno
[reason],onewouldhaveasmuchrighttosayitissomeoneelse.Itistruethatmyinner
experiencehasconvincedmeaposterioriofthisidenticalness,buttheremustalsobea
[reason]apriori.(LA43)
Theunsupportedassertionthattheremustbeareasonapriorimaystrikeusatfirstasmerelya
questionbeggingassertionthatthereasonmustbeconceptualcontainment,butIthinkthatisan
anachronisticreadingofthetext.Leibnizdoesnotusuallyuse'apriori'intheepistemologicalsense
towhichwehavebecomeaccustomedsinceKant,butinitsolder,originalsense,inwhichareason
aprioriisanargumentfromthecausesratherthantheeffectsofthefacttobeproved(asexplained
intheappendixtothischapter).ForLeibnizaproofaprioriexplainsthefactproved;aproofa
posterioridoesnot.Thatisthecrucialdifferencebetweenthem.HereLeibnizissayingthatthere
mustbeareasonthatexplainswhydifferentstatesatdifferenttimesshouldbesaidtobelongtothe
samesubstance.Inotherwords,heissayingthattheremustbeareasonthatexplainshisown
identitythroughtime;hedoesnotthinkthatsuchidentitycanbeaninexplicableprimitive.
Itsexplanationistobesoughtinaconceptualcontainment,accordingtoLeibniz.
Nowitisnotpossibletofindanother[reasonforthisidenticalness]exceptthatmy
attributesoftheprecedingtimeandstate,aswellasmyattributesofthefollowingtime
andstate,arepredicatesofoneandthesamesubject,insunteidemsubjecto[theyarein
thesamesubject].Nowwhatisittosaythatthepredicateisinthesubject,exceptthat
theconceptofthepredicateisincludedinsomewayintheconceptofthesubject?And
since,fromthetimeIbegantobe,itcouldbesaidtrulyaboutmethatthisorthatwould
happentome,it
77
mustbeacknowledgedthatthesepredicateswerelawsincludedinthesubjectorinmy
completeconceptwhichmakeswhatiscalledme,whichisthefoundationofthe
connectionofallmydifferentstatesandwhichGodknewperfectlyfromalleternity.(
3
LA43)
WemaywonderwhyLeibnizthoughtthattheinclusionofearlierandlaterstatesinasingle
conceptispeculiarlyapttoexplainatranstemporalidentity.Surelyhedidnotsupposethata
conceptarbitrarilyframedtoincludepartsofhisownyouthandtheoldageofArnauldcould
groundthetranstemporalidentityofanindividualaswellashisownidentitythroughtimeis
groundedbyhisindividualconcept.Whatisit,then,aboutindividualconceptsthatfitsthemto
explaintranstemporalidentity?
Theanswertothisquestionistobefoundintheclaimthat"thesepredicateswerelawsincludedin
thesubjectorinmycompleteconcept...whichisthefoundationoftheconnectionofallmy
differentstates."Ithinkthelawshereareconceivedascausallaws,andasfoundingaconnection
ofsuccessivestates,notonlyinthoughtbutalsoinreality.Thegreatestthreattoourunderstanding
ofthispartofLeibniz'sphilosophyisaprejudicethatmayhaveitshistoricalrootsinLockeand
Humeanassumptionthatconceptualconnectionscannotalsobecausalconnections,thatthey
imposenecessityonlyonourthought,andcannotexplainwhyanythingoccursinreality.Leibniz
certainlydidnotmakethisassumption,asisclearfromhisconceptualcontainmenttheoryoftruth
andhisuseofittoexplainthePrincipleofSufficientReason.Leibnizthoughtthatconceptual
connectionsarepreciselywhatdoultimatelyexplaintheexistenceofallrealthingsandthe
occurrenceofallrealevents.
Thecoalescenceofconceptualandcausalconnectionsismostmarkedinthenotionofsubstantial
formthatplaysacentralroleinLeibniz'smaturephilosophy.ForLeibnizasforAristotle,a
substance'sformiscloselyrelatedtothedefinitionorconceptofthesubstance;wemaythinkofthe
form,perhaps,asaconcreteexpressionoftheindividualconceptofthesubstance.Atthesame
time,formsarerealcausesofactualeffects;Leibnizidentifiesthesubstantialformwiththe
4Leibnizbringstheseideastogetherinthefollowing
primitiveactiveforceofthesubstance.
passagefromanimportanttextthatmayhavebeenwrittenduringtheperiodoftheLeibniz
Arnauldcorrespondence.
Forthenatureofanindividualsubstanceissuchthatithasacompleteconcept,in
whichallthepredicatesofthesamesubjectareinvolved....Butsinceallthingshave
transactions[commercium]withotherthings,eitherdirectlyorindirectly,itfollowsthat
thenatureofeverysubstanceissuchthatbyitsforceofactingandbeingactedon,that
isbytheseriesofitsimmanentoperations,itexpressesthewholeuniverse.Andthis
principleofactions,orprimitiveforceofacting,fromwhichaseriesofvariousstates
follows,istheformofthesubstance.(GVII,316f./MP84f.)
____________________
3
ThisandthepreviouslongquotationarefromapreliminarydraftofLeibniz'sletterof14July1686
toArnauld.Intheletteritselftheargumentislessfullydevelopedonthepointsthatmostconcern
ushere,butitissupplementedwithalinktoLeibniz'scritiqueofCartesianviewsaboutextended
substance(LA53f.;cf.Sleigh,LeibnizandArnauld,p.126f.).
4
Leibniz'sconceptionofsubstantialformisexpoundedmuchmorefullyinChapter11,section1.
78
Thereisineachindividualsubstance,Leibnizbelieves,aprimitiveforcethathecallsasubstantial
form,ortheformofthesubstance.Andthisformissocloselyconnectedwiththeindividual
conceptofthesubstancethatLeibnizthinksitselfevidentlyvalidtoinferfromthecompletenessof
theconcepttothesufficiencyoftheformorforceforthegenerationofacompleteexpressionof
theuniverse.Therearetwopointscallingfordiscussionhere:theconnectionbetweenformand
conceptandtheconnectionofidentitywithformasforce.
1.Theconnectionbetweenformandconceptissignaledin10oftheDiscourseonMetaphysics,
whereLeibnizarguesthatthereissomethingrightabouttheAristotelianideaofsubstantialforms.
Forimmediatelyafterhavingintroducedthedoctrineofthecompletenessoftheconceptofeach
individualsubstance(DM8),anddrawnfromittheconsequencethat"eachindividualsubstance
expressesthewholeuniverseinitsownway"(DM9),Leibnizstatesthatancientandmedieval
philosophers"hadsomeknowledgeofwhatwehavejustsaid,andthatiswhatledthemto
introduceandmaintainthesubstantialformsthataresomuchcriticizedtoday"(DM10). 5C.D.
Broadarguedthatsuchconsequencesasthecausalindependenceandexpressivecompletenessof
eachsubstancecouldnotfollowfromtheconceptualcontainmenttheoryoftruthorthecomplete
concepttheoryofsubstancewithouttheadditionofanindependentpremisetotheeffectthatthere
isintheconcreteactualsubstancewhatBroadcalledan"ontologicalcorrelate"oftheconceptof
6Whydidn'tLeibnizseeanyneedtoarticulateaseparatepremiseofthatsort?The
thesubstance.
answerprobablyliesinthecloseconnectionofformandconceptinhismind.Thesubstantialform
isthe"ontologicalcorrelate,"asBroadputit,oftheconceptofthesubstance:"Itwillbeinsisted
that[JuliusCaesar's]natureorformcorrespondsto"hisindividual(andcomplete)concept.Leibniz
doesnotrejectthisassumption,thoughhecombatsanobjectionthatisbasedonit(DM13).He
tookforgrantedthatthedefinitiveconcept(God'sconcept)ofasubstancewouldrepresentits
internalcausalstructure,its"natureorform,"ashisAristotelianidealof"real"and"causal"
definition(DM24;GIV,424f./L293)wouldleadonetoexpect.Forthisreason,thecontainmentof
Adam'ssininAdam'sindividualconceptisnotexactlyanalternativetothecontainmentofthesin
inAdamhimself.ForifAdam'sindividualconceptrepresentsAdam'sinternalcausalstructure,
whateverfollowsfromtheonefollowsfromtheother,also.
2.ThereareseveralplacesinhislaterwritingswhereLeibnizseemstoexplainthetranstemporal
identityofasubstanceintermsof"theperpetuallawwhichmakesthesequenceofperceptionsthat
areallottedtoit"andinwhich"itsindividualityconsists"[T291(1710)].In1698hewroteof"that
lawoftheorderthatmakestheindividualityofeachparticularsubstance"(GIV,518/L493).7
"Thatthereisacertainpersistinglawwhichinvolvesthefuturestatesofthatwhichweconceiveas
thesame:thatiswhatIsayconstitutesthesamesubstance"
____________________
5
TherelevanceofDM10totheconceptualcontainmenttheoryhasbeenoverlookedbymany
interpreters.ItisrightlyemphasizedinGarber,"LeibnizandtheFoundationsofPhysics,"pp.
6062.
6
Broad,Leibniz:AnIntroductionp.24f.
7
IowethisreferencetoSleigh,LeibnizandArnauld,p.129.
79
8Successivemomentarystatesbelongtothesameindividualsubstance,
[GII,264/L535(1704)].
accordingtoLeibniz,ifandonlyiftheyareproducedbythesamepersistingindividuallaw.
Nowifwethinkofcausallawsasabstractobjects,wemightthinkthatthesamelawcouldbe
responsibleforthesequenceofstatesofseveraldifferentindividualsubstances.ButLeibniz
evidentlyhassomethingelseinmind.AsLouisLoebhaspointedout,Leibniz'scriterionoftrans
temporalidentitydependsonhisdenialofcausalinteractionbetweencreatedsubstances. 9The
successionofstatesofeachindividualsubstance,ormonad,formsanisolatedcausalseries,sothat
twostatesoccurringatdifferenttimesbelongtothesameindividualsubstanceifandonlyifthe
earlierisacauseofthelater:"Perceptionistheoperationpropertothesoul,andthenexusof
perceptions,accordingtowhichsubsequentonesarederivedfromtheprecedingones,makesthe
unityoftheperceiver"[GII,372/L599(1709)].
The"law"or"nexus"thatconstitutestheunitythroughtimeofanindividualsubstanceisfor
Leibniznotmerelyaformulathatdescribestheseriesofstates.Itisratherasubstantialform,
concretelyrealizedinthesubstanceateverymomentofitsexistence.Aswehaveseen,Leibniz
identifiedthissubstantialformwitha"primitiveforceofacting."Theconceptofforcehasacentral
metaphysicalroleinLeibniz'sthought."Theverysubstanceofthingsconsistsintheforceofacting
andbeingactedon,"andthereforeadenialof"lastingforce"tocreatedthings,reservingittoGod
alone,comestothesamethingasSpinoza's"doctrineofmostevilrepute,"that"Godisthevery
natureorsubstanceofallthings"(GIV,508f./L502;cf.RML421,LA133,GIV,594).Theforcethat
constitutestheverysubstanceofthingsis"primitiveforce,"andLeibnizlinksitwithlaw.Primitive
forces,LeibnizwrotetoBurcherDeVolderin1704or1705,are"internaltendenciesofsimple
substances,bywhichaccordingtoacertainlawoftheirnaturetheypassfromperceptionto
perception"(GII,275/AG181).Theprimitiveforcescanevenbeidentifiedwithlaws:"the
primitiveforceisasitwerethelawoftheseries"ofsuccessivestatesofanenduringthing(G
II,262/L533).This"lawoftheseries"issurelyalsothe"persistinglaw"thatconstitutesthe
transtemporalidentityofanindividualsubstance(GII,264/L535),andalsothe"lawsincludedin
the...completeconcept"(LA43).Thislicensesinferencesfromthecontentsoftheconceptofa
substancetoconcreteforcesortendenciesinthesubstanceitself.
Webeganthissectionofourinvestigationwiththequestion,Whycouldn'ttherebeapossible
worldthatisjustliketheactualworlduptosometimebutdivergesqualitativelythereafter,dueto
somedifferenceinthelawsofthatpossibleworld?Ithinkwearenowinapositiontoseethat
Leibnizrejectsan
____________________
8
ThesewordsarepartofapassagethatisbracketedinLeibniz'smanuscript(asIhaveverifiedona
photocopyofthemanuscript),andwhichwaspresumablynotsenttoDeVolder,probablybecause
itdealtwithaquestionthatLeibnizpreferred,onreflection,nottoraisewithhiscorrespondentat
thispoint.Butthestatementisnotcrossedout,andthereareenoughsimilartextstoremoveany
doubtthatLeibnizdidindeedholdtheviewexpressedhere.Forotherpassages,andagood
discussion,seeLoeb,FromDescartestoHume,pp.31719.
9
Loeb,FromDescartestoHume,pp.31719.
80
assumptionthatgivesrisetothatquestion.Herejectstheassumptionthatcausallawsandrelations
areimposedfromtheoutsideonindividualsthatarecausallyneutralintheirindividualnatures(G
IV,507,584/L500).CausalpowersorforcesareprimitivefeaturesofrealityasLeibnizconceivesof
it;theyarenottobeanalyzedintermsofcausallyneutralstatesplusextrinsiclaws.Leibnizthinks
thatthelawsareinternaltoindividualsubstancesandthattheyarepermanentandunchanging
throughoutthesubstance'shistory,constitutingtheformofthesubstance.Inapossibleworldthat
haddifferentlawsfromtheactualworld,therefore,everyindividualsubstanceaffectedbythe
difference(thatis,allindividualsubstances)mustalwayshavebeenconstitutedbya"primitive
force"thatisqualitativelydifferentfromthatwhichconstitutesthecorrespondingindividualinthe
actualworld.Inthatrespect,theindividualsofthatotherworlddifferqualitativelyfromtheiractual
counterparts,fromthebeginningoftheirexistence.Theyhavedifferentsubstantialforms.Leibniz
couldplausiblyclaimthatsobasicadifferenceisenoughtoruleouttransworldidentityandmake
themdistinctpossibleindividuals.
2.SubstanceandMiracle
Section1dealtwithonewayinwhichitmightbesupposedthattwopossibleworldscouldbe
qualitativelyidenticalbeforeacertaintimebutthendiverge.IhavearguedthatLeibnizmayhave
rejecteddifferenceinthelawsofthetwoworldsasabasisforsuchdivergenceonthegroundthat,
inhisopinion,adifferenceinthelawsimpliesaqualitativedifferenceintheindividualsubstances
ofthetwoworldsfromtheverybeginningoftheirexistenceaqualitativedifferenceinthe
substantialformsorprimitiveforcesofthesubstances.ButwemustalsoconsiderwhyLeibniz
shouldnothavethoughtthattwopossibleworldswiththesamelawscoulddifferqualitativelyonly
afteracertaintime.Shouldn'tanomnipotentGodbeabletosuspendtheoperationofanylawor
createdforceandworkamiracleforwhichtherewasnopreparationinthepreviousqualitative
historyoftheworld?Ifso,won'ttherebeapossibleworldinwhichsuchamiraclehappens,and
another,justlikeitbeforethemiracle,inwhichthemiracledoesnothappen?
AdmittingthatGodcould,byamiracle,preventAntoineArnauld'ssubstantialformorprimitive
forcefromhavingitsnaturaleffectoflifelongcelibacywouldunderminethecaseIhavebeen
developingfordenyingArnauld'scounterfactualidentitywithapossiblymarriedman.Itiseasy
enoughtoseewhyLeibnizwouldthinkthatamanwhosesubstantialformwasqualitatively
differentfromthebeginningofhisexistencewouldnotbeidenticalwithArnauld,butwhywoulda
miracleprecludecounterfactualidentity?Supposethereisapossibleworld,w,whosehistoryis
exactlylikethatoftheactualworldupto1632.Inw,ofcourse,thereisamana,bornin1612,who
isqualitativelyidenticalwiththeactualAntoineArnauldforthefirsttwentyyearsofhislife.In
particular,theprimitiveforcethatahasinwisqualitativelyidenticalwiththeprimitiveforcethat
Arnauldhasintheactualworld,andwouldhavelifelongcelibacyas
81
itsnaturaleffect.Butwearetosupposethatinw,amarriesin1632asaresultofamiraclethat
preventsa'sprimitiveforcefromhavingitsnaturaleffect.Theoccurrenceofonesuchmiracledoes
not,initself,seemtomeaplausiblereasonfordenyingthatacouldbe,inw,numericallythesame
personastheactualAntoineArnauld.Leibnizcouldsupporthisrejectionoftransworldidentity
moreeasilyifhedeniedthatthereisanysuchpossibleworldasw.Butwouldhiscommitmentto
divineomnipotencepermithimtodenyit?
ThetraditionofChristianAristotelianism,towhichbroadlyspeakingLeibniz'sviewsoncausality
belong,hadlimited,morethanmanymodernswould,thedependenceofcausalityonGod'swill.
Manymedievalphilosophersheld,forexample,thatGodcouldchoosetocreateornotcreatefire,
but,havingdeterminedtocreatefire,Godcouldnotwithholdthe(causal)powerofheatingfrom
thefirethatwouldexist,becausethispowerisessentialtofire.ThesepredecessorsofLeibniz
wouldgenerallyhavesaid,however,thatonceGodhascreatedasubstancewithcertaincausal
powers,Godcouldmiraculouslysuspendorobstructthosepowers,orpreventthemfromoperating
(becausetheactualoperationofthepowersisnotessentialtothecreature),andcouldequally
refrainfromdoinganysuchmiracle.Alternatively,Godcouldmiraculouslyannihilatethecreature.
God'smiraculouspowersaresoimportanttoChristianorthodoxythatitwouldhavebeendifficult
forLeibniztodenythem.Wearenotsurprisedtofindhimsayingthat"thelawsofnatureare
subjecttothedispensationoftheLegislator"andthat"Godcandispensecreaturesfromthelaws
thathehasprescribedforthem,andproduceinthemwhattheirnaturedoesnothold,indoinga
Miracle"(Tpd3).Weshallhavetoseeinwhatsensehecanhaveacceptedthis.
Thisquestionwillleadusintoafairlylengthydiscussion.Wewillbegininsection2.1witha
featureofLeibniz'ssystemthatseemstofavorinterpretingmiraclesassomehowcausedbythe
primitiveforcesinherentincreatures.Wewillgooninsections2.22.3toconsidersomeof
Leibniz'sexplicitdiscussionsofthemiraculous.Inthesetexts,however,Leibnizmainlydiscusses
whatmiraclesare,notwhattheycouldbe.Suchtextsareobviouslyrelevanttoourinvestigation.
Onanyinterestinginterpretation,Leibniz'sargumentabouttheGenoeseblockofmarblerequires
certainlimitsonthetypesofmiraclesthatactuallyoccur.Thequestionwhatlimits,ifany,Leibniz
wouldimposeonthetypesofmiraclesthatGodcouldperform,whichwillbetakenupinsection
2.4,isobviouslyimportant,too,andmoredifficulttoanswer.Nonetheless,Ibelievewewillbe
ableeventually,insection4,toarriveatasatisfactoryinterpretation.
2.1TheKingdomofNatureandtheKingdomofGrace
Howevertheyhappen,suchmiraclesasactuallyoccurintheLeibnizianuniversearetheretoserve
theaimsofwhatLeibnizcalled"thekingdomofgrace,"inwhichGodisrelatedtorational
creatures,notonlyastheirarchitectandmaker,butalso,morepersonally,asajustandbenevolent
monarch(DM36,T247,Mon8790).TheproblemaboutthenatureofmiraclesisforLeibnizapart
ofamoregeneralproblemabouttherelationofthekingdomofgracetotheking
82
domofnature.Andhedevelopedasolutiontothatmoregeneralproblem,intermsofpre
establishedharmony.
Hisfamoustheoryofpreestablishedharmonyoperatesonseverallevels.Atthedeepestlevelthere
isaharmonybetweentheperceptionsofdifferentmonads.Thereisalsoaharmonybetweenbody
andsoul,whichcanalsobeseenasaharmonybetweendiversecausalsystemsbetweenthe
kingdomof"efficientcauses,"asystemofmechanicalcausationoperatinginthephenomenal,
corporealworld,andthekingdomof"finalcauses,"asystemofteleologicalcausationoperating
withinthemonads.Atthehighestlevelthereisaharmonybetween"thePhysicalkingdomof
Nature,"comprehendingthe"twoNaturalKingdoms"ofefficientandfinalcauses,"andtheMoral
kingdomofGrace,thatistosaybetweenGodconsideredasArchitectoftheMachineofthe
universe,andGodconsideredasMonarchofthedivinecityofMinds"(Mon87).
ThishighestlevelofharmonyaddressesacrucialproblemforLeibniz'stheodicy.IntheDiscourse
onMetaphysicsthemostgeneralstandardofperfectiongoverningGod'schoiceamongpossible
worldsappearstobemetaphysical:a"balance"between"simplicityofthewaysofGod"thatis,of
lawsand"variety,richness,orabundance"inthecreaturesproduced(DM5).Suchmetaphysical
perfectionisoflimitedrelevance,however,tothereligiousproblemofevil,whichiscentrally
concernedwithGod'smoralgoodness,God'sgoodnesstocreatedpersons.Forwhatistoguarantee
thatamachineofnature,producingtherichestvarietyofbeingsinaccordancewiththesimplest
laws,willnotjustgrindcreatedpersonstomincemeat,regardlessofanyvirtuetheymaypossess?
10
ThisproblemarisesquiteclearlyinNicolasMalebrancheTreatiseonNatureandGraceandrelated
works,whichLeibnizcertainlyhadinmindwhenwritingtheDiscourse.Thephrase,"the
simplicityofthewaysofGod,"whichLeibnizusesintheDiscourse,isusedrepeatedlyby
MalebranchetosignifywhatheregardsasamostimportantcriterionoftheperfectionofGod's
actionincreatingandgoverningtheworld.ItwouldbeunworthyofGod'swisdom,Malebranche
holds,tocompromisethesimplicityofGod'swaysbymakingalotofmiraculousexceptionstothe
lawsofnaturetopreventparticularevils.Malebrancheaffirmedan"orderofgrace"aswellasan
"orderofnature,"butinsistedthatGodoperatesbyuniversallaws,avoidingfrequentmiraculous
exceptionstothem,inbothorders.ThisregardforuniversallawsexplainsGod'spermissionof
manyevils."Godoughtnottodisturbtheorderandsimplicityofhiswaystopreventabirthdefect
[unmonstre],asterility,aninjustice"(OMVI,40).Moredrasticallystill,"ifGodhaspermittedsin,
andiftherearesomanypeopledamned,itisnotthatGoddoesnotlovehisworks[sonouvrage],
butthat,asheshould,heloveshiswisdominfinitelymorethanhisworks."11Thestatementthat
Godloveshiswisdommorethanhisworks,orevenexplicitly"thatheloveshiswisdommorethan
hisWorks,morethanhumanbeings,andthatheoughtnottodisturbtheorderandsimplicityofhis
waysinorderto
____________________
10
Itisperhapsworthnotingherethattheproblemofassuringaharmonybetweennaturalandmoral
ordersispreciselywhatleadstothepostulationofadeityinKant'smoraltheology.
11
OMVIII,684.Thistextwaspublishedin1686,theyeartheDiscoursewaswritten.Alltheother
textsofMalebrancheIciteinthisparagraphwerepublishedby1685.
83
provideforourneeds"(OMVI,35f.),isalmostarefraininMalebranche'swritingsonthissublect.
12
Leibnizevidentlywishedtobemorereassuringonthissubject.AlreadyintheDiscoursehe
insistedthat"itisnottobedoubtedthatthehappinessofmindsisGod'sprincipalend,andthathe
putsitintoeffectasmuchasthegeneralharmonypermits"andindeedthatGodhassoordered
thingsthatmindsendureasmindsforever,andthattheywillbeperfectlyhappyprovidedonlythat
theyloveGodwithasincereandseriousgoodwill(DM5,36).ButintheDiscourseLeibnizoffers
noveryclearexplanationofhowthis"moral"purposeofGod'sfitstogetherwiththemoregeneral
metaphysicalcriterionofperfection,exceptthatheobservesthatmindsarecapableofmore
perfectionthanotherbeings,andinterferelesswithotherbeings,andthuspresumablycontribute
moretotheperfectionoftheuniverse(DM36,5)andmorestill,inproportionastheyarehappy,
sinceLeibnizunderstandspleasureandhappinessasperceptionofperfection(DM15).
InboththeTheodicyandtheMonadology,however,Leibnizholdsthatthereisapreestablished
harmonybetweenthemoralorderandthemetaphysicalperfectionofthenaturalorder.Whatis
importantaboutthisforourpresentpurposeisthatitimpliesthatthebestpossibleworldisonein
whichtheaimsofthekingdomofgracearerealizedbytheworkingsofthekingdomofnature,and
thusbynaturalobjectsoperatingaccordingtotheirowninherentlaws,withoutdivineinterference.
Thus,havingintroducedtheharmonybetweenthekingdomsofnatureandofgraceinthe
Monadology,Leibnizcontinues:
ThisHarmonymakesthingsleadtogracebytheverywaysofnature,and[bringsit
about]thatthisglobe,forexample,mustbedestroyedandrepairedbynaturalwaysat
themomentswhenthegovernmentofmindsdemandsit,forthepunishmentofsome
andtherewardofothers.(Mon88)
AndintheTheodicyLeibnizwritesthat
thereisreasontojudge,followingtheparallelismofthetwokingdoms,thatoffinal
causesandthatofefficientcauses,thatGodhasestablishedintheuniversea
connectionbetweenthepenaltyorrewardandthebadorgoodaction,insuchaway
thattheformerisalwaysattractedbythesecond,andthatvirtueandvicegettheir
rewardandpunishmentinconsequenceofthenaturalcourseofthings,whichcontains
yetanotherspeciesofpreestablishedharmonythanthatwhichappearsinthe
commerceofthesoulandthebody.(T74)
Similarly,LeibnizobjectstoPierreBayle'sapparentbeliefthat"Godcouldbetterhaveattainedhis
endinthekingdomofGraceifhewerenotattachedtotheselaws[ofthekingdomofnature],ifhe
haddispensedhimselfmoreoftenfromfollowingthem,orevenifhehadmadeothers"(T340).
BaylehadwrittensarcasticallyofaGodwho"wouldprefertoletthewholehumanraceperish
ratherthantosuffersomeatomstogofasterorslowerthanthegenerallaws
____________________
12
Inadditiontothetextsalreadycited,seeMalebrancheTreatiseofNatureandGrace,I,43(first
publishedin1680),theAdditionsto1,23,39,47,56(1684),and23and26ofthethird
claircissement(1683)(OMV,49f.,37,47f.,52f.,5860,184196);alsoMalebranche'sresponsesto
Arnauld'scriticisms,OMVII,533,555f.(1685).(TheAdditionsandthirdclaircissementarenot
includedinRileytranslationoftheTreatise.)
84
demand";he"wouldnothavemadethisoppositionifhehadbeeninformedofthesystemof
generalharmonythatIconceive,"Leibnizsays,"whichimplies...thatmatterisdisposedinsucha
waythatthelawsofmotionservethebestgovernmentofminds,andthatconsequentlyitwillturn
outthathehasobtainedthemostgoodthatispossible,providedthatmetaphysical,physical,and
moralgoodsarecountedtogether"(T247).Theconcludingprovisoremindsus,ofcourse,that
Leibnizdoesallowthatthebestpossibleworldmaybeoneinwhichthehappinessofrational
creaturesiscompromisedtosomedegreeforthesakeofmorephysicalormetaphysicalgoods(cf.
T118),thoughhedoesnotstressthispointasharshlyasMalebranchedid.
ThesestatementsdonotabsolutelyexcludemiraclesinwhichGodwouldbringsomethingabout
thatdidnotfollowfromthesubstantialformsandpreviousstatesofcreatures,buttheyarenot
favorabletobeliefinsuchmiracles.Forthepurposeofmiraclesistoadvancetheaimsofthe
kingdomofgrace,butwhatLeibnizsaysintheTheodicyandtheMonadologyaboutthegeneral
relationshipbetweenthekingdomofgraceandthekingdomofnatureindicatesthattheaimsofthe
kingdomofgraceareachievedbyapreestablishedharmonybetweenthetwokingdomsratherthan
bydivineinterventionthatbypassestheactiveprinciplesofthekingdomofnature.Wemuststill
consider,however,whatLeibnizactuallyassertsaboutmiracles.
2.2"Essence"and"Nature"
ThepossibilityandnatureofmiracleswasasensitiveissueforLeibniz.Itengageshisattentionin
severalsectionsoftheDiscourseonMetaphysics,whereheexplicitlyasks"howitispossiblefor
Godsometimestoinfluencehumanbeingsorothersubstancesbyanextraordinaryormiraculous
concurrence,sinceitseemsthatnothingextraordinaryorsupernaturalcanhappentothem,given
thatalltheireventsareonlyconsequencesoftheirnature"(DM16).Hisreplydependsona
distinctionbetweentwotypesoflaw.Miracles"arealwaysinconformitywiththeuniversallawof
thegeneralorder"(DM16),butnotwithcertain"subordinatemaximsorlawsofnature"(DM17;
cf.DM67).Thesameview,whichwemustnowexaminemoreclosely,isstatedbrieflywhen
LeibnizintroducesthesubjectofmiraclesinhiscorrespondencewithArnauld(LA51).
Theuniversallawofthegeneralorderisalawthatgovernsthemutualrelationsofabsolutelyall
substancesandeventsintheuniverse.Bydefinition,itiswithoutexception;anylawtowhichthere
isanexceptionisnotuniversalintherelevantsense.Leibnizclaimedthatwecanseethatevery
possibleworldhasanorderofthissort.Heappealedtogeometricalexamples.Nomatterwhatsort
oflineisdrawn,hesays,
itispossibletofindaconceptorrule,orequationcommontoallthepointsofthatline,
invirtueofwhich[its]changes[ofdirection]mustoccur....Thusitcanbesaidthatin
whateverwayGodhadcreatedtheworld,itwouldalwayshavebeenregularandina
certaingeneralorder.ButGodhaschosentheonethatisthemostperfect,thatistosay,
theonethatisatthesametimethesimplestinhypothesesandtherichestin
phenomena.(DM6;cf.GVII,312/MP78f.)
85
Leibnizregardeditasarathertriviallynecessarytruth,therefore,thattheuniverseisorderedbya
universallawtowhichtherearenoexceptionsnotevenmiraculousexceptions.
Thegeneralorderoftheactualworld,however,cannotbecomprehendedbyanycreatedmind(
DM16).(Howthatisconsistentwiththepreeminentsimplicityoftheactualgeneralorder,Leibniz
doesnotexplain,sofarasIamaware.)Ontheotherhand,"everythingthatiscallednatural
dependsonthelessgeneralmaximsthatcreaturescancomprehend"(DM16;cf.NE65,GIII,353).
Theselessgeneralmaximsincludethe"lawsofnature"thathumansciencecaninprinciple
discover.Andtherecanbeexceptionstothem.Indeed,Leibnizholdsthatmiraclesaresuch
exceptions.HisstatingthecontrastintermsofwhatiscomprehensibleonlytoGod,andnottoany
createdmind,certainlysuggeststhatLeibnizthinksofthegeneralorderasinfinitelycomplexand
ofthenaturallawsasonlyfinitelycomplex.Thenaturallawsareonlyfinitelyunderstandable,
however,notfinitelydemonstrable,fortheycanhaveexceptions,andhenceareneithernecessary
nordemonstrable.
Forourpresentpurpose,themostimportantquestionhereishowthesetwotypesoflawarerelated
tothesubstantialformthatconstitutesacreatedsubstance.Iftheuniversallawofthegeneralorder
isincorporatedinthesubstantialformofaparticularsubstancetowhichamiracleisnotgoingto
happen,thenthatsubstancewouldhavetohavehadaqualitativelydifferentsubstantialformor
primitiveforceifamiracleweregoingtohappentoit,andtwopossibleworldscouldnomore
differwithrespecttomiraclesthanwithrespecttolawswithoutdifferingqualitativelyfromthe
beginning.Butifitisonlythelawsofnaturethatareincorporatedinthesubstantialformsof
individualsubstances,thentwopossiblehistoriesofasubstancecouldbequalitativelythesameup
toacertaintime,proceedingfromthesamesubstantialformorprimitiveforce,andcouldthen
divergebyamiracle,whichwouldrequireGodtointerferewiththeoperationoftheprimitiveforce
inoneofthehistories.
SofarasIknow,Leibnizdoesnotdirectlyanswerthisquestionaboutsubstantialforms.Buthe
doesproposeintheDiscourseonMetaphysicsadistinctionbetweenthe"essence"andthe"nature"
ofanindividualsubstance,correspondingtothedistinctionbetweenthetwotypesoflaw.
Thatcouldbecalledouressence13whichincludesallthatweexpress,andasit
expressesourunionwithGodhimself,ithasnolimitsandnothinggoesbeyondit.But
thatwhichislimitedinuscanbecalledournatureorourpower[puissance],andinthis
regardthatwhichgoesbeyondthenaturesofallcreatedsubstancesissupernatural.(
DM16)14
____________________
13
0nthefirstdraft,butnotonthemorefinishedsurvivingcopies,Leibnizaddedherethewords"or
idea."
14
Leibnizwasnotalwaysloyaltothisterminologicaldistinction.Inadraftforaletterof8December
1686toArnauld,the"concept,idea,essence,"and"nature"ofanindividualsubstancearetreatedas
equivalentandascontaining"everythingthatistohappentoit"(LA68f.)a"lowwatermark"for
thedistinction,asremarkedinSleigh,LeibnizandArnauld,p.79.AtNE433Leibnizsuggestsa
similar(butperhapsnotexactlythesame)distinctionbetweenthe"essential"andthe"natural,"but
healsoseemssomewhatwillingtouse'essential'morebroadly,tocovertheterritoryofthemerely
naturalaswellasthatofthestrictlyexceptionless.
86
Twointerpretationsofthispassagearepossible.Inthefirst,itisthe"natureorpower"thathere
correspondstothesubstantialform.Itisacausalforceintheconcretesubstance,butthe"essence"
isonlyanideainthemindofGod.Itisonlythesubordinatelawsofnaturethatareincorporatedin
concretesubstances.Inthesecondinterpretation,itisthe"essence"thatherecorrespondstothe
substantialform.ItisnotonlyanideainthemindofGod,butalsoacausalforceintheconcrete
substance,whichthusincorporatestheuniversallawofthegeneralorder.Ibelievethesecond
interpretationistobepreferred,atleastasanunderstandingofthepredominanttendencyof
Leibniz'sthought,butthereisacasetobemadeforthefirstinterpretation,andwewillbeginwith
it.
2.2.1SubstantialFormas"Nature"
GroundsforthefirstinterpretationmightbesoughtinLeibniz'sinsistencethatlaterstatesoffree
creatures(Caesar'scrossingtheRubicon,forexample)areonlycontingentlyconnectedwiththeir
earlierstates(DM13;cf.Gr384).ButthishardlycommitsLeibniztodenyingthattheearlierstates
containthelawofthegeneralorderfromwhichthelaterstatesfollow,sincehecertainlythought
thatthecompleteconceptofafreecreatureinsomesensecontainsthelawsfromwhichitsactions
follow,butstillmaintainedthattheconnectionbetweentheconceptandtheactionsiscontingent(
DM13).Ifthisisunderstoodintermsoftheinfiniteanalysisconceptionofcontingency,thereisno
reasonwhyfreeactionscouldnotflowcontingentlyfromaninfinitelycomplexlawofthegeneral
orderincorporatedinthesubstantialformoftheagent.Leibnizcertainlythoughtthattheconcrete
causalstructuresofcreatedsubstancesmustbeinfinitelycomplexinordertomirrorthecomplexity
ofthewholeuniverse.
AdetailinthisdiscussionthatmightsupportthefirstinterpretationisthatLeibnizsuggestsitcould
besaidindefenseofCaesar'sfreedomthattheactionscontainedinhiscompleteconcept"belongto
himonlybecauseGodknowseverything."AndtothecounterobservationthatCaesar's"natureor
formcorrespondsto"hiscompleteconcept,Leibnizsays,"Icouldrespondbytheexampleoffuture
contingents,fortheyhavenorealityexceptintheunderstandingandwillofGod"(DM13).This
certainlywouldfitwiththeviewthatthe"essence"thatcontainsallofCaesar'sactsisonlyanidea
inthemindofGod,andthatwhatisconcretelyexpressedinCaesar'ssubstantialformissomething
lesscomprehensive.ButIdoubtthataheavyweightofinterpretationshouldbelaidonthese
arguments,forLeibnizlaysthemasideasnot"satisfy[ing]thedifficulties"(DM13).
ThestrongestevidenceIhavefoundforthefirstinterpretationisinaletterofApril1687to
Arnauld,aletterwhichsurelymusthaveleftArnauldthinkingthatLeibnizbelievedinmiracles
andhelpsofgrace("extraordinaryconcurrencesofGod")thatarenotproducedbyanythingin
creatures.Intheend,IaminclinedtothinkthatLeibnizmeanttobe(misleadingly)noncommittal,
assertingnothingaboutextraordinaryconcurrence,whenhewroteinthisletter,"Settingaside
extraordinaryconcurrence,[God's]ordinaryconcurrenceconsistsonlyinconservingthesubstance
itselfinconformitywithitspreviousstateandthechangesthat[thatstate]holds"(LA91f.).A
readermightbepardoned,however,fortak
87
ingLeibniztomeanthatinmetaphysicalrigor,Goddoessomethingmorethanconservea
substancewhenitisanobjectofGod'sextraordinaryconcurrence.Asimilarimplicationmight
easilybedrawnwhenLeibniz,inthesameletter,assertingthat"theactionsofmindschange
nothingatallinthenatureofbodies,norbodiesinthatofminds,"addsthat"Godchangesnothing
there[i.e.,intheirnature]ontheiroccasion,exceptwhenheworksamiracle"(LA93).The
implicationthatmiraclesinvolvesomethingmorethanconservationofcreatedsubstancesseems
evenmorestronglysupportedbyapassagewrittenfortheletterthatLeibnizdidnotsendArnauld,
butstruckoutevenonhisowncopy.ThereheinvokedtheScholasticdistinctionbetween
immanent(intrasubstantial)andtranseunt(intersubstantial)causation,and"claimedthat,in
metaphysicalrigor,transeuntcausationisrestrictedtoGod'soperationsandcomesinthreeforms:
creation,conservativecausation,andtheproductionofmiracles."15
Whatisespeciallystriking,however,aboutthetreatmentofmiracleintheletteristhatLeibniz
offersanexplicitcriterionofthemiraculous:
Iadmitthattheauthorsofoccasionalcauseswillbeabletogiveanotherdefinitionof
theterm,butitseemsthataccordingtousageamiraclediffersinternallyandbythe
substanceoftheactfromanordinaryaction,andnotbyanexternalaccidentoffrequent
repetition;andthatstrictlyspeakingGodworksamiraclewhenhedoesathingthat
surpassestheforcesthathehasgiventocreaturesandconservesinthem.(LA93)
Inreadingthisdefinition,weshouldbearinmindthatLeibnizandArnauldbothattacked
occasionalismonthesubjectofmiracles,butfromquitedifferentdirections.Leibnizrepeatedly
accusedtheoccasionalistsofimplyingthatalleventsinnaturearemiraculous(e.g.,LA57f.).
Occasionalistswouldnotadmitthis;Malebrancheheldthatmosteventsinnaturearenot
miraculousbecauseGodproducesthemnotbyparticularbutbygeneralvolitions(forinstance,not
bywillingthatIseeredonthisoccasion,butbywillingthatallhumanmindsshallseeredwhen
theirbodiesareaffectedinacertainway,inwhichminehappensnowtobeaffected).Leibnizhere
suggeststhatthisleavestheoccasionalistswithtoosuperficialaconceptionofmiracle.His
commentsaccuratelyreflectafundamentaldifferencebetweenhimandMalebranche,whichisthat
Leibnizrecognizescreatedsubstancesastruecauses,whereasMalebrancheacceptsonlyGodasa
truecause.LeibnizproposesacriterionofthemiraculousthatdoesleaveMalebranchewithtoo
manymiracles.
ItthreatenstoleaveLeibnizhimselfwithtoofewmiracles,however.Thisisaseriousmatterinhis
correspondencewithArnauld,whoalreadyfearedthatMalebranchewouldendupnotwithtoo
manymiracles,butwithnoneorwithmiraclesinadequatelydistinguishedfromGod'sordinary
activity(RML21922).Leibnizwillendupwithnomiracles,byhisowncriterion,unlesshethinks
thatGodsometimesdoestocreaturesthingsthat"surpasstheforcesthathehasgivento"them.
ThisletterclearlyimpliesthatLeibnizdidthinkthat,anditwasatbestdisingenuousifhereally
thoughtthatthereisineachcreatedsubstanceacausalstructurethatproducesallitsstates,
miraculousaswellasordinary.
____________________
15
IquotefromthedescriptionofthispassageinSleigh,LeibnizandArnauld,p.134.
88
2.2.2SubstantialFormas"Essence"
IthinkthereisagoodcaseforsupposingthatLeibnizwasdisingenuousinjustthiswayandthatby
'forces',asascribedtocreaturesinthisletter,and'natureorpower'inDM16,hemeansonlyapart
oftheprimitiveforceortotalcausalstructureinherentinacreatedsubstance.Thisisstrongly
suggestedinDM16:
Ifweincludeinournatureeverythingthatitexpresses,nothingissupernaturaltoit,for
itextendstoeverything,sinceaneffectalwaysexpressesitscauseandGodisthetrue
causeofsubstances.Butasthatwhichournatureexpressesmoreperfectlybelongstoit
inaspecialway,sinceitisinthatthatitspowerconsists,andsince[itspower]is
limited,asIhavejustexplained,thereareplentyofthingsthatsurpasstheforcesofour
nature,andeventhoseofalllimitednatures.Consequently,inordertospeakmore
clearly,IsaythatmiraclesandextraordinaryconcurrencesofGodhavethispeculiarity,
thattheycannotbeforeseenbythereasoningofanycreatedmind,howeverenlightened
itmightbe,becausethedistinctcomprehensionofthegeneralordersurpassesthemall.
Therearethreepointstobenotedinthispassage.
1.
The"effect"ofwhichLeibnizsaysherethatitexpressesGodasitscause,andthereforeexpresses
everything,issurelynotjustanideainGod'smind,butaconcretestructureinthesubstancesof
which"Godisthetruecause."ThisagreeswiththefactthatLeibnizispreparedtosay,notmerely
ofanindividualconcept,butof"eachindividualsubstance,"thatinexpressingthewholeuniverse
"itexpressesalsotheaforesaidmiracles"(LA40f.).The"nature"construedbroadlyasincluding
everythingexpressedbythesubstanceisclearlythesameas"ouressence,whichincludesallthat
weexpress"(DM16),anditcanbeidentifiedwithwhatLeibnizcalls"primitiveforce"or
"substantialform,"ifthistalkaboutcreatedsubstancesexpressingevenmiraclesistobebelieved.
2.
The"power"ofournatureconsistsonlyin"thatwhichournatureexpressesmoreperfectly."What
Leibnizhas"justexplained"(inDM15)aboutthelimitedpoweroffinitesubstancesisthat
"practical"talkaboutsuchsubstances"acting"oneachother,andthusexercising"power,"canbe
understoodintermsofdifferencesinhowwelleachsubstance"expresses"whatisgoingon.The
formsinwhichthisrecurrentLeibniziantheme16isdevelopedinDM15,however,seemtometo
shedlesslightonDM16thandoesLeibniz'slaterstatementthatasubstanceis"activeinsofaras
whatisdistinctlyknowninitservestogiveareasonforwhathappensinanother,andpassive
insofarasthereasonforwhathappensinitisfoundinwhatisdistinctlyknowninanother"(
Mon52).Nowifsomethinghappensinacreatedsubstancemiraculously,inawaythatdoesnot
agreewiththelawsofnaturethatfinitemindscanunderstand,thereasonforthateventwill
presumablybevastlylessdistinctly"knownin"thatsubstance(thatis,itcanmuchlesseasilybe
readoffthepreviousstatesofthesubstance)thanifitwereproducedinaccordancewiththoselaws
ofnature.
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16
TheideaisnotoriginalwithLeibniz,sofarasIcanjudge.Somethingveryclosetoitisfoundin
Spinoza(Ethics,III,def.2).LeibnizdidnotacknowledgeintellectualdebtstoSpinoza,thoughhe
wasgenerallyeagertoacknowledgesuchdebtstopredecessors(evenunfashionableones,suchas
theScholastics)whowerenotregardedasheretics.
89
Thiswillbeareasonforsayingthatinthemiraculouseventthesubstanceisneitheractivenor
exercisinganypower,andthattheeventexceedsanythingithasthe"power"toproduceeven
though,inmetaphysicalrigor,themiraculousstatesofthesubstanceareproducedbythesubstance
itselfinaccordancewiththeuniversallawofthegeneralorderthatisincludedinthe"essence"to
whichGodhasgivenconcreteexpressioninthe"form"ofthatsubstance.
ThisinterpretationofDM16issupportedbythefactthatinthesummaryofDM16thatLeibniz
senttoArnauldinFebruary1686,"ournature,"whoseforcesaresurpassedby"theextraordinary
concurrenceofGod,"isequatedwith"ourdistinctexpression,whichisfiniteandfollowscertain
subordinatemaxims"(LA13).Similarly,whenLeibnizimpliestoArnauldthatGodsometimes
"doesathingthatsurpassestheforcesthathehasgiventocreatures,"hemayhavemeantonlythat
Godsometimesdoesathingthatisnotdistinctlyexpressed(inadvance)bycreaturesbecauseit
doesnotagreewiththelawsofnaturethatfinitemindscangraspthoughhecanhardlyhave
expectedArnauldtounderstandhiminthissense.Thus,whenLeibniz'slettercarriesastrong
suggestionthatinmiraclesGodchangessomethinginthe"nature"ofcreatedsubstances,hemay
bethinkingonlyofchangesin(orexceptionsto)thesubordinatelawsthatareintelligibletous.
3.TheinabilityofcreatedmindstoforeseemiraclesandextraordinaryconcurrencesofGod,orto
understandtheorderonwhichtheydepend,playsacentralroleinthisinterpretation.Itisapoint
thatisoftenemphasizedinLeibniz'sdiscussionsofmiracle.17Thereasonwecannotforesee
miraclesisthattheorderonwhichtheydependistoocomplexforustograsp.Accordingly,
Leibnizsometimesindicatesthatmiraclesaredistinguishedfromnonmiraculouseventsbytheirnot
havingsimpleexplanations.InthecopyhekeptofhisApril1687lettertoArnauld,immediately
afterthedefinitionofmiraclethatIhavequoted,LeibnizsaysthatifGoddecreedthatanybody
swunginacircleinaslingshouldalwayscontinueincircularmotionwhenreleasedfromthesling,
"withoutbeingpushedorrestrained"byanyotherbody,thiswouldbeamiracleeventhoughit
happenedregularly,"sincethismotioncannotbeexplainedbysomethingsimpler"(LA93).
Thesimplicityofexplanationsplaysaparticularlydecisivepartinthediscussionofmiraclesina
draftLeibnizwrotein1702forareplytoFranoisLamy,anoccasionalistcriticofthesystemof
preestablishedharmony.HereLeibnizrepeatshisobjectionthatifGodisthesolecauseofnatural
eventsandtheeventsproducedarenaturalwheneverGodactsaccordingtogenerallaws,then
naturaleventswilldifferfrommiraclesonlybyanexternalaccidentoffrequentrepetition.
Thenaturalandthemiraculouswouldnotdifferinthemselves,butonlybytheexternal
denomination(denominationeextrinsica)takenfromtheantecedentsand
consequences.Forwhatisprecededandfollowedby[events]likeitwouldbenatural,
andwhatisnotsuchwouldbeamiracle.
Butingoingontoexplainthat"thereisanessentialdifferencebetweenthenaturalandthe
miraculous,"whatLeibnizemphasizesisthat"noteverysortofruleor
____________________
17
SeeRML203(1685),C508(17024),GIII,353(1704).
90
lawisfittomakealawofnature."Forexample,ifGodestablishedarulethataplanetshould
alwaysmoveinanellipticalorbit,withoutanymechanicalactionofotherbodiestokeepitspath
elliptical,
Godwouldhaveestablishedaperpetualmiracle,and...itcouldnotbesaidthatthe
Planetwouldgothatwayinvirtueofitsnatureorfollowingnaturallaws,sinceitisnot
possible...togiveareasonforsuchaphenomenon,whichwouldneed[tobegiven],
however,becausethat[elliptical]motioniscomposite,hencethereasonmustcome
fromsimplermotions.
Whereas,ifthecompositemotioniscausedbysimplermotionsofotherbodies,"thenitwillbein
thesesimplerreasonsthatthenatureofthethingwillconsist"(GIV,587f.).18Inshort,the
essential,internaldistinctionofthemiraculousfromthenaturalseemsheretodependonthe
simplicityoftheexplanations,orsystemoflaws,inaccordancewithwhichnaturaleventsare
produced.AndthatiscertainlyconsistentwithLeibniz'sthinkingthattheuniversallawofthe
generalorder,towhichevenmiraclesconform,andwhichisnotsosimple,isconcretelyexpressed
inthesubstantialformofeverycreatedsubstance.
Asimilarinterpretationcanbegiventoanotherdocumentwhichotherwisewouldseemtosupport
anoppositeinterpretationofDM16.MaterialrathersimilartoLeibniz'sletterofApril1687to
ArnauldcanbefoundincorrespondencebetweenLeibnizandhispatroness,theDuchess(later
Electress)Sophia,in1691.ShehadwrittentohimaboutayoungprophetessinLneburgwho
claimedtoreceivedictationfromChristandhadapparentlybeenabletorespondpertinentlyin
GermantoquestionspresentedtoherinEnglishinasealedpaperwhichshedidnotopen(A
I,vii,2931).Leibnizrespondedthathewas"thoroughlypersuadedthatthereisnothingbut[what
is]naturalinallthat,andthattheremustbesomeembellishmentintheaffairofthesealednotein
English."Suchapersonshowsthesurprisingresourcesofthehumanmind,andshouldnotbe
persecutedorreformed,butpreservedasamuseumpiece[piecedecabinet],thoughhealso
thought"onewoulddowellnottoputtheyoungladyprophetesstothetestofsealednotesany
more"(AI,vii,33,40).Leibnizwentontosay,however,that"thegreatProphets,thatistosay,
thosewhocanteachusthedetailsofthefuture,musthavesupernaturalgraces.Anditisimpossible
thatalimitedmind,howeverpenetrating,couldsucceedatthat"becauseofthe"infinityofcauses"
onwhicheachfutureeventdepends(AI,vii,35).
Sophiadidnottakeupthesecommentsaboutthesupernatural,butendedasubsequentletterabout
thecasewiththebluntandsweepinglynaturalisticremark,"whateveritmaybe,itisalwaysavery
strangeeffectofnature,forIcomprehendnothingthatsurpassesnature.Ibelievethateverything
thathappensisnatural,evenwhenwedonotknowthecauseofit"(AI,vii,44).Inhisnextletter
Leibnizcommentedonthisstatementasa"pointofimportance":
Thatisverysolid,provideditisexplainedcorrectly.Itisverytrue,then,that
everythingthatisdoneisalwaysnaturaltotheonethatdoesit,ortotheonethataidsin
doingit.ThuswhatahumanbeingdoeswiththeaidofGod,ifitisnotentirelynatural
tothehumanbeing,willatleastbenaturaltoGod,
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18
Foraverysimilardiscussionofthemiraculous,directedagainstoccasionalism,seeGIV,520f./
L494f.
91
inasmuchasheaidsinit;anditcannotsurpassthedivinenature,norconsequentlyall
natureingeneral.ButpopularlywhenNatureisspokenof,thatoffinitesubstancesis
understood,andinthissenseitisnotimpossiblefortheretobesomethingsupernatural,
whichsurpassestheforceofeverycreatedbeing.Itiswhenaneventcannotbe
explainedbythelawsofmovementofbodies,orbyothersimilarrulesthatarenoticed
infinitesubstances.AndIhaveshowninanearlierletterthatoneencountersthatevery
timeonefindsasuccessionoftruepropheciesthatgointodetail.Itistruethattheyare
rare,likeallothersupernaturalthings.(AI,vii,46f.)
ItmaybehardertoseeLeibnizasdisingenuousherethaninwritingtoArnauld.Sophiawasa
trustedfriend;moreover,Leibnizwouldhavebeenmoreinagreementwithherifhehadtakena
lesssupernaturalistlineherethoughintheseventeenthcenturyitwasdoubtlesssaferingeneralto
bemoreorthodox(andonthispointmoresupernaturalist)thanone'spatrons,ratherthanlessso.
Itisstriking,however,thatLeibnizechoesthelanguageofDM16,speakingofwhat"surpassesthe
forceofeverycreatedbeing,"andthatheequatesthemiraculouswithwhatisinexplicableinterms
oflaws"thatarenoticed[seremarquent]infinitesubstances."Thelawsthatarenoticedin
creaturesarepresumablythesimplerlaws,whichtheyexpressmoredistinctly.Thissuggeststhat
thedistinctionbetweenthenaturalandthemiraculousisbeingdrawnhereintermsofthe
simplicityorcomplexityofthelaws,ratherthanwheretheyareexpressedwhichleavesopenthe
possibilitythatLeibnizisindeedthinkingofthecomplexbutexceptionlesslawthatgrounds
miraclesasexpressedintheformsorprimitiveforcesofcreatedsubstances.Hemayhaveleftthat
unsaidwithSophiasimplybecausehedidnotgenerallyexpoundhissubtlestmetaphysicalthoughts
toher.
Oneapparentconsequenceofthisinterpretationofthedifferencebetweenthenaturalandthe
miraculousisthatthefreeactionsofcreatureswillbemiraculous.ForLeibnizcertainlythought
thatfreeactions"cannotbeforeseenbythereasoningofanycreatedmind"becauseofthe
complexityoftheorderonwhichtheydepend.Leibnizmadethispointhimself:
ButindeedFreeorintelligentSubstanceshavesomethinggreaterandmoreremarkable,
inacertainimitationofGod:thattheyarenotboundtoanycertainsubordinateLawsof
theuniverse,butactspontaneouslyfromtheirownpoweralone,asifbyasortof
privatemiracle....Andthisistrueinasmuchasnocreatureisaknowerofheartsthat
canpredictwithcertaintywhatsomeMindisgoingtochooseinaccordancewiththe
lawsofnature.(C20/MP100)
Thisisanexceptionaltext,inpartbecauseitalsosaysthatfreeagents"interrupttheconnectionand
courseofefficientcausesoperatingontheirwill"somethingthatseemsquitecontrarytoLeibniz's
usualviews,asexpressed,forexample,inhisletterofApril1687toArnauld(LA93f.).19Buteven
asidefromthat,whichmaybejustalapse,IknowofnoothertextinwhichLeibnizassimilates
freeactionstomiracles,anditmaybethattheassimilationdidnotusuallyseemwelcometohim.
____________________
19
SeealsoChapter1,section2.6,whereItakethispointasevidenceofacomparativelyearlydate
(beforeJuly1686)forC1624.
92
Despiteanyproblemsonthispoint,anddespitesuchtextualevidenceaswehaveseenontheother
side,IthinkthetenorofLeibniz'sphilosophyingeneralfavorstheviewthatthewholeuniversal
lawofthegeneralorderisincorporatedinthesubstantialformorconcretecausalstructureofeach
createdsubstance.20ItisinterestinginthisconnectionthatintheTheodicy,havingsuggestedthat
thoughoursoulspreexistedourbirthashumanbeings,itmayhaverequiredaspecialor
extraordinaryoperationofGodtoelevatethemfrommeresentiencetorationality(T91),Leibniz
addsthat"Iwouldprefertodowithoutmiracleinthegenerationofthehumanbeing,asinthatof
otheranimals,"whichcanbedoneifwesupposethat"thosesoulsalonethataredestinedtoattain
onedaytohumannaturecontainthereasonthatwillappearthereoneday"(T391)presumably
implyingthattheeffectofextraordinarydivineactionshouldhavebeenincorporatedinthesesouls
fromthebeginning.
Onefurtherargumentforthisinterpretationisthefollowing.AccordingtoLeibniz,wenotonly
ourconcepts,butalsoweconcretelyexpressthewholeuniverse,includingallthemiraclesthat
occurinit(LA40f.).Howdoweexpressit?Byvirtueofoursubstantialformorprimitiveforce,
fromwhichalwaysproceedperceptionsofthewholeuniverse,theperceptionsbeingproducedby
lawsthatexpressthelawsbywhichtheeventsperceivedareproduced.Butifoursubstantialform
expressedonlythelawsofnatureandnotthewholelawofthegeneralorderoftheuniverse,then
perceptionsofmiracles,whicharenotproducedbythelawsofnature,willnotfollowfromour
substantialform.Doesthedivine"clockmaker"havetointerveneineachofusateveryinstantto
causeustoperceivethemiraclesthatoccurintheuniverse?OrdoesGodadjustusallonlyonce,
whenthemiracleoccurs,inwhichcaseourperceptionsafterthemiracledonotperfectlyagreeor
harmonizewiththosebefore?Eachoftheseconsequenceswouldcertainlybeunpalatableto
Leibniz.
Leibnizhimselfpointsoutsimilarproblems.AllowingtoBartholomewDesBossesthat"Godcould
createinfinitelymanynewMonads,"Leibnizaddsthat"itshouldbethoughtthattheoldmonads
werealreadysoorderedbyGodfromthebeginning,whenhecreatedthem,thattheirphenomena
correspondedformerlytothemonadthatwasstilltobecreated;unlesswepreferGodtochangeall
theothermonadsbyamiracle,whenhecreatesanewone,soastoaccommodatethemtothenew
one,whichislesslikely"(GII,371/L598).Anotherpertinenttextisacurioussectionofthe
TheodicywhereLeibnizsuggeststhatthemiracleofCana(John2:111)mayhavebeenworked
"bytheministryofsomeinvisiblesubstances,suchastheangels,astheRev.Fatherde
Malebranchealsoholds,"21ratherthanbyadirectdivineinterventioninnature.
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20
ThereisatextinwhichLeibnizexplicitlyraisesthequestionwhether"preciselythefuturityitself
ofanaction...isanintrinsicdenominationorarealaffectioninthewill?"(Gr387)Anansweris
notgivenunambiguously,andthetextispublishedbyGruainamanifestlyimperfectstateof
preservation,butIthinkthedocumentpredominantlysupportstheanswerthatthefuturityofthe
actionissomehowinthenatureofthecreature,notonlyinGod.Aninterestingpieceofevidence
includedinthetextisthatefficaciousgrace,whichobviouslymightberegardedasadivine
interventioninhumanlives,ishereidentifiedbyLeibnizasa"createdentityorreality,"whichis
presumablyarealcauseintheconcretecreatedperson,notonlyinGod.
21
SeeRobinet,Systmeetexistencedlansl'oeuvredeMalebranche,p.112,onthedevelopmentof
thisthemeinthethoughtofMalebranche.
93
HoweverifthechangingofwaterintowineatCanawereamiracleofthefirstrank,
Godwouldhavechangedtherebythewholecourseoftheuniverse,becauseofthe
connectionofbodies;orelsehewouldhavebeenobligedtoobstructthatconnection,
miraculouslyagain,andtomakethebodiesnotinvolvedinthemiracletoactasifno
miraclehadhappened;andafterthemiraclewasover,hewouldhavehadtorestore
everything,eveninthebodiesthatwereinvolved,tothestateitwouldhavereached
withoutthemiracle,afterwhicheverythingwouldbereturnedtoitsoriginalchannel.
Thusthismiracledemandedmorethanitseemedto.(T249)
2.3"MiraclesoftheFirstRank":Creation,Conservation,Incarnation,
Annihilation
ThepassagejustquotedisoneofagroupoftextsfromthelastyearsofLeibniz'slife,inwhichhe
speakssomewhatdifferentlyaboutmiraclesbutdrawsthelinebetweendivineandcreaturelyaction
exactlywhere(inmyopinion)hisfundamentalprinciplesrequireittobedrawn.Itisonly"miracles
ofthefirstrank"(cf.LCV,117)thatinvolvenocausalagencyofcreatures."Thechangingofwater
intowinecouldbeamiracleofthat[inferior]species"thatangelsmightbenaturallyabletodo.
"Butcreation,incarnation,andsomeotheractionsofGodsurpassalltheforceofcreatures,andare
trulymiracles,orevenmysteries"(T249;cf.Tpd23).
OftheprincipalactionsthatarereservedtoGodonthisview,creationhasthelargestrolein
Leibniz'smetaphysics,andclaimsthemostdiscussionhere.Creation(understoodbroadly)is
productionoftheexistenceofafinitebeing.Itisamiracleinthemetaphysicallystrongsensethat
nocauseoftheexistenceofanycreatureistobefoundinthatcreature(sinceonlyGodexistsper
se),orinanyothercreature(sincethecausalefficacyofcreatedsubstances,accordingtoLeibniz,
ispurelyimmanent,anddoesnotextendbeyondtheirowninternalstates).ButGod'scausingthe
existenceofcreaturesseemstoconstitutenointerruptionintheorderofnature.Solongaseach
creature,throughitssubstantialform,causesallitsownstates,God'scausingitsexistence,
includingtheexistenceofitssubstantialform,doesnotcontributetoanywayinwhichan
individualcreatedsubstancecouldhaveexistedwithoutsomeofthestatesthatitssubstantialform
wouldnaturallyproduce.
Thisintegrationofcreationwiththecausalroleofcreatedsubstantialformsistooeasy,however.It
suggeststhat,giventheexistenceofacreaturewithitssubstantialformproducedbyGod,the
creatureitselfcausesallitsownstates,sothatnothingmorethantheexistenceofthecreaturehas
tobesuppliedbyGod.ButthereareprominenttextsinwhichLeibnizappearstorejectthatview.
Hisactualviewsaboutcreationarecomplexandsubtle,difficulttodiscernandnoteasily
reconciledwithhisbeliefinthecausalagencyofthesubstantialformsofcreatures.
TheviewofDuranddeSt.Pouralnandothers,that"theconcurrenceofGodwiththecreature(I
meanphysicalconcurrence)isonlygeneralandmediate,andthatGodcreatessubstancesandgives
themtheforcethattheyneed,andthatafterthatheletsthemact,anddoesnothingbutconserve
them,withouthelping
94
themintheiractions"ismentionedbyLeibnizonlytoberejectedasprovidinganinadequate
accountoftheconservationofcreaturesbyGod(T27).
Godistheconserverofallthings.Thatis,thingsarenotonlyproducedbyGodwhen
theybegintoexist,buttheyalsowouldnotcontinuetoexistunlessacertaincontinuous
actionofGodterminatedinthem,onthecessationofwhichtheythemselveswouldalso
cease.(Gr307)
And"thisdependenceobtains,notonlywithregardtosubstance,butalsotoaction"(T27;cf.
Gr381,RML490)."Godconcursintheactionsofthings,insofarasthereissomethingofperfection
intheactions";indeed,God'sconcurrence"isdirectednotonlytotheexistenceandactsofathing,
buteventothemodeandqualitiesofexistence,insofarasthereissomethingofperfectioninthem"
(GVI,440).
Conservationfallsundertheheadingofcreation,understoodbroadly,andLeibnizispreparedto
speakofconservation,withsuitableexplanations,as"continuous[orcontinued]creation"(Gr330;
T27,38285).22"Forthedependencebeingasgreatinthesequelasinthebeginning,theextrinsic
denomination,ofbeingnewornot,doesnotchangeitsnature"(T385).Alternatively,'creation'can
beunderstoodinanarrowersense,assignifyingthebeginningofthedivineproductiveactivity
that,initslaterstages,iscalled"conservation"(Gr307).Ifweunderstandcreationinthenarrower
sense,anddistinguishconservationfromit,thenconservationwillbeasmuchamiracleofthefirst
rankascreation."Forthedependence[ofcreaturesonGod]beingasgreatinthesequelasinthe
beginning,"conservationexceedsalltheforceofcreaturesasmuchas(initial)creationdoes.
Indeed,conservationistheaspectofcreation(inthebroadsense)thathasthemostimplicationsfor
therelationofGod'sactivitytothatofcreatures.
ThethesisassertedbyLeibnizthatGodinconservingcreaturescontinuallyproducestheiractions
aswellastheirsubstancecouldseemtoleadtotheoccasionalistconclusionthatGodistheonly
agent.AndifGodistheonlyagent,thenofcoursethewholeargumenttyingallofacreated
substance'sstatestoitsidentitybywayoftheirproductionbyitssubstantialformfallsbythe
wayside.ButLeibnizwillnotaccepttheoccasionalistconclusion.
Igrantinsomeway...thatGodcontinuallyproducesallthatisrealincreatures.ButI
holdthatindoingithealsocontinuallyproducesorconservesinusthatenergyor
activitywhichaccordingtomeconstitutesthenatureofsubstanceandthesourceofits
modifications.AndsoIdonotgrantthatGodaloneactsinsubstances,oralonecauses
theirchanges,andIbelievethatthatwouldbetomakethecreaturestotallyfutileand
useless.(GIV,588f.)
ThefirstsentenceofDM8indicatesthatLeibnizwantedtofindamiddlewaybetweenthe
occasionalismofMalebrancheandtheratherdeisticpositionofDurand,andthathethoughtitno
easytask:"ItisratherdifficulttodistinguishtheactionsofGodfromthoseofcreatures;forthere
aresomewhobelieve
____________________
22
SeealsoDM14,whereLeibnizsaysthat"createdsubstancesdependonGod,whoconservesthem
andwho,indeed,producesthemcontinuallybyakindofemanationasweproduceourthoughts."
Gr330datesverylikelyfromtheearly1690s(VE451).
95
thatGoddoeseverything,[and]othersimaginethathedoesnothingbutconservetheforcethathe
hasgiventocreatures."Malebranchewouldarguethatthereisnomiddlewayhere,andthat
occasionalismfollowsfromtheconceptionofconservationascontinuedcreation.23Howdid
Leibnizthinkhecouldescapebetweenthehornsofthisdilemma?
RobertSleigh,inanilluminatingdiscussionofthisproblem,suggeststhat"Leibniz'smature
position"istobefoundinhisclaimthat"theperfectionthatisintheactionofthecreaturecomes
fromGod,butthatthelimitationsthatarefoundthereareaconsequenceoftheoriginallimitation
andoftheprecedinglimitationsthathaveoccurredinthecreature"(GVI,348),24orinSleigh's
words,that"Godproduceswhatthereisofperfectioninthestatesofcreatures;creaturesproduce
whateverthereisoflimitationintheirownstates."25ThereisnodoubtthatLeibnizmadethis
claim,anditsintendedfunctioninhistheodicy,asawayofavoidingtheconclusionthatGodisthe
authorofsinsandotherevils,isexplicit(T30)andobvious.
Asametaphysicalmiddlewaybetweenoccasionalismanddeism,however,itseemstomeless
promising.ItsfundamentaldisadvantageisthatitseemstocompetewithLeibniz'sstrategyfor
distinguishingbetweenactivityandpassivitywithincreatedsubstances.Leibnizclassifieda
substanceasactiveinanyeventinwhichit"passestoagreaterdegreeofperfection,"andpassive
inanyeventinwhichit"passestoalesserdegree"ofperfection(DM15).Identifyingsubstantial
formwithprimitiveactiveforce,andprimarymatterwithprimitivepassiveforce,hetherefore
treatstheformerasatendencytoperfection,ordistinctperception,andthelatterasatendencyto
imperfectionorlimitation,orconfusedperception.26ButifGod'sconservingactivityproduces
directlyalltheperfectioninthestatesofcreatures,insuchawaythatcreaturesproduceonlythe
imperfectionoftheirstates,theconclusioniscloseathandthatGod'sistheonlyactiveforceand
thatcreatureshaveonlypassiveforce.Thatmaybeenoughtoavoidtheoccasionalistconclusion
thatcreaturesarenotrealcausesatall,butitseemsquiteinconsistentwithLeibniz'stheoryof
createdsubstantialformsasactiveforces.
Theremustbesomethinginthereasoningleadingtothisconclusionthatisoutofkeepingwith
Leibniz'sintentionsinattributingallandonlytheperfectionincreaturestothedivineagency.For
thatattributionisfollowed,intheTheodicy,bypassagesimplyingthatallthe"accidents"or
"qualities"ofcreatedsubstancesareproducedbythecreaturesthemselves.
Theproductionofmodificationshasneverbeencalledcreation....Godproduces
substancesfromnothing,andthesubstancesproduceaccidentsbythechangesoftheir
limits....ImaintainthatallSouls,Entelechiesorprimitiveforces,substantialforms,
simplesubstances,orMonads,bywhatevername
____________________
23
NicolasMalebranche,EntretienssurlaMtaphsique(1688),VII,vixi(OMXII,15563).
24
P.390inHuggardEnglishtranslationoftheTheodicy.
25
Sleigh,LeibnizandArnauld,p.185.Sleighcitesseveralothertextsforthisposition.Ashenotes
(p.184),ThomasAquinastakesaverysimilarpositioninhisSummacontraGentiles,book3,ch.
71.IammuchindebtedtoSleigh'sdiscussion,andalsototheexcellentdiscussioninRobinet,
Architectoniquedisjonctive,pp.41842.
26
ThisaspectofthetheoryofformandmatterisdiscussedatlengthinChapters1113.
96
onemaycallthem,cannotbebornnaturally,norperish.AndIconceiveofqualitiesor
derivativeforces,orwhatarecalledaccidentalforms,asmodificationsoftheprimitive
Entelechy,justasshapesaremodificationsofmatter.(T39596)
"TheprimitiveEntelechy"hereisclearlythesoul,substantialform,orprimitiveactiveforce,27and
itsaccidentsorqualitiesareincluded,alongwiththoseofmatter,amongthe"modifications"that
donotrequirecreationbutareproducedbythecreatedsubstancesthemselves.Thecharacterization
ofmodifications,assuch,intermsoflimitsandchangesoflimitsseemsintendedtoaccommodate
theseclaimstothethesisthatcreaturesproduceinthemselvesonlylimitation.ButIconfessthatI
stilldonotseehowLeibnizmayhavethoughtthatthelatterthesiscouldbemadewhollyconsistent
withhischaracterizationofsubstantialformsasactiveforcestendingtowardperfection.
IthinkthatinallocatingperfectionandimperfectiontotheactionofGodandofcreatures,
respectively,Leibnizhadtheproblemsoftheodicymoreonhismindthanthoseofmetaphysics.
Morelightseemstometobeshedonthelatterbyanotherlineofthoughtdevelopedinthe
Theodicy.
Supposethatthecreatureisproducedanewateachinstant;grantalsothattheinstant,
beingindivisible,excludesalltemporalpriority.Butletusnoticethatitdoesnot
excludepriorityinnature,orwhatiscalledpriorityinSignorationis,andthatthatis
enough.TheproductionoractionbywhichGodproducesispriorinnaturetothe
existenceofthecreaturethatisproduced;thecreaturetakeninitself,withitsnatureand
itsnecessaryproperties,ispriortoitsaccidentalaffectionsanditsactions;andyetall
thesethingsoccurinthesamemoment.Godproducesthecreatureinconformitywith
thedemand[exigence]oftheprecedinginstants,followingthelawsofhiswisdom;and
thecreatureoperatesinconformitywiththatnaturethathereturnstoitincreatingit
always.(T388)
Inonerespectthispassagesteersuncomfortablyclosetotheoccasionalisthornofthedilemma.
Thelastsentencecouldeasilysuggestthatinrelationtolaterstatesofacreatedsubstance,its
earlierstatesareonlyoccasionalcauses,towhichGodattendsinaccordancewith"thelawsofhis
wisdom."WemaywonderwhetherthisisconsistentwithtextsinwhichLeibnizseemstospeakof
realanddirectcausaleffectsoftheearlieronthelaterincreatures(e.g.,GII,275/AG181;G
IV,532).Eveninthepresentcontext,however,Leibnizdoesdisagreewithoccasionalisminwhathe
saysabouttheorderofcauseswithinasingleinstantoftime.Godproducesthewholerealityofthe
creatureineachinstant,theaccidentalaffectionsandtheactionsaswellasthenatureofthe
creature.ButwithinwhatGodproducesthereisanatural(notatemporal)order,thenatureofthe
creaturebeingpriortoitsaffectionsandactions.WhatGod(directly)produces,wemaysay,isnot
justthecreature'snatureorsubstantialformorcapacitytoproduce,andnotjustthecreature's
natureanditsaffectionsandactions,butthecreature'snature"operating"andthusproducingits
affectionsandactions.28
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27
Leibniz'suseofhisterminologyinthequotedpassageissomewhatimprecise,however,ashinted
bythephrase"bywhatevernameonemaycallthem."SeeChapters1013.
28
Forasimilarinterpretation,seeRobinet,Architectoniquedisjonctive,p.440.
97
Inthusproducingthecreature'sproducing,God'sconservingactivityhasadirectcausalrelationto
thecreature'sactions,butwithoutexcludingtheproductiveagencyofthecreatednature.
Otherpassagessupportthisinterpretionaswellforinstance,thestatementfrom1702,quoted
above,that"Godcontinuallyproducesallthatisrealincreatures.ButIholdthatindoingithealso
continuallyproducesorconservesinusthatenergyoractivitywhichaccordingtomeconstitutes
thenatureofsubstanceandthesourceofitsmodifications"(GIV,588f.).Similarly,whenLeibniz
saysthattheconcurrenceofGodis"immediate,sincetheeffectdependsonGod,notonlybecause
itscauseoriginatedfromGod,butalsobecauseGod'sconcurrenceisneitherlessnormoreremote
inproducingtheeffectitselfthaninproducingitscause,"heisclearlyspeakingofeffectsthatnot
onlyhaveGodasanimmediatecause,butalsohavecreatedcauses,themselvesproducedbyGod.
Acarefullywordedstatement,writtenin1702andpublishedin1712,presentsaninteresting
disjunction:"ForitisGodwhoconservesandcontinuallycreatestheir[creatures']forces,thatisto
say,asourceofmodificationsthatisinthecreature,orindeed[oubien]astatebywhichitcanbe
judgedthattherewillbeachangeofmodifications"(GIV,568/L583).Inthesecondalternative,
statedintermsofastatethatgroundspredictions,commitmenttometaphysicallyrealinfluenceof
earliercreatedstatesonlateronesiscarefullyavoided.Ametaphysicallyrealproductionof
creatures'modificationsbyforcesthatareinthemisaffirmedinthefirstalternative,butthatmay
applyonlytoanactionoftheforcesthatissimultaneouswiththemodificationsproduced.
Wecanspeculatealittlefurtheraboutthenatureoftheexplanatoryrelationbetweenearlierand
laterstatesofthesamecreatedsubstanceinLeibniz'stheoryofconservation.Leibnizsaidin1706
toDesBossesthat"thereisintheactivepower[ofcreatures]acertaindemand[exigentia]for
actionandthereforefordivineconcurrenceforaction,"ademandthat,though"resistible,"is
"foundedinthelawsofnatureconstitutedbydivinewisdom."Withoutsuchanactivepoweror
forceinthecreature,Leibnizdeclared,God's"ordinaryconcurrence"wouldnotsufficetogiverise
totheaction(GII,295;cf.T388).Itakeitthatthe"demand"isenvisagedhereastemporallyprior
totheactiondemanded.PerhapsitwasalsoLeibniz'sviewthatthecausallyefficaciousactionof
theforcesofacreatedsubstanceisalwayssimultaneouswithitseffect,butthatitproducesthe
effect,inaccordancewiththerelevantlaws,inviewofthesubstance'spreviousstates.29
Conservation,onmyinterpretationofLeibniz'sview,doesnotinvolveGod'sproducinganystate
ofacreaturethatdoesnotalsohavea"source"inthenatureorsubstantialformofthecreature.
"ThecreaturedoesnotconcurwithGodtoconserveitself,"Leibnizagrees,buthesees"nothing
thatpreventsitfromconcurringwithGodfortheproductionofsomeotherthing,andparticularly
ofits[own]internaloperation,asathought,avolition,wouldbe,thingsreallydistinctfromthe
substance"(T391).Soifcreation,inthebroadsense,includingconservation,weretheonly
"miracleofthefirstrank,"theonlyactionofGod
____________________
29
Thiswayofputtingittakesrationalagencyasmodelfortheactionofcreatedsubstancesassuch.
ThatwasinfactLeibniz'smodel,asIshallshowinChapter11,section1.3.
98
thatstrictlysurpasses"alltheforceofcreatures,"Leibnizwouldnotbecommittedtoanymiraclein
whichacreature'shistorydepartsfromthepatternlaiddowninitssubstantialform.Thereareat
leasttwoothertypesofdivineaction,however,thatLeibnizclassifiesasmiraclesofthefirstrank,
andwemustnowconsiderthem.
Oneofthemisincarnation.Itisaspecialcase.Obviously,nothingwouldbeanincarnationofGod
unlessGodparticipateddirectlyinit.Butincarnationisnotamatterofcausingstatesofacreated
substance;rather,itisaunionofthedivinewithahumannature.Thereisanothertextinwhich
Leibniz,proposingtoaccountformostapparentmiraclesasproducedthroughtheministryof
angels,says:
Thustherewouldbenoabsolutemiraclesinthesethings,exceptthecreationofthings
andtheunionofGodwiththefirstcreature[thatis,withthehumannatureofJesus
Christ];therestwouldhappenbylawsofnature,butbylawsthatwouldfitthefirst
creatureandtheangels.Furthermore,throughtheunionGodwouldnotchangethe
naturallawsofthefirstcreature,sincehewouldhavenoneedofthischange.This
unionwouldthereforechangenothinginthephenomena,eventhoughthestateofunion
differsinternallyfromnonunion.(RML413)
Itseemstofollowthatdivineincarnation,asconceivedbyLeibniz,doesnotimplythatanything
occursinthehistoryofcreaturesassuchthathasnosourceintheirsubstantialforms.
TheotheractionthatLeibnizsaysisreservedtoGodaloneisannihilation.Inhiscorrespondence
withClarke,Leibnizintroduceshisdistinctionbetween"miraclesofaninferiorsort,whichan
angelcanwork,"and"miracleswhichnonebutGodcanwork...[o]fwhichkindarecreatingand
annihilating"(LCIV,44).30LeibnizmayhavethoughtthatGodnever,infact,annihilatesacreated
substance.Inthetextquotedinthepreviousparagraph,hesays,"IprefertosaythatGodhasnot
actedmiraculouslyexceptintheCreationandtheincarnation"(RML413).ButLeibnizcertainly
believedthatGodcanannihilatecreatedsubstances."ForweknowwellthatthepowerofGodcan
renderoursoulsmortal,totallyimmaterial(orimmortalbynaturealone)astheymaybe,sincehe
canannihilatethem"(NE67).ThatisthereverseofthecoinofLeibniz'sbeliefthatcreated
substancesarecontinuallyconservedinexistencebyGod.Itwillbeimportanttocomebacktothis
questionofthepossibilityofannihilationinourconsiderationofthemodalissuethatIhave
deferredtothispoint.
2.4TheModalIssue
Webeganwiththequestionwhethertherearepossibleworlds,orpossibleindividualhistories,that
arequalitativelyidenticalbeforeacertaintimebutdiffer
____________________
30
IfollowClarke'stranslationhere,exceptforpunctuation.Leibnizgoesontosaythatmutual
attractionofbodiesatadistance,andcontinuedcircularmotionofabody,wouldbe"supernatural"
unlesstherewereamechanicalexplanation.Hecouldbetakenheretobeassigningthesetothe
firstrankofmiracles,butitisatleastarguablethathisthoughtaboutthesecases,whichwerevery
relevanttohiscontroversywithClarke,hadmoretodowiththeidea,discussedabove,that"laws
ofnature"mustprovideexplanationsofacertainsimplicity.
99
entthereafterand,specifically,whethersuchadifferencecouldarisebyamiracle.WhatIthinkwe
haveseenmostclearlythusfaraboutLeibniz'streatmentofmiraclesisthathewasnotcommitted
(thoughhemayhavebeentempted)totheviewthatinmiracles(orinsomeofthem)Goddoesin
factcausesomethingtohappentoacreatedsubstancethatisdifferentfromwhatwouldfollow
fromthepreviousstatesofthatsubstancebythemostcomprehensivelawsbuiltintoitssubstantial
form.Evenifwethink,asIdo,thatLeibniz'sphilosophyisbestrepresentedbytheviewthatthe
whole,exceptionlessgeneralorderoftheuniverseisbuiltintothesubstantialformsofallcreated
substances,andthattheythereforehavealwaysexpressedorprefiguredallthemiraclesthat
actuallyhappentothemandevenifweaddtothisviewthatthatwouldhavebeentrue,nomatter
whatmiraclesGodhaddonethatdoesnotsettlethecrucialmodalissue.Wemustaskwhether(1)
itisonlyGod'scommitmenttoharmonythatassurestheprefiguringofallmiraclesinsubstantial
forms,orwhether(2)thenatureofsubstanceassuchmakesitabsolutelyimpossibleevenforGod
tocreateasubstancewhoseconcreteformornaturedoesnotperpetuallyexpressabsolutely
everythingthateverhappenstoit.31
Thesecondiswhatisrequiredifpossibleworldsorhistoriesdifferingqualitativelyonlyaftera
certaintimearetobeexcluded.ThestrongesttextualevidenceforascribingthisviewtoLeibniz
maybefoundintheDiscourseonMetaphysics,particularlyin16.Thequestionaddressedinthat
sectionis
howitispossibleforGodsometimestohaveinfluenceonhumanbeingsoronother
substancesbyanextraordinaryandmiraculousconcurrence,sinceitseemsthatnothing
extraordinaryorsupernaturalcanhappentothem,inviewofthefactthatalltheir
eventsareonlyconsequencesoftheirnature"[italicsadded].
Thiscertainlysuggeststhatinproposingtheanswerthatmiracleshappeningtoacreatedsubstance
areaconsequenceofits"essence"butnotofits"nature,"Leibnizsupposesthatitisnotpossiblefor
themiraclesnottobeconsequencesofthe"essence,"whichIhavearguedistobeidentifiedwith
thesubstantialform,oratleasttoberegardedasfullyexpressedbythesubstantialform.
Whywoulditbeimpossibleformiraclestohappentoasubstancethatarenotconsequencesofits
"essence,"andhenceofitssubstantialform?Ananswerintermsofthenatureofcausality,and
indeedofthedivinecausality,issuggestedbythestatementthatnothingissupernaturaltoour
essence"sinceaneffectalwaysexpressesitscauseandGodisthetruecauseofsubstances"(DM
16).ButtheanswersuggestedbytheformulationofthequestioninDM16,andbyDM69asthe
backgroundofthequestion,isthatthenatureofasubstanceassuchrequiresaninherentessenceor
substantialforminthesubstancefromwhichallofitsstatesflow.Againstthebackgroundof
DM69,theapparentreasonforthisanswerisLeibniz'sconceptualcontainmenttheoryoftruth.
Thisisadisappointingobservation,inasmuchasIhavebeenseeking,inthepresent
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31
Thephrase"toit"marksarestrictionofthescopeofthepresentinquiryintothemodalissue.I
postponeuntilsection3thequestion(alsorelatedtothelawofthegeneralorder)whetherthe
natureofsubstanceallowsGodanyabilitytocreateasubstancewhoseconcreteformfailsto
expresssomethingthathappensoutsideit.
100
chapter,analternativetotheconceptualcontainmenttheoryasagroundforLeibniz'srejectionof
transworldidentity.Analternativerationalemightbesoughtinthenatureofsubstanceasactive.
Thefollowingargumenthasarguably.Leibnizianpremises:
Necessarily,acreatedsubstancedoesnotexist(atanytime)unlessitacts(atthattime).
Necessarily,acreatedsubstancedoesnotact(atanytime)unlessallitsstates(atthattime)follow
fromitsownsubstantialformanditsownpreviousstates.
Therefore,necessarily,acreatedsubstancedoesnotexist(atanytime)unlessallitsstates(atthat
time)followfromitsownsubstantialformanditsownpreviousstates.
Thisargumentisformallyvalid;(3)doesfollowfrom(1)and(2).(1)iscertainlyaLeibnizian
doctrine(GIV,469f./L433);itisconnectedwithLeibniz'sargumentthatcreatedthingsmusthave
activepowersiftheyaretobesubstancesandnotmeremodesasSpinozathought(LA133;G
IV,508f./L502).Theconsiderationsabouttranstemporalidentitypresentedinsection1ofthis
chaptermightalsohaveinclinedLeibniztoacceptsomethinglike(2).Themostquestionable
pointintheargumentistheuniversalquantifier("allitsstates")inpremise(2).Withoutitthe
argumentwillnotexcludeanymiracles.Butonemighthavethoughtthatthemostthatwouldbe
requiredforasubstancetoact(atall)wouldbethatsomeofitsstatesfollowfromitsown
substantialformandpreviousstates.Leibnizmayhaveaccepted(2)initsfullstrength,however,
believingthattheuniversalquantifierthereisrequiredforthegroundingoftranstemporalidentity
(cf.LA43).Andiftheconclusion(3)canbederivedinthisway,itwillfollowthat
HoweverGodworksmiracles,itcannotbebycausingsomethingtohappentoacreatedsubstance
thatdoesnotfollowfromthecreature'sownsubstantialformandpreviousstates,unlessthe
creatureistherebyannihilated.
Theconcludingqualificationin(4),aboutannihilation(a"miracleofthefirstrank"),is
significant.Anargumentbasedontherequirementsfor(continued)existenceofacreated
substancecannotexcludethepossibilityofeventsbywhichthesubstancewouldceasetoexist.
Thisargumentthereforedoesnotsupportthethesisthatitisabsolutelyimpossibleforthe
annihilationofasubstancetobeaneventthatwasnotcaused,norevenexpressed,bythe
substance'ssubstantialformandpreviousstates.
Infact,thereisconsiderableevidence,atleastintheTheodicy,thatLeibnizrecognizedasensein
whichGodcouldatanytimeannihilateacreatedsubstance,nomatterwhatitsprevioushistory
mighthavebeen.Hedeclaresthat"intruth,itdoesnotfollownecessarilyfromthefactthatIam,
thatIshallbe;butthatstillfollowsnaturally,thatistosay,ofitself,perse,ifnothingpreventsit"(
T383).
101
Theclaimthatmyfutureexistencedoesnotfollow"necessarily"frommypresentexistenceisnot
decisiveforourpresentpurpose,sinceitcouldjustmeanthattheconnectionbetweenthemisnot
(finitely)demonstrable.Moreimportantistheindicationthatthefutureexistencefollowsonly
"naturally"fromthepresent,forfollowing"naturally,"inLeibniz,generallysignifiesaconnection
thatdependsonGod'schoiceofaharmoniousworld.Similarly,itseemstobeLeibniz'sviewthat
conservation,aswellas(original)creationisavoluntaryoperationofGod(Tcd9),whichshould
implythattheconnectionbetweenpresentandfutureexistenceofacreaturedependsonGod's
choice,whichisofcourseinfactthechoiceofaharmoniousworld.
Leibnizalsosaysthat"Godproducesthecreatureinconformitywiththedemand[exigence]ofthe
precedinginstants,followingthelawsofhiswisdom"(T388;cf.GII,295).Thisseemstoimply
thatthe(re)productionbywhichGodconservesanygivencreatureinexistencedependsonGod's
wisdomandhence,certainly,onGod'sgoodnessandchoiceofthebest.Thistextcouldbereadas
implyingthatitdependsonGod'sgoodness,notonlywhethertheindividualcreaturewillcontinue
toexistbutalsowhetheranycontinuedexistenceithaswillconformtothedemandsofits
substantialformorinherentprimitiveforces.ButIthinkthisreadingisnotimposedonus;wecan
stillsupposethatGod'scausingasubstancetohaveanystatenotfollowingfromitsprimitive
forcesandpreviousstatewouldbecountedbyLeibnizasannihilation.
FromthesepassagesoftheTheodicytakentogetheremergestheviewthatGodcouldannihilateany
createdsubstanceatanytime,inthesensethatonlythedivinegoodnesspreventsGodfromdoing
that.32ItwouldbedifficulttoascribetoLeibnizatthispointtheviewthatifGoddidannihilatea
substance,thatannihilationmusthavebeenexpressedandperceivedinthesubstancefromthevery
beginningofitsexistence,andthatthisrequirementdoesnotdependonGod'swisdomor
goodness,sothatGodcouldnot,inthesenseinvokedhere,annihilateasubstancewhoseprevious
statesdonotdemandit.ThatinterpretationwouldhardlybeconsistentwithLeibniz'sstatementthat
itisby"followingthelawsofhiswisdom"thatGod'sconservingactivityagrees"withthedemand
oftheprecedinginstants"(T388).Atleastwithrespecttoannihilation,Leibniz'sstatementsinthe
Theodicysuggestasortofpossibilityofalternativeindividualhistoriesthatdifferonlyaftera
certaintime.
3.PerceptionandRelations
SuchapossibilityissuggestedevenmorestronglyinLeibniz'sthoughtaboutrelations.Inthecase
ofrelations,unlikethatofmiracles,thereisnodoubtofhowLeibnizthinksthingsgointheactual
world.Actually,everysubstanceateverytimecompletelyexpressesallitsrelationswithevery
othersubstance,andeveryevent,inthewhole(actual)world.Leibnizassertsthatrepeatedly,in
discussionsofsubstance,ofperception,ofpreestablishedharmony,andnevercontradictsit.The
issueherecanonlybewhetherGodcould,insomerelevantsense,
____________________
32
0ntheimportanceofthistypeofpossibilityforLeibniz'stheoryofcreation,seeChapter1,section
3.
102
havemadeasubstancethatwouldnothaveexpressedallitsrelations,andhencewhetherthereare
possibleindividualhistoriesthatareperfectlyalikeinternallybutdifferinsomeoftheirrelations.
Issuesaboutthepossibleexistenceofanactualsubstanceinaworldinwhichsomeofitsactual
relationswouldfailarenotprominentinLeibniz'sdiscussionsoftransworldorcounterfactual
identity,whicharemuchmoreconcernedwithwhethertherearepossibleworldsinwhichactual
creaturesactorsufferotherwisethantheydointheactualworld.Afocusonthelatterquestionis
easilyexplainedbyLeibniz's(andArnauld's)religiousandethicalinterests.Nonethelesswecan
askwhetheraccordingtoLeibnizthereisapossibleworldinwhichAdolfHitler,forexample,does
notexist,orislessmaliciousthanintheactualworld,butinwhichthereisamanbothnumerically
andqualitativelyidenticalwiththeactualAntoineArnauld[except,ofcourse,forthemerely
"extrinsicdenominations"thatArnauldactuallyhasbyvirtueofhis(distant)relationstoHitler].
Thisquestioncanbedividedintotwoparts:(1)Aretherepossibleworldsinwhichthereisaman
qualitativelyidenticalwiththeactualAntoineArnauld,butnoonequalitativelyidenticalwiththe
actualAdolfHitler,exceptforpurelyrelationalpropertiesoftheindividuals?(2)Iftherearesuch
possibleworlds,doesatleastoneofthemcontainsomeonenumericallyidenticalwiththeactual
AntoineArnauld?Leibnizhaslittletosayaboutthesecondofthesequestions.Ourstartingpointin
hisargumentabouttheGenoeseblockofmarble,withitsclaimsaboutqualitativedifferences,leads
metofocus,forthetimebeing,onthefirstquestion.Leibnizhasalottosaythatbearsonitbut
someofhisstatementsmaytellinoppositedirections.
ThepassageabouttheGenoesemarblemaysuggestanegativeanswer.Leibnizsaystherenot
merelythatthestonewouldhavebeenqualitativelydifferentfromthebeginningifitweregoingto
stayinGenoa,butthat"becauseoftheconnectionofthingsthewholeuniversewithallitsparts
wouldbeentirelydifferent,andwouldhavebeenanother[universe]fromthebeginning,iftheleast
thinginitwentotherwisethanitdoes"(LA42,italicsadded).SoifLeibnizisdenyingthatthereare
possibleworldsinwhichtheblockofmarble,oritscounterpart,isqualitativelythesameasinthe
actualworlduntilthetimeofitsactualtransportation,butthenstaysinGenoa,heisequally
denyingthattherearepossibleworldsinwhichonesubstanceisinternallydifferentfromitsactual
counterpartbutothersubstancesstartoutonlyrelationallydifferentfromtheiractualcounterparts.
Whatis"theconnectionofthings"thatprecludessuchpossibleworlds?Wehaveseenthatfor
Leibniztheprimitiveforceofeachindividualsubstanceprovidestheconnectionthatprecludes(if
anythingdoes)pairsofpossibleindividualhistoriesthatdifferinternallyafterbutnotbeforea
certaintime.IstheresomethinginLeibniz'sconceptionofthingsthatmightplayananalogousrole
inprecludingpairsofpossibleindividualhistoriesthatdifferrelationallybutnotindividually?
Theobviouscandidateforthisroleisperception.Leibnizheldthateachsubstancealwaysperceives
everythingthateveroccursinthewholeuniverse.Throughouthislife,AntoineArnauld,for
instance,perceivedtheexistenceofAdolfHitler,andeverydetailofHitler'scareer,thoughof
courseArnauldwas
103
notconsciousoftheseperceptions.ItseemstofollowthatifapossibleworldinwhichHitlerdid
notexistcontainedamanwhoisinternallyjustliketheactualArnauld,thatmanwould,inthat
world,"perceive"somethingsthatdonotexist.Perhapsthisinferencecouldberesistedbyholding
thatanysufficientlycomplexinternalstateofaperceivingsubstancecouldbeplacedinonetoone
correspondencewithanysufficientlycomplexpossibleworld,withorwithoutHitler,andwould
thereforeconstituteanaccurateperceptionofwhateverworldthesubstanceexistedin.Leibnizdoes
oftenexplainperceptionintermsofonetoonecorrespondence,buthecouldhardlyaffordto
acceptthistrivializationofhisconceptofperceptionandtheconsequenttrivializationofhispre
establishedharmony.
Ifhedoesnotacceptit,hisalternativesaretoadmitthattherearepossibleworldsinwhichsome
substancefailstoperceivethewholeworldjustasitis(failstoperceiveitasnotcontainingHitler,
forinstance),ortodenythattherearepossibleworldsthatdifferqualitativelywithrespecttothe
existenceorinternalpropertiesofsomebutnotalloftheirsubstances.Thereismuchtoincline
Leibniztothesecondalternative.Hethoughtthatitfollowsfromthenatureoftruththatthereare
nopurelyextrinsicdenominations,andhencethateverysubstanceperceivesthewholeuniverse(
C520/L268f.).Perhapshethoughtthatthisprecludespossibleworldsinwhichanysubstancefails
toperceivethewholeworldjustasitis.(Ofcourse,herecognizedthattherearefalsebeliefs,buthe
thoughtthatthebeingsthathavethemalso,unconsciously,perceivetheworldexactlyasitis.)On
thisview,thewholegeneralorderoftheuniverse,includingitsrelationalaspects,wouldbe
incorporatedintheconcretesubstanceasitisincludedinthesubstance'scompleteindividual
concept,andnotmerelybyvirtueofGod'swisechoiceofamostharmoniousworld.Therelational
lawsofthegeneralorderwouldbeincorporatedinthesubstance'sperceptionsasthelawsof
intrasubstantialcausationareincorporatedinitsprimitiveforce.Andallofthesubstance'sstates
andrelationswouldfollowfromtheforceandtheperceptionsithasatanygiventime,sothatthere
wouldbenopossibilityofapredicate'sbeingcontainedintheindividualconceptandnotbeing
containedintheconcretesubstance.
ThishastheveryimportantadvantageforLeibnizofprovidinganontrivialsenseinwhichpossible
individualscanfailtobe"compossible"witheachother.Inthinkingabouttheproblemofevilin
moreorlessLeibnizianterms,itisnaturaltoask,Whycouldn'tGodhaveimprovedtheworldby
replacingHitlerwithamorallybetterindividual,whileleavingtheexcellencesofmoreexcellent
individuals(suchasArnauld)unchanged?OneanswerthatLeibnizseemstowanttogivetothis
sortofquestionisthatGodcouldnotdothatbecauseArnauld(withhisactualexcellences)isnot
compossiblewithanysuchHitlersubstitute.Buthowarewetounderstandthisincompossibility?
SupposethatHitlerisreplacedbyamorevirtuoussubstituteinsomepossibleworldsthatcontaina
manwhoseinternal,nonrelationalqualitiesandstatesareexactlythesameasArnauldactuallyhas.
OfcourseifArnauld'sindividualconceptincludesthewholehistoryoftheactualworld,Arnauld
himselfwillbeabsent,bydefinition,fromanypossibleworldcontainingsuchasubstituteinplace
ofHitler.InthatcasetherewillbeatrivialsenseinwhichArnauldisincompossiblewithaHitler
sub
104
stitute.ButthissortofincompossibilitydoesnotanswerthequestionwhyGodcouldnothave
madeabetterworldbyreplacingparticularlyviciousorunhappycreatureswithbetterandhappier
oneswhilereplacinghismoreexcellentcreatureswithcounterparts33thatwouldhaveexactlythe
sameexcellencesinternallyandwoulddifferonlyintheirextrinsicdenominations.Tothis
question,Isuppose,Leibnizcouldreplythatcreaturesthatwouldbeinternallyjustlikethe
excellentactualcreatures,butinaworldthatisnotjustliketheactualworld,wouldtherebylackan
important(relational)excellenceofallactualcreatures,inthattheywouldnotperceivetheirwhole
worldjustasitis.Butinthisreplyitisnotincompossibilitybutharmonythatiscalledintosolve
thefundamentalproblem.
Perhaps,indeed,theappealtoincompossibilityisjustacovertappealtoconsiderationsofharmony.
ButitwouldbesomethingmoreifLeibnizthoughtthattheinternalstatesofpossiblesubstances
areperceptionsthatareconceptuallyconnectedwiththeexistenceandstatesofothersubstances,so
thatnoindividualinanypossibleworldhasexactlythesamehistoryofinternalstatesasany
individualinanyotherpossibleworld.Thentheinternalhistoriesofsubstancesinoneworldwould
beincompossiblewiththeinternalhistoriesofsubstancesinanyotherworld,andthis
incompossibilitywouldputaconstraintonGod'soptionsthatwouldbequiteindependentofthe
constraintsofharmony.
DespitethesereasonsforascribingtoLeibniztheviewthatGodcouldnothaveactualizedan
individualsubstancewithoutactualizingthewholepossibleworldperceivedbythatsubstance,I
knowofnotextinwhichLeibnizexactlyassertsit,34andtherearetextsinwhichheexplicitly
contradictsit.35Indeed,itishardlytobereconciledwithhisaccountofthepreestablished
harmony.EverystudentofLeibnizisfamiliarwithhisstatementthattheseriesoffuture
perceptionsthatfollowsfromhispresentnature"wouldnotfail,andwouldhappentomejustthe
same,ifeverythingthatisoutsideofmeweredestroyed,providedthatthereremainedonlyGod
andI"(DM14;cf.G1,382,IV,484/L457).ThisstronglysuggeststhatLeibnizthoughtthatwithout
creatinganyothersubstance,Godcouldcreateasubstancewithqualitativelythesamesubstantial
formandseriesofperceptionsasLeibnizactuallyhas.Butthisisnotthestrongestevidence,for
Leibnizmightconceivablybeusingacounterfactualconditionalwithanimpossibleantecedent,as
arhetoricaldevicetoexpressthemutualcausalindependenceofcreatedsubstances.
MoresignificantisthefactthatinexplainingthepreestablishedharmonyLeibnizrepeatedlysays
thatonlytheactionofGodcancausecreatedsubstancestocorrespondtoeachother'sperceptions.
"ThereisnothingbutGod...tobethecauseofthiscorrespondenceoftheirphenomena,andto
makewhatisparticulartoonetobepublictoall"(DM14).The"idealinfluenceofoneMonadon
another...cannothaveitseffectexceptbytheinterventionofGod....Forsinceonecreated
Monadcannothaveaphysicalinfluenceontheinteriorof
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33
Iamnotusing'counterpart'hereinthetechnicalsenseusedinLewis,"CounterpartTheoryand
QuantifiedModalLogic."
34
Hisstatementthat"weneedothersubstances"(GIV,364/L389),containingnoexplanationofwhy
weneedthem,doesnotclearlyimplytheview.
35
0nthissubject,cf.Sleigh,LeibnizandArnauld,pp.18082.
105
another,itisonlybythismeansthatonecanhaveanydependenceonanother"(Mon51).Leibniz
presentsthedifficultyofachievingthiscorrespondenceasaproofoftheinfiniteknowledgeand
powerofGod.
ForsinceeachoftheseSoulsexpressesinitswaywhatgoesonoutside,andcannot
havethisthroughanyinfluenceofotherparticularBeings,orrathermustdrawthis
expressionfromtheresourcesofitsownnature,eachonemustnecessarilyhave
receivedthisnature(orthisinternalreasonoftheexpressionofwhatisoutside)froma
universalcauseonwhichalltheseBeingsdependandwhichmakestheoneperfectly
agreeandcorrespondwiththeother.Thisisnotpossiblewithoutaninfiniteknowledge
andpower,andbysogreatanartifice,especiallywithrespecttothespontaneous
agreementofthemachinewiththeactionsofthereasonablesoul,that[Bayle]doubted,
asitwere,whetheritdidnotsurpassallpossiblewisdom,sayingthatthewisdomof
Goddidnotseemtohimtoogreatforsuchaneffect,andrecognizedatleastthatthe
feebleconceptionsthatwecanhaveofthedivineperfectionhadneverbeenputinsuch
highrelief.(NE440f.;cf.GIV,578,LCV,87)
Buttheharmonyorcorrespondenceoftheperceptionsofcreatedsubstanceswitheachothercould
hardlybesuchapowerfulproofofGod'sinfinitewisdomandpowerifnocreatorcouldhave
createdaworldthatlackedsuchcorrespondence,asDesBossespointedouttoLeibnizin1715(G
II,493).Theuseofthepreestablishedharmonytoprovethegreatnessofthecreatorseemstherefore
topresupposethatamongthepossibleworldsthatGodcouldhaveactualizedweresomeinwhich
createdsubstancesfailtocorrespondwitheachother'sperceptions.Accordingly,Leibniz
respondedflatlytoDesBossesthatGod"wasableabsolutely[tocreateoneofthosemonadsthat
nowexistwithoutcreatingalltheothers],butwasnotablehypothetically,giventhathedecidedto
doeverythingmostwiselyandharmoniously"(GII,496/L611).36
4.Conclusions
Weareleft,Ithink,withtheconclusionthat,accordingtoLeibniz,
(1)ItisonlybyvirtueofGod'swisdomandgoodnessthatthereisnofailureof
correspondenceoftheprimitiveforcesofcreatedsubstanceswithwhathappensinthe
world.
WehaveidentifiedtwofailuresofcorrespondencethatLeibnizseemstothinkarepreventedonly
voluntarilybyGodthefailuresthatwouldbeinvolvedinGod'sannihilatingasubstancewhose
pastdidnot"demand"annihilation,or
____________________
36
Theuseof"absolutely"inthiscontextisprobablymeanttosuggestthefamousScholastic
distinctionbetweenGod'sabsolutepowerandGod'sorderedpower.InAquinas'sversionofthis
distinction,God'sabsolutepowerisGod'spowerconsideredapartfromtheconstraintsofother
divineattributessuchaswisdomandgoodness.SoGodisableabsolutelytodowhateverGod
coulddowereitnotforthedivinewisdomandgoodness.God'sorderedpowerisGod'spower
consideredinrelationtotheotherattributesthatactuallydetermineitsexerciseforAquinas,
indeed,inrelationtothedeterminationofitsexercisebytheplanGodhasactuallychosen.SeeM.
Adams,WilliamOckham,pp.118690.
106
creatingasubstancewithouttheexternalrelationsinternallyexpressedbyit.Thismayseem
inconsistentwiththethesisthat:
(2)Nothingwithqualitativelythesameprimitiveforcesasanyactualsubstancehas
wouldhaveexistedifanythingatallintheworldhadgonedifferently.
TheargumentabouttheGenoesemarblecertainlycommitsLeibniztothesis(2).
Infact,thereisnoinconsistencyhere.Thereisastrongconnectionbetweentheprimitiveforcesof
eachactualcreatureandabsolutelyeverythingthathappensintheactualworld,andthisconnection
canbeexpressedinacounterfactualconditionalsuchas(2).Butconnectionsdonothavetohave
absolutemetaphysicalnecessityinordertogroundcounterfactualconditionals.Theconnectionin
thiscasemaydependonthewisdomandgoodnessofGod.IfGodhadcreatedaworldinanyway
different,Godwouldnothavecreatedanysubstancewithprimitiveforcesqualitativelythesameas
thoseofanyactualsubstance,becausethatwouldhaveproducedastateofaffairstoodiscordantfor
thedivinewisdomandgoodnesseventoconsideritseriouslyasacandidateforcreation.The
demandsofGod'swisdomandgoodnessaremorethanstrongenoughtogroundcounterfactual
conditionals.
ThislineofthoughtgivessomesupporttothefirsthypothesisconsideredinChapter1,section2.3,
forexplainingcontingentconnectionsbetweenpossiblesthehypothesisthatalternativepredicates
foranindividualcreatedsubstanceare"possibleinthemselves"iftheyareexcludedbythe
substance'sindividualconceptonlyinvirtueofthelawsofitsuniverse.Thatisbecausethe
principaldoubtabouttheviabilityofthehypothesisconcernedtheacceptabilitytoLeibnizofthe
distinctionbetweenfeaturesofasubstancethatareparticulartoit,asembodiedinitsprimitive
forces,andthelawsofitsuniverse.Andproposition(1)impliesthatthereareindeedalternative
predicatesforacreatedsubstancewhicharenotexcludedbythesubstance'sprimitiveforcesallby
themselves,butonlyinvirtueofthedecisionofGod'sgoodnesstocreateaworldconformingtoat
leastminimallyharmoniouslaws.
Proposition(2)isaclaimaboutcounterfactualqualitativeidentity.Leibnizwasinterestedinit
largelyasabasisfordefendinghisthesisofthecompletenessofindividualconceptsagainst
Arnauld'sclaimsofcounterfactualindividualidentity.Thismaysuggesttousthatifthetruthof(2)
dependsonGod'swisdomandgoodness,sodoLeibniz'sdenialsofcounterfactualindividual
identity.IsthisLeibniz'sview?AssumingthatonlydivinewisdomandgoodnesskeepGodfrom
creatingsomeoneinternallyjustlikeme,butinanexternallydifferentsituation,wouldLeibnizsay
thatsuchanindividual,ifGoddidcreateone,couldbeme?Thisisadifficultquestion.The
possibilityofsuchadiscordantstateofaffairs,Isuspect,heldnomoreinterestforLeibnizthanfor
Leibniz'sGod.Itispossibletodenycounterfactualindividualidentityevenwherecounterfactual
qualitativeidentityofanindividual'sinternalhistory,oraninitialsegmentofitshistory,obtains,
andsometextsdiscussedinChapters1and2(e.g.,LA42,52)mightsuggestthatLeibnizwoulddo
this.Sodoeshiswritinginthemid1680sthat"aconceptthatisstillindeterminateeveninthe
slightestcircumstances...could
107
becommontotwodifferentindividuals"(Gr311);foritseemstofollowthatanindividualmustbe
definedbyaconceptthatisnotundeterminedinanyway,evenregardingexternalrelationsor
durationofexistence.Ontheotherhand,whereLeibnizdoesenvisagethechaoticsituationin
whichGodcreatesasubstancewithoutcreatingtheexternalrelationsthatitexpressesinternally,he
usesthelanguageofindividualidentity,speakingfreelyofhimselfandGodexistingwithout
anythingelse(DM14),orofGodcreating"oneofthoseMonadsthatnowexist"withoutallthe
others(GII,496/L611).
LetusassumeforthesakeofargumentthatLeibniz'sclaimsofcounterfactualindividual
nonidentitydodependonGod'swisdomandgoodnessinthesamewayashisclaimsof
counterfactualqualitativenonidentity.Itmightbethoughtthatthisconclusionwouldbe
inconsistentwiththethesisforthesakeofwhichLeibnizresistedArnauld'sclaimsof
counterfactualidentity,thethesisthat
(3)Allthepredicatesofeachsubstancearecontainedintheindividualconceptofthat
substance.
Againthereisinfactnoinconsistencyhere.WehaveseeninChapter1thatamostimportant
predicateofactualsubstancestheirexistenceiscontainedintheirindividualconcepts,according
toLeibniz,butonlybyvirtueofGod'swisdomandgoodness.Sobeingcontainedinanindividual
conceptanddependingonGod'swisdomandgoodnessarenotinconsistentmodalitiesforLeibniz.
37ThereareindeedtextsinwhichitseemsprettyexplicitthatinLeibniz'sviewthecontainmentof
anactioninacreatedsubstance'sindividualconcept,andhencethefailureofcounterfactual
individualidentity,likethatofcounterfactualqualitativeidentity,dependsonGod'swisdomand
goodness,atleastinsomecases.LeibnizsaysthatCaesar'sdecisiontocrosstheRubicon
"presupposesthesequenceofthingsthatGodhaschosenfreely,andthatisfoundedonthefirstfree
decisionofGod,theimportofwhichistodoalwaysthatwhichismostperfect"(DM13).
Likewise,inreadingnotesfromabout1695,havingstatedthat"whenIaskwhatwouldhavebeen
ifPeterhadnotdeniedChrist,whatisaskediswhatwouldhavebeenifPeterhadnotbeenPeter,
forhavingdeniediscontainedinthecompleteconceptofPeter,"Leibnizgoesontosaythatitcan
happensometimesthatadecision(presumablyonelikePeter's)"doesnotfollow[fromanythingin
theuniverse]unlessanewdivinedecreeoccursbyreasonofbestness"(Gr358).
DoesthisinterpretationleadtotheconclusionthatLeibnizdoesnotdenytransworldidentityof
individualsafterall?Heseemstodenyit,couchinghispointintermsofpossibleworlds,inthe
Theodicy(T414).Infact,hesuggestsasenseinwhichhecandenyitwithoutcontradictingthe
conclusionsproposedhere.Thesuggestioncomesinanexplicitstatement,from1698,thatGod
couldhavecreatedsubstancesthatwouldnothavecorrespondedwitheachother'sperceptions:
"Godwasabletogiveeachsubstanceitsphenomenaindependent
____________________
37
IfIunderstandit,thesenseofSleigh'sclaimthatLeibnizaffirmed"superintrinsicalness"butnot
"superessentialism"issimilartotheinterpretationthatIhaveofferedthusfarinthissection.See
Sleigh,LeibnizandArnauld,pp.57f.,6972.
108
ofthoseoftheothers,butinthatwayhewouldhavemade,sotospeak,asmanyworldswithout
connectionastherearesubstances"(GIV,519).38Thissuggeststhatacollectionofsubstancesthat
didnotcorrespondwitheachother'sperceptionswouldnotbesufficientlyconnectedtoconstitutea
single"world."PerhapsLeibnizdidnotthinkthateverystateofaffairsorsetofcreaturesthatGod
could(butforthedivinegoodness)haveactualizedshouldbecountedasa"possibleworld"(orpart
ofapossibleworld).Perhapsonlycompletesetsofperfectlyharmoniouscreatedsubstancesareto
countaspossibleworlds.CertainlyLeibnizwassoconvincedofthesupremeworthofharmony
thathewouldnothaveexpectedGodseriouslytoconsideractualizinganystateofaffairsthatdid
notsatisfythisconstraint,andIdonotknowofanypassageinwhichLeibnizhimselfspeaksof
"possibleworlds"thatdonotsatisfyit.IfLeibnizassumedthatthenotionofa"possibleworld"is
subjecttothisrequirementofharmony,hewouldhaveaclearreasontoholdthatsubstanceswith
differentrelationalproperties,ordifferentdurations,indifferentpossibleworldsmusthavehad
differentinternalproperties(differentperceptions)fromtheverybeginning;andthiswouldsupport
adenialoftransworldidentity,givingitasenseinwhichitwouldfollowfromhismetaphysicsof
causalityandperception.Ofcourseitwouldalsomovehimstillfartherfromtheconceptionof
possibleworldsintermsofwhichthequestionoftransworldidentityhasbeenraisedinourtime.
Appendix:'APriori'and'APosteriori'
Proofsaprioriandaposteriori,intheoriginalsenseofthoseterms,areproofsfromthecauseand
fromtheeffects,respectively,ofthefacttobeproved.Thissenseofthetermsisstillfoundinthe
PortRoyalLogic,whichspeaksofmattersinwhichourmindmaybe"capableoffindingand
comprehendingthetruth,eitherinprovingtheeffectsbythecauses,whichiscalleddemonstrating
apriori,orinverselyindemonstratingthecausesbytheeffects,whichiscalledprovinga
posteriori."39Theconceptionisclear,althoughtheauthorsgoonimmediatelytoremarkthat"itis
necessarytoextendthesetermsalittleinordertoreduceallsortsofdemonstrationstothem."
TherearemanyindicationsinLeibniz'swritingsthatheunderstood'apriori'intheoldersensethat
Ihaveindicated.Hesays,"ProofaprioriorApodeixisisexplanationofthetruth"(C408).He
equatesknowledgeaprioriwithknowledgethroughcauses(C272).Areason"wouldmakeknown
thereality[ofadefinition]aprioriinexhibitingthecauseorpossiblegenerationofthething
defined"(NE294).Mosttelling,perhaps,isanearlypassageinwhichLeibniztreatedindirect
proof[reductioadabsurdum],whichisnotnormallyempirical,asacaseofproofaposteriori
presumablybecauseitdoesnotexplainwhythepropositionprovedistrue(C154).40
____________________
38
0nthistext,cf.Sleigh,LeibnizandArnauld,pp.150f.
39
ArnauldandNicole,PortRoyalLogic,IV,1.
40
Couturat'seditorialcommments(C153f.)noteinternalevidencefordatingthispieceto1677.The
watermarkalsosuggestsapproximatelythatdate(VE309).
109
Nonetheless,therearepassagesinwhichLeibnizcouldeasilybereadinthenewersenseinwhich
'apriori'meanssimply'nonempirical'.Heregularlyconnectstheaposterioriwithexperience,and
cancontrast"truthsaposteriori,oroffact"with"truthsapriori,orofReason"(NE434).Isuspect,
indeed,thatLeibnizplayedacrucialroleinthetransformationofthemeaningof'apriori'.Ibelieve
that'proofapriori'alwaysmeantforhim'proofthatexplainsthereasonforthefactthatisproved'.
Butitfollowsfromhisepistemologyandhisconceptualcontainmenttheoryoftruththatapriori
knowledgeinthissensecoincideswithknowledgethatisindependentofexperienceandwith
knowledgebyanalysisofconcepts.Itwasthereforeeasyforhimtousetheterm'apriori'whenthe
ideathatwasforemostinhismindwasnotthatofknowledgebycausesbutoneoftheseotherideas
thatwere,forhim,coextensivewithit.
Bythesametoken,itwaseasyforaLeibnizianlikeAlexanderGottliebBaumgartentodefinethea
prioriasthenonempirical.41ChristianAugustCrusius,ontheotherhand,whowasmoreresistant
toLeibnizianviewsaboutsufficientreason,wasstillusing'apriori'and'aposteriori'intheold
senseinthemiddleoftheeighteenthcentury:
Ademonstrationaposterioriisonefromwhichisknownonlythatathingisfor
example,byexperience,orbyreductiontoabsurdity,orbycomparisonwithsome
otherthing.Ademonstrationaprioriisonefromwhichisknownwhyathingisfor
example,wherewededucetheattributesofthingsfromdefinitions,ordrawoutthe
effectfromthecausesanddeterminingreasons.42
____________________
41
Risse,DieLogikderNeuzeit,vol.2,p.649.
42
Risse,DieLogikderNeuzeit,vol.2,p.690.AsimilarconceptionisfoundinCrusius,Entwurfder
nothwendigenVernunftWahrheiten,,35.
110
II
Theism:GodandBeing
111
112
4
TheEnsPerfectissimum
WebeginhereasequenceoffivechaptersonLeibniz'sviewsandreasoningsontherelation
betweenGodandontology.Leibnizis(inmyopinion)themostinterestingwriteronthe
ontologicalargumentfortheexistenceofGodbetweenSt.Anselmandthetwentiethcentury.This
chapterisconcernedwithoneofthekeyideasinLeibniz'sversionofthatargument,hisconception
ofGodasa"mostperfectbeing,"anensperfectissimum,bywhichhemeanta"subjectofall
perfections"(AVI,iii,579/L167),abeingthathasallperfections,andwhoseessence,indeed,isthe
"aggregate"(cf.AVI,iii,574)orconjunctionofallperfections.Leibnizseemstohaveworked
hardestonthedevelopmentofthisconceptionduring1676,attheendofhisyearsinParis,butit
stilldominateshisthoughtaboutGodintheDiscourseonMetaphysicsandintheMonadology(
DM1,Mon4148).Hebequeathedtheconceptiontohissuccessors.Inslightlyvaryingformsit
appearsinChristianWolffandAlexanderGottliebBaumgarten,anditprovidestheconceptofGod
fortheexcessivelyfamousdiscussionoftheontologicalargumentinImmanuelKantCritiqueof
PureReason.
Whatsortofthingasubjectofallperfectionswouldbeobviouslydependsonwhatperfectionsare.
Leibnizoffereddefinitionsof'perfection'onmorethanoneoccasion.TheoneIhavechosenasa
startingpointoccursinoneofhismorefinishedpapersfrom1676andfiguresprominentlyinhis
attempttoprovethepossibilityofGod'sexistence,whichIwilldiscussatlengthinChapter5.He
writes:"AperfectioniswhatIcalleverysimplequalitythatispositiveandabsolute,or[seu=that
is]thatexpresseswithoutanylimitswhateveritexpresses"(AVI,iii,578/L167).
Perfectionsarequalities.Noteverypredicateexpressesaquality.Inparticular,onlymonadic
predicates,predicatesofasinglesubject,(andperhapsnotallmonadicpredicates)expressqualities.
LeibnizdoesnotadhererigidlytoAristotle'sschemeofcategories,butheiscertainlyAristotelian
enoughtorefusetocountrelationsasqualities.Thequestionwhetherexistenceisaqualitywillbe
importantinconnectionwiththeontologicalargument.
Asimplequalityhereisonethatisnotanalyzableasaconjunctionofotherproperties;this
becomesexplicitinthenextstepoftheargument.Apositivequalityisnotthenegationofanother
quality.ThemostdurablefeatureofLeibniz'sconceptionofperfectionsisthattheyinvolveno
negationatall.Itakethelastclauseofthedefinitiontoindicatethatanabsolutequalityisnota
limiteddegreeofanyquality,andindeedinvolvesnolimitationatall;Iwillshortlyoffersome
justificationforthisinterpretation.
113
TherearemanymisgivingsonecouldhaveaboutthisconceptionofGod.NormanMalcolm
1I
objectedthathecouldnotunderstandhowanyqualitycouldbeintrinsicallysimpleorpositive.
havealwayswonderedwhetheritisreallyaconceptionofGod.Itisnotimmediatelyobviousthat
theconjunctionofallsimple,purelypositivequalitiesthatexpresswithoutlimitswhateverthey
express(assumingthattherearesuchqualities)wouldconstitutetheGodoftraditionaltheism
ratherthana"Metaphysicalsomething"toborrowaphrasethatLeibnizusestocharacterize
someoneelse'stheology(AVI,iii,474f./L158).SomehavesuspectedthatascribingtoGodthesum
ofallpurelypositiveattributeshasSpinozisticorpantheisticimplications.Wemaywonder,atany
rate,whetherthedefinitionofaperfectionincludesandexcludes,respectively,thosepropertiesthat
wouldandwouldnotcharacterizeabeingthatisrecognizablyGod.Shadesofcolor,whichGodis
notsupposedtopossess,haveseemedtosometobesimpleandpositive,andperhapstheyarenot
limiteddegreesofanything,butareonlyperfectlythemselves;shouldwecountthemas
perfections?Andareknowledgeandpower,whichGodissupposedtopossessinunlimiteddegree,
reallysimpleandpurelypositive?Argumentseemstobeneededonsuchpoints.
Wewillnotfindasmuchargumentasisneeded,butthepublicationofthecriticaleditionof
Leibniz'sphilosophicalwritingsfromtheParisperiod,167276,2makespossibleamoreadequate
understandingofthedevelopmentandmeaningofhisconceptionoftheensperfectissimumandof
thestructureoftheuniverseoverwhichthisbeingpresides.Inthesewritingswegetclear
indicationsofwhatqualitiesLeibnizthoughtofasperfectionsandattributesofGod.Theyarenot
sensiblequalities,butbasicmetaphysicalcategories.Or,rather,theyareprimal,unlimited,purely
positiveversionsofmetaphysicalcategoriesthatarecombinedwithlimitsinotherbeings.
Specifically,theyincludeimmensity,eternity,omniscience,andomnipotence,allconceivedasthe
absolutedegreesofthequalitiesorcategoriesofrealitymanifested,respectively,inspatialand
temporalbeing,inthoughtorintelligence,andinagency[AVI,iii,391f.,520(MarchApril1676)].
Ifthesimple,purelypositivequalitiesarepreciselytheunlimiteddegreesofthesecategories,the
3
Leibniziandeityis,orcouldbe,thepersonalGodoftraditionaltheism.
Severalissuesofmetaphysicalandtheologicalimportancewillrepayacloserinvestigationhere.I
willtryinsection1todevelopmorefullythemeaningandmotivationofLeibniz'sdefinitionofa
perfection,beginningwiththeinterpretationoftheterm'absolute'.Section2willbedevotedtothe
questionwhetherhisdefinitionpicksouttherightpropertiesasperfections,withspecificreference
tosensiblequalitiesandtoknowledge.SomepassagesofsurprisinglySpinozisticappearanceoccur
inLeibniz'spapersonthissubjectfrom1676,andIwilltryinsection3toshowbothhowfarhis
thoughtaboutGodwasSpinozisticthen,andhowintheenditescapesfromanySpinozistic
implication.
____________________
1
Malcolm,"Anselm'sOntologicalArguments,"p.59.
2
AVI,iii(1980).Leibniz'slettersfromthatperiodwerealreadyincludedinAII,i(1926),butthe
newervolumeisvastlysuperiorindocumentationandindexingandcontainsmoreonthistopic.
3
Later,intheTheodicy,Leibniztriestofitmoralperfection,orperfectionofthewill,intothis
scheme,claimingthat"thewillconsistsintheinclinationtodosomethinginproportiontothegood
thatitcontains"andmoralperfectionistheabsolutedegreeofthisinclination(T22).
114
1.AbsoluteQualitiesas"Requirements"ofThings
'Absolute'hasseveralmeanings.Leibnizoffersformaldefinitionsofitasmeaning"whatisthought
withoutanythingelsebeingthought"[AVI,ii,489(167172?)],orastheoppositeof'relative'[
4Nonrelativitymightberelevanthere,butIhavenotfoundinLeibniz's
C475(17024)].
discussionsoftheensperfectissimumanythingthatisunambiguouslyabouttheroleofrelational
properties.Moreclearlyrelevantisanotherfamilyofsensesinwhich'absolute'meanssomething
like'unqualified'[cf.C51/P19andC60(bothofApril1679)].Thisconceptionisexpressed,almost
intheformofadefinition,inamemorandumofMarchorApril1676inwhichLeibnizspeaksofa
thing"towhichexistenceisascribedabsolutely,thatis,withoutadeterminingaddition"(A
VI,iii,520/L163).The"determiningaddition"mightbeacondition;and'absolute',accordingly,can
mean'unconditional'[cf.AVI,ii,397(166971?);C26(Nov1677);GI137(1686)].Alternatively,
5Since
the"determiningaddition"canbealimitation,and'absolute'canmean'unlimited?'.
'unlimited'isoneoftheavailablemeanings,theexplicativeclause("thatexpresseswithoutany
limitswhateveritexpresses")makesitthelikeliestmeaningof'absolute'inthepresentcontext.
Thereisnosharpdistinctionbetween'absolute',inthismeaning,and'positive',foralimitationisa
sortofpartialnegation.Aquality"circumscribedbylimits"is"understoodthroughnegationsof
furtherprogress"(AVI,iii,578/L167).AtleastonceLeibnizexplained'absolute'asmeaning
'affirmative'[AVI,iii,519/L163(MarchApril1676)],andhesinglesoutthepurelypositive
characterofperfectionsasincompatiblewiththeirbeinganalyzedashavinglimits(AVI,iii,578/
L167).Theabsenceofa"determiningaddition"alsomeansthatanabsolutequalityisapureand
noncompositequality,andLeibnizcanuse'absolute'tomeansomethinglike'primitive',speaking
of"somethingabsolute,intowhichtheobjectsofthoughtsmustbeanalyzed"(C409).Thusthe
meaningof'absolute'canincludethatof'simple'aswellas'positive',andLeibnizcanspeakof"all
absoluteformsorpossibleperfections"withoutseparatementionofsimplicityandpositiveness,
sayingthatfromtheir"conjunctioninthesamesubjectarisesthemostperfectBeing[Ens
perfectissimum]"[AVI,iii,521/L163(MarchApril1676)].
Leibniz'sconceptionofdivineperfectionisaconceptionofinfinity,orunlimitedreality.Hegivesit
anegativeexpression,as"withoutanylimits."Inviewofhisinsistenceonthesimpleandpurely
positivecharacterofperfections,however,hecannotregardthenatureofthisinfinityasadequately
expressedinnegativeterms.Essentiallynegativeaccountsofinfinityingeneral,andofGod's
infinityinparticular,abound.AccordingtoLocke,"whenwewouldframeanIdeathemost
suitablewecantothesupremeBeing,weenlarge...withour
____________________
4
OtherplaceswhereLeibnizappearstouse'absolute'tomeannonrelativeareAVI,ii,161(from
1669);AVI,iii,518(probablyfromApril1676),thoughthatisnottheonlysenseof'absolute'inthis
text;andC590(probablyfrom1688).
5
SeeAVI,iii,502(April1676)andGr371(169597),whereLeibnizexplicitlyopposestheabsolute
tothelimited;cf.AVI,iii,520/L163.Innoteswrittenprobablyinthelastyearorsoofhislife,
Leibnizdistinguishedtwosensesof'absolute':oneinwhich"itisopposedtothelimited,"andone
inwhich"itisopposed...totherelative"(VE1087=LHIV,8,6061).
115
IdeaofInfinity"allourideasofqualitiesdesirableinourselves;andtheideaofinfinityis
essentiallynegative,"theNegationofanendinanyQuantity." 6Inpresentdayphilosophical
theologyomnipotenceorunlimitedpowerisstandardlydefined(atleastroughly)astheabilityto
7Theideaofinfinityinthatdefinitionisexpressedbya
bringaboutanypossiblestateofaffairs.
universalquantifier("any"),and,asanylogicianknows,universalquantifiersareequivalenttoa
sortofnegation.Soconceived,omnipotenceissuchpowerthatthereisnopossiblestateofaffairs
thatitspossessorcouldnotactualize.
Descartesfirmlyrejectedsuchnegativeconceptionsofthedivineinfinityorperfection;inthethird
ofhisMeditationshesays:
AndIoughtnottothinkthatIdonotperceivetheinfinitebyatrueidea,butonlyby
negationofthefinite,asIperceiverestandshadowsbynegationofmotionandlight;
foronthecontraryIclearlyunderstandthatthereismorerealityininfinitethaninfinite
substance,andthathencetheperceptionoftheinfiniteisinsomewaypriorinmeto
8
thatofthefinite;thatis,theperceptionofGodispriortotheperceptionofmyself.
Settingasideforthemomentquestionsofpriorityoftheperception,wecanatleastsaythat
Leibniz'sconceptionofdivineperfectioncommitshimtoagreewithDescartesthatinitsown
naturethedivineinfinityorperfectionisprimitivethatitisunanalyzableandnotanegationofthe
finite.Forhim,asforDescartes,theinfinite,inpropertiescapableofinfinity,istheprimarycase,
andthefiniteisformedbylimitation,orpartialnegation,oftheinfinite(NE157f.)."Theabsolute
ispriortothelimited,"Leibnizstates."Andjustsotheunboundedispriortothatwhichhasa
boundary[terminus],sinceaboundaryissomethingadded[accessioquaedam]"[AVI,iii,502
(April1676);cf.AVI,iii,392(18March1676);AII,i,313f.=GI,214f.(5April1677)].
Thepriorityoftheunlimitedisfirstofallconceptual.Beingpurelypositiveandsimple,according
toLeibniz,theunlimitedisunanalyzable.Itis"conceivedthroughitself,"inthesensethatithasno
constituentsintermsofwhichitmightbeunderstood.Rather,theperfectionsareprimitive,inthe
sensethattheyarefirstorultimateconstituentsintheanalysisofotherqualities.Butthepriorityof
theunlimitedorabsoluteisnotonlyconceptualforLeibniz.Unlessweseethatitisalsocausal,we
willmissanimportantpartofthemotivationofhisconceptionoftheensperfectissimum.Causal
dependencetendedtofusewithconceptualdependenceinhisthought;heheldthat"theeffectis
conceivedthroughitscause"[AVI,iii,514(April1676)],andhealwaysthoughtthatadefinitionor
analysisofanythingoughtideallytoexhibitthecauseofitsexistence,oratleastareasonwhyitis
possible(GIV,425/AG26).So,ifallotherthingsarecausallydependentonGod,theiressences
shouldbeconceptuallydependentonthedivineessence.Thisisaccomplishedifthedivineessence
isaconjunctionofallthesimple,positiveattributesoutofwhichallotherpredicatesare
constructed.
____________________
6
Locke,Essay,II,xxiii,33;II,xvii,15.
7
Qualificationsmaybeaddedtodealwithproblemsabout,forinstance,thefreewillofcreatures.
8
ATVII,45.Cf.ATVII,113,365.
116
Inapassagetobediscussedmorecomprehensivelyinsection3,Leibnizexpressesthisdouble
primacyoftheabsolute,unlimitedattributesordivineperfectionsbycallingthemthe"first
requirements"ofthings(AVI,iii,573).Theterm'requirement'[requisitum]isoneofwhichLeibniz
madeheavytheoreticaluse,especially,butnotexclusively,inhisearlywritings.9Wewillhave
severaloccasionstoattendtoit.In167172Leibnizdefinedarequirementas"somethingsuchthat
ifitisnotpositedthething[ofwhichitisarequirement]isnot"(AVI,ii,483).Thisformulais
used,inamoreelaboratedefinitionfrom17024,todefinethenotionofasustainer[suspendens].
"Asustainer,"saysLeibniz,"issomethingsuchthatifitisnotgiven,somethingelseisnotgiven;
itisalsocalledacondition."Thesustainingrelation,thusdefined,couldbereciprocal;twothings
couldbesustainersofeachother.Therequirementrelation,however,isasymmetrical,andis
thereforedefinedwithanadditionalprovisoofnaturalpriority:"Arequirement[requisitum]isa
sustainerthatisnaturallyprior"(C417).10Anotherwisecompresseddefinitionfromthe
mid1680sexplains"naturallyprior"inthiscontextasequivalentto"simplerinnature"
(Schmidt481).11
Notoriously,thereismorethanonekindofnecessarycondition.A"requirement,"intheindicated
sense,maybewhatwewouldordinarilycallacause,ormorepreciselyacausallynecessary
condition,particularlyifitiswhatLeibnizcallsa"requirementforexistence"(AVI,iii,584,118).
Requirementsseemtofunctionascausesinaproofoftheprincipleofsufficientreasondeveloped
intheearly1670s(AVI,ii,483;iii,118)andrepeatedin1716inLeibniz'slastlettertoSamuel
Clarke(LCV,18).12
Therearealsologicallynecessaryconditions,however,anditisclearthatLeibnizthoughtofthe
definingoressentialpropertiesofathingasamongitsrequirements,itsrequisita.Afterall,they
tooaresuchthatiftheyarenotposited,thethingisnot."Adefinition,"Leibnizsays,"isnothing
elsethananenumerationofrequirements"(AVI,iii,133;cf.AVI,iii,462f.,573;C60;GIII,247;G
VII,293).Thissortof"requirement"isclearlyinviewintextsof1676(AVI,iii,670f.=GVII,83)
andofApril1679.InthelatterLeibnizspeaksoftreatingthingsinhisgeneralcharacteristicor
languageforreasoning
insofaraswehavedistinctnotionsofthemthatis,insofarasweknowsome
requirementsofthem,bywhich,whenexaminedindetail,wecandistinguish
____________________
10
Thisasymmetryisindicated,moreawkwardly,whenLeibnizwrites,inApril1676,"Connectedare
thingsofwhichonecannotbeunderstoodwithouttheother.Requirementsarethingsthatare
connectedtoanotherandnotconversely"(AVI,iii,515/L161).Unfortunately,'connected'hasnot
beenassignedherethedirectionalitythatitneedsforitsuseinexplainingtheasymmetryof
requirement.
11
Forthedate,whichisbasedonthewatermarkinthepaper,andisearlierthanthatproposedby
Schmidt,seeVE1251.TheaccountofnaturalpriorityintermsofsimplicityisfoundalsoinVE170
(=LHIV,7C,7172)(assignedapreliminarydatingof167985bytheAcademyeditors,ongrounds
ofcontent),butaproblemabouttheaccountisdiscussedinnotesprobablydatingfromLeibniz's
Italianjourneyin168990(VE132=LHIV,7B,4748).
12
ThisproofisquotedinChapter2,section5.
9
1havebeenparticularlyhelpedintracingandunderstandingLeibniz'suseofthistermbythe
editor'snote31inSaame,146.AnexampleofitspersistenceinLeibniz'slaterworkisa
requisitabasedanalysisfromapublicationof1684(GIV,425/AG26)whichreappearsinaletterof
January1699toThomasBurnett(GIII,247/AG287).
117
themfromanyotherthingsorinsofaraswecanspecifytheirdefinition.Forthese
requirementsarenothingbutthetermswhosenotionscomposethenotionthatwehave
ofthething.(C50/P18)
InviewofthefusionofcausalandconceptualdependenceinLeibniz'sthought,however,itis
misleadingtospeakoftheseastwodifferenttypesofrequirement.Hiscallingsomethinga
"requirement"mustnormallybeassumedtohaveimplicationsaboutbothcausalandconceptual
relations,ofwhichonemaybemoreprominentthantheotherinaparticularcontext.
Thereisaproblemabouttherelationbetweenlimitedandunlimiteddegreesofaquality,towhich
Leibniz,sofarasIknow,devotesnodiscussionandoffersnosolution.Onemightassumethat
differentdegreesofthesamequalityshouldbestructuredlogicallyinsuchawayastocontaina
commonpartnamely,thequalityofwhichtheyaredegrees.Giventhataperfectionissimple,and
thushasitselfasitsonly"part,"itappearstofollowthattheperfectionitselfmustbea"part"ofthe
limiteddegreesofthesamequality.Thisconclusionalsoseemstobesupportedbytheideathatthe
perfectionisthepurecaseofthequality,andlimitationisasortofnegation.Italsoseemstobe
confirmedwhenLeibnizspeaksofthedivineperfectionsaspresent"in"thingsthathavelimited
degreesofthem(AVI,iii,391f.).SupposePisaperfection,andQisalimiteddegreeofthesame
qualityofwhichPistheunlimiteddegree.TheapparentimplicationisthatQisderivedfromPby
addingthenegationofsomequality,orinotherwordsthatQ=(P+notX).Thisseemstoentail,
however,thatwhateverpossessesQ,thelimiteddegree,alsopossessesP,theperfection,sincePis
aconjunctin(P+notX).Thisconsequencecastsdoubtontheanalysis,fortheterminologyis
devisedtocompareabeingthathasaperfectionwithbeingsthatpossessonlyalimiteddegreeof
thequality.
Thereareatleasttwopossiblewaysofdealingwiththisdifficulty.Onewouldtobetorejectthe
inferencefromathing'spossessing(P+notX)toitspossessingtheperfection.Topossessthe
perfection,itmightbesaid,isnotjusttopossessPinanywaywhatever,buttopossessPwithout
anylimitation.Thedifficultywiththisisthatitlookslikeanegativeunderstandingofthenatureof
aperfection.IfLeibnizchosethiscourse,hewouldhavetodenythatitinvolvesanalyzingthe
perfectionas(P+notlimited).TohavetheperfectionisnottohavePplusadoublenegative
property;itisjusttohavePandnothaveanegativeproperty.
Ifthatdoesnotsufficientlyguardthepurelypositivecharacteroftheperfections,thenLeibniz
mightwishtodenythatthesamenessofaqualityindifferentdegreesistobeunderstoodinterms
ofapartorelementthatiscommontoallthedegrees.Theconceptionoftheultimatedegreeofa
qualityasthepurecaseofthequalityisPlatonic,andmaybewecandrawhereononeofPlato's
ideasabouttherelationoftheformstotheirmundaneinstancesnamely,thatthelatterare
imitationsoftheformer.TheanalogueofPlato'sideaforthepresentcasewouldbethatother
degreesofanyqualityare(imperfect)imitationsoftheultimatedegreeofit.Leibnizactuallyuses
thislanguageintheMonadology,sayingthat"increatedMonads...thereareonlyimitations"of
thedivineperfections,andspecificallyofGod'spower,knowledge,andwillimitations"tothe
degree[mesure]thatthereisperfection"(Mon48).Ontheviewthatthis
118
suggests,thefundamentalrelationsofthelesserdegreestotheunlimiteddegreeofaqualitywould
besimilaritybutalsodistinctness,andindeedincompatibility.Since(asweshallsee)Leibniz
understandsallincompatibilityofpropertiesintermsofonecontaininganegationoftheother,and
sincetheperfectionsareunanalyzableandpurelypositive,Q,thelimiteddegree,mustbe
analyzableasaconjunctionhavingnotP,thenegationoftheperfection,asaconjunct.Perhapsthe
similaritywillalsobeaconjunct,inwhichcasetheanalysisofQwillbe,orinclude,(similartoP+
notP);orperhapsthesimilaritywillsimplysuperveneontheanalysisofQ.
Leibnizmightfindthissolutionproblematic,too.Itinvokessimilarityasafundamentallogical
relationofproperties,whereasmuchinhisphilosophyoflogicseemstoimplythattheonlysuch
relationsaredistinctness,identity,andconstructionbyconjunctionandnegation.ButIthink
Leibnizwouldwantinanyeventtomaintainthatlimitedandunlimiteddegreesofaqualityare
incompatibleinanyonesubstance.AsIwillsuggestattheendofthischapter,thatthesismaybe
importanttoLeibnizindifferentiatinghisviewsfromthoseofSpinoza.
2.SensibleQualities,Knowledge,andPerfection
InthinkingaboutthequestionwhetherLeibniz'sdefinitionofaperfectionincludesandexcludes
therightproperties,forpurposesoftheology,letusfocusonapairofexamplescloselyrelatedin
histhought:ontheonehand,thesensiblequalities,whichGodisnotsupposedtopossess,and
whichshouldthereforenottobeclassedamongtheperfections;andontheotherhand,knowledge,
ormoreprecisely,omniscience,whichLeibnizcertainlycountsasaperfectionandanattributeof
God.Leibniz'swritingsaffordadequatematerialfortheconstructionofareasonableanswerto
claimsthatheshouldcountsensiblequalitiesasperfections.Indeed,hemaybesaidtohave
addressedaformofthatproblemhimself.Iwillconclude,however,thatitwouldbemoredifficult
forhimtovindicatetheclassificationofomniscienceasapurelypositiveattribute.
AslongasLeibnizdefinestheperfectionsassimplequalities,heseemstohaveananswertothe
questionwhysensiblequalitiesdonotcountasperfections.Heheldthatcolor,forexample,"is
analyzableinitsownnature,sinceithasacause"(GVII,293;13Cf.C190,360f./P51f.),or(ashe
putitinApril1676)that"theperceptionofasensiblequalityisnotoneperceptionbutanaggregate
ofinfinitelymany"(AVI,iii,515/L161).14ItistruethatinatextfromperhapsasearlyasFebruary
1676Leibnizlists"sensiblequalities,suchasheat,cold,light,etc."alongwith"Existence,theEgo,
perception,thesame,change,"asexamplesofthingsthat"seemtobeconceivedthrough
themselvesbyus,thetermsorWords
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13
Tobedated,probably,168386,onthebasisofwatermark(VE900).
14
Leibnizseemstosayherethatthisis"onaccountofthedivisibilityofspaceandtimetoinfinity,"
butthecontextalsosuggeststheideathatsensiblequalitiescannotbe"conceivedthrough
themselves,"andthereforecannotbesimple,becausetheyhavecauses.'Conceivedthrough
themselves'mustbeunderstoodhere(andinanumberofotherpassages)inthesenseLeibniz
assigns'understoodthroughthemselves'inthenextpassageIshallquoteinthetext.
119
forwhichareindefinable,ortheideasofwhichareunanalyzable."ButIthinkthesearenotall
supposedtobeexamplesofpropertiesthatareabsolutelyunanalyzableintheirownnature.Leibniz
goesontodistinguishwhatisconceivedthroughitselffromwhatisunderstoodthroughitself;the
latteris"onlythatallofwhoserequirementsweconceive,withouttheconceptofanotherthing
thatis,thatwhichisitsownreasonofexisting"(AVI,iii,275=GI,131).Thisdistinctionseems
designedtoallowthattheremaybethingsthatweconceivethroughthemselves,inasmuchaswe
doconceivethembutcannotanalyzethem,butthatwedonotunderstandthroughthemselves,
becauseintheirownnaturetheyareanalyzableintorequirementsthatweareeitherunableto
conceiveorunabletodiscerninthem.Thatsensiblequalitiesaresimpleonlyinthesensethatwe
areunabletoanalyzethemiscertainlyathesisofLeibniz'smaturephilosophy,andIthinkthe
evidenceindicatesitwashisviewin1676aswell.
InApril1677,however,inaconversationwithArnoldEckhardabouttheontologicalargument
Leibnizhimselfdidraisethequestionwhypain,whichcanbeconsideredasensiblequality,should
notbeconsideredaperfection.LeibnizreportsthathedemandedfromEckhardadefinitionof
perfection.
He[said]thataperfectioniseveryattribute,oreveryreality.I[said]thatthereforeeven
painisaperfection.He[said]thatpainisnotsomethingpositive,butaprivationof
tranquillity,asdarknessisoflight.I[said]thatitseemstomethatpaincannomorebe
calledaprivationofpleasure,thanpleasureaprivationofpain.Butpleasureaswellas
painissomethingpositive.Andpainisrelatedtopleasurequiteotherwisethan
darknesstolight.Fordarknesscannotbemademoreandlessintense,oncelighthas
beenexcluded,norisonedarknessgreaterthananotherwherealllightisabsent.But
paindoesnotexistbythemereremovalofpleasure,andonepainisstrongerthan
another.ThereforeitfollowsthatthemostperfectBeinghaspainstoo.
Thediscussioncontinuedalittlefurther;butonthisoccasion,Leibnizrecords,"wewerestuck...
here,anditwasnotadequatelyexplainedwhypainisnotasmuchaperfectionaspleasureor
satisfactionofmindis"(AII,i,313=GI,214).
Leibniz'sapproachinthisconversationwaspolemical,directedagainstCartesianism.Itwas
Eckhard'sdefinitionofaperfectionhewascriticizing,nothisown.Hecouldhaveofferedhisown
definition,butdidnot.AndEckhard'sdefinitionomitsthecriterionofsimplicitythatisamainpart
ofLeibniz's.Butitemphaticallyincludespositiveness,whichisalsoamainpartofLeibniz's
definition(indeedthemostimportantpart,asweshallsee).Itisnotclear,therefore,whether
Leibnizwasstumpedonthisoccasionbyaproblemthataffectedhisownviewsaswellas
Eckhard's.
Laterin1677,incorrespondencewithEckhard,Leibnizarticulatesasolutionthatseemsatleastto
comeclosetosatisfyinghim:
SomeofmyobjectionsceasewhenyouhaveexplainedthatforyouperfectionisBeing
[Entitas],insofarasitisunderstoodtodepartfromnonBeingorasIshouldpreferto
defineit,thatperfectionisdegreeorquantityofrealityoressence,asintensityisdegree
ofquality,andforcedegreeofaction.ItisclearalsothatExistenceisaperfection,or
increasesreality;thatis,whenexistingAisconceived,morerealityisconceivedthan
whenpossibleAisconceived.
