Foster Weeler Process STD 602 Safety Device Design PDF

PROCESS STD 602
PAGE Contents-1
FOSTER WHEELER SAFETY REVISION 3
PROCESS PLANTS DIVISION RELIEVING DEVICES DATE December 1999
CONTENTS PAGE
1.0 GENERAL INFORMATION

1.1 Scope 1.0-1
1.2 Basis 1.0-1
1.3 Limitations 1.0-1
1.3.1 National, Local and Client Codes 1.0-1
1.3.2 Mobile Equipment 1.0-1
1.3.3 Overheating and Corrosion 1.0-1
1.4 Definitions 1.0-2
1.4.1 Relieving Devices 1.0-2
1.4.2 Terms 1.0-5
2.0 VARIOUS TYPES OF RELIEVING DEVICES

2.1 Safety Valves and Safety-Relief Valves 2.0-1
2.1.1 Conventional Type 2.0-1
2.1.2 Balanced Type 2.0-2
2.2 Relief Valves 2.0-3
2.3 Pilot-Operated Pressure Relief Valves 2.0-3
2.4 Pilot-Assited Pressure Relief Valves 2.0-4
2.5 Rupture Disk Devices 2.0-5
2.5.1 Installation 2.0-5
2.5.2 Selection of Rupture Disk Type 2.0-5
2.5.3 Rapid Pressure Rise 2.0-5
2.5.4 Upstream of Pressure Relief Valve 2.0-5
2.5.5 Downstream of Pressure Relief Valve 2.0-6
2.5.6 Use in Hydrogen 2.0-6
2.6 Liquid Seals 2.0-6
2.7 Explosion Hatches 2.0-6
2.8 Vacuum Relieving Devices 2.0-6
2.9 "O Ring" Seat Seal or Stellited Pressure Relief Valve 2.0-7
2.10 Breaking Pin Devices and Spring-Loaded Non-Reclosing Pressure Relief Devices 2.0-7
3.0 CODES REQUIREMENTS FOR PROTECTIVE DEVICES

3.1 Boilers, Economizers, Superheaters, Reheaters, Organic Fluid Vapor Generators 3.0-1
(ASME Section I)
3.1.1 Number of Safety Valves or Safety Relief Valves 3.0-1
3.1.2 Relieving Capacity 3.0-2
3.1.3 Pressure Setting, Accumulation and Tolerance 3.0-3
3.1.4 Electric Boilers and Organic Fluid Vapor Generators 3.0-3
3.1.5 Isolating Valves 3.0-3
3.2 Pressure Vessels (ASME Section VIII) 3.0-4
3.2.1 Number of Relieving Devices 3.0-4
3.2.2 Relieving Capacity 3.0-4
3.2.3 Pressure Setting and Tolerance of Pressure Relief Valves 3.0-4
3.2.4 Pressure Setting and Tolerance of Rupture Disk Devices 3.0-6
3.2.5 Pressure Accumulation 3.0-9
3.2.6 Vaccum Design 3.0-9
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE Contents-2
CONTENTS PAGE
3.3 Pressure Accumulation Guide 3.0-10

3.4 Other National Codes 3.0-10
3.4.1 Italian Code ISPESL 3.0-10
3.4.2 British Standard B.S 5500 3.0-10
3.4.3 French Code 3.0-11
4.0 HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS AND INDIVIDUAL RELIEVING RATES 4.0-1

4.1 Fire 4.0-2
4.1.1 Fire Outside a Pressure Vessel 4.0-2
4.1.2 Protection of Vessels from Fire Exposure 4.0-2
4.1.3 Formula for Amount of Heat Absorbed 4.0-4
4.1.4 Surface Area Exposed to Fire 4.0-5
4.1.5 Relieving Capacity in Case of Fire 4.0-8
4.2 Operational Failure 4.0-17
4.2.1 Closed Outlets 4.0-17
4.2.2 Opening Manual Valves or Check-Valve Failure 4.0-18
4.2.3 Cooling Water Failure 4.0-18
4.2.4 Tower Top Reflux or Top Product Failure 4.0-19
4.2.5 Pumparound or Sidestream Reflux Failure 4.0-20
4.2.6 Reflux and Pumparound Failure 4.0-20
4.2.7 Absorbent Medium Failure 4.0-20
4.2.8 Accumulation of Non-Condensables 4.0-21
4.2.9 Volatile Material into System 4.0-21
4.2.10 Overfilling of Storage or Surge Vessels 4.0-21
4.2.11 Automatic Control Failure 4.0-22
4.2.12 Abnormal Process Heat Input 4.0-26
4.2.13 Internal Explosion (Excluding Detonation) 4.0-27
4.2.14 Chemical Reaction 4.0-27
4.2.15 Hydraulic Expansion of Liquids and Vapors 4.0-28
4.2.16 Heat Exchanger Tube Failure 4.0-30
4.2.17 Electric Power Failure 4.0-30
4.2.18 Instrument Air Failure 4.0-31
4.2.19 Steam Failure 4.0-32
4.2.20 Loss of Heat in Series Fractionation Systems 4.0-32
4.2.21 Other Causes 4.0-32
4.3 Protection of Equipment 4.0-32
4.3.1 Pressure Vessels 4.0-32
4.3.2 Shell and Tube and Double-Pipe Heat Exchangers 4.0-33
4.3.3 Air-Cooled Exchangers 4.0-40
4.3.4 Pumps 4.0-44
4.3.5 Compressors 4.0-45
4.3.6 Turbines 4.0-46
4.3.7 Furnaces (Fired Heaters) 4.0-47
4.3.8 Liquid Filled Lines 4.0-47
4.4 Two-Phase Flow, Autorefrigeration, and Solids Formation 4.0-48
4.4.1 Two-Phase Flow 4.0-48
4.4.2 Autorefrigeration 4.0-48
4.4.3 Solids Formation 4.0-48
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE Contents-3
CONTENTS PAGE
5.0 SIZING OF RELIEVING DEVICES

5.1 Sizing Pressure Relief Valves 5.0-1
5.2 Pressure Relief Valve Downstream From a Rupture Disk 5.0-1
5.3 Sizing Explosion Hatches 5.0-1
5.4 Sizing Rupture Disk Devices 5.0-2
5.4.1 Explosion 5.0-2
5.4.2 Other Overpressure 5.0-2
6.0 INSTALLATION OF RELIEVING DEVICES

6.1 Spare Requirements 6.0-1
6.2 Piping 6.0-1
6.2.1 Inlet Piping 6.0-1
6.2.2 Discharge Piping 6.0-2
6.2.3 Operating and Design Conditions 6.0-3
6.3 Blowdown and Pop Action Control 6.0-4
6.4 Remote Sensing for Pilot-Operated Pressure Relief Valves 6.0-4
6.5 Installation of a Rupture Disk in Combination with a Pressure Relief Valve 6.0-5
6.5.1 Upstream of a Pressure Relief Valve 6.0-5
6.5.2 Downstream of a Pressure Relief Valve 6.0-5
7.0 PROCESS SPECIFICATION OF RELIEVING DEVICES

7.1 Relieving Cases 7.0-1
7.2 Preparation of Process Specification Sheets 7.0-1
7.2.1 Pressure relief valve 7.0-1
7.2.2 Rupture disk 7.0-4
APPENDIX A TABLES AND FIGURES
LIST OF TABLES
Table Table Description
1 Properties of Gases A-1

2 Accumulation Expressed as Percentage of MAWP A-2
3 Superheat Correction Factor Ksh for Steam Service A-3
4 Viscosity Correction Factor Kv A-3
5 Spring-Loaded Pressure Relief Valves Data A-4
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Figure Description
1 Typical Effects of Superimposed Back Pressure on the

Opening Pressure of Conventional Pressure Relief Valves A-6
2 Typical Effects of Built-Up Back Pressure on the Capacity

of Conventional Pressure Relief Valves A-6
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE Contents-4
LIST OF FIGURES (continued) PAGE
3 Typical Effects of Back Pressure on Set Pressure of

Balanced Pressure Relief Valves A-7
4 Pop-Action Pilot-Operated Valve A-7
5 Typical Relationship Between Lift of Disk and A-8

Vessel Pressure
6 Pressure Conditions for Safety Relief Valve Installed A-9

on a Pressure Vessel (Vapor Phase)
7 API Formula for Heat Absorbed from Fire on Wetted A-11

Surface of Pressure Vessel, Q = 21,000 FA 0.82
8 Vapor Pressure and Heat of Vaporization of Pure Single- A-12

Component Paraffin Hydrocarbon Liquids
9 Generalized Compressibility Chart A-14
10 Constant Back Pressure Sizing Factor Kb , for A-18

Conventional Safety-Relief Valves (Vapors and Gases)
11 Back Pressure Sizing Factor Kb , for Balanced Bellows A-19

Valves with Gases and Vapors
12 Capacity Correction Factor due to Overpressure for A-20

Relief and Safety Relief Valves in Liquid Service
13 Variable or Constant Back-Pressure Sizing Factor Kw, A-21

for 25 Percent Overpressure on Balanced Bellows Safety
Relief Valves (Liquids Only)
14 Curves for Paraffin Hydrocarbons Expanding from A-22

Relieving Pressures at or near Saturation to Critical Flow Pressures
15 Curve for Evaluating Coefficient C in Safety-Relief Valve A-23

Flow Formula Isentropic Coefficient n
16 Rupture Pin Valves A-24
References A-25
APPENDIX B SIZING OF RELIEVING DEVICES
1 Flow of a Gas or Vapor Through a Nozzle B-1

2 Discharge Area or a Pressure Relief Valve B-2
3 Sizing Pressure Relief Valves B-3
3.1 Gas or Vapor B-3
3.2 Steam B-3
3.3 Liquids B-5
3.4 Flashing liquids B-7
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 1.0-1
1.1 Scope
The purpose of this Process Standard is to establish the methods and recommend the
practices to be used in specifying the relieving devices required for individual protection of
pressure vessels in process plants. Atmospheric and low pressure storage tanks are not
covered. The reader is referred to API Standard 2000 "Venting Atmospheric and Low
Pressure Storage Tanks".
1.2 Basis
A considerable part of the material included here has been obtained from :
a) API RP 520 "Sizing, Selection, and Installation of Pressure-Relieving Devices in
Refineries" Part I - Sizing and Selection, Sixth Ed., March 1993 (with Errata Sheet
issued in November 1994), and Part II - Installation, Fourth Ed., December 1994.
b) API RP 521 "Guide for Pressure-Relieving and Depressuring Systems" (Fourth Ed.,
March 1997).
c) 1995 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Sections I and VIII.
1.3 Limitations
1.3.1 National, Local, and Client Codes
These instructions should not over-rule national and local codes of jobsite or
customer's specifications.
The reader is referred to Process Standard 601, Section 3.0, "Codes and
Recommended Practices".
1.3.2 Mobile Equipment
Pressure vessels used for transportation of gaseous or liquid products in bulk or in

shipping containers are not within the scope of this standard.
1.3.3 Overheating and Corrosion
Pressure relieving devices protect a vessel or item of equipment against

overpressure and not against failure due to high temperature when exposed to fire,
nor failure due to corrosion. Safety in connection with such failures must be
considered independently. For instance, a vessel exposed to fire is protected for
pressure by the relief valve ; however, the vessel can fail because of excessive
metal temperature, especially in those cases where the vessel contains mainly
gases. Vessel safety can be improved by a depressuring system to reduce the
pressure to a safe low level (refer to API RP 521, 3.19) or by cooling the vessel
with water spray, or with fire-proof insulation.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 1.0-2
1.4 Definitions
1.4.1 Relieving Devices
A. Pressure Relief Valve
A pressure relief device actuated by inlet static pressure and designed to

reclose and prevent the further flow of fluid after normal conditions have
been restored.
Pressure relief valve is a generic term applying to relief valves, safety valves,
safety relief valves, or pilot operated pressure relief valves.
B. Non-Reclosing Pressure Relief Device
A pressure relief device designed to remain open after operation.
Section VIII of ASME Code (UG-127) considers the following :

(a) rupture disk devices
(b) breaking pin devices
(c) spring-loaded non-reclosing pressure relief devices.
Other non-reclosing pressure relief devices are explosion hatches and liquid
seals, normally employed below 15 psig.
C. Safety Valve
A safety valve is a pressure relief valve characterized by rapid opening or

pop action. It is used for gas or vapor service.
D. Relief Valve
A relief valve is a pressure relief valve, which opens in proportion to the

increase in pressure over the opening pressure. It is used primarily for liquid
service.
E. Safety Relief Valve
A safety relief valve is a pressure relief valve which can be used in either
vapor or liquid service. For vapor service it is adjusted to give a "pop" action,
for liquid service it is adjusted for gradual opening.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 1.0-3
1.4 Definitions
1.4.1 Relieving Devices (cont'd)
F. Pilot Operated Pressure Relief Valve
This is a pressure relief valve in which the major relieving device is combined
with and is controlled by a self-actuated auxiliary pressure relief valve (pilot).
An important ASME code requirement (section VIII UG 126) on the

reliability of these valves is that "the main valve will open automatically at not
over the set pressure and will discharge its full rated capacity if some
essential part of the pilot should fail".
G. Pilot-Assisted Pressure Relief Valve
This pressure relief valve is a standard pressure relief valve (spring loaded)
fitted with an additional spring-diaphragm actuator to which a pneumatic
signal is fed from a pressure sensing pilot.
The arrangement connecting the actuator to the spindle is such that the valve
is still capable of operating as a standard safety valve in the event of pilot or
actuator failure. The pressure relief valve will then open at 105 % of the set
pressure as the valve spring set pressure is normally adjusted to 5 % higher
than the pilot set pressure.
H. Power-Actuated Pressure Relieving Valve
Movements to open or close are fully controlled by an external source of

power (electricity, air, steam or hydraulic). If the power-actuated pressure
relieving valve is also positioned in response to other control signals, the
control impulse to prevent over-pressure shall be responsive only to pressure
and shall override any other control function.
It has to be noted that the power-actuated pressure relieving valve cannot be
considered as safety device, since, unlike the others, it relies on an external
source of power.
I. Rupture Disk Device
A non-reclosing differential pressure relief device actuated by inlet static

pressure and designed to function by the bursting of a pressure-containing
disk.
A rupture disk device includes the rupture disk or sensitive element and the
rupture disk holder.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 1.0-4
1.4 Definitions
1.4.1 Relieving Devices (cont'd)
J. Breaking Pin Devices and Spring-Loaded Non-Reclosing Pressure Relief

Devices
A breaking pin device is a non-reclosing pressure relief device actuated by

inlet static pressure and designed to function by the breakage of a load-
carrying section of a pin which supports a pressure-containing member. A
breaking pin device includes the breaking pin or load-carrying element and
the breaking pin housing. Breaking pin devices shall not be used as single
devices but only in combination between the pressure relief valve and
the vessel.
A spring-loaded non-reclosing pressure relief device is pressure actuated by

means which permit the spring-loaded portion of the device to open at the
specified set pressure and remain open until manually reset. It may be used
provided the design of the spring-loaded non-reclosing device is such that if
the actuating means fail, the device will achieve full opening at or below its
set pressure. Such a device may not be used in combination with any
other pressure relief device.
Notes :
- These devices are described in ASME Code, Section VIII (UG-127,

respectively (b) & (c)), and not in API RP520.
- Some vendors sell rupture pin devices (see Figure 16) which correspond
either to :
. breaking pin devices (ASME VIII, UG-127 (b)) when they are used at
the inlet of safety relief valves. The pin is then orientated
perpendicularly to its inlet and outlet flanges.
. spring-loaded non-reclosing pressure relief devices (ASME VIII,
UG-127 (c)) when they are to be used alone. The pin position follows
then the pressure relief device inlet axis.
- These devices can be used as an alternate to rupture disk devices.
K. Explosion Hatch
A hinged metal cover placed over an opening in a vessel.
L. Liquid Seal
Liquid seals may be used for set pressures below 10-15 psig. Examples :
- seal leg of a flare
- liquid seals used in MEK units to protect the filters.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 1.0-5
1.4 Definitions (contd)
1.4.2 Terms
A. Operating Pressure
The pressure at the top of a pressure vessel at which it normally operates.
It shall not exceed the maximum allowable working pressure and it is usually
kept at a suitable level below the setting of the pressure relieving devices to
prevent their frequent opening.
B. Design Pressure
1) The gauge pressure used in the design of a vessel for the purpose of
determining the minimum permissible thickness of the different parts of
the vessel.
When applicable, static head pressure drop through trays or beds or

grids, and any combination of loadings shall be added to the design
pressure at the top of the vessel to determine the thickness of any
specific part of the vessel.
2) The difference between design and operating pressure must allow a

suitable margin to avoid undesirable opening or bursting of a pressure
relief device when the operating pressure fluctuates.
3) A generally accepted rule for vessels protected by a pressure relief

valve is :
Design pressure (at top) equal either to 1.10 x operating

pressure (at top) or to operating pressure (at top) plus 25 psi,
whichever is greater.
Minimum design pressure is often set a 50 psig (3.5 barg). This

allows standard PSV specification and easier sizing of
inlet/outlet lines.
For reflux drums, refer to 4.2.10.
Note that generally clients have their own rule which may be different
from above.
For vessels protected by rupture disk devices, which have behaviors

and tolerances different from pressure relief valves, different criteria
should be used for specifying the design pressure. Refer to 3.2.4 of
this standard.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 1.0-6
1.4 Definitions
1.4.2 Terms
B. Design Pressure (cont'd)
4) When a vessel is on the discharge side of a centrifugal pump or

compressor, designer may choose to specify design pressure not less
than centrifugal machine shutoff pressure (refer to Process Bulletin
No. 9).
C. M.A.W.P. - Maximum Allowable Working Pressure
1) M.A.W.P. of a vessel part
Maximum internal or external pressure, including static head on the

vessel part, that the vessel part can withstand at its design stress
together with any combination of loadings which are likely to occur, at
the designated coincident operating temperature.
Any metal thickness specified as corrosion allowance shall be
excluded to arrive at the M.A.W.P. of a vessel part.
2) M.A.W.P. for a vessel
Maximum pressure permissible at the top of the vessel in its operating

position for a designated temperature, usually the design temperature.
It is the least of the values found for the various essential vessel parts
adjusted for any difference in static head and pressure drop that may
exist between the part considered and the top of the vessel.
3) M.A.W.P. may be determined for more than one designated operating

temperature, using for each temperature the applicable allowable
stress value.
4) The difference between M.A.W.P. and design pressure, if any, is due

to the difference between actual vessel thickness and the minimum
thickness calculated using design pressure. Corrosion allowance is
always excluded from pressure/thickness calculations.
Theoretically, the M.A.W.P. should be the basis for the pressure

setting of the pressure relieving device protecting the vessel. In most
of the cases, however, the pressure relieving device is set at the design
pressure and not at the M.A.W.P. because the latter is only known
late in the design, when the detailed mechanical design of the vessel is
completed.
The MAWP is the pressure which will be stamped on any ASME VIII
vessel.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 1.0-7
1.4 Definitions
1.4.2 Terms (cont'd)
D. Set Pressure
Set pressure is the inlet gauge pressure at which the pressure relief valve is
adjusted to open under service conditions.
E. Accumulation
Accumulation is the pressure increase over the maximum allowable working

pressure of the vessel during discharge through the pressure relief device,
expressed as a percent of that gauge pressure, or in pressure units.
Maximum allowable accumulations are established by applicable codes for
operating and fire contingencies.
F. Overpressure
Overpressure is the pressure increase over the set pressure of the relieving
device ; it is the same as "accumulation" when the relieving device is set at
the maximum allowable working pressure of the vessel, assuming no inlet
pipe loss to the relieving device.
G. Relieving Conditions
Relieving conditions of relief devices are the inlet gauge pressure and
temperature at a specific overpressure. The relieving pressure is equal to the
valve set pressure (or rupture disk burst pressure) plus the overpressure. The
temperature of the flowing fluid at relieving conditions may be higher or
lower than at the operating temperature.
H. Opening pressure
Opening pressure is the value of increasing inlet static pressure at which

there is a measurable lift of the disk or at which discharge of the fluid
becomes continuous.
I. Closing pressure
Closing pressure is the value of decreasing inlet static pressure at which the
valve disk reestablishes contact with the seat or at which lift becomes zero.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 1.0-8
1.4 Definitions
1.4.2 Terms (cont'd)
J. Simmer
The leakage across the valve seat preceding the "pop" or true opening of the
valve. Simmering causes premature damage of the seat and occurs when the
valve is improperly adjusted or when the operating pressure is too close to
the set pressure.
K. Back Pressure (Types : Superimposed and Built-up)
Back pressure is the pressure that exists at the outlet of a pressure relief
device as a result of the pressure in the discharge system. It is the sum of the
superimposed and built-up back pressures.
Superimposed Back Pressure
This is the pressure at the relief device discharge before the device
opens. It is the result of pressure in the discharge system from other
sources. This type of pressure may be constant or variable ; it may
govern whether a conventional or a balanced pressure relief valve
should be used in a specific application.
Built-up Back Pressure
Built-up back pressure is the increase in pressure in the discharge

