G.R. No.
L-48594 March 16, 1988
GENEROSO ALANO, petitioner,
vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondent.
GUTTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The only issue in this case is whether or not the injury sustained
by the deceased Dedicacion de Vera resulting in her death is
compensable under the law as an employment accident.
The facts as found by the respondent Employees' Compensation
Commission are as follows:
Dedicacion de Vera, a government employee
during her lifetime, worked as principal of Salinap
Community School in San Carlos City,
Pangasinan. Her tour of duty was from 7:30 a.m.
to 5:30 p.m. On November 29, 1976, at 7:00 A.M.,
while she was waiting for a ride at Plaza Jaycee in
San Carlos City on her way to the school, she was
bumped and run over by a speeding Toyota mini-
bus which resulted in her instantaneous death.
She is survived by her four sons and a daughter.
On June 27, 1977, Generoso C. Alano, brother of
the deceased, filed the instant claim for in come
benefit with the GSIS for and in behalf of the
decedent's children. The claim was, however,
denied on the same date on the ground that the
"injury upon which compensation is being claimed
is not an employment accident satisfying all the
conditions prescribed by law." On July 19, 1977
appellant requested for a reconsideration of the
system's decision, but the same was denied and
the records of the case were elevated to this
Commission for review. (Rollo, p. 12)
The respondent Commission affirmed the decision of the
Government Service Insurance System. It stated that Section I
(a), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation
specifically provides that: "For the injury and the resulting
disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be the
result of an employment accident satisfying all the following
conditions (1) The employee must have sustained the injury
during his working hours; (2) The employee must have been
injured at the place where his work requires him to be; and (3)
The employee must have been performing his official functions."
(Rollo, p. 13)
According to the respondent Commission, the deceased's
accident did not meet any of the aforementioned conditions. First,
the accident occured at about 7:00 a.m. or thirty minutes before
the deceased's working hours. Second, it happened not at her
workplace but at the plaza where she usually waits for a ride to
her work. Third, she was not then performing her official functions
as school principal nor was she on a special errand for the
school. The case, therefore, was dismissed.
The petitioner then went to this Court on petition for review on
certiorari. He alleges that the deceased's accident has "arisen out
of or in the course of her employment."
The respondent Commission reiterates its views and contends
that the present provision of law on employment injury is different
from that provided in the old Workmen's Compensation Act (Act
3428) and is "ategorical in that the injury must have been
sustained at work while at the workplace, or elsewhere while
executing an order from the employer." (Rollo, p. 44)
The Government Service Insurance System which received a
copy of the Court's resolution requiring the parties to submit their
memoranda, however manifests that it does not appear to be a
party to the case because it had not been impleaded as a party
thereto.
We rule in favor of the petitioner.
This case does not come to us with a novel issue. In the earlier
case of Vda. de Torbela v. Employees' Compensation
Commission (96 SCRA 260,263,264) which has a similar factual
background, this Court held:
It is a fact that Jose P. Torbela, Sr. died on March
3, 1975 at about 5:45 o'clock in the morning due
to injuries sustained by him in a vehicular accident
while he was on his way to school from Bacolod
City, where he lived, to Hinigaran Negros
Occidental where the school of which he was the
principal was located and that at the time of the
accident he had in his possession official papers
he allegedly worked on in his residence on the
eve of his death.
The claim is compensable. When an employee is
accidentally injured at a point reasonably
proximate to the place at work, while he is going
to and from his work, such injury is deemed to
have arisen out of and in the course of his
employment.
In this case, it is not disputed that the deceased died while going
to her place of work. She was at the place where, as the
petitioner puts it, her job necessarily required her to be if she was
to reach her place of work on time. There was nothing private or
personal about the school principal's being at the place of the
accident. She was there because her employment required her to
be there.
As to the Government Service Insurance System's manifestation,
we hold that it is not fatal to this case that it was not impleaded as
a party respondent. As early as the case of La O v. Employees'
Compensation Commission, (97 SCRA 782) up to Cabanero v.
Employees' Compensation Commission (111 SCRA 413) and
recently, Clemente v. Government Service Insurance
System (G.R. No. L-47521, August 31,1987), this Court has ruled
that the Government Service Insurance System is a proper party
in employees' compensation cases as the ultimate implementing
agency of the Employees' Compensation Commission. We held
in the aforecited cases that "the law and the rules refer to the said
System in all aspects of employee compensation including
enforcement of decisions (Article 182 of Implementing Rules)."
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Employees' Compensation
Commission appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE and the
Government Service Insurance System is ordered to pay the
heirs of the deceased the sum of Twelve Thousand Pesos
(P12,000.00) as death benefit and the sum of One Thousand Two
Hundred Pesos (P1,200.00) as attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 78617 June 18, 1990
SALVADOR LAZO, petitioner,
vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION &
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (CENTRAL
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES), respondents.
Oscar P. Paguinto for petitioner.
PADILLA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the respondent Employees
Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. 2883 which
affirmed the dismissal of petitioner's claim for compensation
against the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS).
The petitioner, Salvador Lazo, is a security guard of the Central
Bank of the Philippines assigned to its main office in Malate,
Manila. His regular tour of duty is from 2:00 o'clock in the
afternoon to 10:00 o'clock in the evening. On 18 June 1986, the
petitioner rendered duty from 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon to
10:00 o'clock in the evening. But, as the security guard who was
to relieve him failed to arrive, the petitioner rendered overtime
duty up to 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 19 June 1986, when he
asked permission from his superior to leave early in order to take
home to Binangonan, Rizal, his sack of rice.
On his way home, at about 6:00 o'clock in the morning of 19 June
1986, the passenger jeepney the petitioner was riding on turned
turtle due to slippery road. As a result, he sustained injuries and
was taken to the Angono Emergency Hospital for treatment. He
was later transferred to the National Orthopedic Hospital where
he was confined until 25 July 1986.
For the injuries he sustained, petitioner filed a claim for disability
benefits under PD 626, as amended. His claim, however, was
denied by the GSIS for the reason that
It appears that after performing your regular duties
as Security Guard from 2:00 P.M. to 10:00 P.M. on
June 18, 1986, you rendered overtime duty from
10:00 P.M. to 5:06 A.M. of the following day; that
at about 5:06 A.M. after asking permission from
your superior you were allowed to leave the Office
to do certain personal matter that of bringing
home a sack of rice and that, while on your way
home, you met a vehicular accident that resulted
to (sic) your injuries. From the foregoing
informations, it is evident that you were not at your
work place performing your duties when the
incident occurred. 1
It was held that the condition for compensability had not been
satisfied.