120
Neverthelessitstillseemstofollowfromthisthatthereismoreperfectionorrealityin
amindthatishurtingthaninonethatisindifferent,thatisneitherenjoyingnorhurting;
andthusthat,metaphysicallyspeaking,evenpainisaperfection.Butsincepleasureis
alsoametaphysicalperfection,thequestionseemstoarise,whetherpainorpleasureis
thegreaterperfection,,metaphysicallyspeaking.Anditseemsthatpleasureisthe
greaterperfection,sinceitisconsciousnessofpower,inthesamewaythatpainis
consciousnessofweakness.Weakness,however,isanimperfection,metaphysically
speaking,andconsciousnessofmetaphysicalimperfectionisalsolessperfect,
metaphysicallyspeaking,thanconsciousnessofmetaphysicalperfection.Andsopain
impliessomeimperfectioninthebeingthatisinpain;yetthereremainsomescruples
evenhere,whichInowpassover.(AII,i,363/L177)
Thereismetaphysicalperfectioninpainaswellasinpleasure,itissuggestedhere,insofarasboth
augmentconsciousness;buttobeinpainisalsotobeimperfect,insofaraspainisconsciousnessof
metaphysicalimperfection.
Itisnoteworthythatthissolutionseemstoinvolveadifferentnotionofperfectionfromthatwith
whichwehavebeenworking.Webeganwithadefinitionthatyieldsayesornoanswertothe
questionwhetheranypropertyis"aperfection."Buthereweareintroducedtoperfectionasa
measureofthedegreeofrealitycontainedinaproperty.Thisisnotonlyatransitionfrom'Perfect
ornot?'to'Moreperfectorless?'Simplicityalsodropsoutasacriterion,andonlypositivenessand
perhapsabsolutenessareleft.Fordegreeof"reality"isameasureofpositivenessandunlimitedness
ofbeing.
CommentingonalongletterfromEckhard,moreover,Leibnizacceptsthisdefinitionofperfection:
"Perfectionformeisquantityordegreeofreality"(AII,i,327=G1,225).Thereisreasontothink
thatsimplicityisinfactdispensableasacriterionofperfectionsforLeibniz.Itisnotreallyneeded
forhisproofofthepossibilityofamostperfectbeing(asweshallseeinChapter5,section2.1).
Leibniz'searliestandlatestversionsoftheproof,insayingthatGod'sattributesare"affirmative"(
AVl,iii,395f.)orinclude"nolimits,nonegation"(Mon45),withoutmentioningsimplicity,leave
outnothingessential.SimilarlyintheDiscourseonMetaphysics(1686),inthefirstsection,which
ismainlydevotedtothedivineperfections,unlimiteddegreeistheonlycriterionofferedtoexplain
whataperfectionis:"theformsornaturesthatarenotsusceptibleofanultimatedegreearenot
amongtheperfections";simplicityisnotmentioned.
ThisisnottodenythatLeibnizbelieved(probablythroughouthiscareer)thateachsimplepositive
propertyinfactcharacterizesGod,andGodalone(C51315).Thesimplicityoftheperfectionsis
used,unnecessaryasitmaybe,inhisfullestversionsofthepossibilityproof,whichdatefromfall
1676.InsketchingtheproofforthePrincessElizabethabouttwoyearslater,heputsitintermsof
theattributesofGodbeing"allthesimpleforms,takenabsolutely,"withoutexplicitmentionof
theirpositiveness(AII,i,437f./AG240).
ItisnotclearwhetherourdatarepresentchangeanddevelopmentinLeibniz'sconceptionof
perfections,orsimplyvarietyinhischoiceofstrategiesofproof.Itisclearthatfromsometimein
orafter1678,ifnotbefore,hedoubted"whether
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15
Thewatermarksuggeststhatthistextcomesfromtheperiod167886(VE869).
121
any[primitiveorsimple]conceptappearstohumansdistinctly,thatis,insuchawaythattheymay
knowthattheyhaveit"(C513;cf.C431,360/P51;GVII,293).16Thiscouldhavebeenareason
forLeibniznottorequiresimplicityofperfections,sinceheclaimedtoknowsomeofthedivine
perfections,suchaspowerandknowledge(DM1,Mon48).
TotheextentthatpositivenesswasLeibniz'sprimarycriterionofperfection,andthathemayinthe
endhavewishedtocountamongthedivineperfectionsqualitiesthatmightnotbeabsolutely
simple,thesensiblequalitiesmightbeseenaspresentingamoredifficultproblemforhisview.For
hisbeliefthatthesensiblequalitiesarenotsimplewillnotprovidehimwithanadequatereasonfor
notregardingthemasperfections,oratanyrateascompatiblewiththedivinenature.His
conceptionofperfectionapproachesEckhard's,andmayfacesomeofthesameproblems.The
solutionheproposedtoEckhardfortheissueaboutpainmayindicatethelinesalongwhichhe
wouldrelatetheconceptionofperfectiontosensiblequalitiesingeneral.Leibnizthinksthatour
conceptionsofsensiblequalitiesareconfusedconceptionsofaspectsoftheworldthathaveinthem
somemeasureofrealityandperfection,butalsooflimitationandimperfection.Theyaretherefore
notconceptionsofanyoftheabsoluteperfectionsofGod,andarenotevencompatiblewiththe
natureofabeingofunlimitedperfection.
ThissolutionreflectswhatItaketobeapersistentaspirationofLeibniztoreduceallqualitiesto
combinationsanddegreesofwhatwouldseemtomostofustoberatherabstractmetaphysical
categories,suchasconsciousnessandpower.Itisdifficulttoseehowthedifferentiationand
structureofaworldcanbeaccountedforinthatway.ThematureLeibnizseemstohave
maintainedthatitispreciselyindegreesofperfection,invariousrespects,thatfinitesubstances
differfromeachotherandfromGod;whattheyallshareisperceptionofthestructureofthesame
world.Thephenomenalspatialarraythatconstitutesthatperceptioninusdoesnotfitneatlywithin
theconceptualframeworkofLeibniz'sspeculationsaboutdivineperfections.Itisnotreadily
understoodeitherasasimplepositivequalityorasconstructedoutofsuchqualitiesbynegation
andconjunction.Itthereforeseemsnottobeaperfection,whichisanadvantageforLeibniz,
inasmuchasitenableshimnottoascribeaperfectiontofinitethings.Ifhewishestoadhere
rigorouslytohisconceptionoftheensperfectissimum,however,heisleftwiththeproblemof
understandinghowGod'sperceptionofaninfinitelycomplexstructureoflimitedthingscouldbea
simple,purelypositivequality,oraconjunctionofsuchqualities.
Thisproblemisaggravatedbythefactthatperfectknowledge,forLeibniz,isanomnisciencethat
includesknowledgeofwhatisnot,aswellaswhatis.Godknowsthepossiblesthatwillneverbe
actual,andknowsthattheyarenotactual.Ifthisnegativeknowledgeisreducibletoanythingmore
basic,itwouldbetheknowledgethatthenonactualsystemsofpossiblesarelessperfectthanthe
actualsystem;andthatisstillknowledgeofafactthatessentiallyinvolves
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16
C431suggeststheinterestingideathatthereareonlytwoabsolutelysimpleconcepts,onepositive
(pureBeing[Ens]orGod),andonenegative(nothing),andthatallotherconceptsaresomehow
compoundedofthese.
122
limitation,andhencenegation.Ifperfectknowledgethus,andindeedofitsverynature,hasan
objectthatinvolveslimitationandnegation,itishardtoseehowperfectknowledgecanbeapurely
positiveattribute.
3.IsLeibnizsConceptionofGodSpinozistic?
3.1LeibnizsViewsin1676
Adifferentapproachtotherelationbetweendivineperfectionandthestructureoftheuniverseof
finitethingsissuggestedinapaperof18March1676inwhichLeibnizgivesoneofhisfullest
indicationsofwhatattributeshecountsasperfections:
Butthereissomethinginspacewhichremainsamidstthechanges,andwhichis
eternal,andisnothingotherthantheimmensityitselfofGod,thatis,asingleattribute
atonceindivisibleandimmense.Ofthis,spaceisonlyaconsequence,asapropertyis
ofanEssence.Itcaneasilybedemonstratedthatmatteritselfisperpetually
extinguishedorrepeatedlybecomessomethingdifferent.Inthesamewayitcanbe
shownthatthemindalsoiscontinuouslychanged,exceptforthatwhichisDivineinus,
orwhicharrivesfromoutside;justasinspacethereissomethingdivine,theimmensity
itselfofGod,sointhemindthereissomethingdivine,whichAristotlecalledtheagent
intellect,andthisisidenticalwiththeomniscienceofGod,inthesamewayasthat
whichisdivineandeternalinspaceisidenticalwiththeimmensityofGod,andthat
whichisdivineandeternalinbodyorthemovablebeingisidenticalwiththe
omnipotenceofGod,andthatwhichisdivineintimeisidenticalwitheternity.(A
Vl,iii,391f.)
Twofeaturesofthisaccountmayseemproblematic.OneisthatitascribestoGodaperfection,
immensity,whichisquasispatialandissaidtobe"thatwhichisdivineandeternalinspace."This
wasnotanextraordinaryviewintheseventeenthcentury,thoughitwasnotuncontroversial.Onthe
assumptionofarealisticconceptionofspace,itprovides(thoughwithoutmucharticulation)away
inwhichthestructureofaspatialuniversecanbedirectlyrelatedtoadivineperfection.Butit
seemstobeindisagreementwiththematurephilosophyofLeibniz,inwhichspaceandtimeare
idealentities,whichwewouldnotexpecttobegroundeddirectlyinattributesofGod.
ItistruethatwefindthematureLeibnizwriting,probablyabout1688,that"whateverisrealin
spaceisGod'somnipresenceitself";thisisassociatedwiththeviewthat"theextensionofspace
perseisabsolute"whereas"theextensionofabodyislimitedineveryway"(VE1603=LHIV,7
C,99f.).Bytheendofhislife,however,Leibnizcontraststhedivineimmensityasabsolutewith
spaceas"purelyrelative,"thoughhestillbringstheimmensityofGodintocloserelationwiththe
ideaofspace(LCIII,34),ashehadintheNewEssays(NE158).17Thethoughtthatspace
involves,andgetsitsrealityfrom,thedivineimmensitydidnot,forLeibniz,implythattheyareon
thesamelevelofreality.Ashewroteabout1695,"space,time,andmotionare,tosomeextent,
beingsofreason,and
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17
IamindebtedtoAyvalRamatiforcallingmyattentiontothispassage.
123
aretrueorreal,notperse,butonlyinsofarastheyinvolveeithertheDivineattributesof
immensity,eternity,andoperation,ortheforceofcreatedsubstances"(GMVI,247/L445).
ThewayinwhichNewtonconnectedspacewithGodwasoneofLeibniz'sinitialpointsofattackin
hiscorrespondencewithClarke,andoneofthecontinuingthemesinthiscorrespondencewas
Leibniz'sobjectiontoClarke'sidentificationofinfinitespacewiththedivineimmensity(admittedly
asimpleridentificationthanLeibnizhimselfwouldhavemaintainedevenin1676).Inhislast
years,LeibnizunderstandsGod'simmensityasomnipresence(LCV,45;RS38/AG276)andseems
favorablydisposedtotheScholasticreductionofGod'spresenceinaplaceto"immediate
operation"onthingsthatareinthatplace(LCIII,12;LCIV,35;cf.NE221f.).18Thissuggeststhe
viewthatimmensityisnotadivineperfectiondistinctfromomnipotence.
TheothersurprisingfeatureofthequotationwithwhichIopenedthissectionisthewayinwhich
LeibnizlocatesattributesofGod,something"divineandeternal,"inpartsoraspectsofthecreation.
Thedivineimmensityisfoundinlimitedforminspatialthings;thedivineeternity,intemporal
things;thedivineandperfectknowledge,oromniscience,inthemind;andthedivinepower,
interestingly,"inbodyorthemovablebeing"thatis,insubstantialityandaction.19Such
affirmationofdivineimmanencemayarousesuspicionsthattheconceptionbeingexpressedis
pantheistic.Leibnizseemstohavebeensensitivetothispossibility,forlaterinthesamepaperhe
triestodistancehimselffromacertainformofpantheism,saying:
Thereisinmatter,asalsoinspace,somethingeternalandindivisible,whichseemsto
havebeenunderstoodbythosewhobelievedthatGodhimselfisthematterofthings.it
isnotcorrecttosaythat,however,sinceGodconstitutes,notapart,butaprincipleof
things.(AVl,iii,392)WithoutknowingmoreaboutwhathemeantbycallingGoda
"principle"[principium,"beginning"or"source"]ofthingswecanhardlytellhow
effectivelythisdistancesLeibnizfrompantheismingeneral.Hisstatementheremay
remindusofhiswritingtoBurcherDeVolder,almostthirtyyearslater,that
"substantialunitiesarenotparts,butfoundations,ofphenomena"(GII,268/L536),
wherehecertainlymeantthatthephenomenaaremetaphysicallyconstructedoutofthe
"unities."DenyingthatGodisapartof(finite)thingswillnotdifferentiateLeibniz
fromSpinoza,themostimportant"pantheist"inhisintellectualenvironment.Themost
seriousquestionaboutthetheisticorthodoxyofLeibniz1676conceptionofdivine
perfectionisindeedwhetheritispantheisticinaSpinozisticway.
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18
Thereductionisnotflatlyassertedinthesetexts,butthereisampleevidencethatthroughmostof
hisadultlifeLeibnizthoughtthatallpresenceofanysubstanceinaplaceshouldbereducedto
operation;seeChapter12,sections2.22.3.
19
0ntherelationofspaceandbodytothedivineattributes,cf.Kant,LecturesonPhilosophical
Theology,pp.52f.(AkXXVIII,1021f.).ParticularlyinterestinginthiscontextisKant'sstatement
that"fromtheconceptofmatter"wecanretainforascriptiontoGod,"afterseparatingoff
everythingnegativeandsensiblethatinheresinthisconcept,nothingbuttheconceptofan
externallyandinternallyactiveforce."
124
ithasbeenclaimedthatitis.WolfgangJanke,inanimportantarticle,characterizestheformof
ontologicalargumentusedbyLeibnizin1676as"Spinozistic."20"Thesumofallpositive
constituentsofthings...standsunderthepressingsuspicion'thatitisidenticalwiththeworldas
anAllofexistingbeings(regardlessofallprotestationsagainstSpinozism)',"Jankesays,quoting
Kant.21Thereisevidencetosupportthissuspicion.ItisclearthatLeibnizwasthinkingabout
SpinozawhileheworkedonhisproofofthepossibilityofGod'sexistence.HeshowedSpinozathe
mostfinishedformofitwhenhevisitedhimintheHague.Infact,thereisagooddealinthetexts
of1676inwhichtheproofwasbeingdevelopedthatsuggestsaSpinozisticconceptionofthe
relationbetweenGodandtheworld.
TheprevailingtendencyinrecentresearchholdsthatLeibnizwasalwaysfundamentallyopposedto
Spinoza'sphilosophy,22andtherearealreadyplentyofstatementsofdisagreementwithSpinozain
Leibnizwritingsfrom1676.Butpointsofagreementanddisagreementneedtobedistinguished
herewithmuchcare.DuringthisperiodLeibniz'sknowledgeofSpinoza'sthoughtwasincreasing
butstillquiteimperfect.HehadstudiedtheTheologicoPoliticalTreatisebutdidnothavean
opportunitytostudytheEthicsuntilhereceivedacopyafterSpinoza'sdeath.Hewaslearningmore
aboutSpinoza'smetaphysicsinconversationswithEhrenfriedWalthervonTschirnhaus,whowas
familiarwithatleastpartsoftheEthics,andhewasseeingfragmentsofSpinoza'sthoughtin
letters.HecopiedoutthreelettersofSpinozatoHenryOldenburg,whichwereprobablyshownhim
byOldenburginLondoninOctober1676,shortlybeforehismeetingwithSpinoza.Inhismarginal
commentsontheselettersLeibnizvigorouslytakesissuewithSpinoza'streatmentofmiraclesand
rejectionofthedoctrineoftheincarnation(AVI,iii,36567,371=G1,12426,130).Leibnizagrees
that"theexistenceofthingsisaconsequenceoftheNatureofGod,"butonlybecausethedivine
nature"bringsitaboutthatonlythemostperfectcanbechosen";heiscarefultospecifythatfinite
thingsdonotproceedfromGod"withoutanyinterventionofthewill,"andthatsomethingsare
possiblethatdonotexist(AVl,iii,370,364f.=G1,129,123f.)23
Leibniz'sinsistenceontheroleofGod'swill,andchoiceofthebest,inthetheologicalexplanation
oftheexistenceofthecreatedworldwouldremainthechiefpointinhisdifferentiationofhisown
versionofdeterminismfromSpinoza's(seeChapter1,section1.4).Itisalso,Ibelieve,thepointon
whichLeibnizcanmosteasilybeseenasdefendingthepersonalityofGodagainstSpinoza.
Spinozaheldthat"ifintellectandwillbelongtotheeternalessenceofGod,somethingvery
differentmustbeunderstoodbybothoftheseattributesfromwhatpeople
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20
Janke,"DasontologischeArgument,"esp.p.259.
21
Janke,"DasontologischeArgument,"p.269;Kant,PreisschriftberdieFortschritteder
Metaphysik,AkXX,302.Kantelsewhererejectsthesuspicion:LecturesonPhilosophicalTheology,
pp.7375(AkXXVIII,1041f.).
22
SeeFriedmann,LeibnizetSpinoza,esp.ch.3,andParkinson,"Leibniz'sParisWritingsinRelation
toSpinoza."Stein,LeibnizundSpinoza,hadarguedforanearlySpinozisticphaseofLeibniz's
thought.
23
AllthesedisagreementswithSpinozaareemphasizedbyFriedmann,LeibnizetSpinoza,pp.
11721.
125
arecommonlyaccustomed[tounderstand].Fortheintellectandwillthatwouldconstitutethe
essenceofGod"wouldagreewithoursonlyinname,as"thedog,thecelestialsign"or
constellation,agreeswith"thedog,thebarkinganimal."24Thisseemstopresentanimpersonal
conceptionofGod,aresultwhichLeibnizcertainlywishedtoavoid.Commenting,probablyinthe
springof1676,onChapter14ofSpinozaTheologicoPoliticalTreatise,Leibnizsays,"Herehe
sufficientlyintimateshisopinion:thatGodisnotamind[animus],butthenatureofthingsetc.,
whichIdonotapprove"(AVl,iii,269f.).25Moreemphatically,butwithoutexplicitreferenceto
Spinoza,Leibnizwriteson11February1676:
GodisnotaMetaphysicalsomething,imaginary,incapableofthought,will,action,as
somemakeout,sothatitwouldbethesameasifyousaidthatGodisnature,fate,
fortune,necessity,theWorld;butGodisaSubstance,Person,Mind....Itshouldbe
shownthatGodisapersonorintelligentsubstance.(AVI,iiii,474f./L158)
ThepointinLeibniz'sphilosophythatdoesmosttogivesubstancetohisascriptionofintellectand
willtoGodishisinsistencethatthecreationoftheworldmustbeexplainedbyGod's
understandingallthepossibleworlds,andtheirvalues,andchoosingthebest.26These,andabove
alltheroleoffinalcausation(thatis,purposiveness)intheworksofGod,formthecenterpieceof
hisobjectiontoasectof"newStoics,"whoholdthat"properlyspeaking,Godhasneither
understandingnorwill,whichareattributesofmen."HenamesSpinozaasaprimeexamplarof
thissect[GVII,334/AG282(167780)].
WhatLeibnizclearlyrejectsinSpinoza'stheology,therefore,isSpinoza'sdenialofchoiceand
optimificpurpose,andofintellectandwill,inanyordinarysense,inGod.Eveninobjectingto
suggestionsthatGodisthematter,orapart,ofthings,or"isnature,fate,fortune,necessity,the
World,"LeibnizmaybeobjectingonlytoanyideathatGodisnothingmorethanthesethings
(whichmaynotinfacthavebeenSpinoza'sview).ItwouldnotnecessarilyfollowthatLeibniz
thoughttheworldissomethingexternaloradditionaltoGod.Likewise,itIsnotsoclearhowmuch
LeibnizrejectsofwhatSpinozaaffirmedabouttheontologicalrelationshipbetweenGodand
creatures.Specifically,itisnoteasytodiscernLeibniz'sattitude,in1676,towardtheSpinozistic
ideathatfinitethingsareinGodas"modes"ormodificationsofthedivineattributes.
CommentingthirtyyearslateronSpinoza'sstatement,toOldenburg,that"AllthingsareinGod,"
Leibnizwoulddenythat"allthingsareinGod...asanaccidentisinasubject"(RS38/AG276).
Thatapproachesanexplicitrejectionofthemode/attributerelationbetweenfinitethingsandGod.
CommentingonthesametextofSpinozain1676,Leibnizwrote:
____________________
24
Spinoza,Ethics,I,prop.17,schol.
25
TheeditorssuggestthatLeibniz'sperceptionofthisintimationwasduetoknowledgeofSpinoza's
metaphysicsobtainedfromTschirnhaus(AVl,iii,248).
26
1noneofLeibnizlegalwritingsfrom1676wecanfindadefinitionof'person'as"whathassome
will"(AVl,iii,592=Gr722),whichmightsuggestthatwillwasLeibniz'smainorevensole
criterionofpersonality.Butthisdefinitionwasprobablymeantonlyforlegalpurposes.Bothalater
noteonit,fromLeibniz'shand,andthepassageIhavejustquotedinthetextsuggestthatin
metaphysicalcontextsherecognizedintellectasatleastasimportantacriterionofpersonality.
126
Itcanbesaidatanyratethatallthingsareone,thatallthingsareinGod,asaneffectis
containedinitsfullcause,andapropertyofanysubjectintheessenceofthatsame
subject.ForitiscertainthattheexistenceofthingsisaconsequenceoftheNatureof
God,whichbringsitaboutthatonlythemostperfectcanbechosen.(AVl,iii,370=G
I,129)
AtfirstglanceLeibnizseemsheretobeproposingcausaldependenceinsteadofontological
inclusionastheacceptablemeaningof"AllthingsareinGod."Thereisaquestion,however,tobe
askedbeforeascribingtoLeibnizthissomewhatstrainedinterpretation.Howisaneffectcontained
initsfullcause,accordingtoLeibniz?Is'contained'meantaslightlyhereaswemightthink?We
mighttakesomewarningfromthefactthatLeibnizoffers,asanapparentlyequivalentexplanation,
that"allthingsareinGod...asapropertyofanysubject[iscontained]intheessenceofthatsame
subject."Thisexplanationispuzzling,butitcertainlybreathesnoobviousairofontological
externality.Indeed,wemightnaturallyexpectthepropertyandtheessencetobepresentinthe
samesubject.
TherelationofpropertytoessenceisusedseveraltimesinLeibnizpapersof1676asamodelfor
therelationoffinitethingstoGod;itmeritssomediscussion.'Property'isclearlymeanthere,notin
thebroadsenseinwhichwecustomarilyuseit,butinanolderandnarrowersense.Leibniz
distinguishedanaccident,as"acontingentpredicate"ofathing,fromseveralkindsof"necessary
predicate":
Anattributeisanecessarypredicatethatisconceivedthroughitself,orthatcannotbe
analyzedintoseveralothers.
Anaffectionisanecessarypredicateanalyzableintoattributes....
Apropertyisareciprocalaffection,oranaffectioncontainingalltheattributesofa
subject,orfromwhichallotherpredicatescanbedemonstrated.
Anessenceis...theaggregateofalltheattributes[ofathing].[AVI,iii,574(late
1676)]
InapaperofApril1676Leibnizproposesanexampleoftherelationthatconcernsus."Itseemsto
me,"hesays,"thattheoriginofthingsfromGodisliketheoriginofpropertiesfromanessence."
Theessenceof6,heproposes,is1+1+1+1+1+1;amongitspropertiesare3+3,3x2,and4
+2.27Thesepropertiesaredistinct,forwithoutthinkingofanyoneofthemwecanthinkofany
other,oroftheessence:"Thereforeasthesepropertiesdifferfromeachotherandfromtheessence,
soalsothingsdifferfromeachotherandfromGod"(AVI,iii,518f.).Thisexampledoesnotsuggest
muchontologicalexternalitybetweenthederivative"things"andGod.Neitherdoesthepaperof18
March1676whenitsays(asIhavequotedit,above)that"spaceisonlyaconsequenceof[the
immensityitselfofGod],asapropertyisofanEssence"(AVl,iii,391).
PerhapsthemostsuggestiveofthepassagesinwhichLeibnizusestherelationofessenceto
propertyasamodelfortherelationofGodtootherthingsisinanotherpaperofApril1676:
____________________
27
IrelyhereonthecontextfortheinterpretationofsomesignsbywhichItakeLeibniztomean
equalityandthemultiplicationrelation.
127
TheattributesofGodareinfinite,butnoneoftheminvolvesthewholeessenceofGod;
fortheessenceofGodconsistsinthefactthatheisthesubjectofallcompatible
attributes.ButanypropertyoraffectionofGodinvolveshiswholeessence,asGod's
havingproducedacertainsomethingthatisconstanttooursensation,howeversmallit
be,involvesthewholenatureofGod,becauseitinvolvesthewholeseriesofthingsof
thatkind.Aninfiniteseries,moreover,resultsonlyfrominfiniteattributes.Whenall
theotherattributesarerelatedtoanyoneofthem,thereresultinitmodifications,
whenceithappensthatthesameEssenceofGodisexpressedasawholeinanykindof
World,andsothatGodmanifestshimselfininfinitemodes.(AVI,iii,514)
Herea"kindofWorld,"ora"wholeseriesofthingsofthatkind,"ispresumablyapossibleworld.
28LeibnizenvisagesaworldasarisingfromtherelationofeachoftheinfiniteattributesofGodto
alltheothers.Givenhisdefinitionof'property',thatisofcoursealsothewayinwhichaproperty
ofGodarises.Thiscreativeinteractionofattributesfollowsfromthedivineessence,butitwillbe
crucialforLeibnizthattheperfectionofGod'swillplaysapartinit,aswellastheperfectionof
God'spower.ItisGod's"havingproduced"thingsthatsoresults.ButitisinterestingforLeibniz's
relationtoSpinozathathespeaksoftheresultoftheinteractionasmodifications"in"anattribute,
andasGod'sselfmanifestation"ininfinitemodes."ItisnaturalenoughtothinkofGod'spower,for
example,asmodifiedbyGod'swill,inasmuchasitisdeterminedbythechoiceofthebest.Whatis
strikinghereisthatLeibnizisnotmovedtospeakclearlyoftheworldasanadditional"result"
outsidethedivinebeing.
ThepassagesuggeststhatLeibnizwasthinkingoftheexistenceofcreatedthingsasbeing,inthe
lastanalysis,afactaboutthethought,will,andpowerofGod.Thatthoughtseemstorecurin
Leibnlz'srepeatedflirtationwiththeideaofdefiningexistenceintermsof"whatpleasesGod"(see
Chapter6,section2).Onthisaccount,ourexistence,forexample,wouldconsistinthefactthatthe
perfectionsofknowing,willing,andpowerinGodconvergeinthechoiceofourworldasthebest
possible.AndthisideawascertainlyinLeibnizmindinApril1676,whenhewrotethatacreated
mind"willbeandwillsubsistbythewillofGod,thatis,oftheunderstandingofthegood.For
being[esseitselfisnothingbutbeingunderstoodtobegood"(AVl,iii,512).
SimilarimplicationscanbefoundinyetanotherpaperofApril1676inwhichLeibnizsaysthat
"Modifications...resultingfromall[thesimpleforms],relatedtoindividual[simpleforms],29
constitutethevarietyinthem"(AVl,iii,522/L162).Inthesameparagraphhealsousestheexample
oftherelationoftheessenceofthenumbersixtoItspropertiestosupportwhatappearstobea
denialofindependentessencestoderivativethings:
Thereisthesamevarietyinanykindofworld,anditisnothingbutthesameessence
relatedindiverseways,asifyoulookatthesamecityfromdiverseplaces;orifyou
relatetheessenceofsixtothree,itwillbe3x2or3+2[sic],
____________________
28
AtAVl,iii,523Leibnizexplicitlyidentifies"kindsofThings"with"Worlds."
29
Loemkertranslatesthisas"relatedtoindividuals,"apparentlyoverlookingthefeminine,ratherthan
neuter,formofsingulas,whichmustthereforerefertoformas(alsofeminine)ratherthanto
indefiniteentities.
128
whereasif[yourelateit)tofouritwillbe6/4=3/2or6=(4x3/2).Henceitisnot
strangethatthingsareproducedthatareinacertainwaydifferent.(AVl,iii,523)
Theexampleofacityviewedfromdifferentplacesrecurs,ofcourse,inanotherroleinLeibniz's
maturewritings.Italsoisfoundinanothertextof1676,inanexplicitassertionthatallthingshave
thesameessence.(ThepaperisonethatcontainsimportantworkonLeibniz'sproofforthe
possibilityofamostperfectbeing.)HereLeibnizflatlyaffirmstheSpinozisticideathatfinite
thingsareonlymodes.
Thatallthingsaredistinguishednotassubstancesbutasmodes,caneasilybe
demonstrated,fromthefactthatifthingsareradicallydistinct,oneofthemcanbe
perfectlyunderstoodwithouttheother;thatis,alltherequirementsoftheonecanbe
understoodwithoutalltherequirementsoftheotherbeingunderstood.Butitisnotso
inthings;forsincetheUltimatereasonofthingsisunique,whichalonecontainsthe
aggregateofallrequirementsofallthings,itismanifestthattherequirementsofall
thingsarethesame.Andthustheessenceistoo;ontheassumptionthattheessenceis
theaggregateofallthefirstrequirements,theessenceofallthingsisthereforethe
same,andthingsdonotdifferexceptinmode,asaCityviewedfromthehighestplace
differsfrom[thecity]viewedfromafield.Iftheonlythingsthatarereallydifferentare
thosethatcanbeseparated,oroneofwhichcanbeperfectlyunderstoodwithoutthe
other,itfollowsthatnothingisreallydifferentfromanotherthing,butallthingsare
one,asPlatoalsoexplainsintheParmenides.(AVl,iii,573)
Herethe"firstrequirements"ofathingarepresumablythesimplest,purestattributesoccurringin
theanalysisofthething.30Leibnizissupposingthattheconjunctionofallthesimplest,purest
attributesconstitutestheessenceofGod,andapparentlyalsothatallsuchattributesoccurinthe
analysisoftheessenceofeveryfinitething.
Theargumentisnotpersuasive.Themonisticconclusionisbuiltintotheimplausiblydemanding
criterionofdistinctnessthatisusedasapremise.Andwhyshouldwegrantthat"theessence[of
eachthing]istheaggregateofall[its]firstrequirements"'?Foritwouldseemthatdifferent
essencescouldbeconstructedoutofthesamefundamentalattributesoneessencecontainingP,
anothercontainingnotP,differentessencescontainingdifferentdegreesofQ,andsoforth.Behind
theargument,however,isclearlytheideathatwesawinotherpassages,ofderivativethings
resultingfromtherelations,orlogicalinteractions,soto
____________________
30
Leibniz'suseoftheterm'requirement'isdiscussedinsection1ofthischapter.Thepaper1have
justquoted,however,containsinitsnextparagraphasomewhateccentricexpressionofLeibniz's
characteristicfusionofconceptualandcausaldependencerelations.Theconceptualaspectofthe
requirementrelationisindicated,thoughthecausalaspectisnotexcluded,whenLeibnizsays,"The
aggregateofsufficientrequirementsistheEssence."Thecausalroleofrequirementscomestothe
forewhenheadds,almostimmediately,"Requirementsseemtoindicatearelationtoexistence,
attributestoessence"(AVl,iii,573).InthelatterstatementItake'requirements'and'attributes'to
refer,atleastforthemostpart,tothesameproperties,viewedintheonecaseasrequiredfor
existence,andintheotherasdefiningthenatureofthething.Thisdistinctionbetween
requirementsandattributesdoesnotseemtohavebeenanenduringfeatureofLeibniz'sthought,
andtheparagraphinwhichitisfoundlooksratherexperimental.
129
speak,ofallthedivineattributes.Andthistime,ontologicalexternalityoftheresultingentities
seemsexplicitlyrejected.
Thisisnot,Ithink,aconclusionwithwhichLeibnizwasentirelyhappy,anditwasnotastable
outcomeinhisthought.Tothestatementthat"allthingsaredistinguishednotassubstancesbutas
modes,"headdedaninterlinearqualificationbywritingintheadverb'radically'overtheword
'substances'.Moreover,oneoftheotherpapersfromwhichIhavequotedarathermonistic
statementconcludeswithaparagraphthatintroducesanimportantpluralizingnotion.Beginning
withtheobservationthatwhenachangeisperceived,thereisachangeintheperceiver,Leibniz
says:
Andinthiswayeverythingiscontainedinsomewayineverything.Butclearlyin
anotherwayinGodthaninThings;andinanotherwayinkindsofThings,orWorlds,
thaninindividuals.Thingsaremade,notbythecombinationofformsalone,inGod,
but[bycombination]withasubjecttoo.Thesubjectitself,orGod,withitsubiquity
yieldstheimmense;thisimmense,combinedwithothersubjects,causesallthepossible
Modes,orThingsinit[Resinipso],tofollow.Variousresultsfromformscombined
withasubjectcauseparticularstoresult.
Leibnizisstillworkingwiththesamemodeloflogicaldependenceasabasisforontological
dependenceorcausalgeneration,forheadds:
HowthingsresultfromformsIcannotexplainexceptbythesimilitudeofNumbers
[resulting]fromunities,butwiththisdifference,thatunitiesareallhomogeneous,but
formsaredifferent.(AVl,iii,523)
Whatisnewhereisthedistinctionof"subjects."Combinedwiththesingledivinesubject,the
simpleformsconstituteGod;"combinedwithothersubjects,"theformsconstitutederivative
things.Thisisexactlythewayinwhichmostofuswouldintuitivelyexpectontologicalexternality
tobemaintainedinapluralisticmetaphysicsthoughitisstrangelycombinedinthispassagewith
thesurvivingcharacterizationofderivativethingsas"Modes,orThingsinit,"whichpresumably
meansthings"in"thedivinesubject.
WasLeibnizpermanentviewintroducedinthispassage,whichhedated"April1676"?Doesit
markadecisiveandirreversiblesteptowardtheconceptionoffinitethingsasdistinctsubstances?
WecanhardlyseethispassageassodecisiveifweacceptthedateofNovember1676whichthe
editorsofAVl,iiiassigntothepaperinwhichLeibnizflatlyassertsthatallthingshaveasingle
essenceandaredistinguishedasmodesratherthanassubstances.Buttheevidenceforthelater
dateinthatcaseisnotconclusive,astheeditorsnote.
3.2LeibnizsLaterViews
ClearlytherewaschangeinLeibniz'sthoughtonthispointinthe1670s.Theideathatfinitethings
"aredistinguishednotassubstancesbutasmodes"wasdefinitelyrejectedby1678.Andwhereas
on15April1676hewrotethat"God...iseverything.Creaturesaresomethings"(AVl,iii,512),he
wrotetoEckhardonthe28thofthefollowingAprilthat"itseemstobeimpossiblefortheretobea
Beingthatiseverything;foritcouldbesaidofsuchaBeingthatitisyouand
130
itisalsome,whichIthinkyouwillnotadmit"(AII,i,323=GI,222).31Moreoversomethinglike
theideaof"othersubjects"recursinLeibniz'scommentsonthetextofSpinozaEthics,whichhe
finallyreceivedin1678.TothethirddefinitionofPartI("BysubstanceIunderstandthatwhichis
initselfandisconceivedthroughitself")Leibnizobjectsthat"onthecontrary,itseemsratherthat
therearesomethingsthatareinthemselveseveniftheyarenotconceivedthroughthemselves.
Andthatishowpeoplecommonlyconceiveofsubstances"(GI,139/L196).32The"things"to
whichLeibnizrefershereareobviouslyderivativeorfinitethings,andinsayingthatthey"arein
themselves"hemeansthattheyhaveoraredistinctsubjectsofpredication,andthusaredistinct
substances,eventhoughtheyareconceived,notthroughthemselves,butthroughtheattributesof
God.
ButthistoomaynotrepresentastablepositioninLeibniz'sthought.Wedonotfindthemature
Leibnizgroundingthedistinctnessofsubstancesonaprimitivedistinctnessofsubjectsassuch.
Suchagroundingmightevenbeinconsistentwithhisdoctrineoftheidentityofindiscernibles.As
inthecaseofnecessityandcontingency(seeChapter1,section1.4),wemustbecarefultolet
LeibnizdisagreewithSpinozainhisownway,andnottoimportalienassumptionsabouthowan
ontologicalpluralistwouldconceivetherelationbetweenGodandtheworld.
Thereisampleevidencethat,intraditionaltheologicalterms,LeibnizsawGodas"immanent"as
wellas"transcendent"inrelationtotheworld,andthatthedistinctnessofcreatedthingswasin
somewaysprecariousforhim.TheDiscourseonMetaphysicssuggestsasubstantialconnection
betweenGodandfinitethings,describingcreationasakindofemanation:33
Nowitis...veryevidentthatthecreatedsubstancesdependonGod,whoconserves
themandevenproducesthemcontinuallybyakindofemanation,asweproduceour
thoughts.ForasGodturnsonallsides,sotospeak,andinallways,thegeneralsystem
ofphenomenathathefindsgoodtoproducetomanifesthisglory,andregardsallthe
facesoftheworldineverypossiblemanner,sincethereisnorelationthatescapeshis
omniscience,theresultofeachviewoftheuniverse,asregardedfromacertainplace,is
asubstancethatexpressestheuniverseinconformitywiththatview,ifGodfindsit
goodtorenderhisthoughteffectiveandproducethatsubstance.(DM14)34
____________________
31
Thecontextisinteresting.EckhardhasofferedaproofofthepossibilityofGod'sexistence
strikinglysimilartoLeibniz'sownproof(which,sofarasweknow,hehadnotcommunicatedto
Eckhard).ButEckhard'sproofturnsonidentifying"theconceptofanEnsperfectissimum"with
"theconceptofaBeingthatdoesnotparticipateinnonbeing."Suchabeing,Leibnizargues,
wouldhavetobe"everything,"becausethereisnothingitcouldbesaidnottobe.Hisownaccount
doesnothavethisuntowardconsequence,becausehedoesnotdenythattherearenegativetruths
aboutGod.Hedeniesonlythatanynegationiscontainedinanyoneofthedefiningattributesof
God.
32
Cf.Leibniz'scommentonproposition14ofpartI(GI,145/L201).
33
ForextensivedocumentationofLeibniz'suseofthevocabularyofemanation,seeRobinet,
Architectoniquedisionctive,pp.431f.;seealsop.438.
34
StrikinglysimilartothistextareVE62/L185of1677("WhenGodcalculatesandexercizes[his]
thought,theworldismade")andVE292=LHIV,1,14C,10.Inthelatter,however,asubstantial
formorsoulresults"fromtheveryfact[eoipso]"thatGodregardsthewholeuniverseasiffroma
certainbody;nomentionismadeofGodrenderinghisthoughteffective.Thisisnotthe
131
AsimilaraccountofthecreationisgivenintheMonadology,although'fulguration'replaces
'emanation':
ThusGodaloneisthePrimitiveUnity,ortheoriginatingsimplesubstance,ofwhichall
thecreatedorderivativeMonadsareproductionsandareborn,sotospeak,by
continualFulgurationsoftheDivinityfrommomenttomoment,limitedbythe
receptivityofthecreature,towhichitisessentialtobelimited.(Mon47)
AparticularlyimportantindicationofthetendenciesofLeibnizthoughtonthissubjectisfoundin
hisstatement,publishedin1698,thatif,asMalebrancheheld,therewerenoenduringcausally
efficaciousforceinthings,
itwouldfollowthatnocreatedsubstance,nosoul,remainsnumericallythesame,and
sothatnothingisconservedbyGod,andhencethatallthingsareonlysomeevanescent
orfleetingmodificationsandphantasms,sotospeak,oftheonepermanentdivine
substance.Thisamountstothesamethingasthatdoctrineofmostevilrepute,whicha
certainsubtleandprofanewriterrecentlyintroducedintotheworld,orrevivedthatthe
verynatureorsubstanceofallthingsisGod.(GIV,508f./L502)
The"subtleandprofanewriter"mentionedhereisobviouslySpinoza,andLeibnizissayingthat
theirpossessionofenduringforce(closelyconnectedinhismindwithformandessence)isallthat
keepscreatedsubstancesfrombeingmeremodificationsofthedivinesubstance,alongthelinesof
Spinoza'stheory.Thisisadramaticexpressionofthetenuousnessofthecreatures'independence
fromGodintheLeibnizianschemeofthings.HereLeibnizisnotpreparedtoassertthedistinction
betweenGodandcreatedsubstancesasasimple,primitivedistinctionbetweendifferentsubjectsof
properties.Atthesametime,itisclearthatLeibnizisaffirmingthatcreatedthingsaresubstances,
andnotmeremodificationsofthedivinesubstance.Theirdistinctnessistracedtoadistinctionof
powers.
ItisnothardtoseehowLeibnizmighthavethoughtthepowersofcreaturesdistinctfromGod's
power.Forthepowersofcreatureshavelimitations.ItispartofLeibniz'stheoryofforcesthat
limitedpowerscanbemodificationsofbroader,morefundamentalpowersinthesamesubject.35
ButitdoesnotfollowthatsuchlimitationscanbepresentinGod.Indeed,Itakeittobepartof
Leibniz'sconceptionoftheensperfectissimumthatnolimitedperfectioncanbeascribedtoit,
becauseeverylimitedperfectioninvolvessomenegationofanabsolutedivineperfection.Nodoubt
itfollowsthatthelimitedpowersofcreaturesexistinsubjectsdistinctfromthedivinesubject.But
thedistinctionofsubjectshereisnotprimitive.Rather,itflowsfromthedistinctionofpowers,or
(morebroadlyspeaking)offormsasitshould,foraproponentoftheidentityofindiscernibles.36
ThatthisistherightbasisfordistinguishingLeibniz'sconceptionoftherelationbetweenGodand
finitethingsfromSpinoza'sisconfirmedbyapaper
____________________
34
onlywayVE292divergesfromLeibniz'smaturethought.Iinclinethereforetothinkitisearlier
thanDM.Itswatermarkisattestedfrom1679and1690.Leibniz'sviewsonwhatGoddoesin
conservingcreaturesarediscussedinChapter3,section2.2.
35
See,e.g.,GII,270/L537.ThisisamaintopicofChapter13ofthisvolume.
36
ThispointisanalogoustoapointIwillmakeinChapter11,section3:Leibnizrevealsinthistext
thatforhimitisformratherthanmatterthatiscrucialforrealisminphysics.
132
titled"OntheAbstractandtheConcrete"fromabout1688(VE1603=LHIV,7C,99100).37The
relevantpassagebeginswithanattempttodefinethenotionof"beingin[inesse]asubject"in
termsofthenotionofrequirement,apparentlyinthesensediscussedinsection1ofthischapter.
Andthereforewhatisinasubjectappearstobethatwhoserealityispartofthereality
ofthesubjectitself.Or,tospeakinawaymoresuitedforforminganddemonstrating
propositions,AisinBifeverythingthatisimmediatelyrequiredforAisalso
immediatelyrequiredforB.Whatisimmediatelyrequiredforsomething,however,in
suchawaythatnothingfurtherisimmediately,norevenmediately,requiredforit,can
becalled[its]reality.
ThissuggeststoLeibnizaformoftheproblemthatwehavebeendiscussing:"Butsinceallthe
realityofcreaturesisinGod,itseemstofollowfromthisthatallcreaturesareinGod."Thepoint,
presumably,isthat,givenLeibniz'sbeliefthatthe"requirements"ofcreaturesarethedivine
attributes,fromwhich,ultimately,alltheattributesofotherthingsarecomposed,itfollowsfrom
thedefinitionsgivenherethatthedivineattributesarethe"reality"ofcreatures,andthecreatures
"arein"'GodwhichseemsatleastclosetoaSpinozisticconclusion."Butwemustreply,"Leibniz
goeson,"thattherealityofcreaturesisnotthatveryrealitythatinGodisabsolute,butalimited
reality,,forthatisoftheessenceofacreature."Herethethoughtseemsveryclearthatthelimited
andtheabsoluteorunlimitedrealityaredifferent,indeedincompatible,attributesandhencearenot
presentinthesamesubject,sothatthecreaturesarenot"in"Godafterall.
AlittlefurtheronaworryseemstooccurtoLeibniz."Butitstillseemsundeniablethat...the
absoluterealityisimmediatelyrequiredforthelimited"'nodoubtbecausethelimitedattributes
areinsomewayconstructedfromtheunlimited.ThisleadsLeibniztoreplacerequirementswith
"constituents"inthedefinitionof"beingin."
Thereforeitseemsthedefinitionshouldbecorrected,namely,sothatwesaythatAis
inB,athingin38adifferentthing,ifalltheconstituentsofAitselfareconstituentsof
Bitself.
Unfortunatelythedefinitionhethenoffersof"constituents"doesnotmakeveryclearthedifference
betweenconstituentsandrequirements.
ButIunderstandconstituentstobethosethingsthatinprinciple[exinstituto]makea
thing,insuchaway,namely,thatwhentheyarepositedthethingisposited,andthat
thisisassumedasaprinciple.Theconstituentsofaconstituentareconstituentsofthe
[thing]constituted.
Unclearasthisis,themostplausiblereadingofthepassageasawholeissurelyoneaccordingto
which,first,creaturesarenot"in"Godbecausetheirlimitedattributescannotbe"in"Godand,
second,some"requirements"ofcreatures
____________________
37
Allquotationsfromheretotheendofthepresentchapterarefromthissource.Thewatermarkof
thedocumentisattestedfromthelastthreemonthsof1688,andthepaperseemsrelatedtoanother
whosewatermarkhasthesameattestationandwhichcannothavebeenwrittenbefore1685because
itcitesabookpublishedinthatyear(VE1607).
38
Reading"in"forVE's"im."
133
particularlytheabsoluteattributesofGod)arenot"constituents"ofcreaturesbecausetheyarenot
attributesofcreatures(thoughattributesofcreaturesareconstructedfromthembylimitation)and
theyarenot"in"creatures.
Weareleft,Ithink,withthefollowinganswertothequestionwhetherLeibniz'sconceptionofGod
asensperfectissimumhas,inescapably,Spinozisticimplications:itdoesnot.Therelationofthe
limitedattributesofcreaturestotheabsoluteattributesofGodisnottherelationofmodeto
attribute,sincetheyexcludeeachotherfromanyonesubject,byvirtueofthenegationinvolvedin
thecreaturelyattributes.39
____________________
39
1nthischapter,inadditiontosourcescitedabove,IhavebeenhelpedbySchneiders,"Deus
Subjectum."
134
5
TheOntologicalArgument
Duringthelater1670sLeibnizwasintenselyengagedwiththeCartesianversionoftheontological
argument.Hedevelopedastandardlineonthesubjectthatrecursinvariousplacesinhiswritings
fromthenon.Ithasthreemainpoints.(1)TheCartesianargumentisincomplete.Itdoesshowthat
ifGod'sexistenceispossible,thenGodexists;butitassumeswithoutproofthatGod'sexistenceis
possible,whichcanbedoubted. 1(2)TheexistenceofGodshouldbepresumedpossibleunlessitis
provedimpossible.Thispresumption,togetherwiththeCartesianproof,providesajustificationof
2But(3)thedemonstrationcanbe
theisticbelief,thoughitfallsfarshortofdemonstration.
completed:itcanbeproved1.3thatGod'sexistenceispossible.3WhenLeibnizoffersanapriori
proofinsupportofhisthirdclaim,hetouchesonfascinatinganddifficultissuesaboutexistence
thatgorighttotheheartofthelogicalstructureofhisphilosophy.Thefirstclaimwillbediscussed
inthischapter;thethirdclaimwillbediscussedinthischapterandthenext;thesecondclaimwill
bediscussedinChapter8.
____________________
1
AII,i,250/L165f.(28December1675);AVI,iii,510f.(15April1676);AVl,iii,579/L168
(November1676);AII,i,300,306,325,383f.(1676,1677);AII,i,312,401=GI,213,198(1677,
1678);AII,i,436=GIV,294(1678);AII,i,478/L211(22June1679);AII,i,529(1682);G
VII,294/L231(16831986);GIV,424/L292f.(1684);AII,i,545f.(1685);VE47=LHI,20,160
(16781985?);DM23(1686);GIV,358f./L386(1692);GVII,310;AVI,vi,8=GV,18(1695?
1997);GIV,401ff.,405(17001701);NE437f.(1704);GVII,490(1710).(Insomeofthesetexts
Descartesisnotmentioned,buttheargument,whichLeibnizdidnotregardaspeculiarlyor
originallyCartesian,isclearlyinview.)In1671Leibnizdidnotyetgivethisobjection,butaquite
differentone,totheCartesianargument(AVI,ii,306).In"DeVitaBeata"of1676,hepresentsthe
Cartesianargumentwithoutanycriticism(AVI,iii,642),theprobableexplanationbeingthatthe
workisapasticheofCartesianviewsratherthanadevelopmentofLeibniz'sownthought.
2
AII,i,312f.=GI,213f.(5April1677);AII,i,388=GI,188(3January1678);AII,i,436=G
IV,294(1678);GIV,404,405(17001701);GIII,444(20November1702);NE438(1704);G
VII,490(1710);alsoinamemorandum,probablyof167778,publishedinpp.286f.ofJanke,
"DasontologischeArgument."Janke'spaperisoneofthemostimportantonthissubject,andIam
muchindebtedtoit.Itshouldbenoted,however,that,unlikeitsappendixIII,whichIhavejust
cited,itsappendicesIandIIhaveappearedintheAcademyedition,inAVI,iii,57173andA
II,i,39193,respectively(thelatterunaccountablyoverlookedbyJanke).
3
AII,i,43338/AG23540(1678);GIV,4014,405f.(17001701);andNE437f.(17031905)are
noteworthyforcontainingallthreeofthemainpoints.Exceptforthefirstofthem,however,they
donotsupportthethirdpointwithanaprioriproofofpossibility.Thatisattemptedmostfullyin
textsfrom1676(AVI,iii,395f.,57179/L167f.),andwithalmostcrypticbrevityinGr325
(mid1680s)andintheMonadologyof1714(45).WritingtoEckhard,28April1677,Leibniz
sayshethinksthepossibilitycanbeproved,butadds,"noonehasdoneityet"(AII,i,324=G
135
1.TheIncompleteProof
ThatthepossibilityofGod'sexistencecanbedoubtedandthatitmustbeeitheranassumptionora
premiseofanyaprioritheisticproofaretruthssofamiliarincontemporaryphilosophicaltheology
astocallforlittlecommenthere.EvenintheseventeenthcenturyLeibniz'sobjectiontothe
Cartesianargumentwashardlyoriginal.IthadbeenpresentedtoDescartes,intheSecond
ObjectionstotheMeditations,andDescarteshadgivenareply.4Whetherhisreplywasadequate
ismoreproperlyaquestionforCartesianthanforLeibnizianstudies.Whatdeservesdiscussion
hereisthequestion,OnwhatgroundsdidLeibnizbelievethattheontologicalargumentshowsthat
ifanecessarybeingispossible,itactuallyexists?
Hewroteanelaborateandilluminatingproofofthisthesis,datedJanuary1678.Thisdocumentwas
probablyconnectedwiththeextensivediscussionabouttheCartesianontologicalargumentthathe
5Iwillquote
carriedon,bothorallyandbyletter,beginningin1677,withArnoldEckhard.
extensivelyfromit,asIbelievethereisnopublishedEnglishtranslation.
ProofoftheexistenceofGodfromhisessence
(1)ThepossibleexistenceorPossibilityofanythingandtheessenceofthatsamething
areinseparable(thatis,ifoneofthemisgivenintheregionofideasortruthsor
realities,theotherisalsogiventhere.Thatis,ifthetruthofoneofthemexistssodoes
thetruthoftheother;forthetruthsexistevenifthethingsdonotexistandarenot
thoughtofbyanyone....
Thereforebysubsumption
(2)ThepossibleexistenceorpossibilityofGodandtheessenceofGodareinseparable
(fortheessenceofathingisthespecificreasonofitspossibility),
but
(3)TheessenceofGodandhisactualexistenceareinseparable.
Thereforeinconclusion
(4)ThepossibleexistenceorPossibilityofGodandhisactualexistenceareinseparable,
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4
ATVII,127,14951.LeibnizmusthaveknownofthisandbeenunsatisfiedwithDescartes'sreply.
HecriticizesarelatedpassageoftheSecondReplies(ATVII,139)inpresentinghisobjectionina
draftofalettertoMalebrancheinJuneof1679(AII,i,476f.=GI,338f.).
5
Theconnectionissuggestedinaletterof3January1678toHermannConring,inwhichLeibniz
clearlyalludestohisdiscussionswithEckhard(whomheidentifiesonlyas"aprofessorfroma
neighboringAcademy,aCartesian")andclaimstohavediscoveredademonstration"thatGod
necessarilyexists,givenonlythatitispossiblethatheexists"(AII,i,388=GI,188).InAII,i,390
theeditorssuggestthatLeibnizpreparedthisproofforHenningHuthman,buttheonlyevidence
theyciteforthishypothesisisaletterofthesamemonth,toLeibniz,inwhichHuthmanobjectsto
an"argumentrecentlyproposed"ontheground"thatIcanprovethatExistencecannotbededuced
fromanyconceptofEssence"(AII,i,389).Giventhisopinion,Huthmancanhardlybethe
CartesianthatLeibnizmentionstoConring.
x
I,224)whichmaynotbeinconsistentwithhisthinkingthathehimselfhadanunpublishedproof
ofit.Inanotherletterof1677hesaysthatthepossibilitycannotbeprovedonCartesianprinciples
butcanbeprovedbythemethodof"analysescontinuedtotheend"whichwillleadtotherational
languageor"characteristic"projectedbyLeibniz(AII,i,383f.).SeealsoAII,i,401=GI,198.
136
or,whatisthesame,
(5)OntheassumptionthatGodispossibleitfollowsthatGodactuallyexists(A
6
II,i390).
Step(4)followsfromsteps(2)andbythetransitivityoftheinseparabilityrelation.Step(2)follows
fromstep1byinstantiationandisjustifiedonthegroundthat"theessenceofathingisthespecific
7sothatthereisanessenceofathingifandonlyiftheexistenceofthe
reasonofitspossibility,"
8ThesestepsmustbeadmittedifwearetoallowLeibniztomeanwhathesays
thingispossible.
hemeansby'inseparable',andwhathemustmeanby'essence'.Ibelievethatstep(5)alsofollows
fromstep(4),givenLeibniz'sstatedconceptionofinseparability,butthereisadoubttobe
overcometherethatIwilldiscusspresently.Step(3)remainsastheoneLeibnizrightlyregardsas
mostinneedoffurtherjustification.
Heofferstwoproofsofit.Thefirstisanargument,alongCartesianlines,fromGod'ssupreme
perfection.Commenting,however,that"thisreasoningcanbeabbreviatedatthispointandthe
mentionofperfectioncanbeeliminatedfromit,"heproceedstoofferasecondproofinwhichGod
issimplydefinedasanecessarybeing.Leibnizrecommendsthisstreamliningoftheargument
9Indeed,itisanotherpersistentfeatureofhiscritiqueoftheCartesianproof,
elsewhere,too
althoughconsiderationofthedivineperfectioncertainlyremainedimportanttohisthoughtabout
thenecessityofGod'sexistence.Thesimplificationeliminates(forthetimebeing,atanyrate)
possiblegroundsofobjectionpertainingtoideasaboutperfection.Italsothrowsintohigherrelief
themostsolidpartofLeibniz'smodalversionoftheontologicalargument.Itdistinguishes
Leibniz'streatmentoftheargumentnotonlyfromDescartes's,butalsofromthosefoundin
Anselm,forwhomtheargumentisfirstandforemostaboutdivineperfection.
Theconclusionofthispartoftheargumentis,ineffect,thatiftheexistenceofanecessaryGod,the
GodofwhattheGermanscall"ontotheology,"issomuchaspossible,thensuchadeityactually
(andalso,ofcourse,necessarily)exists.Recentworkonthesubjecthasestablished,Ithink,that
thisconclusioniscorrect.10Itisworthwhile,however,totrytounderstandwhetherandhow
____________________
10
SeeHartshorne,LogicofPerfection,pp.50f.;R.Adams"LogicalStructureofAnselm's
Arguments";andPlantinga,NatureofNecessity,ch.10.
6
InquotingfromthisdocumentIomitsomemarginaladditionsandsomecrossreferencestoother
partsofit.
7
LeibnizsaysthisalsoatAVI,iii,583;cf.VE47.
8
Discussingtheontologicalargumentinaletterof1685,Leibnizsays,"Fortherebeinganessence
ofathingisthesameasthethingbeingpossible"(AII,i,545).Foracasualendorsementofthis
equivalence,seeGVII,294.
9
AII,i,312=GI,212f.(5April1677,amemorandumofLeibniz'sfirstconversationwithEckhard);
AII,i,323f.=GI,223(28April1677);GIV,359,402,405f.(1692,17001701).Anevenmore
abbreviatedformoftheargumentisgiveninthefirsttwosentencesofapiece(assignedbythe
Academyeditorstolate1676or1677)headed"DefinitionofGodortheBeingofitself':"Godisa
beingwhoseexistencefollowsfromitspossibility(oressence).IfthenGod,definedinthisway,is
possible,itfollowsthatheexists"(AVI,iii,582).Aparticularlyelegantshortformoftheargument
isgiveninaletterof1710:"IfaBeing,fromwhoseessenceexistencefollowsispossible(orifit
hasanessence),itexists(thisisanidenticalorindemonstrableaxiom).GodisaBeingfromwhose
Essenceexistencefollows(thisisadefinition):ThereforeifGodispossible,heexists.Q.E.D."(G
VII,490).
137
Leibnizsucceededinestablishingit.Hereistheconclusionofhisargument,beginningwithhis
secondproof11ofstep(3):
[6]TheessenceofGodinvolvesnecessityofexistence(forbythenameofGodwe
understandanecessaryBeing).
[7]Iftheessenceofanythinginvolvesnecessityofexistence,itsessenceisinseparable
fromexistence(forotherwiseitisamerelypossibleorcontingentthing).
Therefore
TheessenceandexistenceofGodareinseparable.
FinallythereforewehaveconcludedthatIfGodispossible,heactuallyexists,and
thereforeitneedonlybeprovedthatamostperfectBeing[Ensperfectissimum],orat
anyrateanecessaryBeing,ispossible.(AII,i,391)12
ThepivotofLeibniz'sreasoninghereishisconceptionofessence.Inanannotationtothisproof,he
makesclearthatforhimanecessarybeingisone"whoseexistencenecessarilyfollows,oris
inseparable,fromitsveryessence"(AII,i,392).13Heavoidsacircularversionoftheontological
argumentinwhichGod'sexistenceisillegitimatelypresupposed:
InsayingthattheEssenceofGodinvolvesexistence,itmustnotbeunderstoodas
meaningthat,ifGodexists,henecessarilyexists,butinthisway,asmeaningthaton
thepartofthething[aparterei],evenifnoonethinksaboutit,itisunconditionally,
absolutelyandpurelytrueinthatregionofessencesorideasthattheessenceand
existenceofGodareinseparablyconnected.(AII,i,392)14
Leibnizthinksofanessenceasaquasilogicalstructurethatgroundstruthsthatneednotbe
hypothetical,orconditionalontheexistenceofsomethingexemplifyingtheessence.Thisis
implicitintheexplanationthat"theessenceofathingisthespecificreason[ratio]ofits
possibility,"whichsurelymeansthattheessenceisaquasilogicalstructurethatgroundsthe
(unconditional)truththattheexistenceofthethingispossible.15Likewise,anessencethat
involves(necessary)existenceisaquasilogicalstructurethatgroundsthe(unconditional)truththat
thething(necessarily)exists.Suchanessenceis"inseparable"fromtheexistenceofthethingina
senseindicatedbyLeibniz'sinitialexplanationofinseparability:theessencecannotbe"givenin
theregionofideasortruths"unless
____________________
11
Thefirstproof,whichLeibnizhimselfsaysissuperfluous,willreceivesomecriticalattentionin
Chapter6,section1.
12
Ihaverenumberedstepstoavoidconfusionwithprevioussteps.
13
Cf.AII,i,391,andatextpublishedbyJankein"DasontologischeArgument,"p.286.Leibnizgave
asimilardefinitionin1701:"GodisaBeingfromitselforprimitiveEnsase;thatistosay,one
thatexistsbyitsessence"(GIV,405).Andincommentswrittenin1685orlater,hethinks"Being
[Ens]whoseessenceinvolvesexistence"is"moreaccurate"than"Beingthatsufficesforitself
alone"asadefinitionof"causeofitself[causasui]"(VE2189=LHIV,3,6,1).
14
LeibnlzalsochargedthatSpinozawasguiltyofthesortofcircularargumenthementions(A
II,i,393).
15
Similarly,Leibnizwouldsaymorethantwentyyearslater(in1701),"theessenceofthethingis
nothingbutthatwhichmakesitspossibilityinparticular."Therefore,hewouldgoontosay,"itis
quiteevidentthat[forathing]toexistbyitsessenceistoexistbyitspossibility"(GIV,406).
138
thetruththatfollowsfromit,thatthethingexists,isgiventoo.Forasupposedessencethatimplied
theexistenceofsomethingthatdidnotexistwouldimplysomethingfalse,andwouldthusbe
defectiveasanessence.Itisclearthatnothingthatisdefectiveinthiswaycountsasanessencefor
Leibniz.
TherearethereforeonlytwoalternativesforLeibniz.Either(A)thereisanessenceofanecessary
God,or(B)thereisnot.(A)Ifthereis,itmustinvolvenecessaryexistence,andsomustgroundthe
truththatanecessaryGod(necessarily)existsandthatmustindeedbeatruth.Inthiscase,
therefore,Godexists,andexistsnecessarily.Conversely,(B)ifitisnotatruththatanecessaryGod
exists,thenthereisnoessencethatgroundssuchatruthorinotherwords,nodivineessence
involvingnecessaryexistence.Thatis,thereisinthiscasenoessenceofanecessaryGod.Butif
thereisnoessenceofanecessaryGod,theexistenceofsuchabeingisnotpossible.Leibniz
describesthisalternativeasoneinwhich"thenecessarybeingisanimpossiblefiction[figmentum)"
(AII,i,392f.).Foraccordingtotheplausibleassumptionthatseemstounderliesteps(1)and(2)of
Leibniz'sargument,thepossibilityofanything'sexistencemustbegroundedinaquasilogical
structurethatconstitutesaconsistent,nondefectiveessence.Inshort,if(A)thereisanessenceofa
necessaryGod,itfollowsthatsuchabeingnecessarily,andhenceactually,exists;ontheother
hand,if(B)thereisnoessenceofanecessaryGod,thentheexistenceofsuchabeingisnoteven
possible.Q.E.D.
IwilldiscusstwopossibleobjectionstoLeibniz'sreasoning.Ourfirstobjectormaygrantthatthe
essence,andthereforethepossibility,ofanecessaryGodareinseparablefromexistence,oreven
fromnecessaryexistence,"intheregionofideasortruthsorrealities,"butwilldenythatanything
abouttheactualexistenceofsuchabeingthereforefollowsfromitsmerepossibility.The
transitionfromstep(4)tostep(5)inLeibniz'sproof,itwillbeclaimed,isaninstanceofthe
illegitimateinference"fromconceptstoreality"thatmanyphilosophershaveseeninthe
ontologicalargument.ElsewhereIhavecriticizedthistypeofobjectiontotheontological
argument.16Hereitsufficestoobservethattheobjector'smetaphysicalviewsfitneatlywithinone
ofthealternativesadmittedatthisstageofLeibniz'sargument.Forifnoessencecangroundthe
actualexistenceofathing,thenthereisnoessencethatinvolves(necessary)existenceinLeibniz's
sense,andthereforenoessenceofanecessaryGod,andnopossibilityofsuchabeing.
AsecondobjectormightchargethatLeibnizhasoverlookedanalternativeinassumingthatifthere
isnoessenceofanecessaryGod,thenthereisnopossibilityofsuchabeing'sexistence.Thenew
suggestionisthatevenifthereisinfactnoessencefromwhichthenecessary(andthereforeactual)
existenceofaGodfollows,perhapstherecouldhavebeensuchanessence.Therelevanceofthis
objectionisundeniable.ItproposesawayinwhichitcouldallegedlybepossibleforGod's
existencetobenecessaryevenifitisinfactneithernecessarynoractual.Intermsofmodernmodal
logictheobjectorquestionsthefollowingprinciples:
____________________
16
R.Adams,"DivineNecessity."Mytargetinthatearlierpaperisactuallyanobjectiontotheideaof
abeingwhoseexistenceisnecessary,orfollowsfromitsessence,ratherthantotheontological
argumentassuch;butthemetaphysicalissuesraisedbytheobjectionarethesame.
139
(9)Ifitisnotnecessarythatp,thenitisnotpossibleforittobenecessarythatp.
(9)Ifitisnotactuallythecasethatp,thenitisnotpossibleforittobenecessarythatp.
TherecentlydevelopedproofsofthethesisthattheexistenceofanecessaryGodisactualifitis
evenpossible,towhichIhavealluded,alldependononeortheotheroftheseprinciples,whichare
characteristicaxiomsofwidelydiscussedsystemsofmodallogic.Theyarenotuncontroversial,
thoughIdonotseeanycompellingreasontodoubttheircorrectnessasappliedtotheissueof
necessarydivineexistence.Thequestiontobeconsideredhere,however,is,Howwellgroundedis
Leibniz'scommitmenttothem?
IhavearguedinChapter1,section3,thatprinciple(8)isnotvalidonthedemonstrability
conceptionofnecessityconnectedwithLeibniz'sinfiniteanalysistheoryofcontingency.Principle
(9)isalsoinvalidonthatconception,forsimilarreasons.Ithinkitisclear,however,thatthe
conceptionsofpossibilityandnecessityconnectedwiththetheoryofinfiniteanalysisarenotthe
conceptionsemployedinLeibniz'sdiscussionsofthenecessaryexistenceofGod.Therethe
relevantmodalconceptionsarethoseindicatedbythetheoryofessencesthatfiguresinthese
discussions,andtheyaremuchclosertothoseinvolvedinLeibniz'sothermaintheoryof
contingencythetheorythatinsiststhatwhateverhas"someessence"is"possibleinitsown
nature"(Gr289f.)andthatdistinguisheswhatis"necessarythroughitself"fromwhatisnecessary
onlyonaccountofitsrelationtosomethingelse.17Thelatterdistinctioniscertainlynotaliento
Leibniz'sdiscussionsoftheontologicalargument,forthedivineexistenceissupposedtobe
necessarythroughitself,withanecessitythatisinternaltothedivineessence.Commentingin1676
onSpinoza'sdefinitionofsubstance,Leibnizequates"thatwhichisitsownreasonforexisting"
with"that,allofwhoserequirementsweconceivewithouttheconceptofanotherthing"(A
VI,iii,275=GI,131).18Anecessarybeingisonethathasinitsessenceareasonforitsexistence
thatdoesnotinvolvetheessence(ortheaction)ofanotherbeing.
Here,however,wearenotsomuchconcernedwiththedistinctionbetweenthetwotypesof
necessityaswiththegroundsofpossibility.Inthetheoryofessencespossibilityappearsas
somethingpositiveratherthannegative.Itisnotjusttheabsenceofimpossibility.Aspositive,it
requiresagroundorreason,whichwillbeaquasilogicalstructure,asIhavecalledit,andindeed
anessenceorsystemofessences.Inthiscontext,whatwoulditmeantosaythattherecould
____________________
17
18
ThisisnotapointonwhichLeibnizdisagreeswithSpinoza.Spinozahasadistinctionbetween
whatisnecessarythroughitself(orthroughitsownessence)andwhatisnecessaryonlyonaccount
ofitsrelationtosomethingelse,andneedsthedistinctioninordertoobtainasenseinwhichGod
(substance)isanecessarybeingandmodesarenot.In1676Leibnizcopiedoutapassageinwhich
Spinozamakesthisdistinction,andLeibniz'sbriefcomment"This[presumablywhatSpinoza
ascribestomodes]isjustwhatiscommonlycalledcontingent"suggeststhathegotthepoint.In
GI,147f./L202f.,fromabout1678,however,itisnotcleartomethatLeibnizunderstoodSpinoza
onthispointthoughthetextdoesconfirmthatLeibnizhimselfunderstoodanessence'sinvolving
existenceasconstitutinginternalasdistinctfromexternalnecessity.
140
havebeenanessence,orapossibility,thatthereisn't?Tosaythattherecouldhavebeenistosay
thereisapossibility,whichmusthaveits"specificreason."Andwhatistokeepthatspecific
reason,orsomethingimpliedbyit,frombeingtheessencethatsupposedlythereisn't?These
assumptionsaboutthegroundingofpossibilitiescanbedoubted,ofcourse,buttheyseemplausible
enough.IconcludethatLeibnizreasonablyemploysinthiscontextprinciplesthatimply(8)and(9)
,andthatthisfirststageofhisargumentaboutnecessarydivineexistenceiswellsupported.
2.ProofofPossibility
TocompletehisversionoftheontologicalargumentLeibnizofferstwotypesofproofforthe
possibilityofanecessaryGod.Theoneusedinhiswritingsinthe1690sandthefirstyearsofthe
nextcentury19isderivedfromacosmologicalargument.Leibnizclaimsthatiftheexistenceof
contingentbeingsispossible(asisobvioussincetheyactuallyexist),theexistenceofanecessary
Godmustalsobepossible,sinceitisonlythroughtheactionofsuchadeitythattheexistenceof
contingentthingscouldbeexplainedinaccordancewiththePrincipleofSufficientReason.Onthe
"obliqueapproach"[biais]thatLeibnizadvocates,accordingtowhichitestablishestheconditional,
butveryimportant,modalconclusionthat"ifthenecessaryBeingispossible,itexists,"the
ontologicalargument
appearstohavesomesolidity,andthosewhowillhaveitthatfromnotions,ideas,
definitions,orpossibleessencesaloneonecanneverinferactualexistencefallback
into...denyingthepossibilityoftheBeingfromitself.Butnotewell,thisoblique
approachitselfservestomakeknownthattheyarewrong,andultimatelyfillsthehole
inthedemonstration.ForiftheBeingfromitselfisimpossible,allthebeingsby
anotheraretoo,fortheyare,ultimately,onlybytheBeingfromitself;thusnothing
wouldbeabletoexist.Thisreasoningleadsustoanotherimportantmodalproposition,
equaltothepreviousone,whichtogetherwithitcompletesthedemonstration.Itcanbe
expressedthus:ifthenecessaryBeingisnot,thereisnopossibleBeing.Itseemsthat
thisdemonstrationhadnotbeencarriedsofaruntilnow;however,Ihavealsolabored
elsewheretoprovethattheperfectBeingispossible.(GIV,406)
Evenifsuccessful,thisargumentdoesnotyieldeverythingthatLeibnizwanted,asItaketobe
hintedinthelastsentenceofthequotedpassage.Because
____________________
19
TheargumentisexplicitatGIII,450(1702)aswellasatGIV,406(1701).Noticeofthegapinthe
Cartesianargumentelicitsanappealtoaprooffromeffects(GIV,404,about1700),or"fromthe
factthatcontingentthingsexist"(GIV,359/L386,about1692);butthesepassagesarenotclear
aboutthemodalstructureofthestrategy.Cf.GVII,3028/L48691;VE1909=LHIV,6,9,6.A
similarargumentforthepossibilityofan"absolutelynecessaryBeing"isfoundinamarginal
additiontoatextof11February1676(AVI,iii,472).Andinamarginaladditiontoatextof1678
(discussedatlengthinsection1ofthischapter),Leibnizemployedaslightlydifferentstrategy,
arguingthatthePrincipleofSufficientReasoncannotbemaintainedunlessitisgrantedthata
necessarybeingis(actualandtherefore)possible;for"otherwiseallthingswouldbecontingent"
andwouldhavenosufficientreason(AII,i,390).Thesemarginaladditionsmayofcoursebelater
thanthetextstowhichtheyareattached.
141
theconceptionofacomprehensivelyandsupremelyperfectBeingplaysnoessentialpartinit,it
needssupplementation,asLeibnizremarked,ifitisto"provethatthenecessaryBeingmusthave
allperfections"(GIII,450).Furthermore,andprobablymoredecisivelyforLeibniz,theargument
fromthepossibilityofcontingentbeingsisademonstration"aposteriorithatistosay,fromthe
effects"(GIV,404).20Assuch,itdoesnotgivedirectinsightintothepossibilityofanecessary
Godorexplainhoworwhysuchabeingispossible.ThereforeLeibnizstillaspires,inthiscontext,
tocomplete"thedemonstrationapriori"(GIV,404).
Leibniz'sprincipalattemptsatamoredirect,apriori,proofofthepossibilityofnecessarydivine
existenceallappeartobeofasingletype,andtheydobeginwiththeconceptionofabeingthat
possessesallperfections.Thelineofargumentreceivesitsfullestdevelopmentinpapersdating
fromtheyear1676(AVI,iii,395f.,57179),andislatersketched,withapproval,in1678inaletter
tothePrincessElizabeth(AII,i,437f./AG240).Somethinglikeitappearstobeendorsedinapaper
(Gr325)fromthemid1680S,21andagainin1714,neartheendofLeibniz'slife(Mon45).In
layingouttheargumentIshallfollowthebestknownandmostfinishedversionofit,which
LeibnizsaysheshowedtoSpinozainNovemberof1676,obtainingthelatter'sopinionthatitwas
"solid"(AVI,iii,578f./L167f.).Ishallquoteroughlyinorder,butonlyinfragmentsasneededfor
myexposition,sincetextandEnglishtranslationarewidelyavailable,andIshalldraw
supplementarymaterialfromotherversionsinLeibniz'spapers.
2.1TheFirstStageoftheProof
Thefirststepoftheargumentappearstobeadefinitionof'perfection':
(1)"AperfectioniswhatIcalleverysimplequalitythatispositiveandabsolute,or[seu
=thatis]thatexpresseswithoutanylimitswhateveritexpresses."
Asimplequalityhereisonethatisunanalyzable;thiswillshortlybecomeexplicit.Apositive
qualityisnotthenegationofanotherquality.ThemostdurablefeatureofLeibniz'sconceptionof
perfectionsisthattheyinvolvenonegationatall.Itakethelastclauseofthedefinitiontoindicate
thatanabsolutequalityisnotalimiteddegreeofanyquality,andindeedinvolvesnolimitationat
all;thisinterpretationisjustified,andamplified,inChapter4,section1.
Allperfectionsareunanalyzable.
(2)"Butaqualityofthissort,sinceitissimple,isthereforeunanalyzable,orindefinable
..."
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20
ThisargumentisaposterioriinbothofthesensesinwhichthattermmaybeinterpretedinLeibniz
(seetheappendixtoChapter3).Thatis,(1)itproceedsfromtheeffecttothecause(andtherefore
doesnotexplainthetruththatitpurportstoprove),and(2)ithasanempiricalpremise(that
contingentbeingsexist,fromwhichthepossibilityoftheirexistenceisinferred).Thefirst,and
older,ofthesesensesisundoubtedlythemoreimportantinthiscontext.
21
ltswatermarkisattestedfrom1685;seeVE1251.
142
HereLeibnizoffersadisjunctionofreasonstoshowthatthisfollowsfromthedefinitionofa
perfection.
[F]orotherwiseeitheritwillnotbeonesimplequalitybutanaggregateofseveral;orif
itisone,itwillbecircumscribedbylimits,andtothatextentitwillbeunderstood
throughnegationsoffurtherprogress,contrarytothehypothesis,foritwasassumedto
bepurelypositive.
Wemaywonderwhythedisjunctionisneeded,sincehehasdefinedperfectionsassimple,which
seemstomeanunanalyzable.Leibnizappearstobethinkingofanalyzablepropertiesashavingtwo
possiblebasictypesofconstruction.Analyzablepropertiesofthefirsttypeareconjunctionsor(as
Leibnizputsithere)"aggregates"ofproperties.BeingAisapropertyofthistypeifitisanalyzable
asbeingBandC.ThisisthetypeofconstructionthatLeibniztakestoberuledoutbysimplicity:a
simplequalityisnotaconjunctionofstillsimplerones.Analyzablepropertiesofthesecondtype
arenotconjunctionsofsimplerpropertiesbutareinsomewaynegative.Somephilosopherswould
saythatapropertyformedbynegationofanotherpropertyisthereforenotsimple,butLeibnizdoes
notusethatargumentheretoestablishthatnegativepropertiesarenotperfections,choosingrather
toappealtothefactthathehasdefinedperfectionsaspositive.
AtthispointLeibnizannouncesoneofthemainconclusionshewilltrytoprove:
(3)"Fromthese[considerations]itisnotdifficulttoshowthatallperfectionsare
compatiblewitheachother;thatis,theycanbeinthesamesubject."
Heproceeds,notexactlybyindirectproof,butbyproposingforrefutationaputative
counterexampletothethesisannouncedinstep(3).
(4)"Forsupposeapropositionofthissort:AandBareincompatible(understandingby
AandBtwosimpleformsofthissort,orperfections...)."
Leibnizadds,withoutargument,that"itisthesameifmore[thantwo]areassumedatthesame
time."'Incompatible'isamodalterm;'AandBareincompatible'meansthesameas'Itisnecessary
thatAandBarenotinthesamesubject'.
Hethenbeginsalemmawiththefollowingpremise:
(5)"Itisevidentthat[thepropositionproposedasanexampleinstep(4)]cannotbe
demonstratedwithoutanalysisofthetermsAorB,eitherorboth."
Hegivesaratherobscurereasonfortheclaim:"forotherwisetheirnaturewouldnotenterintothe
reasoning,andtheincompatibilitycouldjustaswellbedemonstratedaboutanyotherthingsas
aboutthem."Iinterpretthisasacrypticabbreviationofthefollowingargument.
143
Assumethatifapropositionisdemonstrated,itmustbebyvirtueofsomefeatureofthelogical
formoftheproposition.Assumefurtherthatifthedemonstrationisbasedonsomeaspectoflogical
forminternaltoatermoftheproposition,itmustdependonananalysisoftheterm.Hence,if'A
andBareincompatible'canbedemonstratedwithoutanyanalysisofAorB,thedemonstration
mustfollowfromthelogicalformthatthepropositionhasapartfromanyformthatisinternalto
theterms.Apartfromanylogicalformthatisinternaltotheterms,however,thelogicalformofthe
propositionwouldnotbeaffectedbythesubstitutionofanyotherdistincttermsforAandB.Soif
'AandBareincompatible'couldbedemonstratedwithoutanalysisofAorB,thisdemonstration
wouldfollowfromalogicalformthatthepropositionshareswith'CandDareincompatible',anda
similardemonstrationcouldbegivenforthelatterproposition.Thusitcouldbeprovedthatall
qualitiesareincompatible.Sincethatresultwouldbeabsurd,wemustconcludethat'AandBare
incompatible'cannotbedemonstratedwithoutanalysisofAorB.
Therestofthislemmaiseasy.
(6)"But[AandB]areunanalyzable[exhypothesi]."
Fortheyareperfections[asassumedinstep(4)],andallperfectionsareunanalyzable[bystep(2)
].
(7)"Thereforethispropositioncannotbedemonstratedaboutthem."
Thatis,itfollowsfromsteps(5)and(6)that'AandBareincompatible'cannotbedemonstrated.
Thenextsentenceoftheproofcontainsanotherwholelemma:"Itcouldcertainlybedemonstrated
aboutthem,however,ifitweretrue,sinceitisnotknownthroughitself,butallpropositionsthat
arenecessarilytrueareeitherdemonstrableorknownthroughthemselves."Iwillseparateand
reorderthethreestepsofthissubproof.
(8)"Allpropositionsthatarenecessarilytrueareeitherdemonstrableorknownthrough
themselves."
HereIthinkLeibniz'sterminologyissomewhatmisleading.Heappearstotiealogicalor
metaphysicalmodality("necessarilytrue")toepistemologicalcriteria("demonstrableorknown
throughthemselves").Infact(asIhavearguedinChapter1,section2.2)demonstrability,for
Leibniz,isastructuralfeatureofpropositionsandisnotrelativetothecapacitiesoropportunities
ofaknower.WhenLeibnizwrotethis,moreover,heprobablyhadnotyetdevelopedhistheoryof
infiniteanalysis,accordingtowhichfeaturesofanessencethatcouldbeelicitedonlybyaninfinite
analysisarenotdemonstrable.Thisrestrictionmustbedisregardedhere,inaccordancewithwhatI
saidearlierinsection1ofthischapteraboutthemodalitiesrelevanttoLeibniz'sversionofthe
ontologicalargument.Inotherwords,IdonottakeLeibniztobeclaimingherethatanyconceptual
incompatibilitymustbediscoverablebyafiniteanalysis,ifanalysisisneededat
144
all.ToleaveopenachancethattheconceptofGodmaycontainaninconsistency,thoughonethat
couldbediscoveredonlybysomethingmorethanfiniteanalysis,istoabandonLeibniz'sproject,
sincegenuineessencescannotcontaineventhatsortofinconsistency.
Similarly'knownthroughthemselves'[persenota]mustbeunderstoodhereasmeaning'knowable
throughthemselves',inprinciple,whetherornotweinfactknowtheminthatoranyotherway.
Leibnizexpresseshimselfmoreclearlyinanotherversionofthisproof,wherehesaysthatifthe
propositioninquestionisnecessary,thenitwillbe"eitheridenticalordemonstrable"(AVI,iii,572,
italicsadded).Anecessarilytrueproposition,forLeibniz,isonethatiseitheridenticalorcanbe
reducedtoidentitiesbyalogicalprocessthatcountsasademonstration.Thiscanbetrueofa
propositionevenifnohumanbeinghaseversomuchasthoughtofit.
Thisunderstandingof'knownthroughitself'iscrucialfortheotherpremiseofthislemma,which
Leibnizsimplyasserts,withoutproof.
(9)Theproposition,'AandBareincompatible',"isnotknownthroughitself."
Ofallthestepsinthewholeargument,wemightinitiallythinkthisonethemostinneedofproof.
Forifsomesimple,purelypositivequalitiesareincompatible(whichisthehypothesisLeibnizis
tryingtorefute),theirincompatibilityispresumablyaprimitive,indemonstrablenecessity.
Leibniz'sconfidenceinthispremiseisbasedonhisconvictionthatallprimitive,indemonstrable
necessitiesmustbeidentities.Thatis,theymusthavesuchaformas'A=A',orperhaps'Aisnot
nonA,',or'WhathasAandBhasA'.AndwhereAandBaredistinctperfections,'AandBare
incompatible'doesnothavesuchaform,nordoestheunderlyingnonmodalproposition,'AandB
arenotinthesamesubject',whichitdeclarestobenecessary.Thisreasoningismoreexplicitinthe
otherversionIhavementionedoftheargument,where'identical'takestheplaceof'knownthrough
itself'.Therehesays:
Thisproposition,'QualityAandqualityBcannotbeinthesamesubject',...cannotbe
identical,forthen'WhereAis,Bcannotbe'wouldbethesameas'AisA'or'Ais[not]
22B',andsoonewouldexpresstheexclusionoftheother,andsooneofthemwouldbe
thenegativeoftheother,whichiscontrarytothehypothesis,forweassumedthatthey
areallaffirmative.(AVI,iii,572)
Inotherwords,'AandBareincompatible'cannotbeprimitively,indemonstrablynecessary.Forif
itwere,itwouldhavetobeanidentity,whichitcannotbeunlessA=notBorB=notA.Butthat
isimpossible[bysteps1and4],sinceAandB,asperfections,arepurelypositive.
Atthispointwecansee(asIpromisedinChapter4,section2)thatLeibniz'sargumentneednot
dependonthesimplicityoftheperfections.Theirpurelypositivecharacterissufficientforit.Even
iftheperfectionswereanalyzable,
____________________
22
Leibnizwrote'AisB',butthatistheoppositeofthesenserequiredhere;soIassume"not"was
inadvertentlyomitted.
145
'AandBareincompatible'couldnotbedemonstrable,accordingtoLeibniz,unlessitwere
reducibletoanidentity.ThatcouldnotbeunlesstheanalysisofAorBcontainedthenegationofa
propertycontainedintheanalysisoftheother.AndthatcannotbeifAandBarepurelypositive.
Leibnizsawthispoint,andmadeithimselfinoneofhis1676versionsoftheproof,sayingthatthe
possibilityofamostperfectBeing
willbeclearifIshowthatall(positive)attributesarecompatiblewitheachother.But
attributesareeitheranalyzableorunanalyzable.If,theyareanalyzable,theywillbethe
aggregateofthoseintowhichtheyareanalyzed.Thereforeitwouldbeenoughtohave
shownthecompatibilityofallthefirst,orunanalyzable,attributes,thatis,thosewhich
areconceivedthroughthemselves.Forifindividual[attributes]arethuscompatible,
pluralitieswillbetoo,andthereforealsocomposites.(AVI,iii,572)
Inotherwords,ifallsimplepositiveattributesarecompatiblewitheachother,thenevenifsomeof
thedivineperfectionsarenotsimple,theywillstillbecompatiblewitheachotheraslongasthe
simpleattributesofwhichtheyarecomposedareallpositive(astheymustbeiftheperfectionsare
purelypositive).
Moreover,inwhatmaybeLeibniz'searliestversionofthepossibilityproof,dated22March1676,
hedoesnotmentionsimplicitybutspeaksonlyof"affirmativeattributes...absolute,pure,and
unlimited,"whichareneither"modifiedbylimits"nor"in[any]waynegative"(AVI,iii,395f.).Ina
relatedstudyfourdaysearlierhehadwritten,"Aperfectionisanabsoluteaffirmativeattribute"(A
VI,iii,392).Againinhislast,briefversionoftheproof,intheMonadology(1714),onlythe
positivenessofthedivineattributesismentioned:"nothingcanpreventthepossibilityofthatwhich
includesnolimits,nonegation,andconsequentlynocontradiction"(Mon45).AstheMonadology
wastheonlyworkofLeibnizcontainingtheproofthatwasgenerallyaccessibleintheeighteenth
century,itisnotsurprisingthathissuccessors,ChristianWolffandAlexanderGottlieb
Baumgarten,giveaversionoftheproofthatreliesexclusivelyonthepositivenessofthe
perfections.23
Fromsteps(8)and(9)Leibnizinfersthat
(10)Theproposition'AandBareincompatible'"could...bedemonstratedifitwere
true."
Thisinferencerequiresasuppressedpremise,however,applyingwhatstep(8)saysaboutnecessary
truths,assuch,tothecaseunderdiscussion.Leibnizisassumingthat
(8a)If'AandBareincompatible'istrue(atall),itisnecessarilytrue.
Since'AandBareincompatible'isequivalent,asIhavenoted,to'ItisnecessarythatAandBare
notinthesamesubject',(8a)followsfromthemodalaxiom,
____________________
23
WOlff,TheologiaeNaturalisParsII,pp.118,esp.9f.(paragraphs128,esp.13);Baumgarten,
Metaphysica,pp.33032(paragraphs80311,esp.8089).
146
'Ifitisnecessarythatp,thenitisnecessarythatitisnecessarythatp',whichseemsacceptablein
relationtoanyconceptionofnecessitythatLeibnizwouldbelikelytobeusinghere.24From(8)
and(8a)itevidentlyfollowsthatwhat(8)saysabout"allpropositionsthatarenecessarilytrue"
istrueabout'AandBareincompatible'ifthelatteristrueatall.Thatis,from(8)and(8a)it
followsthat
(8b)If'AandBareincompatible'istrue,itiseitherdemonstrableorknownthrough
itself(thatis,anidenticalproposition).
Nowfrom(8b)and(9),whichsaysthat'AandBareincompatible'isnotknownthroughitself
(oranidenticalproposition),step(10)followsstraightforwardlybymodustollens.
ByanothermodustollensLeibnizinfersfromsteps(7)and(10)thatsince'AandBare
incompatible'isnotdemonstrable,itisnottrue.
(11)"Thereforethispropositionisnot...true;25thatis,itisnotnecessarythatAand
Barenotinthesamesubject."
Inotherwords,AandBarecompatible."Andsincethereasoningisthesameaboutanyother
qualitiesofthissortthatmaybeassumed,"Leibnizadds:
(12)"Thereforeallperfectionsarecompatible."
Thisistheconclusionthatwasannouncedinstep(3).
Strictlyspeaking,sincethereasoningwascarriedthroughwithapairofperfections,themostthat
couldhavebeenprovedisthatallpairsofperfectionsaremutuallycompatible.Andthatindeedhas
beenproved,iftheargumentisgoodtothispoint,for,asLeibnizsays,nothinginthereasoninghas
dependedonwhichperfectionsAandBare.Butmoreargumentisneededtogetustothe
conclusionassertedin(12).Leibnizclaimedatstep(4)that"itisthesameifmore[thantwo]are
assumedatthesametime,"butheofferednoargumentfortheclaim.Hecouldplausiblyarguethat
nothinginsteps(5)to(11)dependedonthenumberofperfectionsintheexample,andtherefore
thattheconclusion,ifjustifiedfortwo,isjustifiedforanynumberofperfections.Thatseemsfair
enough,aslongaswearetalkingaboutafinitenumberofperfections,butargumentsthatworkfor
anyfinitenumberoftermsdonotnecessarilyworkforaninfinitenumberofterms.Andnoreason
hasbeengivenhereforthinkingtheperfectionsfinitein
____________________
24
IhavearguedinChapter1,section3thataconceptionofnecessityintermsofdemonstrability
(understoodbroadlyenoughforidentitiestobecountedasdemonstrable)supportsthisaxiom.
Underthelikeliestalternativeconceptioninthiscontext,thenecessarywouldbeconceivedhereas
whatisdeterminedbyessencesalone.Butsurelyifsomethingisdeterminedbyessencesalone,itis
determinedbyessencesalonethatthatisso;sothisconceptionsustainstheaxiom,too.
25
Leibnizwrote,"Thereforethispropositionisnotnecessarilytrue."Ihaveeliminatedthemodal
qualifier,asitisnotpartoftheconclusionrequiredbytheargumentatthispoint,norisitrequired
bytheexplicativeclausefollowing"thatis"[sive].Itfollows,ofcourse,from(8a),whichLeibniz
mustbeassuming,thattheconclusionswithandwithout'necessarily'hereareequivalent.His
sloppinessintheuseofiteratedmodalitiesinthisargumentbeganwithhisunnecessaryuseofthe
modalterm'incompatible'inthepropositionproposedasanexamplewhosemodalstatushewas
goingtodiscuss.
147
number.Indeed,inapaperofthesameyearasthisproof(1676),Leibnizhadwrittenthat"There
areinfinitelymanysimpleforms,"andIthinkthatprobablyreferstothedivineperfections,though
theinterpretationofthetextisnotunproblematic(AVI,iii,521).Inanyevent,thereseemstobea
gaptobefilledintheargumentatthispoint,thoughIdoubtitwouldbeafatalweakness.
Arestatementofstep(12)yieldsasaconclusionthepossibilityofabeingpossessingall
perfections:
(13)"Thereisgiven,therefore,orcanbeunderstood,asubjectofallperfections,or
mostperfectBeing[Ensperfectissimum]."
SinceLeibnizisobviouslyassumingthatsuchabeingwouldbeGod,thislookslikethepossibility
premisethatisneededtocompletetheontologicalargument.Butitisnot,oratanyrate,notyet,
foritiscrucialthatLeibniz'sversionoftheontologicalargumentisaboutanecessaryGod,aGod
thatisanecessarybeing.Aproofofthepossibilityofamostperfectbeingdoesnotestablishthe
possibilityofanecessaryGod,however,unlessithasbeenprovedthatamostperfectbeingwould
beanecessarybeing.LeibnizhimselfwouldlaterobjecttooneofDescartes'sversionsofthe
ontologicalargumentas"takingforgrantedthatnecessaryexistenceandperfectexistencearejust
thesamething"(AII,i,476).Similarly,inhisconversationwithEckhardinApril1677,hesaidthat
inthisdemonstrationofthedivineexistencetherearetwothingstobeconsidered.One
iswhetheramostperfectBeingdoesnotimplyacontradiction.Theotheris,giventhat
amostperfectBeingdoesnotimplyacontradiction,whetherexistenceisamongthe
perfections.(AII,i,313=GI,214)
2.2TheSecondStageoftheProof:OneVersion
Leibniz'swayofstructuringtheprobleminthisremarktoEckhardreflectsthestrategyoftheproof
heshowedtoSpinoza,whichconcludeswiththestatement,"Whenceitisevidentthat[thesubject
ofallperfections]alsoexists,sinceexistenceisincludedinthenumberoftheperfections."Here
againasubproofiscompressedintoasinglesentence,anditistheleastcarefullyhandledpartof
Leibniz'sargument,intheversionthatwehavebeenfollowing.Thepremisethatexistenceisa
perfectionisassertedwithoutproof:
(14)"Existenceisincluded[among]theperfections."
WithinafewmonthsLeibnizhimselfwouldberaisingdoubtsaboutitinhisconversationand
correspondencewithEckhard(e.g.,AII,i,313=GI,214).From(13)and(14)Leibnizinfersthat
(15)Thesubjectofallperfections,whichhasbeenprovedtobepossible,"alsoexists."
BoththeinferenceandtheroleoftheconclusioninLeibniz'sstrategyarehighlyproblematic,aswe
shallsee.Foronething,wemayaskhow(15)issupposedtofollowfrom(13)and(14).
Certainly(14)entailsthefollowing:
148
(14a)Anysubjectofallperfectionsisasubjectof(i.e.,has)existence.
Fromthis,however,andthepossibilityofasubjectofallperfections,supposedlyestablishedat
step(13),whatfollows?Allthatfollows,accordingtomanyphilosophers,isthepossibilityofan
existingsubjectofallperfections.Butthisaffordsnoinferencetotheactualexistenceofsucha
being,whichisassertedinstep(15).Sincethepossibilityofabeingofanysortisgenerally
assumedtobethepossibilityofanexistingbeingofthatsort,steps(14)and(14a)seemnotto
havegottenusbeyondaclaimofpossibleexistencethatwasalreadyobviouslyimplicitinstep
(13).
Alternatively,onemightinferfrom(14)that
(14b)Existenceiscontainedinthenatureofasubjectofallperfections.
Step(15)couldthenbeinferredfrom(13)and(14b)withtheaidoftheCartesianpredication
principle:
(14c)Whateveriscontainedinthenatureofapossiblethingcanbe(truly)assertedof
thatthing.26
TheseareprobablytheassumptionsunderlyingLeibniz'sinference.Andthisisnottheonlyplace
inwhichhisdiscussionoftheontologicalargumentappearstorelyon(14c).27Itisa
controversialprinciple,however,regardedbymanyasvitiatingversionsoftheontological
argumentthatdependonit.28Indeed,byJanuary1678Leibnizhimselfwasbeginningtoobjectto
itsuseinanontologicalargument,asweshallseeinChapter6,section1.
Itmaybeamistake,however,toworrytoomuchaboutwhether(15)followsfrom(14).The
largerstrategyindicatedbyLeibniz'sargumentofJanuary1678,discussedinsection1,was
apparentlynotyetsoclearinhismindinNovember1676whenhewroteoutforSpinozahisproof
ofthepossibilityofGod'sexistence.For(15)saysbothmoreandlessthanthelargerstrategy
requiresinaconclusionofthepossibilityproof:more,since(15)assertsactualexistencewherea
proofofpossibilityisallthatwasneeded,andless,since(15)failstoidentifyGod,theperfect
being,asanecessarybeing.Theconclusionrequiredbythestrategyissomethinglikethe
following:
(15a)Asubjectofallperfections,whichwouldbeanecessarybeing,ispossible.
InordertoreachthisconclusionLeibnizneedsapremisethatsaysaboutnecessaryexistencewhat
(14)saysonlyaboutexistence:
____________________
26
ThisisassertedandusedbyDescartesinaversionofhisontologicalargument(ATVII,162,166).
ItalsoplaysaleadingroleinLeibniz'saccountoftheCartesianontologicalargumentin1684atG
IV,424/L292,andaboutthesametimeatGVII,294/L231.(Onthedatingofthelattertext,see
VE900andCouturat,LalogiquedeLeibniz,pp.189,n.1.323n.)
27
Anotherisamemorandum,datingverylikelyfrom167778,publishedinpp.286f.ofJanke,"Das
ontologischeArgument."
28
Ihavediscussedtheprinciple,anditsproblematicroleinbothAnselmianandCartesianversionsof
theargument,in"TheLogicalStructureofAnselm'sArguments."
149
(14d)Necessaryexistenceisincludedamongtheperfections.
TherecanbelittledoubtoftheacceptabilityofthispremisetoLeibnizin1676.Fortheexistence
thatheregardedasaperfectionissurelynotthelimited,contingentsortofexistencethatwe
possess,buttheunlimited,necessaryexistencethatGodpossesses.From(14d)andthetrivial
(14e)Anysubjectofnecessaryexistencewouldbeanecessarybeing,wecaninfer
(14f)Anysubjectofallperfectionswouldbeanecessarybeing.
Thedesiredconclusion(15a)clearlyfollowsfrom(13)and(14f).Letusthereforeconsider
Leibniz'spossibilityproofasamendedbythesubstitutionof(14d)and(15a)for(14)and(15),
respectively.
Oneobjectiontotheproof,evenasamended,isthatitcaneasilybeparodiedtoprovethe
possibility,andhencetheexistence,offartoomanynecessarybeings.Thisisaclassictypeof
objectiontoontologicalarguments;onethinksofGaunilo'sperfectislandandCaterus'sexisting
lion.29Thereisanobviousproblemofthissortfortheunamendedproofthatreliesonthe
Cartesianpredicationprincipleandthepremisethatexistenceisaperfection:Existencecan
consistentlybeconjoinedwiththedefiningpropertiesofanysortofthingthatcouldpossibly
existthatis,inLeibniz'sview,withanyconsistentsetofproperties;inthiswayitseemswecan
producenew,existenceimplyingdefinitions.So,ifwearetorelyontheCartesianpredication
principle,wemustacceptanassertionoftheexistenceofeverypossiblesortofthing.30
Eventheamendedprooffacesasimilardifficulty.31Leibnizclaimedthat"onlytheessenceofGod
hasthisprivilege,"thatexistencefollowsfromit[AII,i,391(January1678);similarlyAII,i,436/
AG238(167879);Mon45(1714)].Buthowcanhesustainthisclaim?Ifnecessaryexistenceisa
perfection,inthesenseofstep(1)ofthepossibilityproof,itisasimple,purelypositivepropertyof
unlimiteddegree.Theheartoftheamendedproofwillbetheclaimthatbyvirtueoftheirsimple,
purelypositivecharacter,necessaryexistenceandalltheotherperfectionsaremutuallyconsistent,
becausethereisnowayinwhichsimple,purelypositivequalitiescanbemutuallyinconsistent.But
nowsupposethataperfectionP(otherthannecessaryexistence)isreplacedbyitsnegation,notP.
Thatis,considerasetSofproperties,composedofnotP,N(necessaryexis
____________________
29
Gaunilo,"OnBehalfoftheFool,"6;Caterus,inATVII,99f.
30
ThisisageneralizationofGaunilo'sfamous"perfectisland"objectiontoAnselm'sversionofthe
ontologicalargument,orCaterus's"existentlion"objectiontoDescartes'sversion.Ihavediscussed
these,andsomerepliestothem,insectionIIof"TheLogicalStructureofAnselm'sArguments."
Myargumenttherewouldsupporttheclaimthatevenifdefendersofanontologicalargumentwish
torelyontheCartesianpredicationprinciple,theyhavereasontoruntheirargumentintermsof
necessaryexistence,ratherthansimplyexistence,beingaperfection.
31
Iamindebtedtomystudentsformuchdiscussionofthispoint.JeffreyWeismanfirstproposedthe
objectiontome.
150
tence),andalltheotherperfectionsexceptP.ItseemsthatonLeibnizianprinciplesSmustbe
consistent.Forhisargumentdependsontheassumptionthattheonlywayinwhichasetof
propertiescanbeinconsistentisifoneofthemisthenegationofanothermemberoftheset,orisa
conjunctionhavingsuchanegationasaconjunct.ButnotPisnotaconjunctionandisnotthe
negationofanyothermemberofS,butonlyofP,whichisnotamemberofS.Andnoother
memberofSisaconjunctionoranegationofanything.Itseemstofollow,onLeibnizian
principles,thatthereisapossiblesubjectofS,whichmustbeapossible,andthereforeactual,
necessarybutimperfectbeing.Indeed,itseemsthatforsimilarreasonsLeibnizmustadmit
indefinitelymanynecessarybeingsthatarelessthanperfect,assomeotherperfectioninsteadofP,
ortwoperfectionsinsteadofone,couldbereplacedbytheirnegationswithoutaffectingthe
structureoftheargument.IbelievethatthisobjectionwillprovefataltoanyversionofLeibniz's
argumentthatreliesonthepremisethatnecessaryexistenceisaperfection.
2.3TheSecondStage:AnotherVersion
VersionsthatdonotrelyonitarefoundinLeibniz'sworksorsuggestedbylaterdevelopmentsin
histhought.OneofthembelongstothesameyearastheversionheshowedSpinoza.Inanother
paperof1676,havinggivenanargumentverysimilartosteps(1)to(13)above,Leibniztriesto
connecttheperfectbeingwithnecessaryexistencebyadifferentsubproof,whichdoesnothaveit
asapremisethateitherexistenceornecessaryexistenceisaperfection.
Hencenowitseemstobeproved,further,thataBeingofthissort,whichismost
perfect,isnecessary.Foritcannotbeunlessithasareasonforexistingfromitselfor
fromsomethingelse.Itcannothaveitfromsomethingelse,becauseeverythingthatcan
beunderstoodinsomethingelsecanalreadybeunderstoodinitthatis,becausewe
conceiveitthroughitself[perse],orbecauseithasnorequirementsoutsideitself.
Thereforeeitheritcannothaveanyreasonforexisting,andsoisimpossible,contraryto
whatwehaveshown,orelseitwillhaveitfromitself,andsowillbenecessary.(A
VI,iii,572)32
Thekeytounderstandingthisproofliesinthestatementthatamostperfectbeing(ens
perfectissimum)cannothaveareasonforexistingfromsomethingelse"becauseweconceiveit
throughitself,orbecauseithasnorequirementsoutsideitself."Suchabeingisconceivedthrough
itselfbecauseithasallthesimple,purelypositiveattributes,andthereforealltheattributesinto
whichtheconceptofitisultimatelyanalyzableareattributesthatitpossesses.Ithasno
requirementsoutsideitselfforthesamereason,ontheassumptionthatabeing's"requirements"are
allattributesorpredicatesthatoccurintheanalysisofitsessence,33andthatifithasrequirements
"outsideitself,"thesewillbeproper
____________________
32
Alittlelater(p.573)inthissamepaperisfoundthepassage,discussedatlengthinChapter4,
section3.1inthisvolume,inwhichLeibnizoffersademonstrationfortheratherSpinozisticthesis
that"allthingsaredistinguishednotassubstancesbutasmodes."ThequestionofSpinozistic
influenceonthepresentargumentwillbediscussedlaterinthischapter.
33
Leibniz'snotionof"requirements"isdiscussedatlengthinChapter4,section1.
151
tiesthatthebeingdoesnotpossessbutthatareinvolvedinthelogicalconstructionofitsessential
properties.
Whyisthisfeatureofanensperfectissimumareasonforthinkingthatitcannothaveareasonfor
existingfromsomethingelse?34Giventhatsuchabeinghasno"requirements"outsideitselfinthe
sensethatthelogicalstructureofitsessenceinvolvesnopropertiesthatthebeingitselfdoesnot
possess,totakethatasmeaningthatithasno"requirements"outsideitselfinthesenseofhaving
nocausallynecessaryconditionsinanotherbeingwouldseem(atleasttomanyphilosophers)a
verybadpun.ButLeibnizwasnotpunning.Hebelievedthatthereisaconnectionbetweenlogical
dependenceandcausaldependence,35andclaimed[AVl,iii,514(April1676)]that
(16)"Theeffectisconceivedthroughitscause."
Thisclaimmustbeunderstoodasmadeabouteveryeffect,andasmeaningthatthecausehasan
attributeorpredicatethattheeffectdoesnotpossessbutthatisinvolvedintheanalysisofthe
conceptoftheeffect.ForLeibnizoffered(16)asareasonfor
(17)"Whateverisconceivedthroughitself,acauseofitcannotbeunderstood.
Theinferenceisvalid,if(16)isunderstoodasIhaveindicatedand'cause'in(17)meansan
externalcause,acausedistinctfromtheeffect.ForreasonsthatIhavediscussed,Leibnizheldthat
(18)Anensperfectissimummustbeconceivedthroughitself.
Andfrom(17)and(18),undertheinterpretationof'cause'Ihaveassumedfor(17),itfollows
that
(19)Anensperfectissimumcannothaveareasonforexistingfromsomethingelse.
Thekeypremiseinthisreasoningis(16).ItisreminiscentofSpinoza'saxiomthat"The
knowledgeoftheeffectdependsontheknowledgeofthecause,andinvolvesit."36Wecannot
excludethepossibilitythatLeibniz'sbeliefin(19)was
____________________
34
Asimilarargumentfromthenotionofarequirementisfoundinapieceofuncertaindate(VE51=
LHIV,1,15,3).Theretheargumentisthatifanatureiscompletelysimple,itwillhaveonlyone
requirement,withwhichitwillbeidentical,andathingofsuchanaturemustthereforeexist
throughitself,andhencenecessarily,ifitexistsatall.Leibnizdoesnotapplythistotheexistence
ofGod,however,nordoeshehereaffirmthetraditionaldoctrineoftheabsolutesimplicityofthe
divinenature,whichgenerallydoesnotappeartobehisview.(Cf.Grua,Jurisprudence,p.244.)
Ratherheusestheargumentaspartofalargerargumentthatvolitionsmusthavecomplex
requirementsandmustthereforehavereasons.
35
See,again,Chapter4,section1.
36
Spinoza,Ethics,I,axiom4.LeibniziscommentingonanexpositionofSpinoza'sideaswhenhe
indicateshisbeliefinsomethinglike(16),inanothertextof1676,byequatingathing"thatis
152
rootedintheSpinozisticideathatbeingsthatarecausedtoexistaremodificationsofaninfinite
attributepossessedbythebeingthatcausesthem.Anensperfectissimum,ofcourse,couldnotbe
causedinthiswaybecauseitsattributesareallabsolute,unmodified.Insupportofthis
interpretationitcouldbeurgedthattheargumentinwhich(19)figuresseemscalculatedto
provide,forthecaseofGod,whatLeibnizhaddemanded,probablysomewhatearlierin1676,for
Spinoza'sviewthatexistencepertainstotheessenceofsubstance.Hesaid,"Itshouldbeshownthat
thisfollowsfromthefactthat[substance]isconceivedthroughitself"(AVI,iii,277=GI,132).
Thepapercontainingtheargumentwearestudying,thatanensperfectissimummustbea
necessarybeing,isoneofthemostSpinozisticinappearanceofLeibnizwritingsfrom1676,
containingademonstration"thatallthingsaredistinguished,notassubstances,butasmodes"(A
VI,iii,573).37Suggestionsofthisideaarealsofoundinthepaperinwhich(16)isfound.(A
VI,iii,514f.)
Nevertheless,both(16)and(19)couldbeheldwithoutthisSpinozisticbelief.Itisclearthat
throughouthislifeLeibnizsawconceptualandcausalrelationsasinsomewaysfused.38
Moreover,aweakerpremiseaboutcausalitythan(16)couldsupport(19).Manyphilosophers,
notablyincludingDescartes,havebelievedthat
(16a)Ifanythingcauses,oristhereasonfor,theexistenceofsomethingelse,any
perfectionfoundintheeffectmustbefoundinatleastashighadegreeinthecause.
Leibnizbelievedtherecannotbetwoabsolutelyperfectbeings.Inanearlysketchofhispossibility
proof,heclaimedthat"itismanifestthatsuchaBeing[onetowhichallaffirmativeattributes
belong]isunique"(AVI,iii,396)fromwhichitfollowsthat
(17a)Therecannotbeabeingthatpossesses,inatleastashighadegree,allthe
perfectionsfoundinanensperfectissimumthatisdistinctfromit.
Leibnizarguedfortheuniquenessoftheensperfectissimumonthebasisoftheprincipleofthe
identityofindiscernibles,orsomethinglikeit:"Foriftwounlimited[beings]differnumerically,
theywillalsodifferinspecies,sincetheywillcertainlydiffer."Thisisnotthemostlucid
formulationoftheprinciple,butitiscoupledwithanaffirmation(andLeibnizianqualification)of
theThomisticthesisabouttheangelsthatLeibnizwouldlaterciteasapartialprecedentforhisown
thesisoftheidentityofindiscernibles:"AndSt.Thomasrightlyheldthatsubstancesseparatedfrom
matter(asisGodalone)woulddifferinspeciesifthereweremanyofthem"(AVI,iii,396).
Statements(16a)and(17a)jointlyentail
____________________
36
itsownreasonofexisting"withathing"allofwhoserequirementsweconceivewithoutthe
conceptofanotherthing"(AVI,iii,275=GI,131).
37
Seenote32above.
38
Cf.Chapter3,section1.
153
(19)Anensperfectissimumcannothaveareasonforexistingfromsomethingelse.
Suchareasoncouldbefound,accordingto(16a),onlyinabeingthatsatisfiesaconditionthatno
beingcansatisfy,accordingto(17a).
RegardlessofhowLeibnizmeanttojustify(19),heisobviouslyrightininferringfromitthat
(20)Eitheranensperfectissimumcannothaveanyreasonatallforexisting,orsucha
beingcan39haveareasonforexistingfromitself.
Headdstwofurtherpremises:
(21)Ifanysortofthingcannothaveanyreasonatallforexisting,thenthatsortof
thingisimpossible.
(22)AnybeingthathasareasonforexistingfromitselfMUSt40beanecessarybeing.
Statements(20),(21),and(22)jointlyimply
(23)Eitheranensperfectissimumisimpossible,oranensperfectissimumcanbea
necessarybeing.
But,Leibnizclaims,hehasjustprovedthat
(24)Anensperfectissimumispossible.
Soitfollowsbymodustollensthat
(25)Anensperfectissimumcanbeanecessarybeing.
Inotherwords,anecessaryGodispossible,whichisjusttheconclusionLeibnizneedstocomplete
hisontologicalargument.
Thisargumentrestsonapremiseaboutcausalitywhether(16)or(16a)thatwouldbe
questioned,andevenrejected,bymanyphilosophers.Here,however,weneednotpauseto
considerthetruthoftheseassumptions.Itisenoughtopointoutthattheuseofanyoftheminthe
presentcontext,asapremiseinacompletionofLeibniz'sproofforthepossibilityofanecessary
God,underminesthestrategyoftheproof.
Thefirststageoftheproof,whichIhavearticulatedinsection2.1ofthischapterandwhichis
supposedtoestablishthepossibilityofanensperfectissimum,dependscruciallyontheassumption
thattheonlywayinwhichanysortofthingcanbeimpossibleisbyincludingbothapropertyand
itsnega
____________________
39
LeibnIzwrote"will"atthispoint,but"can"iswhatiswarrantedandrequiredbytheargument.
40
Asinstep(20),IhavecorrectedLeibniz'smodality,thistimefrom"will"to"must."
154
tionamongitsessentialordefiningproperties,oramongconjunctsthatwouldappearinananalysis
ofitsessentialordefiningproperties.Butinconjoining(21)with(16)[or(16a)]Leibnizwould
commithimselftoanotherwayinwhichitisatleastthinkablethatasupposedsortofbeingcould
beimpossiblethatis,byhavinganessencethatdoesnotinvolveexistencethoughitisconceived
throughitself(orisnotanalyzableintermsofaperfectionthatsomeotherbeingcouldpossessin
higherdegree).Theargumentofsection2.1doesnotshowthatanensperfectissimumcouldnotbe
impossibleinthisway;soifwetrytocompletetheargumentbyshowingthatanens
perfectissimummustbeimpossibleinthiswayunlessitisanecessarybeing,wemerelyinvitethe
suspicionthatanensperfectissimummayindeedbeimpossibleinthisway.
PerhapsLeibnizwouldreplythatwedonotreallyhavehereanotherwayinwhichsomething
couldbeimpossible.Perhapshethoughtitcouldbeshownthatasupposednonnecessarybeing
whoseessenceisconceivedthoughitself(orisnotanalyzableintermsofaperfectionthatsome
otherbeingcouldpossessinhigherdegree)mustcontainanexplicitcontradictionamongits
definingproperties,oramongconjunctsintowhichtheycouldinprinciplebeanalyzed.ButIdo
notseehowthiscouldbeshown,anditdoesnotseemparticularlyplausible.
Ideasaboutcausalityrelatedto(16)or(16a)mightalsohavebeenthoughttoprovideLeibniz
withadefensefortheversionofthesecondstageofhispossibilityproofpresentedinsection2.2of
thischapter.Thatversionfacestheobjectionthatasimilarproofseemstobeavailableforthe
possibility,andhencetheexistence,ofindefinitelymanyimperfectnecessarybeings.Perhaps
Leibnizthoughtoftheperfectionsas"requirements"ofallpossiblethingsinsuchawaythathe
mighthaverepliedthatanypossiblebeingthatwouldbeinanywayimperfectmust(i)havea
limiteddegreeofoneoftheperfectionsand(ii)becausedbyabeingthathastheunlimiteddegree
ofthatperfection.Thereasonfor(ii)wouldbethatsincetheunlimitedispriorinnaturetothe
limited,thelimiteddegreeoftheperfectionmustbeconceivedthroughtheunlimiteddegreeofit,
andcausaldependencerunsparalleltoconceptualdependence.Wemayadd(iii)thatabeingthat
mustbecausedbyanotherbeingisnotanecessarybeinginthesenseintendedbyLeibniz,sinceits
existencedoesnotflowfromitsownnaturealone,andthusitisnotnecessaryinitself(regardless
ofwhetheritisnecessarilyproducedbyitscause).Fromtheseassumptionsitfollowsthat
necessaryexistenceisinconsistentwithanyimperfection,sothatonlytheabsolutelyperfectbeing,
whichpossessesallperfections,couldbeanecessarybeing.
Thisdefense,however,confrontsthesamecrucialdifficultyastheversionoftheproofthatrelies
on(21)and(16)or(16a).Thatis,itunderminestheassumptionthatanimpossiblesortofthing
mustcontainanexplicitcontradictionamongitsdefiningproperties,whichiscrucialtothefirst
stageofLeibniz'spossibilityproof.Forthedefenserelieson(i)and(ii)asnecessaryconditionson
imperfectbeingstoshowthatanimperfectnecessarybeingisimpossible,butwithoutshowingthat
animperfectnecessarybeing,asanimperfectbeingnotcausedbyanotherbeing,mustcontainan
explicitcontradictionamongitsdefiningproperties.Leibnizmayhavebelievedthat(ii)expressesa
necessarytruthofcausalmetaphysics,butitishardtoseehowhecouldshowthatalimiteddegree
ofanyperfectionisanalyzableasaconjunctionhavingasaconjunctthe
155
propertyofbeingcausedbyanotherbeinghavingtheunlimiteddegreeoftheperfection.
Neitherofthe1676versionsofLeibniz'sproofofthepossibilityofanecessaryGodseemstohave
muchlikelihoodofsucceeding.Evenifthefirststage,leadingtotheconclusionthatanens
perfectissimumispossible,weretobejudgedsuccessful,thereisnoanswerinsighttothe
objectionsthatconfrontbothversionsoftheconcludingstage,inwhichLeibniztriestoshowthat
anensperfectissimummustbeanecessarybeing.Leibniz'sviewsontherelationofexistenceto
perfectioncontinuedtodevelopafter1676,however.Inthenextchapterwewillconsiderwhether
hislaterviewsprovideabasisforabetterversionofthepossibilityproof.
156
6
ExistenceandEssence
InhisconversationandcorrespondencewithArnoldEckhard,beginninglessthansixmonthsafter
hisvisitswithSpinoza,weseemtoseeLeibnizworkinghiswayoutoftheassumptionthat
existenceis"aperfection"inthesenseofa"simplequalitythatispositiveandabsolute."AsInoted
attheendofsection2.1ofthepreviouschapter,LeibnizpointedouttoEckhardthatoneofthe
"twothingstobeconsidered"regardingtheCartesianontologicalargumentis"whetherexistenceis
amongtheperfections."Leibnizthenproceededtoproposeareasonforthinkingthatexistenceis
notaperfection:"Forperfectionsseemtobequalities,asexistenceisnot"(AII,i,313=GI,214).
ThatexistenceisnotaqualitymaynothavebeenafixedpointforLeibnizinthisdiscussion,forin
hisnextlettertoEckhardheappearstoequatethequestion"whetherexistencecanfollowfrom
essence"(ashesurelybelievedthatitcan)withthequestion"whether...existencecanbe
understoodasanessentialqualityofsomeBeing,namelyofGod"(AII,i,324=GI,223).Inthe
resolutionultimatelyreachedonthispointinthecorrespondence,however,theideaofperfections
asthesimpleprimitivequalitiesseemstobeleftbehind,atleastforthetimebeing.Leibniz
droppedhisobjectiontotheclaimthatexistenceisaperfection"after[Eckhard]explainedthatfor
[him]perfectionisBeing[Entitas],insofarasitisunderstoodtodepartfromnonBeingoras
[Leibnizwould]prefertodefineit,thatperfectionisdegreeorquantityofrealityoressence"(A
II,i,363/L177).Giventhisdefinitionofperfection,whichLeibnizhimselfapproved(AII,i,327=
1hesays"itisplainalsothatExistenceisaperfection,orincreasesreality;thatis,when
GI,225),
existentAisconceived,morerealityisconceivedthanwhenpossibleAisconceived"(AII,i,363/
L177).
IpointedoutinChapter4,section2,thatinthisdefinitionsimplicitydropsoutasacriterionfor
perfection,leavingpositivenesstostandalone.Moreimportantinthepresentcontextistherelation
betweenperfectionandessence.Indefiningperfectionhereas"degreeorquantityofrealityor
2apropertyofproperties,andspe
essence,"Leibniztakesittobeeitherasecondorderproperty,
____________________
1
Similarly,in"ElementsofTruePiety,"whosewatermarkisattestedfrom167778(VE233),
'perfection'isdefinedas"degree[gradus]orquantityofreality"("orquantity"beinganemendation
byLeibniz),andin"OnAffections,"datedApril1679,'perfection'isrepeatedlydefinedas"degree
ofreality"(Gr11,527,529).
2
Idonotuse'property'hereinthetechnicalLeibniziansenseexplainedinChapter4,section3.1,but
inabroadsenseinwhichitsignifiesanythingthatmaybepredicatedofanobjectofthought,
157
cificallyofessences,orelseapropertyofthingsthatisdefinedintermsofa(secondorder)
propertyoftheiressences.Hereperfectiondependsontheessence.Thisisquitedifferentfromthe
1676proofsofthepossibilityofGod'sexistence,whereperfectionsarefirstorderproperties,on
whichessencesdepend,inasmuchasessencesarecomposedofperfectionsand/orofproperties
derivedinsomewayfromperfections.Weneednotsupposethatafundamentallydifferent
metaphysicalstructureisenvisagedinthesedifferenttexts,buttheattachmentoftheconceptof
perfectiontoadifferentpartofthestructureintheEckhardcorrespondencemayopenthewayfora
reconceptionoftherelationbetweenexistenceandessence.Thebeginningsofsuchareconception
appearbyJanuary1678atthelatest.Wecanapproachitbywayofthequestionhowexistence
increasesreality,asLeibnizacknowledgedtoEckhardthatitdoes.
1.IsExistenceanEssentialQualityofGod?
Leibniz'sacceptanceofEckhard'sdefinitionofperfectionasameasureofthedegreeofpositive
realitycontainedintheessenceofathingwouldbeconsistentwithhiscontinuingtothinkof
existenceasasimple,purelypositivequalityofthesortthathehadcalledperfectionsinhis1676
proofsofthepossibilityofGod'sexistence.Hisassigning'perfection'tosignifyanotherfeatureof
themetaphysicalstructurecertainlydidnotmeanthathehadceasedtobelievethattherearesuch
qualitiesandthattheyessentiallyanddistinctivelycharacterizeGod.Sinceanythinghasmore
"reality,"intherelevantsense,ifitpossessesanypurelypositivequalitythanifitlacksit,the
identificationofexistenceassuchaqualitywouldexplainhowexistenceincreasesreality.If
existenceisconceivedinthisway,itisnaturaltosupposethatexistencemayberelatedtoan
essenceinthesamewayasothersimple,positivequalitiesthatis,asaconstituentoftheessence,
andthusasanessentialordefiningqualityofthethingthathastheessence.
Leibnizcametoobjecttothiswayofthinkingofexistence,however,forhewrote:
IfExistenceweresomethingotherthananessence'sdemand[exigentia],itwould
followthatithassomeessenceorsuperaddssomethingnewtothings,aboutwhichit
couldbeaskedagainwhetherthisessenceexists,andwhythisoneratherthananother.
3
(GVII,195)
____________________
provideditisunderstoodthatwhatissignifiedisafeatureoftheobject,ratherthanafeatureof
thoughtorspeechabouttheobject.
3
Thisisa(possiblylater)marginalannotationtoamanuscriptthatmaybedatedwithsome
probability,onthebasisofwatermark,totheperiod167780(seeVE115).Ithinkboththenote
andtheunderlyingtext,whichalsocontainstheideaof"anessence'sdemand,"shouldbedated
afterthedocumentofJanuary1678,discussedlaterinthissection,whichshowsnotraceofthat
ideaandtreatsexistenceassimilarto"realitiesorformsorperfections"thatareconsituentsof
essences(AII,i,392),evenwhileitstrivestoarticulateadifferentrelationofexistencetoessence.
ForsimilarreasonsIwouldassignadateafterJanuary1678(thoughnotverymuchlater)to
"ElementsofTruePiety,"whosewatermarkisattestedfrom167778(VE233),andwhich
containsaversionoftheideaofanessence'sdemand,thoughintermsof"propensity[propensio]to
exist,"ratherthaninthemetaphoricaltermsof"demand[exigentia]"(Gr16f.).
158
Wewillcomeinduecoursetotheconception,implicitlyaffirmedhere,ofexistenceas"an
essence'sdemand."Ourpresentconcerniswiththeideathatexistence"hassomeessenceor
superaddssomethingnewtothings."Ifthisweretrue,Leibnizobjects,wecouldaskwhether
existenceexists,orwhetherexistentthingsexist,andwhytheyexistratherthansomethingelse.
Grantinghimthatthesequestionsareabsurd,wemaywonderwhyhethinkstheywouldarise.
AsimilarargumentinKantspringsreadilytomind,oneinwhichKantalsoobjectstotheideaof
existenceaddingsomethingnewtothings."Theactual,"wroteKant,"containsnomorethanthe
merelypossible.Ahundredactualdollarscontainnottheleast[coin]morethanahundredpossible
dollars,"although"ahundredactualdollarshavemoreeffectonmyfinancialconditionthanthe
4Kanttakesthisasareasonfordenyingthat
mereconceptofthem(thatis,theirpossibility)does."
existenceisa"realpredicate"or"determination"[Bestimmung]thatis,"apredicatethatisadded
5Thusfar,Ithink,Kantisinsubstantialagreement
totheconceptofthesubjectandenlargesit."
withLeibniz.
Kant'sfavoredalternativeistosaythatthefunctionoftheverb'tobe'initsexistentialuseisto
posit[setzen]"thesubjectinitselfwithallitspredicates,andindeed[topositit]astheobjectin
6Modernlogicaltheoryhascarriedthissuggestioninadirectionthatis
relationtomyconcept."
certainlynotinagreementwithLeibniz'sviewsorwithhispractice.Inourlogicalsymbolismwe
donotnormallytreatexistenceformallyorgrammaticallyasapredicateatall.Existenceisallowed
expressiononlyindirectly,infusionwithquantityspecifically,withthe"particular"quantityofa
term,astraditionalpredicatelogicwouldhavecalledit.'(x)Fx'isnormallyinterpretedasmeaning
simultaneously'Forsomething,x,Fx'and'Thereexists(atleastonething)xsuchthatFx.'Under
thiscustomaryinterpretation,followingKant'scommentaboutpositinganobjectforourconcept,
wedonotinthefirstinstanceascribeexistencetoanobject,butrathersaythatapredicateis
exemplified.(InthiswegobeyondKant,whoexplicitlyallowedthatexistencecouldbeusedasa
7)
"logicalpredicate,"thoughitisnota"realpredicate."
Howcanweallow'Forsomex,Fx'and'ThereexistsanxsuchthatFx'tocoincide?Mightwenot
thinkthat'Forsomex,xis(orwas)awingedhorse'istrue(sincePegasus,forexample,wasa
wingedhorse),but'Thereexists(orexisted)anxsuchthatxis(orwas)awingedhorse'isfalse
(sincePegasus,andwingedhorsesgenerally,haveneverexisted)?Theusualanswerinvolvesthe
ideathat'Forsomex,(x)'meansthatistrueofatleastonememberofasetofthingswhichis
knownasthe"universeofdiscourse."Andininterpretingoursymboliclogicwenormallyassume
thatonlythingsthatactuallyexist(atsometime,ortimelessly)areintheuniverseofdiscourse.On
thisinterpretation'Forsomex,Fx'willbetrueifandonlyifthereexistsanxsuchthatFx.Thisset
ofideasiseventakenasanexplicationoftheconceptofexistenceintheinfluentialQuinean
dictumthat"tobeistobeavalueofaboundvariable."Moreover,ifweaddtheusualassumption
that'Fa'(whereaisaparticularindividual)entails
____________________
4
Kant,CritiqueofPureReason,A599/B627.
5
6
7
159
'Forsomex,Fx',itfollowsfromtheseviewsthatpredicatescanbeascribedwithtruthonlyto
existingthings,andthatexistenceisnotneededasaseparatepredicatebecauseitisimpliedinthe
ascriptionofanypredicate.
ItisclearthatLeibnizdiffersfrommorerecentlogicaltheoryonthesepoints.'Existent'isusedasa
predicateinhislogicalapparatus(C271f.,375f./P65f.),and,asweshallsee,hispapersabound
withdefinitionsofit.Intheintensionalinterpretationofpredicatelogicwhichhemostoften
prefers,moreover,'SomeAisB'doesnotimplythatanyAorBactuallyexists,8anditis
possibilityratherthanexistencethatisrequiredofabeingorentity(ens)towhichpredicatesareto
9Thesearemainlyformalpoints,however,andtheascriptionofpredicatestopossible
beascribed.
beingsassuchwasregardedbyLeibnizasreducibletomorefundamentalsortsofproposition,as
weshallsoonsee.
IfwearetounderstandtheconsiderationsthatledLeibniztorejecttheconceptionofexistenceasa
quality,and,inthecaseofGod,anessentialquality,wemustfocusnotontherelationofexistence
topredication,butontherelationofexistencetoessence.Leibnizexpressedtherejectedviewin
termsofexistencehaving"someessence,"andItakethattomeanhavingcontentofthesortthatis
requiredtoconstitute,inwholeorinpart,anessencecontentofthesortpossessedorcontributed
bypositivequalitiesingeneral.Inthiswayexistencewouldbe,inKant'sterms,"apredicatethatis
addedtotheconceptofthesubjectandenlargesit,"thoughsomethingimportanttoLeibnizisleft
outinreplacing'essence'by'concept'.Ifexistencehad"someessence"inthissense,itwouldbethe
essence,or(moreplausibly)partoftheessence,ofexistentthings,andexistentthingswouldbea
kindofthings,orexistentFswouldbeakindofFs.
Leibnizsuggests,however,thatonthisviewitwouldseemtobeanopenquestion,whetherand
whyitisthingsofthiskindthatactuallyexist,ratherthanthingsofsomeotherkind.This
suggestionmayseempuzzling;whyaren'tthesequestionsansweredbytheobservationthatthe
kindofthingswearetalkingaboutisexistentthings?ButthepointLeibnizistryingtomakeisthat
theconceptofexistencehasanessentialuseinaskingquestionsthatcannotbeansweredinthat
way,and,morebroadly,thatsayingthat(oraskingwhether)Fsexistisquitedifferentfromsaying
oraskinganythingaboutwhatkindofthingFsare.InLeibniz'swayofthinkingthisisapoint
abouttherelationofexistencetoessence,becauseitistheessenceofathingthatdeterminesthe
kindstowhichitbelongs.10Ourconceptofexistence,therefore,isnottheconceptofakindof
thing,orofacontentthatanessencemighthave.Itwouldbemoreaccuratetosaythatitisthe
conceptofastatusthatthingshave,andcarrieswithittheconceptofacorrelatedstatusthatthe
essencesofexistentthingshave.Asweshallsee,muchofLeibniz'sdiscussionofexistenceisan
efforttocharacterizesuchstatuses.
____________________
10
InAristotelianthought,accidentalaswellasessentialkindsarerecognized.ForLeibniz,however,
anydifferenceinkindconstitutesadifferenceintheessenceofanindividualthing,andthus
essencecompletelydetermineskindmembership;seeDM16.
8
SeeChapter2,section3.
9
Thereisatleastonetext[GVII,214/P118(after1690)]inwhichLeibnizacknowledgesthe
possibilityofusinganalternativeinterpretationinwhichactualexistenceisrequiredofabeing
(ens).SeeMates,PhilosophyofLeibniz,pp.5557,foraninterestingdiscussionofthistopic,with
manyreferencesthoughIthinkthattheexistentialinterpretationofensislessprominentin
Leibniz'sworkthanMatessuggests.
160
AnimportantdocumentofthedevelopmentoftheseideasinLeibniz'sthoughtdatesfromJanuary
1678.Inhisannotationstohisversionoftheincompleteorconditionalontologicalproof,discussed
inChapter5,section1,hesays:
Spinozareasonsthus,followingDescartes:Itisthesametosaythatsomethingis
containedinthenatureorconceptofsomething,astosaythatthatvery[predication]is
trueaboutthatthing(asitiscontainedintheconceptofaTriangle,orfollowsfromits
essence,thatitsthreeanglesareequaltotworightangles).Butnecessaryexistenceis
containedinthesamewayintheconceptofGod.ThereforeitistrueaboutGodtosay
thatnecessaryexistenceisinhim,orthatheexists.Tothisreasoning,andotherslikeit,
itcanbeobjectedthatallthosepropositionsareconditional,fortosaythatthreeangles
equaltotworightanglesareinvolvedinthenatureorconceptofatriangleistosay
onlythatifatriangleshouldexist,thenitwouldhavethisproperty.Sointhesameway,
evenifitbegrantedthatnecessaryexistencebelongstotheconceptofGod,stillallthat
willbeinferredfromthatisthatifGodshouldexist,thenhewouldhavethisproperty
(ofnecessaryexistence),orthatifGodshouldexist,hewouldexistnecessarily.Our
reasoning,however,isnotliabletothisdifficulty,butprovessomethingmore,namely
thatifGodisevenpossible,henecessarilyexistsinfact.(AII,i,393)
LeibnizascribestoSpinozawhatIhavecalled(inChapter5,section2.2)"theCartesianpredication
principle":
(14c)Whateveriscontainedinthenatureofapossiblethingcanbe(truly)assertedof
thatthing.
Thisprincipleisacandidatefortheinterpretationofthekeyfinaltransitionintheproofthat
LeibnizhimselfshowedSpinozain1676.Here,however,in1678,Leibnizofferswhatseemstobe
theusualKantianandpostKantianobjection11totheuseoftheCartesianpredicationprinciplein
theontologicalargument:thatfromthecontainmentofapropertyFinthenatureorconceptofan
XitfollowsonlythatifthereshouldexistanX,itwouldbeF.Hisownargument,Leibnizsays,is
notliabletothisobjection.Itbeginsbyestablishingapropositionthatisfranklyacknowledgedas
conditional.Butitsconditionalconclusionismoresubstantial:notmerely"thatifGodshouldexist,
hewouldexistnecessarily,"but"thatifGodisevenpossible,henecessarilyexistsinfact."Allthat
remainsistoprovethepossibilityoftheexistenceofsuchanecessaryGod.
Insayingthat'BisinvolvedinthenatureorconceptofA'isequivalentto'IfanAshouldexist,it
wouldbeB',Leibnizmightbetakentoberejecting(14c)insuchawayastoimply,contraryto
hisownusualpractice,thatpredicatesaretobeascribedonlytoexistentthings.ButIthinkthat
wouldbeamisreading.Leibnizisindeedareductionist,butnotaneliminationist,withregardtothe
ascriptionofpredicatestopossiblethingsassuch.ThisisclearinawellknownpassageoftheNew
Essays.Therehetreatstheproposition,'Theanglesofeverythreesidedfigureareequaltotwo
rightangles,'asascribingaEuclidianpredicatetoeachpossibletriangle.Atthesametime,hetreats
thispropositionasreducible,indicatingthatitis"atbottomconditional"andequivalentto'Ifa
figure
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11
ItwasalreadyGassendi'sobjection,ofcourse(ATVII,323).
161
hasthreesides,[thatsamefigure's]anglesareequaltotworightangles.'Thewayinwhicha
proposition"aboutasubject"thatdoesnotexist"canhavearealtruth"is"thatthetruthisonly
conditional,andsaysthatincasethesubjecteverexists,itwillbefoundtobeofthissort"(
NE446f.).12
Tobesure,thisisnottheonlyLeibnizianreductionofpredicationswhosesubjectsareconsidered
merelyaspossible.Thereisalsoareductiontorelationsofconceptualinclusion,whichheregards
asalwaysimplicit,andfoundational,inanythingsaidaboutapossiblesubjectassuch.Hiscriticism
ofSpinozacouldberegardedasreducingconceptualcontainmentclaimstoconditional
propositionsaboutthepropertiesactualexistentswouldhave.Butareductiveintentisneitherclear
norcrucialatthispoint.Themainburdenoftheargumentisthatthecorrespondingpropositionsof
thetwotypesareequivalent,andhencethat'BisinvolvedinthenatureorconceptofA'saysno
morethan'IfanAshouldexist,itwouldbeB'.
ButhowcouldLeibnizhavethoughtthatthisrefutedSpinozawithoutalsodestroyinghisown
argument?Heishereannotatingaproofthathasasapremisethat"TheessenceofGodinvolves
necessityofexistence"(whichissurelythesamepropertyasthe"necessaryexistence"thatfigures
inLeibniz'srenditionofSpinoza'sargument).Andtheproof,whensupplementedwithapossibility
proof,issupposedtoestablishtheexistenceofanecessarybeingwhosenecessityconsistsinthe
factthatitsessence"involvesexistence."Leibnizsurelythinksthisinvolvementmeansmorethan
thatifthisbeingshouldexist,itwouldexist.
Leibniz'sargumentrequiresadistinctionbetween(atleast)twowaysinwhichapredicatecanbe
involvedorcontainedinthenatureorconceptofathing.Heisquiteexplicitthathisownversion
oftheontologicalargumentturnsonasortofinvolvementthatmeanssomethingunconditional:
Inthisplacetheeternaltruthsarenottobeconsideredashypothetical,[as]assuming
actualexistence;forotherwiseacirclewouldarise.Thatis,theexistenceofGodbeing
assumed,thence[God's]existencewouldbeproved.Certainly,insayingthatthe
EssenceofGodinvolvesexistence,itmustnotbeunderstoodasmeaningthat,ifGod
exists,henecessarilyexists,butinthisway,[asmeaningthat]onthepartofthething
[aparterei],evenifnoonethinksaboutit,itisunconditionally,absolutelyandpurely
trueinthatregionofessencesorideasthattheessenceandexistenceofGodare
inseparablyconnected.(AII,i,392)
WhatistokeepSpinozafromreplyingthatinhisargument,too,thecontainmentofnecessary
existenceinthenatureorconceptofGodmeanssomethingunconditional?Leibnizneitherraises
noranswersthisquestionhere,butIbelievethebestansweristhefollowing.Intheargumentthat
Leibnizquotes(wordforword)fromSpinoza1663geometricaldemonstrationofDescartes
Principlesitisclearthatitisasanessentialpropertythatnecessaryexistenceissaid
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12
Leibnizhadalreadyexpressedthesameviewin1670:approvingNizolius'sstatementthatin
"essential"predications,suchas'Manisananimal,'"theexistenceofthesubjectsisnotrequired,"
Leibnizcommented,"Theyarerightinsayingthis.Forwhoeversays'Manisananimal'means'If
anythingisaman,itisananimal.'Andsincetheconditionpositsnothing,thereforeitisnot
requiredforthetruthofthispropositionthattherebeanyman,butthatifthereshouldbe,hewould
necessarilyalsobeananimal,whichismosttrue"(AVI,ii,472).
162
tobecontainedintheconceptofGod.Spinozasupportsthecontainmentclaimbyappealtoan
axiomthatsaysthatnecessaryexistenceiscontained"intheconceptofGod,orofasupremely
perfectbeing;forotherwiseitwouldbeconceivedasimperfect,contrarytowhatissupposedtobe
conceived."13Thereasoninghereisevidentlythatnecessaryexistencemustbecontainedinthe
conceptofGodbecauseabeingthatdidnotexistnecessarilywouldnotqualifyasperfect,and
thereforewouldnotqualifyasGod.Butthestrongestcontainmentclaimthatcouldbewarrantedby
thisreasoning(ontheassumptionthatitspremisesarecorrect)saysnomorethantheconditional
thesisthatifanybeingisGod,thatbeingmustexistnecessarily.Andfromsuchaconditional
thesis,asLeibnizargues,itdoesnotfollowthatthereactuallyexistssuchabeing.
Thismakesclear,Ithink,thecrucialpointabouttherelationofexistencetoessence.Ifthe
necessaryexistenceofanybeingistobeexplainedintermsoftheinvolvementofexistenceinthe
essenceofthatbeing,thisinvolvementmustnotbeofthesortthatessentialordefiningproperties
have.FortheinvolvementofBasadefiningoressentialpropertyintheessenceofAmeansno
morethanthatifanythingisA,itmusthaveB.Andfromthisitdoesnotfollowthatsuchathing
actuallyexists.Thusnothingcanbe"definedintoexistence";itcannotbe"truebydefinition"that
anybeingexists.IftheessenceofGodinvolvesexistenceinsuchawayastorenderGod's
existencenecessary,itmustnotbesimplybysayingthatabeingmustexistnecessarilyinorderto
beGod,butbyvirtueofsomeotherfeatureofthedivineessence.Thismaybeexpressedbysaying
thatexistencemustbeconnectedwiththeessenceofanecessarybeing,notprimarilyasapartof
theessence,butbyvirtueofasecondorder,andprobablyholistic,propertyoftheessence.
NotthatLeibnizhadseenallofthisinJanuaryof1678.Theclearestevidenceofthe
incompletenessofhisgraspoftherelevantpointsatthattimeisinhistreatmentofexistenceas"a
perfection,"apparentlyinthesenseofhis1676arguments.Forheoffersthefollowinglemma(A
II,i,391):
TheessenceofGodandsupremeperfectionareinseparable(exhypothesi,forwe
supposethattheessenceofGodcontainssupremeperfection).
Supremeperfectionandeveryperfectioninkind[inspecie]areinseparable.
Actualexistenceisaperfectioninkind[inspecie].
Therefore
TheessenceofGodandhisactualexistenceareinseparable.
Thislemmaplainlyexpressestheviewthatexistenceiscontainedasanessentialpropertyinthe
essenceofGodasasupremelyperfectbeing,andisthusessentiallysimilartoSpinoza'sCartesian
proofthatLeibnizwouldcriticizelaterinthesamedocument.Theinseparabilityofessenceand
existenceestablishedinthiswayissimplytheinclusionofexistenceasapartoftheessence,and
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13
Spinoza,Opera,vol.1,p.155;cf.p.158.Spinozaevidentlyreliesonapreviouslystateddefinition
ofGodasasupremelyperfectsubstance(ibid.,p.150).TheargumentfortheexistenceofGodin
SpinozaEthics,I,prop.7,andthefirstdemonstrationofprop.11,isnotliable(inmyopinion)to
theobjectionLeibnizmakeshere,becausenecessaryexistencefiguresintheargument,
163
itcanhardlymeanmorethanthatifanybeingisGod,thatbeingmustactuallyexist.
Leibniz'slargerargumentstillescapesthisobjection,however,becausethislemmaissuperfluous
forthelargerargument.AsLeibniznotes,"thementionofperfectioncanbeeliminatedfrom"the
argumentbydefining'God'assignifyinganecessarybeing.Theargumentproceedingfromthis
definition14stillturnsonaninvolvementof(necessary)existenceinthedivineessence.Butthe
argumentisnolongerthatabeingthatdidnotexistcouldnotsatisfytheessence,butthatan
essencethatdidnotinvolvenecessaryexistencecouldnotqualifyastheessenceofanecessary
being.Heretheinvolvementrelationbetweenexistenceandthedivineessenceneednotbe
understoodintermsoftheinclusionofexistenceasapart,oressentialordefiningproperty,inthe
essence,butcanbeunderstoodintermsoftheessencenecessarilyhaving,forsomeotherreason,
thestatusofbeingactuallyexemplified.Thesignificanceofthelattersortofinvolvementisnot
exhaustedbytheconclusionthatifanybeingisGod,thatbeingmustactuallyexist.
ThiscanhardlyhavebeencleartoLeibnizwhenheformulatedtheargument.Eveninthe
annotationstoitheassimilatesexistence,asa"form,"tothe"perfections."
Asintheregionofeternaltruths,orinthefieldofideasthatexistsobjectively[aparte
rei],theresubsistUnity,theCircle,Potency,equality,heat,rose,andotherrealitiesor
formsorperfections,evenifnoindividualbeingsweretoexist,andtheseuniversals
werenottobethoughtabout;soalsothereamongotherformsorobjectiverealitiesis
foundactualexistence,notasitisfoundintheWorldandinexamples,butasa
universalform.Ifinthefieldofideasthisformisinseparablyconnectedwithsome
otheressenceorform,thereresultsthenceaBeingthatnecessarilyexistsinactuality."(
AII,i,392)
Thisinvites,thoughitdoesnotentail,thedefiningpropertyconstrualoftherelationofexistenceto
thedivineessence.Intheannotations,however,hedoessee,first,thatinsomecontextsthe
involvementorcontainmentofapredicateinanatureorconceptmeansnomorethanthatif
anythinghasthenatureorsatisfiestheconcept,itmusthavethepredicate,and,second,thatheis
thereforeassertingadifferentsortofinvolvementofexistenceinthedivineessence.Withinthe
nextfewyearshewouldarticulateaconceptionoftherelationofexistencetoessencethatmightbe
seenaspromisinganexplicationofthesortofinvolvementrequiredbytheargument.
2.DefiningExistence
OneoftheclearestpresentationsofthelineofthoughtIwishnowtoexploreisfoundinthe
followingbrief,undatedmemorandum:
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notmerelyasanessentialqualificationforbeingGod,butasafeatureofthedivinenature'scausal
roleinthestructureofreality.ButLeibnizwouldnothavetheEthicsbeforehimuntilthemonth
afterthiscritiquewaspenned.
14
Premises[6]and[7]andtheconclusiondrawnfromthemintheargumentdiscussedinChapter5,
section1.