header which develops as a result of flow after the pressure relief
device opens. It is always variable ; may govern the choice between a
conventional and a balanced type pressure relief valve.
L. Blowdown
Blowdown is the difference between the set pressure and the closing
pressure of a pressure relief valve, expressed as a percent of the set
pressure, or in pressure units.
M. Lift
Lift is the actual travel of the disk away from the closed position when the
valve is relieving.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 2.0-1
2.1 Safety Valves and Safety-Relief Valves
These are pressure relieving devices for gases or vapors which have been specifically
designed to give full opening with little over-pressure. The kinetic energy of relieving gas
or vapor creates a pop action which opens the disk rapidly, reaching the full lift before
maximum overpressure (see Fig. 5).
There are two basic types of safety valves : conventional and balanced valves.
2.1.1 Conventional Type
Conventional relieving valves are shown schematically in Fig. 1. The following

two situations are possible :
A. If the bonnet is vented to the atmosphere, the back pressure acts with the
vessel pressure against spring force.
B. If the spring bonnet is vented to the valve discharge rather than to atmosphere,
the back pressure acts with the spring force.
If the superimposed back pressure were constant, (no matter what its value), it
could be taken into account in adjusting the spring loading so that the relief valve
would open at the required set pressure. In practice, however, the superimposed
back pressure is generally not constant and varies between a minimum, which
corresponds to the flow of purge gas alone in the flare system (no valve
discharging) and a maximum which corresponds to the design flow of the flare
system.
For a conventional valve of type B, spring set pressure is equal to design
pressure minus superimposed back pressure ; therefore the valve will open above
the vessel design pressure if the superimposed back pressure is higher than
expected, and will open below design pressure if the superimposed back pressure
is lower than expected.
In order to avoid opening of the valve at pressures too different from the required
set value (as a result of variable superimposed back pressure), the first step is to
only accept the use of conventional relieving valves when superimposed back
pressure varies over a range not exceeding 10% of set pressure (gauge).
However, this is not always sufficient because the flow performance after
opening must also be examined. When the valve is open, the built-up back
pressure tends to unbalance the equilibrium between spring force and vessel
pressure. For a conventional valve of type B, this may result in a reduction of
valve opening and rapid fall of capacity (see Fig. 2). Therefore conventional
valves, even when acceptable from the point of view of superimposed back
pressure, must be checked with regard to built-up back pressure. The designer
must check that the difference between the maximum value of back pressure and
the minimum value of superimposed back pressure does not exceed 10% of set
pressure (gauge).
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 2.0-2
2.1 Safety Valves and Safety-Relief Valves (cont'd)
2.1.2 Balanced Type
Balanced safety relief valves are those in which the back pressure has little
influence on the performance characteristics.
Piston type and Bellows type are available, the latter being more widely used (See
Fig. 3).
A. Bellows Type
The effective bellows cross sectional area is equal to nozzle seat area ; disk
areas extending beyond the bellows and beyond the seat area are equal and
forces developed over those areas cancel each other.
Area under the bellows is kept under a constant pressure by venting the
bellows to a source of constant pressure, which is often atmosphere, unless
fluid which would be vented in case of bellows failure is dangerous ; in that
case, vent should be discharged to a safe location, provided that its pressure
is constant.
Bellows valves have limited allowable set and outlet pressures (refer to
Table 5).
If the maximum set or back pressure allowed for a single orifice appears too
low, use a combination of smaller valves having an aggregate area equal to
the valve in question. Use of smaller valves will permit higher set or back
pressures.
B. Piston Type
In the piston type, of which several variations are manufactured, the piston
guide is vented so that the back pressure on opposing faces of the valve disk
cancels itself, and the top face of the piston, which has the same area as the
nozzle seat area, is kept at atmospheric pressure by venting the bonnet.
Since gases may leak past the piston to the bonnet, the bonnet of piston-type
valves must be vented in a safe manner.
Note that the vent on the valve bonnet should not be piped back into the flare
header as its performance will then be the same as a conventional valve
(Clients may request this for environmental reasons such as preventing
hydrocarbon releases to atmosphere due to ruptured bellows).
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 2.0-3
2.1 Safety Valves and Safety-Relief Valves

2.1.2 Balanced Type (contd)
With balanced type relieving devices, not subject to the limitations of back
pressure set for conventional devices, the back pressure (superimposed and built-
up) can be allowed to rise, permitting a reduction in size and cost of the relief
header.
However, even when using balanced type valves, when back pressure reaches
30% of set pressure, capacity of the valve for vapors and gases starts to fall
below the theoretical capacity. With liquids, the capacity reduction starts at 15%
of set pressure. The fall-off in valve capacity depends also on overpressure, type
and make of valve used (see Figs. 11 &13).
For back pressures higher than this limit, valve size becomes progressively larger
for the same flow, even if critical flow conditions are maintained. For back
pressures higher than 50% of set pressure, the valve manufacturer must always
be consulted for valve sizing. In general, although there would be an incentive in
increasing back pressure with balanced type valves in order to reduce size and
cost of relief headers, values exceeding 30-35% of set pressure (gauge) should
not be used without checking with an instrument specialist.
2.2 Relief Valves

Relief valves are generally used for liquids. In this type of valve, at the set pressure, the
disk rises slightly from the seat without popping and permits a small amount of fluid to
pass. As the pressure in the vessel increases, the disk is further raised ; thus an additional
area is available so as to allow an increasing flow of fluid.
Liquid-relief valves reach their rated capacity at approximately 25 percent overpressure.
At a lower percent overpressure, the flow capacity of a given valve is reduced (for
example, for 10% overpressure, corresponding to the maximum accumulation allowed by
ASME, Section VIII, the flow only reaches 60% of the value at 25% overpressure, as
shown on Fig. 12).
2.3 Pilot-Operated Pressure Relief Valves

The main valve encloses a floating piston (or diaphragm) with a larger effective area on
the top. Up to set pressure the top and bottom areas of the piston (or diaphragm) are
exposed to the same inlet operating pressure and the main valve is tightly closed. At the
set point the pilot vents the pressure from the top of the main valve piston (or diaphragm),
allowing the main valve to open.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 2.0-4
2.3 Pilot-Operated Pressure Relief Valves (contd)

The pilot valve can be either :
- a pop-action or modulating-action pilot (see Fig. 4 & 5),
- flowing or non-flowing type, as process fluid is allowed or not to flow through the pilot
when main valve is open : this will be determined with manufacturer advice.
Pilot-operated pressure relief valves should be considered versus spring loaded pressure
relief valves in any of the following cases :
- max operating pressure between 90 % and 95 % of set pressure,
- low set pressure (below 10-15 psig),
- two-phase flow,
- high back pressure,
- high inlet piping pressure drop (above 3 % at rated capacity) : use of remote pressure
sense connection,
- set pressure limitation for spring loaded valves (see table 5) particularly for large
orifice areas.
The use of pilot-operated pressure relief valves may be limited by the fluid characteristics
(fouling, viscosity, presence of solids, corrosiveness) or by the operating temperature. The
manufacturer should then be consulted. Note also that some advanced pilot-operated
pressure relief valve systems include an auxiliary fluid for the pilot.
2.4 Pilot-Assisted Pressure Relief Valves
Pilot-assisted pressure relief valves are used in the following situations :
- when operating pressure is close to the MAWP, as an alternate to pilot-operated

pressure relief valves when the process fluid characteristics are limiting,
- overpressure control combined with optional temperature, flow or liquid level pilot
control (refer to 4.2.14 for protection of chemical reactors).
Compared with the pilot operated valves, the main advantages are the following :
. As an external energy is used, the valve operation is not affected by the nature of the
process fluid (duty service, corrosive fluid ).
. The system is very reliable as the valve is not totally dependent on the pilot. In case of
pilot or actuator failure, the valve will operate as a standard safety valve which opens
typically at 105 % of the pilot set pressure.
It has to be noticed that local codes and regulatory requirements are to be reviewed to
ensure that pilot-assisted pressure relief valves are acceptable devices for overpressure
protection.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 2.0-5
2.5 Rupture Disk Devices
2.5.1 Installation
Rupture disk devices are used either alone or in conjunction with a pressure relief
valve. The application of rupture disks alone is limited by the fact that when the
disk ruptures the entire contents of the system may be lost. They may, however,
be installed in parallel with a pressure relief valve to provide additional capacity ;
in this case, the relief valve is set at a lower pressure to limit rupture disk bursting
to major disasters.
Rupture disks are pressure differential devices and the relieving capacity is
therefore affected by the sizes and lengths of the inlet and outlet pipework.
2.5.2 Selection of Rupture Disk Type

A rupture disk is the pressure-containing and pressure-sensitive element of a
rupture disk device. Rupture disks may be designed in several configurations, such
as flat, domed (prebulged), or reverse acting.
Rupture disks may require a rupture disk holder to enclose, seal, and clamp the
rupture disk in position. The combination of the disk and holder is called a rupture
disk device.
Refer to 3.2.4 for pressure setting and tolerance of rupture disk devices.
2.5.3 Rapid Pressure Rise

The use of rupture disk devices may be advisable when very rapid rates of
pressure rise may be encountered (e.g. fast chemical reaction or deflagration).
2.5.4 Upstream of Pressure Relief Valve

Rupture disk devices also may be installed upstream of pressure relief valves in
systems containing extremely valuable or toxic materials to guard against leakage
of the valve or in systems handling materials likely to make the pressure relief
valve inoperative because of fouling, plugging or corrosion.
This arrangement results in a reduction of the pressure relief valve capacity (refer
to 5.2).
This type of installation requires the use of a vent to atmosphere or LP flare to
prevent built-up pressure between the disk and the valve ; this vent (excess flow
valve) closes if the disk ruptures. Also, a pressure indicator shall be provided
between the rupture disk and the pressure relief valve. A bursting disk failure
detection/alarm device shall be provided if the vent is not fitted with an excess
flow valve.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 2.0-6
2.5 Rupture Disk Devices (cont'd)
2.5.5 Downstream of Pressure Relief Valve

Rupture disks are also used occasionally on the downstream side of pressure
relief valves where conditions make an upstream installation impractical or where
valves are connected to a header and it is designed to protect the valve
mechanism against corrosion from this source. This arrangement requires the use
of a valve whose set point is unaffected by a back pressure equal to the rupture
disk bursting pressure, or a vent between valve and disk similar to that described
above.
Note that this arrangement is not allowed by the French and Italian Codes.
2.5.6 Use in Hydrogen

The use of metallic disks to protect systems involving hydrogen has resulted in a
number of fires. The explanation of this is that during the initial rupturing of the
disk the shear forces are sufficient to raise the metal temperature to the ignition
point of the gas.
2.6 Liquid Seals

Liquid seals can be used instead of pressure relief valves for set pressures below 10-15
psig, where relief valves are not considered reliable. Typical examples are the seal leg of
a flare and liquid seals used in MEK units to protect the filters.
The "U-tube" may be filled with water, mercury, or other liquid. Freezing of the sealing
liquid shall be avoided by steam tracing or heating.
Provisions for make-up and draining of the filling liquid should be made.
2.7 Explosion Hatches
The hatch consists of a hinged metal cover placed over an opening. It is used for vessels
operating near atmospheric pressure and when risk of explosion exists (e.g., asphalt
oxidizers, air borne dusts, etc.).
Explosion hatches are not recommended for use at higher pressures, since the weight of
the hatch will be excessive and this may prevent quick opening.
2.8 Vacuum Relieving Devices

Vacuum can be the normal operating conditions of a vessel (e.g. Vacuum Towers) or an
occasional event for vessels normally operating under pressure. This can happen due to
internal vapor or steam condensation, pumping out, gravity transfer of liquids, loss of
heating and temperature changes, etc.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 2.0-7
2.8 Vacuum Relieving Devices (contd)
In the first case, the vessel is designed to withstand full vacuum. In the second case, the
designer can choose between specifying the vessel for full vacuum or providing a vacuum
relief device (valve or liquid seal) which permits the entrance of air, inert gas, or fuel gas,
etc., to prevent vacuum conditions.
It is important to specify the actual temperature coincident with occasional vacuum

conditions. This temperature may be appreciably lower than the normal operating
temperature. Based on the pressure/temperature level when the occasional condition
occurs, vessel specialists will check the wall thickness required, which may not have to be
increased due to the lower temperature coincident with vacuum conditions.
2.9 "O Ring" Seat Seal or Stellited Pressure Relief Valve
Pressure relief valves may leak when the operating pressure is above 90 % of the valve set
pressure.
It is possible to enhance the tightness of a spring loaded pressure relief valve for max operating
pressure up to 92 % of set pressure (above 92 % consider pilot operated pressure relief valves),
either with :
- an "O ring" seat seal ; the compatibility of this seal with the product has to be carefully
investigated,
- a stellited pressure relief valve.
2.10 Breaking Pin Devices and Spring-Loaded Non-Reclosing Pressure Relief Devices
(Rupture Pin Devices)
Refer to 1.4.1 J for a basic description of these devices and to Figure 16.
A rupture pin valve may be used instead of a rupture disk, considering the following advantages :
- the rupture pin valve is not subject to premature failure due to fatigue, nor to set pressure
variations with operating temperature changes,
- a lower tolerance for rupture pin valves at low set pressures (below 50 psig),
- a rupture pin valve can be quickly reset without breaking flanges.
Nevertheless a rupture disk should remain the first choice in services where the disk seldom
ruptures, because of its lower cost and demonstrated performance.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 2.0-8
2.10 Breaking Pin Devices and Spring-Loaded Non-Reclosing Pressure Relief Devices
(Rupture Pin Devices) (contd)
Set pressures and tolerances
In ASME Code section VIII (UG-134) the same rules apply to the set pressure of a pressure
relief valve or of a spring-loaded non-reclosing device, the burst pressure of a rupture disk
device, or the breaking pressure of a breaking pin device. However, the recommended approach
is to specify a lower "set pressure" for all pressure relief devices having a set pressure tolerance
above the standard pressure relief valve tolerance (shown in 3.2.3.G). Refer also to 3.2.4 for
recommended approach on rupture disks.
Additional specific requirements of ASME Code for these devices are the following :
Breaking Pin Devices
Breaking pin devices shall be used only in combination with a pressure relief valve, between the
valve and the vessel.
The space between a breaking pin device and a pressure relief valve shall be provided with a
pressure gauge, a try cock, a free vent, or suitable telltale indicator.
Tolerances
The rated pressure at which the pin will break at the coincident operating temperature
(specified by the user) shall be guaranteed by the manufacturer with the following
tolerances :
Rated Pressure, psig Tolerance, plus or minus
30 150 5 psi
151 275 10 psi
276 375 15 psi
Pressure Setting
The rated breaking pressure of the breaking pin plus the tolerance shall not exceed 105 % of the
M.A.W.P. (or design pressure) of the vessel.
Spring-Loaded Non-Reclosing Pressure Relief Devices
Such a device may not be used in combination with any other pressure relief device.
Tolerance
Not to exceed +/- 5 percent of its bursting pressure.

PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 3.0-1
Reported below are the recommendations of the ASME Code regarding safety. This code is
generally known and accepted in many countries. For other national codes refer to Paragraph
3.4.
The two sections of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code of interest are :
Section I : Power Boilers

Section VIII-1 : Pressure Vessels
Generally, all unfired pressure vessels, including filters and shell and tube heat exchangers, fall
under the jurisdiction of Section VIII, while Section I covers fired and electric boilers and
organic fluid vapor generators (i.e. Dowtherm vapor generators).
In the case of unfired pressure vessels classified as unfired steam boilers (e.g. waste heat
boilers), the vessels can be designed according to Section I or VIII, depending on process
conditions and local safety regulations, but their safety devices will follow Section I.
Unfired pressure vessels in which steam is generated shall be classed as unfired steam boilers
with the following exceptions :
a) Vessels known as evaporators or heat exchangers.

b) Vessels in which steam is generated by the use of heat resulting from operation of a
processing system containing a number of pressure vessels such as those used in the
manufacture of chemical and petroleum products.
The process engineer should check with the Heat Transfer Engineering Group and/or
Technology Department as to whether the particular steam generators shall be classed as
unfired steam boilers or process heat exchangers, depending upon process conditions and local
safety law. The classification will dictate which section shall be chosen to properly specify
relieving devices.
Other types of equipment requiring protection include compressors, pumps, piping and air
coolers. For such non-code equipment it is customary to base safety-relief valve specification
and sizing on the same rules used for code equipment.
3.1. Boilers, Economizers, Superheaters, Reheaters, Organic Fluid Vapor Generators (ASME,
Section I)
3.1.1. Number of Safety Valves or Safety Relief Valves
A. Each boiler shall have at least one safety valve or safety relief valve.
Rupture disks are not accepted, except on organic fluid vapor generators between
safety valve and vapor if certain conditions are satisfied (Part PVG of Section I,
paragraph 12.3).
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 3.0-2
Section I)
3.1.1. Number of Safety Valves or Safety Relief Valves (contd)
B. Boilers having more than 500 sq ft (47m2) of bare tube water-heating

surface or electric boilers having a power input of more than 1100 kW shall
have two or more safety valves or safety relief valves.
For a boiler with combined bare tube and extended water-heating surface
exceeding 500 sq ft, two or more safety valves or safety relief valves are
required only if the design steam generating capacity of the boiler exceeds
4000 lb/hr (Paragraph PG-67).
C. Any economizer which may be shut off from the boiler, thereby permitting
the economizer to become a fired pressure vessel, shall have one or more
safety relief valves.
D. Forced-flow steam generators with no fixed steam and water line may be
protected by means of safety valves and power-actuated pressure-relieving
valves (See PG-67.4).
E. Every superheater shall have one or more safety valves.
F. Every reheater shall have one or more safety valves and at least one valve
shall be located at reheater outlet.
3.1.2. Relieving Capacity
Determination of relieving capacity for Boilers, Superheaters, Reheaters,