Upon review of the case, the respondent Employees
Compensation Commission affirmed the decision since the
accident which involved the petitioner occurred far from his work
place and while he was attending to a personal matter.
Hence, the present recourse.
The petitioner contends that the injuries he sustained due to the
vehicular accident on his way home from work should be
construed as "arising out of or in the course of employment" and
thus, compensable. In support of his prayer for the reversal of the
decision, the petitioner cites the case of Pedro Baldebrin vs.
Workmen's Compensation Commission, 2 where the Court awarded
compensation to the petitioner therein who figured in an accident on
his way home from his official station at Pagadian City to his place of
residence at Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur. In the accident, petitioner's
left eye was hit by a pebble while he was riding on a bus.
Respondents claim that the Baldebrin ruling is a deviation from
cases earlier decided and hence, not applicable to the present
case.
The Court has carefully considered the petition and the
arguments of the parties and finds that the petitioner's submission
is meritorious. Liberally interpreting the employees compensation
law to give effect to its compassionate spirit as a social
legislation 3 in Vda. de Torbela u. ECC, 4 the Court held:
It is a fact that Jose P. Torbela, Sr. died on March
3, 1975 at about 5:45 o'clock in the morning due
to injuries sustained by him in a vehicular accident
while he was on his way to school from Bacolod
City, where he lived, to Hinigaran, Negros
Occidental where the school of which he was the
principal was located and that at the time of the
accident he had in his possession official papers
he allegedly worked on in his residence on the
eve of his death. The claim is compensable.
When an employee is accidentally injured at a
point reasonably proximate to the place at work,
while he is going to and from his work, such injury
is deemed to have arisen out of and in the course
of his employment.
Again in Alano v. ECC, 5 it was reiterated:
Dedicacion de Vera, a government employee
during her lifetime, worked as principal of Salinap
Community School in San Carlos City,
Pangasinan. Her tour of duty was from 7:30 a.m.
to 5:30 p.m. On November 29, 1976, at 7:00 A-M.,
while she was waiting for a ride at Plaza Jaycee in
San Carlos City on her way to the school, she was
bumped and run over by a speeding Toyota mini-
bus which resulted in her instantaneous death. ...
In this case, it is not disputed that the deceased
died while going to her place of work. She was at
the place where, as the petitioner puts it, her job
necessarily required her to be if she was to reach
her place of work on time. There was nothing
private or personal about the school principal's
being at the place of the accident. She was there
because her employment required her to be there.
More recently, in Vano vs. GSIS & ECC, 6 this Court, applying the
above quoted decisions, enunciated:
Filomeno Vano was a letter carrier of the Bureau
of Posts in Tagbilaran City. On July 31, 1983, a
Sunday, at around 3:30 p.m. Vano was driving his
 motorcycle with his son as backrider allegedly on
his way to his station in Tagbilaran for his work the
following day, Monday. As they were approaching
Hinawanan Bridge in Loay, Bohol, the motorcycle
skidded, causing its passengers to be thrown
overboard. Vano's head hit the bridge's railing
which rendered him unconscious. He was taken to
the Engelwood Hospital where he was declared
dead on arrival due to severe hemorrhage.
We see no reason to deviate from the foregoing
rulings. Like the deceased in these two (2)
aforementioned cases, it was established that
petitioner's husband in the case at bar was on his
way to his place of work when he met the
accident. His death, therefore, is compensable
under the law as an employment accident.
In the above cases, the employees were on their way to work. In
the case at bar, petitioner had come from work and was on his
way home, just like in the Baldebrin case, where the employee "...
figured in an accident when he was ping home from his official
station at Pagadian City to his place of residence at Aurora,
Zamboanga del Sur ...." 7Baldebrin, the Court said:
The principal issue is whether petitioner's injury
comes within the meaning of and intendment of
the phrase 'arising out of and in the course of
employment.'(Section 2, Workmen's
Compensation Act). In Philippine Engineer's
Syndicate, Inc. vs. Flora S. Martin and Workmen's
Compensation Commission, 4 SCRA 356, We
held that 'where an employee, after working
hours, attempted to ride on the platform of a
service truck of the company near his place of
work, and, while thus attempting, slipped and fell
to the ground and was run over by the truck,
resulting in his death, the accident may be said to
have arisen out of or in the course of employment,
for which reason his death is compensable. The
fact standing alone, that the truck was in motion
when the employee boarded, is insufficient to
justify the conclusion that he had been notoriously
negligent, where it does not appear that the truck
was running at a great speed.'And, in a later
case, Iloilo Dock & Engineering Co. vs.
Workmen's Compensation Commission, 26 SCRA
102, 103, We ruled that '(e)mployment includes
not only the actual doing of the work, but a
reasonable margin of time and space necessary
to be used in passing to and from the place where
the work is to be done. If the employee be injured
while passing, with the express or implied consent
of the employer, to or from his work by a way over
the employer's premises, or over those of another
in such proximity and relation as to be in practical
effect a part of the employer's premises, the injury
is one arising out of and in the course of the
employment as much as though it had happened
while the employee was engaged in his work at
the place of its performance. (Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, it can be seen that petitioner left his station at
the Central Bank several hours after his regular time off, because
the reliever did not arrive, and so petitioner was asked to go on
overtime. After permission to leave was given, he went home.
There is no evidence on record that petitioner deviated from his
usual, regular homeward route or that interruptions occurred in
the journey.
While the presumption of compensability and theory of
aggravation under the Workmen's Compensation Act (under
which the Baldebrin case was decided) may have been
abandoned under the New Labor Code, 8 it is significant that the
liberality of the law in general in favor of the workingman still
subsists. As agent charged by the law to implement social justice
guaranteed and secured by the Constitution, the Employees
Compensation Commission should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of
the employee in deciding claims for compensability, especially where
there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work connection to the
accident.
This kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the
compassionate spirit of the law as embodied in Article 4 of the
New Labor Code which states that 'all doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor
Code including its implementing rules and regulations shall be
resolved in favor of labor.'
The policy then is to extend the applicability of the decree (PD
626) to as many employees who can avail of the benefits
thereunder. This is in consonance with the avowed policy of the
State to give maximum aid and protection to labor. 9
There is no reason, in principle, why employees should not be
protected for a reasonable period of time prior to or after working
hours and for a reasonable distance before reaching or after
leaving the employer's premises. 10
If the Vano ruling awarded compensation to an employee who
was on his way from home to his work station one day before an
official working day, there is no reason to deny compensation for
accidental injury occurring while he is on his way home one hour
after he had left his work station.