164
Existence
Itcanbedoubtedverymuchwhetherexistenceisaperfectionordegreeofreality;forit
canbedoubtedwhetherexistenceisoneofthosethingsthatcanbeconceivedthatis,
oneofthepartsofessence;orwhetheritisonlyacertainimaginaryconcept,suchas
thatofheatandcold,whichisadenominationonlyofourperception,notofthenature
ofthings.Yetifweconsidermoreaccurately,[weshallsee]thatweconceive
somethingmorewhenwethinkthatathingAexists,thanwhenwethinkthatitis
possible.Thereforeitseemstobetruethatexistenceisacertaindegreeofreality;or
certainlythatitissomerelationtodegreesofreality.Existenceisnotadegreeof
reality,however;forofeverydegreeofrealityitispossibletounderstandtheexistence
aswellasthepossibility.Existencewillthereforebethesuperiorityofthedegreesof
realityofonethingoverthedegreesofrealityofanopposedthing.Thatis,thatwhich
ismoreperfectthanallthingsmutuallyincompatibleexists,andconverselywhatexists
ismoreperfectthantherest.Thereforeitistrueindeedthatwhatexistsismoreperfect
thanthenonexistent,butitisnottruethatexistenceitselfisaperfection,sinceitis
onlyacertaincomparativerelation[comparatio]ofperfectionsamongthemselves.(
VE2016=B119f.)
HereLeibnizexplicitlydenies,notonlythatexistenceisa"perfection,"suchascanconstitute"one
ofthepartsofessence,"butalsothatexistenceisasecondorderpropertyofessencesofthesortthat
wasidentifiedwithperfectioninhiscorrespondencewithEckhardthatis,a"degreeofreality."
Existencecannotbeidentifiedwithanyonedegreeofreality,fortheexistenceofanydegreeof
realityispossible.Indeed,Leibnizbelievedthat(infinitely)manydegreesofrealityactuallyexist.
Existenceiscloselyrelatedtodegreesofreality.Itisidentifiedwiththepropertyofhavingmore
realityorperfectionthananyincompatiblealternative.Degreesofrealityorperfection,however,
areequivalent,inthisschemeofthings,nottoexistenceitself,buttodegreesoftendencytoexist.
Anessence'sperfectionismeasuredbythestrengthofits"demand"[exigentia]forexistence.
Degreeofperfectionisnotexistencebuttheprincipleorsource[principium]ofexistence(G
VII,194f.,303f./L487f.).15
SimilardefinitionsofexistencearefoundinseveralotherplacesinLeibniz'spapers.Forinstance,
hedefines'existent'as"compossiblewiththemostperfect,"andsays,"Existentisthatseriesof
possibleswhichinvolvesmoreofreality,andwhateverentersintoit"(Gr325).16These
formulationsmakeclearthatthisaccountofexistenceappliesinthefirstplacetocompletesetsof
compossible
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15
Theformulationthat"perfectionordegreeofEssence"is"thesourceofexistence"comesfromthe
essay"OntheRadicalOriginationofThings,"of23November1697,whichcertainlyusesand
developsideasbelongingtothisnexus.Weshallhavetoquestionlaterhowfullythe1697paper
acceptsthedefinitionofexistencewearestudying.Butthebasicideaofessences"demanding"
existenceinproportiontotheirperfectionisfoundinpapersbelongingcertainlyorprobablytothe
period167885,towhichIbelievemostofLeibniz'sdevelopmentofthislineofargumentcanbe
dated.SeeVE238f.,277=Gr16f.,288/AG20;andseenote3.
16
Thefirstoftheseformulationsispreliminarilydated167985,onthebasisofcontent,andthe
second168385,onthebasisofwatermark,inVE169,166.Thefirstformulationoccursinthesame
documentwithanalternativedefinition:"Entity[Ens]is[something]distinctlythinkable.Existent
[is]distinctlyperceivable"(VE171).Onthesignificanceofthispairingofdefinitionsofexistence,
andforadditionalreferences,seenote23.Foranotheroccurrenceofthedefinitionfromthesame
period,seeGVII,194f.
165
things,ratherthantoindividualsubstances.Theessencesofactuallyexistingearthwormsareless
perfectthantheessencesofpossiblehumanbeingsthatdonotactuallyexist.Whatexistsisthatset
ofcompossiblesubstancesthatismoreperfectthananyalternativethatisnotcompossiblewithit.
Thisanalysisofexistencereadilysuggestswaysofcompletingorrevisingtheontologicalargument
fortheexistenceofGod.Onewayistoarguethattheessenceofasupremelyperfectbeing
involves(necessary)existence,withthesortofunconditionalinvolvementrequiredbyLeibniz's
argument,onthegroundthatsuchanessenceobviouslycontainsmoreperfectionorrealitythanthe
essenceofanythingthatwouldbeincompatiblewithit.Tothisitmaybeobjectedthatcompetitors
forexistencemeetthetestofperfection,notsingly,butincompletesetsofcompossiblebeings.
TheexistenceofGodthereforedoesnotfollowdirectlyfromthefactthatthedivineessenceis
moreperfectthananyotheressenceofanindividualsubstance;itmustbeprovedthatnosetof
compossiblebeingsthatexcludesGodhasahighersumofperfectionthanallthesetsthatinclude
God.ButLeibnizwouldhaveareadyanswertothisobjection.Hecouldmaintain,asmosttheists
would,thatthedivineperfection,allbyitself,withoutanysupplementationbytheperfectionof
otherbeings,isgreaterthanthesumofperfectionofanyaggregateoflessperfectbeings.Hecould
alsoarguethattheexistenceofGodmustbecompossiblewiththatofthemostperfectpossibleset
offinitethings,becausethechoiceandcreationofthatsetfollowsfromtheperfectionofthedivine
willandpower.OnthesegroundsLeibnizcouldholdthat(necessary)existenceisinvolved,inthe
relevantway,intheessenceofasupremelyperfectbeing.Andifthepossibilityofasupremely
perfectbeingistakenasprovedbytheargumentdiscussedinsection2.1ofChapter5,thisseems
tocompleteanontologicalproofoftheexistenceofGod.
ThefollowingobjectionmightberaisedagainsttheargumentthatGod'sexistencemustbe
compossiblewiththemaximumoffiniteperfection.Leibnizsaysthat"iftherewerenotabest
[optimum]amongallthepossibleworlds,Godwouldnothaveproducedanyofthem"(T8).From
thistheobjectormightinferthatiftherewerenobestamongpossibleworlds,theexistenceofGod,
accordingtoLeibniz,wouldnotbecompossiblewiththeexistenceofanypossibleworld.But
Leibnizcouldreplythat,giventhedefinitionofexistencethatisassumedhere,theexistenceof
Godwouldnotbepreventingtheactualizationofaperfectionthatmightotherwiseexist.Forif,
amongthepossibleworlds,allincom
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Accordingtoalaterstatement:"Existenceisconceivedbyusasathinghavingnothingincommon
withEssence,whichcannotbe,however,sincetheremustbemoreintheconceptoftheExistent
than[inthat]ofthenonexistent;thatis,existencemustbe[a]perfection,sincereallynothingelse
isexplicableinexistenceexceptenteringintothemostperfectseriesofthings"(C9).Thistexthas
beenassignedapreliminarydateofabout1700bytheAcademyeditors(personalcommunication,
1977).Ithinkthisstatementdoesnotimplyareductivedefinitionofexistence,however,butis
consistentwithsupposingexistencetobeanunanalyzableprimitive.Despitethebeginningofthe
statement,Ialsodonottakeittoimplythatexistencemightenterintoessencesasadefining
propertyofthings.Whatitsaysisratherthatexistentthingsassuchmustdifferfromnonexistent
thingsinsomewaythatisrootedintheiressence,andtheonlysuchdifferencethatcanbe
explainedisthatallandonlytheexistentthingsenterintothemostperfectseriesofthings.Thatis
somethingthatIthinkLeibnizbelievedtotheendofhislife(withsomequalificationsforthe
uniquerelationofGodtothemostperfectseriesofthings).
166
possiblewitheachother,thereisnonethatisbetterthanalltheothers,thenthereisnonethat
satisfiesthedefinitionofexistence.Itmightalsoberepliedthat,giventhatweexperiencethat
somefinitethingsdoexist,wecaninfer,bothfromthedefinitionofexistenceandfromLeibniz's
philosophicaltheology,thatthereisabestamongpossibleworlds.Butthisdoesnotyieldana
prioriargument;moreover,asweshallsee,thedefinitionofexistenceinvolvedintheargument
callsintoquestionanyempiricaljustificationofexistentialclaims.
Leibnizneveroffersthisproof.Thatmaysurpriseuslesswhenwereflectthatthedefinitionof
existenceonwhichitrestsisliabletoratherobviousobjections.ItseemstotrivializetheLeibnizian
doctrinethatthebestofallpossibleworldsactuallyexists.Isitstillgoodnews,iftheactual
existenceofthebestworldconsistssimplyinitsbeingthebest?Anddowestillhavereasonto
believethatourworldactuallyexists,andisthebest,ifactuallyexisting,forworlds,justisbeing
thebest?Ifwehadtoprovetheactualexistenceofourworldfromitssuperiorityoverother
possibleworlds,wemightbeleftinsomedoubtofourownexistence.17Surelybyactualexistence
wemeansomethingmorethanbeingpartofthebestpossibleaggregateofthings.Andifwedid
not,wemightconcludethatthebestpossibleworldneedsnohelpfromGodtoexist,butexists
simplybynecessityofitsnature,asthebest.ThiswouldeliminatetheroleofGod'schoicein
explainingtheexistenceoftheworld,contrarytothetheoryofcreationespousedbyLeibniz
throughouthisintellectualcareer.
Theobviousnessoftheseobjectionssuggeststhattheaccountofexistenceassimplyidenticalwith
inclusioninthebestpossibleaggregateofthingsmaybetoosimplemindedtorepresentadequately
Leibniz'sintentions.Certainlyitisnotanexplicitpartofthephilosophythathepresentedtothe
learnedworld,anditappearstobeinconsistentwiththetheoryofcreationthatisfound,for
instance,intheTheodicyandthewellknownessay"OntheRadicalOriginationofThings"(T7;G
VII,302ff./L486ff.).Wemustthereforetrytosituatethetextsthatsuggestitwithinalargerpattern
anddevelopmentofLeibniz'sideas.
ThereisconsiderablevarietyinthedefinitionsofexistenceproposedinLeibniz'swritings.
Particularlyinterestingisaparagraphof"GeneralInquiriesabouttheAnalysisofConceptsand
Truths"(1686),inwhichLeibnizpursuesthequestion"what'existent'means.""AnExistent,"he
says,"isanEntity[Ens],thatis,apossible,andsomethingbesides";andweunderstandactual
existenceas"somethingsuperaddedtopossibilityorEssence."Butwhatisthissomethingextra?
IsaythereforethatanExistentisanEntitythatiscompatiblewiththemost;thatis,an
Entitymaximallypossible,andsoallcoexistentsareequallypossible.Or,whatcomes
tothesamething,anexistentiswhatpleasesanintelligentandpowerful[being];but
thusExistenceitselfispresupposed.However,itcanatleastbedefinedthatanExistent
iswhatwouldpleasesomeMind,andwouldnotdisplease18anothermorepowerful
[mind],ifanymindsatallwereassumedtoexist.Thereforethemattercomestothis,
thatthatissaidtoExistwhichwouldnotdispleasethemostpowerfulMind,ifamost
powerful
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17
Ontheseobjections,cf.R.Adams,"TheoriesofActuality,"pp.21214.
18
AtthispointinP,ausuallyreliabletranslation,"please"shouldbecorrectedto"displease."
167
mindwereassumedtoexist....Butitpleasesamindthatwhathasareasonshould
cometoberatherthanwhatdoesnothaveareason.(GI73)
Wegetherewhatlookslikequiteadifferentdefinition:anexistentiswhatwouldplease(orwould
notdisplease)themostpowerfulmind;andthisisnottheonlyplaceinLeibniz'sworkswhere
existenceisanalyzedinapproximatelythisway.19
Itisnoteworthy,however,thatLeibnizsaysthisalternativedefinition"comestothesamethingas"
thedefinitionintermsofperfectionwhichwehavebeenexamining.Thismayperplexus,
inasmuchastheydonotseemtohavebyanymeansthesamemeaning.Theconclusiontobe
drawn,Ithink,isthatneitherdefinitionisintendedasananalysisofourmeaning.Bothare
intendedasrealdefinitionsthatis,asintendedtoexplicatethenatureofexistenceinsuchawayas
toexhibitthereasonorcausethatanyexistencewouldhave.20Ifweconfineourattentiontofinite
existents,wecanseethateachofthesedefinitionsprovidespartoftheexplanationthatLeibniz
thoughttheremustbefortheexistenceofanyexistentthing.Onepartofthereasonisthatthething
isincludedinthebestpossibleaggregateofthings;theotherpartisthat(becauseofitssuperiority)
thataggregatepleasesGod,themostpowerfulmindandisthereforechosenandactualizedby
God.Thusthetwodefinitionsarecomplementary,eachencapsulatingelliptically,withdifferent
omissions,thesamecausalaccountofthenatureofexistence.
Whenthematterisviewedinthislight,however,aseriousproblemarises.Insayingthat"an
existentiswhatpleasesanintelligentandpowerful[being]...Existenceitselfispresupposed,"as
Leibnizhimselfnotes.ItisofcoursetheexistenceofGodthatispresupposed.Theexplanationof
existencecontainedinthispairofdefinitions,understoodasmutuallycomplementary,isthatthe
bestpossibleaggregateofthingsischosenandcreatedbyGod.ButGodmustexistinorderto
create.ThisyieldswhatiscertainlythecorrectinterpretationofLeibniz'stalkaboutthepossibles
"striving"forexistenceandhavingatendencytoexistthatisproportionedtotheirperfection.Itis
inthemindofGodthattheystrive,anditisthepowerofGodthatgivesrealitytotheirtendencyto
exist.ThatimpliestheexistenceofGodwhichiswhythestrivingpossiblescanfigureinan
argumentfortheexistenceofGod(GVII,302ff./L486ff.;T7).21
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19
SeeC405,wheretheclaimthat"thenotionofexistenceissuchthat[whatis]existentissuchastate
oftheuniverseaspleasesGOD"isimmediatelyfollowedbytheobservation,"ButGODispleased,
freely,bywhatismoreperfect."Interestingly,Leibnizbegantowrite,"existentissuchastateof
theuniverseasissuperior"(andbeforethatapparently,"asis[more]perfe[ct]"),andthenchanged
ittopresenttheanalysisintermsofpleasingGod(VE165).
20
ForLeibniz'spreferenceforrealorcausaldefinitionssee,e.g.,his"MeditationsonKnowledge,
Truth,andIdeas"of1684(GIV,424f./L293).Foratextinwhichthedefinitionofexistencein
termsofperfectionisexplicitlycalleda"realdefinition,"andmotivatedbytheneedto"givea
reasonoftheexistenceofthings"(specificallyareasonthatfitstheconceptualcontainmenttheory
oftruth),seeGVII,195.Notealsothatin"GeneralInquiries"(C360/P51)Leibnizhasalready
connectedthepossibilityofdefining'existent'as"whatiscompatiblewithmorethingsthan
anythingelsethatisincompatiblewithit"withthepossibilityofgiving"acauseofexistence."
21
ThequestionofinterpretationiswellandthoroughlyarguedinBlumenfeld,"Leibniz'sTheoryof
theStrivingPossibles."SeealsoGr324(=VE189f.,withawatermarkattestedfrom168386):
"Everyessenceorrealitydemandsexistence....AndeverypossiblenotonlyinvolvesPossibility,
butalsoaneffort[conatus]toactuallyexistnotasifthingsthatarenotmakeaneffort,but
because
168
ThedifficultythisposesforLeibnizgoesmuchdeeperthananymereproblemofformulation,forit
appearstoimplythattheaccountofexistencegivenbythepairofdefinitionsappliesonlytothe
existenceoffinitethings.ItcanhardlyapplytotheexistenceofGod,sinceLeibnizneversuggests
thatthedivineexistenceitselfistobeexplainedbyGod'shavingchosenandactualizeditaspartof
thebestpossibleaggregateofthings.Thissuggestionisnotonlyimplausiblebutalsoinconsistent
withLeibniz'sfirminsistencethattheexistenceofGodisanecessarytruthandthatnecessary
truthsdonotdependonthedivinewill.Thisimpliesthatthepairofdefinitionsdonotgivean
adequateaccountofthenatureofexistenceingeneral,sincethedivineexistenceisacaseof
existenceindeedtheprimecaseofit.
"GeneralInquiries"mightbereadasproposingadefinitionofexistenceingeneral,includingthe
existenceofGod,initsresorttocounterfactualmodalities.Existence,onthisaccount,would
consistinbeingsuchaswouldpleaseaGodifoneexisted.God'sexistencesatisfiesthiscriterion
becausetheperfectionofthedivinenaturedoespleaseGod,accordingtotraditionaltheology.But
thisviewisliabletoanobjectionthatmustbecrushingfromLeibniz'spointofview:itrendersthe
existenceofcreatures,aswellasthatofGod,independentofthepresuppositionofGod'sexistence.
IfourworldissuchasaGodwouldchoose,thatconstitutesitsexistence.God'sexistingand
actuallychoosingthisworldarenotneededtoexplainitsexistence.Butthedependenceof
creaturesonGod'sactualdecisionsisapersistentthemeinLeibniz'sphilosophy.Itiswhathe
chieflyseizeson,forinstance,todifferentiatehisbrandofdeterminismfromthatofSpinoza.22
Abetterwayofintegratingtheideasofthepairofdefinitionsintoacompletelygeneralaccountof
thenatureofexistencemightbesoughtinastrikingtextfrom1672,earlyinLeibniz'sParisperiod.
Hewrote:
IseemtomyselftohavediscoveredthattoExistisnothingotherthantobeSensed
[Sentiri]tobesensedhowever,ifnotbyus,thenatleastbytheAuthorofthings,tobe
sensedbywhomisnothingotherthantopleasehim,ortobeHarmonious.(AVI,iii,56)
ThisisnottheearliesttextinwhichLeibnizanticipatedBerkeley'sfamousthesisthattobeistobe
perceived(seeAVI,i,285;AVI,ii,282f.,487),anditiscertainlynotthelatest(seeC437,of17024).
23Whatisparticularlyinterestingaboutthistextisthattheideasofexistenceconsistinginpleasing
God,andinbeingharmonious(whichplaysherethepartofperfection),areembeddedinamore
fundamentalconceptionofexistingasbeingperceived,principallybyGod.Theseconceptionsare
linkedbyLeibniz'sversionofthetraditionalScholasticdoctrinethatthewayinwhichGodknows
abouttheexistenceoffinitethingsoutsidehimselfisbyknowinghisownwilltocreatethem.God
sensesfinitethings,
____________________
theideasofessences,whichactuallyexistinGod,makesuchademand,afterGodhasfreely
decreedtochoosewhatismostperfect....[F]ortheyareabletoobtainexistence,notbytheirown
forcebutbyGod'sdecision."Cf.Gr286,from1679;andVE1141(=LHIV,1,14C,6),probably
fromabout1689.
22
23
Forafullerdiscussion,seeChapter9,section2.
169
saysLeibniz,byperceivingthattheyareharmoniousandthereforepleasehimthatis,byperceiving
thathechoosestocreatethem.
Thistextpresentsmorethanonepossibilityofaquitegeneralaccountofthenatureofexistence.
Themostobviousistheaccountwithwhichthetextbeginsthattoexististobeperceived,atleast
byGod.ThisappliestotheexistenceofGodaswellasoffinitethings,sinceGod'sexistenceis
surelyperceivedbyGod.WhatissaidaboutbeingharmoniousandpleasingGodwouldservethen
toexplainhowfinitethingscometobeperceived.
Amoredaringalternativewouldbetoidentifyexistence,ingeneral,withbeingrecognizedbyGod
assuperiorinperfection,andthuspleasingGod.EvenGod'sexistence,itmightbeclaimed,isnot
distinctfromthepleasureGodtakesinthedivineperfection.Fortraditionalphilosophicaltheology,
afterall,thedivineperfectionisthemostessentialobjectofthedivineknowledgeandlove.It
wouldnotbeclaimedthatGodexactlychoosestoexist,orcauseshisownexistencebylovingit,
butratherthatexisting,forGod,consistsmostessentiallyinknowingandlovingtheperfectionof
hisownnature.
Unfortunately,neitheroftheseaccountsofthenatureofexistenceprovidesanexplanationofthe
necessityofGod'sexistence.PerhapsGodmustexistifanythingatallistobeperceived.Certainly
GodmustexistifanythingistopleaseGod.Butthisisnoreasonforregardingasimpossiblethe
stateofaffairsinwhichGoddoesnotexistandthereforenothingatallisperceivedorpleasesGod
orexists.Inanyevent,thereisnostrongreasontobelievethatthematureLeibnizheldeitherof
thesetheories.
Anotheralternativewouldbetohaveseparatedefinitionsofdivineandcreaturelyexistence.For
God,existencewouldbedefinedsimplyasbeingmoreperfectthananyincompossiblethingorset
ofthings.Forcreatures,however,existencewouldbedefinedasenteringintoanaggregateoffinite
thingsthatpleasesGod,orischosenbyGod,byvirtueofthesuperiorityofitssumofperfectionto
thatofalternatives.PerhapsLeibnizwouldhaveregardedtheseseparatedefinitionsashavingone
ofthemostimportantofthevirtueshesoughtinarealdefinition,expressingtherealreasonsofthe
existenceofGodandofcreatures,respectively,insofarastheycanbeknowntous.Buttheycan
hardlyberegardedasentirelysatisfying.Inadditiontotheobviousdisadvantageoffailingto
presentaunifiedaccountofthenatureofexistence,theygiveusnoanswertothequestion,Whatis
itthatGoddecidestogivetocreatureswhenhechoosesthem?Indeed,thedefinitionofcreaturely
existenceseemstoprecludeananswertothatquestion:iftheirexistencesimplyisbeingchosenby
God,thereisnothingleftforGod'schoicetobeadecisiontodo.Thisisadefect,indeed,ofallthe
definitionsofexistencewehavebeenconsidering,intheirapplicationtocreatures.Noneofthemis
consistentwithLeibniz'stheoryofcreation.
3.ExistenceIrreducible
Atthispoint,thehypothesisthatexistenceisindefinable,oratleastnotreductivelyanalyzableinto
simplerelements,mightbefoundappealing.Itwas,infact,arecurrenthypothesisinLeibniz's
thought,despitetheprofusionofdefi
170
nitionsofexistencethatheproduced.Aforcefulearlystatementofitisfoundinatextdated
September1677:
Being[esse]itselfseemstobeconceivedthroughitself.Forsupposeittobeconceived
throughotherthings,sayaandb;itseemsthataboutthesethingstooitcanbe
conceivedthattheyare,whichisabsurd.Existence[existentia]isthereforean
uncompoundedorunanalyzablenotion.(G1,271)24
Here,however,thehypothesisappearstobebasedontheconception,soontoberejected,ofbeing
orexistenceasanessenceorpartofanessence.Theargumentassumesthatifexistenceis
analyzableintootherterms"through"whichitisconceived,theywillbepartsofanessence,inthe
sensethattheywillsignifykindsofthingthatcanbeconceivedasexisting,introducingwhat
Leibnizregardsasaviciouscircularityintotheanalysisofexistence.Thisargumentforthe
indefinabilityofexistenceisthereforenotavailabletoLeibnizafterhehasdrawntheappropriate
conclusionfromthecircularityproblem,in1678.Andnosuchcircularityseemstoarisefroma
definitionofexistenceasenteringintothemostperfectpossibleaggregateofthings,sinceitdoes
nottreatexistentsasakindofthing.
ThisisnottheonlyargumentfortheirreducibilityofexistencethatdisappearsfromLeibniz's
thought.Thetreatmentofexistenceasaperfection,intextsof1676bearingontheontological
argument,impliesaviewofexistenceasaprimitive,unanalyzablequality,forwhichnoreal
definitioncanbegiven.Butwehaveseenthatthisviewoftherelationofexistencetoperfection
didnotsurviveLeibniz'sdiscussionswithEckhard;itcanbeseenin1704,butonlywiththe
qualification"asM.Descartesputsit"(NE437).
Nonetheless,westillfindtheindefinabilityofexistenceassertedinthefollowingtextfromthe
mid1680s25thistimewithoutanyargumentthatLeibnizwouldthereafterhavereasontoreject
indeed,withoutbeingbasedonanyargumentatall:
Existentcannotbedefined,anymorethanEntity[Ens]orthepurelypositivethatis,in
suchawaythatsomeclearernotionmightbeshowntous.Weshouldknow,however,
thateverypossiblewillexistifitcan;butsincenotallpossiblescanexist,assome
interferewithothers,thoseexistthataremoreperfect.Therefore,whateverismost
perfect,itiscertainlyestablishedthatitexists.Thereis,moreover,acertainmost
perfectBeing[Ensperfectissimum];thatis,thesupremelyperfectispossible,sinceitis
nothingotherthanthepurelypositive.(Gr325)
Itisinterestingthattheindefinabilityofexistenceisassertedhereinconjunctionwiththedoctrine
thatthemostperfectisassuredofexisting.Thismightrepresentaconsciousabandonmentofthe
attempttodefineexistenceintermsofthatdoctrine.Tobesure,Leibnizdeniesonlythatexistence
canbeanalyzedinsuchawayastoshowusaclearernotion,butthedefinitionofexistenceas
____________________
24
ThisbeginsadocumentofaboutoneprintedpageincludedbyGerhardt,butnotbytheAcademy
edition,inLeibniz'scorrespondencewithEckhard.Itlacksanyindicationofepistolaryform.
25
ItSwatermarkisattestedfrom1685;seeVE1251.Thetextispublishedmorecompletelyin
Schmidt47884thaninGr.
171
inclusioninthebestseriesofpossiblessurelywasanattempttogiveusaclearernotion.
IaminclinedtothinkthatifLeibnizhadanystablepositiononthesubject,thiscautionwithregard
todefinition,andacertainagnosticismaboutthedeepestnatureofexistence,musthavebeenan
importantpartofit.Iinterprettheindefinabilitythesisasdenyingonlythatexistenceisreducibleto
somethingmorefundamental,inwhichexistenceconsists.Itisconsistentwithsome,atleast,ofthe
definitionsofexistencethatoccurinhislaterpapers(andperhapsevensomeofthoseinhisearlier
papers),providedthatwhattheyareconstruedasattemptingtoidentifyisnotwhatexistence
consistsin,butonlyhowtorecognizeexistence,26orwhatdifferencebetweenexistingand
nonexistingthingsexplainstheexistenceofthosethatexist.27ThisconstrualofLeibniz'sintentin
offeringdefinitionsofexistenceissupportedbythecases(quotedinChapter9,section2)inwhich
heoffersdifferentdefinitionsforthelattertwopurposes(VE404f.,1086).
TheconclusionofthepassagequotedabovefromGr325remindsus,however,ofanattendant
problem.Insayingthat"thesupremelyperfectispossible,sinceitisnothingotherthanthepurely
positive,"Leibnizseemstobeoffering,inthebriefestpossibleform,theargumentforthe
possibilityofasupremelyperfectbeingthathehadshownSpinozasomeyearsearlier.The
questionsthenarise,Ishestillentitledtothisargument?Ifso,whatuseisheentitledtomakeofit?
Hisindefinabilitythesisgivesrisetothefollowingdifficulty.
Ifaproofofthepossibilityofanensperfectissimumistocompleteanontologicalargumentthat
beginswithaproofthatanecessaryGodiseitheractualorimpossible,itmustbeprovedthatthe
ensperfectissimumwouldbeanecessarybeing.By1678Leibnizseemstohavecome,rightly,to
theconclusionthatthiscannotbeprovedbycounting(necessary)existenceamongtheperfections
(inthesenseofhis1676arguments).Itcouldbeprovedbyareductivedefinitionofexistencein
termsofperfection,ifthatwereacceptable,butheappearsheretoabandonsuchadefinitionagain
rightly.Soagapmaybethoughttoremainintheargument.
Thepassagebeforeussuggestsasomewhatdifferentstrategyofargument,however.Itseemsto
containanargumentfortheexistenceofGod,foritsbriefargumentforthepossibilityofanens
perfectissimumimmediatelyfollowsthestatementthatitiscertainlyestablishedthatwhateveris
mostperfectexists.Thetheisticargumentthissuggestsismoremodestinitspretensionstopurely
formalrigorthanthoseof1676.Leibnizarticulatesherenologicaldoctrines,andnodefinitions,
thatwouldjustifyhispremises.Hedoesofferametaphysicaldoctrine,howeverthat"every
possiblewillexistifitcan"and"thoseexistthataremoreperfect."Theexistenceofapossible
beingcanbepreventedonlybyitsincompatibilitywithsomethingmoreperfect.Thisisnota
definition,anditappliesindifferentwaystoGodandcreatures.ButitdoesapplytoGod,onthe
viewthatLeibnizseemstoholdhere.Sinceanensperfectissimumcannotbeincompatiblewith
anythingmoreperfect,itmustexist,andwillthereforebea
____________________
26
ItishardtobelievethatmorethanthisisintendedbyLeibniz'sfairlynumerousdefinitionsof
existenceintermsofperceptibility,exceptperhapssomeoftheveryearliestofthem.Seep.169
andChapter9,section2,forcitationsandfullerdiscussion.
27
ThedefinitionofexistenceofferedatC360/P51(1686)canberegardedplausiblyenoughas
offeredonlyforthelastofthesepurposes.
172
necessarybeing,ifitisapossiblebeingatall.Thethesisofitspossibilitywillperhapsbe
supported,notonlybythelogicalargumentthat,aspurelypositive,itcontainsnoformal
contradictionbutalsobythemetaphysicalargumentthat,aspurelypositive,itcannotinterferewith
anythingofgreaterreality.28
ThismetaphysicalargumentseemsconsistentwithLeibniz'stheoryofcreation.Thusfar,however,
itisunsatisfyingatanotherimportantpoint:itdoesnotexplainwhythosepossiblethingsexistthat
aremoreperfect.Thereforeitalsofailstoexplainhow(necessary)existenceisinvolvedinthe
essenceofanensperfectissimum.Moreover,wemightsuspectthatLeibniz'sanswertotheformer
questionmustbeamereconjunctionofprinciplesaboutthenecessaryexistenceofthemostperfect
possiblebeing,ontheonehand,andthatbeing'schoiceofthebestpossibleworldofbeingsof
limitedperfection,ontheotherhand.Suchaconjunction,ifnotexactlyadhoc,offerstoolittle
insightintothenatureofexistence(orofanything)tohavemuchpersuasiveforceinthiscontext.
Themetaphysicalanalysismustbedeepenedifitistosatisfy.
Suchadeepeningmightbeginwiththeobservationthattheprincipleofessence'sdemandfor
existence,inthegeneralform'Eachessencewillbeexemplifiedunlessthereissomereasonthat
preventsitsexemplification',isacorollaryofaversionofthePrincipleofSufficientReason(PSR).
EvidencethatLeibnizunderstooditinthiswayisprovidedbyatext(GVII,194)inwhichthe
principle"Everypossibledemandstoexist"takestheplaceheusuallyassignstoPSRasthe
absolutelyfirstamongtruthsoffact.SincePSR,assuch,appliesequallytotheexistenceofGod
andoffinitethings,so,inageneralway,doestheprincipleofessence'sdemandforexistence.
FurtherdevelopmentofthelatterprincipleforGodandcreaturesbifurcates,however,atthe
question,Whatsortofreasoncanpreventexistence?Whatreasonscanpreventathing'sexistence
dependsonwhetherthething,ifitexisted,wouldexistthroughitselforthroughanexternalcause.
Ifitwouldexistthroughitself,itsexistencecanbepreventedonlybyinconsistencyinitsown
essence.Ifitwouldexist(ifatall)throughthecausalagencyofanotherbeing,itsexistencecanbe
preventedbyareasonthatwouldpreventthecausefromactingtocauseit.
TheseconsiderationscanberelatedtoLeibniz'sviewsabouttheperfectionofGodandofcreatures,
bywayofsomeofhisviewsaboutrequirements[requisita].Accordingtotheseviews,causal
dependenceandindependencearedeterminedbytheattributesinvolvedinathing'sessence.The
firstrequirementsofanythingaretheabsolutedegreesoftheattributesinvolvedinitsessence.The
lineofargumentIamdevelopingdependsonacceptingasnecessarytruthstwoprinciplesabout
requirementsandthecausationofexistence.
First,thebeingwhoseessencecontainstheabsolutedegreesofallattributeshasallitsrequirements
initself,thatis,initsessence.Suchabeingexists,ifatall,throughitself.Wehavealready(in
Chapter5,section2.3)seenevidencethatLeibnizheldthis,atleastin1676.Second,abeingthat
hasalimiteddegreeofanyattributeexists,ifatall,throughthecausalagencyofthebeingthathas
theabsolutedegreeofallattributes(orofallthatareinvolvedinitsessence,butI
____________________
28
ThemetaphysicaltypeofrationaleIhavepresentedinthisparagraphcouldalsobeusedtointerpret
thebriefversionoftheontologicalargumentin45oftheMonadology.
173
suspectLeibnizthoughtthatanemptyqualification).ThatLeibnizbelievedthisproposition,
inasmuchashebelievedthatGodhastheabsolutedegreeofallattributes,isclear.Toascribeitto
himasametaphysicalprincipleofdeepexplanatoryforceisamorespeculativeinterpretation,but
hecameclosetoassertingitassuchin1676,inequating"thatwhichisitsownreasonforexisting"
with"that,allofwhoserequirementsweconceivewithouttheconceptofanotherthing"(AVI,
iii,275=GI,131).Forhecertainlythoughtthattherequirementsofalimitedbeingcannotbe
conceivedwithouttheconceptofattributesthatbelongonlytoanunlimitedbeing.
Thesecondprincipleisnarrowerthantheprinciplethatherejectedin1678or1679inobjectingto
Spinozathatitis"false"that"thatwithoutwhichsomethingcannotbeconceivedisitscause"(G
I,147f./L203).InthistextLeibnizacceptstheimplicationfrom'AcausesB'to'TheconceptofB
involvestheconceptofA',butrejectstheconverseimplication.Thisisconsistentwithhis
maintainingthefollowing:'TheessenceofBinvolvesanabsoluteattributeAwhichisnotan
attributeofB'entails'TheexistenceofBdependscausallyontheexistenceofsomethingthatdoes
possessA.'ItisnoteworthythatwhatLeibnizisattackingisanargumentofSpinoza'sinsupportof
thepropositionthat"Godistheefficientcausenotonlyoftheexistences,butalsooftheessences
ofthings,"andthathiscounterexamplestotheinferencethatherejectsaredrawnfromrelations
betweenmathematicalobjects.Leibnizdoesnotnormallyspeakofessencesas"caused,"29andit
maybethatheisonlyresistingtheextensiontoessencesofaprinciplethatheacceptsasappliedto
existences.
Giventhattheessenceoftheensperfectissimum,asLeibnizunderstandsit,istheessencethat
containstheabsolutedegreesofallattributes,ithasallitsrequirementsinitselfandexists,ifatall,
throughitself.Itsexistencecouldbeprevented,therefore,onlybyaninconsistencyinitsessence.
Giventhat,asLeibnizbelieves,theessencecontainingtheabsolutedegreesofallattributesis
consistent,itfollowsthatnothingcanpreventtheexistenceofabeing(God,theens
perfectissimum)thathastheabsolutedegreesofallperfections;fromthatandfromPSRitfollows
thattheensperfectissimumexists.Ifallthepremisesofthisreasoningarenecessarytruths,thenthe
essenceoftheensperfectissimuminvolves(necessary)existence.Andthisindeedishowsuchan
essenceinvolves(necessary)existence,onthisinterpretationofLeibniz.
Finitebeings,ontheotherhand,wouldexist(ifatall)throughthecausalagencyoftheens
perfectissimum.Theirexistencethereforecanbepreventedbyareasonthatwouldpreventtheens
perfectissimumfromactingtocreatethem.GivenwhatLeibnizbelievesaboutthewaytheactionof
amostperfectbeingisgovernedbyreasons,itfollowsthattheexistenceofafinitebeingwhose
essenceisinternallyconsistentcanbepreventedonlybythepossibilityofamoreperfectseriesof
thingsthatexcludesit,whichiswhatwouldgiveGodareasontorefrainfromcreatingtheless
perfectseries.
Thusallessenceincorporatesatendencytoexist,andthetendencycanbe
____________________
29
LeibnizdoesspeakofGodinMon43as"thesource...ofessences,"andatGVII,305/L488as
"thesource[fons]ofeveryessence,"butinawaythatdoesnotdependontheparticularcontentof
theessences.Iwilldiscussthissubjectinthenextchapter.
174
saidtobeproportionedtotheperfectionoftheessence.Thisisbasedonageneralprinciplethat
appliesbothtoGodandtofinitebeings,thoughitappliestothemindifferentways.Thisreasoning
restsonseveralpotentiallycontroversialmetaphysicaltheses.Acomprehensiveassessmentof
themwouldoverstepbyfartheboundsofourhistoricalinquiry,butIthinkitwillbeappropriateto
considerbrieflythreeobjectionstothereasoning,asinterpretationandasargument.
1.
1.ItassumesthattherelevantversionofPSRisanecessarytruth,butitmaybedoubtedwhether
thatisconsistentwithLeibniz'streatmentofPSRasthefirstprincipleofcontingenttruths(G
VI,413;cf.T44,Mon3132,36).ItisdifficulttodetermineLeibniz'sviewsonthemodalstatusof
PSR,30butIdonotthinkheiscommittedtoitsbeingcontingentinanysensethatunderminesthe
argumentbeforeus.Inthesensethatmostconcernsushere,Godhasnecessaryexistenceifthe
divineexistencefollowsfromthedivineessence,withoutessentialreferencetotheessenceofany
otherthing;moreover,finitethingslacknecessaryexistenceinasmuchasthereasonoftheir
existencedoesinvolvetheessence(andexistence)ofanotherbeing(God).Theexistenceoffinite
thingsremainscontingentinthissenseevenifitisanecessarytruththattheremustbeareasonfor
theirexistenceornonexistence.
Thequestionwhetherthetruthsinvolvedcanbeprovedbyafiniteanalysisdoesnotenterintothis
systemofideas,asoriginallyworkedoutbyLeibniz,asIarguedattheendofsection1ofChapter
5.Butevenifnecessityisunderstoodintermsoffinitedemonstrability,thecontingencyoffinite
existencesisconsistentwiththenecessarytruthofPSRif,asLeibnizbelieved,31itisnotfinitely
demonstrablewhichfinitethingshavethestrongestreasonsfortheirexistence.WhetherLeibnizin
factthoughtthat'Godalwayschoosesthebest'(anobviousandcrucialcorollaryofPSR)isfinitely
demonstrable,andhencenecessary,isadifficultinterpretivequestion;Ihavearguedearlier
(Chapter1,section2.5)thatanaffirmativeanswerfitsbestwithLeibniz'sphilosophyasawhole.
ThereisalsoatextualconsiderationthatfavorsareadingofLeibnizassupposingthatPSRplaysa
partingroundingthenecessaryexistenceofGod.Leibnizclaims,earlyandlate,thattheproofof
theexistenceofGoddependsonPSR[Gr268(1679);NE179(170305);T44(1710)].Howcan
hehavebelievedthis?ForheneverceasedtobelievethattheexistenceofGodcanbeprovedbya
prioriargument,andthereforeneverbelievedthatacosmologicalargumentisrequiredtoproveit(
Mon3645).Thesepositionscanbereconciled,however,ifLeibnizthoughtthateventheapriori
proofsinvolvePSRasaprinciplerequiredtoaccountforthenecessityofthedivineexistence.
2.
2.ItisnoteworthythatthisaccountofthenecessityofGod'sexistencepresupposesaversionof
PSRthatrequiresareasonforthenonexistenceaswellasfortheexistenceofanything.32Indeed,
itmaybesaidtodemandareasonmorestringentlyfornonexistencethanforexistence,treating
existenceratherthannonexistenceas
____________________
30
Cf.Parkinson,LogicandRealityinLeibniz'sMetaphysics,pp.6269.
31
SeeChapter1,sections2.12.2.
32
Thusfar,Leibniz'sargumentisinagreementwithSpinoza,EthicsI,prop.11.Indeedmuchofthe
reasoningIamascribingtoLeibnizcanbefoundinSpinoza'sargumentthere,thoughLeibnizparts
companywithSpinozaemphaticallyintheroleheassignstoGod'swillandchoiceofthegoodin
thereasonwhichexplainstheexistenceofthosefinitethingsthatexist.
175
thedefaultstatus,sotospeak,foranypossiblething.Foritallowstheabsenceofasufficient
reasonfornonexistencetocountasasufficientreasonforexistence.Thisisacontroversial
featureofthetheory,asitiscommontodemandareasonmorestringentlyforexistencethanfor
nonexistenceandtoallowtheabsenceofasufficientreasonforexistencetocountasasufficient
reasonfornonexistence.33
Leibniz'sdefenseonthispointisbothclearandinteresting.Hearguesthatwemustsupposethat
abiasinfavorofexistenceisbuiltintothemostfundamentaltruthsofontology,forotherwise
nothingatallwouldexist,whichismanifestlycontrarytofact."Thisproposition,'Everypossible
demandstoexist',canbeprovedaposteriori,giventhatsomethingexists....Iftherewerenot
someinclinationtoexistenceintheverynatureofEssence,nothingwouldexist"(GVII,194;cf.
Gr16f.,GVII,303/L487).34Thisisnotasillyargument.Thefactthatsomethingexists,rather
thannothing,doesindeedseemtobeareasonforsuspectingthatthereisabiasforexistencein
themostbasicmetaphysicaltruths.
3.
3.Itmaybesuspectedthataviciouscirclelurksintheveryideaofabeingthatexists"through
itself,"orthroughitsownessence.Insuchanexplanationoftheexistenceofanecessarybeing,
isn'ttheexistenceofthebeingitself,oratleastofitsessence,alreadypresupposed?Anddoesn't
thatleaveeitheranunexplainedexistenceoraviciouscircleinexplanation?Hereitissignificant
thattheideathatessencesinvolvea"propensitytoexist"(Gr17)doesnotmeanthatessencesare
efficientcausesthatacttoproducetheexistenceofthething.Anefficientcausemustalready
haveafootholdinexistenceinordertoact.Butessencescanbeviewedasformalratherthan
efficientcauses(Gr269).Theyarenotefficientcausesofexistence.35Godistheefficientcause
oftheexistenceoffinitethings,andthepowertocausetheirexistenceisinGod.Theessencesof
finitethingsarereasonsthatinfluencethecreator'schoice.Eventhedivineessenceneednotbe
understoodasanefficientcauseofGod'sexistence.Itisareasonthatexcludesthepossibilityof
God'snonexistence.
Thisdoesnotdisposeoftheissueofcircularity,however,forLeibnizcertainlybelievedthat
essencesrequireafootholdinexistencewhichdependsonthedivineexistence.Itseemsthathe
explainsGod'sexistencebyGod'sessence,andheexplainstherealityofallessences,including
God's,asdependingonGod'sexistence.Thispresentsanappearanceofcircularitythatcannotbe
dismissedwithoutafullerdiscussionoftherelationoftheontologicalstatusofessencesand
theirrelationtoGodinLeibniz'sphilosophy.Thatrelationwillbethesubjectofthenextchapter.
____________________
33
Cf.Rowe,CosmologicalArgument,ch.2.RoweisuncertainofthetruthofPSR,butproposesas
themostdefensibleversiononethatdemandsareasononlyforexistences,arguingthatsome
suchlimitationisnecessarytoavoidsweepingnecessitarianimplicationsofasortthatgiverise
tomuchofthediscussioninChapter1above.
34
AtPNG7(1714),inthecourseofdevelopingacosmologicalargumentfortheexistenceof
God,Leibnizsaysthat"nothing[lerien]issimplerandeasierthansomething."Thismightseem
difficulttoreconcilewiththedoctrineofafundamentalmetaphysicalbiasinfavorofexistence.I
thinkitisprobablysomethingthatLeibnizshouldnothavesaid,butIdoubtthatitrepresentsan
intentionalabandonmentofthebiasforexistence,whichplayedapartinhisreasoningsovera
longperiodoftime.FormorediscussionofthisstatementinPNG7,seeChapter8,pp.21011.
35
Whereoperationratherthanexistenceistobeexplained,however,substantialforms,whichare
closekintoessences,andmayevenbeviewedasconcretizedessences,areefficientcausesfor
Leibniz;seeChapter3,section1,andChapter11,section1.1.
176
7TheRootofPossibility
1.TheProofoftheExistenceofGodfromtheRealityofEternalTruths
"Iftherewerenoeternalsubstance,"wroteLeibniz,"therewouldbenoeternaltruths;andfrom
thistooGODcanbeproved,whoistherootofpossibility,forhismindistheveryregionofideas
ortruths"(GVII,311/MP77).Similarly,intheMonadologyheclaimedtohaveprovedthe
existenceofGod"fromtherealityofeternaltruths"(Mon45).
Itistrue...thatinGodisnotonlythesourceofexistences,butalsothatofessences,
insofarastheyarereal,orofwhatisrealinpossibility.That'sbecausethe
UnderstandingofGodistheregionofeternaltruths,oroftheideasonwhichthey
depend,andbecausewithouthimtherewouldbenothingrealinthepossibilities,and
notonlynothingexisting,butalsonothingpossible.
ForifthereisarealityintheEssencesorpossibilities,orindeedintheeternaltruths,
thatrealitymustbefoundedinsomethingexistingandActual;andconsequentlyinthe
ExistenceofthenecessaryBeing,inwhichEssenceincludesExistence,orinwhich
beingpossibleissufficientforbeingActual.(Mon4344)
ToJohnBernoulli,inMay1699,Leibnizwrotethatthepropositions,"Godexists[est]"and"Two
contradictoriescannotbetrueatonce"canbeheldto"coincide,"onthegroundthat"theDivine
essenceis,sotospeak,theregionofeternaltruths,sothatitisthroughtheexistenceofGodthat
truthsaboutnonexistentpossiblesaremadereal,andtheywouldotherwiselackasubjectand
support"(GMIII,586).
Thisargumentdeservesattentioninitsownright.Itismorepersuasive,Ithink,thananyof
Leibniz's(oranyoneelse's)versionsoftheontologicalargument,thoughinimportantwaysless
1formajorpartsofLeibniz'stheoryoftheontologyoflogic.
complete.Itisalsothemaincontext
AccordingtoLeibniz,theobjectsoflogicexistinthemindofGod.Amongtheseobjectsare
2andessencesorideas.Theyare
mentionedpossibilitiesorpossibles,necessaryor"eternal"truths,
stratified.TheessencesareforLeibniz
____________________
1
Nottheonlycontext,however.ThetheoryappearswithoutthisargumentinT184,forinstance,
andinthecontextofadifferent,morecosmologicalargumentfortheismatGVII,305/L488.
2
"TheEternalTruths...areabsolutelynecessary,sothattheoppositeimpliesacontradiction"(T
pd2).
177
themostfundamentalobjectsoflogic.Possibilitiesdependonessences,asdiscussedinChapter5,
andtheeternaltruthsaresaidtodependon"ideas"(Mon43),bywhichIbelieveessencesare
meant.TheessencescanbeidentifiedwithideasinGod'smind,ideasofpossibleindividuals,
whichconstitutethepossibilityofsuchindividuals,andwhichareconcatenatedtoconstitutethe
ideas,andthepossibility,ofpossibleworlds.Andthenecessarytruthsexpress,orfollowfrom,
factsabouttheessencesandtheirrelations.
Analysisoftheargumentmaybeginwithathesisclearlypresupposed,butnotfullyarticulated,by
Leibnizinthetextsquotedabovethatwhateveristrue(orpossible),theremustbesomethingby
virtueofwhichitistrue(orpossible).ThisisimpliedbyLeibniz'sclaimthatwithouttheexistence
ofGod'smindforthepossibilitiestoexistin,therewouldbenothingpossible(Mon43).Inanother
contextheflatlyassertsasimilarthesisabouttruth:"Nowitissurethateverytruepredicationhas
somefoundationinthenatureofthings"(DM8).Andwithregardto"therealityofeternalTruths"
hesays,"Everyrealitymustbegroundedinsomethingexistent"(T184;cf.Gr392f.).Thesetheses
havegreatintuitiveappeal,andarebynomeanspeculiarlyLeibnizian.MichaelDummetthas
stated,"Itiscertainlypartofthemeaningoftheword'true'thatifastatementistrue,theremustbe
somethingbyvirtueofwhichitistrue."3SomemaybelesscertainthanDummettthatthisispart
ofthemeaningof'true';butitisattheveryleastaphilosophicallyrespectablepremise.
Whatistherebyvirtueofwhichthetruthsoflogic(andmathematics)aretrue?Modernthoughton
thissubjecthasfocusedmainlyontwoanswers.Accordingto"Platonism," 4asitiscalled,the
necessarytruthsthemselves,ortheessences,propositions,numbers,orwhateversortof"abstract
object"itmaybethattheydependon,exist,orperhaps"subsist,"independentlyofanyothersortof
realityindependently,inparticular,ofbeingeitherexemplifiedorthoughtof.Theprincipal
alternativetoPlatonismhasbeen"anthropological,"asIshallcallit,holdingthatthetruthsoflogic
andmathematicsaretrueinvirtueofsomefeatureofhumanthought,whichmightbeideasinour
minds,ourintentionsregardingouruseoflanguage,orproofswehaveactuallyconstructed.
LeibnizrejectedbothPlatonisticandanthropologicaltheoriesintheontologyoflogic,andhewas
consciousofthisrejectionaspartofthegroundsofhisargumentfortheexistenceofGodfromthe
realityofeternaltruths.Thisisclearerfromapairofearlynotes,onecertainlyandbothprobably
fromAugustof1677,andcompletelyunpublisheduntilrecently(VE6567=LHIV,5,3,34),than
fromthelaterandsketchierformulationsoftheargumentwhicharebetterknown.
Thenotesseemtobecloselyconnectedwiththe"Dialogue"ofAugust1677,inwhichLeibniz
attackswhatIamcallingananthropologicaltheory,atypeofconventionalismthatheascribesto
Hobbes,accordingtowhichtruthsoflogicandmathematicsarearbitrarybecause"definitions
dependonourdecision"(GVII,191/L183).Leibnizgrantsthatitisarbitraryorconventionalwhat
soundsorsignsweuseinwhatsenses,buthearguesthattruthsoflogicandmathematicsdepend
onsomethingelse,somethingmore"permanent[perpetuum],"and
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3
Dummett,"Wittgenstein'sPhilosophyofMathematics,"p.335.
4
Whatissaidabout"Platonism"hereisnotmeantasaninterpretationofthehistoricalPlato,though
IalsodonotmeantoexcludehimfromtheclassofPlatonists.
178
independentofourwills,whichappearstocorrespondtowhatwewouldcalllogicalform(G
VII,192f./L184f.).
Tosaythatlogicalform,andtruthsgroundedinit,areindependentofourwills,isnotyettosay
thattheyareindependentofusineveryway.ThismoresweepingpointLeibnizattemptedto
establishinoneofthenotestowhichIhavereferred.
Itistrue,andevennecessary,thatthecircleisthelargestofisoperimetricfigures.Even
ifnocirclereallyexisted.LikewiseevenifneitherInoryounoranyoneelseofus
existed.Indeedevenifnoneofthosethingsexistedwhicharecontingent,orinwhich
nonecessityisunderstood,suchasthevisibleworldandothersimilar[things].Since,
therefore,thistruthdoesnotdependonourthought,theremustbesomethingrealinit.
Andsincethattruthiseternalornecessary,thisrealitytoothatisinitindependentof
ourthoughtwillbefrometernity.(VE65)
Ithinkthelastofthesestatementscontainsthemainpremiseofthisargument.Sincethetruths
underconsiderationareeternal,inthesenseofbeingnecessary,whatevertherealityisinwhich
theyaregroundedmustbeeternalandnecessarytoo.Thewholeargumentproceedsonthe
assumptionthatthereareindeednecessarytruths,truthsthatwouldbetruthsnomatterwhat.And
sinceitissurelyfalsethatIoryouoranyoneelseofushumanswouldexistnomatterwhat,it
followsthattherewouldbethenecessarytruthsevenifwedidnotexist,andthatwhateverreality
groundsthemcouldbewithoutusfromwhichinturnitfollowsthattheydonotdependonour
thought.
Leibnizassumesherethatsince,trivially,thenonexistenceofeachcontingentthing,considered
singly,ispossible,thereforeastateofaffairsispossibleinwhich"noneofthosethings[would
exist]whicharecontingent."Thisinferenceisnottrivial,andweshallreturntoitlater.Forthe
present,however,thepossibilityofastateofaffairsinwhichnohumanbeingsatallwouldexist
mayreadilybegrantedtoLeibniz,andthatsufficesfortherejectionofanthropologicaltheoriesin
theontologyoflogic,ifweassumewithLeibnizthattherewouldbenecessarytruths,and
somethinggroundingthem,nomatterwhat.
HereLeibnizmakesarelatedpointthatthebeingofthenecessarytruthscannotdependonthe
existenceofthingsinstantiatingorexemplifyingtheessencesinwhichtheyaregrounded,forthere
wouldbenecessarytruthsaboutcircles,forexample,"evenifnocirclereallyexisted."Leibniz
obviouslyintendsBernoulli,in1699,tomakeasimilarinferencefromtheassumptionthatthe
eternaltruthsinclude"truthsaboutnonexistentpossibles"(GMIII,586).
APlatonistontologyoflogicseemsnomoreacceptabletoLeibniz.Theobjectsoflogic,inhis
opinion,arenotthesortofthingthatcouldsubsistofthemselves."Theobjectiverealitiesof
5thought,therewouldstill
thinkablenaturesandtruths...arenotsubstances"(VE66)."Ifnoone
existtheimpossibilityofasquare
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5
Inthecontext,"noone[nemol"cannotbeintendedtoexcludeGod,butonlyhuman,oratmost
finite,thinkers.ThisissoclearinthistextthatwhenLeibnizwrites,lessthansixmonthslater,ina
documentofJanuary1678,that"evenifnoonethoughtaboutthem,...itwouldstillremaintrue
intheregionofideasortruths"thattheobjectsoflogic"actuallyexist,"Ithinkweshouldassume
heisnotexcludingdependenceonGod'sthought,butonlyrestatingtheclaimhe
179
largerthananisoperimetriccircle.Andsinceitisonlyamode,theremustbesomethingthatisits
subject"(VE67).Animpossibilityis"onlyamode."Likewise"naturesandtruthsaremodes"(
VE67).(Intheseearlynotes"natures"seemtoplaythepartofessences.)Wemaywonderwhether
"mode"isreallytherightcategoryhere,andweshouldnotassumethatLeibnizwouldhave
adheredtoitinthiscontextthroughouthiscareer.Thebasicideaisthatimpossibilities,truths,
naturesoressences,andotherobjectsoflogicareabstractobjectsintheoriginalsense;thatis,they
canbeconceivedonlybyabstractionfromaricher,morecompletebeingor"subject."The
connectionoftheideaofabstractionwiththatofmodesisexplicitinLeibniz'sprefaceforthe
reprinting,in1670,ofabookbyMariusNizolius:"Forconcrete[objects]aretrulythings[res];
abstract[objects]arenotthings,butmodesofthings."Leibnizgoesontoamplifyhisconceptionof
modesinawaythatmakesitlesssurprisingthathewouldtreatabstractobjectsingeneralasmodes
ofa(divine)mind:"mostmodes,however,arenothingbutrelationsofathingtotheintellect,or
capacities[facultates]forappearing"(AVI,ii,417/L126).
TheassumptionsgroundingLeibniz'srejectionofanthropologicalandPlatonistontologiesoflogic
areintuitivelyappealing,Ithink,onbothsides.Onemightbereluctanttoletoneselffeelthe
strengthofbothsetsofintuitionsatonceifonecouldseenootheralternativeontologyoflogic.
Leibnizhasanalternativeinstore,however,atheisticmodificationofPlatonism,sponsoredin
antiquitybyPhiloandAugustine,andgenerallyacceptedintheMiddleAges. 6Onthisview,the
realityinwhichnecessarytruths,andmoregenerallythebeingoftheobjectsoflogicand
mathematics,aregroundedistheensembleofideasinthemindofGod.Theseideastakeupin
manywaystheroleoftheselfsubsistentIdeasofPlato'smiddledialogues.Theyexistnecessarily,
sinceGod'shavingandunderstandingthemfollowsfromthedivineessence,buttheycanbe
regardedbyLeibnizasmodesofthedivinebeing.Inthiswaytheimplausibilitiesofboth
anthropologicalandPlatonistontologiesoflogiccanbeavoided.Itseemstobeatheoretical
advantageoftheismthatitmakesthispossible,andLeibniz'sprooffromtherealityofeternaltruths
isanattempttoexploitthisadvantage.
Atheoreticaladvantageofanyviewisofcourseareasoninitsfavor,buttherejectionof
anthropologicalandPlatonisttheories,evencombinedwiththeassumptionthattruthsoflogicand
mathematicsmusthavesomegroundinreality,fallsfarshortofaproofoftheism.Ifitisconcluded
thattheremusteternallyandnecessarilyexistthoughtsofsomenonhumansortgroundingthe
truthsinquestion,thisisamomentousconclusionformetaphysics,butitdoesnotamounttothe
existenceofGod.Foronething,itisrelevantatmosttoGod'sintellectualattributes.Nothinginthe
argumentfromtherealityofeternaltruthsimpliestheexistenceofanomnipotentorperfectlygood
being,forexample.In
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5
hasmadeinthepreviousclause,that"[e]ssences,truths,ortheobjectiverealitiesofconceptsdonot
depend...onourthought"(AII,i,391f.,italicsadded),eventhoughinthetextfromJanuary1678
thereisnoexplicitidentificationof"theregionofideasortruths"withthedivinemind.
6
0nthemedievalbackgroundofthisaspectofLeibniz'sthought,seeGrua,Jurisprudence,pp.
26267.
180
thiswayitislesscompletethantheontologicalargument,which,ifitweresuccessful,would
establishtheexistenceofabeingperfectineveryway.
Still,iftheargumentcouldestablishthenecessaryexistenceofaconceptuallyomniscientbeing,a
beingthateternallyunderstandsallessences,possibilities,andnecessarytruths,thatwouldbea
substantialachievementforphilosophicaltheology,aswellasformetaphysicsingeneral.Buteven
thisrequiresmoreargumentthanwehaveexploredpreviously.Atmostwehavethusfarbeen
givenreasontobelievethattheremustnecessarilyexistthoughtssufficienttogroundallthose
objects.Afurtherinferenceisrequiredtoconcludethatthoughtsofallofthemmustnecessarily
existinasinglemind.Ockham'srazormightfavorasingleomniscientnecessarybeing,as
ontologicallymoreparsimoniousthanapluralityofknowerssufficienttokeeptheobjectsoflogic
inbeing,butamorerigorousargumentwouldbedesirable.
Leibnizattemptstoprovidesuchanargumentinthetwonotesfrom1677;Iknowofnoothertext
inwhichheeventakesnoteoftheneedforit.Hisargumentof1677isbasedontheinterrelations
ofnecessarytruthsandotherobjectsoflogic.
Apluralityoftruthsjoinedwitheachotherproducenewtruths.Andthereisnotruth
whichdoesnotproduceanewtruthwhenunitedwithanyothertruthwhatever.
Thereforewhateverinanytruthexistsfrometernitywithrespecttotheobject[aparte
rei]isunitedwithanyothertruthwhatever.Andthisismuchmoremanifestfromthe
factthatonenaturejoins[concurrit]inconstitutinganothernature.Naturesandtruths
aremodes.Thecausewhyanecessarypropositionistruewhennooneisthinkingmust
beinsomesubjectwithrespecttotheobject[aparterei].Thecausewhytheabove
mentionedpropositionaboutthecircleandthesquareistrueisnotinthenatureofthe
circlealonenorinthenatureofthesquarealone,butalsoinothernaturesthatenterinto
itforinstance,oftheequalandoftheperimeter.Theproximatecauseofonethingis
single.Anditscausemustbeinsome[thing][inaliqua].Therefore[itmustbe]inthat
inwhichthenatureofthecircle,thesquare,andtheothersis;thatis,inthesubjectof
ideas,orGod.(VE67)
Takeanyplurality,P,of(necessary)truthsornatures,wemaysay,toparaphraseLeibniz's
argument.Somefurthernecessarytruth,T,willbebasedonarelation,R,amongallthemembersof
P,on"somerealconnectionamongthemselves"that"alltherealitiesintheeternalTruths"have(
VE66).Asanecessarytruth,Twouldbeatruthnomatterwhat.Thecrucialquestionforthe
argumentiswhatmustexist,eternallyandnecessarily,inordertosustainTinbeing.
TheultimategroundsofT,inLeibniz'sview,arethenaturesoressencesinvolvedinit.Theycould
exist,individually,eachasanideainthemindofadifferentintelligentbeing.ButLeibnizargues
thatthatwouldnotbeenoughtosustainTinbeing.Asasinglething,Tmusthaveasingle
proximatecauseor(asitmightbebettertosayinthiscontext)reasonorground.Theproximate
groundofTisR.
LeibnizclaimsthatinordertosustainTinbeing,"its[proximate]causemustbeinsome"thing;
andhemeans,insomeonething.Whatjustifiesthisassumption?Sincethe"cause"inquestionis
R,arelationnecessarilyobtainingamongthemembersofP,wemightthinkthattheexistenceofall
themembersofP,eachinadifferentmind,wouldbeenoughtosustainR,andhencealsoT,in
181
being.Leibniz'sreasonsforthinkingthatwouldnotbeenougharetobesoughtinhisviewsabout
relations.Itisapersistentthemeinhisphilosophythatrelationsassuch,atleastinsofarasthey
involvemorethanonesubstance,arementalentities,havingtheirbeingonlyasobjectsofthought
7Arelationhasfoundationsinitsrelata,theitemsthatitrelates;butwithoutamind
orperception.
thatrelatestherelata,orregardsthemasrelated,therelationitselfdoesnotexist.Soifallthe
membersofPexistindifferentminds,butthereisnoonemindthatperceivesorunderstandsthe
relationRamongthem,thenfoundationsofRexistbutRitselfdoesnot.
WemightbetemptedtoexpressthisviewbysayingthatinsuchacasethemembersofP,intheir
isolatedexistence,aresuchthatifsomeonemindunderstoodthemalladequately,thentherewould
betherelationRamongthem.ButLeibnizcannotaccepteventhis.Forthetruthofsucha
counterfactualconditionalaboutthemembersofPwouldbearelationamongthem;infact,it
wouldbeequivalenttoR.Andsotherecanbenosuchtruthifthereisnomindwithenough
understandingtosustainRinbeing.Understoodinthisway,asitmustbetosupportthetheistic
argument,Leibniz'sthesisoftheidealityofrelationsisveryradical,anditisdoubtlessapointat
whichsomephilosopherswillobjecttotheargument.
AccordingtoLeibniz'sargument,foranyplurality,P,of(necessary)truthsornatures,there
necessarilyexistsanecessarytruth,T,groundedinarelation,R,amongallthemembersofP;in
ordertosustainTinbeingtheremusteternallyandnecessarilyexistatleastonemindthat
understandsR.ButamindthatunderstandsRmustbeonethatunderstandsthemembersofP,a
mind"inwhich[theideaof]thenatureofthecircle,thesquare,andtheothersis,"ifthosearethe
naturesinwhichTisgrounded;understandingallthat,itwillpresumablybeamindthat
understandsTitself.Theconclusionofthisargumentisthatforanyplurality,P,of(necessary)
truthsornatures,thereeternallyandnecessarilyexistsatleastonemindthatunderstandsallthe
membersofP.
ThismayhelpexplainwhyLeibnizdoesnotofferthetypeofargumentthatKantfavoredinhis
early(1763)treatiseonTheOnlyPossibleGroundofProofforaDemonstrationoftheExistence
8andstillviewedwithsomefavorinhis"criticalperiod."ItisanargumentthatGod's
ofGod,
existenceisrequiredtoaccountfortheontologicalstatusofpossibilities,butitisbasedonGod's
exemplifyingallperfectionsratherthanonGod'sunderstandingallpossibilities.Itdependsonthe
ideathat"allthingsaspartlyreal,partlynegative,presupposeabeingthatcontainsallrealitiesin
9It
itself,andthatmusthaveconstitutedthesethingsthroughthelimitationoftheserealities."
shouldbeclearfromChapter4
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7
Thistheme,asappliedtorelationsofunityamongparts,playsanimportantpartinLeibniz's
argumentthatbodies,asaggregates,aremerelyphenomenal(seeChapter9,section3.2).Ibelieve
thethemeisalreadypresentinthatargumentin1687(LA100f.;cf.thelater,moreexplicitNE
145f.).Thatrelationsarebeingsofreason,orideal,ordependontheunderstanding,isfrequently
statedinLeibniz'sworksfromafter1700(NE145,227,265;GII,438,486,517/AG199,203,L609;
LCV,47).Andasearlyas1676hecalledrelations"imaginaryideas"(AVI,iii,399).Cf.Mates,
PhilosophyofLeibniz,ch.12.
8
AkII,64163;theargumentitselfisfoundinpp.7792.
9
AkXXVIII,1033f.,translatedinKant,LecturesonPhilosophicalTheology,p.66.Thistext,which
ascribesrealthoughlimitedvaluetotheargument,notsufficingtoestablishthe"objective
182
ter4thatLeibnizhadinhisphilosophythematerialforsuchanargument;whydidn'theuseit?
Onepossiblereasonisthatbecauseofhisviewsaboutrelations,Leibnizthoughtthatitisnot
enoughfortheontologicalgroundofpossibilitiesandnecessarytruthstocontainthematerialsfor
theirconstruction;itmustalsocontainsomecorrelateofthelimitationsandotherrelationsby
whichtheyareconstructedfromthosematerials,andthelattercanbefoundinthecontentsof
God'sunderstanding,butnotinGod'sattributesassuch.
Onestepremainstotheconclusionthatthereeternallyandnecessarilyexistsaconceptually
omniscientmind.Itdependsontheassumptionthatthetotalityofessences,possibilities,and
necessarytruthsconstitutesthesortofpluralityIhavediscussed,thatmusthaveanecessarytruth
groundedinarelationamongallitsmembers.Thisisnotatrivialassumption.Leibnizseemsto
relyonitwithoutargument,thoughheknewwellenough(iflesswellthantwentiethcentury
logicians)thatparadoxcanlurkininfinitizingormaximizingassumptions(see,e.g.,GIV,424/
L293).The"classical"intuitionsaboutlogicandmathematicsthatimpelLeibniztoreject
anthropologicaltheoriesprovidesomesupportfortheviewthattherearenecessarytruthsthat
dependonnothinglessthanthetotalityofallessencesandpossibilities,andperhapsonall
necessarytruthsotherthanthemselves.Butifthisviewistoofraughtwithrisksofparadox,one
whosharedLeibniz'sotherpremisesmightseektoavoidparadoxbystratifyingtheobjectsoflogic
into"logicaltypes"andmightmaintainthatforeachlogicaltypethereisanecessarytruth(ofthe
nexthighertype)groundedinalltheessences,possibilities,andnecessarytruthsofthattypeand
lowertypesandhencethatthereeternallyandnecessarilyexistsatleastoneintelligentbeingthat
isconceptuallyomniscientwithrespecttothattypeandlowertypes.ThustheLeibniziancould
haveaproofofthenecessaryexistenceofconceptualomniscienceuptoashighalogicaltypeas
youplease.
TheconclusionofLeibniz'sargumenttothispointisthatitisnecessarythatthereexistsatleastone
beingthatisomniscientwithrespecttoavastrealmofpossibilities,necessities,andessences.
Wouldthisbeanecessarybeing?Itmustbe,ifLeibnizwascorrectinassuming,asheseemsto
havedone,atleastin1677,10thatifeachpossiblebeingofacertaintypeiscontingent,itmustbe
possiblefornoneofthemtoexist.Butthisisnotobviouslycorrect.Whycouldn'titbenecessary
thatthereissomeconceptuallyomniscientbeing(forreasonsindicatedintheprooffromthereality
ofeternaltruths),butcontingentwhichsuchbeingexists?SomemaydoubtthatLeibnizhas
adequatereasonforrejectingthishypothesis,butitisnotlikelytoappealtoanyoneascommitted
ashewastothePrincipleofSufficientReason:itishardtoseewhatthesufficientreasonwouldbe
thatwoulddeterminewhichofthoseindividuallycontingentbeingswouldexist,ifthereisnotone
ofthemthatnecessarilyexistswiththepowertodecidewhichcontingentbeingsshallexist.
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necessity"ofGod'sexistence,butonly"thesubjectivenecessityofsupposingit,"represents
lecturesgivenafterthefirsteditionoftheCritiqueofPureReason.
10
SeethediscussionofVE65,p.179inthischapter.
183
2.Leibniz'sThcoryExamined
HavingexaminedLeibniz'sprincipallineofargumentforit,wemayfurtherexplorehistheological
theoryoftheontologyoflogicbyconsideringthreeobjectionstoit,beginningwiththechargeof
circularitythatImentionedattheendofChapter6.11
2.1CircularityorSelfExistence?
ThechargemaybedirectedatLeibniz'saccountoftherealityofessences.ThethesisthatGod's
existenceisnecessaryplaysaprominentpartinLeibniz'saccountoftheontologyoflogic.Leibniz
understandsnecessaryexistenceintermsofabeing'sexistencefollowingfromitsessence,aswe
haveseeninChapters5and6.ButifLeibnizholdsthattherealityofallessences,presumably
includingthedivineessence,dependsontheexistenceofGod,whilealsoexplainingGod's
existenceasgroundedinthedivineessence,ishenotinvolvedinaviciouscircle?
Alternatively,thechargemaybedirectedatLeibniz'saccountoftherealityofeternaltruths,asit
wasbyBertrandRussell:
Moreover,God'sexistenceisdeducedfromtheLawofContradiction,towhichitis
thereforesubsequent....Again,withoutthelawofidentityorcontradiction,asLeibniz
trulysays(GV,14),therewouldbenodifferencebetweentruthandfalsehood.
Therefore,withoutthislaw,'itcouldnotbetrue,ratherthanfalse,thatGodexists.
Hence,thoughGod'sexistencemaydependuponthelawofcontradiction,thislaw
cannotinturndependuponGod'sexistence.12
AnattemptmightevenbemadetoenlistLeibnizhimselfinsupportofthisobjection.Hepresseda
similarchargeofcircularityagainsttheCartesiandoctrinethatnecessarytruthsdependonGod's
will:"Forthusthenecessityofthedivineexistenceandthenecessityofthedivinewillthemselves
willdependonthedivinewill;andthussomethingwillbebothpriorandposteriorinnatureto
itself"(AII,i,351=GI,253).LeibnizseesDescartesasinvolvedinaviciouscirclethataffects
God'sunderstandingaswellasGod'swill:"ForifthetruthitselfdependsonlyonthewillofGod
andnotonthenatureofthings,andastheunderstandingisnecessarilypriortothewill(Ispeakof
natural,nottemporal,priority),God'sunderstandingwillbepriortothetruthofthingsand
consequentlywillnothavethetruthasitsobject"(AII,i,507=GIV,285).CanLeibnizescape
circularityinhisowntheorywithoutrenouncingeitherhistheologicalontologyoflogicorthe
necessityofGod'sexistence?
AfirstpointtobemadeinLeibniz'sdefenseisthathenormallyseeksorpostulatesareason,rather
thananefficientcause,forthedivineexistence.In1677hewrote,"If[something]isthroughitself
[perse],thenitsreasonofexistingistakenfromitsownnature....Butifsomethingisthrough
somethingelse,thenithasareasonofexistingoutsideitself;thatis,ithasacause"(VE302=
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11
ImportantdiscussionsofLeibniz'sviewsontheontologyoflogic,includingaspectsofhisviews
thatIwillnottreathere,arefoundinMates,PhilosophyofLeibniz,ch.10;Mondadori,
"Nominalisms";andMugnai,"Leibniz'sNominalism."
12
Russell,PhilosophyofLeibniz,p.180.
184
LHIV,4,3C,1214),whichseemstodenyacausetoanythingthatexistsperse.Leibnizdoesnot
usuallyevenspeakofGodascausasui[selfcaused],exceptwhendiscussingSpinoza.13Thisisan
importantdifferencebetweenLeibniz'sownpositionandCartesianvoluntarism,asItakehimto
haveunderstooditin1677.Forthewillseemstobeanefficientcause,andonethatpresupposes
alternativesinsomesensepossible.14Thereisaviciouscircleintheideaofsuchacausepushing
itselfintoexistence.ButwearenottotakeLeibnizasthinkingofthedivineessencepushingitself,
orGod,intoexistence.Norissuchapushneeded,foramainpointofLeibniz'sdoctrineisthat
thereisnot,andcannotbe,anystateofaffairsinwhichGoddoesnotexist.Thereisnoproblemof
gettingfromdivinenonexistencetodivineexistence,forthereisnopossibledivinenonexistenceto
beastartingpointforanytransition.Theonlypossibleproblemforexplanationhereiswhatreason
therecanbewhythedivineexistenceisnecessary.
AllofthekeythesesinthispartofLeibniz'sphilosophy,indeed,areassertedasnecessarytruths.
ThatGodexists;thatGod'sessenceexists;foreachessence,thatitexists;foreachoftheeternal
truths(includingtheprincipleofcontradiction),thatitistrue;foreachoftheessencesandeternal
truths,thatGodunderstandsit;thattherealityoftheessencesandeternaltruthsconsistsinGod's
understandingthemallarenecessarytruthsaccordingtoLeibniz.Whateverrelationsof
explanationandmetaphysicaldependenceLeibnizsupposestoobtainamongthesetheses,he
cannotconsistentlysupposethatanyofthemisindependentofanyoftheothersinthesensethat
thereisapossibilityofitsobtainingwithoutthem,forhedoesnotbelievethatthereisany
possibilityofanyofthemnotobtaining.Allnecessarytruthsareinthiswayinseparablefromeach
other.
WemustbecarefulthereforenottofoistonLeibnizclaimsofprioritytowhichheisnot
committed.HisargumentfortheismfromtherealityofeternaltruthsdoesnotimplythatGod's
understandingisnaturallypriortothenecessarytruths.Itdoesimplythatthetruthscouldnotexist
withoutbeingunderstoodbyGod,andthatissupposedtoexplainwhatsortofbeingthetruths
have.ButitisequallypartofLeibniz'sviewthatGodcouldnotexistwithoutunderstandingexactly
thosenecessarytruths.Neithercouldexistwithouttheother.Theyaretwosidesofasinglefact.
Godexiststhroughhimself[perse],accordingtoLeibniz.Alternatively,Godexiststhroughhis
essence;butLeibnizaffirmsthetraditionalthesisthat"InGodexistencedoesnotdifferfrom
Essence"(Gr302/AG28;cf.Gr354).Eitherway,God'sexistenceispresentedasselfexplanatory.
TheexistenceofGod,thereal
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13
SeeGrua,Jurisprudence,p.244.Grua'spointispresumablythatincriticizingSpinozafordefining
causasuias"thatwhoseessenceinvolvesexistence"(B104&GI,147,citedbyGrua,loc.cit.),
Leibnizimpliesthatanessenceinvolvingexistenceisnottobeunderstoodasacauseintheusual
sense.Thetextsdonotseemtometoimplythatmuch,forinbothLeibnizsaysratherthatSpinoza
needstoprovethatcausasuisodefinedhastheusualcausalimplications.Thetextsdoatleast
imply,however,thatLeibnizdidnotthinktheideaofathing'sexistencebeingexplainedbyits
ownessencecanonlybeunderstoodintermsthatareintheordinarysensecausal.
14
ThatitpresupposesthisseemstobeimpliedbyLeibnizin1677;ontheCartesianview,sincethe
natureofjusticedependsonthedivinewill,"therewillbeabletobeaworldinwhichthepiousare
damned,theimpioussaved"(AII,i,352=GI,254).By1710Leibnizhadnotchangedhisown
opinion,butwaspreparedtoentertainanalternativeinterpretationofDescartes'svoluntarism(
T186),whichisdiscussedlaterinsection2.3.
185
ityofthedivineessence,andofallotheressencesascontainedinit,andthetruthofallnecessary
truthsasgroundedtherein,forminasenseasingleindissolublemetaphysicalreality,thefirstofall
realities.Thereisnogettingbeyondittoanythingmetaphysicallydeeper.Itmustthereforehavethe
reasonofitsexistencewithinitself,inaccordancewithLeibniz'sversionofthePrincipleof
SufficientReason.Thestandpointfromwhichsuchareasoncanbegivencanonlybeoneinwhich
theexistenceratherthanthenonexistenceofthisfirst,divinerealityisthedefaultvalue,soto
speakjustaswecanintelligiblyspeculateabouttheontologicalstatusofthePrincipleof
Contradictiononlyfromastandpointinwhichthetruthratherthanthefalsityofthatprincipleisthe
defaultvalue.
AreasongivenfromthisstandpointshouldnotbeseenasspecifyingsomethingthatmakesGod
exist.Itismorenaturallyunderstoodasexplainingwhythereisnoalternativepossibilitytobe
opposedtothedivineexistence.Oneapproachtothistakesupanideacentraltothetraditionofthe
ontologicalargument:thatthedivineexistenceistoogoodtobefalsethatGodissoperfectthat
Godcannotfailtoexist.Itfocuses,however,ontheconverse:thatasupposedstateofaffairsin
whichGoddoesnotexististoodefective,metaphysically,tobepossible.Whatwouldbethe
defectsofsuchastateofaffairs?Ananswertothisquestionsuggestedbytheprooffromthereality
ofeternaltruthsisthatasupposedstateofaffairsinwhichGodwouldnotexistwouldnothavethe
necessarystructureofanystateofaffairs,inasmuchastherewouldbeinitnonecessarytruths
(indeedinacertainsensenotruthsatall),becausetherewouldbeinitnoideas,possibles,
essences,orrelationsamongthem.
Despitethemetaphysicalinseparabilityofallnecessarytruthsfromoneanother,itremainsthatin
ourreasoningswederivesomenecessarytruthsfromothersandexplainsomefeaturesofthe
systemofnecessarytruthsintermsofotherfeaturesofit.Leibnizisclearlyengagedinsuchan
enterprisewithregardtotheessenceandexistenceofGod.Butitisimportantthatwecan
distinguishheretwoquitedifferentquestions:WhydoesGodexist?WhatkindofbeingdoesGod's
essencehave?Thefirstquestiongets(inLeibniz'sview)ananswerintermsofthe(characterof)
God'sessence.ThesecondgetstheanswerthatGod'sessenceexistsasexemplifiedandunderstood
byGodwhichofcoursecannotbeunlessGodexists.Butitisnotthesamequestionthatgets
answeredintermsofGod'sessenceasregardsGod'sexistence,andintermsofGod'sexistenceas
regardsGod'sessence.Similarly,theproposition'Godexists'dependsforitstruthonthetruthof
thePrincipleofContradiction,whilethePrincipleofContradictiondependsontheexistenceof
God,notforitstruth,butforitsreality.Inthisway,Ithink,aviciouscircleinexplanationis
avoided.Tobesure,LeibnizhasnotexplainedGod'sexistenceintermsofsomethingthatcould
existwithoutGodexisting,buttherecannotbeanysuchthingifGod'sexistenceisnecessaryas
Leibnizclaims.
2.2GodandtheEpistemologyofLogicandMathematics
ThepointthatnecessarytruthsdependontheexistenceofGod,notfortheirtruth,butfortheir
reality,15hasimportantimplicationsfortheepistemologyof
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15
Thisthesisisemphasized,andascribedtoDunsScotusaswellastoLeibniz,inMondadori,
"Modalities,Representations,andExemplars:the'RegionofIdeas'."
186
necessarytruth.ItexplainswhyLeibnizcansay,"Essencescaninacertainwaybeconceived
withoutGod,butexistencesinvolveGod"although"theveryrealityoftheessences,bywhich
indeedtheyflowintoexistences,isfromGod"(RS24/AG273).Onecanunderstandthecontents
andinterrelationsofessenceswithoutanyattentiontothefactthattheirrealityconsistsintheir
beingunderstoodbyGod,whereas,accordingtoLeibniz,onecannotunderstandwhyotherthings
existwithoutreferencetoGod.Leibnizheldthat"anAtheistcanbeaGeometer.Butiftherewere
noGod,therewouldbenoobjectofGeometry"(T184).Theatheistgeometerdoesnotnecessarily
makegeometricalmistakes;shecanunderstandthereasonsforallnecessarygeometricaltruths
about,say,triangles.Thereasonsforthesetruthsarefoundinthecontentandinterrelationsofthe
essenceoftriangleandotheressences.Onecanunderstandthemwithoutinquiringwhatthereality
ofessencesandnecessarytruthsconsistsin,thoughnotwithoutinsomesenserecognizingthat
reality.Toexplain,correctly,whythereisanyessenceoftriangleatall,onemustrefertoGod.But
onecanunderstandwithoutreferencetoGodwhyitfollowsfromtheessencesoftriangle,angle,
side,andsoonthatatrianglehasjustasmanysidesasangles.
Inanotherway,however,Leibnizcanhardlyregardknowledgeofgeometryorlogicascompletely
independentofawarenessofGod.Iftheobjectsoflogicandmathematicshavetheirrealityin
God'smind,inbeingunderstoodbyGod,itseemstofollowthatinknowingthemweareawareof
someofGod'sthoughts.AndLeibnizdoesnotrejectthisinference,thoughofcoursehedeniesthat
theatheistmathematicianmustrecognizewhatsheknowsasthoughtsofGod.LikeAugustine,16
helinksatheologicalontologyoflogicwithanepistemologyofdivineillumination:
Whilewhatistrueremainstrueevenifitwereknownbynohumanbeing;andwhatis
goodretainsitsgoodnessevenifnohumanbeingmadeuseofit;ontheotherhand,if
therewerenoGod,therewouldnotonlybenothingactual,butalsonothingpossible,
andthusthetrueandthegoodwouldbeannihilatedtogether,sothatitcanwellbesaid
thatthetrueiswhatagreeswiththeunderstanding,andthegoodiswhatagreeswiththe
will,ofGod,thefirstbeing[Urwesen].
Andthiscanalsohelpustodistinguishthetruefromthefalseandthegoodfromthe
evil.Fortherearefoundinuscertainraysofthedivinewisdomandoftheeternalword,
namelythefirsteternaltruthswhichareacriterion[maa]oftheothersthatspring
fromthem.Inotherwords,justasheisanoriginalsourceofallthings,soalsoisall
fundamentalknowledgetobederivedfromGod'sknowledge,andinhislightwesee
light.(GVII,111)
Thecontinuationofthispassage,onthegood,neednotconcernushere.Theremarksaboutthe
goodinquotedtexthaveamorevoluntaristicflavorthanisusualinLeibniz,whogenerallyinsists
thatGod'sunderstandingofthegoodispriortoGod'swill.Thestatementthat"thegoodiswhat
agreeswiththewillofGod"canofcoursebereadinasensethatisconsistentwithLeibniz'susual
views,sincehefamouslyheldthatwhatisbestisinfactalwayswilledbyGod.Butperhapsthis
textisanomalousonthispoint.
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16
Augustine,DediversisquaestionibusLXXXIII,xivi,inPLvol.40,cols.3031.
187
Thereisnoreason,however,tosuspectthatitsteachingaboutdivineilluminationisanomalousfor
Leibniz.Heexpressessimilarviewsinotherplaces."Godisthesunandlightofsouls,'thelight
illuminatingeveryhumanbeingwhocomesintothisworld',"hedeclares(DM28),quotingthe
Bible(John1:9)."OurUnderstandingcomesfromGod,andshouldbeconsideredasarayfrom
thatsun"(G111,353).
Theterminologyofdivine"illumination"andofraysfromthedivinesunisobviously
metaphorical.17WhatrelationsbetweenGodandthehumanmindLeibnizregardedasjustifying
themetaphormayperhapsbeseenmoreclearlyinconsideringhisreactiontoNicolas
Malebranche'scelebrateddoctrinethatweseeallthingsinGod.Thatdoctrine,tobesure,isnot
concernedsimplywiththeontologyandepistemologyoflogicandmathematics,butwhatLeibniz
saysaboutideasinresponsetoitcertainlyappliestohisownviewsonthosesubjects.
LeibnizunderstoodMalebranchetomeanthat"ourideasthemselvesareinGod,andnotatallin
us."ThatviewLeibnizregardedasirreconcilablewithhisownaccountofthenatureofsubstance,
accordingtowhicheverysubstancemusthaveinitselfagroundofallitspredicates.Inparticular,
thehumansoul"includeseverythingthathappenstoit,andexpressesGod,andwithhimall
possibleandactualbeings"(DM29).Thatinoursoulswhichgroundsourbeingtrulysaidtoknow
theobjectsoflogicandmathematics,andwhichexpressesthoseobjectsastheyareinGod,isour
ideaofthoseobjects;anditisindeedinus.
Nevertheless,Leibnizacknowledgedasenseinwhichwe"seeinGod"thepossibilitieswhich
"subsistalwaysaseternaltruthsofthepossibleswhosewholerealityisgroundedinsomething
actualthatistosay,inGod."Leibnizis
persuadedthatGodistheonlyimmediateexternalobjectofsouls,sincethereis
nothingbuthimoutsidethesoulthatactsimmediatelyontheSoul.Andourthoughts,
withallthatisinus,inasmuchasitincludessomeperfection,areproducedwithout
interruptionbyhiscontinuousoperation.Soinasmuchaswereceiveourfinite
perfectionsfromhiswhichareinfinite,weareimmediatelyaffectedbythem;anditis
thusthatourmindisimmediatelyaffectedbytheeternalideasthatareinGod,when
ourmindhasthoughtsthatarerelatedtothemandparticipateinthem.Anditisinthis
sensethatwecansaythatourMindseeseverythinginGod.(GVI,593f./L627)
TheclaimthatGodistheonlyimmediateexternalobjectofoursoulsisfoundinwritingsfrom
quitedifferentperiodsofLeibniz'slife.18TheprincipalreasongivenforitinthetextIhavequoted
iscausal:Godistheonlyexternalcauseonwhichourexistenceandfiniteperfections,including
ourideas,directlydepend."Becauseofthedivineconcurrencewhichcontinuallyconfersoneach
creaturewhateverofperfectionthereisinit,itcanbesaidthattheexternalobjectofthesoulis
Godalone,andthatinthissenseGodistothemindaslightistotheeye"(DutensII,224/L593).
Thesecausalclaimsmustbeunderstood,ofcourse,inthecontextofthetheoryofpreestablished
harmony.Thewholeseriesofmythoughtsisaconsequence
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17
Leibnizcouldexpressthesamethoughtinanaltenativemetaphor,appealingtotheearratherthan
theeye:"ReasonisthenaturalvoiceofGod"(Gr138).
18
GVI,593isfrom171215(onthedate,seeRML427f.).DutensII,224isfrom1707,andDM28is
from1686.SeealsoGIII,561f.,from1714.
188
ofmyownnature.Goddoesnotintervenetocauseanythoughtsinmethatdonotfollowfrommy
nature.WhatGoddirectlyandcontinuallycausesissimplytheexistenceofauniquebeinghaving
mynature.ButinsodoingGodalsocausestheideasthatareconsequencesofmynature.Andas
"everyeffectexpressesitscause"(DM28),myfiniteperfections,includingmyideas,asaspectsof
mynature,arecausedbytheinfiniteperfectionsinGodtowhichtheycorrespond.
ThecausalrelationissurelyrelevanttotheclaimthatGodisanobjectofourawarenessinour
understandingoflogicandmathematics,butitisjustassurelynotenoughtoestablishit.Leibniz
seestheclaimasgroundedalsoinarelationofexpressionorresemblance,whichinturnis
groundedinthecausalrelation.
ThusitisonlyinvirtueofthecontinuousactionofGodonusthatwehaveinoursoul
theideasofallthings;thatistosay,becauseeveryeffectexpressesitscause,and
becausetheessenceofoursoulisthusacertainexpression,imitation,orimageofthe
divineessence,thought,andwill,andofalltheideasthatarecontainedthere.Itcan
thereforebesaidthatGodaloneisourimmediateobjectoutsideus,andthatweseeall
thingsthroughhim.(DM28)
SinceGodisourcauseand"everyeffectexpressesitscause,"thereforetheessenceofoursoul
expressesorimages,initsimperfectway,thedivineessence.Andbecausethedivineessence
includesthedivineideasofallthings,thereforeouressence,inexpressingorimagingthedivine
essence,includesideasthatexpressorimagethedivineideas.Inasmuchasourideasoftheobjects
oflogicexpressthedivineideasandarecausedbythem,theycanbesaidtohavethedivineideas
astheirobject,inLeibniz'sview.Thisconclusionmaybefurtherconfirmedbythereflectionthat
wereadilytakeourselves,inlogicandmathematics,tobethinkingaboutsomethingthatis
independentofourthought;thatcanbeso,accordingtoLeibniz,onlyifwearethinkingabout
somethingthatexists,whetherwerealizeitornot,inGod'smind.
Anepistemologyofdivineilluminationisnotasillytheory.Ithink,infact,itmaybethebesttype
oftheoryavailabletousforexplainingthereliabilityofoursupposedknowledgeoflogicand
mathematics,sincethealternativetypeoftheorymostsalientforus,intermsofnaturalselection,
doesnotobviouslyexplainouraptitudeforthehigherreachesofthosesubjects,whichwasofno
usetoourancestorsonwhomtheselectivepressuresweresupposedlyoperative.Butthisisnotthe
placetodevelopthatpoint;Ihaveargueditelsewhere.19
2.3TruthandDivineUnderstanding
SomeofBertrandRussell'sobjectionstoLeibniz'sontologyoflogicseemtobebasedonan
interpretationofLeibnizasholdingthatGod'sknowingorunderstandingthenecessarytruthsis
"whatmakesthemtrue."20ThisreadingofLeibnizmightbesupportedbyatextIquotedinthe
previoussection,accordingtowhich"itcanwellbesaidthatthetrueiswhatagreeswiththe
understanding....ofGod"(GVII,111).Ibelievethisisnotacorrectinterpretation,butthepoint
issubtleandrequiressomeexamination.
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19
R.Adams,"DivineNecessity."
20
189
Throughouthiscareer,LeibnizwasvehementlyopposedtotheCartesianthesisthatnecessary
truthsdependonGod'swill.21Thisthesis,heargued,iscontrarytotheverynatureofthewill:"the
willofGodpresupposesanunderstandingofthethingtobewilled.Thisunderstandinginvolves
thepossibilityofthethingunderstood.Thereforethewillpresupposesthepossibilityofthethingto
bewilled"(AII,i,354=GI,256).HenceitisincoherenttosupposethatthewillofGoddetermines
whatispossible.Butpossibilitiesareinseparablefromessencesandnecessarytruths,whichmust
thereforealsobepresupposedbythedivinewill.ThetheologicalconsequencesoftheCartesian
position,moreover,seemedtoLeibnizappalling.IfGod'swilldidnotpresupposeessencesand
necessitiesindependentofit,Leibnizarguedparticularlyifitdidnotpresupposetheessencesof
justiceandgoodness,andnecessarytruthsfollowingfromthemthenGodwouldbearbitraryin
waysthatwouldfatallyunderminebeliefindivinegoodnessandjustice(AII,i,298f.;Gr433).
IntheTheodicyLeibniztriestoputamoreacceptableinterpretationonDescartes'sclaims.
Isuspectthathehadinviewhereanotherextraordinarywayofspeaking,ofhisown
invention,whichwastosaythataffirmationsandnegations,andinternaljudgmentsin
general,areoperationsofthewill.AndbythisartificetheeternalTruths,whichhad
been,upuntilthiswriter,anobjectofthedivineunderstanding,havebecomeatone
strokeanobjectof[God's]will.Nowtheactsofhiswillarefree,soGodisthefree
causeoftheTruths.(T186)
Onthisinterpretation,however,"theseactionswouldbenothinglessthanfree,forthereisnothing
tochoose."Theaccountwould"keeponlythenameoffreedom"(T186).Thepointofthis
criticism,ofcourse,isthatafreechoicemustbeamongapluralityofalternativespossiblein
themselves(seeChapter1,section1.4).Thatthereisnosuchalternativetoanecessarytruth,even
forthedivinewill,isperhapsthecentralthesisinLeibniz'scritiqueofCartesianvoluntarism.
InthispassageoftheTheodicyLeibnizdoesnotrejectthethesis,ascribedtoDescartes,that
necessarytruthsdependontheaffirmationsorjudgmentsbywhichGodacceptsthem.Elsewhere,
however,hedoesrejectit,andIthinktherejectionexpressesanauthenticallyLeibnizianthought.
Itisthoroughlyerroneous,however,[tothink]thattheeternaltruthsandthegoodness
ofthingsdependonthedivinewill,sinceeveryvolitionpresupposesajudgmentofthe
understandingaboutgoodnessunlesssomeonebyachangeofnamesweretotransfer
alljudgmentfromtheunderstandingtothewillthougheventhenitcouldnotbesaid
thatthewillisthecauseofthetruths,sincethejudgmentalsoisnot.Thereasonofthe
truthslurksintheideasofthings,whichareinvolvedinthedivineessenceitself.(G
VII,311/MP77)
Nomentalact,whetherofthewilloroftheunderstanding,makesthenecessarytruthstrue,Leibniz
implieshere,becausethenecessarytruthsfollowfromthedivineessence,whichispresupposedby
allGod'smentalacts.
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21
ImportanttextsfromtheperiodofLeibniz'sfullestdevelopmentoftheontologicalargumentand
theprooffromtherealityofeternaltruthsareAII,i,298f.,35155(167677).Fromthemiddle
yearsseeDM2(1686)andGr365(1695),andfromhislastyearsseeT186(1710)andMon46(
1714).ForotherreferencesseeGrua,Jurisprudence,pp.142f.,27073.
190
Understandingandbeliefarenotmentalactsinthesamewayasjudgment,however,anditseems
tobethroughthedivineunderstandingthat"theideasofthings"ingeneral"areinvolvedinthe
divineessence."CoulditstillbeGod'sunderstanding(andhencebelievingoraccepting)themthat
makesthenecessarytruthstrue?HereIthinkwemustreturntoadistinctionverysimilartoone
thatwasintroducedearlierinsection2.1.
Wecanask(1)Whyarethenecessarypropositionstrue?Leibniz'sanswerseemstobethat"the
reasonofthetruths[whytheyaretrueratherthanfalse]lurksintheideasofthings."Thatis,those
propositionsthatarenecessarilytruearesobecauseofthecontentofthe(divine)ideas."Thesole
principleofnecessarytruthsisthatthecontraryimplies[acontradiction]interms"(AII,i,351=G
I,253;cf.Gr365),asLeibnizsaysincriticizingCartesianvoluntarism.Itisnecessary,ofcourse,
thatGodbelievesoracceptsthenecessarytruths;butthatisnecessarybecauseofthereasonsfor
theirtruththatarefound"inthe[divine]ideasofthings."ItisnotbecauseGodacceptsthemthat
theyaretruthsratherthanfalsehoods.
Wecanalsoask(2)Whatsortofbeingdothenecessarytruthshave?AccordingtoLeibniz,of
course,theirbeingdependsonGod'sunderstanding.Doesitdependontheirbeingrecognizedin
thedivineintellectastruths,orsimplyonthepresencethereoftheideasonwhichtheyarebased?
Thatisadifficultdistinctiontomake.Canoneunderstandanidea,orcanGodperfectlyunderstand
anidea,withoutrecognizingthenecessarytruthsthatflowfromit?Insection1ofthischapterI
arguedthatLeibniz'sfullestversionoftheproofofGod'sexistencefromtherealityofeternaltruths
dependsonthethesesthatnecessarytruthstypicallydependonrelationsamongideas,andthatthe
beingofarelationdependsonitsbeingperceivedorunderstoodbysomemind.ButhowcanGod
perceivetherelevantrelationsamongideaswithoutrecognizingthecorrespondingnecessary
truths?SuchconsiderationsshouldprobablyleadLeibniztotheconclusionthatthebeingof
necessarytruthstypicallyconsistsintheirbeingrecognizedoracceptedastruebyGod,thoughthe
reasonwhytheyaretrue(andhenceaccepted)ratherthanfalse(andhencerejected)istobefound
intheircontentratherthaninthedivineacceptanceassuch.
191
8
PresumptionofPossibility
EvenifwehavenotfoundacompellingproofofthepossibilityofanecessaryGod,aslongassuch
abeinghasnotbeenprovedimpossible,Leibnizclaims,itistobepresumedpossible.Giventhat
hismodalversionoftheontologicalargumentshowsatleastthatanecessaryGoddoesexistifthe
existenceofsuchabeingispossible,Leibnizisofferingapresumptiveproofoftheexistenceof
1ThischapterisdevotedtoastudyofthisargumentanditsbackgroundinLeibniz'sthought.
God.
Wewillbeginwithfourstatementsoftheargumentfromtwoquitedifferentperiodsofhiscareer.
InhisinitialconversationwithArnoldEckhardabouttheontologicalargument,Leibnizrecords(5
April1677),whenhehadsaidthatCartesiansoughttoprovethepossibilityofamostperfect
Being,Eckhardcalledthisa"harddemand,"saying"thatsuchapossibilityneednotbeproved."
Aftersomediscussionofgeometricalexamples,inwhichLeibnizseemstohaveobtaineda
concessionthatpossibilityproofssometimescanandshouldbeprovided,Eckhardclaimed"thatit
isotherwisewithsimplerthings,whichareunderstoodtobepossible."Leibnizdescribesthe
ensuingdiscussion:
I[said]thattheirpossibilityisprobable,butnotcertain,untilitisproved.Certainlyitis
presumeduntilthecontraryisproved.Butthismodeofproofisadmittedonlyinthe
forum,notinphilosophy.He[said]thatitisadmittedeveninphilosophy,foritisnot
thecasethateveryoneisboundtoproveeverything.I(said]thatifitconcernspractice
[praxis],IgrantthatthepossibilityofanecessaryBeingormostperfectBeingis
presumed.Butwheredemonstrationisconcerned,itisincumbentononewhoseeks
perfectcertaintyordemonstrationtoproveallthepropositionsthatherelieson.(A
II,i,312f.=GI,213f.)
InaletterabouttheCartesianontologicalargument,probablywritteninthelaterpartof1678tothe
2Leibnizsays:
PalatinePrincessElizabeth,Descartes'scorrespondent,
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1
OnthebackgroundofthischapterinLeibniz'sthoughtaboutprobability,Ihavebeenhelpedbythe
classicdiscussioninCouturat,LalogiquedeLeibniz,pp.23960;byHacking,Emergenceof
Probability,esp.chs.10,1415;andbyBurkhardt,LogikundSemioticinderPhilosophievon
Leibniz,pp.42234.Amosthelpfulspecializedstudywithconsiderablediscussionofpresumption
isdeOlaso,"Leibnizetl'artdedisputer."
2
Therecipientisaddressedsimplyas"Madame"and"YourHighness."Gerhardt(GIV,268)
suggestedthatshewasElizabeth'ssisterSophia,whoin1678wassisterinlawtotheDukeof
192
Moreover,Iinfer...thatthereisapresumptionthatGodexists.Forthereis
alwayspresumptiononthesideofpossibility;thatistosay,everythingisheldto
bepossibleuntilitsimpossibilityisproved.Thereforethereisalsoapresumption
thatGodispossiblethatistosay,thatheexists,sinceinhimexistenceisa
consequenceofpossibility.Thatcansufficefortheconductoflife[lapractique
delavie],butitisnotenoughforademonstration.(AII,i,436/AG238)
3.
Thefulleststatement,andamoreemphaticallyfavorableevaluation,ofapresumptive
justificationoftheisticbeliefisfoundinapresentationthatarosefromLeibniz'sdiscussions
withIsaacJaquelotin1702:
ThisargumentofDescartes,andbeforehimofSt.Anselm,Archbishopof
Canterbury,isnotaSophism,assomeclaim;andinmyopinionitisonlyan
incompleteargument,orsomethingmuststillbesupplied.Butifnothingwouldbe
supplied,thereisalreadyaveryconsiderableusefulness,incompleteasthe
argumentis,inthatitshowsthatthedivineNaturehastheprivilegethatItneeds,
foritsExistence,onlyitspossibilityoressence.Andfurthermore,thisargument
yieldsatleastpresumptivelytheExistenceofGod.
Foreverybeingoughttobejudgedpossibleuntilthecontraryisproved,untilitis
shownthatitisnotpossibleatall.
Thisiswhatiscalledpresumption,whichisincomparablymorethanasimple
supposition,sincemostsuppositionsoughtnottobeadmittedunlesstheyare
proved,buteverythingthathaspresumptionforitoughttopassfortrueuntilitis
refuted.
ThereforetheexistenceofGodhaspresumptionforitinvirtueofthisargument,
sinceitneedsnothingbesidesitspossibility.Andpossibilityisalwayspresumed
andoughttobeheldfortrueuntiltheimpossibilityisproved.
SothisArgumenthastheforcetoshifttheburdenofprooftotheopponent,orto
maketheopponentresponsiblefortheproof.Andasthatimpossibilitywillnever
beproved,theexistenceofGodoughttobeheldfortrue.
InordertocompletethedemonstrationinanabsoluteandGeometricmanner,
however,itistobewishedthattheproofofthepossibilityinquestionbegiven.(
GIII,443f.)
4.
Thelatestofthesetextsisalsothemostfamiliar.Astatementofthepresumptiveargumentis
foundintheNewEssays(17031705):
Anditisalreadysomethingthatbythisremark[abouttheCartesianargument]it
isprovedthatgiventhatGodispossible,heexists,whichistheprivilegeof
Divinityalone.OnehastherighttopresumethepossibilityofeveryBeing,and
aboveallthatofGod,untilsomeoneprovesthecontrary.Sothat
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HannoverandwouldsoonbecomeDuchessofHannover,andLeibniz'spatroness.Theeditors
ofAII,isuggestthePrincessElizabeth(atthattimeAbbessofHerford)astheletter's
addresseeandpropose1678asthedate.Theygivenoreasons,butIthinktheyareprobably
right.TheletterindicatesthatitwaswrittentosomeonewhohadspokenbrieflywithLeibniz
andaskedforhisviewsontheCartesianargument.ThePrincessElizabethvisitedHannover
"inthewinterof1678"(Aiton,Leibniz:ABiography,p.90;cf.AII,i,455).Beginning5
December1678,moreover,andcontinuinginto1680,oneofLeibniz'scorrespondents,F.A.
Hansen,repeatedlyaskedforacopyofaletter"touchingthephilosophyofMonsieur
Descartes"thatLeibnizhadwrittentothePrincessElizabeth(AI,ii,389,408,501;A
I,iii,418f.).Hansen'sreferenceisprobablytotheletterthatconcernsushere.
193
thismetaphysicalargumentalreadyyieldsamoraldemonstrativeconclusion,which
impliesthatinthepresentstateofourknowledgeweoughttojudgethatGodexists,
andactaccordingly.(NE438)
Oneistemptedtoregardthisargument,eveninitsfullestform,asarathercasualeffort.
Presumptionisaninferioralternativetoproof,andLeibnizalwaysthoughthecouldprovethe
existenceofGodinonewayoranother.Moreover,thereseemstobeaneasyandobvious
refutationofthepresumptiveargumentinthiscase.Forif"thereisalwayspresumptionontheside
ofpossibility,"itwouldseemthatpresumptionshouldfavorthepossibilityofthenonexistence,as
muchasthepossibilityoftheexistence,ofanecessaryGod.IftheargumentdiscussedinChapter
5,section1,issound,however,eithertheexistenceorthenonexistenceofanecessaryGodmustbe
impossible.Iftheexistenceisnotimpossible,itisnecessary;andiftheexistenceisnecessary,the
nonexistenceisimpossible.Presumingeitherpossibilitythereforeleadstorejectionoftheother,
andthetwoopposingpresumptionsofpossibilityseemtocanceleachother.
1.JurisprudenceandPragmatisminTheology
Thisobjectionmayindeedbeconclusive,andwewillreturntodiscussitmorefully.Butthereis
moretoLeibniz'sargumentthanmeetstheeye.Behindhisappealstopresumptioninconnection
withtheontologicalargumentliesalargeapparatusofdefinitionandargumentrootedina
particularintellectualtradition,atraditionofjurisprudenceorlegaltheory.Mostreadersofthis
essaywillbefamiliarwiththeruleofEnglishcommonlawaccordingtowhichthedefendantina
criminalcaseis"presumedinnocentuntilprovenguilty."Leibniz'svoluminouswritingsin
jurisprudence,orientedtowardRomanlaw,alsoaboundindiscussionsandcasesofpresumption.
Forinstance,"apossessorispresumedtobeanowner"(AVI,iii,608).WhenLeibnizsaysto
Eckhardthatpresumption"isadmittedonlyintheforum,notinphilosophy,"wearerightly
remindedoftheroleofpresumptioninlegalprocedureandlegaltheory.
Inthuscallingattentiontothefactthattheconceptofpresumptionhasitshomeinthelawrather
thanin"philosophy,"Leibnizmaystrikeusasdisparagingthepresumptiveargument.This
impressionmaybedeepenedbytherelatedcontrastbetween"practice"[praxis]or"theconductof
life"[lapratiquedelavie]and"demonstration"inbothofthefirsttwopassagesIhavequoted,for
weknowthatwhatpresumptiongovernsinthelegalsystemisbehavior.Personspresumed
innocent,forexample,arenotnecessarilybelievedinnocent.Butsurely(andparticularlyinthe
LutherantraditiontowhichLeibnizbelonged)religionrequiresbelieforfaith,andnotjust
behavioralconformity.Itmightthereforeseemnaturaltoconcludethatpresumptioncouldnotbe
worthmuchindefenseofareligiousthesis,suchastheexistenceofGod,andthattheassessment
ofthepresumptiveargumentinthetwoearliertextsiswidelyatvariancewiththerather
enthusiasticevaluationinthepiecefrom1702.
Thisinterpretationisnottotallymistaken.CertainlyLeibnizmeanttocomparepresumption
unfavorablywithdemonstration.Thetheoreticalinsufficiencyofpresumptionismostheavily
emphasizedintheearliestofthesetexts,andits
194
apologeticusefulnessisevidentinthemuchlaterpair.Butthereisalsoanearlytext(probablyof
167778)inwhichLeibnizofferstheprinciplethat"eachthingisheldtobepossibleuntilthe
contraryisproved"asareasonwhyaproof"thatGodeitherisimpossible,orelseactuallyexists"is
3IntheNewEssays,moreover,aclearaffirmationofthevalueofthe
"ofgreatimportance."
presumptiveargumentseemstocoexisthappilywithacharacterizationofitsconclusionas"moral"
andanemphasisonitsrelevanceforaction.AcloserexaminationofLeibniz'sconceptionofthe
relationsamongtheology,jurisprudence,andthelogicofprobabilitywillgreatlymitigatethe
apparentdisparagementofpresumptioninanyofthesetextsandwillshowthatallofthemcanbe
interpretedasexpressingthesamesystemofviews,withoutanyfundamentalchangefromthe
earliesttothelatest.
Leibnizclearlythoughtthatjurisprudenceisimportantfortheology.4InhisNewMethodof
LearningandTeachingJurisprudence,publishedin1667,hestatesthat"Theologyisacertain
speciesofJurisprudence(thelatterbeingtakenuniversally);foritdealswiththe[systemofJustice
[Jus]andLaws[Leges]obtainingintheRepublic,orratherkingdom,ofGODoverhumanbeings."
Hejustifiesthisclaimbymappingalonglistoftopicsoftheologyontotopicsoflegaltheory.For
instance:"infidelsarelikerebels;theChurchlikegoodsubjects";thedoctrinesofScripture,thelast
judgment,andeternaldamnationarelikethoseoflaws,judicialprocess,andcapitalpunishment(A
5"Inshort,"headds,"almostallofTheologydependsinlargepartonJurisprudence.
VI,i,294).
Howoftenisatestament,howofteninheritance,howoftenslavery,howoftenisadoption
mentionedbySt.Paul?"Hegoesontogiveotherexamplesoftheuseoflegalconceptsintheology
(AVI,i,295).Leibnizcannotbesaidtohavearticulatedheretheidea,recentlyproposedin
6thatthedoctrinesofreligiousbodies(asdistinctfrompersonalreligiousbeliefs)are
theology,
bestunderstoodasrulesgoverning(verbalaswellasnonverbal)behavior,butsomethingofthesort
maybeimplicitinhisidentificationofthetheologicaldoctrine"offundamentalErrors"(heresies)
as"like[thelegaldoctrine]ofCapitalCrimes"(AVI,i,294).
Thirtyyearslaterthesamebasicideaoftheologyasjurisprudenceisexpressed,thoughlessfully
andmorecautiously,inalettertoVincentPlaccius:"practicaltheologyisnothingbutjurisprudence
fortheuniversalrepublicwhoserulerisGod,insofarasitdescribesourdutiesinit"(Dutens
VI,i,84).'Practicaltheology'heredoesnotreferprimarily,asitoftendoesinmoderntheological
curricula,totheartsofreligiousministryandtheirspecifictheoreticalbackground.Itssenseis
givenbyLeibniz'simmediatelyprecedingstatementthat
Godmustbeconsideredintwoways:physicallyandmorally.Physically,thatis,asthe
ultimatereasonofthings,withrespect,ofcourse,toeveryperfec
____________________
3
Thetextisprintedonpp.286f.ofJanke,"DasontologischeArgument."
4
Inadditiontotextscitedbelow,seeGr370.Thispointprovidesthetitle,andaleadingidea,ofone
ofourcentury'sgreatestworksofLeibnizianscholarship,GastonGruaJurisprudenceuniverselleet
thodiceselonLeibniz;seeesp.ch.4.
5
Leibnizhadalsopublishedtheseideas,largelyinthesamewords,thepreviousyearinhis
DissertationontheArtofCombinations(AVI,i,190f.).
6
Lindbeck,NatureofDoctrine.
195
tionthatisinthem;butmorally,asthemonarchofthemostperfectrepublic,whichis
thatpoliticalcommunity[civitas],sotospeak,ofthemindsofthewholeuniverse.(
DutensVI,i,84)
"Practical"theologyarisesfromthe"moral"considerationofGod,andtakesasitsfieldallthe
socialorquasisocialrelationsbetweenGodandrationalcreatures.Itisthispartoftheologythatis
aspeciesofjurisprudence,andthatwasdoubtlessLeibniz'smeaninginhisyouthfulpublications,
too.Evenin1667hewouldsurelynothaveassignedtolegaltheorythe"physical"considerationof
Godasthemetaphysicalfirstcauseofthings.
TheportionoftheologytowhichLeibnizwaspreparedtoassignapracticalcharacterwasvery
7Theextentofhispragmatismregardingreligiousbeliefisperhapsnowheremore
large,however.
clearlyrevealedthaninapaper,writtenabout1670,ontheproblemofa"judge"orcriterionfor
8Thefirsthalfofitisdevotedtoreligiouscontroversies,
resolvingcontroversies(AVI,1,54859).
andLeibnizaversthat,atleastfromaProtestantpointofview,theologicalquestionsthatcannotbe
settledbyrecoursetoexplicitstatementsinScripture"arenotoffaith,butofmorals,not
theoretical,butpractical,whichwearenotcommandedtobelieve,buttoperform"(1011).
EvenwherethereareexplicitstatementsinScripture,placingtheissueinthetheoreticalcategory,
pragmaticconsiderationsmaycomeinifthereisdoubtabouttheinterpretationofthesacredtext
(asforinstanceofthestatement,"Thisismybody,"ascribedtoJesusathislastsupper).
InthiscaseIthinkthedutyofaChristianisthis:hearingthewordsofthetext,to
appropriatethemastrueinaliteral[proprius]sense,butwithdevoutsimplicity,which
thinksthatitcouldbemistaken,andthatperhapsthepropositionistrueinafigurative
[tropicus]sense,butthatitissafertoactthus.Andsothisfaithwillbedisjunctive,but
incliningtooneside.Andthisinfact,ifyouwillnotice,iswhatmostChristiansdoin
practice.(24)
Heretheacceptanceofadisjunctionofmeaningsispresumablytheoretical,butthe"incliningto
oneside"ratherthantheotherlookslikeabehavioralresponsetothewordsofthetext,defendedas
a"safer"wayof"acting"(cf.Gr32),andas"whatmostChristiansdoinpractice."
Particularlystriking,andinterestingforourpresentdiscussion,isthefactthatLeibnizwasprepared
toadmitsuchadisjunctivefaith,orsomethingverylikeit,regardingtheexistenceofGod.
IndeeditcanbetaughtthattheveryfaithofmostChristiansbothnowconsists,andhas
alwaysconsisted,intheapprovalofpropositionsnotunderstood.Forsee,ifyouaska
PeasantwhetherhebelievesthereisaGOD,hewillbeindignantthatyoudoubtedit;
butifyouaskwhathecallsGOD,hewillbeamazedthatyouevenaskthis,andwill
finallyconfessthathehashardlyeverpaidanyattentiontowhatmaybemeantbythe
word[vox]GOD,[but]hasbeensatisfiedtorecitethisproposition,havingconceived
underthewordssomeobscuresense,bywhichhehasunstablyimaginedGOD,nowas
alargeandwiseman,nowotherwise.(30)
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7
OnLeibniz'semphasisontheimportanceofthepracticalaspectofreligion,seeLeBrun,"Critique
desabusetsignifiancedespratiques,"withampledocumentation.
8
Furtherreferencetothistext,inthepresentdiscussion,willbebysectionnumber.
196
TheordinaryChristian'stheoreticalbeliefinGod'sexistenceispresentedhereasdisjunctive,or
perhapssimplyvague.Whatisdefiniteisthebehaviorofhearingandreciting(affirmatively)a
formofwords.
Somemightthinkthistheologicallyscandalous,9andtheessayinwhichitisfoundwasboth
youthfulandneverpublishedbyLeibniz.Butasimilarlypragmatic,thoughlessfullydeveloped,
viewofadherencetoareligiouspositionisfoundintheNewEssays,writtenmanyyearslaterand
withadefiniteintentionofpublication.Intermsnotlikelytobefoundscandalousinhisowntime,
Leibnizwritesofthedeferenceduetoexpertopinion,andgivesexamplesfromtherealmof
religion.
Thusachild,andanyotherpersonwhoseconditionishardlybetterinthisrespect,is
obligedevenifheisquitehighlyplacedtofollowtheReligionofthecountryinsofar
asheseesnothingwrongwithit,andinsofarasheisnotinapositiontoinquire
whetherthereisabetterone.Andagovernorofpageboys,whateverhisownsect,will
makeeachofthemgototheChurchthatisattendedbyadherentsofthebelief
professedbytheyoungman.(NE458)
ModernphilosophicalreaderswillnaturallyberemindedatthispointofDescartes,forwhom
constantadherencetothereligioninwhichhehadbeenraisedstoodattheheadofthecodethathe
proposedtohimself(andhisreaders)forguidanceduringaperiodoftheoreticaluncertainty.Itis
noteworthythatDescartessawthiscodeasa"morality"[unemorale],andappealedtoutilityto
defendadherencetotheopinionsofhisowncountryinpreferencetothoseofthePersiansand
Chinese.10
ForLeibnizaswellasforDescartes,pragmaticconsiderationsseemtohavebeeninorder
wherevertheoreticalcertaintywaslacking.AndLeibnizwasquitewillingtoappealtoarguments
ofpracticalormoralforce,specificallyincludingpresumption,inmattersofbasicreligiousbelief.
11Forinstance,inanessaywrittenforDukeJohannFriedrichofHannoverin1671,stressingthe
humanandpracticalimportanceofawellgroundedbeliefintheimmortalityofthesoul,Leibniz
says:
Nophilosopherhasthusfarbeenabletoexplainthoughtbythemotionsorshapesof
bodies.Iacknowledgethatthisyieldsastrongpresumptionofincorporeality,butnota
demonstration.ThereforeDigby'sdemonstration[whichisbasedonthispoint],ifyou
analyzeit,isintheendamoralone,orestablishesnotacertaintybutapresumptionof
immortality.Idonotdeny,however,thatthisisalreadysomethingofgreatimportance
formotivatingprudentpeople.(AII,i,113)
Likewiseinanoutlineofhisplanned"CatholicDemonstrations,"writtenslightlyearlier,Leibniz
thoughtitworthwhiletoinclude,inadditiontofourtheisticproofsofpresumablystricter
theoreticalcogency,a"demonstration[oftheexistence
____________________
10
Descartes,DiscourseonMethod,part3(ATVI,23).
11
Leibnizalsoseemstohavethoughtpresumptiveargumentsquiteinplaceindebatesbetween
ProtestantsandRomanCatholics;seeGr198f.ThistextiscitedbydeOlaso("Leibnizetl'artde
disputer,"p.221f.),whoalsoarguesthatLeibnizappealsoftentoconsiderationsofburdenofproof
inhisTheodicy.
9
Seetheattackontheideaof"implicitfaith"inCalvin,InstitutesoftheChristianReligion,
III,ii,25.Cf.NE520f.
197
ofGod]ofinfiniteprobability,ormoralcertainty"from"thebeautyoftheworld"(AVI,i,494).
AndinhisTheodicy,manyyearslater,hedeclaresthat"theproofsofthetruthofreligion,"
meaningrevealedreligion,"canonlygiveamoralcertainty"(Tpd5).
Itmaynotbeentirelyobviousthatincallingacertainty"moral"intheselasttextsLeibnizreally
meanttoenterthesphereofpracticalconsiderations.Couldhenotbeusing'moralcertainty'simply
asanameforthehighestpossibledegreeofprobability?Certainlyitdidsignifyforhimadegreeof
probabilitysohigh"thatnonoteworthycomparisoncanbemadewith[theprobabilityof]the
opposite"(GVII,44f.;cf.C515;GVII,320/L364;NE68).ButIdoubtthatLeibnizeverforgotthe
originalpointofspeakingofaprobabilityasa"moral"or"practical"certainty,whichisthatitis
strongenoughtoactonwithouthedgingone'sbetsinviewofthetheoreticalpossibilityoferror.
Thispointismanifestinaparticularlyinterestingdiscussionofempiricalgeneralizationsin
science,publishedbyLeibnizin1670.Forhisjustificationforclaiminga"practicalormoral
certainty"forthegeneralizationthatallfire(ofthesortthatwehaveobserved)burnsdependson
premisesaboutwhat"shouldbeheldinpractice"(AVI,ii,431f./L129f.).12
2.JurisprudenceandtheLogicofProbability
Thereisreason,indeed,tothinkthatLeibnizassignedallmerelyprobablereasoning,allreasoning
oflessthanfullydemonstrativeforce,tothepracticalsphere.13Thisissuggestedbytextsfrom
167778onthepresumptiveargumentfortheism,where"demonstration"isthesolealternative
contrastedwith"practice"or"theconductoflife"(AII,i,312f.,436).ItisinthislightthatIwould
interpretthefactthat,afterdiscussingthepresumptionofthepossibilityofGod'sexistenceinhis
lettertothePrincessElizabeth,Leibnizgoesontosaythat"onehasdonenothingifonedoesnot
provethispossibility"(AII,i,436/AG239,italicsadded).Thisisnotadenialofthereligiousvalue,
butonlyoftheintellectualmerit,ofapresumptioninfavorofdivineexistence.Theletterisvery
muchconcernedwithintellectualmerit,andbreathesaspiritofcompetitionwiththeCartesians.
Theassignmentofprobablereasoningto"practicalphilosophy"isnotmerelysuggestedbutplainly
impliedinaletterofFebruary1697toThomasBurnett,whichisespeciallyinterestingalsoforthe
connectionsitdrawsbetweenjurisprudenceandthelogicofprobability.LeibnizwritestoBurnett
that"Theologicaltruthsandinferencesareoftwokinds;somehaveametaphysicalcertaintyand
othershaveamoralcertainty."Inordertodealproperlywiththelattersort,"onemustalsohave
recoursetothetruePhilosophy,andinparttonaturalJurisprudence."
ForPhilosophyhastwoparts,thetheoreticalandthepractical.TheoreticalPhilosophy
isfoundedonthetrueanalysis,ofwhichtheMathematiciansgive
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12
Someofthemoreimportantpartsofthistext,formypresentpurpose,areomittedinLoemker's
translation.
13
Thispointisnotdiscussed,butbackgroundrelevanttoitispresented,inSchupp,"TheoriaPraxis
Poiesis."
198
examples,butwhichoughtalsotobeappliedtoMetaphysicsandtonaturaltheology,in
givinggooddefinitionsandsolidaxioms.ButpracticalPhilosophyisfoundedonthe
trueTopics14orDialecticsthatistosay,ontheartofestimatingthedegreesofproofs,
whichisnotyetfoundamongtheauthorswhoareLogicians,butofwhichonlythe
Juristshavegivenexamplesthatarenottobedespisedandthatcanserveasa
beginningforformingascienceofproofs,suitableforverifyinghistoricalfactsandfor
givingthemeaningoftexts.ForitistheJuristswhoareoccupiedordinarilywiththe
oneandtheotherin[legal]processes.ThusbeforeTheologycanbetreatedbythe
methodofEstablishments,asIcallit,aMetaphysics,ordemonstrativenatural
Theology,isneeded,andsoisamoralDialectic,andanaturalJurisprudence,bywhich
thewaytoestimatethedegreesofproofsmaybelearneddemonstratively.Forseveral
probableargumentsjoinedtogethersometimesmakeamoralcertainty,andsometimes
don't.Thereisthereforeneedofasuremethodtobeabletodetermineit.Itisoften
said,withjustice,thatreasonsshouldnotbecounted,butweighed;howevernoonehas
yetgivenusthatbalancethatshouldservetoweightheforceofreasons.Thisisoneof
thegreatestdefectsofourLogic;wefeeltheeffectsofiteveninthemostimportantand
mostseriousmattersoflife,whichconcernjustice,thepeaceandwellbeingoftheState,
humanhealth,andevenreligion.ItisalmostthirtyyearssinceImadetheseremarks
publicly,andsincethattimeIhavedoneaquantityofresearch,tolaythefoundations
ofsuchwork;butathousanddistractionshavepreventedmefromgivingfinalformto
thosePhilosophical,Juridical,andTheologicalElementsthatIhadprojected.IfGod
stillgivesmelifeandhealth,Iwillmakeitmyprincipalbusiness.Istillwouldnot
proveallthatcanbeproved,butIwouldproveatleastaveryimportantpart,inorderto
beginthemethodofEstablishments,andtogiveothersoccasiontogofurther.(G
III,193f.)
Iknowofnoothertextthatunitesallthepointsfoundinthisprogrammaticstatement,butitisby
nomeanseccentric.MostofitsideasarefoundfrequentlyinLeibniz'swritings,andthereisa
plausiblereferenceforhisclaimtohave"madetheseremarkspublicly"almostthirtyyearsbefore
thislettertoBurnett.InhisSpeciminaJuris,publishedin1669,Leibnizremarksofacertain
probleminlegaltheorythatit"dependsentirelyontheLogicaldoctrineofdegreesofprobability;
butit15hasnotbeentreatedaccuratelybyanyLogician,sofarasIknow,althoughitwouldbeof
greatuseinpractice,notonlyhere,butalsowhenpresumptionsaretobecompared"(AVI,i,426).
Thetopicofprobabilitywascloselyconnectedinhismindwithlegaltheory.Inaletterof1697to
JohnBernoulli,mentioningearliermeditationsofhisownona"Doctrineofthedegreesof
probability,"Leibnizsaystheywere"especiallyforuseinJurisprudenceandPolitics"(GM
III,377).Andheoftencommendsthelegaltheoristsfortheirworkonprobability(AVI,i,280;
NE464f.;C211f.;GVII,167,477,521;GMIII,850;DutensV,403;DutensVI,i,36).16
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14
AscienceofdialecticalornondemonstrativereasoningissonamedhereafterAristotleTopics.In
1667LeibnizhadidentifiedTopicsas"theartofdiscovery"[arsinventiva](AVI,i,279).
15
Thesensehereseemstometorequirethis'it'torefertotheLogicaldoctrineofdegreesof
probability,andIcitethetextontheassumptionthatthisinterpretationiscorrect;Leibniz'sLatinis
exactlyasambiguousasmyEnglishtranslationonthispoint,however.
16
0nlegaltheoryasasourceofideasaboutprobability,cf.Hacking,EmergenceofProbability,ch.
10.AtGr792f.thejuristsarecommended,butsomewhatbackhandedly.
199
Indeed,Leibniz'sinterestsinthewholeoflogicandinjurisprudencewerelinkedfromthe
beginning.HisDissertationontheArtofCombinations(1666)iswidelynotedastheforerunnerof
thehighlyoriginalresearchesinlogicthathavedrawnsomuchattentioninourcentury.Itisless
oftennotedthatproblemsoflegaltheoryfigureprominentlyamongthe"uses"proposedforlogicin
thisearlywork(AVI,i,177,18991).Legalapplicationsundoubtedlyrankedhighamongthe
expectedusesofthe"generalcharacteristic"ofwhichLeibnizdreamedthroughouthisadultlife,
thequixoticallymassiveproposedencyclopediaofdefinitions,axioms,andtheoremsthatwould
facilitateaccurateandrelativelyuncontroversialreasoningoneverytopic.Andlegaltheoryisone
ofthetopicsonwhichLeibnizwasmostassiduous,earlyandlate,incompilingactuallistsof
definitions.ToAntoineArnauld,in1688,Leibnizwritesthathisworkonthe"general
Characteristic"includes"someessaysinjurisprudence"(LA134).Itisundoubtedlyhisworkon
thegeneralcharacteristicthatLeibnizdescribestoBurnettas"aquantityofresearch"thathehas
done"tolaythefoundations"ofa"methodofEstablishments"having"Philosophical,Juridical,and
TheologicalElements"(GIII,194).
SincetheprojectunderdiscussioninthelettertoBurnettisthedevelopmentofanadequatelogical
apparatusforprobablereasoning,myinterpretationofitasreferringtothegeneralcharacteristic
maybequestionedbystudentswhohavethoughtofthecharacteristicasasuperrationalisticproject
forpurelyapriorireasoningtoconclusionsestablishedonthebasisofconceptualanalysisand
deductivelogicalone.Itisclear,however,thatprobablereasoningwasinfactsupposedtohavean
importantplaceinthegeneralcharacteristic.17WritingtoJeanGalloisin1677,forinstance,
Leibnizlistsamongthepromisedbenefitsofthecharacteristicthat"wecouldestimatethedegrees
ofprobability,ratheras[wedo]theanglesofatriangle"(AII,i,381=GVII,22;cf.AII,i,384).
Likewise,writingtoNicolasRmondin1714,Leibnizsaysthat"thisLanguageorCharacteristic..
.wouldalsoserveforestimatingthedegreesoflikelihood(whenwedonothavesufficientdatato
arriveattruthsthatarecertain)"(GIII,605).Tothesetextsfromtheearlyandthefinalyearsof
Leibniz'scareercanbeaddedothersfromtheinterveningyearsconfirmingthepartlyprobabilistic
natureofthegeneralcharacteristic(C176,215;GIII,259;GVII,26,125,167,188,201).
ThecomparisonwithestimatingtheanglesofatrianglesuggeststhatLeibniz'srationalismdid
extendtotheviewthatevenwhenmerelyprobablereasoningmustbeemployed,theprobabilities
themselvescouldbedeterminedaprioriwithgeometricalrigor,andthisisstronglyconfirmedby
mostofthetextsIhavejustmentioned.Asearlyas1678Leibnizheldthat
eveninmattersoffactthatarecontestedwithpresumptionsandconjecturesonboth
sides,itcanbeaccuratelydefinedonwhichsidethereisgreaterprobabilityfromthe
givencircumstances.Thereforeprobabilityitselfcanbedemonstrated,anditsdegree
admitsofbeingestimated,althoughthisargumentisnotmuchcultivated.(AII,i,387=
GI,187)
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17
ThemostextravagantlyrationalisticinterpretationsofLeibnizarehardlycompatiblewithhisblunt
statement,inaletterof1680,that"Itisridiculoustoexpectuniversalknowledge(pansophia)from
anycharacteristic,...asalsofromanyanalysis,formanythingsareknownonlybyexperience"(
GVII,19).
200
Similarly,hesaysinanotherplace:
Evenwhendealingonlywithprobabilities,onecanalwaysdeterminewhatismost
likelyfromthedata....Sowhenonehasn'tenoughconditionsgiventodemonstrate
certainty,asthematterisonlyprobable,onecanalwaysatleastgivedemonstrations
touchingtheprobabilityitself.(GVII,167)
These"demonstrations"presumablyestablishtheprobabilitiesoftherelevanthypotheses"from
thegivencircumstances"or"fromthedata"thatis,theconditionalprobabilitiesthatmeasure
howlikelythehypothesesaretobetrueifthesearethedata(cf.GVII,44).Thetruthofthe"data"
maybegivenempirically,buttheconditionalprobabilitiesaretobeestablishedaprioriinthe
generalcharacteristic:"OnecouldsaywithCardanothattheLogicofprobableshasdifferent
inferencesfromtheLogicofnecessarytruths.Buttheprobabilityitselfoftheseinferencesmustbe
demonstratedbytheinferencesoftheLogicofnecessary[truths]"(NE484).
Whymustthisbeso?InhisprefacetoaneditionofNizolius,of1670,Leibnizoffersthefollowing
argument.
Itisevidentthatinductionbyitselfproducesnothing,notevenamoralcertainty,
withoutthesupportofpropositionsthatdependnotoninductionbutonuniversal
reason.Forifthesupportstoowerebasedoninduction,theywouldneednewsupports
andnomoralcertaintywouldbeobtained[byfollowingsucharegress]toinfinity.(A
VI,ii,432/L129f.)
Asthecontextmakesclear,the"supports"towhichLeibnizrefersareineffectpropositions
assigningconditionalprobabilitiesandthusdetermininghowthe(resulting)probabilityofgeneral
hypothesesisaffectedbyempiricaldata.Ifweweretotrytojustifythose"supports"themselvesby
inductionorempiricalevidence,wecouldnotdeterminehowtheirprobabilityisestablishedby
suchevidencewithoutfurther"supports"totellustheconditionalprobability;this,Leibnizargues,
willleadtoaviciousinfiniteregressunlesswecanrelyatbottomonapriorideterminationsof
conditionalprobability.
Leibnizsaysthatthe"supports,"whichIinterpretasgivingtheconditionalprobabilities,are
"universalpropositionsthatdepend...ontheuniversalideaordefinitionoftheterms"(A
VI,ii,431/L129).IanHackinghasplausiblyinterpretedLeibnizasholdingsomethingliketheview
lateradoptedbyCarnap,whichhasbecomeknownasthe"logical"interpretationofthenatureof
probability.18Onthisview,theconditionalprobabilityofahypothesis,H,ondata,D,(the
probabilityHwouldhaveifDwereourdata)isalogicalrelationthatnecessarilyobtainsbetween
HandD.Thiscouldbetrueevenifwewereoftenunabletoknowtheselogicalrelationsapriori.
Commonly,however(asatGVII,167),Leibnizimpliesthattheconditionalprobabilitiescan
alwaysbeestablisheddemonstratively,"mathematically"(C176),"withgeometricalor
metaphysicalaccuracy"(GIII,259).
Ifweinterprettheseclaimsasapplyingonlytoconditionalprobabilities,weneednotfollow
Hacking19intakingLeibniztohavechangedhismindaboutthelastofthemwhenhesays,ina
letterof1714toLouisBourguet:"Likeli
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18
Hacking,EmergenceofProbability,ch.15.
19
Hacking,EmergenceofProbability,p.128.
201
hoodsarestillestimatedaposteriori,byexperience,andonemusthaverecoursetothatindefault
ofreasonsapriori.Forexample,itisequallylikelythatachildtobebornshouldbeaboyoragirl,
becausethenumberofboysandofgirlsisfoundtobeapproximatelyequalinthisWorld"(G
III,570).Leibnizisindeedcontrastingtheprobabilisticpropensitiesofthehumanreproductive
process,whichcanbeknownonlyempirically,withthoseofdice,whichheseemstothinkcanbe
knownapriori.Forallthatissaidhere,however,hemaystillhaveassumedthatitisknowna
priorithattheconditionalprobabilityofahumanfetusbeingfemale,ontheassumptionthat50
percentofobservedhumanfetuseshavebeenfemale,is50percent.Fortheobservedpast
frequencyofmaleandfemalehumanbirthsmaybetakenasamajorpartofthedata,whichLeibniz
(onmyinterpretation)alwaysbelievedmustoftenbegivenempirically.Hacking'sfurther
suggestion,thatLeibniz'schangeofmind(iftherewasone)wasduetopersuasionbyJames
Bernoulli,seemstometohavenogroundinthistext,whichsaysaboutBernoullionlythathehad
"cultivated[thestudyofprobability]at[Leibniz's]encouragement"(GIII,570).
3.AProofforthePresumptionofPossibility
AmongthetruthsofprobabilitythatLeibnizexplicitlyclaimsaregivenby"reason"istheprinciple
accordingtowhich"wepresumethatanideaispossibleuntilthecontraryisdiscoveredbyamore
preciseinvestigation"(NE446).20ThisispreciselytheprincipletowhichLeibnizappealsinhis
presumptiveargumentfortheexistenceofanecessaryGod.Asweshallsee,thereisactuallya
proofofthisprincipleinoneofhisearlyworks.
ThetheoryofpresumptionsisoneofthemorefullyarticulatedpartsofLeibniz'sviewson
probabilities,anditisveryoftenmentionedwhenhediscussesthelargersubject.Sometimeshe
seemstothinkofpresumptionasoneofthehighergradesofprobability(NE464),butothertimes
heseemstodistinguishitfromprobabilityasacloselyrelatedalternative(AVI,i,472;Gr598).His
definitionofpresumptionexhibitssomevariationwithinafairlyconstantpattern.Inaparticularly
fullstatementofabout1671hesays,"Topresumeistoholdforcertainuntiltheoppositeis
proved,"andadds,"Forcertainiswhatwefollowinactionasifitwerecertain.Whatistobe
presumediswhateverisprudentlypresumed"(AVI,ii,567).21In1676hewrites,"Presumptionis
whatisheldfortrueuntilthecontraryisproved"(AVI,iii,631),andintheNewEssayshesaysthat
presumption"issomethingmore"thanconjectureand"oughttopassfortruthprovisionally,until
thereisproofofthecontrary"(NE457;cf.NE464,Tpd33).Thereissomedifferenceamongthese
definitionsastowhetherwhatispresumedisheldforcertainoronlyheldfortrue.22Allthe
definitions
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20
PeterRemnantandJonathanBennett'sgenerallyreliabletranslationobscurestherelevanceofthis
passagetoourconcernsbytranslatingnouspresumonsas"weassume."
21
ThisisfromadraftthatLeibnizcrossedoutandreplaced.Ithinkthedraftwasabandonedfor
reasonsnotinvolvingrejectionofthisdefinition,withwhichtherevisedtextseemstoagree.
22
EzequieldeOlaso,"Leibnizetl'artdediputer,"n.46,seesanoscillationinLeibniz'sviewsabout
therelationofcertaintytoprobabilityandpresumption.
202
agree,however,thatwhatispresumedishelduntilthecontrary,ortheopposite,isproved.
Itisnotalwaysasexplicitasitwasinthe1671passagethatpresumptionisdefinedasgoverning
action,butIbelievethatthisisalwaysimplicitinLeibniz'stalkofholdingfortrueandpassingfor
acompleteproof.ThedefinitionintheNewEssays,itmayalsobenoted,ispartofaseriesof
explanationsoflegalstandardsofevidence,mostofwhicharemeasuredbythekindsofactionthey
areacceptedaswarranting.23Thisisnottosay,however,thatpresumptionwasforLeibniz
exclusivelyamatterofovertbehavior.ThereisatleastonepassageinwhichLeibnizseemsto
implythatpresumingsomethingtobetruedoesnotquiteamounttobelievingittobetrue(G
VII,45).Normally,andespeciallyinmattersofreligion,however,thereisnosignthatLeibnizdoes
notassumethatwhatispresumedtobetrueisalsobelievedtobetrue(oratleasttobeprobably
true).Andheclearlytookadimviewofthesortoflegalpresumptionjurisetdejurewhichwas
supposedtoholddespiteanyamountofcontraryevidence,andwhichthereforedidnotimplya
preponderanceofprobability(Gr848;cf.AVI,iii,631n).24
Indeed,Leibnizinsistedthatpresumptionmusthaveafoundation:"Topresumeisnot...toaccept
before[avant]theproof,whichisnotpermitted,buttoacceptprovisionally[paravance],butwith
grounds[fondement],whilewaitingforacontraryproof"(NE457).Thegroundsmentionedhere
areundoubtedlyepistemological,butLeibnizbelievedthatgoodepistemologicalgroundsshould
alsohaveametaphysicalfoundationinthenatureofthings.Hefrequentlyconnectstheprobability
ofanoutcomeorputativefactwiththe"ease"withwhichitcouldbeproduced,or,inotherwords,
withthestrengthofthepropensityinthenatureofthingstoproduceit(NE372f.;C515;G
III,569f.).25"Whatiseasyinreality[facileinre]isprobableinthemind"(AVI,ii,492).That
presumptionistobesimilarlygroundedineaseorfacilityisaffirmedinanearlytext.Leibnizhad
written,"Forwhatwepresume,wedemonstratefromitsnaturetobeeasier,andhencewepresume
ittobemorefrequent"(AVI,ii,567).Hecrossedoutthepassagecontainingthisstatement;thefinal
textofthis(unpublished)papercontainsamorecomplicatedformulation:
Whatiseasier,however,andwhatistobepresumeddifferasLessandpart.Forthatis
easierinwhichlessorfewer[things]arerequiredthantheopposite;[whereas]thatisto
bepresumedwhoserequirementsarepartoftherequirementsoftheopposite.
Thereforeeverythingthatistobepresumediseasier,butnotconversely.(AVI,i,472,
ascorrectedatAVI,ii,529)
Thisviewabouttheproperfoundationforpresumptionconstitutesoneofthekeyassumptionsof
Leibniz'sproofthatpresumptionfavorspossibility,whichisfound,indeed,inthetextfromwhichI
havejustquoted.Acrucialnotionfor
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23
PresumptionisalsoconnectedexplicitlywithactionatNE438,andwithpracticeatAVI,ii,431f./
L129f.(Thecitedtranslationsofbothtextsfailtorenderpresumer/praesumereas"presume.")
24
0nthesubjectofpresumptionsjurisetdejure,seedeOlaso,"Leibnizetl'artdedisputer,"p.217f.,
andnotesthereto.
25
0nthispointseealsodeOlaso,"Leibnizetl'artdedisputer,"p.218,andHacking,Emergenceof
Probability,p.127f.,and"LeibnizCarnapProgramforInductiveLogic."
203
boththeviewandtheproofisthatof"requirements."AsIhaveexplainedatlengthinChapter4,
section1,thistermsignifiedforLeibnizbothconceptualconstituents,suchasdefiningproperties,
andcausallynecessaryconditions,andheseemscommonlytohaveuseditwiththeassumptionthat
thetwosignificationswouldcoincide.
Leibnizheldpersistentlytotheviewthatease,andthereforeinherentprobability,variesinversely
withquantityofrequirements.Inalistofdefinitionsfrom1702to1704hestillsays,"Easy,thatof
whichtherequirementsarefew.Difficult,thatofwhichtheyaremany.Undermanyareincluded
large;forthelargehavemanyparts"(C474).Thereisobviouslyaquestionabouttheplausibility
ofLeibniz'spositionatthispoint.Ifwethinkofthenumberofrequirementsasanumberofdistinct
efficientcauses,itmayberelativelyplausibletosupposethatthefewerarerequired,theeasierthe
resultwillbe.Butiftherequirementsaredefiningproperties,itmayseemmoredoubtfultous
whethersomethingwithmoredefiningproperties,ormorecomplexlogicalrequirements,must
thereforebemoredifficultinsuchawayastobeintrinsicallylesslikelytooccur.Leibnizmight
replythatasweaddpropertiesorlogicalrequirementstothedefinition,wecloseoffwaysinwhich
thedefinitioncouldbesatisfied,sothatifAhasfewerdefiningpropertiesthanB,therewillbe
morewaysinwhichAcouldoccur,andthereforeAwillbeinherentlymoreprobablethanBjust
asthesumofpointsina(fair)castofdiceisinherentlylikeliertobeseventhantwelvebecause
therearemorepossiblecombinationsthatyieldseventhantwelve(cf.GIII,569f.).Wewillneedto
bealert,however,toconsiderwhetherthedifferencesinlogicalcomplexitythatwillconcernusare
indeedassociatedwithdifferencesinthenumberofpossiblewaysofrealizingtheputative
possibilities.
Therearealsodifficultiesindeterminingthenumberofpropertiescontainedasrequirementsina
definition.Howdoweindividuatepropertiesforthispurpose?ItmayseemthatLeibnizmustcount
allindividualsubstances,ifpossibleatall,ashavingexactlythesamenumberofessential
requirements,sincetheirconcepts,ascomplete,mustcontainexactlyonememberofeverypairof
mutuallycontradictoryproperties(asexplainedinChapter2,above).Wemaybeabletoavoid
thesedifficultieshere,however.Forthebasisforpresumptionistobetheinclusionofthe
requirementsofwhatistobepresumedasaproperpartoftherequirementsofitsopposite,anda
properpartisnecessarilylessthanthewhole.
Inthecaseoftheproofthatpresumptionfavorspossibility,wearenotconcernedwithrequirements
forexistence,butwithrequirementsforpossibilityorimpossibility.Wearethereforeprimarily
concernedwithrequirementsasessentialordefiningfeatures,ratherthanas(efficient)causes.The
argumentgoesasfollows:
Foritiseasierforsomethingtoturnouttobepossiblethanimpossible.Fornothingis
requiredforthepossiblebutthatitbesupposed;fortheimpossible,however,itis
requiredthatwhileitissupposed,itsoppositebesupposedatthesametime.Therefore
morethingsarerequiredfortheimpossiblethanforthepossible....Thatispresumed,
however,whosesuppositions[supposita]arealsosuppositionsoftheopposite,andnot
conversely.(AVI,i,471)
204
Fromwhichitfollowsthatanythingistobepresumedpossibleunlessanduntilthereisweightier
reasontobelieveitimpossible.
Theargumentofthisremarkablyinterestingpassagedeservestobesetoutinalesscompressed
formthanLeibnizhasgivenit.
(1)"Fornothingisrequiredforthepossiblebutthatitbesupposed."
ThisItaketomeanthattherequirementsofaputativepossibilityaretheessentialorconstitutive
featuresofwhatwouldbepossible.
(2)"Fortheimpossible,however,itisrequiredthatwhileitissupposed,itsoppositebe
supposedatthesametime."
AtfirstglancewemighttakeLeibniztobearguingthatitisharderforsomethingtobeimpossible
thantobepossiblebecause,inordertothinkthatitisimpossible,wemustholdcontradictory
suppositionsatthesametime.Ithinkitislikelierthathemeansthat,sinceimpossibilityisrooted
ininconsistency,aputativeimpossibilitynotonlyhastherequirementsofthepossibilitydenied
(withoutwhichitwouldlackasubjectmatter)butalsorequiresthattheyimplytheiropposites.
Fromthispointtheargumentcangointwodirections.
(3a)Wecaninferthatlessisrequiredforapossibilitythanfortheopposed
impossibility.
And,aswehaveseen,Leibnizholds
(4a)Thatforwhichlessisrequiredispreciselythatwhichiseasier.
Therefore
(5a)"Itiseasierforsomethingtoturnouttobepossiblethanimpossible."
From(1)and(2)wecanalsoinfer
(3b)Therequirementsofapossibilityareaproperpartoftherequirementsofthe
correspondingimpossibility.
Butthisispreciselytheconditionlaiddowninthistextforpresumption.
(4b)"Thatistobepresumedwhoserequirementsarepartoftherequirementsofthe
opposite,"or"whosesuppositions[supposita]arealsosuppositionsoftheopposite,and
notconversely."
Therefore
(5b)Possibilityistobepresumedunlessanduntilthecorrespondingimpossibilityis
proved.