Economizers, High-temperature Water Boilers and Waste Heat Boilers shall be
made in accordance with rules reported under paragraphs PG-67 through PG-73
of ASME Code, Section I. For electric boilers, the minimum relieving capacity
shall be 3.5 lb (1.6 kg)/hr/kW input.
When auxiliary firing and waste heat recovery are used, the effect of such heat
shall be taken into account.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 3.0-3
Section I)
3.1.3. Pressure Setting, Accumulation and Tolerance
A. Organic fluid vapor generators shall be designed for at least 40 psi (280 kPa)
above the normal operating pressure.
B. One or more safety valves on the boiler shall be set at or below the
M.A.W.P.
If additional valves are used, the highest pressure setting shall not exceed the
M.A.W.P. by more than 3 percent.
C. When multiple safety valves are installed, the difference between the highest
and the lowest set pressures should not be greater than 10 percent of the
highest set pressure (on high-temperature water boilers this 10 percent range
may be exceeded, as stated in ASME I PG-67.3).
D. The safety valves shall be capable of discharging all the steam that can be
generated by the boiler without allowing the pressure to rise more than 6
percent above the highest set pressure and in no case to more than 6 percent
above the M.A.W.P.
E. The popping point tolerance plus or minus shall not exceed the following :
2 psi (14 kPa) for pressures up to and including 70 psig (483 kPa g)
3% for pressures over 70 psig up to and including 300 psig
(2100 kPa g)
10 psi (69 kPa) for pressures over 300 psig (2100 kPa g) up to and
including 1000 psig (6900 kPa g)
1% for pressures over 1000 psig (6900 kPa g)
3.1.4. Electric Boilers and Organic Fluid Vapor Generators
For electric boilers see also ASME, Sect. I, Part PEB. For organic fluid vapor
generators see also ASME, Sect. I, Part PVG.
3.1.5. Isolating Valves
No valve of any description shall be placed between the required safety valves or
safety relief valves and the boiler, nor on the discharge pipe between the safety
valve or safety relief valve and the atmosphere.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 3.0-4
3.2. Pressure Vessels (ASME, Section VIII)
Pressure vessels having an inside diameter not exceeding six inches, without limitation in
temperature and pressure, or vessels with an internal or external operating pressure not
exceeding 15 psig, with no limitation in size, do not fall under the jurisdiction of ASME,
Section VIII (U-1).
All pressure vessels within the scope of ASME Code, Section VIII, irrespective of size
and pressure, shall be provided with protective devices (pressure relief valves or non-
reclosing pressure relief devices may be used as protective devices). Heat exchangers
and similar vessels shall be protected with a relieving device of sufficient capacity to avoid
overpressure in case of an internal failure (UG-133 (d) of ASME, Section VIII).
Vessels connected together by a system of adequate piping not containing isolating valves
may be considered as one unit and protected by one relieving device (e.g., tower with its
reflux drum).
3.2.1. Number of Relieving Devices
No rule is set by code ; the number of relieving devices is only a function of total
capacity. Unfired steam boilers, if designed under the provisions of Section VIII,
shall be protected as required by Section I of ASME Code.
3.2.2. Relieving Capacity
Code does not specify capacity, which is left to the designer to specify according
to various hazardous conditions (see paragraph 4.0). Unfired steam boilers, if
designed under the provisions of Section VIII, are to be protected according to
Section I of ASME Code.
3.2.3. Pressure Setting and Tolerance of Pressure Relief Valves
A. Unfired steam boilers follow Section I of ASME Code.
B. For all other vessels, except unfired steam boilers, when a single relieving
device is installed, it shall be set to blow at a pressure not higher than the
M.A.W.P.
As explained in Paragraph 1.4.2 (and in API RP 520 Part I) the design

pressure of the vessel is generally used instead of M.A.W.P.
C. If more than one relieving device is installed, only one device needs be set to
open at a pressure not exceeding the M.A.W.P. The additional valves may
be set to open at a higher pressure, but not to exceed 105 percent of
M.A.W.P.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 3.0-5
3.2.3. Pressure Setting and Tolerance of Pressure Relief Valves (cont'd)
D. In case of a vessel with operating pressure at the top lower than operating
pressure at the bottom because of pressure drops and/or liquid heads, while
the mechanical design (wall thickness) of each section of the vessel is based
on its design pressure, the set pressure of the relieving device must be based
on the design pressure at the point where the relieving device is connected,
which is generally the top. If a relieving device placed at the top were set at
the design pressure of the bottom, the bottom section would be exposed to
pressures greater than design, when the device relieves.
E. In the case of vessels filled with liquid, such as crude desalters, with relief
valve connected to the top of the desalter through a vertical pipe, the set
pressure is the design pressure of the vessel at the top minus the liquid head
of the connecting pipe.
F. In the case of multiple relieving valves, one of which is installed for fire
exposure only, this particular valve may be set at a pressure not exceeding
110 percent of M.A.W.P.. Refer to Fig. 6.
G. Tolerance
ASME, Section VIII (UG-126) specifies that set pressure tolerance of a
safety valve shall not exceed + 2 psi for pressures up to and including 70
psig, and + 3 % for pressures above 70 psig.
H. Relief valves are usually tested and set at ambient temperature. To

compensate for the effect of operating temperature on spring force, the
correction done by Vendor corresponds to the following table of increases in
set pressure vs operating temperature (for information only) :
Increase in "Set value

of relieving Pressure"
Operating temperature, F at Ambient Temperature
0 - 200 None
201 - 600 1%
601 - 800 2%
801 - 1000 3%
above 1000 5%
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 3.0-6
3.2. Pressure Vessels (ASME, Section VIII) (contd)
3.2.4. Pressure setting and Tolerance of Rupture Disk Devices
The following guidelines are based upon ASME code and general recommended
design practices.
A. Burst Pressure Tolerance
The manufacturer shall guarantee that the disk will burst within 5% (plus or
minus) of the stamped bursting pressure above 40 psig (Some manufacturers
may guarantee plus or minus 2%), and within 2% (plus or minus) up to and
including 40 psig (UG-127) at the coincident disk temperature specified by
the user. This tolerance is comparable to the pressure relief valve tolerance
of 3 % on set pressure.
B. Manufacturing range
It is the pressure range agreed with the rupture disk manufacturer, and
associated to the specified burst pressure. The stamped or rated burst
pressure derived from destructive tests performed from each rupture disk lot,
must fall within the manufacturing range.
Typical manufacturing ranges are +/- 5 % (or + 0/-10 %), +/- 2 %.

According to API RP 520 2.5.4.2 some disks are manufactured at zero
manufacturing range, i.e. the stamped burst pressure is then the specified
burst pressure.
C. Pressure cycling
Rupture disks are liable to fail prematurely due to metal fatigue if pressure
cycling can occur on the upstream process side. The disk manufacturer
should be advised of pressure/temperature cycling situations on the process
side.
D. Ratio of max operating pressure to min burst pressure
The maximum operating pressure should not exceed 70 to 90 % of the

minimum burst pressure to prevent premature failure of the rupture disk due
to fatigue or creep. This margin depends mainly on disk type and material but
is also related to many other factors, such as bursting pressure level, disk
size, disk temperature, and installation. Refer to API RP 520, Part I, Section
2.5 for typical values of the ratio of maximum operating pressure to minimum
burst pressure for different types of rupture disk. The margin to be
considered has a major influence on the design pressure determination and
should be agreed early with the instrument specialist and the rupture disk
manufacturer.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 3.0-7
3.2.4. Pressure setting and Tolerance of Rupture Disk Devices (cont'd)
E. Pressure setting and design pressure
The stamped burst pressure shall not exceed the vessel MAWP.
The values of the maximum accumulated pressure follow the same rules
given for pressure relief valve. Refer to Fig. 6 for these values of maximum
allowable accumulated pressure.
The burst pressure and design pressure (use MAWP if available) are
determined from the following considerations :
the design pressure shall be greater or equal to the maximum

burst pressure (from manufacturing range).
the maximum operating pressure should not exceed 70 to 90 % of
the minimum burst pressure (from manufacturing range).
the difference between design pressure and maximum operating
pressure should be generally kept above 25 psi (same margin as
for vessels protected by a pressure relief valve).
for rupture disks relieving to a closed system, the margin between
maximum operating pressure and design pressure should be
increased to account for variable back pressure, as the rupture
disk is a differential pressure element.
These principles have been applied herebelow (P in any pressure unit) :
Manufacturing Range +/-5% Zero

Design P (or MAWP) 100 100
Max Burst P 100 100
Min Burst P 90 100
Stamped Burst P Between 90 and 100
100
Actual Burst P Stamped Burst P +/- 5 %
Operating P limit 63 to 81 70 to 90
Ratio Design P / Operating P 1.23 to 1.58 1.11 to 1.43
Note that some National Codes (French for instance) require to consider all
tolerances guaranteed by the manufacturer for the maximum burst pressure.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 3.0-8
3.2.4. Pressure setting and Tolerance of Rupture Disk Devices
D. Pressure setting and design pressure (contd)
In any case the design pressure of a vessel protected by a rupture disk shall
be reviewed with the following data :
rupture disk tolerances,

required margin above operating conditions to prevent disk failure
from fatigue,
relieving temperature,
back pressure.
When a rupture disk is installed upstream of the pressure relief valve and the
devices are close coupled, the maximum burst pressure and set pressure
should be the same nominal value. Whenever possible the combination of the
rupture disk and the pressure relief valve should be specified and purchased
as one set.
E. Relieving temperature
The bursting pressure varies with temperature, decreasing with increasing

temperature (minimum variation is obtained with graphite disks). The rupture
disk must be specified at the temperature and pressure at which the disk is
expected to burst ; therefore, when the vessel is at ambient temperature, the
bursting pressure is much higher and the vessel must withstand this higher
pressure at ambient temperature.
If the rupture disk is located at an appreciable distance from the vessel then
the local temperature may be considerably lower than the vessel
temperature. This could result in the rupture disk being specified and supplied
by the Manufacturer with an effective set pressure which is significantly
higher than the nominal value, and could subsequently result in overpressure
of the vessel.
Vessel mechanical design department must be warned whenever a vessel is

protected by a rupture disk.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 3.0-9
3.2.5. Pressure Accumulation
According to ASME Code (UG-125) all pressure vessels, other than unfired
steam boilers (which are to be protected in accordance with Section I), shall be so
protected by pressure relieving devices that the pressure is prevented from rising
above the design pressure (or M.A.W.P.) more than the following values :
A. 10 percent for vessels protected by a single relieving device for operating

(nonfire, no external heat) contingencies.
B. 16 percent for vessels protected by multiple valves for operating (nonfire, no

external heat) contingencies. At least one relieving device shall be set at or
below the design pressure (or M.A.W.P.). Refer to 3.2.3 C for additional
valve set pressure (< 105 % M.A.W.P.).
C. 21 percent when an additional hazard can be created by fire or other

unexpected external source of heat.
The attached Fig. 6 gives a graphic representation of relationships between

operating pressure, M.A.W.P., set pressure, accumulation, overpressure, etc.
3.2.6. Vacuum Design
When specifying a vacuum relief valve and the vacuum design pressure of a
vessel, attention has to be paid to the fact that the vacuum design pressure shall
never be exceeded (in terms of negative pressure), even during the operation of
the vacuum relief valve.
In ASME VIII Div. 1 UG-28 it is stated that :

(e) "The external design pressure or maximum allowable external working
pressure shall not be less than the maximum expected difference in operating
pressure that may exist between the outside and the inside of the vessel at
any time".
(f) Need to "specify the required maximum allowable external working
pressure18.
18
It is recommended that a suitable margin be provided when establishing the
maximum allowable external working pressure to allow for pressure
variations in service".
Note that in previous edition of ASME Code the "suitable margin" was more
precise : "25 % more than the maximum possible external pressure" (this may
be used as guideline).
Please note that most clients require full vacuum design whenever there is a
vacuum operating pressure.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 3.0-10
3.2. Pressure Vessels (ASME Section VIII)
3.2.6. Vacuum Design (contd)
If a partial vacuum design is used, it shall accommodate for the minimum pressure
encountered when the vacuum relief valve is operating. The pressure conditions
are then staged as follows :
- minimum operating pressure (below atmospheric pressure),

- vacuum relief valve set pressure,
- relieving pressure greater or equal to the vacuum design pressure. No
excursion below the vacuum design pressure is allowed.
The margins between these conditions should be carefully reviewed with the
vacuum relief valve supplier.
3.3. Pressure Accumulation Guide
Guidelines for specifying pressure accumulation based upon ASME code and general
recommended design practice are summarized in Table 2 in the appendix A of this
standard.
3.4. Other National Codes
Regulations imposed by other national codes will be reported under this paragraph as
required.
3.4.1. Italian Code ISPESL
See "Raccolta E, Raccolta F, Raccolta R, Raccolta H" plus several D.M.

(Ministerial Decrees).
3.4.2. British Standard B.S. 5500
The total capacity of the pressure relieving device(s) shall be adequate to prevent
the pressure rising to more than 10 % more than the design pressure. There is no
special concession on this figure for cases where the pressure rise is due to
exposure to external heat or fire. (This makes sense as the design of vessels to
B.S. 5500 is based on smaller safety factors than ASME VIII Div. 1).
The pressure setting of a relief valve shall not be greater than the design pressure
of the vessel, except that where the capacity is achieved by more than one
relieving device, one only need be set at or below the design pressure and the
others may be set at a pressure not more than 5% above design pressure.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 3.0-11
3.4. Other National Codes (contd)
3.4.3. French Code
Refer to :
J.O. nb 1498 Appareils pression
Arrt of September 4, 1967 Rgles damnagement et dexploitation des
units de traitement de ptrole brut, de ses drivs et rsidus,
Arrt of November 9, 1972 Rgles damnagement et dexploitation des
dpts dhydrocarbures liqufis,
and to CODAP, Section S.
All specific requirements listed hereabove for the British Standard ( 3.4.2) also
apply to the French Code. In addition the French Code is more stringent for steam
or condensate vessels, particularly on the number of pressure relief valve required.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 4.0-1
4.0 HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS AND INDIVIDUAL RELIEVING RATES
Any circumstance that reasonably constitutes a hazard under the prevailing conditions for a
system should be considered in the design.
The relief requirements are classified as due to either "fire" or "operational failures".
The simultaneous occurrence of two or more conditions that could result in overpressure will not
be postulated if the causes are unrelated. The simultaneous occurrence of two or more unrelated
contingencies is unlikely and classified as a "double hazard or risk" ; therefore, it is rarely used as
a basis for determining the maximum relieving load. For example, in a plant where a single boiler
is used for both process steam and electric power generation, a boiler failure ( a single
contingency) could cause simultaneous loss of electric power and steam. If instead, electric
power is supplied from an external source, simultaneous loss of steam and electric power should
not be considered because it would be caused by two unrelated events. In case of two vessels
connected through a line having an isolating valve always open during normal operation, the
simultaneous occurrence of this valve blocked and fire should not be considered as a double risk,
since the situation of valve blockage may be extended in time (for instance, during maintenance)
and during this time the occurrence of a fire is a distinct possibility ; therefore, a relieving valve
for fire protection will be installed on each vessel.
Where very large quantities of hazardous materials are involved (flammable or toxic) such as for
storage or transportation, then a hazard analysis should be carried out. This type of analysis
deals with all possible failure cases, both single and multiple. For on plot equipment the total
number of multiple failure cases to be considered would become very large and this approach
then becomes very costly and time consuming. Some client codes however require the possibility
of multiple failure to be considered.
Having established which equipment items require protection, and the design temperatures and
pressures of these, it is next necessary to determine all of the applicable causes of overpressure
for each equipment item and the resulting individual relieving rates. Most standards refer to API
RP 521 Sections 2 and 3 (including Table 2) for guidance. This shall be done for all possible
operating cases including start-up, shutdown, turndown, feedstock variations and variations (as
detailed in the basis of design) in process conditions. Include for example aging of catalysts and
adsorbents and fouling of heat exchange surfaces where these considerations are relevant.
The possibility of autorefrigeration occurring when LPG or LNG is depressurized must also be
taken into account (See process Standard 603).
Good engineering judgment, rather than blind adherence to the proposals shown hereafter should
be followed in each case. This is not intended to be a complete list and a detailed study of all the
Standards and Codes specified by the project should be carried out before starting the design of
the relieving systems.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 4.0-2
4.1 Fire
Atmospheric and low-pressure storage tanks are not covered by this standard. The reader
is referred to API Standard 2000 "Venting Atmospheric and Low Pressure Storage
Tanks".
4.1.1 Fire Outside a Pressure Vessel
Flammable fluids may escape from a vessel or a pipe (from leaking joints or from
operational mishaps). They may be carried some distance from the source of the
leakage, by the natural slope of the ground, by air currents, or by a jetting stream (if
coming from a pressure source), and may accidentally become ignited. Therefore,
any pressure vessel (including heat exchangers, filters, or air coolers) may be
exposed to a fire at some time in its life, even though the content of the vessel itself
is not flammable. The heat absorbed by radiation or by direct contact from hot
gases and/or flames will cause the contained liquid to evaporate, if the critical
pressure of the fluid is in excess of the relieving pressure. When pressure relief
conditions are above critical point, the rate of vapor discharge depends on the rate
at which the fluid will expand as a result of the heat input.
For liquid-full vessels (such as treaters), at the start of a fire the opening of the
pressure relief valve is due to the thermal expansion of the liquid. Afterwards, the
liquid will vaporize.
As long as the vapor quantity generated under these conditions is below the flow
capacity of the safety relief valve, the valve, when opened, will discharge until the
pressure in the vessel has dropped to the valve reseating pressure and the valve
closes.
Intermittent valve operations, (called chattering), will continue in this range of heat
input. At higher rates of heat input the valve will start to operate constantly in an
open position and pressure in the vessel will build up to maximum accumulation.
4.1.2. Protection of Vessels from Fire Exposure
A vessel or group of vessels must be protected from fire exposure by using one of
the following pressure relief devices :
A. a pressure relief valve

B. a rupture disk device
C. a combination of A. and B.
D. a non-reclosing pressure relief device
Additional protection should be provided (however, not substituted for the pressure
relieving device) with the purpose of improving emergency control ; for instance :
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 4.0-3
4.1 Fire
4.1.2 Protection of Vessels from Fire Exposure (cont'd)
A. Remotely controlled depressuring valve to reduce vessel pressure usually in 15

minutes to 50 % of design gage pressure (API RP 521 paragraph 3.19).
B. Fire resistant insulation (See paragraph 4.1.3.).
C. Water spray of the vessel
This additional protection is important, because the vessel can fail because of
excessive metal temperature, even though the pressure is controlled by the relief
valves. The risk is greater for a vessel containing only gas because the heat
absorption due to evaporation of liquid is missing. This additional protection is
recommended by ASME, Sect. VIII, Division 1, Appendix T and in API RP 521
( 3.15.4.1). Another method for limiting heat input from fire is earth-covered
storage or location of pressure storage underground.
Where equipment can contain liquids having high boiling points then the relieving
temperature in the case of fire may be considerably higher than normal operating
and hence design temperatures. For heavy materials in big vessels, it may be
interesting to :
estimate the time to reach boiling temperature, and compare it to the

period of exposure which can last up to 2 hours (depending on the
firefighting facilities. Refer to 3.15.5.2 of API RP 521).
consider that cracking will occur above say 800F (430C), and that
pressure relief device may be sized on a lower Molecular Weight (MW)
than initial stock MW. In absence of other data, a MW of 80 and a heat
of cracking of 350 Btu/lb can be used. The vapor relief load, W, in lb/hr
for this contingency then becomes W = Q/350, where Q is the heat input
from the wetted surface in Btu/lb. It is assumed that any liquid formed
due to cracking will ultimately coke or become 80 MW vapor.
check with the vessel department if rupture of the vessel will occur, and
estimate the time to rupture (to advise the Client accordingly).
consider additional protection as mentioned here above.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 4.0-4
4.1 Fire (cont'd)
4.1.3 Formula for Amount of Heat Absorbed
For vessels containing only gases or vapors, see paragraph 4.1.5.1.
For vessels containing liquids, the total heat absorbed is computed by using the
following formula (see Figure 7) :
Q = 21,000 F A 0.82
where :
Q = Btu/hr. absorbed by total wetted surface
A = Total wetted surface, sq. ft.
F = Environment factor, depending on type of installation
For bare vessel F= 1.0

For insulated vessel (fire resistant) :
Insulation conductance 4 Btu/hr. ft2.F F= 0.3
For water spraying of bare vessel F= 1.0
For depressuring and emptying facilities F=1.0
For underground storage F= 0
For earth covered storage above grade F= 0.03
Requirements for fire resistant insulation are as follows :

Remain in place under fire exposure conditions.
Withstand dislodgment when subjected to hose stream impingement
during fire exposure.
Maintain a maximum conductance of 4 Btu/hr. sq ft.F when outer jacket
is at 1660F and average insulation temperature is 1000F.
Note : NFPA Code 30 does not allow for an insulation environment factor lower
than 0.3. In the UK there is also a lower limit of 0.3 for some types of storage
containing liquefied flammable gases (IP Code).
If fire resistant insulation is not specified by Process or included in the job

specification (by Project or Customer), the installed insulation will not meet the
above three requirements and environment factor should be equal to 1.0.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 4.0-5
4.1 Fire
4.1.3 Formula for Amount of Heat Absorbed (cont'd)
Mineral type insulation (calcium silicate, mineral wool, diatomaceous earth, perlite)
when covered with stainless steel, or galvanized steel or aluminized steel sheets
shall be considered to meet the fire resistant insulation requirements. Insulation
such as polyurethane, iso-cianurate, fiber glass and metal sheets made in
aluminum do not meet the requirements.
Note : Common insulating material has the following relationship between

thickness of insulation and conductance :
Conductance Thickness
Btu/hr. ft2 .F inches
4 1
2 2
1 4
In case of fire resistant insulation, if conductance or thickness are not known at

the time the valve is to be specified, it is suggested that F= 0.3 be used.
4.1.4 Surface Area Exposed to Fire
For each item the area effective in generating vapor is the area wetted by liquid.
The total wetted surface A shall be at least :
A. the wetted surface within a height of 25 ft. above grade in general.
The term "grade" usually refers to ground grade, but may be at any level at
which a sizable fire could be sustained (platforms, roofs, etc.).
B. for spheres and spheroids, the wetted surface included within the elevation of
the maximum horizontal diameter or within 25 ft., whichever is greater.
C. Lines exposed to fire
It is recommended to add a margin in calculating the wetted area for the

associated lines exposed to fire.
Typical margins are :
- 10 % for fractionation towers,
- up to 30 % for other vessels and heat exchangers.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 4.0-6
4.1 Fire
4.1.4 Surface Area Exposed to Fire (cont'd)
D. Wetted Surface of Typical Vessels
The wetted surface is calculated on the basis of the internal liquid contents.
The liquid contents under variable level conditions should ordinarily be taken at
the average inventory, i.e. :
D.1. Liquid-full Vessels (such as treaters)
Total area including heads within 25 ft. from grade.
D.2. Heat Exchangers
Shell side :
Tube side :
D.3. Fractionating Columns
The wetted surface will be based on the high liquid level in the bottom,
bottom head, plus wetted surface corresponding to four inches of liquid for
any tray within a height of 25 ft. from grade.
D.4. Surge Drums
The wetted surface will be calculated up to the high liquid level but at least
50 percent of the total vessel surface, heads included.
D.5. Knockout Drums
Use the surface up to the high liquid alarm, heads included.

PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 4.0-7
4.1 Fire
4.1.4 Surface Area Exposed to Fire (cont'd)
D. Wetted Surface of Typical Vessels
D.6. Working Storage Tanks
Usually 50 percent of the surface, since they usually work half full and in any
case a certain time is necessary to raise a large volume of liquid to its boiling
point, but at least up to 25 ft. from grade (refer also to B for spheres and
spheroids).
In some cases (like OSBL storage tanks) it may be required to follow:

NFPA Code 30, with the following criteria for wetted area calculation :
- 55 % of total exposed area for a sphere or spheroid,
- 75 % of total exposed area for a horizontal tank,
- area within 30 ft from grade for a vertical tank;
or API STD 2000, which is slightly different from NFPA Code 30 as the
greater area from the above criteria and from the 30 ft elevation should
be used.
D.7. Vessels in Pits
Use the entire surface area.
D.8. Air-cooled Exchangers
In previous editions of API RP 521 (up to Edition 3), air-coolers were

supposed to produce a chimney effect and pull hot combustion products into
their plenums. The height limit of 25 ft on fire exposure was therefore not
applicable to air-coolers.
As stated in 3.15.7 of API RP 521 (4th Edition), the air-coolers are
considered now to be subject to the same height limitations as other
equipment.
See paragraph 4.3.3 for calculating relief loads due to fire under air-cooled
exchangers.
E. Equipment Simultaneously Affected by Fire
When a group of vessels and other equipment is protected by one relieving

device, the total load to be discharged is the sum of loads of each item of the
group, e.g. tower, condenser, reboiler, reflux drum and related piping full of
liquid.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 4.0-8
4.1 Fire
4.1.4 Surface Area Exposed to Fire
E. Equipment Simultaneously Affected by Fire (cont'd)
When one relief valve protects several equipment items, it is important to

determine which of these items can be simultaneously affected by a fire.
Also, in sizing Flare Headers it is necessary to identify the valves that can
simultaneously relieve due to fire. API RP 521 ( 5.2.2) considers plot areas
between 2,500 and 5,000 sq. ft. FW practice has been to use 2,500 sq. ft. for
a paved drained surface in a plant where NFPA required fire fighting
equipment (or equivalent) is available. Some customers require larger areas
and this is to be confirmed prior to design. This "design plot area for fire" is
not necessarily a circle but any reasonable regular geometric shape. Areas
larger than 5,000 sq. ft. are to be considered if enclosed by a curb or dike.
4.1.5 Relieving Capacity in Case of Fire
4.1.5.1 Gas Expansion in a Vessel Exposed to Fire
API RP 521 Section 3.15.2 suggests using the following formula for
vessels containing vapor and exposed to open fires :
MP1 A' (Tw 1.1506

T1 ) 1.25
W = 0.1406
T1
where : W = Vapor relief load, lb/hr,

M = Molecular weight of the gas,
A' = Exposed surface area of the vessel, sq ft.,
P 1 = Upstream relieving pressure, psia. This is the set
pressure plus the allowable overpressure plus the
atmospheric pressure.
Tw = Vessel wall temperature, R,
T1 = Gas temperature, R, at the upstream pressure,
determined from the following relationship :
P1
T1 = Tn
Pn
where : P n= Normal operating gas pressure, psia,

Tn= Normal operating gas temperature, R.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 4.0-9
4.1 Fire
4.1.5.1 Gas Expansion in a Vessel Exposed to Fire (cont'd)
The recommended maximum vessel wall temperature T w for the usual

carbon steel plate materials is 1100F. Where vessels are fabricated
from alloy materials, the value for Tw should be changed to a more
appropriate recommended maximum.
The derivation of this formula is based on the physical properties of air

and the perfect gas laws. The derivation assumes that the vessel is
uninsulated and has no mass, that the vessel wall temperature will not
reach rupture stress, that there is no change in fluid temperature and
that the capacity correction factor (Kb) due to back-pressure in
balanced bellows pressure relief valves is equal to one. These
assumptions should be reviewed to ensure that they are appropriate for
any particular situation.
Where these assumptions are not appropriate, more rigorous methods

of calculation may be warranted. In such cases, refer to API RP 521
Section 3.15.2.
Depressuring is recommended for high pressure gas filled equipment

(Refer to 4.1.2).
4.1.5.2 Fluid with Critical Pressure Above Relieving Pressure
The rate of vapor release through the relief device may be calculated
as follows :
W = Q
L
where : W = vapor release rate, lb/hr

Q = total heat input, Btu/hr
L = Latent heat of fluid in vessel, evaluated at
relieving pressure, Btu/lb.
No credit is normally taken for the sensible heat capacity of the fluid in
the vessel, all heat input being considered as latent heat. Thus no time
limit is placed on the duration of the fire.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 4.0-10
4.1 Fire
4.1.5.2 Fluid with Critical Pressure Above Relieving Pressure (cont'd)
The latent heat of vaporization varies for different liquids.
Latent heat of vaporization decreases as the temperature of

vaporization increases, and becomes zero at the critical temperature
and pressure. In the absence of more specific information the heat of
vaporization for hydrocarbon systems can be obtained from Fig. 8.
The value obtained will approximate that for paraffin hydrocarbon
mixtures with a vapor pressure and temperature corresponding to
those of the pure compounds for which the chart is made.
Note :API RP 521 3.15.3.2 specifies that pressure relief valves

located in the liquid zone on vessels that may be exposed to fire
conditions must be able to pass a volume of liquid equivalent
to the displacement caused by vaporization from a fire.
On a case-by-case basis the following two design scenarios

should be considered :
a) Specify the pressure relief valve in accordance with API RP

521 when the vapor must force liquid out through the pressure
relief valve in order to establish a path to the pressure relief
valve (i.e., when the system is pocketed).
b) Do not consider a liquid equivalent to the displacement caused

by vaporization from a fire when the pressure safety valve is
free draining (no pockets) back to the high point of the system
being protected. The premise here is that vapor generated by
fire slowly builds up in the high point system (such as the top
center of a drum), thus allowing liquid to drain back out of the
pressure safety valve inlet.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 4.0-11
4.1 Fire
4.1.5 Relieving Capacity in Case of Fire (cont'd)
4.1.5.3 Fluid with Critical Pressure Below Relieving Pressure
For fluids that reach or exceed their critical point before their vapor
pressure reaches the set pressure of the relief valve, a fictitious latent
heat is used to calculate the flow of fluid. API RP 521 3.15.3.1
suggests that a minimum value of 50 Btu/lb is sometimes acceptable as
an approximation.
Noting that the apparent latent heat of hydrocarbons near the critical
point is approximately 74 Btu/lb for methane and 42 Btu/lb for octane,
the suggestion made by API may be explained by means of the
following theoretical approach (not of API source) :
A. Foreword
To simplify the problem, a vessel partially filled with a pure liquid

hydrocarbon like n-heptane under an H2 atmosphere is assumed
to be equipped with a relief valve having a set-pressure higher
than the critical pressure of n C7 (P c = 396.8 psia).
If the vessel is exposed to an external source of heat such as

fire, the following events may occur in sequential order :
1) As the temperature rises the H2 gas increases its specific

volume and the pressure inside the vessel rises to the
relief valve set pressure causing the relief valve to open.
2) Some gas escapes from the vessel. This gas becomes

richer and richer in heptane vapor as and when the liquid
temperature is increased.
The gas escapes from the vessel for the following reasons :
a) thermal expansion of gas ;
b) vaporization of liquid which causes an equal
number of gas moles to escape ;
c) thermal expansion of liquid which causes less
volume to be available to the gas phase.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 4.0-12
4.1 Fire
4.1.5.3 Fluid with Critical Pressure Below Relieving Pressure
A. Foreword (cont'd)
3) Assuming that in normal conditions the vessel is at least

half full of liquid, and considering that specific gravity of
liquid in the critical region is close to 0.25, it is very likely
that the vessel will be full of expanded liquid before the
critical temperature of the liquid is attained.
4) When all the gas has escaped and liquid has not yet
reached its critical temperature, the relief valve
discharges liquid at very low density, while its
temperature increases.
5) When the critical temperature of the liquid is attained, the

liquid turns into a dense gaseous phase and therefore
additional gas will escape through the relief valve due to
the thermal expansion of the dense gas phase still in the
vessel.
In conclusion, the following steps occur :
Step 1. Gas flows through the relief valve until all gas has
escaped.
Step 2. Low density liquid escapes until the critical

temperature is reached.
Step 3. High density gas is discharged.
B. Controlling Step and Valve Specification
It can be demonstrated that step No. 2 is the controlling one,

since the maximum valve orifice size is required for these
conditions.
The flowrate of fluid escaping is :
W = QB
C
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 4.0-13
4.1 Fire
4.1.5.3 Fluid with Critical Pressure Below Relieving Pressure (cont'd)
where :
W = flowrate of fluid, lb/hr

Q = heat absorbed by the vessel surface due to fire,
Btu/hr.
B = volumetric coefficient of thermal expansion, l/F
C = specific heat of liquid, Btu/lb. F
It is convenient to introduce a fictitious latent heat = C/B which

is here below tabulated for n-heptane (Data derived from API
Technical Data Book) (1).
Temp, F S.G. (2) C B (3) = C/B
400 0.485 0.735 2.63 x 10-3 280

460 0.415 1.000 6.76 x 10-3 148
500 0.319 1.4 1.49 x 10-3 94
505 0.295 1.8 2.37 x 10-2 76
510 0.262 3.07 5.0 x 10-2 62
512.6 (crit) 0.230
Notes : (1) S.G. and C values are at saturation pressures, while they
should be at constant pressure, but the two errors should
tend to cancel each other.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 4.0-14
4.1 Fire
Notes :
(2) S.G. at 60F is 0.688
(3) B has been calculated according to the following formula :

(Perry, V Ed., Page 3-227)
2 2
D D
1 2
B=
2 (T - T ) D D
2 1 1 2
where B is the average volumetric coefficient of thermal

expansion for the indicated temperature range T1 to T2
with corresponding fluid densities D1 and D2.
It is easy to see that in the vicinity of the critical temperature,

the latent heat is very low and close to the suggested figures of
API RP 521.
It is important to note that the fluid discharged is liquid at the

valve inlet, but it will flash through the valve and this should be
clearly specified in the valve specification sheet.
C. Step 3 - Dense gas discharge
As shown above, Step 2 is controlling : while it is not so simple

to show this when comparing Step 2 and Step 1, this is not
difficult with Step 3.
The following considerations apply to a vessel full of gas when

exposed to fire conditions : at a given temperature and pressure
the quantity of gas confined in the vessel is :
w = NM = PVM (lb) (1)

ZRT
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 4.0-15
4.1 Fire
where :
M = molecular weight
N = number of lb-mols
P = pressure, psia
V = vessel volume, ft3
R = gas constant (10.73)
T = temperature, R
Z = compressibility factor.
If the temperature increases from T to T + T at constant

pressure, w decreases by w which is discharged through the
valve :
w = PVM T = w T (2)
ZRT2 T
The heat q necessary to raise the gas temperature is
q = TCw (3)
where :
q = heat necessary to heat the quantity w (lb of gas

confined in the vessel) from T to T + T, Btu.
C = specific heat of gas, Btu/lb. F
time t required for that is :
t = q/Q (4)
where :
Q = heat flux to the vessel (Btu/hr).

PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 4.0-16
4.1 Fire
By suitable handling of Eqs. 2, 3 and 4 the following expression

is obtained for the flowrate of gas discharging through the valve
:
W = w = Q (5)
t CT
In comparing the above expression with the one for Step 2, it is

easy to see that CT is normally much larger than the pseudo
latent heat C/B at critical conditions and Step 2 has a larger
relieving requirement than Step 3.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 4.0-17
4.2 Operational Failure
4.2.1 Closed Outlets
API RP 521 requires that possible hazards due to wrongly closed outlets be
considered, for example vessels on the discharge side of a pump when shut-off
pressure of the pump is above M.A.W.P. of the vessel.
The main sources of overpressure are pumps, compressors, high pressure supply
headers and process heat.
To determine the capacity of the relieving device the maximum in-flow of the
liquid to the vessel under consideration or the maximum vapor generation therein
should be considered at the specific relieving conditions, i.e. set pressure plus
overpressure. There can be a considerable reduction in required valve capacity
when the basis is considered for mechanical equipment. Nevertheless, if the
characteristic curves are not known when the valve is specified, the normal flow
should be considered.
Note that it is to be assumed that the pump or compressor suction pressure is at

its maximum (i.e. suction vessel at design pressure and liquid at high level).
If not all outlets are blocked, then API RP 521 3.10.4 allows that credit for flow
out through the remaining outlets be taken unless automatic control action will
tend to close them. This credit should be calculated at relieving conditions, which
can considerably reduce the required relief loads. However, before any credit is
taken, a detailed risk analysis must be made in order to justify that the assumption
made is valid. Note that the possibility that operators will completely block in the
system during abnormal operation is not considered to be multiple jeopardy.
A special case of closed outlet is that affecting a process system where a single
pressure relief device is used to protect several equipment components. A typical
example is that of a hydrotreater - reactor recycle - gas loop. It is not necessary
to design the entire system for the highest pressure occurring during normal
operation (i.e. at feed pump discharge). Follow the procedure set forth in the
Foster Wheeler Hydrotreater Manual. Alternately, the procedure in API RP 521,
Appendix B may be checked (some Clients may require it), but it may give either
more, or less, conservative design pressures than the FW method.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 4.0-18
4.2.1 Closed Outlets (cont'd)
In the case of non-flashing liquids some Clients make an exception where the
system to be protected has a sufficiently large liquid ullage space (free vapor
space). This is usually quoted as the time required to fill the ullage space from
either normal or maximum liquid level to full. These specifications will depend on
the Client but are generally from between 10 and 30 minutes. It is essential that
the operators be provided with reliable alarms and instrumentation to monitor the
liquid levels concerned and be provided with reliable valves, shut-down systems
etc. to stop the flow of liquid into the system.
4.2.2 Opening Manual Valves or Check-Valve Failure
Each vessel or group of vessels shall be protected for inadvertent opening of

manual valves, which may either release a high pressure stream into them or
expose them to vacuum conditions.
The valve shall be considered fully opened and where applicable the methodology
of 4.2.11.1 should be followed.
Failure of a check-valve to close can have the same effect as inadvertent valve
opening. If the downstream pressure is significantly higher than the design
pressure of equipment upstream, consideration should be given to the provision of
a secondary device to minimize the potential for a reversal of flow (refer to API
RP 521, paragraph 2.3.4).
Critical flow, flashing from liquid to vapor, entrance of volatile liquid into a hot
fluid or vice versa, are to be considered.
4.2.3 Cooling Water Failure
The main effects of cooling water failure are loss of process or utility cooling or
condensing duty. Loss of seal or lube oil cooling and jacket water for rotating
equipment should also be considered.
For distillation columns with no air condenser and no pump-around, normally the
gross overhead is to be discharged by the relief device less any net overhead
vapor product flow through the control valve at relieving conditions.
For very large relieving capacities, consider the possible reduction of vaporization
due to the increase of pressure from normal to design. This possible reduction of
vaporization is discussed in 4.2.4.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 4.0-19
4.2.3 Cooling Water Failure (cont'd)
If an air condenser is provided upstream of the water condenser, the relieved load
is the total vapor entering the water condenser minus any overhead net vapor
product.
For towers with pumparound or sidestream reflux circuits, e.g. crude distillation
towers and cat cracking fractionators, water coolers also will be inoperative.
The vapor rate therefore equals the total steam and vapor input to the tower plus
the vapor generated in the system, minus any vapors condensed in exchangers
cooled by some medium other than cooling water.
4.2.4 Tower Top Reflux or Top Product Failure
Failure of reflux or top product, which may be due to pump shutdown or control
valve closure, causes condenser flooding (or accumulation of non-condensable in
condenser in case of top vapor product failure), which is equivalent to the total
loss of coolant. Refer also to 4.2.10 for considerations on the reflux drum
overfilling case.
A heat balance around the tower should be made, but the gross overhead is
generally considered adequate, except in quench towers, where the quench liquid
failure requires the relieving of the total vapor entering the tower.
Strictly speaking, relief capacity for distillation columns is normally required to

accommodate the worst case of either reflux failure or overhead condenser
failure or blocked vapor outlet or reboiler heat full on. See API RP 521 Table 2
and Section 3.6. The first paragraph of Section 3.6 instructs the designer to carry
out a heat and material balance at the relieving pressure (reference M. Sengupta
and F.Y. Staats "A new Approach to Relief Load Calculations" Hydrocarbon
Processing, May 1978, pp 160-162). Various simplifications are discussed in the
remainder of Section 3.6. Some clients may require to consider the reduced flow
which would occur at the relieving pressure due to the steady state reduction in
LMTD in the reboiler. On loss of overhead cooling, or reflux, the column becomes
ineffective in its ability to separate the light components from the heavy
components. As a result of this the reboil rate is at first reduced as the pressure
rises, but subsequently increases rapidly as light material from the column feed
and material from the trays reaches the reboiler thus increasing the LMTD. A
quick method of estimating the effect of this is to determine the bubble point
temperature of the feed at the column relieving pressure plus accumulation and
use this to calculate the reboiler LMTD at relieving conditions. Then prorate the
normal gross overhead vapor rate by this relieving LMTD divided by the normal
reboiler LMTD and use this flow rate to size the relief devices.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 4.0-20
4.2.4 Tower Top Reflux or Top Product Failure (cont'd)
Where credit is taken for LMTD reduction due to the elevation of pressure and
temperature above normal at relieving conditions then account should be taken of
the reduction in latent heat which also occurs. This reduction in latent heat will
tend to increase relief flow rates.
Controller action must be considered also since the particular configuration of the
various process controllers which are regulating the operation of a distillation
column can have a marked effect on the behavior of the column if overhead
failure should occur. If the flow of reboiler heating medium is under differential
pressure control, top temperature control or top or bottom composition control
then the reboiler steam or hot oil control valve will be driven fully open on reflux
failure. This is because the separating power of the column will be lost and the
controller will attempt to rectify this. The flow rate of heating medium to the
reboiler will then be the maximum flow which can occur through the fully open
control valve. Each case should be reviewed in detail with regard to the particular
control scheme employed.
4.2.5 Pumparound or Sidestream Reflux Failure

The relief rate requirement is the vaporization rate caused by an amount of heat
equal to that removed in the pumparound circuit or by the sidestream reflux. A
latent heat corresponding to temperature and pressure at relief point shall be used.
4.2.6 Reflux and Pumparound Failure

Reflux and pumparound failure may occur simultaneously, for instance in case of
electric power failure. The required relieving capacity is discussed in paragraphs
4.2.4 and 4.2.5.
4.2.7 Absorbent Medium Failure

The relief load is generally the difference between normal input and normal
output.
For lean oil absorption of hydrocarbons there is generally no relief requirement.
However, for CO2 absorption from synthesis gas, where a significant fraction of
the inlet gas is removed, absorbent failure may overload downstream equipment
and cause large relief loads. When a methanator follows the absorption system,
the extra CO2 resulting from any decrease in absorption can violently upset the
methanator. This situation must be carefully analyzed.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 4.0-21
4.2 Operational Failure (cont'd)
4.2.8 Accumulation of Non-Condensable

With certain piping configurations it is possible for non-condensable to accumulate
to the point that condensers are blocked. This effect is equal to total loss of
coolant.
See therefore Cooling Water Failure, Par. 4.2.3.
A manual (remote) or automatic purging at the condensers by rapid controlled
release of gas may be provided.
4.2.9 Volatile Material into System

a) Water or Light Hydrocarbons into Oil
At atmospheric pressure the volumetric expansion ratio for water passing
from liquid to steam is approximately 1 to 1,400 and it is essentially
instantaneous. Furthermore, the quantity of water is almost never known,
excluding the case of heat exchanger tube rupture (see heat exchangers).
The same applies to light hydrocarbons although the ratio is less than 1 to
1,400.
Normally, no pressure relieving device is provided for this contingency. All

precautions should be taken to avoid water entering a hot oil system such as
avoidance of water collecting pockets, proper steam condensate traps, and
double blocks and bleeds on water connections to hot process lines.
b) Upstream Equipment Malfunction
It is possible that higher than normal volatility material may reach the column
during upset conditions in upstream equipment, like :
- chemical reactor upset,