We are constrained not to consider the defense of the street peril
doctrine and instead interpret the law liberally in favor of the
employee because the Employees Compensation Act, like the
Workmen's Compensation Act, is basically a social legislation
designed to afford relief to the working men and women in our
society.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Let the case be remanded to the ECC and the GSIS
for disposition in accordance with this decision.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Sarmiento and
Regalado, JJ., concur.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE M. CAPACITE, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
This is an appeal under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court of the
decision dated August 4, 2011 and the resolution dated
1 2
November 24, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP
No. 116030. The appealed decision reversed and set aside the
Decision dated June 29, 2010 of the Employees' Compensation
Commission (ECC), which denied the claim for compensation
benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626 (PD 626) filed by
3
Jose M. Capacite (Jose).
The Antecedent Facts
Elma Capacite (Elma) was an employee in the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) Eastern Samar Provincial Office,
Borongan, Eastern Samar, who successively held the following
positions between the periods of November 8, 1982 to July 15,
2009: Junior Statistician,
Bookkeeper, Bookkeeper II, and finally as Accountant I. 4
On May 11, 2009, due to persistent cough coupled with
abdominal pain, Elma was admitted at the Bethany Hospital. The
pathology examination showed thatshe was suffering from
"Adenocarcinoma, moderately differentiated, probably cecal origin
with metastases to mesenteric lymph node and seeding of the
peritoneal surface."
5
On July 16, 2009, Elma died due to "Respiratory Failure
secondary to Metastatic Cancer to the lungs; Bowel cancer with
Hepatic and Intraperitoneal Seeding and Ovarian cancer." 6
On May 13, 2009, Elmas surviving spouse, Jose, filed a claim for
ECC death benefits before the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) Catbalogan Branch Office, alleging thatElmas
stressful working condition caused the cancer that eventually led
to her death.
7
On August 18, 2009, the GSIS deniedJoses claim. The GSIS
opined that Jose had failed to present direct evidence to prove a
causal connection between Elmas illness and her work in order
for the claimant to be entitled to the ECC death benefits. 8
Jose appealed the GSIS decision tothe ECC. On June 29, 2010,
the ECC denied Joses claim for death benefits. The ECC held
9
that colorectal cancer is not listed as an occupational and
compensable disease under Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on
Employees Compensation. Although its item 17 provides that
10
"[c]ancer of the lungs, liver and brain shall be compensable," the
rules required"that it had been incurred by employees working as
vinyl chloride workers, or plastic workers."11
Jose appealed the ECC ruling to the CA under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court. On August 4, 2011, the CA granted the petition
and reversed the ECC findings. Without discussing the nature of
Elmas employment, the CA ruled that she had "adenocarcinoma
of the lungs" or "lung cancer," which is a respiratory disease listed
under Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on Employees
Compensation, entitling her heirs to death benefits even if she
had not been a "vinyl chloride worker, or plastic worker."
The CA further ruled that Jose was no longer required to provide
evidence that would directly connect the deceaseds illness with
her working conditions; that it was enough that the nature of her
employment contributed to the development of the disease. As a
bookkeeper, the CA assumed that Elma had been exposed to
voluminous dusty records and other harmful substances that
aggravated her respiratory disease.
GSIS filed a motion for reconsideration which the CA denied in its
resolution dated November24, 2011. The GSIS now comes
before us for a final review.
The Issues
GSIS raises the following assignment of errors:
I.
THE CA ERRED IN RULING THAT METASTASIZED TO THE
LUNGS IS AN AILMENT AKIN TO RESPIRATORY DISEASE
UNDER ANNEX "A" OF P.D. NO. 626, AS AMENDED, OR THAT
SUCH DISEASE IS WORK-RELATED.
II.
THE CA ERRED IN APPLYING THE LIBERAL
INTERPRETATION OF THE RULES SINCE THE LIMITED
RESOURCES DERIVED FROM ECC CONTRIBUTIONS
SHOULD ONLY BE APPLIED TO LEGITIMATE CLAIMS FOR
COMPENSATION BENEFITS.
GSIS primarily argues that Elmas illness is not work-related. It is
neither listed under Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on
Employees Compensation, nor was it caused by her working
conditions. GSIS asserts that the liberal attitude to grant benefits
should not be used to defeat the mandate of the GSIS to provide
meaningful protection to all government employees who are
actually working under hazardous circumstances.
The Courts Ruling
We find the petition meritorious.
PD 626, as amended, defines compensable sicknessas "any
illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by
the Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to
proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is
increased by the working conditions." Of particular significance in
this definition is the use of the conjunction "or," which indicates
alternative situations.
Based on this definition, we ruled in GSIS v. Vicencio that for
12
sickness and the resulting death of anemployee to be
compensable, the claimant must show either: (1) that it is a result
of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of the
Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation with the conditions
set therein satisfied; or (2) if not so listed, that the risk of
contracting the disease was increased by the working conditions.
While item 17, Annex "A" of the Amended Rules of Employees
Compensation considers lung cancer to be a compensable
occupational disease, it likewise provides that the employee
should be employed as a vinyl chloride worker or a plastic worker.
In this case, however, Elma did not work in an environment
involving the manufacture of chlorine or plastic, for her lung
cancer to be considered an occupational disease. There was,
13
therefore, no basis for the CA to simply categorize her illness as
an occupational disease without first establishing the nature of
Elmas work. Both the law and the implementing rules clearly
state that the given alternative conditions must be satisfied for a
disease to be compensable.
No proof exists showing that Elmas lung cancer
was induced or aggravated by her working conditions
We also do not find that Elmas cause of death was work-
connected. As we earlier pointed out, entitlement to death
benefits depends on whether the employees disease is listed as
an occupational disease or, if not so listed, whether the risk of
contracting the disease has been increased by the employees
working conditions.
In reversing the ECC and granting the claim for death benefits,
the CA relied on the case of GSIS v. Vicencio, which particularly
14
states:
Granting, however, that the only cause of Judge Vicencios death
is lung cancer, we are still one with the CA in its finding that the
working conditions of the late Judge Vicencio contributed to the
development of his lung cancer.
It is true that under Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on
Employees Compensation, lung cancer is occupational only with
respect to vinyl chloride workers and plastic workers. However,
this will not bar a claim for benefits under the law if the
complainant can adduce substantial evidence that the risk of
contracting the illness is increased or aggravated by the working
conditions to which the employee is exposed to.