205
4.PresumingthePossibilityofBeingsasSuch
IdoubtthatweareinapositiontoknowwhetherLeibnizhadthisearlyproofinmind,oreven
whetherhewouldstillhaveendorsedit,whenhewroteintheNewEssaysthat"reasonyields"the
principlebywhich"wepresumethatanideaispossibleuntilthecontraryisdiscoveredbyamore
preciseinvestigation"(NE446).Itwillbeworthwhile,however,toconsiderwhethertheproof
yieldsabasisforagoodreplytotheobviousobjectiontohispresumptiveargumentfortheism.I
willtrytoworkoutthesortofpositionthatLeibnizwouldhavetohaveheldinordertohavesucha
reply,drawingfreelyontextsthatsuggestsuchaposition.ThenIwilldiscusssomeobjectionsboth
tothepositionitselfandtothehypothesisthatLeibnizheldit.
InpresentingtheobjectionitisconvenienttoassumethatwhenLeibnizsaysthat"possibilityis
alwayspresumedandoughttobeheldfortrueuntiltheimpossibilityisproved"(GIII,444),he
meansthatthetruthofanypropositionoughttobepresumedpossibleunlessanduntilitisproved
impossible.Thisrule,theobjectorpointsout,appliesequallytothepropositions,'AnecessaryGod
exists'and'NonecessaryGodexists'.ButLeibnizhasarguedthatif'AnecessaryGodexists'is
possiblytrue,itisnecessarilytruefromwhichitfollowsthatif'AnecessaryGodexists'is
possiblytrue,'NonecessaryGodexists'isnotpossiblytrue.Thereforewecannotconsistently
acceptbothofthesepropositionsaspossiblytrue.Itmaybeplausibleinmostcasestopresume,in
theabsenceofproof,thatapropositionispossiblytrue.Butwhenwehavetwopropositionsof
whichweknowthatexactlyoneispossiblytrue,butwehavenotprovedwhichoneitis,the
generalruleofpresumingpropositionspossiblytrueyieldsnoconsistentconclusion.
Theonlydefensiblegeneralpresumptioninfavorofpossibilityofpropositionswouldreallybea
presumptioninfavorofcontingencyapresumptionthatapropositionshouldbepresumed
contingent(possiblybutnotnecessarilytrue)unlessprovednottobe.Therearepropositionsthat
areknownnottobecontingentbutaboutwhichithasnotbeenprovedwhetheritistheyortheir
contradictoriesthatarepossibly(andhencenecessarily)true.Goldbach'sconjecture(thatevery
evennumbergreaterthantwoisthesumoftwoprimes)isafamousexample.Ageneral
presumptioninfavorofcontingencyhasnobearingonsuchcases,andthatisasitshouldbe.It
wouldbeabsurdtosupposethatweoughttodecideaboutGoldbach'sconjectureonthebasisofa
presumptiverulefavoringpossibilityorcontingencyoranyothermodalstatusofpropositionsas
such.Theobjectorarguesthatthisisalsotrueof'AnecessaryGodexists'.
Ageneralpresumptiverulefavoringpossibilityofpropositionscannottelluswhetheragiven
noncontingentproposition,ratherthanitscontradictory,shouldbeassumedpossibly(andhence
actually)true,becausesuchapresumptionfailstodiscriminatebetweenthealternativesthatis,
becausenodifferencebetweenthealternativesisrelevantaccordingtotherule.Butperhaps
Leibnizhadadifferentruleinmind,onethatwoulddiscriminatebetween'AnecessaryGodexists'
and'NonecessaryGodexists'.Itmaybesignificantthatsomeformulationsoftheruleof
presumptiongiveninhisdiscussionsofthepresumptiveargumentfortheismareexplicitlyabout
thepossibilityofbeings:"Everybeing
206
oughttobejudgedpossibleuntilthecontraryisproved"(GIII,444)."Onehastherighttopresume
thepossibilityofeveryBeing,andaboveallofGod,untilsomeoneprovesthecontrary"(NE438).
IfLeibniz'sruleofpresumptiondoesfavorthepossibilityofbeingsassuch,itwilldirectusto
presumethepossibilityof(theexistenceof)anecessaryGod,andwillnotcontradictitsownadvice
bygeneratingacountervailingpresumptionofthepossibilityofthenonexistenceofanecessary
God,sincenonexistencesarenotbeings.
Ofcourseitmightcontradictitsownadviceinanotherway,bygeneratingpresumptionsof
possibility,andhencepresumptivearguments,fortheexistenceoftwoormoreincompatible
necessarybeings.Perhapsthesewouldbeanecessary(personal)GodandanimpersonalPlatonic
FormoftheGood,oneconceivedasnecessarilyindependentofallotherbeingsthanitself,andthe
otherconceivedasnecessarilyacauseofallotherbeingsthanitself.26Thiswouldlimitthe
applicabilityandusefulnessofaruleofpresumptionfavoringthepossibilityofbeingsassuch.It
couldnothelpustodecideamonghypothesesinvolvingalternativeandincompatibletypesof
necessarybeing.SofarasIcansee,thattaskcannotbeaccomplishedbyapresumptiveargument
andmustbedealtwithinsomeotherway.Butthisobjectionfailstoshowthatsucharulecould
contradictitsownadviceindirectingustopresumethepossibilityoftherebeinganecessarybeing
ofsomesortorother,abeingwhoseexistencefollowsfromitsessence.Andsincemuchof
Leibniz'sargumentissimplyabouttheexistenceofanecessarybeingassuch,thatrathergeneral
conclusionwouldsurelystillbeofinteresttohim.
ItisquitepossibletointerpretLeibniz'searlyproofthat"presumptionis...forpossibility"(A
VI,i,471)asanargumentforpresumingthepossibilityofbeings.Theproofturnsontheconceptof
a"requirement."WhileLeibnizwascertainlypreparedtospeakoftherequirementsofaneventor
ofanimpossibility,itisclearthatinhisminditwasprimarilythings,substances,thathad
requirements.Theessentialpropertiesthatenterintothedefinitionofathingaretheprimecaseof
requirements,particularlywhereweareconcernedwithrequirementsforpossibilityratherthanfor
(actual)existence.
InLeibniz'sview,thepossibilityofthingsisgroundedintheiressences,whichare"thespecific
reason[s]of[their]possibility"(AII,i,390),aswesawinChapter5,section1.Andthe
possibilitiesofeventsandstatesofaffairsaregroundedintheessencesofthesubstancesthatenter
intothem.CertainlyLeibnizheldthattheactualityofeventsandstatesofaffairs,andevenofthe
actualworldasawhole,followsfrom,andisgroundedin,theactualizationoftheessencesofthe
individualsubstancesthatactuallyexist(DM89,1314).Aspossibleworldsarecollectionsof
possiblethingsinthesamewaythattheactualworldisacollectionofactualthings(GIII,573/
L662;cf.GVII,302ff./L486ff.),itseemstofollowthatthepossibilityofapossibleworld,andof
allthatoccursinit,followsfrom,andisgroundedin,theessencesoftheindividualsubstancesthat
____________________
26
SeeR.Adams,"PresumptionandtheNecessaryExistenceofGod,"pp.22f.,forafuller
presentationofthisexampleandofthiswholeobjection.Itreatedtheobjectionthereasshowing
conclusivelythataruleofpresumptionfavoringthepossibilityofbeingsassuchisofnouseinthis
context.Ihavecometothinkthattoohastyajudgment,forreasonsthatwillemergeinthepresent
discussion.
207
wouldexistinit,andtheircompossibility.GivenLeibniz'sbeliefsthatallpossiblefactsareabout
substances,andthattheessenceofeverypossibleindividualsubstancedetermineseveryfactthat
wouldbetrueaboutthatsubstance,theessencesofpossibleindividualsubstances,inproviding
reasonsforthepossibilityofthesubstances,mustprovidesufficientreasonsforthepossibilityof
allpossiblefacts.Inthestructureofpossibility,asseenbyLeibniz,thefoundationsaretheessences
ofsubstances.Ifanythingcouldbemorefundamental,itwouldbethegeneralpropertiesofwhich
thoseessencesarecomposed;butthey,too,arepropertiesofsubstances,andtheirpossibilityisthe
possibilityofakindofsubstanceorbeing.Theultimatefoundationofallpossibility,ofcourse,is
theessenceofGod(Mon4346),whichiscomposedofthesimplestandmostpositiveofgeneral
properties.
InlightofthesereflectionswemayinterpretthefirstpremiseofLeibniz'sargumentforthe
presumptionofpossibility,that"nothingisrequiredforthepossiblebutthatitbesupposed"(A
VI,i,471).Iwilltakeitasapplyingtothepossibiityofanindividualsubstanceorakindof
substance.Thecontextoftheargumentmightbethoughttotellagainstthisinterpretation.Leibniz
isdiscussingtherelationoflegalmodalitiestologicalmodalities.Seeingtheanalogybetween
deonticlogicandmodallogic,hesupportsthethesisthatitiseasierforanacttoberight[justus,
permitted]thanwrong[injustus]byarguingfirstthatitiseasierforsomethingtobepossiblethan
impossible(AVI,i,470f.).ThismightbetakenassuggestingthatLeibnizwasthinkingofacts
ratherthansubstancesaspossibleorimpossible.Butthatisnotrequiredbyhisanalogybetween
deonticandmodallogic,and,inanyevent,IamheredevelopingsuggestionsinLeibniz'sworkofa
positionthatwouldhaveenabledhimtorejecttheobviousobjectiontohispresumptiveargument
fortheism,reservingforlateranydoubtsastowhetherhedidholdtheposition.
Appliedtosubstances,Leibniz'spremiseimpliesthatinthatcasetherequirementsofthepossibility
aresimplythepropertiesthatconstitutetheessenceofthesubstanceorkindofsubstanceitself.
Thisisthesimplestandthereforetheeasiestcase,and,otherthingsbeingequal,themostprobable.
Forothercasesthereareadditionalrequirements.Fortheimpossibilityofathing,Leibnizimplies,
arerequirednotonlythepropertiesthatwouldconstituteitsessenceifitwerepossible,butalso
theirimplying(inconsistently)theiropposites.
Similarly,itmaybesuggested,boththeexistenceandthenonexistenceofathingrequire
somethingmorethanitssimplepossibility.Theactualexistenceofapossiblethingrequiresbothits
possibility,oritsessence,andsomereasonwhyitisactual.Andtherequirementsofathing's
nonexistenceincludebothitsessence(whichdefineswhatitisthatdoesnotexist)andsomereason
whyitisnotactual.Thepossibilityofathing'snonexistence,therefore,willrequireboththe
essenceofthethingandthepossibilityofareasonwhythethingwouldnotactuallyexist.Thusthe
sumoftherequirementsofthepossibilityofthething(thatis,itsessence)isaproperpartofthe
requirementsofthepossibilityofitsnonexistence.Thepossibilityofthethingisthereforeeasier,
havingfewerrequirements,thanthepossibilityofitsnonexistence;andthereiscorrespondingly
lessreasontopresumethepossibilityofitsnonexistencethantopresumethepossibilityofthe
thing.Thisisanargumentforacceptingaruleofpresumptionthatwouldfavor
208
thepossibilityofanecessarybeinginpreferencetothepossibilityofthenonexistenceofsucha
being.
5.ObjectionsConsidered
Itisnotdifficulttothinkofobjectionstothisargument.Itreliesonsomeasymmetries,asyet
undefended.OneisalreadypresentinLeibniz'sexplicitargumentforpresumingpossibility,asI
understandit.Theimpossibilityofathingrequiresthatthething'sdefiningproperties,collectively,
implytheiropposites.Theargumenttakesthattobeanewrequirement,overandabovethe
definingpropertiesthemselves,butitdoesnottakethemutualconsistencyofthedefining
propertiesasanewrequirement,overandabovethepropertiesthemselves,forthepossibilityofthe
thing.Thisasymmetryhassomeintuitiveappeal:implyingsomethingmayseemtobeanadditional
requirementinawaythatnotimplyingsomethingisnot.ButIwouldnotknowhowtodefendthis
intuition,anditseemstobeaweakpointoftheargument.Thereissomeintuitiveappealonthe
otherside,forexample,totheclaimthatinconsistencyisnotamoreextraneousfeatureofthe
propertyset(spherical,pyramidal),thanconsistencyisoftheset(triangular,equilateral).
AsimilarasymmetrymaybefoundintheargumentIhavesuggestedforregardingthepossibility
ofathingashavingfewerrequirements,andhenceaspreferablepresumptively,incomparisonwith
thepossibilityofitsnonexistence.Itsupposesthatapossiblereasonwhyitwouldnotexistmustbe
givenasarequirementinadditiontoathing'sessencetoyieldapossibilityofitsnonexistence,but
thattheessence,withoutanycorrespondingaddition,sufficesasthesumoftherequirementsfor
thething'spossibility.Thisisquestionable.SinceLeibnizcertainlysupposesthatthepossibilityof
athinginvolvesthepossibilityofitsexistence,wemayaskifapossiblereasonwhythething
wouldexistshouldn'tbeconsideredanadditionalrequirementforthepossibilityofthething.
HereIimagineLeibnizwouldreplythatapossiblereasonwhyathingwouldexistisindeeda
requirementofthething'spossibility,butnotanadditionalrequirement,asitisalreadyincludedin
theessence.(Exceptinthecaseofanecessarybeing,ofcourse,theactualityofthereasonfor
existencewillnotbeincludedintheexistence,andhencewillbeanadditionalrequirementforthe
actualexistenceofthething.)TherearepassagesinLeibniz'swritingsthatcouldbeinterpretedas
supportingthisviewoftheessencesofthings(LA51;GIII,572/L661).Wemayask,however,
whetheritisfairtorelyonitatthispoint.Iftheessenceincludesapossiblereasonfortheexistence
ofthething,oughtweperhapstoexcludethatpartoftheessencefromtherequirementsforthe
possibilityofthething'snonexistence?Thatwouldenableustoavoidtheconclusionthatthe
possibilityofathing'snonexistencerequirespossiblereasonsbothforitsexistenceandits
nonexistence,whereasthepossibilityofthethingrequiresapossiblereasononlyforitsexistence.
ThisasymmetryiscrucialtotheargumentIhavesuggestedforthepreferentialpresumptionin
favorofthepossibilityofbeingsassuch.Thedefensibilityofthatargumentmaydependon
whetherLeibnizcouldargueplausiblythatapossiblereasonforathing'sexistenceisessentialto
209
thesubjectmatterofbothitsexistenceanditsnonexistenceinawaythatapossiblereasonforits
nonexistenceisnot.
Anotherobjectionisrelatedtobothoftheseasymmetries.SupposewegrantLeibnizthatthe
requirementsofanimpossibility,orofapossiblenonexistence,includealltherequirementsofthe
correspondingpossibility,orpossiblebeing,plusanadditionalrequirement.Wemaystillask
whetherthisadditionalrequirementeffectsareductioninthediversityofpossiblerealizations.In
bothcases,Ithink,theanswerisno.Ifthedefiningpropertiesofathingimplytheiropposites
(whichistheadditionalrequirementforanimpossibility),thatisalreadyimplicitinthedefinition,
evenifitisnotspelledoutthere.Likewise,ifthereisapossiblereasonforthenonexistenceofa
thing(whichistheadditionalrequirementforapossibilityofnonexistence),thatispresumablya
necessaryfeatureofthetotallogicalormetaphysicalsetup,evenifitisnotpartoftheessenceof
thething.SoevenifLeibnizcoulddefendtheclassificationoftheserequirementsas"additional,"
theiradditiondoesnoteliminatepossibilitiesastheadditionofequilateralitytothedefinitionofa
triangleasaclosed,threesidedplanefigurereducesthevarietyofwaysinwhichthedefinition
couldpossiblybesatisfied.Andwherethe"addition"ofdefiningoressentialrequirementsdoesnot
eliminatepossibilities,IthinkthereislittleplausibilitytoLeibniz'sthesisthatwhathasmore
requirementsistherebymetaphysicallymoredifficultorinherentlylesslikely.Forthisreasonmore
thananyother,thereasonthatLeibnizofferedforpresumingpossibility,andthereasonIhave
suggestedhemighthaveofferedforpresumingpossibilityofexistenceinpreference,ifneedbe,to
possibilityofnonexistence,bothseemtomequiteweak.
Leibnizseemstohavealwaysbelieveditatruthofreasonthatthereisapresumptionfavoring
possibility.Thereisanobjectionyettobecanvassed,however,toincludinginhisphilosophythe
viewthatpresumptionfavorspreferentiallythepossibilityofbeingsassuch,orofexistence.In
"ThePrinciplesofNatureandofGrace"(7),bywayofmotivatingthequestion,whythereis
somethingratherthannothing,asastartingpointforhiscosmologicalargumentfortheexistenceof
God,Leibnizsays,"Fornothing[lerien]issimplerandeasierthansomething."Thisseemstomean
thattheexistenceofnothingisinherentlyeasierthantheexistenceofsomethingfromwhichit
wouldseemtofollow,givenLeibniz'sotherviews,thatiftherulesofpresumptionhaveany
systematicpreferencebetweenexistenceandnonexistence,theywouldfavornonexistence.This
apparentimplicationofaverylate(1714)textseemstobeconfirmedbyLeibniz'sstatementin
1670that"theexistenceofathingthatisnotperceivedisnotpresumed,"where"whateverisnot
presumedisinpracticetobeheldfornothing"(AVI,ii,431/L129).
Forseveralreasons,however,Ihesitatetoregardthesetextsasdecisiveinthematter.Inthefirst
place,theyconcernthecomparativecaseorpresumabilityofactualexistenceandnonexistence,
whereastheargumentweareconsideringisaboutthecomparativeeaseandpresumabilityof
possibleexistenceandnonexistence.IfLeibnizembracedthatargumenthewouldsay,asIhave
suggested,thatapossiblereasonofnonexistenceis,andapossiblereasonofexistenceisnot,an
additionalrequirementoverandabovetheessenceofthethingthatisthesubjectofbothputative
possibilities.Theactualexistenceofathing,how
210
ever,hastheactualityofareasonforitasarequirement,and,exceptinthecaseofanecessary
being,thatisplainlyanadditionalrequirementoverandabovetheessenceofthething.Leibniz
mighthavethoughtthattheactualityofareasonfornonexistenceisingeneraleasierthanthe
actualityofareasonforexistence,eveniftherequirementsforthepossibleexistenceofathingare
aproperpartoftherequirementsforitspossiblenonexistence.
Inthesecondplace,Leibniz'sattempttomotivatethecosmologicalargumentbysayingthat
nothingiseasierthansomethingmaybeanillconsideredappealtoreceivedopinion,andnotreally
consistentwithhisphilosophy.Forheholdsindeeditispartofhisfullestpresentationofthe
cosmologicalargumentthat"inpossiblethings,orinpossibilityitselforessence,thereisa
demand[exigentia]forexistence,or(sotospeak)aclaim[praetensio]onexistence,and,toputitin
aword,thatessenceofitselftendstowardexistence."Thismayatfirstseemtousfarfetched,but
Leibnizhasareasonforitthatdeservescarefulreflection.Heinfersit"fromtheveryfactthatsome
thingexistsratherthannothing"(GVII,303/L487).Ifnonexistenceisindeedinherentlyeasierthan
existence,wemightask,Howisitthatanythingexistsatall?"Iftherewerenotintheverynature
ofEssencesomeinclinationtoexist,nothingwouldexist,"Leibnizdeclares(GVII,194).Howthis
demandorclaimorinclinationtoexistenceistobeunderstoodisadifficultissueinthe
interpretationofLeibniz,whichIhavediscussedinChapter6.Hereitisenoughtoremarkthat
someonewhothoughtthatessencehasofitselfaninclinationtoexistmightbeexpectedtodeny
thatnonexistenceiseasierthanexistence.Indeed,Leibnizwrote,atleastonce,inacontextofthis
sort,that"everythingiseasier,themoreithasofreality"(Gr17)thatis,themoreperfectits
essenceis.
Itmayalsoberemarked,inthethirdplace,thattheideaofNothing,ofastateofaffairsinwhich
nothingexists,assimpleandeasydoesnotfitverywellintheLeibnizianstructureofpossibility.
Forinthatstructure,ifIhaveunderstoodit,everypossibilityisgroundedinareason,andthemost
basicreasonsofpossibilityaretheessencesofthings.Butallessencesareessencesofpossible
things,andhenceofrealities.Althoughsomeessencescontainorexpressmore"reality"or
perfectionthanothers,thereisnoessencethatcontainsorexpressesnorealityatall.Hencethereis
noessenceofNothing,noessencewhosefirsttaskistobethespecificreasonofthepossibilityof
anemptyuniverse.Ifsuchastateofaffairsispossibleatall,itcannotbeforLeibnizaprimitive
possibility.Itspossibilitymustbeconstructedorderivedfromtheessencesthatarethespecific
reasonsofmorepositivepossibilities.Itisnotdifficulttoseehowsuchaconstructionmightgo.I
discussedearlierhowthenonexistenceofathingmightbeconstructed,havingtheessenceofthe
thingamongitsrequirements.Astateofaffairsinwhichnothingwouldexistmightbeconstituted
bytheconjunctionofthenonexistencesofallpossiblethings.Thiswouldbeaverycomplexstate
ofaffairs,andnoteasyatallbyLeibnizianstandards,sincetheessences,andthustherequirements,
ofallpossiblethingswouldbeamongitsrequirements.Intheend,ofcourse,Leibnizmustsaythat
itisnotevenapossiblestateofaffairs,sincesomething(namely,God)existsnecessarily.
AlthoughthereisarichsystemofthoughtbehindLeibniz'stalkaboutpresumption,asystemwhose
juridicalaspects,particularly,Ihavehardlybegunto
211
explore,Idonotthinkwearelikelytofindinitacompellingargumentfortherationalnecessityof
therulethatpresumptionfavorspossibility,letaloneforapresumptionpreferentiallyfavoringthe
possibilityofbeingsassuch.Certainlytherearetoomanyweakanddoubtfulpointsinthe
argumentspresentedearlierinsections3and4.Theoppositesuggestion,thatpresumptionfavors
thepossiblenonexistence,inpreferencetothepossibleexistence,ofaNecessaryGod,wasnot,to
myknowledge,consideredbyLeibniz,andwillthereforenotbediscussedhere.AsIhave
explainedelsewhere,IthinkitcanbemademoreplausiblethanLeibniz'spresumptiveargument,
butIamnotintheendpersuadedbyit.27Indeed,Inotonlydoubtthattheclichthatpresumption
favorspossibilityorcontingencycanbeprovedbyaLeibnizianargument;Idoubtitsapplicability
tothecaseathand.Ithinkitdoesnotingeneralprovideareasonablebasisfordeciding
metaphysicalissuesthataremodalincharacter,suchasthatoftheexistenceornonexistenceofa
necessaryGod.
Nodoubttherearecasesinwhichitisplausibletopresumepossibilityintheabsenceofproof.Or
perhapsitwouldbemoreaccuratetosaythattherearecasesinwhichourfailuretofindaproofof
impossibilityisagoodreasonforassumingpossibility.Itseemstobemetaphysicallypossible,for
example,forOrelHershisertopitchthirtyfivenohitmajorleaguegamesinoneyear.One
importantreasonforassumingthistobepossibleisthatwecanseenogoodreasonwhyitwouldbe
impossible.
Butthatisbecauseitisplausibletoassumethatifitwereimpossiblewewouldseeagoodreason
forthinkingso.Incidentalfeaturesaside,thesupposedpossibilitydiffersonlyquantitativelyfrom
events(individualnohitters)thatweknowtobepossiblebecausetheyareactual.Thereis
thereforenoreasontosuspectthatweareenteringintoanareaofdeepperplexityaboutmodalityin
thiscase.Thequantitativeaspectsofthecasealsoseemfairlysimple,sothatiftherewerea
mathematicalimpossibilitywewouldprobablyhavefoundit.
Itisworthnotingthatweoftenhavesimilarreasonsforpresumingimpossibility.Canideassleep
furiously?Mostofusthinknot;whyisthat?Iwouldnotexpecttofindastrictproofinthismatter,
butIthinkwecanreasonablyrejectanysupposedpossibilityofideassleepingfuriously,onthe
groundthatwecan'tseehowanythingwouldcountasideassleepingfuriously.Hereweassume
thatiftherewereawayinwhichideascoulddosomethingthatwouldcountassleepingfuriously,
wewouldseethatthatwasso.Ourinabilitytoseeanysuchpossibilityisareasonforthinking
thereisnone.
Metaphysicallyinterestingissuesaboutpossibilityandnecessityaremorebaffling.Wecannot
reasonablyassumethatiftherearepossiblephenomenalcolors,verydifferentfromorange,that
wouldfallbetweenredandyellowonaspectrum,wewouldseethatthatwasso.Andwecannot
reasonablyassumethatifthereissomethingthatkeepstraveltothepast,orthenonexistenceof
God,frombeingpossible,wewouldhavediscoveredit.ThereforeIthinkweshouldbevery
suspiciousofanypresumptiveargumentonthesematters.
____________________
27
R.Adams,"PresumptionandtheNecessaryExistenceofGod,"pp.2327.Thesubsequent
paragraphsofthepresentsectionaredrawn(inabbreviatedform)fromthatpaper.
212
Abetterapproachfordealingwithsuchissuesistolooktobroadertheoreticalconsiderations,
askingwhetherthereareattractivetheoriesinmetaphysicsoranyrelatedsubjectthatimplyone
positionortheotheronthemodalissue,orthatatleastworkbestontheassumptionofone
position.Thisapproach,inmyopinion,offersthebrightestprospectsforjustifyingbeliefina
necessaryGod.28Leibnizpursuedit,too,arguingthattheexistenceofcontingentbeings,andthe
ontologicalstatusofpossibilitiesandtheobjectsoflogic,couldbestbeexplainedonthehypothesis
ofanecessaryGod(GIV,406;NE447,Mon4344).Ihavehadalittletosayabouttheformer
argumentatthebeginningofChapter5,section2,andquitealotaboutthelatterinChapter7.
____________________
28
Forafullerdiscussionofthispoint,seeR.Adams,"PresumptionandtheNecessaryExistenceof
God,"pp.30f.
213
214
III
Idealism:MonadsandBodies
215
216
9
Leibniz'sPhenomenalism
ThemostfundamentalprincipleofLeibniz'smetaphysicsisthat"thereisnothinginthingsexcept
simplesubstances,andinthemperceptionandappetite"(GII,270/L537).Itimpliesthatbodies,
whicharenotsimplesubstances,canonlybeconstructedoutofsimplesubstancesandtheir
propertiesofperceptionandappetition.('Constructed'isourwordforit.Leibnizcommonlysays
thatbodiesorphenomena"result"fromsimplesubstancesandtheirmodifications,butresultingis
1
notwhatwewouldcallacausalrelationinthiscontext.)
Howarebodiesconstructedoutofsimplesubstancesandtheirproperties?Inthischapterandthe
nextIwillpresentthemainoutlinesofthecomplexanswergiventothisquestioninLeibniz's
maturephilosophy.ManyofLeibniz'sbestinterpreters2haveseeninthiscomplexstructure
irreconcilabletheses,forwhichtheyhavetriedtoaccountintermsofchangeofmindoroneor
anotherformofpermanenttension.WhatIpropose,bycontrast,isaunitaryinterpretation,a
metaphysicalschemetowhich,initsessentials,IbelieveLeibnizadheredthroughoutthelastthirty
yearsofhislife.Thereweresomevariationsanddevelopmentsindetailandterminologyduringthe
period,butnone,Ibelieve,assubstantialorrevolutionaryasothershaveargued.Someissuesof
changeanddevelopmentwillbediscussedinChapters9and10,butthemostseriouschallengeto
Leibniz'sconstancyinthesematters,from1686tohisdeath,willbeexaminedprincipallyin
Chapters1113.
Aconstructionofthewholeofrealityoutofperceivingsubstancesandtheirperceptionsand
appetitesexemplifiesabroadlyidealistapproachtometaphysics.Leibnizwasthefirstofthegreat
modernphilosopherstodevelopanidealistmetaphysics.Idealiststrandsappearveryearlyinhis
thought(asearlyas1670),thoughtheykeepcompanyintheearlyyearswithlessidealiststrands.I
willfocusheremainlyonthematureperiodofhisthought(beginningabout1686);but
____________________
1
"Inactualrealitiesthewhole,"forexample,"isaresultoftheparts"(GVII,562),butthatdoesnot
meanthatthepartsare(efficient)causesofthewhole.Ithinkthedatafromwhichsomething
"results"inLeibniz'ssensearejointlysufficientfortheresult,andtheresultaddsnothingtothem.
(Cf.GMVII,21f./L669thoughtheLatinprosultareisusedthereinplaceofthemoreusual
resultare.)Perhapsthedatawillalsobeindividuallynecessaryfortheresult,butIdoubtthatthatis
impliedinthenotionof"result."Certainlytheresultneednotbecapableofdefinitionintermsof
thedata,inafinitelanguage,forthedatawillcommonlybeinfinite.
2
E.g.,Hochstetter,"VonderwahrenWirklichkeitbeiLeibniz";Broad,Leibniz:AnIntroduction,pp.
4992;Loeb,FromDescartestoHume,pp.299309;Garber,"LeibnizandtheFoundationsof
Physics";Robinet,Architectoniquedisjonctive;andC.Wilson,Leibniz'sMetapbysics.
217
themostphenomenalistoftheseearlystrandswillbethetopicofsection2.Itmakesclearthat
Leibnizhadarticulatedmuchofthestructureofaphenomenalisttheoryofbodieslongbefore
3
reachingthematureperiodofhisthought.
ItisalsoclearthatphenomenalismretainsanimportantplaceinLeibniz'smaturephilosophy,as
statedforinstanceintwoofhisletterstoBurcherDeVolder:
Matterandmotionarenotsomuchsubstancesorthingsasthephenomenaof
perceivers,whoserealityislocatedintheharmonyofperceiverswiththemselves(at
differenttimes)andwiththeotherperceivers.(GII,270/L537)
ThereforeIfeelthatthebodiesthatarepopularlyregardedassubstancesarenothing
butrealphenomena,andarenomoresubstancesthanparheliaandrainbowsare.(G
II,262)
ThematureLeibniztriedtocombinehisphenomenalismwithatheoryofcorporealsubstances,but
inawaythatleavesintactthebasicidealismofthesystem.Iwilldiscussthetheoryofcorporeal
substanceinChapter10,focusinginthepresentchapteronLeibniz'sconceptionofacorporeal
phenomenon.AnotherthesisofthematureLeibnizthatmightseemtobeinconflictwithhis
phenomenalismcannotwaitsolongfordiscussion.Itisinfactsointimatelyboundupwithhis
conceptionofbodiesasphenomenathatitmustbetakenupinthischapter.Thisisthethesisthat
4assuchareaggregatesofsubstances.
bodiesormassesofmatter
Howcanbodiesbebothmerephenomenaandaggregatesofsubstances?Inthisconnection
interpretershavespokenofavacillationinLeibnizorhavetriedtodocumentachangeofmind,
5Iamconvinced,however,that
assigningthedifferenttheoriestodifferentperiodsinhiscareer.
Leibnizdidnotvacillateorchangehismindonthispoint.Tobesure,heisoftencarelessor
imprecise,sayingthingsinwaysthatignoreaspectsofhisviewsthathedoesnotwanttopresentat
themoment.ButLeibnizbelieved(rightlyorwrongly)thatthetwotheses,thatbodiesare
phenomenaandthattheyareaggregatesofsubstances,areconsistent,andheheldbothofthem
throughoutthematureperiodofhisthought(say,from1686on).
____________________
3
Otherearlyidealiststrandsmaybenoted.SeeAVI,i,509/L116,apaperof1670onEucharistic
theology(discussedfurtherinChapter12,section2.3):"theSubstanceofabodyisunionwitha
sustainingmind."ForanotherstrandseeAVI,ii,266/L141,atreatiseinphysicsof1671,which
exhibitswhatDanielGarberhascalleda"mentalizationofbody,"declaringthat"everybodyisa
momentarymind;thatis,onelackingmemory."However,thecontextofthelatterstrandin
Leibniz'spreParisianphysicaltheorizing,heavilyinfluencedbyHobbes,maysuggestthatthe
mentalizationofbodyisaccompaniedbyaphysicalizationofmind.Onthiswholesubjectinthe
youngLeibniz,seeGarber,"MotionandMetaphysicsintheYoungLeibniz,"esp.pp.16878(this
notequotesp.168);Robinet,Architectoniquedisionctive,esp.pp.12564;andC.Wilson,Leibnizs
Metaphysics,pp.4570.
4
Tobemoreprecise,massesofsecondarymatter,asweshallseeinChapter10.
5
Forexample,Hochstetter,"VonderwahrenWirklichkeitbeiLeibniz,"esp.thereferencesto
LeibnizSchwanken,pp.422and440;andLoeb,FromDescartestoHume,pp.299309to
mentiontwoworksthatIholdinhighregard.NicholasJolley,inhisinterestingpaper,"Leibniz
andPhenomenalism,"alsotreatsthesetheoriesasinconsistent,butclaimsthat"Leibnizneverdid
morethanflirtwithphenomenalism"(p.51).
218
InthischapterIwilltrytoshowhowthesetwothesesbelong,forLeibniz,toasingle,
phenomenalistictheory,whichseemstometobereasonablycoherent.Insection2Iwilltracethe
transitiontothistheoryfromanearlier,simplerconceptionofphenomenalism,andinsection3I
willtrytoexplainwhyLeibnizthoughtthatbodiesareonlyphenomenapreciselybecausetheyare
aggregatesofsubstances.Insection4Iwillexaminethedistinctionbetweenrealandimaginary
bodiesinhissystem,whichistheprincipalpointatwhichhemightbesuspectedofusingtwoor
moremutuallyinconsistentconstructions.Beforethat,however,ImusttrytoexplainwhatLeibniz
doesanddoesnotmeanbycallingbodies"phenomena."Section1willbedevotedtothistopic,
whichcontains(inmyopinion)someofLeibniz'smostvaluablecontributionstometaphysics.
1.Phenomena
1.1WhatArePhenomena?
Leibniz'sphenomenalismisquitedifferentfromthesortsofphenomenalismwithwhichEnglish
speakingphilosophersarelikelytobemostfamiliar,andIthinkitissuperiortotheminimportant
respects.Weneed,therefore,toclearourmindsofpreconceptionswhenweconsiderwhatLeibniz
meantbycallingbodiesphenomena.Theword'phenomenon'playsanimportantpartinLeibniz's
discussionofthenatureofbodies,asitdoesnot,forexample,inBishopBerkeley's.'Phenomenon'
isaGreekwordthatmeans'appearance',ormoreliterally'thingthatappears'.Thingsthatappear
areobjectsofawarenesstosomeonetowhomtheyappear.Thefirstthingtobesaidabout
6Inthisrespect
phenomena,asLeibnizconceivesofthem,isthattheyareintentionalobjects.
(thoughofcoursenotinallrespects)IbelievethatLeibniz'sphenomenalismisaforerunnerofthe
phenomenalismofKant.Leibnizcertainlydidnotdevoteasmuchattentiontotherelevantconcept
of"object"asKantdid,thoughhedidatleastoncecharacterize"phenomena"as"objectsoflimited
minds"(GVII,563,italicsadded).Forpresentpurposes,bodies,asphenomena,maybethoughtof
astheobjectsofastoryastorytoldorapproximatedbyperception,commonsense,andscience.
IncallingthemphenomenaLeibnizmeansthattheyhavetheirbeinginperceptionsthatrepresent
thisstorytoperceivingbeings.
Leibnizdoesnotgiveusawelldevelopedaccountofthenatureofthedependenceofbodies,as
phenomena,onperception.Asimpleidentificationofphenomena(andhenceofbodies)with
perceptions,orwithcollectionsofthem,wouldpositionLeibniz'sphenomenalismclosertothe
idealismofBerkeley.Theinterpretationofphenomenaasintentionalobjects,whichIfavor,
7
requiresamorenuancedaccountoftheirrelationtoperceptions.
____________________
6
Cf.Furth,"Monadology,"p.172.
7
Thisisapointonwhichitseemshistoricallytohavebeendifficulttoattainclarity.Wecanfind
Kanttendingtolapseintoasimpleidentificationofappearanceswithrepresentations,evena
passageinwhichheisatleastbeginningtoseethatamorenuancedaccountoftherelationbetween
themisessentialtohisargument(CritiqueofPureReasonA190f.=B235f.).
219
Thetextsthatseemtotelluswhatphenomenaareareofdoubtfulrelevancetothisissue.Thereare
textsthatcouldbereadassimplyidentifyingphenomenawithperceptions,whereLeibnizsaysthat
"phenomenaarenothingbutthoughts"(LA70)andseemstofavortheviewthatthe"phenomena"
thatarealwaysproducedinuswhenweseebodies"aresimplynewtransitorymodificationsofour
souls"(RML457/L626).8Itmaybedoubted,however,whether'phenomena'isusedinthesame
senseinthesepassagesasinthoseinwhichbodiesaresaidtobe"phenomena."
Therearealsotexts,mostofthemearly,inwhichitisvirtuallyexplicitthatphenomena'signifies
intentionalobjectsofperception,ratherthantheperceptionsthemselvesaspsychologicalstates.
Leibnizdefines"phenomena"in1672as"whatarecertainbyvirtueofsensation"(AVl,iii,3)and
in1679as"propositionsthatareprovedbyexperience"(C33).Herethereisclearlynothoughtof
identifyingphenomenawithmentalimageslikethe"ideas"ofBerkeley'sphilosophy.Examplesof
"phenomena"thatLeibnizmentionsintheperiod167172include"thelightofthestars(especially
ofthesun)andthesolidityandresistanceoftheearth"(AVl,ii,329)andthatfactthat"thelightof
9WritingaboutNicolas
dayismoveddailyaroundtheglobeoftheearth"(AVI,iii,69).
Malebranchein1697,Leibnizexplicitlycontrasts"thephenomenathattakeplaceinbodies"with
whatis"inus"inperception(RML321f.).Butthesearenotovertlyphenomenalisttexts,andare
thereforeoflimitedrelevancetothemeaningof'phenomena'inphenomenalistcontexts.Abetter
text,perhaps,formypurposesisalistofdefinitions,relatedbywatermarktotheperiod168386,
whichsaysthat"athingisacongruentphenomenon"(VE180=LHIV,7c,101).Thiscertainlyhas
aphenomenalistflavor,and"thing"canhardlybemeantheretoreferonlytopsychologicalstates
assuch.
ItisrelevantthatLeibnizsaysthatdifferentperceivers"allexpressthesamephenomena"(DM14).
Whattheyallexpressispresumablyacommonintentionalobject,butLeibnizcertainlydoesnot
thinktheyallexpressitbyqualitativelythesamepsychologicalstates.Tobesure,heisalsowilling
tospeak,eveninthesameparagraph,ofaperceiver'sownphenomena,saying,that"allour
phenomena...areonlyconsequencesofourbeing."10Butourownphenomenacanstillbe
understoodastheintentionalobjectsorrepresentationalcontentsofourperceptionswhatappears
toustheobjectiveratherthantheformalrealityofourperceptions,inCartesianterms.
Inanyevent,itisdifficulttoacceptthatLeibnizsimplyidentifiedbodies,asphenomena,with
perceptionsoraggregatesofperceptions.Oneobviousreason
____________________
10
DM14;cf.GII,444/L602.RobertMcRae,whocallsattentiontothisterminologicalvariation,in
hisLeibniz:Perception,Apperception,andTbougbt,p.141f.,takesitmoreseriouslythanIdoasa
signofinconsistency.
8
Littleweight,insuchasubtlequestion,canbeplacedonsuchacasualequivalenceas"perceptions
or[seu]phenomena"(C14/MP176).(Onthedateofthistext,seenote55below.)Seunormally
signifiesanequivalence,butinafairlyvagueway.Itisnoteworthyalsothatinthesameparagraph
Leibnizsaysthat"everysoulwillrepresentproximatelythephenomenaofitsownorganicbody,"
apparentlytakingthephenomenaofthebodyasobjectsrepresentedbytheperceptionsofthesoul.
9
Mostofthesetexts,andothersofrelatedcontent(andearlydate)arenotedinRobinet,
Architectoniquedisjonctive,p.154n.
220
forthisjudgmentisthat,asnotedandaswillbediscussedinsection3,Leibnizidentifiedbodies,as
phenomena,withaggregatesofsubstances.Itisalsoclearthatthepropertiesheascribestobodies
aredifferentfromthoseheascribestoperceptualmodificationsofthemind.Perceptions,butnot
bodies,aredistinctorconfused.Bodies,butnotmodificationsofthemind,havephysical
properties.Mostimportant,asIshallargue,Leibnizshowsnoconcernforsometypesof
psychologicalanalysisthatarecrucialforBerkeleyanreductionsofbodiestoperceptions.
OnepromisingwayofaccountingforLeibniz'svariousutterancesonthissubjectistosupposethat
whenhespeaksofmaterialthingsasphenomena,henormallythinksofthosephenomenaas
perceptions,orasqualitiesormodificationsofaperceivingsubstance,consideredonlyinacertain
respect.Specifically,corporealphenomenaareperceptionsconsideredwithregardtotheir
objectiverealityorrepresentationalcontent,orinsofarastheyexpresssomenature,form,or
essence.HereIamextrapolatingfromthingsLeibnizsaysabout"ideas."Hisnotionofideaisbyno
meansthesameashisnotionofphenomenon.Thelatternotionismorecloselyconnectedwith
perceptionthantheformer;andsomephenomenaaretransitory,whereasideasingeneralarenot.
Butideas,likephenomena,canbeconstruedbothaspropertiesofthemindandasobjectsofthe
mind;andLeibnizgivesmuchfullerdiscussiontotherelationbetweenideasandthemindthanI
havefoundhimtogivetotherelationbetweenphenomenaandtheperceivingsubstance.
AfamouscontroversybetweenMalebrancheandAntoineArnauldprovidesthestartingpointfor
muchofwhatLeibnizsaysaboutideas.Malebrancheheldthatideasofbodiesareobjectsof
awarenessdistinctfromanymodificationsofourmindsbywhichweareawareofthem.Hehadto
regardthemasdistinct,sinceheheldthattheideasareinGod'smindandnotinours.Arnauld
maintainednotonlythatwehaveideasofbodiesinourownminds,butalsothattheyare
modificationsofourminds.LeibnizdeclaredhimselfforArnauldinthisdebate:"Itsufficesto
considerideasasNotions;thatistosay,asmodificationsofoursoul.ThatishowtheSchool,M.
Descartes,andM.Arnauldtakethem"(GIII,659;cf.GIV,426/L294).11
ThisdeclarationdoesnotfullyreflectthecomplexityofLeibniz'sposition,however.Inthefirst
place,heagreedwithMalebranchethat,ifideasaretaken"astheimmediateexternalobjectofour
thoughts,itistruethattheycouldonlybeplacedinGod,sincethereisnothingbutGodthatcanact
immediatelyuponus"(RML317).Andinconciliatorymoodshewaspreparedtosaythat"itcan
verywellbemaintainedinthissensethatweseeeverythinginGod"(RML490).ButLeibniz
insiststhatwealsohaveanimmediateinternalobjectofourthought(RML317):"Ihold,however,
thattherealsoisalwayssomethinginusthatcorrespondstotheideasthatareinGodaswellasto
thephenomenathattakeplaceinbodies"(RML321f.).Inthissensewehaveourownideasinour
ownminds(DM2829),andourideasaremodificationsofourminds,or(RML490)
____________________
11
OnLeibniz'srelationtothiscontroversy,seeRML133ff.Evenbeforeseeingthedocuments,
Leibnizwroteinaletterthat"Mons.Arnauldwriteswithmorejudgment"thanFatherMalebranche
(RML150).
221
relationsofcorrespondencetoGod'sideas,whichareincludedinmodificationsofourminds.
Inthesecondplace,Leibniz'scallingideasmodificationsofthesoulshouldnotleadustosuppose
thatheidentifiedthemwithconsciousepisodes.In26oftheDiscourseonMetaphysicshe
distinguishestwosensesof'idea':
Sometaketheideafortheformordifferenceofourthoughts,andinthiswaywehave
theideainourmindonlyinsofaraswearethinkingofit,andeverytimewethinkofit
anew,wehaveotherideasofthesamething,althoughsimilartothosethatwentbefore.
Butitseemsthatotherstaketheideaforanimmediateobjectofthoughtorforsome
permanentformwhichremainswhenwearenotcontemplatingit.
Leibnizprefersthesecondoftheseconceptions.Anidea,properlyspeaking,isa"qualityofour
soul,"butapermanentqualityandnotatransitorymodification(DM26).Itmanifestsitselfin
distinctsuccessivemodificationswhenwethinkofitconsciously,andevenwhenwearenot
thinkingofit,thereremainsinusaproperty[habitudo]thatexpressesthecontentoftheidea(G
VII,263/L207).Theconcreterealizationoftheideainourmindsisthusquitedifferentatdifferent
times.
Inthethirdplace,itisonlyconsideredinacertainrespectthatqualitiesofthesoulareideas.Ifwe
askwhatitisthatispermanentinanideathattakessuchdifferentformsastheconsciousandthe
unconsciousatdifferenttimes,theansweris,first,thattherepresentationalcontent,orinCartesian
termstheobjectivereality,oftheideaisconstantand,second,thatthemindalwayshasinita
certainpotentialityformakingthatcontentconscious,"thequality,"asLeibnizputsit,"of
representingtoitselfwhatevernatureorformitis,whentheoccasionarisesforthinkingofit"(
DM26).Leibnizhimself,inthepassagequoted,connectsthepermanenceoftheideawithits
characterasobjectofthought.Wemaysaythattheideaisapermanentqualityofthemind
consideredwithregardtoitsrepresentationalcontent.Leibnizsays,"Thisqualityofoursoul
insofarasitexpressessomenature,form,oressence,isproperlytheideaofthething,whichisin
us,andwhichisalwaysinus,whetherwearethinkingofitornot"(DM26,italicsadded)."An
ideaisthatinwhichoneperceptionorthoughtdiffersfromanotherbyreasonoftheobject"(
RML73).
Similarly,whenLeibnizspeaksofbodiesasphenomena,wemayunderstandthosephenomenaas
qualitiesormodificationsoftheperceivingsubstanceconsideredwithregardtotheirobjective
realityorrepresentationalcontentorinsofarastheyexpresssomenature,form,oressence.
AdaptingCartesianterms,onecansaythatintheirobjectiverealityorasphenomena,perceptions
havepropertiesthattheydonothaveintheirformalrealityorasmodificationsofthemind,and
viceversa.Amongthemostimportantoftheseproperties,forLeibniz,arecausalproperties,for
theyarethebasisofthepreestablishedharmonybetweenbodyandsoul.StudentsofLeibnizhave
sometimeswonderedwhatthethingsarethatneedtobeharmonized,ifbodiesarephenomenaand
phenomenaaremodificationsofthesoul.Leibnizholdsthatcorporealphenomenaassuchare
causedmechanicallybyprecedingcorporealphenomena,whereasmodificationsofthesoulassuch
aretobeexplainedteleologicallybyprecedingappetites(Mon
222
79,87;GIV,391/L409f.;C12f./MP173f.).Godpreestablishesaharmonybetweensoulandbody
bysoprogrammingperceptionsthat,whiletheirformalrealityfollowsfromtheformalrealityof
previousperceptionsandappetitesofthesamesubstancebylawsofteleologicalexplanation,their
objectiverealityfollowsfromtheobjectiverealityofpreviousperceptionsbylawsofmechanical
explanation.
Inspiteofthesefundamentaldifferencesbetweenperceptionsasphenomenaandperceptionsas
modificationsoftheperceivingsubstance,Leibnizwillresistanyattempttotreatthemasfully
distinctentities.Thepointofhissayingthatphenomenaaremodificationsofoursoulsisthatasa
conceptualistaboutallsortsofabstractentitiesandmerelyintentionalobjects,Leibnizdoesnot
believethatphenomenahaveanybeingexceptintheexistenceoroccurrenceofqualitiesor
modificationsofperceivingsubstances.Theexistenceofaphenomenonmustconsistinthe
occurrenceofcertainperceptions:"OurMindmakesaphenomenon"(C528).
Nonetheless,Leibnizdistinguishes,amongphenomena,betweenrealandmerelyimaginarybodies
andholdsthatsomestoriesinwhichtherealonesfigurearetrue.ThetaskofLeibnizian
phenomenalistanalysisistoexplainwhatthisrealityandtruthconsistin.Itisnottoanalyzethe
contentofthetruestories.Consideredasphenomena,bodiesstillhavethepropertiesofbodies.I
havefoundinLeibniznoattempttoreducethosepropertiestopsychologicalpropertiesof
perceptions.ThisisaprincipaldifferencebetweenLeibnizandmanyotherphenomenalists.
IdonotmeantodenythatLeibnizmayhavethoughtthattheobjectiverealityofperceptionsmust
result,inhissense,fromtheirformalreality.Itakehimtobecommittedtotheviewthatthe
objectiverealityofaperceptionmustbeexpressedbytheformalrealityoftheperception(cf.
RML321f.),whereonethingexpressesanotherifandonlyifthereisaonetoonemappingfrom
elementsofthelattertoelementsoftheformeraccordingtoappropriaterules(GVII,263f./L207f.;
LA112).Thisisanecessaryconditionforaperception'shavingacertainobjectivereality.Leibniz
seemsalsotohavethoughtthatexpressionofanobjectiverealityinasimplesubstanceissufficient
foraperceptionhavingthatobjectivereality,thoughwemaydoubtthatanadequateaccountof
intentionalitycanreallybeprovidedinthatway."Wecouldnotsaywhattheperceptionofplants
consistsin,andeventhatofanimalswedonotconceivewell.Fortheretobeaperception,
however,it'senoughthattherebeavarietyintheunity"(GIII,581/L664;cf.Mon14).
EvenifLeibnizthoughtthattheremustbeareductionoftheobjectiverealityofperceptionstotheir
formalreality,basedonthenotionofexpression,itisnopartofhisphilosophyofbodytogivesuch
areduction.Givingitwouldrequireidentifying(withoutreferencetoobjectiverealityor
representationalcontent)theformal,psychologicalfeaturesofperceptionsthatcorrespondwiththe
corporealfeaturesofrepresentedobjects,andLeibnizmakesnoattempttodothat.Inhis
philosophyofbody,theobjectiverealityorrepresentationalcontentofaperceptionistreatedforall
workingpurposesasaprimitivefeatureofthatperception.Leibnizprovidesatleastoneanalysisof
thenotionoftherealityofacorporealuniversethatappearstous(asweshallseelaterinsections2
and4).
223
Butheprovidesnoanalysisofthenotionofacorporealuniverse'sappearingtous(asopposedto
somethingelseappearingtous).Hethustreatsthenotionofacorporealuniverse'sappearingtous
asconceptuallypriortothenotionofsuchauniverse'sbeingreal.
1.2LeibnizandBerkeley
ForfurtherexplorationofthedistinctivefeaturesofLeibniz'sconceptionofphenomena,letusturn
tohisexplicitdisagreementswithBerkeley.HisbestknowncommentonBerkeley,inaletterof15
March1715toBartholomewDesBosses(GII,492/L609),suggeststhatLeibnlzfailedtorealize
thestrengthofBerkeley'sdesiretobefoundinagreementwithcommonsenseandoverlooked
Berkeley'seffortstodefineasenseinwhichbodiescanbecalled"real."Otherevidencedoesnot
contradictthesesuggestions,butdoesmakeclearthatLeibnizactuallyreadBerkeleyandsawmore
thanhehascommonlybeenthoughttohaveseenofthesimilarities,aswellasthedifferences,
betweenBerkeley'sviewsandhisown.Thisevidenceisprovidedbythefollowingcommentsthat
LeibnizwroteonthelastpageofhiscopyofBerkeleyTreatiseConcerningthePrinciplesof
HumanKnowledge:
Muchherethat'srightandagreeswithmyviews.Buttooparadoxicallyexpressed.For
wehavenoneedtosaythatmatterisnothing;butitsufficestosaythatitisa
phenomenonliketherainbow;andthatitisnotasubstance,butaresultofsubstances;
andthatspaceisnomorerealthantime,i.e.,thatitisnothingbutanorderof
coexistences,astimeisanorderofsubexistences.ThetruesubstancesareMonads,or
Perceivers.Buttheauthoroughttohavegoneonfurther,namelytoinfiniteMonads,
constitutingallthings,andtotheirpreestablishedharmony.Hewrongly,oratleast
pointlessly,rejectsabstractideas,restrictsideastoimaginations,despisesthesubtleties
ofarithmeticandgeometry.Hemostwronglyrejectstheinfinitedivisionofthe
extended,evenifheisrighttorejectinfinitesimalquantities.12
LebnizdidnotfailtoseethatheBerkelywerefundamentallyonthesameside.13Hethoughtmuch
oftheirdisagreementwasinpresentation,style,andtactics.Berkely"expressed"theircommon
beliefs"tooparadoxically."SeveralsubstantialdisagreementsarereflectedinLebniz'scritique,
however.Iwilldiscussthreeofthese.
TheperceptualatomismofBerkerly'sconstructionofphysicalobjectsevokesLeibniz'sstrongest
protest.Berkerley"mostwrongly[pessime]rejectstheinfinitedivisionoftheextended."For
Berkerley,extendedthingsareideasorcol
____________________
12
TheLatinoriginalispublished,withafullreportofthediscovery,byWillyKabitz,"Leibnizund
Berkeley";thequotedtextisonp.636.Ithasbeenrepublished,andfurtherannotated,byAndr
Robinet,"Leibniz:LectureduTreatisedeBerkeley."AnEnglishtranslationhasbeenpublishedin
AG307.
13
MargaretWilsonvaluablepaper,"LeibnizandBerkeley,"istosomeextentaprotestagainstthis
evaluation.SherightlypointsoutanumberofimportantdifferencesbetweenLeibnizandBerkeley,
includingsomethatIdiscusshere,aswellassomethatarenotrelevanttomypresentpurpose,
whichistheexpositionofLeibniz'sconceptionofaphenomenon.SofarasIcansee,the
disagreementbetweenherreadingofthetextsandmine,thoughsignificant,ispurelyamatterof
emphasis.
224
lectionsofideas,andtheseideasinturnarecomposedofpartsthatareonlyfinitelysmall
becausetheycannotbesmallerthanthemindinwhichtheyexistcandiscriminate(Principles,
124).Individinganyextendedthing,therefore,wecomeeventuallytopartsthatarestill
extendedbutsosmallthattheycannotbedividedanyfurther;Berkeleymaintainsthatthereare
nodistinctpartswithintheseleastdiscernibleparts,onthegroundthatasanideaexistsonlyin
themind,"consequentlyeachpartthereofmustbeperceived"(ibid.).
Leibnizacceptsnosuchconstructionofextendedthingsfromextendedbutindivisible
perceptions.Hecanbeseenasconstructingcorporealphenomenafromindivisible,simple
substancesinasmuchasheregardstheformerasaggregatesofthelatter(asIwilldiscussin
section3).Butthisisaconstructionfromsubstances,notfromideasorperceptions.Moreover,
thesimplesubstancesmustbeunextendedpreciselybecausetheyareindivisible;divisibilityisof
theveryessenceofextensionforLeibniz.ThisisonereasonwhyLeibnizcanviewbodiesas
infinitelydivided.
ThereisinLeibniz'sviewanextendedbutmerelyidealobjectthatentersintotheconstructionof
corporealphenomena(asIwillalsoargueinsection3.4).Thisisspace.Ithasextendedparts,but
isnotconstructedfromthem.Leibnizregardsitaspriortothem:
Indeedspaceissomethingcontinuous,butideal....Inactualthings,simplethings
arebeforeaggregates;inidealthingsthewholeispriortothepart.(GII,379)
Intheidealorcontinuousthewholeispriortotheparts,astheArithmeticalunitis
priortothefractionsthatdivideit,whichcanbeassignedarbitrarily,thepartsbeing
onlypotential;butintherealthesimpleispriortothegroups,thepartsareactual,
arebeforethewhole.(GIII,622;cf.GVII,562f.)14
Thisisnottosaythatwehaveaverycomprehensivespatialperceptionthatisprior,inits
"formal"reality,tootherperceptionsthatareitspsychologicalparts.SpaceisidealforLeibnizin
thesensethatitismerelyanobjectofthoughtorperception.Hispriorityclaimisthatthe
representingofspacebyourthoughtsorperceptionsispriortotherepresentingofpartsof
spaceandthatthereisnothingmoretospaceoritsparts,assuch,thanarepresentational
content.
TherearethusintheLeibnizianschemeofthingsnopsychologicalentitiesthatserveasbuilding
blocksintheconstructionofextendedthingsinthewaythatideasdoforBerkeley.
2.Leibniz'sinsistenceon"theinfinitedivisionoftheextended"isbasedontheintellectual
demandsofhisgeometryandmetaphysics,notonthephenomenologyofsensation.Thisis
relatedtohisviewthatBerkeleyiswrongto"restrictideastoimaginations."Leibnizrejectsthe
sensationalismofBerkeley'stheory.IfbodiesarephenomenaforLeibniz,the"perceptions"of
whichtheyareobjects
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14
Bodiesthatarewellfoundedphenomenafallontherealratherthantheidealsideofthiscontrast,
andthereforearenotpriortotheirpartsorconstituentsinLeibniz'sview(seesections1.3.2and
2.1inthischapter).In"PhenomenalismandCorporealSubstanceinLeibniz,"pp.222f.,I
mistakenlyappliedtocorporealphenomenaassuchwhatLeibnizsayshereaboutidealthings.
GlennA.HartzandJ.A.Cover,intheirvaluablepaperon"SpaceandTimeintheLeibnizian
Metaphysic,"showedmetheerrorofmyprevioustreatmentofthesetextsthoughIstilldisagree
withthemonsomerelatedpoints,asdiscussedinsection3.4inthischapter.
225
arebynomeansonlysensations,thoughhewascertainlycapableofputtingaphenomenalist
pointintermsof"thephenomenaofthesenses"(NE392).InLeibnizianterms,perceptionsof
bodiesmaybeeithertooconfusedortoodistincttobesensations.Leibnizheld,famously,that
thelargestpartofour(andothercreatures')perceptionsofbodiesaretooconfusedtocountas
sensations,buthedidspeakof"phenomena"representedbythem(GII,521/AG206).Weneed
notpauseheretoworryabouttheimportantandobviousdifficultiesofascribingrepresentational
contenttounconsciousperceptions,foritissurelyLeibniz'sdeparturefromsensationalisminthe
otherdirection,thedirectionofgreaterdistinctness,thatmotivateshiscriticalcommentabout
Berkeley's"restrict[ing]ideastoimaginations."
Leibniziancorporeal"phenomena"areobjectsoftheintellectaswellasofsensationand
unconsciousperception.WritingtoArnauldinApril1687,Leibnizexplicitlyassignsreasoninga
roleintheconstructionofcorporealaggregatesasphenomena(LA101).Theintellect'spartin
ourperceptionofcorporealphenomenaisparticularlyimportantandincludesbothmathematics
andphysics.
Amongthefeaturesofphenomenathatweperceiveprimarilybytheintellectareforces.Forceis
characteristicofmonads,butthereareforcesthatarepropertiesofphenomena:
AsItakebodiestobe,soalso[Itake]corporealforces[tobe]:thatis,inthe
phenomena.15(GII,276/AG182)
Asmatteritselfisnothingbutaphenomenon,butwellfounded,resultingfromthe
monads,itisthesamewithinertia,whichisapropertyofthisphenomenon.(G
III,636/L659)
CertainlyLeibnizdidnotthinkwehaveasensoryimageofinertia.Heregards"theessenceof
body"asconstitutedbya"forceofactingandresisting,whichweperceive,notbyimagination,
butbytheintellect"(GVII,314f./MP82).16Itisby(rudimentaryorsophisticated)scientific
thinkingthatweperceiveforcesassuch.
Indeed,IbelievethatforLeibniztheuniverseofcorporealphenomenaisprimarilytheobject,
notofsense,butofscience.Thisisanotherpointofsimilaritybetweenthephenomenalismof
LeibnizandthatofKant,forwhomthephenomenalworldincludesobjectsnotperceptibleby
oursensesbutpostulatedonscientificgrounds.17Therealityofcorporealphenomenadepends
forLeibniz,
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15
AtthispointLeibnizadds,"thatis,iftheyareunderstoodassuperaddinganythingtothesimple
substancesortotheirmodifications,"whichItaketobeasomewhatobscurewayofunderlining
thecorporealcharacteroftheforcessaidtobephenomena.Theseforcesarephenomenalinsofar
astheyareunderstoodasdistinctfromtheforcesinternaltosimplesubstances,whichconstitute
themostfundamentalpropertiesofthesimplesubstances.
16
Itcouldconceivablybearguedthatthereferencehereistointramonadicratherthantocorporeal
forces.Giventheplaceof"theessenceofbody"inthestatement,however,itseemsmore
plausibletotaketheremarkaboutourperceptionofforcesasdirectedeitherspecificallyat
corporealforcesorelseindiscriminatelyatalltheforcesthatmightbecloselyconnectedwith
bodies.Thephenomenalcharacterofcorporealforcesmayalsonotbeinviewinthistext,which
ismuchearlierthanthoseinwhichLeibnizexplicitlyspeaksofcertainforcesasphenomena;but
Iseenoreasontosupposethathewouldhavehesitatedatanytimetosaythatforcesingeneral
andassuchareperceived"notbyimagination,butbytheintellect."
17
Kant,CritiqueofPureReason,A226=B273.Unfortunately,Kant'sexampleofsuchanobject,
"amagneticmatterpervadingallbodies,"isonenolongerpostulatedbyourscience.It
226
aswewillseeinsection4,ontheirfindingaplaceinthestorythatwouldbetoldbyaperfected
physicalscience.
3.PartofLeibniz'spointinsayingthatbodiesarephenomenaistoclaimthattheyhavetheir
existenceonlyinsubstancesthatperceivethem,andinthisheagreeswithBerkeley.18Butthereis
somethingelsegoingoninLeibniz'stalkofphenomena,somethingthatisreflectedinhiscomment
thatBerkeley"oughttohavegoneonfurther,namelytoinfiniteMonads,constitutingallthings."
'Phenomenon'contrastsnotonlyas'intramental'with'extramental';italsocontrastsas'apparent'
with'real'.AndwhileLeibniz'smetaphysicsiscertainlyaformofidealism,italsoincludesasortof
qualifiedrealismaboutbodiesandaboutphysicalscience.PartofwhatisgoingoninLeibniz's
maturethoughtisthathedoesassumethatinourperceptionofbodiesweareatleastindirectly
perceivingsomethingthatisprimitivelyrealindependentlyofourminds,andheaskswhatsortof
thingthatmaybe.19Hisansweristhatitis"infiniteMonads,"whoseharmoniousperceptionsare
the"foundation"ofcorporealphenomena.
Thisanswer,however,doesnotadequatelyrepresenttheinterplayofappearanceandrealityin
Leibniz'sthought.Likealmostallmodernphilosophers,hebelievedthatgoodsciencerequiresus
tosupposethatthereareveryconsiderablequalitativedifferencesbetweenbodiesastheyappearto
naivesenseperceptionandbodiesastheyshouldbeseenbyscience.Inthecorporealworldas
describedbymodernsciencethereis,inacertainsense,nopartforcolorsandtheothersocalled
secondaryqualitiestoplay.Ontheotherhand,modernsciencepostulatesvastnumbersofmotions
ofminuteparticlesinportionsofmatterthatappeartooursensestobeperfectlyquiescent
internally.ThiswastrueofwhatLeibnizregardedasmodernscience,anditistrueofwhatwe
thinkofasmodernscience.
Manyamongusrespondtothissituationbysupposingthat,whereaswhatweperceivenaivelyby
oursensesisonlyanappearance,whatisdescribedbyscienceorwhatwouldbedescribedbya
perfectedscienceisreality.Leibnizhasafundamentalreasonforrejectingthisstrongformof
scientificrealismareasonfornotexpectingsciencetogiveusknowledgeofrealityasitisin
itself.Scientificknowledge,asLeibnizseesit,isrelativelydistinct,butbuysitsdistinctnessatthe
priceofstudyingamathematicalidealization."Abstractionsareneededforthescientific
explanationofthings"(GII,252/L531).Thecomplexityof
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17
shouldalsobenotedthatbecauseofKant'sdistinctionbetweenintuitionsandconcepts,andhis
treatmentofit,regardedbyKanthimselfasamaindifferencebetweenhisphilosophyandthatof
Leibniz,itisimportanttoKant,thatanyphenomenonnotinfactperceptiblebyoursensesbesuch
that"wewould...also,inanexperience,encountertheimmediateempiricalintuitionofit,ifour
sensesweremoreacute"(ibid.).(Leibnizwouldsaythattoo,butfordifferentreasonshavingto
dowithhisowntheoriesofuniversalharmonyandperception.)Itremainsclearthatsomethingcan
beaphenomenonforKantbyvirtueofitsappearingtotheintellectandnottosensationthoughof
courseitmustappearinsuchawayastobeplacedbytheintellectwithinthespatiotemporal
"form"ofsensation.
18
M.Wilson("LeibnizandBerkeley,"p.7)isunwillingtosaythatLeibnizandBerkeley"agree"on
thispoint,becausethereissuchalargedifferenceinwhattheymeanby'perception'.Iagreethat
thedifferenceislarge,butIthinkitisnotlargeenoughtokeeptheperceptiondependenceof
bodiesfrombeinganimportantpointofmetaphysicalagreementbetweenthetwophilosophers.
19
Foranicestatementonthispoint,seeAntonioLamarra,"LeibnizonLockeonInfinity,"p.181.
227
reality,hethinks,isinfinite,intensivelyaswellasextensively.Itisnotjustthatthereareinfinitely
manyobjectsinfinitespace.Evenwhenweperceiveabodyoflimitedextension,suchasthebody
ofahumanbeing,Leibnizbelievesthattherealityrepresentedbyourperceptionisinfinitely
complex,andthatallofthatinfinitecomplexityisrelevanttotheexplanationofsomeofthesalient
featuresofthebody'sbehavior.Humanmindsarefinite,however,andthedefinitivemarkoffinite
mindsisthattheycannotdistinctlyknowaninfinitecomplexity.Soifscienceisdistinct
knowledge,theonlysortofsciencethatispossible,eveninprinciple,forhumanbeingswillhave
asitsimmediateobjectafinitelycomplexrepresentationoftheinfinitelycomplexreality.Atleast
tothisextent,theobjectsofscientificknowledgewillbephenomena.Leibniz'sopinion,thatthe
objectofscientificknowledgeisnotrealityasitisinitselfbutamathematicalabstractionfromits
infinitecomplexity,isplausibleenoughinitsownright,Ithink,butitisalsorootedinotheraspects
ofhisphilosophy,whichneednotberecountedindetailhereinhistheoryoffreeactionand
infiniteanalysisconceptionofcontingency,20forexample,andinhisdoctrinethateachthing
expressesthewholeuniverse.
1.3ThePhenomenalityofPhysicalQualities
Leibniz'streatmentoftherelationofthedifferentsensiblequalitiestorealitycanbeunderstoodin
thislight.Itwouldbeconvenienttobeabletodiscussitintermsofthedistinctionbetween
"primary"and"secondary"qualitiesofbodieswhichhasbeenestablishedinEnglishspeaking
philosophybyBoyleandLocke,butthatterminologyisnotLeibnizian.Leibnizuseditin
discussingLocke,butwithsomereservations(NE13033).Hethoughtthattheonlyfundamental
differencebetweenthetwosortsofsensiblequalitiesisinthedegreeofconfusionwithwhichthey
expressadeeperreality.Heregardedthedegreeofthatdifferenceaslarge(NE403f.),21butplaced
itwithinaspectruminwhichnosensiblequalityoccupiesasufficientlydistinguishedpositionto
meritthedesignationof"primaryquality."Hethoughtthattherearequalities(namely,forces)that
belongtobodiesinamoreprimarywaythananystrictlysensiblequalitydoes.Inarticulatinghis
viewsIwillthereforerefertosize,shape,andmotionsimplyassuch,oras"theCartesianmodesof
extension,"andtothesocalled"secondaryqualities"simplyas"theothersensiblequalities."
In12oftheDiscourseonMetaphysicsLeibnizwrote:
Itcanevenbedemonstratedthatthenotionofsize,shape,andmotionisnotsodistinct
asoneimagines,andthatitincludessomethingimaginaryandrelativetoour
perceptions,asarealso(thoughmuchmoreso)color,heat,andothersimilarqualities
ofwhichitcanbedoubtedwhethertheyaretrulyfoundinthenatureofthingsoutside
us.
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20
21
ThisisapointrightlyemphasizedbyM.Wilson,"LeibnizandBerkeley,"p.12.Moreimportant,
shepointsoutamajordifferenceinLeibniz'sandBerkeley'streatmentsofsensiblequalities.While
theybothcriticizethemetaphysicsofprimaryqualitiesthatwasthestandard"modern"viewof
theirtime,theydeveloptheircriticism"incompletelyoppositedirections,"Berkeleyascribingall
thesensiblequalitiesequallyto"real"bodies,andLeibnizdistancingallthesensiblequalities,
thoughnotequally,fromwhatheregardsasrealinbodies(ibid.,p.12f.).
228
Manysimilarstatementsarefoundinotherplacesinhiswork.Itseemstobeimpliedherethatthe
othersensiblequalitiesareevenlessrealthantheCartesianmodesofextension,althoughbothsorts
areinsomedegreeapparentratherthanultimatelyreal.22Size,shape,andmotion,Ithink,canbe
morerealonlyinthesensethattheyrepresentrealitymoredistinctlythantheothersensible
qualities.They"containmoreofdistinctknowledge"thantheothers,buttheyboth"holdsomething
ofthephenomenal[tiennentduphnomne]"(LA119).
AccordingtoLeibniz,theperceptionofothersensiblequalities,astheyappeartous,isaconfused
perceptionofminutemotionsortexturesaconfusedperceptionofsizes,shapes,andmotionsthat
aretoosmallforustoperceivethembysense(NE13133).Wemightputthisbysayingthatthe
othersensiblequalitiesareappearancesofsizes,shapes,andmotionsandassuchareappearances
ofappearances.IdonotknowthatLeibnizeversaidexactlythat,butinthelastletterthathewrote
toDesBosses(29May1716)hedidsuggestrelatingothersensiblequalitiestothecorresponding
sizes,shapes,andmotionsas"resultantphenomena"to"constitutivephenomena."Thusthe
"observedperception"ofwhiteandblackresultsfrombumpsanddepressions,tootinytobe
(consciously)observed,whichreflectandtrapraysoflight,respectively,butthesegeometrical
texturesthemselvesarestillonlyphenomena(GII,521/AG206;cf.C489).
1.3.1Shape
EvenwithintherealmofCartesianmodesofextensionthereareveilsbehindveilsofappearance
betweenusandrealityintheLeibnizianuniverse.Inspectthelegofaflywiththenakedeyeand
underamicroscope;youwillseeratherdifferentshapes.23YetLeibnizwouldsurelysaythatwhat
youseewiththenakedeyeisaconfusedrepresentationofthemorecomplexshapethatappears
underthemicroscope,andthatthelatterisstillnotcomplexenoughtobemorethananappearance.
ThisisindeedoneofLeibniz'sreasonsforholdingthatshapeisonlyaphenomenon.24
Forevenshape,whichisoftheessenceofaboundedextendedmass,isneverexactand
strictlydeterminedinnature,becauseoftheactualdivisiontoinfinityofthepartsof
matter.Thereisneveraspherewithoutinequalities,norastraightlinewithout
curvaturesmingledin,noracurveofacertainfinitenaturewithoutmixtureofany
otherandthatinthesmallpartsasinthelargewhichbringsitaboutthatshape,far
frombeingconstitutiveofbodies,isnotevenanentirelyrealanddeterminedquality
outsideofthought.(LA119)
Oneofthereasons,Itakeit,whyLeibnizthoughtthatfinitelycomplexshapescannotbe"entirely
real...outsideofthought"isthattheycannotexpressa
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22
IseeonlyaverbalinconsistencywiththiswhenLeibnizwritesthatshapeandmotion"involve
somethingoftheimaginary,nolessthanheatandcolorandothersensiblequalities"(GVII,314/
MP82,italicsadded).Itisequally(thatis,absolutely)trueofbothsortsofqualitythattheyinvolve
somethingoftheimaginary,buttheothersensiblequalitiesinvolvemoreoftheimaginarythanthe
Cartesianmodesofextensiondo.
23
Cf.Berkeley,Works,vol.2,p.189.
24
ForadiscussionofLeibniz'sreasonsforholdingthatmotionisonlyaphenomenon,seeSleigh,
LeibnizandArnauldpp.111f.,andMcGuire,"'LabyrinthusContinui',"esp.p.323f.
229
relationtoeveryeventinaninfinitelycomplexuniverseasthequalitiesofarealthingoughtto.
"Thereisnoactualdeterminateshapeinthings"hewrote,"fornoneisabletosatisfyinfinite
impressions"(C522/L270).
Theshapesthusexcludedfromnaturearefinitelycomplexshapes;"thereisnolineorshapein
naturethatgivesexactlyandkeepsuniformlyfortheleastspaceandtimethepropertiesofa
straightorcircularline,orofanyotherlinewhosedefinitionafinitemindcancomprehend"(G
VII,563).TheconclusionthatIthinkLeibnizdrawsisnotthatrealshapesareinfinitelycomplex,
thoughsomethingshesays(e.g.,inDM6)mightleaveuswiththatimpression.Rather,he
concludesthatshapeassuchisonlyaphenomenon.Isupposethataninfinitelycomplexshape
wouldinvolvealinesegmentoffinitelengththatchangesnotmerelyitscurvaturebutalsothe
directionofitschangeofcurvatureinfinitelymanytimes,andthatLeibnizwouldhavethoughtthat
anabsurdandimpossiblemonstrosity.WhatIassumehewouldsay,insteadofpostulating
infinitelycomplexshapes,isthatforeveryfinitelycomplexshapethatmightbeascribedtoabody
thereisanotherstillmorecomplexthatmoreadequatelyexpressesreality.
Thisissuggestedbyhisuseoftheideaofaninfiniteseriesinaninterestingtextthatmayhavebeen
writtenshortlybeforetheDiscourseonMetaphysics,25andwhichexpresseswhatisprobablythe
correctLeibniziananswertothequestion,Doesshape,asaphenomenalproperty,belongtobodies
(sinceafterallbodiesthemselvesareonlyphenomena)oronlyappeartobelongtothem?"No
determinateshapecanbeassignedtoanybody,"Leibnizclaimsinthistext,andthenaddsthe
qualification,"althougheveninaninfiniteseries'departurefromapath[deviatio]somerulesare
observedbynature"(GVII,314/MP81),suggestinganinfiniteseriesofshapesmoreandmore
adequatelyexpressingreality.Everyshapeintheseries,however,willstillbeonlyfinitely
complex,andforthatreasonamongotherswillstillbeonlyanappearance,qualitativelydifferent
fromtherealityexpressed,whichisinfinitelycomplexanddoesnotliterallyhaveashapeatall.
Leibnizdoesnotconsistentlyadhere,however,tothedoctrinethatdeterminateshapesdonot
belongtobodies,consideredasphenomena,for(evenapartfromcasualandpresumably
unmetaphysicalcommentsabouttheshapesofbodies)hestates,inamuchlaterdocument,that
finitelycomplexshapes"arefoundinphenomenaorintheobjectsoflimitedminds"(GVII,563).
Bodiesorganicorlivingbodiesinparticularareappearancesofmonads.26Amonadis
representedbyitsbody;weperceiveitbyperceivingitsbody.Thisispossiblebecausethemonad
anditsbodyexpresseachother;thebodyistheexpressionofthesoul.Wehavejustseen,however,
thatabodyconceivedasaphenomenonhavingacertaindefiniteextension,shape,andmotionis
notcomplexenoughtobeanadequateexpressionofanyrealthing,accordingtoLeibniz.Itisnot
complexenoughtoexpresssomethingthatexpressesthewholeuniverse
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25
Robinet(Architectoniquedisionctive,p.34n)arguespersuasivelyforthisdating.Iamindebtedto
Sleigh,(LeibnizandArnauld,p.114)forpointingoutthe"suggestion,"whichSleighindeedtakes
tobemorethanasuggestion.
26
HereIdisagreewithHochstetter,"VonderwahrenWirklichkeitbeiLeibniz,"p.436.Itmustbe
grantedtoHochstetterthatLeibnizdidnotexplicitlyspeakofphenomenaas"appearancesof
monads."
230
asamonaddoes.Itisamathematicalabstraction.Perhapsthebodythatadequatelyexpressesa
monadisaninfiniteseriesofsuchabstractions,eachmorecomplexthanitspredecessors.
ItshouldbenotedthatthefullestdevelopmentIhavefoundinLeibnizofanargumentagainstthe
realityofshapeisbasedonadiachronicaccountofhowbodieswouldexpressaninfinitely
complexuniverse,ratherthanonthesynchronicconsiderationspresented(rathersketchily)to
Arnauldin1687anddevelopedinmyexpositionabove.Itisopentoseriousobjection,inmy
opinion,butitmaybetheargumentthatinfactlaybehindLeibniz'sstatementofabout1689that
"thereisnoactualdeterminateshapeinthings,fornoneisabletosatisfyinfiniteimpressions"(
C522/L270).Thediachronicallybasedargumentisfoundinadocumentdated(onthebasisof
watermark)about1686:
Thereisnopreciseandfixedshapeinbodies,becauseoftheactualdivisionoftheparts
toinfinity.
SupposeforexampleastraightlineABC;Isaythatitisnotexact[i.e.,notexactly
straight].Foraseachpartoftheuniversesympathizeswithalltheothers,itmust
necessarilybethatifthepointAtends[tomove]inthestraightlineAB,thepointBhas
anotherdirection.ForaseachpartAtriestocarrywithiteveryother,butparticularly
thenearestpartB,thedirectionofBwillbecomposedofthatofAandofsomeothers.
ItisnotpossiblethatB,indefinitelyneartoA,beexposedtothewholeuniversein
preciselythesamefashionasA,insuchawaythatABwouldcomposeawholewithout
anysubdivision.(VE1478=LHIV,3,5B,1)
Leibnizarguesherethatinorderforthephysicalstateofbodiestoexpressadequatelytheir
relationstoeachother,thematteratanytwopoints,AandB,howeverclose,mustbetendingin
differentdirections,atanygiventime.Presumablyhewouldextendtheargumenttoanythree
pointssupposedtolieinastraightline,assuggestedbytheintroductionofhisexample,andargue
thatthematteratthemmustbetendinginthreedifferentdirections,andsimilarlyforanynpoints
andndirections.
InhisnextparagraphLeibnizexplainswhyhethinksitfollowsfromthisthatthesupposedstraight
lineisnotphysicallyrealafterall.
Itistruethatitwillalwaysbepossibletodrawanimaginarylineateachinstant;but
thatline,withthesameparts,willnotendurebeyondthatinstant,becauseeachparthas
adifferentmotionfromeveryotherbecauseitexpressesthewholeuniversedifferently.
Thusthereisnobodythathasanyshapeduringacertaintime,howevershortitmaybe.
NowIbelievethatwhatisonlyinamomenthasnoexistence,sinceitbeginsandends
atthesametime.(VE1478=LHIV,3,5B,1)
Leibnizarguesthatifallthematteratallthepointsthatmightbethoughttolieinaphysicallyreal
shapeismovingindifferentdirectionsateverytime,ashearguedinthepreviousparagraph,it
followsthatnosuchshapeenduresbeyondaninstant.Togettheconclusionthatnophysicallyreal
shapeexists,headdsanotherkeypremise,that"whatisonlyinamomenthasnoexistence."This
lastisalargeanddubiousassumption,however.IthinkLeibnizhimselfmustprobablyascribeto
monadsperceptualstatesthatdonotendure,unchanged,
231
beyondaninstant.Iamthereforereluctanttoregardthisargumentastheprincipalsupportof
Leibniz'sthesisofthephenomenalityofshape,thoughitmaybehismostfullydevelopedargument
onthesubject.
1.3.2Continuity
Leibniz'slistofmerelyphenomenalphysicalqualitiesgoesbeyondeventheCartesianmodesof
extension.Itextendstoextensionitself,27andthedynamicpropertiesofbodies:
Withmanyancientsages,however,Ijudgethatextensionand,init,Mass[Moles28]or
impenetrabilitywiththeothercorporealpredicatesarisingthence,whichseemtomany
toconstitutecorporealsubstance,andbyothersareheldtobeabsoluterealqualities,
areinfactnothingbutphenomenawellfounded,tobesure,andnotdeceptive,but
havingnootherobjectiverealitythanthatbywhichwedistinguishdreamingfrom
waking,amutualmetaphysicomathematicalagreementofeverythingthatthesoulsor
Entelechiesperceive.[GVII,468(1705)]
Thephysicalqualitiesthataremostreal,inLeibniz'sview,areforces;butevenforces,asfoundin
bodies,arephenomenal(GII,276/AG182).Thequestionoftherelationofphysicalforcesto
appearanceandtoultimatelyrealqualitiesofsubstanceswillbeamajortopicofChapter13.
AnotherimportantqualitytowhichLeibnizascribesdiminishedrealityiscontinuity.29Continuity
isoffundamentalimportancetoextension.Extensionwastraditionallyconceivedasaspeciesof
continuousquantity,andLeibnizfrequentlydefinesextensionas"thesimultaneouscontinuous
repetitionofposition"and"aplurality,continuity,andcoexistenceoftheparts."30Repetition,says
Leibniz,iseitherdiscreteorcontinuous.Incontinuousrepetition"thepartsareindeterminateand
canbeassumedininfiniteways"(GIV,394/AG251).Thereareothernecessaryconditionsof
continuity,ofcourse,butindeterminacyofthepartsisthefeatureofcontinuitythatdiminishesits
realityinLeibniz'seyes.Realthingsarediscrete,andanythingcomposedofrealthingsistherefore
notcontinuous,buthasfixedanddeterminatedivisions.Itis"ideal"wholes,asLeibnizputsit,that
aredivisibleinindefinitelyvariouswaysintomerelypossibleparts.
Inmatterandinactualrealitiesthewholeisaresultoftheparts;butinideasorin
possibles...theindeterminatewholeispriortothedivisions....The
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27
Leibnizthinksextensioncanbeprovedto"enterintotheessenceornatureofbody"thoughitdoes
notconstitutethewholeessenceofbody(RML437/L619).1willofferalotofevidencethat
Leibnizregards,andmustregard,extensionasnomorethanaphenomenon.Iamnotsurewhatto
makeofhiswritingtoRmondin1715thatextension"isanattributeofsubstances"(RML480).
28
MolesistheLatintermusuallytranslatedas'mass'indynamiccontexts.InsomecontextsIfollow
AGintranslatingitas'bulk',todistinguishitfromtheLatinmassa,whichhasadifferent
(nonquantitative)meaningforLeibniz.
29
ForhelpfulaccountsofLeibniz'sphilosophicaltreatmentofcontinuityingeneral,seeBreger,"Das
KontinuumbeiLeibniz,"andLamarra,"LeibnizonLockeonInfinity."
30
GII,339;GIV,467/W104;seealsoC361;B124;GIV,394,364f.;GII,169f.,183/P52;AG251;
L390,516,519textsdatingfrom16861707.
232
bettertoconceivetheactualdivisionofmattertoinfinity,andtheexclusionthatthereis
ofallexactandindeterminatecontinuity,wemustconsiderthatGodhasalready
producedthereasmuchorderandvarietyasitwaspossibletointroducethereuntil
now,andthusnothinghasremainedindeterminatethere,whereastheindeterminateis
oftheessenceofcontinuity.(GVII,562f.)31
Continuity,therefore,is"anidealthing"(GMIV,93/L544),notafeatureoftheultimatelyreal.It
mightstillbethoughtafeatureofbodies,ifbodiesareonlyphenomena;andLeibnizcanbequoted
onbothsidesofthequestionwhetherbodiesarecontinuousoronlyappeartobecontinuous.An
importanttextof1702classifiesbodyascontinuous(GIV,394/AG251).Theotheranswerisgiven
intextsof1705,atleastasregards"matter":"Infactmatterisnotacontinuum,butissomething
discrete,actuallydividedtoinfinity"(GII,278)."Matterappearstous[tobe]acontinuum,butit
onlyappearsso"(GVII,564).32ThisissueisdeeplyinvolvedwithissuesaboutLeibniz's
conceptionofbodiesasaggregatesofsubstances,soIwillhavetoreturntoitinsection3.Forthe
timebeing,Iwilljustsaythatasinsection1.3.1Ipreferredtheviewthat(determinate,finitely
complex)shapeonlyappearstobelongtobodies,sohereIthinkLeibnizprobablyoughttohold
thatbodiesonlyappeartobecontinuous.33
Thisview,inbothcases,isassociatedwithanaccountintermsofaninfiniteseriesofbetterand
betterapproximations,anaccountthatissomewhatmoreexplicitlydevelopedforcontinuitythan
forshape.Animportanttextrejectingcontinuity"ineveryaggregatethatissensibleorcorresponds
tophenomena"goeson,"Meanwhiletheknowledgeofcontinua,thatisofpossibles,contains
eternaltruths,whichareneverviolatedbyactualphenomena,sincethedifferenceisalwaysless
thananyassignablegivendifference"(GII,282f./L539).34Thepointpresumablyisthatwhilein
actualphenomena(bodies)thedivisionintopartsisgivenanddeterminate,thereissomesuch
actual,givendivision(orseriesofdivisions)ascloseasyoupleasetoanyarbitrarylinethatmight
bedrawn
____________________
31
Forsimilarstatements,seeGIV,491f./AG146f.;GII,379;GIII,622f.Inthelastofthesepassages,
Leibnizbothdeniesthat"thecontinuumissomethingreal"andstatesthat"continuityisnotan
idealthing,butwhat'srealinitiswhatisfoundinthatorderofcontinuity."Thepointofthelatter
statementseemstobethatifanaggregateofrealthingsisviewedasarrayedinacontinuousorder
suchasthoseofspaceandtime,thecontinuousorderinheritsameasureoftheirreality(thoughit
surelyisnotthereforerealinthemostfundamentalsense).ButLeibniz'sconsistencyheremaybe
doubted.
32
Itisinteresting,andperhapsrevealing,thatthediminishedrealityofbothshapeandcontinuityare
discussedtogetherinGVII,56264.Ironically,however,thistext,whichclearlystatesthatmatter
"onlyappears"tobeacontinuum,seemstogivetheoppositeanswertotheanalogousquestion
aboutshape,allowingthatdeterminateshapes"arefoundinphenomenaorintheobjectsoflimited
minds,"whichpresumablyincludebodies.
33
Thisisacorrectionofmy1983paper,"PhenomenalismandCorporealSubstanceinLeibniz,"p.
242,whereIoverlookedalotofthematerialdiscussedhereandtriedtomaintainthecontinuityof
Leibnizianbodies,evenwheretheyareunderstoodasaggregatesofsubstances.Insodoing,I
alloweddensitytocountasasortofcontinuity,somethingthatLeibnizhimselfmaysometimes
havedone(asIwillsuggestbelow).IamindebtedtothecriticismsofHartz,"Leibniz's
Phenomenalisms,"forforcingmetorethinkthetopic.
34
Theimportanceofthispointisemphasizedbythenextsentence,whichmentionsagreementwith
eternaltruthsasamarkoftherealityofphenomena.Agreementwithmathematicaltruthfigures
similarlyasamarkofreality,inconnectionwithsimilarviewsaboutcontinuity,atGIV,569.
233
throughthebody,becausethebodyisactuallydividedtoinfinity.Thisimplies,inmodern
terminology,thattheactualdivisionsineverybody,thoughnotcontinuous,aredense.
WemaywonderwhetherLeibnizoccasionallyreferredtothedenseas"continuous."ToDes
Bosses,in1707,hewrites:
WhenIsaythatExtensionisthecontinuationoftheresistant,youaskwhetherthat
continuationisonlyamode.WhatIthinkisthatitisrelatedtothethingscontinuedor
repeatedasnumberistothethingsnumbered:thatis,asimplesubstance,eventhough
itdoesnothaveextensioninitself,stillhasposition,whichisthefoundationof
extension,sinceextensionisthesimultaneouscontinuousrepetitionofposition.(G
II,339)
Number,conceivedasrelatedtothingsnumbered,issurelydiscrete.Leibnizusesthecomposition
ofnumber"fromunities"asanexampleofdiscretestructure,ascontrastedwiththecompositionof
number"fromfractions,"whichiscontinuous(GII,282/L539;cf.GVII,562;GIII,622).
Moreover,heisspeakinghereofarepetitionofsimplesubstances,whichmustcertainlybe
discrete.Itappearsthereforethatthe"continuation"thathediscussesheremustbeadiscrete
operationorconstruction;andthatisnotproblematicinitself,sincecontinuation[continuatio]is
notcontinuity.WhatisproblematicinthispassageisthatLeibnizgoesontosaythatanextension
whichmust,inthecontext,beformedbythisdiscreteoperationonthepositionsofsimple
substances,is"continuous."Itishardtoseehow'continuous'canmeanmoreherethanthatthe
repetitionofthepositionsofsimplesubstancesisdense,asLeibnizsurelybelievedittobe.
Definingextensionintermsofsuchaweakenedsenseofcontinuity(thatis,intermsofdensity)
wouldavoidtheimplicationthattheextendedmusthaveindefiniteparts.Andthatwouldeliminate
oneobjectiontotherealityoftheextended.35Thisconsiderationmayhavemotivatedanumberof
formulationsinwhichLeibnizsaysthatwhatisextendediscontinued,orcontinuallyrepeated,but
doesnotsaythatitiscontinuous.36Butsuchtreatmentofthedefinitionofextensiondoesnotleave
Leibnizinapositiontoholdthatextensionismorethanaphenomenon.Forextension,asdefined
here,consistsinarelationamongthesubstancesrepeated,andLeibnizheldthatrelationsdepend
onperceiverswhoapprehendthem,asweshallseeinsection3.2.WritingtoDeVolderin1704or
1705,accordingly,Leibnizexplicitlyconnectstherelationalcharacterofextensionwithitsbeing
somethingintrinsicallyideal[resperseidealis].Thenextparagraphofthesameletter,itmaybe
added,suggestsanothergroundofthephenomenalityofextension:therepetitionordiffusion
involvedinextensionrequiresahomogeneityofthatwhichisrepeatedordiffused;37this
homogeneityisonlyapparentand"obtainsonlybyanabstractionofthemind"(GII,277/AG183).
____________________
35
Insomecontexts,Leibnizmay,ofcourse,havewishedtousethisobjectionasanargumentforthe
phenomenalityordiminishedrealityofextension.SuchanargumentisdevelopedbyMcRae,
Leibniz:Perception,Apperception,andThought,p.40f.
36
GIV,589(1702);GII,269/L536(1704);RML443/L621(1712).
37
Onthisrequirement,cf.C542f.
234
2.EsseIsPercipi
ThesimplestandstarkestversionofphenomenalismtobefoundinLeibniz'swritingsbelongsnot
tohismaturephilosophy,buttotheyears167579.Manyofitsideaspersistinhisthought.His
laterphenomenalismgrowsoutofitmuchmorebyadditionthanbysubtraction,anditprovidesan
illuminatingbackgroundtothecomplexitiesofhislaterthought.
ThisearlyphenomenalismisconnectedwithanotableanticipationofBerkeley'sfamousdoctrine
that(forsensiblethings)"esseispercipi"tobeistobeperceived.38Thereisalongseriesoftexts,
runningfromLeibniz'syouthtohisoldage,inwhichheidentifiesexistencewithbeingperceived
or(insometexts)perceivable,andoftenconnectsthiswiththeideathatwhatexistsiswhatisbest
ormostharmonious.In1672,forexample,earlyinLeibniz'sstayinParis,hewrites:
IseemtomyselftohavediscoveredthattoExistisnothingotherthantobeSensed
[Sentiri]tobesensedhowever,ifnotbyus,thenatleastbytheAuthorofthings,tobe
sensedbywhomisnothingotherthantopleasehim,ortobeHarmonious.(AVI,iii,56)
Inmostofthesetexts,concernedwithdefiningexistence,thereisnoclearphenomenalistintent,
despitethestrikingresemblancetoBerkeley.Insomethereisreasontodoubtthepresenceofany
sortofreductiveintent.Forinstance,VE171(=LHIV,7C,71f.),whichbelongs,Ithink,toafamily
oftextsfromtheearly1680s,hastheinterestingfeaturethatthesamedocumentcontainsa
definitionofexistenceintermsofperfection.Thatbothtypesofdefinitioncouldbeappropriateat
onceisexplicitinVE1086(=LHIV,8,6061),probablyfromthelastyearorsoofLeibniz'slife
andcertainlyafter1706,whereLeibnizsays,"IoncedefinedanEntity(Ens)aswhateveris
distinctlythinkable,Existentaswhatisdistinctlysensibleorperceivable.Explainingthemattera
priori,anEntityiswhateverispossible,butthereactuallyexistswhateverisinthebestseriesof
possiblethings."Explainingthematterapriorihereclearlymeansexplainingitfromitscausesor
reasons(cf.theappendixtoChapter3ofthisvolume);anda"real"definitionofexistencedoes
that.Butanothersortof"definition"followstheorderofknowledgeratherthanofcausality,
identifyingexistenceintermsofacriterion(perceivability)bywhichitisrecognized.VE404f.(=
LHIV,7C,73f.),ofuncertaindate,admitsbothtypesofdefinitioninsimilarterms.39
Therearetwoimportantmanuscriptsfromthemidtolate1670s,however,inwhichthe
identificationofexistencewithbeingperceivable,andharmoniouslyso,isclearlyintheserviceof
aphenomenalistargument.Therelationbetweenperceivabilityandexistenceliesattheheartofthe
argumentinafragmententitledbyLeibniz"BodyisnotaSubstancebutonlyamodeofaBeingor
____________________
38
Berkeley,Works,vol.2,p.42(ATreatiseconcerningthePrinciplesofHumanKnowledge,partI,
3).
39
ThereareatleastfourotherpassagesinVEinwhichLeibnizoffersadefinitionofexistencein
termsofperceptionorperceivability.ThewatermarkofVE1339(=B123f.)isattestedfortheearly
1690s.ThereissomereasontodateVE146(=LHIV,7C,47)inthelate1670s.VE476f.(partof
which=GVII,319/L363)andVE180(=LHIV,7C,101)havewatermarksattestedforthe
mid1680s.SeealsoseeC437,of17024.InChapter6,section2Ihavediscussedsomepassages
ofthissortinrelationtoissuesaboutexistence.
235
acoherentappearance,"althoughthethoughtofofferingadefinitionoraccountofthenatureof
existence(and,inthiscase,truth)doesnotemergeuntiltheendofthetext,andtheninconnection
withharmonyandpleasingGodratherthanwithperceivability.
Iunderstand,however,bybody,notwhattheScholasticscomposeofmatteranda
certainintelligibleform,butwhattheDemocriteans[i.e.,atomists],inanothercontext,
callmass[moles].ThisIsayisnotasubstance.ForIshalldemonstratethatifwe
considermassasasubstancewefallinto[views]implyingacontradiction,justbecause
ofthelabyrinthofthecontinuum,wherewemustconsiderespecially,first,thatthere
cannotbeAtoms,fortheyconflictwiththedivinewisdom.Next,thatbodiesare
actuallydividedintoinfiniteparts,yetnotintopoints,andthereforethatthereisnoway
inwhichasinglebodycanbemarkedout,butthatanyportionwhateverofmatterisa
beingbyaccident,andeveninperpetualflux.Butifwesayonlythis,thatbodiesare
coherentappearances,thatputsanendtoallinquiryaboutinfinitelysmallthings,which
cannotbeperceived.ButherethereisaplacealsoforthatHerculeanargumentofmine,
thatallthosethingsaboutwhichitcannotbeperceivedbyanyonewhethertheyareor
not,arenothing.Nowthatisthenatureofbodies,forifGodhimselfwilledtocreate
corporealsubstancessuchaspeopleimagine[fingunt],hewoulddonothing,andeven
hewouldnotbeabletoperceivethathehaddoneanything,sincenothingisperceived,
intheend,butappearances.Thesignoftruth,therefore,iscoherence,butitscauseis
thewillofGod,anditsformaldefinition[formalisratio]isthatGodperceivesthat
somethingisbestormostharmonious,orthatsomethingpleasesGod.Thereforethe
divinewillitself,sotospeak,istheexistenceofthings.(VE1872=LHIV,1,14B,1)
Severalpointsinthisremarkabletextdeservecommenthere.
1.
TheAcademyeditorsdateitnoearlierthan1677,afterLeibnizfirstsettledinHannover.Butthe
textcontainsnotraceoftheinterestinfindingsomethingsubstantialinbodies,andinaffirmingthe
existenceofsomesortofcorporealsubstance,soevidentinLeibniz'scorrespondencewithArnauld
andothertextsfrom1686andlater.Theonlyreferencestotheideaofcorporealsubstancehereare
hostile.Andwhilethe"Scholastic"conceptionofcorporealsubstanceascomposedofmatterand
substantialformisexplicitlyexcludedfromthescopeofthiscriticaldiscussion,thereisnopositive
indicationherethatLeibnizhasdecidedtorehabilitatethenotionofsubstantialformadecisionhe
apparentlymadeinsummer1679.40Thissuggeststhatthetextbeforeusshouldbedatednolater
thanthefirsthalfof1679.
2.
Thisdatingisconfirmedbythetreatmentofthefirstofthetwoargumentsforphenomenalism
offeredinthetext,whichisanearlyversionofLeibniz'sargument(discussedmorefullyinChapter
11,section2.2)againstthesubstantialityofextendedthingsassuch,fromtheirinfinitedivision
intoparts.WhilethepresenceofthisargumentlinksthistextwithLeibniz'smaturephilosophy,its
employmenthereisnotablydifferentfromitslateruse.Hereitissimplyan
____________________
40
ThispinpointingofthemomentousdecisionisduetoRobinet(Architectoniquedisjonctive,pp.
24551).HisargumentispersuasiveandstronglysupportedbyacomparisonofAII,i,469f.and
490.GiventhedateofdeathofDukeJohannFriedrich,itsaddressee,thelattertextshowsthat
Leibniz'sdecisioncanhardlyhavebeenmadelaterthan1679.
236
argumentforphenomenalism,andthehypothesis"thatbodiesarecoherentappearances"is
presentedasacompletelysatisfyingsolutiontotheproblemposedbytheinfinitedivisionof
extendedthings.Inlatertextsthisinfinitedivisionisindeedpresentedasareasonwhyextended
thingsassucharemerelyphenomena(becausemerelyaggregates).Indeed,asweshallsee,this
argumentisamorecrucialsupportofphenomenalisminLeibniz'slaterthoughtthanitishere.But
phenomenalismisrarelythewholepointoftheargumentinthelatertexts.Morestressisusually
laidontheconclusionthatifthereistobeanythingsubstantialinbodies(asthereshouldbe,in
Leibniz'slaterview),theremustbeinbodiessomethingindivisible,asubstantialform,orsoul,or
monad(andindeedmanysuch).Thiscontrastingstrategyofargumentisevidentinapassagefrom
oneoftheearliesttextsreflectingLeibniz'sdecisiontotrytorehabilitatesubstantialforms:
Herewemusttreatofthesoul,andshowthatallthingsareanimated.Iftherewereno
soulorform,abodywouldnotbeanybeing,sincenopartofitcanbemarkedout
whichwillnotconsistinturnofmany,andsonothingcouldbemarkedoutinabody
whichcouldbecalledthissomethingorsomeonething.(VE651=LHXXXVII,3,910)
41
3.
Theotherphenomenalistargumentinourtextdeservesseveralparagraphs.ItistheoneLeibniz
callshis"Herculeanargument,"basedontheprinciplethat"allthosethingsaboutwhichitcannot
beperceivedbyanyonewhethertheyareornot,arenothing."Thisofcourseexpressesonehalfof
theequivalenceofexistencewithperceivability,thethesisthatexistenceentailsperceivability,
thoughwearenottoldherewhetheritrestsonadefinitionofexistence.Claimsofthissortin
Leibnizhaveevokedthecommentthat"Leibnizcomesclosetoemployingwhatisnowcalledthe
Verifiabilitycriterionofmeaning."42Thecommentiscorrect,aslongasthe"closeness"isnot
exaggerated,butweshouldbeclearthatLeibnizneveroffersacriterionofmeaningintheseterms.
Inthepresentcase,thethesisisnotaboutmeaningbutaboutexistenceandabouttherealityof
differences.
AsLeibnizbeginsthisargument,wemayexpectittobebasedalsoontheclaimthat"infinitely
smallthings...cannotbeperceived,"43butthatclaimdriftsoutofsightastheargumentproceeds.
ThereasonemphasizedforthinkingthatevenGodcouldnotperceiveanydifferencebetweenthere
beingandtherenotbeinganybodiesmoresubstantialthanmereappearancesisthat"nothingis
perceived,intheend,butappearances."Thismustbeunderstood,Ithink,asaclaimthattheobject
ofperception,assuch,ismerelyanappearance,whoseexistenceisnotdistinctfromitsbeing
perceived.NotonlythisclaimbutalsoitsapplicationtoGod'sperceptionsisechoed
(independently,ofcourse)byBerkeley,
____________________
41
CitedbyRobinet,Architectoniquedisjonctive,p.246.Thewatermarkofthistextisattestedfrom
theperiodJuly1678June1682.
42
Mates,PhilosophyofLeibnizp.234.MatesiscommentingonLCV,29.
43
Leibnizhereclearlyrejectsinfinitelysmallthings,asBerkeleywouldlater.Itisequallyclearhere,
however,thatheisnotpostulatingfinitelysmallindivisibleobjectsofperception,asBerkeley
would,butalreadyaffirmstheinfinitedivisionoftheextended,ashedideventuallyinhissharpest
disagreementwithBerkeley,asnotedinsection1.2inthischapter.
237
who,inthesecondofhisThreeDialoguesbetweenHylasandPhilonous,arguesthathisidealismis
superiortooccasionalismbypointingoutthat
it[is]not...easytoconceivehowtheexternalorabsoluteexistenceofanunthinking
substance,distinctfromitsbeingperceived,canbeinferredfrommyallowingthat
therearecertainthingsperceivedbythemindofGod,whicharetoHimtheoccasionof
producingideasinUS.44
This"Herculeanargument"doesnot,tomyknowledge,recurasanargumentforphenomenalismin
Leibniz'smaturephilosophy.Hecontinuedinothercontextstogivefavorableattentionto
definitionsofexistenceintermsofperceivability(e.g.,C437),andtogiveargumentsthatseemto
restontheassumptionthatadifferencenotinprincipleperceivableisnorealdifference(GIV,514/
L505f.;LCV,29).Buthenolongerfollowsadirectroutefromthatassumptiontothe
phenomenalityofbodies;themostprominentthoughtaboutthenatureofexistenceinhislater
metaphysicsofbodyisthatsubstantialexistenceentailspowertoact(and,infinite,imperfect
substances,tobeactedon).45
Thethemeofharmonyisnotabsentfromthistextof167779.Itemergesexplicitlyattheend,but
ispresentmorecentrallyintheidentificationofbodies,notmerelywithappearances,butwith
"coherentappearances."Theemphasisofthetext,nonetheless,fallsontherelationofexistenceto
perceivability,ratherthantoharmony.Bywayofcontrast,therelationofexistencetoharmony,
hereconceivedas"congruence,"regularity,and"beauty,"dominatesatextwritteninParisin1676:
Rightlyconsidered,allthatiscertainisthatwesense,andsensecongruently,andthat
someruleisobservedbyusinsensing.Tobesensedcongruentlyistobesensedin
suchawaythatareasoncanbegivenforeverything,andeverythingcanbepredicted.
Andexistenceconsistsinthis,insensationkeepingcertainlaws,forotherwise
everythingwouldbelikedreams.Furtherthatmanysensethesamething,andsense
thingsthatagree....Moreoversleepneednotdifferfromwakingbyanyintrinsic
reality,butonlybytheformororderofsensations;whereforethereisnoreasontoask
whetherthereareanybodiesoutsideus....Henceitisclearthatsofarfrommaterial
thingsbeingmorerealthanothers,onthecontrarytherecanalwaysbedoubtoftheir
existenceorrathertheirexistencedoesnotdifferatallmaterially,orinitself,fromthe
existenceofdreams,eveniftheydiffer,ofcourse,inbeauty.(AVI,iii,511)46
Thispassagepresentsatheoryofthenatureofthedistinctionbetweenrealandunrealphenomena.
Phenomenathatreallyexistcanbesensed.Leibnizfrequentlycontrastedtheexistent,assomething
thatcanbesensedorperceived,withessenceorentity[ens]assomethingthatcanbethoughtor
conceived.47Buttheemphasis
____________________
44
Berkeley,Works,vol.2,p.220.
45
E.g.,GIV,508/L502.ThisthoughtisnotabsentfromLeibnizearlythoughtaboutbody;see,e.g.,A
VI,i,509/L116.
46
Castaeda,"Leibniz'sMeditationonApril15,1676,"isanextendeddiscussionofthepassagefrom
whichthisquotationistaken.
47
AVI,i,285;AVI,ii,487;B123f.;C437;VE146,171,404,180,1086(=LHIV,7C,pp.47,7174,101;
LHIV,8,6061).
238
fallshereonafurtherthesis.Notonlycanreallyexistentphenomenabesensed;theycanbesensed
harmoniouslyor"congruently,"andthatdistinguishesthemfromdreams.Thesepointswillremain
apartofLeibniz'smatureaccountofthedifferencebetweenrealandimaginaryphenomena,aswe
shallseeinsection4.Themostinterestingthing,metaphysically,abouttheearlyformofthis
theoryisthatitsstronglyreductivecharacterconstitutesitaclearlyphenomenalisttheory,even
thoughtheonlythingthatreceivesareductiveanalysishereisthedifferencebetweenthereally
existentandthenonexistent(ornotreallyexistent)amongostensiblebodies.Itisstrikinghow
completeaphenomenalismcanbeconstitutedbyatheoryofthenatureofthisdifference,anditis
characteristicofLeibniz'sphenomenalismthatthisiswherethereductiveanalysisisdone,asI
arguedinsection1.1.
LegitimatequestionscanberaisedabouttheextenttowhichLeibnizwascommittedto
phenomenalisminthemid1670s.Thereseemtohavebeenother,lessidealisticstrandsinhis
thoughtduringtheperiod.Sometextsof1675and1676,growingoutofLeibniz'srelationswiththe
skepticalphilosopherSimonFoucher,suggestaviewofmaterialthingsasexternalcausesof
perception,"somethingotherthanthatwhichthinks"(AII,i,246f./L152;cf.AVI,iii,318f.).Itis
clearinthesetextsthatLeibnizisquiteconsciousofthepossibilityofskepticismaboutthe
extramentalexistenceofbodies,butphenomenalismisnotproposedhereastheonlyresolutionof
theproblem.CatherineWilsonseesinthesetendenciesoftheParisperiodthegroundworkofa
permanentambiguityinLeibniz'sthought"onthequestionoftheindependentexistenceof
'external'things."48ClearlyIrejectthehypothesisofpermanentambiguity,butIdonotpretendto
offeracomprehensiveaccountofLeibniz'sphilosophyofbodyatanystageofhiscareerbeforethe
mid1680s.Formypresentpurpose,whatismostsignificantaboutLeibniz'sthoughtinthe1670sis
that,whetherornothewascommittedtothem,hehadcertainlyarticulatedtheoriesofadeveloped
phenomenalistcharacter.
ThemostfundamentaldifferencesofLeibniz'smaturephenomenalismfromthephenomenalism
workedoutinhiswritingsof167679arisewithhisdecisiontotrytorehabilitatetheScholastic
notionofsubstantialform.Substantialformsaretobeprinciplesofunity,andLeibnizconceivedof
themonthemodelofsouls(aswillbediscussedinChapter11,section1).Twoimplicationsof
theirrehabilitationmaybestressedhere.
1.WiththeacceptanceofsubstantialformsLeibniz"goesontoinfinitemonads,"ashelater
thoughtBerkeleyoughttohavedone.Theonlysoulsorperceivingbeingswhoseexistenceis
entailedinthephenomenalistwritingsof167679areminds.49Butwhileallsubstantialformsare
tocarrypowersofperception,mostofthemarenottocountasminds,orevenassouls,strictly
speaking,becausetheirpowersofperceptionaretooimperfect.Mostsubstantialformsaretohave
onlypowersofunconsciousperception.Thusthereistobeaddedtothemindsamultitudeof
inferiorprinciplesofunityandperceptionaninfinite
____________________
48
C.Wilson,Leibniz'sMetaphysics,p.67).
49
Foratextof1678(thoughoneinwhichphenomenalistissuesareavoided)inwhich"minds"are
clearlytheonlysuchbeingsthatareallowed,seeAII,i,400/L189.
239
multitude,forsubstantialformsaretobefound"in"everyportionofmatter,nomatterhowsmall,
accordingtoLeibniz'smaturephilosophy.Thismultiplicationofperceivingbeingsisoften
emphasizedinLeibniz'sdiscussionsofsubstantialforms,asinthefollowingearlyendorsementof
theirrehabilitation:
ThereforeIjudgethatineverybodythereissomesensationandappetite,orsoul,and
accordinglyitisasridiculoustoattributeasubstantialformandperception,orasoul,to
manalone,astobelievethateverythingwasmadeforthesakeofmanaloneandthat
theearthisthecenteroftheuniverse.(VE642=LHXXXVII,3,16)
Leibnizseemsnevertohaveforgottenthatthisvastexpansionofhisontologybroughtwithitan
increasedvulnerabilitytoskepticaldoubts.Forthisreason,hisearlier,moreaustere
phenomenalismissometimesvisiblebehindthecomplextheoryofhislateryears,asarejectedbut
respectedalternative,orevenasafallbackpositionkeptinreserve.Thisisparticularlytrueof
someofLeibniz'swritingsofthemid1680s(e.g.,GVII,31922/L36365,whichwillbediscussed
insection4).RobertSleigh,Jr.,notesthatatheorylikethatwhichIhaveidentifiedasLeibniz's
earlierphenomenalism"isinthebackground,thoughnotoutrightassertedatDM14and34,"
andclaimsthat"acarefulreadingof[theoriginalautograph]version[oftheDiscourse]indicates
thatnothesisassertedthereinentailsthatthereare"substancesotherthanminds.50Sleighalso
pointsoutthatLeibniz'slettersanddraftsofletterstoArnauldcontainanumberofindicationsthat
thequestionwhethertherearetruesubstantialunitiesinnatureotherthan(human)mindswas
regardedbyLeibnizasapivotalquestioninthephilosophyofbody,whichheansweredinthe
affirmative,butonlywithmanyexpressionsofcaution.51
2.Withtheadditionofaninfinitemultitudeofinferiorsubstantialunities"in"everyportionofthe
corporealuniverse,therelationofphenomenatosubstancebecomesmorecomplicated.Inthe
phenomenalismarticulatedbyLeibnizin167679,mostbodies(stonesandtrees,forexample)had
nosubstances"in"them;butinthematureviewthereissomethingsubstantial"in"everyparticleof
matter.Ithinkitisclearthatthedesiretofindsomethingsubstantialinbodiesassuchwasamain
motiveforLeibniz'srehabilitationofsubstantialformsandhisacceptanceofamoreexpansive
ontology.
Intheearlierview,therelationofsubstancetophenomenawassimplyaperceptualoneofsubject
toobject.Thephenomenawerethe(internal)objectsofsubstances'perceptions.Thesubstances
werethesubjectstowhichthephenomenaappeared.ThisrelationremainsinLeibniz'smature
phenomenalism,butisjoinedtherebyotherrelations.Sinceallbodieshavesubstances"in"them,
theycanberegardedasappearancesofsubstancesaswellasappearancestosubstances.Theycan
evenbetreatedasaggregatesofsubstances.Inordertomaintainaphenomenalistpositioninhis
maturephilosophy,therefore,Leibnizmustarguethataggregatesofsubstancesaremerely
appearances.Weshallseeinsection3thathedoesjustthat.Fromthispointonweshallbe
concernedalmostexclusivelywithLeibniz'smaturephilosophy.
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50
Sleigh,LeibnizandArnauld,p.98;seealsopp.1013.
51
SeeSleigh,LeibnizandArnauld,pp.1036,formuchdocumentation.
240
3.Aggregates
ThematureLeibnizholdsthat"thebodyisanaggregateofsubstances"(LA135).52Thisapplies
notonlytodisorganizedmasses,butalsotoorganicbodies:"thehumanbodyisanaggregate"(G
VII,468n).Wemaybetemptedtothinkthiscontradictsthethesisthatbodiesarephenomena,but
Leibnizdidnotthinktheseviewsinconsistent.Hespeaksofmassesas"onlybeingsbyaggregation,
andthereforephenomena."53Indeed,hefrequentlyassertsthatpreciselyasaggregatesof
substances,bodiesarephenomena.Intryingtounderstandthisdoctrine,itwillbehelpfultoattend
tothreequestions:Ofwhatsortofsubstancesarebodiesaggregates?Whatistheontologicalstatus
ofaggregatesingeneral?Whatistheprincipleofaggregationthatdetermineswhichindividual
substancesaregroupedtogethertoformaparticularcorporealaggregate?Thenextthree
subsectionsaredevotedtothesequestions,andafourthsubsectionwillconsideranobjectiontomy
answertothethirdquestion.
3.1AggregatesofWhat?
Leibniziscommonlyreadasholdingthatbodiesareaggregatesofmonads.Onemightthinkthatan
aggregateofthoseultimatelyrealsubstanceswouldbemorethananappearance.Butitmaybe
questionedhowfaritiscorrecttosaythatLeibnizthoughtofbodiesasaggregatesofmonadsor
simplesubstances.Thereareindeedplacesinhisworkswherehespeaksofacorporealmassas
aggregatedfrom"unities"[GII,379(1709)]or,moreclearly,as"aresultorassemblageofsimple
substancesorindeedofamultitudeofrealunities"[GIV,491/AG146(1695)].Othertexts
containingthisideawerewrittenin1705(GIII,367;GVII,561),1706(GII,282/L539),and1714
(PNG1;GIII,622).Therearealsomanytexts,however,thatsupporttheviewthat"amassisan
aggregateofcorporealsubstances,"whereacorporealsubstance"consistsinasimplesubstanceor
monad...andanorganicbodyunitedtoit"[GVII,501f.,italicsadded(1711)].54Othertexts
expressingthisviewwerewrittenin1699(GIII,260/AG289)oraboutthen(GIV,572f.),in1700
(GII,205f.),in1705orlater(GVI,550),andin1712(GII,459/L607;C13f./MP175).55The
organicbody,whichisoneoftheconstituentsofacorporealsubstanceonthisaccountisa
phenomenonaccordingtoLeibniz(GIII,657).ThismightsuggesttousthatLeibnizthought
corporealmassesarephenomenabecausetheyareaggregatesofcorporealsubstancesthatare
partlycomposedofphenomena.
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52
Inarrivingatthepresentformofthissection(andalsoforsection1.3.2)Iamindebtedto
discussionwithMarianneKooij,andtoGlennHartzpaperon"Leibniz'sPhenomenalisms."Neither
ofthem,ofcourse,isresponsiblefortheviewsIexpress,andIremaininsubstantialdisagreement
withHartz.
53
GII,252/L531,emphasisadded.Itakethesephrasestoapply,inthecontext,tomasses.Literally,
Leibnizsaysthisabout"therest"[reliqua]bycontrastwith"simplethings."Cf.GVII,344/AG319,
and,fromasearlyas168085,VE1299=LHIV,7C,105f.
54
OfthearguablyLeibniziantheoriesofcorporealsubstancetobediscussedinChapter10,thistext
expressesthe"twosubstance"theory.
55
OnthedateofC13f.,seeMP258.Theuseofthetermsubstantiatummayindicatearelation
betweenthedocumentandcorrespondenceof1712withDesBosses.Thedocumentwasdated
about1708byHochstetter,"VonderwahrenWirklichkeitbeiLeibniz,"p.427n.
241
ThisexplanationofLeibniz'sbeliefinthephenomenalityofbodiesisunacceptable,however,forat
leastfourreasons.(1)Ifbodiesarephenomenabecausetheyarecomposedofcorporealsubstances
thatarepartlycomposedofphenomena,thecorporealsubstancesthemselvesshouldalsobe
phenomenabecausetheyarepartlycomposedofphenomena;Leibnizdidnotholdthatcorporeal
substancesarephenomena,however.(2)SofarasIknow,Leibnizneversaysthatcorporeal
aggregatesarephenomenabecausetheyarepartlycomposedofphenomena,butheoftensaysthey
arephenomenabecausetheyareaggregates.(3)Indeed,aviciouslookingcirclewouldariseif
Leibniztriedtoexplainthephenomenalityofcorporealaggregatesonthegroundthattheyare
partlycomposedoforganicbodiesthatarephenomena,forheexplainsthephenomenalityof
organicbodiesonthegroundthattheyare(corporeal)aggregates.(4)Ingeneral,itseemsthat
Leibniz'streatmentofbodiesasaggregatesofcorporealsubstancesisnotmeanttoexcludethe
claimthatatbottomtheyareentirelyreducibletosimplesubstancesormonads,relatedincertain
ways.ThusLeibnizcansaythateachbody"isnothingbutanaggregateofanimalsorotherliving
andthereforeorganicthings,orelseoffragmentsormasses,butwhichalsothemselvesarefinally
analyzedintolivingthings"whereItakethe"livingthings"tobecorporealsubstances.Buthe
immediatelyaddsthat"thelastthingintheanalysisofsubstancesisthattherearesimple
substances,namelysoulsor,ifyoupreferamoregeneralword,Monads,whichlackparts"(C13f./
MP175).ForallofthesereasonsIthinkwemusttrytounderstandwhyLeibnizwouldhave
thoughtthataggregatesassuchcannotbemorethanphenomenaeveniftheyareaggregatesof
simplesubstancesormonads.
ThisconclusionwillsurviveexaminationoftwotextsinwhichLeibnizdeniesthatbodyormatter
is"composedof"monads,andwhichmightseemtobeevidencethatLeibnizwoulddenythat
bodiesareaggregatesofmonads.Bothtextsarerelatedtotheproblemofthecontinuum,butIthink
theymustbeunderstoodinratherdifferentsenses.Iwillbeginwiththelaterofthetwotexts,from
aletterof1712toBartholomewdesBosses,inwhichLeibnizhadjustintroducedforthefirsttime
thetheoryofsubstantialbonds,analternativetohispurelymonadologicalmetaphysics,whichwill
bediscussedinChapter10,sections5.3and5.4.Eveniftherearenosubstantialbonds,Leibniz
states,"monadsshouldnotbesaidtobepartsofbodies,totoucheachother,ortocomposebodies,
anymorethanitisrighttosaythataboutpointsandsouls"(GII,436/AG199).Why,inthis
context,woulditbewrongtosaythat"monadscomposebodies"?Wecannotbecertain,butone
possiblerationaleisrelatedtothequestiondiscussedearlier,insection1.3.2,whetherbodiesare
continuousoronlyappeartobeso.Leibnizheldthataggregatesofrealsubstancesarenot
continuous,becausetheyareactuallydividedintodiscreteuntities,whereasthecontinuousassuch
isonlypotentiallydividedintoindeterminateparts.Hence,ifbodiesreallyarecontinuous,they
cannotbeaggregatesofrealsubstances,andinthatsensetheycannotbe"composedofconstitutive
unities."
ThistrainofthoughtisstronglysuggestedbyapassageinLeibniz'slastlettertoDesBosses,in
1716:"Besides,ifmonadsaloneweresubstances[andtherewerenosubstantialbonds],theneither
bodieswouldhavetobemerephenomenaorthecontinuumwouldhavetoarisefrompoints,which
isknowntobeabsurd.
242
Realcontinuitycannotariseexceptfromasubstantialbond"(GII,517/AG203).Whyisitthat,
underthestatedcondition,"eitherbodieswouldhavetobemerephenomenaorthecontinuum
wouldhavetoarisefrompoints"?Presumablyitisbecause,inordertobemorethanmere
phenomena,intherelevantsense,56bodieswouldhavetobecomposed,asaggregates,ofmonads,
andthenamathematicalcontinuumwouldhavetoarisefromunextended,indivisibleunities.But
thatpresupposesthatbodiesarefully,mathematicallycontinuous.
InthecontextoftheDesBossescorrespondence,thispresuppositioncanbeviewedasalargely
terminologicalaccommodationtotheconcernsofthetheoryofsubstantialbonds.Itappearsfrom
the1716passagequotedthatobtaining"realcontinuity"isoneoftheaimsofthetheory.Thismay
beseenasservingthemainaimofthetheory,whichisobtainingrealunityand,hence,
substantialityforbodies.For,accordingtoLeibniz,acontinuouswholeispriortoitsparts,andits
unityisthusoriginalandnotconstitutedmerelybyrelationsamongtheparts.Itwouldthereforebe
naturalforasubstantialbondtheoristtodefinebodiesascontinuousthingsandinferthatbodiesare
lessrealeventhanaggregatesofsubstances,unlesstherearesubstantialbondstogiveriseto"real
continuity."
Itstrainscredulity,however,tosupposethatduringtheperiodofthedesBossescorrespondence
Leibnizwasreallynotwillingtocountdiscontinuousaggregatesofsubstancesasbodies.Forin
othertextsfromthatperiodheaffirmsthatbodiesareaggregatesofsubstances[C13f./MP175
(1712);PNG1(1714);GIII,622,657(1714,1715);cf.RML447/L623(171215)],andLeibniz
certainlydidnotthinkthataggregatesofsubstancesarecontinuous.Theseconsiderationssupport
theviewthatLeibnizoughttosaythatbodiesonlyappeartobecontinuousandalsotheviewthat
thetheoryofsubstantialbondsisnotpartofhisphilosophy.
Inanyevent,theargumentthatbodiesarecontinuousandthereforemustnotbeaggregatesof
substancescannotmotivateLeibniz'searlierstatement,inaletterof1704toBurcherDeVolder,
that"accuratelyspeaking,matterisnotcomposedofconstitutiveunities,butresultsfromthem"(G
II,268/L536).Ibelievethat"constitutiveunities"refersheretosimplesubstancesormonads.The
statementiscertainlyrelatedtotheproblemofthecontinuuum,whichLeibnizhasjustbeen
discussing.ButLeibnizhasalsojustimplied,unambiguously,thatbodieslackoneofthe
characteristicsthatdefine,forhim,thecontinuous,declaringthat"inrealthings,namelybodies,the
partsarenotindefinite(as[theyare]inspace,amentalthing),butareactuallyassignedinacertain
way"(GII,268/L536).Thecluetothecorrectinterpretationofthepassage,Ithink,isgivenwhen
Leibnizgoesontosay,"Phenomenathereforecanalwaysbedividedintosmallerphenomena
whichcouldappeartomoresubtleanimals,andonewillneverarriveatsmallestphenomena.But
substantialunitiesarenotparts,butfoundations,ofphenomena"(GII,268/L536).Thepartsof
phenomenaaresmallerphenomena;"substantialunities"standinsomeotherrelationto
phenomena.
Arelatedtreatmentofthepart/wholerelationisilluminating.In1690Leibnizwrote,"Furthermore
evenifanaggregateofthesesubstancesconstitutesabody,
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56
Asenseimplyingmoredistancefromreality,obviously,thanthesenseinwhichanaggregateof
substances,asanaggregate,ismerelyaphenomenon.
243
theystilldonotconstituteitinthemannerofapart,sinceapartisalwayshomogeneouswiththe
whole,inthesamewaythatpointsarenotpartsoflines"(VE2156/AG105).Apartofaline,on
thisview,mustbehomogeneouswiththeline,andthereforemustbealinesegment,andnota
point.57Similarly,Isuppose,apartofaphenomenonmustbeaphenomenon,andapartofan
aggregatemustbeasubaggregate.Specifically,apartofabodymustbeabody.Ifabodyisan
aggregateofsubstanceswhicharenotaggregates,thosesubstanceswillnotbepartsofthebody,
andthebodywillnotbecomposedofthemifbeing'composedof'meanshavingasparts.
Butthereissurelyabroadersenseinwhichanaggregateofsubstancesiscomposedofthose
substances,andiftheyarenotpartsofit,theyaresomeothersortofconstituentofit.Leibnizused
'composedof'inboththenarrowerandthebroadersenseintheDeVoldercorrespondence.When
hewrotetoDeVolderthat"matterisnotcomposedofconstitutiveunities,"Iamarguing,hemust
havemeantthattheunitiesarenotpartsofthematter.ButwhenhewrotetoDeVolder,lessthan
eighteenmonthslater,that"actualthingsarecomposed...ofunities"(GII,282/L539),hewas
presumablyusing'composedof'inabroadersenseandwasnotgivingupthethesisthatsubstantial
unitiesarenotpartsofcorporealaggregates.Inneithercase,Ibelieve,washedenyingthatbodies
areaggregatesofsubstances,orindeedofmonads.
Ifnotparts,whatarethesubstancestotheaggregates?Leibnizoccasionallyusestheword
'elements'inthiscontext,sayingthat"itisnecessaryforallaggregatestoresultfromsimple
substancesasfromthetrueelements"(GVII,502),orreferringto"primitiveunities"or"simple
substances"as"thefirstelementsofsubstantialthings"(GIV,491/AG146).58Thepicturethat
emergesisoneinwhichbodiesareaggregatesof(infinitelymany)simplesubstances.These
substancesareelements,butnotparts,oftheaggregates.Thepartsoftheaggregates(orofthe
bodies)aresubaggregates(orsmallerbodies)whichhavesimplesubstancesastheirfirstelements.
59Ibelievethatthis,ratherthananythingbelongingtothetheoryofsubstantialbonds,isthe
dominantschemeforthesetopicsinLeibniz'sphilosophy.
3.2TheOntologicalStatusofAggregates
Theapparentconflictbetweenthethesisthatbodiesarephenomenaandthethesisthattheyare
aggregatesofsubstancesspringsfromtheassumptionthatanaggregateofFsmusthavethesame
ontologicalstatusastheFs.Thisisatbestacontroversialassumption.Thereisnothingatallodd
aboutLeibniz'srejectingit.
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57
Thiswasatraditionalview,maintainedinAristotlePhysics,bookVI,ch.1.
58
Itisinterestingthatinthistextof1695(asalsoinGMIII,536of1698),Leibnizseemstodenythat
pointsare"thefirstelementsoflines,"therebyabandoningthecloseparallelismbetweenthe
point/lineandsubstance/bodyrelationsassertedin1690(VE2156/AG105).Thismayinfact
reflectachangeinhisviewofthoserelations;cf.HartzandCover,"SpaceandTimeinthe
LeibnizianMetaphysic,"pp.49397.Othertextsof16981705(GMIII,524;GII,276)inwhich
'element'seemstobeusedintherelevantsense,butnotinreferencetotherelationofmonadsto
corporealaggregates,arequotedinLamarra,"LeibnizonLockeonInfinity,"p.183n.
59
FormorediscussionofthedistinctionsIhaveintroducedhere,andmoreevidencebearingonthem,
seeChapter10,sections3.1and3.2.
244
Aggregatesarepresumablycloseontologicalkintosets,andwearefamiliarwiththefactthatthe
assumptionthatasetofpencilsmusthavethesameontologicalstatusasthepencilsishighly
controversial.Weshouldnotexpectittobeassumedwithoutargumentthatanarmy,oneof
Leibniz'sfavoriteexamplesofanaggregate,60hasthesameontologicalstatusasthesoldiersthat
areitselements.Infact,Leibnizmakesclearrepeatedlythathebelievesthatallaggregates,assuch,
areatmostphenomena,andhencethatanaggregateofsubstancesdoesnothavethesame
ontologicalstatusasthesubstances.
AnotherreasonforfindingthisstrangemightarisefromthefactthatLeibnizthinksrealityinsome
senseaccruestocorporealaggregatesfromthesubstancesofwhichtheyareaggregates(asweshall
seeinsection4).Again,Ithinkthereisnothingreallyoddhere.Anaggregateofsubstancesisfor
Leibnizasortoflogicalormetaphysicalconstructionoutofsubstances,andthusoutofultimately
realthings.Suchaconstructionhasmorerealitythanaconstructionoutofthingsthatarenotreal,
butitisstillnotultimatelyrealinitsownright.The"reality"oftheconstructedaggregateisnotthe
sameontologicalstatusastheultimateororiginalrealityofthesubstancesthatareelementsofthe
aggregate.Leibniz'stheoryofbodiesisreductionist,andinareductionistphilosophy,beinga
logicalormetaphysicalconstructionoutofultimatelyrealthingsisadifferentontologicalstatus
fromthatoftheultimatelyrealthings.
ThereasonLeibnizusuallygivesforthinkingthataggregatesassuchareonlyphenomenaisthat
theylackintrinsic[perse]unity.OnereasonwhytheidealisticcharacterofLeibniz'sphilosophy
maybelessthanobvioustousisthatweexpectidealismtoberootedprimarilyinthephilosophy
ofperception,whereasforthematureLeibnizitismotivatedlargelybyworriesabouttheunityof
bodies.Claimsaboutperceptionplayedamorecentralroleinthephenomenalismarticulatedin
Leibniz'swritingsof167679,discussedinsection2.Butwiththepostulationofsubstantialforms
"in"allbodies,sothatthebodiescanberegardedasaggregatesofsubstances,thethesisofthe
pheneomenalityofbodiesrestsheavilyonanargumentthataggregates,byvirtueoftheirdisunity,
areonlyphenomena.
"Finally,"Leibnizwrites,"bodiesarenothingbutaggregates,constitutingsomethingthatisone
accidentally[peraccidens]orbyanexternaldenomination,andthereforetheyarewellfounded
Phenomena"(GVII,344/AG319).Theunityofanaggregatecomestoitbyan"external
denomination"namely,byrelationtoamindthatperceivesrelationshipsamongthethingsthatare
aggregated.SinceLeibnizadheredtotheScholasticmaximthat'being'and'one'areequivalent
[Ensetunumconvertuntur](GII,304;cf.GII,300),heinferredthataggregatesthathavetheir
unityonlyinthemindalsohavetheirbeinginthe
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60
See,e.g.,LA97.Incountingarmiesasaggregates,Leibnizignoressomedistinctionsfoundin
Scholasticphilosophy.ForFranciscoSurez(MetaphysicalDisputations,IV,iii,14),unityby
aggregationistheweakestsortofaccidentalunity;theunityofanarmy,thoughstillaccidental,is
stronger,becausethereis"someorder"amongtheentitiesmakingupthearmy.Foranevenmore
elaboratearrayofScholasticdistinctions,seetheCoimbracommentaryonAristotlePhysics,
I,9,11,2,quotedinGilson,Indexscolasticocartsien,pp.304f.Leibnizdoes,however,recognize
different"degreesofaccidentalunity,"basedonstrongerandweakerrelationsamongthe
constituentsofanaggregate(LA100).
245
mind.Historically,atleast,thisinferenceisnotbizarre.AlongAristoteliantraditionconnects
beingandunitysocloselythatforFranciscoSurezanentitycanbesaidtohavebeingperseor
peraccidensonthebasisofitshavingunityperseorperaccidens.61
ThisreasoningisclearlyexpressedinLeibniz'slongletterof30April1687toAntoineArnauld.
Tobebrief,Iholdasanaxiomthisidenticalpropositionwhichisdiversifiedonlyby
emphasis,namelythatwhatisnottrulyonebeing[unestre]isnottrulyabeing[un
estre]either.Ithasalwaysbeenbelievedthatoneandbeingaremutuallyconvertible
[reciproques]things....IhavebelievedthereforethatIwouldbepermittedto
distinguishBeingsofaggregationfromsubstances,sincethoseBeingshavetheirunity
onlyinourmind,whichreliesontherelationsormodesofgenuinesubstances.(LA97)
62
Leibniz'sclaimisthataggregateshavetheirunity,andthereforetheirbeing,onlyinthemind,and
thatthisistrueevenofaggregatesofrealthings.
WhydidLeibnizthinkthataggregateshavetheirunityonlyinthemind?Anotherpassageinthe
samelettertoArnauldremindsusthatLeibnizwasaconceptualistaboutabstractobjectsingeneral
andalsoaboutrelations(cf.NE145;GII,438/AG199),believingthattheyhavetheirbeingonlyin
themind(especiallyinthedivinemind).Thesametreatmentistobeaccordedtotheunityofan
aggregateand,hence,totheaggregateitself.
Ourmindnoticesorconceivessomegenuinesubstancesthathavecertainmodes.These
modescontainrelationstoothersubstances.Fromthisthemindtakestheoccasionto
jointhemtogetherinthoughtandtoputonenameintheaccountingforallthesethings
together,whichservesforconvenienceinreasoning.Butonemustnotletoneselfbe
deceivedtherebyintomakingofthemsomanysubstancesortrulyrealBeings.Thatis
onlyforthosewhostopatappearances,orelseforthosewhomakerealitiesofallthe
abstractionsofthemind,andwhoconceiveofnumber,time,place,motion,shape,
sensiblequalitiesassomanyseparatebeings.(LA101;cf.AI,ix,16)
InLeibniz'sontology,theonlythingsthathavebeingintheirownrightareparticular"substances
orcompleteBeings,endowedwithatrueunity,withtheirdifferentsuccessivestates"(ibid.).
Everythingelse,includinguniversals,andalsoincludingaggregates,islogicallyormetaphysically
constructedfromtheindividualsubstances.Thisconstruction,inLeibniz'sview,isamental
operation.Theontologicalstatusofentitieslogicallyormetaphysicallyconstructedfrom
substances,"beingnothingbutphenomena,abstractions,orrelations"(ibid.),isthereforeatleast
partlymental.63Theyexistinthemindandaredependent
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61
Surez,MetaphysicalDisputations,IV,iii,23.
62
Ihavesuppressedsomeunimportantemphasesinthetext,inordertolettheemphaseson"one"
and"being"standoutmoreclearly.Thelastsentenceinthequotationwasnotinthecopyofthe
lettersenttoArnauld,butsimilarmaterialatLA101,whichIwillquotesoon,wassent(seeRL69,
73f.).SimilarideasarefoundinGVI,516(1702);NE146,211(1704);andRML447/L623
(1715).
63
AtNE146thementalorphenomenalcharacterofbeingsbyaggregationisgroundedsimplyinthe
relationalcharacterofaggregation,aspointedoutbyMcRae,Leibniz:Perception,Apperception,
andThought,p.135f.
246
onbeingthoughtof.Doubtsmayremain,nevertheless,abouttheconsistencyoftheviewthat
bodiesareaggregatesandthereforephenomena.Atleasttwoquestionsarisehere.
1.
Ifbodiesasphenomenaaretheobjectsofstoriestoldbyperception,bycommonsense,and
especiallybyscience,asIsuggestedinsection1,cantheyalsobeaggregatesofsubstances?
Certainlytheycanalsobeaggregates,for,accordingtoLeibniz,itispartofthestorytoldby
science,andlessdistinctlyalsobycommonsenseandperception,thateveryextendedthingis
composedofactualparts,andthatisenoughtomakeextendedthingsaggregatesinLeibniz'sbook.
Ontheotherhand,itdoesnotseemtobepartofthestorytoldbyperception,commonsense,or
sciencethatextendedthingsarecomposedofmonads,norperhapseventhattheyarecomposedof
substancesatall.TothisIthinkLeibnizmightsaythatthosestoriesdonotexcludethethesisthat
bodiesareaggregatesofsubstances.Itisatleastvaguelypartofthestoriestoldbycommonsense
andsciencethattheappearancesofbodieshaveormayhavesomefurtherfoundationinreality.
ButnohypothesisofthenatureofthatfoundationispartofthestoriesofLeibnizianscienceand
commonsense;itislefttometaphysicstoconsiderwhatthefoundationmightbe.
2.
Canaggregatesofsubstancespossessthephysicalpropertiesthatbodieshaveinthestorytoldby
science?Themostimportant,andmostreal,ofthoseproperties,forLeibniz,areforces,andhe
doesascribephysicalforcestoaggregatesofsubstances(GII,251/L530).Therelationofforcesto
substancesontheonehandandtophenomenaontheotheristoolargeasubjecttobedealtwith
here,however.ItwillbeamajortopicofChapter13.
3.3ThePrincipleofAggregation
HavingexaminedLeibniz'sreasonsforholdingthatallaggregates,assuch,arenomorethan
phenomena,weshouldnotethathehasanadditionalreasonforassigningthestatusofappearances
tocorporealaggregatesinparticular.TherainbowprovidesLeibnizwithafavoriteexampleofa
phenomenon,towhichhefrequentlylikensbodies(e.g.,GII,262,390).Histreatmentofthe
exampleisnotperfectlyconsistent.Atleastonce(LA58)heseemstocontrasttherainbowwith
aggregates,butmoreoftenitispresentedassomethingthatisaphenomenonbecauseitisan
aggregate:
Therainbowisanaggregateofdropswhichjointlyproducecertaincolorsthatare
apparenttous....Hencetherainbowisofdiminishedrealityundertwoheadings,both
becauseitisaBeingbyaggregationofdrops,andbecausethequalitiesbywhichitis
knownareapparentoratleastofthatkindofrealonesthatarerelativetooursenses.
(VE188=Gr322)
ThefirstofthesereasonsforthediminishedrealityoftherainbowcorrespondstoLeibniz'sgeneral
thesisofthephenomenalityofaggregates;64itisthesecondreasonthatIwanttodevelopnow.
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64
ItmaybesignificantthatLeibnizspeakshereof"diminishedreality"ratherthanphenomenality.
Thenextparagraphofthistextisaramblingdiscussionofthequestion,"howaBeingby
aggregation...isone,"inwhichLeibnizdiscussesmorethanonewayinwhichanarmyhasless
247
Thisreasonhastodowiththeperceptualrelativityofcolors.Colors,Leibnizindicatesinthesame
text,are"apparentqualities"inthesensethatthey"arenotinthingsabsolutely,butinsofarasthey
actonus;thusthesamewaterwillseemcoldortepidorhotaccordingtothedispositionofmy
hands.Yetthisisrealinit,thatitisnaturallyapttoproducethissensationinmewhenIamthus
disposed."Colorsingeneralareapparentqualitiesinthissense,accordingtoLeibniz;buthe
neglectstoemphasizethatthecolorsoftherainbowareevenmorethanordinarilyrelativeto
perception.Anyparticularaggregateofdropsofwaterintheairwillbecoloredasarainbowonly
relativetoperceptionsfromaparticularplace.AsIhavenotedinsection1.3,however,Leibniz
thinksthateventhemorefundamentalqualitiesofsize,shape,andmotion,havesomethingofthe
phenomenalandarerelativetoperception;yettheaggregationofsubstancestoformabodyis
basedforLeibnizonsuchspatialpropertiesoftheirbodies,asIshallargue.Becausethe
aggregationofdropsinarainbow,andofsubstancesinabody,isbasedonpropertiesthatare
relativetoperceptionintheseways,Leibnizinfersthattherainbowandthebodyarephenomena
andhavediminishedreality.
Itismisleading,Ithink,thatLeibnizsaysinpresentingthisargumentthatthequalitiesbywhich
therainbowisknownorrecognized[noscitur]arerelativetooursenses.Whatiscrucialhereisnot
thatweknoworrecognizetherainbowbymerelyapparentqualities.Leibnizmustsaythatin
generalweknoworrecognizeevenmonadsbypropertiesoftheirbodiesthataremerelyapparent,
andthemonadsarenonethelessrealforthat.Thecruxoftheargumentisthattheexistenceofthe
aggregatedependsonpropertiesthatarerelativetoourperceptions.Therelationtoperception
providestheprincipleofgroupingthatdefinestheaggregate.Ifwethinkofarainbowasan
aggregateofdrops,whatisitthatpicksthemoutfromalltheotherdropsofwaterintheskyand
groupsthemasanobjectthatwecallarainbow?Itistheirrelationtothecolorperceptionsthatan
observer(inoneplacebutnotinothers)wouldhave.Itisthusonlyrelativetoappearancesthat
thereismorereasontoaggregatethesedropstogetherthantoformsomeothergroupfromthe
dropsinthesky.Likewise,theaggregationofsubstancesasbelongingtoasinglecorporealmass
dependsonlargelyphenomenalpropertiesthattheirbodiesappeartohave.
Supposethroughacleverlycontrivednetworkofglassfiberstheimagesofathousanddifferent
peoplewalking,talking,andgesturingonathousanddifferentstreetsofahundreddifferentcities
werecombinedtogiveyouanimageofanangrymob.This"mob,"wemightsay,isanaggregate
ofrealhumanbeings,buttherealityoftheindividualpersonsdoesnotkeepthemobassuchfrom
beingamerephenomenon.Thisisbecausetheexistenceofamobdependsonrelationsamongits
membersinawaythattheexistenceofamathematicalsetdoesnot,andIthinktheexistence
conditionsforaLeibnizianaggregatearelikethoseforamobinthisrespect.Ifsetsexistatall,the
existenceofallthemem
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x
unitythanasoldier,butdoesnotexpresstheviewthattheunityofanaggregateismental.The
secondreasonforthediminishedrealityoftherainbow,whichexplicitlyinvolvesrelativityto
perception,maythereforebemoreimportantinthistextthanitwouldbeinLeibniz'slaterwork.
Themanuscript'swatermarksuggestsadateintheperiod168386,whenLeibniz'smature
philosophywasstillinformation.
248
bersofasetsufficesfortheexistenceoftheset.ButthatLeibnizianparadigmofanaggregate,a
pileofwood,ceasestoexistwhenthelogsinitarescattered,eventhoughthelogsarenot
destroyed.Apileormobexistsonlywhileitsmembersaregroupedbyacertainproximity.Inthe
casethatIdescribed,themobisamerephenomenonbecauseitsgroupingismerelyapparentand
existsonlyintheimagepresentedtoyoubytheopticalapparatus.Thiswouldbeanaptexample
forLeibniz,because,onhisview,theaggregationofsubstancestoformbodiesisnolessdependent
onperception,beingbasedonthewaythatthesubstances,ortheirorganicbodies,arespatially
representedinourperceptions.
ThisargumentrestsonapremisewhoseLeibniziancharacterIhaveyettoestablish,thatthe
aggregationofsubstancestoformbodiesisindeedbasedonthewaythatthesubstances,ortheir
bodies,areperceived.Leibnizseemstosayasmuch,writing,inthelastyearofhislife,that"the
aggregatesthemselvesarenothingbutphenomena,sincebesidesthemonadsthatenterintothem,
therestisaddedbyperceptionalone,bytheveryfactthattheyareperceivedtogether"(GII,517/
AG203).65Thepointisworthdiscussing,however,asitinvolvesabasicissueaboutLeibniz's
theoryofcorporealaggregates,whichwemaycallthequestionoftheprincipleofaggregation:
Whatdetermineswhichindividualsubstancesaregroupedtogethertoformaparticularcorporeal
aggregate.
ThatLeibnizneedsaprincipleofaggregationisintuitivelyobvious,Ithink,fromwhathasbeen
saidaboveaboutrainbowsandmobsandpilesofwood.Noteveryrandomlyselectedsetof
substancesconstitutesatanygiventimeanaggregate,letaloneacorporealmassorbody.
Substancesthatconstituteabodymuststandinsomemutualrelationthatdistinguishesthemfroma
setofsubtancesnotsoaggregated,aslogsthatformapilearedistinguishedfromarandom
selectionoftheworld'slogs.Leibnizseemstoassumethisinpresentinghisaccountofcorporeal
aggregatestoArnauld,forhewritesthatrelationsbetweensubstancesgivethemind"theoccasion
tojointhemtogetherinthought"(LA101).Inthisconstructionourmind"reliesontherelationsor
modesofgenuinesubstances"(LA97).ItistruethatLeibnizalsosaysthat"noorderedprinciple
[rienderegl]willeverbefoundformakingagenuinesubstanceofmanybeingsbyaggregation"(
LA101).Butthisisnotarenunciationofprinciplesofaggregation;66inthecontextitisrathera
denialthatanygenuinesubstancecanbeformedbyaggregation.