- loss of the heat input to the upstream column; the overhead load of the
second column may consist of its normal vapor load plus the light ends
from the first column (refer to 4.2.20).
4.2.10 Overfilling of Storage or Surge Vessels
See Par. 4.2.1, Closed Outlets.
It is essential to consider overfilling of storage or surge vessels, except if the free

vapor space above the high liquid level alarm is greater than say 10 minutes (10 to
30 minutes operator response considered in API RP 521 3.4) and/or if adequate
means are provided to stop the flow of liquid into the system. These exceptions
must be reviewed with the Client.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 4.0-22
4.2.10 Overfilling of Storage or Surge Vessels (contd)
Reflux Drum Overfilling
Note that the reflux drum design pressure should be specified above the column
design pressure, to account for the max liquid static head in the overhead system
in case of any operational failure resulting in liquid build-up and potential
condenser flooding. A differential pressure of 7-8 psi (0.5 bar) corresponding for
instance to 25 feet of liquid SG = 0.7 is generally adequate.
When the system is protected by one pressure relief valve (PSV) on the top of
the column (or overhead line), the reflux drum pressure will not exceed its design
value even if the condenser gets flooded when the PSV starts opening (no liquid
relief through PSV).
When the system is protected by two PSVs with one on the reflux drum for fire
protection only, it is with the above recommendation not necessary to consider
liquid relief (through the PSV) due to reflux drum overfilling.
4.2.11 Automatic Control Failure
It has been stated in the past that it is only necessary to consider the possibility of
the control valve moving to the fully open position if the valve failure mode is
open. This is incorrect since failure of the process controller, the valve positioner
or operator error can all result in the valve moving fully open. The effect of the
control valve moving fully open must therefore be considered irrespective of the
valve actuator failure mode.
1. Inlet Control Device
Failure of inlet process controllers and its associated valve or valves is

discussed in API RP 521 Section 3.10.3.
The following points should be reviewed where the relieving flow is being
determined as the flow through a fully open control valve.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 4.0-23
4.2.11 Automatic Control Failure (cont'd)
a) Preliminary check of pressure increase in the LP vessel :

If the low-pressure side has a large vapor volume, it may prove
worthwhile to take credit for the fact that the transfer of vapors from
the high-pressure system needed to raise the pressure on the
downstream side from operating pressure to relieving pressure
(110 percent of design pressure) will lower the upstream pressure.
This decrease produces a corresponding reduction in the flow that
establishes the relieving requirement. Where such credit is taken, an
allowance must be made for the normal make-up of vapor to the high-
pressure system, which tends to maintain upstream pressure.
b) Upstream pressure of the control valve :

Where a relieving flow is being determined as the flow through a fully
open control valve, then the flow may be calculated by employing
either the normal pressure on the upstream side of the control valve
(API RP 521, par 3.10.3 recommendation) or the design pressure on
the upstream side (as required by some clients).
c) Maximum flowrate to be relieved :

The maximum flowrate through the fully open control valve and
associated by-pass (refer to point (e) hereafter) will be determined by
the instrument specialist, using the actual Cv of valves and the pressure
conditions specified by the process engineer. If this flowrate exceeds
the maximum flowrate that the HP system can supply, the latter should
be used.
d) Level control valve :

For the case of level control valve between HP vessel and LP vessel,
the following cases should be considered for the flow through the fully
open control valve :
flash of the HP liquid,
if loss of level in the HP vessel is a viable contingency, vapor
letdown from HP vessel to LP vessel.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 4.0-24
1. Inlet Control Device (cont'd)
Note the potential transient liquid relief due to HP vapor into liquid full
vessel. The filling of the downstream vessel has to be carefully
evaluated considering the liquid flow out of the vessel (see f
hereafter). Note also the API RP 521 3.20.2 : "Where valves or
other devices are sized to relieve vapors caused by vapor entry or
generation of vapor in a normally all-liquid system (see 3.10,
3.12, 3.13, and 3.19), care should be taken to locate the device
so that it actually relieves vapor and is not required to relieve the
volumetric equivalent of the vapor as liquid." with API 3.10.3
dealing with inlet control device failure.
e) By-passes :
Allowance should also be made for the inadvertent opening of control

valve by-passes. API RP 521 Sections 3.10.1 and 3.16 discuss this
requirement. In view of the comments made in API RP 521 one of the
following actions should be taken :
Size the downstream relief valve(s) for the flow which is obtained
with both the control valve and the by-pass fully open. Specify
the by-pass valve as an HCV having the same Cv (or lower Cv) as the
main control valve. Note that globe valves can have a Cv many
times larger than the installed control valve. Note also that globe
valves belong to the bulk piping material, and it is therefore almost
impossible to get the information about the Cv of the by-pass
globe valve (and to be sure of it).
When the above calculated load is excessive, and/or becomes the

controlling load used to size the downstream relief valve or relief
header, it may be possible to reduce the relief load through the
following methods :
Omit or remove the by-pass and fit a hand wheel to the control
valve.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 4.0-25
1. Inlet Control Device
e) By-passes : (cont'd)
Specify two control valves in parallel both taking feed from a

single three way valve. This valve must be fully closed at the
intermediate position between the two outlets. Note that the three
way valve does not replace the upstream control valve block
valve.
Another possibility is to install an interlock on the block valves of
the control valve and of the bypass valve (not as "foolproof" as
the above methods).
f) Capacity credit for flow out of the vessel :
The relief load shall be calculated on the basis of turndown operation,

in which case capacity credit for normal flow out of the vessel should
either be reduced or not be taken. Some clients may also require that
start-up and shut-down operations be considered.
g) Pressure profile in the LP system :
For any equipment located between the fully open control valve and
the LP vessel fitted with the relief device, the pressure should be
checked considering :
the accumulated pressure in the LP vessel,
the friction losses at relieving flowrate in the LP system.
This pressure should not exceed accumulated pressure of the
equipment.
2. Outlet Control Device
See Par. 4.2.1 Closed Outlets.
3. Controller Failure
Automatic controller failure shall be considered, which may lead to

misoperation of several control valves. A typical example is a pressure
controller failure on a vessel, which will lead to overpressure with vapor inlet
control valve fully open and vapor outlet control valve closed.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 4.0-26
4.2.12 Abnormal Process Heat Input (Refer to API RP 521, Section 3.11)
In case of control device failure or misoperation causing the complete opening of

valves, an abnormal quantity of heat could be transferred to the process system :
this may cause additional vapor generation and a possible pressure rise in the
system. To determine the relieving requirements, the system shall be analyzed,
taking the following items into account :
a) The wide open capacity of control valves admitting fuel, hot oil or steam shall
be considered, even if limit stops are provided on the valve.
b) The common practice of specifying burners capable of 110 to 125 percent of

heater design heat input should be considered, since this could be the
controlling factor.
c) In shell and tube heat exchangers, heat input should be calculated on the basis
of clean, rather than fouled conditions. Calculate the overall heat transfer
coefficient hc from
l/hc = l/hd - fh - fc
where : hd = overall heat transfer coefficient with fouling

fh = hot side fouling factor
fc = cold side fouling factor.
d) A calculation margin of 20% above the heat exchanger design duty should be
employed for abnormal process heat input where the exchanger contains fluids
such as water, light hydrocarbons, hydrocarbon vapors, steam. This has been
advised by Heat Exchanger department and is made up of a 15% correlation
margin and a 5% design margin (note these margins do not include the process
design margin). For fluids such as crude oil and residues a margin of 30%
above the heat exchanger design duty should be employed.
When conditions a) c) and d) are applied to a reboiled distillation column, it turns

out in practice that the total overdesign factor to be used to determine the
maximum vapor flow in the column stripping section is around 200%. Based on
this rough figure, an analysis must be made to determine how this will affect the
column overhead rate used to specify the pressure relief valve.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 4.0-27
4.2.13 Internal Explosion (Excluding Detonation)
No general rule can be given for determining the relieving requirements in case of
internal explosion. When protection is required, rupture disks should be used, since
they react faster than safety valves. It should be noted that the peak pressure
reached during a vented explosion is usually higher, sometimes much higher than
the pressure at which the vent device activates. The design pressure should be
determined accordingly.
In API RP 521 3.12 it is mentioned that for design of explosion relief systems,
simplified rules-of-thumb (as shown in previous editions of API RP 521 up to
Edition 3) should not be used as these can lead to inadequate designs.
Refer to NFPA 68, Guide for Venting Deflagrations, and to NFPA 69,
Expansion Prevention Systems, for guidance on this subject.
4.2.14 Chemical Reaction
The methodology for determining the appropriate size of an emergency vent

system for chemical reactions was established by DIERS (refer to STD 601
3.2).
The DIERS methodology is based on the following :
a) Defining the design basis upset conditions for the reaction system.
b) Characterizing the systems through bench scale tests simulating the design
basis upset conditions.
c) Using vent sizing formula which account for two phase gas/liquid vent flow.
The design basis upset conditions are process specific, but generally include one
or more of the following : external fire, loss of mixing, loss of cooling, mischarge
or reagents.
If the chemical reaction can approach the conditions of an explosion, the

considerations 4.2.13 should be applied.
Refer to API RP 521 3.13 for further general information on chemical reaction,
and to the DIERS documentation.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 4.0-28
4.2.14 Chemical Reaction (cont'd)
A pressure relief device should be used to control overpressure. Additional

protective systems should be considered : automatic shutdown systems, inhibitor
injection, quench, de-inventorying, alternative power supplies and depressuring.
When using only such a safety system to control overpressure, the reliability of
the protective system shall be addressed in a formal risk analysis (refer to STD
601, 3.3 on High Integrity Trip Systems).
The use of pilot-assisted pressure relief valves (refer to 1.4.1 G and to 2.4)
should also be considered here with the following principles :
- the main valve spring set pressure (usually 105 % pilot set pressure) shall not
exceed the reactor MAWP,
- the pilot is generally pressure sensing, but alternate pilot can sense
temperature, flow, liquid level or other parameter necessitating valve opening.
4.2.15. Hydraulic Expansion of Liquids and Vapors
Hydraulic expansion of a fluid is due to an increase or decrease in temperature.
Examples : Solar radiation on a blocked pipeline, liquid blocked in on the cold side
of an exchanger with flow in the hot side, piping or vessels blocked and heated by
heat tracing, coils or fire. Sections of piping containing more than 500 liters of
LPG or toxic material which could be normally blocked in.
The following factors should be taken into account when deciding whether to fit
thermal expansion relief :
Is the linework or equipment in continuous operation and thus not routinely

isolated without being depressurized and drained. Most continuous process
equipment and linework is in this category.
Is the liquid highly toxic, corrosive or a LPG.
Is there a weak point in the system such as a flange where expansion could
relieve without serious consequences.
Is it likely that the system will be totally liquid filled (i.e. to more than 95 %)
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 4.0-29
4.2.15. Hydraulic Expansion of Liquids and Vapors (cont'd)
As general guide, thermal relief valves are not needed for :
ISBL Process plant piping

Storage or transport piping sections which are not normally shut in for
operation or emergency purposes
Lines in which there is normally two-phases flow
Heat traced lines which are not blocked in as part of normal operation.
Relieving capacity :
For the amount of fluid to be discharged, see Par. 4.3.2.1 under Shell and
Tube Heat Exchangers. Generally a 3/4 in. x 1 in. safety-relief valve is
adequate, unless long pipelines or large vessels are involved.
For vessels or piping subject to solar radiation in most locations, a value of

320 Btu/hr/ft2 may be used.
A manually operated bleeded valve, a small bypass kept permanently open, or a

hole drilled in the control valve seat may be used as a protection in some
instances ; however, since the hole in the control valve seat may be forgotten
when the valve is changed, the last solution is to be avoided.
The thermal relief valve should discharge to atmosphere, drain, or into a closed
circuit if the fluid is dangerous. It should not discharge into the same line outside
of the block valves. When thermal relief valves discharge into a closed system,
the effects of back pressure should be considered.
FW practice is to protect exchangers from thermal expansion by the use of

thermal relief valves. However, some clients use "caution" signs on the block
valves to warn against blocked in conditions. If this is a client requirement it must
be confirmed as a requirement in writing.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 4.0-30
4.2.15. Hydraulic Expansion of Liquids and Vapors (cont'd)
Typically, a "caution" sign is placed at the block valves of all exchangers not
equipped with a permanently open bypass.
The wording typically is as follows :
CAUTION
Thermal Expansion of Trapped Liquid Can
Cause Rupture
DO NOT CLOSE
both inlet and outlet valve unless

you open the drain or small bypass
4.2.16. Heat Exchanger Tube Failure
This type of failure is discussed in paragraph 4.3.2. below.
4.2.17. Electric Power Failure
Electric power failure will shut down electrically driven equipment such as pumps,
compressors, air coolers, solenoid valves, etc. Note that in turn, a pump failure
can cause loss of cooling water, reflux, fuel, pumparound, etc. A compressor
failure may cause loss of instrument air, inert gas, refrigeration, etc.
In addition, air cooled condensers may flood. In this case no credit shall be given
for natural convection.
There are three categories of power failure which shall be considered :
a) Total power failure

b) Partial power failure
c) Failure of one equipment item driver only
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 4.0-31
4.2.17. Electric Power Failure (cont'd)
The analysis of (a) and (c) is usually relatively straightforward. Partial power
failure (b) may be analyzed as failure of any single transformer bus bar. In order
to do this it is necessary to examine the one line wiring diagram or its equivalent.
The one line wiring diagram is usually not available early in the project so the
basis upon which the relief valve sizing has been carried out and the assumptions
made in the calculations for partial power failure should be made clear to all
interested parties (Project Dept., Electrical Dept., Client, HAZOP Team etc.) and
recorded in writing. Alternatively take the simultaneous failure of electrically
driven equipment which yields the largest relief load.
Note that in the case of power failure a fired heater may still contribute to the
relief load because of the heat retained in the fire bricks. This heat can be
estimated to range from about 10 % of normal duty for large forced draught fired
heaters to 70 % of normal duty for small natural draught heaters.
4.2.18. Instrument Air Failure
The relief load for air failure should be based on the failure of the single most
critical component of the air supply system. See paragraph 4.2.19 below for credit
taken for spare equipment.
In order to reduce the risk of instrument air failure the main air compressor is
generally spared by another compressor which automatically starts on low
pressure in the air receiver. This spare compressor may be either turbine-driven
or motor-driven using electricity from a different source. An air receiver is also
usually provided, sized to give 5 to 10 minutes before the instrument air pressure
drops to 50 percent of normal.
In determining the relief loads the Process Engineer must consider the action of
control valves on air failure. This action can be either fail open, fail closed or fail
locked (at the last controlled position). For this last case, since there is no way of
determining what the valve position is, the position causing the largest relieving
load must be assumed.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 4.0-32
4.2.19. Steam Failure
A steam failure could cause turbine driven pumps or compressors, or ejectors to

fail.
Each case should be individually analyzed. Note that in a plant where a single
boiler or source of steam is used for both process drivers and electric power
generation, a failure of a steam source can cause simultaneous loss of electric
power. In this case, if an alternate source of electricity is not available, consider
the possible loss of cooling tower fans, cooling tower pumps and reflux pumps.
Credit may be taken for parallel equipment powered by a different energy source
(e.g. turbine-driven pumps) only when it is normally operating. Automatic starting
of spare equipment is not sufficiently reliable to eliminate the need for relieving
capacity. Manual start of auxiliaries must be carefully analyzed for time and
operator requirements before it can be used to reduce relief requirements.
4.2.20. Loss of Heat in Series Fractionation Systems
In series fractionation (that is, where the bottoms from the first column feed into
the second column, and the bottoms from the second feed into the third), the loss
of heat input to a column can overpressure the following column. Loss of heat
results in some of the light ends mixing with the bottoms and being transferred to
the next column as feed. Under this circumstance, the overhead load of the
second column may consist of its normal vapor load plus the light ends from the
first column. If the second column does not have the condensing capacity for the
additional vapor load, excessive pressure could occur.
4.2.21. Other Causes
There may also be flows from depressuring operations (especially during fire) and
flows from operational flaring of surplus vapor (especially during start-up and
shut-down).
4.3 Protection of Equipment
4.3.1 Pressure Vessels
Paragraphs 4.1 and 4.2 give the necessary instructions for protection of pressure
vessels.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 4.0-33
4.3 Protection of Equipment (cont'd)
4.3.2 Shell and Tube and Double Pipe Heat Exchanger
4.3.2.1 Cold Fluid Blocked in Heat Exchanger
The liquid in the cold side of a heat exchanger may be accidentally blocked in and
continue to absorb heat from the fluid flowing in the hot side.
In this case, one of the following two conditions occurs :
the cold fluid the cold fluid

remains liquid vaporizes (liquid at, or
and expands close to, its boiling point) :
(API RP 521 3.14)
t t
Q
WL = BQ
1 bp
c Wv = t t x
1 av
L
where :
WL or Wv = liquid or vapor to be relieved, lb/hr (or kg/hr)
Q = normal exchanger duty, Btu/hr (or kcal/hr)
L = latent heat of vaporization at relieving conditions, Btu/lb

(or kcal/kg)
t1 = hot side inlet temperature, F (or C)
tbp = cold side boiling temperature at relieving pressure prevailing

when block valve is closed, F (or C)
tav = average of inlet and outlet temperature of cold side during

normal operation, F (or C)
c = specific heat of cold medium, Btu/lb.F (or kcal/kg C)
B = coefficient of expansion of cold medium, 1/F

(or 1/C)
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 4.0-34
4.3.2.1 Cold Fluid Blocked in Heat Exchanger (cont'd)
Typical values of B (1/F) for hydrocarbon liquids and water at 60F :

Oil, 3 to 34.9 API 0.0004
Oil, 35 to 50.9 API 0.0005
Oil, 51 to 63.9 API 0.0006
Oil, 64 to 78.9 API 0.0007
Oil, 79 to 88.9 API 0.0008
Oil, 89 to 93.9 API 0.00085
Oil, 94 API and up 0.0009
Water 0.0001
The required relieving area shall be calculated on the basis of the flowrate to be
delivered, but a 3/4 in. by 1 in. relief valve shall be used as minimum size.
4.3.2.2 Tube Failure and Leakage
a) Protection by a pressure relief device or 2/3 rule
Internal failure such as a leaking tube, tubesheet or a complete tube

rupture (of one tube) should be considered. According to API RP
521, paragraph 3.18.2, the following guideline is recommended to
determine if protection is required :
Since standard hydrostatic test pressure is 150 percent of the

equipment design pressure, equipment failure, in other words,
loss of containment of the low-pressure side to atmosphere, is
unlikely to result from a tube rupture where the low pressure
side (including upstream and downstream systems) is designed
for at least two-thirds of the design pressure of the high
pressure side.
Where the actual test pressure of the low-pressure side is less

than 150 percent of the design pressure, this lower pressure
should be used to determine whether overpressure protection
is needed. Pressure relief for tube rupture is not required
where the low-pressure exchanger side (including upstream
and downstream systems) is designed at or above this two-
thirds criteria.
Please note that the 2/3 rule should be applied to the whole LP
system including all piping and equipment that can be overpressured
by a tube rupture.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 4.0-35
a) Protection by a pressure relief device or 2/3 rule (cont'd)
In some critical cases where hazardous conditions are related to the

HP side product entering the LP side system, a reliable Emergency
Shutdown System (ESS) can be provided to isolate the exchanger LP
side from the rest of the LP system. Note that in this case the ESS
need to be a High Integrity System (refer to STD 601 3.3) since it is
used to replace a relief device that would protect the balance of the
LP system.
When a relieving device is installed, its set pressure shall not exceed to
the M.A.W.P. or the design pressure of the low pressure side.
b) Double pipe exchangers

According to API RP 521 ( 3.18.6), tube failure does not need to be
considered when schedule pipe is used for the inner tube.
Two remarks should be noted on this statement :
the process engineer should check with the heat-exchanger
specialist that the exchanger will really be a double-pipe, as only
selected sizes are available in this technology.
some clients require that tube failure be considered if the
pressure differential is greater than 1000 psi (69 bar).
c) Location and type of relieving device

Following API RP 521, paragraph 3.18.4, the relieving device should
preferably be located either directly on the exchanger or immediately
adjacent on the piping.
Rapid pressure rise and high pressure surge will result from a tube
rupture in a heat exchanger operating with an incompressible fluid
(liquid) on the LP side and a significantly higher pressure on the HP
side. Protection by pressure relief valve is then not adequate, and
rupture disks should be used as they react faster.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 4.0-36
c) Location and type of relieving device (cont'd)