It is well-settled that the degree of proof required under P.D. No.
626 is merely substantial evidence, which means, "such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion." What the law requires is a reasonable
work-connection and not a direct causal relation. It is enough that
the hypothesis on which the workman's claim is based is
probable. Medical opinion to the contrary can be disregarded
especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a
work-connection. Probability, not certainty, is the touchstone. It is
not required that the employment be the sole factor in the growth,
development or acceleration of a claimants illness to entitle him
to the benefits provided for. It is enough that his employment
contributed, even if to a small degree, to the development of the
disease.
[Emphasis ours]
xxxx
We hold that the CAs application of the Vicencio ruling is
misplaced. The correct implementing ruleunder PD 626 or
Section 1(b), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees
Compensation in fact provides that:
Section 1. Grounds.
xxxx
(b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be
compensable, the sickness must bethe result of an occupational
disease listed under Annex "A" of these Rules with the conditions
set therein satisfied, otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk
of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions.
[Emphasis ours]
The CA failed to consider that what moved the Court to grant
death benefits to the heirs of Judge Vicencio was the proof that
the judge had been in contact with voluminous and dusty records.
The Court also took judicial notice of the dilapidated conditions of
Judge Vicencios workplace:
The late Judge Vicencio was a frontline officer in the
administration of justice, being the most visible living
representation of this country's legal and judicial system. It is
undisputed that throughout his noble career from Fiscal to
Metropolitan Trial Court Judge, and, finally, to RTC Judge, his
work dealt with stressful daily work hours, and constant and long-
term contact with voluminous and dusty records. We also take
judicial notice that Judge Vicencios workplace at the Manila City
Hall had long been a place with sub-standard offices of judges
and prosecutors overflowing with records of cases covered up in
dust and are poorly ventilated. All these, taken together,
necessarily contributed to the development of his lung
illness."[Emphasis ours]
In contrast with the present case, Jose merely alleged that
throughout Elmas 27-year service atthe DAR, she had a very
demanding job; that she rose from the ranks as a Junior
Statistician, until she reached the position of Accountant I. Jose
also explained that Elma had to examine various financial
statements for accuracy; perform complex accounting reports;
and prepare financial statements. She also had to constantly
render overtime work, even during weekends, in order to study,
analyze, balance, formulate and finalize reports. All these
involved prolonged sitting, exposure to cold room temperature at
the office, physical effort and mental exertion, making her highly
susceptible to physical and mental fatigue, stress and strain.
15
The rule is that the party who alleges an affirmative fact has the
burden of proving it because mere allegation of the fact is not
evidence of it. Proof of direct causal connection is not, however,
16
indispensably required. The law merely requires substantial
evidence such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion that the claimants
employment contributed, even if to a small degree, to the
development of the disease. Thus, there is no requirement that
17
the employment be the sole factor in the growth, development or
acceleration of a claimantsillness for the latter to beentitled to the
benefits provided for. However, it is important to note that
18
adequate proofmust be presented to substantiate the claim for
death benefits.
In Dator v. Employees Compensation Commission, we 19
emphasized that the deceased employee had been proven to
have been exposed to dusty substances and unsanitary
conditions:
Until now the cause of cancer is not known. Despite this fact,
however, the Employees' Compensation Commission has listed
some kinds of cancer as compensable. There is no reason why
cancer of the lungs should not be considered as a compensable
disease. The deceased worked as a librarian for about 15 years.
During all that period she was exposed to dusty books and other
deleterious substances in the library under unsanitary conditions.
[Emphasis ours]
In Raro v. Employees' Compensation Commission, we stated
20
that medical science cannot, as yet, positively identify the causes
of various types of cancer. It is a disease that strikes people in
general. The nature of a person's employment appears to have
no relevance. Cancer can strike a lowly paid laborer, or a highly
paid executive, or one who works on land, in water, or in the
bowels of the earth. It makes no difference whether the victim is
employed or unemployed, a white collar employee or a blue collar
worker, a housekeeper, an urban dweller or the resident of a rural
area.
By way of exception, certain cancers have reasonably been
traced to or considered as strongly induced by specific
causes. For example, heavy doses of radiation (as in Chernobyl,
1wphi1
USSR), cigarette smoke over a long period for lung cancer,
certain chemicals for specific cancers, and asbestos dust, among
others, are generally accepted as increasing the risks of
contracting specific cancers. In the absence of such clear and
established empirical evidence, the law requires proof of
causation or aggravation.
Aside from Joses general allegationsproving the stressful duties
of his late wife, no reasonable proof exists to support the claim
that her respiratory disease, which is similar to lung cancer, was
aggravated by her working conditions. The records do not support
the contention that she had been exposed to voluminous and
dusty records, nor do they provide any definite picture of her
working environment.
We cannot, under this evidentiary situation, grant death
compensation benefits solely on the assumption thatshe might
have been exposed to deleterious substances while working as
bookkeeper and accountant. We cannot likewise award
compensation benefits on the basis of stress and fatigue, which
are general consequences of working in practically all kinds of
human activity; otherwise, we would unreasonably open the flood
gates of compensability and render the purposes ofa system like
GSIS meaningless.
Insurance trust fund should only be applied to legitimate claims
for compensation benefits
While PD 626, as amended, is a social legislation whose primary
purpose is to provide meaningful protection to the working class
against the hazards of disability, illness, and other contingencies
resulting in loss of income, it was not enacted to cover all
ailments of working men. The law discarded, among others, the
conceptsof "presumption of compensability" and "aggravation"
and substituted a system based on social security principles. The
intent was to restore a sensible equilibrium between the
employer's obligation to pay workmen's compensation and the
employee's right to receive reparation for work-connected death
or disability.
21
The new employee compensation program now directs that all
covered employers throughout the country be required by law to
contribute fixed and regular premiums or contributions to a trust
fund for their employees. Benefits are paid from this trust fund. If
diseases not intended by the law to be compensated are
inadvertently or recklessly included, the integrity of the trust
fundwould be endangered.In this sense, compassion for the
victims of diseases not covered by the law ignores the need to
show a greater concern for the trust fund to which the tens of
millions of workers and their families look up to for compensation
whenever covered accidents, salary and deaths occur. 22
As an agency charged by law to manage and administer the
limited trust fund of the government officials and employees, the
GSIS has the difficult task of insuring all legitimate claims. Suffice
it to say that a misplaced compassion for victims of diseases or
injuries would prejudice the very same workers and their
beneficiaries in times of need.