What,then,aretherelationsamongsubstances,onthebasisofwhichtheyareaggregatedtoforma
body?AlthoughLeibnizdoesnotgivemuchexplanationonthispoint,Ithinkitisfairlyclearthata
bodywillbeanaggregateofallormostofthesubstanceswhosepositionsarewithinsome
continuousthreedimensionalportionofspace.Thisisthenaturalassumption,and,sofarasIknow,
Leibnizneversuggestsanyalternativetoit.Whatportionofspacethebodyoccupies,andwhich
substancesaremembersoftheaggregate,maychange
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65
TheLatinofthelastphraseiseoipsodumsimulpercipiuntur.Simulusuallyhasatemporal
meaning,andRogerAriewandDanielGarber(AG)havetranslatedit,defensibly,as"atthesame
time."Itcanjustmean"together,"however,andIhavetranslateditthatway.Allmonadsare
perceivedatthesametime,afterall;notjustthosebelongingtothesamebody.Iwillarguethatthe
togethernessinvolvedatthispointinLeibniz'stheoryisspatial,orbasedonspatialappearance.
66
AsclaimedbyHartz,"Leibniz'sPhenomenalisms,"p.538.
249
overtime,ofcourse.Spatialtogethernessisanecessaryconditionforanycorporealaggregation,
butitispresumablynotasufficientconditionforeventheaccidentalunitythatLeibnizascribesto
astone.Forsuchunity,additional,quasicausalconditionsonthewayinwhichthemembersofthe
aggregatechangetheirpositionsrelativetoeachotherwillalsobenecessary.67
Iftheaggregationofsubstancesintobodiesdependsonthepositionsofthesubstances,thenext
thingwewillwanttoknowiswhatdeterminesthepositionsofthesubstancesinspace.Itisnot
hardtofindananswertothisquestionifitisaboutcorporealsubstances.Acorporealsubstanceis
composedofamonadandtheorganicbodyofthatmonad(aswemayassumefornow,following
GVII,501).Thespatialpositionofthecorporealsubstancewillsurelybethespatialpositionofits
organicbody.Theorganicbodyisitselfanaggregate,andhenceaphenomenon;andspatial
positionissurelyasmerelyphenomenalapropertyassize,shape,andmotion.Wemayplausibly
concludethatthespatialpositionoftheorganicbody,andhenceofthecorporealsubstance,is
giveninappearance,andistheoneitappearstohave,orperhapstheoneitwouldappeartohavein
asufficientlyperfectedscience.
Insection3.1,however,IarguedthatwewoulddowelltotrytounderstandLeibniz'sconception
ofbodiesasaggregatesontheassumptionthathethoughtthattheelementsoftheaggregatesare
simplesubstancesormonads,ratherthancompositeorcorporealsubstances.Onthisunderstanding
wewillneedtoassociatethesimplesubstancesaswellasthecorporealsubstanceswithspatial
positions.Thiscanbeaccomplished,eventhoughmonadspersedonothaveanylocation(G
II,444,450f./L602,604).Wecanassigntoeachsimplesubstancethespatialpositionofitsorganic
body,for,accordingtoLeibniz,eachsimplesubstancehasanorganicbody.68Spiritual,aswellas
material,changehas"itsplaceintheorderofcoexistencesorinspace,"LeibnizwritestoDe
Volder."Foreventhoughmonadsarenotextended,theystillhavesomekindofpositionin
extensionthatis,someorderedrelationofcoexistencetootherthingsthroughtheMachine,that
is,overwhichtheypreside"(GII,253/L531)."TheMachine"istheorganicbody,asisclearinthe
contextofthisstatement,andLeibnizissayingthatmonads"havesomekindofpositionin
extension"whichtheygetthroughtheirrelationto"their"organicbodies.
Thisconstructionofbodiesasaggregatesofeithercorporealorsimplesubstanceshasthe
metaphysicalpeculiaritythatthegroupingofsubstancesintoaggregatesdependsonthespatial
appearanceofthebodies.ThosewhoseekalessphenomenalisticreadingofLeibnizmightwishto
findaconstructionofcorporealaggregatesthatisindependentofsuchphenomenalpropertiesof
bodies.Oneapproachwouldbetosupposethatmonadsareaggregatedtogetheronthebasisof
similaritiesamongtheirperceptions.Inabroadenoughsenseof'similarity',thisissurelycorrect,
butthequestionis,Whichsimilaritiesarerelevant?Theperceptionsofallmonadsareprecisely
similarinthatallperceiveexactlythesameuniverse,inallitsinfinitedetail.Theydifferonlyinthe
distinctnessorconfusednessofperceptions.Soifmonadsaretobeaggregatedonthebasisof
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67
ForthislastpointIamindebtedtothelateWallaceAnderson.Cf.LA100.
68
Therelationbetweenasimplesubstanceand"its"bodywillbediscussedinChapter10,section4.
250
similarityofperceptions,thebasismustbefoundinthedistinctnessorconfusednessoftheir
perceptions.Inthemosteasilyspecifiablerespect,themonadsmostsimilartoeachotherarethose
whoseperceptionshaveapproximatelythesamedegreeofdistinctness.Thusthemonadsmost
similartomysoulareotherhumansouls.Butnogroupingofhumansoulsisacorporealaggregate
orbody.Moregenerally,everyaggregateconstitutingaLeibnizianbodywillincludesubstances
thatdifferwidelyinthegeneraldistinctnessoftheirperceptions.Forwhateversubstancesit
includes,itwillalsoincludethesubstancescontainedintheirbodies(GMIII,542/AG167f.);and
theperceptionsoftheformerwillbemoredistinctthantheperceptionsofthelatter,inasmuchas
eachmonadperceivestheuniversemoredistinctly,ingeneral,thanthosemonadsthatare
aggregatedtoformitsorganicbody.
Reflectiononthisproblem,Ithink,leadstotheconclusionthatiftheaggregationofsubstancesinto
corporealmassesistobebasedonsimilaritiesamongtheirperceptions,thesemustbesimilarities
amongtheirpatternsofperceivingsomethingsmoredistinctlythanothers.Andthesimilarities
mustberelevanttoassigningspatialpositionstothesubstances,sinceweclearlywillnotcountan
aggregateofsubstancesasabodyifwedonotassignthemappropriatelyrelatedspatialpositions.
Isthere,then,awayofassigningspatialpositionstosubstancesonthebasisoftheirperceptions,
andthusofconstructingcorporealaggregates,withoutpresupposingphenomenalpropertiesof
bodies?
IoncethoughtIhaddiscoveredawayofdoingthat.ItstartswithBertrandRussell'sstatementthat
forLeibniz"placesresultfrompointsofview,andpointsofviewinvolveconfusedperceptionor
materiaprima."69Inthisconstructionallspatialrelationsaretobedefinedintermsofthepoints
ofviewofmonads.Thesepointsofviewwillbethepositionsofthemonads,andwillbe
conceptuallypriortothepositionsofbodies.Thepointsofviewofmonadswillbepositions
determinedbycomparisonofthedegreeofconfusionoftheirperceptionsofeachother,in
accordancewiththeprinciplethatifmonadA'sperceptionofmonadCismoreconfusedthan
monadA'sperceptionofmonadB,thenmonadAisclosertomonadBthantomonadC.
WilliamIrvine70haspersuadedmethatthisconstructionismathematicallypossible.Thatis,ifwe
aregivenenoughmonadsforthemtobecorrelatedonetoonewitheverypointofspace,plus,for
everytripleofmonads,A,B,andC,theinformationwhetherthedistanceABisgreaterorless
than,orequalto,thedistanceAC,thatwillsufficefortheconstructionofallspatialrelations.
Furthermore,Leibnizoftenindicatesthatdistanceiscorrelatedwithconfusionofperceptions.
Nevertheless,IhavenotfoundthisconstructioninLeibniz,andIhavecometobelievethatitdoes
notcorrespondtohisintentions,forseveralreasons.
1.Inordertomakethepointsofviewofthemonadscompletelypriortobodies,Iwastryingto
definethemintermsofmonads'perceptionsofeachother,ratherthanintermsoftheirperceptions
ofbodies.Butitisnotcleartomethat
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69
70
InanunpublishedpaperwrittenatUCLA.Aconstructioninsomewayssimilar,butnotclaimingto
beLeibniz'sownandnotmakinguseofconfusedness,oranyotherinternalfeatureofperceptions
suggestedbyLeibnizinthisconnection,isdevelopedbyHacking,"ALeibnizianSpace."
251
Leibnizthoughtthatanymonad,exceptGod,everperceivesanyothermonaddirectly.Inthe
Monadology(62)hedepictsthemonadasrepresenting"thewholeuniverseinrepresenting"its
ownorganicbody;andinChapter10,section4.1,IwillargueforaninterpretationofLeibniz's
systeminwhichIperceiveeveryothercreatedmonadbyperceiving,moreorlessdistinctly,its
organicbody.
Thisargumenthaslimitedforceinthepresentcontext.Thewholesubjectofdirectnessof
perceptionisveryobscure(aswewillalsoseeinChapter10,section4.1).Therecouldbea
questionoftherelevanceofapassageIhavealreadyquoted(LA101),inwhichLeibnizdoesspeak
ofthemind'sperceptionof"somegenuinesubstances"andtheirmodesandrelationsaspriortoits
constructionofaggregatesofsubstances(thoughthecontextisambiguousattowhetherthese
genuinesubstancesaremonadsorcorporealsubstances).Thisofcoursedoesnotexclude,but
certainlydoesnotconvey,theideathatthemind'sperceptionofthe"genuinesubstances"isbyway
ofanappearanceoftheirorganicbodiesthatprecedestheinterpretationofthosebodiesas
aggregates.Twootherargumentsseemmoreconclusive.
2.Itisnotplausibletosupposethatwealwaysperceivenearerthingsmoredistinctlythananything
thatisfartheraway,andLeibnizdoesnotseemtohavebelievedit.Inresponsetoarelated
objectionbyArnauld,hewrotethatindistinctnessofperception"thedistanceofsomeis
compensatedforbysmallnessorotherobstaclesinothers,andThalesseesthestarswithoutseeing
theditchinfrontofhisfeet"(LA90).Inotherplaceshesaysthatthethingsamonadperceives
distinctlyare"somethatarenearerormoreprominent,accommodatedtoitsorgans,"or"the
nearest,orthelargestwithrespecttoeachoftheMonads"(C15/MP177;Mon50,italicsadded).
Thusdistanceandconfusionofperceptionarenotalwaysdirectlyproportionaltoeachother,andit
isnotclearthatdegreesofconfusionofperceptionwillprovideenoughusabledatafora
mathematicallysatisfactoryconstructionofspatialrelations.
3.Theconstructionofallspatialrelations,andthereforeofbodies,fromthepointsofviewof
monadsdependsonassigningtoeachmonadapointinspaceasitspreciseposition.Leibniznoted
in1709,however,thatalthoughhehadonce"locatedSoulsinpoints,"thatwas"manyyears
[before],when[his]philosophywasnotyetmatureenough."71Onmorematureconsideration,he
did"notthinkitappropriatetoconsidersoulsasinpoints."Abetterapproachwouldallowthemto
"beinaplace"insuchawayasto"beinthewholeorganicbodythattheyanimate"(GII,37072/
L598f.).Similarly,in1695,inadraftofthe"NewSystem,"Leibnizreferredto"thebodythat
makes[orconstitutes,fait]its[thesoul's]pointofviewintheworld"(GIV,477;cf.NE221f.;G
III,357).
Iconcludethattheconstructionofthespatialpositionsofsubstancesintermsofastraightforward
metricofcomparativedistinctnessoftheirperceptionsof
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71
ThereferenceheretoLeibniz'searlierviewsisprettyclearlytoideaspresentinhiswritingsasfar
backas166971(AVI,i,496;AII,i,113).Theseideasinvolvedamuchdeepermetaphysical
connectionbetweensoulsandpointsthanwouldbesuggestedinanyofLeibniz'sworksofthe
1680sorlater.OnthisseethefascinatingdiscussioninRobinet,Architectoniquedisjonctive,pp.
19095.Thoughmorethanmerelocationisinvolvedintheearlierwritings,Ithinkitisclearfrom
thecontextthatin1709Leibnizisdenyingthatmonadshaveanysortoflocationinpoints.
252
eachotherisnotplausibleasaninterpretationeitherofexperienceorofLeibniz.Still,itmaybe
argued,Leibniziscommittedtothethesisthatallthepropertiesandrelationsofsubstances'bodies
arerepresentedbyintrinsicfeaturesofthesubstances'perceptions.Whycouldn'ttheaggregationof
substancesintobodiesbegroundeddirectlyinthoseintrinsicperceptualfeatures,andindependent
ofthephenomenalrepresentationalcontentoftheperceptions?Thisamountstothesuggestionthat
intrinsicfeaturesofsubstances'perceptionsprovideareasonforgroupingthemincorporeal
aggregates,areasonthatisindependentofthephenomenalspatialpositionsrepresentedbythe
perceptions.Thosephenomenalpositionsprovidetheonlyreasonwehaveforaggregatingthose
substances,andtheonlyreasonthatLeibnizmakesclear.Thepossibilityofanindependentreason
intrinsictotheperceptionsofmonadscannotbeabsolutelyexcluded,butitissurelynotun
Leibniziantoseephenomenalfeaturesofthecorporealworldasprovidingreasonsoffundamental
metaphysicalimportance.Leibnizthinks,forinstance,thatthepreestablishedharmonyis
prominentamongGod'sreasonsforchoosingthisworldtoactualize,andoneofthemain
excellencesofthepreestablishedharmonyisthatthecorporealworldobeysmechanicallaws(
Mon87;C12f./MP173f.)whichconcernphysicalpropertiesthat(aswehaveseeninsection1.3)
arephenomenalratherthanultimatelyreal.
Onbalance,IthinkthebestconstructionofLeibniziancorporealaggregatesistheoneIinitially
proposed,whichbeginswiththespatialpositionsofsubstances'bodies.Thesepositions,and
thereforetheaggregationofsubstancesintobodies,dependontheapparentpositionofbodiesas
phenomena.Andthisisareasonforcountingthebodiesthemselvesasphenomena,sincetheir
constitutiondependsinthiswayonperceptualappearances.
3.4Space
GlennHartzhasobjectedtothisargumentonthegroundthatitdependsonassigningpositionsin
spacetobodies,andatleastderivativelytosubstances.72HartzholdsthatLeibnizassignsspace,
bodies,andsubstancestothreedifferentmetaphysicallevels.Substances"areatthegroundfloor
metaphysicallevel";73spaceisatthemerelyideallevel,farthestremovedfromultimatereality;
andbodiesareataphenomenallevelbetweentheothertwo.74Thereissometextualbasisforthis
stratification.HartzandJ.A.Coverhaverightlypointedoutthatwhereasin1687,writingto
Arnauld,Leibnizclassifiedspaceandtimeas(wellfounded)phenomena(LA118f.),fromthe
mid1690sonheusuallyclassifiedspaceandtimeratheras"ideal"things.75Itisidealthings,not
usuallyphenomena,thatarecharacterizedfromthenonascontinuousandhavingonlyindefi
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72
Hartz,"Leibniz'sPhenomenalisms,"pp.52737.
73
HartzandCover,"SpaceandTimeintheLeibnizianMetaphysic,"p.503.
74
SuchathreelevelinterpretationispresentedbyMcGuire,"LabyrinthusContinui,"pp.30811,and
byA.T.Winterbourne,"OntheMetaphysicsofLeibnizianSpaceandTime,"aswellasbyHartz
andCover,"SpaceandTimeintheLeibnizianMetaphysic."
75
HartzandCover,"SpaceandTimeintheLeibnizianMetaphysic,"pp.493ff.Note,however,atext
of1712,inwhichLeibnizseemstoclassifyspaceandtimeamong"God'sphenomena"andas
havingacertain"reality"(GII,438/AG199).
253
nite,merelypotentialpartsandthatarerepeatedlycontrastedinthisrespectwith"real"or"actual"
things.76Moreover,Leibnizsometimesplaces"matter"(GII,278;GIV,562)or"phenomena"(G
II,282)ontherealoractualsideofthiscontrastfromwhichHartzandCoverrightlyinfer,notthat
Leibnizisplacingmatterorphenomenaatthegroundfloormetaphysicallevel,butthatheascribes
morerealitytothemthantomerelyidealthings.
MydisagreementwithHartzandCoverbeginswiththeirascriptiontoLeibnizofa"metaphysical
apartheidbeweenidealthingsandwellfoundedphenomena."77Itisonaccountofthisapartheid,I
takeit,thatHartzthinksitamistakenmixtureoflevelstoascribespatialproperties,orapositionin
space,tocorporealphenomenaintheLeibniziansystem.Iseenosuch"metaphysicalapartheid"in
thetexts.ItistruethatLeibnizregardsspace,andotheridealentities,aspurelymental,whereashe
spokeattimesofphenomena,particularlybeingsbyaggregation,as"semimental"(e.g.,GII,304).
Semimentalbeingsarealso"semibeings"(GII,506/L617);theyhavetheirmetaphysicalplace
somewherebetweenthepurelymentalormerelyidealandtheultimatelyreal.Butthatisnot
becausetheyaremetaphysicallyisolatedfromeither;itisratherbecausetheypartakeofboth.In
thecaseofbeingsbyaggregation,beingphenomenal[dephnomne]canbetreatedasequivalent
tobeing"insomefashionmental"(NE146)."Thewellfoundedphenomenon,"asRobertMcRae
putsit,"ispartwaybetweentherealandtheidealormental,abeingwhichparticipatesinboth."78
Boththeultimatelyrealmonadsandmerelyidealspaceareinvolvedintheconstructionofsuch
phenomena.IwouldaddthatLeibnizianphenomenaarebestseen,notasasingle"level"between
themonadsandpurelyidealobjects,butasaninfinitegradationofapproximationstoreality.
TherearemanyplacesinLeibniz'slaterwritingswhereheimpliesthatbodiesarelocatedinspace.
Perhapstheclearest(acknowledgedbyHartz79)isaletterof1705toDeVolderinwhichLeibniz
saysthat"noassignablepartofspaceisemptyofmatter,"whilealsoaffirmingthat"matterisnot
continuousbutdiscrete"andthatspaceissomething"ideal"(GII,278).Hartzdoubtsthatlocation
inspaceisimpliedwhenLeibnizascribestounextendedmonads"somekindofposition[situs]in
extension,thatis,somerelationofcoexistencetoothers"(GII,253/L531),orwhenheseemsto
allowthatasoulisinaplace[inloco]throughitsrelationtoitsorganicbody(GII,371/L598).80
Butthereareothertypesoftexttobetakenintoaccount.Inthelastmonthsofhislife,discussing
withLouisBourguethiscorrespondencewithSamuelClarke,Leibnizwrotethat"spaceisnotan
absolutebeing,butanorder,orsomethingrelative,andwhichwouldbemerelyidealifbodiesdid
notexistinit[y]"whichseemsbyitscounterfactualconditionalformtoimplythatbodiesdoexist
inspace(GIII,595).ToClarkehimselfLeibnizwrotethat"spaceistheplaceofthings,
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76
GIV,491f./AG146f.(169596);GVII,562(1705);GII,278f.,379(1705,1709);GIII,622(1714).
77
HartzandCover,"SpaceandTimeintheLeibnizianMetaphysic,"p.512.
78
McRae,Leibniz:Perception,Apperception,andThought,p.132.
79
Hartz,"Leibniz'sPhenomenalisms,"p.528.
80
Hartz,"Leibniz'sPhenomenalisms,"pp.528f.WithregardtoGII,253/L531,Iwouldpointoutthat
itascribesto"spiritualchanges"a"placeintheorderofcoexistencesor[seu]inspace."
254
addnottheplaceofGod'sideas"(LCIV,29).Ifspaceistheplaceofthings,presumablythethings
areinspace;andwhatarethese"things,"ifnotbodies?SimilarlyLeibnizwritestoClarkeof"the
spaceoccupiedbyabody"(LCV,37).Moreover,whenLeibnizwritestoDesBossesin1709that
"space,justliketime,isacertainorder,specifically(inthecaseofspace)anorderofcoexisting,
whichembraces[complectitur]notonlyactualsbutalsopossibles"(GII,379),hecertainlyseems
toimplythatactualsaswellaspossiblesarerangedintheorderthatisspace.
Hartzseemstosupposethatifactualbodieswereinspace,theywouldhavetobe"indifferently
divisibleintoaninfinitevarietyofparts,"asspaceis.81ButIcannotseethegroundsforthis
assumption,andLeibnizassertstheopposite:"Spacecanintelligiblybefilledininfinitewaysby
matteractuallydividedintoparts"(GII,279).82Thatiswhatweshouldexpect.Theclaimthat
spaceisindifferentlydivisible,orhasindefinite,merelypotentialparts,ismostnaturally
understoodasmeaningthatthereareindefinitelyvariouswaysinwhichspacecouldbeoccupied
bythingshavingdefiniteparts.
ItiscertainlythedominantviewofLeibniz'slateryearsthatspaceissomethingmerelyideal,an
orderimposedbythemind,thoughgroundedinrelationsofrealthings.Therearenospatialfactsat
thegroundfloorlevelofLeibniz'smetaphysics,exceptinsofarasfactsaboutmonads'perceptions
havingspatialrelationsaspartoftheirrepresentationalcontentmaybelongtothatlevel.In
themselvesthemonadshavenospatialpositionandnootherspatialproperties.Itisonlybya
mentalconstructionthatsubstancesandaggregatesofsubstancesreceivespatialproperties.Soif
(asIclaim)theaggregationofsubstancestoformaggregatesdependson(apparent)spatial
propertiesofbodies,thatwilltendtoinfecttheaggregateswithminddependence,anddiminish
theirreality.ButthatisnotanobjectiontomyinterpretationofLeibniz.Itispartofmy
interpretation,providingoneofthereasonsforthephenomenalityofcorporealaggregates.
4.TheRealityofPhenomena
Phenomenalistsandidealistsdonotgenerallyleaveuswithoutasystematicdifferencebetweenthe
physicalobjectsthatappeartousinnormalexperienceandthosethatappeartousindreamsand
hallucinations.InLeibniz'sthoughtthereisadistinctionbetween"real"phenomenaand
"imaginary"(GVII,319/L363)or"false"or"apparent"phenomena(VE188=Gr322).AsIstated
earlierinsection1.1,theanalysisofthisdistinctionisthemainreductionisticanalysisinLeibniz's
phenomenalism.Indeed,areductiveanalysisofthisdistinctioncanconstituteacomplete
phenomenalism,aswesawinsection2,withreferencetoatextfrom1676.
Theanalysisofthedistinctiongiveninthattextisclassicallyphenomenalisticinthesensethatitis
termsofthecontentsofperceptionandtheir"harmony"
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81
Hartz,"Leibniz'sPhenomenalisms,"p.533.
82
Leibnizsupportsthisclaimwithanargument,havingtodowithalternativegeometrical
constructionsforfillingaspace.Buttheargumentisdifficulttofollow.Itissupplemented,inthe
manuscript,byadiagram,whichGerhardtdoesnotprint;butthevisualaiddoesnothelpmuch.
255
oragreementswithotherperceptions.In1704LeibnizstillgaveDeVolderrecognizablythesame
analysisofwhatitisforphenomenatobe"real":"Matterandmotionare...thephenomenaof
perceivers,whoserealityislocatedintheharmonyofperceiverswiththemselves(atdifferent
times)andwiththeotherperceivers"(GII,270/L537).InLeibniz'smaturethought,asweshall
see,thisaccountoftherealityofphenomenaintermsoftheirharmonyisonlythefirstlayerofa
morecomplexconstruction.Butitremainsamainfeatureofhisphenomenalismandisfoundinhis
writingsallthroughhismatureyearsintheearlytomid1680s(VE188=Gr322,andDM14),in
criticismsofDescartesabout1692(GIV,356/L384),andinasketchofhismetaphysicsprepared
forRmondin1714(GIII,623),tomentiononlyafew.
Leibniz'sfullestdiscussionofcriteriafortherealityofphenomenaisinanessayof168386,"On
theMethodofDistinguishingRealfromImaginaryPhenomena."Heofferscriteriasimilartothose
proposedbyotherearlymodernphilosophers.Theinternalmarksofarealphenomenonarethatit
isvivid,complex,andharmonious[congruum].
Itwillbevividifqualitiessuchaslight,color,heatappearintenseenough.Itwillbe
complexiftheyarevaried,andsuitedforsettingupmanyexperimentsandnew
observations;forexample,ifweexperienceinthephenomenonnotonlycolorsbutalso
sounds,odors,tastes,tactilequalities;andthatbothinthewholeandinvariouspartsof
it,whichwecaninvestigateagainwithvariouscauses.(GVII,319f./L363)
VividnessandcomplexityarenotmentionedinmostofLeibniz'sformulationsabouttherealityof
phenomena.IntheNewEssayshedisparageslivelinessasacriterionforreality,onthegroundthat
"althoughsensationsareusuallylivelierthanimaginations,oneknowsstillthattherearecases
whereimaginativepersonsarestruckbytheirimaginationsasmuchas,orperhapsmorethan,
someoneelseisbythetruthofthings"(NE374).83
HarmonyisthecriterionforrealitythatLeibnizmentionsmostoften.Internally,"aphenomenon
willbeharmoniouswhenitconsistsofseveralphenomenaforwhichareasoncanbegivenfrom
eachotherorfromsomesufficientlysimplecommonhypothesis"(GVII,320/L364).Themain
externalmark,andthemostimportantmark,oftherealityofaphenomenonisalsoasortof
harmony
ifitkeepsthecustomofotherphenomenathathaveoccurredtousfrequently,sothat
thepartsofthephenomenahavethesameposition,order,andoutcomethatsimilar
phenomenahavehad....Likewiseifareasonforthis[phenomenon]canbegivenfrom
thosethatprecede,oriftheyallfitthesamehypothesisasacommonreason.The
strongestevidence,however,issurelyagreementwiththewholeseriesoflife,
especiallyifmostother[people]affirmthatthesamethingagreeswiththeir
phenomenatoo....Butthemostpowerfulevidenceoftherealityofphenomena,which
evensufficesbyitself,issuccess
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83
Cf.Naert,MmoireetconsciencedesoiselonLeibniz,p.97.Naertsuggeststhatconcernaboutthe
imaginativeness"oftheVisionariesandtheEnthusiasts"ledLeibniztoabandonvividnessasa
criterionofreality.Shecitesaletterof1691whereLeibniznotesthefallibilityofthevividness
criterioninconnectionwiththecaseofavisionary(AI,vii,34).
256
inpredictingfuturephenomenafrompastandpresentones,whetherthatpredictionis
foundedonreasonorahypothesisthathassucceededthusfar,oronacustomthathas
beencompliedwiththusfar.(GVII,320/L364)84
Thenotionsofcomplexityandharmonyareclearlyconnectedinthesestatementswithnotionsof
explanatoryandpredictiveorder.Realphenomenaarethosethatformpartofacoherent,
scientificallyadequatestorythatappearsallormostofthetime,atleastinaconfusedway,toallor
mostperceivers.Thatisthestorythatwouldbetold,orapproximated,byaperfectedphysical
science.Imaginaryphenomenaarethosethatdonotfitinthisstory.85
ThereisaproblemabouthowLeibnizcanadmitimaginaryphenomenainthissenseatall,sincehe
holdsthateverymonadalwaysperceivesthewholeuniverse.Itfollowsthatthetruephysicalstory
appearsatalltimestoallperceivers,notjusttomostofthematmosttimes.Howthencantherebe
anyfalsephenomena?Hesaysthat"asGod'sviewisalwaystrue,ourperceptionsarealso,butitis
ourjudgmentsthatarefromusandthatdeceiveus"(DM14).Thisformulationcorresponds
accuratelywiththedemandsofLeibniz'sphilosophyinonerespect,inthatitpostulatestrueand
falsementalcontentsatdifferentlevels,butitishardlyacompletesolutiontotheproblem.
SupposeIhallucinateapinkrat.Leibnizmustsaythatthisperceptionexpresses,andisa
perceptionof,someeventinmybody,towhichitcorrespondsaccordingtothepreestablished
harmony;butitisaconfusedperceptionofthatevent."Itisnotthatevendreamsarenotrelatedto
theorgansandtotherestofthebodies,but[itis]inalessdistinctmanner"(GIV,519).Though
confused,myperceptionofthatevent,assuch,isatrue,notafalse,perception,andtheeventisa
real,notanimaginary,phenomenon.Whatappearstomeconsciously,however,isnottheeventin
mybody,butapinkrat.InthiscaseLeibnizhastosaythatmysoulrepresentstwodifferent
phenomena.Thefirst,aneventinmybody,cohereswiththestorythatwouldbetoldbyanideal
physicalscience,andsoitisreal,butlessdistinctlyperceived.Thesecond,apinkrat,doesnot
coherewiththatstory,andthusitishallucinatoryandfalse.Whatislessclear(tome,atanyrate)is
whethertheprocessthatproducestheappearanceofthepinkratisadequatelycharacterizedas
"judgment"(asimpliedinDM14).Butthatquestioncouldnotbesettledwithoutamoreextensive
explorationofLeibniz'sepistemologyandtheoryofperceptionthanIwillattemptinthisbook.
TheproblemoferrorseemstoplayapartinsometextsinwhichLeibnizproposes,notanideal
humanscience,but"God'sview"(DM14),asastandardoftruthofphenomena.In1712,inastudy
foralettertoDesBosses,Leibnizwrote,
Ifbodiesarephenomenaandareevaluatedonthebasisofourappearances,theywill
notbereal,sincetheyappeardifferentlytodifferentpeople.Thereforetherealityof
bodies,space,motion,[and]timeseemstoconsistintheirbeingGod'sphenomena,or
theobjectofintuitiveknowledge[scientiavisionis].(GII,438/AG199)
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84
Cf.GII,270/L537;VE296=LHIV,3,5E,2.
85
Thisisaconvenientwayoftalking.Leibniz'sconceptualismmightgiverisetosomeproblems
abouttheontologicalstatusofsuchastory,ifwerelyheavilyon"wouldbetold."
257
Thispassageraisesanobviousinterpretiveproblem:howcanitbereconciledwiththeviewthat
Leibnizseemstoholdelsewhere(e.g.,DM14;GII,451f./L605),thatthereisenoughagreement
amonghumanperceiversfortheirphenomenatosatisfytheintersubjectiveharmonyconditionfor
reality?
Morethanoneanswertothisquestionispossible.86GregoryBrownpointsoutthatinthequoted
textof1712,Leibnizgoesontosaythat"Godviewsnotonlytheindividualmonadsandthe
modificationsofeachMonad,butalsotheirrelations,andinthisconsiststherealityofrelations
andtruths"(GII,438/AG199).BrownarguesthatforLeibniz,onlyGodseestherelations
betweencreatedsubstances;andtherealityofthoserelations,includingtherealityoftheharmony
amongtheperceptionsofcreatedmonads,consistsinGod'sperceptionofthem.Brownargues
furtherthattheharmonyamongmonads'perceptionsdependsonthedivinemindinasmuchasthe
lawsofnaturedetermineforLeibnizthecorrectinterpretationofwhatisexpressedbyeach
monad'sperceptions,andwhatarethecorrectlawsofnaturedependsonGod'sunderstanding,and
choice,ofwhichlawsarebest,anunderstandingthatexceedsthepowerofanycreatedmind.87
ThereistextualbasisforBrown'sinterpretation.ButIthinktherearealsogroundsforanother
interpretationinotherthingsthatLeibnizsaystoDesBossesaboutGod'sphenomena.In1713,
offeringhisJesuitfriendapossibleaccountoftheCatholicdoctrineoftransubstantiationinpurely
monadologicalterms,without"substantialbonds,"Leibnizsaysthatonthisaccount
thesubstanceofbodiesshouldbesaidtoconsistintruephenomena,namelythosethat
Godhimselfperceivesinthembyintuitiveknowledge,andtheAngelsandtheBlessed
likewise,towhomitisgiventoseethingstruly;andthusGod,withtheBlessed,
perceivestheBodyofChrist,wherebreadandwineappeartous.(GII,474/L607f.;cf.
GII,482)
ThephenomenathatGodissaidheretoperceivecanhardlybeintersubstantialrelationsthatare
perceivedbyGodalone,sincetheangelsandtheblessedinheavenarealsosaidtoperceivethem.
Rathertheirperceiving"truly"iscontrastedwithwhatappearstous.Thiscanbereconciledwith
thedoctrinethatweperceive,atleastunconsciously,everythingasitis,ifweassumethattruthin
thedistinctandconsciousknowledgeoftheblessedisbeingcontrastedwitherrorinourconscious
beliefs.Divineknowledgeisthustheidealtowhichthetruephysicalstorytoldbyharmonious
phenomenamustapproximate.Onthisinterpretation,asonBrown's,thethoughtthatthereal
phenomenaareGod'sphenomenarepresentsadevelopment,notanabandonment,ofthe
harmoniousperceptionsaccountofrealphenomena.
TherearemanypassagesinwhichLeibnizseemstosaythatinternalandexternalharmony,
supplementedperhapsbyvividnessandcomplexity,oragree
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86
Thisiscontrarytomyprevioustreatmentofitin"PhenomenalismandCorporealSubstancein
Leibniz,"p.245f.,whereItooktheproblemasgroundsforregardingGII,438/AG199asan
aberranttextinthisrespect.
87
Brown,"God'sPhenomenaandthePreEstablishedHarmony."Brownalsoprovidestherean
illuminatingdiscussionofthedifficultquestion,whatGod'scorporealphenomenawouldbe.Iam
indebtedtoBrown'sinterestingarticleforforcingmetothinkmoreaboutLeibniz'sstatements
aboutGod'sphenomena.
258
mentwithmathematicaltruth(amarkaddedinsomelatertexts),issufficienttoconstitutethe
realityofaphenomenon.Intheessay"OntheMethodofDistinguishingRealfromImaginary
Phenomena,"however,hespeaksmorecautiously.Therethemarksofrealityarepresentedas
epistemiccriteriabywhichwemaytellwhenaphenomenonisreal;itisnotassertedthatthey
definewhattherealityofaphenomenonconsistsin.Indeed,itisvirtuallyimpliedthata
phenomenoncouldpossessthemarksofrealityandyetnotbefullyreal:"Itmustbeadmittedthat
theproofsofrealphenomenathathavebeenadducedthusfar,eventakeninanycombination
whatever,arenotdemonstrative."Theyhave"thegreatestprobability,"or"moralcertainty,"but
not"Metaphysical"certainty;therewouldbenocontradictioninsupposingthemfalse:
Thereforeitcannotbeabsolutelydemonstratedbyanyargumentthattherearebodies;
andnothingpreventssomewellordereddreamsfrombeingobjectstoourMind,which
wewouldjudgetobetrueandwhichwouldbeequivalentforpracticalpurposestotrue
thingsbecauseoftheirmutualagreement.
LeibnizrejectsDescartes'sclaimthatinsuchacaseGodwouldbeadeceiver:
Forwhatifournaturehappenednottobecapableofrealphenomena?SurelyGod
shouldbethankedratherthanblamedinthatcase;forbycausingthosephenomenaat
leasttoagree,sincetheycouldnotbereal,hehasfurnisheduswithsomethingequally
asuseful,foralloflife,asrealphenomena.(GVII,320f./L364)
VerysimilarideasarefoundinLeibniz'swritingsasearlyasaletterof1675toSimonFoucher(A
II,i,248f./L153f.)andaslateastheNewEssaysof1704(NE379f.)andaletterof1715toDes
Bosses(GII,496/L611).
IthasbeenthoughtthatLeibnizvacillatedorchangedhismindaboutthesufficiencyofthe
harmonyandagreementofphenomenafortheirreality,butIthinkitismoreaccuratetoseehimas
constantlyawareoftheepistemologicalvulnerabilityofthefullontologythatheheldthroughout
hismatureyears,andwantingthereforetomaintaintheavailabilityofastarkerphenomenalismasa
fallbackposition,asIsuggestedinsection2ofthischapter.Forthispurposeitwasimportantto
haveasenseof'real'inwhichbodiescouldbereal,asopposedtoimaginary,inthecontextofthe
starkerphenomenalism;itseemstomeprobablethatLeibnizused'real'instrongerandweaker
sensesinexpressingdifferentaspectsofafairlyconstant,andconsistent,systemofthought.
Astatementinthepreviousparagraphof"OntheMethodofDistinguishingRealfromImaginary
Phenomena"isparticularlyrevealing:"Indeedevenifitweresaidthatthiswholelifeisnothingbut
adream,andthevisibleworldnothingbutaphantasm,Iwouldcallthisdreamorphantasmreal
enoughifwewereneverdeceivedbyitwhenweusedourreasonwell"thatis,ifpredictions
reasonablybasedonpastexperiencegenerallysucceededsofarasfutureexperienceisconcerned(
GVII,320/L364).Tosaythatthiswholelifeisadreamispresumablytosaythatitsphenomena
lackakindofrealitythatphenomenacouldhave;butLeibnizindicatesasenseinwhichour
phenomenawouldstillbe"realenough,"providedonlythatourexperiencehasalltheinternal
marksofreality.Asimilar,weaksenseof'true'asappliedtophenomenaappearsinthe
DiscourseonMetaphysics
259
onMetaphysicswhenLeibnizsaysthatifourphenomenaareinternallyharmoniousenoughsothat
wecanmakeobservationsthatareusefulforregulatingourconductandthatare
justifiedbythesuccessoffuturephenomena,andthatthuswecanoftenjudgeofthe
futurebythepastwithouterror,thatwouldbeenoughtosaythatthesephenomenaare
true,withoutworryingaboutwhethertheyareoutsideusandwhetherothersperceive
themtoo.(DM14)
ThishelpsmakesenseofthefactthatLeibnizseemstoacceptanotheraccountofwhatthereality
ofbodiesconsistsin.Thisaccount,Isuggest,shouldbeseenasstatinganadditionalconditionthat
harmoniousphenomenamustsatisfyinordertoberealinthefullestsense,althoughtheirharmony
issufficientfortheirrealityinaweakersensethatisenoughforallpracticalpurposes.Itmustbe
admitted,however,thatbothaccountsareusuallypresentedasiftheywerecompletely
independent.Theadditionalaccountapplieschieflytoaggregatesassuchandsaysthattheirreality
consistsintherealityofthesubstancesthatenterintothem.Aggregates"havenootherrealitythan
thatwhichbelongstotheUnitiesthatareinthem"(GII,261).GiventhatLeibnizsaysthatbodies
areaggregatesofsubstances,indeed,itishardtoseehowhecouldfailtothinkthattheirreality
consistsatleastpartlyintherealityofthesubstancesthatareaggregatedinthem.Thisthesisplays
apartintheargumentformonads.Itispartlybecauseanaggregate"hasnorealityunlessitis
borrowedfromthethingscontained"initthatLeibniz"inferred,thereforethereareinthings
indivisibleunities,sinceotherwisetherewillbeinthingsnotrueunity,andnorealitynot
borrowed"(GII,267).Thereareseveralreasonsforthinkingthatthisisnotacompletely
independentaccountoftherealityofbodiesthatitdoesnotconflictwiththeaccountintermsof
harmoniousperceptions,butsupplementsitandevendependsonit.
1.
Leibnizseemstohaveregardedthetwoaccountsasconsistent.Hesometimesgivesbothofthemin
thesamedocument.Ihavequotedexpressionsofbothofthemfromhisletterof30June1704to
DeVolder(GII,267,270).Andinasingletwopagepiecewrittenin1714Leibnizsaysboththat
"whatwecallbodies"areassemblagesofmonadsandthatmaterialthings"havetheirrealityfrom
theagreementoftheperceptionsofapperceivingsubstances"(GIII,622f.).
2.
IthinkLeibnizbelievedthatthetwoaccountsareatleastmateriallyequivalent.Hebelievedthat
thereisascientificallyadequatestorythatisalwaysatleastunconsciouslyperceivedbyall
monads,andthereforecountsas"true,"andthatmostofwhatappearsconsciouslytoconscious
perceiversfitsatleastapproximatelyintothatstory.Healsobelievedthatthereareinfinitelymany
monadswhoseinternalpropertiesareexpressedbyorganicbodiesthatwouldfigureina
sufficientlydetailedextensionofthetruescientificstory,andthataggregatesofthesemonads(or
ofthecorporealsubstancesthattheyformwiththeirorganicbodies)canthereforeberegardedas
thebodiesthatfigureinthetruescientificstory.Thusthebodiesofthetruescientificstoryarereal
accordingtobothaccounts,bothascoherent,harmoniousphenomenaandasaggregatesofreal
things.
260
3.
Theclaimthattherealityofbodiesconsistsintherealityofthesubstancesthatareaggregatedin
thempresupposesthatsubstancesareaggregatedinthem,andthisaggregationpresupposesthe
harmonyofperceptions.AsIarguedinsection3.3,thegroupingofsubstancesintocorporeal
aggregatesdependsonthespatialpositionsthesubstances'organicbodiesappeartohave.Ifa
singlesystemofaggregatesofsubstancesistobereal,asopposedtoanyothers,whichmaybe
imaginary,itissurelynotenoughthatthesubstancesbelongingtotherealaggregatesbereal.We
coulddoubtlessdreamupimaginaryaggregatesofrealsubstances,whichwouldstillbeunreal,
despitetherealityoftheirelements.Realaggregatesmustnotonlyhaverealelements,butmustbe
formedbyarealortruegroupingofthoseelements.Andthetruegroupingofsubstancesinto
corporealaggregatescanhardlydependonthepositionsthesubstances'organicbodiesappearto
havejustalittleofthetimetojustanyperceiver.Itmustdependonsomethingmoredefinitive,and
thisforLeibnizinvolvesthepositionsthebodieshaveinacoherentsystemofphenomenathatis
representedbyallormostoftheperceptionsofallperceivers.Inorderfortheretobecorporeal
aggregatesthatarerealbyvirtueoftherealityofthesubstancesaggregatedinthem,theymust
appearasmaterialmassesinthiscoherentsystemofphenomena.Thereforetheymustsatisfythe
harmoniousperceptionsconditionforreality.
Consideringallthesereasons,IthinkwefindinLeibniznottwocompetinganalysesofthereality
ofcorporealphenomena,butoneanalysisintwoorthreelayers.Phenomenaarereal,inaweak
sense,ifandonlyiftheyfitintoasinglescientificallyadequatesystemofharmoniousphenomena
ofallperceivers.Thosephenomena,andonlythose,thatarerealinthisweakersensearealsoreal
inafullersensetotheextentthatthereexistrealmonadsthatareappropriatelyexpressedby
organicbodiesbelongingtothesystemofphenomenathatisatleastweaklyreal.Andperhaps
Leibnizalsorecognizesastillweakersenseinwhichphenomenaare"realenough"iftheybelong
toascientificallyadequatesystemofharmoniousperceptionsofasingleperceiver.
261
10
CorporealSubstance
Therehabilitationofsubstantialforms,onwhichLeibnizseemstohaveresolvedin1679,asI
notedinthelastchapter,generallycarriedwithitanaffirmationofcorporealsubstances,
composed,inAristotelianterms,offormandmatter.Indeed,asIalsosuggestedthere,the
rehabilitationoftheformsseemstohavebeenmotivatedlargelybyadesiretoaccommodate
realisticintuitionsbyfindingsomethingsubstantialinbodies.SomescholarshavereadLeibniz's
accountofcorporealsubstancesassorealistic(andsoAristotelian)astobeinconsistentwiththe
phenomenalismIhaveascribedtohiminChapter9.IthinkthatexaggeratesLeibniz's
accommodationtorealism.ThischapteroffersaninterpretationofLeibniziancorporealsubstance
asametaphysicalconstructionfromsimple,perceivingsubstances,consistentwiththeidealistic
foundationsofhisphilosophy.
Iwouldnotdeny,however,thatatensionbetweentheidealisticfoundationsandthe
accommodationofrealismcausesproblemsinLeibniz'stheoryofcorporealsubstance.Asweshall
seeinsection5,thereissomeevidencethatsuchproblemsmayhaveweakenedLeibniz'sown
adherencetohisconceptionofcorporealsubstanceinhislastyears,thoughheneverreally
abandonedit.
1.BodiesandCorporealSubstances
ItisnotLeibniz'sviewthatbodiesingeneralaresubstances.Theclearestreasonforthisisthat
onlythingsthatare,insomesense,alivearecorporealsubstances.
"Icallthatacorporealsubstance,"Leibnizwrotein1711,"whichconsistsinasimplesubstanceor
monad(thatis,asoulorsomethinganalogoustoaSoul)andanorganicbodyunitedtoit"(G
VII,501).Corporealsubstancesarefoundwherethereare"bodiesthatareanimated,oratleast
endowedwithaprimitiveEntelechyorwithavitalprinciple(ifyouallowthename'life'tobeused
sogenerally)";theycanthusbecalled"living"(LA118).ButwhenLeibnizsaysthatcorporeal
substancesarelivingthingsandthat"allnatureisfulloflife"(PNG1),heemphaticallydoesnot
meanthateverymaterialobjectisalivingthing.Herejectstheviewof"thosewhoimaginethat
thereisasubstantialformofapieceofstone,orofanothernonorganicbody;forprinciplesoflife
belongonlytoorganicbodies"(GVI,539/L586;cf.LA76).(Here,asinmanyotherplaces,Leibniz
usestheAristotelianterm'substantialform'tosignifythesoul,
262
orthatwhichisanalogoustoasoulorprincipleoflife,inanycorporealsubstance;thiswillbe
discussedmuchmorefullyinChapter11.)Headdsthat
itistrue(accordingtomySystem)thatthereisnoportionofmatterinwhichthereis
notaninfinityoforganicandanimatedbodies;amongwhichIincludenotonlyanimals
andplants,butperhapsothersortsaswell,whichareentirelyunknowntous.Butitis
notrighttosay,onaccountofthat,thateveryportionofmatterisanimatedjustaswe
donotsaythatalakefulloffishisananimatedbody,althoughthefishis.(GVI,539f./
L586)
Stonesandlakes,then,arenotcorporealsubstances."Eachanimalandeachplanttooisacorporeal
substance"(GIII,260);IbelievetheyaretheonlycorporealsubstancesofwhichLeibnizclaims
empiricalknowledge,ifweincludeamonganimalsandplantsthetinylivingthingswhose
discoveryunderseventeenthcenturymicroscopessoexcitedhim(LA122).Inalakefulloffishthe
waterbetweenthefishisnotacorporealsubstance,butitiscomposedofcorporealsubstances,
whichmaybeverydifferentfromthethingsthatweknowasanimalsandplants(Mon68).In
particular,theymaybeevensmallerthanmicroscopicorganisms;thereisindeednominimumsize
forcorporealsubstances.
Still,allcorporealsubstancesarealive,inabroadsense.AndLeibnizseemstohaveassumedthat
wecandetectthepresenceorabsenceoflifeinbodieslargeenoughtobedistinctlyperceivedby
oursenses.Hespeaksofastudyofnaturethatwouldenableusto"judgeoftheforms[ofcorporeal
substances]bycomparingtheirorgansandoperations"(LA122).
TheprincipalcharacteristicoflivingbodiesthatLeibnizmentionsasdistinguishingthemfrom
otherportionsofmatteristhattheyare"organized"or"organic.""Thereis...noanimatedbody
withoutorgans"(LA124);"Irestrictcorporealorcompositesubstancetolivingthingsalone,or
exclusivelytoorganicmachinesofnature"(GII,520/AG205f.).Ihavefoundlittleexplanationin
Leibnizofwhatdistinguishesorganicfrominorganicbodies.Itisnotaradicaldifferenceinthe
kindofcausalitythatoperatesinthem.Leibnizalwaysinsiststhateverythingcanbeexplained
mechanicallyinorganicaswellasininorganicbodies.Thereisnoneedtorefertothesubstantial
formsorsoulsofcorporealsubstancesinexplainingtheirphysicalbehavior(e.g.,LA58,77f.):"And
thisbodyisorganicwhenitformsakindofAutomatonorMachineofNature,whichisamachine
notonlyasawholebutalsointhesmallestpartsthatcanbenoticed"(PNG3;cf.GIII,356).
Similarly,hespeaksof"Organism,thatistosay,orderandartifice"(GIII,340).Presumably,an
organicbodyisonesoorganizedmechanicallythatitcontinuesovertimetocohereandretaina
sortofunityinphysicalinteractions.Butstoneshavethatproperty,too,soitisnotenoughto
distinguishorganicbodiesfromothers.
Perhapsthebestaccountthatcanbegivenofthenotionoforganismhereisthatanorganicbodyis
abodysostructuredmechanicallythatitcanbeinterpretedasalwaystotallyexpressingandbeing
expressedbytheperceptionsandappetitesofasoulorsomethinganalogoustoasoul.We
recognizelivingthingsbyobservingthattheirbehaviorcanbeinterpretedasacoordinated
responsetotheirenvironmentonthebasisofsomethinglikeperceptionoftheenvironmenttogether
withatendencytowardsomethinglikeagoalthoughLeibnizwould
263
insistthattheirbehaviorcanalsobeexplainedmechanically.Thisaccountfitsanimalsbetterthan
plants,butitisclearinanycasethatLeibniz'sprincipalmodelofcorporealsubstanceistheanimal.
Hementionsplantsonlyoccasionallyandseemsfavorablydisposedtowardthesuggestionthat
they"canbeincludedinthesamegenuswithanimals,andareimperfectanimals"(LA122).
Soinorganicbodies,bodiesinnosensealive,arenotcorporealsubstances.Butmorethanthatin
thetermsthatLeibnizultimatelypreferrednobodiesatallaresubstances,notevenorganic
bodies.Thereareimportanttextsfrom1686inwhichLeibnizframesthecorporealsubstance
hypothesisintermsof"bodies"beingsubstances(DM34,LA58,71),butinamorecarefully
regimentedvocabularyusually(thoughnotinvariably 1)employedfrom1690on,corporeal
substancesarenotsaidtobebodies,butrathertobeendowedwithbodies.
ThisregimentationismanifestedinverysimilartermsintwodocumentsofMarch1690,oneof
whichisLeibniz'slastlettertoAntoineArnauld:"Thebodyisanaggregateofsubstances,andthat
isnotasubstance,properlyspeaking"(LA135)."Thebodyisnotasubstance,butsubstancesoran
aggregateofsubstances"(VE2156=FC322/AG105).Thesedocumentsarenotplausibly
interpretedasabandoningtheprojectofconstructingatheoryofcorporealsubstance.Itisunlikely
thatLeibnizwouldhavesignaledsuchanabandonmenttoArnauld,especiallywhentheirrelations
wereasdistantastheyhadbecomeby1690.Thereisstillacorporealsubstance,butitisnot"the
body."ThechangeinLeibniz'spositionismerelyverbal,oratmostaclarification.Thedistinction
markedbythelaterterminologyisanticipatedinlettersof168687toArnauld.Ourbodyisnota
substancereallydistinctfromoursoul:
Ourbodyinitself,settingasidethesoul,orthecadaver,cannotbecalledonesubstance
exceptbyanabuse[ofwords],likeamachineorapileofstones,whichareonlybeings
byaggregation.(LA75)
Asforcorporealsubstances,Iholdthatthemass,whenoneconsidersinitonlywhatis
divisible,isapurephenomenon.(LA126)
Insofarasthebodyisconsideredapartfromthesoul,thedivisiblefromtheindivisible,thebodyis
notasubstance.Thisnonsubstantialitemisthe"bodyinitself"or,inthetermsLeibnizultimately
preferred,simply"thebody."Thecorporealsubstanceissomethingmore.
Insometextsfromthemid1680sphenomenalismandthehypothesisofcorporealsubstanceseem
tobepresentedasmutuallyexclusivealternatives,aswhenLeibnizsays,"ifbodyisasubstance
andnotasimplephenomenonliketherainbow"(LA58;cf.LA77,andDM34draft).Butthisisa
misleadingappearance,duetoLeibniz'sfailureinthesetextstodistinguishthecorporealsubstance
fromitsbodyasheeventuallywouldwhenspeakingcarefully.Whenthatdistinctionismade,the
bodyassuchisonlyanaggregate,andhenceonlyaphenomenonandthatappliestobothorganic
andinorganicbodies(GIII,657).Thesubstantialityofthecorporealsubstanceiscontributedbyits
indivisible,soullikeconstituents.Thusthecorporealsubstanceremainsametaphysical
constructionoutofsimplesubstances.
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1
In1711,forexample,wefindhimallowingthealternative:"Abody,however,iseitheracorporeal
substance,oramassgatheredfromcorporealsubstances"(GVII,501).
264
"Thebody"appearsasmerelyoneingredientinafullydevelopedaccountofLeibniziancorporeal
substance.Itistimetoexaminethecomplexstructureimpliedinsuchanaccount.
2.TheStructureofaCorporealSubstance:AlternativeInterpretations
2.1TheTwoSubstanceConception
Leibniz'sfulleststatementaboutthestructureofacorporealsubstanceisinaletterof20June1703
toBurcherDeVolder:
Idistinguishtherefore(1)theprimitiveEntelechyorSoul,(2)Matter,i.e.primary
matter,orprimitivepassivepower,(3)theMonadcompletedbythesetwo,(4)theMass
[Massa]orsecondarymatter,ororganicmachine,forwhichcountlesssubordinate
Monadscometogether[adquam...concurrunt],(5)theAnimalorcorporeal
substance,whichismadeOnebytheMonaddominatingtheMachine.(GII,252/
L530f.)
Thefirstthreeoftheseitems,andtheirrelationtoeachother,willoccupyusintensivelyin
Chapters1113;theycanbediscussedquitebrieflyhere.Themonad(3)is"asimplesubstance...;
simple,thatistosaywithoutparts"(Mon1).Theprimitiveentelechy(1)andprimarymatter(2)
mustnot,therefore,beconceivedaspartsthatcomposethemonad,butratherasaspectsor
propertiesofthemonad.Inparticular,primarymatterisnottobeunderstoodhereasasubstanceor
extendedstuff.Itisprimitivepassivepowerandisafundamentalpropertyoraspectofthemonad.
'Entelechy'issometimesusedbyLeibniz(asinMon18,6263)asasynonymfor'monad'or'simple
substance';butheretheentelechyclearlyisnotthecompletemonad,butapropertyoraspectofit.
Sinceitgoestogetherwithprimitivepassivepowertoformthemonad,theentelechyhereis
presumablythemonad'sprimitiveactivepower.Inotherpassagesthe"substantialform"isgiven
therolethatisassignedheretothe"entelechy."Itisstrikingthatthe"soul"isnotidentifiedhere
withthemonad,butwithanaspectofit,andispresumablynotasubstancebutsomethingthatcan
beconsideredasanentityonlybyabstractionfromacompletesubstanceormonad.Thisisone
wayinwhichLeibnizsometimesspeaksofthe"soul,"thoughitappearsinothertextsasasimple
substanceormonad(e.g.,Mon19).
Theprimitiveforcesthatcombinethusto"complete"themonadaremostfundamentalfeaturesof
theLeibnizianschemeofthings.Leibnizheldthat"theverysubstanceofthingsconsistsinthe
forceofactingandbeingactedon"(GIV,508/L502;cf.GII,248f.AL528).Theproperties
possessedbymonadsassuchareperceptionsandappetites,oranalogoustoperceptionsand
appetites,asLeibnizwrotetoDeVolderon30June1704(GII,270/L537).Inhisnextletter,
Leibnizdrewtheconsequencethat"primitiveforcesmanifestlycannotbeanythingbutinternal
tendenciesofsimplesubstances,bywhichaccordingtoacertainlawoftheirnaturetheypassfrom
2
perceptiontoperception"(GII,275/AG181).
____________________
2
Therelationbetweenforcesaspropertiesofmonadsandforcesaspropertiesofbodieswillbe
discussedinChapter13.
265
Mypresentpurposedemandsmoreattentiontothemass,orsecondarymatter(4),whichcombines
withthemonadtoformthecompletecorporealsubstance.Thisis"thebody,"whichisnotitselfa
substancebutbelongstothecorporealsubstance.
Inspeakinghereof"secondaymatter,"andearlierof"primarymatter,"Leibnizpicksupa
Scholasticdistinction.Inrelationtoastatue,thebronzeofwhichitiscomposedismatter;butas
bronzeitisnotpurematter,foritmusthaveasubstantialformtoconstituteitasbronze.Something
whichinthiswayismatterforsomethingelse,butwhichhasitsownformorformsinit,is
secondarymatter.Primaryorprime 3matterispurematter,matterconsideredapartfromallforms
thatmayinhereinit.The"mass"mentionedhereissecondarymatterinsofarasithassubstantial
forms"in"itbyvirtueofthecountlesssubordinatemonadsthat"cometogether"toformit.
Itisimportant,however,tonoteamajordifferencebetweentheScholasticconceptionofthe
relationbetweenprimaryandsecondarymatterandtheconceptioninthefivefoldoutlinethat
LeibnizgaveDeVolder.ForScholasticismtheprimarymatterofasubstanceisasubstratum,and
henceaconstituent,ofanysecondarymatterithas.ButLeibnizdescribesthemtoDeVolderas
muchmoreseparatethanthat,presentingtheprimarymatterofacorporealsubstanceasanaspect
ofitsdominatingmonad,whereasitssecondarymatterisformedbythecomingtogetherofother
(subordinate)monads.
Themassofsecondarymatterofacorporealsubstanceisanorganicmachine,asLeibnizsaysin
hisfivefoldoutline,ortheorganicbodyofthesubstance,ashemoreoftensays.Noteverymassof
secondarymatterisanorganicbody;inorganicbodiesarealsomassesofsecondarymatter.But
onlyanorganicbodycanbethebodyofacorporealsubstance.Nomassofsecondarymatter,
organicorinorganic,isinitselfasubstance.Theorganicbody,"takenseparately(thatis,apart,or
isolated,fromthesoul)isnotonesubstancebutanaggregateofmany"(GIV,396/AG252f.)."And
secondarymatter(asforexampletheorganicbody)isnotasubstance"because"itisamassof
severalsubstances,likealakefulloffish,orlikeaherdofsheep,andconsequentlyitiswhatis
calledOneperaccidensinaword,aphenomenon"(GIII,657).Amassofsecondarymatter,as
such,isthusmerelyaphenomenonbecauseitisanaggregateofsubstancesandperhapsforother
4
reasonsaswell.
AccordingtoLeibniz,everycreatedmonadhasanorganicbodyofthissort,withwhichitformsa
corporealsubstance(GIV,395f./AG252f.;GVII,502,530;cf.Mon6263).Themonadalwayshas
itsbody,andhencetheorganicbodyisanenduring,thoughconstructedandmerelyphenomenal,
objectpermanentlyattachedtoitsdominantmonad(GII,251/L530).Evenindeath,itdoesnot
ceasetoexist,itdoesnotceasetobeorganic;itjustundergoesasudden,drasticreductioninsize
andachangeinitsoperations(e.g.,PNG6).Thepartsofanorganicbodydonotbelongtoit
permanently,however."Itistruethatthewholewhich
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3
Theterms,inScholasticLatin,andinLeibniz'sLatinandFrench,literallymeanfirstmatterand
secondmatter;butIthinkitworksoutbesttouse'primary'and'secondary'intranslatingand
discussingLeibniz.
4
Ontheconnectionbetweenbeinganaggregateandbeingaphenomenon,seeChapter9,section
3.2.
266
hasatrueunitycanremainstrictlythesameindividualeventhoughitlosesorgainsparts,aswe
experienceinourselves;thusthepartsareimmediaterequisitesonlyforatime"(LA120).The
substancesthatareincludedinanorganicbodycanbereplacedwithothersubstancesaslongasthe
bodyretainsthenecessaryorgansandthesamedominantmonad(Mon7172).
Thecorporealsubstance(5)formedinthiswayisnotanaggregate,butoneperse,accordingto
Leibniz.Henceitisnotamerephenomenon;corporealsubstanceisregularlycontrastedwiththe
phenomenal(LA77;GVII,314,322/MP81,L365;GII,435/L600).Butthecorporealsubstance
appearstobecomposedofamonadandanorganicbody,andthusnottobesimpleinthewaythat
monadsare.Howthencanitbeoneperse?Theanswergiveninthisoutlineisthatthecorporeal
substance"ismadeOnebytheMonaddominatingtheMachine."Thisstatementgivesrisetoat
leasttwoquestions:Howdoesamonad"dominate"itsorganicbodyor"Machine"?Howdoesthis
dominationmakethecorporealsubstanceoneperse?Thesequestionswillbethemaintopicsof
sections4and5,respectively,inthischapter.Butanotherissuewilloccupyusintherestofsection
2andinsection3.
IntheoutlineIhavebeenfollowing,Leibnizclearlydistinguishesthecorporealsubstance(5)both
fromitsorganicmachineandfromitsdominantmonad.Itissomethingformedbythecombination
ofthesetwoandcanbedescribedas"theCompositeof"them(GIII,657).Twodifferentsortsof
"substance"appearintheaccountwhenLeibnizsaysthatacorporealsubstance"consistsina
simplesubstance....andanorganicbodyunitedtoit"(GVII,501).This"composite"or"two
substance"conceptionofthestructureofacorporealsubstance,aswemaycallit,clearlyappearsin
anumberofplacesinLeibniz'swritingsunambiguously,forexample,inatextdatingverylikely
fromabout1712inwhichhesays,"Asubstanceiseithersimple,likeasoul,whichhasnoparts,or
composite,likeananimal,whichisconstitutedofasoulandanorganicbody"(C13/MP175). 5I
knowofnotextthatisflatlyinconsistentwithit,butalltheclearestarticulationsIhavefoundofit
areintextsof1703orlater.Some,thoughnotall,earliertexts,maybemorenaturallyinterpreted
asexpressingalternativeconceptions,whichIwantnowtoexplore.
2.2OneSubstanceConceptions
Insomeofthemostinterestingpassagesfromthe1680sand1690sinwhichLeibnizpresentsa
conceptionofcorporealsubstance,thereisnounambiguousindicationthathethinksofthe
corporealsubstanceashavingaconstituent,distinctfromit,thatisanindividualsubstanceof
anothersort.Thesetextsseemtoinviteinterpretationintermsofaonesubstanceconceptionof
corporealsubstance.Butwhatistheonesubstance?Intermsofthefivepartoutlineof1703,isit
themonad?Orisitthecompositesubstanceofthetwosubstanceconception?Bothinterpretations
havesomeclaimonourattention.
ThosewhoemphasizetheAristoteliancharacterofLeibniz'sthoughtinthe1680sand1690smight
betemptedtoembracewhatcouldbecalledtheAristotelian
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5
AnothertextforthetwosubstanceconceptionisRML451/AG264(1712and1715).
267
6Itrecognizesnothingcorrespondingtothemonadofthetwo
telianonesubstanceinterpretation.
substanceconception,becauseitsonesubstanceresemblesthecompositesubstanceofthetwo
substanceconceptioninhavingtheorganicbodyasaconstituent.Thedistinctivefeatureofthis
viewisthatthesubstantialformorsouldoesnotformaconcreteindividualsubstanceatallexcept
byunitingwiththesecondarymatterthatconstitutestheorganicbody.Thatisarguablypartof
Aristotle'sownconceptionoftherelationofasubstantialformtoabodyofwhichitistheform;
andLeibnizsometimesspeaksofthesoulasthesubstantialformofthebody.Hedoesso,for
instance,intheletterofNovember/December1686inwhichhefirstexplainshisconceptionof
corporealsubstanceatlengthtoArnauld(LA77),whichisalsoadocumentthatcontainsnoexplicit
indicationthatLeibnizistalkingabouttwodifferentkindsofsubstance.
ThisisnotagoodargumentfortheAristotelianonesubstanceinterpretation,however.Leibnizwas
notgenerallyscrupulousaboutinterpretingaccordingtotheirownintentionsthosephilosophers
withwhomheclaimedanagreement.InanyeventtheAristotelianismthathemeantinsome
measuretorevivewastheChristianAristotelianismofthelaterMiddleAges,forwhichatleastone
substantialform,thehumanrationalsoul,wascertainlyaconcreteindividualsubstancethatcould,
anddid,survivewithoutitsbody.Sinceitisabundantlyclearthatthehumanrationalsoulwas
alwaysregardedasthemodelforallsubstantialformsinLeibniz'srehabilitationproject,his
awarenessoftraditionalantecedentswouldinclinehimtoconceiveofsubstantialformsasconcrete
individualsubstances.
Moreover,thereiscompellingevidencethatinhisletterstoArnauld,Leibnizrecognizedasa
concreteindividualsubstancesomethingcorrespondingtothemonadofthetwosubstance
conception.Thisisexplicitwhenhesaysof"asoulorsubstantialformaftertheexampleofthat
whichiscalledI[moi]"that"thesearetheonlygenuinecomplete[accompli]beings"(LA76).The
soulorsubstantialformhereispresumablythethirditeminthefivefoldoutline,thecomplete
monad,asitisinanumberoftextsofLeibniz(e.g.,GVI,550).Itcannotbethefirstitem,the
primitiveactiveforce,whichisnotacompletebeing,butonlyanaspectofone.Moreover,inhis
lastlettertoArnauld(23March1690),Leibnizsaysthat"everywhereinbodytherearesubstances,
indivisible,ingenerable,andincorruptible,"which"havealwaysbeenandalwayswillbeunitedto
organicbodies,diverselytransformable"(LA135f.).HereLeibnizspeaksexplicitlyofsubstances
whoserelationtoorganicbodiesisbeingunitedtothem,nothavingthemasconstituents. 7
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6
DanielGarberdoesnotembraceit,butseemstofavortheAristotelianversionofthetwosubstance
interpretationdiscussedinsection2.3inthischapter.SeeGarber,"LeibnizandtheFoundationsof
Physics,"p.58.
7
Thatacompletebeingorsubstancethatcanbeidentifiedwiththesoulorsubstantialformis
presentinLeibniz'sviewinhisletterstoArnauldisconvincingly,andmorefully,arguedbyRobert
Sleigh,LeibnizandArnauld,pp.109f.WhatIamcallingtheAristotelianonesubstance
conceptionisroughlyequivalenttothe"unmodifiedcorporealsubstancetheory"whichSleigh
arguesisnotfavoredbythetextsofDMandLA.Theonlyotherconceptionofcorporealsubstance
thatSleighconsiders,however,isatwosubstanceconception.Hedoesnotdiscussthe"qualified
monadconception"thatIamabouttodescribe.TheexistenceofSleigh'silluminatingandclosely
arguedstudyisonereasonwhyIhavenotselectedthesetextsformoreintensivetreatmenthere.
268
IftheAristotelianinterpretationisuntenable,asIbelieveittobe,onemightthinkthatnoone
substanceinterpretationcouldbeaccepted.Weareconcerned,afterall,withtextsinwhichLeibniz
presentsaconceptionofcorporealsubstance.Sohowcouldtherebeonlyonetypeofsubstance
recognizedinthemifitisnotthecompletecorporealsubstanceofthetwosubstanceconception?
Thereremainsanalternative,however,whichwassuggestedlongagobyErnstCassirer.He
identifiedcorporealsubstancewiththemonaditself"insofarasitisendowedwithaparticular
organicbody,accordingtowhichitrepresentsanddesires." 8Themonadcanbecalledacorporeal
substanceinasmuchasithasabody.Acorporealsubstance,onthisview,isnotamonadplusa
body,butamonadashavingabody.Wemaythereforecallthisthe"qualifiedmonadconception"
ofcorporealsubstance.
ItmaybedoubtedthatLeibnizwouldapplythelabel'corporeal'toanentitythatdidnothavea
bodyasaconstituent,butthereisapassagefrom1686inwhichhesaysthat"therealityofa
corporealsubstanceconsistsinsomeindividualnature,thatis,notinmass[moles]butinthepower
ofactingandbeingactedon"(GVII,314/MP81).In1696,likewise,helocates"thenotionof
corporealsubstance....intheforceofactingandresistingratherthaninextention"(GIV,499/
L460).Ineachofthesestatementscorporealsubstanceissaidtoconsistin,belocatedin,orbe
completedbyadualpowerorapairofentitiesinwhichwecanunmistakablyrecognizethe
entelechyandprimarymatterbywhich,inthefivefoldoutlineofthetwosubstancetheory,the
monad,notthecompositesubstance,iscompleted. 9?Theorganicbodyorsecondarymatterisnot
mentionedasaconstituentofcorporealsubstanceinthesestatements.
Similarpointscouldbemadeaboutapassagefrom1702inwhichLeibnizsaysthat"theprimitive
activeforce,whichiscalledthefirstentelechybyAristotle,andpopularlythesubstance'sform,is
theothernaturalprinciplewhich,withthematterorpassiveforce,completesthecorporeal
substance."Inthiscase,however,Leibnizgoesontosaythatthesoulorentelechy"always
naturallyactuatessomeorganicbody,whichitself,takenseparately(thatis,apart,orisolated,from
thesoul),isnotonesubstancebutanaggregateofseveralinaword,amachineofnature"(G
IV,395f./AG252f.)."Actuates"[actuat]isScholasticterm,rarelyusedbyLeibniz,forwhataform
doestomatterwhosepotentialityitactualizes.10TheclauseinwhichLeibnizusesitherecertainly
seemstoimplythatbyitsrelationtothesoulorentelechy,theorganicbodyenters(presumablyas
aconstituent)intosomethingmoresubstantialthanitcouldbebyitself.
2.3CompleteandIncompleteSubstances
ThereisarefinementinScholasticAristotelianaccountsofcorporealsubstancethatIhaveignored
thusfar.AccordingtoFranciscoSurez,forexample,both
____________________
10
See,e.g.,Surez,MetaphysicalDisputations,XV,vii,3.
8
Cassirer,Leibniz'sSystem,p.408.In"PhenomenalismandCorporealSubstanceinLeibniz,"p.
229,1tookalessfavorableviewofCassirer'sinterpretationthanIdonow.
9
Somethingsimilarcouldbesaidaboutapassagewrittenin1699or1700andtransmittedtoLocke
byThomasBurnett,amutualfriend(AVl,vi,32=GIII,227).Butarelatedletterof1699toBurnett
(GIII,260)isnotsonaturallyinterpretedintermsofthequalifiedmonadconception.
269
thecorporealsubstance(suchasahumanbeing)anditssubstantialform(suchasthehumansoul)
aresubstances,butonlythewholecorporealsubstanceisacompletesubstance.Notthatthe
substantialformisamereabstraction;ittooisaconcrete,individualsubstance,asisclearinthe
caseofthehumansoul.Butitisanincompletesubstancebecauseitis"byitsnatureconstructed
[institutus]toinformmatter,"andthustobecompletedbythematter.Ithasthisnatural"aptitude"
evenifitisabletoexistwithoutthematter;"andthustherationalsoulisincluded[intheclassof
incompletesubstances]evenifitisseparatedfromthebody."Athirdtypeofconcretesubstance
alsoentersthepictureforSurez;thematter,likethesubstantialform,is"asimpleandincomplete
substance"incompletebecauseithasanaturalaptitudetobecompletedbytheform.11
LeibnizcertainlydoesnotshareSurez'sviewofmatter.MatterforLeibniziseithersecondary
matter,whichisnotasimplesubstancebutonlyapluralityoraggregateofsubstances,orprimary
matter,whichforLeibniz(unlikeSurez)isnevermorethananabstraction,andthusnotaconcrete
substance,aswillbediscussedmorefullyinChapter12.ItmightbethoughtthatLeibnizand
Surezareasfarapartonsubstantialformsasonmatter,sinceLeibnizreferstosubstantialforms
as"complete[accompli]beings"(LA76).Butsuchstatementsmustbereadinthelightofother
textsinwhichLeibnizseemstofollowScholasticprecedentinviewingsubstantialformsas
incompletesubstances.
WritingtoDamarisCudworthMasham,forexample,on30June1704,Leibnizagreeswithherthat
thereareno"completesubstanceswithoutextension...amongcreatures,"andgoesontosaythat
"soulsorformswithoutbodieswouldbesomethingincomplete,inasmuchas,inmyopinion,the
soulisneverwithoutananimalorsomeanalogue"(GIII,357).Thisseemstoimplythatthesoul
needsits(organic)body,andnotjustitsprimarymatter,toformacompletesubstance,andthus
thatnothinglikethe"monad"ofthetwosubstanceconceptioncouldbeacompletesubstance.
Itisnotplausibleinthiscontext,however,toseeLeibnizasholdingtheAristotelianonesubstance
conception,inwhichthereisnoconcretesubstanceatallcorrespondingtothe"monad"ofthetwo
substanceconception.ForthistextisdatedontheverysamedayastheletterinwhichLeibnizsaid
toDeVolderthat"thereisnothinginthingsexceptsimplesubstances,andinthemperceptionand
appetite"(GII,270/L537).These"simplesubstances"aresurelythe"monads"ofthetwo
substanceinterpretation.InthislettertoLadyMasham,moreover,Leibnizsays,"Iholdthatitis
notmatterthatthinks,butaBeingthatissimpleandapartbyitselforindependent,joinedto
matter"(GIII,355/AG290).Thissimpleandseparatebeingissurelythe"monad"ofthetwo
substanceconception,whichappearstobepresentinthisletter,butregardedasanincomplete
substance,inlinewithScholasticconceptions.
AfullerexpressionofLeibniz'sinterestinthedistinctionbetweencompleteandincomplete
substancesisfoundinapassagewrittenprobablyabout1699.12Inthecourseofarguing,against
occasionalism,thattheagreementofsoulandbodyisnotsupernaturalbutnatural,Leibnizsays:
____________________
11
Surez,MetaphysicalDisputations,XV,v,12;cf.XXXIII,I,11.
12
Thedateissuggestedbythefactthatthetextisaresponsetosomethingthatappearedinthe
journaldesSavantsinSeptember1698.
270
TheopinionoftheSchool,thatthesoulandmatterareincompleteinaway[ont
quelquechosed'incomplet],isnotsoabsurdasisthought.Formatterwithoutsoulsand
formsorentelechiesisonlypassive,andsoulswithoutmatterareonlyactive,sincethe
completecorporealSubstance,trulyone,whichtheSchoolcallsoneperse(asopposed
toaBeingbyaggregation)mustresultfromtheprincipleofunitywhichisactiveand
themass[masse]whichmakesthemultitudeandwhichwouldbepurelypassiveifit
containedonlyprimarymatter.(GIV,572)
LeibnizpurportsheretobedefendingtheScholasticviewofformandmatterasincompletebeings.
Butthematterandformsofwhichheproceedsatoncetospeakarenottheconcretebutincomplete
substancesofSurez,butratherthefirsttwoofthefiveitemsoftheoutlineof1703,theentelechy
orsoulwhichismerelyactiveandtheprimarymatterwhichismerelypassive.Thesearemere
abstractions(asIwillshowinChapter12,sections23),andassuchtheyarecertainlyincomplete,
butwithanincompletenessmoreradicalthanthatofSurez'smatterandsubstantialform,which
areparticularconcretebeings.
Theoneitemofthefiveintheoutlineof1703thatisnotmentionedinthepassagebeforeusisthe
third,the"monad"ofthetwosubstancetheory."Themasswhichmakesthemultitude"isplausibly
takentobethefourthitem,secondaryratherthanprimarymatter,andthisinterpretationis
confirmedbythestatementthatitwouldbepurelypassiveifitcontainedonlyprimarymatter,
whichcarriestheimplicationthatitinfactcontainssomethingmorewhichmakesitpartlyactive.
"ThecompletecorporealSubstance"mentionedhereispresumablythefifthitemoftheoutlineof
1703,thecompositesubstanceratherthanthesimplesubstanceofthetwosubstancetheory.The
passage'ssilenceaboutthelattersuggeststhequestionofwhetherthetextexpressesthe
Aristotelianonesubstanceconceptionofcorporealsubstance.
ThatconceptionisfurthersuggestedbythefactthatLeibnizsaysherethatthecorporealsubstance
resultsfromtheactiveprincipleofunityandthemassthatmakesthemultitude.Thisseemsto
implythattheorganicbodyormultitudinousmassofsecondarymatterunitesdirectlywiththe
(abstract)soulorsubstantialformthatis,withthefirstratherthanthethirditemintheoutline.
ThatisadistinctivefeatureoftheAristotelianonesubstanceconception.Inboththetwosubstance
andthequalifiedmonadconception,the(abstract)soulorsubstantialformunitesfirstwiththe
primarymattertoformthemonad,andthemonadasawholerelatestotheorganicbody.
TheAristotelianonesubstancereadingofthedocumentisnotplausible,however.Adirectunion
oftheabstractsubstantialformorentelechywithsecondaryratherthanprimarymatterdoesnotfit
thedemandsoftheargumentaboutincompleteness.Foritisasmerelyactivethattheentelechyis
incomplete,anditisprimarymatterthatistheprincipleofpassivity.Henceitshouldbeaunion
withprimaryratherthansecondarymatterthatisrequiredtobringthesoulorformtocompletion.
Theapparentimplicationofourtext,thatthesoulorsubstantialformunitesdirectlywiththe
secondarymatterororganicbody,mayperhapsbestbeaccountedforasanellipsisormetonymy
thatleavestheprimarymatteroutofaccount,lettingthesoulorformstandforthecomplete
271
monad.Leibnizwascapableofthis,Ithink,becausehewasalwaysmuchmoreinterestedinthe
substantialformthanintheprimarymatter.
Moreover,theconcretesimplesubstance,the"monad"ofthefivefoldoutline,isimplicitlypresent
inthecontinuationofourtext.Leibnizsays:
Whereasthesecondarymatterormass[masse]whichconstitutesourbodyhasparts
throughoutwhicharecompletesubstancesthemselves,whiletheseareotheranimalsor
separatelyanimatedoractuatedorganicsubstances.Butthemass[amas]ofthese
organizedcorporealsubstanceswhichconstitutesourbodyisnotunitedwithourSoul
exceptbythatrelationwhichfollowstheorderofphenomenathatarenaturaltoeach
substanceseparately.Andallofthisshowshowitcanbesaid,ontheonehand,thatthe
soulandthebodyareindependentofeachother,andontheotherhand,thattheoneis
incompletewithouttheothersincetheoneisnevernaturallywithouttheother.(G
IV,572f.)
TwofeaturesofwhatissaidhereaboutincompletenessdistinguishitfromLeibniz'sstatementson
thesamesubjectearlierinthedocument.
1."Thesoulandthebody"thataresaidheretobeincompletearenotthefirsttwoitemsofthe
fivefoldoutline,butthethirdandfourth.That"thebody"hereisthefourthitem,theorganicbody,
isobvious.ThisofcourseisneverasubstanceinLeibniz'smaturewritings,butatmostan
aggregateofsubstances.Itisthereforenotanincompletesubstance,andLeibnizdoesnotsaythat
itis,butonlythatitis"incomplete."
"Thesoul,"Ithink,isnotonlyincompletebutanincompletesubstancehere,beingthe"monad"of
thefivefoldoutline.Thismaybelessobvious,butpresenceofthe"monad"inthispassageis
impliedbythestatementthatthesoulisunitedtothesecondarymatterororganicbodyonlybya
harmonyoftheinternalproperties(the"phenomena")ofseparatesubstances.Itfollowsthatthe
soulmusthavesomephenomenaseparately,andmusthavethemprior,metaphysically,toitsunion
withthemassofothersubstancesthatconstituteitsorganicbody.Thisitcandoonlyifitis(orisa
constituentof)aconcreteindividualsubstancethatisconstitutedindependentlyoftheorganic
body.Whatwouldthissubstancebe,ifnotthe"monad"ofthetwosubstancetheory?Andthe
ascriptionofincompletenessheresurelyappliestothissubstance.
Whatweseemtohaveinthispassage,therefore,isnotanAristotelianonesubstanceconceptionof
thestructureofacorporealsubstance,butaversionofthetwosubstanceconceptioninwhichthe
simplemonadisanincompletesubstance,andonlythewholecompositecorporealsubstanceisa
completesubstance.WemightthinkofthisasanAristoteliantwosubstanceconception,asitis
arguablymoreAristotelian,ormoreScholastic,thanthesimplerversionofthetwosubstance
conceptionpresentedearlierinsection2.1.Althoughhedoesnotexpressitveryfullyorveryoften
inhiswritings,IbelievethatthisAristotelianversionofthetwosubstanceconceptionistheview
thatmostadequatelyrealizesLeibniz'saimsintryingtoincorporateaversionoftheScholastic
theoryofcorporealsubstanceintohisphilosophy.
2.Theotherdistinctivefeatureoftheclaimabouttheincompletenessofsoulandbodythat
concludesthequotedpassageisthereasongivenforit:"sincetheoneisnevernaturallywithoutthe
other."Theword'naturally'isimportanthere;
272
itisnotanidlequalifier.Sayingthatthesoulisnever"naturally"withoutthebodyleavesopenthe
possibilitythatthesoulcouldexistwithoutthebodybythepowerofGod,thoughthatwouldbe
unnatural.13TheLeibnizianreasonforthinkingitunnaturalisthatitwouldbeinconsistentwith
theharmonyofthings,assuggestedbytheimplicationinourtextthatthesoulisunitedwithits
bodybytheharmonyoftheperceptionsofthesubstancesinvolved.
ThisisimportantforLeibniz'sconceptionoftheunityofacorporealsubstance,andinthat
connectionIwillreturntothistextinsection5.ForthepresentIwantrathertoemphasizethatthe
incompletenessthatsoulandbodyhavebyvirtueofthefactthattheharmonyofperceptions
demandsthateachbe"completed"orcomplementedbytheotherismuchlessradicalthanthe
incompletenessthatmerelyactiveandmerelypassiveprinciplesinasubstancehavebyvirtueof
theirbeingmereabstractions.Theincompletenessofmereabstractions,assertedearlierinthetext,
issoradicalthatitmaybedoubtedwhethertheycouldbemadetoexistseparatelyevenbythe
powerofGod.14Itisthusmoreradicalalsothantheincompletenessofincompletesubstancesfor
Surez,sinceheheldthatsubstantialformsand(primary)mattercanbemadetoexistseparately
fromeachotherbythepowerofGod.15
Inthisrespect,indeed,evenLeibniz'sclaimof"natural"inseparabilityseemsstrongerthanSurez
wouldacceptwithoutqualification,forSurezheldthatonesubstantialform,therationalsoul,"is
ableevennaturallytoremainwithoutmatter,"16thoughithasanatural"aptitude"toinformmatter.
Comparisononthispointisdifficult,andperhapsdubious,however,becausewecannotassume
thatSurezandLeibnizhadthesameconceptionofthedifferencebetweenwhatisnaturaland
whatisnot.
Notonlydowethushavemoreandlessradicalclaimsofincompleteness,butalso,Ibelieve,
Leibnizusesthelanguageofcompletenessandincompletenessincorrespondinglydifferentsenses
indifferentcontexts.Thusbodyandsoulareincomplete,becausenot"naturally"separable,inthe
contextwehavebeendiscussing.Thesoulthatisthusincompleteisa"complete[accompli]being"
inanothercontext(LA76),however,anditis"completed,"becauserenderedconcrete,bytheunion
ofactiveandpassiveprinciplesinit(GII,252).17Inonesense
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13
WehaveseeninChapter3,section3,that,whilethetextualevidenceisnotunambiguous,Leibniz
seemstohavebelievedthatitwaswithinthepowerofGodtocreateasinglesubstancewithoutthe
othersthatarerepresentedbyitsperceptions,andhencepresumablytocreateasoulwithoutthe
othersubstancesthatwouldformitsorganicbody.
14
Leibnizatleastdoubtedit.Aboutthesametimeasthetextwehavebeenstudyinghewrotealetter
toJohnBernoulli,discussedmorefullyinChapter12,section3,inwhichhedeclinedtoanswerthe
question(GMIII,560/AG169f.).ButIthinkthisexpressesonlyareverentialcautionratherthana
realuncertainty.Icanseenoreasoninhisphilosophyforacceptinganypossibilityofseparate
existenceforabstractions,andnoevidenceinthetextsthathedidacceptit.
15
Surez,MetaphysicalDisputations,XV,ix,13.
16
Surez,MetaphysicalDisputations,XV,ix,1.
17
ThispointisobscuredatL530f.andAG177,becauseneithertranslationrenderscompletamby
"completed."IncompletenessseemslikewisetobeamatterofabstractnesswhenLeibnizsaysthat
secondarymatteris"acompletesubstancebutnotmerelypassive,"whereasprimarymatter"is
merelypassivebutisnotacompletesubstance"(GIV,512/L504),buttheclassificationof
secondarymatterhereas"asubstance"ofanysortisapieceofsloppiness,sinceLeibnizatthetime
(1698)wasinsistingthat"secondarymatter...isnotasubstance,butsubstances"(GMIII,537/
AG167).
273
itistheabstractthatisincomplete(seeChapter12,sections23);intheothersense"natural"
inseparabilityisenoughforincompleteness.18
Icannotclaim,however,thatLeibnizkeptthesesensesclearlydistinctinhiswriting.Forexample,
inapassagewrittenforanotherlettertoLadyMasham,thoughapparentlynotsenttoher,Leibniz
writesthat"thesoulwithoutthebodyorthebodywithoutsouls"wouldbeincomplete"asanumber
withoutnumberedthings,andadurationwithoutenduringthings"(GIII,363).Now"anumber
withoutnumberedthings,andadurationwithoutenduringthings"wouldsurelyberegardedby
Leibnizasabstractions,andincompleteonthataccount.And"the[organic]bodywithout[anyof
the]souls[ofthesubstancesinit]"wouldalsobeanabstractioninLeibniz'sview.But"thesoul
withoutthebody"(asdistinctfromthesoulwithoutprimarymatter)isincompleteonlyasnaturally
inseparable,andnotasanabstraction,exceptonanAristotelianonesubstanceinterpretation,which
isclearlyinadmissiblehere,inasmuchasthistext,onlyafewlineslater,explicitlyacknowledges
twomeaningsof'substance'whicharepreciselythetwotypesofsubstanceofthetwosubstance
conception.WemustthereforesupposethatLeibnizhascarelesslymixedexamplesofthingsthat
areincompleteinquitedifferentways.
3.TheStructureofaCorporealSubstance:SomeTexts
Anexaminationofsomeothersourcesfromtheyears16901704willyieldarichersenseofthe
difficulties,andtherelevantfactors,involvedininterpretingLeibniz'sviewsonthestructureofa
corporealsubstance.Mostofthesetextshavebeencited,ormightbe,asevidencingalessidealistic
viewthanIthinkshouldbeascribedtoLeibniz.
3.1TheFardellaMemo(1690)
ThefirstisamemorandumthatLeibnizwroteinMarch1690,inVenice,aboutsomemetaphysical
discussionshehadhad,orallyandinwriting,withMichelangeloFardella,anItalianFranciscan
friarandpriest.ThepassagemostcitedindiscussionsofLeibniz'sviewsonsubstanceisthe
following:
Idonotsaythatabodyiscomposedofsouls,northatabodyisconstitutedbyan
aggregateofsouls,butofsubstances.Moreoverthesoul,properlyandaccurately
speaking,isnotasubstance,butisasubstantialformorprimitiveformexistingina
substance;[itis]afirstactualization[actus],afirstactivefaculty.Buttheforceofthe
argumentconsistsinthis,thatabodyisnotasubstance,butsubstancesoranaggregate
ofsubstances.Thereforeeitherthereisnosubstance,andsonosubstanceseither,or
thereissomethingotherthanbody.Furthermoreevenifanaggregateofthese
substancesconstitutesabody,theystilldonotconstituteitinthemannerofapart,
sinceapartisalwayshomogeneouswiththewhole,inthesamewaythatpointsarenot
partsof
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18
Strongerandweakersensesof'incomplete'areexplicitlydistinguishedbyDescartesinaclosely
relatedcontext,ATVII,222.
274
lines.Howevertheorganicbodiesofthesubstancesincludedinanymaterialmassare
partsofthatmass....Sotherearesubstanceseverywhereinmatter,astherearepoints
inaline.Andasthereisnoportionofalineinwhichtherearenotinfinitepoints,so
thereisnoportionofmatterinwhichtherearenotinfinitesubstances.Butjustasitis
notapointthatispartofaline,butalineinwhichthepointis,soalsoitisnotthesoul
thatispartofmatter,butthebodyinwhichitis.(VE2156=FC322/AG105)19
Onemightcertainlybetemptedtotakethestatementthatthesoulisnotasubstance,strictly
speaking,becauseitisasubstantialform,asexpressingtheAristotelianonesubstancetheory,in
whichacorporealsubstancehasitsorganicbodyasaconstituentanddoesnothaveasimpler
substanceasaconstituent.Thestatementdoesnotcompelustothisinterpretation,however.In
sayingthatthesoulisnotasubstanceLeibnizcertainlyhasinmindthatitisonlyanaspectof,or
abstractionfrom,aconcretesubstance.20Thequestionis,Whatisthatconcretesubstanceofwhich
itisanaspect?Isitasubstanceofwhichtheorganicbodyisaconstituent,asintheAristotelian
onesubstanceconception?Orisitanunextendedmonad,asinthequalifiedmonadandtwo
substanceconceptions?Inthetwosubstanceconceptionasexpressedinthefivefoldoutlineof1703,
afterall,thesoulorsubstantialformisthefirstitem,whichisonlyanaspect,butanaspectofthe
thirditem,themonad,ratherthanofthefifthitem,thecompositesubstance.Andinthequalified
monadconception,asIhaveformulatedit,theone"corporeal"substanceisthethirditemofthe
fivefoldoutline,whichmaystillhavethesoulorsubstantialformasanaspectofit.Thestatement
oftheFardellamemothatthesoul,asasubstantialform,isnotasubstanceisthereforequite
consistentwithboththetwosubstanceandthequalifiedmonadconceptions.
OtherfeaturesofthetextseemtometomaketheAristotelianonesubstanceinterpretation
implausibleandthequalifiedmonadinterpretationcomparativelyplausible.Mostimportanthereis
thewayinwhichtherelationbetween"substances"andbodiesormatterislikenedtothatbetween
pointsandlines.Thiscomparisonismoreobviouslyaptifthesubstancesinquestionare
unextendedmonadsthaniftheyincorporateextendedbodiesasconstituents.
Attheendofthequotedpassage,moreover,"souls"taketheplaceof"substances"inbeingrelated
tomatteraspointsaretolines."Souls"and"substances"seemheretobeequivalent.Either'soul'
haschangeditsmeaningfromthefirsttwosentencesofthequotation,andherereferstothewhole
monad,thethirdratherthanthefirstitemofthefivefoldoutline,orelse'substance'haschangedits
meaningfromthebeginningofthepassage,andherereferstothefirstitemofthefive.Boththese
usesareattestedinotherwritingsofLeibniz.Ihavealreadynotedapassage(LA76)inwhich'soul'
mustrefertoaconcretesimplesubstance.AbitlaterinthetheFardellamemoalso,"soul,mind,
Ego"aregivenastermsforthatinme,surelyconcrete,whichsurvivesdeath(VE2157=FC323/
AG105).Ontheotherhand,Leibnizelsewhererecognizesasenseinwhich'substance'signifies
"substanceintheabstract,"whichis"thesubstanceof,"andas
____________________
19
WithrespecttothistextIdepartfrommyusualpracticeandciteVE,fromwhichItranslate,in
additiontotheotherreferences,becausethetextgiveninVEissomuchmoreadequate.
20
OntheroleofabstractioninLeibniz'sviewsonthesetopics,seeesp.AI,vii,248f.,andChapter12,
sections23.
275
suchanaspectof,aconcretesubstance(AI,vii,248f.).InthepresentcontextintheFardellamemo,
however,Ithinktheinterpretationof"substance"assubstanceintheabstractisuntenable.Forin
thetext'sfirstlikeningofsubstancestopoints,inthefifthsentence,"thesesubstances"mustsurely
refertothe(concrete)substancesofthebeginningofthequotedpassage,whicharecontrastedwith
(abstract)souls.Andifthesubstancesthatarelikenedtopointsareconcrete,thenthesoulsatthe
endofthequotation,whichseemtobeequivalenttothosesubstances,arepresumablyalso
concretesubstances,asnosoulsareinwhatIhavebeencallingtheAristotelianonesubstance
conception.
ThemeaningofthispassageturnsonLeibniz'sconceptionofthepartsofbodies.Thestatement
that"apartisalwayshomogeneouswiththewhole"isakeytothis.Abody,accordingtothe
memo,isanaggregate.Itshomogeneousparts,therefore,aresubaggregates(andthusstillbodies)
ratherthantheindivisiblenonaggregates"of"whichitisanaggregate.Thelatterwemightcall
"elements"asdistinctfrom"parts"ofthecorporealaggregate(asIhavesuggestedinChapter9,
section3.1),andIthinknothingissaidheretoprecludetheirbeing(concrete)soulsor,asIputit,
"qualifiedmonads."
Thatsomethinglikethe"monad"ofthetwosubstancetheoryplaysapartintheconceptionof
corporealsubstanceintheFardellamemoisattestedbyanotherpairofparagraphsfromit:
Hence,sinceIamtrulyasingleindivisiblesubstance,notanalyzableintoseveral
others,thepermanentandconstantsubjectofmyactionsandaffections[passiones],
theremustbe,besidestheOrganicbody,apermanentindividualsubstance,totally
differentinkindfromthenatureofbody,whichbeingplaced[positum]inthe
continuousfluxofitsparts,neverremainsthesame,butperpetuallychanges.
Inahumanbeing,therefore,besidesthebody,thereissomeincorporealsubstance,
whichisimmortal,sinceitisnotabletobeanalyzedintoparts.(VE2154=FC320/
AG104)
Itishardtobelievethatthesubstancediscussedhere,whichissomething"besidestheorganic
body"and"totallydifferentinkindfromthenatureofbody"isabeingpartlycomposedofan
organicbody,likethecompositesubstanceofthetwosubstanceconception.Itseemsrathertobe
thesimplesubstancethatappearsasthe"monad"inthetwosubstanceconception.
IfthereisonlyonesortofsubstanceintheFardellamemo,itisthelattersort,amonadorconcrete
soul.Itishardertodecidebetweenatwosubstanceandaqualifiedmonadinterpretationofthe
FardellamemothantorejecttheAristotelianonesubstanceinterpretation.Theprincipalevidence
forthequalifiedmonadinterpretationisthatthememosaysnothingtosuggestthattherearetwo
differentsortsofsubstance,relatedtobodiesinquitedifferentways,thoughsuchadistinction,if
accepted,wouldbehighlyrelevanttothediscussion.Ithinkthetextismostnaturallyreadas
talkingaboutasinglekindofsubstancethroughout,andthatisaweightyconsideration.Itisstillan
argumentfromsilence,however,andthereforefarfromconclusive.
Thereareatleastacoupleofpointsinthememoatwhichtheremaybesomereasontodoubtthat
thequalifiedmonadconceptiongivesthecorrectinterpretation.Oneisinthepassagelastquoted,
whereLeibnizspeaksofan"incorpo
276
real"substance.Ifhewasalsopreparedtospeakof"corporeal"substances,ashedidinothertexts
oftheperiod,mustnotthesebetwodifferentsortsofsubstance?Maybe;butmaybenot.This
variationcouldbemerelyverbal,themonadbeingcountedascorporealinasmuchasithasabody,
andincorporealinasmuchasitisnotabody.
AtanotherplaceinthememoLeibnizsaysitisprobablethatbeastsandplants"areconstitutednot
onlybyacorporealprinciple[corporearatione],butalsobyasoul,inaccordancewithwhichthe
beastorplant,asingleindivisiblesubstance,thepermanentsubjectofitsoperations,isled"(VE
2155=FC321/AG104).Ifwetakethistomeanthatthebeastorplantisasubstancethatis
composedofabodyandasoul,wewillhavetoconcludethatthecompositesubstance,aswellas
themonad,ofthetwosubstanceconceptionispresentinthetext.Butwedonothavetotakeitthat
way:beingconstitutedbyacorporealprinciple[corporearatio]aswellasasoulisnotclearlythe
sameasbeingcomposedofabodyaswellasasoul.Thecorporealprinciplemightbe,notthe
body,butwhateveritisinthemonadbyvirtueofwhichithasabody.
OurdiscussionoftheFardellamemocanhardlybecompletewithoutmentionofthelastsentence
ofatextthatappearstobecloselyrelatedtoit(perhapsasafragmentarydraft).Leibnizwrote,"It
shouldbeconsideredwhethertheremustnotbesomethinginmatterbesidesthoseindivisible
substances"(VE2159=FC325).IfthisreferstotheindivisiblesubstancesoftheFardellamemo,
asseemstomeprobable,ithasadoublebearingontheinterpretationofthememo.Thattheremust
be"somethinginmatterbesidesthoseindivisiblesubstances"iscertainlynotinkeepingwithmy
interpretationofLeibniz'sphilosophyandofthememo.Ontheotherhand,thissentencebeginning
"Itshouldbeconsidered"issurelynotasummaryoftheviewthathasbeenpresentedinthememo.
Itraisesratheradoubtabouttheadequacyofwhatissaidinit.Anditmaybehardertoseewhy
suchadoubtwouldberaisedifLeibnizhadbeenpostulatingcorporealsubstanceslessmindlike
thanthequalifiedmonadconceptionallows.Thesentencemaythereforebeevidenceofthe
presenceofthatconceptionintheFardellamemo.Itiscertainlyevidencethatin1690Leibnizwas
notastrangertothethoughtthatperhapstheontologyofhisphilosophyofbodywastoo
parsimonious.Insection5weshallseehimentertainingthatthoughtmuchmoreextensivelyata
laterdate.
3.2Bernoulli'sQuestions(1698)
Infall1698therewasanimportantseriesofmetaphysicalinterchangesinthelongcorrespondence,
mostlydevotedtotechnicalsubjects,betweenLeibnizandthefamousmathematicianandphysicist
JohnBernoulli(16671748).InaletterofAugustorSeptemberLeibnizsentBernoulliasummary
ofhisviewsonthenatureofbody,containingthefollowingstatements:
ByaMonadIunderstandasubstancetrulyone,thatis,whichisnotanaggregateof
substances.Matteritself,initself[perse],orbulk[moles],21which
____________________
21
Thereisnohappytranslationformolesinthiscontext.IfollowAGinrenderingitas'bulk',asit
wouldcertainlybeconfusingtousethesameEnglishtranslationformolesandmassahere.But
molesisinmanycontextsanancestorof'mass'inmodernphysics;itisnotasynonymfor'volume'.
277
youcancallprimarymatter,isnotasubstance,andnotevenanaggregateof
substances,butsomethingincomplete.Secondarymatter,orMass[Massa],isnota
substance,butsubstances;sonottheflockbuttheanimal,notthefishpondbutthefish,
isonesubstance.Butevenifthebodyofananimal,ormyorganicbody,iscomposed
inturnofinnumerablesubstances,thosesubstancesarestillnotpartsoftheanimalor
ofme(GMIII,537/AG167)
Whatissaidabout"theanimal"here(thatitdoesnothaveothersubstancesasparts)issimilarto
whatissaidabout"themonad"(thatitisnotanaggregateofsubstances).Thiswouldsupport,
thoughitdoesnotprove,aonesubstancereading,inwhichtheanimal(whichissurelytobe
identifiedwiththe"corporealsubstance")andthemonadarethesamesubstance.Thedefinitionof
amonadgivenhereisnoteworthy,too.VerballyitisdifferentfromthatoftheMonadology.In
1714Leibnizdefinedamonadas"asimplesubstance,whichentersintocomposites;simple,thatis
tosay,withoutparts"(Mon1).Buttheremaybenosubstantivedifferencebetweenthedefinitions.
NoteverysortofinternalcomplexityisdeniedtomonadsintheMonadology;theyhavemany
differentperceptions,forinstance.Whattheyclearlymustnothaveaspartsissubstances,andnot
beinganaggregateofsubstancesispreciselythemarkofamonad(andnothavingsubstancesas
partsisthemarkofan"animal"),accordingtothislettertoBernoulli.
Itisthereforenaturaltoconstruethe"monad"(andperhapsalsothe"animal")hereasmuchthe
samesortofthingasthe"monad"ofthetwosubstanceconception.Buttheseconsiderationsdonot
absolutelyexcludethepossibilitythatatleastthe"animal"(andperhapsalsothe"monad")ismore
likethecompletecorporealsubstanceofthetwosubstanceconception.Forthelatter,though
composite,wasdefinitelyregardedbyLeibnizasoneperse,andthereforenotanaggregate;its
unitarycharactermighthavegivenhimsomereasontodenythatithasothersubstancesas"parts,"
thoughnothavingpartsseemstobegivenasadistinctivefeatureofthenoncompositetypeof
substancewherethetwosubstanceconceptionismostclearlypresented(C13/MP175).
Bernoullirespondedwithasetofinquiries,which,togetherwithLeibniz'ssubsequentdivisionof
themintosixquestions,providedtheframeworkfortheensuingdiscussion.Iwillletthemprovide
theframeworkformydiscussion,too,focusingmainlyonthelastfourquestionsatpresent,asthe
firsttwowillprovidethemaintopicofsection3ofChapter12.
Idonotadequatelygrasp[1]whatyouunderstandbyprimarymatterinitself[perse]or
bybulk[moles]asdistinctfromsecondarymatterormass[massa],nor,also,[2]what
isincompleteforyou.[3]Ifsecondarymatterormass[massa]isnotasubstancebut
substances,ifyouarerighttocompareitwithaflockorafishpond,thendivideforme
acertainportionofmatterintoitsseparate,singularorindividualsubstances,asaflock
isdividedintoanimals,anarmyintosoldiers,etc.[4]Andexplainclearly,please,in
whatyouthinksuchasingularsubstanceconsists.[5]Letitbesomethinganalogousto
thesoul:yougrantthatnoportionofmatterissosmallthattheredonotexistinitan
infinityofsuchsouls,suchsubstances,suchmonads,orwhateveryouwishtocall
them;howfarmustIgothentoarriveatasimpleunity,singularandindividual,tobe
abletosaythatthisisasubstance,notsubstances?[6]
278
Surelymatterwillhavetobedividednotonlyintoinfinitelysmallparts,butintoleast
parts,thatis,intopointsorunquantifiedthings[nonquanta],whichdonotexist.(GM
III,539f.,numberingadded)
AllthatneedconcernusnowaboutthefirsttwoquestionsisfoundinLeibniz'sinitialrepliesto
them:
Youask(1)whatIunderstandbymatterinitself,orprimarymatterorbulk,asdistinct
fromsecondary[matter].Ianswer:thatwhichismerelypassive,andseparatefrom
soulsorforms.
Youask(2)whatisincompleteformehere.Ianswer:thepassivewithouttheactive,
andtheactivewithoutthepassive.(GM111,541f./AG167)
The"active"thatisincomplete"withoutthepassive"iscertainlythesubstantialformorentelechy,
consideredasanaspectofasubstance.Anditisclearlyimpliedherethatwhatisneededto
completeitispreciselytheprimarymatterasprincipleofpassivity.If"theactive"and"the
passive"herearethefirsttwoitemsofthefivefoldoutline,thentheir"completing"eachother
surelyyieldsthethirditemofthatoutline,thesimplemonad,andanorganicbody(thefourthitem
intheoutline)isnotrequiredforthecompletionofthesubstantialform,aswouldbedemandedby
anAristotelianonesubstanceinterpretationofthepassage.
Thethirdquestionisprobablytheeasiestoftheset,thoughitisbasictoBernoulli'sconcerns.Inhis
initialresponseLeibnizwrote:
(3)Youaskmetodivideforyouaportionofthemassintothesubstancesofwhichitis
composed.Ireplythatthereareasmanyindividualsubstancesinitasthereareanimals
orlivingthingsorthingsanalogoustolivingthings.ThereforeIdivideitinthesame
wayasaflockorafishpond,exceptthatIjudgethatthefluidinterposedbetweenthe
animalsoftheflock,andbetweenthefish,andlikewisethefluid(andindeedthe
remainingmass)containedinanyfishoranimal,mustbedividedagain,asanew
fishpond,andsoontoinfinity.(GMIII,542/AG167f.)
Bernoulliseemsnottohavefeltanydifficultyunderstandingthisreply,forinhisnextletter,
insteadofrequestingfurtherclarification,heaskedLeibnizhowhewouldrespondtoaCartesian
objectiontotheLeibnizianmultiplicationofsoullikeentities(GMIII,546).Weneednotfollow
thatobjectionthroughtheremainingroundsofdiscussion.
Thefourthquestion,inwhatLeibnizthinks"suchasingularsubstanceconsists,"istheonethat
mostinterestsushere.Forinthecontext,immediatelyfollowingthethirdquestion,"sucha
singularsubstance"mustmeanacorporealsubstance.Leibniz'sinitial(and,asitturnedout,only)
directreplytothisquestionis:
(4)WhatIcallacompletemonadorsingularsubstanceisnotsomuchthesoulasthe
animalitselforanalogousthing,endowedwithasoulorformandanorganicbody.(
GMIII,542/AG168)
Thisanswercertainlydoesnotseemtoenvisageanysubstancebesides"theanimal"whichhere,as
usuallyforLeibniz,isclearlythecorporealsubstance;itthereforesuggestsaonesubstance
conceptionofthestructureofcorporealsub
279
Surelymatterwillhavetobedividednotonlyintoinfinitelysmallparts,butintoleast
parts,thatis,intopointsorunquantifiedthings[nonquanta],whichdonotexist.(GM
III,539f.,numberingadded)
AllthatneedconcernusnowaboutthefirsttwoquestionsisfoundinLeibniz'sinitialrepliesto
them:
soulsorforms.
andtheactivewithoutthepassive.(GM111,541f./AG167)
The"active"thatisincomplete"withoutthepassive"iscertainlythesubstantialformorentelechy,
consideredasanaspectofasubstance.Anditisclearlyimpliedherethatwhatisneededto
completeitispreciselytheprimarymatterasprincipleofpassivity.If"theactive"and"the
passive"herearethefirsttwoitemsofthefivefoldoutline,thentheir"completing"eachother
surelyyieldsthethirditemofthatoutline,thesimplemonad,andanorganicbody(thefourthitem
intheoutline)isnotrequiredforthecompletionofthesubstantialform,aswouldbedemandedby
anAristotelianonesubstanceinterpretationofthepassage.
Thethirdquestionisprobablytheeasiestoftheset,thoughitisbasictoBernoulli'sconcerns.Inhis
initialresponseLeibnizwrote:
(3)Youaskmetodivideforyouaportionofthemassintothesubstancesofwhichitis
composed.Ireplythatthereareasmanyindividualsubstancesinitasthereareanimals
orlivingthingsorthingsanalogoustolivingthings.ThereforeIdivideitinthesame
wayasaflockorafishpond,exceptthatIjudgethatthefluidinterposedbetweenthe
animalsoftheflock,andbetweenthefish,andlikewisethefluid(andindeedthe
remainingmass)containedinanyfishoranimal,mustbedividedagain,asanew
fishpond,andsoontoinfinity.(GMIII,542/AG167f.)
Bernoulliseemsnottohavefeltanydifficultyunderstandingthisreply,forinhisnextletter,
insteadofrequestingfurtherclarification,heaskedLeibnizhowhewouldrespondtoaCartesian
objectiontotheLeibnizianmultiplicationofsoullikeentities(GMIII,546).Weneednotfollow
thatobjectionthroughtheremainingroundsofdiscussion.
Thefourthquestion,inwhatLeibnizthinks"suchasingularsubstanceconsists,"istheonethat
mostinterestsushere.Forinthecontext,immediatelyfollowingthethirdquestion,"sucha
singularsubstance"mustmeanacorporealsubstance.Leibniz'sinitial(and,asitturnedout,only)
directreplytothisquestionis:
(4)WhatIcallacompletemonadorsingularsubstanceisnotsomuchthesoulasthe
animalitselforanalogousthing,endowedwithasoulorformandanorganicbody.(
GMIII,542/AG168)
Thisanswercertainlydoesnotseemtoenvisageanysubstancebesides"theanimal"whichhere,as
usuallyforLeibniz,isclearlythecorporealsubstance;itthereforesuggestsaonesubstance
conceptionofthestructureofcorporealsub
279
stance.Ifweconsiderthequotedsentencealone,wemightwellbetemptedtosupposethattheone
substanceisacompositesubstancehavinganorganicbodyasaconstituent.
Thetextdoesnotsay,however,that"theanimal"hasanorganicbodyasaconstituent,onlythatit
is"endowed"[praeditum]withone.Thislatterthesisbelongstothequalifiedmonadconceptionas
muchastotheAristotelianonesubstanceconception.Itisalsocompatiblewiththequalifiedmonad
conceptionthat"thesoul"appearshereasanaspectofasubstanceratherthanasasubstance.So
Leibniz'sexplicitanswertoquestion(4)isambiguouswithrespecttoourtwoonesubstance
conceptions.
Wemightseekfurtherilluminationindiscussionofthequestioninsucceedingletters,but,
unfortunately,Bernoulli'sinterestswerenotours,andtheoriginalquestion(4)isdisplacedor
swallowedupbyothers,beginningwithhisnextletter.WewillhavemoreluckwithLeibniz's
initialresponsetothefifthquestion.
(5)Youaskhowfarwemustgoinordertohavesomethingthatisasubstanceandnot
substances.Ireplythatsucharepresentedrightaway,evenwithoutsubdivision,and
everysingleanimalissuch.ForneitherareI,you,hecomposedofthepartsofour
body.(GMIII,542/AG168)
Can"qualifiedmonads,"asIhavecalledthem,be"presented"[offerri]inthewayenvisagedhere?
Certainly.Forashavingbodies,monadscanbeperceivedsince,asIshallargueinsection4.1,they
areperceivedbyperceivingtheirbodies.Andthereisanindicationherethatthesubstances
presentedarenotcompositeshavingorganicbodiesasconstituents.ForI,you,andhearesurely
mentionedasexamplesofthesortofsubstanceinquestion,anditissaidthatwearenotcomposed
ofthepartsofourbody.Itisnaturaltotakethatasimplyingthatthepartsofthebodyarenot
constituentsofthesubstance.Andonemightthinkthatifthepartsarenotconstituentsofthe
substance,neitheristhewholebody,whichisthesumoraggregateoftheparts.
Thelikeliestwayofavoidingthisconclusionwouldbetosupposethatby'arecomposedof'here
Leibnizmeant'haveasparts'inasensethatisstrongerthan'haveasconstituents',sothatheneed
notbedenyingthatwehaveourbodies,andtheirparts,asconstituentsofus.Leibnizseemstohave
used'composedof'bothinthebroadersense,relatedto"constituents,"andinthenarrowersense,
relatingto"parts,"indifferentplaces(asIhavearguedinChapter9,section3.1).Itismyintention
touse'composedof'inthebroadersenseinthisbook,exceptwhereotherwiseindicated;butIwill
givereasonforthinkingthatithasthenarrowersenseinLeibniz'sfirstanswertoquestion(6).SoI
wouldnotclaimtohaveprovedthatthisletterexpressesthequalifiedmonadconception.Butsuch
aninterpretationishardtoexclude,andinwritingtoBernoulli,atanyrate,Leibnizshowsno
anxietytopreservethepossibilityoftheorganicbody,orsecondarymatter,beingproperlya
constituentofasubstance,andnotmerely,ashesaysattheoutset,apluralityofsubstances.
Bernoulli'ssixthquestionisperhapshismostpenetrating.Bernoulli'smaininterestinthiswhole
discussionisinthedivisibilityofmatter.HealreadyknowsthatLeibnizthinkseveryextended
portionofmatterisdivisible,andindeedactuallydivided(GMIII,536).Heforeseesanargument
thattherefore,since
280
substancesareindivisible,theymustbeunextended.Assumingthatextension,orvolume,isthe
foundationofthe,quantitativetreatmentofmatter,hewondershowLeibniz'sconceptionof
corporealsubstancecanberelatedtoaquantitativephysics.Leibniz'sinitialreply,inlate
September,was:
(6)Youareafraidthatmatterwillbecomposedofunquantifiedthings[nonquanta].I
answerthatitisnomorecomposedofsoulsthanofpoints.(GMIII,542/AG168)
ThisresponseisreminiscentofLeibniz'sstatementintheFardellamemothat"justasitisnota
pointthatispartofaline,butalineinwhichthepointis,soalsoitisnotthesoulthatispartof
matter,butthebodyinwhichitis"(VE2156=FC322/AG105).Iarguedinsection3.1thatinthat
statementthe"soul"isaconcretesubstance,the"monad"ofthefivefoldoutline,andsuggestedthat
apartofmatterthereisasubaggregate,butthatsoulswerenotprecludedfrombeingtheelements
"of"whichmatterisanaggregate.
Leibniz'sanswertoBernoulli'ssixthquestiondiffersfromthestatementoftheFardellamemo,
however,indenying,notthatsoulsare"parts"ofmatter,butthatmatteris"composedof"souls.
Thiswouldexcludethequalifiedmonadconceptionofcorporealsubstanceifweassume,first,that
"souls"areconcretemonadshere,asinthememo,and,second,that,inthesenseintendedhere,an
aggregateis"composedof"itselements,thoughtheelementsarenot"parts"oftheaggregate.But
wearenotobligedtomakeeitheroftheseassumptions.Iaminclinedinfacttorejectbothofthem.
Ithinkthat'soul'istobeunderstoodintheabstractratherthantheconcretesensethroughoutthis
setofanswers.AndtheanswertothesixthquestionthatLeibnizandBernoulliultimatelyagreed
oniscloselyrelatedtotheideathatthepartsofmatteraresubaggregates.
Howeveritistobeunderstood,Leibniz'sinitialresponsetothesixthquestiondidnotsatisfy
Bernoulli.InhisletterofNovember8herestatedthequestion:
(6)Iwasneverafraidthatmatter(thatis,secondarymatter)wouldbecomposedof
unquantifiedthings[nonquanta],butthatitwouldbecomposedofpointsendowed
withforms,sincetheleastcorpuscle,supposingiteventobeinfinitelysmall,doesnot
constituteasubstance,butsubstances.Asingularsubstancethereforemustbeapoint
withaform,notsomethingquantified[quantum]withaform;otherwiseitwouldbe
dividedintomoresubstances.(GMIII,546f.)
Bernoullihadinfactsaidwhathedenieshavingsaidinthefirstsentenceofthisresponse.
Moreover,hesaysitagaininthelastsentenceoftherestatement.Isuspectaslipofthepen;ifwe
emend"unquantifiedthings"inthefirstsentenceto"souls,"wegetagoodresponsetoLeibniz.His
initialresponseintermsof"souls"didnotaddressBernoulli'sconcern,especiallyif"souls"was
meanthere(asIbelieve)intheabstractsense.Whetherornotmy,emendationiscorrect,
Bernoulli'sinterpretationofLeibnizintermsof"pointsendowedwithforms"showsthathetook
Leibniztobethinkingofcorporealsubstancesashavingaconstituentlocatedinspace,andsawa
problemaboutphysicalquantitiesifthatconstituentturnedouttobeunextended,lackingvolume.
ReplyingonNovember18,Leibnizdidnotaddressthequestionwhetherthebodyofacorporeal
substanceisaconstituentofthesubstance,whichofcourse
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hadnotbeenraisedasanissuebyBernoulli.WhatLeibnizdidistodenythatthebodyofa
corporealsubstanceisapoint,orindeedindivisible.
Asto(6).IthinkthereisnosmallestAnimalorlivingthing,nonewithoutanorganic
body,nonewhosebodyisnotdividedagainintomoresubstances.Thereforewenever
cometolivingpointsorpointsendowedwithforms.(GMIII,552/AG168)
Bernoullievidentlyfoundthisilluminating,forinhisnextletterhewrote:
BecauseIjudgedthatyouwereoftheopinionthatnocorpuscleissosmallthatitcan
becalledonesubstanceratherthanmany,IbelievedthatIrightlyinferredthata
singularsubstanceisnotextendedbutamerepoint.ButfromtheprecedingarticleI
havelearnedthatyouincludesubstancesinasubstance.(GMIII,556)22
Leibnizlettheissuerestthere,thoughthesenseinwhichheincludessubstancesinasubstance
deservedcomment.Bernoulliwassatisfied,andhadgraspedapointthatseemeddecisiveforhis
concernnamely,thatthecorporealpresenceofaLeibniziansubstanceisalwaysanextended(and
divisible)body,neveramerepoint.Thedivisionof(secondary)matteristhereforealwaysinto
extendedbodies,neverintothingsthatlackquantity.Idonotthinkthisresolvesallissuesaboutthe
relationofLeibniz'smetaphysicstophysicalquantities.Inparticular,itdoesnotanswerquestions,
whichwillengageusinChapter13,abouttherelationofprimarymattertophysicalquantities.But
IthinkitdoesdealadequatelywithBernoulli'simmediateconcern,whichpertained,inLeibniz's
terms,tothedivisionofsecondarymatter.
3.3ToDeVolder(Draft),June1703
Atextwhichcouldberead,inisolation,assuggestingtheAristotelianonesubstanceconceptioncan
befound,strikingly,inanearlierversionoftheveryparagraphinwhichLeibnizgaveDeVolder,
in1703,thefivefoldoutlineofthetwosubstanceconception.Theparagraphbeginswiththe
sentence,"Ifyoutakethemass[massa]asanaggregatecontainingmanysubstances,youcanstill
conceiveinitonepreeminentsubstance,ifindeedthatmassconstitutesanorganicbodyanimated
byitsprimaryentelechy."23AtthestageofcompositionIhaveinmind,thenextsentence,along
oneimmediatelyprecedingtheoutline,beganwiththestatement,"Fortherest,toformtheMonad
orcompletesimplesubstance,IconjoinwiththeEntelechynothingbuttheprimitivepassiveforce
ofthewholemass"(LBr967,69).Thisintroducestotheparagraphtheideaofthemonador
completesubstanceconstitutedbytheentelechyandtheprimitvepassiveforce.Itidentifiesthe
primitivepassiveforce,however,asthat"ofthe
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22
ThisresponseclearlyaddressesLeibniz'spreviouscommentonquestion(6),thoughitisnumbered
"5"inBernoulli'sletterof6December1698,andisinfactthefifthandlastofasetofresponses
there.Itfollowsabriefparagraph,numbered"4,"inwhichBernoullihascommingledhis
discussionofquestions(4)and(5).
23
LBr967,69.Gerhardt,unaccountably,abbreviatessiquidemcorpusorganicumeamassaconstituat,
suaentelechiaprimariaanimatumtoseuentelechiaprimariaanimatum(GII,252).Theresulting
hash,understandably,hasledtodesperateexpedientsatL530andAG177.
282
wholemass"amassthathasbeenidentifiedintheprecedingsentenceas"anaggregatecontaining
manysubstances."ThiscertainlysuggeststhatLeibnizisthinkingoftheentelechyorsubstantial
formascombiningdirectlywithanaspectofbodyorsecondarymattertoformthe"monad"or
completesubstance,astheAristotelianonesubstanceconceptionrequires.
Thissuggestionisfirmlyexcluded,however,inthefinalversionofthesentence,forLeibniz
crossedout"ofthewholemass,"replacingitwithamorenuancedphrase,soastoreferinsteadto
"theprimitivepassiveforcerelatedtothewholemassoftheorganicbody"(LBr967,69=G
II,252).Thisisclearlycorrectfromthepointofviewofthetwosubstanceconception(oreventhe
qualifiedmonadconception),forLeibnizcertainlythoughtthattheprimitivepassiveforceinthe
monadisrelatedtothewholemassofthemonad'sorganicbody.Whattherelationiswillbe
discussedinmoredetailinChapter13,section2.Forthepresentitisenoughtoobservethatthe
terminologicalshiftfromtheforceofthewholemasstoaforcerelatedtothewholemassismost
plausiblyunderstoodasintendedtoavoidanyimplicationthattheforceisanaspectofthe
corporealmassanddependentonitinthatway.
NotthatthiscorrectionmarksatimeatwhichLeibnizshiftedfromtheAristotelianconceptionto
thetwosubstanceconception.Asketchofthefivefoldoutline,containingtwoitems,the"Monad"
andthe"Animal,"whichcanonlybeunderstoodassubstances,isfoundattheendofthis
paragraphinthemarginofastillearliermanuscriptoftheletter(LBr967,66).Itwasinall
probabilitywrittentherebeforeLeibnizwrote"theprimitivepassiveforceofthewholemass"in
thelaterdraft.IconcludethatLeibnizheldthetwosubstanceconceptionthroughoutthedraftingof
thisletter,butwasledintoamisleadingformulationatonepointbyhisundoubteddesirefora
strongrelationbetweentheprimitivepassiveforceandthecorporealmass.
3.4ToDeVolder,January1700
OneofLeibniz'searlierletterstoDeVoldergivesexpressiontooneofthestrongestreasonsthat
couldhavecommendedthequalifiedmonadconceptionofcorporealsubstancetoLeibniz.
WhenIsaythatthesoulorentelechycannotdoanythingtothebody,thenbythebody
Imean,notthecorporealsubstancewhoseentelechyitis,whichisonesubstance,but
theaggregateofothercorporealsubstancesthatconstituteourorgans;foronesubstance
cannotinfluenceanother,andthereforenotanaggregateofothers.SoImeanthis:
whateverhappensinthemass[massa]oraggregateofsubstancesaccordingto
Mechanicallaws,thesamethingisexpressedinthesoulorentelechy[orifyouprefer,
intheMonaditselfortheonesimplesubstanceconstitutedbybothactivityand
passivity24]byitsownlaws.Buttheforceofchangeinanysubstanceisfromitselfor
itsownentelechywhichissotrue,thateveninanaggregate,everythingthatwill
occurcanbegatheredfromthosethingsthatarealreadyintheaggregate.However,
sincetherearesomanyseparate[privatae]entelechiesinthemass[massa]ofourbody,
itiseasytojudgethatnoteverythingthathappensin
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24
Thesewordsarebracketedintheoriginal,andwerepresumablynotsenttoDeVolder.
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ourbodyistobederivedfromourEntelechy,evenifitaccordswithit.25Entelechyor
forceoractivitydoubtlessdiffersfromresistanceorpassivity;youmaytaketheformer
fortheformandthelatterfortheprimarymatter.Theyarenotsodifferent,however,
thattheyoughttobeconsideredastwodifferentsubstances;but[theyoughttobe
considered]asconstitutingonesubstance,andtheforcethatchangestheprimarymatter
isbynomeansitsownforcebuttheentelechyitself.(GII,205f.)
Theemphasisofthispassagefallsonthepointthat,becauseofthemutualcausalindependenceof
substancesonwhichLeibnizinsists,thesoulorentelechyorformdoescausallyinfluenceits
primarymatterbutcannotcausallyinfluenceitssecondarymatter,inasmuchasitisan"aggregate
ofothercorporealsubstances."Thisisgivenasareasonforconsideringtheformandprimary
matter,not"astwodifferentsubstances,butasconstitutingonesubstance."Hereweseeoneofthe
reasonswhyinLeibniz'sletterstoDeVolder,asIhavealreadynoted,theprimarymatterofa
substanceisnotasubstratumorconstituentofitssecondarymatter,asitwasfortheScholastics;if
itwere,itwouldhavetobelongatoncetotheonesubstanceandtotheothersubstancesthat
constituteitssecondarymatter,andhencewouldhavetobebothinfluencedanduninfluencedby
theformorentelechyoftheonesubstance.
Mypresentconcerniswithanotherimplication,however.Inthefirstsentenceofthequoted
passageLeibnizisatpainstoexplainthathedoesnotmeanthatthesoulorentelechycannot
influencethecorporealsubstancewhoseentelechyitis.Heseemstoassumethatasubstantialform
mustbeabletoinfluencethesubstanceitinforms.Buthedeniesthattheformcaninfluenceits
organicbody.Soiftheorganicbodyisaconstituentofthecorporealsubstance,theinfluenceofthe
formonthecorporealsubstancemustnonethelessbeexhaustedbyitsinfluenceonthesubstantial
corethatisthe"monad"ofthetwosubstancetheory.Inwhatsensecanthesubstantialformandthe
organicbodybeconstituentsofonesubstanceifthereisnorealcausalinteractionbetweenthem?
Inthelastsentenceofthepassage,afterall,itseemstobeassumedthattheprimarymatteris
accessibletoinfluencefromtheformiftheyareconstituentsofthesamesubstance.Thesupposed
compositesubstancethathastheorganicbodyasaconstituentcannotsatisfyaconceptionof
substanceaccordingtowhichthemetaphysicalboundariesofasubstancemustboundasystemof
realcausalaction.Thisconsiderationstronglyfavorsthequalifiedmonadconceptionaccordingto
whichacorporealsubstanceisamonadamonadashavinganorganicbody,butnotamonadplus
anorganicbody.
Itisnotclear,however,thatLeibnizwasthinkingintermsofthequalifiedmonadconceptionwhen
hewrotethislettertoDeVolder.Thewayinwhichhespeaksinsuccessivesentencesof"the
corporealsubstance"andthenof"theMonaditselfortheonesimplesubstanceconstitutedbyboth
activityandpassivity"caneasilysuggestthatheisthinkingofthemastwodifferentthingsandthus
hasinmindthetwosubstanceconceptionthathewouldlayoutsofullyforthesamecorrespondent
threeandahalfyearslater.Leibnizseemsneverto
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25
ThissentenceisamarginaladditioninLeibniz'smanuscript(LBr967,38),omittedbyGerhardt
presumablybyoversight,sincethereisnoindicationinthemanuscriptthatLeibnizdidnotintendit
tostandintheletter.
284
havebeencontentwiththequalifiedmonadconceptiondespitetheexcellentfitbetweenitandhis
fundamentalideaofsubstancesingeneralasclosedcausalsystems.Ithinkhistalkof"corporeal
substance"wasusuallyrootedinaninterestinaccommodatingwithinhissystem,atleastverbally,
andifpossiblemorethanverbally,acommonsenseortraditionalrealismaboutbodies.Probably
thequalifiedmonadconceptionwasnotsufficiently"corporeal"tosatisfythatinterest,whose
destabilizingeffectsonLeibniz'sthoughtaredocumentedatmorethanoneplaceinthischapter.
SumminguptheseinvestigationsintoLeibniz'sviewsonthestructureofacorporealsubstance,I
wouldsaythatthetwosubstanceconceptionistheonlyonethatwecanbecertainthatLeibniz
heldatanytime.HeatleastsometimesenvisagedanAristotelianversionofitdistinguishing
betweenincompleteandcompleteconcretesubstances.Someofhiswritings,especiallybefore
1703,mayhavebeeninfluencedbysomethinglikethequalifiedmonadconception,butitis
improbablethatheeveracceptedtheAristotelianonesubstanceconception.
Crucialtoboththetwosubstanceandthequalifiedmonadconceptionsistheideathatmonads
have(organic)bodies.Howdotheyhavebodies?Inthetermsusedinthefivefoldoutlineof1703,
inwhatsensedoesamonad"dominate"orruleitsorganicbody?Andinwhatsensedoesit
dominateorrulethesubordinatemonads"in"itsbody,asLeibnizmoreoftensays?These
questionsarethetopicofthenextsection.
4.MonadicDomination
Inaletterof16June1712toDesBosses,Leibnizsays,"Thedomination,however,and
subordinationofmonads,consideredinthemonadsthemselves,consistsinnothingbutdegreesof
perfections"(GII,451/L604f.).26Clearlyitisthedominantmonadthatmustbemoreperfectthan
themonadssubordinatetoit,andperfectionofmonads,forLeibniz,ismeasuredbydistinctnessof
perceptions.Sothedominantmonadmustperceivesomethingsmoredistinctlythanthe
subordinatemonads.
Whatmustthedominantmonadperceivemoredistinctlythanthesubordinatemonads?Everything
thathappenswithinitsbody,suggestedBertrandRussell.Butthatdoesnotadequatelyexplainthe
senseinwhichLeibnizthoughtthedominantmonadrulesthebody.Inparticular,thesufficient
conditionfordominationthatRussellseemstoproposeisnotplausible.Hesays:
If,then,inacertainvolume,thereisonemonadwithmuchclearerperceptionsthanthe
rest,thismonadmayperceiveallthathappenswithinthatvolumemoreclearlythando
anyoftheotherswithinthatvolume.Andinthissenseitmaybedominantoverallthe
monadsinitsimmediateneighborhood.(Russell,p.148)
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26
NotealsothatinthesameplaceLeibnizsaysthatbetweenthedominantmonadandtheothers
"thereisnointercourse,butonlyconsensus."Thistextmustbeusedwithcare,becausethecontext
isoneinwhichLeibnizisexpoundingatheoryof"substantialbonds"(seesection5.3),which,in
thisletteratanyrate,heisclearlynotendorsing.Thepassageasawhole,however,seemstometo
indicatethatLeibnizbelieveswhathesayshereaboutmonadsinthemselvesistruewhetherornot
therearesubstantialbonds.
285
Butsupposethatacertainvolumeofairimmediatelyadjacenttomyrighteyecontainsnomonad
thatperceivesanythinginthatvolumeorinmybodyasdistinctlyasIdo.ByRussell'scriterion,ifI
dominateasamonadovermybody,Iwilldominatealsooverthemonadsinthatadjacentvolume
ofair,anditwillpresumablyformpartofmybody.Theincorporationofsuchvolumesofairinmy
bodywouldsurelybeanunacceptableconsequenceforLeibniz.Hemighttrytoavoiditby
insistingthatinanysuchspacetherewouldalwaysbeamonadthatperceivedsomethinginthe
spaceasdistinctlyasIdo.ButIwouldexpecthimtobasehisstrategymoredirectlyonthe
offensivefeatureoftheexample,whichisthatthevolumeofairdoesnotseemtobepartofthe
organicstructureofmybody.
InalettertoDeVolder,Leibnizsays,"Nayratherthesoulitselfofthewholewouldbenothingbut
thesoulofaseparatelyanimatedpart,wereitnotthedominantsoulinthewholeonaccountofthe
structureofthewhole"(GII,194/L522,italicsadded).AcorrectunderstandingofLeibniz's
conceptionofmonadicdominationdependsontherelationofthedominantmonadtothestructure
ofitsorganicbodynolessthanonthesuperiordistinctnessofthedominantmonad'sperceptions.
Therearetwomainpointstobediscussedhere.
4.1DirectnessofMutualExpression
Inapreliminarydraftofhis"NewSystem,"Leibnizsaysthattheperceptionsofamonad
correspond"totherestoftheuniverse,butparticularlytotheorgansofthebodythatconstitutesits
pointofviewintheworld,anditisinthisthattheirunionconsists"(GIV,477).Everymonad
expresseseverythinginthewholeuniverse,accordingtoLeibniz;buteachmonadexpresses,andis
expressedby,itsownorganicbodyinaspecialway."Thesoul'sjob,inpart,istoexpressitsbody"
(GVI,570).Amonadanditsorganicbodybothcontainexpressionsofaninfinityofthings,but
eachis,asawhole,anexpressionoftheother,andthisrelationshipofmutualexpressionis
peculiarlydirect.Anorganicbodystandsinthisrelationtoitsdominantmonadalone,nottothe
subordinatemonadsinitthoughtheydoofcoursecontainexpressionsofit.Thisisanimportant
partofthestructuralrelationshipbetweenamonadanditsorganicbodybywhichmonadic
dominationisconstituted.
Anorganicbodyisanexpressionofitssoulordominantmonad.Leibnizhaslesstosayaboutthis
thanaboutthesoul'sexpressingitsbody,butexpressionasheunderstandsitisarelationofoneto
onemapping,whichwillnormallybesymmetrical.Soifeachmonadisanespeciallygood
expressionofitsbody,theorganicbodywillbe,reciprocally,anespeciallygoodexpressionofits
dominantmonad.IbelievethatinthemostnaturaldevelopmentofLeibniz'ssystemthisexplains
howoneperceivesanothermonad.Thereisonlyindirecttextualsupportforthisinterpretation,but
howelsewouldLeibnizthinkthatweperceiveothermonads?
SupposeIseeakittenjumpingoffachairtopounceonapieceofstring.Leibnizwillpresumably
saythatIperceivecertaininternalpropertiesofthekitten'ssoul:itsseeingthestringandintending
toseizeit.AndhowdoIperceivethosepsychologicalproperties?Byfarthemostplausibleanswer
isthatI
286
readthemoffcertainpropertiesofthekitten'sbody:itsstructure,spatialposition,andmovements.
AccordingtoLeibnizthesubordinatemonadsinthekitten'sbodyalsohaveinternalproperties
analogoustotheseeingandintendinginthekitten'ssoul.AndsinceIperceiveeverything,atleast
unconsciously,Imustperceivetheseperceptionsandappetitionsofthesubordinatemonads.Butit
wouldnotbeplausibletosaythatIperceivethembyperceivingphysicalpropertiesofthewhole
bodyofthekitten.Rather,Iperceivethesubordinatemonadsbyperceivingtheirorganicbodies,
whichmostdirectlyexpresstheirperceptionsandappetitions.PerhapsIdonotusuallyperceive
themconsciously;butwithasuitablemicroscope,forexample,Imightobserveoneofthekitten's
whitebloodcellsreactingtoabacteriuminitsvicinity.InthiscaseImaybetakenasperceivinga
perceptionofthebacteriumandanappetiteforitsobliterationthatarepresent(confusedly,no
doubt)inthedominantmonadofthewhitecorpuscle.AndIwouldbereadingtheseinternal
propertiesofthemonadoffthemovementsandotherphysicalpropertiesofthecell.IfIunderstand
Leibnizcorrectlyonthispoint,eachmonadisperceivedbyperceivingitsorganicbody,and
perceptionofanorganicbodyassuchdirectlyyieldsperceptionofitsdominantmonadbutnotof
itssubordinatemonads.
MyclaimthatforLeibnizoneperceivesamonadbyperceivingitsbodyissomewhatspeculative,
butheexplicitlyholdsthateachcreatedmonadexpressesandperceiveseverythingelseby
expressingandperceivingitsownorganicbody.
ThusalthougheachcreatedMonadrepresentsthewholeuniverse,itrepresentsmore
distinctlythebodywhichisparticularlyassignedtoitandofwhichitconstitutesthe
Entelechy;andasthisbodyexpressesthewholeuniversebytheconnectionofall
matterintheplenum,theSoulalsorepresentsthewholeuniverseinrepresentingthis
body,whichbelongstoitinaparticularway.(Mon62)27
TheLeibnizianharmonyisasystemofinfinitelymanymodelsorevenasystemofsystemsof
models.Eachmodelperfectly,ifperhapsobscurely,expressesalltheothers,butsomeexpresseach
otherwithaspecialclosenessordirectness.Leibnizseemstoexplainthisspecialclosenessinterms
ofdistinctnessofperceptions(Mon62);Ifinditapointofobscurityinhisphilosophy.Onesystem
ofmodelsoccupiesapeculiarlycentralrole,althoughitdoesnothavehighstatusontologically.
Thisistheuniverseoforganicbodies,consideredasphenomenaextendedinspaceandtime.They
areinvolvedinallofthemodelinginthewholeharmony.Eachoftheultimatelyrealmodels,the
monads,standsinadirectmodelingrelationshiponlytoitsownorganicbody.Theorganicbody,
however,isalsoamodelofthewholeuniverseoforganicbodies.Leibnizthoughtthatinaphysical
universewithnoemptyspaceeveryphysicaleventwouldhavesomemechanicaleffect(albeitno
metaphysicallyrealinfluence)oneachinfinitelydividedorganicbody,andthateachsuchbody
wouldthereforealwaysbearinitselftracesfromwhich,inaccordancewiththemechanicallawsof
nature,aninfinitemindcouldreadoffallpast,present,andfutureeventsintheuniverseofbodies
(cf.Mon62).Sincemyorganicbodyexpressesinthiswaythe
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27
Cf.LA90f.,112f.;GII,253/L531;GIV,530ff.,545;NE132f.;GVII,567;C14/MP176.
287
wholecorporealuniverse,andalsoisexpressedbymeasitsdominantmonad,Iperceivethewhole
corporealuniverseinperceivingmyownbody.Andsincetheotherorganicbodiesintheuniverse
expresstheirowndominantmonads,andsinceeachfinitemonadisexpressedbyitsownbody,I
perceiveeachmonadbyperceivingitsorganicbodyandIperceivethewholesystemoffinite
monadsbyperceivingthewholesystemoforganicbodies.AndIperceiveallofthisbyperceiving
myownorganicbody.(SofarasIcansee,thethesisthatIperceiveothermonadsbyperceiving
theirbodiesisneededhereiftheideathatIperceiveeverythingbyperceivingmybodyandthe
mechanicaleffectsofotherbodiesonitistobecarriedthrough.)
Obviously,Idonotconsciouslyperceiveallthesethings.BecauseIamfinite,Iperceivemostof
themmuchtooconfusedlytobeconsciousofthem,Leibnizwouldsay.Hisschemeisatleast
initiallylessplausibleifweattendmainlytoconsciousperceptions.WhenIamreadingapage,doI
reallyperceivethelettersonthepagebyperceivingwhatisgoingoninmyeye?itseemsthatIcan
seeperfectlywellwhatisonthepagewithoutbeingconsciousatallofwhatisgoingoninmyeye
(andwithoutevenbeingabletobecomeconsciousoftheinnerworkingsofmyeyebypaying
attentiontothem).Ifmyperceptionmodelswhatisgoingoninmyeyemoredirectlythanit
modelsthesurfaceofthepage,andifconsciousperceptionsarealwaysmoredistinctthan
perceptionsthatcannotevenbebroughttoconsciousnessbyattendingtothem,28thenthiscase
showsthatLeibnizcannotconsistentlyexplaindirectnessoftheexpressionandperceptionrelations
whollyintermsofdistinctnessofperceptions.Perhapsdirectnessandindirectnessofperceptionsin
suchacasearefoundedonexplanatoryrelationsratherthanondegreesofdistinctness.Iperceive
whatisgoingoninmyeyemoredirectlythanwhatisonthepagebecausethepsychologicallaws
thatcorrelatecorporealphenomenawithwhathappensinmonadsrelatevisualperceptionsmore
directlytoeventsintheeyethantoeventsatadistance.Thedistanteventsarerelatedtovisual
perceptionsbyvirtueoftheirconnection,undermechanicallaws,witheventsintheeye.
Thetaskofprovidingasatisfactoryaccountoftherelationofdirectnessofexpressionwillnotbe
pursuedfurtherhere,butclearlyitisanimportantproblem.Theideathateachmonadandits
organicbodyexpresseachotherwithauniquedirectnessplaysapivotalroleinLeibniz's
philosophy.Aswehaveseen,itisusedtoexplainhoweverymonadperceiveseverythingelse.I
thinkitplaysanessentialpartindeterminingwhichmonadhas,ordominates,whichorganicbody.
Thatismypresentconcern;inaddition,IhavearguedinChapter9,section3.3,thatthespatial
positionor"pointofview"ofamonaddependsinturnonwhichorganicbodyithas,whileany
aggregationofmonadstoformbodiesdependsontheirspatialposition.Thusagreatdealdepends
directlyorindirectlyontherelationofdirectnessofexpression.
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28
IbelieveconsciousnessanddistinctnesswerelinkedinthiswayinLeibniz'smind,butthequestion
couldberaisedwhetherhistheoryofperceptionwouldnotgobetterifdistinctnessand
consciousnesswereallowedtobetwodimensionsinwhichperceptionscanvaryindependently
distinctnessbeingafeatureofthestructureoftheperceptionandconsciousnessbeing,asitwere,
thelightthatisturnedonit.(IamindebtedtoJeremyHymanforthisimage.)Separatingthese
dimensionswouldgivethetheorymoreflexibility.
288
4.2DominationandOrganicFunctions
Leibnizdoesimplythatadominantmonadperceivessomethingsmoredistinctlythanthemonads
subordinatedtoitdo.Whatremainstobeexplainedhereaboutmonadicdominationishowthe
greaterdistinctnessofthedominantmonad'sperceptionsisrelatedtothestructureoftheorganic
bodyandwhytheserelationsshouldbeexpressedbyanideaofdominationthatis,ofruleor
control.ThehypothesisIproposetoanswerthesequestionsisthatwhatthedominantmonadas
suchperceivesmoredistinctlythananyothermonadinitsbodyisanappetiteortendencyfor
perceptionsofthenormalorganicfunctioningofthebody.
IndevelopingthehypothesisIbeginwithapassageofanearlydraftof14oftheDiscourseon
Metaphysics:
Itissureaboveallthatwhenwedesiresomephenomenonanditoccursatthe
designatedtime,andwhenthishappensordinarily,wesaythatwehaveactedandare
thecauseofit,aswhenIwillthatwhichiscalledmovingmyhand.Alsowhenit
appearstomethatatmywillsomethinghappenstothatwhichIcallanothersubstance,
andthatthatwouldhavehappenedtoittherebyevenifithadnotwilled,asIjudgeby
frequentexperience,Isaythatthatsubstanceisactedon[patit],asIconfessthesame
thingaboutmyselfwhenthathappenstomefollowingthewillofanothersubstance.
Thesestatementsrevealtheintuitiveoriginoftheideathatactivityandpassivitycanbeexplained
intermsofdistinctnessofperceptions.Voluntaryagencyprovidestheparadigmofactivity.Itis
characterizedbyconsciousnessofatendencyorappetitethathasacertaineventasitsgoal.The
goalisdescribedbyLeibnizhereasa"phenomenon,"acertaineventasperceivedbythevoluntary
agent.Thewholepassageisstatedverymuchintermsofwhatappearstotheagent;thatLeibniz
wasthinkinginthosetermsisconfirmedbythefactthatheinitiallywrote"perception"where
"phenomenon"standsinthequotedtext,andstartedtowrite"whenIwillthatitappeartome"in
describingthewillingofamotionofhishand.
Asubstancethatisconsciousofanappetiteforaperceptionofacertaineventisactivein
producingtheevent,iftheappetitedoesindeedproducetheperception,whereastheother
substancesinvolvedintheeventareactedoniftheirperceptionsoftheeventarenotproducedbya
consciousappetiteforsuchperceptions.AccordingtoLeibniz'sphilosophytheymusthavehad
appetitesforthoseperceptions,buttheywerenotconsciousofthem.Thatis,theyweremuchless
distinctlyawareofthemthantheactivesubstancewasofitscorrespondingappetite."Our
involuntaryinternalmotionsdonotceasetocorrespondtoourconfusedandimperceptible
appetites,butthesemotionsdependaslittleontheempireofthewillastheseappetitesdependon
ourunderstanding"(GIII,510).29
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29
Thistextof1710,togetherwithoneof1704(GIII,347),suggestsaviewinwhichthesoul's
(voluntary)dominationofitsbodydependsonappetites,mainlyconfusedandunconscious,for
thoseinternalmotionsofitsbodythataremeanstotheendconsciouslywilled.Butthisseemsto
contributemoretoanaccountofthewillthantothedistinctionbetweendominantandsubordinate
monads,sincemostdominantmonadshavenoconsciousends,andallmonadshaveappetites(at
leastconfusedones)formeanstothoseeventsthatactuallyhappen.
289
Moregenerally,activityandpassivityintheproductionofaneventcanbeunderstoodasconsisting
inmoreorlessdistinctperceptionofamonad'sownappetiteforperceptionsoftheevent,although
thisdistinctnessdoesnotamounttoconsciousnessinmostcasesasitdoesinvoluntaryaction.
MyhypothesisisthatLeibnizsawthedominantmonadasactiveinthiswayinthenormal
functioningofitsorganicbody,thefunctioningthatfitsthebodyconstantlytobethedirect
expressionofthedominantmonad.ThisisconnectedwithLeibniz'sspeakingofthemonadasthe
"soul"or"substantialform"ofthebodyorcorporealsubstance.Hewasconsciouslyand
professedlyadoptingoradaptingAristotelianandScholasticterminologyhere,andheexplicitly
tookaposition,inthefamousScholasticdisputeabouttheunityorpluralityofsubstantialforms,
forthosewhoheldthatthereisonlyonesubstantialformorsoulineachsubstance.30He
consideredhimselftobeinagreementwiththeologicalauthorityonthispoint(Gr552).ToQueen
SophiaCharlottehewrote:
Ialsorecognizedegreesinactivities,suchaslife,perception,reason,andthus
[recognize]thattherecanbemorekindsofsouls,whicharecalledvegetative,sensitive,
rational,[and]thattherearekindsofbodiesthathavelifewithoutsensation,andothers
thathavelifeandsensationwithoutreason.However,Ibelievethatthesensitivesoulis
vegetativeatthesametime,andthattherationalsoulissensitiveandvegetative,and
thatthusonesinglesoulinusincludesthesethreedegrees,withoutitsbeingnecessary
toconceiveofthreesoulsinus,ofwhichthelowerwouldbematerialinrelationtothe
higher;anditseemsthatthatwouldbemultiplyingbeingswithoutnecessity.(G
VI,521;31cf.GII,389)
Twopointsinthistextareimportantformypresentpurpose:thatIamthevegetativeandsensitive
soulofmybody,aswellastherationalsoul;andthatthefunctionsofavegetativeandsensitive
soularetheactivitiesoflifeandsensation,respectively.IfIamthevegetativesoulofmybody,
thatispresumablybecauseIamactiveinthefunctionsofmybodythatsustainlifeforexample,in
particulareventsofsugarmetabolisminthecellsofmybody.AndifIamactiveinthoseevents,
thatisbecauseIperceivemyprecedingappetiteformyperceptionofthemandthatperception,
thoughunconscious,iscomparativelydistinct.Specifically,itismoredistinctthantheperception
anyothermonadinmybodyhasofitscorrespondingappetite,andthatiswhatiscrucialformy
statusasdominantmonadinmybody.