For a quicker bursting, it is recommended to install the rupture disks on
the exchanger itself.
Typical arrangements are :
HP Shell side: relief device on each header box,
HP Tube side: relief devices at 1/3 and 2/3 of the shell's
length
Consider for each of the above mentioned relief device, the installation
of 2 rupture disks in series, with an excess flow valve or a PAH in-
between, to avoid relief due to spurious rupture.
A further analysis can be done using dynamic modeling, to review the
LP side design pressure and select the adequate overpressure
protection system, i.e. relief device type, number and location : an
example of such analysis is described in the publication "Prevent
overpressure failures on heat exchangers" by J.R. Cassata, Z.J. Feng,
S. Dasgupta and R. Samways, in Hydrocarbon Processing Nov. 1998.
d) Flowrate
A tube rupture is considered to be a sharp break in one tube. The high
pressure fluid flows through both openings, which is equal to twice the
cross-sectional area of the single tube.
In some cases Clients would not consider the possibility of complete
guillotine fracture of heat exchanger tubes greater than 1" or 1.25"
occurring. This is because of the very large relief flows which would
result if larger tube sizes are considered. Check procedures,
documentation and with the Client for the Project concerned. If a very
high standard of mechanical design is employed, some Clients relax
this requirement and employ a smaller break cross sectional area than
that which results from a guillotine fracture.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 4.0-37
d) Flowrate (contd)
In determining the flow rate, allowance should be made for any liquid that
will flash to vapor either as the result of the pressure reduction or, in the case
of certain volatile fluids being heated, because of the combined effects of
pressure reduction and vaporization as the fluid is intimately contacted by the
hotter material on the low-pressure side.
The following equations can be used to calculate the flow from the high to
the low pressure side (equations based on a discharge coefficient of 0.7,
Cp/Cv = 1.33 and area of tube break equal to twice the cross sectional area
of one tube) :
M
Vapors WG = KG d2 P 1 (1)
zT
Liquids WL = KL d2 (P P ) (2)
L 1 2
P1 P 2
Equivalent to VL = KL d2 (2)
L
Where : (*) variable discussed hereafter.
WG : gas flow through tube break, kg/hr or lb/hr

WL : liquid flow through tube break, kg/hr or lb/hr
VL : liquid flow through tube break, m3/hr or GPM
d : tube inside diameter, mm or inch
P 1(*) : HP side normal pressure, bara or psia
(alternatively the HP side design pressure may be
considered for P1, as required by some clients).
P 2(*) : relieving pressure of the low pressure side, usually 1.1 x
gauge set pressure, bara or psia
M : molecular weight
z : compressibility factor
T(*) : vapor temperature, K or R
L(*) : liquid density, kg/m3 or 1b/ft3
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 4.0-38
4.3.2 Shell and Tube and Double Pipe Heat Exchanger (cont'd)
d) Flowrate (cont'd)
KG : constant factor of (1), use either 2.93 (metric) or 385

(British units), depending on the above listed units used
KL : constant factor of (2), use either 1.77 (metric) or 2645
KL : constant factor of (2), use either 1.77 (metric) or 330.3
Review of the pressure conditions P1 and P2
The liquid equations (2) or (2) will be used in the following cases :
the liquid flow stays liquid as it flows through the tube break :
P 2 > PVL
P VL (*) : vapor pressure of the liquid
the liquid flashes as it flows through the tube break

P 2 < PVL
then :
i) if the upstream pressure P1 is significantly above the liquid vapor pressure
(P 1 > PVL), use PVL instead of P2 and calculate WL or VL based on P1 - PVL.
ii) If the liquid is at boiling conditions on the high pressure side (or close to these
conditions), the liquid flow WL or VL can still be calculated using (2) or (2),
but based on :
The pressure differential P1 - P2 with :

P 1 = PVL
P2 : higher pressure of :
critical flow downstream pressure (P c ). Experience has shown that
P c should be calculated as Pc = 0.55 P1, with Pc and P1 in absolute
pressure units here,
relieving pressure P2.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 4.0-39
The mixed phase density M (at relieving or critical flow conditions)

instead of the liquid density :
L
x 1 x
M = 1 / +

G L
with G : vapor density

x : vapor fraction at relieving or critical flow conditions
These data can be obtained from an isenthalpic flash on the computer, or
with :
Cp
x = (T1 - T2)

where : T2 relieving or critical flow temperature
Cp specific heat of the liquid
latent heat of the liquid
Review of the temperature condition
(*) The high pressure side temperature is used to determine : T, L, P VL

A reasonable value is to consider the average operating temperature of this high
pressure side. Nevertheless if the range of temperature is very large, flow through
tube break should be calculated both at inlet and at outlet conditions.
Review of the calculated flowrate through tube break
If the calculated discharge exceeds the normal total flow in the high pressure
side, the latter flow should be used, except when sufficient volume on the HP
side may supply the calculated flowrate above the normal flowrate.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 4.0-40
4.3 Protection of Equipment (cont'd)
When calculating the flow out of the low-pressure side, credit can be
taken for the fluid-handling capacity of both the inlet and outlet lines
unless the inlet contains check valves or control valves which would tend
to be closed by the effects of tube breakage.
Valves on low pressure side provided only for isolation may be assumed
fully open, control valves in a position equivalent to the minimum normal
flow unless the valve could automatically close due to the emergency
situation.
In some cases the flowrate to be relieved out of the low-pressure side is
greater than the flow through the tube break -calculated using (1), (2) or
(2')- because of the additional vaporization due to the mixing of a volatile
fluid with a hot fluid.
4.3.3 Air Cooled Exchangers
4.3.3.1 Fire
There is no uniformly accepted approach to the problem of heat input to air-

cooled exchangers exposed to fire. API RP 521 gives guidelines leaving some
flexibility in the flux value to be used in the calculation of vaporization rate (refer
to API RP 521, paragraph 3.15.7.2). Following API 521 ( 3.15.7.1) may give
extremely high calculated relief loads, often several times higher than any other
load ; resulting in more costly relief headers and flare systems. For this reason
and based on previous experience, general industry practice has been to use
alternate calculation procedures which give much lower relieving rates. Foster
Wheeler practice is to obtain the customer's agreement on the method to be used
in calculating the load due to fire under an air-cooled exchanger.
If the client requests the use of API RP 521 ( 3.15.7.1) then this should be done
and the client informed of the extra cost. Note that with lump-sum jobs this should
be settled with the client at the time the job is bid.
Foster Wheeler recommended methods of calculating relief loads due to fire

under air fans are given below, followed by the methods from API
RP 521.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 4.0-41
4.3.3.1 Fire (cont'd)
FW Recommended Methods
Assume that all cooling capacity within the fire zone is lost but that the
air cooler does not absorb heat from the fire. Relief loads will then be
excess vapor due to the lost cooling capacity plus vapor generated by
the fire from liquid in associated equipment within the fire zone. For a
tower with an air cooled condenser this would be the total of the
normal gross overhead minus vapor product plus any vapor generated
by fire exposure under the tower bottom, reboiler and reflux drum.
In an air cooler used for gas cooling the tubes may soften and rupture
on fire exposure, even if depressuring is provided, since heating of the
tubes may occur much faster than the time needed for depressuring.
With an air cooled condenser exposed to fire, vaporization would be

limited to a very short period by the low liquid inventory in the tubes.
As condensing stops, the quantity of liquid will be further reduced by
natural drainage.
In liquid cooling service, heat absorption in an air cooler exposed to fire

may be reduced by vapor binding or by suppression of vaporization due
to the increased pressure at relieving conditions.
Note that liquid filled air cooled exchangers that may be blocked in
must be protected by a pressure safety valve. This requirement is in
accordance with ASME Section VIII, Division 1 or 2, UG-125, which
requires that all pressure vessels within the scope of this Division shall
be provided with a protective device in accordance with UG-125
through UG-136.
Unless otherwise specified by the client, FW shall install a pressure

relief valve at the inlet to the air cooler, located at the high point, and
sized to pass a thermal relief load as calculated per Standard 602,
Section 4.3.2, where the cold fluid remains liquid and expands
(WL = BQ/c). In this instance, the duty (Q) is set equal to the heat
input to the aircooler from a fire as calculated by Q = 21,000 A1.0,
where A is the bare tube area or the aircooler.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 4.0-42
API Methods
API RP 521, 3.15.7.1 does not recommend the methods below, but
explains :
Assuming that the exchangers are treated as vessels, the relieving

load could be calculated using the bare tube area installed in the
bundle as a basis for establishing the area term. The bare tube
area is used instead of the finned tube area because most types of
fins are destroyed within the first few minutes of exposure to fire.
The bare tube area is calculated as follows :
a) Condensing without subcooling. The wetted surface area is

equal to 0.3 times the bare tube area (based on the bottom
30 percent of the circumference being wetted by the
condensate layer).
b) Condensing with subcooling. The condensing section

should be treated as in item a ; for the subcooling section,
the wetted surface area is equal to the bare tube area.
c) Gas cooling. The surface is equal to the bare tube area.
d) Liquid cooling. The wetted surface area is equal to the bare

tube area.
In the wetted-surface cases, the area term, A, would be taken to

an exponent of 1.0 instead of 0.82 as is done for vessels ; the
environmental factor for insulation, F, would be 1.0.
Air-cooled exchangers are subject to the same height limitations

as other equipment. Refer to 4.1.1.D8 on this subject.
In the condensing services, the equation Q = 12000 A (Btu/hr) gives

more reasonable results than the previously mentioned equation Q =
21000 A (Btu/hr).
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 4.0-43
As a conclusion, API RP 521, does not give any "firm

recommendations" for the condensing services, but now mentions :
The total vapor input under relieving conditions seems a
reasonable minimum for condensing services... The sudden
evaporation of the limited quantity of liquid remaining in the
tubes causes a brief increase in pressure in the system and may
result in safety relief valve discharge, but is has generally been
concluded, depending somewhat on assumptions, that the quantity
of vapor generated in most cases is insufficient to require
increased safety relief valve capacity".
4.3.3.2 Fan Failure
Due to natural convection effects, credit for partial condensing

capacity of 20 to 30 percent of normal duty is often used (API RP 521
3.6.4) ; capacity of the relief valve is then based on the remaining 70
to 80 percent. The exact value is to be confirmed by the aircooler
manufacturer (but some clients do not accept that such credit be
taken).
4.3.3.3 Louver Closure
Louver closure may result from automatic control failure, mechanical

linkage failure, or destructive vibration on a manually positioned louver.
Louver closure on air-cooled condensers is considered to be total

coolant failure.
4.3.3.4 Electric Power Failure
It is possible to lose all the fans of an air cooler, the reflux and product
pumps, at the same time. The condenser may be flooded and therefore
no credit should be taken for the effect of natural convection on the air
condenser.
Note : Mechanical failure of louvers, fans, motors, etc. should be

considered to occur singly.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 4.0-44
4.3.3 Air Cooled Exchangers (contd)
4.3.3.5 Blocked Outlet
For a liquid filled air cooled exchanger downstream of a pump, design

pressure may be set at or above the pump shutoff pressure. This
would eliminate the need for a safety-relief valve for this condition.
For a condenser, the relief load would be equal to total inlet flow.
If a condenser can be blocked in, check the vapor pressure of the fluid
at ambient temperature for the possibility of creating a vacuum inside
the exchanger. If the vapor pressure is below atmospheric pressure
the exchanger should be designed for vacuum conditions or a vacuum
relief valve provided.
4.3.4 Pumps
Positive displacement (reciprocating, plunger, and rotary) pumps require a

pressure relief valve on the discharge, since when the discharge is blocked the
pump may generate pressures much higher than the design pressure of lines and
equipment on the discharge side and of the pump itself.
The relief valve set pressure should be equal to the maximum allowable pressure
of the pump casing, discharge piping or downstream equipment, whichever is
lowest, and shall be reviewed with the mechanical specialist. In case of motor-
driven reciprocating or rotary pumps, the set pressure of the relief valve is
generally set at 10% or 25 psi, whichever is greater, above the operating
discharge pressure in order not to overload the electric motor.
Piping and equipment downstream from a centrifugal pump are normally designed
for the maximum pump shut-off pressure (see paragraph 4.2.1), therefore a relief
valve is generally not required.
There are, however, cases where a relieving device is necessary in order to avoid
excessive design pressure of downstream equipment, for instance when two
centrifugal pumps are in series.
Turbine (regenerative) pumps have a steep head/capacity curve : a relief valve is

generally provided to prevent overloading of the driver at low flowrates and the
development of excessive pressure in the pump circuit and, consequently, high
design pressure.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 4.0-45
4.3.4 Pumps (contd)
The head/capacity curve of the selected pump shall be consulted to ensure that
the pressure relief valve capacity shall be at least equal to the flow on the
head/capacity curve corresponding to the set pressure of the relief valve plus
overpressure.
For all types of pumps, consideration should be given to possible speed change
with consequent change of the characteristic curve.
4.3.5 Compressors
Positive Displacement Compressors (Reciprocating and Rotary)
Interstage and discharge pressure relief valves shall be provided for the same
reasons given for positive displacement pumps.
Pressure relief valve capacity and set pressure should be provided by compressor
vendor.
Centrifugal, Axial and Mixed Flow Compressors
Like centrifugal pumps, for this type of compressor a relieving device is not
normally required. However, when the characteristic curve is steep, it may be
convenient to install a relief valve to avoid excessive design pressure of discharge
equipment.
In the case of multi-stage centrifugal compressors, a relief valve is necessary
between stages to protect the interstage equipment (cooler, K.O. drum) and
upstream stage, in the event that the antisurge control valve of the downstream
compressor stage fails open, causing a back flow of gas from high pressure to
lower pressure. In selecting interstage design pressure consideration should be
given to the effect of possible speed change.
Generally, any necessary relief valve for centrifugal compressors should be
specified in accordance with compressor manufacturer's instructions.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 4.0-46
4.3 Protection of Equipment (contd)
4.3.6 Turbines
Condensing Turbines
A special type of relief valve supplied by the condenser manufacturer is provided

on the exhaust side of condensing turbines to prevent overpressure of the surface
condenser and turbine in event of a condenser cooling water failure or other
operating failure. This type of valve operates against the back pressure of the
atmosphere and has no spring. In addition, it requires fresh water for sealing. For
a further reference see the Heat Exchanger Institute Standard for Surface
Condensers.
Non-Condensing Turbines
Non-condensing turbines exhausting into a steam main (API Standard 611) do not
require installation of a safety valve to protect the turbine casing ; a sentinel valve
(which warns the operator with a sound alarm in case of overpressure) supplied
by the turbine manufacturer is considered acceptable. It is also advisable,
however, to specify the exhaust steam block valve as "car seal open".
Although not mandatory, large non-condensing turbines with high back pressure
generally have a safety valve on the outlet, set for 10% accumulation and a
relieving pressure at least 10% higher than normal exhaust pressure, but never
greater than the design pressure of the turbine casing. Turbine outlet pressure
relief valves are specified by vendor (flow and set pressure) based on the design
pressure of the discharge side of the turbine. Also, for large, non-condensing
turbines, the exhaust steam block valve must be specified "car seal open".
In the case of turbine drivers note that an additional margin on shut off head may
be required to account for the possibility of the turbine being operated at speeds
higher than normal.
The maximum possible estimated suction pressure may be employed, however

rather than the design suction pressure if using the latter results in uneconomically
high discharge design pressures.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 4.0-47
4.3 Protection of Equipment (contd)
4.3.7 Furnaces (Fired Heaters)

A pressure relief valve is necessary if there is a control valve, a block valve (unless
the applicable code permits a car seal open block valve) or a restriction which may
coke-up on the transfer line. Pressure relief valves are always provided for
furnaces such as cracking coil and reformer heaters which operate under pressure
maintained by a back pressure device in the transfer line. The pressure relief valve
is preferably located at the furnace outlet to avoid the possibility of furnace tube
damage, due to no flow of fluid through the tubes. The pressure relief valve should
be placed on the furnace inlet when all the following conditions occur together :
the feed is wholly or partly liquid ;
there is the possibility of coking the valve inlet if placed on the furnace outlet ;
steam or other purge may not be used to keep the safety valve inlet clear.
Capacity of the pressure relief valve should be specified equal to the flowrate of
liquid and/or vapor leaving the heater at accumulated pressure. Flashing of
discharged liquid shall be considered.
The valve should discharge to a safe place : into a blowdown drum or into the
vessel downstream of the furnace.
4.3.8 Liquid Filled Lines

Lines which can be left full of liquid and blocked at both ends shall be protected
against the thermal expansion of the liquid due either to fire or to solar radiation.
A single one-inch thermal relief valve, preferably located at the block valve
adjacent to a tank, is often sufficient. Sections 4.2.15 and 4.3.2.1 should be
consulted to find relieving capacity required. Car seal open (CSO) block valves
should be installed on the inlet and discharge piping to permit periodic inspection of
the relief valve.
Thermal relief valves protecting above-ground lines are sometimes discharged to
a catch basin or to a refinery sewer, and their setting may reach the design or
hydrostatic test pressure of the line.
Since dock lines generally have a block valve on shore, a check valve should be
installed to bypass the block valve and relieve any thermal expansion due to fire at
the dock. A thermal relief valve (sized for thermal expansion only) should be
installed on the main section of the line. See paragraph 4.2.15 for relief
requirements.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 4.0-48
4.4 Two-Phase Flow, Autorefrigeration, and Solids Formation
4.4.1 Two-Phase Flow
A liquid at its boiling point or a vapor-liquid mixture flowing through a pressure

relief valve will produce flashing and generate vapor.
The amount of liquid flashed to vapor at both the inlet to and the outlet from the
device must be calculated and specified on the pressure relief device specification
sheet.
- API RP 520 recommends to calculate the quantity of vapor produced by
flashing adiabatically from the upstream relieving conditions either to the
critical downstream pressure for the flashed vapor or to the back pressure,
whichever is greater.
- DIERS has recently recommended the Homogeneous Equilibrium Model

(HEM) as the most appropriate flashing flow formulation. It is based on an
isentropic expansion with equal phasic velocities and temperature. The HEM is
found to yield low estimate for flow capacity and therefore provide
conservative relief areas. It also provides the best prediction of critical flow
data.
For two-phase flow it is recommended to use either a pilot-operated pressure

relief valve, or a balanced type safety relief valve for which the effect of flashing
on valve capacity will be minimized.
4.4.2 Autorefrigeration
Flashing of a saturated liquid will result in cooling of the fluid. This becomes
particularly apparent when flashing low boiling fluids such as liquefied petroleum
gases or liquefied natural gases.
It may be necessary to specify a lower equipment and/or line design temperature
in addition to the usual upper design temperature. Selection of material of
construction must be made accordingly.
4.4.3 Solids Formation
In case of autorefrigeration, the fluid discharged through the pressure relief

device may form hydrates or solids. This could be the case with carbon dioxide,
wet propane, etc.
Careful installation, avoiding water in LPG's avoiding mixing LPG's with other
products containing water, injection of methanol and steam tracing are possible
solutions to the potential plugging problem.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 5.0-1
5.1 Sizing Pressure Relief Valves
Sizing pressure relief valves is the responsibility of the Instrument Specialist who will do
the sizing on the basis of the process specifications transmitted by the Process Engineer.
Calculation method (to be mainly used for inlet/outlet lines sizing) can be found in
Appendix "B".
5.2 Pressure Relief Valve Downstream from a Rupture Disk
Unless the relieving capacity of the combination of the rupture disk device and the
pressure relief valve is established by certification tests carried out according to ASME
VIII, it is necessary to (refer to ASME VIII, UG-127 (a.3.b.2)) :
- derate the capacity of the combination to 90 % of the rated relieving capacity of the
valve alone.
- ensure that the opening provided through the rupture disk, after burst, is sufficient to
permit a flow equal to the capacity of the valve, and there is no chance of
interference with proper functioning of the valve ; and this area shall be at least the
area of the inlet of the valve.
5.3. Sizing Explosion Hatches
The required relieving capacity, W, for explosion hatches (and for rupture disks in case of
explosion) is :
W = 3,600 W
e
'
where :
W = required relieving capacity, lb/hr