In sum, for insufficiency of evidence of causation or aggravation,
we cannot grant Jose's claim for compensation benefits.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the
petition. The decision and the resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-GR SP No. 116030 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The ECC decision dated June 29, 2010 is hereby
REINSTATED. No costs.
G.R. No. 196102 November 26, 2014
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Petitioner,
vs.
AURELIA Y. CALUMPIANO, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari are 1) the
1
October 30, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
2
G.R. SP No. 85908 which set aside the June 24, 2004
Decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) in
3
ECC Case No. GM-16174-0209-04 and ordered the payment of
disability benefits to the herein respondent Aurelia Y. Calumpiano;
and 2) the CA's February 23, 2011 Resolution denying
4
reconsideration of the assailed CA Decision.
Factual Antecedents
As determined by the CA, the facts are as follows:
x x x Aurelia Y. Calumpiano was employed as Court
5
Stenographer at the then Court of First Instance ofSamar from
January 5, 1972 until her retirement on March 30, 2002.
On March 7, 2002, shortly before her retirement, [respondent]
filed before the Supreme Court, an application for disability
retirement on account of her ailment[s], Hypertensive
Cardiovascular Disease [and] Acute Angle Closure Glaucoma. To
bolster her claim, [respondent] submitted the medical certificates
issued by her attending physicians, Dr. Alfred I. Lim and Dr. Elmer
Montes, both of whom are Op[h]thalmologists [at] Eastern Samar
Provincial Hospital. She submitted them together with the results
of her perimetry test, [a certificate of] which x x x was issued by
Dr. Lim. On September 30, 2002, the Supreme Court approved
[respondents] application for disability retirement, under Republic
Act No. 8291 (New GSIS Act of 1997).
[Respondents] disability claim was forwarded to GSIS, but the
6
latter denied her claim for the reason that hypertension and
glaucoma, which were her illnesses, were not work[-]related. Her
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the GSIS.
Petitioner filed an appeal [with] the ECC, which rendered the
assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which stated:
7
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision appealed
from is hereby AFFIRMED and the instant appeal dismissed for
want of merit.
SO ORDERED. 8
In dismissing respondents appeal, the ECC held:
"Glaucoma is characterized by an intraocular pressure sufficiently
elevated to produce intraocular damage. The three major
categories of glaucoma are: (1) angle-closure glaucoma, (2)
open-angle glaucoma, and (3) congenital and juvenile glaucoma.
Eyes that develop primary angle glaucoma are anatomically
predisposed to the condition. In primary open-angle glaucoma,
[the] angle appears open [and] does notseem to function properly.
The exact nature of obstruction has not yet been elucidated.
Congenital glaucoma and juvenile glaucoma are thought to be
hereditary inmost cases, although infectious causes are possible
(rubella).["] (Pathologic Basis of Disease by Cotran, 6th edition,
pages 1374-1375)
"Hypertension is an increase in the blood pressure within the
normal of less than 120/80 mm Hg as defined by the Joint
National Committee VII. Primary risk factor for developing
hypertension is smoking. Other important risk factors are excess
body weight, high salt intake, nutritional factors, high alcohol
consumption, physical inactivity and psychological factors,
including stress." (Principles of Internal Medicine)
To warrant compensability of ailment and its resulting sickness,
disability or death under P.D. 626, as amended, Rule III, Section
1(b) thereof, specifically provides that the ailment must be listed
by the Commission as an occupational disease with the
conditions set forth therein satisfied, otherwise, the conditions
imposed under the Increased Risk Theory must be complied with.
Appellant worked as a Court Stenographer III of the Supreme
9
Court for thirty (30) years. Her duties were no doubt stressful and
the same may have caused her to develop her ailment,
hypertension. However, to make the same compensable, it is
necessary that there must be impairment of function of her body
organs like kidneys, heart, eyes and brain resulting in her
permanent disability. An examination of the appellants records
would show that she was not suffering from end[-]organ damage.
This was shown in the x x x report [of the ECG] that was taken on
the appellant on January 21, 2002. Thus, the same cannot be
considered compensable and work-connected.
Likewise, her other ailment, Glaucoma[,] cannot also be
considered work-connected. Medical science has explained that it
is characterized by an intraocular pressure sufficiently elevatedto
produce intraocular glaucoma. Here, there was nothing in her
duties that would cause or increase her risk of contracting the
said ailment.
10
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In a Petition for Review filed with the CA and docketed therein as
11
CAG.R. SP No. 85908, respondent sought to set aside the
aboveECC Decision, arguing that her illness is work-connected
which thus entitles her to disability compensation.
On October 30, 2009, the CA issued the herein assailed Decision
containing the following decretal portion:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the
assailed Decision is SET ASIDE. Let this case be REMANDED to
the Employees Compensation Commission for the payment of
the disability benefits due the Petitioner.
SO ORDERED. 12
The CA held that while respondents hypertension and glaucoma
are not listed as occupational diseases under the implementing
rules of the Employee Compensation Program under Presidential
Decree No. 626 (PD 626), they were nonetheless contracted
13
and became aggravated during her employment as court
stenographer; that under the "increased risk theory," a "non-
occupational disease" is compensable as long as proof of a
causal connection between the work and the ailment is
established; that respondents illnesses are connected to her
14
work, given the nature of and pressure involved in her functions
and duties as a court stenographer; that the certifications issued
by the attending physicians certifying to respondents illnesses
should begiven credence; that the ECC itself conceded that
respondents duties were "no doubt stressful and the same may
have caused her to develop her ailment, hypertension;" and that
while the presumption of compensability has been abrogated with
the issuance of PD 626, employees compensation laws
nevertheless constitute social legislation which allows for liberality
in interpretation to the benefit of the employee, and the policy has
always been to extend the applicability of said laws to as many
employees who can avail of the benefits thereunder. 15
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied
the same in its February 23, 2011 Resolution. Hence, the instant
Petition.