Thishypothesisallows,butdoesnotrequire,thatthedominantmonadperceivesalleventsinits
bodymoredistinctlythananyothermonadinthebodydoes.Allthatisrequiredisthatithave
moredistinctperceptionsofitsappetitesforalleventsofnormalfunctioningofthebody.Iseeno
reasonwhythesoulmustbesimilarlyactivewithrespecttotraumasofdiseaseorinjuryinthe
body.Infact,IsuspectLeibnizwoulddenythatitis.Hisfullestdiscussionofthesoul'sroleinthe
productionofsuchtraumasisinresponsetoacriticismbyPierreBayle.
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30
Regardingthisdispute,seeM.Adams,WilliamOckham,vol.II,pp.638f.,64769.
31
Inlightofthisveryexplicittext,wecannotfindLeibniz'sownviewinanothertextofthesame
period(alsoGVI,521)inwhichheiswillingtoexploitfortheologicalpurposeswhatappearstobe
anotherperson'sadvocacyofthepluralityofsubstantialformsinasinglesubstance.
290
Baylehadaskedhowthetheoryofpreestablishedharmonycouldexplainthesuddentransition
frompleasuretopaininadogthatisstruckunexpectedlybyastickwhileeating(GIV,531).What
isthepreviousstateofthedog'ssoulfromwhichthesuddenpainresults,accordingtoLeibniz?
Leibnizreplies:
Thusthecausesthatmakethestickact(thatistosaythemanpositionedbehindthe
dog,whoisgettingreadywhileiteats,andeverythinginthecourseofbodiesthat
contributestodisposethemantothis)arealsorepresentedfromthefirstinthesoulof
thedogexactlyinaccordancewiththetruth,butweakly,bylittle,confusedperceptions,
withoutapperception,thatistosaywithoutthedognoticingit,becausethedog'sbody
alsoisonlyimperceptiblyaffectedbyit.Andasinthecourseofbodiesthese
dispositionsfinallyproducetheblowpressedhardonthedog'sbody,inthesameway
therepresentationsofthesedispositionsinthedog'ssoulfinallyproducethe
representationoftheblowofthestick.Sincethatrepresentationisdistinguishedand
strong,...thedogapperceivesitverydistinctly,andthatiswhatmakesitspain.(G
IV,532)32
WhatIwanttoemphasizeinthistextisthatthesoul'spriortendencytohavethepainthatisits
perceptionofthetraumainitsbodyisbasedonitsunconsciousperceptionofeventsoutsideits
body.Itperceivestheseeventsindirectlybyperceivingitsownbody.Presumablyitmayinsome
casesperceiveexternaleventsmoredistinctlythanitperceivesitsown"appetite"thatisgrounded
inthem,aswhenIperceivethatIamfallingandabouttostrikethegroundwithconsiderableforce;
33butwheretheperceptionoftheexternaleventsisveryconfused,theperceptionofthe
correspondingappetitecertainlycanbetoo.IcannotseethatLeibniziscommittedtosayingthat
thesoulperceiveseithertheappetiteortheexternaleventsmoredistinctlythanthesubordinate
monadsdo.Atanyrate,amoredistinctperceptionofexternalevents,orofthecausesoftraumas,
isnotobviouslyconnectedwiththefunctionsofavegetativesoul.
Thishypothesisaboutthenatureoftherulethatthedominantmonadbearsinitsbodyconfirmsand
illuminatesmyinterpretationofthenatureoforganisminLeibniz.Anorganicbodyisonemanyof
whoseoperations,initspartsofallsizes,canbeexplainednotonlymechanicallybutalso
teleologically,asdirectedinaccordancewiththeactiveappetitesofasoulthatisatleastvegetative
andmayalsobesensitiveandrational.Andtheactiveappetitesofavegetativesoulareforstates
thatcontributetothemaintenanceofthebodyasadirectexpressionofamonadandaperfect
expressionofthewholecorporealuniverse,accordingtocertainlawsofnature.
5.PrinciplesofUnity
TherearemanytextsinwhichLeibnizsaysthatcorporealsubstancesaredistinguishedfrommere
aggregatesbyaprofoundersortofunity.WritingtoArnauld
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32
Thisexplanation,accordingtowhichperceptionsproduceoneanotherinthesoulbyvirtueoftheir
representingcorporealeventsthatfollowfromoneanotherbylawsofthecorporealuniverse,is
reminiscentofSpinoza'sversionofpsychophysicalparallelism,asdevelopedinPartTwoofhis
Ethics.Cf.alsoLA92;GIV,591.
33
IowethisobservationtoTimothySheppard.
291
latein1686,hesays,"iftherearenocorporealsubstances,suchasIwish,itfollowsthatbodiesare
nothingbuttruephenomena,liketherainbow,"foronaccountoftheinfinitedivisionofmatter,
"onewillnevercometoanythingofwhichonecansay,'Hereistrulyabeing',exceptwhenone
findsanimatedmachineswhosesubstantialunity,independentoftheexternalunionofcontact,is
madebythesoulorsubstantialform"(LA77).Thisstatementimplies,first,thattherecannotbea
corporealsubstancewithouta"substantialunity"strongerthantheunitythatmanyaggregateshave
bythebodilycontactoftheirmemberswitheachother,andsecond,thatsuchasubstantialunityis
somehowprovidedbythesubstance's"soulorsubstantialform."Andthisisonlyoneofanumber
oftextsinwhichthedominantmonad,ortheactiveentelechyinthedominantmonad,is
characterizedastheprincipleofunityinthecorporealsubstance:Acorporealsubstanceis
"actuatedbyoneEntelechy,withoutwhichtherewouldbeinitnoprincipleoftrueUnity"(G
II,250/L529);"theAnimalorcorporealsubstance...ismadeOnebytheMonaddominatingthe
Machine"(GII,252/L530f.).34
Substantialunityisnotaperipheralissue.AsindicatedinthequotedstatementtoArnauld,Leibniz
regardeditasthemainpointinthequestionwhethertherearecorporealsubstances.Alinkageof
substantialitywithperseunitywascharacteristicoftheAristotelianconceptualframeworkwhose
partialrehabilitationLeibnizwasattempting.Midseventeenthcenturydebateastowhether
Cartesianismallowedahumanbeingtobeatruesubstance,asconservativephilosophers
demanded,focusedonwhetheritallowedamorethanaccidentalunityofbodyandsoul.Descartes
himselfattemptedtogivethehumanbeingunitypersebytreatingthesoulasthesubstantialform
ofthehumanbeing.35Arnauldwaslessconservativeonthispoint,however,andresistedLeibniz's
insistenceontyingsubstantialityinbodiestoperseunity(LA86f.,106f.).
OnwhatIhavecalledthequalifiedmonadconceptionofcorporealsubstancethereisnogreat
difficultyabouttheperseunityofacorporealsubstance,sinceitisidenticalwithasimple
substance.Thereisaseriousproblem,however,onthetwosubstanceconception,whichseemsto
havebeenLeibniz'smainconceptionandmaywellhavebeenhisonlyconceptionofcorporeal
substance.ForitmaybedoubtedwhetheronLeibniz'sshowingthedominantmonadcouldgiveto
acompositethatitformswiththeorganicbodyaunitydifferentinkindfromtheunityofan
aggregate.
5.1TheMiddleYears
Thereareseveraltextsofthe1690s(e.g.,LA136;GIV,477;E127/L458;RML315)inwhichthe
unionofsoulandbodythatconstitutesacorporealsubstanceisexplicitlyexplainedbyLeibnizas
arisingfromrelationsofharmonyamongtheperceptionsofsubstancesinvolvedintheunion:36
____________________
34
ForsimilarclaimsseeVE416=LHIV,7C,111;LA120;E124f./L454;GIV,492/AG147;G
III,260f./AG289f.;PNG3.
35
SeeHoffman,"UnityofDescartes'sMan."
36
Theexplicittextscitedinthisparagraphareallfromthe1690s.Buttheharmoniousperceptions
theoryofthenatureofsubstantialunityisimplicitinDM33,andstronglysuggestedby
292
Themass[amas]oftheseorganizedcorporealsubstanceswhichconstitutesourbodyis
notunitedwithourSoulexceptbythatrelationwhichfollowstheorderofphenomena
thatarenaturaltoeachsubstanceseparately.(GIV,573)
Furthermoretheunionofthesoulwiththebodyinahumanbeingconsistsinthatmost
perfectagreementbywhichtheseriesofmotionscorrespondstotheseriesofthoughts.
(FC320/AG104)
ThisiswhatLeibniz'sidealismshouldleadustoexpect.Givenhisdoctrinethat"thereisnothingin
thingsexceptsimplesubstances,andinthemperceptionandappetite"(GII,270/L537),thereisno
wayfortheunityofacorporealsubstancetobeanythingoverandabovethesystemofrelations
amongperceptionsofsimplesubstances.Butaggregates,too,areunitedbyrelationsamongthe
perceptionsofsubstances,accordingtoLeibniz,asIarguedinsection3.3ofChapter9.Soonthis
lineofthoughtitmightseemthattheunityofacorporealsubstanceisofthesamekindasthe
merelyaccidentalunityofanaggregate.
TheScholastictraditionaffordsLeibnizawayoutofthisdifficulty,whichheseemstohave
envisagedatleastonce.Scholasticphilosopherswereintensivelyconcernedwiththequestionof
howabeingcomposedofotherbeingscouldbeoneperse.Oneofthemainideasproposedfor
solvingthisproblemwasthatacompositebeingcanbeoneperseifthebeingsthatcomposeitare
incomplete,andcompletedbytheirunioninthecomposite.37Surez,forexample,countsita
certainty"regardingcompositebeing...thattherecantrulyandproperlybeabeingperseand
[something]oneperse,asallphilosophersteachregardingthesubstantialnature,insofarasit
consistsofmatterandform....Forsinceneithermatternorformpersearecompleteandwhole
entitiesintheirkind,butarebytheirnatureconstructedtocomposethat[composite],thatwhichis
immediately[proxime]composedofthem,theessenceornature,isrightlycalled,andis,oneper
se."38ForSurezthematterandsubstantialformaresubstancesthatcouldexistapartfromeach
other,atleastbydivinepower.39Theyarenonethelessincompletebyvirtueoftheirnatural
aptitudetounitewitheachother(asdiscussedearlierinsection2.3).
ThisideaappearsinDescartes,40andwascertainlyavailabletoLeibniz.AsIarguedinsection2.3,
therearepassagesinwhichLeibniztreatsthesimplesubstanceanditsorganicbodyasincomplete
beings,"sincetheoneisnevernaturallywithouttheother"(GIV,572f.).Thisopensthewayfor
Leibniztosaythat
____________________
Leibniz'sstatementtoArnauldthatthesoulis"theformofitsbodybecauseitexpressesthe
phenomenaofalltheotherbodiesaccordingto[their]relationtoitsown"(LA58)bothfrom1686.
OnthissubjectseealsoGarber,"LeibnizandtheFoundationsofPhysics,"pp.44f.
37
Thisideawasalreadyproposedinthethirteenthandfourteenthcenturies;seeM.Adams,William
Ockham,pp.66469.
38
39
Surez,MetaphysicalDisputations,XV,v,12;ix,13.
40
ATIII,459f.;VII,222.TheformertextisfromDescartes'scorrespondencewithRegius,which
Leibnizciteswithapprovalontheperseunityofahumanbeingascomposedofsoulandbody.
ThesincerityofDescartes'smoreScholasticutterancesinthiscorrespondencewasalready
questionedintheseventeenthcentury,butLeibnizwasinclinedtoacceptit,ashelargelyapproved
thecontent(NE317f.).Cf.Hoffman,"UnityofDescartes'sMan,"pp.345f.,36469.
293
thecomposite,corporealsubstancecomposedofthesimplesubstanceanditsorganicbodyisone
persebyvirtueoftheincompletenessofitsconstituentswithouteachother,andtheirnatural
aptitudefortheirrelationtoeachother.Hedoesnotquitesayit,butthemostimportanttextonthis
pointdoesbeginwiththeperseunityof"thecompletecorporealSubstance"beingclosely
associatedwiththeincompletenessofitsconstituents(GIV,572).
Thisexplanationdoesnotcompetewithanaccountoftheunityofacorporealsubstanceintermsof
theharmonyofperceptions,butsupplementsandpresupposesit.Fortherelationtoeachotherfor
whichthesimplesubstanceanditsbodyhaveanaturalaptitudeisunderstoodbyLeibnizasa
harmonyofperceptions,anditisbyvirtueofthepreestablishedharmonyofperceptionsthatthey
are"nevernaturallywithout[each]other."ItisthusperfectlyappropriatethatLeibniz'sclearest
statementoftheviewthatsoulandbodyareincompletewithouteachotherisimmediately
precededbythestatementthat"themass[amas]oftheseorganizedcorporealsubstanceswhich
constitutesourbodyisnotunitedwithourSoulexceptbythatrelationwhichfollowstheorderof
phenomenathatarenaturaltoeachsubstanceseparately"(GIV,573).
ThisseemstomethebestaccountoftheunityofacorporealsubstancesuggestedbyLeibniz's
writingsofthe1680sand1690s.Itfitselegantlybothhisownmetaphysicsandsomeimportant
Scholasticaccountsofperseunity.Itisthereforepuzzlingthathedoesnotmakemoreuseofit.
DidLeibnizfearthatinthecontextofhisphilosophytheunionofincompletebeingswouldnotbe
astrongenoughrelationtosatisfyScholasticexpectations?Thatwouldnotbeaplausiblefearwith
regardtotheroleoftheconceptofincompletebeingintheaccountIhavesuggestedforLeibniz.In
thisaccounttheincompletenessofthesoulordominantmonadanditsbodystrengthenstheirunion
becauseitsignifiesthattheirtogethernessisdemandedbythepreestablishedharmony.Andthe
demandsofpreestablishedharmonyareverystrongdemandsinLeibniz'sphilosophy,tantamount
todemandsofthegoodnessofGod,andsurelynotweakerthanthenaturalaptitudethatmatterand
substantialformhaveforeachotheraccordingtoSurez.
Theremaybemorereasontofearweaknessintheunitiverolethatharmonyofperceptionsplaysin
theLeibnizianaccount.Therelationinwhichmatterandthesubstantialformthatactuatesitstand,
accordingtoSurez,isabroadlycausalrelation(specifically,therelationofformalcausation),41
whichmightbethoughtastrongerrelationmetaphysicallythanaharmonyofperceptions.Inhis
lateryearsLeibnizwasclearlyconcernedaboutsomesuchperceptionofcomparativeweaknessin
theharmonyofperceptionsaccount.Inthe1680sand1690s,however,heseemstohavehadno
qualmsaboutexplainingtheunionofsoulandbodyintermsofaharmonyofperceptions.Ifhehad
anydoubtsonthatpoint,itishardtoseewhyhewouldnothavewantedtostrengthenhisaccount
byincorporatingtheideaofincompletebeings,withrespecttowhichhedoesnotseemtobeina
weakerpositionthanSurez.
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41
294
5.2FromTourneminetotheTheodicy
About1706anoticeablydifferentstancebeginstoappear,especiallybutnotexclusivelyin
writingsthatLeibnizaddressedtoJesuittheologians.Henoticed,"quitelate"ashesays,anarticle
thathadappearedunderthedateofMay170342inthesocalledMmoiresdeTrvoux,an
influentialjournalpublishedbytheJesuits.Thearticlewasbyoneoftheeditors,RenJosephde
Tournemine,andobjectedagainstLeibnizthattheunionofsoulandbodycannotbeexplainedin
termsofharmony(AG196).Inhisresponse,probablysenttoTournemineinJanuary1706,and
finallypublishedintheMmoiresdeTrvouxofMarch1708,43Leibnizdisavowedanysuch
explanation.
TheresponsetoTourneminecontainsbothnegativeandpositivethemes;bothrecurinlatertexts.
Thepositivehypothesishasreceivedfarmoreattention,bothfromLeibnizandfromhis
interpreters,butIshallarguethatitwasneverpartofhisphilosophy,thoughitmayreveal
somethingaboutthemodalityofhismetaphysicalthinking.Thenegativeconcessionisless
obviouslydramatic,butitmayinfactrepresentanabandonmentofpartofLeibniz'stheoryof
corporealsubstance.Theresponsebeginswiththenegative:
FatherTourneminehasspokensoobliginglyofme...thatitwouldbewrongformeto
complainthatheattributestomeanobjectionagainsttheCartesiansthatIdon't
remember,andthatcanobviouslybeturnedagainstme.Ideclare,however,thatifI
haveeverusedit,Irenounceitfromnowon....ImustadmitthatIwouldbevery
wrongtoobjecttotheCartesiansthattheagreementthatGodmaintainsimmediately,
accordingtothem,betweentheSoulandtheBody,doesnotconstituteatrueUnion,
sinceassuredlymypreestablishedHarmonycouldnotdoitanybetter.(GVI,595/
AG196f.)
ItisremarkableLeibnizcouldnotrememberclaimingthathispreestablishedharmonycould
explaintheunionofsoulandbodybetterthantheCartesianscould.AsTourneminedidremember(
GVI,596),Leibnizhadclaimedexactlythat,inprint,inthe"NewSystem"of1695,whichwas
probablythemostdiscussedpublicpresentationofhismetaphysicalviews(E127/L457f.;cf.also
GVI,551,from1705).Wemaybesurprisedthathenowdeniesit.Forhistheoryofpreestablished
harmonycontainstwofeaturesthatseemtostrengthentherelationbetweensoulandbodyandthat
arenotfoundinCartesianandoccasionalisttheories.First,thesoulanditsorganicbodyare
completeandperfectandpeculiarlydirectexpressionsofeachother,and,second,thepre
establishedharmonyimposesastrongrequirementthatifeitherthesouloritsbodyexists,theother
shouldalsoexist,incorrespondencewithit.Byvirtueofthisrequirement,aswehaveseen,thesoul
anditsbody,withouteachother,canbecalled"incomplete"beings.Thestrengththatthesefeatures
imparttotherelationisapparentinLeibniz'sstatmentofabout1704that"accordingtomethe
____________________
42
LeibnizdateditMarch1704,corresponding,ithasbeensuggested,tothetimeofitsactual
appearance(AG196).
43
TheinitialdateofsubmissionmaybeinferredfromletterstoDeVoiderandDesBosses(G
II,281,296/L538f.).Thelettersmakeclearthatwhatwassentthenwasatleastcloseincontentto
theresponseultimatelypublished.
295
soul'sjob,inpart,istoexpressitsbody.Withoutthebody,withouttheorgans,[thesoul]wouldnot
bewhatitis"(GVI,570).
Tothisitmightbeobjectedthattheseadvantagesofthepreestablishedharmonyarebalancedby
thefactthatininteractionistversionsofCartesianismtherelationbetweensoulandbodyis
strengthenedbydirectcausallinksnotfoundinLeibniz'ssystem.ButLeibnizdoesnotseemtobe
thinkingofaninteractionistversionofCartesianismhere.Theoneadvantagehedoesclaimforthe
preestablishedharmonyinthiscontextisbycomparisonwithwhatisclearlyanoccasionalist
versionofCartesianism.TheclaimedadavantageservestointroducebycontrastwhatIhavecalled
thepositivethemeorpositivehypothesisoftheresponse:
Mydesignhasbeentoexplainnaturallywhattheyexplainbyperpetualmiracles,andI
havetriedtogiveareasononlyforthePhenomena,thatistosay,fortherelationthatis
perceivedbetweentheSoulandtheBody.ButastheMetaphysicalUnionthatoneadds
toitisnotaPhenomenon,andasanintelligibleNotionhasnotevenbeengivenofit,I
havenottakenituponmyselftoseekthereasonofit.Idonotdeny,however,thatthere
issomethingofthatnature.(GVI,595/AG197)
Thisisanambiguousstatement.Leibnizdoesnotaffirmthatthereisametaphysical
unionofsoulandbodynotexplainedbyhistheoryofpreestablishedharmony.Hesays
onlythathedoesnotdenyit.Andhedoesdeny,ineffect,thatsuchaunionispartof
hisphilosophy.Butishetactfullymufflinghisbeliefthatitisanunintelligible
absurdity?Orishemorestraightforwardlyacknowledgingthattheremaybesomething
intheuniversethatcannotbeunderstoodinhisphilosophy?
Thetextprovidesadditionalmaterialforthelatterinterpretation,intheformofremarks
assimilatingmetaphysicaluniontomysteries,astheyfigureintheology.
ItisasintheMysterieswherewealsotrytoelevatewhatweconceiveintheordinary
courseofCreaturestosomethingmoresublimethatcancorrespondtoitinrelationto
theDivineNatureandPower,withoutbeingabletoconceivethereanythingdistinct
enoughandsuitableenoughtoformatotallyintelligibledefinition.(GVI,596/AG197)
Wemayseehereasuggestionthatastherearereligioustruthsthatexceedhumanunderstanding,
aboutwhichfaithmaybelievemysteriesthatwegrasponlydimly,ametaphysicalunionofsoul
andbodymaybeclassedamongthem,ifitseemsreligiouslyimportanttodoso.(Leibnizdoesnot
implythatitisreligiouslyimportanttohim,butitpresumablywastoTournemine.)This,Ithink,is
themostprobableofficialmeaningofthetext.
Themorecynicalreadingofthetextissupported,however,byLeibniz'slastlettertoDeVolder
(19January1706),inwhichhereportshisinterchangewithTournemine.WhathewrotetoDe
VolderagreescloselyinsubstancewithwhathewroteforTourneminebutisnoticeablyless
respectfulandmoreironicintone.Itisintroducedwiththeremark,"Thescholasticscommonly
seekthingsthatarenotsomuchbeyondthisworld[ultramundana]asUtopian.Anelegant
examplewasrecentlysuppliedtomebytheJesuitTournemine,aningeniousFrench
296
man"(GII,281/L538).The"example"stigmatizedas"Utopian"isTournemine'sdesireforan
accountofaunion,differentfromharmony,betweenbodyandsoul.Thismaywellleadustodoubt
thatLeibniztookthepossiblerealityofsuchaunionveryseriously.
Otherstookitveryseriously,however,andtheideacropsuprepeatedly,thoughstill
noncommittally,inLeibniz'swritingsthereafter,especiallyinhisletterstoBartholomewDes
Bosses,hisbestfriendamonghisJesuitcorrespondentsoftheperiod.On20August1706Des
BossessentLeibnizalistofpropositions"mostlydrawnfromDescartesandMalebranche"that
were"recentlycondemnedbyourschoolsatRome."Oneofthecondemnedpropositionswasthe
following:
22nd.TheunionoftheRationalSoulwiththebodyconsistsinthisalone,thatGodhas
willedthatcertainperceptionsbearousedinthesoulatcertainchangesofthebody,and
[haswilled]conversely,forcertainthoughtsorvolitionsofthesoul,thatcertain
motionsfollowinthebody.(GII,312)44
ThismakesclearthatsomeinfluentialCatholicsdidthinkitreligiouslyimportanttomaintainthe
unionofsoulandbody,andtomaintainitinastrongersensethanoccasionalismcanexplain.
Leibniz'sreply,afewdayslater,wasbriefandcautiousonthispoint."Tothe22nd:SincetheSoul
istheprimitiveEntelechyofthebody,theUnionwillconsistatleastinthat;butagreement
betweenperceptionsandcorporealmotionsisintelligiblyexplainedbythepreestablished
harmony"(GII,314).DesBosses,havingseenLeibniz'sresponsetoTournemine,wouldsurely
takehimhereascontrastingthephenomenaofcorrelation,asexplainedbypreestablished
harmony,withtheunion.Buthowdeepisthecontrast?Theunion,Leibnizclaims,canbe
explainedbythesoul'sbeingtheentelechyofthebody;andthatinturnisexplainedintermsofthe
preestablishedharmony,onviewsthatLeibnizhadheldhitherto.WhatLeibnizsayshereis
perhapscompatiblewiththeviewthatsomethingoverandabovetheharmonyisrequiredtomake
thesoultheentelechyofthebody;butwhatwouldthatbe?Onemightexpectittobea
metaphysicalunion,butthentheunionwouldexplainthesoul'sbeingtheentelechyofthebody,
ratherthantheotherwayaround.
LeibnizdidnotforgethisinterchangewithTournemine.Twoyearslater,3September1708,and
again24April1709,inletterstoDesBosses,hementionsandsummarizeshisresponse,withthe
metaphysicalunionstillfallingwithinthescopeofthecautious"Idonotdeny"(GII,354f.,371/
L598).Hecomesclosertounqualifiedaffirmationofthemetaphysicalunioninaletterof8
September1709toDesBosses,stating,inaEucharisticcontext,"IhavealreadygivenTournemine
theanswerthatpresenceissomethingMetaphysical,asunionis,whichisnotexplainedby
phenomena"(GII,390).Inthiscontext,however,thementionofunionisapendanttothe
discussionofpresence,whereasthereversehadbeentrueintheoriginalresponsetoTournemine.
Leibniz'scommitmentto
____________________
44
0nlyaselectionofthepropositionsaregiveninthisletter.DesBossessentafulllist,atLeibniz's
request,withhisletterof17September1706.Gerhardtdidnotprintthislist,buttheadditional
propositionscanbefoundinRobinet,Architectoniquedisionctive,pp.115f.Thenumberingofthe
propositionsusedinthecorrespondence,andhere,isthatofthecompletelist.
297
aninexplicableunionispresumablynostrongerherethanhiscommitmenttoaninexplicable
presence.Andthelatterseemsweakenough,forafewmonthslater,inJanuary1710,hereasserts,
toDesBosses,amorereductionistictheoryofpresencethathehadusedinhisEucharistictheology
forfortyyears(GII,399;seealsoChapter12,sections2.22.3).
Inlettersof1710toDesBosses,inEucharisticcontexts,wefindLeibnizsaying,"Sincethebread
infactisnotasubstance,butabeingbyaggregationorsubstantiated[being]resultingfrom
innumerablemonadsbysomesuperaddedUnion,itssubstantialityconsistsinthisunion,"and
"Sincethebreadinfactisabeingbyaggregationorsubstantiated[being],itssubstantialitywill
consistintheunionofthemonads"(GII,399,403).Thesestatementsseemprettyassertive,
althoughthefuturetenseinthesecondmayservetodistancetheauthorfromwhatissaidandthe
firstbeginsaparagraphthatendswiththedisclaimer,"Butwewhorejecttransubstantiationdonot
needsuchthings."Itisnotclearfromthecontextofthislatterstatementwhetherthesuperadded
unionisoneofthethingsthatLeibnizthereforedoesnotneed.Inanyevent,thesestatementsfall
outsidethegroupoftextsrelatedtotheresponsetoTournemine,foratleastonthesurfacetheyare
notabouttheunionbetweenasoulordominantmonadanditsorganicbody.Rathertheyseemto
beaboutaunionofmonadstoformapieceofbread,whichisnotanorganicbodybutameremass
whichhasnodominantmonadthoughwecannotexcludethepossibilitythatLeibnizwasspeaking
carelesslyandreallyhadinmindapluralityofsuperaddedunionsforthedifferentcorporeal
substancescontainedinthebread,ratherthanasingleunionforthebreadasawhole.45
LeibnizrecallshisresponsetoTournemineagainintheTheodicy(1710).InthePrefacehewants
tomakeclearthat
indenyingphysicalinfluenceofthesoulonthebodyorthebodyonthesoul,...Ido
notdenytheunionoftheonewiththeotherthatmakesofthemasuppositum;46but
thisunionissomethingmetaphysical,whichchangesnothinginthephenomena.Thisis
whatIalreadysaidinrespondingtowhatFatherTournemine...hadobjectedtomein
theMmoiresdeTrvoux.(GVI,45)47
AgainLeibnizsaysonlythathedoesnotdenythemetaphysicalunion;hedoesnotactuallyassert
itsreality.HeismarginallymoreassertiveinanotherpassageoftheTheodicy,butwithamore
ambiguouscontent.
Weunderstandsomethingbyunion...whenwespeakoftheunionofthesoulwiththe
bodytomakeasingleperson.ForalthoughIdonotholdthatthesoulchangesthelaws
ofthebody,northatthebodychangesthelawsofthesoul,andalthoughIhave
introducedthepreestablishedHarmonytoavoidthatdisorder,Idonotfailtoadmita
trueunionbetweenthesoulandthe
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45
Robinet(Architectoniquedisjonctive,pp.98,101)takesthesetextsatfacevalue,asconcernedwith
aunionofanaggregate,thebread,assuch,andcontraststheminthiswiththetheoryofsubstantial
bondsdevelopedlaterinthecorrespondence.
46
IrendertheFrenchsupptwiththeLatintechnicaltermthatliesbehindit.A(created)suppositum
is,roughly,acompleteindividualsubstance;seeSurez,MetaphysicalDisputations,XXXIV,i,9.
47
Page68f.inHuggardEnglishtranslation.
298
body,whichmakesofthemasuppositum.Thisunionbelongstothemetaphysical,
whereasaunionofinfluencewouldbelongtothephysical.(Tpd55)
Toadmit[Frenchadmettre]ismostnaturallyreadasimplyingan(unenthusiastic)assertion,though
itmightjustbepossibletoreaditasmerelygrantingothersthepermissiontomaketheassertion.
Butifadmissionisasortofassertionhere,whatisasserted?Thepassagehasenoughsimilarityto
thestatementintheprefacetotemptthereadertoassumethatwhatLeibnizassertshereiswhathe
did"notdeny"therewhichisalsowhathedid"notdeny"toTournemine.Butthemoreassertive
passageisnotitselftaggedwithareferencetoTournemine,andwhatitsaysabouttheunionofsoul
andbodycontainsnothingthatLeibnizcouldnothavesaidaboutitfromthestandpointofhis
reductionistictheory.Thatthereisarealunion,makingofbodyandsoulasuppositumorcomplete
individualsubstance,andthatthisunionismetaphysical,arethingshecouldcertainlyhavesaidin
the1690swhilehewasmaintainingthattheunionmustbeunderstoodintermsoftheharmonyof
perceptions.Ontheotherhand,sincetheunionismentionedhereassomethingthatLeibnizadmits
althoughhehasintroducedthepreestablishedharmony,thereadermightnaturallytakeitthatthe
sourceornatureoftheunionisnottobefoundintheharmony.
Thattheidea,ifnottheunambiguousaffirmation,ofanirreduciblemetaphysicalunionofsouland
bodyappearsintheTheodicymarksanescalationofitsimportanceforLeibniz.FortheTheodicy
wasthemostpublicofhisworks,notwhollycandid(asIhavearguedinChapter1,section4),but
centraltotheimpressionofhimselfthathewishedtogivethelargestpossibleeducatedpublic.
Leibniz'sbeliefintheirreduciblemetaphysicalunionisnot,inmyopinion,establishedbyhis
writingsoftheyears170610,amongwhichwemustnotforgettoincludethesarcasticcomments
toDeVolder.Buthedidsayrepeatedly,inpublicandprivate,thathedidnotdenysuchaunion.
Hecouldoffernotheoryofit,ashestatedtoTournemine,butheatleastgranteditsadmissibility
forthosewhosawareligiousorotherneedforit.
5.3LetterstoDesBosses(171216)
Beginningin1712,theideaofanirreduciblemetaphysicalunion,asafactorintheconstitutionofa
corporealsubstance,assumesamuchmoreelaborateforminLeibniz'sletterstoDesBosses.Thisis
theperplexingconceptofasubstantialbond[vinculumsubstantiale].Thesubstantialbondis"a
certainunion,orratherarealunifiersuperaddedtothemonadsbyGod";itis"somethingabsolute
(andthereforesubstantial)"(GII,435/L600).It"willnotbeasimpleresult,thatis,itwillnot
consistsolelyoftrueorrealrelations,butwilladdbesidessomenewsubstantialityorsubstantial
bond;anditwillbeaneffectnotonlyofthedivineintellectbutalsoofthedivinewill"(GII,438/
AG199)oraswemightsay,itwillnotbeamerelogicalconstructionoutofmonadsandthe
relationsoftheirperceptions.Atleastnaturally,asubstantialbonddoesnotunitespatiallyscattered
monads;itunites"monadsthatareunderthedominationofone,orthatmakeoneorganicbodyor
oneMachineofnature"(GII,438f./AG199;cf.GII,486/L609).Andeachsubstantialbondis
permanentlyattachedtoasingledominantmonad(GII,496/L611).
299
Itisonlybytheorderofnature,however,andnotbyabsolutenecessity,thatthesubstantialbond
musthavetheserelationswithmonads.Supernaturallyandmiraculously,Godcanseparatethe
bondfromthemonads,and"canmakeitcorrespondtomonadsthatwerenotpreviouslyitsown"(
GII,495f./L610f.;cf.GII,516/AG202).Thesesupernaturaleffectsmayoccurin
transubstantiation,whichLeibnizproposedtoexplainintermsof"thesubstantialbondofthebody
ofChrist"comingtounitethemonadsofthebreadandwineinplaceofthesubstantialbondsof
breadandwine(GII,459/L607),thoughgroupsofthemonadsthusunitedmaybewidely
separatedinspace,andthephenomenaofthebreadandwineareunchanged.Theconceptionofthe
substantialbondincludessomeofthepropertiesthatLeibnizhadpreviouslyascribedtothe
dominantmonad,ortoitsentelechy.Itspresenceinasubjectislikenedtothatofasubstantialform
(GII,504/L614).Moreaccurately,nodoubt,"theverysubstantialformofthecomposite,andthe
primarymattertakeninthescholasticsense,thatis,theprimitivepower,activeandpassive,"are
saidtoinhereinthesubstantialbond(GII,516/AG202),whichapparently"oughttoconsistinthe
primitiveactiveandpassivepowerofthecomposite"(GII,485f./L609)."Thisbondwillbethe
source[principium]oftheactionsofthecompositesubstance"(GII,503/L613).Aboveall,"the
unityofacorporealsubstance"arises"fromasuperaddedsubstantialbond"(GII,451/
L604).Unlikeanymonad,however,thesubstantialbondismetaphysicallyactedonbyotherfinite
things.Itdoesnotchangeanythinginthemonads(GII,451,517/L604,AG203),forthatwouldbe
contrarytotheirnature.Butitunitesthembybeinginfluencedbythem(GII,495f./L610f.).Also
"itwillbenecessarythattheaccidentsofthecompositebeits[thesubstantialbond's]
modifications"(GII,486/L609)."Ifthatsubstantialbondofmonadswereabsent,allbodieswithall
theirqualitieswouldbenothingbutwellfoundedphenomena,liketherainbowortheimageina
mirror"(GII,435/L600).Butifthereweresubstantialbonds,thencorporealsubstancewouldbe
"somethingmakingphenomenarealoutsideofSouls"(GII,451/L604;cf.GII,519/AG205).
Amongthephenomenamaderealarenotonlybodiesbuttheirpropertiesofcontinuityand
extension(GII,517/AG203;cf.pp.24243).ThequestionoftheextenttowhichLeibnizpersonally
acceptedthistheoryofsubstantialbondsisextremelycontroversial.Someinterpretershavetaken
thetheorystraightforwardlyasapartofhisphilosophyinitsfinalform.Themajorityview,)
however,istypifiedbyRussell'sstatement,"Thusthevinculumsubstantialeisratherthe
concessionofadiplomatistthanthecreedofaphilosopher."48Severalreasonscanbegivenfornot
takingthetheoryofsubstantialbondsveryseriouslyasapartofLeibniz'sthought.
Themostimportantisthatitisblatantlyinconsistentwithotherpartsofhisphilosophy.It
postulatessomethingultimatelyrealinthingsbesides"simplesubstances,andinthemperception
andappetite"(cf.GII,270/L537).Italsograntsareal,asopposedtoidealorphenomenal,
existencetocontinuousexten
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48
Russell,PhilosophyofLeibniz,p.152.Forausefulsurveyofthehistoryofinterpretationto1960,
seeMathieu,LeibnizeDesBosses,pp.1225.
300
sion.BothofthesepositionsareemphaticallyrejectedinmanyplacesinLeibniz'swritings,late
aswellasearly(e.g.,inGIII,622f.andE745f.,writtenin1714and1716,respectively).49
2.Russellsaysthat"nowheredoesLeibnizhimselfassertthathebelieves"thedoctrineof
substantialbonds.50Thiscouldbedisputed.Inaletterof16January1716hesaystoDes
Bosses:
AndinthisIjudgethatIcertainlyagreewiththeScholastics,andthattheirprimary
matterandsubstantialform[are]theprimitivepowers,passiveandactive
respectively,ofthecomposite;andthecompletethingresultingfromthemIjudgeto
beinfactthatsubstantialbondthatIamurging.(GII,511)
Thiscaneasilybereadasanendorsementofthedoctrine,butitneednotbe.Thestatementis
abouttherelationofsubstantialbondstoScholasticmetaphysics,anddoesnotaddressthe
questionoftherelationofthatmetaphysicstotherealworld.Itdoesimplythatheis"urging"the
substantialbonds,butthatcouldmeanonlythatheisurgingthemaspreferabletononsubstantial,
merelymodalbonds.ThatpreferenceissomethingthathecertainlyisurgingonDesBosses,
whereasheusuallyspeaksofthesubstantialbondsinarathertentativewaythatseemstoleave
openthealternativehypothesisthattherearenobondsatallandbodiesareinfactonly
phenomena.HeevenexplicitlyexpressestoDesBossessomepreferenceforthephenomenalistic
view(GII,461;cf.GII,450/L604).
3.AparticularlyimportantindicationofLeibniz'sintentionsisfoundinapassage,citedby
Russell,fromLeibniz'sletterof30June1715toDesBosses:
WhethermylatestansweraboutMonadswillhavepleasedyou,Ihardlyknow.Ifear
thatthethingsIhavewrittentoyouatdifferenttimesaboutthissubjectmaynot
coherewellenoughamongthemselves,since,youknow,Ihavenottreatedthis
theme,ofPhenomenatobeelevatedtoreality,orofcompositesubstances,excepton
theoccasionofyourletters.(GII,499)
Thetheme[argumentum]mentionedinthistextiscertainlythetheoryofsubstantialbonds.
LeibnizistellingDesBosses,ineffect,thathehasnotthoughtenoughaboutitanddoesnothave
theideasclearlyenoughinmindtobeconfidentthathehasbeenconsistentinwhathehassaid
aboutitfromonelettertoanother.WhatevermayhaveseemedplausibletoLeibnizinthose
hoursthathespentwritingtoDesBosses,atheorythathedidnot"treat"exceptinthis
correspondence,thathedidnotkeepclearlyinmind,andthatisblatantlyinconsistentwith
importantdoctrinesthatheassertedinmanyotherplacesandcontinuedtoassertduringthis
periodofhislife,cannotbecountedasapartofhisphilosophy.51
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49
OnetextoutsidetheDesBossescorrespondencefrom1715,alettertoNicolasRmond,contains
anambiguousreferenceto"themetaphysicalunionofthesoulanditsbody,whichmakesthem
composeunumperse,ananimal,alivingthing"(GIII,658).Butthismustbebalancedagainst
theflatstatement,"IbelievethatthewholeuniverseofCreaturesconsistsonlyinsimple
substancesorMonads,andinAssemblagesofthem"(GIII,622),inadocumentwrittenfor
Rmondthepreviousyearbutnotsenttohim,clearlybecause(assuggestedinthetext,G
III,624)Leibnizfeareditmightscandalize.
50
51
Somethinglikethesubstantialbondisdiscussedbriefly,butwithoutclearcommitmenttoits
existence,inadocumentoutsidetheDesBossescorrespondence,writtenprobablyafewmonths
301
Thereisquitearangeofattitudes,however,thatonecanhaveasaphilosophertowardideasthat
arenotapartofone'sownphilosophy.Onemaybesuretheyarefalse.Onemaybeafraidthey
maybetrueorwishtheyweretrue.Onemaythinktheypresentanintriguingorperhapseven
promisingalternativetosomeofone'sownviews.Onemayplaymoreorlessseriouslywiththe
thoughtoftryingtoincorporatethemintoone'sphilosophy.Onemaybecompletelyconfidentof
thecorrectnessofone'sowntheories;butifnot,ifoneisworriedabouttheiradequacyinsome
respect,thatwillaffectone'sinterestinalternativetheories.
IntryingtodiscoverLeibniz'sattitudetowardthetheoryofsubstantialbonds,wemustformsome
assessmentofhismotivesindiscussingitwithDesBosses.Russell'sclaimthatthevinculum
substantialeis"theconcessionofadiplomatist"reflectsacynicalassessment.Itisbasedonthe
ideathatthetheory"springsfromLeibniz'sendeavourtoreconcilehisphilosophywiththedogma
ofTransubstantiation."52Notthathemeantatthisstageinhislifetoacceptthedogma.Asa
Lutheran,hewasquitefrankwithDesBossesthathedidnotacceptit(GII,399),but"hewas
extremelyanxioustopersuadeCatholicsthattheymight,withoutheresy,believeinhisdoctrineof
monads,"suggestsRussell.53
Leibnizwascertainlycapableofconcealingpartofhispositioninordertomaketherestofitmore
palatabletoothers.Heevenleftbehindsomeindicationfromhisearlieryearsthathebelievedin
doingso(AVI,iii,573f.).ButthereareatleastthreereasonsforregardingRussell'sexplanationof
Leibniz'smotivesasimplausible.
First,ImustrecordmyownimpressionthatLeibniziscomparativelycandid,ratherthancautious,
inhisletterstoDesBosses.ItisworthnotingthatthemorephenomenalisticaspectsofLeibniz's
thoughtfindmuchfullerexpression
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51
afterthisletter(VE1083f.,1086=LHIV,8,6061asetofnotesonaJesuitmetaphysicaltreatise).
TheLeipzigActaEruditorumforAugust1715(p.376)containsabriefnoteinterpretingLeibniz's
intentionsinwhathesaidaboutEucharistictheologyinhisTheodicy.ItstatesthatLeibniz"rejects
somebondorthird[thing]superaddedtothings...asamodificationconnectingthethingstobe
united,whetheralocalmodificationofinclusionoradhesion,orahypostaticonelikethat
[connecting]soulandbody,[or]thewordandhumanity[inChrist],oranothermodification
analogoustothese,sincethiswouldbetomultiplyBeingsbeyondnecessityandinvolveoneselfin
Philosophicalperplexities,"andperhapsinconclusionscontrarytoLutheranteaching.Louis
Dutens,whoreprinteditinhiseditionofLeibniz'sworks,heldthatthisnotewascomposedby
Leibnizhimself(DutensI,32).Robinet(Architectoniquedisjonctive,p.85)takesthedocumentas
revealing"Leibniz'shostilitytowardsthe'vinculum'."Butthebonddiscussedinthenotewouldbe
a"modification,"andhenceishardlythesubstantialbondoftheDesBossescorrespondence.The
notewasprintedwithoutindicationoftitleorauthor.Itbeginsinthevoiceofthejournal'seditors,
whosaythatitisinsertedattherequestoftheLutherantheologianChristopherMatthusPfaff
(exceptthattheygivehisfirstname,erroneously,as"Christian").Pfaffhadchargedinprintthat
LeibnizmisrepresentedLutheranEucharistictheology.Now,"betterinstructedaboutthemindof
theIllustriousAuthor,"hewishedacorrectiontobepublished.Onthemostnaturalreadingofthis
note,itgivesPfaff'sinterpretationofLeibniz.Nodoubtitinsinuatesthattheinterpretationisbased
onconversationorcorrespondencewithLeibniz,butwehavereasontomistrustPfaff's
understandingofsuchcommunications(seeChapter1,section4).Stillitislikelyenoughthat
LeibnizsaidtoPfaffthatLutheranEucharistictheologyhasnoneedofsuperaddedbonds.
52
53
302
inthemthantheydoinhispublicationsandhisletterstomostcorrespondents,thoughhegavea
fullerendorsementofsuchviewstosomeothersthanhedidtoDesBosses.Second,thetheoryof
substantialbondswasproposedbyLeibniz,notforcedonhimbyDesBosses,thoughtheterm
'bond'[vinculum]inthiscontextdoeshaveresonancewithJesuitmetaphysicsoftheseventeenth
century.54Indeed,DesBossesshowedaratherpersistentpreferenceforaccidentalormodalbonds,
againstwhichLeibnizhadtodefendhissubstantialbonds.AndDesBossesdidnotreactwith
horrortothephenomenalisticalternativesofferedbyLeibniz.Ifthevinculumsubstantialewasa
concession,itwasnotinanysimplewayaconcessiontoDesBosses.Third,exceptinoneof
Leibniz'sletters,neitherhenorDesBossesseemstohavebelievedthatthedoctrineof
transubstantiationcouldnotbeaccommodatedwithoutthesubstantialbonds.Leibnizdidoncesay
thathecouldhardlyseehowthedogmacouldbe"sufficientlyexplainedbymeremonadsand
phenomena"(GII,460).Buthesubsequentlyproposedtwodifferenttheoriesoftransubstantiation
basedontheassumptionthatonlymonadsandtheirphenomenaexist(GII,474,520f./L607f.,
AG206),andtheavailabilityofthesetheoriesdidnotseemtodiminishhisinterestinsubstantial
bonds.
DesBossesalsoproposedtoLeibnizatheoryoftransubstantiationbasedon"theHypothesisof
bodiesreducedtoPhenomena"(GII,45355).Hedidnotendorsethistheory,buthelikeditbetter,
inonewayatleast,thanLeibniz'ssubstantialbondtheoryoftransubstantiation.InLeibniz'stheory
thesubstantialbondsofthesacramentalbreadandwine,orofthecorporealsubstancescontainedin
them,aremiraculouslydestroyed,butthemonadsofthebreadandwineendureandare
miraculouslyunitedtothesubstantialbondsofthebodyofChrist.DesBossesobjectedtothe
survivalofthemonadsofthebreadandwineasinconsistentwith"thedogmaoftheChurch...
thatthewholesubstanceofthebreadandwineperish"(GII,463;cf.GII,474,480).InDes
Bosses'stheorybasedonmonadsandphenomenaalone,themonadsofthebreadandwineare
destroyedandthemonadsofthebodyofChristtaketheirplace.Leibnizwasaverse,ofcourse,to
thedestructionofmonads,butDesBossesforcedhimtoadmitintheendthatthedestructionof
substantialbondswouldbejustasunnatural(GII,481f.).
5.4Conclusions
Thereismorethanonealternative,ofcourse,toacynicalreadingofLeibniz'sdiscussionof
substantialbonds.Washesimplyplayingwithideasinletterstoagoodfriend?Washeseriously
temptedbytheideaofasuperaddedunion,ifnotyetreadytoacceptit?Ihavecometobelievethat
theTheodicy's"PreliminaryDiscourseontheConformityofFaithwithReason"providesan
importantkeytounderstandinghere.Usingatraditionaldistinction,Leibniztherecontrastsbeliefs
thatareabovereason,"whichcannotbecomprehended,andforwhichonecannotgiveareason,"
withbeliefsthatareagainstreason,whichare
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54
Boehm,Le"vinculumsubstantiale"averyusefulbook,thoughBoehmtakesremarkablylittlenote
ofthereasonsfordenyingthatthedoctrineofthevinculumwaspartofLeibniz'sphilosophy.
303
"opposedbyinvinciblereasons,orwhosecontradictorycanindeedbeprovedinanexactandsolid
way"(Tpd60).Leibnizapprovesoftheformeranddisapprovesofthelatter.Moreprecisely,he
grantsthatfaith,ortheology,mayneedtoassertsomethingsthatareabovereason.
ThisideacanbeseenatworkinLeibniz'sresponsetoTournemine.Asuperaddedunionofsouland
bodyisbeyondourcomprehension;"anintelligibleNotionhasnotevenbeengivenofit"(G
VI,595/AG197).AndLeibnizcannotgiveareasonforitbecauseit"cannotbeexplainedfrom
Phenomenaanddoesnotchangeanythinginthem"(GII,371/L598).Itisthusmetaphysicalina
morenonempiricalwaythanthesubstantialformsthatLeibnizthinkswecanunderstandonthe
modelofourownsoul,andforwhichhearguesasprovidingthebest(metaphysical)explanationof
phenomena,thoughtheyareofnouseinexplainingthe(physical)detailofphenomena.
Nonetheless,Leibnizdoesnotdenythatthereissuchathingasasuperaddedunion.Andhe
explicitlyinvokesherethereligiousconceptofmystery(GVI,596/AG197,quotedearlierin
section5.2),inawaythatItaketoimplythatthebeliefinasuperaddedunionofsoulandbodyis
abovereasonbutnotagainstreason.Similarly,intheletterstoDesBosses,thehypothesisof
substantialbondsisintroducedunderthecondition,"iffaithdrivesustocorporealsubstances"(G
II,435/L600),thatis,assomethingthatcouldbeacceptediftheologicallyrequired.
Theideasofmystery,andofbeliefsthatareabovereason,introduceintoLeibniz'sthoughta
categoryofwhatmightbecalledproblematicconcepts.IdeliberatelyborrowthistermfromKant,
55becausetheconceptsthatLeibnizthusadmitshavethreeimportantfeaturesincommonwith
Kant'sproblematicconcepts.(1)Ourunderstandingofthemislimitedbytheircomparative
unrelatednesstoourexperience.(2)Theirobjectiverealitycanbeneitherprovednordisprovedby
reason.And(3)theyareparticularlyimportantforthephilosophyofreligion.Ofcourse,thereare
alsoimportantdifferences.Thewayinwhichexperienceisimportantforunderstandingisdifferent
forKantandLeibniz,andmoreoftheconceptsthatareimportantforbothphilosophersare
problematicforKantthanforLeibniz.
ThereisplentyofevidencethatLeibnizthoughtsuchproblematicconceptswouldhavetobeused
indoctrinestowhichhewascommitted,ashewasnotcommittedtotransubstantiation.56The
mostimportantoftheseisthedoctrineoftheincarnation,andtheproblematicconceptinvolved
thereisaconceptofunion,theunionofthedivineandhumannaturesinChrist.Leibnizwroteto
DesBosses,10October1712:
Ifanaccountcouldbethoughtoutforexplainingthepossibilityofyour
transubstantiationevenwithbodiesreducedtophenomenaalone,Iwouldmuchprefer
that.ForthatHypothesispleasesinmanyways.Nordoweneedanyotherthingbesides
Monadsandtheirmodifications,forPhilosophyasopposedtothesupernatural.ButI
fearthatwecannotexplainthemysteryoftheIncarnation,andotherthings,unlessreal
bondsorunionsareadded.(GII,461)
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55
Kant,CritiqueofPureReason,A254=B310.
56
Igavemoreemphasistothispoint,anddevelopeditmorefully,withsomecitationsandquotations
notusedhere,in"PhenomenalismandCorporealSubstanceinLeibniz,"pp.253f.
304
HereLeibnizseemsquiteclearthathewouldaccept"realbondsandunions"overandabove
"Monadsandtheirmodifications"onlytoaccountforsupernaturalthings.Healsoseemstothink
thatsuchaproblematicconceptismorelikelytobeneededforthedoctrineoftheIncarnation,
whichhedoesaccept,thanforthatoftransubstantiation,whichhedoesnotaccept.SofarasI
know,heneverproposedtoaccountfortheunionofthedivineandhumannaturesinChristonthe
basisofthepreestablishedharmonyoranyotherfeatureofhismonadology.Thisgiveshim
theologicallycompellinggroundsforacceptingaproblematicconceptionofthatunion.Itdoesnot
givehimsimilarlycompellinggroundsforacceptingthemuchlesslocalizedcompromiseofhis
monadologythatwouldcomewithsubstantialbondsorsuperaddedunionsunitingmonadstoform
ordinaryorganicbodiesorcorporealsubstances.
Still,itmightbeargued,ifoneisforcedtouseaproblematicconceptionofunioninatheological
specialcase,therewouldbeacertaineconomyinusingittosolveproblemsmorewidely.This
thoughtseemstohaveoccurredtoLeibniz,asevidencedbyatheologicalfragment,notaddressed
toanyone,inwhichhesaysthat
everythingcanbeexplainedbyaddingonethingtothosethingsthatcanbeexplained
byphenomena:namely[byadding]theunionofGodwiththecreatureinthe
incarnation;ofthesoulwiththebodytomakethesuppositumofthehumanbeing;of
themonadsamongthemselvestomakethesecondarysubstanceororganicbody.
Hencealsometaphysicalaction,bywhichtheactionsofthiscompositearetheactions
ofthesoul.Thusonlytheactionofunionissomethinginexplicablewhich,joinedto
inexplicable57thingsthataresufficientforthephenomena,isalsosuffientfor
revelation.(RML414)
Thisisarelativelyisolatedtext,however,andthereisnoevidencethatLeibnizthoughtthatthe
problematicconceptionofasuperaddedunionformingamerelycreatedbodyorcorporeal
substancewasrequiredforanytheologicaldoctrinetowhichhewascommitted.Itwastherefore
opentohimtodeny,asIhavenotedthathedidtotheendofhislife,thatthereisanythinginthe
createdworldoverandabovemonadsandtheirmodifications(GIII,622f.;E745f.).Atthesame
timeheseemstohavewishedtoleaveitopentoothers,particularlyCatholics,tousesucha
conceptionindevelopingtheirtheologicaldoctrines.
Atthebeginningofsection5.2Idistinguishedanegativeconcessionandapositivehypothesisin
Leibniz'sresponsetoTournemine.LikeLeibnizhimselfandmostofhisinterpreters,Ihave
devotedmostattentiontothepositivehypothesisofsuperaddedunionsorbondsformingcorporeal
substances.ButIactuallybelievethatthenegativeconcession,thattheperseunityofacorporeal
substancecannotbeexplainedbymonadsandpreestablishedharmony,ismoredisturbingforour
understandingofLeibniz'sphilosophy.
TheconcessionisrepeatedseveraltimesintheletterstoDesBosses,intheformofstatementsthat
withoutsubstantialbondstherewouldbenocorporeal(or,moreoften,"composite")substances
becausethemonadsandtheirsubordinationwouldnotbeenoughtoconferunityperse(G
II,435f.,444,511/L600,602).HadLeibnizthereforeabandonedhisoftrepeatedclaimthatthe
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57
Itakethiswordtohavebeenwrittenbymistakeinplaceof"explicable."
305
dominantmonadistheprincipleofunitythatmakesacorporealsubstanceoneperse?Itisnot
clearthathehad.Importantevidenceonthesubjectisfoundin3ofThePrinciplesofNatureand
ofGrace(1714).Itcontainstwostatementswhich,asfirstdrafted,unambiguouslyexpress
Leibniz'searlierviewoftheunityofacorporealsubstance,butwhicharebothmoreambiguousin
theirfinalform.
Thefirstofthemoriginallysaidof"eachsimpleSubstanceorMonad"thatit"constitutesthecenter
ofacompositesubstance(as,forexample,ananimal)andtheprincipleofitsunity[unit]."Leibniz
thenchangedunittounicit[unicity],awordveryrareinFrenchofthatperiod,andunderlinedit.
Unicitshouldmean"uniqueness,"butitmightalsobereadasimplyingunity;58thereisnoreason
toexpectacommentaboutuniquenessinthecontext.Thefirstversionclearlyimpliesthatthe
dominantmonadistheprincipleofunityofacompositesubstance;thefinalversionleavesit
ambiguouswhetherthatisso.
Theotherstatementoriginallyread,"Butthereisaperfectharmony,preestablishedfromthe
beginning,betweentheperceptionsofthesoulandthemovementsofthebody;andthatiswhatthe
unionofthesoulandthebodyconsistsin."Inthefinalversionthesecondclausereads,"andthatis
whattheagreementandthephysicalunionofthesoulandthebodyconsistsin,withoutonebeing
abletochangethelawsoftheother."Thefirstversionclearlyassertsapreestablishedharmony
theoryoftheunionofsoulandbody;theinsertionof"physical"inthefinalversionleavesopenthe
hypothesisthatthereisafurther,metaphysicalunionthatisnotexplainedbytheharmony,though
thereisnoexplicitsuggestionofsuchahypothesisinthetext.Asimilarambiguityispresentinthe
MonadologywhenLeibnizsaysofthepreestablishedharmony,"Theseprincipleshavegivenme
themeansofexplainingnaturallytheunion,oralternatively[oubien]theagreementoftheSoul
andtheorganicbody"(Mon78).
TheinitialformulationsofthestatementsinPNG3reflectLeibniz'soldaccountinwhichthe
dominantmonadistheprincipleofunityofacompositesubstancewhoseunityisexplainedin
termsofthepreestablishedharmony.Thelikeliestexplanationofhishavingbeguntowriteinthat
wayisthatthisviewstillprevailedinhisownthinkingaboutcorporealsubstance.Thefinaltext
doesnotrejectthisview,butleavesopen,forreaderswhomaybesoinclined,possibilitiesofaless
reductionistmetaphysicsofunion.
Unequivocalendorsementsoftheharmonyaccountoftheunityofacorporealsubstancesare
certainlyhardtofindinthewritingsofLeibniz'slastyears,thoughtheevidencewehavesurveyed
suggeststhathestillpreferredittolessreductionisticalternatives.Whydidhenotdefenditmore
vigorously?Iknowofnoevidencethathehadencounteredorconstructedadevelopedrefutationof
itthatwouldhavebeenpersuasivetohim;andIhavearguedinsection5.1thathecouldhavegiven
afairlypowerfuldefenseofit,inScholasticterms,usingadistinctionbetweencompleteand
incompletesubstances.
Thispuzzlemustbelinkedwithanother.Theconceptofcorporealorcompositesubstance,while
bynomeansabsentfromLeibniz'slaterwritingsout
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58
Thereisnoentryforunicitinthe1694dictionaryoftheFrenchAcademy.Seventeenthcenturyuse
ofthecorrespondingEnglishword'unicity',asrecordedintheOxfordEnglishDictionary,does
suggestimplicationsofunity.
306
sideoftheDesBossescorrespondence,isnoticeablylessprominenttherethaninhiswritingsof
the1680sand1690saboutthephilosophyofbody.Thereisnomentionofcompositesubstanceor
corporealsubstance,assuch,intheMonadology,forinstance.ItisclearfromPNG3thatLeibniz
hadnottotallyabandonedtheconcept,buthewasquitepreparedtogiveanaccountofthe
corporealworldwithoutusingit.
Ibelievethesepuzzlingfactsarebestexplainedintermsofadistinctionbetweenwhatis
autonomousandwhatisheteronomousinLeibniz'srehabilitationofScholasticAristotelianideas.
Someofhisviewsaboutsubstantialformswerecertainlyautonomous.Hehadrealpersonal
convictionsfavoringaninfinitemultitudeofsubstantialunities,andthemetaphysicalcentralityof
perceptionandforce,whichweshallexploreinthenextchapter.ButIthinkLeibnizneverhada
deeppersonalcommitmenttotheviewthattherearecorporealsubstances,oneperse.Hisattempt
tofindaplaceforthatideainhisphilosophywasheteronomous,anaccommodationto
traditionalistconcernsofothers,especiallyRomanCatholics.Sowhenhefoundthatthoseothers
didnotfeeltheirconcernssatisfiedbyhisaccountofcorporealsubstance,hehadlittlereasonto
insistonit.
307
11FormandMatterinLeibniz'sMiddleYears
InChapters9and10IhavepresentedaninterpretationofLeibnizaccordingtowhichbodiesmust
bereducible,metaphysically,tosimple,perceivingsubstancesandtheirperceptionsandappetites,
inaccordancewithLeibniz'sstatementof30June1704toBurcherDeVolderthat"Thereis
nothinginthingsexceptsimplesubstances,andinthemperceptionandappetite"(GII,270/L537).
AccordingtoanimportantcurrentofmodernLeibnizinterpretation,however,thisviewis
characteristicofonlythelastdozenyearsorsoofLeibniz'slife,andaviewofthephysicalworld
thatismorerealistic,lessidealistic,andspecificallymoreAristotelianthanthisispresentedinthe
worksofwhatDanielGarbercallsLeibniz's"middleyears"roughlyfromthemid1680stoabout
1704.
ThisinterpretationgoesatleastasfarbackasC.D.Broad'sposthumouslypublishedlectureson
1Ithasbeengivenitsmostpowerfulandinfluentialpresentationtodateinalongand
Leibniz.
extremelyinterestingpaperbyGarber,2andGarber'sversionoftheinterpretationistheoneIwill
discuss.HecallsourattentiontothefactthatthewritingsofLeibniz'smiddleyearslookmuch
moreAristotelianthanthoseofhislastyears.ParticularlyinhisletterstoArnauld,Leibnizsays
nothingaboutsimplesubstancesassuch,butmuchaboutcorporealsubstances,whichheconcludes
arefoundeverywhereinbodies.Hethinksthatinordertounderstandthepossibilityofcorporeal
substances,itisnecessarytorehabilitatetheScholasticnotionofsubstantialform.Hedeclaresto
Arnauld:
Ifthebodyisasubstance,andnotasimplephenomenonliketherainbow,norabeing
unitedbyaccidentorbyaggregationlikeapileofstones,itcannotconsistinextension
andonemustnecessarilyconceiveofsomethingtherethatiscalledsubstantialform
andthatcorrespondsinsomewaytothesoul.(LA58)
IdisagreewithGarber'sinterpretation.Moreprecisely,IbelievethattheAristotelianelementsthat
areundeniablypresentinLeibniz'sthoughtarenotinconsistentwithhismonadologicaltheories,
butarepartofthem,andthatthereisnomajorchangefromhismiddletohislateryearsonthis
point.Thepresent
____________________
1
Broad,Leibniz:AnIntroduction,pp.4992.
2
Garber,"LeibnizandtheFoundationsofPhysics."
308
chapterisnottheplaceforareviewofallthetextsthatbearontheinterpretiveissue.Someofthem
havealreadybeenreviewedinChapter10,section3,andmorewillbediscussedinChapter12.
HereIwillofferamoregeneralexaminationofthemeaningandmotivesofLeibniz'streatmentof
theAristotelianpolarityofformandmatterintheworksofhismiddleyears.Ibelievethis
investigationwillshowthatinLeibniz'sthoughtofthatperiodthemainfeaturesofphysicalreality
couldhardlyhavebeenidentifiedwithanythingbutwhathewouldlatercall"simplesubstances,
andinthemperceptionandappetite."Ihopeitwillalsoilluminatethefundamentalproblemsof
modernnaturalphilosophywithwhichLeibnizwaswrestling.
1.Form
1.1FormasForce
3Itiscommontothinkabout
WhatisitinthenotionofsubstantialformthatattractedLeibniz?
bothPlatonicandAristotelianformsinthecontextoftheproblemofuniversalsinthephilosophy
oflogic.Thismayleadustothinkoftheformsasproperties.Thatisnotentirelywrong;theform
ofwarmth,forexample,islikeapropertyinasmuchashavingit,withcertainqualifications,is
4Butthatdoesnotmakeitanyeasierforustograspsomethingthatwasevenmore
beingwarm.
importantfortheseventeenthcentury,whichisthattheformswerecauses,realbeingsthatreally
contributetodeterminingandexplainingwhatoccursintheworld.
ForAristotletheformisoneofthe"fourcauses"theothersbeingmatter,theagentorefficient
cause,andtheendorgoalorfinalcause.Inthethoughtoftheleadingsixteenthandseventeenth
centuryScholasticAristotelianFranciscoSurez,however,strictlyformalcausationisonlyapart
ofthecausalactivityoftheforms;theyarealsoefficientcauses.AccordingtoSurez,theformal
causalityofasubstantialformconsistsinitsunionwithmattertoformacompositesubstance.
Formalcausalityisaform'sinforming,orbeingtheformof,whateveritistheformof.Theeffect
ofthiscausalitycanbedescribedeitherasthecompositesubstanceitself,orasthe"actuation"of
5Theconceptofactuationisrootedintheideathattheformandthematter
thematterbytheform.
withwhichitunites,orisabletounite,arerelatedastheactualityandthepotentialityofthevery
samething.Theform"actuates"thematter,then,inthesensethatitconvertsthepotentialityofthe
matterintothecorrespondingactualityor"act."Andtheformalcausalityofanaccidentalformisto
beunderstoodinmuchthesamewayasthatofasubstantialform.Asubstantialformistheform
thatmakesasubstanceorindividualthingthekindofthingitis;mysubstantialform,forinstance,
makesmeahumanbeing.Accidentalformsconferotherlessessentialpropertiesonthings.
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3
Leibniz'sdecisiontotrytorehabilitatethenotionofsubstantialformseemstohavebeenmadein
1679,beforethemiddleyears,andIoffernoaccountoftheevent.Aninformativeandrichly
documentedaccountispresentedinRobinet,Architectoniquedisjonctive,ch.5.
4
Theconverse,thatpropertiesareforms,certainlydoesnotholdingeneral.Someproperties
(privations,forexample,suchasblindness)arenotformsandhavenodirectlycorresponding
forms.
5
Surez,MetaphysicalDisputations,XV,vi,7andvii,23.
309
Ofthis"formal"sortofcausalityIfindlittletraceinthethoughtofLeibniz.Herarelyusestheterm
6HeexplicitlyrecognizesitasanAristoteliantermfortheactualizationofa
'actuate'[actuare].
potentialityorpower[puissance],whichisconceivedasamerecapacityorreceptivity,incontrast
withhisownmorerobustconceptionofpowersorforces(NE169f.).Moreimportant,whilehe
contrastsmatter("primary"matter)aspassivewithformasactiveinvarioustransactions,hedoes
notcontrastmatteraspotentialitywithformasactualityanddoesnotseemtoconceiveofthebeing
ofmatterasconsistinginapotentialityfortheactualityrepresentedbytheform.Therefore,the
unionofformwithmatter,ofwhichhedoesspeak,canhardlyhaveforhimthecausalstructure
thatithadfortypicalScholasticAristotelians.
AsIhavenoted,however,Surezalsoascribedefficientcausalitytoforms.Thesubstantialform"is
7Itcannotbe
theprincipalsource[principium]ofalltheactionsofthesubject[suppositum]."
8It
excludedfromsucharole"sinceitisthefountofthewholebeing[esse]andallitsproperties."
istheactiveandseniorpartnerinconstituting,withthematter,thetotalorcomprehensive
"principleofoperation"ofthesubstance.9Accidentalformsalsohaveapartinefficientcausation
accordingtoSurez;howtheirrolerelatestothatofthesubstantialformisacomplicatedstorythat
willnotbetoldhere,sinceitisonlyforsubstantialformsthatLeibnizseemsinterestedinreviving
theconceptofform.10
Aroughandreadypresentationofastandardexamplemayhelpgiveanideaofthecausalityofa
substantialformasa"principleofoperation."Thesubstantialformofanoaktreeislikethe
propertyofbeinganoak,insofarashavingitiswhatmakesanoakanoak.Butinotherwaysit
functionsmorelikeacontrolmechanism(orlikeDNAinmodernbiology11)thanlikewhatwe
wouldusuallythinkofasaproperty.Ineachoaktreeitisthe"soul"ofthatindividualplant.Itis
alreadypresentinanoakseedling,andeveninanacorn,thoughthey
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10
Itmaybeinterestingtoexploreanalogiesbetweentherelationofprimitiveandderivativeforcesin
Leibniz'sthoughtandtherelationofthecausalitiesofsubstantialandaccidentalformsin
Scholasticthought,buttheformeriscertainlynosimpletranslationofthelatter.Itisalsotruefor
LeibnizasforSurezthat(primary)matterhasapartinthetotaloperationofasubstance,but,for
now,ourfocusisonform.
11
Cf.Furth,Substance,FormandPsyche,p.119.
6
HedoesuseitatGIV,395f./AG252f.(1702),wherehesaysthatthesubstantialform"always
naturallyactuatessomeorganicbody,whichitself,takenseparately(thatis,apart,orisolated,from
thesoul),isnotonesubstancebutanaggregateofmanyinaword,amachineofnature."Itis
interestingthatwhatissaidheretobe"actuated"isthe"organicbody,"whichinLeibniz'sviewis
notprimarybutsecondarymatter.IfLeibnizcouldviewanysortofmatterashavingitsbeingina
potentialityforanactualizationorcompletiontobeimpartedbyform,onemightexpectittobe
primaryratherthansecondarymatter,inasmuchasprimarymatterisincompleteinawaythat
secondarymatterisnot(GIV,512/L504).Leibnizdidascribearelevantsortofincompletenessto
theorganicbody,however(seeChapter10,section2.3).Inaletterof1703toDeVolderitisthe
corporealsubstance,ratherthanitsmatterorbody,thatissaidtobe"actuatedbyoneEntelechy"(
GII,250/L529).Thesecontextspresentnoasymmetricalactuationofmatterbyform,forLeibniz
seemstoregardtheformorsoulascompletedbythematterorbodynolessthanthelatterbythe
former.
7
Surez,MetaphysicalDisputations,XVIII,v,1.
8
Surez,MetaphysicalDisputations,XVIII,ii,3.'Properties'may,however,beusedhereina
narrowersensethanisusualwithus;cf.pp.12728.
9
Surez,MetaphysicalDisputations,XV,xi,4.
310
lackmanyormostofthecharacteristicperceivablepropertiesofanoaktree.It(directlyor
indirectly)causestheacorntosprout,androotstogrowdownandfoliageupandout,andbarkto
coverthestem.Itcontinuestoworkinthematuretree,controllingitsvegetativeprocesses,keeping
italive,andkeepingitsleaves,andallitsotherparts,oaklike.
Thecausalityofthesubstantialformdescribedinthisexampleisimmanentthatis,itisactionon
thesubstancetowhichtheformbelongs.Perhapsthiscanberegardedastheprimaryandmost
characteristiccausalactionofsubstantialforms,thoughScholasticismalsorecognizeda
"transeunt"actionofsuchformsonothersubstances(forinstance,inthegenerationofnew
substances).Atanyrate,itisawellknownfeatureofLeibniz'ssystemthatimmanentcausalityis
theonlymetaphysicallyrealcausalityherecognizedincreatedsubstances(RML315).
OtherfeaturesoftheexampleIgavearealsorelevanttoLeibniz'sthought.Theactionofthe
substantialformintheexampleisteleological,aimedatdevelopingandmaintainingtheformof
lifecharacteristicofamatureoaktree.Ishallhavemoretosaybelowabouttheteleological
characteroftheactionofLeibniziansubstantialforms.Mostimportantinthepresentcontextisthe
relationofsubstantialformtoactivepower.Asubstantialformisnotanevent.Theroleoftheform
inwhatSurezcallsefficientcausalityisthereforenotthatofatriggeringevent.Itappearsrather
thattheformhasan"efficient"causalroleinsofarashavingasubstantialformisorinvolves
havingcertainpowersandtendencies.
TheconceptofpowerorforceisparticularlyimportantforLeibniz.Itisalreadyquiteexplicitin
worksofhismiddleyearsthatextensionanditsmodes(the"primaryqualities,"asweare
accustomedtocallthem)belongtothephenomenalrealmratherthantotheultimatelyreal,
althoughtheydoexpressrealitymoredistinctlythanothersensiblequalities(DM12,18;LA119).
Theonethinginwhatweknowofthephysicalworldthatismorerealthanextensionandits
modes,accordingtoLeibniz,isforce.Henceitisasascienceofforces,ratherthanasascienceof
motionsandothermodesofextension,thatphysicsisastudyofreality;dynamics,thetheoryof
forces,takesprideofplaceinLeibnizianphysics.12
TherecanbenodoubtthatpartofwhatLeibnizlikedaboutsubstantialformswastheirconnection
withthenotionofforce.Statinginthe"NewSystem"of1695thathehadhadtorehabilitate
substantialforms,hegoesontosay,"Ifoundthenthattheirnatureconsistsinforce"(E124f./L
454).Similarly,hewrotetoJoachimBouvetin1697that"theformsoftheAncientsorEntelechies
arenothingbutforces"(E146/W104).Specifically,asweshallsee,thesubstantialforms,inthe
strictestsenseforLeibniz,areprimitiveactiveforces.Inthinkingofsubstancesasconstitutedby
whathecalledforces,andwhatSurezcalledaprincipleofoperation,Leibnizexplicitly,and
correctly,tracedtheideatoAristotle'sowndefinitionof"natures."13
Sowhenitissaidthatprimitiveforceconstitutesthesubstanceofbodies,theirnature
oressenceisunderstood;thusAristotlesaysthatthenatureistheprin
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12
Cf.Garber,"LeibnizandtheFoundationsofPhysics,"p.90.
13
Aristotle,Metaphysics,1015a1319.SeeT87forasomewhatdifferentwayinwhichLeibniz
tracedtoAristotletheconnectionofforcewithform.
311
cipleofmotionandrest;andtheprimitiveforceisnothingbutthatprincipleineach
bodyfromwhichallitsactionsandaffections14areborn.(AI,vii,248)15
Oneofthereasonsthatmademeemploythetermforcetoexplainthenature,the
substantialform,theessenceofbodies,isthatitismoreintelligible,andgivesamore
distinctidea.(AI,vii,250)
Theascriptionofinternal,primarilyactiveforceorpowertocreatethings,asconstitutingtheir
substance,isthekeynoteofLeibniz'sdisagreementwiththeoccasionalismofNicolas
Malebranche,whoascribedgenuinepowerorcausalefficacytoGodalone.Thesignificanceofthe
ideaofinternalpowersinthisconfrontationisnicelycapturedinacommentbyBurcherDe
Volder,oneofLeibniz'smostacutecorrespondents,andoneinclinedtooccasionalism.
Butnottobelongeraboutit,itiscertainthateitheraninternalprincipleofchanges
mustbeacknowledgedinthingsthemselves,orwemusthaverecoursetoGod.Butthis
doesnotkeepitfrombeingtruethatIdonotunderstandthisinternalprincipleorthe
wayinwhichitoperates.Thisdifficultyofunderstandinganinternalprinciplecauses
mosttohaverecoursetoGod;anditcannot,inmyopinion,besolvedasitneedstobe
unlessthisprincipleanditswayofoperatingarethoroughlyunderstood.(GII,274)
IthinkitisnotahistoricaleccentricitythatLeibnizandmanyofhiscontemporariessawthese
issuesintermsofforces,powers,or,morebroadly,dispositionalproperties.Twofeaturesofthe
causalorderoftheworldareeasytosee:therearemanyregularities(ofoccurrentor
nondispositionalfact)amongobservablephenomena,describablebytrueconditional
generalizations,andtheseregularitiesobtainovertime.Humeansmaintainthattheseobservable
factsareallthereistothecausalorderoftheworld.Ifonefindsthatimplausible(asIdo),whatare
thealternatives?
Onemightascribesomesortofmetaphysicalrealitytothelawsofnatureintheirownright,seeing
themasfreestandingfeaturesoftheworldthatreallydeterminewhathappensinit.Suchan
ascriptionofrealitywouldnotnecessarilyimplythatthelawsaresubstances,orinanystrongsense
"things."Itwouldbeenoughifitwereametaphysicallyobjectivefactthattheseregularitiesmust
obtainafactoverandabovethefactthattheydoobtain,andafactthatisnotaboutanyobjector
objectsinparticular.ButIthinkthisisneitheraveryplausibleapproachnoronethatwasvery
influentialintheseventeenthcentury.16
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14
InFrench,passions.Thesenseisthatoftheplural,ifwehadone,of'beingactedon'.
15
ThequotationisfromaletterofJanuary1692toPaulPellissonFontanier.Weshouldnotethatin
thisstatementLeibnizisspeakingnotonlyofthesubstantialforminhisstrictestsense,inwhichit
isonlytheprimitiveactiveforce,butoftheprimitiveactiveandpassiveforcesofasubstance,oras
hewouldalsosay,theprimarymatteraswellasthesubstantialform.Togethertheyarethe
principlefromwhich"alltheactionsandaffections"ofthesubstancespring.Hereheisin
agreementwithSurez,whoalsoidentifiesthe"nature,"asdefinedbyAristotle,withacomplex,
the"metaphysical"substantialform,or"formofthewhole,"includingthematteraswellasthe
substantialforminthenarrower,"physical"sense(Surez,MetaphysicalDisputations,XV,xi,4).It
isclear,however,thatforbothSurezandLeibniz,theprincipaloractivedynamicrolebelongsto
thesubstantialforminthestrictsense,andnottothematter.
16
IreadSpinozaasoneofthosewhohavethoughtthatthelawsofnatureareabsolutelynecessary,
nolessnecessarythanthelawsoflogic.Itmightbethoughteasiertounderstandhowthe
312
Theideaoflawsofnaturewascertainlybecomingmoreprominenttheninthinkingaboutscience,
buttherewasusuallyinthebackgroundsomeideaofintentionsofGodornaturesofcreatedthings
inwhichtherealityoreffectivenessofthelawswouldbelocated.
Ifthereismoretothecausalorderoftheworldthanjusttheobservableregularitiesof
nondispositionalfact,andifthelawsofnaturearenotfreestandingfeaturesoftheworld,itremains
thattheremustbeafeature(orfeatures)ofoneormoreobjectsorsubstancesbyvirtueofwhichthe
regularitiesofnatureobtain.Itisreasonabletosupposethatthiswillbeanenduringfeatureof
enduringthings,sincetheregularitiesobtainovertime.Onthemostinfluentialand,Ithink,the
mostplausibleaccounts,itisadispositionalpropertyofthethingstowhichitbelongsapoweror
tendencyorperhapsaliability.ThemainalternativeIcanseefornonHumeanswouldbean
occurrent,primitive,realrelationofcauseandeffect;butthiswouldhelplessinaccountingforthe
regularitiesofnatureandwouldprovidenogroundatallforfacts,inwhichmostofusbelieve,
aboutwhatwouldhavehappenedincircumstancessomewhatdifferentfromthosethatareactual.It
isnotsurprisingthattheideaofpowershasaperennialappealandseemsnowtoberegaining
popularitywithphilosopherswhowishtoberealistsaboutcausation.
Ifwecanatleastappreciatetheappealofsucharealismaboutpowers,wemayalsobeabletogain
someinsightintoLeibniz'sreasonsforholdingthattheremustberealpowersorforcesnotonlyin
Godbutalsoincreatedsubstances.Forifathingdoeshaveenduringpowers,andespeciallyifthe
powersdeterminethecharacteristicsofthethingovertimeinaccordancewithsomerule,thatcan
beseenasunifyingthethingmetaphysicallyovertime,makingitanenduringthingorsubstance.
Leibnizseemsindeedtohavefavoredacriterionofidentitythatassignsstatestothesame
individualsubstanceifandonlyiftheyarecausedbythesameindividualcausalnexus(orthesame
substantialform,inthefavoredterminologyofhismiddleyears).DuetoLeibniz'sdenialofreal
causalinteractionbetweencreatedsubstances,thiscriterionwillnot,inhissystem,assignthesame
statetotwodifferentcreatedindividuals.17ThereisevidencethatLeibnizalsobelieved(rightlyor
wrongly)thatwithoutsuchindividual
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16
lawsofnaturecouldbe"freestanding"iftheyareabsolutelynecessary.Infact,however,Spinoza
regardedthenecessityofthelawsofnatureasgroundedmetaphysicallyinthenatureofGod(see,
e.g.,EthicsI,prop.33).
PaulHoffmanhaspointedouttomethatDescartescallssomelawsofnature"secondaryand
particularcausesofthediversemotionswenoticeinindividualbodies"(ATVIII1,62:Principles
II,37).ButIthinkthatiscompatiblewithDescartes'snotsupposingthelawstohaveanyreality
outsidetheintentionsandoperationsofGod.Themostfundamentallawoftheconservationof
motionhasbeenexplained(ATVIII1,61f.:PrinciplesII,36)asanexpressionoftheimmutability
ofGod'soperation.Thequotedstatementseemsnottoapplytothatlaw,butisexplicitlyaboutlaws
thatarealsosaidtobeknown"fromthesameimmutabilityofGod"(PrinciplesII,37).Descartes
states,moreover,thatthecauseoftheselawsis"theimmutabilityandsimplicityoftheoperationby
whichGodconservesmotioninmatter"(ATVIII1,63:PrinciplesII,39).Itmustbegrantedthat
thisinterpretationpushesDescartesinanoccasionalistdirectioninwhichhemaynothavewished
togo.ButIthinkitisfairtosayatleastthattheideathatthelawsofnaturehavemetaphysical
realityintheirownright,asdistinctfrompowersandpropertiesofGodandparticularcreatures,is
neitherunambiguouslynorarticulatelypresentinDescartes.
17
SeeChapter3,forsourcesandafullerdiscussionofthiscriterion.
313
causalprinciplesoftranstemporalunity,createdthingscouldnotbeunifiedovertimeand,ashe
says,wouldbemerely"evanescentorfleetingmodificationsandphantasms,sotospeak,oftheone
permanentdivinesubstance"(GIV,508/L502;cf.GIII,575).18
ThusLeibnizbelievedthatanysubstancehastohavewithinitanenduringpowerorpowers,a
continuingcenterofimmanentcausalactivitythatunifiesitandconstitutesitasthesubstanceitis.
Thisisanimportantpartoftherolethatithadtypicallybeensupposedthatsubstantialformsplay.
Ifwebegintospeculateabouthowthisimmanentcausalactivitytakesplace,additionalaspectsof
thenotionofsubstantialformcometothefore.
1.2FormasLaw
Supposethat,asLeibnizbelieved,thelawsofnaturearenotfreestandingfeaturesoftheworld,but
theregularitiesdescribedbythelawsaretobeexplainedbyrealpowersincreatedthings,which
Leibnizcalledsubstantialforms.Sinceitremainsthattheregularitiesareamajorpartofwhatisto
beexplained,itfollows,Ithink,thatthepowersmustbe,atleastinpart,dispositionstoactin
accordancewithlawsthatdescribeorpredicttheregularities.Inthissense,thelawsmustbe
incorporatedinthesubstantialforms,andhavingtheformmustinvolveatleastthefunctional
equivalentofasensitivitytowhateverlogicalandmathematicalstructuresorrelationshipsare
involvedinthesatisfactionornonsatisfactionofthelaws.Forinstance,ifamathematicallawof
universalgravitationalattractionisafundamentallawofnature(asLeibnizdeniedandeven
Newtonwouldnotaffirm),thenthesubstantialformorinherentpowersofeverymaterialthing
wouldhavetoinvolveadispositiontobehaveaccordingtothatlaw,withresponsivenesstothe
relevantmathematicalrelationships(e.g.,ofmassanddistance)inwhichitmightstand.
AtthispointIthinkLeibnizpicksupanimportantstrandinAristotle'sconceptionofform.The
formascause,saidAristotle,"isthelogosofwhatitistobe[thethinginquestion],andthekinds
towhichthisbelongs...andthepartsthatareinthelogos."19Logosisdifficulttotranslate,asis
ratio,itsusualequivalentinScholasticLatin.Itcansignifyalinguisticexpression,athought
expressibleinlanguage,orthecontentintendedbyeither.Insomecontextsitseemstomeanan
explanationorreason."Thelogosofwhatitistobe"20somethingwouldnormallymeana
definition,andformiscloselyrelatedtologosinthissensefor
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18
ThisformsLeibniz'ssharpestattackonoccasionalism,explicitlysuggesting(GIV,509/L502)that
itleadstothepantheismofSpinoza.Itisinterestingthataformulationofoccasionalismin
MalebrancheSearchafterTruth(VI,ii,3:p.448)practicallyinvitesthischarge.Matebrancheclaims
that"thenatureorforceofeachthingisnothingbutthewillofGod"(OMII,312).Malebranche
wasnotapantheist,buttheremightseemtobeaperilouslyshortstepfromdescribingthedivine
willasthenatureofallthingstoregardingGodasthesubstanceofallthings.
19
Aristotle,Physics194b2629=Metaphysics1013a2629.Commentingonthispassageinhis
MetaphysicalDisputations,XV,v,2,Surezthinksitmustbeunderstoodwithsomequalificationas
towhattheformisthelogosorratioof,buthedoesnotquestionthecloseconnectionbetweenthe
conceptsofformandlogosorratio.
20
"Whatitistobe"isamoreliteraltranslationofanexpressionverycommoninAristotlethatis
usuallyrenderedas"theessence[of]."
314
Aristotle.21Theformthusincorporateswhatwecouldcall,broadlyspeaking,alogicalstructure,
orthesortofthingthatistheobjectofrationalthought;anditisindeedbyreceivingformsthatthe
mindunderstands,accordingtoAristotle.22
Nowalawofnatureisnotexactlyadefinition,butitis,broadlyspeaking,alogosorratio,a
rationallyintelligiblecontent.LeibnizrecognizedthatforAristotletheformisaratioorlogos(A
VI,ii,189,247).AndasalogoscouldbeforAristotleacausallyefficaciousfeatureoftheformsin
things,soforLeibnizlawsofnatureareincorporatedinthesubstantialformsofthings.Indeed,he
ispreparedtoidentifytheformswithlaws.In"OnNatureItself"heindicatesthat"thelaw
establishedbyGodleavessometraceofitselfexpressedinthings,"andthisisthe"formorforce"
inthingsthatiscalled"nature"(GIV,507/L501).Furtheronhesaystheremustbe"asoul,ora
formanalogoustoasoul,orthefirstentelechy;thatis,acertaineffort[nisus]orprimitiveforceof
actionwhichisitselftheimplantedlawimpressedbydivinedecision[decretum]"(GIV,512/L
504).InletterstoDeVolderhespeaksof"theprimitiveforce"ofasubstanceasa"law"(GII,262/
L533).Theideacanbefoundinhiswork,thoughwithoutmentionof"form,"asearlyas1676:
"Theessenceofsubstancesconsistsintheprimitiveforcetoact,orinthelawofthesequenceof
changes,likethenatureoftheseriesinnumbers"(AVI,iii,326/L155).23
OneofthemostinterestingLeibniziantextsonthispointistheDiscourseonMetaphysics,even
thoughthesubstantialformsarenotexplicitlycalled"laws"init.24InDM10,rather,Leibnizsays
thatancientandmedievalphilosophersintroducedsubstantialformsbecausethey"hadsome
knowledgeof"whathehadjustbeensaying,whichisthateachindividualsubstancehasacomplete
conceptfromwhichallitspredicatesfollowandistherefore"likeawholeworld"and"expresses,
albeitconfusedly,everythingthathappensintheuniverse,past,present,orfuture"(DM89).Thus
thesubstantialformsarecloselyconnectedwiththecompleteindividualconcept.Theyare,Ithink,
thatinthesubstancewhichisexpressedbytheconcept,andwhichLeibnizintheDiscoursedoes
nottroubletodistinguishfromtheconceptoftheindividual.Thisisofinterestherebecausethe
completeindividualconceptisclearlyalogosorlogicalstructureorrationallyintelligiblecontent,
anditisalogosthatisexpressedinrealcausalrelationships.InDM89and14Leibnizseemstobe
arguingthatbecauseallthepredicatesofanindividualsubstance,andhencealltheeventsinwhich
thatsubstancewilleverbeinvolved,followlogicallyfromitscompleteconcept,thereforeeach
substanceis"likeawholeworld"or"likeaworldapart,independentofeveryotherthingexcept
God,"andeverythingthathappenstoitisonlya
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21
SeeAristotle,DeAnima414a414;Metaphysics996b8,1035a21,1044b12ff.Alsorelevantisthe
associationofformwithessence(=whatitistobex)inMetaphysics1032b1,1035b32,1044a36,
andofsoulwithlogos,DeAnima4129ff.
22
SeeespeciallyAristotle,DeAnima429a1029.
23
Thistranslationofthelastphraseseemstometomakethemostsense.LeroyLoemker's
translation,"asthenatureoftheseriesconsistsinthenumbers"(L155),isalsopossible.Another
textinwhich"theprimitiveforceofacting"seemstobetreatedasequivalentto"thelawofthe
sequenceofchanges"datesprobablyfrom1685orshortlythereafter(RML75).
24
InDM14,however,the"certainreasonsorlaws"thateachsubstancecarefullyfollowsaresurely
connectedwiththesubstantialform.Thetextleavesopenthequestionwhethertheyaretobe
identifiedwithit.
315
consequenceofits"being."Inotherwords,arealcausalconnectionisinferredfrom,and
presumablyexplainedby,alogicalconnection.
InterpretershavetreatedthisreasoningprimarilyasanargumentforLeibniz'sthesisofthemutual
causalindependenceofcreatedsubstances,andhenceforthepreestablishedharmony.Itisthat,of
course,butGarberinaveryilluminatingnotepointsoutthatitisalsoanargumentagainst
occasionalism.HesuggestsindeedthatLeibniz'sprincipalpurposeinintroducinghistheoryof
completeindividualconceptsinDM8was"torefuteoccasionalismandestablishthatindividuals
aregenuinesourcesofactivity."ThecontextsupportsGarber'sreading,for"DM17dealswith
Godascause,andDM8ispresentedasdealingwithhow'todistinguishtheactionsofGodfrom
thoseofcreatures'."25Alltheseconsiderationsconfirmthatsubstantialformsareseeninthe
Discoursefirstofallasinternalsourcesof(immanent)causalactionincreatedsubstances,andthat
theiractionisseenthereasbasedontheirincorporatingalogosorlogicalstructureorintelligible
contentthatcanbeidentifiedwithlawsofnature.
1.3FormasSoul
AnotheraspectofAristoteliantheoriesofsubstantialformisrichinsuggestionsastohowthe
immanentcausalactionofsuchformsworks.Forthesubstantialformofalivingthingwas
identifiedwithitssoul.Insomecasesthismaynothelpusmuchinunderstandinghowsubstantial
formswork.Speakingofthe"soul"ofaplant,thoughimportanttoAristoteliantheoriesoflife,will
nothavemuchpointforLeibnizorothermodernphilosophers,apartfromamoregeneraltheoryof
soulorsubstantialform.ThemajorsourceofilluminationhereforLeibnizisthatinourowncase
weareprivilegedtowitnesstheoperationofasubstantialform"fromtheinside,"sotospeak,if
oursubstantialformisindeedoursoul.
Thispossibilityforinterpretingtheactionofsubstantialformsmaynothavebeengenerally
exploitedbyAristotelians,butitclearlywasseizeduponbyLeibniz.Heregularlysaysthat
substantialformsaresouls,orlikesouls.Athisfirstmentionofsubstantialforminhis
correspondencewithAntoineArnauld,forexample,hesaysthatit"correspondsinsomewaytothe
soul"(LA58).Ourownmindsaretheonlysubstantialformsthatwehaveexperienced(LA121).
Particularlyilluminatingishisintroductionofsubstantialformsinthe"NewSystem"(1695):
Ifoundthenthattheirnatureconsistsinforce,andthatfromthistherefollows
somethinganalogoustosensationandappetite,sothattheymustbeconceivedonthe
modeloftheconceptthatwehaveofSouls.(E124f./L454)
Thecausalcharacterofsubstantialforms,Leibnizseemstobesaying,theirnatureasforce,implies
thattheyarelikesoulsandhavesomethinglikesensationandappetite.Thesuggestion,Ithink,is
thatourexperienceofperceptualandappetitivefunctionsinourownconsciousselvesisourbest
clueforunderstandinghowtheimmanentcausalactionofsubstantialformsworks."Ifyouhavea
clearideaofthesoul,youwillhaveonealsoofform,"asLeibnizwrotetoJohnBernoulliin1698(
GMIII,552).
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25
Garber,"LeibnizandtheFoundationsofPhysics,"pp.122f.(n.166).
316
TherearemanyotherindicationsthatLeibnizbelievedthis.Theintenttouseourownexperience
ofperceptiontoexplicatethenotionofsubstantialformisclearin1703when,inresponsetoLady
Masham'scomplaintthatshefound"nopositiveidea"oftheessenceof"whatyoucallaForm,
Soul,orAtomedeSubstance,"Leibnizwrote,"ThepositiveIdeaofthatsimplesubstanceor
primitiveForceiscompletelydiscovered,sinceitmustalwayshaveinitanorderedprogressionof
perceptions,accordingtotheAnalogythatitmusthavewithoursoul"(GIII,350,356).26To
Arnauldhewrotethatsubstantialunityrequiresanentitywhose"conceptcontainseverythingthat
istohappentoit,whichcannotbefoundeitherinshapeorinmotion...butratherinasoulor
substantialformaftertheexampleofwhatonecallsself[moi]"(LA76;cf.LA72,78).
Extensionanditsmodes,suchasshapeandmotion,Leibnizseemstobesayinginthisstatementto
Arnauld,cannotencodeenoughinformationtopredictthefutureorretrodictthepast.Buthow
couldhebelievethat?Surelyhewasenoughofamechanisticdeterministinphysicstothinkthat
fromthesizes,shapes,positions,andmotionsofallbodiesinanybriefperiodoftime,together
withthelawsofmotion,allpastandfuturestatesofthephysicaluniversefollow.Thekeypoint
hereinvolvesthelawsofmotion.Extensionanditsmodesdonotencodethelawsofmotion,and
thelawsmustbeaddedinordertogenerateanyreliablepredictionorretrodiction.Itisnotenough,
Leibnizthought,forasubstancetohaveapresentstate;itmustalsocontainorencodethelawsthat
connectthatstatewithpastandfuturestates.
Theexpressivecapacityofsoulsismuchgreaterthanthatofthemodesofextension.27Leibniz
held,ofcourse,thatsoulsareexpressedbytheirbodies.ButItakeithethoughtthatwhereaswhat
isexpressedcanbereadoffthebodiesonlywiththeaidofacodeoflawsthatarenotcontainedin
them,thelawsarealreadyinthesouls.Soulsexpressbytheirperceptions.Sincethoughtsare
countedamongperceptionsforLeibniz,weknowfromourownexperiencethatitispossiblefor
perceptionstorepresentbothlawsofnatureandpastandfuturestatesofaffairs.Thisiscertainly
suggestedintheDiscourseonMetaphysics.Leibnizsaysthateverysubstance"expresses,albeit
confusedly,everythingthathappensintheuniverse,past,present,orfuture,"andthatthis"bears
someresemblancetoaninfiniteperceptionorknowledge"(DM9).Themodelofintentional
followingofrulesunderstoodisusedinexplainingthepreestablishedharmonywhenhespeaksof
eachsubstance"followingcarefullycertainreasonsorlawsthatithasobserved"(DM14).Later,in
1702,Leibnizexplicitlyinvokesthesoul'sadvantageofmemoryforencodinglaws(GIV,543f.).
Thishelpsexplainhowhecouldthinkthatalawofnaturewhichisalogosorintelligiblecontentis
effectuallyincorporatedinaconcretesubstanceasitssubstantialform.
Forfurtherexplanationoftheefficacyorforceoflawswithinsubstances,wemayturntothe
conceptofappetite,which,aswehaveseen,islinkedwithsensation,inthe"NewSystem,"asthe
sortofthingthatsubstantialformsmust
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26
0ntheuseofpsychologicalnotionstoexplicatetheideaofforce,seealsoGII,270/L537(1704),
quotedanddiscussedinsection2.1.1inthischapter,andLeibniz'sapprovalofasimilarmovein
Locke(NE170f.).
27
Onthethoughtdevelopedinthisparagraph,cf.Sleigh,LeibnizandArnauldpp.13234.
317
aveinordertohaveforce.ItakeitthatLeibnizthoughtofperceptionsasencodingthelawsof
nature(aswellasotherdata),andofappetitesastendenciestoactinaccordancewiththelawsand
dataencoded.Leibnizneversaidasmuchaboutappetiteasaboutperceptions,butattheendofhis
life,heexplainedthefunctionofappetitebysayingthat"Soulsactaccordingtothelawsoffinal
causesbyappetitions,ends,andmeans,"andthat"theActionoftheinternalprinciplethatmakes
thechangeorthepassagefromoneperceptiontoanothercanbecalledAppetition"(Mon79,15).
Appetition,asthenamesuggests,isateleologicalprincipleofaction:Theideathatsubstantial
formsactforanendispresent,alongwiththeideaofappetite,inwritingsofLeibniz'smiddleyears
(VE642f./L289;GVII,451/L472).ThiscertainlypicksupanotherthemeofAristotelianthought,
inwhichtheoperationofsubstantialformstypicallyhasateleologicalcharacter.
Inonerespect,however,thelanguageof"appetite"and"endsandmeans"maybesomewhat
misleading.Itsuggeststhepursuitofadesiredfuturestateofaffairs,buttheactionofaLeibnizian
substantialformismorelikewhatissometimescalled"actingonprinciple."InLeibniz'sviewthe
"internalprinciple"governing"thepassage[ofasubstance]fromoneperceptiontoanother"isnot
basedonthedesirabilityofthelaterperceptioninitself,butratheronthefollowingofcertainlaws
ofnature.28Ifsoulsorsubstantialformsingeneralactforthesakeof"thegood"(cf.VE643/
L289),thegoodprincipallyinview,intheLeibniziansystem,mustbetheharmonyoftheuniverse
thatismaintainedbyfollowingthelawsofnature.
Leibnizwasbynomeanseccentricinsupposingthatsubstantialformswouldhavetobelikesouls.
Theviewwasintheairintheseventeenthcentury.ThereisevidencethatDescartesthoughtthe
ideaofasubstantialformwasessentiallyanideaofasoul,forinaletterof1642heappearsto
endorsetheviewsthatthesoul"isthetruesubstantialformofthehumanbeing"andthatthehuman
soul"istheonlysubstantialform"(ATIII,503,505).Therearealsoplaceswhereheseemstobe
sayingthattheideaofimmanentactionbyaform(eitherasubstantialformorarealquality)is
anthropomorphic.29ItakeDescartestobesuggestingthatthesoul,andnothingbutthesoul,does
indeedhavesomethingliketheimmanentcausalactionascribedbyScholasticismtoforms.
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28
DM14.Thepointthatthesucceedingperceptionmaynotbedesiredforitsownsake,ordesirablein
itself,isemphasizedatGIV,532,(atextof1702)discussedinChapter10,section4.2;asimilar
exampleistreatedinessentiallythesamewayatLA114.
29
ThemostfamousoftheseplacesisthatinwhichhewritestothePrincessElizabeththatinthinking
ofgravityorweightasa"realquality"whichisjoinedtoabodyinsuchawayastobeableto
moveit,onemisappliestogravityaconceptthat"wasgiventousforconceivingthewayinwhich
thesoulmovesthebody"(ATIII,667f./K139).SeealsopassagescitedbyHoffman,"Unityof
Descartes'sMan,"p.350.IamlargelyfollowingHoffmaninthisinterpretationofDescartesand
amalsoindebtedtohimforilluminatingdiscussions.SeealsoGarber,"UnderstandingInteraction,"
pp.1922.Itshouldbenotedthatthechargeofanthropomorphismhastodospecificallywiththe
ideaofcausationbyaform.AsHoffmanhaspointedouttome,therearealsopassagesinwhich
Descartesseemstoascribeimmanentcausation,oractiononitself,toabody,butwithoutinvoking
theconceptofform(ATVII,367;111,428).ForotherCartesianreferencestothesoulassubstantial
form,seeGilson,Indexscolasticocartsien,p.297(s.v.union).
318
Asimilarexplicitassociationofthenotionofsubstantialformwiththatofsoulisfoundinthe
worksoftheBritishscientistandphilosopherRobertBoyle.30Boylewouldalsoagreewith
Leibnizthatidentifyingthenatureofathingwithalawbywhichitactsimpliesthatthethinghas
somethinglikeasoul.Forheobservesthat"tospeakproperly,alawbeingbutanotionalruleof
actingaccordingtothedeclaredwillofasuperior,itisplain,thatnothingbutanintellectualBeing
canbeproperlycapableofreceivingandactingbyalaw."31
Boyle'sobservationsuggestsaquestionthatmayconfrontthosewhowouldgroundinthenatures
ofcreatedthingstheactualityofnaturalregularitiesorlawsofnature.Howcananythingbe
inherentlyresponsivetoalawwithouthavingsomeanalogueofintelligence?Leibnizwouldsolve
thisproblembyascribingtoallsubstancesananalogueofmentality.
Boyleisnotled,likeLeibniz,topostulatesoulsorsoullikeformsinallthebodiesthatparticipate
innaturalregularities.Rather,heconcludesthatitisimproperorfigurative"tosay,thatthenature
ofthisorthatbodyisbutthelawofGodprescribedtoit"32LikeDescartes,Boyleseemsto
ascribeasubstantialformtohumanbeingsalone,declaring,"Iknownotanythinginnaturethatis
composedofmatter,andasubstancedistinctfrommatter,exceptman,whoaloneismadeupofan
immaterialformandahumanbody."33
Itisnotsurprising,therefore,thatinaletterof1669,publishedin1670,inwhichhestillrejected
theideathatbodiesingeneralhavesubstantialforms,34Leibnizalreadyarguedthatifone(falsely)
ascribedsubstantialformsto"inanimatethings,"itwouldbe"morecorrect"toascribetotheforms
"sensation,knowledge,imagination,will,"ashesaysTommasoCampanella(d.1639)andMarcus
Marci(d.1667)did.
Certainlyallthosewhospeakofthoseincorporealsubstancesofbodiescannotexplain
theirmeaningexceptintermsborrowedfromMinds.Forhencethatnaturalappetiteor
instincthasbeenascribedtothem,fromwhichalsofollowsnaturalknowledge.(A
Vl,ii,442/L101;cf.AII,i,20)
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30
RobertBoyle,"TheOriginofFormsandQualities"(1666),inhisWorks,vol.3,p.27,saidthat
"whenanybodyisreferredtoanyparticularspecies(asofametal,astone,orthelike)...mostof
thewritersofphysickshavebeenapttothink,thatbesidesthecommonmatterofallbodies,there
isbutonethingthatdiscriminatesitfromotherkinds,andmakesitwhatitis,andthis,forbrevity's
sake,theycallaform:whichbecauseallthequalitiesandotheraccidentsofthebodymustdepend
onit,theyalsoimaginetobeaverysubstance,andindeedakindofsoul,which,unitedtothegross
matter,composeswithitanaturalbody,andactsinitbytheseveralqualitiesfoundtherein,which
menarewonttoascribetothecreaturesocomposed."
31
Boyle,"AFreeInquiryintotheVulgarlyReceivedNotionofNature"(1682),inWorks,vol.5,p.
170.
32
Boyle,"NotionofNature",inWorks,vol.5,p.170.
33
Boyle,"OriginofFormsandQualities",inWorks,vol.3,p.40.
34
Thereisadocumentaboutthedoctrineoftransubstantiation,probablyfromthissameperiod,in
whichLeibnizdoesseemtoascribesubstantialformstoallbodies,butidentifiesthesubstantial
formofabodywithitsunionwitha"concurrentmind"ahumanmind,inthecaseofhuman
bodies;thedivinemind,inthecaseofbodieslackingreason(AVl,i,50813/L11518).Sincethe
substantialformthusascribedtomostbodiesisnotaninternalsourceofcausalactivity,wehave
hereonlyaterminologicalaccommodationandnotyetametaphysicalrehabilitationofthe
Scholasticidea.Thementalismoftheaccountthatisofferedalsotendstoconfirmmypresent
argument.
319
ThisbackgroundshouldhelpusunderstandwhatwasdistinctiveinthematureLeibniz's
rehabilitationofScholasticviewsaboutsubstantialforms.Itwasnotunusualtoascribetohuman
beingssomethingthatcouldbecalleda"substantialform"(thoughthetermwasnotparticularly
popularwiththemodernphilosophers),andtheviewthatiftherearesubstantialformstheymust
allbelikesoulswasmoremodernthanScholastic.Leibniz'sboldnesswasinnotrestricting
substantialformstothehumanrealm,butpostulatingthemineveryportionofmatter,and
acceptingtheconsequencethatthismeantaninfiniteproliferationofsoullikeentities.Thiswas
alsoLeibniz'sownviewofhisagreementanddisagreementwithDescartesregardingsubstantial
forms(LA113;NE317f.;GVI,547).
1.4LeibnizandCudworth
Thisboldnesswasnotunparalleled.Manysixteenthandseventeenthcenturythinkers,often
drawingonprecedentsfromancientthought,speculatedaboutsoullikebeingspervadingtheentire
materialworld,includingthepartsofitthatseeminanimate.AninstructiveparalleltoLeibniz's
thoughtonthispointcanbefoundinTheTrueIntellectualSystemoftheUniverse(1678)ofthe
CambridgePlatonistRalphCudworth(161788).
Cudworthspeaksofa"plasticnature"createdbyGodandactinginallmaterialthings.Theplastic
natureisconceivedonthemodelofasoulinthesenseofaprincipleoflife;Cudworthdefineslife
as"InternalEnergyandSelfactivity)(p.159).35Heholdsthattheplasticnatureacts"forthesake
ofEnds,butwithoutknowledge,understanding,oreven"expressConsciousness,"andhence
withoutfully"Intending"itsends(pp.15659.).Nonetheless,"hethatassertsaPlastickNature,
assertsMentalCausalityintheWorld"(p.155);andCudworthsays"itcannotbedeniedbutthat
thePlastickNaturehathacertainDullandObscureIdeaofthatwhichitStampsandPrintsupon
Matter,"whichcanbecalled"akindofDrowsie,Unawakened,orAstonish'dCogitation(p.160)."
Cudworth'splasticnaturethusappearstobeconceivedonthemodelofamind,butofmuch
diminishedcapacityforthoughtorperception,liketheinferiorformsormonadsinLeibniz's
system.36Insupportofthisview,indeed,Cudworthappealstoexamplesofhabit,instinct,and
bodilymotionsthatwecontrolwithoutunderstandingthem,toprovethattherecanbe
teleologicallyeffectivepsychologicalfunctioningwithoutconsciousness(pp.157f.,160f.).Thisis
similar,inaway,toargumentsLeibnizwouldlaterusetoshowthattherecanbeunconscious
perceptions,althoughtheunconsciouspsychologicalfunctioninwhichCudworthismostinterested
isnotperceptionbut"VitalAutokinesie"(selfmotion)(p.159).InCudworth'sconceptionofplastic
nature,indeed,asin
____________________
35
Cudworth,TrueIntellectualSystemoftheUniverse.Parentheticalpagereferencesinthepresent
paragrapharetothiswork.Therearetwopagesnumbered155;Iwillrefershortlytothefirstof
them.IgivehereonlyaveryincompletesketchofCudworth'stheoryoftheplasticnature.
36
Instatingthematterthus,IignoreafurthercomplicationofCudworth'stheory,forheleavesit
openwhethertheplasticnatureisineverycase"aLowerFacultyofsomeConsciousSoul,"orin
somecases"anInferiourkindofLifeorSoulbyitself,butessentiallydependinguponanHigher
Intellect"thatis,onGod(TrueIntellectualSystem,p.172).
320
Aristotelian,andmorebroadlyancient,conceptionsofsoul,theideaoflifeisatleastas
fundamentalasthatofmentality.Leibniz,ontheotherhand,inthisrespectmoreCartesianaswell
asmoremodern,reliesatbottomonlyondecidedlymentalfunctions,subjectivelyapprehendedin
ourselves,asmodelsforconceivingoftheactivityofsoulsorsubstantialforms.
AmongthefunctionsthatCudworthascribestotheplasticnatureistheexecutionofthelawsof
nature.HisargumentforplasticnaturemakesexplicitimportantpartsoftherationalethatIhave
suggestedforLeibniz'sregardingsubstantialformsassoullikeandincorporatinglaws.Wefindin
Cudworthtwoideasimportanttothatrationale:thatthealternativetooccasionalism,37ifthe
createdworldisindeedgovernedbylaws,isrealcreatedcausesthatgiveeffecttothelaws;and
thatonlyapurposive,somewhatsoullikeagentcanexecutealawofnature.38
ForunlesstherebesuchathingadmittedasaPlastickNature,thatacts...forthesake
ofsomething,andinordertoEnds,Regularly,ArtificiallyandMethodically,itseems
thatoneorotheroftheseTwoThingsmustbeconcluded,ThatEitherinthe
EfformationandOrganizationoftheBodiesofAnimals,aswellastheother
Phenomena,everythingcomestopassFortuitously,andhappenstobeasitis,without
theGuidanceandDirectionofanyMindorUnderstanding;Orelse,thatGodhimself
dothallImmediately....Asalso,thoughitbetruethattheWorksofNatureare
dispensedbyaDivineLawandCommand,yetthisisnottobeunderstoodinaVulgar
Sence,asiftheywerealleffectedbythemereForceofaVerbalLaworOutward
Command,becauseInanimatethingsarenotCommandablenorGovernablebysucha
Law;andthereforebesidestheDivineWillandPleasure,theremustneedsbesome
otherImmediateAgentandExecutionerprovided,fortheproducingofeveryEffect;
sincenotsomuchasaStoneorotherHeavyBody,couldatanytimefalldownward,
merelybytheForceofaVerbalLaw,withoutanyotherEfficientCause;buteitherGod
himselfmustimmediatelyimpelit,orelsetheremustbesomeothersubordinateCause
inNatureforthatMotion.WhereforetheDivineLawandCommand,bywhichthingsof
Natureareadministered,mustbeconceivedtobetheRealAppointmentofsome
Energetick,Effectual,andOperativeCausefortheProductionofeveryEffect.39
WhereforesinceneitherallthingsareproducedFortuitously,orbytheUnguided
mechanismofMatter,norGodhimselfmayreasonablybethoughtto
____________________
37
TheoccasionalisthypothesisplainlyfiguresasarejectedhypothesisinCudworth'swork,though
presumablywithoutanyliterarydependenceonMalebranche,ashisdaughtertestifiedtoLeibniz
thatCudworthdidnotreadFrenchandwasignorantoftheFrenchoccasionalists(GIII,372).
38
Averyclearstatementofthesepoints,especiallythelatterone,andsimilartoCudworth's,comes
fromthenaturalistJohnRay(16271705):"anintelligentbeingseemstomerequisitetoexecute
thelawsofmotion....Andasforanyexternallawsorestablishedrulesofmotion,thestupid
matterisnotcapableofobservingortakinganynoticeofthem...;neithercanthoselawsexecute
themselves.Thereforetheremust,besidesmatterandlaw,besomeefficient,andthateithera
qualityorpowerinherentinthematter'itself,whichishardtoconceive,orsomeexternal
intelligentagent,eitherGodhimselfimmediatelyorsomeplasticnature"[JohnRay,TheWisdom
ofGodManifestedintheWorksofCreation(1691),quotedinWestfall,ScienceandReligionin
SeventeenthCenturyEngland,pp.94f.)Cudworthdidnotregardtheplasticnatureasintelligent,
however.
39
Cudworth,TrueIntellectualSystem,p.147.
321
doallthingsImmediatelyandMiraculously;itmaywellbeconcluded,thatthereisa
PlastickNatureunderhim,whichasanInferiorandSubordinateInstrument,doth
DrudginglyExecutethatPartofhisProvidence,whichconsistsintheRegularand
OrderlyMotionofMatter.40
CudworthexplicitlyrejectswhatIhavecalled"freestandinglawsofnature,"butwithnosuggestion
thatanyonemightseriouslyadvocatesuchaview.Thosetheistswhorejectaplasticnature,but
supposethatGodcausestheworldtobegovernedbylawsofnature,
mustofnecessity,eithersupposethesetheirLawsofMotiontoexecutethemselves,or
elsebeforcedperpetuallytoconcerntheDeityintheImmediateMotionofeveryAtom
ofMatterthroughouttheUniverse,inordertotheExecutionandObservationofthem.
TheFormerofwhichbeingaThingplainlyAbsurdandRidiculous,
wemustconcludethat,ifthesephilosophersareopposedtooccasionalism,theyareconfused,and
theirLawsofNatureconcerningMotion,arereallynothingelse,butaPlastickNature,
actingupontheMatterofthewholeCorporealUniverse,bothMaintainingtheSame
QuantityofMotionalwaysinit,andalsoDispensingit(byTransferringitoutofone
Bodyintoanother)accordingtosuchLaws,FatallyImprestuponit.41
ItisnotlikelythatLeibnizwasmuchinfluencedbyCudworth.HedidnotseetheTrueIntellectual
Systemuntil1689.42ToCudworth'sdaughter,DamarisMasham,whosenthimacopyofthebook
in1703,heexpressed,Iwouldsay,onlyamoderateappreciationforit,passingquicklytothetopic
ofthetheoryofpreestablishedharmonythathewouldaddtotheideaofanintellectualsystemof
theuniverse(GIII,336).In1705,promptedbyJeanleClerc,whowasengagedincontroversy
withPierreBayleonthesubject,LeibniztookanotherlookatCudworth'stheoryoftheplastic
nature.ThistimeherecognizedspecificallythatheagreedwithCudworthinpostulating
"principlesoflife"ineverybody,andthatinthisrespect"substantialform"playedaroleforhim
that"plasticnature"playedforCudworth(GVI,55153).
Hedweltmore,however,onadisagreementhehadwithCudworththatespeciallyconcerned"the
formationofplantsandanimals"(GVI,543f./L589).Theoccasionforthisdisagreementwasthe
factthatCudworthdidnotrestricttheoperationoftheplasticnatureinmattertotheexecutionof
mechanicallaws,butextendedittoteleologicallygovernedproductionsandbehaviorsthathe
thoughtcouldnotbeexplainedmechanically,notablyincludingtheformationoforganicbodies,
reasoningthat
iftherebeaPlastickNature,thatgovernstheMotionsofMatter,everywhere
accordingtoLaws,therecanbenoReasongiven,whythesamemightnot
____________________
40
41
42
WhenhewasinRome(GIII,336).Thatestablishesthedate;cf.Alton,LeibnizABiography,pp.
15860,andRobinet,"G.W.LeibnizRome."Leibniz'sreadingnotesonthebookfromthat
period(LHIV,3,3,12,onpaperwithawatermarkattestedforthesummerof1689)areprintedin
VE18821892;averysmallpartofthemisinGr32729.
322
alsoextendfurther,totheRegularDisposalofthatMatter,intheFormationofPlants
andAnimalsandotherthings,inordertothatAptCoherentFrameandHarmonyofthe
wholeUniverse.43
Indeed,thepurposiveformationofparticularbiologicalstructuresseemsinplacestobethe
operationofplasticnaturethatisforemostinCudworth'smind.LeibnizagreedwithCudworth"that
thelawsofMechanismallalonecouldnotformananimalwherethereisnothingalready
organized"(GVI,544/L589),butinLeibniz'sviewthereisnotinfactanyoriginationofliving
bodiesexceptbydivinecreation,sincewhatappearsasbirthorgenerationisreallythe
transformationofapreexistinganimalorplant.44Giventhepreexistingorganicbodies,he
claimedthathedidnotneedorwantimmaterialplasticnaturestoexplainthe(trans)formationof
livingbodies,butwouldexplainitbythosepreexistingstructures,andthusbymaterial
mechanisms.Healsoputthispointbysayingthatthetrueplasticnaturesaretheseorganic
mechanicalstructures,andthusarematerialratherthanimmaterial(GVI,544/L589;cf.GIII,374;
VI,478f.,553f.).Inaway,thisapplicationoftheterm'plasticnature'tothefeatureofLeibniz's
systemwhichexplainsthe(trans)formationoforganicbodiesisreasonableenough,since'plastic'
originallymeantformative;butitisalsomisleading,sinceinotherways,asherecognized,itis
substantialformthatcorrespondsinhissystemtoCudworth'splasticnature.Itisclearthatthe
plasticnatureisconceivedbyCudworthasaprincipleoflife;butLeibniz,inexpressinghisown
views,applies'principleoflife'tohissubstantialforms,signalingtherebyapartialagreementwith
Cudworth,whilerestricting'plasticnature'tomaterialmechanisms,signalingtherebyhis
disagreementwithCudworth'saccountofbiologicalformation(GVI,55155,53946/L58691).
ThatdisagreementwasimportanttoLeibnizbecauseCudworth'stheoryonthispointconflicted
withLeibniz'sinsistencethateverythingthathappensinmattercanbeexplainedmechanically.
CentraltoLeibniz'sattempttomodernizethenotionofsubstantialformishisinsistencethat
substantialformsarenottobeinvokedtoexplainthedetailsofphysics(DM10).Theydo
ultimatelyexplaintheconformityofbodiestomechanicallaws,butthoselawsprovideacomplete
systemofexplanationsofparticularphysicalevents,andsincesubstantialformsarenotmechanical
causes,theyhavenoplaceinsuchparticularexplanations.Leibnizmakesthispointexplicitlyinthe
clearestandfullestofhiswritingsaboutCudworth:
Iadmittheseprinciplesoflife,orthesesouls,butIgrantthemnothingbutinternalvital
actions,whicharealsolinkedwitheachotherbycertainlawswithinthesameAgent,
andalsoharmoniousfromoneAgenttoanother,buttheactionsofthecorporealmass
arelinkedwitheachotherbythelawsofmechanism.(GVI,553)
Leibniz'sunwillingnesstocallsubstantialforms"plastic"naturescanplausiblybetracedtoan
apprehensionthatthatmightsuggestaroleforthemasparticularcausesoftheformationoforganic
bodies,interruptingthechainofmechanicalcauses.
____________________
43
44
Ileaveasidehere,asLeibnizalsodoesinthiscontext,thequestionofhowthisappliestohuman
beings,whichwasasensitiveandcomplexissueforLeibniz;seeT397.
323
2.Matter
TheAristotelianconceptionofcorporealsubstanceincludedmorethanform,ofcourse.Therewas
alsothematterwithwhichthesubstantialformunitestoformthecomplete,orcomposite,
substance.ThereseemstobesomethingthatplaystheroleofmatterinLeibniz'sconceptionof
corporealsubstance,too,andhespeaksofit,fromtimetotime,as"matter."
Butwhatsortofmatter?Thisquestion,asGarbersees,iscrucialtohisinterpretation.Ifthereisa
basisforascribingtoLeibniz,inhismiddleyears,alessidealisticmetaphysicsthanthatofthe
monadology,itwillnotbefoundinthesoullikesubstantialforms,butinthematter.
Garbernotesthat"theScholasticsdrewadistinctionbetweentwoconceptionsofmatter,primary
(prime)andsecondary"45InthestockAristotelianexampleofabronzestatue,theformisthe
shape,andthematteristhebronze.Butbronzeisalreadyasubstance,oramixtureofsubstances,
andisconstitutedasbronzebyaformorformsinheringinit.Bronzeisthereforeonlysecondary
matter;itismatterinrelationtothestatue,butitisnotpurematter.Primarymatter,purematter,is
postulatedintheScholasticschemeofthingsastheultimatesubstratuminwhichallformsinhere,
andthereforeasdistinctfromallforms,somethingoverandaboveallforms.
Leibnizmakesuseoftheterminologyofprimaryandsecondarymatter(GMVI,237/L437).
Consideredapartfromitssubstantialform,thebodyofacorporealsubstanceissecondarymatter.
Itisanaggregateofsmallercorporealsubstances,eachofwhichhasitsownsubstantialform
unitingitsownsecondarymatter.Consideredinitself,asanaggregate,thissecondarymatterisa
phenomenon.GarberagreesthatthiswasalreadyLeibniz'sviewinthemiddleyears.46
ThusfarwehavenothinginconsistentwiththemonadologyofLeibniz'slastyears.Wehavean
infinitehierarchyofcorporealsubstancesconstitutedbysubstantialformsunitingcorporeal
substancesconstitutedbysubstantialformsunitingcorporealsubstancesconstitutedbysubstantial
forms,andsoon.Thisconstructiondoesnotimplythatthereisanythinginacorporealsubstance
overandaboveitssubstantialformandtheinfinitehierarchyofsubstantialformsthatareranged
underit.Wewillneverfinishpeelingthelayersoffthisontologicalonion,butallthelayerswewill
everpeeloffaresubstantialforms.Andthesubstantialformscanbeidentifiedwiththesimple,
soullikesubstancesofthemonadology.
Leibnizdoestalkaboutprimarymatteraswellassecondarymatter.Hesaysprimarymatteris
constitutedbyprimitivepassiveforce,"theprimitive[forceofsufferingorofresisting"(GM
VI,236/L437),complementingtheprimitiveactiveforcewithwhichheidentifiessubstantialform.
Whatisthisprimarymatterorprimitivepassiveforce?Isit,finally,somethingthatisrealinthings
overandabove"simplesubstances,andinthemperceptionandappetite"?Garberhasclaimedthat
inthemiddleyears,thoughnotlater,itis.GarbergrantsthatLeibniz,inhislastyears,conceivedof
primitivepassiveforce,andhenceofprimarymatter,
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45
Garber,"LeibnizandtheFoundationsofPhysics,"p.42.1introducedthisdistinctioninChapter10,
section2.1.
46
Garber,"LeibnizandtheFoundationsofPhysics,"p.43.
324
asmerelyanaspect,thepassiveaspect,ofthemonadorsimplesubstance,afunctionofthedegree
ofconfusednessofitsperceptions.47ButGarberprefersalessmentalisticinterpretationofprimary
matterforLeibniz'smiddleyearsaninterpretationaccordingtowhichprimarymatterisnotan
internalaspectofsoullikesubstancesatall,andcertainlynotmerelyafunctionoftheirmannerof
perceiving.Onthisinterpretation,Leibnizthoughtthat"theprimarymatteroftheScholastics"
existsasa"nonmental,materialcomponentofreality""somethingoverandabovetheimmaterial
substanceshecallsforms,somethingfromwhichextensioncanarise."48
Idisagree.IthinkthetheoryofLeibniz'slastyearsprovidesthebestinterpretationforthemiddle
years,too.Tobeginwith,Garber'sviewconfrontsatextnowdated,onthebasisofphysical
evidence,tothebeginningofthemiddleyears,orjustbefore,inwhichLeibnizseemstoembrace
theconfusedperceptionconceptionofprimarymatter,statingthat"substanceshaveMetaphysical
matterorpassivepowerinsofarastheyexpresssomethingconfusedly;active,insofaras[theydo
so]distinctly"(GVII,322/L365).49
OnesuchtextdoesnotrefuteGarber,ofcourse,especiallysincehedoesnotdenythatmore
idealisticthoughtssometimesappearinwritingsofLeibniz'smiddleyears.50Moreimportant
supportformypositioncomesfromtheneedsandimplicationsofLeibniz'slargertheoretical
projects,particularlyhiscritiqueoftheCartesianthesisthatextensionconstitutestheessenceof
corporealsubstance.HisoppositiontoDescartesonthispointwasaconstantthatenduredthrough
changesinhisownpositiveviewsonthesubject.Naturallytherewerealsochangesinhis
argumentsagainstDescartes.Twoofthemainlinesofargumentthatheusedinthemiddleyears
seemtometoshowthatLeibnizhadreasonforidentifyingconfusednessofperceptionswiththe
primitivepassiveforcefromwhichextensionarises,andthattherewasnoroominhisphilosophy
foranythingveryliketheScholasticconceptionofprimarymatter.Thebetter
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47
AsnotedinGarber,"LeibnizandtheFoundationsofPhysics,"p.47andn.68,theconfused
perceptionconceptionofprimarymatterisstronglysuggestedinsomelettersofLeibniztoDes
Bosses,datedafterthemiddleyears(esp.GII,324f.,dated16October1706;cf.alsoGII,460/L
607,from20September1712).SimilarimplicationsmaybeseeninothertextsthatGarberwould
assigntothe"later"file(GII,275/AG181;GIII,636/L659).AlthoughIaminclinedtobelievethat
Leibnizheldthisconceptionofprimarymatterinbothhismiddleandhislateryears,Ishouldnote
thattherearelaterletters(of1715and1716)toDesBossesinwhichLeibnizsaysofcomposite
substancethatitconsistsinprimitiveactiveandpassivepower[potentialorforce[vis](G
II,506,517f./L617,AG203f.).IntheearlierofthetwopassagesLeibnizexplicitlyoffersthe
alternativeformulation,"orconsistsinprimarymatter...andinsubstantialform."These
statements,oratleastthesecondofthem,seemtobeconnectedwiththehypothesisof"substantial
bonds"(seeChapter10,section5.3),andIcountthatasreasontodoubtthattheyexpressLeibniz's
ownconvictions.
48
49
ThestaffoftheAcademyeditionhaveprovisionallydatedthistextto168386onthebasisofthe
watermarkinthepaperonwhichitiswritten.SeeVE476(forthedating),481(forthequoted
sentence).inanotherfragment,datedto1683(becauseitiswrittenontheblankportionsofabill
dated29March1683),thenatureof"matterortheprincipleofpassivity[passio]"isexplainedat
leastpartiallyintermsofmannerofcognition(VE294f.=LHIV,1,14C,11).Buttheexplanation
isobscure,andnotobviouslyinagreementwiththetextIhavequoted.In1683Leibnizmaystill
havebeenexperimentingwiththeseideas.
50
Garber,"LeibnizandtheFoundationsofPhysics,"pp.65f.
325
knownoftheseargumentshastodowithinfinitedivisibility.Theother,whichIwilldiscussfirst,is
basedontherelationalcharacterofextensionanditsmodes.51
2.1TheAnalysisofExtension
Tobeextendedistohavepartsthatbearcertainspatialrelationstoeachother.Themostobvious
andeasiesttostateoftheserelationsisthatthepartsaredistantfromeachotherinthree
dimensions.(Leibniz'sdefinition,asweshallsee,isevenmoreabstract,butnolessrelational.)Of
themodesofextension,sizeandshapearealsoamatterofrelationsamongthepartsofthething,
beingdeterminedbythedistancesanddirectionsinwhichthepartsliefromeachother.Positionis
amodeofextensionthatisconstitutedbyrelationsofthebodytootherbodies(accordingto
DescartesandLeibniz)ortopointsofspace(accordingtoNewton).Andmotionandrestare
constitutedbyrelationsamongrelationsthatis,byrelationsamongthepositionsofthethingat
differenttimes.InsofarasthesepropertiesconstitutethecorporealworldasseenbyCartesianism,
thatworldwouldappeartobejustasystemofspatiotemporalrelationships.Inaway,thisisjust
whatDescartes,andGalileo,wanted:theywantedasmuchofphysicsaspossibletobereducibleto
geometry,andgeometryiscertainlyastudyofspatialrelations.Intuitively,however,asystemof
spatiotemporalrelationshipsseemstoohollow,sotospeak,toconstituteasubstance.Relations
presupposeentitiesthatarerelated,andentitiesseemtoneedconstitutiveproperties.Sohowwould
asystemofspatiotemporalrelationshipsevergetstarted,ifitdoesnotrelateentitiesthathave
constitutivepropertiesoverandabovespatiotemporalrelations(and,hence,overandabove
extensionanditsmodes)?InanotepublishedintheJournaldesSavantsin1693,Leibnizargued
forcefullyalongtheselines.
Thosewhowouldhaveitthatextensionitselfisasubstancereversetheorderofwords
aswellasthatofthoughts.Besidesextensiontheremustbeasubjectthatisextended
thatistosay,asubstancethatcanproperlyberepeatedorcontinued.Forextension
signifiesnothingbutarepetitionorcontinuousmultiplicityofthatwhichisspreadout
aplurality,continuity,andcoexistenceoftheparts;andconsequentlyitdoesnotsuffice
toexplaintheverynatureofthesubstancethatisspreadoutorrepeated,whosenotion
ispriortothatofitsrepetition.(GIV,467/W104)52
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51
Anotherlineofargument,muchemphasizedbyLeibnizinpublicationsofthe1690s(E11214/W
1024;GMVI,24042/L440f.;alsoinDM21),hasreceived(Ithink)itsbestdiscussioninGarber,
"LeibnizandtheFoundationsofPhysics,"pp.78f.Leibnizarguedthatifextensionanditsmodes
weretheonlypropertiesofbodies,asDescartesaffirmed,bodieswouldobeyquitedifferentlawsof
motionincollisionsfromthosethatareactuallyobservedtoobtain,andthatthereforetheremust
alsobeforcesinbodiestoexplaintheirbehavior.Itisdifficulttounderstandwhyanyconclusions
atallaboutthelawsofmotionwouldfollowfromCartesianassumptionsabouttheconstitutive
propertiesofbodies,andLeibnizprovidesnoexplanationonthiscrucialpoint.Garber'ssolutionto
thepuzzleseemstomethelikeliest:"thisargumentworksonlyifweassumethatthelawsthat
governthebehaviorofbodiesinmotionderivefromsomethingintrinsictobody"(ibid.,n.174).
Inotherwords,Leibnizispresupposinghisantioccasionalistviewswithregardtobodies.
52
AsimilarargumentisfoundinGIV,364f./L390(1692orearlier),inGII,169f.,183/L516,519
(1699),inGIV,589(1702),inGVI,584,andinseveraltextscitedinmynextnote.
326
Whatproperty,accordingtoLeibniz,doesconstitutethenatureofthesubstancewhoserepetitionor
spreadingoutconstitutesextension?Resistance,orpassive(asopposedtoactive)force,isthe
propertymostemphaticallyofferedbyLeibnizasananswertothisquestion,53andwehaveseen
thatheidentifiedprimitivepassiveforcewithprimarymatter.Whatthenistheresistanceorpassive
forceofwhichLeibnizspeakshere?Hesaysitisthat"bywhichbodyresistsnotonlypenetration
butalsomotion"(GIV,395/AG252).Butisthissupposedtoexpressthewholenatureof
resistance?Ordoesitmerelyindicatesomeeffectsofresistance,effectssufficienttoidentify
resistanceforpurposesofphysics?
Theideathatresistanceconsistssimplyinatendencyofbodiesnottobepenetratedormoveddoes
notfitverywellintheargumentabouttherelativecharacterofextension.Forthatisonlya
tendencytostabilityincertainspatialrelationships,andatendencytostability(ortochange)in
spatialrelationshipsseemstobejustanadditionalrelationalfeatureofasystemofspatiotemporal
relationships,whichleavesthesystemas"hollow"asitwasbefore.54Theontologicalgrounding
ofasystemofspatiotemporalrelationshipsrequiresentitiesthatstandintherelationships,and
Leibnizseemstobeassuming,veryplausibly,thatsuchentitiesmusthavesome"nature"thatis
diffusedthroughoutthesystem.Itakeitthat,inordertodoitsontologicaljob,thisnaturemust
includemorethanspatiotemporalrelationsandtendenciestohavesuchrelations;itmustinclude
someintrinsic,nonrelationalproperty.ItisindeedoneofLeibniz'sbeliefs,enunciatedinapaperof
about168955that"therearenopurelyextrinsicdenominations"(C520/L268),whichimplies
thatinordertohaveextrinsicorrelationalpropertiesathingmusthaveintrinsic,nonrelational
properties.
Ifresistanceorpassiveforcemustincludeintrinsicproperties,whatcantheybe?Ithinkthatfor
Leibniztheycanonlybequalitiesofperception,ortendenciestosuchqualities.Herethe
identificationofpassiveforceasafunctionofconfusednessofperceptionssatisfiesLeibniz's
conceptualneeds.Resistance,insofarasitisanaturepriortothesystemofspatiotemporalrelations
andcangroundextensionbyitsrepetitionordiffusion,willbeatendencytohaveconfused
perceptions.Theentitiesinwhichthesystemofspatiotemporalrelationsisgroundedwillbe
perceivingsubstances,asisimpliedinthelateryears(after1706)byLeibniz'sstatementthat
extensionis"nothingbutrepetitionofperceivers"(RS42/AG276).
____________________
53
SeeGIV,393f./AG251.Therearealsopassages(GIV,394f./AG252f.;GII,170/L516)inwhich
thisroleseemstobeassignedtothedynamikon,whichcouldbeinterpretedasincludingactiveas
wellaspassiveforce.ActiveforceseemsexplicitlyincludedinaletterofDecember1693to
GerhardMeter,inwhichLeibnizspeaksof"something...thatissaidtobeextendedthatis,
spreadoutbyrepetitioninwhichtherewillbethecharacterofsubstance,namelytoactorbe
actedon"(AI,ix,634).Asimilarimplicationisfoundinalater(andundoubtedlyfully
monadological)lettertoDeVolder(GII,269/L536).ButinLeibniz'snextlettertoDeVolder
onlypassivityseemstobeinvolvedinthisspreadingout(GII,277/AG183).Inanyevent,weare
primarilyconcernedherewiththeimplicationsoftheargumentregardingpassiveforceorprimary
matter.
54
Thisclaimwillbeexaminedinthefourthobjectionconsideredinsection2.1.1inthischapter.
55
SeeVE1998forthedating,basedonthewatermark.
327
2.1.1SurveyofObjectionstoThisInterpretation
Thisinterpretation,anditsgrounds,canbefurtherilluminatedbyconsideringfourpossible
objectionstoit.
Firstobjection:ItmightbeclaimedthatLeibnizdidnotreallybelievethatanyqualityof
perceptionisdiffusedthroughoutthespatialsystem,becauseperceivingsubstancesarenotstrictly
speakinginspace.Thisobjectionseemstomeerroneous.Leibnizdidinfactbelieveinwaysof
assigningmonadsorperceivingsubstancestospatiallocations(asdiscussedinChapters9and10).
ThuswefindLeibnizwritingtoBartholomewDesBossesin1707,alittleafterthemiddleyears,
thatthe"continuation"involvedinextension"isrelatedtothethingscontinuedorrepeatedas
numberistothethingsnumbered:thatis,asimplesubstance,eventhoughitdoesnothave
extensioninitself,stillhasposition,whichisthefoundationofextension,sinceextensionisthe
simultaneouscontinuousrepetitionofposition"(GII,339).Ithinktheenvisagedassignmentsof
monadstopositionsmustamounttoaconstructionofspatialrelationsfromintrinsicpropertiesof
theperceivingsubstances.ButthatfitswellenoughintoLeibniz'sargumentabouttherelational
characterofextension,fortherehedefinesextensionas"simultaneouscontinuousrepetition."And
hedidbelievethatatendencytoconfusedperceptionissimultaneouslyrepeatedininfinitelymany
substances.Ifthisrepetitionisnotexactlycontinuous,sincetheperceivingsubstancesarediscrete,
itisatleastdense,insuchawayastoapproximatecontinuity(seeChapter9,section1.3.2).
Indeed,ontheinterpretationIamoffering,theneedtohaveadensely,ifnotcontinuously,repeated
intrinsicnatureinordertogroundextensionisoneofLeibniz'sreasonsforpostulatingthe
disseminationofperceivingthingseverywhereinmatter.
Secondobjection:ThemostthatLeibnizactuallysaysaboutthenatureofresistanceindirect
connectionwiththeargumentwearestudyingisthatitisthat"bywhichbodyresistsnotonly
penetrationbutalsomotion."Likewise,itisnaturaltoreadhimasofferinganaccountofthewhole
natureofresistance,andofprimarymatter,whenhesays,inaletterof1699toBurcherDeVolder,
that"theresistanceofMattercontainstwothings,impenetrabilityorantitypyandresistanceor
inertia,andsincetheyareequaleverywhereinbody,orproportionaltoitsextension,itisinthese
thatIlocatethenatureofmatterorthepassiveprinciple"(GII,171/L517;cf.GIV,510/L503).
Nonetheless,IfindithardtobelievethatLeibnizdidnotintendtopostulatethediffusionofan
intrinsicproperty,andalsohardtobelievethatheregardedatendencytoresistpenetrationand
motionasanintrinsicratherthanarelationalproperty.Moreover,itisdifficulttoseewhatthe
alternativetoafeatureoftheperceptualfacultywouldbeforLeibnizifhewasdemandingan
intrinsicproperty.Asidefromperceptionsandperceptualfaculties,theonlyclearlyidentifiable
propertiesheascribestocorporealthingsaretheprimaryqualities,aswecallthem,and
dispositionsregardingtheprimaryqualities,whichIhavearguedareallrelational.
Thirdobjection:WemightaskwhetherLeibnizneedstoidentifytheintrinsicpropertythatis
diffusedthroughmatter.Somephilosopherswouldbecontenttopostulateonewithoutbeingable
tosaywhatitis,exceptthatitisthepropertythatfillsthisrole.Somewouldsaythatinfactmany
oftheproperties
328
studiedbyphysicalsciencehaveanintrinsicnature,butareknowntousonlybytheirrole.They
wouldagreewithThomasReidthatthereisnotnecessarilyanythingwrongwithpostulatingan
occultquality,ifthatmeansonly"someunknowncauseofaknowneffect."56Whateverthemerits
ofthisposition,itishardlyonethatLeibnizwouldembrace.Indeed,heindicatesthathisinsistence
onanalyzingextensionintermsofthenatureofthatwhichisextendedisbasedonhisrefusalto
acceptoccultqualities.
Butfromthese[considerations]itisevidentthatextensionisnotsomeabsolute
predicate,butisrelativetothatwhichisextendedordiffused,andthereforeitcanno
morebeseveredfromthenatureofthatwhichisdiffusedthannumberfromthething
numbered.AndaccordinglythosewhohaveassumedExtensionassomeabsolute,
primitiveattributeinbody,indefinableandunutterable,haveerredbyinsufficient
Analysisandhavereallytakenrefugeinoccultqualities,whichinotherrespectsthey
somuchdespiseasifextensionweresomethingthatcannotbeexplained.(GIV,394/
AG251)
ThisstronglysuggeststhatLeibnizwouldinsistthattheintrinsicnaturewhosediffusionconstitutes
extensionmustbeexplainableintermsofqualitiesthatareknowntous.Bythetimehewrotethe
MonadologyitseemedquitecleartoLeibnizthattheonlyintrinsicqualitiesknowntousarethose
ofperception(Mon816),andIthinkitwouldbehardtofindinworksofthemiddleyearsany
suggestionofotherqualitiessatisfyingthesecriteria.
OfcourseitdoesnotfollowthatLeibnizsawclearlyduringthemiddleyearsthathehadnoother
seriouscandidateforthisrole.Iknowofnotextfromtheperiodinwhichhestatesthatexplicitly.
Indiscussingthenextobjection(thefourth)inthisserieswewillexamineatextfrom1704in
whichLeibnizarguesfromthenonrelationalcharacterofforcestotheirquasimentalcharacter.Of
coursethatleavesapossibilitythatthislinkisonethatLeibnizrecognizedonlyneartheendofthe
middleyears.Evenifthatwasso,however,theideathattheprimaryoperationsofforces,including
primitivepassiveforce,havetodowithperceptionrepresentsnosharpturninLeibniz'sthinking,
butisanaturaldevelopmentofleadingideasofhismiddleyearsnottomentionthatwehave
alreadyseenitreflectedinatextofthe1680s(GVII,322/L365).
Fourthobjection:Thiscallsforthelongestdiscussion.Inarguing,above,thattheargumentabout
therelativecharacterofextensionrequiressomethingmoreinresistanceorprimarymatterthana
tendencyofbodiesnottobepenetratedormoved,Ireliedonthepremisethatatendencyto
stability(ortochange)inspatialrelationshipsisjustanadditionalrelationalfeatureofasystemof
spatiotemporalrelationships.Thispremisemightbequestioned;itmightbesuggestedthata
"force"ordispositioncanbeanintrinsic,notessentiallyrelationalpropertyofathingevenifitis
onlyapowerortendencytohavecertainrelationalproperties.Thissuggestionseemstomeboth
counterintuitiveandcontraryinspirittoLeibniz'sinsistenceonthecausalisolationofcreated
substances.
Hedidcharacterizeforceassomething"absolute,"incontrastwithmotion,whichissomething
"relative"(LA133).Butthischaracterizationmay(andI
____________________
56
Reid,EssaysontheIntellectualPowersofMan(1785),essay2,ch.18,p.255;inhisWorks,vol.
1,p.321.
329
thinkdoes)presupposethattheforceissomethingmorethanatendencytohavecertainrelational
properties:thattheforcealwaysandnecessarilyinvolvessomeintrinsicoperationinthecaseof
activeforce,anintrinsicactionoreffort[conatus](cf.GIV,469f./L433).Leibnizexplicitlysaw
somethinganalogoustoeffortinpassiveforces.Thepassiveforceofresistance"whichisinmatter"
isnotamere"capacityorreceptivityformotion,"butsomething"moreparticularandmore
chargedwithreality"(NE169f.).IhavethereforethoughtitreasonabletointerpretLeibnizas
committedtotheassumptionthat,inordertobeanintrinsic,nonrelationalproperty,adisposition,
force,ortendency,evenapassiveone,musthaveanintrinsic,nonrelationaloperation.
ThisinterpretationseemstometobeconfirmedbythetrainofthoughtthatleadsLeibniz,in1704,
tohisavowalthat"thereisnothinginthingsexceptsimplesubstances,andinthemperceptionand
appetite"(GII270/L537).Hehasjustpresentedhisargumentthat"theconceptofextensionis
relative,"and"thenatureofthatwhichissupposedtobespreadout,repeated,continued"to
constituteextension"cannotbefoundinanythingbuttheprincipleofactingandbeingactedon"(
GII,269/L536)thatis,inprimitiveactiveandpassiveforces.NowLeibnizisrespondingtoDe
Volder'spuzzlementabouthismetaphysicsofforces.DeVoldersaidhehad"alwaysconsidered
forces,regardedapartfromthefoundationfromwhichtheyflow,aslikeanexternaldenomination
"thatis,asmerelyrelational,incomparisonwiththefoundation,"whichwouldexistinreality"(
GII,266).SinceDeVolderhadgoneontosuggest(correctly,asLeibnizattested)thatthis
"foundation"wouldcorrespondtothe"primitiveforces"inLeibniz'ssystem,hisrelationalitythesis
seemstoapplyspecificallytotheothersortofforce,whichLeibnizcalled"derivative."The
relationofderivativetoprimitiveforceswillbeamaintopicofChapter13.Whatconcernsushere
isjustthatLeibnizrefusesinthiscontexttoaccepttheclassificationofderivativeforcesasmerely
relational;heisspeakingparticularlyaboutactiveforces,butthereisnoreasonwhythemainline
ofhisargumentwouldnotalsoapplytopassiveforces.
Youadd,"Ihavealwaysconsideredforces,regardedapartfromthefoundationfrom
whichtheyflow,aslikeanexternaldenomination."Ishouldprefertoconsider
derivativeforcesinrelationtothefoundation,asshapeinrelationtoextension,thatis
asamodification....AndthisiswhatIhaveoftensaid,withnodeviationthatI
remember,thatunlessthereweresomeprimitiveactivethinginustherecouldnotbe
derivativeforcesandactionsinus,becauseeverythingaccidentalorchangeablemust
beamodificationofsomethingessentialorperpetual,andcannotinvolvemoreofthe
positivethanthatwhichismodified,sinceeverymodificationisonlyalimitation;
shape[isalimitation]ofwhatischanged,andderivedforce[isalimitation]ofwhat
causeschange[figuravariati,visderivatavariantis].(GII,270/L537)
Thederivativeforce,Leibnizimplies,escapesbeingmerelyrelationalbybeingamodificationof
somethingpermanentandessentialtoasubstance.ALeibnizianforcedoesnotgetitsessenceor
naturefromtheeffecttowardwhichittends(asanAristotelianpotentialitymightbethoughttoget
itsessence),butratherfromthecausethatproducestheeffect.Andthecauseisasubstanceof
whichtheforceisanaspect,primitiveforcesbeingessentialprinciples,andderivativeforcesbeing
330
currentstates,ofthesubstance.Nowifthederivativeforceistoescapebeingan"external
denomination"bybeingamodificationofasubstanceinthisway,itmustbeaninternalorintrinsic
stateofthesubstance.Butwhatsortofinternalstatemightitbe?
ThisisnotexactlythequestionthatperplexedDeVolder,butitisclosetoit.Herightlyinferred
thatthe"foundation,"ofwhichLeibniznowsaysthederivativeforcesareamodification,iswhat
Leibnizcalled"primitiveforces.""Butofthese,"hesaid,"suchisthefeeblenessofmyintellect,I
perceivenothingexceptthatyouassertthatalltheotherchangesflowfromthem"(GII,266).57
LeibnizrepliesthatDeVolderunjustlydenigrateshisownmentalpowers.Theseforcesarenotthe
sortofthingthatcanbeimagined;theymustratherbeunderstood.AndDeVolderdoesunderstand
somethingaboutthemnamely,thatchangesflowfromthem.Incasethatmayseemnottobe
enough,however,andinordertoconfirmtheintelligibilityofhisnotionofforce,Leibnizaddsa
paragraphthatissurelyoneofthemostimportantinallhisworks:
Itisworthwhile,however,toconsiderthatthereismaximumintelligibilityinthis
principleofAction,becausethereissomethinginitanalogoustowhatisinus,namely
perceptionandappetite,sincethenatureofthingsisuniform,andournaturecannot
differinfinitelyfromtheothersimplesubstancesofwhichthewholeUniverseconsists.