W' = weight of air and gas in the vessel, lb
e = time to attain maximum pressure, seconds
The time to attain maximum pressure for mixtures of gases and air at one atmosphere and
150F is 0.01 seconds for hydrogen, 0.045 seconds for ethane, 0.056 for propane, 0.06 for
hexane and naphtha, 0.017 for acetylene, 0.06 for benzene, 0.10 for toluene.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 5.0-2
5.3 Sizing Explosion Hatches (continued)
The required open area, A, to discharge the relieving capacity W, using a discharge
coefficient of 0.8 is :
W zT
A =
245P1 M
where :
A = discharge area, sq. in.
W = required relieving capacity, lb/hr
P1 = relieving pressure, psia
T = initial temperature, R (F + 460)
z = compressibility factor, at P1 and T
M = mixture molecular weight
5.4 Sizing Rupture Disk Devices
5.4.1 Explosion
Refer to paragraph 4.2.13.
5.4.2 Other Overpressure
The required relieving capacity, W, is calculated as for pressure relief valves.
In case of liquid service it is necessary to carefully evaluate the design of the

rupture disk to ensure that the dynamic energy of the system will result in a
sufficient opening of the rupture disk.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 6.0-1
6.1 Spare Requirements
Codes may allow CSO (car seal open) or LO (locked open) block valves at the inlet
and/or outlet side of a relieving device for maintenance. Section VIII of ASME Code
permits such block valves, whereas for power boilers, ASME Code Section I does not
allow any valve at the inlet nor at the outlet side of a pressure relief valve (refer to 3.1.5
of this standard).
Such block valves, when permitted, shall be full bore and shall be sized following the
criteria shown hereafter for inlet piping and discharge piping. For 3" and smaller valve, the
full bore requirement should be noted on the EFD since most piping block valves of this
size are reduced port.
English, French, German and Swedish codes allow block valves if adequate spare capacity
is provided, and if the block valves are so interlocked that the required relieving capacity is
always available.
Italian code allows the installation of CSO block valves on inlet and/or outlet, subject to
certain conditions.
An English manufacturer (Castel) supplies key operated systems for both open relief
systems (to atmosphere) and closed relief systems (to flare or blowdown drum).
Three way valves (change-over or selector valves) may be used in place of interlocked
block valves : they shall be of the full open port type and are typically one or two line sizes
larger than the pressure relieving valve inlet/outlet. Note that the Safety Selector Valve
manufactured by Keystone Anderson, Greenwood & Co has a "Y" shape which is
particularly adequate for the low pressure drop requirements detailed hereafter.
6.2 Piping
6.2.1 Inlet Piping
Preferably the relief devices should be mounted in the vapor section of the vessel
protected. It is, however, allowable to install them on piping connected to the
vessel (ASME Code, Section VIII).
The total pressure drop between the vessel and the relief valve, including the
pressure drop due to entrance, contraction, fittings, etc... should be kept below 3%
of the pressure relief valve set pressure (in gauge units). The pressure loss should
be calculated using the rated capacity of the pressure relief valve (API 520, Part
II, 2.2.2). This pressure drop limitation is related to the pressure relief valve
blowdown characteristic (6-7 %), and is imposed to prevent valve chattering. This
may be a critical factor for set pressure below 50 psig.
Some clients may require that it be calculated on the basis of the actual capacity
of the relief valve : rated capacity is generally 10 % less than actual. The 10 %
margin is required by ASME Code, section VIII.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 6.0-2
6.2 Piping
6.2.1 Inlet Piping (contd)
According to API RP 520 Part II, 2.2.2, an engineering analysis of the valve
performance at higher inlet losses may permit increasing the allowable pressure
loss above 3 %. In this case, the blowdown of the pressure relief valve needs to
be increased accordingly, and the valve capacity shall not be reduced (by the
higher pressure drop) below that required.
The cross sectional area of the inlet piping, when multiple relief valves are
manifolded, shall be at least equal to the sum of the cross sectional area of all the
relief valve inlets tied to the manifold.
For a single pressure relief valve, the inlet line size and associated fittings must be
at least equal to the pressure relief valve inlet size.
Alternate arrangements in case of pressure drop problems are :
- pilot-operated valve with remote sensing point ( 6.4),
- for multiple valves, individual inlet lines which will give less pressure drop than
a manifolded configuration.
When car seal open valves are provided at the inlet of a pressure relief valve, a
bleed valve should be installed between the CSO valve and the pressure relief
valve.
Where fouling of relief valve inlets due to coke, catalysts, etc., is anticipated,
provision should be made for continuous injection of steam or other purging fluid
into the inlet riser between the vessel and the relief valve. A purge velocity of 5
ft/sec. in the inlet riser is normally satisfactory.
Occasionally for a very corrosive service when a vessel is equipped with a mist
eliminator the relieving device should be connected below the mist eliminator to
avoid the possibility of blockage due to disintegration of the mist eliminator. This
should also be done when a problem of plugging of the wire mesh pad may occur
or when depressurizing may cause the wire mesh to lift. Connection of the
relieving device below the mist eliminator need not be done in cases where the
possibility of blockage may be considered to be remote.
6.2.2 Discharge Piping
The discharge lines and associated fittings from individual pressure relief valves
should not be smaller than the pressure relief valve outlet size.
Silencers or any form of restriction should never be installed at discharge of
pressure relief valves.
The rated capacity of the pressure relief valve shall be used to size the discharge
line from the pressure relief valve to the relief header (API RP 520, Part II,
Fourth Ed., 3.3).
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 6.0-3
6.2 Piping
6.2.2 Discharge Piping (cont'd)
Velocity and back pressure considerations determine the size of the discharge
lines.
Liquid relief valves and valves normally in vapor service but which might vent
liquid under certain conditions are always discharged to a closed system.
Vapor relief valves relieving to the atmosphere, are generally discharged at a
point 10ft. above the highest structure within the unit area and at a distance of at
least 50 feet from a furnace.
For other details see Section 603.
Steam tracing of discharge piping, and sometimes of the inlet piping, is required
when the discharging fluid solidifies either at ambient temperature or due to
refrigeration caused by fluid expansion or evaporation.
Quenching steam may be piped into atmospheric discharge of safety relief
valves to minimize the hazard of ignition

Release of corrosive or toxic vapors may require chemical neutralization or

conversion by burning to less toxic materials.
6.2.3. Operating and Design Conditions
The following guidelines may be used specifying these conditions :
Inlet line
The operating and design conditions of the relief valve inlet line should be the
same as that of the equipment it protects.
In addition, the highest relieving temperature from any contingency shall be added
as a note to the line list (or to the Engineering Flow Sheet), except where this
relieving temperature is less than the design temperature. This relieving
temperature will then be used to stress the relief valve inlet pipework, including
the main process line if the relief valve is not directly located on the equipment.
The extent of the main process line to be stressed at this higher temperature
needs careful consideration, and depends on the relief case in question.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 6.0-4
6.2 Piping
6.2.3. Operating and Design Conditions (cont'd)
Discharge line :
The operating pressure is the superimposed back pressure (normally about

atmospheric).
The operating temperature is generally ambient temperature.
The design pressure is typically 50 psig (3.5 barg) for flare headers in refinery
services.
The design temperature (hot and/or cold) of the relief valve outlet line is taken
to be the relieving temperature, excluding fire case temperature.
If there is only a fire case contingency for the relief valve, then the inlet line
design temperature should also be taken for the outlet line.
The fire case temperature shall be noted for the inlet line. This will be used for
stress purpose.
6.3 Blowdown and Pop Action Control

Safety relief valves incorporate devices for positive adjustment of blowdown and/or pop
action, as may other pressure relief valves.
Blowdown is controlled by moving a ring screwed to the disk or to the guide of the disk.
This changes the reactive forces of the flowing fluid.
The pop action is controlled by moving a ring screwed to the outside of the nozzle.
To prevent the changing of blowdown or pop action by an unauthorized person, both the
guide ring set screw and the nozzle ring set screw are sealed.
6.4 Remote Sensing for Pilot-Operated Pressure Relief Valves
Remote sensing for a pilot-operated pressure relief valve (i.e. sensing directly on
protected equipment instead of integral pressure sensing) can be useful when there is
excessive inlet pipe pressure loss or when the main valve must be located at a pressure
source different from the pilot sensing point because of service limitations of the main
valve (Refer to API RP 520, Part II, Section 2.2.3).
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 6.0-5
6.5 Installation of a Rupture Disk in Combination with a Pressure Relief Valve
6.5.1 Upstream of a Pressure Relief Valve
Refer to paragraph 2.4.4 of this standard and to API RP 520 - Part II - Section 2.6.
6.5.2 Downstream of a Pressure Relief Valve
A rupture disk device may be installed on the outlet side of a pressure relief valve,
provided (ASME Code Section VIII-1, UG-127 (a.3.c)) :
1) The valve is so designed that it will not fail to open at its proper pressure
setting regardless of any back pressure that can accumulate between the
valve disk and the rupture disk. The space between the valve disk and the
rupture disk shall be vented or drained to prevent accumulation of pressure
due to a small amount of leakage from the valve.
2) The valve is ample in capacity to discharge the required relieving flowrate

without exceeding the allowable vessel overpressure.
3) The stamped bursting pressure of the rupture disk at the coincident disk
temperature plus any pressure in the outlet piping shall not exceed the design
pressure of the outlet portion of the pressure relief valve and any pipe or
fitting between the valve and the rupture disk device. However, in no case
shall the stamped bursting pressure of the rupture disk at the coincident
operating temperature plus any pressure in the outlet piping exceed the
maximum allowable working pressure of the vessel or the set pressure of the
pressure relief valve.
4) The opening provided through the rupture disk device after breakage is
sufficient to permit a flow equal to the rated capacity of the attached
pressure relief valve without exceeding the allowable overpressure.
5) Any piping beyond the rupture disk cannot be obstructed by the rupture disk
or fragment.
6) The contents of the vessel are clean fluids, free from gumming or clogging
matter, so that accumulation in the space between the valve inlet and the
rupture disk (or in any other outlet that may be provided) will not clog the
outlet.
7) The bonnet of the safety relief valve shall be vented to prevent accumulation
of pressure.
Note : the installation of a rupture disk at the outlet of a pressure relief valve is not
allowed by the French Code.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 7.0-1
7.1. Relieving Cases
In order to be able to design flare network and flare stack, or to fill the effluent summary
(reliefs to atmosphere) a complete set of information should be filled for any emergency
case causing the pressure relieving device to discharge. Cases to be investigated are listed
at the bottom of the process specification.
7.2. Preparation of Process Specification Sheets
7.2.1 Pressure relief valve
The accompanying process specification form lists the process information to be

transmitted to Foster Wheeler instrument group. The notes below refer to the
various data items on the form.
NOTES
No. Subject
(1) Overpressure Over the set-pressure. Usually expressed

as a percentage. "Overpressure" is the
same as "Accumulation" when the set
pressure equals the MAWP.
Overpressure varies according to the
relief case and the applicable vessel
design code. It is therefore essential to
refer to the design code.
(2) Superimposed back pressure Specify whether constant (as when

discharging from a pump discharge to
suction) or variable (as when relieving to
a manifold serving several valves
simultaneously). If constant, specify
value. If variable, specify range over
which superimposed back pressure is
variable.
This information is not required for

balanced valves. For conventional valves,
the differential set pressure is the set
pressure less the constant back pressure.
For balanced valves, the differential set
pressure and the set pressure are the
same.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 7.0-2
7.2. Preparation of Process Specification Sheets
7.2.1 Pressure relief valve (cont'd)
(3) Back pressure Back pressure is the sum of the

superimposed back pressure and the
built-up back pressure. It is the total
pressure which exists at the relief valve
discharge flange when the valve is
relieving.
Back pressure is used in calculating

orifice area. Depending on relief valve
type and the level of back pressure it may
be necessary to apply a back pressure
correction factor in calculating the area
required.
(4) Flashing liquids For flashing liquids, the following

additional data should be provided :
liquid vapor pressure,
wt % vaporized at outlet, temperature
at outlet,
vapor molecular weight,
compressibility factor and k (Cp/Cv)
at outlet.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 7.0-3
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 7.0-4
7.2.2 Rupture disk
Refer to attached Process Data Sheet.
The following items differ from the pressure relief valve data sheet.
(1) Burst pressure, corresponds to the set pressure (in gauge units for P above
atmospheric, in absolute units for P below atmospheric) of pressure relief
valves.
(2) Allowable burst tolerance, covers the allowable range around the specified
burst pressure.
(3) Ratio max operating pressure/Min burst pressure. This ratio is of :

70 % for normal domed rupture disks,
up to 90 % for some reverse acting disks.
(4) Fragmentation allowed. Fragmentation is not allowed for a rupture disk

located at the inlet of a pressure relief valve.
(5) Size (optional data). The size is shown as a nominal pipe size.
(6) Type (optional data). Client or service may require a specific type, such as
conventional domed, or reverse buckling.
(7) Design pressure (optional data). Specify if different from max burst
pressure.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE 7.0-5
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE A-1
APPENDIX "A" : TABLES AND FIGURES
TABLE 1 - PROPERTIES OF GASES (Ref.1)

Referenced in Appendix B
Flammability
Specific Critical Flow Limits
Heat Ratio Pressure Specific Critical (Volume
(k=Cp/Cv) Ratio at Gravity at Constants Condensation percent
Molecular at 60 F and 60 F and 60 F and Pressure Temperature Temperature in air
Gas Weight 1 Atmosphere 1 Atmosphere 1 Atmosphere (psia) (F) 1 Atmosphere mixture References
Methane 16.04 1.31 0.54 0.3 667 -117 -259 5.0-15 1
Ethane 30.07 1.19 0.57 0.356 708 90 -127 2.9-13 1
Ethylene 28.05 1.25 0.56 0.139 731 49 -155 2.7-36 1
Propane 44.1 1.13 0.58 0.507 615 206 -44 2.0-9.5 1
Propylene 42.08 1.15 0.57 0.518 672 198 -54 2.0-10.6 2.3
Isobutane 58.12 1.1 0.59 0.563 528 274 11 1.8-8.5 1
n-Butane 58.12 1.09 0.59 0.584 549 306 31 1.5-9.0 1
I-Butane 56.11 1.11 0.58 0.6 586 296 21 1.6-9.3 2.3
Isopentane 72.15 --------- --------- 0.625 490 369 82 1.3-8.0 1
n-Pentane 72.15 --------- --------- 0.631 488 386 97 1.4-8.3 1
I-Pentane 70.13 --------- --------- 0.646 510 377 86 1.5-8.7 1
n-Hexane 86.18 --------- --------- 0.664 437 454 156 1.1-7.7 1
Benzene 78.11 --------- --------- 0.882 710 552 176 1.4-7.1 2.3
n-Heptane 100.2 --------- --------- 0.688 397 513 209 1.0-7.0 1
Toluene 92.14 --------- --------- 0.874 596 606 231 1.2-7.1 2.3
n-Octane 114.23 --------- --------- 0.707 361 564 258 0.8-6.5 1
n-Nocane 128.26 --------- --------- 0.722 332 611 303 0.7-5.6 1
n-Decane 142.28 --------- --------- 0.734 305 653 345 0.7-5.4 1
Air 28.96 1.4 0.53 0.875 547 -221 -318 --------- 2.3
Ammonia 17.03 1.31 0.54 0.616 1636 271 -28 16.0-25.0 2.3
Carbon Dioxide 44.01 1.29 0.55 0.818 1071 88 -109 --------- 2.3
Hydrogen 2.02 1.41 0.53 --------- 190 -400 -423 4.0-75.0 2.3
Hydrogen Sulfide 34.08 1.32 0.54 0.801 1300 213 -77 4.3-45.5 2.3
Sulfur Dioxide 64.06 1.27 0.55 1.394 1143 316 14 --------- 2.3
Steam 18.02 --------- --------- 1 3199 705 212 --------- 2.3
References:
1. Physical Constants of Hydrocarbons C1 to C10 . ASTM Special Publication No.
109A, Philadelphia, Pa., 1963
2. International Critical Tables, , McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., New York.
3. Engineering Data Book. Gas Processors Suppliers Association, 1977.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE A-2
TABLE 2 - ACCUMULATION EXPRESSED AS PERCENTAGE OF MAWP

Referenced in Section 3.3
ASME Section I ASME Section VIII ASME B31.3

Fired and Unfired Pressure Vessels Piping (2)
Steam Boilers (1)
Single PSV Multiple Single PSV Multiple Single and Multiple
PSV PSV PSV
LIQUID (THERMAL
EXPANSION)
Non-fire - - 10 16 20
Fire - - 21 21
STEAM
Operating Overpressure 6 6 10 16 20
Fire - - 21 21
GAS OR VAPOR
Operating Overpressure - - 10 16 20
Fire - - 21 21
Notes : (1) For mechanical equipment (pumps, compressors), the pressure-containing

parts are generally designed per ASME Code Section VIII.
(2) Pressure relief valve for piping protection only (no equipment protection).
The allowances for pressure and temperature variations above design

conditions are shown in the Process Piping Code ASME B31.3 302.2.4 :
"(f) Occasional variations above design conditions shall remain within one
of the following limits for pressure design :
(1) .
(2) When the variation is self-limiting (e.g., due to a pressure relieving

event), and lasts no more than 50 hr at any one time and not more than 500
hr/year, it is permissible to exceed the pressure rating or the allowable
stress for pressure design at the temperature of the increased condition by
not more than 20 %".
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE A-3
TABLE 3 - SUPERHEAT CORRECTION FACTOR Ksh FOR STEAM SERVICE

(Ref.1)
Set Pressure
(Pounds per
square inch Temperature (degrees Fahrenheit)
Gauge) 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200
15 1.00 0.98 0.93 0.88 0.84 0.80 0.77 0.74 0.72 0.70
20 1.00 0.98 0.93 0.88 0.84 0.80 0.77 0.74 0.72 0.70
40 1.00 0.99 0.93 0.88 0.84 0.81 0.77 0.74 0.72 0.70
60 1.00 0.99 0.93 0.88 0.84 0.81 0.77 0.75 0.72 0.70
80 1.00 0.99 0.93 0.88 0.84 0.81 0.77 0.75 0.72 0.70
100 1.00 0.99 0.94 0.89 0.84 0.81 0.77 0.75 0.72 0.70
120 1.00 0.99 0.94 0.89 0.84 0.81 0.78 0.75 0.72 0.70
140 1.00 0.99 0.94 0.89 0.85 0.81 0.78 0.75 0.72 0.70
160 1.00 0.99 0.94 0.89 0.85 0.81 0.78 0.75 0.72 0.70
180 1.00 0.99 0.94 0.89 0.85 0.81 0.78 0.75 0.72 0.70
200 1.00 0.99 0.95 0.89 0.85 0.81 0.78 0.75 0.72 0.70
220 1.00 0.99 0.95 0.89 0.85 0.81 0.78 0.75 0.72 0.70
240 --------- 1.00 0.95 0.90 0.85 0.81 0.78 0.75 0.72 0.70
260 --------- 1.00 0.95 0.90 0.85 0.81 0.78 0.75 0.72 0.70
280 --------- 1.00 0.96 0.90 0.85 0.81 0.78 0.75 0.72 0.70
300 --------- 1.00 0.96 0.90 0.85 0.81 0.78 0.75 0.72 0.70
350 --------- 1.00 0.96 0.90 0.86 0.82 0.78 0.75 0.72 0.70
400 --------- 1.00 0.96 0.91 0.86 0.82 0.78 0.75 0.72 0.70
500 --------- 1.00 0.96 0.92 0.86 0.82 0.78 0.75 0.73 0.70
600 --------- 1.00 0.97 0.92 0.87 0.82 0.79 0.75 0.73 0.70
800 --------- --------- 1.00 0.95 0.88 0.83 0.79 0.76 0.73 0.70
1000 --------- --------- 1.00 0.96 0.89 0.84 0.78 0.76 0.73 0.71
1250 --------- --------- 1.00 0.97 0.91 0.85 0.80 0.77 0.74 0.71
1500 --------- --------- --------- 1.00 0.93 0.86 0.81 0.77 0.74 0.71
1750 --------- --------- --------- 1.00 0.94 0.86 0.81 0.77 0.73 0.70
2000 --------- --------- --------- 1.00 0.95 0.86 0.80 0.76 0.72 0.69
2500 --------- --------- --------- 1.00 0.95 0.85 0.78 0.73 0.69 0.65
3000 --------- --------- --------- --------- 1.00 0.82 0.74 0.69 0.65 0.62
TABLE 4 - VISCOSITY CORRECTION FACTOR Kv (Ref.1)
Reynolds Number Viscosity Correction Reynolds Number Viscosity Correction
Factor, Kv Factor, Kv
35 0.30 300 0.82
40 0.35 400 0.85
50 0.40 600 0.87
70 0.50 1,000 0.90

80 0.53 2,000 0.93
90 0.57 3,000 0.95
100 0.60 4,000 0.96

150 0.70 10,000 0.97
200 0.75 20,000 0.98
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE A-4
TABLE 5 - SPRING-LOADED PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE DATA (Ref.3)

Referenced in Section 2.1.2 and in Appendix B
Set P limit
psig (2)
Effective Inlet x Conventional Outlet P limit Remarks
Area (1) Outlet Size Valves psig (2) (3)
Orifice sq.in (sq.cm) in &
Balanced
Bellows V. Conventional Balanced
Valves Bellows V.
D 0.110 (0.71) 1x2 1235 285 Balanced valve
1x2 3080 600 500 with D orifice may be not
1x3 5135 740 500 available
E 0.196 (1.26) 1x2 1235 285 230 Balanced valve with E
1x2 3080 600 500 orifice may be not available
1x3 5135 740 500
F 0.307 (1.98) 1x2 1235 285 230
1x3 5000 740 500
G 0.503 (3.24) 1x3 1845 740 470 Size may be : 1 x 2
2x3 3705 740 470
H 0.785 (5.06) 1x3 285 285 230
2x3 2750 740 415
J 1.287 (8.30) 2x3 285 285 230
3x4 2700 600 230
K 1.823 (11.86) 3x4 1235 285 200
4x6 2220 600 200
L 2.853 (18.41) 3x4 285 285 100
4x6 1500 285 170
M 3.6 (23.2) 4x6 1100 285 160
N 4.34 (28.0) 4x6 1000 285 160
P 6.38 (41.16) 4x6 1000 285 150
Q 11.05 (71.23) 6x8 600 115 115
R 16.0 (103.23) 6x8 100 60 60
8 x 10 300 100 100
T 26.0 (167.75) 8 x 10 300 100 100
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE A-5
Notes on Table 5
(1) These effective areas are valid only when used with the sizing equations of API RP
520, Part I (i.e. sizing equations shown in this FW standard).
(2) API STD 526 details Set Pressure Limit and Outlet Pressure Limit for various
temperature ranges and materials of Body/Bonnet and Spring :
T from -20F to 100F CS and CS.
T up to 450F CS and CS (shown here).
T up to 800 F CS and high T alloy steel.
T up to 1000F Cr Mo. steel and high T alloy steel.
T from -75F to -21F Austenitic SS and CS.
T from -450F to -76F Austenitic SS and low T alloy steel.
and for different inlet flange class (150 # , 300 #...up to 2500 # ) and outlet flange
class (150 # , 300 # ).
The data shown here correspond to the highest class available for each valve size.
(3) Outlet pressure limit shown here is for T < 100F.