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for resolution:
1. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS DISEASES
(HYPERTENSION AND GLAUCOMA) ARE
COMPENSABLE UNDER THE INCREASED RISK
THEORY; AND
2. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
REVERSING THE FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE ECC. 16
Petitioners Arguments
Praying that the assailed CA pronouncements be set aside and
that the June 24, 2004 Decision of the ECC be reinstated,
petitioner argues in its Petition and Reply that respondents
17
hypertension and glaucoma are not compensable under the
principle of increased risk; that although essential hypertension is
listed as an occupational disease, it is not compensable per seas
the conditions under Section 1, Rule III of the Amended Rules on
Employees Compensation should be satisfied; that hypertension
18
is compensable only "if it causes impairment of function of body
organs like kidneys, heart,eyes and brain, resulting in permanent
disability;" that since respondent did not suffer "end-organ
19
damage" to or impairment of her kidneys, heart, eyes and brain
which resulted in permanent disability, her illness is not
compensable; that respondents other illness glaucoma is not
compensable; and that the findings of the ECC should be
20
accorded respect and finality, as it has the expertise and
knowledge on account of its specialized jurisdiction overemployee
compensation cases. Respondents Arguments
In her Comment, respondent seeks the denial of the Petition,
21
arguing relevantly that the "increased risk theory," which applies
to her, has been upheld in several decided cases; that in
22
disability compensation cases, it is not the injury which is
compensated for but rather the incapacity to work resulting in the
impairment of the employees earning capacity; and that while
23
the ECC has the expertise and knowledge relative to
compensation cases, the CA isnot precluded from making its own
assessment of the case which goes against that of the ECCs.
Our Ruling
The Court denies the Petition.
In resolving this case, the case of Government Service Insurance
System v. Baul comes into mind and lays the groundwork for a
24
similar ruling. In said case, the Court held:
Cerebro-vascular accident and essential hypertension are
considered as occupational diseases under Nos. 19 and 29,
respectively, of Annex "A" of the Implementing Rules of P.D. No.
626, as amended. Thus, it is not necessary that there be proof of
causal relation between the work and the illness which resulted in
the respondents disability. The open-ended Table of
Occupational Diseases requires no proof of causation. In general,
a covered claimant suffering from an occupational disease is
automatically paid benefits.
However, although cerebro-vascular accident and essential
hypertension are listed occupational diseases, their
compensability requires compliance with all the conditions set
forth inthe Rules. In short, both are qualified occupational
diseases. For cerebro-vascular accident, the claimant must prove
the following: (1) there must be a history, which should be proved,
of trauma at work (to the head specifically) due to unusual and
extraordinary physical or mental strain or event, or undue
exposure to noxious gases in industry; (2) there must be a direct
connection between the trauma or exertion in the course of the
employment and the cerebro-vascular attack; and (3) the trauma
or exertion then and there caused a brain hemorrhage. On the
other hand, essential hypertension is compensable only if it
causes impairment of function of body organs like kidneys, heart,
eyes and brain, resultingin permanent disability, provided that, the
following documents substantiate it: (a) chest X-ray report; (b)
ECG report; (c) blood chemistry report; (d) funduscopy report;
and (e) C-T scan.
The degree of proof required to validate the concurrence of the
above-mentioned conditions under P.D. No. 626 is merely
substantial evidence, that is, such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. What the law requires is a reasonable work
connection and not direct causal relation. It is enough that the
hypothesis on which the workmens claim isbased is probable. As
correctly pointed out by the CA, probability, not the ultimate
degree of certainty, is the test of proof in compensation
proceedings. For, in interpreting and carrying out the provisions of
the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, the
primordial and paramount consideration is the employees
welfare. To safeguard the workers rights, any doubt as to the
proper interpretation and application must be resolved in [his]
favor.
In the instant case, medical reports and drug prescriptions of
respondents attending physicians sufficiently support her claim
for disability benefits. Neither the GSIS nor the ECC convincingly
deny their genuineness and due execution. The reports are made
part of the record and there is no showing that they are false or
erroneous, or resorted to [for the purpose] of deceiving the Court,
hence, are entitled to due probative weight. The failure of
respondent to submit to a full medical examination, as required by
the rules, to substantiate her essential hypertension, is of no
moment. The law is that laboratory reports such as X-ray and
ECG are not indispensable prerequisites to compensability, the
reason being that the strict rules of evidence need not be
observed in claims for compensation. Medical findings of the
attending physician may be received in evidence and used as
proof[s] of the fact in dispute. The doctors certification as to the
nature of claimants disability may begiven credence as he orshe
normally would not make untruthful certification. Indeed, no
physician inhis right mind and who is aware of the far[-]reaching
and serious effect that his or her statements would cause on a
money claim against a government agency would vouch
indiscriminately without regarding his own interests and
protection.
Significantly, evenmedical authorities have established that the
exact etiology of essential hypertension cannot be accurately
traced:
The term essential hypertension has been employed to indicate
those cases of hypertension for which a specific endocrine or
renal basis cannot befound, and in which the neural element may
be only a mediator ofother influences. Since even this latter
relationship is not entirely clear, it is more properly listed for the
moment in the category of unknown etiology. The term essential
hypertension defines simply by failing to define; hence, it is of
limited use except as an expression of our inability to understand
adequately the forces at work. 25
It bears stressing, however, that medical experiments tracing the
etiology of essential hypertension show that there is a relationship
between the sickness and the nature and conditions of work. In
this jurisdiction, we have already ruled in a number of cases the
strenuous office of a public school teacher. The case of Makabali
v. Employees Compensation Commission, which we have re-
affirmed in the subsequent cases of De Vera v. Employees
Compensation Commission, Antiporda v. Workmens
Compensation Commission, and De la Torre v. Employees
Compensation Commission, amply summarized, thus:
xxxx
The fact that the essential hypertension of respondent worsened
and resulted in a CVA at the time she was already out of service
is inconsequential. The main consideration for its compensability
is that her illness was contracted during and by reason ofher
employment, and any non-work related factor that contributed to
its aggravation is immaterial.
Indeed, an employees disability may not manifest fully at one
precise moment in time but rather over a period of time. It is
possible that an injury which at first was considered to be
temporary may later on become permanent or one who suffers a
partial disability becomes totally and permanently disabled from
the same cause. The right to compensation extends to disability
due to disease supervening upon and proximately and naturally
resulting from a compensable injury. Where the primary injury is
shown to have arisen in the course of employment, every natural
consequence that flows from the injury likewise arises out of the
employment, unless it is the result of an independent intervening
cause attributable to claimants own negligence or misconduct.
Simply stated, all medical consequences that flow fromthe
primary injury are compensable.
P.D. No. 626, as amended, is said to have abandoned the
presumption of compensability and the theory of aggravation
prevalent under the Workmens Compensation Act. Nonetheless,
we ruled in Employees Compensation Commission v. Court of
Appeals, that:
Despite the abandonment of the presumption of compensability
established by the old law, the present law has not ceased to be
an employees compensation law or a social legislation; hence,
the liberality of the law in favor of the working man and woman
still prevails, and the official agency charged by law to implement
the constitutional guarantee of social justice should adopt a liberal
attitude in favor of the employee in deciding claims for
compensability, especially in light of the compassionate policy
towards labor which the 1987 Constitution vivifies and enhances.