Consideringthematteraccurately,moreover,itmustbesaidthatthereisnothingin
thingsexceptsimplesubstances,andinthemperceptionandappetite.Matter,onthe
otherhand,andmotion,arenotsomuchsubstancesorthingsasphenomenabelonging
toperceivers,whoserealityislocatedintheharmonyoftheperceiverswiththemselves
(atdifferenttimes)andwiththeotherperceivers.(GII,270/L537)
ThusweseethatinthecourseoftryingtomakeintelligibletoDeVoldertheviewthatLeibnizian
forces,eventhe"derivative"forces,arenotmerelyrelationalincharacter,butareinternalfeatures
ofsubstances,Leibnizisledtopresenthisbeliefthat"thereisnothinginthingsexceptsimple
substances,andinthemperceptionandappetite."Inotherwords,preciselyinordertoaccountfor
theinternal,nonrelationalcharacteroftheforcesthatheregardsasaspectsofsubstance,Leibnizis
ledtoaffirmthequasimentalcharacterofalltheoperationsofsubstances.Itseemsclearthatat
thispointLeibnizhadnothingnonmentalinmindasamodelforconceivingofintrinsicor
nonrelationalpropertiesofsubstances.
____________________
57
1tmaybequestionedwhether"these"forcesofwhichDeVolderspeakshereareprimitiveor
derivative.IntheoriginalcontextinDeVolder'sletter,itisambiguous.Onthestrictlygrammatical
groundthat"these,"inLatin,normallyreferstothealternativethatis,verbally,mostrecently
mentioned,itshouldrefertoderivativeforces.Thismaybeconfirmedbythereferenceto"the
otherchanges"[reliquas...mutationes],whichsuggeststhat"these"forcesarethemselvesviewed
aschanges,whichderivativeforcesmaybebutprimitiveforcescertainlyarenot,inLeibniz'sview.
Theseconsiderationsmaywellbeoutweighed,however,byone'ssensethatthemaintopicunder
discussion,atthepointwhereDeVoldersays,"butofthese,"isprimitiveforces,andthatDe
Volderislikelytohavefoundthenotionofprimitiveforcemoreobscurethanthemorephysical
notionofderivativeforce.Moreover,itisexplicitlyprimitiveforcethatDeVolderstillclaimsnot
tounderstandtwoletterslater(GII,279).Leibniz,atanyrate,seemstohavetakenDeVoldertobe
referringheretoprimitiveforces,anditisLeibniz'slineofthoughtthatIamtryingtointerpret.
331
Ofcoursethistextisfrom1704,attheendofthemiddleyears.Diditrepresentanewdeparturein
Leibniz'sthought?HadhediscoveredtheseideasonlyinJuneof1704,inreflectingonDeVolder's
objections?DeVolder'snextletterexpressedastonishment,saying,"inyourlastletterInoticed
manythingsthatwereentirelynewandunexpected"(GII,272).Leibnizrejectedtheimputationof
novelty,however,replying:
Butperhapsyouwilldiscoverthatthesamethingswerealreadysufficientlyinsinuated
inearlier[letters],andthatonlyprejudiceskeptyoufromreachingthispointsometime
ago,soasnolongertoseeksubstanceandthesourceofforceswhereitisnot.ThusI
wasforcedtoinsistonsomethingsmoreexplicitly,andtorespond,ifnotto[the
question]thatwasasked,atleastto[one]thatshouldbeasked.(GII,275/AG181)
HowfarbackdidLeibnizthinkthemonadologicalviewsinquestioncouldbetracedinhis
correspondencewithDeVolder?Wecanonlyspeculate.Theearliestdatehecouldhavehadin
mindwas1699,whenhebegancorrespondingwithDeVolderaboutthenatureofforces,andthe
latestwasJanuary1704,whenhewrotehislastletterbeforetheonethatsurprisedDeVolder.The
toneofhisresponsetoDeVoldersuggests,atleast,thathewasthinkingfurtherbackthanasingle
letter.
2.1.2TheEnduringInterestofThisArgument
ItisinterestingtonotethatKantsawLeibnizashavingthoughtaboutmatterandrelationalityalong
thelinesIhaveproposed.AspartofhisaccountoftheLeibnizianphilosophyinthe"Notetothe
AmphibolyofConceptsofReflection"intheCritiqueofPureReason,hepresentsaverysimilar
argumentfortheconclusionthatallrealityisreducibletosimplemonads.
Accordingtomereconceptstheinneristhesubstratumofallrelationorouter
determinations....Fromthisitseemstofollowthatineverything(substance)thereis
somethingthatisabsolutelyinternalandprecedesallouterdeterminations,inthatitis
whatfirstofallmakesthempossible;andhencethatthissubstratumissomethingthat
nolongercontainsinitselfanyouterrelations,andconsequentlyissimple.(For
corporealthings,ontheotherhand,areneveranythingbutrelations,atleastoftheir
partsexternaltoeachother.)Andsinceweknowofnoabsolutelyinnerdeterminations
exceptthose[known]throughourinnersense,thereforethissubstratumisnotonly
simple;butalso(inanalogywithourinnersense)determinedthroughrepresentations;
thatis,allthingswouldreallybemonads,orsimplebeingsendowedwith
representations.(A282f.=B33840)
Kantrejectsthisargument,asregardsbodies,holdingthat"apersistingappearanceinspace
(impenetrableextension)cancontainonlyrelationsandnothingatallthatisabsolutelyinternal,
andyetbetheprimarysubstratumofallouterperception"(A284=B340).Intuition(inthe
Kantiansense)yieldsthispossibility,thoughconceptsdonot.Thisisconnected,however,with
Kant'sviewthatbodiesaremerelyphenomenal.Thingscanbe"giveninintuitionwith
determinationsthatexpressmererelations,withouthavinganythinginnerastheirground,because
theyarenotthingsinthemselvesbutmerelyappearances"
332
(A284f.=B341).Inotherwords,bodiescanbeconstitutedbyrelationsalone,andthusbe
ontologicallyincomplete,formuchthesamereasonthatthereneedbenodatethatisthedateon
whichagivenfictitiouseventoccurs.ThetypicalscientificrealistwillfindcoldcomfortinKant.58
Itwouldbeamistaketodismissthisargumentfromtherelationalcharacterofextensionasa
historicalcuriosity.MostphilosopherstodaywillbenoreadierthanLeibnizwastoascribe
secondaryqualitiestobodiesasintrinsic,nonrelationalproperties.Ifsciencewouldnowascribe
anypropertiestophysicalobjectsotherthanspatiotemporalrelations,theywouldbepropertiesthat
arenotknowntousbydirectacquaintancebutonlythroughtheirroleincausalexplanationof
perceptionsandspatiotemporalrelations.Ithinkitfollowsthatthescientificrealistmustsuppose
either(1)thatthephysicalworldisasystemofspatiotemporalrelations(anddispositionstohave
suchrelations),obtainingamongultimatelyrealentitiesthathavenointrinsicconstitutive
properties,or(2)thatthephysicalworldisconstitutedbythingshavingrelationalproperties,many
ofthematleastpartlyunderstoodbyus,andalsointrinsicproperties,whichareeither(a)similarto
phenomenalqualitiesthatweexperienceinourownmindsor(b)suchaswearenotdirectly
acquaintedwithatall(andprobablyneverwillbe).Ofthesealternatives,(1)seemstometheleast
plausible,and(2b)leavesthosewhoholditwithlittlegroundsforconfidencethattherealthings
whoseintrinsicpropertiestheyconfesstobequiteunknowntousarenotafterallofasomewhat
psychologicalcharacter.
2.2InfiniteDivisibility
OfLeibniz'sargumentsagainsttheCartesianconceptionofextendedsubstance,themostimportant
forthestructureofhisphilosophyturnsontheinfinitedivisibilityofextendedthingsassuch.He
useditoften;itwillbeconvenienttoexamineitinitsfirstfulldressappearanceintheLeibniz
Arnauldcorrespondence.Thisisapassage59fromadraftofalettertoArnauld.Ifbodiesare
substances,Leibnizsays,"Ibelieveitcanbeinferredthatcorporealsubstancedoesnotconsistin
extensionordivisibility."Foriftwobodiesarebroughtintocontact,thatisnotenoughtomake
themasubstance(orone60substance).
Noweachextendedmasscanbeconsideredascomposedoftwoorathousandothers;
thereisonlyextensionbyacontact.Thusonewillneverfindabodyofwhichonecan
saythatitistrulya[orone]substance.Itwillalwaysbeanaggregateofseveral.Or
rather,itwillnotbearealbeing,sincethepartsthatcomposeitaresubjecttothesame
difficulty,andsinceoneneverarrivesatanyrealbeing,asbeingsbyaggregationhave
onlyasmuchrealityasthereisintheircomponents.Fromthisitfollowsthatthe
substanceofabody,iftheyhaveone,mustbeindivisible;whetheritiscalledsoulor
formdoesnotmattertome.(LA72)
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58
IdonotmeantobetakinganypositiononthecomplexinterpretiveissueofwhetherKant'saccount
ofbodiesislessrealisticthanLeibniz's.
59
AlsoquotedinGarber,"LeibnizandtheFoundationsofPhysics,"p.32.
60
ItaffectstheformoftheargumentthatLeibniziswritinginFrench,inwhichtheindefinitearticle
alsomeans'one'.
333
Oneofthepremisesofthisargumentisthatanyextendedmassiscomposedofextendedparts.It
doesnotmatterwhetherthepartscanbephysicallydividedorseparated,"sincetheinvincible
attachmentofoneparttoanother(ifitcouldberationallyconceivedorassumed)wouldnotdestroy
theirdiversity,"asLeibnizpointsoutinthe"NewSystem"(E126/L456).Whatmatterstothe
argumentisthatanyextendedthinghasdistinct(extended)parts.Andsincethesepartsare
extendedtoo,thesameistrueoftheminturn.Soanyextendedthinghasdistinctparts,whichhave
distinctparts,whichhavedistinctparts,...andsoontoinfinity.
Thateveryextendedthingiscomposedofparts,insomesense,isrelativelyuncontroversial.Itis
generallyacceptedinbothmedievalandmodernphilosophy.InLeibniz'spredecessorsitis
connectedwiththeconceptionofextensionasaspeciesofcontinuousquantity,andwithAristotle's
argumentthat"everythingcontinuousisdivisibleinto[parts]thatarealwaysdivisible."61
Descartesexplicitlyaffirmedit:"itisnotpossibletodivideanybodyintosomanypartsthateach
ofthesepartscannotstillbeunderstoodtobedivisible."62
Animportantissueliesbelowthesurfacehere,however.Suarezthoughttherearehomogeneous
continuousmassesofmaterialsubstance,forinstanceoffireorofwater,whichareindeed
composed[constare]ofparts,butwhichareintrinsically[perse]one.Animportantpartofhis
groundsforascribingperseunitytothesebodiesisthatSuarezthoughtthattheirpartsarenot
actuallybutonlypotentiallymany.63ButitwasLeibniz'sviewthatevery(actual)extendedthing
hasnotmerelyapotentialbutanactualpartitionintoinfinitelymanydeterminateparts."Inthe
idealorcontinuousthewholeispriortotheparts,...thepartsbeingonlypotential;butinthereal
thesimpleispriortothegroups,thepartsareactual,arebeforethewhole"(GIII,622;cf.G
II,268,282,379/L536,539;andChapter9,sections1.2and1.3.2inthisvolume).Writingto
Arnauldin1686,Leibnizseemsalreadycertainthatthepartsofanyextendedmassassuchareone
onlyaccidentally[peraccidens,notperse],andareasdistinctfromeachotheractuallyasanytwo
diamondsthatmightbesetinthesamering(LA76).
HisconfidenceonthispointmaywellbeconnectedwiththesecondpremiseofthepassageI
quotedfromLA72,apremiseexpressedinthewords,"beingsbyaggregationhaveonlyasmuch
realityasthereisintheircomponents."Itakethistomeanthatbeingsthataredivisible,ordivided,
intopartsgettheirrealityfromtheirpartsthattherealityofabeingthathaspartsconsistsinthe
realityoftheparts,andthattherealityofthepartsismetaphysicallypriortothatofthewhole.64I
thinkthisisaplausiblethesis,andplausibleasaninterpretation
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61
Aristotle,Physics231b16.
62
Descartes,PrinciplesofPhilosophy,I,26(ATVIII/1,15);seealsoII,20(ATVIII/1,5If.).
63
64
Thisthesisisspecificallyaboutreality(inasensenoweakerthanthestrongestsenseof"reality"of
phenomenadiscussedinChapter9,section4).Totheextentthatawholeismerely"ideal,"Leibniz
ispreparedtoregarditaspriortoitsparts.Ashewrotein1705,"inmatterandinactualrealities
thewholeisaresultoftheparts,butinideasandinpossibles...theindeterminatewholeisprior
tothedivisions"[GVII,562;cf.GII,379(1709),GIII,622(1714)].Ontherelationofthispoint
aboutidealitytoLeibniz'sownconstructiveviewsaboutbodies,seeChapter9,sections1.3.2and
3.4.
334
ofLeibniz,65butitismoredebatablethanthefirstpremise.ThelinesalongwhichLeibnizwould
defenditareclearenough.Itrestsforhimontheassumptionthatanextendedmassisamere
aggregateinthesensethatitspartsdonotbearamorestronglyunifyingrelationtoeachotherthan
thatofcontiguity.Itakeitthatiswhathemeansbysayingthat"thereisonlyextensionbya
contact."Hewasfondoflikeningextendedthingsassuchtoheapsandflocks.Nowmostpeople
wouldagreethatinaheapofsandandaflockofsheepthegrainsofsandareontologicallypriorto
theheap,andthesheeptotheflock(evenifthesheepareallhuddledtogether,touchingeach
other).Soiftherelationbetweenanextendedwholeanditspartsisthesameasthatbetweenthe
heapandthegrains,ortheflockandthesheep,itisplausibletoinferthatintheextendedthingthe
partsareontologicallypriortothewhole.
FromthesepremisesLeibnizdrawstheconclusionthatinanextendedmassassuch"onenever
arrivesatanyrealbeing."66Hisreasoning,presumably,isthattheinfiniteregressofparts
composedofpartscomposedofpartsandsoonisviciousbecauseitisaninfiniteregressofthings
thatgettheirrealityfromtheirparts,whichgettheirrealityfromtheirparts,whichgettheirreality
fromtheirparts,andsoon.Asallthelinksinthechainpossessonlyderivativereality,onewill
neverarrive,insucharegress,atanythingthathasrealityinitself,orthathas"arealitynot
borrowed,"asLeibnizputittoDeVolderin1704:"Andwherethereisnorealitythatisnot
borrowed,therewillneverbeanyreality,sinceitmustbelongultimatelytosomesubject"(G
II,267).67
ItisaninterestinganddifficultquestionwhetherLeibnizisrightinregardingthisregressas
vicious.Theideathattheexistenceorrealityofathingcomposedofpartsconsistsintheexistence
orrealityofthepartsisbothplausibleandaninspirationformanyphilosophicalprojects.An
infiniteregressofthingswhoserealityconsistsintherealityofotherthings,whoserealityconsists
intherealityofotherthings,whoserealityconsistsintherealityofotherthings,andsoondoes
lookvicious.Ontheotherhand,theideathatmassescanbebothrealandinfinitelydivisibleinto
partshasgreatintuitiveappeal.Onemighttrytopreservethisideabyarguing,contrarytoLeibniz,
thatasthepartsarenotoutsidethewhole,theyarenot"otherthings"thanthewholeanddonot
havesuchanontologicalprioritywithrespecttothewholethatthewholecannot"haverealityin
itself"intherelevantsense.Perhapsthewholeandthepartshaverealityinthemselvescollectively,
sothatitisnotnecessaryforthemto"borrow"theirrealityfromsomethingthathasitinawaythat
divisiblethingscannothaveit.Nonetheless,IthinkthereissomeplausibilitytoLeibniz'sviewthat
theinfiniteregresshereisviciousunlesssuchrealityasthemasspossessescanbetracedto
componentsthatlieoutsidetheregress.
OnthatviewLeibnizseemsjustifiedinconcludingthat,insofarasthereisanythingrealinthem,
bodiesmustbecomposedultimatelyofindivisiblethingsthathavenopartsandthatsuch
indivisiblethingsmustconstitute"the
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65
ItisclearlyhismeaningintheversionoftheargumenthesenttoDeVolderon30June1704(G
II,267),thoughGarberwouldputthattextinthe"later"pile.
66
Forasimilarthreestepargument,morefocusedontheissueofborrowedreality,inaletterof21
January1704toDeVolder,seeGII,261.
67
ThispassagemaybefoundintranslationinRussell,PhilosophyofLeibniz,p.242.
335
substanceofthat"anybodythathasasubstance.Thisindivisibleentityheiswillingtocalleither
"soul"or"form."68Notethatthisconclusionisaboutwhatmustbetrueofabodyinorderforitto
beevenanaggregate.Evenanaggregate,inordertobeanaggregateofrealthings,mustbe
composedultimatelyofindivisibleelements.Thisismostobviouslythepointoftheargument
whenitrecursaboutfivemonthslaterinalettertoArnauld,andmuchlaterintheMonadology:
Ibelievethatwherethereareonlybeingsbyaggregation,therewillnotevenbereal
beings.Foreverybeingbyaggregationpresupposesbeingsendowedwithatrueunity,
becauseithasitsrealityonlyfromthatofitscomponents,sothatitwillhavenoneatall
ifeachbeingofwhichitiscomposedisagainabeingbyaggregation;orelseyet
anotherfoundationofitsrealitymustbesought,whichcannoteverbefoundinthisway
ifonemustalwaysgoonseeking.(LA96)
Andtheremustbesimplesubstances,becausetherearecomposites;forthecomposite
isnothingbutacollectionoraggregateofsimples.(Mon.2)
Thisargumentmustthereforebedistinguishedfromarelatedargument(discussedinChapter9,
section3.2)thatLeibnizoffersfortheconclusionthataggregatesassuchareonlyphenomena.That
argumenthasthepremisesthatthingshavebeingonlyinsofarastheyhaveunity,andthat
aggregateshavetheirunityonlyinthemindfromwhichLeibnizconcludesthataggregates(as
distinctfromtheelementsofwhichtheyarecomposed)havetheirbeingonlyinthemind.The
argumentwearediscussinginthepresentsection,however,doesnotpresupposetheequivalenceof
beingandunity.Anditsconclusionisnotthatinordertohavebeingasasubstance,acorporeal
substancemusthaveasubstantialformthatunifiesit(thoughthatisindeedaLeibnizianthesis),
butthatinordertobecomposedofanythingreal,abodymustbecomposedultimatelyofthings
thatareindivisible,partless,andhencenotextended.
Thisconclusionisradical.Leibniz'sargumentamountstoanattackonanyconceptionofinfinitely
divisiblestuffasafundamentalconstituentofreality.Moreprecisely,heopposesanybeliefina
realthingorconstituentofarealthingthatisinfinitelydivisible(orinfinitelydivided)andnot
composedofindivisibles.SuchbeliefisnotapeculiarityofCartesianorevenofmodern
philosophy.Inmedievaltheories,too,primarymatter(atleastinthestateinwhichitactually
exists)isinfinitelydivisibleandnotcomposedofindivisibles.Theargumentofhiscorrespondence
withArnauldwillthereforenotallowLeibniztohold,consistently,anythingverylikeaScholastic
theoryofprimarymatter.69
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68
LA72.InaScholasticcontexttheconceptofsoulwouldbemoreappositeforsignifying
somethingindivisible.Forforms,evensubstantialforms,arenotallindivisibleaccordingto
Scholastictheories.Thesubstantialformofwater,forexample,isasinfinitelydivisibleasthe
matterthatitinforms.Itwaseventhoughtthatthesoulsofsomeanimalsaredivisible;Arnauldhad
Scholasticprecedentintakingthemovementofbothseveredhalvesofawormasevidencethatthe
soulofthewormwasdividedintotwopartswhenthebodywasdivided(LA87).Theclearest
casesofindivisiblesubstantialthingsintheworldofourexperience,forScholasticism,arethe
soulsofhigheranimalsandthehumanrationalsoul.
69
TheclosesttoLeibnizoftheScholasticsonthissubjectisprobablySt.ThomasAquinas,but
LeibnizdivergesevenfromAquinas'stheoriesatthisaswellasotherpoints.Seep.349.
336
Leibnizianprimarymatter70mustbeindivisible.Foritisaconstituentofarealthing,andIshall
arguethatitcannotbecomposedofindivisibles.Inthisitdiffersfromsecondarymatter.Leibnizian
secondarymatterisanaggregateofinfinitelymanysubstancesandisinfinitelydivisibleintoparts
whicharesubaggregates;andifLeibnizallowsittobeaconstituentofarealcompositesubstance,
thatisonlyontheassumptionthatitisultimatelycomposedofindivisibleunities,whicharethe
substancesofwhichitisanaggregate.
ThoseScholasticswhoheldthatasubstancecanhavesecondaryaswellasprimarymatterassumed
thatanypartofasubstance'ssecondarymatterwouldhaveamongitsconstituentsapartofthe
substance'sprimarymatter.ButthiscannothavebeenLeibniz'sview.Theprimarymatterofeach
substancecannotbepartitioned,andcomposedofindivisibleunities,inthesamewayasthe
secondarymatter.Forwhatwouldtheybe?
Couldtheindivisibleunitiesofwhichtheprimarymatterofasubstanceisultimatelycomposed,on
thishypothesis,beidentifiedwiththeprimarymatterofthesubstancesaggregatedtoformitsbody
orsecondarymatter?No.ForeveryLeibniziansubstancehasabodyofsecondarymatterthatis
composedofparts,andpartsofthoseparts,toinfinity.Soiftheprimarymatterofeverysubstance
ispartitionedinthesamewayasthesecondary,theprimarymatterofthesmallersubstanceswill
beinfinitelydivisible,too,andcannotplaythepartofindivisibleunities.Moreover,theideathat
eachsmallersubstanceintheorganicbodyofacorporealsubstancehasapartoftheprimary
matterthatisaconstituentofthelargersubstancesuitsveryillwithLeibniz'softrepeatedview
[e.g.,GMIII,537/AG167(1698)]thatsmallersubstancesinasubstance'sbodyarenotpartsofthe
largersubstance.
Infact,thereisnoroominthethoughtofLeibniz'smiddleyearsforindivisibleunitiesofwhicha
divisibleprimarymattercouldbecomposed.Duringthemiddleyearsheneverspeaksofanything
butformasabletoconferindivisibleunityonanythinginreality.(Thesituationinhislateryearsis
morecomplicated,butcontainsnosuggestionofprinciplesofunityintrinsictoprimarymatteras
such;seeChapter10,section5.)Andanymattercomposedofentitiesunifiedbyformswouldbe,
bydefinition,secondaryratherthanprimarymatter.
AnotherargumentagainstascribingtoLeibniztheviewthatprimarymatterispartitionedinthe
samewayassecondaryisbasedontextsfrom1687and1706inwhichLeibnizsaysofwhatis
clearly(andin1706explicitly)meanttobeprimarymatterthatitis"alwaysessentialtothesame
substance"(LA120;cf.GII,324).Thisisinconsistentwiththesuppositionthatacorporeal
substancesharesportionsofitsprimarymatterwithothersubstancesonthebasisoftheir
membershipintheaggregatethatformsitsorganicbody.Forthatmembershipiscontinually
changing,accordingtoLeibniz,sothatprimarymattersharedonthebasisofitwouldhaveto
belongtodifferentsubstancesatdifferenttimes.
Iamtemptedtothinkthisargumentisexplicitinthe1706text(alettertoDesBosses),where
Leibnizsays,"Thereforetheprimarymatterofanysubstancethatexistsinitsorganicbody
involvestheprimarymatterofanothersubstance,
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70
Ispeakhereof"primarymatter"inthesenseinwhichIbelieveLeibnizmostoftenusedtheterm.
AnalternativesenseofthetermoccursatleastonceintheNewEssays,thoughnoteverywherein
thatwork,andisdiscussedinChapter12,pp.37275.
337
notasanessentialpart,butasanimmediaterequirement,andonlyforatime,sinceonesucceeds
another"(GII,324).Theonedisturbingfeatureofthisstatement,formyinterpretation,isthe
mentionof"animmediaterequirement."Isuspectithastodowithrelationsthatare"required"in
viewoftheorderoftheworldandthepreestablishedharmony.Thereisatleastonetext,however,
from1690,inwhich'immediaterequirements'refersto"principles"(butnot"parts")ofwhichsome
matteris"composed"(FC324).Nevertheless,Ithinkitisnotlikelythattheimmediate
requirementinthelettertoDesBossesisacomponent,forthatwouldbeinconsistentwiththe
argumentIhavegiven,andwithitspremises,towhichLeibnizappearstobecommittedinthis
letter.
Weareleftwiththeconclusionthattheprimarymatterofasubstance,onLeibniz'sview,isas
indivisibleandhenceasunextendedasthesubstantialform.Inthetextof1687thatImentioned
inthepreviousparagraphheflatlystatesofmatter,inthesenseof"theprimitivepassivepowerofa
substance,"thatit"wouldbeneitherextendednordivisible"(LA120).71Ifasubstantialform
uniteswithsuchaprimarymattertoformasubstance(aperceivingsubstance,onGarber's
interpretationaswellasonmine),itishardtoseewhytheprimarymatterwouldnotbeaninternal
aspectofanunextended,perceivingsubstance.Inotherwords,theprimarymatterseemstobe,thus
far,aninternalaspectofwhatLeibnizwouldultimatelycalla"monad,"contrarytowhatItaketo
betheintentofGarber'sinterpretation.
ThisprimarymattercanstillbecloselyassociatedwithextensioninLeibniz'sthought.Denyingits
divisibility,headdsthequalificationthat"itwouldbetheprincipleofdivisibility,orofwhat
amountstoitforthesubstance"(LA120).72Itisfromtherepetitionofprimarymatter(orpassive
force)thatextensionresults,asIhaveexplainedinsection2.1.Butthisisnotacloserassociation
betweenprimarymatterandextensionthanobtainsinthemonadologicalaccount;Ithinkitis
preciselytheassociationbetweenthemthatobtainsinthemonadologicalaccount.Leibniz's
argumentaboutinfinitedivisibilityleavesnoroom,eveninthephilosophyofhismiddleyears,for
anythingverylikethemoreusualconceptionsofmatter.
3.Realism
Garberpointsoutthat"Leibnizwasaphysicistofsomenoteinhisday"andthatthemiddleyears
weretheperiodofhislifeinwhichhemadehismaincontributionstophysics.Garberthinksthese
factsmustbefoundperplexingontheusualunderstandingofLeibniz'sthought."Whatstatuscould
thescienceofphysicspossiblyhave,"heasks,"foraphilosopherwho...seemstoholda
metaphysicssodistant[asthemonadology]fromourcommonsenseconceptionsoftheworldof
physics?"73ItisoneoftheexplicitmotivesofGarber'sinterpreta
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71
ThisisthepassageinwhichprimarymattermakesitsclearestappearanceintheArnauld
correspondence.ItwasomittedfromtheletteractuallysenttoArnauldon9October1687;see
Chapter12,section1,forafulldiscussion.
72
Onthetranslationofthisstatement,seeChapter12,note15.
73
338
tiontoremovethisparadoxbyascribingtoLeibnizinthemiddleyearsamore"realistic"
metaphysicalconceptionofthephysicalworld.Theconcludingsentenceofhispaperstates:"Itis
onlylaterinLeibniz'slife,afterhehasputasidehisseriousworkinphysicsthathisscienceloses
itsgriponreality."74
IamnotmovedbythisreasonforGarber'sinterpretation.Themostobviousreplytoitisthatitis
notimpossibleforanidealisttotakeaseriousinterestinthescienceofphysicsandthatitis
certainlynotunheardofforaphysicistofnotetoflirtwithidealism.Amorefundamentalreply,
however,willfocusonthenotionof"realism"andthe"grip"ofscienceon"reality."
Inwhatway,ifatall,isLeibniz'stheoryofthephysicalworldinthemiddleyearsmore"realistic"
onGarber'sinterpretationthanonthemonadologicalinterpretation?Onanyinterpretation,afterall,
Leibnizgroundedphysicsinmetaphysicalconsiderationsaboutsubstantialformsandfinalcauses,
whichheregardedasbeyondtheprofessionalexpertiseofthephysicist.EvenonGarber'sreading,
extensionanditsmodes,whichareamongthemainpropertiesstudiedbyphysics,arenotfullyreal.
75Itisatmosttheforcesstudiedbyphysicsthatbelongtoultimatereality.Andoneitherreadingof
Leibniz,physicsmeasuresthoseforcesbytheirphenomenaleffects,suchasmotion,whichare
expressionsandresultsoffactsaboutprimitiveactiveandpassiveforcesthatareultimatelyreal.So
oneitherinterpretationthephysicalmeasurementofforcesisamathematicaltreatmentofa
phenomenalexpressionofsomethingultimatelyreal.Doesitmattertothegripofphysicsonreality
whetherthesomethingultimatelyrealisstatesofsoullikemonadsonly,orstatesofsoullike
substantialformsplusstatesofaprimarymatterthatisdistinctfromtheformsandfromany
internalorperceptualfeatureofasoullikesubstance?EvenonGarber'sinterpretationitishardto
seewhatphysicscouldtellusaboutthenatureofwhateveritmightbethatprimarymatteradds
overandabovetheperceptualfeaturesofreality.
IthinkLeibnizwouldhavebeensurprisedattheideathattheconceptofprimarymatterwouldbe
thekeytotherealismofhisphysics.Iftherewasanycontextinwhichhesawhimselfasa
championofrealisminphysics,itwasinhiscritiqueofoccasionalism.Inthatcontext,whathe
regardedasessentialtorealismaboutbodiesisbeliefintherealityofforces,especiallyofthe
activeforcesthatheidentifiedwithsubstantialforms.ForLeibnizitisontheconceptofform,not
ofmatter,thatrealisminphysicsprincipallydepends.
Thismayseemstrangetousbecausesomuchmoderndebateaboutrealismhasbeenfocusedon
theconceptofmatter.ButreflectiononLeibniz'sideasaboutmatter,andtheirScholasticand
modernantecedents,shouldmakeclearthatthenotionofmattersooftentakenforgrantedin
modernphilosophyisnotatimelesspossessionofthehumanmind.Attheendofthethirteenth
century,andevenmoreinthefourteenth,ideasofmatterbegintolookmuchmore"modern"than
thoseofThomasAquinas.Morefullymodernconceptionsofmatterarefoundintypical
seventeenthcenturythinkers(thoughnotinLeibniz)andarestillwithus,buttheymaybeinthe
processofdissolutionintwentiethcenturyphysics.
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74
75
339
Leibniz'sopinionthat,ofthefeaturesofbodiesstudiedbyphysics,theforcesarethemostreal
retainsmuchplausibility.Perhapsithasevengainedplausibility.Thesecondaryqualitiesarenot
studiedbymodernphysicsintheirownright,anyway,andiftheygiveusaccesstoanything
regardedasphysicallyreal,itistopowersorforcesorstructuresofprimaryqualities.Asforthe
primaryqualities,theyareconstitutedbyrelationsinspaceandtime.Inthephysicsofourcentury,
"spaceandtime"havebeenreplacedbyfourdimensionalspacetime,whichisamathematical
structurethatisatmostanalogoustospaceandtimeaspresented,andperceptuallyrepresented,in
ourexperience.Inwhatisthatmathematicalstructurerealized?Themostplausible"realistic"and
nonoccasionalistansweristhatitisrealizedinasystemofentitiesconstitutedbyproperties,such
asmassandelectricalcharge,knowntophysicsonlyasforcesorpowersandliabilitiesofcertain
sorts.Perhapsthatwillgiveusmoresympathyforaseventeenthcenturyviewinwhichitisthe
realityofforces,andofformratherthanmatter,thatiscrucialforrealisminphysics.
340
12
PrimaryMatter
InChapter11IhavearguedthatthemainlinesofLeibniz'sphilosophyinhis"middleyears"
(roughly,16851704)leavenoroomformattertoaddanythingtotheveryaustere,andrather
mentalistic,fundamentalfurnitureoftheuniverseindicatedbyhisstatement(of1704,toBurcher
DeVoider)that"thereisnothinginthingsexceptsimplesubstances,andinthemperceptionand
appetite"(GII,270/L537).Thereareundoubtedlytextsfromthatperiod,however,inwhich
Leibnizspeaksofprimarymatterassomethingwithwhichthesubstantialformsorsoulsof
creaturesmustbejoinedinordertoconstituteacompletesubstance.Ihaveyettodealwiththese
texts,whichareanimportantpartofthebasisofDanielGarber'slessmonadologicalinterpretation
ofLeibniz'sthoughtinthemiddleyears.ThatisthetaskofthepresentchapterthoughIreservefor
Chapter13afewrelevanttexts,inwhichwhatissaidaboutprimarymatteriscloselyconnected
withthedistinctionbetweenprimitiveandderivativeforces.Ipresupposetheexplanationofthe
distinctionbetweenprimaryandsecondarymattergiveninChapter10.
1.ThreeSensesof'Matter'inaLettertoArnauld
ItisappropriatetobeginaninvestigationofLeibniz'sconceptionofprimarymatterinthemiddle
yearswiththeoneplaceinhiscorrespondencewithAntoineArnauldwhereLeibnizdiscussesa
1Onlyonesense
distinctionofsensesof'matter'.Itisintheletterof9October1687(LA11820).
of'matter'ismentionedinthetextsenttoArnauld,buttwoothers,readilyidentifiableassecondary
andprimarymatter,arediscussedinamarginaladditiontothecopyretainedbyLeibniz.
Physically,ofcourse,thisadditioncouldhavebeenwrittenlongaftertheoriginalletter,andwe
knowLeibnizwasstillthinkingofpublishingthecorrespondenceaslateas1707(RL107). 2But
wealsoknownow,fromthemanuscriptofapreliminarydraftoftheletter,whichhasrecently
3that
cometolight,
____________________
1
DateofthecopyreceivedbyArnauld(RL78);Leibnizdatedhisowncopy"September1687"(G
II,111).
2
1nlate1706,also,hewroteDesBossesaletter(GII,324)containingstatementsaboutprimary
matterthatwerestrikinglysimilartopartofthemarginaladditionatLA120.
3
SeeSleigh,LeibnizandArnauld,pp.8,208f.forabriefaccountofthetextualevidence.In
Leibniz'scopyoftheletteritselfthisadditioniswrittenaroundother,adjacentmarginaladditions
inawaythatshowsthatitwaswrittenafterthem.
341
themainideas(andsomeofthewording)ofthemarginaladditionwereinLeibniz'smindin1687,
whentheletterwaswritten.That,andthefactthattheadditionitself,inLeibniz'scopyoftheletter,
isenclosedinbrackets,stronglysuggestthattheadditionwasalreadywritten,anddeliberately
excludedfromArnauld'scopy,whentheletterwassent.Wheneverthemarginaladditionwas
written,thedraftmanuscriptandArnauld'scopyareevidenceenoughthatLeibnizhadsome
hesitationabouttheadditioneitheraboutthetruthortheoreticaladequacyofitscontentorabout
thewisdomofsendingittoArnauldthoughitisnotcrossedout,asmanypassagesare,inhisown
copyoftheletter.Detaileddiscussionofthetextwillaffordoccasionforsomespeculationsabout
possiblereasonsforwithholdingthispassage.
1.1CartesianMatter
Arnauldreceived,then,adiscussionofmatterinonlyonesense.Itisasensethathasplainly
nothingtocontributetoanonphenomenalisticaccountofthesubstanceofthings."Mattertakenfor
massinitselfisnothingbutapurephenomenonorwellfoundedappearance,asspaceandtimeare
too,"Leibnizdeclares(LA118f.).Lateronintheparagraph,inamarginaladditionthatArnauld
didreceive,hemakesthepointintermsthatmakeabitclearerwhathemeansby"themassin
itself":"theextendedmassconsideredwithoutthesubstantialform...isnotthecorporeal
substance,butanentirelypurephenomenonliketherainbow"(RL86). 4Inthefinalstateofthe
passageinLeibniz'scopyoftheletteritisquiteclearthatthisisathirdsenseofmatter,distinct
fromsecondarymatterandfromwhatheusuallyidentifiesasprimarymatter.Ithinkthisisalsothe
correctinterpretationoftheversionreceivedbyArnauld,butsinceitislessobviousthere,itwillbe
welltobeginwithaseparatereadingofthatdocument.
The"entirelypurephenomenon"ofourtextcanhardlybetheprimarymatterthatplayssuchan
importantpartintherealismthatGarberseesinLeibniz'smiddleyears.5Moreover,thereisa
stronger(andnotmerelyphenomenal)candidatefortheroleofprimarymatterintheportionofthe
textthatwasnotsenttoArnauld.Ishallassigntheroletothatstrongercandidate,bothhereandin
almostallofthematureLeibniz'sreferencestoprimarymatter.Itshouldbenoted,however,that
wewillseeinsection4.4somemuchlatertexts,fromLeibniz'sdiscussionofthephilosophyof
Locke,inwhichtheroleofprimarymatterseemstobeassignedtosomethinglikethesortofmatter
describedinthispassagesenttoArnauldthoughthedocumentsaboutLockealsocontainevidence
forascribingtheroletothesamestrongercandidateasisfoundinthepassagewithheldfrom
Arnauld.
Shouldweinterpretthematterdiscussedhereassecondarymatter,matterconceivedasan
aggregateofsubstances?Thatiswhatwemighthaveexpected
____________________
4
ThisisthetextreceivedbyArnauld.RegardinganemendationinLeibniz'scopy,seep.344below.
5
Garber("LeibnizandtheFoundationsofPhysics,"pp.43,47,53)doesinterpretthe"extended
mass"inthispassageasprimarymatter,thoughherecognizesthatthiscausesadifficultyforhis
morecomprehensivereadingofLeibniz,inviewofthepurephenomenalityascribedtothismass
here.
342
inthecontext.LeibnizisrespondingtoaproblemraisedbyArnauldabouttheunificationthat
substantialformissupposed,byLeibniz,toaccomplishincorporealthings."Ifaparcelofmatteris
notonebeing,butmanybeings,"Arnauldsaid,"Idonotconceivethatasubstantialform,which
couldgiveitonlyanextrinsicdenomination,sinceitisreallydistinctfromit,canmakeitceaseto
bemanybeingsandbecomeonebeingbyanintrinsicdenomination"(LA107).Inshort,howcana
substantialformbestow(intrinsic)unityonaportionofmatterthatisdistinctfromit?
WithwhatsortofmatterisArnauld'sobjectionconcerned?Clearly,withmatterthatis,initself,an
aggregate,"notonebeing,butmanybeings."Leibniz'sresponsetotheobjection,therefore,should
presumablydealwithmatterofthatsort.Indeed,intheparagraphprecedinghisresponse,Leibniz
acknowledgesashisownaviewof"matterorextendedmassinitselfneverbeinganythingbut
manyBeings"(LA118).Thischaracterizationof"extendedmass"as"manyBeings"maywell
suggestthatLeibnizisspeakingofsecondarymatter,matterasanaggregateofsubstances.
Leibniz'sanswertoArnauld'sobjectiondisappointsexpectationsinmorethanoneway.Hesaysit
isnotthematterbutthecorporealsubstancethatisunifiedbythesubstantialform:"Irespondthat
itistheanimatedsubstancetowhichthismatterbelongsthatistrulyonebeing,andthematter
takenforthemassinitselfisnothingbutapurephenomenonorwellfoundedappearance"(LA
6Howasubstantial
118).Fairenough,asfarasitgoes,butbynomeansafullysatisfyinganswer.
formunifiesacorporealsubstanceremainsaseriousproblemforLeibniz(asdiscussedinChapter
10,section5),but,insteadoftakingtheoccasionofArnauld'sobjectiontosaysomethingabout
thatproblem,Leibnizgoesontoexplainwhythematterofwhichhespeakshereispurely
phenomenal.
Theexplanationtowhichheproceedsisnothisusualexplanationforthephenomenalityof
secondarymattertheexplanationhehasgivenArnauldinapreviousletter(LA100f.)that
aggregatesassuchareonlyphenomena.Thatwouldseemtobeanappositeexplanationinthis
context,inasmuchasbeinganaggregateisthefeatureofmatterthatgivesrisetoArnauld's
objection;andLeibnizdoesalludetothephenomenalityofaggregatesattheendofthisparagraph
asArnauldreceivedit.Butthepriorityinexplainingthephenomenalityofmattergoesheretothe
claimthat"itdoesnotevenhavepreciseandfixedqualitiesthatcouldmakeitpassfora
determinatebeing"(LA119).Leibnizbeginsbyarguingatsomelengthfortheindeterminacy,and
hencephenomenality,ofshapeasaqualityofanextendedmass, 7claimsthathisargumentcanbe
extendedtosizeandmotion,andconcludes,"consequently,theextendedmassconsideredwithout
thesubstantialform,sinceitconsistsonlyinthesequalities,isnotthecorporealsubstance,butan
entirelypurephenomenonliketherainbow"(RL86;cf.LA119).
ThisconclusioncontainstheclearestindicationintheletterreceivedbyArnauldthatthematteror
"extendedmass"discussedhereisnotsecondarymatterafterall.Foritcannotbesaidthat
secondarymatter,asanaggregateof
____________________
6
Withsomejustice,Sleigh,LeibnizandArnauld,p.107,callsit"nitpicking."
7
ThisargumentisdiscussedinChapter9,section1.3.1.
343
realsubstances,"consistsonlyinthesequalities"ofshape,size,andmotion.Anotherclear
indicationisaddedtothissentenceinthefinalversioninLeibniz'scopy(LA119),where"without
thesubstantialform"iscrossedoutandreplacedby"withouttheEntelechies."Whatismost
importantinthisemendation,forourpresentpurpose,isthechangefromsingulartopluralnumber.
Toconsideranextendedmasswithoutits(single,dominant)substantialform(ifithasone)could
betoconsideritassecondarymatter.Buttoconsideritwithout(all)the(many)entelechies(or
substantialforms)initcouldnotbetoconsideritassecondarymatter,sinceitispreciselythe
presenceofformsthatdistinguishessecondarymatter.Leibnizmayhavemadethischangemuch
laterthan1687;notingthat,while'entelechy'occursinLeibniz'scopiesofseveralitemsofthe
correspondence,"itdoesnotoccurinanyletterreceivedbyArnauld,"RobertSleighopinesthat
"everyoccurrenceisanadditionmadeaftercompletionofthecorrespondencewithArnauld." 8
Thefocusongeometricalqualitiesandmotioninthisargumenthelpsilluminatethesenseof
'matter'inthepassageasArnauldreceivedit.Likesecondarymatter,andunlikeprimarymatterin
whatIthinkisitsusualsenseforLeibniz,thissortofmatterisaphenomenon.Unlikesecondary
matter,however,itisnotanaggregateofsubstances.Itsphenomenalityspringsnotmerelyfromits
divisibility,butfromitsbeingconstitutedbythe(phenomenal)qualitiesofshape,size,andmotion.
Itisbestinterpreted,Ithink,asaphenomenonconstitutedbytheappearanceofphysicalqualities
perceivablebysense.
Leibnizdoesnotusuallydistinguishsosharplybetweenaphenomenonsoconstitutedandthe
phenomenonthatisanaggregateofsubstances.Evenhere,wheretheyseemtobetwodifferent
typesof"matter,"weprobablyshouldnotconstruethemasreallydistinctthings.Forinspeakingof
"theextendedmassconsideredwithoutthesubstantialform[italicsadded]"Leibnizmaywellhave
beenthinkingofthismassasabstractedfromsomethingthatdoesincludesubstantialforms.In
otherwords,wemaysupposethatthematterLeibnizdescribestoArnauld(likeprimarymatter9
andmuchmorefullythansecondarymatter)isanabstraction,andthatitisfromsecondarymatter
(i.e.,fromanaggregateofsubstances)thatitisabstracted.Themoving,geometricalphysical
appearanceisanappearanceofanaggregateofsubstances,andLeibnizmaybethinkingofithere
asanaspectofsuchanaggregate,abstractedfromitssubstantialforms.Onthispointitis
interestingtocomparethistextwithamuchlater(andundoubtedlyfullymonadological)letterto
DeVolder,inwhichLeibnizsaysthat"thehomogeneityofmatter"whichisinvolvedinthe
"spreadingout"thatconstitutesextension"doesnotobtainexceptbyamentalabstraction,insofar
asthingsthatareonlypassiveandthereforeincompleteareconsidered"(GII,277/AG183;AG
overlooksthepluralnumberoftheLatinverbhere).Inthislatertext,however,thereisno
suggestionofaspecialsenseof'matter',besidestheprimaryandthesecondary.
Asnotedearlier,thestatementfromwhichIhavedrawntheseinferencesisfoundinamarginal
additioninLeibniz'scopyoftheletter,thoughitwasincludedinthetextsenttoArnauld.Leibniz's
copy,withoutallitsmarginaladditions,
____________________
8
Sleigh,LeibnizandArnauld,p.209,n.6.
9
0nthestatusofprimarymatterasanabstraction,seesection2inthischapter.
344
presentsastateofthetextinwhichthereislessevidencethatthetypeofmatterunderdiscussionis
notsecondarymatter.Isitthereforelikelythatinwritingthatstateofthetext,respondingto
Arnauld'sconcernsaboutmatterconceivedas"manybeings,"Leibnizmeanttobetalkingabout
secondarymatter,andonlyshiftedthereferencetoanothersortofmatterintheprocessofrevising
thetextwithhismarginaladditions?Iwouldanswerthisquestioninthenegative,forseveral
reasons.
1.
Evenbeforeallitsmarginaladditionsthetext,inarguingforthephenomenalityofthekindof
matterunderdiscussion,givestheprioritytotheargumentfromthephenomenalityofshape,size,
andmotion,andstatesthatshape"isoftheessenceofaboundedextendedmass."Thissuggests,
thoughitdoesnotstrictlyimply,thatLeibnizwasalreadythinkingofamatterthat"consistsonly
inthesequalities,"ashewouldwriteinthemargin.
2.
Theconceptionofmatterasaphenomenonconstitutedbytheperceptualappearanceofphysical
qualitiesisnotincompatiblewithaconceptionofmatteras"manybeings."Forsucha
phenomenonis,asLeibnizsays,extended,andassuchcomposedofparts;andascomposedof
parts,itcanalsobeseenas"manybeings,"thoughallofthosemanybeingswillthemselvesbe
purephenomena,unlikethesubstanceswhoseaggregationconstitutessecondarymatter.
3.
ThepreliminarydraftoftheletterprovidesevidencethatLeibnizdidnottakeArnauldtobe
thinkingofwhatLeibnizwouldcallsecondarymatter,forhespeaksthereofmatter"inthemanner
inwhichyoutakeitnamely,asanextendedmasscomposedofpartswherethereisonlymassand
extension."10InLeibniziansecondarymatter,bycontrast,thereismorethanmassandextension,
fortherearealsothesubstantialformsoftheaggregatedsubstances.Thedraftthusshowsthat
LeibniztookArnauldtobethinkingofaCartesianmatter,whichdiffersfromLeibniziansecondary
matterpreciselyinnothavinganysubstantialformsinit,andwhich,accordingtoLeibniz,would
alsobe"manybeings."
Perhapswemaythereforetakethispassage,asitwassenttoArnauld,asexplainingwhatplaceina
LeibnizianschemeofthingscanbeassignedtoaCartesianmatter,amatterconstitutedsolelyby
extensionanditsmodes:itcanonlybe"anentirelypurephenomenonliketherainbow."11This
wouldwouldhelpexplainwhythisthirdtypeofmatterrarelyfindsaplaceinLeibniz'swritings:it
isnotpartofthenativestructureoftheLeibniziansystem,buttheproductofanattempttorelate
thatsystemtoanalienconception.Conversely,theconsiderationthattheothertwosensesof
'matter'werefurtherfromhiscorrespondent'sownthoughtmayhavebeenamongLeibniz'sreasons
fornotsendingArnauldhisdiscussionofthem.
1.2SecondaryMatter
Leibniz'sownpatternofthinkingemergesmoreclearlyintheadditionthatArnaulddidnotsee.
Thattextbegins:
____________________
10
IquotethetranslationofthisunpublishedtextgivenbySleigh,LeibnizandArnauld,p.108.
11
LeibnizseemstobespeakingofthesameCartesiansortofmatterwhenhesays,laterinthesame
letter,"Iholdthatmass,whennothingisconsideredinitbutwhatisdivisible,isapure
phenomenon"(LA126).
345
Butifonetakesasmatter[ofthecorporealsubstance],notthemasswithoutforms,but
[asecondarymatter,whichis]themultitudeofsubstanceswhosemassisthatofthe
[whole]body,onecansaythatthesesubstancesarepartsofthatmatter,asthosethat
enterintoourbodymakepartofit.(LA119)
Thebracketedwordsareinterlinearadditionswithinthemarginaladdition.12Apartfromthem,
neither'primarymatter'nor'secondarymatter'occursanywhereinthispassageorinthe
preliminarydraftofit.Butifthephrase'secondarymatter'wasintroducedheresometimeafter
1687,itrepresentednosubstantivechangeinLeibniz'sthinking.Herethe"multitudeofsubstances"
isclearlywhathewouldcallsecondarymatter,whichdiffersfromothersortsofmatterprecisely
byhaving(anaggregateof)substances,andtheirsubstantialforms,somehowincludedinit.Itis
explicitlycontrastedwith"themasswithoutforms,"whichinthecontextsurelyrefersto"the
extendedmass...consistingonlyin[the]qualities"ofshape,size,andmotion,whichisdiscussed
inthepreviousportionoftheparagraph,theportionsenttoArnauld.
TheissueaboutsecondarymatterthatprincipallyengagesLeibniz'sattentionhereistherelationof
parttowhole.Aftercommentingthatwhathehassaidcanbeappliedaseasilytoothercorporeal
substancesastoahumanbeing,hecontinues:
Thedifficultiesthatpeoplemakeforthemselvesinthesematterscome,amongothers,
fromthefactthattheycommonlydonothaveadistinctenoughnotionofthewholeand
ofthepart,whichatbottomisnothingbutanimmediaterequirementofthewhole,and
insomefashionhomogeneous.Thuspartscanconstituteawholewhetherithasordoes
nothaveatrueunity.Itistruethatthewholethathasatrueunitycanremainrigorously
thesameindividual,eventhoughitlosesorgainsparts,asweexperienceinourselves;
thusthepartsareimmediaterequirementsonlyforatime.(LA120)
Whiletherelationofparttowholemayseemtohavesomerelevancetotheissueraisedby
Arnauld,howthesubstantialformcanimpartanintrinsicunitytomatter,thisdiscussionfallsto
addressthatissue.Onthatpoint,itaddsnothingtoLeibniz'sinitialstatementthatitisthecorporeal
substanceratherthanthematterthatisunifiedbythesubstantialform.The"trueunity"mentioned
heremustbeacorporealsubstance,forthesecondarymatterthatisthebodyofsuchasubstance,
consideredwithouttheformofthesubstance,iscertainlynotatrueunityinLeibniz'sview.The
secondarymatterassuchisamereaggregate,andtheonlyunityhecanascribetoanaggregateis
notintrinsicbutphenomenal,ashesaysattheendofthepartoftheparagraphthathedidsendto
Arnauld,agreeing"thatonecangivethenameonetoanassemblyofinanimatebodieseventhough
nosubstantialformbindsthem,...butitisaunityofphenomenonorofthought,whichisnot
enoughforwhatthereisthatisrealinphenomena"(LA119).
Thediscussionofthepart/wholerelationisthelikeliestsourceofanymisgivingsLeibnizmayhave
feltaboutthetheoreticaladequacyofthetexthewithheldfromArnauld.Thereisnothinginthe
restofthepassagethathewouldnot
____________________
12
Ihavebracketedonlysimpleadditions;otherwiseItranslatethefinaltext,whichembodiesthe
resultsofafewchangesofothersorts.
346
laterassertinonecontextoranother.Butontwopointswhathesayshereaboutcorporeal
substancesaspartsandwholesdisagreeswithotherthingshewroteduringthelastyearsofhis
correspondencewithArnauld.
First,hisinitialstatementaboutsecondarymatterhere,thatcorporealsubstancescanbesaidtobe
partsofit,disagreeswithhisstatementin1690,inamemoarisingfromdiscussionswith
MichelangeloFardella,that"anindivisiblesubstanceshouldnotthereforebesaidtoenterintothe
compositionofabodyasapart,butratherasanessentialinternalrequirement"(FC320/AG103).
13Itisalsointensionwithhisstatementinthisverypassagethatapartmustbe"insomefashion
homogeneous"withitswhole;forsubstancesareinthemostimportantrespectsnothomogeneous
withaggregates,andthereforenotwithsecondarymatter.
Second,theimplicationherethata"wholethathasatrueunity"(whichIhavearguedmustbea
corporealsubstance)canhavepartsandgainandlosethemobviouslyconflictswithastatementin
thepreliminarydraftofthisletter,that"asubstancecanloseitsmodes,butnotitsparts."14Ithink
itisalsointensionwiththeFardellamemoof1690,inwhichhavingpartsthatalwayshaveother
parts,andsoontoinfinity,istreatedasamarkofnotbeingasubstance(FC319/AG103),forthe
wayinwhichpartsofcorporealsubstancesseemtobeadmittedinthetextbeforeusoffersno
meansofblockingsuchaninfiniteregress.Laterstill,writingtoJohnBernoulliin1698,Leibniz
wasparticularlyexplicitthatthepartsofasubstance'sorganicbodyarenotpartsofthesubstance
(e.g.,GMIII,537/AG167).
1.3PrimaryMatter
Immediatelyfollowingthisdiscussionoftherelationofwholeandpart,asitpertainstosecondary
matter,Leibnizintroducesanothersortofmatter:
Butifoneunderstoodbythetermmattersomethingthatisalwaysessentialtothesame
substance,onecouldunderstandbythat,inthesenseofcertainScholastics,the
primitivepassivepower[Frenchpuissance]ofasubstance,andinthatsensematter
wouldbeneitherextendednordivisible,althoughitwouldbetheprincipleof
divisibility,orofwhatamountstoitforthesubstance.ButIdonotwishtodispute
abouttheusageofterms.(LA120)
Identifiedas"theprimitivepassivepowerofasubstance,"thisisclearlysomethingthatLeibniz
wouldlatercallprimarymatter,thoughitisnotsonamedinthistext.ThefirstthingLeibnizsays
aboutithereisthatit"isalwaysessentialtothesamesubstance."Thebondassertedhereseemsto
betightinbothdirections.First,thesameprimarymattercannotbelongtoanysubstancebutthe
oneitnowinfactbelongsto.ThisexcludesLeibnizianprimarymatterfromoneofthemain
functionsofAristotelianprimarymatternamely,thefunctionofbeingthesubstratumof
substantialchange,inwhichitbelongssuccessivelytodifferentsubstances.Second,ifa
substance'sprimarymatterisessentialtoit,it
____________________
13
Thedocumentof1690fromwhichIquoteinthisparagraphisdiscussedinChapter10,section3.1.
14
Sleigh,LeibnizandArnauld,p.109.
347
cannotbelostwhilethesubstanceexists.Inthisitcontrastswithsecondarymatter,which,as
Leibnizhasjustbeenexplaining,iscomposedofpartsthatcanbelostorgainedbythebodyofa
corporealsubstance.Sincethepartsofasubstance'sbodycanbelostorchanged,whileitsprimary
mattercannot,itfollows,asIhaveargued(forthisandotherreasons)inChapter11,section2.2,
thatitsprimarymattercannotbedividedintopartsthataretheprimarymatterofsubstancesthat
arepartsofitsbody.Thatispresumablyonereasonwhyprimarymatteris"neitherextendednor
divisible."
Thoughnotitselfextendedordivisible,Leibnizsays,primarymatter,conceivedastheprimitive
passivepowerofasubstance,is"theprincipleofdivisibility,orofwhatamountstoitforthe
substance."15Thatmeans,presumably,thatitistheprinciplefromwhichitfollowsthatthe
substancehasadivisible(andhenceextended)body.Wemaybetemptedtoconnectthiswith
Leibniz'sview,documentedinChapter11,section2.1,thatitistherepetitionofpassiveforcethat
constitutesextension.Butiftheextensionofmybodyisconstitutedbytherepetitionofprimitive
passiveforceorprimarymatter,itispresumablybytherepetitionoftheprimitivepassiveforcesof
themanysubstancescontainedinmybody,ratherthanbyarepetitionoftheprimarymatterthatis
essentialtomeasasubstance.Indeed,itishardtoseehowtherecouldbearepetitionofmy
primarymatterassuch,sinceitispresumablyassingleasIam.Iftheextensionordivisibilityof
mybodyisderivedfrommyprimarymatter,itmustbebyadifferentroute(aboutwhichIwilloffer
suggestionsinChapter13).
AnotherimplicationofLeibniz'sstatementaboutthissortofmatterasprincipleofdivisibility
deservesourattention.'Principle'[Frenchprincipe,Latinprincipium]meanssource,notresult,as
Leibnizsurelyknewwellenough.Hisstatementthereforepresumablymeansthatacorporeal
substancehasadivisiblebodybecauseofitsprimarymatternotthatithasprimarymatterbecause
ofitsdivisiblebody.Thisimplies,Ithink,thattheunionofacorporealsubstance'ssubstantialform
withitsprimarymatterisprior,intheorderofexplanation,totherelationbetweenthesubstantial
formandtheextendedbodyorsecondarymatter.Theprimarymatterappearsheretobeclosely
relatedtothesubstantialform:bothareunextendedandindivisible;botharealwaysessentialtothe
samesubstance;andbothwork,presumablytogether,ingroundingthesubstance'spossessionofan
extendedbody.Togethertheyformaunitprior,metaphysicallythoughnottemporally,tothe
possessionofthebody.ThisagreesstrikinglywithwhatItaketobeLeibniz'sfullydeveloped
monadologicalviewofcorporealsubstance:thatthesubstantialform,orentelechy,andtheprimary
mattertogetherconstitutethecompletemonad,whichjoinswiththesecondarymattertoconstitute
thecorporealsubstance(GII,252/L530f.).Anditdisagreeswithonewayinwhichsomemightbe
temptedtoreadLeibniz'stheoryofcorporeal
____________________
15
Leprincipedeladivisibilitoudecequienrevientlasubstance.Mytranslationofthisphrase
agreesinthemainwithH.T.Mason(LA120),butIthinkanytranslationofitisquestionable.
Grammatically,sofarasIcanjudgeafterconsultingseveraldictionariesofseventeenthcentury
French,cequienrevientU+00EOlasubstanceshouldmean"whatcomesofitforthesubstance,"
butthatmakesnophilosophicalsenseinthiscontext.TogivethemeaningthatIhavetranslated,
Leibnizshouldhavewritten,cequiyrevientpourlasubstance.Myhypothesisisthatheconfused
twoidiomsinFrench,which,afterall,wasnothisnativelanguage.
348
substanceinthemiddleyearsaslessmonadologicalandmoreAristoteliannamely,byreadinghim
assupposingthatacompletesubstancepossessingbothsubstantialformand(primary)matter
arisesonlyfromtherelationofthesubstantialformtothe(secondary)matterofitsbody.16
ItremainstocommentonLeibniz'sidentificationofthissortofmatterwith"theprimitivepassive
powerofasubstance."Heclaimstosaythis"inthesenseofcertainScholastics."Probablythebest
ScholasticprecedentfortheidentificationisSt.ThomasAquinas,whoheldthatprimarymatteris
purepotentiality,andindeedthatprimarymatter(oritsessence)isitspotentiality[Latinpotentia].
17AndpotentialityiscertainlyapassiveprincipleforAquinas,bycontrastwiththeactualityoract
[Latinactus]thatconstitutesform.Moreover,St.Thomas'sprimarymatter,likeLeibniz's,isprior,
metaphysically,todivisibility;itisnotdivisibleofitself,butonlybyvirtueofaquantitativeform
inheringinit(STI,q.50,a.2).Consideredinabstractionfromsuchforms,Thomisticprimarymatter
isveryunlikemostmodernconceptionsofmatter,andcanhardlyevenbecalledasortof"stuff."18
LeibnizconfinesprimarymattertotheroleofpassivepowermorestrictlythanAquinasdid,
however.ForwheninformedbyaquantitativeformThomisticprimarymatterisanextended,
divisiblestuff,whichisitsnormal,naturalstate.Anditisdefinitelynotalwaysessentialtothe
samesubstance,butisasubstratumofsubstantialchange.OtherScholastics,suchasScotusand
Ockham,heldviewsofprimarymatterevenfurtherremovedfromanythingLeibnizcouldhave
accepted.19
2.MatterandtheEucharist
2.1ToPellisson(January1692)
ThemetaphysicsoftheChristiansacramentoftheEucharistplayedasignificantpartinthe
philosophyofbodyintheseventeenthcentury(atleastontheContinent),thoughdoubtlessless
thanintheMiddleAges.ItisarecurrenttopicinLeibniz'stheologicalnotesandcorrespondence
from1668totheendofhis
____________________
16
Thisisthe"Aristotelianonesubstanceconception"ofthestructureofacorporealsubstanceI
rejectedinChapter10,section2.2.
17
STI,q.115,a.1,ad2;q.54,a.3;q.77,a.1.ThatLeibniz,atleastinhisyouth,wasawareofSt.
Thomas'sconceptionofmatter,andofitsthinness,isattestedbyamanuscriptinwhichhesays,
"Matter,accordingtoThomas,isanonBeing"(AVI,i,497n).Thatmayindeedexaggeratethe
thinnessoftheThomisticconception;itwouldbemoreaccuratetosaythat(primary)matterdoes
nothaveforThomasabeing[entitas]ofitsown,asitdoesformanylaterScholastics.(Itseemsto
memostnaturaltoassumethat"Thomas"hereisAquinas;unnaturaltosupposeitistheThomas
AnglusdiscussedinthequiteseparatemanuscriptofAVI,i,5017.)
18
AnotherinterestingparallelbetweenLeibniz'sandAquinas'sviewsaboutprimarymatterhasbeen
pointedouttomebyHoustonSmit.ItiswellknownthatSt.Thomasheldthatprimarymatter
(signedbyquantity)istheprincipleofindividuationforsubstancesthathaveit(see,e.g.,M.
Adams,WilliamOckham,vol.II,pp.67274).InLeibniz'sphilosophy,inhislateryearsatleast
and,onmyinterpretation,inhismiddleyearstoo,primarymatteristheprincipleofconfusionof
perceptions,andsubstancesareindividuatedbydifferencesintheconfusionoftheirperceptions
makingprimarymatteraprincipleofindividuationforLeibniz,too.
19
SeeM.Adams,WilliamOckham,vol.II,ch.16.
349
life.Thesacramentseemsnottohaveplayedalargepartinhispersonalpiety,atleastinhislater
years,20buthisphilosophywouldhavetoprovideametaphysicsforitinordertobeabasisfor
reunionofthechurches.Thepuzzling,exploratorytreatmentofthistopicintermsof"substantial
bonds"inhisletterstoBartholomewDesBosseshasbeendiscussedinChapter10,section5.3and
comesafterthe"middleyears"thatprimarilyconcernushere.OneofLeibniz'smostimportant
discussionsofprimarymatterfromthemiddleyears,however,isfoundinaEucharisticcontext,in
aletterhewroteinJanuary1692toPaulPellissonFontanier(162493),anotedFrenchconvert
fromProtestantismtoCatholicism,withwhomhewasexploringtheologicalandphilosophical
basesforreunionofthechurches.
Thewordsubstancecanbetakenintwoways,forthesubjectitselfandfortheessence
ofthesubject.Forthesubjectitself,whenonesaysthatthebodyorthebreadisa
substance;fortheessenceofthesubject,whenonesays,thesubstanceofthebody,or
thesubstanceofthebread;andthenitissomethingabstract.Sowhenitissaidthat
primitiveforceconstitutesthesubstanceofbodies,theirnatureoressenceis
understood;thusAristotlesaysthatthenatureistheprincipleofmotionandrest;and
theprimitiveforceisnothingbutthatprincipleineachbodyfromwhichallitsactions
andaffections21areborn.Iconsidermatterasthefirstinternalprincipleofpassivity
andresistance,anditisbyitthatbodiesarenaturallyimpenetrable.Andthesubstantial
formisnothingbutthefirstinternalprincipleofaction,thefirstentelechy.(A
I,vii,248)
TheconceptionofmatterpresentedhereisclearlyLeibniz'sconceptionofprimarymatter,and
severalpointsrelevanttoourinvestigationcanbeelicitedfromthispassageanditscontext,even
beforewefillinthebackgroundinEucharistictheology.
1.
Inthedistinctionbetweensubstanceassubjectandsubstanceastheessenceof(or"substanceof")
thesubject,primitiveforceisclassedhereasessenceratherthanassubject.Sinceprimarymatter
appearshereasthepassiveprincipleinprimitiveforce,itfollowsthatprimarymatterisclassedasa
featureofessenceratherthanasasortofsubject.Thisisamajorpointofdifferencefrom
Aristotelianconceptionsofmatter.ForwhileAristotelianscouldspeakoftheessenceofabodyas
includingmatter,inthesensethatitrequiresthebodytohavematter,matterremainedforthem
alwaysasubject,andprimarymattertheultimatesubjectofinherenceinmaterialthings.
2.
MostimportantisLeibniz'sstatementherethattheessence"issomethingabstract."Inthecontextit
followsatoncethatprimitiveforcesareabstract,andhencethatbothprimarymatterand
substantialformareabstract.Incallingthesethingsabstract,ofcourse,Leibnizdoesnotmeanthat
theyinhabitsomesortofPlatonicheavenratherthanarealworldofactingandperceivable
substances."Abstract"mustbeunderstoodhereinrelationtothementaloperationofabstraction
thatis,ofconsideringsomethingapartfromthecontextinwhichitoccurs."Somethingabstract"is
somethingthatcanbeviewedasathingorsubjectonlybyconsideringitapartfromtheonlysortof
contextinwhichitcan
____________________
20
SeeAiton,Leibniz:ABiography,p.349.
21
InFrench,passions.Thesenseisthatoftheplural,ifwehadone,of'beingactedon'.
350
occur.Tosaythatprimitiveforcesareabstractisnottodenythattheyhaverealexistence,butto
saythattheyhaveitonlyasaspects,properties,orfeaturesofaconcretesubjectthatisnotjusta
force.ThisistheabstractstatusthatLeibnizassignstobothprimarymatterandsubstantialform.22
Weareleftwiththequestion,fromwhatsortofsubjecttheyareabstracted.Isitverylikethe
"monad"ofLeibniz'slastyears,orisitsomehowmorerobustlycorporeal?23
Onepieceofevidenceforthefundamentallymonadologicalcharacteroftheviewexpressedinthis
textisthattheprimarymatter(likethesubstantialform)isdescribedasaninternalprinciple
[principeinterieur].Aninternalprincipleinasubstanceispresumablyaprinciplethatthe
substancehasindependentlyofits"external"propertiesthatis,independentlyofitsrelationsto
othersubstances.Ifthatisthecorrectinterpretation,itisimpliedherethattheprimarymatter,as
wellasthesubstantialform,ofacorporealsubstanceismetaphysicallyindependentoffull
embodiment,becauseindependentofrelationstotheothersubstancesthatgotogether,insome
sense,toconstituteitsorganicbody.
Theindependenceoftheprimarymatterfromtheorganicbodyorsecondarymatterisfurther
evidencedbythefactLeibnizgoesoninthislettertosaythattheprimitiveforceis"ahigher
principleofactionandresistance,fromwhichextensionandimpenetrabilityemanatewhenGod
doesnotpreventitbyasuperiororder"(AI,vii,249).Inasmuchasactionisafunctionof
substantialform,andresistanceisafunctionofprimarymatter,primarymatterandsubstantial
formarepresentedhereasfusedinasingle"principleofactionandresistance."Itisa"higher"
principle,inthecontext,bycontrastwithextensionandimpenetrability,ofwhichitisthesource.
Astheirsource,itispriortothem,andthereforepresumablypriortotheembodimentofthe
substancewhoseprincipleofactionandresistanceitis.Moreover,Leibnizexplicitlyallowsthe
possibilitythatGodmightpreventa"higherprinciple"ofthissortfromhavingtheextensionand
impenetrabilitythatwouldnaturallyemanatefromit.Thisraisestheissuesaboutdivine
interferencewiththeoperationsofcreatedsubstancesthatwerediscussedinChapter3,section2,
anditcertainlyseemstoenvisagethepossibilityofthehigherprincipleconstitutingasubstance
withoutabody,perhapsbyvirtueofGod'snotcreatingtheothersubstancesthatwouldbeinvolved
initsbody.Inthismetaphysicalindependencetheentityfromwhichprimarymatterisabstracted
looksverymuchlikethe"monad"ofLeibniz'slastyears.
Aninterestingforeshadowingofsucha"higherprinciple"isfoundinasetofreadingnotesfrom
about1668onapassageabouttheEucharistbyoneThomasWhite("ThomasAnglus").Whitehad
writtensomethingthatseemedtoLeibniztopresuppose"thatmatterisreallydistinguishedfrom
quantity,oratleastcanbetakenapart[praescindere]fromit."Leibniz'scomplaintthatnoonehad
____________________
22
ThatinLeibniz'sview"primarymatterisanabstractionfromsubstancetakeninitsentirety"isalso
afeatureoftheinterpretationadvocatedinGarber,"LeibnizandtheFoundationsofPhysics,"p.
54.
23
ThisisobviouslyrelatedtoissuesaboutthestructureofacorporealsubstancediscussedinChapter
10,sections23.Inthe"twosubstance"and"qualifiedmonad"conceptions,thesubstantialform
andprimarymatterareaspectsofthemonad.Itisinthe"Aristotelianonesubstance"conception
(whichIarguedwasneverheldbyLeibniz)thattheyareabstracteddirectlyfromsomething"more
robustlycorporeal."
351
explained"whatthatmatter,consistinginsomethingindivisible,wouldultimatelybe"issoforceful
thatonemightwellbetemptedtotakehim,inthistext,aspreferringamoreorlessCartesian
identificationofmatterwithquantity(thatis,withextension).Butthenheaddssomethingofa
ratherdifferentflavor:
Toexplainthisdifficultyclearlyandmakeperspicuous[thenotion]thatthereis
somethinginbodypertainingtosubstance,whichconsists,however,insomething
indivisible,andispartlyactiveandcanappropriatelybecalledformintheScholastic
Style,andpartlypassiveandwillrightlybecalledmatterintheirsense,whichisprior
toallmass,quantity,andshape;thisisatask,thisishardwork,thusfarnomortalhas
accomplishedit.(AVI,i,502)
DidLeibnizalreadythinkitcouldbeaccomplished?And(whatprobablyamountedtothesame
thingforhisyouthfulambition)didhehimselfaspiretoaccomplishit?Thetextdoesnottellus,but
Iaminclinedtothinkhedid.HereweglimpseaconceptionLeibnizhadveryearlyofwhatit
wouldbetorehabilitateScholasticconceptionsofprimarymatterandsubstantialform.Theywould
beinseparableaspectsofanindivisiblesubstantialcorewhichismetaphysicallypriortosuch
physicalfeaturesasmassandextension.
Ifprimarymatterisaprincipleinternaltoacorporealsubstance,mustitsmetaphysically
fundamentaloperationbeinternaltothatsubstance?Andmustthatoperationbeanaspectofthe
perceptualoperationofthesubstance?Theseinferencesarenotexplicitlydrawnintheletterto
Pellisson,butIbelievetheywerewarrantedbyLeibniz'sprinciplesatthetime.
Thefirstinferencegetssomesupportfromastatement,inafragmentthatseemstobelongwith
Leibniz'sFardellamemoof1690,that"Ineverysubstancethereisnothingbutthatnatureor
primitiveforcefromwhichfollowstheseriesofitsinternaloperations"(VE2158=FC324)which
impliesthatsome,andsuggeststhatall,oftheoperationsofasubstance'sprimitiveforceare
internaltothesubstance.AlineofargumenttosupportbothinferencesisbasedonLeibniz's
repeatedcontrastofmatterwithformaspassivewithactive.Ifthisisthemostfundamental
differencebetweenthem,asheseemstoimply,thenitisnaturaltoassumetheyarepassiveand
active,respectively,withrespecttooperationsofthesamesort.Otherwise,andspecificallyifthe
operationsoftheonewereperceptualandtheother'swerenonperceptualincharacter,thatwould
beanotherfundamentaldifferencethatwoulddeservetobementionedatleastasprominentlyas
theactive/passivedifference.SoifLeibnizspeaksof"theinternalaction"ofasubstantialform,and
presentsitasperceptualincharacter,thatwouldbeevidencethataperceptualinternaloperationis
tobeassignedtoprimarymatteraswell.ThereisatextfromOctober1693,withsomerelationto
thePellissoncorrespondence,inwhichLeibnizdoesjustthat,contrastingmatterandformas
passiveandactive,andsaying:
Itisnotthatthisformmakesitsbodyactotherwisethanaccordingtothelawsof
mechanics.Butwiththat,theinternalactionofthisform,whichiscalledsensationin
animals,andthoughtinman,hasitsjurisdictionapart,althoughithasitsparallelism
withtheactionsofthebody.(AI,ix,211)24
____________________
24
Theselinesarefromashortpieceabouttheessenceofbody,writtenforJacquesBnigneBossuet(
16271704),whowasassociatedwithPellissonontheCatholicsideofacorrespondence
352
Amoresolidlineofargument,Ithink,drawssupportfromtheJanuary1692lettertoPellisson.If
primarymatterisaprincipleinternaltoacorporealsubstance,andcanbeconceivedasanentity
onlybyabstractionfromthesubstance,thensurelytheoperationoftheprimarymatterisan
operationofthesubstanceitself.Thisconclusionissupportedalsobythethesisthatmatterinthis
sense"isalwaysessentialtothesamesubstance"(LA120),whichisechoedinthisletterbya
statementthattheprimitiveforce"remainsalwaysthesameinthesamebody"(AI,vii,249).But
Leibnizdeniesthatthereisanymetaphysicallyfundamentaloperationofonesubstanceonanother.
Talkofinteractionofsubstancescanbegivenanacceptablesenseonlyintermsofaharmonyof
theinternaloperationsofthedifferentsubstances.Andthereisnoexceptiontothis,eveninthis
periodofLeibniz'sthought,forrelationsbetweenacorporealsubstanceandtheothersubstances
thatare"in"itsorganicbody;25tosupposeotherwisewouldbetomakehashofthe"systemofpre
establishedharmony."Asanoperation,oranaspectoftheoperation,ofacorporealsubstance,
therefore,thefundamentaloperationoftheprimarymattermustbeinternaltothatsubstance.
Ingivingrisetoextensionandresistance,moreover,asitnaturallydoes,theprimarymattermust
beinvolvedininteraction,inthederivativesense,withothersubstances,whichmustbeexplained
intermsofaharmonyofinternaloperations.Butharmonyoftheinternaloperationsofone
substancewithothersisperception,accordingtoLeibniz(LA112).Hencethemetaphysically
fundamentaloperationofprimarymatterbywhichitnaturallygivesrisetoextensionandresistance
isanaspectofaperceptualoperationofacorporealsubstance.Q.E.D.
2.2Leibniz'sSolutiontotheProblemofMultipresence
TherathermonadologicalinterpretationIhavegiventhispassageseemstometobeconfirmedby
thewayinwhichLeibnizproceedstouseitsideasforametaphysicsoftheEucharist.Atthispoint
Ineedtomakeclearwhatwas(andwasnot)thetheologicalissueunderdiscussion.Leibniz's
understandingoftwoofthemaindoctrinestobedistinguishedhadbeenarticulatedasfollowsina
muchearlierdocument,probablydatingfromfall1671:
I.OneandthesameBodyofChrist(whichsufferedontheCrossforus)isreally
present,byitssubstance,wherevertheEucharisticsacrificialoffering[Hostia]is.II.In
thesacrificialofferingoftheEucharistthesubstanceoftheBodyofChristisunderthe
forms[species]ofbread.(A,VI,i,515)
____________________
'
withLeibnizaboutreunionofthechurches.Thepassageofinterestwasbracketedandnotactually
senttoBossuet,butIthinkthatisprobablybecauseitwentdeeperphilosophicallythanLeibniz
normallywishedtogowiththefamousbishop,ashethoughtlesshighlyofBossuet'sreasoning
thanofhisrhetoric(AI,viii,125).Whenhewentdeeper,aswehaveseen,withPellisson,itwasnot
withoutapologiesforhis"prolixity"(AI,vii,250).
25
Cf.LA136.ItshouldbenotedthatGarberagrees("LeibnizandtheFoundationsofPhysics,"p.
55).ThisisoneofthedoctrinesoftheDiscourseonMetaphysicsaboutthenatureofindividual
substancethathesaysapplytocorporealsubstancesashethinksLeibnizconceivedoftheminthe
middleyears.
353
FollowingtheterminologyoftheCouncilofTrent,Leibnizreferstotheseasthedoctrinesofreal
presenceandtransubstantiation,respectively.Henotes(correctly)that"TheAugsburgConfession
[oftheLutherans26]admitsonlythefirstproposition;thesecondisaddedbytheRomanChurch
and,withmostcautiousphrasing,bytheCouncilofTrent"(AVI,i,515).Hisformulationofthe
secondpropositiondoesnotmakethedistinctionbetweenthedoctrinesasclearlyasitshould.The
doctrineofrealpresenceispositivethatthesubstanceofthebodyofChristispresentinthe
sacrament.Themainpointthatthedoctrineoftransubstantiationaddstothisisnegativethatthe
substanceofthebreadisnolongerpresentinthesacrament,althoughitsspeciesorperceptible
accidentsremain.27
LeibnizdidnotatthistimethinktherejectionoftransubstantiationessentialtotheLutheran
position.In1671hewaspreparedasaLutherantoacceptbothdoctrines(AVI,i,515f.;AII,i,175).
Inlateryearshewaslessreadytoaffirmtransubstantiation,butin1694hecouldbequitecautious
onthepoint:"ItdoesnotseemtofollowthatsinceTransubstantiation...canbeaffirmedwithout
overturninganyprincipleoftheProtestants,thereforeitoughttobeaffirmed.Foritdoesnotfollow
thatwhateverwearenotabletorefuteistrue"(AI,x,112).Itisofcapitalimportanceforthe
understandingofLeibniz'sletterstoPellissonthatwhatLeibnizwastryingtoexplainandto
vindicateinthemisonlythedoctrineofrealpresence,towhichhewaspersonallyand
ecclesiasticallycommitted,andnotthatoftransubstantiation,whichbythenheavoidedaffirming.
PellissonandLeibnizbothacknowledgetheirfundamentalagreementontherealpresence(A
I,vii,168,295).ThisgivestowhathesaysaboutEucharisticmetaphysicsintheselettersa
seriousnessthatwehavelessreasontoascribetothediscussionof"substantialbonds"inhisletters
toDesBosses,whereheistryingtoaccountfortransubstantiation,whichhebythenexplicitlydid
notaccept(GII,390,399;cf.Gr220;Tpd1819).
Leibniz'sprioritiesasaLutheranarereflectedinthefactthatthecentralproblemthathetriesto
solveinmostofhiswritingsaboutEucharisticmetaphysicsistheproblemofmultipresencethat
is,ofhowtheonebodyofChristcouldbepresentinthemanydifferentplaceswherethesacrament
mightbeobservedatoncewhichisaproblemforthedoctrineofrealpresence.Indrawingon
EucharistictheologyforanobjectiontoDescartes'sphilosophyofbody,forexample,hedoesnot
takeupthewellknownobjectionthathadbeenraisedbyArnauldanddiscussedatsomelengthby
Descartes(ATVII,217f.,24756),whichisbasednotontherealpresencebutonaversionofthe
doctrineoftransubstantiation.Instead,andevenintheveryfirstletterLeibnizwrotetoArnauld,in
1671(AII,i,171),Leibnizoffersanobjectionbasedontheproblemofmultipresencethatitwould
beimpossibleforanybodytobeinmanyplacesatonceiftheessenceofbodywereextension,as
Descartesclaimed,forthentheextension,orthefilling,ofeachplace,eachboundedspace,would
constituteadifferentbody
____________________
26
Leibnizdisapprovedoftheterm'Lutheran'(Schrecker57,96;AI,vii,257),andnormallyreferredto
hisownchurchas"Evangelical,"orbymentionoftheAugsburgConfession.Hewassometimes
willing,however,perhapsoutofcourtesy,tofollowaprincelycorrespondentinusing'Lutheran'(
AI,iii,282,333;iv,419).
27
ForaphilosophicalaccountofthedoctrineoftransubstantiationinitsScholasticcontext,seeM.
Adams,"AristotleandtheSacramentoftheAltar."
354
(AVI,iii,158/W63;AI,vii,198;cf.Systema127;AI,x,111;DutensI,30).Thisargument
presupposesthatifextensionconstitutestheessenceofbody,thentheextensionofagivenspace
constitutesaprincipleofindividuationforanindividualbody.Itcanbearguedthatthiswasalso
presupposedbyDescartesinhisargumentsaboutrarefactioninPrinciplesII,58(AT
VIII1,4245).Nonetheless,theobjectionraisedbyLeibnizwasonethatDescarteshadnot
addressed,asLeibniznotes(AI,x,144).
HavingpresentedthisobjectiontoPellisson,Leibnizclaimsthathisownconceptionofcorporeal
substanceprovidesasolutiontotheproblem:
Thenitisbytheapplicationtoseveralplacesofthis[higher]principle[ofactionand
resistance],whichisnothingbuttheprimitiveforceofwhichIhavespoken,or(to
speakinmoreordinaryterms)theparticularnatureofthething,thatthemultipresence
ofabodyistobesaved.Itistrue,however,thatthesubstanceinconcretoissomething
otherthantheForce,foritisthesubjecttakenwiththatforce.Thusthesubjectitselfis
present,anditspresenceisreal,becauseit28emanatesimmediatelyfromitsessence,as
Goddeterminesitsapplicationtotheplaces....Iwouldevensaythatitisnotonlyin
theEucharist,buteverywhereelse,thatbodiesarepresentonlybythisapplicationof
theprimitiveforcetotheplace;butthisoccursnaturallyonlyinaccordancewitha
certainextension,orsizeandshape,andinregardtoacertainplace,fromwhichother
bodiesareexcluded.(AI,vii,249)
Themetaphysicalcenteroftheselinesisobviouslythestatementthat"notonlyintheEucharist,
buteverywhereelse,"thepresenceofacorporealsubstanceinaplaceconsistsonlyinthe
"applicationof[its]primitiveforcetotheplace."Thesubstanceor"body"ofwhichthisissaidis
presumablythesubstanceofwhichprimarymatterisanaspect,orfromwhichitisanabstraction;
foritisthewholeprimitiveforceorhigherprincipleofactionandresistance,whichincludesthe
primarymatteraswellasthesubstantialform,thatissaidheretobeappliedtoaplacetoconstitute
thepresenceofabodyinthatplace.Itseemstobeimplied,then,thatprimarymatterisan
abstractionfromasubstancethatisnotso"physical"astohaveanymoreprimitivewayofbeingin
aplacethanbyoperating(immediately)onoratthatplaceasubstancethatinthiswayalso
resemblesthemonadsoftheMonadology.
ThisconclusionisallthemorestronglyestablishedinthatLeibnizisresistingconsiderable
theologicalpressurefromPellissontofindamoreprimitivewayforacorporealsubstancetobein
aplace.LeibnizhadgivenPellissonapreliminaryaccountofhistheoryofmultipresenceinaletter
ofNovember1691.OnDecember30Pellissonrepliedwithamisgiving:
Iamsomewhatafraidthatthewayinwhichyouexplain...substanceasakind
[espece]offorcethatcanbeappliedindifferentplacesmaygiveoccasiontosomeone
tosaythatyouarenotgenuinelyoftheAugsburgConfessionontheEucharistbecause
youdonotbelieveinagenuinerealpresence,butinapresenceofforceandpower
[vertu],whichmostoftheSacramentariansaccept,andCalvinmuchmorethanthe
others.
____________________
28
"It"hereprobablyreferseithertothepresenceortotheforce.Areferenceto"thesubject"is
grammaticallyimpossibleongroundsofthegenderinFrench.
355
Pellissonaskedforfurtherexplanation,addingthathehimselfconceivedofforce"asanordinary
andalmostnecessaryconsequenceofsubstance,butnotasbeingsubstanceitself"(AI,vii,227f.).
Thisquestionisaimedquiteaccuratelyatatheologicallysensitivepoint.Calvinhadaffirmedthat
believersenjoyinthesacramenta"trueandsubstantialpartakingofthebodyandbloodofthe
Lord,"29andthiswascertainlyunderstoodasacommunicationofspiritualbenefitsbyChrist's
power.ForCalvin,however,thisinteractiontookplacespirituallybetweenChristandthebeliever
anddidnotinvolvethepresenceofChrist'sbodyatanyplaceexceptinheaven.Itwasthemost
impassioneddisagreementbetweenCalvinandtheLutheransthathedenied,andtheyaffirmed,the
presenceofthebodyofChristintheplaceoftheconsecratedbreadandwine.30Leibnizofcourse
istryingtoexplainthepresenceofChrist'sbodyinmanyplaces,whichwasimportanttoCatholics
aswellasLutherans,butPellissonfearsthathemeansnothingmorethanwhatCalvinwould
acceptthatinthesacramentChrist'spoweroperatesonbelieverswherevertheymaybe.
ThelongdiscussionofthenatureofsubstanceinLeibniz'sletterofJanuary1692isaresponseto
Pellisson'sconcern.Thefollowingstatementsaddresstheobjectiondirectly:
Itistrue,however,thatthesubstanceinconcretoissomethingotherthantheForce,for
itisthesubjecttakenwiththatforce.Thusthesubjectitselfispresent,anditspresence
isreal,becauseitemanatesimmediatelyfromitsessence,asGoddeterminesits
applicationtotheplaces.Apresencebypower[presencevirtuelle],asopposedtoareal
presence,mustbewithoutthatimmediateapplicationoftheessenceorprimitiveforce,
andhappensonlybyactionsatadistanceorbyintermediateoperations.Whereasthere
isnodistancehere.ThosewhofollowCalvinadmitarealdistance,andthepowerof
whichtheyspeakis(itseemstome)spiritualandrelatedonlytofaith;thathasnothing
incommonwiththeforceImean.(AI,vii,249)
Thisisnotaverysatisfyinganswertotheobjection.Calvinwouldnotsaythatinthesacrament
Christdoesnotoperateonbelieversdirectly,butonlybyintermediateoperations[aswemightact
onadistantbodybythrowingastoneatit,toborrowanexampleLeibnizwoulduselater(A
I,vii,294)].CalvindidsaythatChrist'sbodyremainsatadistancefromours,andLeibnizdenies
that;butPellisson'sworryispreciselythatthelocalpresenceamongusthatLeibnizascribesto
Christ'sbodyisnothingbutanoperationthatCalvinascribedtoChristinotherterms.Leibnizdoes
alludetoadifferencethatmaybemoresignificant,thattheCalvinistsspeakofapowerthatis
"relatedonlytofaith,"orthatisappliedonlytothebelievingsoul;whereasLeibnizseemstospeak
ofaforcethatis"applied"totheplaceoftheconsecratedbreadandwine,ortowhateverisinthat
place.Butthisdifferenceisnotreallydevelopedhere.
Pellissonwassomewhatmollifiednot,Ithink,bythisanswer,butbythemoregeneral
metaphysicalexpositioninLeibniz'sletterofJanuary1692.Reply
____________________
29
Calvin,Institutes,p.1382(IV,xvii,19).Thispassageisparaphrasedalmostverbatim,andwith
evidentunderstanding,byPellisson(AI,vii,276).
30
Calvin,Institutes,IV,xvii,512,1619.
356
ingamonthlater,PellissonispreparedtoacceptLeibnizasholdingarealpresenceofthebodyof
Christifwhathesaysispresentistheprimitiveforceunderstoodasaprincipleofaction,andnot
merely"theactionthatistheeffectofthisprinciple"(AI,vii,276).LeibnizrespondedinMarch,
makingclearthathedidindeedmeantobespeakingofthepresenceoftheprincipleofactionitself.
ButhelookedPellisson'sgifthorseinthemouth,expressingareservationaboutcontrastingthe
presenceoftheprinciplewithamerepresenceofoperation."Ianswerthateverythingthatoperates
immediatelyinseveralplacesalsoisinseveralplacesbyatruepresenceofitsessence,andthatthe
immediateoperationcannotbejudgedtobedistantfromtheindividualthatoperates,sinceitisa
mannerofbeingofit"(AI,vii,294).Whatparticularlyinterestsmeaboutthisresponseisthat
LeibnizwasnotabletoacceptassharpadistinctionasPellissonwantedbetweenpresenceof
essenceandpresenceofoperation.Perhapsindeedheisnotabletomakeasharpenoughdistinction
todistancehimselffromCalvinonthisissue.31Thereasonforthat,Itakeit,isthatLeibnizsaw
nothingforthelocalpresenceofasubstanceoritsessencetobe,ifitisnotapresencebysomesort
ofoperation.
Whatsortofoperationthatwouldbeisoneofthethingswewouldmostliketoknow,butLeibniz's
letterstoPellissonarequiteuninformativeonthepoint,speakingvaguelyofthe"application"of
primitiveforcestoplaces.Ihaveargued,however,thatLeibniz'sprinciplesrequireittobean
internaloperationinharmonywithothersubstancesand,therefore,inabroadLeibniziansense,
perceptual.ItmayalsoberelevanttonotehereamuchlatertextinwhichLeibnizseemstohave
beenawareoftheconsiderationsthatpresshiminthisdirection.Speakingoftheassignmentof
placestosouls,inaletterwrittentoDesBossesinApril1709,heoffersthealternatives"thatthey
arenotinaplaceexceptbyoperation,thatis,speakingaccordingtotheoldsystemofinfluence,or
rather(accordingtothenewsystemofpreestablishedharmony)thattheyareinaplaceby
correspondence,andthusareinthewholeorganicbodythattheyanimate"(GII,371).Thewayin
whichthesealternativesareformulatedseemstoimplythatLeibnizhimselfmustrejectthe
interpretationintermsofoperationandembraceinsteadaninterpretationintermsof
correspondence.Wehavebeenexaminingtextsfromthe1690s,however,whenhealreadyrejected
thesystemofinfluenceinfavorofthatofpreestablishedharmony,butinwhichhenonetheless
ascribedtoprimitiveforces(doubtlessincludingsouls)alocalpresencebyimmediateoperation.
Theobviouswayofrenderingthisconsistentistosupposethatnometaphysicalinfluenceis
impliedinthetextsofthe1690s,butatmostanactionofonesubstanceonanotherinthederivative
senseexplainedinDM15,whichamountstoasortofcorrespondenceoftheirinternalproperties.
Inotherwords,beinginaplaceby(immediate)operation,asaffirmedinthe1690s,isreducedto
beinginaplacebycorrespondence.
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31
By1699LeibnizwaswillingtosaytoarepresentativeoftheReformedcommunionthatCalvin's
accountofthematterwas"mostsatisfying"(Gr449).(Thereisanimplicitcontrastinthetextwith
otherReformedtheologianswhoseviewsonthesacramentdifferedmorefromLutheranpositions
thanCalvin'sdid.)AndinNE514Leibnizexplicitlyminimizestheimportanceofanydifference
betweenLutheranandCalvinistpositionsonthemannerofChrist'spresenceinthesacrament(see
alsoTpd18).
357
Thequestionmayberaisedwhetherthisreductioncompromisestheimmediacyofthepresence.In
theNewEssays(17035)LeibnizcomparesthelocalpresenceofsoulswiththeThomisticviewof
angelsasnotbeing"inaplaceexceptbyoperation,whichaccordingtomeisnotimmediateandis
reducedtothepreestablishedharmony"amodeofpresencethatLeibnizgoesontocontrastwith
thepresencethatGodhasbyoperating"immediately"oncreatures(NE222).Itisnatural,thoughI
thinknotlogicallycompulsory,toreadthedenialofimmediacyhereasapplyingtosoulsaswellas
toangels,andasinferredfromthereductiontopreestablishedharmony.
By1709,Leibnizseemstohavehadsomedoubtsastowhetherhistheoryofferedaconceptionof
substantialpresencerobustenoughforallthetheologicaldemandsthatmightbeplacedonit.The
mostpublicevidenceofthesedoubtsisthefactthatin1710,discussingtheEucharistinthe
Theodicy(Tpd19),Leibnizdoesnotclaimmorethanan"analogy"betweenpresenceand
immediateoperation.Thestrongestevidenceofdoubtorchangeisinaletterof1709toDes
Bosses,whereLeibnizsays,inaEucharisticcontext,"IhavealreadygivenTourneminetheanswer
thatpresenceissomethingMetaphysical,asunionis,whichisnotexplainedbyphenomena"(G
II,390;cf.GVI,595).ThesetextsmaysuggestarejectionofLeibniz'soldtheoryofthereal
presenceinfavorofthepostulationofametaphysicallyprimitivelocalpresenceofsubstance,
whichhehadrejectedinthe1690s.Withregardtothenotionofunion,however,intheTheodicy
andthetextsconnectedwithhisinterchangewithTournemine,IarguedinChapter10,section5.2,
thatLeibnizhadnotpersonallyabandonedhisownmorereductionistictheory,butallowedatleast
aproblematicpossibilityofsomethingmoreforthosewhosetheologymightdemandit.Asimilar
interpretationofhisstatementsaboutpresenceinthesetextsseemstomethemostplausible.Itis
supportedbylettersof1710toDesBossesinwhichLeibnizstilldefendshisoldtheory."Andin
truth,"hesays,"ifGodbroughtitaboutthatsomethingoperatedimmediatelyatadistance,bythat
veryfacthewouldbringaboutitsmultipresencewithoutanypenetrationorreplication"(GII,399;
cf.GII,407).
2.3"OnTransubstantiation"(1670)
MyinterpretationoftheletterstoPellissonisinkeepingwiththepriorhistoryofLeibniz'stheory
oftherealpresenceintheEucharist.ThemainideaoftheEucharistictheorythatheoffered
Pellissonisthatifthesubstanceofabodyisseenasconsisting,notinextension,butinaforceor
principleofaction(andbeingactedon),thesubstancewillbepresentwhereitoperates
immediately,andthatwhileinthenaturalordertheimmediateoperationofacorporealsubstanceis
confinedtooneplace,bythepowerofGoditcanbemadetooperateimmediatelyinmanyplaces.
Leibnizusedthisstrategyforsolvingtheproblemofmultipresenceforfortyyears,ifnotmore.It
recursfromhisyouthfultheologicalworkinMainzabout1670,throughhismiddleyears,andat
leastaslateas1710.32Intheearliestsurvivingfulldevelopmentoftheideaitisclearthat
____________________
32
See,e.g.,AVI,iii,158f./W64f.(from167276);AI,iii,272f.andSystema127f.(fromthe1680s);A
I,x,143f.(toBossuet,1694);DutensI,30f.andSchrecker87f.,120(from169899inthe
358
theoperationbywhichthesubstantialprincipleispresentinanyplaceisperceptualorcognitivein
character.ThetexttowhichIreferisentitled"OnTransubstantiation,"andwascomposedin
Mainz,Ithinkprobablyinspring1670(AVI,i,50813/L11518).33Thisessaybeginswithan
accountofthenatureofsubstanceaccordingtowhichsubstancerequiresaprincipleofactionthat
canbefoundonlyinamind.Leibnizconcludesthat"theSubstanceofabody,therefore,isunion
withasustainingmind."Moreprecisely,sinceLeibnizdidnotyetbelieveininternalmindlike
principlesinnonrationalcreatures,"theSubstanceofthehumanbodyisunionwiththehuman
mind;theSubstanceofbodiesthatlackreasonisunionwiththeuniversalmindorGod"(A
VI,i,509/L116).InthisearlyworkLeibnizacceptsthedoctrineoftransubstantiation,andoffersa
metaphysicalaccountofitastakingplace"insofarasthespecialconcurrenceofthemindofChrist,
whoassumesthebreadandwineinto[his]34body,issubstitutedinplaceofthegeneral
concurrencewhichtheuniversalorDivinemindimpartstoallBodies"(AVI,i,509/L116).35We
aremoreconcernedhere,however,withLeibniz'stheoryoftherealpresence,andofmultipresence,
whichisdevelopedasfollowsin"OnTransubstantiation."Havingarguedthat"themindisnotina
placethroughitself[perse],"hegoeson:
23.
Themindoperatesonabodywhichisinspace.
24.
Tothatextentthereforeitcanbesaidtobeinspaceby[its]operation.St.Thomas.
25.
Everyoperationofthemindisthought.
____________________
'
contextofdiscussionsbetweentheLutheranandReformedcommunions);andGII,399(toDes
Bosses,1710).
33
Ihopetodiscussthisfascinatingdocumentinmoredetailelsewhere.Noonedoubtsthatitwas
writtenduringtheMainzperiod.Nodateisrecordedinit,andunfortunatelyithascomedowntous
onlyinaneighteenthcenturycopy,sothereisnorelevantphysicalevidenceofitsdateof
composition.(SeeAVI,i,xxv;ii,572f.)Wemustthereforerelyontheagreementanddisagreement
ofitscontentwithother,moresecurelydatedtexts.Itseemstohavebeenwrittentobereadasa
Catholicstatement,thoughLeibnizwasstill,ashesaidataboutthattime,"committedtothe
AugsburgConfession"(AVI,i,516.).ButIthinkthisisnoreasontodoubttheauthentically
Leibniziancharacterofthetext,forhisapproachtoreunionofthechurcheswasbasedonabelief
thatCatholicandProtestant(or,atanyrate,CatholicandLutheran)theologieswerenot
irreconcilablyopposedonbasicissues.Leibnizseemstohaveassumedthatreunionwouldtake
placewithintheinstitutionalframeworkoftheRomanCatholicChurchandwouldleavethe
doctrinalframeworkofthatchurchalmostentirelyintact,thoughitwoulddemandsomefurther
reformsofitspractices.HiseffortwastofindinterpretationsofCatholicdoctrinesthatcouldbe
acceptedbyProtestantswithoutanysubstantialcompromiseofProtestantconvictions,andthat
wouldstillbeacceptabletoCatholics;reunionshouldtakeplacesalvisprincipiisutriusquepartis
[preservingtheprinciplesofbothparties](aphraseusedbyLeibniztoexpresshisownaspirations
in1685:AI,iv,386f.,and,withvariations,380,389).FormostofthesepointsaboutLeibniz's
projectforchurchreunion,seeAII,i,488/L259.Itseemsfairlyclearthatuntilsometimeinmiddle
ageLeibnizhimselfwaspreparedtoassenttovirtuallyallCatholicdogmasabouttheEucharist,
andthatheneverregardedsuchassentasincompatiblewithadherencetotheAugsburgConfession.
34
Somethingseemstohavebeenomittedherebytheeighteenthcenturycopyist.
35
DespitehisantiCartesianpolemiconthissubject,LeibnizmayherebetakingupaCartesianidea.
Inaletterof9February1645totheJesuitDenisMesland,Descartessuggestedthat
transubstantiationmaytakeplacebyunionofthesoulofChristwiththeparticlesofthebreadand
wine(ATIV,16570);cf.Watson,"TransubstantiationamongtheCartesians,"p.170.
359
26.
Themindcanthinkmanythingsatonce.
27.
Themindcanthereforebeinmanyplacesatonceby[its]operation.
28.
ThereforethemindofChristcanbestowoperation,action,orsubsistencebothonthegloriousbody
ofChristandatthesametimeonthespeciesofconsecratedbreadandwine,andonnumerically
differentinstancesofthelatterindifferentplacesontheearth.
29.
ThereforethemindofChristcanbepresenteverywheretothespeciesofbreadandwine.
30.
ThemindofChristconcurringwithhisgloriousbodythatsufferedforusisitsSubstance,byno.9.
36
31.
ThereforetheSubstanceofthegloriousBodyofChristcanbepresenteverywheretothespeciesof
breadandwine.Q.E.D.(AVI,i,510/L116f.)
Themind,wearetold,ispresentinplacesbyoperation;anyother,moredirectwayofbeing
spatiallypresentisinapplicabletoit.AndsuchpresenceofthemindofChristconstitutes
substantialpresenceofthebodyofChrist,thebodywithwhichChrist'smindconcurs.This
substantialpresencebyoperationisessentiallythecentralideaofthetheoryoftherealpresence
thatLeibnizwouldoffertoPellissonovertwentyyearslater,subjecttothequalification,inthelater
texts,thattheoperationmustbeimmediate."OnTransubstantiation"givesusanexplanationof
whattheoperationis:"Everyoperationofthemindisthought."
Foramindtooperateataplaceispresumablyforthemindtothinkthatplace,ortohaveasobject
ofitsthoughtwhatisatthatplace.ThatseemstobepresupposedinLeibniz'sinferenceofthe
mind'spossiblemultipresencefromitsabilitytothinkmanythingsatonce;thisinterpretationis
confirmedbythefactthatinthisdocumentLeibnizreferstotheunionorconcurrenceofGod's
mindwithabodyasGod's"ideaof"thebody.ThisforeshadowsLeibniz'slaterviewinwhichthe
bodyofamonadisthebodywhichthatmonadperceivesmostdirectly.37Thequalificationof
specialdirectness(orofimmediatenessofoperation,asintheletterstoPellisson)isneededearlyas
wellaslate,ofcourse,todistinguishamind'sownbodyfromothersofwhichitthinks;butLeibniz
obviouslyhadnotworkedallthisthroughin1670.
ItisnoteworthyalsothatLeibnizsayshereboththat"everyoperationofthemindisthought"and
thatthemindofChristbestows"operation,action,orsubsistencebothonthegloriousbodyof
Christandatthesametimeonthespeciesofconsecratedbreadandwine."Theobviousimplication
thatthelatterbestowaltakesplacebythinkingsuggestsaratherphenomenalistviewofwhatthere
isinbodiesbesidesthesustainingorconcurrentmind.
Thisofcoursedoesnotprovethattheoperationbywhichprimitiveforcesarepresentinplaces
accordingtoLeibniz'sletterstoPellissoniscogitativeorperceptual,liketheoperationbywhich
mindsweresaidtobeinplaces,overtwentyyearsearlier,in"OnTransubstantiation."ButIthinkit
issignificantfortheinterpretationofthelatertextsthattheircentralideaisonethatLeibniz
originallyworkedoutwithacogitativeorperceptualoperationinmind.
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36
No.9was"TheSubstanceofabody,therefore,isunionwithaconcurrentmind."
37
360
3.Bernoulli'sQuestions
Infall1698therewasanilluminatingseriesofinterchangesonthenatureofcorporealsubstance
betweenLeibnizandJohnBernoulli,aswehaveseeninChapter10,section3.2.Agroupof
questionswereproposedbyBernoulliandnumberedbyLeibnizassix.Thefirsttwoofthemwere
aboutprimarymatter,andwerefollowedwithnotablepersistencethroughseveralroundsof
discussion.TheywereinspiredbyapreviousstatementofLeibniz:"Matteritself,initself[perse],
orbulk[moles],38whichyoucancallprimarymatter,isnotasubstance,andnotevenanaggregate
ofsubstances,butsomethingincomplete"(GMIII,537/AG167).Bernoulliformulatedhis
questionsaboutthisstatementasfollows:"Idonotadequatelygrasp[1]whatyouunderstandby
primarymatterinitself[perse]orbybulk[moles]asdistinctfromsecondarymatterormass
[massa],nor,also,[2]whatisincompleteforyou."(GMIII,539f.,numberingadded)
InhisletteroflateSeptemberLeibnizreplied:
soulsorforms.
andtheactivewithoutthepassive.(GMIII,541f./AG167)
'Incomplete'hereisroughlyequivalentto'abstract'.Primarymatterisnotasubstancebecauseitis
notcompleteenoughtobeaconcretesubject.Itisa"merelypassive"principle,andittakesboth
passiveandactiveprinciplestoconstituteasubstance.Eitherwithout,or"separatefrom,"theother
isincomplete,anabstractionfromthecompleteorconcretesubstance.InlightoftheJanuary1692
lettertoPellisson,thisseemstomethenaturalinterpretationoftheselinesfromLeibniz'slettersto
Bernoulli.39
Bernoulli,however,hadpresumablynotseenthelettertoPellissonandrespondedon8November
1698withthecomplaintthatLeibniz'sanswerswere"tooLaconic"(GMIII,545).Heposed
objectionstothemfromaCartesianpointofview:
(1)Bymatterinitself,orprimarymatterorbulk,asdistinctfromsecondary[matter]
yousayyouunderstandthatwhichismerelypassive,andseparatefromsoulsorforms.
ButaCartesian,whohasnoideaofforms,andwhoplacesthenatureofbodyin
extensionalone,wouldreplytoyouherethathedoesnotknowwhatitistobeseparate
fromforms.
(2)Yousaythatwhatisincompleteistheactivewithoutthepassiveandthepassive
withouttheactive.Youcouldhavesaidthatwhatisincompleteisprimarymatter
withoutform,andformwithoutprimarymatter.Butthesamedifficultyasinthe
preceding[question]wouldariseforaCartesian,whoacknowledgesnodistinction
betweenmatterandform.(GMIII,546)
Replyingtendayslater,Leibnizsaid:
____________________
38
Onthetranslationofmoleshere,seeChapter10,note21.
39
Ontheincompletenessofprimarymatter,aspurelypassive,cf.GIII,657.
361
Asto(1).WhenIsaidthatprimarymatteristhatwhichismerelypassiveandseparate
fromsoulsorforms,Isaidthesamethingtwice;thatis,itisjustasifIhadsaidthatit
ismerelypassiveandseparatefromallactivity.Forformsarenothingformebut
ActivitiesorEntelechies;andsubstantialformsindeedareprimitiveEntelechies.
Asto(2).Ipreferredtosaythatwhatisincompleteistheactivewithoutthepassive,
andthepassivewithouttheactive,ratherthanthatitismatterwithoutform,orthe
reverse.Thatwasinordertopositwhatisexplainedratherthanwhatistobeexplained,
andinordertofollowyouradvice,inaway,beforeyougaveit,sincethecrowdof
Modernizersislessoffendedbythenameofactivitiesthanofforms.(GMIII,551/
AG168)
HereLeibnizseemstobesayingthatthenatureofformandmatterisexhaustivelyexplainedin
termsofactivityandpassivity,respectively.HehopestoavoidtheCartesianobjectiontothe
matter/formdistinctionbyreducingittothepassive/activedistinction.Thishassomeimplications
forourtopic.
Oneimplicationisthatthereisnoprimitivecontent,overandabovepassivity,inLeibniz's
conceptionofprimarymatter.Andpassivityisclearlyanaspectofthingsnotasubstance,and
nothingatalllikeastuff.PerhapsprimarymatterwasnomorethanthisforAquinas,butit
certainlywasformostlaterScholastics.Moreover,Ihavearguedearlier(p.352)thatifitis
exclusivelyinitspassivitythatprimarymatterdiffersfromform,thenitshouldfollowthatthe
operationswithrespecttowhichprimarymatterispassiveshouldbethesameasthosewithrespect
towhichsubstantialformisactive,whichLeibnizsaysareperceptualorquasipsychologicalin
character(AI,ix,211;E124f./L454).
Furthermore,thehumanselfcertainlyhasapassiveaspect,andLeibnizthoughtthatallcreated
mindsareinsomewayspassive.Thissuggeststhatifprimarymatterissimplytheprincipleof
passivity,itisatleastinsomecasesanaspectofselves,minds,andmindlikebeings.40Thisvery
pointistakenup,fromadifferentdirection,inBernoulli'snextresponse(6December1698).Heis
ledtoitbytherecognitionthatseemstocometohimatthispointthatinLeibniz'sviewmatterand
formcannotbeseparatefromeachotherexceptbyabstraction;butheseemsstilltoassumethat
Leibnizwouldnotascribeprimarymattertospirits.
(1)Yousaythatprimarymatter(whichIwouldnameuniform,orratherunformed,
extension)isthatwhichismerelypassiveandseparatefromsoulsorforms.And
elsewhereyousaythatforcesorformsareofthesameageasprimarymatter,andthat
itcannotsubsistwithoutthem.Thereforethepassiveisnotandcannotbeseparatefrom
theactivereally,butonlybyamentalabstraction,inasmuchaswecanconsiderthe
formerwithoutthelatter,aswedoinGeometry.ButIaskneverthelesswhetherGodby
hisomnipotencecouldnotcreatethepassivewihouttheactive,orprimarymatter
withoutsoulsor
____________________
40
ThepossibilityofanargumentofthissortisacknowledgedbyGarber,"Leibnizandthe
FoundationsofPhysics,"p.111,n.67.HisresponsethatwhenLeibnizspokeoftheprimarymatter
ofcorporealsubstances,hemusthavehadsomethingmoreinmindthanamatterthataccruesto
substancesbyvirtueoftheirpassivitywithrespecttoperceptiondoesnotconvinceme.Acorporeal
substanceforLeibnizisjustasubstanceendowed[praedita]withanorganicbody.Theorganic
body,assuch,issecondarymatter,anditspresencesaysnothingclearaboutthenatureofprimary
matter.
362
forms,ifindeedhehascreatedsouls,namelySpiritsandAngels,withoutmatter,orthe
activewithoutthepassive....
(2)Igraspyourthoughtabouttheincomplete.Butiftheactivewithoutthepassive,or
formwithoutmatter,issomethingincomplete,itseemstofollowthatSpirits,Angels,
andGodhimself,whoisthemostcompleteBeing,areneverthelessincomplete.Isee
whatyouaregoingtosay,namelythathereyoumeansomethingincompletewith
respecttocomposition,notperfection.Becarefulnonetheless,nottogivethe
malevolentandenviousanygroundforquibblingandtwisting[yourwords]inaworse
sense.(GMIII,555f.)
Leibniz'sresponse(17December1698:GMIII,560/AG169f.)isinteresting.Firsthesays,"You
rightlyjudgethatthepassiveisneveractuallyseparatefromtheactiveincreatures,"ascribingthis
viewtohiscorrespondent,whereasitisnotcleartomethatBernoullimeanttosaymorethanthat
theviewfollowsfromLeibniz'spremises.ThenLeibnizsidestepsastandardScholasticissueby
saying"whatGodcando,Ishouldnotventuretodefine.Ifsomethingexclusivelypassive,andthe
vacuum,donotconflictwithhispower,atleasttheyseemtoconflictwithhiswisdom."The
phrasingsuggeststhatheseesthathispositionseemstoimplytheThomisticviewthatGodcould
notcreatematterwithoutform,butisreluctant,onreverentialgrounds,todrawthatconclusion.
Mostinterestingtomeiswhatfollows.Leibnizdoesnotacknowledgethesolutionofproblemthat
Bernoulliproposedforhimintermsofcompositionandperfection.Ratherhesays:
itisnotcertainthatthereareanyutterlyseparateIntelligences,exceptGod.Andmost
ofthe[Church]Fathersinclinedtothecontrary,attributingbodieseventoAngels.
Goddoubtlessispureact[purusactus],sinceheismostperfect.Butimperfectthings
arepassive,andifyouconceiveofthemotherwise,theyaretakenincompletely.
Itakethisresponsetomeanthatmindsandmindlikebeings,exceptforGod,aretosomeextent
passive,andthereforehavematter.Giventhecontext,inwhichitispassivitythatisunder
discussion,andpassivityhasbeenidentifiedwithprimarymatter,Leibnizmustmeanthatprimary
matteristobeascribedtothe(finite)mindlikebeings,thoughhedoesnotsaythathereexplicitly.
Thephrase"attributingbodieseventoAngels"mightsuggestthatitis(organic)bodies,andhence
secondarymatter,thatisattributedtothemindlikebeings,butIthinkthephrasemustbeexplained
otherwiseasreflectingthecontentoftheprecedenttowhichLeibnizisappealing,andalsothefact
thatforLeibnizasubstance'spossessionofprimarymatterisconnectedwithitspossessionofan
organicbody.ThatLeibnizbelievedinthisconnectionisclear.Thenatureoftheconnectionisnot
explainedinthisdocument.Iwouldexplainitbysayingthatitisthepatternofmoreandless
distinctperception(whichinvolvesconfusedperception,hencepassivity,henceprimarymatter)
thatlinksasubstancewithaparticularorganicbody.41
Leibnizhereinfersactivityfromperfectionandpassivityfromimperfection.Hedoesnotsayto
Bernoullithathemeansperfectionandimperfectionofper
____________________
41
ForLeibniz'sexpressionofessentiallythesameviewsaboutthematerialityofangels(thoughin
lessdevelopedcontexts)intheperiod17035seeGIII,457,NE307,GVI,548.
363
ception.Butwhathedoessayherecertainlyfitsthepatternoftheearlierstatementthat
"[s]ubstanceshaveMetaphysicalmatterorpassivepowerinsofarastheyexpresssomething
confusedly;active,insofaras[theydoso]distinctly"(GVII,322/L365,from1683).Similarly,in
1686,inDM15,Leibnizhadcharacterizedactivityandpassivityintermsofincreaseanddecrease
ofperfection,andperfectionasperfectionofthesubstance'sexpressionoftheuniverse.For
Leibniz,asIhavealreadyremarked,asubstance's(internal)expressionofothersubstances,orof
theuniverse,isperceptionandallthemoreobviouslysowhereintelligentsubstancesareunder
discussion,asinthislettertoBernoulli.
ItisclearfromLeibniz'sresponsetoBernoullithathethoughtthepossessionofprimarymatteris
entailedbyanyimperfectionorpassivityinrespectoftheoperationsthatspiritsareassumedto
have,whicharesurelyperceptualorcogitativeoperations.Thisatleaststronglysuggeststhathe
didnotsupposethepossessionofprimarymatterrequiresanyoperationatametaphysically
fundamentallevelthatisnotperceptualorcogitative.Andnosuchrequirementissuggestedin
theseletters.
4.TheDebateaboutThinkingMatter
AnimportantgroupofLeibniz'sstatementsaboutmatterfromtheyears16981704ariseinthe
contextofhisinterestinthephilosophyofJohnLocke,theinterestthatissuedultimatelyinLeibniz
NewEssaysonHumanUnderstanding.CharacterizinghisaimsintheNewEssaysinaletterof28
April1704toIsaacJaquelot,Leibnizbeganbysaying,"Idevotemyselfabovealltovindicatingthe
immaterialityofthesoul,whichMr.Lockeleavesdoubtful"(GIII,473).Thismayseema
surprisingstatementtothosewhohavebeenintroducedtotheNewEssaysprimarilyasadefenseof
Rationalistepistemologyandinnatism,butNicholasJolley,inamajorrecentstudyofLeibniz's
relationtoLocke,hasarguedpersuasivelythattheimmaterialityofthesoulwasindeedLeibniz's
mainconcerninthework.42
TheprincipalwayinwhichLockeseemedtoleavedoubtaboutthesoul'simmaterialitywasby
arguingthatwearenotinapositiontoknow"withoutrevelation...whetherOmnipotencyhasnot
giventosomeSystemsofMatterfitlydisposed,apowertoperceiveandthink,"asopposedto
having"joinedandfixedtoMattersodisposed,athinkingimmaterialSubstance"(EssayIV,iii,6).
AsJolleynotes,"Lockedevotessolittlespaceto[this]issuethatitseemstohaveescaped
Leibniz'sattentionwhenhefirstreadtheEssay."43Itisnotmentionedinhisfirstwritten
"Remarks"ontheEssay,astransmittedtoLockein1697.ThereLeibnizseemstotakeLockeasan
antimaterialistally,noticingratherhisclaim,inhisproofoftheexistenceofGod(EssayIV,x)that
matterandmotionofthemselvescannotexplainthought(AVI,vi,8).In1697,however,beganthe
controversy,inprint,betweenLockeandEdwardStillingfleet,theBishopofWorcester;Locke's
argumentforthe(epistemic)possibilityofthinkingmatterwasoneofthetargetsofthebishop's
attack.ThisseemstohavedrawnLeibniz's
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42
ThisisthemainthesisofJolleyLeibnizandLocke.
43
Jolley,LeibnizandLocke,pp.17f.
364
attentiontotheissue.Hebegantoreadthepublisheddocumentsofthecontroversyin1698(A
VI,vi,xxi),andbyJanuary1699hewasbeginningtoallyhimselfwithStillingfleet'scriticism
regardingtheincompatibilityofthoughtwithmatter(GIII,248f.).
InrelationtoLeibniz'sownviewsaboutmatter,aswehavebeenexploringthem,wemayatfirst
wonderwhyhewouldbesoconcernedabout"theimmaterialityofthesoul,"orwhatindeedhe
wouldmeanbyit.Consideredasaconcretesubstance,afterall,thesoulinhisviewhasprimary
matterasanaspectorconstituentandisneverwithoutanorganicbodyofsecondarymatter.Indeed
heexplicitlyacknowledgesintheNewEssaysthathisbeliefthatsoulsareimmaterialsubstancesis
notabeliefin"substancesseparatedfrommatter"(NE68).Thereisnodoubtthathethoughtthe
immaterialityofthesoulwasimportantbecauseofitsbearingonimmortality.Ashewroteto
ThomasBurnett,6July1706,hebelievedthat"theimmortalityofthesoulwouldbevery
improbableifitsimmaterialityweredestroyed,andifsensationcouldbeproducedanddestroyedin
matterasoneofitsmodifications"(GIII,311).Butthis,inaway,onlyaddstoourperplexity,for
asJolleypointsout,"oneof[Leibniz's]doctrinesisthatthebodyaswellasthesoulisconserved
afterdeath."44
InresolvingthesepuzzleswemustrememberfirstofallthatLeibniziscriticizingLocke'sposition
ratherthanpresentinganindependentdevelopmentofhisownposition.Someofhisformulations
maythereforebeasmuchinfluencedbyLocke'sconceptionsofmatterasbyhisown.Onone
point,atleast,theyagreed.TheideaofmatterforLocke,likethatofprimarymatterforLeibniz,is
abstractor"incomplete,"seemingtoLocke"tobeusedfortheSubstanceandSolidityofBody,
withouttakinginitsExtensionandFigure"(EssayIII,x,15);curiously,Leibnizdoesnotrecordor
commentonthisagreement(NE344).ForLocke,however,unlikeLeibniz,therecaninprinciple
beasubstancewhoseessenceisconstitutedbymatter,inthisabstractsense,eitheraloneor
supplementedbyprinciplesthatareallpurelypassive,asmatteris.Fromsuchanessence,Locke
agreed,indeedinsisted,thoughtdoesnotfollowandcouldnothaveitsfirstbeginninginthe
universe(EssayIV,x,10).ButhedidnotseeanyproofthatGodcouldnot"superadd"toa
substancesoconstitutedapowerofthinking(EssayIV,iii,6).
ApowerorforceisofcoursejustwhatLeibnizthinksmustbeaddedtomattertoformathinking
substance,orindeedanysubstanceatall.ButthiscannotinLeibniz'sviewbeanadditionoverand
abovetheessenceofthesubstance.Itmustbeasubstantialform,andthusmustconstitutethe
essence(oratleasttheactiveaspectoftheessence)ofthesubstance.Mostimportantinthiscontext
isthattheactiveforceorsubstantialformunifiesthesubstanceandmakesitindivisible.Thisisthe
onepointthatLeibniztakesasatargetinhisintitialcriticismofLocke'sviewsonthinkingmatter
inhisletterofJanuary1699toBurnett."However,"hesays,"Ibelievethatatbottomonecould
reachademonstrationthatthesubstancethatthinkshasnoparts,althoughIaminagreementthat
extensionbyitselfdoesnotconstitutetheessenceofmatter"(GIII,249).HerecognizesthatLocke
doesnotholdtheCartesiandoctrinethatextensionisthe
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44
Jolley,LeibnizandLocke,p.22.Jolley'sworkisilluminatingonthissubject.
365
wholeessenceofamaterialsubstance,buthe(rightly)seesinLocke'sideaofamaterialsubstance
towhichapowerofthinkinghasbeensuperaddednothingtoprecludesuchasubstance'shaving
parts.Andheviewsthatasathreattobeliefinthenaturalimmortalityofthethinkingsubstance,for
heassumesthatathingthatiscomposedofpartscouldbedestroyednaturallybydisintegration,by
theseparationofitspartsfromeachother.Leibnizpursuestheseconcernswithseveraltypesof
argumentagainstLocke.
4.1TheImpossibilityofPurelyMaterialSubstance
Theargumentthatarticulatesthemostfundamentaldisagreementbetweenthetwophilosophersis
thatthepurelymaterialsubstanceenvisagedbyLockeisimpossiblebecause"anextendedsolid
thingwithoutasoulisonlyaresultofseveralsubstances,andnotatruesubstanceatall,"as
LeibnizwroteinhislastlettertoLadyMashambeforeLocke'sdeath(GIII,363).Thisisthefirst
argumentthatLeibnizpresentsinthepassageoftheNewEssaysthatishisformalcommentaryon
Locke'sdiscussionofthinkingmatterinEssayIV,iii,6:
OnemustconsiderthatmattertakenforacompleteBeing(thatistosay,secondary
matter,asopposedtoprimarymatterwhichissomethingpurelypassiveandtherefore
incomplete)isonlyanaggregate[amas],orwhatresultsfromone,45andthatevery
realaggregatepresupposessimplesubstancesorrealUnities.Andwhenoneconsiders
furtherwhatbelongstothenatureoftheserealunities,thatistosayperceptionandits
consequences,oneistransported,sotospeak,intoanotherworld,thatistosayintothe
intelligibleWorldofsubstances,whereaspreviouslyonewasonlyamongthe
phenomenaofthesenses.Andthisknowledgeoftheinteriorofmattermakesvisible
enoughwhatitisnaturallycapableof,andthateverytimethatGodgivesitappropriate
organsforexpressingreasoning,theimmaterialsubstancethatreasonswillnotfailto
begiventoittoo,invirtueofthatharmonywhichisalsoanaturalconsequenceofthe
substances.Mattercouldnotsubsistwithoutimmaterialsubstances,thatistosay
withouttheUnities;thisshouldputanendtothequestionwhetherGodisfreetogiveit
anyornot.Andifthesesubstancesdidnothavethecorrespondenceorharmonyamong
themofwhichIjustspoke,Godwouldnotbeactingaccordingtothenaturalorder.(
NE378f.)
Thisisacomplexandfascinatingpassage.Itscontrastofthephenomenalandintelligibleworlds,
anticipatingKantianterminology,clearlyexpressesamonadological(andnotKantian)view.
Leibnizhereasserts,anddistinguishes,aweakerandastrongerconnectionbetweenmatterand
immaterialsubstances.Theweakerconnection,lessfullyargued,isthattheharmonyofthings,and
therefore"thenaturalorder,"requiresathinkingimmaterialsubstancecorrespondingtoeverybody
thatisorganizedinsuchawayastoexpressthought.ButitisnotexcludedthatGodmightact
miraculously,contrarytothenaturalorder,tocreateonewithouttheother.Evenmiraculously,
however,Godcouldnotcreatereal(secondary)matterwithnoimmaterialsubstancesatall,foran
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45
Thissuggestionofplacingsecondarymatteratastageoflogicalconstructionevenfartherremoved
fromthemetaphysicalfoundationofthingsthantheaggregateassuch,ratherthansimply
identifyingthesecondarymatterwiththeaggregate,isinteresting,butunusualinLeibniz'swork.
366
aggregateofrealunitiesthatareimmaterialsubstancesispreciselywhatsecondarymatteris.That
isthestrongerconnection.
Behindit,ofcourse,isthecentralargumentofthemonadology:thatanyrealthingcomposedof
partsmustultimatelybeanaggregateofsubstancesthathavenoparts.TothisargumentLeibniz
evidentlyaddsheretheassumptionthattheseindivisiblesubstanceswillbeimmaterial.Howwould
hejustifythisassumption?Ibelievehethoughtittruevirtuallybydefinitionbydefinition,thatis,
of'immaterial'.IncallinghisrealUnities"immaterial"heclearlydidnotmeanthattheydonot
"have"bodiesofsecondarymatter,andhepresumablydidnotmeanthattheydonothaveapassive
aspectandhenceapassiveprincipleorprimarymatter.Whatremainsforhimtomeanissimply
that,unlikeLockean"matter"andLeibniziansecondarymatter,therealunitiesarenotdivisible
intopartswhichispreciselywhathewantedofimmaterialityfortheproofofthenatural
immortalityofthesoul.46
WhatmaybemostenduringlysurprisinginLeibniz'streatmentofthistopicisthathedoesnot
alwaysrelyonthisargument,norevenalwaysmentionthathedoesnotbelieveinthemetaphysical
possibilityofsuchamerelymaterialsubstanceasLockeenvisages.Isuspectthisisduetohis
desire,incombatingthematerialisticinfluenceshefearedfromLocke'sthought,toextendhis
influencetopeoplewhomightnotbepreparedtoacceptsomuchofhisownmetaphysics.Hisother
argumentsagainstLockeonthepossibilityofthinkingmatterdohavelessdistinctivelyLeibnizian
premises.
4.2TheArgumentfromtheMechanicalNatureofMatter
ThisisplainlytrueoftheotherargumentthatisprominentintheNewEssays.Itisbothcertainand
recognizedmorethanoncebyLocke,Leibnizdeclares,thatthought"cannotbeanintelligible
modificationofmatter,thatistosay,thatthesentientorthinkingbeingisnotamechanicalthing,
likeawatchoramill,asifsizes,shapes,andmotionscouldbeconceivedwhosemechanical
conjunctioncouldproducesomethingthinking,orevensensing,inamasswheretherewasnothing
ofthesort"(NE66f.).TheclaimthatmechanismcannotexplainthoughtisonethatLeibniz
ascribedtoLocke(rightly,inmyopinion47)onthebasisofEssayIV,x,10(seeNE439f.),and
wouldlaterdevelopmorefullyhimself,arguingthatifwecouldenteramachine,suchasamill,all
wewouldfindtherewouldbe"piecesthatpusheachother,andneveranythingtoexplain
perception"(Mon17).Asindicatedbyhis"thatistosay"(NE66),LeibniztakesLocketoassume
thatnothingisexplainedbythenatureofmatterthatisnotmechanicallyexplained,anditwas
probablyreasonableforhimtoassumethatthisassumptionwouldbepartofthematerialismhe
sawmostneedtocombat.ThereissomethingadhomineminLeibniz'sargumentatthispoint,
inasmuchashehimselfdidnotbelieveinanysubstancethatactsmechanically,machines(and
evenorganicbodiesconsideredinthemselves)beinginhisviewsecondarymatterand
____________________
46
Cf.Jolley,LeibnizandLocke,p.22,n.29:"IthinkitpossiblethatLeibniztooksimplicityand
immaterialitytobeequivalent."
47
Theascriptionisnotuncontroversial.IhavesaidalittlemoreaboutitinR.Adams,VirtueofFaith,
pp.249f.andp.261,n.11.
367
atbestaggregatesofsubstances.Inrelationtohispolemicalproject,however,hehasreasonto
insistonthepointthatthenatureofmatter,asthematerialistofhistimeislikelytoconceiveofit,
doesnotprovideanexplanationofthought.
IfLeibnizagreesthusfarwithLocke,howishecriticizingLocke?Hisattackisbasedonhis
conceptionofmiracle:
Soitisnotsomethingnaturaltomattertofeelandtothink,andthiscanhappeninitin
onlytwoways.OneisifGodjoinstoitasubstancetowhichitisnaturaltothink.The
otherisifGodputsthoughtinitbyamiracle.(NE67)48
Thefirstalternative,ofcourse,istheonethatLeibnizfavors.Theother,involvingaperpetual
miracle,seemsobjectionabletohim,astheharmonyororderlinessoftheuniversedemandsthat
miraclesbekepttoaminimum.Butevenapartfromtheobjectionablenessofaperpetualmiracle,
thedisjunctionyieldsLeibnizacleverargumentthattheextinctionofthesoulorthinkingbeing
wouldinvolveamiracleatonepointoranother:
Anditisenoughthatonecannotmaintainthatmatterthinkswithoutputtinginitan
imperishablesoulorelseamiracle,andsotheimmortalityofoursoulsfollowsfrom
whatisnatural,sincetheirextinctioncannotbemaintainedexceptbyamiracle,either
inexaltingmatterorinannihilatingthesoul.(NE67)
Theissueofmiraclewascrucialinthehistoricalcontext.Nodenialorevenquestioningofthe
actualityoflifeafterdeathisascribedtoanypartyinthisdiscussion,thoughLeibnizobviously
fearsthatitliesatthebottomofaslipperyslope.Whatisatissueisthenaturalimmortalityofthe
soul,whichwouldimplythattheconsciousbeingcannotbeannihilatedatdeathexceptbya
miracle.ItsdenialwasassociatedbyLeibnizwiththeSocinianheresy,asJolleyhasshown.49The
Sociniansbelievedinlifeafterdeath(forthosewhoaresaved),butthoughtitrequiresamiracleof
grace.Thisseemsreligiouslyacceptabletomanytwentiethcenturytheologians,andevidently
seemedsotoLocke(EssayIV,iii,6);butLeibnizandmanyofhiscontemporariesthoughtitvery
dangerous.
Lockewouldprobablyresisttheclaimthathisconceptionofthinkingmatterinvolvesamiracle.
Hissuggestion,afterall,wasnotthatGodmaycauseallourthoughtsdirectly,withoutthe
interventionofany"secondcause,"butthatGodmayhavesuperaddedtomatterapoweror
"faculty"ofthought,whichwouldpresumablybeacreatedcauseofthoughts.Leibniz'sclaimabout
themiraculouscharacterofthinkingmatterdependsonaLeibnizianconceptionofmiracle.Inhis
view,whateverisnotnaturalinthecreatedworldismiraculous,andwhateverisnaturalmustbe
derivablefromthenaturesofcreatedsubstances"asexplicablemodifications"(NE66).The
emphasisfallshereon"explicable."For"whatisnaturalmustbeabletobecomedistinctly
conceivableifonewereadmittedintothesecretsofthings"(NE66).Andthismeansexplicableor
distinctlyconceivablebyafinite,createdmind;for"creatures'conceptionisnotthemeasureofthe
powerofGod,but...theirconceptivityorpowerofcon
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48
Theargument,tothispoint,isreproducedmorebrieflyatNE379.Itispresentedorsuggestedin
othertextsfromtheperiodinwhichLeibnizwasoccupiedwithLocke:GIII,355f.,363/AG290f.;
GVI,507.
49
Jolley,LeibnizandLocke,pp.1225.
368
ceivingisthemeasureofthepowerofnature;foreverythingthatconformstothenaturalordercan
beconceivedorunderstoodbysomecreature"(NE65).Thisisessentiallytheviewofmiraclelaid
outalmosttwentyyearsbeforein16oftheDiscourseonMetaphysics(cf.Chapter3,section
2.2.2inthisvolume).Andgiventhisviewofthenaturalandthemiraculous,a"power"ofthought
thatcouldnotbeexplainedbythenatureofthethingtowhichitbelongedwouldnotbenaturalbut
miraculous.
4.3TheArgumentfromtheSimplicityofThinkingSubstance
AnotherargumentagainstthinkingmatterisindicatedbrieflyinaletterofJanuary1699toThomas
Burnett,whotransmittedacopytoLockeinMarchofthesameyear(AVI,vi,xxi).Leibniz
acknowledgesthatLocke'sthesisthatthesubstanceofbodyandofmindare(equally)unknownto
uspreparesthewayforanargumentthatwearenotinapositiontoknowthattheyarenot
"inwardly[dansl'interieur]"identical,"althoughtheyaredistinctinappearance."Leibniz's
responseis:
Atbottom,however,Ibelieveonecouldarriveatademonstrationthatthesubstance
thatthinkshasnoparts,althoughIremaininagreementthatextensionalonedoesnot
constitutetheessenceofmatter.ThusIamoftheopinionofthosewhobelievethatitis
bynatureandnotbygracethatsoulsareimmortal.(GIII,248f./AG288)
Thepointofacknowledgingwithan"although"that"extensionalonedoesnotconstitutethe
essenceofmatter"ispresumablythatsomeonemighttakethispointasabasisforclaimingthatthat
thinking,too,belongstotheessenceofmatter.AgainstsuchaclaimLeibnizarguesthat"the
substancethatthinkshasnoparts."Boththeproofofthispremiseandmuchoftherestofthe
argumentareheresuppressed.Thepointispresumablythatwhateveritsessencemaybe,matter,as
understoodbyLocke,hasparts,andthereforecannotbeidenticalwiththesubstancethatthinks,if
thelatterhasnoparts.Andthenaturalimmortalityofthethinkingsubstanceisprobablyseenby
Leibnizasfollowingdirectlyfromitspartlessness,whichIhavearguedisthereforewhatiscrucial
forhiminits"immateriality."
4.4TheArgumentfromthePassivityofMatter
Ihavesaveduntillasttheargumentagainstthinkingmatterthathasmosttodowithprimary
matter.ThisargumentisnotusedintheNewEssays,50butLeibnizrestsonithiswholecase
againstthinkingmatterinapiecethathesenttoLocke,bywayofBurnett,inFebruary1700:
Myopinionisthereforethatasmatterisnothingbutanessentiallypassivething,
thought,andevenaction,cannotbemodificationsofit,butofthecompletecorporeal
substancethatreceivesitscompletionfromtwoconstituents[constitutifs],namelyfrom
theactiveprincipleandthepassiveprinciple,of
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50
ThoughitistheargumentsuggestedbythewayLeibnizmentionshisattackonthinkingmatterin
summarizingtheNewEssaystoIsaacJaquelotaslateas28April1704(GIII,474).
369
whichthefirstiscalledform,soul,entelechy,primitiveforce,andthesecondiscalled
primarymatter,solidity,resistance.Thusitmustbesaidthataction,life,feeling,
thoughtareaffectionsordifferencesofthefirst,andnotmodificationsofthesecond.
Asfordurability,itmustalsobesaidthateveryindivisibleEntelechy,suchasourmind
[esprit]is,subsistsalwaysandcannotperishnaturally.(AVI,vi,32=GIII,227)
Wedonotlearnmuchhereaboutprimarymatter,exceptthatitisapassiveprinciplethatenters,
withanactiveprinciplecalledformorsoul,intotheconstitutionofacorporealsubstance.The
focusoftheargumentisnotonLeibniz'spersonalconceptionofprimarymatter,butontheidea,
acceptedbymostofhiscontemporariesandpredecessors,thatthenatureofmatterassuchispurely
passive.Butapurelypassivethingcannothaveanactivemodification,Leibnizclaims;and
thought,heevidentlysupposes,isactive.Inordertohavethoughtasaproperty,therefore,a
substancemusthaveanactiveprinciple,andsomustbesomethingmorethanmatter.AndLeibniz
assertshere,withoutargument,thatthisactiveprinciplewillbeindivisibleandhencenaturally
imperishable.
ThisisanargumentthatanythingthatthinksmusthavewhatLeibnizcallsasubstantialform.It
seemstobeanadaptationofanargumentthathadusedearliertoshow,morebroadly,thatthere
mustbesubstantialformsinmatter.Forinstance,inwritingtoJohnBernoulliinNovember1698,
hesaid:
Therecannotbeanyactivemodificationsofthatwhichismerelypassiveinitsessence,
sincemodificationslimitratherthanaugmentoradd;thereforebesidesextension,
whichistheseatorprincipalofshapes,wemustpositaseatorfirstsubject[proton
dektikon]ofactions,namelyasoul,form,life,firstentelechy,asonemaychoosetocall
it.(GMIII,552)
Andintheeleventhparagraphofhisimportantarticle"OnNatureItself,"publishedin1698,
Leibnizargued,againsttheCartesianphysicistJohannChristopherSturm,thattheevidenceof
activityinthephysicalworldrequiresthepostulationof"afirstsubject[protondektikon]of
activity,thatis,aprimitivemotiveforce"inbodies,"sincetheseactivitiesorentelechiescertainly
cannotbemodificationsofprimarymatterormass[moles],whichisanessentiallypassivething,as
themostjudiciousSturmhimselfveryclearlyacknowledges."Hewentontosaythat"this
substantialprincipleitselfiswhatiscalledsoulinlivingthings,andinotherthingssubstantial
form"(GIV,511/L503f.).
Particularlyinterestingin"OnNatureItself"isthatLeibnizexplicitlyascribestohisdiscussion
partnertheassumptionofthepassivityofmatterandatthesametimedistanceshimselfsomewhat
fromit.HerepeatsinthenextparagraphthataccordingtoSturm,"matterisasubstancethatis
passivebyitsnatureandessentially,...butamodificationofanessentiallypassivethingcannot
makethethingactive(whichIacknowledgetobebeautifullysaid)."Leibniz'sresponseisthat
"matterisunderstoodeitherassecondaryorasprimary;thesecondaryindeedisacomplete
substance,butnotmerelypassive;theprimaryismerelypassive,butisnotacompletesubstance;
andthereforeasoul,oraformanalogoustoasoul,mustbeadded"(GIV,511f./L504).Thisisa
somewhatimpreciseresponse,sinceLeibnizwasquiteclearinhislettersofthesameyeartoJohn
Bernoullithat"secondarymatter...isnotasubstance,butsubstances"(GM
370
III,537),thatis,anaggregate.Theresponsedoescapturethepoint,however,thatsecondarymatter,
inLeibniz'sview,isnotpurelypassivebecausesubstantialformentersintoitsconstitution
namely,thesubstantialformsofthesubstancesofwhichitisanaggregate.
Wemayseehereonereasonforthedisappearanceofthisargumentfromtheattackonthinking
matterintheNewEssays.Lockedidconceiveofmatteraspurelypassive.Butinotherrespectshis
conceptionofmatterasconcrete,extended,andsubstantialisclosertoLeibniz'sconceptionof
secondarythanofprimarymatter.Therefore,thoughLeibnizcouldlegitimatelyusethisargument
adhominemagainstLocke,hisdoingsomightobscureratherthanilluminatehisownthought
aboutmatter.AnotherconsiderationthatmighthaveinfluencedLeibnizindiscardingthisargument
fromthepolemicagainstLockeisthatitsfocusontheactivenatureofthesoulislessrelevantto
Leibniz'sunderlyingconcernaboutimmortalitythanthepartlessnessofthesoulthatishighlighted
insomeofhisotherarguments.
Whateverthereasons,Leibniz'sinterestinthisargumentagainstthinkingmatterseemstohave
peakedintheyears1699and1700.Thefulleststatementofit,andthemostinterestinginits
implicationsaboutprimarymatter,isinadocumentfromthatperiod,alettertoBurnettthatisnot
knowntohavebeentransmittedtoLocke.ItisonlyslightlymoreexplicitthanthetextthatLocke
didseeonsuchpointsasthat"whatisessentiallypassivecannotreceivethemodificationof
thoughtwithoutreceivingatthesametimesomeactivesubstantialprinciplethatwouldbeaddedto
it,"andabitsubtler,perhaps,initsconclusion:"Therefore,althoughmatterinitselfcannotthink,
nothingpreventsthecorporealsubstancefromthinking"(GIII,261/AG290).Butitopenswitha
strikinglysystematicstatementaboutthenatureofmatter:
InbodiesIdistinguishcorporealsubstancefrommatter,andIdistinguishprimary
matterfromsecondary.Secondarymatterisanaggregateorcompositeofseveral
corporealsubstances,asaflockiscomposedofseveralanimals.Buteachanimaland
eachplantisalsoacorporealsubstance,havinginitselftheprincipleofunity,which
makesittrulyasubstanceandnotanaggregate.Andthisprincipleofunityiswhatis
calledSoul,orelsesomethinganalogoustothesoul.Butbesidestheprincipleofunity
thecorporealsubstancehasitsmassorsecondarymatter,whichisinturnanaggregate
ofother,smallercorporealsubstances,andsoontoinfinity.Primitivematter,however,
ormattertakeninitself,iswhatisconceivedinbodieswhenalltheprinciplesofunity
aresetaside,thatistosay,whatispassive,fromwhichspringtwoqualities:resistance
[resistentia]andholdingback[restitantia]orinertia.Thatistosaythatabodydoesnot
allowitselftobepenetrated,andrathergiveswaytoanother,butthatitdoesnotgive
waywithoutdifficultyandwithoutweakeningthetotalmotionoftheonethatpushesit.
Thusitcanbesaidthatmatterinitself,besidesextension,includesaprimitivepassive
Power.ButtheprincipleofunitycontainstheprimitiveActivepower,ortheprimitive
force,whichisneverlostandalwaysperseveresinanexactorderofitsinternal
modifications,whichrepresentthosethatareoutsideit.(GIII,260f./AG289f.)
Wecanonlyassumethat"primitivematter,ormattertakeninitself,"hereisasynonymof
"primarymatter."Itisintroducedas"whatisconceivedinbodies
371
whenalltheprinciplesofunityaresetaside"(myitalics).OnemighttakethistocommitLeibniz
onlytotheclaimthatsomepeople"conceive"suchathingtobeinbodies,notthatitisreallythere.
Andcertainly"conceive"and"setaside"indicatementalactivitybywhich(alone)primarymatter
attainsthestatusofathing.ButIthinkitlikeliestthatthisactivityisseenasabstraction,as
suggestedby"setaside,"ratherthanasthecreationofafiction.Leibnizhadrecentlywrittento
Bernoulli,andin"OnNatureItself,"thatprimarymatteris"incomplete."Hethoughtthatthere
reallyarebothactiveandpassiveaspectsofsubstances,eitherofwhichcanbeviewedin
abstractionfromtheother,butneitherofwhich,byitself,constitutesacompletesubstance.
Thereareimportantquestionsaboutthewayinwhichthisabstractionisconceivedhere,andfirst
ofall,whatare"theprinciplesofunity"thatare"setaside."Ifwetakethemtobecompletemonads
orsimplesubstances,thenLeibnizwouldbespeakinghereaboutsomethingthatis"conceived"to
be,andperhaps(contrarytomyinterpretation)reallyis,inbodiesoverandaboveallthemonads.
ThisreadingmightseemtobesupportedbythefactthatLeibnizsaysthat"theprincipleofunity
containstheprimitiveActivepower"(myitalics);doesthatdistinguishtheprincipleofunityas
concretefromtheabstractpowerthatitcontains?Ithinknot."Matterinitself,"whichiscertainly
viewedhereasanabstraction,isalsosaidto"include"[envelopper],ratherthantobe,aprimitive
passivepower.HereaselsewhereinLeibniz'swork,"principles,"including"principlesofunity,"
canreasonablybeassumedtobeabstractions.
Thereisanotherrespect,however,inwhichthistextmaynotfitsoneatlyintomyaccountof
Leibniz'sconceptionofprimarymatter.Ihavecalledattentiontopassagesinwhichprimarymatter
appearsasanabstractionfromasinglesubstance,something"alwaysessentialtothesame
substance."Here,however,theremaybesomeindicationthatitisabstractedratherfromsecondary
matterorcorporealaggregates.Thisissuggestedfirstbythefactthatitisdescribedassomething
conceived"inbodies,"ratherthanincorporealsubstances,andmorestronglybythefactthatits
conceptioninvolvesthesettingasideof"alltheprinciplesofunity,"intheplural,ratherthanofthe
singleactiveprinciplethatinothertexts,asIhaveargued,joinswithprimarymattertoconstitutea
complete,andunitary,substance.