PROCESS STD 602
PAGE A-6
PROCESS STD 602
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PROCESS STD 602
PAGE A-9
Figure 6 - Pressure Conditions for Safety

Relief Valve installed on a Pressure Vessel (Vapor phase)
Referenced in Section 3.2.5.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE A-10
Notes on Figure 6
1. The operating pressure may be any lower pressure required
2. The set pressure and all other values related to it may be moved downward (below
MAWP) if the operating pressure permits. Overpressure may then be higher than
accumulation.
3. This figure conforms with the requirements of ASME Code, Section VIII, shown in API
RP 521. The British and French codes do not allow any accumulated pressure above 110
% of MAWP (Refer to par. 3.4 of this standard).
4. Reference of overpressure is Set Pressure.

Reference of accumulation is MAWP.
5. Set P Tolerance = 3 % if Set P 70 psig.
6. Different accumulation applies for MAWP below 30 psig.
7. A Multiple valve installation requires the combined capacity of two or more pressure
relief valves to alleviate a given overpressure contingency : First valve + Additional
valve(s).
A Supplemental valve provides relieving capacity for fire exposure. It is used only in
addition to valves sized for process (non fire) contingencies.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE A-11
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE A-12
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE A-13
Note on Figure 8
Data on Latent Heat of Vaporization of Hydrocarbons (API RP 521, A.3)
Different hydrocarbon liquids have different latent heats of vaporization even though
hydrocarbons as a group behave similarly to one another. The latent heat of vaporization of
a pure single-component liquid decreases as the temperature at vaporization increases and
the latent heat becomes zero at the critical temperature and pressure for that liquid.
Figure 8 shows the vapor pressures and latent heats of the pure single-component paraffin-
hydrocarbon liquids. This chart is directly applicable to such liquids and applies as an
approximation to paraffin hydrocarbon mixtures composed of two components whose
molecular weights vary no more than propane to butane and butane to pentane.
The chart may also be applicable to isomer hydrocarbons, aromatic or cyclic compounds, or
paraffin hydrocarbon mixtures of components that have slightly divergent molecular weights.
The equilibrium temperature should be calculated. Using the relationship for the calculated
temperature versus vapor pressure, the latent heat can then be obtained from Figure 8. The
molecular-weight relationship as shown by the chart is not to be used in such cases ; the
molecular weight of the vapor should be determined from the vapor-liquid equilibrium
calculation.
For cases that involve mixtures of components that have a wide boiling range or widely
divergent molecular weights, a rigorous series of equilibrium calculations may be required
to estimate vapor generation rates, as discussed in API RP 521 Section 3.15.3.2.
Other recognized sources of latent-heat data or methods of calculating latent heat of

vaporization should be used where Figure 8 does not apply.
Note that if the unit has been simulated, the time-dependant relief (composition, T, flow)
discussed in API RP 521 3.15.3.2 should be evaluated using the simulator.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE A-14
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE A-15
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE A-16
Figure 9 (3/4) - Generalized Compressibility Chart (from AICHE Data Prediction

Manual)
PROCEDURE 4D
A DESK CALCULATION METHOD FOR ESTIMATING THE DENSITY OF PURE ORGANIC GASES
Method
Figures 4D-1 through 4D IV are given as a procedure which produces rapid, reasonably accurate estimates of
gas phase densities. I procedure 4D, the compressibility factor , Z, is obtained as a function of the reduced
temperature, the reduced pressure and the reduced compressibility factor.
Z = (Tr,Pr,Zc)
Plots of compressibility factors based on a critical compressibility factor , Zc of 0.27 are given in figure 4D-1
and 4D-2. Figure 4D-III or 4d-IV provides a correction to the compressibility factor for compounds whose Zc
differs from 0.27 . The equation for the compressibility factor Z is then:
Z = Z|Zc-0.27 + Di (Zc-0.27)
Where:
Di = Da for Zc > 0.27 (from figure 4D-III)

Di = Db for Zc < 0.27 (from figure 4D-IV)
From Equation (4D-2)
M
=
ZRT
Where
M = Molecular weight
= pressure, pascals
R = gas constant = 8314.0 (Pa) (m3 ) per (kmol) (K)
T = temperature, kelvins
Z = compressibility factor
= density of the gas (or vapor) at temperature T, kilogram per cubic metre
Procedure
Step 1: Obtain the critical properties and molecular weight from appropriate sources
Step2: Calculate the reduced temperature and reduced pressure.
Step 3: Depending on the magnitude of the reducxed pressure, estimate the compressibility factor at Zc
= 0.27 from the appropriate figure.
Step 4: Depending on whether Zc is greater than or less than 0.27, estimate the deviation term Di, from
the appropriate figure.
Step 5: Using equation (4D-2), calculate the compressibility factor, Z.
Step 6: Calculate the density of the gas ( or vapor) using Equation (4D-3)
Limitations and Reliability
With the exception of mercaptans and carboxylic acids, the figures given in procedure 43D are
applicable to all families of organic compounds. The deviation charts, however are restricted to a
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE A-17
reduced temperature greater than or equal to 0.90 . The deviations can be ignored (without any
significant loss in accuracy) when the reduced temperature is less than 0.90. Procedure 4D gave an
average devation of 5% for 63 data pointsa covering 33 representative compounds. Although procedure
4D has been hudged to produce rapid, reasonably good estimates of gas ( or vapor), phase densities, use
of procedure 4E is recommended wherever possible.
Literature Source
Figures 4D-I through 4D-IV have been adapted from Lyderson, A.L., R.A.Greenkorn, O.A. Hougen,
Univ Wisconsin Eng Exp. Station Rept. 4 (Oct 1955). Also in Hougen, O.A., K.M. Watson, R.A.Ragatz,
Chemical Process Principles charts, 3rd ed., 1964
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE A-18
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE A-19
Percent of absolute back pressure = B /(s+o) x 100 = rx100
C1 = Capacity with back pressure

C2 = rated capacity with zero back pressure
B = back pressure
S = Set pressure, in pounds per square inch absolute
O= overpressure, in pounds per square inch
Set pressure (MAWP) = 100 pounds per square inch gauge

Overpressure 10 pounds per square inch
Superimposed back pressure
(constant) = (70+ 10 + 14.7 )
(100 + 10 + 14.7) x 100 = 76
Kb (follow dotted line) = 0.89 (from the curve)
Capacity with back pressure = 0.89 (rated capacity without back pressure)
Note: This chart is typical and suitable for use only when the make of the valve, or actual critical flow
pressure point for the vapor or gas is unknown; otherwise, the valve manufacturer should be consulted
for specific data. This correction factor should be used only in the sizing of a conventional (non-
balanced) pressure relief valves that have their spring setting adjusted to compensate for the
superimposed back pressure. It should not be used to size balanced-type valves.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE A-20
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE A-21
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE A-22
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PAGE A-23
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE A-24
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE A-25
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE A-26
REFERENCES (for Tables and Figures)
1) API RP 520 Sizing, Selection and Installation of Pressure Relieving Devices in Refineries
Part I : Sizing and Selection, 6T h . Ed., 1993
2) API RP 521 Guide for Pressure-Relieving and Depressuring Systems, 4th Ed., March 1997
3) API STD 526 Flanged Steel Pressure Relief Valves, 4Th. Ed., June 1995
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE B-1
APPENDIX "B" : SIZING OF RELIEVING DEVICES
Note that steady state flow and Newtonian fluids are assumed in these formulas.
1. Flow of a Gas or Vapor Through a Nozzle
For a gas or vapor flowing in non-critical conditions through a nozzle from the
upstream pressure P1 to the downstream pressure P2 the rate of flow is given by
the following formulas, in English units :
MP1 ( P1 P2 )
W = 735 F2 KA (1)
ZT
k+1
2/ k
W = 735 KAP1 M k P 2
P2 k (2)
ZT k 1 P1 P1

where :
W= flow through the nozzle, lb/hr
P1 = upstream pressure, psia
P2 = back pressure, psia
M= gas molecular weight
T= absolute upstream temperature, R (F + 460)
A= discharge nozzle area, sq. in.
K= discharge coefficient.
k= Cp/Cv ,ratio of specific heats
Z= gas compressibility
F2 = coefficient of subcritical flow, defined as
k 1
F2 = k r 2 k 1 r k
k 1 1 r
P2
r= = ratio of back pressure to upstream pressure
P1
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE B-2
1. Flow of a Gas or Vapor Through a Nozzle (cont'd)
If a compressible gas is expanded across a nozzle, an orifice, or the end of a pipe,

its velocity and specific volume increase with decreasing downstream pressure.
For a given set of upstream conditions (using the example of a nozzle), the mass
rate of flow through the nozzle will increase until a limiting velocity is reached in
the throat. It can be shown that the limiting velocity is the velocity of sound in the
flowing media at that location.
The critical flow pressure P cf, in absolute units, may be estimated by the
following equation for ideal gases :
k
P 2 k 1
cf = (3)
P
1
k + 1
The critical flow pressure ratio for hydrocarbon gases usually encountered is
given in Table 1. The listed values range from 0.53 to 0.59.
The corresponding sonic velocity for adiabatic flow of a perfect gas is :
kPcf
Vcf = 68 (4)
Dcf
where :
Dcf = density at the critical flow conditions, lb/ft3.
Substituting the values of Pcf from equation (3) in formula (1), the theoretical gas
discharge formula for critical flow is obtained :
M
W = CKAP1
ZT
where :
Z = gas compressibility
and
( )
n +1 0.5
C = 520 n n2+1 n 1

where n is the isentropic expansion coefficient of the actual gas or vapor. The
ratio k of specific heats may be used instead.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE B-3
2. Discharge Area of a Pressure Relief Valve
The effective discharge area of a pressure relief valve (refer to Table 5) will be
one of the following two areas, whichever is controlling, depending on valve
design :
1) the passage corresponding to the least diameter of the nozzle ;
2) the curtain area which is the product of the circumference of the minimum
passage through the valve seat and the valve lift.
3. Sizing Pressure Relief Valves
3.1 Gas or Vapor
The discharge area for safety and safety relief valves in gas or vapor
service can be determined by use of the following formula (API RP 520,
4.3.2.1 and 4.3.4.1) :
A= W ZT
CKd P1 K b M
For symbols see Par. 3.2. hereafter.
Note that the same formula may be used for conventional or balanced
pressure relief valve, with different Kb.
3.2 Steam
Safety and safety relief valves in steam service are sized by use of the
following formula (API RP 520, 4.4.1) :
A = W
51.5P1 Kd KN Ksh
W = flowrate, lb/hr.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE B-4
3.2 Steam (cont'd)
A= required effective discharge area, sq. in.
P1 = usptream relieving pressure, in psia (valve gauge set pressure plus

allowable overpressure plus the atmospheric pressure).
T= absolute temperature of the inlet vapor, R (F + 460).
Z= Compressibility factor, see Fig. 9 for paraffin hydrocarbons
M= molecular weight of gas or vapor
Kd = coefficient of discharge.
API RP 520 suggests using Kd = 0.975.
n= isentropic expansion coefficient of an actual gas or vapor, Figure

14. The ratio of specific heats, k = Cp/Cv, may be used instead,
Table 1.
n +1
( )
0.5
C = 520 n 2 n 1
see Figure 15
n +1
When k or n cannot be determined, API RP 520 suggests using

C = 315 which corresponds to n = 1 (see Figure 15)
Note that for n = 0.6, C = 258;

while for n = 0.8, C becomes 289.
Ksh = Correction factor for superheated steam, Table 3. For

saturated steam at any pressure, Ksh = 1.0
KN = Correction factor for Napier equation.

KN = 1 where P1 < 1515 psia
KN = (0.1906 P1 - 1000) / (0.2292 P1 - 1061)
for 1515 <P 1 <3215 psia
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE B-5

3.2 Steam (cont'd)
Kb = capacity correction factor due to back pressure. See Figure 10 for
conventional safety relief valves (constant back pressure) and
Figure 11 for balanced bellows valves (constant or variable back
pressure).
In connection with Figure 10 for conventional valves, back pressure above
90 percent is not recommended because valves tend to become unstable
with small differentials. Figure 10 is a graphical presentation of Kb, which
can be related, for conventional valves, to coefficient F2 of Formula in
paragraph 1 above :
735 F2
Kb = 1 r
C
When using Figure 11 for sizing balanced-bellows valves, consult the valve
manufacturer for Kb in case of :
- set pressure lower than 50 psig
- subcritical flow back pressure
3.3 Liquids
Safety relief valves in liquid service may be sized by the use of the
following formula (API RP 520, 4.6), a conversion from a basic liquid
flow formula :
gpm G
A=
38 .0 K d K p K w K v 1.25 P Pb
where :
Kd = coefficient of discharge which should be obtained from valve

manufacturer. If Kd is unknown, a conservative value of 0.62
should be used.
gpm = flowrate at the selected percentage of overpressure, in U.S gallons

per minute.
A= effective discharge area, sq. in.
Kp = capacity correction factor due to overpressure. Many, if not most,

relief valves in liquid service are sized on the basis of 25 %
overpressure, in which case Kp = 1.00. The factor for other
percentages of overpressure can be obtained from Figure 12.
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE B-6
3.3 Liquids (cont'd)
Kw = capacity correction factor due to back pressure. If the back

pressure is atmospheric, the factor can be disregarded or Kw =
1.00. Balanced bellows valves in back pressure service will require
the correction factor as determined from Figure 13. Conventional
valves have Kw = 1.00.
Kv = capacity correction factor due to viscosity (Table 4). For most

applications, viscosity is not significant, in which case, Kv = 1.00.
P= set pressure at which relief valve begins to open, psig.
Pb = back pressure, psig.
G= specific gravity of the liquid at the flowing temperature referred to

water, equal to 1.00 at 70 F.
When a relief valve is sized for viscous liquid service, it is suggested that it
be sized first as for non viscous type application (Kv = 1) in order to obtain
a preliminary required discharge area, A. From manufacturer's standard
orifice sizes, the next larger orifice size should be used in determining the
Reynold's number, R, from either of the following relationships :
gpm (2,800 G)
R=
A1 / 2
or
12 ,700 gpm
R=
U A1 / 2
where :
gpm = flowrate at the flowing temperature, gpm.
G = specific gravity of the liquid at the flowing temperature referred to

water equal to 1.00 at 70 F
= absolute viscosity at the flowing temperature, cP.
A = effective discharge area, sq. in. (from manufacturer's standard

orifice areas).
PROCESS STD 602
PAGE B-7
3.3 Liquids (cont'd)
U = viscosity at the flowing temperature, in Saybolt Universal seconds.
After the value of R is determined, the factor Kv is obtained from Table 4.

Factor Kv is applied to correct the "preliminary required discharge area". If
the corrected area exceeds the "chosen standard orifice area", the above
calculations should be repeated using the next larger standard orifice size.
3.4 Flashing liquids
The API RP 520 method consists in determining the valve's size by adding
up the areas calculated for the liquid and flashed vapors separately (refer
to 4.4.1).
This method may be satisfactorily when used for non-flashing flow.

However, for flashing flow, this method is regarded by many as obsolete
and can lead to undersizing.
DIERS has recently recommended the Homogeneous Equilibrium Model

(HEM) as the most appropriate flashing flow formulation. As the HEM is
found to yield low estimates for flow capacity, it provides conservative
relief areas. For more details and a description of formulas to be used,
refer to the DIERS documentation.
Selecting a pilot-operated pressure relief valve or a balanced pressure

relief valve is often desirable to minimize the effect of flashed vapor on the
valve capacity.
The effect of any auto-refrigeration that may arise from the flashing of
liquid should also be investigated. Materials of construction must be
adequate for the outlet temperatures involved ; in addition, the installation
must preclude the possibility of flow blockage occurring from hydrate or
possibly solid formation.

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PROCESS STD 602

1.0 GENERAL INFORMATION

2.0 VARIOUS TYPES OF RELIEVING DEVICES

3.0 CODES REQUIREMENTS FOR PROTECTIVE DEVICES

3.3 Pressure Accumulation Guide 3.0-10

4.0 HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS AND INDIVIDUAL RELIEVING RATES 4.0-1

5.0 SIZING OF RELIEVING DEVICES

6.0 INSTALLATION OF RELIEVING DEVICES

7.0 PROCESS SPECIFICATION OF RELIEVING DEVICES

APPENDIX A TABLES AND FIGURES

Table Table Description

1 Properties of Gases A-1

Figure Figure Description

1 Typical Effects of Superimposed Back Pressure on the

2 Typical Effects of Built-Up Back Pressure on the Capacity

LIST OF FIGURES (continued) PAGE

3 Typical Effects of Back Pressure on Set Pressure of

4 Pop-Action Pilot-Operated Valve A-7

5 Typical Relationship Between Lift of Disk and A-8

6 Pressure Conditions for Safety Relief Valve Installed A-9

7 API Formula for Heat Absorbed from Fire on Wetted A-11

8 Vapor Pressure and Heat of Vaporization of Pure Single- A-12

9 Generalized Compressibility Chart A-14

10 Constant Back Pressure Sizing Factor Kb , for A-18

11 Back Pressure Sizing Factor Kb , for Balanced Bellows A-19

12 Capacity Correction Factor due to Overpressure for A-20

13 Variable or Constant Back-Pressure Sizing Factor Kw, A-21

14 Curves for Paraffin Hydrocarbons Expanding from A-22

15 Curve for Evaluating Coefficient C in Safety-Relief Valve A-23

16 Rupture Pin Valves A-24

APPENDIX B SIZING OF RELIEVING DEVICES

1 Flow of a Gas or Vapor Through a Nozzle B-1

1.0 GENERAL INFORMATION

1.3.1 National, Local, and Client Codes

1.3.2 Mobile Equipment

Pressure vessels used for transportation of gaseous or liquid products in bulk or in

1.3.3 Overheating and Corrosion

Pressure relieving devices protect a vessel or item of equipment against

1.0 GENERAL INFORMATION

1.4.1 Relieving Devices

A. Pressure Relief Valve

A pressure relief device actuated by inlet static pressure and designed to

B. Non-Reclosing Pressure Relief Device

A pressure relief device designed to remain open after operation.

Section VIII of ASME Code (UG-127) considers the following :

A safety valve is a pressure relief valve characterized by rapid opening or

A relief valve is a pressure relief valve, which opens in proportion to the

E. Safety Relief Valve

1.0 GENERAL INFORMATION

1.4.1 Relieving Devices (cont'd)

F. Pilot Operated Pressure Relief Valve

An important ASME code requirement (section VIII UG 126) on the

G. Pilot-Assisted Pressure Relief Valve

H. Power-Actuated Pressure Relieving Valve

Movements to open or close are fully controlled by an external source of

I. Rupture Disk Device

A non-reclosing differential pressure relief device actuated by inlet static

1.0 GENERAL INFORMATION

1.4.1 Relieving Devices (cont'd)

J. Breaking Pin Devices and Spring-Loaded Non-Reclosing Pressure Relief

A breaking pin device is a non-reclosing pressure relief device actuated by

A spring-loaded non-reclosing pressure relief device is pressure actuated by

- These devices are described in ASME Code, Section VIII (UG-127,