Elsewise stated, a humanitarian impulse, dictated by no less than
the Constitution itself under the social justice policy, calls for a
liberal and sympathetic approach to legitimate appeals of
disabled public servants; or that all doubts to the right to
compensation must be resolved in favor of the employee or
laborer. Verily, the policy is to extend the applicability of the law
on employees compensation to as many employees who can
avail of the benefits thereunder. (Emphasis supplied)
26
Also, in Government Service Insurance System v. De
Castro, this Court made the following pronouncement:
27
Other than the given facts, another undisputed aspect of the case
is the status of the ailments that precipitated De Castros
separation from the military service CAD and hypertensive
cardiovascular disease. These are occupational diseases. No
less than the ECC itself confirmed the status of these ailments
when it declared that "Contrary to the ruling of the System, CAD
is a form of cardiovascular disease which is included in the list of
Occupational Diseases." Essential hypertension is also listed
under Item 29 in Annex "A" of the Amended ECC Rules as an
occupational disease.
Despite the compensable character of his ailments, both the
GSIS and the ECC found De Castros CAD to be non-work
related and, therefore, noncompensable. To use the wording of
the ECC decision, it denied De Castros claim "due to the
presence of factors which are not work-related, such as smoking
and alcohol consumption." De Castros own military records
triggered this conclusion ashis Admitting Notes, made when he
entered the V. Luna General Hospital due to chest pains and
hypertension, were that he was a smoker and a drinker.
As the CA did, we cannot accept the validity of this conclusion at
face value because it considers only one side the purely
medical side of De Castros case and even then may not be
completely correct. The ECC itself, in its decision, recites that
CAD is caused, among others, by atherosclerosis of the coronary
arteries that in turn, and lists the following major causes:
increasing age; male gender; cigarette smoking; lipid disorder
due to accumulation of too much fats in the body; hypertension or
high blood pressure; insulin resistance due to diabetes; family
history ofCAD. The minor factors are: obesity; physical inactivity;
stress; menopausal estrogen deficiency; high carbohydrate
intake; and alcohol.
We find it strange that both the ECC and the GSIS singled out the
presence of smoking and drinking as the factors that rendered De
Castros ailments, otherwise listed as occupational, to be non-
compensable. To be sure, the causes of CAD and hypertension
that the ECC listed and explained in its decision cannot be
denied; smoking and drinking are undeniably among these
causes. However, they are not the sole causes of CAD and
hypertension and, at least, not under the circumstances of the
present case. For this reason, we fear for the implication of the
ECC ruling if it will prevail and be read as definitive on the effects
of smoking and drinkingon compensability issues, even on
diseases that are listed as occupational in character. The ruling
raises the possible reading that smoking and drinking, by
themselves, are factors that can bar compensability.
We ask the question of whether these factors can be sole
determinants of compensability as the ECC has apparently failed
to consider other factors such as age and gender from among
those that the ECC itself listed as major and minor causes of
atherosclerosis and, ultimately, of CAD. While age and gender
are characteristics inherent in the person (and thereby may be
considered nonwork related factors), they also do affect a
workers job performance and may in this sense, together with
stresses of the job, significantly contribute to illnesses such as
CAD and hypertension. To cite an example, some workplace
activities are appropriate only for the young (such as the lifting of
heavy objects although these may simply be office files), and
when repeatedly undertaken by older workers, may lead to
ailments and disability. Thus, age coupled with an age-affected
work activity may lead to compensability. From this perspective,
none of the ECCs listed factors should be disregarded to the
exclusion of others in determining compensability.
In any determination of compensability, the nature and
characteristics of the job are as important as raw medical findings
and a claimants personal and social history. This is a basic legal
reality in workers compensation law. We are therefore surprised
that the ECC and the GSIS simply brushed aside the disability
certification that the military issued with respect to De Castros
disability, based mainly on their primacy as the agencies with
expertise on workers compensation and disability
issues. (Emphasis supplied)
28
This case should not have been difficult for the petitioner to
resolve on its own, given that so many cases have been decided
in the past which should have provided it the guiding hand to
decide disability cases on its own rightly instead of putting
claimants in the unfortunate position of having to chase the
benefits they are clearly entitled to, and waste years prosecuting
their claims in spite of their adverse circumstances in life. This
Court should not have to parrot over and over again what clearly
has been the settled rule; in many ways, this is a waste of time,
and it only indicates that petitioner has eithernot learned its
lesson, or it refuses to realize it.
Applying Bauland De Castro to the instant case and looking at the
factual milieu, the Court agrees with the CAs conclusion and so
declares that respondents illness is compensable. Respondent
served the government for 30 long years; veritably, as the ECC
itself said, "[h]er duties were no doubt stressful and the same may
have caused her to develop her ailment, hypertension" which
29
is a listed occupational disease, contrary to the CAs
pronouncement that itis not. And because it is a listed
occupational disease, the "increased risk theory" does not apply
again, contrary to the CAs declaration; no proof of causation is
required.
It can also be said that given respondents age at the time, and
taking into account the nature, working conditions, and pressures
of her work as court stenographer which requires her to
faithfully record each and every day virtually all of the courts
proceedings; transcribe these notes immediately in order to make
them available to the court or the parties who require them; take
down dictations by the judge, and transcribe them; and type in
final form the judges decisions, which activities extend beyond
office hours and without additional compensation or overtime
pay all these contributed to the development of her
30
hypertension or hypertensive cardiovascular disease, as
petitioner would call it. Consequently, her age, work, and
31
hypertension caused the impairment of vision in both eyes due to
"advanced to late stage glaucoma",which rendered her "legally
blind."
32
Contrary to petitioners submissions, there appears to be a link
between blood pressure and the development of glaucoma, which
leads the Court to conclude that respondents glaucoma
developed as a result of her hypertension.