Thisreadingofthetextisnotabsolutelyinescapable.Wecannotexcludethepossibilitythatin
speakingofthesettingasideof"alltheprinciplesofunity"Leibnizisaggregatingtheresultsofan
abstractionthatheenvisagesasperformedononesubstanceatatime,settingasideoneprincipleof
unityatatime.ButtheNewEssayscontainotherstrongindicationsofaconceptionofprimary
matterasabstractedfromsecondarymatterratherthanfromaunitarysubstance.Forexample,
Leibnizexpressesthebelief"thatperfectfluidity,like[perfect]rest,isappropriateonlytoprimary
matter,thatistosay,[matter]inabstraction,andasanoriginalquality;butnottosecondarymatter,
suchasitisactuallyfound,clothedinitsderivativequalities"(NE222).51Whatismoststriking
aboutthis
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51
Therearedifficultquestionsofconstructionandtranslationaboutthispassage.IagreewithPeter
RemnantandJonathanBennettthat"inabstraction"heremeans"matterintheabstract."(Seetheir
translationofNE222.)Ialsoagreewiththemthat"it"inthequotationreferstomatter
372
statementisnottheexplicitindication(commontomanytexts)thatprimarymatterisan
abstraction,buttheascriptionoffluiditytoit.Foritishardtoseehowanythingbutanextended
masscouldbefluid,and,inLeibniz'sview,theonlyrealextendedmassesaresecondarymatter.To
besure,heisdenyingthatsecondarymatterisperfectlyfluid.Hispointseemstobethatperfect
fluidityisanidealizationobtainedbyabstractingfromthepatternsofmotionthatdividereal
secondarymatterintosmallercorpuscles,andindeedintosmallerorganizedbodies.Thismeans
thatitisnotobtainedbyaggregatingaqualityabstractedfrommanyunitarysubstances,butby
abstractingafeaturethatbelongstomassesofsecondarymatterassuch.
AsimilarimplicationcanbefoundwhereLeibnizspeaksof"matterinsofarasitisonlyamachine,
thatistosay,insofarasoneconsidersbyabstractiononlytheincompleteBeingofprimarymatter,
ortheentirelypurelypassive"(NE379).52Itisimpliedherethatthepropertyofbeingamachine
belongstoprimarymatterandthatitcanbeisolatedonlyinthesameprocessofabstractionas
primarymatter.Butthepropertyofbeingamachineisapropertythatbelongs,inLeibniz's
opinion,onlytomassesofsecondarymatter,appropriatelyorganized.Thecharacterthatisascribed
toprimarymatterhereisthereforenotanaspectofsinglesubstances,anditseemstofollowthat
primarymatterisabstractedfromwholemassesofsecondarymatterratherthanfromsingle
substances.
AgainstthesetextswemaysetapassageoftheNewEssaysinwhichsomethingthatmustsurelybe
primarymatterappearsasanaspectofasinglesubstance.LeibnizcommendsLockefornottaking
matter"foratrueandperfectMonadorUnity;sinceitisonlyaMass[Amas]ofaninfinitenumber
ofBeings."Hegoesontosay,"ineffectIgiveperceptiontoallthisinfinityofBeings,eachoneof
whichislikeananimal,endowedwithSoul(orwithsomeAnalogousactiveprinciple,which
constitutesthetrueUnityofit),togetherwithwhatthisBeingneedsinordertobepassiveand
endowedwithanorganicbody"(NE440).Whatthebeingneedsinordertobepassiveissurely
primarymatter.Whatitneedsinordertobeendowedwithanorganicbodymightbesecondary
matter,buthereIthinkitisstilltheprimarymatter,thethoughtbeingthata(simple)
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51
ingeneral,andisusedtosaythatmatterasItisactuallyfoundissecondarymatter;butinthiscase
IhavepreferredatranslationthatoffersthesameambiguitiesforinterpretationasLeibniz'sFrench.
UnlikeRemnantandBennett,however,Ithinkitisfluidityratherthanprimarymatterthatis
comparedtorest.Grammatically,itismorenaturaltoattach"asanoriginalquality"to(primary)
matter,butitispossible,andmetaphysicallymoreplausible,tosupposeitisfluiditythatistreated
asa"quality."Icannotrecallanothertextinwhichprimarymatter,evenviewedasaprinciple,
power,orabstraction,isdescribedasaquality;andwegetabettersymmetryhereiffluidity,asan
originalqualityofprimarymatter,iscontrastedwithwhatareclearly,inthefollowingclause,the
derivativequalitiesofsecondarymatter.ButnoneofthesepointsiscrucialfortheissueIam
discussinghere.
52
Itmaybeworthnotingthatthesewordsreplacedthefollowingincomplete,butinsomeways
fuller,formulationinLeibniz'sfirstdraft:"matterinsofarasitisknown[sefaitconnoistre]onlyby
thephenomenaofthesenses,whicharebasedonextensionandresistance,orinsofarasitisonlya
machineorinsofarasoneabstracts."Thisdoesnotexactlysaythatthissortofmatterisonly
phenomenal,butperhapsthecloselinkwithwhatisonlyphenomenalmaybeseenasasimilarity
withtheconceptionofmatterdiscussedinsection1.1inthischapter;cf.p.342.
373
substance"has"abodybyvirtueofitsprimarymatter,beingrelatedtoitssecondarymatterbyits
internalpassivityaswellasitsactivity.53Andwhatitneedstobepassiveisclearlyidentifiedin
thenextsentence,notonlyasmaterialbutalsoasapassiveaspectofthenatureofthesubstance:
"NowtheseBeingshavereceivedtheirnature,activeaswellaspassive(thatistosay,whatthey
haveoftheimmaterialandthematerial),fromageneralandsupremecause."Thisimplies,Ithink,
thatasortofmatter,whichLeibnizinmanyplacescallsprimary,isafeatureofthenatureof
individualsubstancesandcanbeabstractedfromthem.
Thusfarwehaveuncoveredatmostaterminologicalinconsistencyinthisgroupoftexts.
Sometimes(NE222,379)Leibnizusestheterm'primarymatter'torefertoonesortofthing,
whereasinotherplacesinhisworkitreferstosomethingelse.Bothsortsofthingseemtobe
recognizedintheNewEssays,butthereisnosubstantiveinconsistencyinthat.Bothariseby
abstraction,andthereisnoreasonwhyLeibnizshouldnotpermithimselfbothabstractions,solong
ashebelieves,asheseemsto,thatthethingsabstractedfrom(massesofsecondarymatterinthe
onecaseandindividualsubstancesintheother)reallyhavetherelevantfeatures.
Theprimarymatterthatseemstoappearinsomeofthesetextsasanabstractionfrommassesof
secondarymatterisverysimilartothe(merelyphenomenal)matterofwhichalone,intheend,
LeibnizactuallysentadescriptiontoArnauld,amatterconstitutedsolelybyextensionandits
modes(LA118f.).Inbothcaseswehaveasortofmatterconstitutedbyphysicalfeaturesof
extendedmasses,consideredinisolationfromthesubstantialformsthatLeibnizbelievesare
presenteverywhereinmatter.Andinbothcaseswehaveasortofmatterreachedbyabstracting
fromapluralityofsubstantialformsorentelechies,ifweconsiderthelettertoArnauldinthefinal
formitassumedinLeibniz'sownCopy.54Insection1.1,Isuggestedthatheselectedthissortof
matterinwritingtoArnauldbecauseitwaswhathecouldmakeoftheCartesianorquasiCartesian
matterinwhichhetookArnauldtobelieve.55Similarly,IsuspectitoccursinLeibniz'swritings
aboutLockeasarepresentation,fromLeibniz'spointofview,ofLocke'sconceptionofmatter.
Therewouldbeamoresubstantialdivergenceofpositions,however,iftheideaofprimarymatter
asabstractedfrommassesofsecondarymattercarriedwithitadifferentconceptionofthe
operationofpassiveprinciplesincreated
____________________
53
Ifthisinterpretationisaccepted,thistextmightbereadasexpressingwhatIcalledinChapter10,
section2.2,the"qualifiedmonadconception"ofthestructureofacorporealsubstance.Insupport
ofthisreadingwemightnotethatthe"animal"isheresaidtobeendowed,notwithsouland
organicbody,butwithsouland"what[it]needsinordertobe...endowedwithanorganicbody."
Despitetheappearancesofisolatedpassages,however,IaminclinedtothinkthatLeibniz's
writingsrelatedtoLockepredominantlyreflectthetwosubstanceconception(cf.pp.269f.).
54
Seep.344.
55
Anothertext(GIV,511/AG162)inwhichanabstractionfromsecondarymattermaybetreatedas
primarymatterissimilarlydirectedagainstaCartesian,Sturm.Havingidentifiedprimarymatter
withbulk[moles],Leibnizdeniesthatthereare"atomsofbulk,orofminimumextension,"ina
waythatseemstoimplythatbulk(=primarymatter)isextended,whichitcanbeifitisan
abstractionfromsecondarymatter,butnotifitisanaspectoforabstractionfromanunextended
simplesubstance.
374
thingsfromthatcarriedbytheideaofprimarymatterasabstractedfromindividualsubstances.But
suchadivergencecannotbeestablishedfromthetextspresentedhere.Themaincharacterizationof
theoperationofthepassiveprincipleinthelettertoBurnettisthatfromit"spring[literally,are
born,naissent]twoqualities:resistance[resistentia]andholdingback[restitantia]orinertia"(G
III,260/AG289).Theseareindeedphysicalqualitiesofextendedmasses,butitisquiteconsistent
withthistexttosupposethattheyarederivativeratherthanprimitivefunctionsofthepassive
principle.WhatthetextsayscanbeaccountedforonanyviableinterpretationofLeibniz.TheNew
EssayscontainsasexplicitastatementasanyofLeibniz'swritingsthatthemostfundamental
operationofpassivityisperceptualratherthanphysical.
Ihavealreadysaidthatinmetaphysicalrigor,takingactionforwhatcomestothe
substancespontaneouslyandfromitsownground,everythingthatisproperlya
substancedoesnothingbutact,foreverythingcomestoitfromitself,afterGod....
ButtakingActionforanexerciseofperfectionandbeingactedon[passion]forthe
contrary,thereisnoActioningenuinesubstancesexceptwhentheirperception(forI
givesomeofittoallsubstances)developsitselfandbecomesmoredistinct,asthereis
nobeingactedonexceptwhentheirperceptionbecomesmoreconfused.(NE210)
Thisofcourseisabouttheactivityandpassivityof"genuinesubstances."DoesLeibnizmeanto
leaveopenthepossibilityofadifferentsortofactivity,oratleastofpassivity,inbodiesassuch?
No;forheaddsthatinbodiesthereisnomorethan"animage"oftrueactivityandpassivity.Asfor
motion,itisnothingbutarealphenomenonbecausethematterormasstowhichmotionbelongsis
notproperlyspeakingasubstance.However,thereisanimageofactioninmotion,asthereisan
imageofsubstanceinmass,andinthisregarditcanbesaidthatthebodyactswhenthereis
spontaneityinitschange,andthatitsufferswhenitispushedorimpededbyanother.(NE210f.)
5.Conclusions
SeveralconclusionsemergefromthisreviewofdiscussionsofprimarymatterinLeibniz'smiddle
years.
1.Themostfundamentalisthatprimarymatterisanabstraction,asissubstantialform.Thatis,
theycanbeconsideredasentitiesonlybyabstractionfromacompletesubstance,asubject,of
whichtheyconstitutethesubstanceoressence.Thispointismostfullydevelopedintheletterof
January1692toPellisson,butisquiteclearinotherdocumentsoftheperiod.Itisstillrepeated
quiteclearlyinthe"ConversationofPhilarteandAriste"in1715(RML439f./L620),and
especiallyin1712inthefirstdraftofthatdialogue(RML440).WefinditalsoinNovember1715,
intheformoftheclaimthatprimarymatter"isnotasubstancebutsomethingincomplete"(G
III,657).
Leibnizisnotconsistentinhistreatmentoftheconceptofsubstantialformonthispoint.Thereare
passagesfromthemiddleyearsinwhichhereferstocompletesubstances(whichpresumablyhave
passiveaswellasactiveaspects)
375
as"substantialforms."Ibelievethatthisvariationismerelyterminological,anddoesnot
representanyvacillationintheentitiesrecognized,orthecharacteristicsascribedto
them,inLeibniz'smetaphysicalsystem.
Bethatasitmay,thereisnosimilarvariationinhistreatmentoftheconceptofprimary
matter.SofarasIknow,thematureLeibnizneverreferstoacompletesubstanceas
"primarymatter."And,unliketheprimarymatterofAristoteliansystems,Leibnizian
primarymatterisnotanultimatesubjectofinherenceorpredication,butaconceptually
abstractableaspectorfeatureofsuchasubject.
2.Theprimarymatteristhepassiveprinciple,asthesubstantialformistheactive
principle,intheprimitiveforcethatconstitutesthecompletesubstance.Indeed,passivity
constitutesthewholecontentofLeibniz'sconceptionofprimarymatter.Thisisimplied
inhislettersof1698toJohnBernoulli.
Thisgivesrisetoasubtlequestion,towhichIsuspectLeibnizhimselfdidnotattend
carefully.Isprimarymatterapositiveconstituentofasubstance,somethingwhichmust
beaddedtoasubstantialformtoconstituteacompletesubstance?Orisitsimplytheset
oflimitationscharacteristicofaparticularsubstantialform,andthusmerelythe
expressionofsomethingthathasnotbeenaddedto(orincludedin)theform?Wehave
certainlyseentextsinwhichLeibnizseemstobethinkingofprimarymatterasa
positiveadditiontothenatureofasubstance.Ontheotherhand,ashislettersto
Bernoullimakeclear,Leibnizregardedprimarymatterasaprincipleofimperfection,
becauseitispassive,whereasformisaprincipleofperfection,becauseitisactive.
Indeedperfectionandimperfectionseemtohavebeenforhimthemorefundamental
pairofconcepts,intermsofwhichhesometimesexplainedactivityandpassivity(asin
DM15).Andhealsoseemstohavethoughtofimperfectionasmereprivation,
contributingnothingpositive.
Thelatterviewisclearlypresentinatextof1698thatLeibnizwroteaboutsevenmonths
beforehismostrelevantlettertoBernoulli.SpeakingofGodas"theprimitiveunity,
expressedbyalltheothersaccordingtotheircapacity,"andobviouslythinkingofthe
propertiesofcreaturesasimperfectimitationsofdivineperfections,Leibniz
characterized"thecreature"as"variedaccordingtothedifferentcombinationsofunity
withzero;orindeedofthepositivewiththeprivative,fortheprivativeisnothingbutthe
limits"(Gr126).Hereitappearsthatallthatispositiveincreaturesistheextentto
whichtheydoimitateGod,theextenttowhichtheyareperfect,andthereforeactive;
theirimperfection,andhencetheirpassivity,ismerelyprivative,nothingbutthelimits
oftheirperfectionoractivity.
3.Primarymatteris"alwaysessentialtothesamesubstance"(LA120;cf.AI,vii,249;
ix,212).ItislikelythatLeibnizsawthisthirdpointasimpliedbythefirsttwo.Forthe
primitiveforceconstitutestheessenceofasubstance(AI,vii,248);howcouldanaspect
(thepassiveprinciple)ofthisessencebelongtothesubstanceonlysometimes?Norare
principlesorabstractableaspectsasortofthingthatcouldbeseenasmigratingfromone
substancetoanotherinanyperiodofLeibniz'sthought.Thattheessentialbondbetween
asubstanceanditsprimarymatterisimplicitinthecharacterofprimarymatteras
primitiveforceissuggestedintheletterofJanuary1692toPellisson,whereLeibniz
saysthattheprimitiveforce"remainsalwaysthesameinthesamebody"(AI,vii,249).
376
4.Thatprimarymatteris"alwaysessentialtothesame[individual]substance"carriesthe
implicationthatitisnotdivisible(LA120).Forifitweredivisible,partsofitwouldbelong
successivelytodifferentsubstances(cf.Chapter11,section2.2).Philosopherswhobelievedin
divisiblesubstancesandthoughtofthemasconstitutedbyprimitiveforceswouldpresumably
havereasontodoubttheassumptionthatsuchconstitutiveprinciplesmustbe"alwaysessential,"
intherelevantsense,toasinglesubstance.ButLeibnizhadnosuchreasontoquestionthe
assumption,sinceheheldthatanyindividualthingthatisfullyasubstancemustbeindivisible;
thisistrueevenofcorporealsubstanceinthemiddleyearsonGarber'sinterpretation.56
5.Whatsortofthingisthecompletesubstanceorconcretemetaphysicalsubjectfromwhichthe
primarymatterandsubstantialformcanbeabstracted?Ihavearguedthatitmustbeverylikethe
monadofLeibniz'slastyears.Inparticular,theprimarymatteranditsunionwiththesubstantial
formdonotariseoutoftheform'spossessing,anduniting,anextendedorganicbody.Rather,
theprimarymatterandthesubstantialformtogetherformaunitthatisprior,metaphysically
thoughnottemporally,tothepossessionofanextendedbody,"ahigherprincipleofactionand
resistance,fromwhichextensionandimpenetrabilityemanatewhenGoddoesnotpreventitbya
superiororder"(AI,vii,249;cf.LA120).
6.Notonlyisprimarymatteritselfunextended(LA120).Thesubstanceofwhichitisa
constitutiveprincipleispresentinaplaceonlybyimmediateoperation.AndIhaveargued,in
section2.2,thatLeibniz'stheoryofpreestablishedharmonyinthemiddleyearsalreadyrequired
himtoregardsuchoperationasconstructedfromacorrespondenceofinternal,nonrelationaland
thereforenonspatialpropertiesofthesubstancewiththoseofothersubstances.
7.Primarymatter,likesubstantialform,isan"internalprinciple"inasubstance(AI,vii,248).
Presumably,therefore,thesubstance'spossessionofitdoesnotdependonrelationswithother
substances,noteventhosethatareinitsorganicbody.Ihaveargued(insection2.1)thatit
followsthatanyfundamentaloperationofprimarymattermustbeinternaltothesubstanceof
whichitisaconstitutiveprinciple,andmustindeedbeanaspectoftheperceptualoperationof
thatsubstance,givenLeibnizianassumptionsabouttheharmonyofsubstancesandthenatureof
perception.InLeibniz'slettersof1698toBernoulliitappearsthatspiritualoperationsare
sufficientforprimarymatter,providedonlythereissomepassivityorimperfectioninthem.And
by1704,intheNewEssays,Leibnizseemstoimplythattheoperationsofprimarymatterare
necessarilyandexclusivelyperceptual,holdingexplicitlythatthereisnopassionthatis,no
operationofthepassiveprinciple"ingenuinesubstances...exceptwhentheirperception
becomesmoreconfused"(NE210).
8.Wehavefoundafewtexts,fromLeibniz'sdiscussionofLocke,inwhichthetitleof"primary
matter"isgiventosomethingthatappearstohavebeenabstractedfromsecondarymatterrather
thanfromanindivisiblesubstance.Ihavearguedthatthisisaterminologicalvariationrather
thanavacillationinmetaphysicalbelief.
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56
Garber,"LeibnizandtheFoundationsofPhysics,"pp.55f.
377
13
PrimitiveandDerivativeForces
WhenLeibnizcharacterizessubstantialformas"primitiveactiveforce"andprimarymatteras
1theword'primitive'marksacontrast,sometimesexplicit,with
"primitivepassiveforce"
"derivative"activeandpassiveforces.Theforcesstudiedinphysicsareclassifedasderivativeby
Leibniz.Andweconfrontgravedifficultiesintryingtounderstandwhatrelationshipheenvisaged
betweenthederivativephysicalforcesandtheprimitiveforcesthatconstitute,metaphysically,the
essenceofsubstance.Thesedifficultiesareprobablythelargestobstacletounderstandingthe
relationbetweenLeibnizianphysicsandLeibnizianmetaphysics.Theyarethetopicofthepresent
chapter.
1.The"Mixed"CharacterofDerivativeForces
1.1HowArePhysicalandIntramonadicForcesRelated?
Leibnizclearlythought,ashisterminologyindicates,thatthederivativeforcesarederivedfromthe
primitiveforces,andtherearemanytextsfromLeibniz'smiddleyearsinwhichhespeaksof
2Insomeofthemhe
derivativeforcesmorespecificallyasmodificationsofprimitiveforces.
explicitlyinvokestheanalogyoftherelationofshapetoextension,makingitclearthathehasin
mindsomethingliketherelationthatobtainsbetweenmodeandattributeinDescartes'sthought.
On22March1703,forexample,hewrotetoIsaacJaquelotthat
thederivativeoraccidentalforcethatcannotbedeniedtobodiesinmotionmustbea
modificationoftheprimitive[force],asshapeisamodificationofextension.
Accidentalforcescannotoccurinasubstancewithoutessentialforce,foraccidentsare
nothingbutmodificationsorlimitations,andcannotcontainmoreperfectionorreality
3
thanthesubstance.(GIII,457)
____________________
1
InLeibniz'swritings'power'[potentia/puissance]sometimesreplaces'force'[vis/force]inbothof
thesephrases.
2
Formanyreferences,andimportantdiscussion,seeGarber,"LeibnizandtheFoundationsof
Physics,"pp.83f.andnotes19194,213.AnearliertextthanthosecitedbyGarberisAI,ix,212
(23October1693).
3
Similaruseoftheanalogycanbefoundatleastasearlyas18November1698,inalettertoJohn
Bernoulli(GMIII,552/AG169),andatleastaslateas30June1704,inalettertoDeVolder(G
II,270/L537).
378
Inthisstatementitisclear,also,thatLeibnizsawtheconceptionofphysicalforcesas
modificationsofprimitiveforcesasafulcrumyieldingleverageforoneofhisargumentsthatthere
mustbeprimitiveor"essential"forces.
Butamajorproblemloomshere.Physicalforcesseemtopertainessentiallytorelationsamong
extended,divisiblemasses.Itishardtoseehowtheycouldbemodificationsofinternalprinciples
ofindivisiblesubstances.Itisespeciallyhardif(asIhavearguedinChapter12,pp.3S2f.)the
primaryoperationsofthoseinternalprinciplesarealsointernaltotheindivisiblesubstances.
Ourcloserexaminationofthisproblemmaybeginwithanotherveryimportantstatementaboutthe
relationbetweenprimitiveandderivativeforces,foundinLeibniz'sletterof21January1704to
BurcherDeVolder:
Thederivativeforce,however,isthepresentstateitselfaslongasitistendingtoward,
orpreinvolves,thefollowingstate,aseverypresentispregnantwiththefuture.Butthe
persisting[thing]itself,insofarasitinvolvesallevents,hasprimitiveforce,sothatthe
primitiveforceislikethelawoftheseries,andthederivativeforceislikethe
determinationthatdesignatessometermintheseries.(GII,262/L533)
Heretheprimitiveandderivativeforcesarerelatedaspersistingsubjectandpresentstate.
Thecontentoftheprimitiveforceistemporallycomprehensive.Itislikenedtothelawthat
determinesawholeseries;theserieswearemeanttothinkofhereissurelythewholetemporal
successionofstatesofasubstance.What"hasprimitiveforce"issomething"persisting"indeed,
weknowfromothercontextsthattheprimitiveforceitselfissomethingpersisting,"something
substantial"(LW130f.;GII,269f./AG180),inasmuchasitconstitutestheessenceofasubstance.
Thisisemphasizedsevenmonthsearlier,inanotherlettertoDeVolder,whereLeibnizsays,
"WhenIspeakoftheprimitiveforceremaining,Idonotmeantheconservationofthetotalpower
tomove...,buttheEntelechywhichalwaysexpressesthattotalforceaswellasotherthings"(G
II,251/L530).AsDanielGarberaptlyremarks,"Athingdoesn'thaveLeibnizianprimitiveforcein
thewayinwhichabodyinaccelerationhasNewtonianforce,butrather,inthewayinwhichone
mighttalkabouttheChurchasaforceinsociety,orMohammedAliasaforcetobereckonedwith
4
intheboxingring."
Aderivativeforceisa"presentstate,"thevalueoftheseriesforthepresenttime.ButhereIthinka
distinctioniscalledforthatLeibnizdoesnottreatveryclearlyinthequotedpassage.Forthe
presentstateofasubstancewillpresumablyhavesomenondispositionalaspectsthatcannot
plausiblyberegardedasforces,notevenasderivativeforces,butonlyaseffectsofforces.The
derivativeforcewillratherbetheaspectofthepresentstatethatisthetendencythatthesubstance
hasnowtopasstoitsimmediatelyfuturestates.Asthevalueoftheprimitiveforceforthepresent
context,thederivativeforceistheprimitiveforceitself,justinsofarastheprimitiveforceis,or
involves,atendencytodonow,andinthepresentcircumstances,what"thelawoftheseries"
determinesthatthesubstancewilldonowandinthosecirumstances.Itis"whatismomentaryin
action"(GII,269/L537),bycontrastwithboththeprimitiveforce,which
____________________
4
379
persists,andthemotionsorchangesproduced,whichtaketime.This,Itakeit,iswhatLeibniz
meanswhenheidentifiesthederivativeforcewith"thepresentstateitselfaslongasitistending
toward,orpreinvolves,thefollowingstate."(GII,262/L533;cf.GIV,396/AG253).
Anexamplemayhelpmakethispointclearer.Twoletterslater,LeibnizwrotetoDeVolderthat
"primitiveforcescannotbeanythingbutinternaltendenciesofsimplesubstances,becauseof
which,byacertainlawoftheirnature,theypassfromperceptiontoperception"(GII,275/
AG181).Ifwethinkoftheoperationofprimitiveforcesasbeingperceptualinthisway,thenitis
notmypresentperceptionsthatwillbederivativeforces,butmypresentappetites.Derivative
forces,thatis,willbepresenttendenciestopasstothenextperceptionsintheseries.
ButdidLeibnizalreadythinkoftheoperationofforcesasperceptualinthiswayinhismiddle
years?Iwilladdressthisquestionasitappliestoactiveforces;thepresentsectionwillbemainly
aboutthem.Manyoftherelevanttextsmayapplytopassiveforcesaswell,butitcanhardlybe
doubtedthatwhenLeibnizspokesimplyof"primitive"and"derivative"forces,activeforceswere
normallyuppermostinhismind.Indeedhehimselfstatedthat"activeforce...isusuallycalled
forcewithoutqualification"(GIV,395/AG252).
Thereisatextfrom1693inwhichLeibnizsaysthat"theinternalaction"ofaformidentifiedasthe
activepowercontainedinthenatureofbody"iscalledsensationinanimals,andthoughtinman"(
5Doesthisleaveopenthepossibilitythattheactivepowerofacorporealsubstancehas
AI,ix,211).
anexternalactionofaquitedifferentsort?Hardly.NosuchexternalactionisallowedbyLeibniz's
doctrineofpreestablishedharmony.Asisalreadyclearinthe"NewSystem"of1695,thatdoctrine
excludesallinfluenceofthesoulevenonitsownbody,foritisthe"mutualrelation"ofharmony
"thataloneconstitutestheunionofthesoulandthebody."Anditisclearenoughinthisdiscussion
inthe"NewSystem"thatwhatissaidaboutsoulandbodyismeanttoapplytotherelationofany
substantialformtoitsbody(E127/L457f.).Inordertoact,metaphysicallyspeaking,onitsbody,
whichisanaggregateofothersubstances,asubstantialformwouldhavetoactonthoseother
substances;andtheimpossibilityofanymetaphysicallyrealactionofonecreatedsubstanceon
anotherisalreadyafixtureofLeibniz'sthoughtfromthe1680son(e.g.,DM14;C521/L269).
Theseconsiderationssupportaninterpretationoftheoperationofprimitiveactiveforcesas
perceptualeveninthewritingsofLeibniz'smiddleyears.
Contrastingwiththeseimplicationsabouttheinternalcharacteroftheoperationofprimitiveactive
forcearestatementswhichimplythatLeibnizregardedtheoperationofderivativeactiveforceas
dependentonrelationsbetweensubstances.Thelatter,hesays,"resultingfromtheconflictsof
bodieswitheachother,asifbyalimitationofprimitiveforce,isexercisedchangeably"(GM
VI,236/L436).Thederivativeforcesinbodies"dependalsoontheotherbodies"(GIII,457).That
istobeexpectedinsofaras"weunderstandbyderivativeforce...nootherforcethanthatwhichis
connectedwithmotion(motionwithrespecttoplace,6thatis)andwhichinturntendsfurtherto
producemotionwithrespect
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5
thistextisquoted,anddiscussed,onp.352.
6
Motuslocalis[localmotion,assometranslationshaveit].Thepoint,whichwillnotoccurto
modernreaders,istosignifyunambiguouslyachangeofplace,inviewofthefactthatinAristotle's
380
toplace,"aforcealsoidentifiedasthat"bywhichbodiesactuallyactoneachotherorareactedon
byeachother"(GMVI,237/L437). 7
Giventheirroleinphysics,wemightexpectthesederivativeforcestobelongtothecorporeal,
extendedmassesthatphysicsstudies,ratherthantoindivisiblesubstances.Leibnizdoesnot
entirelydisappointthisexpectation,eveninthemiddleyears.In1699hewrotetoDeVolderthat
"thesecondaryormotiveforces,andthemotionsthemselves,mustbeascribedtothesecondary
Matterortothecompletebodyitself,whichresultsfromtheactiveandthepassive"(GII,171/L
517).Thesecondarymatter,ofcourse,isforLeibnizanextendedmass,anaggregate,andassucha
phenomenon,thoughwellfoundedinthesubstancesofwhichitisanaggregate.Thisimplication
ofphenomenalityisreflectedexplicitlyinalaterlettertoDeVolder,writtenbyLeibnizin1704or
1705,wherehesays:
DerivativeforcesIrelegatetothephenomena,butIthinkitisclearthatprimitiveforces
cannotbeanythingbutinternaltendenciesofsimplesubstances,becauseofwhich,bya
certainlawoftheirnature,theypassfromperceptiontoperception.(GII,275/AG181)
Garberhasarguedthat"thisrepresentsafundamentalchangefromthethoughtofLeibniz'smiddle
years,"andthatuntilabout1704Leibnizheldalessphenomenalistic,morerealisticviewof
8Ibelieve,however,thattherelegationorascriptionofderivativeforcesto
physicalforces.
phenomenaisessentiallythesameintheletterof1699asinthelaterletter,andthatthereis
thereforenofundamentalchangehere.(Weshallreturn,especiallyinsection1.3,totheissueof
changeinLeibniz'sviews.)
Inviewofallthis,howcanderivativeactiveforcesbemodificationsofprimitiveactiveforces?
Cananinternalforce,whoseoperationsareallinternaltoasinglesubstance,haveamodification
thatdependsonothersubstances?Cananessentialprincipleofasubstancethatdoesnotinteract
metaphysicallywithothersubstancesbe"limited"asaresultof"theconflictofbodieswitheach
other"?Canatendencytoproduce"localmotion"(changeofplace)beamodificationofaforce
whoseoperationsareallperceptual?Canamodificationoftheessenceofanindivisiblesubstance
belongtosecondarymatterthatis,toanextendedmassoraggregate?
Theremaywellbeseriousproblemshere,butthereislittleevidencethattheytroubledLeibniz.
Indeed,therearetextsinwhichitisclearthathesawnoinconsistencyinthissetofviews.Inhis
letterof20June1703toDeVolderhewrote:
Theforcesthatarisefrommass[massa]andvelocityarederivativeandbelongto
aggregatesorphenomena.WhenIspeakoftheprimitiveforceremaining,Idonot
meantheconservationofthetotalpowertomove,whichwas
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philosophythewordkinesis,renderedintoLatinasmotusandintoEnglishas'motion',isusedto
signifyawidevarietyofchanges,including,butbynomeanslimitedto,changeofplace.Leibniz
takesexplicitnoteofAristotle'susageatNE169.
7
AnothertextinwhichLeibnizindicatesparticularlyclearlythattheforcesstudiedbyphysicsare
derivativeishisletterof20June1703toDeVolder(GII,250f./L529f.).
8
381
discussedbetweenusearlier,buttheEntelechywhichalwaysexpressesthattotalforce
aswellasotherthings.Andcertainlyderivativeforcesarenothingbutmodifications
andresultsoftheprimitive[forces].(GII,251/L530)
Inthispassage,strikingly,allofthefollowingareasserted.(1)Thederivativeforcesofphysics
belongtoaggregatesorphenomena.(2)Primitiveforceisidentifiedwiththeentelechy,whichhere
issurelythesouloractiveprincipleofanindivisiblesubstance.Andyet(3)thederivativeforces
aremodificationsoftheprimitiveforces.Similarly,inaletterof11March1706toBartholomew
DesBosses,tobediscussedinsection1.3ofthischapter,Leibnizbothreferstoderivativeforcesin
thestrongesttermsas"semimental,liketheRainbowandotherwellfoundedphenomena,"and
statesthat"derivativeforces,withtheiractions,aremodificationsofprimitive[forces]"(G
II,306f.).
ThatLeibnizwascapableofassertingthiscombinationofviewsin1703and1706certainlyargues
againstreadinghis"relegating"derivativeforcestothephenomenain1704or1705asa
fundamentalchange.Sodoesthefactthathisascriptionofderivativeforcestosecondarymatterin
1699comesduringaperiodwhenhefrequentlyexpressedtheviewthatderivativeforcesare
modificationsofprimitiveforces.Theapparentlyconflictingviewsseemtohavekepteachother
companyinhismindformanyyears.
1.2CantheProblemBeSolved?
Howcanhehavecombinedthem?OnceagainwemaythinkofadistinctionthatLeibnizdoesnot
emphasize.Theactiveforcesthatheiscommittedtoclassifyingasderivativeareoftwoquite
differentsortsatleastifsortsofforcesaredifferentiatedbytheeffectsthattheyarepowersor
tendenciestoaccomplish.AndaLeibnizianmightbetemptedtosaythatonlyoneofthesesortsof
forceisamodificationofprimitiveactiveforce,andonlytheotherbelongstophenomena.Ihave
alreadynotedthatLeibnizidentifiesderivativeforceas(1)thevalueofprimitiveforceforagiven
time,andthatontheassumptionthatthefundamentaloperationofprimitiveactiveforceisthe
generationofaseriesofperceptions,thederivativeforceseemstobeidentifiedwiththesubstance's
tendencyatthegiventimetopasstoitsnextperceptions.Thissortofderivativeforceiseasily
viewedasamodificationoftheprimitiveforce.Itisnoteasilyidentified,however,with(2)thesort
ofactiveforcestudiedbyphysics,whichseemsrathertoconsistinpowersandtendenciesto
producemotioninbodies.Thelattersortofforce,however,iseasilyregardedasbelongingtothe
corporealmassesthatLeibnizclassifiedassecondarymatterandasphenomena.
Thisistooeasyasolutiontoourproblem,however.Insayingthatderivativeforcesare
modificationsofprimitiveforces,Leibnizdoesnotsuggestanexceptionfortheforcesstudiedby
physics.Andthe"forcesthatarisefrommassandvelocity"areexplicitlyincludedamongthe
derivativeforcesinourtextof1703inwhichLeibnizwritestoDeVolderthat"derivativeforces
arenothingbutmodificationsandresultsoftheprimitive[forces]"(GII,251/L530).Moreover,the
viewthatforcesarethemostrealoftheobjectsstudiedbyphysicsdependsonarealconnection
betweentheinherentforcesessentialtogenuinesubstancesandthederivativeforcesstudiedby
physics.MartialGueroultseems
382
rightinsayingthatLeibniz'snotionofderivativeforce"isamixedconcept,inwhichboth
phenomenalrealityproperlyspeakingandsubstantialrealityappearintimatelyjoinedtoeachother
9AsolutioncorrespondingmoreadequatelytoLeibniz'sintentionswill
inthephenomenonitself."
resistthebifurcationofderivativeforces.
LeibnizdiscussedourproblemwithChristianWolff,inlettersexchangedin1710and1711.Wolff
raisedtheissueinageneralform:"ifderivativeforcesaretoberegardedasmodificationsof
primitiveforces,anexplanation[ratio],andanintelligibleone,ofthismodificationshouldstillbe
given"(LW128).Leibniz'sinitialreplywasbrief:"Theexplanationofthemodificationsof
primitiveforceisjustthesameastheexplanationofthelawsofmotion.Anditisintelligible
indeed,asIhavesaid,butnotfrommeremathematicalconsiderations"(LW129).Wolffquite
rightlywantedtobetoldmore;inparticularhedidnotunderstand"howitcanhappenthroughlaws
ofcollisionthatwhateverislostfromtheforcesofonebodyisacquiredbytheother.Therewould
indeedberoomforthisif[force]wereconceivedonthemodelofabeingdiffusedthroughmatter
andrushingfromonequantityofitintoanother."ButthatseemedincongruoustoWolff"sinceI
conceiveofprimitiveforceasnotdifferentfromtheessenceofmatter"(LW129f.).
ThisevokedafullerresponsefromLeibniz.Hebeganinawaythatshowshetookthediscussionto
beexclusivelyaboutactiveforce:"IfthediscussionisaboutprimaryMatter,orthemerelypassive,
oraboutthatwhichconsistsinbareresistance,primitiveforceisnotoftheessenceofMatter,even
ifitisoftheEssenceofbody."Conatusandimpetusmustbe"modificationsofsomething
substantialorpermanentthatmustitselfbeactive,lesttherebemoreinthemodificationthanin
whatismodified.ThereforeIcallitprimitiveEntelechy,orevenjustEntelechy.Derivativeforces,
therefore,aremodificationsofthissubstantialActivething,asshapesaremodificationsofa
substantialpassivething,thatisofmatter"(LW130).(Iwilldefertosection2thequestionarising
fromthelastclauseofthisstatement,Inwhatsenseareshapesmodificationsofapassivematter,
whichseemstobeacounterpartoftheentelechy,andispresumablyprimaryratherthansecondary
matter?)
LeibnizgoesontocorrectoneofWolff'sassumptions,andthecorrectionisimportantforan
understandingofLeibniz'ssolutionoftheproblem:
Itshouldbeknown,however,thatforcesdonotcrossfrombodyintobody,sinceany
bodywhateveralreadyhasinitselftheforcethatitexerts,evenifitdoesnotshowitor
convertitintomotionofthewholepriortoanewmodification.Forexample,whena
ballthatisatrestisstruckbyanother,itismovedbyanimplantedforce,namelyby
elasticforce,withoutwhichtherewouldbenocollision.Moreover,theElasticforcein
thebodyarisesfromaninternalmotioninvisibletous.AndtheEntelechyitselfis
modifiedcorrespondingtothesemechanicalorderivative[forces].Thereforeitcanbe
saidthatforceisalreadypresentineverybody,anditisdeterminedonlyby
modification.(LW131)
Wolffhadassumedthatforceistransmittedfrombodytobodyincollisions,andLeibnizprobably
tookhimtoassumethatcollidingbodiesaremovedby
____________________
9
Gueroult,Leibniz:dynamiqueetmtaphysique,p.199.
383
forcesofotherbodies.ButLeibnizdoesnotholdthoseviews.Heholdsthateachbodyismoved
onlybyitsown(derivative)force,whichisinternaltoit,althoughtheforcewouldnotbe
manifestedinmotionofthewholebody,butonlyinminuteinternalmotions,iftherewereno
collisionwithanotherbody.Muchearlier,inthe"SpecimenDynamicum"of1695,Leibnizhad
statedthat"everypassionofabodyisspontaneousorarisesfromaninternalforce,thoughonthe
occasionofsomethingexternal"(GMVI,251/L448).
Therehehadtriedtogroundthisviewonaphysicaldoctrineoftheequalityofactionandreaction.
WritingtoWolffin1711,hesuggestsamoremetaphysicalexplanation,forhesaysthatwithoutthe
implantedforceinabodythatisstruck"therewouldbenocollision"(LW131).Whywouldthere
benocollision?Presumablybecausethepreestablishedharmonywouldprohibitit.Itisafeature
oftheharmonythateachorganicbodyexpressesthewholeuniverse(Mon62).Itfollowsthateach
organicbodyhaswithinitselfanexpressionofalltheexternalcircumstancesthataffectit
accordingtophysicallaws.Andifthisistrueofeveryorganicbody,itistrueofeverybody,since
everybodyisexhaustivelycomposedoforganicbodies.ByLeibniz'sdefinitionofexpression,this
expressionmustconsistinacorrespondence,accordingtosomelaws,betweenthestatesofthe
bodyanditsexternalcircumstances.Withtheselaws,togetherwiththephysicallawsgoverningthe
universeasawhole,everycollisionthathappenstothebody,anditsownmovementsinresponse
tothecollision,mustbepredictableonthebasisofitsownpreviousstates.Thereforenocollision
wouldhappenifthebodydidnotalreadyhavestatesfromwhichthecollisioncouldbepredicted.
Andbyvirtueofthesestates,andthelawsbywhichthepostcollisionmovementsofthebody
followfromthem,thebodycanbeviewedashavinginternaltendenciesorforcesthatproduce
thosemovements.
Thisdoctrinethateachbodyismovedbyitsowninternalderivativeforcespreparesthewayforan
importantsuggestionabouttherelationofintramonadicandphysicalderivativeforcesthatLeibniz
makesinthislettertoWolffwhenhesaysthat"theEntelechyitselfismodifiedcorrespondingto
thesemechanicalorderivative[forces]"(LW131).Whatthis"correspondence"suggestsisthat
intramonadicandphysicalderivativeforcesexpresseachother.Amodificationoftheprimitive
forceofasubstanceisinthefirstinstancethepresenttendencytopasstocertainimmediately
futureperceptions.Thesuccessiveperceptionsofasubstance,however,areexpressedbythe
successivestatesofitsorganicbody.10Itfollowsthatthechangesinthesubstance'sperceptions
areexpressedbythechangesintheorganicbody,whicharemotions.Moreoverthesubstance's
successivetendenciestochangewillbeexpressedbywhateversuccessivetendenciesproducethe
motionsoftheorganicbody.Butthelattertendencies,aswehavejustseen,aremotiveforces
internaltotheorganicbody.Andthemotionsandmotiveforcesofinorganicbodiesarecomposed,
inaccordancewithphysicallaws,fromthemotionsandmotiveforcesoftheorganicbodiesof
which(inLeibniz'sview)theinorganicbodiesarecomposed.11Thesemotionsandmotive
____________________
10
SeeChapter10,section4.
11
OntheorganicfoundationsoftheinorganicinLeibnizianphysics,seetheveryinteresting
discussionofapossible"reductionofphysicstobiology"inGarber,"LeibnizandtheFoundations
ofPhysics,"pp.88f.
384
forces,Leibnizinsists,allconformtodeterministicmechanicallaws.Thustheforcesstudiedby
physicsareexpressions,orcomposedofexpressions,ofsubstances'successiveinternaltendencies
toperceptualchange.
Asubsequentlettermakesquiteexplicittherelationofexpressionbetweenintramonadicand
corporealderivativeforces.Wolfffoundhimselfstillunable"toconceivedistinctlyenoughhowthe
primitiveforceismodifiedwhen,forexample,motionisacceleratedinaheavyfalling[body]"(
LW136).Replyingon9July1711,Leibnizwrote:
Youaskhowtheprimitiveforceismodified,forinstancewhenthemotionofheavy
[bodies]isacceleratedbyfalling.Ireplythatthemodificationoftheprimitiveforce
thatisintheMonaditselfcannotbeexplainedbetterthanbyexpoundinghowthe
derivativeforceischangedinthephenomena.Forwhatisexhibitedinphenomena
extensivelyandmechanicallyisinMonadsinaconcentratedandvitalway....And
whatisexhibitedMechanicallyorextensivelythroughthereactionofwhatresistsand
therestorationofwhatwascompressedisconcentrateddynamicallyandmonadically
(asIhavealreadysaid)intheEntelechyitself,inwhichisthesourceofthemechanism
andtherepresentationof[things]mechanical;forphenomenaresultfromMonads
(whicharethesoletruesubstances).Andwhile[things]mechanicalaredeterminedby
externalcircumstances,forthatveryreason[eoipso,inthesourceitself,theprimitive
Entelechyismodifiedharmoniouslythroughitself,sinceitcanbesaidthatthebodyhas
everyderivativeforceofitsownfromitself.(LW138f.)
Heretheimplicationseemsquiteclearthattherelationbetweenthemodificationsoftheprimitive
activeforce(theentelechy)andthederivativeforcesinphenomenaisoneof"representation"and
"harmony,"andthusofexpression.
ThismaynotbeenoughtogetLeibniztotheconclusionthatphysicalderivativeforces,likethe
intramonadicderivativeforcestheyexpress,aremodificationsofprimitiveforces.Expression,after
all,isnotidentity.Expressionsdonottypicallyhaveallthepropertiesofwhattheyexpress.But
Leibniz'sletterof9July1711toWolffsuggestsanimportantstepbeyondexpressionatthispoint.
AsIhavequotedhim,Leibnizcharacterizedtheentelechynotonlyas"therepresentationof
[things]mechanical"butalsoas"thesourceofthemechanism...,forphenomenaresultfrom
Monads"(LW139).Thiscausalrelationmaymakepossibleasortofidentityofintramonadicand
physicalderivativeforces.Forwhateveristrueoftypesofforce,Leibnizdidnothavetoregard
particularforcesasdifferentiatedbytheireffects.WemustbearinmindthataLeibnizianforce,
activeorpassive,isnotamereemptiness,acapacityorreceptivitylookingtoitstelosforits
definition.Leibnizianforcesaremorerealthanthat;theyarecausesalreadyinbeing,witha
positivecharacteroftheirown.12Asingleforceofthissortcanpresumablyhaveeffectsof
differenttypes.AndifweaskLeibnizwhat,inreality,arethecausesofthemotionsstudiedby
physics,theanswerhesuggestshere(andthatIthinkhemustgive)isthatthemotionsare
phenomenacaused,atbottom,metaphysically,bythecurrenttendenciesofsubstancestopassfrom
currentperceptionstofutureones.Soifwecansaythatthederivative
____________________
12
SeeGIV,469f./L433;NE169f.;andChapter11,section1.1.
385
forcesofphysicsarebydefinitionthecausesofphysicalmotions,wecanconcludethattheyare
identicalwiththeintrasubstantialderivativeforcesthataremodificationsofprimitiveforces.13
Thusoneandthesamederivativeforcewouldhavebothanintrasubstantialeffect,thepassage
fromcurrenttofutureperceptions,andaphenomenaleffect,thephysicalmotions.
InthiswaywecanexplainthedualityinLeibniz'swaysofspeakingofderivativeforces.In
physicalcontextsitmaybeconvenienttotreatphysicalforcesasindividuatedbythephysical
effectstowhichtheytend.Soviewed,thephysicalforceisaphenomenonandapropertyofa
phenomenon,anddependsonrelationsamongbodies.Metaphysically,ontheotherhand,physical
forcescanbetreatedasindividuatedbytherealcausesthattendtoproducethephysicaleffects.So
viewed,physicalforcesaremodificationsofprimitiveforces,andofindivisiblesubstances.Butthe
forcesviewedinthesedifferentwaysareinsomesense(doubtlessnotthestrictest)thesame.The
twoviewsrepresentdifferentwaysofcarvingup,conceptually,thesamefacts.
IthinkthisisprobablyacorrectinterpretationofLeibniz'sviews,atleastfromthelatterpartofthe
middleyears.Butitisattendedwithsomedifficultiesthatcomplicatetheinterpretationofhis
viewsonthesubjectinhislateryears.
1.3IssuesfromtheLaterYears
OneproblemabouttheexplanationIhaveofferedforthemixedcharacterofderivativeforcesis
thatitseemstorequireLeibniztocountthecurrentperceptualtendenciesofasubstanceasthe
causeofthemotionsofitsorganicbody,anditmaybedoubtedwhetherhecanconsistentlyand
reasonablydothis.Foranorganicbody,asaphenomenon,existsinbeingperceivednotonlyby
thesubstancewhosebodyitis,butbyallothersubstancesaswell.Itsmotionsmightthenbe
thoughttobecausedbytheperceptualtendenciesofallsubstances,andnotonlybythoseofits
ownsubstance.
IknowofnotextinwhichLeibnizaddressesthisargument,andhewouldsurelyresistits
conclusion.Wecanhardlydoubtthathemeanttoassigntheintrinsicforcesofeachcreated
substanceapreeminentroleinexplainingthephysicalbehaviorofitsorganicbody.Hemighttryto
substantiatethispreeminencebypointingoutthat,inhisview,everythingintheworldgoesasit
doesbecausetheworldwassoorderedbyGod,andGod'spreeminentaiminthisforeachorganic
body,consideredassuch,isthatitsphysicalbehaviorshouldbeanexpressionofthesuccessive
perceptionsandappetitesofthesubstancewhosebodyitis.Inthatwaytheorganicbodycanbe
seenasbehavingasitdoesbecauseoftheperceptualtendenciesofthatsubstanceratherthanthe
othersubstances.14
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13
Somethingofthissortseemstobeintendedinadiscussionofforcein1695,whenLeibnizsays
that"theefficientcauseofphysicalactionsbelongstothejurisdictionofmetaphysics"(GIV,472).
SomethingsimilarisalsosuggestedregardingpassiveforceswhenLeibnizsays,inabracketed
sentencewithheldfromDeVolderin1704or1705,that"MattercanbesaidtobeRealinsofaras
thereisinsimplesubstancesthereasonofwhatisobservedinphenomenathatispassive"(G
II,276/AG182,myitalics).
14
Cf.LA95f.,wheremindscanbecalled"occasionalandevenrealcauses,inacertainway,ofthe
motionsofbodies"becauseGodhasorderedthemotionsofbodieswithregardtothepercep
386
Thismaystillseemashakysupportfortheidentificationofphysicalwithintrasubstantial
derivativeforces,foritremainsequallytruethatinanotherwaythephysicalbehaviorofthe
organicbodycanbeseenasproducedbytheperceptualtendenciesofallthesubstancesthat
perceiveit.
Thisisaproblemabouttheunityofacorporealsubstancewithitsorganicbody.Wehaveseen,in
Chapter10,section5,thatinhislastyearsLeibnizmanifestedsomemisgivingsabouttheabilityof
hisphilosophytoaccountforthissortofunity.Itwouldnotbesurprising,then,ifhislastyears
alsosawsomeretreatfromtheidentificationofphysicalforceswithmodificationsofprimitive
forces.Itisnoteasytofindunambiguousevidenceofsucharetreat,however.Andthe
identificationisstillaffirmed,aswehavejustseen,inlettersof1710and1711toWolff(cf.also
T396).
ItistruethatintheelaboratetableappendedtoLeibniz'sletterof19August1715toDesBosses,
derivativeforcesoccurinmorethanoneplace,asmodificationsofsomethingelse,butnoattempt
ismadetoidentifythemwithmodificationsofmonads(GII,506/L617).Butthistextbelongsto
thedevelopmentofthetheoryof"substantialbonds,"whichwasnotadoptedasapartofLeibniz's
ownphilosophy(asIhavearguedinChapter10,sections5.35.4).Thederivativeforcescanbe
seenhereasmodificationsofprimitiveforces,butthelatterwouldbetheprimitiveforcesofa
compositesubstanceratherthanasimplesubstance,andtheywouldindeedbeidentifiedwiththe
substantialbond(cf.GII,485f./L609).
Regardingpassivephysicalforce,anotherverylatetext,aletterof11February1715toNicolas
Rmond,seemsquiteuncompromisinginitsstatementthat"asmatteritselfisnothingbuta
phenomenon,thoughwellfounded,resultingfrommonads,itisthesamewithinertia,whichisa
propertyofthisphenomenon."ThereisevidencethatLeibnizstillwantedtoemphasizethe
connectionbetweenphysicalandintramonadicforces,however,forbytheendofthisparagraph
aboutinertia,heispointingoutthatbecausecreatedmonadshaveapassiveaswellasanactive
aspect,"theyarethefoundationnotonlyofactionsbutalsoofresistancesorpassivities,andtheir
passivestates[passions]areinconfusedperceptions"(G111,636/L659).15
Leibniz'slastlettertoDeVolder(19January1706)isparticularlyinterestinginconnectionwith
thisissue.Hebeginsbysuggesting,politely,thatDeVolderisseekingfromhimanaccountof
forcethathehasneithertheabilitynorthedesiretogive,sinceitconcernsanotionofforcethatis
"notsomuchbeyondthisworldasUtopian,"andunintelligible.Inthisconnectionhealludestohis
engagement,aboutthattime,withapaperofTournemine's,aninteractioninwhichwefoundsome
oftheearliestevidenceofhismisgivingsabouttheunityofcompositesubstances.Indeed,inthis
lettertoDeVolderhementionsasanexampleofsomething"Utopian"theideaofaunionofbody
andsoulthatwoulddifferfromtheiragreement(GII,281/L538f.).
____________________
14
tionsoftheminds.Inthistext,however,thefocusisongivingasensetointeractionofsubstances,
ratherthanonamind's"causing"thebehaviorofitsownorganicbody.
15
BoththistextandGII,506/L617arecitedasevidenceofachangeinLeibniz'sviewsbyGarber,
"LeibnizandtheFoundationsofPhysics,"n.213.
387
Leibnizthengoesontosay,"IamafraidthatthatforcewhichisconceivedinExtensionormass
[moles],asoutsideofperceiversortheirphenomena,isofthesame[utopian]nature."Forforces
canbeunderstoodtoberealonlyintermsofthe"perceptionsorreasonsofperceptions"ofsimple
substances,which(withtheadditionof"aggregatesresultingfromthem")areallthatcanbe
understoodtoberealinnature(GII,281f./L539).InafirstdraftofthisletterLeibnizwaseven
moreemphaticaboutthephenomenalityofforcesoutsideofperceivers,declaring:
Ijudgethatthatprimitiveorderivativepower[virtus]whichisconceivedinExtension
andMass[moles]asoutsideofperceiversisnotathingbutaphenomenon,inthesame
wayasExtensionitselfandMassandMotion,whicharethingsnomorethananimage
inamirrororarainbowinacloud.(GII,281/AG184)
Astrikingfeatureofthisstatementisthatasortofforcethathasbeenconceivedinmaterialthings
issaidtobenomorerealthanextension,mass,andmotion.Thiscouldeasilybereadasretracting
theclaimthatphysicalforcesaremorerealthanotherphysicalproperties,andspecificallymore
realthanextensionandmotion.
Itisnotclear,however,thattheforceswhoserealityissovigorouslydisparagedhereare
Leibnizianphysicalforces.Inboththefirstdraftandtheletterthatwassentthereisaqualifying
clause:theforceswhoserealityisdeniedarethosethatareconceivedtoexist"outsideof
perceivers."Butiftheinterpretationofferedaboveiscorrect,Leibnizisabletoregardphysical
forcesasmorerealthanotherphysicalpropertiesonlybyidentifyingthemwithforcesthatare
internaltoperceivingsubstances,andthatarethereforenot"outsideofperceivers."Sothe
disparagementinthesepassagesseemsnottotouchhisownconceptionofphysicalforces,andone
mightspeculatethatthequalifyingclausesaretherepreciselybecauseLeibnizdidnotwishto
excludetheidentificationofphysicalforceswithmodificationsof(perceiving)substances.Sucha
speculationseemsevenmorestronglyinvitedbyasimilarstatementinLeibniz'sletterofabouta
yearearlier,inwhichthequalifyingclauseismoreemphaticallyqualifying:"WhereIputbodies,
moreover,Ialsoputcorporealforces,namelyinthephenomena,thatis,iftheyareunderstoodas
addinganythingoverandabovesimplesubstancesortheirmodifications"(GII,276/AG182).
Anotherproblem,abouttheindividuationofphysicalforcesiftheyaremodificationsofindivisible
substances,surfacesinthefirstyearofthecorrespondencebetweenLeibnizandDesBosses.Ina
letterof11March1706,Leibnizwrote:
[Weunderstandthat]secondarymatterresultsfrommanymonads,alongwith
derivativeforces,actions,[and]passivestates,whicharenothingbutbeingsby
aggregation,andthereforesemimental,liketheRainbowandotherwellfounded
phenomena.(GII,306)
ThespecialproblemhereliesinthefactthatLeibnizidentifiesderivativeforcesnotmerelyas
"semimental"orphenomena,orevenasbelongingtoaggregates,butas"beingsbyaggregation"
themselves.However,inthesameletterhesaysthat"derivativeforces,withtheiractions,are
modificationsofprimitive[forces]"
388
(GII,307).Theprimitiveforces,Itakeit,arenotaggregatesbutessentialprinciplesofindivisible
substances.Sohowcanmodificationsofthembeaggregates?Andofwhatwouldtheybe
aggregates?
Unfortunately,thisproblemisnottakenupinthesubsequentlettersthathavecomedowntous
fromthisearlyperiodofthecorrespondence.Theideaofa"derivativepower"thatis"oneby
aggregation"doesemergeagaininthetableconnectedwithLeibniz'sletterof19August1715to
DesBosses.Thereitisstatedthatsuchanaggregateis"collectedfromthemodificationsof
substances"(GII,506/L617).Inthatcontextmodificationsofcompositesubstances,and
ultimatelyof"substantialbonds,"mustbemeant.Inmyview,asstatedabove,thetheoryof
substantialbondswasnotapartofLeibniz'sownphilosophy,anditseemsnottohavebeeninview
anywayinLeibniz'sletterstoDesBossesin1706.
Itispossible,however,togivethe1706textaninterpretationintermsofforcesthatareaggregates
"collectedfromthemodificationsofsubstances"withoutanyinvolvementofthenotionof
substantialbonds.Onthisinterpretation,Leibnizwasthinkingofamassofsecondarymatteras
havingaphysicalderivativeforcethatisanaggregateoftheintrasubstantial,andindeed
intramonadic,derivativeforcesbelongingtothesubstancesthatareincludedinthesecondary
matter.Sincetheintramonadicderivativeforcesareunproblematicallymodificationsof
intramonadicprimitiveforces,thederivativeforceofthesecondarymatter,ifnotitselfa
modificationoftheprimitiveforceofasinglesubstance,willatleastbeanaggregateof
modificationsofintramonadicprimitiveforces.Ithinkthisisnotastrainedinterpretation.How
wouldsecondarymatter'sderivativeforcesbe"beingsbyaggregation"iftheyarenotformedby
aggregationfromsomefeatureofthesubstancesofwhichthesecondarymatterisaggregated?
Onemoreproblem,fromthreeyearslaterintheLeibnizDesBossescorrespondence,takesusto
thebrinkofthetheoryof"substantialbonds,"andperhapsoutsideLeibniz'sownphilosophy.Its
root,however,canbefoundoutsidetheDesBossescorrespondence,indeedatthebeginningofthe
middleyears.On6September1709DesBosses,aRomanCatholic,askedhowLeibnizwould
accountfortherealpresenceofthebodyofChristintheEucharist(GII,388).Twodayslater
Leibnizreturnedaveryshortanswerabouttherealpresence,adoctrinecommontoCatholicsand
Lutherans,alludingtohisresponsetoTournemine"thatpresence,likeunion,issomething
Metaphysical,whichisnotexplainedbyphenomena."Hecontinuedwithanunsolicitedcomment
abouttransubstantiation,aCatholic,notaLutherandoctrine,whichLeibnizbythistimeinhislife
rejected.16Mostofthecommentisconcernedwiththe"commonopinion"ofCatholictheologians,
asDesBossescalledit(GII,396),thatthephysicalqualities(accidents)ofthesacramentalbread
remaininbeing,reallyandnotjustinappearance,but"withoutasubject,"afterthesubstanceofthe
breadhasbeenreplacedbythepresenceofthesubstanceofthebodyofChrist(sincethequalities
ofthebread,thoughstillperceived,arenotsupposedtobecomequalitiesofthebodyofChrist).
Leibnizwrote:
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16
Onthedifferencebetweenthesetwodoctrines,theircontextinEucharistictheology,andLeibniz's
thoughtonthesubject,seeChapter12,sections2.22.3.
389
WhetherandhowyourtransubstantiationcanbeexplainedinmyPhilosophywouldbe
a[subjectfor]moreprofoundinvestigation.Ifyouwantrealaccidentstoremain
withoutasubject,youmustsaythatwhenthemonadsconstitutingthebreadare
removed,asto[their]primitiveactiveandpassiveforces,andthepresenceofthe
MonadsconstitutingthebodyofChristissubstituted,thereremainonlythederivative
forceswhichwereinthebread,presentingthesamephenomenathatthemonadsofthe
breadpresented.(GII,390f.)
DesBossesfoundthissuggestion"nicelyconsonant"withCatholicopinion,butstatedverycrisply
theobviousobjectionastoitsconsistencywithLeibniz'sphilosophy:
Butsincederivativeforces,foryou,arenothingbutmodificationsofprimitiveforces,I
donotunderstandhowthederivativeforcescanremainwhentheprimitiveare
removed,unlessperhapsyouareconfusingmodeswiththeaccidentsthatwecall
absolute.(GII,396)
Leibnizcanhardlyhavebeenconfusedonthispoint.Itisquiteclearthatwhenhespokeof
derivativeforcesas"modifications"ofprimitiveforces,duringthemiddleyearsandlater,he
meansthattheyarenot"absolute"accidentsinthesenseofbeingabletosubsistwithoutthesubject
ofwhichtheyaremodifications.Thisispreciselythepointofhissaying,ashedoestoJaquelotin
1703,that"accidentalforcescannotoccurinasubstancewithoutessentialforce,foraccidentsare
nothingbutmodificationsorlimitations"(GIII,457).
ItislesslikelythatLeibnizwasconfusedthanthathewasrepeating,ratherunreflectively,anidea
hehadworkedoutmanyyearsbeforeforaccommodatingCatholicviewsonthissubject.Thisidea
appearsinthesocalledTheologicalSystem,whichIthinkwasprobablywrittenintheperiod
168486,17andwhichisoneofthefewplacesinLeibniz'swritingsabouttheEucharistwherethe
persistenceofaccidentswithoutasubjectseemstobeaffirmed,andnotmerelyentertainedasa
Catholicopinion.18Theelaborateexplanationthatheoffersthereforthepossibilityofsuch
persistenceturnsontheclaimthatphysicalforcesare"realorabsoluteaccidents,whichdiffernot
onlymodallyfromasubstance"and"superaddsomethingabsoluteandrealtoit"(Systema137).
Specifically:
Thisresistance[antitypialormass[moles],andthisefforttoact,ormotiveforce,are
distinguishedfrommatterortheprimarypowerofbeingactedonorresisting,andfrom
thesubstantialformorprimarypowerofacting.(Systema135)
Andthisdistinctionisa"realdistinction,"sothatthephysicalforcescanbecausedbyGodto
subsistwithouttheprimaryforces;andthatishowthepersistenceoftheaccidentsintheEucharist
istobeexplained(Systema137f.).
____________________
17
Iuse(anEnglishtranslationof)thecustomarytitle,thoughLeibnizhimselfseemstohaveintended
tocalltheworkExamenreligioniscbristianae(AnExaminationoftheChristianReligion)(seeB4).
ForgeneralbackgroundseethediscussionoftheworkinSleigh,LeibnizandArnauld,pp.2123.
Sleighcitesauthorityfordatingtheworkin1686.TheTheologicalSystemdealswithideasthatare
particularlyprominentinLeibniz'scorrespondencewithCountErnstvonHessenRheinfelsin1684,
thoughhedidnotforgetthemquicklyinanyevent.
18
OtherplacesareAVI,iii,15759,probablyfrom167375,andVE218=GIV,345,from168386,
thoughtheaffirmationislessexplicitthere.
390
ThisisplainlythesameexplanationthatLeibnizofferedDesBossesovertwentyyearslater,in
September1709.ButitishardtoseehowitcaneverhavebeenconsistentwithLeibniz's
philosophy.IdoubtthattheTheologicalSystemexpressedhisownviewsonthispointeveninthe
earlytomid1680s.19Andbysometimeintheearly1690shewascertainlyclaimingthat
derivativeforces,includingphysicalforces,aremodificationsofprimitiveforces,inasenseclearly
incompatiblewiththephysicalforcesbeing"absoluteaccidents."
HowthendidLeibnizrespondwhenconfrontedwithDesBosses'sobjection?Inhisnextletterto
DesBossestheobjectionisnotactuallymentioned,butLeibnizoffersanewaccountofthe
persistenceofthephysicalqualitiesintheEucharist.
Sincethebreadisnotreallyasubstance,butabeingbyaggregationorsubstantiated
thing[substantiatum]resultingfromcountlessmonadsthroughasuperaddedUnion,its
substantialityconsistsinthisunion.ThereforeitisnotnecessaryonyourviewforGod
todestroyorchangethosemonads,butonlytotakeawaythatthroughwhichthey
produceanewbeing,namelythatUnion.Thusthesubstantialityconsistinginitwill
cease,eventhoughthereremainsthephenomenonwhichwillnotarisenowfromthose
monads,butfromsomeequivalentdivinelysubstitutedfortheunionofthosemonads.
Thusnosubstantialsubjectwillreallybepresent.Butwewhorejecttransubstantiation
donotneedsuchthings.(GII,399)
Herethesubstantialbond,orsomethingverylikeit,appearsonthescene,underthenameof
"superaddedUnion."Andtheprevioustheoryofpersistingaccidentsasphysicalorderivative
forcesseemsatfirstglancesimplytohavedisappeared.Butinfactitmaystillbepresent,disguised
bythenewterminology.
Onthetheorypreviouslysuggested,theprimitiveforces,asconstitutingthesubstanceofthebread,
areannihilated.Onthenewaccountitisratherthe"superaddedUnion"whichconstitutes,not
exactlythesubstance,butthe"substantiality"ofthebread,andisannihilated.Butthismaynot
avoidtheannihilationofprimitiveforces.ForLeibnizmightsayofthesuperaddedunion,ashe
laterappearstosayofthesubstantialbond,thatit"consistsintheprimitiveactiveandpassive
powerofthecomposite"(GII,485f./L609).
Onthenewtheory,theEucharisticaccidentsremainasa"phenomenon."Couldthisstillbethe
derivativeforcesoftheoldertheory?Aswehaveseen,Leibnizsometimesdescribesderivative
forcesasphenomena;physicalforceshaveatleastaphenomenalaspectforhim.Hisnewaccount
ofthepersistingaccidentsdoesnotactuallysaythattheyareforces,butthatisnotdecisiveforthe
implicationsoftheaccount,becausehemightwellhavethoughtthatCatholictheologywould
demandthatphysicalforcesbeincludedamongthepersistingaccidents.AndIthinkitisnota
seriousproblemforLeibnizthattheprimitive
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19
ThisisnottheplaceforadetailedexaminationoftheTheologicalSystem.Itisnotamerereporting
ofRomanCatholictheology,butbearsmanytracesofLeibniz'sownthinkingandisclosely
connectedwithhisletterstoCountErnstvonHessenRheinfels.Ontheotherhand,itisclearfrom
thoselettersthat,whendealingwithProtestant/Catholicrelations,Leibnizwaswillingtowrite
piecesthatdidnotexpresshisownviews(AI,iv,389).Andtherearedifferencesaswellas
similaritiesbetweenpositionstakenintheTheologicalSystemandthetreatmentofthesametopics
intheletters.Forinstance,compareSystema3135withAI,iv,420onjustificationbyfaith;
Systema177f.withAI,iv,335f.,ix,151f.onordination;Systema91113withAI,iii,310onthecultof
thesaints.
391
forcesofwhichthederivativeforcesweremodificationshavebeenannihilated,sothatifthey
remainasmodificationsitmustbeasmodificationsofsomethingdifferent.Leibnizdoesnotallow
qualitiestomigratefromonesubjecttoanother,butnosuchmigrationwouldbenecessaryinthis
case.Forderivativeforcesaremomentarystates,aswehaveseen.Thereisthereforenoquestionof
thepersistenceofnumericallythesamederivativeforceinanycase,andqualitativelythesame
physicalforcescouldperfectlywellhavedifferentsubjects.
Whatthenewtheorydoesimplyisthatifthepersistingaccidentsarederivativeforcestheyarenot
modificationsofsubstances,andthereforepresumablynotmodificationsofprimitiveforces.
Accordingtothetheory,thepersistingaccidentswill"arise...fromsomeequivalentdivinely
substitutedfortheunionofthosemonads."Leibnizisreticentaboutthenatureofthis"substitute,"
butItisexplicitlynottobea"substantialsubject."Thisimpliesthattheaccidentswillnotbe
modificationsofadifferentsubstance,sincetheywillnotbemodificationsofanysubstanceatall.
ItismostunlikelythatinthisinterchangeweseeLeibnizpersonallyabandoningtheprinciplethat
derivativeforces,includingphysicalforces,arealwaysmodificationsofprimitiveforces,andthus
ofsubstances.HisTheodicy,inwhichderivativeforcesarestill"modificationsoftheprimitive
Entelechy"(T396)),wasprintedafewmonthsafterthislettertoDesBosses.Aboutayearafter
thatletter,thesamepositionwasstillmaintainedinletterstoWolff,aswehaveseen.Eveninthe
lastsentenceofthequotedparagraphofthelettertoDesBossesLeibnizindicatesthathedoesnot
needthetheoreticalapparatusdeployedintheparagraphbecauseherejectstransubstantiation.That
issurelyreasonenoughtorefusetotaketheparagraphasevidenceofachangeinLeibniz'sown
views.Atmost,itisevidenceofthesortoftentativenessregardingtheologicalissuesdiscussedin
Chapter10,section5.4evidencethathedidnotthinkitabsurdforRomanCatholicstoassentto
derivativeforcesbeing,insomecases,somethingotherthanmodificationsofprimitiveforcesif
theirtheologyrequiredit.
EventhattentativenessortoleranceseemsthreatenedbyahardeningofLeibniz'spositioninlater
letterstoDesBosses.In1712,intheletterinwhichheintroducestheterminologyof"substantial
bonds,"LeibnizproposestoaccountfortheEucharisticaccidentsas"sensiblephenomenafounded
in"themonadsthatsurvivewhenthesubstantialbondsofthebreadandwinearetakenawayin
transubstantiation.Hegoesontoconsideracoupleofwaysofallowingabsoluteaccidents"ifyou
arealtogetherunwillingfortheseEucharisticAccidentstobemerephenomena";butheconcludes
bysaying,"Allthesame,totellthetruth,IshouldprefertheEucharisticAccidentstobeexplained
byphenomena;thatwaytherewillbenoneedofnonmodalaccidents,whichIdon'tunderstand
wellenough"(G11,435f./L600f.).
Asubsequentletter,of20September1712,bluntlyquestionsthecoherenceofatheological
positioninvolvingnonmodalaccidents:
Butitisaquestionwhethertherearenotsomeaccidentsthataremorethan
modifications.Theseseemplainlysuperfluous,however;andwhateverisinthem
besidesamodificationseemstobelongtothesubstantialthingitself.NordoIseehow
wecandistinguishtheabstractfromtheconcreteorfromthesubjectinwhichitis,or
explainintelligiblywhatitistobeinorinherein
392
asubject,exceptbyconsideringwhatinheresasamodeorstateofthesubject....But
ifyouknowanotherwayofexplaininginherence,pleaseexplainit,forthematter
dependsonit.Ifthatcannotbedone,wemustfearthatinsayingthatrealaccidentsare
preserved,youreallypreservethesubstance,andthusthewholesubstanceisnotreally
transmuted."(GII,458/L606)
Herenonmodalaccidentsareonthebrinkofbeingrejectedasnotmerelyabovereason,but
contrarytoreason.
2.PrimaryMatterandQuantity
"Passiveforceislikewiseoftwokinds,eitherprimitiveorderivative,"Leibnizwrotein1695inhis
"SpecimenDynamicum(GMVI,236/L437).Primitivepassiveforceiscloselyrelatedtophysical
magnitudes.Itisaprinciple(i.e.,source)ofextension(cf.G11,306),and,asweshallsee,isin
somesensemeasuredbyextension.Itisalsoaprincipleofresistance(impenetrability)andinertia
(aKeplerianinertia,understoodasresistancetomotionratherthantoaccelerationordeceleration).
Andindeedtheprimitiveforceofbeingactedon[patiendi]orofresistingconstitutes
theverythingthatiscalledprimarymatterintheSchools,ifrightlyinterpreted.Itisof
coursetheforcebywhichithappensthatonebodyisnotpenetratedbyanotherbut
opposesanobstacletoitandisatthesametimeendowedwithacertainlaziness,soto
speakthatis,anoppositiontomotionandsodoesnotallowitselftobesetinmotion
withoutsomewhatbreakingtheforceofthebodyactinguponit.(GMVI,236f./L437)
Thederivativepassiveforceswillbetheobservable,physicalmanifestationsofthis.AsLeibniz
says,"Henceafterwardsthederivativeforceofbeingactedonshowsitselfchangeablyin
secondarymatter"(ibid.).
Theexplicitconnectionofderivativepassiveforcewithsecondarymatterinthistextof1695is
noteworthy,thoughitdoesnotgoquitesofarastosaythattheforce"belongsto"thesecondary
matter.Atthesametime,theparallelismofactiveandpassiveforcesinthistextsuggeststhat
derivativepassiveforces,liketheiractivecounterparts,arise"asifbyalimitationofprimitive
force"(GMVI,236/L436).Activeorpassive,derivativeforcesarelinkedbothwithprimitive
forcesandwithcorporealaggregates.
Howisprimitivepassiveforce,orprimarymatter,asourceofextension,resistance,andinertia?
Thisquestionisanaturalstartingpointforanexplorationoftherelationbetweenprimarymatter
andphysicsinLeibniz'sthought.Ishallassumefromtheoutsetthatthemetaphysically
fundamentaloperationofprimitivepassiveforceisinternaltoasinglesubstanceandmustinsome
sensebeperceptualincharacter,asIhavearguedinpreviouschapters.Thiscomplicatesthetaskof
explainingitsrelationtophysics;butthemaindifficultiesinthisproject,asweshallsee,donot
dependontheassumptionaboutperception.
Primitivepassiveforceisaprincipleofimperfection(GMIII,560/AG170),specificallyof
imperfectioninexpressionorperception(DM15).Andinperceptionimperfectionisconfusedness
(cf.GVII,322/L365).Primitivepassiveforcewillthusbeasubstance'stendencynottoperceive
distinctly.Itcanbeconsid
393
eredanantiperceptualprinciple,thoughatthesametimeitisanaspectofthesubstance's
perceptuallife.Thiswayofputtingitsuggestsarealoppositionandstrugglebetweenaforceof
distinctnessandaforceofconfusioninthesubstance.SodoesmuchofLeibniz'slanguage,aswhen
hesaysthattheideathat"asubstanceopposesitsownactivepower...shouldnotseemabsurdto"
DeVolder,since"surelytheremustbeaprincipleoflimitationinlimitedthings,as[theremustbe
aprinciple]ofactioninagents"(GII,257/L532).Butthislanguagemaybetoovivid,asLeibniz
alsosuggeststhatperfectionandimperfectionarerelatednotaspositiveandnegativemagnitudes,
butasunityandzero,andthatimperfectionismerelylimitationorprivationofperfection(Gr126).
Onthisaccountasubstance'stendencytoconfusedperception,itsprimitivepassiveforce,would
simplybeaweaknessofitsprimitiveactiveforce,alimitationinitstendencytoperceivedistinctly.
ItisclearthattheprimitivepassiveforceorprincipleofimperfectionisconnectedinLeibniz's
mindwiththepossessionofabody(see,e.g.,GMIII;560/AG170).Andwecanseehowthey
wouldbeconnected.Forasubstance'shavinganorganicbody,intherelevantsense,consistsin
theircompletelyexpressingeachotherwithauniquedirectness.Anditisthedifferencesin
degreesofdistinctnessoftheirperceptionsofdifferentobjectsthatdeterminewhichsimple
substancesaremostdirectlyexpressedbywhichorganicbodies,andwhichsimplesubstances
"dominate"whichorganicbodies(asdiscussedinChapter10,section4).God,beingabsolutely
perfect,perceiveseverythingwithperfect,andthereforeequal,distinctness,andhenceisnomore
expressedbyonebodythananother,andistheonlysubstancethathasnodistinctive"pointof
view"withintheuniverse.Thusitisthroughlackofa"passive"principleofconfusedperception
thatGodhasnobody.
Thereisaquestionablesimplification,tobesure,inascribingthisonlytotheprimitivepassive
force.Fortheassignmentofbodiestosubstancesdependsonthecombinationofdistinctnessand
confusednessinthesubstances'perceptions,andthereforeontheiractiveaswellaspassiveforces.
Butthereisasimilarlyquestionablesimplificationinascribingthelawofprogressionofa
substance'sperceptionstotheprimitiveactiveforcealone,asLeibniztypicallydoes.20Forthatlaw
mustdetermineconfusednessjustasmuchasdistinctness.InthepresentinterpretationIwillnottry
tocorrectthesesimplifications,sinceLeibnizseemstomakethem.
Givensuchasimplification,theprimitivepassiveforceisaprincipleof(limited)extension.Forin
assigningthesubstanceanorganicbody,thesubstance'spatternofconfusednessofperceptionalso
assignsittheextensionofthatbody.Wemaysaythat,asatendencynottodistinctlyperceive21
bodiesoutsideitsown,theprimitivepassiveforcedeterminestheextensionofthesubstance'sown
____________________
20
ThispointismadebyGarber,"LeibnizandtheFoundationsofPhysics,"p.88.
21
AsdiscussedinChapter10,section4.1,degreesofdistinctnesscanhardlybetheonlyrelevant
factorhere.TheremustalsobearelationwhichIhavecharacterizedas"directness"ofexpression
betweenasubstance'sperceptionsanditsorganicbody.BecauseLeibnizneverarticulatesthisvery
clearly,however,Iwillnottrytoframethepresentdiscussionintermsofit.Leibnizmustclearly
suppose,inanyevent,thatdifferentialdirectnessofexpressionisdependentsomehowonconfused
perception;Godperceivesallcreatedthingswithequaldirectness.
394
organicbody,andalsodefinesalienbodiesoutofitsown,thusconstitutingtheimpenetrabilityof
theorganicbody.Thustheprimitivepassiveforceisaprincipleofresistance.Likewise,the
primitivepassiveforcemaybeseenasdeterminingtheshapethatboundsitsorganicbody;this
thoughtmayhelpexplainLeibniz'ssayingtoWolffthat"shapesaremodificationsofasubstantial
passivething,thatisofmatter"(LW130).
Perhapswemayalsosaythat,asatendencynottoperceivethefuturedistinctly,theprimitive
passiveforceisaprincipleofresistancetochange,whichisexpressedcorporeallyasresistanceto
motion,andthusisaprincipleofinertia.Moreaccurately,itisaprincipleofresistanceto
perceptualpatterns,andhencetospatialpatterns,thataredifferentfromthepresentone.Itgives
risetoaneedforsomepositive,activeforceifthepresentpatternistobechanged.Thislineof
thought,however,issomewhatspeculativeasinterpretationofLeibniz;Idonotknowofatextin
whichhepresentsit.22
Onthisinterpretation,asubstance'sderivativepassiveforces,atpresent,willbeitspresent
tendenciestoconfusedperception,andhenceitspresenttendenciestomaintainits(organicbody's)
extensionandposition,intheimmediatefuture.Intheirexpressionasphysicalforces,these
tendenciescanbeassignedaquantitativemeasure,whichforLeibnizwouldbebasedonthe
presentvolumeoftheorganicbody.23"Impenetrabilityorantitypyandresistenceorinertia,"says
LeibniztoDeVolderin1699,"areequaleverywhereinbody,andproportionaltoitsextension"(
GII,171/L517).Whatismoreperplexingisthat,intheimportantarticle"OnNatureItself"of
1698,Leibnizexplicitlyassignsthatquantitativemeasuretoprimarymatteritself,andhence
presumablytoprimitivepassiveforce,sayingof"Primarymatterormass[moles],"identifiedwith
"thepassiveforceofresisting,"thatit"isthesameeverywhereinbody,andproportionaltoitssize"
(GIV,510/L503).24
ItisunderstandablethatLeibnizshouldwanttoassignquantitiestomatter,sinceconceptionsof
quantityofmatterhadlongplayedanimportantroleinphysics.Oneoftheproblemsthatthe
physicistJohnBernoulliraisedwithLeibniz,inletterswrittenatalmostexactlythesametimethat
"OnNatureItself"appeared,wasthepossibilitythatLeibniz'sphilosophymightunderminethe
quantitativetreatmentofmatter.Itwasexplicitlysecondarymatter,however,thatBernoulliwanted
toseetreatedquantitatively(GM111,540,546).25Andthereareindeedseriousdifficultiesinthe
quantitativetreatmentofLeibnizianprimarymatter.
SofarasIcansee,suchatreatmentispossibleatallonlybycharacterizingtheprimitivepassive
forceintermsofitsphysical,corporealexpression.How
____________________
22
Thisgeneralizationofthenotionofinertiatoapplytointramonadicaswellascorporealpassive
forceswassuggestedtomebyDavidTaiWaiWan.
23
Ontheuseofvolumeasameasureforsuchpurposes,andLeibniz'streatmentofdensityinthis
connection,seeGIV,395/AG232.
24
Thewords"thesame"areunfortunatelyomittedinLoemker'stranslation.Theletterof1699toDe
Voldercomesclosetothisclaimaboutmatter,sinceLeibnizsaystherethathelocates"thenature
ofthepassiveprincipleormatter"intheforcesthusmeasured(GII,171/L517).Thereisalsoa
textof1702(GIV,395/AG252),whichwillbediscussedbelow,inwhichLeibnizsaysthesame
thinginalmostexactlythesamewordsabouta"passiveforce,"butitisnotclearfromthecontext
whetherthisforceisprimitiveorderivative.
25
Thesepassagesaretranslated,anddiscussed,inChapter10,section3.2.
395
wouldLeibnizquantifyatendencytoconfusedperception?Heseemstohavethoughtofsubstances
asoccupyingplacesinarankorderingofdegreesofperfection,basedonhowdistincttheir
perceptionsare.Butheproposesnomathematicalfunctiontomeasuresuchranking.Certainlyhe
didnotthinkthatthedegreeofperfectionisinverselyproportionaltobodysize.Anelephantisnot
lessperfectperceptuallythanamosquito;sothedegreeofconfusednessthatasubstancetendsto
haveinitsperceptionscannotbeproportionaltothesizeofitsorganicbody.
Insayingthatprimarymatteris"thesameeverywhereinbody,"moreover,Leibnizcannothave
meantthatallcorporealsubstancestendtohaveperceptionsthatareconfusedtothesamedegreeor
inthesameway,forheclearlydidnotbelievethat.Whathemeant,surely,isthatthephysical
expressionofprimarymatterisnottobeassigneddifferentquantitiesindifferentbodiesofthe
samesize.Soperhapshethoughtthattheprimitivepassiveforceofeachcreatedsubstanceshould
beassignedthesize(volume)ofitsorganicbodyasaquantitativemeasure.Butthisisproblematic.
Oneproblemisthatthesizeofasubstance'sorganicbodychangesovertime,andthusseemsless
wellsuitedtoexpressaprimitiveforce,whichisconstant,thanaderivativeforcewhichisthe
"value"oftheprimitiveforceforagiventime.
Otherproblemsarisewhenwethinkabouttheaggregationanddivisionofbodies.Insayingthat
primarymatterisproportionaltobodysize"everywhereinbody,"Leibnizpresumablymeansthat
notonlyorganicbodies,butalsoinorganicbodies,whichheviewsasaggregates,aretobeassigned
aquantityofprimarymatterinproportiontotheirvolume.Butwhatwillbemeasuredthereby?On
theassumptionthatprimarymatterbelongsonlytosubstances,aninorganicbodywhichisamere
aggregatehasnoprimarymatterofitsown.Willthequantityofitsprimarymatterbethesumof
thequantitiesofprimarymatterbelongingtoallthesubstanceswhoseorganicbodiesareincluded
intheinorganicbody?Thatwayliesparadox,foreveryorganicbodyhasotherorganicbodiesas
parts,inLeibniz'sview.Thespaceoccupiedbyanorganicbodyisalsoexhaustivelyoccupiedby
smallerorganicbodiesthatarepartsofit,and,inturn,bystillsmallerorganicbodiesthatareparts
ofthem,andsoon.Inthiswaythevolumeofanybody,forexampleastone,willbeusedinfinitely
manytimesoverbytheorganicbodiesincludedinit.Thereforethesumofthevolumesofallthe
organicbodiescontainedinthestone,whichissupposedtobethesumofthequantitiesofprimary
matterofthesubstanceswhosebodiestheyare,willbeinfinitelylargerthanthevolumeofthe
stone,andthereforecannotbemeasuredbythevolumeofthestone.
Anobvioussolutionistosaythatthevolumeofaninorganicbodymeasuresthesumofthe
quantitiesofprimarymatterofthesubstanceshavingthelargestorganicbodiesthattogether
completelyfillthespaceoccupiedbytheinorganicbody.Thismayworkmathematically,butitis
notverysatisfyingphilosophically.Whydowewanttomeasuretheprimarymatterofthat
particularsetofsubstances?SofarasIcansee,itisnotasetthatplaysadistinguishedroleatany
otherpointinLeibniz'sphilosophy.
Thisproblemwouldlargelydisappear,ofcourse,ifLeibnizpartitionedasubstance'sprimary
matteramongthesubstanceswhosebodiesarepartofits
396
organicbody,sothatallofthe"larger"substance'sprimarymatterwouldbelongalsoto"smaller"
substances,andeachofthe"smaller"substanceswouldhavepartofit.Inthatcase,wecouldwork
withanyexhaustivepartitionofacorporealaggregateintoorganicbodies.Thesumofthevolumes
ofthosebodieswouldofcourseequalthevolumeofthewholeaggregate.Andthesumofthe
primarymatterofthesubstancestowhichthoseorganicbodiesbelongwouldbe,ina
straightforwardsense,thesumofalltheprimarymatterinthewholeaggregate.Therewouldstill
beinfinitelymanyothersubstanceshavingsmallerbodies,andperhapssomehavinglargerbodies,
inthecorporealaggregate;buttheirprimarymatterwouldstandinapart/wholerelationtothe
primarymatterofsubstancesalreadycounted,andthereforewouldnotbeanadditiontoit.Butin
fact(asIhavearguedinChapter11,section2.2)Leibnizdoesnotandcannotpartitiona
substance'sprimarymatterinthewayrequiredforthissolution.
Leibnizianprimarymatterisindivisibleand"alwaysessentialtothesamesubstance,"andthis
posesaprobleminrelationtophysicists'aspirationsforaquantitativetreatmentofmatter.
Quantitatively,forpurposesofphysics,theprimarymatterofasubstancemustinsomesense
coincidewiththesumoftheprimarymatterofthesubstanceswhose(smaller)organicbodiesare
completelycontainedinitsorganicbody.Theyclearlymustnotbesummedtogether.
Metaphysically,ontheotherhand,theyareperfectlydistinct.
PerhapsthisneednotdisturbLeibniz,however.Itwouldbedisturbingifthequantitative
measurementofprimarymatterweremetaphysicallyfundamentalforhim.Butitisnot
fundamental.Whatisdirectlymeasuredbyvolumeistheextensionjointlyoccupiedbyagroupof
substances.Thisalsoistheprincipalmeasureofthepresentphysicaleffectoftheirprimarymatter.
Itfollowsthatthepresentphysicaleffectofmyprimarymattercoincideswiththatoftheprimary
matterofallthesubstancespresentinmybody,butthatisasitshouldbeforLeibniz.Andmaybe
thereisnothingelsetobemeasuredquantitativelyinprimarymatter.Primarymatterisprimitive
passiveforce,afterall,andLeibnizheld,atleast"withregardtophysics,"that"forcemustbe
measuredbythequantityoftheeffect"(LA137).Thissuggestsananswertothequestion,Whatis
measuredbyassigningtoacorporealaggregateaquantityofprimarymatterproportionatetoits
volume?Wecanreplythatthisquantitymeasuresthepresentphysicaleffectoftheprimarymatter
ofallthesubstances"included"intheaggregate.
Thisdoesnotresolvethequestion,Whyshouldn'tameasureofpresentphysicalexpressionbea
measureofderivativeratherthanprimitivepassiveforce?Thatdifficultyisnotduetothe
indivisibilityofprimarymatter.Itmightbeavoided,however,byanalternativeinterpretationof
Leibniz'sstatementthat"primarymatterormass[moles]...isthesameeverywhereinbody,and
proportionaltoitssize"(GIV,510/L503).1havebeenassumingthat"primarymatter"herehasits
usualLeibnizianmeaningandreferstotheprimitivepassiveforcethatisessentialtoanindividual
substance.InChapter12(pp.37275),however,Ihavenotedthatthereareafewpassages(
NE222,379)inwhichLeibnizappearstocharacterizeas"primarymatter"somethingthatmustbe
abstractedfromsecondarymatterratherthanfromanindivisiblesubstance.Coulditbethispassive
aspectofsecondarymatterassuchthatLeibnizmeans
397
tosayisproportionaleverywheretothevolumeofabody?Theprimarymatterofamassof
secondarymatter,onthisinterpretation,wouldnotbeaprimitiveforce;itisnotexplicitlyclassified
asprimitiveforceinthispassage.Itwouldsimplybethesumofthepresentderivativepassive
forceofthesecondarymatter,asmeasuredbythephysicalmanifestationofthatforceinextension
and/orintertia.
Idonotfindthisanattractiveinterpretation,inasmuchasprimarymatterseemsinthecontext(G
IV,510f./L503f.)tobesomethingthatjoinswithanactiveprincipletoconstituteanindivisible
substance,andthereforeshouldbeanessentialprincipleofanindivisiblesubstance.ButIthinkitis
apossibleinterpretation.Anditdoesnotchangeanythingimportantintheinterpretationof
Leibniz'sphilosophyasawhole.Onanyreading,allwecanquantifydirectlywithrespectto
passiveforcesarecurrentphysicalmagnitudes.Suchmagnitudesarethephysicalexpressionofthe
derivativepassiveforceswhicharethecurrenttendenciesoftheprimitivepassiveforcesof
indivisiblesubstances.Andsubstanceswhosebodiesarerelatedaspartsandwholemustcoincide
inthephysicalexpressionoftheirpassiveforces.Whatismoredifficulttodetermine,andmay
varysomewhatfromtexttotext,ishowLeibnizmeanttorelatetheterminologyof"primary
matter"tothoseimplicationsofhissystem.
Oneother,relatedproblemaboutthequantificationofmatterclaimsourattention.InMay1702
Leibnizsaid,"ContrarytoAristotleandwithDemocritusandDescartes,IaffirmnoRarefactionor
Condensationexcept[merely]apparent"(GIV,393/AG250)."Rarefaction"and"condensation"
meanthesamemattercomingtooccupy,respectively,alargerorasmallervolume.Howdoes
Leibnizrejectthistypeofchange?Heheld,afterall,thatthevolumeoccupiedbyanindividual
createdsubstancecanchange,andoftenchangesdramaticallyinsuchincidentsasgrowthand
death.Andsincethesameprimarymatterisalwaysessentialtoanindividualsubstance,itseemsto
followthatthevolumeoccupiedbythesameprimarymatteroftenchanges.Soitcanhardlybe
withrespecttotheprimarymatterofanindividualsubstancethatLeibnizrejectsrarefactionand
condensation.
Hecanmoreplausiblybetakenasdenyingtherarefactionandcondensationofsecondarymatter.It
seemsentirelyinkeepingwithhisphilosophytoholdthatacorporealaggregateneverchangessize
exceptbytheadditionorsubtractionofoneormorebodies.Ifmybodygrows,itmustbebythe
additionofcells(toputthematterintermsdrawnfromtwentiethcenturyscience),orofsomeother
particles.Ifmybodyshrinksdramaticallyatdeath,itmustbebytheexclusionoflargemassesof
tissuefromthelivingorganism.
Moreintrinsictothetextof1702isthethoughtthatthephysicalmeasureofquantityofmatter
neverremainsconstantthroughachangeofvolume.Forthepassiveforceofimpenetrabilityand
inertia"isthesameeverywhereinbody,andproportionaltoitssize"(GIV,395/AG252).Soour
understandingofLeibniz'sviewsaboutthequantityofmattermayreasonablydetermineour
interpretationofthesenseinwhichhedeniesrarefactionandcondensation.
ItisnoteworthythatthepositionLeibniztakesonthissubjectin1702seemsintensionwitha
thesisthatformspartoftheaccountofpersistingEucharisticaccidentsintheTheologicalSystemof
almosttwentyyearsearlier.There,aspart
398
oftheargumentforarealdistinctionbetweenphysicalforcesandprimitiveforces,theclaimis
madethatGodcouldincreasethemass[moles]anddensityofabody,byincreasingcertainofits
physicalforces,withoutincreasingitsvolume,whichseemsatthesametimetobetakenas
measuringthequantityofprimarymatter(Systema135f.).Asnoted,Ithinkweneednotassume
thatthecitedpassageoftheTheologicalSystemrepresentedLeibniz'sownviewsevenatthetimeit
waswritten.Butareconciliationofthetwotexts,atleastinpart,seemspossible.ForintheSystem,
whileexamplesareallegedinwhichquantitiesofactivephysicalforcearenaturallychanged
withoutchangeofvolume,itisnotclearthatanymoreisclaimedregardingpassivephysicalforces
thanthattheycanbechangedwithoutchangeofvolumebytheabsolutepowerofGod,asdistinct
fromthenaturalorder.Anditmayalsobethatinrejectingrarefactionandcondensationin1702
LeibnizdidnotmeantobesayinganythingaboutwhatGodcoulddo,butonlyabouttheordinary
courseofnature.Itisnotclearthathethoughtthattheconstantproportionalityofpassiveforceto
volumeismorethanafeatureofthephysicalorderthatGodhascontingentlychosenasthebest.
399
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Vollstndigkeit."MonatsheftefrMathematikundPhysik40(1933):97112.
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410
IndexofLeibnizTextsCited
A
I,ii,389:193n
408:193n
501:193n
iii,282:354n
310:391n
333:354n
41819:193n
iv,33536:391n
380:359n
38687:359n
389:359n,
391n
419:354n
420:391n
vii,2947:9192
34:256n
168:354
198:355
22728:356
24849:275n,276,312,35051,353,35556,37677
250:312,353n
257:354n
276:357
294:35657
295:354
viii,125:353n
ix,16:246
15152:391n
211:352,362,380
212:376,378n
634:327n
x,111:355
112:354
14344:355,358n
II,i,20:319
113:197,252n
11718:10,29,42,68
171:354
175:354
24647:239
24849:259
250:135n
29899:190
300:135n
306:35n
31214:116,120,135n,137n,157,192,198
32324:131,13536n,137n,157
325:135n
327:121,157
35155:184,185n,19091
363:121,157
381:200
38384:13536n,200
38788:135n,136n,200
39093:135n,13639,141n,150,158n,16164,17980n,207
400:239n
401:135n,136n
43338:135n,
436:150,19293,198
43738:121,142
455:193n
46970:235n
47677:136n
478:135n
488:359n
490:235n
507:184
529:135n
411
54546:135n,137n
VI,i,177:200
18991:195n,200
27980:199
285:169,238n
29495:195
426:199
465:22
47072:2025,2078
494:19798
496:252n
497n:349n
5017:349n,352
50813:218n,238n,319n,35860
51516:35354,359n
537:12n
54859:196
ii,189:315
247:315
266:218n
28283:169
306:135n
329:220
397:115
417:180
43132:198,201,203n,210
442:319
472:162n
483:68,117
487:169,238n
489:115
492:203
529:203
567:2023
579:12n
iii,3:220
56:235
69:220
11549:68
115:17n
118:117
124:11,42
12728:1617
133:11,117
148:56
15759:355,358n,390n
26970:126
27273:358n
275:120,140,15253n,174
277:153
31819:239
326:315
36467:21,125
37071:125,127
39192:114,116,118,12324,127,146
39596:121,142,146,153
399:182n
46263:17,117
464:17
472:141n
47475:114,126
502:115n,116
51011:135n,238
512:128,130
51415:116,117n,119,128,15253
51819:115,127
52021:11415,148
52223:12830
57179:135n,142
572:18,14546,15154
573:52,117,129,15154,302
574:113,127,302
57879:72,113,115,135n,14251
582:137n
584:117
608:194
631:2023
642:135n
67071:117
vi,8:135n,364
32:269n,36970
43527:SeereferencestoNE.
AG
11:60
2022:12,165n
26:116,117n
2830:2324,26,4344,47,185
9899:26n,29n
1035:244,264,27477,281,293,347
14647:233n,241,244,254n,292n
162:74n
16770:251,273n,27782,337,347,36163,378n,39394
177:273n,282n
412
180:379
181:80,97,265,325n,332,38081
182:226,232,386n,388
183:234,327n
184:388
193:16
19697:29596,304
199:182n,242,246,253n,25758,299
202:300
2034:182n,243,249,300,325n
2056:226,229,263,300,303
23540:135n
23840:121,142,150,19293,198
250:398
251:23233,327n,329
25253:266,269,310n,327,380,395n,398
264:267n
273:187
276:124,126,327
27778:21,344
282:126
287:117
288:369
28990:241,292n,371,375
29091:270,368n
307:224n
319:241n
B
104:185n
11920:43n,165
121:11
12324:232n,235n,238n
C
12:26n,29n
9:43,64n,166n
1213:22223,24143,253,267,278
14:220n,24143,287n
15:252
1620:26n,27,29,4347,58,92
2124:15,37n,4247
26:115
5153:5963,115
60:115,117
68:65
8586:60
15354:109
176:2001
190:119
21112:199
215:200
27073:43,6465,109,160
300:59
358:65
36061:43n,64n,119,122,168n,172n,232n
369:65
37576:43n,64n,160
401:57
405:36,43,64n,168n
408:109
409:115
417:117
431:122
437:169,235n,238
474:204
475:115
489:229
508:90n
513:12122
515:198,203
517:22
51819:43,58,60,65,68,70
52022:104,23031,327,380
528:223
534:49
54243:234n
590:115n
DM
14:39,113,12122,190n,316
57:8385,100,230,316
8:58,69,72,79,95,100,178,207,31516
9:79,100,207,315,317
10:79,315,323
12:228,311
13:16,28n,30,3233,38,54,79,87,108,207
14:53,105,108,131,207,220,240,25658,26061,289,315,317,318n,380
413
5:89,96,357,364,376,393
16:14,44,8586,8992,100,160n
1718:85,311
21:326n
2324:79,135n
26:222
2829:18889,211
30:30,50,56
3334:240,264,292n
36:82,84
Dutens
I,3031:358n
32:302n
273:16n
II,224:188
IV,iii,261:40
280:40
V,403:199
VI,I,36:199
84:19596
E
11214:326n
12425:292n,311,316,362
126334
12728:44,292,295,380
146311
74546:301,305
FC
17885:10,2629,42,44
31923:264,27477,281,347
324:352
325:277
G
I,12326:125
129:125,127
131:120,140,174
132:153
139:131
143:19
145:131n
14748:140n,174,185n
14950:12,21
187:200
188:135n,136n
98:135n,136n
21214:116,120,135n,137n,157,192
22224:13031,13536n,137n,157
225:121,157
25354:184,185n,191
256:190
271:171
33839:136n
360:15
382:105
II,11138:SeereferencestoLA.
16970:232n,326n,327n
171:328,381,395
183:232n,326n
194:286
2056:241,28384
225:19
24849:265
25051:247,266,292,310n,379,38182
252:227,241n,265,273,282n,283,292,348
253:250,254,287n
257:394
261:260,335n
262:80,218,247,315,37980
264:80
266:33031
26768:124,243,260,33435
269:234n,327n,330,379
270:5,132n,21718,256,257n,26061,265,270,293,300,317n,33031,341,378n,
379
272:332
274:312
275:80,97,265,325n,332,381
276:226,232,244n,386n,388
277:234,327n,344
27879:233,25455,331n
281:295n,297,38788
28283:23334,241,244,254,334
29596:98,102,295n
304:254
414
3067:38889,393
312:297
314:297
32425:325n,337,341n
339:232n,234,328
35455:297
37072:80,93,252,254,297,304,357
379:225,233n,241,254n,255,334
388:389
389:290
39091:247,297,354,358,390
396:389,390
399:298,302,354,358,359n,391
403:298
407:358
43536:242,267,299300,3045,392
43839:182n,246,253n,25758,299
444:220n,250,305
45052:250,258,285,300301
45355:303
45860:241,300,303,325n,39293
461:301,304
463:303
474:258,303
480:303
48182:258,303
48586:182n,299300,387,391
492:224
493:106
49596:106,108,259,299300
499:301
5034:300
506:254,325n,387,389
511:301,305
516:300
51718:182n,243,249,300,325n
519:300
52021:229,263,303
III,3334:3940
5859:11
19394:198200
227:269n,36970
247:117
24849:365,369
259:2001
26061:241,263,269n,292n,371,375
311:365
336:322
340:263
347:289n
350:317
353:86,90n,188
35556:263,270,317,368n
357:252,270
363:274,366,368n
367:241
372:321n
374:323
377:199
379:225
400:16
44344:135n,193,2067
450:141n,142
457:363n,457,380,390
472:36
47374:364,369n
510:289
521:226
524:244n
542:251
56162:188n
56970:2024
57273:19,49,207,209
575:314
581:223
582:51,26n
595:254
605:200
62224:225,233n,234,241,243,254n,256,260,301,305,334
636:226,387
657:44,241,243,264,26667,361n,375
65859:221,301n
IV,285:184
294:135n
345:390n
356:256
35859:135n,137n,141n
415
6465:105n,232n,326n
391:22223
39394:23233,327n,329,398
39596:266,269,310n,327,380,395n,398
4014:135n,137n,141n,142
4056:135n,137n,138n,141,213
42425:79,116,117n,149n,168n,183
440:95
467:232n,326
46970:101,330,385n
472:386n
477:252,286,292
484:105
49192:233n,241,244,254n,292n
499:269
507:81,315
5089:80,101,132,238n,265,314
51011:328,370,374,395,39798
512:310n,315
514:238
51819:79,257
52021:91,273n
53032:97,287n,291,318n
54344:317
545:287n
562:254
568:98
569:233n
57273:241,27173,29394
578:106
584:81
58789:91,95,98,234n,326n
591:291
594:80
V,14:184
18:135n
VI,37:11
45:298
348:96
386:22
413:175
47879:323
507:368n
516:246n
521:290
53946:26263,32223
547:320
548:363n
550:241,268
55155:295,32223
570:286,296
584:326n
59394:188
59596:29596,304
VII,19:200n
22:200
26:200
4445:65,198,201,203
83:117
10811:11,187,189
125:200
167:199201
188:200
19193:17879
19495:28n,158,165,168n,173,176,211
199200:43
201:100
208:60
21415:5960,63,160n
26364:22223
29394:117,119,122,135n,149n
300:70
3028:29,141n,16768,207
302:15,69
3034:35,165,176,211
305:174n,177n
31011:135n,177,190
312:85n
31415:226,229n,230,267,269
316317:78
31921:198,235n,240,25557,259,
322:240,267,325,329,364,393
334:126
344:241n
451:318
468:232,241
416
77:199
490:135n,137n
5012:241,244,262,264n,26667
521:199
530:266
561:241
56264:217n,219,225,230,23234,254n,334n
567:287n
GI
16:70
6075:44
7174:26n,28n,34,43,72,16768
13037:26n,28n,44,58,70,115
GM
III,536:244n,280
537:273n,27778,337,347,361,37071
53940:27879,361,395
54142:27981,361
545:361
54647:279,281,361,395
551:362
552:316,370,378n
55556:282,36263
560:273n,363,39394
586:177,179
850:199
IV,93:233
VI,23637:324,38081,393
247:124
251:384
VII,2122:217n
Gr
11:157n
1617:39,165n,176,211
32:196
126:376,394
138:188n
19899:197n
220:354
229:11
26869:17576
27071:15,18,28
286:169n
28890:1214,16,3637,42,140,165n
297:38,40
299300:11,15,28,3839
3012:37,41
3026:2324,26,34,4344,47,185
3078:11,95
31011:19,31,40,4546,1078
322:247,25556
324:168n
325:43n,49,64n,135n,142,165,17172
327:56
32729:322n
330:95
333:3738
336:24
343:27,35
345:42
347:38
351:23
35354:32,40,45,185
358:54,108
360:38
365:190n,191
370:195n
373:45n
38183:11,32,95
38486:36,46n,87
387:93
390:48
39293:38,178
396:15
421:11
433:190
449:357n
47981:3435
49394:2425,36,39
52729:157n
536:11
552:290
598:202
608:22
79293:199n
848:203
L
101:319
11518:218n,238n,319n,
417
35860
126:180
12930:198,201,203n,210
141:218n
14647:10,29,42
15254:239,259
155:315
158:114,126
161:117n,119
16263:115,128
16566:135n
16768:72,113,115,135n,14251
177:121
18285:131n,17879
189:239n
196:131
2015:12,21,131n,140n,174
2078:22223
211:135n
226:70
231:135n,149n
259:359n
26366:10,2629,42,44
26770:43,58,60,65,68,70,104,23031,327,380
289:318
29195:79,135n,149n,1608n,183,221
36365:198,235n,240,25557,259,267,325,329,364,393
384:256
386:135n
38990:105n,232n
40910:22223
433:101,330,385n
43641:324,326n,38081,393
445:124
448:384
45456:292n,311,316,334,362
45758:44,105,220,292,295
460:269
472:318
48691:15,29,35,69,141n,165,16768,174n,176,177n,207,211
49395:79,91n
500502:8081,101,132,238n,265,31415
5036:238,273n,310n,315,328,370,395,39798
51617:232n,326n,327n,328,381,395
519:232n,326n
522:286
524:19
52831:227,241n,247,250,254,265,266,273n,282n,287n,292,310n,348,379,
38182
532:394
53335:80,315,37980
536:124,234n,243,327n,330,334
537:5,132n,21718,256,257n,265,270,293,300,317,33031,341,378n,379
53839:23334,241,244,295n,297,334,387
544:233
583:98
58691:26263,32223
593:188
59899:80,93,252,254,297,304
600601:267,299300,3045,392
602:220n,250,305
6045:250,258,285,300301
6067:241,300,325n,39293
6078:258,303
609:182n,224,299300,387,391
61011:106,108,259,299300
61314:300
617:254,325n,387,389
61921:232n,234n,375
623:243,246n
627:188
659:226,325n,387
66164:19,26n,51,207,209,223
669:217n
418
LA
1213:53,90
20:55
2831:31,53,61,74
4041:14n,31,55,89,93,101
4243:55,57,75,7778,80,102,107
4951:15,19,3132,85,209
5254:56,78n,107
56:4243,57,60,69,70
5758:44,88,247,26364,293n,308,316
64:57
6871:86n,220,264
72:317,33334,336n
7475:44,264
76:262,268,270,273,275,317,334
7778:26364,26768,317
8687:292,336n
9092:87,252,287n,291
9394:44,88,90,92
9597:245n,246,249,336,386n
100101:182n,226,245n,246,249,250n,252,343
1067:292,343
11214:223,287n,318n,320,353
11820:229,253,262,267,292n,311,337,34149,353,374,37677
12122:26364,316
124:262
126:264,345n
13334:80,101,200,329
13537:241,264,268,292,353n,397
LBr
967,38:28384
66:283
69:28283
LC
III,24:69,123
12:124
IV,12:69
29:255
35:124
44:99
V,39:11,3435
18:68,117
29:237n,238
3745:124,255
47:182n
87:106
117:94
LG
189:13n
LH
I,3,5,2324:11
20,160:135n
IV,1,14B,1:23638
1,14C,6:169n
1,14C,10:131
1,14C,11:325n
1,15,3:152n
3,3,12:322n
3,5B,1:231
3,5E,2:257n
3,6,1:138n
4,3C,1214:18485
5,3,34:178
6,9,6:141n
4,3C,1214:11,38n
7B,4748:117
7C,47:235n,238n
7C,70:15
7C,7172:117n,235,238n
7C,7374:235,238n
7C,99100:123,13334
7C,101:220,235n,238n
7C,1056:241n
7C,11114:15,292n
8,6061:11,115n,235,238n,302n
XXXVII,3,16:240
3,910:237
LW
12831:379,38384,395
13639:386
Mon
12:265,278,336
1419:223,265,318,367
3132:175
419
3648:113,118,12122,132,135n,142,146,150,173n,174n,175,17778,190n,
208,213
5052:89,252
6263:252,26566,287,383
6872:263,267
7879:22223,306,318
8790:8283,22223,253
MP
7779:85n,177,190
8185:78,226,229n,230,267,269
96105:26n,27,29,37n,4247,58,92
17375:223,24143,253,267,278
17677:220n,252,287n
NE
6568:86,99,198,365,36769
13033:22829,287n
14546:182n,246,254
15758:116,123
16971:310,317,381n,385n
179:175
182:42
19293:35
21011:246n,375,377
22122:124,252,358,372,374,397
227:182n
265:182n
294:109
307:363n
31718:293n,320
32324:71
344:365
37274:203,256
37880:259,366,368,37374,397
392:226
4034:228
43334:86n,110
43738:135n,171,19394,203n,207
43941:106,367,373
44647:162,202,206,213
45758:197,2023
46465:199,202
48486:70,201
514:357n
52021:197n
P
1820:5960,6263,115,118
5152:43n,64n,119,122,168n,172n,232n
59:65
6566:43n,64n,160
112:60
11521:5960,63,160n
PNG
1:241,243,262
3:263,292n,3067
6:266
7:176n,21011
RL
39:56
69:246n
7374:246n
78:341n
86:34243
107:341
RML
73:222
75:315n
150:221n
203:90n
21922:88
315:292,311
317:221
32122:22021,223
41214:51n,99,305
421:80
437:232n
43940:375
443:234n
447:243,246n
451:267n
457:220
480:232n
490:95,221
420
RS
24:187
38:124,126
42:327
4850:21
Schmidt
47884:117,171n
Schrecker
57:354n
84:30
8788:358n
96:354n
97:33
120:358n
Systema
3135:391n
91113:391n
12729:355,358n
13539:390,399
17779:391n
T
78:39,16668
2022:35,56,114n
27:95
30:96
4345:13,3435,175
74:84
91:93
118:85
17175:13,19,21,37
18486:177n,178,185n,187,190
194:39
199:19
22837:13,19,22,25,34,3638,42
247:82,85
249:94
282:37
28891:11,37,79
302:11
340:84
34950:21
367:13,22
37174:2122
38285:95,101
388:9798,102
391:93,98
39597:97,323n,387,392
41416:49,54,56,75,108
aVIII:22,36
cd9:102
k14:34,36,68
pd2:22,29,39,177n
pd5:198
pd1819:354,357n,358
pd23:94
pd33:202
pd44:39
pd55:29899
pd60:304
VE
710:11
47:135n,137n
51:152n
62:131n
6567:17881
115:28n,158n
132:117n
146:235n,238n
165:168n
166:15,165n
16971:165n,235,238n
180:220,235n,238n
18890:168n,247,25556
218:390n
23339:15758n,165n
277:12n,165n
292:13132n
29495:325n
296:257n
298305:11,38n,184
309:109n
4045:172,235,238n
41618:15,292n
451:95n
455:44
47681:235n,325n
64243:240,318
651:237
869:121n
900:119n,149n
108388:11,115n,172,235,238n,302n
1105:32
1122:32
1141:169n
421
1251:117n,142n,171n
1299:241n
1339:235n
1478:231
1603:123,13334
1607:133n
1763:23n,26n
176768:26n
177576:2829n
1872:23638
188292:322n
1909:141n
1998:327n
2016:165
215459:244,264,27477,281,352
2189:138n
W
63:355
6465:358n
104:232n,311,326
422
GeneralIndex
Aprioriandaposteriori,77,10910,13536,142,167,175,200201,235
Abelard,P.,13,19
Abraham,W.,27n,42n
Absolute.SeeGod;Perfections;Relative
Abstractness,133,180,22324,22728,230,246,27071,27376,281,344,35053,
36163,37277
Accidents,9697,12627,236,300,303,30910;eucharistic,354,38993,39899
Action,124,330,352,359,369,375,37980,387
Activityandpassivity,270,279,28384,320,325,349,350,36164,36970,37577;
distinguished,89,96,28990,364,375
Actuality,6365,74,30910
Actualization,9,14,2021,23,31n,310
Actuation,269,292,294,30910
Adams,M.,106n,290n,293n,349n,354n
Aggregates,15,69,113,119,127,129,143,146,16869,171,27778,282,292
93,308,324,37071,38182;asbodies,218,221,225,233,240,24155,26061,
264,266,269,272,274,276,283,391;ofcorporealsubstances,24142,283;of
forces,38889;andmatter,34247;ofmonads,24144,250,36667;and
phenomenality,237,24042,24447,266,324,343,346,381;andreality,233n,333
36
Aggregation,principleof,24953,261
Aiton,E.,193n,350n
Analysis,27,65,136n,14246,155,171,198200,22324,239,242,255,276
Analyticityoftruths,6566
Anderson,W.,250n
Angels,153,258,358,363;workingmiracles,9394,99
Anglus,T.SeeWhite,T.
Animals,223,24243,26365,270,272,27780,282,371
Annihilation,82,99,1012,303,39192
Anselm,113,137,149n,193
Appearance.SeePhenomena;Phenomenality;Reality
Appetiteorappetition,217,240,263,265,287,28991,3089,31619,33031,380
Approximation,23031,233
Ariew,R.,249n
Aristotelianism,5,70,79,82,160n,246,262,26772,290,292,30710,316,318,
321,324,330,347,34950,376.SeealsoScholasticism
Aristotle,70,78,113,123,199n,244n,245n,268,309,311,312n,31415,334,
350,38081n,398
Arnauld,A.,4,16,3032,44,53,5659,61,6971,74,75,78,8588,90,92,103,
108,109n,200,221,231,246,249,25253,264,268,29192,293n,308,31617,
33334,336,338n,34147,354,374
Aspects,265,275,27980,283,35051,362,376
Atomism,236,374n
Attribute,defined,127
423
AugsburgConfession,35455,359n
Augustine,180,187
Baumgarten,A.,110,113,146
Bayle,P.,25,84,106,29091,322
Being(ensortre),160,171,235,238;andunity,24546,292
Beingsofreason,123
Bennett,J.,70n,37273n
Berkeley,G.,169,21921,22428,229n,235,23738
Bernoulli,James,202
Bernoulli,John,177,179,199,273n,27782,316,347,36164,370,372,37677,
378n,395
Blondel,M.,51n
Blumenfeld,D.,19n,168n
Body,12324,217,319;andcontinuity,233,24243;doubtsaboutexistenceof,238
40,259.SeealsoOrganicbody
Boehm,A.,303n
Bossuet,J.B.,35253n
Bourguet,L.,51,201,254
Bouvet,J.,311
Boyle,R.,228,319
Breger,H.,232n
Broad,C.,27n,30,34n,79,217n,308
Brody,B.,69n
Brown,G.,258
Bulk.SeeMassorbulk[moles]
Burkhardt,H.,192n
Burnett,T.,117n,198200,269n,365,369,371,375
Calvin,J.,197n,35557
Campanella,T.,319
Cardano,G.,201
Carnap,R.,201
Carriero,J.,33n
Cartesianmodesofextension,22829,311,32633,34345,374
Cartesianism,78,120,198,279,292,29596,321,32526,33334,336,345,352
,359n,36162,374.SeealsoDescartes
Cassirer,E.,269
Castaeda,H.,26n,31n,43n,238n
Categories,11314,122
Caterus,150
Catholicism,52n,297,302,305,307,359n,38993.SeealsoJesuits
Causality,1819,75,7778,8182,100,127,31214,32122;andconceptual
connection,78,11619,129n,130,15253,17374,204;efficient,44,83,92,176,
18485,30911;final2021,44,83,26364,318,339;formal,176,294,30910;
andharmony,291;immanentandtranseunt,88,311,318,38385;andknowledge,
10910;mechanical,263;andperfection,153;realityof,88,33940.Seealso
ConservationofcreaturesbyGod;Occasionalism;Substance
CentroFiorentino,3n
Certainty:metaphysical,198,259;moral,19899,201,259
Characteristic,general,117,136n,200202
Churches,reunionof,350,35253n,359n
Clarke,S.,22,6869,99,117,124,25455
Coimbra,245n
Collingwood,R.,6
Colors,114,119,227,229,248
Commonsense,219,224,247
Compatibilism,11,20,51
Composition,24244,28081,338
Compossibilityandincompossibility,4849,1045,16566
Concepts:basic,1415,47,50,64;complete,1415,3133,4446,61,63,7274,
7980,104,107,315,317;andforms,79;God's,61,67,79;incomplete,45;
individual,14,31,53,57,61,63,7274,7879,104,1078;problematic,3045,
358;simple,6667,12122
Conceptualcontainment,77.SeePredicates;Truth
Conceptualtruthandfalsity,9,27,29,47
Conceptualism,223,24647,257n
ConcurrenceofGodwithcreatedcauses,9495,98,18889,359;ordinaryand
extraordinary,8790
Condensation,39899
Confusion,22829,25052,257,325,363,377,387,394
424
Conjunction,6566,116,11819,122,143,173
Conring,H.,136n
Consciousness,222,28890,320
ConservationofcreaturesbyGod,8788,9599,102,131n,132
Consistencyandinconsistency,27,49,60,64;conceptual56,64,66,72
Constituents,13334,244,26769,272,28081,284,299
Construction(and"resulting"),13334,217,22326,232,24346,25153,25556,
299,366;logical,65;metaphysical,124.SeealsoReduction
Contingency,4,952;dere,36;infiniteanalysistheoryof,2530,3435,3738,40
41,43n,44,51,87,140,175,228;"possibleinitsownnature"theoryof,1222,37
n,38,40,51,140;rootof,40,87;ofsomeconnectionsamongpossibles,3034,43
Continuity,225,23234,236,326,328,334;andsubstantialbonds,24243,300301
Contradiction,principleorlawof,51,184,186
Conventionalism,178
Cosmologicalargument,141,175,176n,177n,211
Counterfactualconditionals,49n,105,107
Counterparttheory,5455,105
Couturat,L.,4,9,27n,43,58n,68,75,109n,149n,192n
Cover,J.,225n,244n,25354
Creation,4950,5556,67,72,75,88,9496,99,107,13132,16667,170,320
Crusius,C.,15n,110
Cudworth,R.,32023
Curley,E.,9,16,25,27n,2930,3941,43
Damnation,13
DatingofLeibniz'swritings,12n,23n,25,26n,28n,32,4446,95n,109n,117n,
121n,132n,133n,141n,142n,149n,157n,158n,16566n,168n,171n,188n,220
,23031,23537,241,248n,270,325,327n,34142,344,346,390
DeOlaso,E.,192n,197n,202n,203n
DeVolder,B.,19,80,124,234,24344,250,254,256,26566,270,28284,286,
295n,296,299,308,310n,312,327n,328,33032,335,341,344,378n,37982,
386n,387,39495
Death,266,398
Definition,11718,200,31415;real,79,116,168,235;roleof,30,52,109,199,
201
Democritus,398
Demonstrability,2630,32,3537,3941,4550,64,102,140,14447,175;dere,
37n
Demonstration,26,34,135,14345,192,194,198,201;moral,194,197
Density,233n,234,328,395n,399
Denzinger,H.,52
DesBosses,B.,16n,52,93,106,224,229,234,241n,24243,255,257,259,285
,295n,297307,325n,328,33738,341n,350,354,35758,38793
Descartes,R.,66,70,116,13537,149,153,157,16162,171,18485,190,192
93,197,221,256,259,274n,29293,297,313n,31820,32526,334,35455,
359n,378,398.SeealsoCartesianism
Determinism,4,11,20,29,51,68,125,317,385
DevelopmentofLeibniz'sthought,121,13031,217,23540,25556,259,264,267,
291340,35860,371,37577,38182,387,392
Distance,25152,356
Distinctness,129,132;degreesof,251,394;ofknowledge,22729;ofperception,36,
226,25053,28586;andreality,229,235.SeealsoIdentity
Divisibilityordivision,34748,370,379;infinite,119n,22425,229,23233,236,
237n,255,27982,287,292,326,33338.SeealsoForm;Matter,primary
Domination,265,28591,38687,394
Dreaming,232,23839,255,257,259
Dummett,M.,69,178
DuranddeSt.Pourain,9495
425
Duration,andexistence,23132
Dutens,L.,302n
Dynamics,311,339
Ease:andperfection,211;andprobability,2035,208,21011
Eckhard,A.,12022,130,131n,135n,136,137n,148,15758,165,171,192
Ego,119
Elements,244,276,281
Elizabeth,PrincessPalatine,121,19293,198,318n
Emanation,13132
Entelechy,9697,232,262,265,269,279,28284,292,297,311,344,362,370,
379,38285
Entity[Ens].SeeBeing
Epistemology,3,257,259,364;oflogicandmathematics,18689
Ernst,CountvonHessenRheinfels,390n,391n
Essence,4,10,1314,1719,4445,113,129,147n,155,222,226,238,311,315
,357;defined,127,13639;andexistence,13639,153,15776,208,211;and
nature,8694,100,350;andnecessarytruths,178;andpossibility,13641,17778,
2078,211;realityof,17791
Essential,31,45,117
Eternaltruths,asprovingexistenceofGod,17783,185
Eternity,114,12324
Eucharist,218n,298,300,34960,38993.SeealsoAccidents,eucharistic;
Transubstantiation
Exigentiaexigence[demand],9798,102,15859,165,173,176,211.Seealso
Strivingforexistence
Existence,4,910,1719,31,41,45,68,94,119,135;andconceptualcontainment,
4246,6365,74,108;definitionsof,64,128,160,16470,23538;necessary,14,
1617,46,67,13741,14850,155,16264;andperception,16970,23538;and
perfection,43,64,120,14850,15776;andpossibility,2089;andpower,238;and
predication,15960;relatedtoGod'schoice,43,64,128;selfexplanatory,18486
Existential,31,34,43,45,46n,72
Experience,110,200201,220,304
Explanation,mechanicalandteleological,291,323,367,386
Expression,189,22023,22831,25758,260,317,38485;directnessof,28688,
291,360,394;natureof,286,384
Extension(spatial),123,22425,247,250,270,281,300,311,325,338,35152,
354,362n,365,369,371,374,377,378,388,39394;defined,232,234,326,
328,334;relationalityof,32633;andsubstance,32538
Extensionalinterpretationofpredicatelogic,5861,63
Facts,69
Falsebeliefs,104,257
Fardella,M.,27477,347,352
Finitethings,15,44,69,131,16970
Force,8890,120,124,132,307;activeandpassive,269,312n,325,327,380,383
,387;andappetite,380;corporealorphysical,226,232,247,33940,37899;and
embodiment,39495;individuationof,38586,388;andperception,35253,380,382
,38485,388,39394;andphenomenality,226,38186,38788;andpresence,355
58;primitive,7882,86,89,1067,265,269,300,311,312n,370,376;primitive
andderivative,97,310n,33031,37899;primitivepassive,28283,32425,32733,
34749,39399;andreality,228,311,339,386n,388;andsubstance,80,226n,265
,269,35556,358,379.SeealsoDynamics;Form;Laws;Matter,primary;
Modificationormode
Form,substantial,4,85,97,105,131n,132,266,307,30823,324,33940,344,
35052;asabstract,35052,37576;andactivity,78,80,96,279,284,31011,361
64,370;ascause,95,176n,30911,316;andconcept,79,315;andcorporeal
substance,268,271,27477,333,336,34849;anddivisibility,336n;asessence,89
94,100,176n;asforce,30915;and
426
law,7881,86,90,31416,319;andlife,32023;asnature,8788,31112;and
perception,31617;andproperties,309;rehabilitationof,23637,23940,262,268,
352;assoul,268,290,31620;andsubstantialbonds,300301;andsubstantialunity,
292,337,343,365;andthought,365;unityorpluralityof,290.SeealsoSouls
Foucher,S.,239,259
Foundations,124
Freewill,11,20,33,35,41,44,69,92,228
Frege,G.,69
Friedmann,G.,125n
Furth,M.,219n
Galileo,326
Gallois,J.,200
Garber,D.,79n,217n,218n,249n,268n,293n,308,316,318n,32425,326n,333
n,335n,33839,34142,351n,362n,377,378n,379,381,384n,387,394n
Gassendi,P.,161
Gaunilo,150
Geometricalproperties,13,344
Geometry,187,225,326
Gerhardt,C.,192n
Gilson,E.,245n
God:absoluteandorderedpowerof,106n,399;active,363;attributesof,72,11334;
choosingthebest,3642,52,55,68,85,102,12526,128,16670,173,187,258,
399;decisionsof,32,38,40,315;essenceof,38,4041,113,116,128,13639,
177,180,18586,190;existenceof4,910,1618,67,135213;freedomof1213,
20,35,38,55;goodnessof,2122,36,40,49,5556,102,1078,180,190,294;
immanenceof,124,131;incorporealityof,394;intellectof,2021,29,31,41,125
26,17791,246,299;justiceof,15,20,40,190;knowingfinitethings,16970;as
perceiver,16970,23538;perfectionof,15,36,3839,41,106,11323,137,394;
personalityof,12526;possibledecisionsof,15,31,33;possibilityof,18,113,121,
131n,13536,186;powerof,20,49,81,16768,273,293,363;transworldidentity
of,55;uniquenessof,153;willof,9,1216,1921,25,31,12526,184,185n,187
,190,236,299,319,386;wisdomof,36,40,5556,83,97,102,1068,236,363
.SeealsoConcurrenceofGodwithcreatedcauses;Eternity;Immensity;Infinity;
Omnipotence;Omniscience;Ontologicalargument;Perfections
Goldbach,C.,13n
Grace,87,91;created,93;andnature,8285
Gravity,318n
Grua,G.,22n,24n,26n,32,37n,40n,42,152n,180n,185n,190n,195n
Gueroult,M.,38283
Hacking,I.,27n,192n,199n,2012,203n
Hallucination,255,257
Hansen,F.,193n
Harmony,10,13n,17,102,105,107,227,232,287,318,323,366,368,385;
andexistence,16970,23536,23839;andperception,353,357;preestablished,44,
8384,100,104,106,188,22223,253,291,305,322,338,377,380,384;and
reality,218,25560,331;andunityofcorporealsubstance,27273,29299,3057
Hartshorne,C.,137n
Hartz,G.,225n,233n,241n,244n,249n,25355
Heresy,195
Historyofphilosophy,56
Hobbes,T.,178,218n
Hochstetter,E.,217n,218n,230n,241n
Hoffman,P.,293n,313n,318n
Homogeneity,234,244,27476,334,344,34647
Hume,D.,78,312
Huthman,H.,136n
Hyman,J.,288n
Idealism,5,21719,245,274,293,308,339
427
Ideality,123,225,23233,25355,300301,334n
Ideas:Berkeleyan,220,22425;inGod'smind,17791,22122;inourminds,18889,
22122
Identicalpropositions,26,28,37n,65,14547
Identity,71,119;counterfactualortransworld,4,5357,61,7174,7576,103,107
9;ofindiscernibles,4n,13132,153;transtemporal,7778,80,31314
Illumination,divine,18789
Imagination,22425,25556,331
ImmediaterelationbetweenGodandoursouls,18889,221
Immensity,114,12324
Immortality,99,197,276,36571
Impenetrability,232,32729,332,35051,393,395,398
Incarnation,94,99,125,302n,3045
Inconsistency.SeeConsistencyandinconsistency
Individual,possible,48
Individuation,349n,355
Induction,201
Inertia,226,328,371,375,387,39394,398
Infinitecomplexity:ofcauses,91;ofthephysicaluniverse,22728;andshape,22932.
SeealsoContingency;Reasons,incliningwithoutnecessitating
Infinity,divine:conceptualpriorityof,116;positive,11516
Influence,physical,298
Intellect(human),22627,331
Intensionalinterpretationofpredicatelogic,5865,160
Intentionalobjects,21920,223,247
Interaction,physical,78,94
Intrinsicconnections,3132
Irvine,W.,34n,251
Janke,W.,125,135n,138n,149n,195n
Jaquelot,I.,36,193,364,369n,378,390
Jarrett,C.,70
Jesuits,29597,302n,303
JohannFriedrich,DukeofHannover,197,236n
Jolley,N.,218n,36465,36768
Judgment,19091
Jurisprudence,22,126n,194200
Kabitz,W.,12n,224n
Kant,I.,3,77,83n,113,124n,125,15961,182,219,22627,304,33233,366
Kauppi,R.,58n,59n,63n,67n,72n
Kooij,M.,65n,241
Kripke,S.,48n
Labrousse,E.,25n
Lamarra,A.,227n,232n,244n
Lamy,F.,90
Laws:andforces,80,31215,379;andforms,7881,86,90,31416,319,32123;
andGod,313,319;andindividualidentity,7881;inindividuals,99;andintelligence,
319;mechanicalorcorporeal,253,283,288,298,317,321n,323,326n,383,385;
ofnature,contrastedwithuniversallawofgeneralorder,8587,8992,104;ofnature
orofauniverse,3133,4344,7678,8082,84,258,291,318;psychological,283,
288,298,318;realityof31214
LeBrun,J.,196n
LeClerc,J.,322
Lewis,D.,5455,105n
Life,26264,279,32023
Limitation,9697,11314,116,11819,12123,13234,143,146,18283,376,378
,38081,39394
Lindbeck,G.,195n
Locke,J.,78,11516,228,269n,36475
Loeb,L.,80,217n,218n
Logic:deontic,22;medieval,69;modal,3,9,1617,4650,13941,14647;
ontologyof,71,16162,17792;philosophyof,35,75,18689,309;ofpredicates,
72,159
Logicalform,17879
Lovejoy,A.,25n,28,34
LuckyProof,34
Lutheranism,194,302,354,35657,359n,389
428
Machines,83,106,292,299,310n,367,373.SeealsoExplanation;Laws;Organic
body
Malcolm,N.,114
Malebranche,N.,50n,8385,88,93,9596,132,136n,188,22021,297,312,314
n,321n
Marci,M.,319
Masham,D.,270,274,317,321n,322,366
Mason,H.,348n
Mass[massa],232n,241,26566,27172,278,28283,323,34246,361,381
Massorbulk[moles],232,236,269,27779,340,361,370,374n,388,390,395,
397
Mates,B.,4n,45n,54n,73,160n,182n,184n,237n
Mathematics,226,33940;philosophyof,17879,18689
Mathieu,V.,300n
Matter,12324,236,270,319,32123,32438;Cartesian,34246;andcontinuity,233
.SeealsoThinking
Matter,primary,273,27779,310n,33642,34764,366,36977;andconfused
perception,251,325,364,39394;defined,266,324;indivisible,33738,347,349,
352,377,39697;andpassivity,96,265,271,279,284,310,32425,328,36164,
36971,376,383;andphysics,39399;andsubstantialbonds,300301
Matter,secondary,218,26566,26869,271,27884,310n,337,34147,351,361,
363,366,37075,381,38889,393,395,39798;defined,266,324
McGuire,J.,229n,253n
McRae,R.,220n,234n,246n,254
Meaning,237
Mechanism,263,385
Meier,G.,327n
Mesland,D.,359n
Metaphysics,225,247,304,339,378,386n,389
Microscope,229,263,287
Middleknowledge,44
Minds,8485,92,123,126,16768,239,35960,36375;andbodies,88,197,218
n
Miracles,44,76,81102,125,296,300,351,36869;ofthefirstrank,9499;and
freewill,92
Modificationormode,97,126,12830,132,153,18081,22122,235,246,249,
300301,302n,303,314,37071,395;offorces,33031,37893
Molanus,G.,30
Molina,L.de,44n
Monads,5,80,96,105,108,118,132,224,227,237,332,33839,355,377,385
,390;aggregatesof,24144;andcorporealsubstance,26772,276,279,283;defined,
27778;dominant,250,26567,28591,299300,3056,38687;expressingorganic
body,286;infinitemultiplicityof,23940;perceivingeachother,25152;spatial
positionof,25055,288;andsubstantialunity,265,267,292,3056;and
transubstantiation,3034.SeealsoSubstance
Mondadori,F.,17n,31n,54n,55n,75n,184n,186n
Motion,13,123,246,313n,326,38081;circular,90,99n;elliptical,91;
phenomenalityof,228229,248,331,339,34345,375,385,388
Mugnai,M.,45n,184n
Mysteries,296,304
Naert,E.,256n
Natural,102,27273,296,36869,399
Naturalism,91
Nature.SeeEssence;Form;Grace;Laws;Order
Necessity,952;causal,117;dedicto,37;dere,25;ofGod'schoosingthebest,3642;
hypothetical,11,1620,52;logical,117,144;metaphysical,11,22,3637,41,107,
144,31213n;moral,11,2122,36,39,52;physical,37n
Negation,6566,11516,11819,12122,131n,134,143,154,376,394
429
Newton,I.,124
Nicole,P.,58n,61n,70n,109n
Nizolius,M.,162n,180,201
Nothing,21011
Number,234,246,329
Occasionalism,44,88,90,91n,9597,238,29596,312,313n,314n,316,32122,
326n,33940,386n
Ockham,W.,349
Oldenburg,H.,125
Omnipotence,114,123,180,362,364
Omnipresence,12324
Omniscience,114,119,12224,131,18183
Ontologicalargument,4,18,66,113,120,125,13556,157,161,166,172,181,
186
Ontologicalstatus,17780,18687,191,24447,257n,287
Ontology,113,277
Order,moralandnatural,8285,399
Organicbody,24142,25052,26273,27576,27980,28283,294,298,310n,322
23,351,357,362n,363,367,377,384;defined,26364,291;expressingamonad,
23031,260,263,28688,291,386,394;expressingtheuniverse,28788,291;as
machine,250,263,26566,269
Organicfunction,28991
Organicstructure,285
Pain,andperfection,12022
Pantheism,80,114,12434,314
Paradox,logical,183
Parkinson,G.,45n,125n,175n
Parts,124,225,24244,26567,27476,278,28081,33435,33738,34648,369
Passivity.SeeActivityandpassivity;Force;Matter,primary
PellissonFontanier,P.312n,34961,37576
Perception,philosophyof,245,28688
Perceptions,13,35,67,75,79,84,93,1026,122,223,263,316,318;distinct
andconfused,36,226,257,28586,325,327,36364,39596;andexistenceor
actuality,16970,23538;metaphysicalroleof,21718,265,3089,32731,339,352
53,35960,362,366,375,377;nexusof,80;andphenomena,21924;and
sensations,22526;spatial,122;unconscious,226,239,320.SeealsoExpression;
Form;Force;Matter,primary
Perfection,96,36364,37577;degreesof122,157,285,396;andessence,15758;
andmonadicdomination,285;natureof,83,8990,12122,394;andreality,12021,
157,16566
Perfections(ofGod),11324,14251;absolute,11315,121,133,142;defined,113,
120,142;andlimitedqualities,11819,123,133,376;moral,114n;positive,11315,
11823,142,14546,157;asqualities,113,157;simple,11316,11822,14246,
157
Pfaff,C.,51,302n
Phenomena,124,131,227,266,296,300,308,385,391;defined,21928;God's,
253n,25758;realityof,218,223,239,253n,25561,300301;andsubstance,240;
wellfounded,225n,245,25354,300,343,382,38788
Phenomenalism,5,21761,262,264,3013,33133,360
Phenomenality,25355,366;ofmatter,266,34245,373n,374;ofphysicalqualities,
22834,311,339,343,345.SeealsoAggregates;Force;Motion;Shape;Size
Philo,180
Physicalproperties,22834,247.SeealsoCartesianmodesofextension;Continuity;
Extension;Force;Space
Physics,226,327,33840,37899
Placcius,V.,195
Place,246,252,35460,377,38081
Plantinga,A.,137n
Plants,26364,277,316,371
Plasticnatures,32023
Plato,118,129,178n,180
Platonism,71,118,17880,309,350
Pleasure,84,121
Points,236,242,244,252,27476,279,28182
430
Pointsofview,25152,288
Position,spatial,25055,288,326,395
Possibilities,71,122,13637,14041,16162;andpresumption,192213;realityof,
177
Potentiality,269,30910,330,349
Powersofcreatedsubstances,13,44,82,8687,8990,121,132
Practicalpartofphilosophyandtheology,19299
Predicates,containedinconcepts,4,910,26,32,4246,53,65,68,70,7778,108
,16264
Predications:timeindexed,73;worldindexed,7374
Prediction,25657,25960
Presence,124;eucharistic,298,35360,389;metaphysical,29798,389.Seealso
Transubstantiation
Presumption,135,192213
Principle[principium],124,165
Priority,225;conceptual,224;innature,97,117,18486,35152
Probability,192,195,198202,259;conditional,2012;"logical"interpretationof,
201
Proof,indirect,10910
Properties,123,12728,30910;defined,127,157n
Prophecy,9192
Propositions,69;affirmativeandnegative,5863,71;categorical,5758,61;
conditional,57;universal,particular,andsingular5865,71
Prudence,197,202
Qualities:degreesof,11820;occult,329;primaryandsecondary,227,328,333,340;
sensible,114,11922,246.SeealsoCartesianmodesofextension;Perfections
Quantity,279,28182,334,349,35152,39399
Rainbow,218,224,249,264,292,300,308,343,345,382,388;asaggregateof
drops,24748
Ramati,A.,123n
Rarefaction,39899
Ray,J.,321n
Realism,5,69,227,262,283,308,33840
Reality,12024,133,233n,243n,311,33335;andappearance,22730,23334,247
;ofbodies,218,22324,22627,23839,25361,300;borrowed,260,335;degrees
of,157,16566,229,247;andexistence,178,211;objective,220,22223;and
reduction,245
Reason,andtheology,3035,39293
Reasons:apriori,77,10910;forexistence,120,15154,168,17576,20811;
incliningwithoutnecessitating,3436,5152;fornonexistence,17576,20811.See
alsoSufficientreason
Reduction,223,235,239,242,245,255,298,306,308.SeealsoConstruction
Regionofideasoreternaltruths,136,13839,162,164,177
Regius(H.leRoy),293n
Regress,infinite,4042,335,347
Reid,T.,329
Relation:intersubstantial,13n,14,1026,249,299,32633,351;minddependent,71,
18182,234,24647,258
Relative,opposedtoabsolute,115,123,254,329
Religion,6;philosophyof,304
Remnant,P.,70n,37273n
Rmond,N.,200,256,301n,387
Representation,222,225,385
Requirements[requisita],41,68,120,133,140,15152,174,2034,207,338,346
47;defined,11718;first,129,173
Rescher,N.,25,27n,28,3941
Resistance,284,32732,35051,37071,375,387,390,39394
Result.SeeConstruction
Risse,W.,110n
Robinet,A.,93n,96n,97n,131n,217n,218n,220n,224n,230n,236n,237n,252
n,297n,298n,302n
Rowe,W.,69n,176n
Russell,B.,45,9,2830,34,75,184,189,251,28586,300302
431
Saame,O.,16n,17n,117n
Salvation,13
Schepers,H.,45n,50n
Schneiders,W.,134n
Scholasticism,5,59,88,106,169,221,236,239,245n,266,26974,290,293
94,301,307,311,319n,320,32425,33637,339,349,352,36263,393.See
alsoAristotelianism
Schupp,F.,109n
Science,6,198,219,22628,247,257,26061
Scotus,J.,40,186n,349
Semimentalbeings,254
Sensation,220,22527,235,240
Sets,mathematical,245,24849
Shape,246,326,352,378,383,395;phenomenalityof,22932,233,248,34345
Sheppard,T.,291n
Similarity,119,189,25051
Simplicity,117,313n;ofexplanations,9091,99;oflaws,83,85,92;ofmotions,91
;ofnatures,predicates,orproperties,66,72,11922,129;andpossibility,192;and
probability,2035,21011;ofsubstances,217.SeealsoConcepts,simple;Perfections
Sin,16,56,79
SincerityofLeibniz,6,5052,29697,299307
Size,326,39597;phenomenalityof,22829,248,34345
Skepticism,23940,259
Sleigh,R.,13n,20n,45n,54n,67,70n,78n,79n,86n,88n,96,105n,108n,109
n,229n,230n,240,268n,317n,341n,343n,344,345n,347n,390n
Smit,H.,349n
Sophia,Duchess/ElectressofHannover,9192,19293n
SophiaCharlotte,QueenofPrussia,290
Souls,9697,131n,197,237,23940,242,252,262,26566,26869,308,316
23,333,336;expressingbody,296;immaterialityof,36475;rational,268,270,290
91,297,336n;sensitive,29091;andsubstance,27478,28081;vegetative,29091,
310.SeealsoForm;Monads
Space,12324,127,22425,243,24950,25355,281,328,359
Spinoza,B.,12,2021,23,28,80,101,114,119,12334,138n,140,142,148
49,15153,157,16163,169,172,174,175n,185,291n,31213n,314n
Spontaneity,11,44
Squareofopposition,6063
Stein,L.,125n
Steno,N.(NielsStensen),11,17n,18,41n
Stillingfleet,E.,36465
Stoics,126
Strivingforexistence,168.SeealsoExigentia/exigence
Sturm,J.,370,374n
Surez,F.,31n,245n,246,26974,29394,298n,30911,312n,314n,334
Subaggregates,244,276,281
Subjects,13033,27677,350,355,361,370,37577,379,38992
Substance,1314,31,7173,7781,100,13132,207,23536,246,249,314,375
77;andactivity,95,98,101,327n,359;causalindependenceof,53,7980,94,105
6,18889,28385,298,313,329,353,357,377,380;completeandincomplete,
26974,27879,29395,370,37273,37577;composite,263,267,271,27778,
294,3057,309,32425,387;andessence,350;expressivecompletenessof,79,93,
104,188,22831,250,257,315,317;andforceorpower,80,238,265;simple,
217,234,270,278,29394,300301,3089,33032,341,36667,369;andunity,
291307.SeealsoForm;Monads
Substance,corporeal,218,232,236,24142,262308,343,34647,35860,362n,
371;alive,26264;Aristotelianonesubstancetheoryof,26768,27172,27476,279
80,28283,285,349,351n;indivisible,377;qualifiedmonadtheoryof,269,275
77,280,28385,292,351n;spatialpositionof,250;twosubstancetheoryof,241n,
26567,268n,272,27478,28385,292,351n
432
Substantialbond[vinculumsubstantiale],24243,258,285n,299305,325n,350,387
,389,39192
Substratum,266,324,332,347,349
Sufficientreason,10,12,4142,110;principleof,51,57,6769,78,117,141,173
75,176n,183,186
Superaddition,15859,167,226n,298300,302n,3035,39091
Superessentialismandsuperintrinsicalness,108n
Supposition,193,205
Suppositum,29899,305
Synthesis,27
Tarski,A.,27
Teleology,318,32021
Theodicy,49,56,8385,9697
Theology:andjurisprudence,19498;andmetaphysics,46,43n,290,296,358;and
reason,3035,39293
Thinking,andmatter,270,36475
ThomasAquinas,37,40,96n,106n,153,336n,339,349,35859,36263
Time,73,123,224,231,246,253,379
Tournemine,R.de,29599,3045,358,387,389
Transubstantiation,258,298,300,3025,319n,35354,359,38993.Seealso
Presence
Trent,Councilof,354
Truth:andcoherence,236;conceptualcontainmenttheoryof4,9,11,36,49n,51,56
n,5774,7879,100,110;correspondencetheoryof,6970,17879;defined,236;and
God18491,236
Truthsofreasonandfact,110,202
Tschirnhaus,E.W.von,125,126n
Union:intheincarnation,99,302n,3045;ofmatterandform,30910,377;
metaphysical,29699,301n,306,358,391;ofmind(orsoul)andbody,218n,272,
29293,29598,301n,3045,35860,387;physical,306
Unit,arithmetical,225,234
Unities,constitutive,244
Unity:accidental[peraccidens],24546,266,29293,334;andbeing,24546;of
bodies,243,346;intrinsic[perse],24546,267,271,278,291307,334;principles
of,239,265,267,27173,291307,343,37173;true,26667,271,34647;and
unicity[unicit],306.SeealsoHarmony;Substantialbond
Universals,71,246,309
Value,explanatoryroleof,2021
Verifiability,237
ViennaCircle,3
Vinculumsubstantiale.SeeSubstantialbond
Visionaries,256n
Volume,39599
Voluntarism,185,187,19091
Wagner,G.,15
Wan,D.,395n
Watson,R.,359n
Wedderkopf,M.,1012,29,42,68
Weisman,J.,150n
White,T.[Anglus,T.],349n,351
Will:andactivity,289;natureof,114n
Wilson,C.,4n,217n,218n,239
Wilson,M.,5457,224n,227n,228n
Winterbourne,A.,253
Wolff,C.,15n,113,146,38385,387,392,394
World,15,69;intelligible,366
World,actual,1213,16,23,25,31,6365,67,7577,8081,1023;bestpossible,
84,16667,235;itsbestnesscontingent,2325,2728,43,52;harmoniousnessof,
1089
World,possible,3,9,1216,23,3233,7274,7577,8081,99100,1034,1089,
128;possibleworldssemantics,4650
433
434
435
436
437
438

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