Although intra ocular pressure (IOP) remains an important risk
factor for glaucoma, it is clear that other factors can also influence
disease development and progression. More recently, the role
that blood pressure (BP) has in the genesis of glaucoma has
attracted attention, as it represents a clinically modifiable risk
factor and thus provides the potential for new treatment strategies
beyond IOP reduction. The interplay between blood pressure and
IOP determines the ocular perfusion pressure (OPP), which
regulates blood flow to the optic nerve. If OPP is a more important
determinant of ganglion cell injury than IOP, then hypotension
should exacerbate the detrimental effects of IOP elevation,
whereas hypertension should provide protection against IOP
elevation. Epidemiological evidence provides some conflicting
outcomes of the role of systemic hypertension in the development
and progression of glaucoma. The most recent study showed that
patients at both extremes of the blood pressure spectrum show
an increased prevalence of glaucoma. Those with low blood
pressure would have low OPP and thus reduced blood flow;
however, that people with hypertension also show increased risk
is more difficult to reconcile. This finding may reflect an inherent
blood flow dysregulation secondary to chronic hypertension that
would render retinal blood flow less able to resist changes in
ocular perfusion pressure. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring
33
supplied)
In recent years, weve learned a lot about ocular perfusion
pressure (OPP), i.e., the pressure difference between blood
entering the eye and IOP. Its clear that three forces OPP, IOP
and blood pressure are interconnected in the glaucoma
disease process. The mechanics of that relationship, however,
remain ambiguous.
xxxx
The ties between hypertension and glaucoma are less well
established but the data, in addition to my involvement in a new
study (discussed below), have convinced me they probably do
exist. Therefore, I believe potential hypertension, along with
potential low blood pressure, should be investigated in patients
whose glaucoma continues to progress despite what appears to
be well controlled IOP.
xxxx
We suspect there is a close relationship among IOP, OPP, blood
pressure and glaucoma, but the exact nature of these
associations remains elusive. Complicating matters is the
physiological phenomenon known as autoregulation. 34
Abstract
Aims: To determine whether systemic hypertension and glaucoma
might coexist more often than expected, with possible
implications for treatment.
Methods: Case-control study using general practitioner database
of patients with glaucoma matched with controls for age and sex.
Results: Hypertension was significantly more common in the
27[,]080 patients with glaucoma (odds ratio 1.29, 95% confidence
intervals 1.23 to 1.36, p<0.001) than in controls. x x x 35
While some of the above conclusions are not definitive, it must be
stressed that probability, not certainty, is the test of proof in
compensation cases." It does not preclude the Court from
36
concluding that respondents hypertension apart from her age,
work, and working conditions impaired her vision as a result.
The Court likewise disregards the ECCs finding, which petitioner
relies upon, that the primary and important risk factors for
developing hypertension are smoking, excess body weight, high
salt intake, nutritional factors, high alcohol consumption, physical
inactivity and psychological factors, including stress. As the Court
held in De Castro, these are not the sole causes of hypertension;
age, gender, and work stress significantly contribute to its
development, and the nature and characteristics of the
employment are as important as raw medical findings and a
claimants personal and social history.
Finally, while the ECC possesses the requisite expertise and
knowledge in compensation cases, its decision in respondents
caseis nonetheless erroneous and contrary to law. The Court
cannot uphold its findings; its specialized training, experience and
expertise did not serve justice well in this case. The medical
1wphi1
certificates and relevant reports issued by respondents attending
physicians Drs. Alfred I. Lim, Elmer Montes, and Salvador R.
Salceda as well as hospital records, deserve credence. The
37
identical findings of these three eye specialists simply cannot be
ignored.
In arriving at the above conclusions, the Court is well guided by
the principles, declared in Bauland De Castro, that probability, not
certainty, is the test of proof in compensation cases;that the
primordial and paramount consideration is the employees
welfare; that the strict rules of evidence need not be observed in
claims for compensation; that medical findings of the attending
physician may be received in evidence and used as proof of the
facts in dispute; that in any determination of compensability, the
nature and characteristics of the job are as important as raw
medical findings and a claimants personal and social history; that
where the primary injury is shown to have arisen in the course of
employment, every natural consequence that flows from the injury
likewise arises out of the employment, unless it is the result of an
independent intervening cause attributable to claimants own
negligenceor misconduct; and that the policy is to extend the
application of the law on employees compensation to as many
employees who can avail of the benefits thereunder.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed October 30,
2009 Decision and February 23, 2011 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 85908 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
SSS Paternity Leave Benefits
The working father or husband may not be aware
that there is a law called Paternity Leave Act of
1996, otherwise known as RA. 8187.
This law provides that a married male employee or worker
is
entitled to a 7 days leave with pay when his wife gives birth
or when his wife suffers a miscarriage.
The Purpose of this Paternity Leave law is to give
opportunity
to the working male employee to give support to his wife
and
help in caring for the newly born child.
To be entitled to this 7 day leave with pay, the male
employee
must inform his employer of the fact that his wife is
pregnant and tell his employer of the expected date of
delivery.
This privilege is good only up to the first 4 delivery. The
wife's 5th delivery will no longer entitle the male
employee of Paternity leave.
The employer has no right to deny the male employee of his
right to paternity leave because doing so will make
the employer liable for fine or imprisonment.
So it is a good news for us Male employees that when our
wife delivers a baby or suffers miscarriage, we can
leave our work to take care of our wife and baby for a
period of 7 days with pay.
This Paternity leave privilege granted by law can be
availed of by employees in the private sector as well
as employees in the public sector.
Please remember that your wife must be legitimate.
Meaning, you are legally married. Your kabit or
mistress delivery or miscarriage will not entitle
you to the benefit of the Paternity leave law.
Note: File the Paternity Leave with the Employer and not
with the SSS.
Note: Under the law, paternity leave is not paternity loan.
The husband's absence from work is paid as if he is
present.
The money given by the employer is not a loan but payment
for work done.
1. The Social Security System Pay only up to the first four
deliveries. The Fifth child or delivery will no longer be
paid by the SSS.
2. You can not claim SSS maternity benefit and SSS
sickness
benefit at the same time.
3. For those who are employed, it is the employer and not
the
SSS who will pay the SSS maternity benefits. The
Employer
in turn will reimburse from the SSS what it paid the
employee.
4. The woman employee must notify her employer of the
fact or
her pregnancy. Those who no longer work or who are self
employed must notify the SSS directly.
5. Not only those who work is entitled to maternity benefit
but also those who no longer work provided she paid 3
months of contribution within the twelve month period
immediately preceding the semester of her childbirth.
6. The Employer will be liable to pay SSS the benefits due
the
employee plus damages in case he fails to pay
contribution
of fail to notify the SSS.
7. The pregnant employee is entitle to a maternity leave of
60 days. These 60 days period maybe extended at the
request of the women employee. But the woman
employee can
not just request for extension for the sake of just
extending. The reason for a request to extend must be
due
to illness medically certified to arise out of her
pregnancy or delivery.