PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO.

1079
REVISING AND CONSOLIDATING ALL LAWS AND DECREES REGULATING PUBLICATION OF
JUDICIAL NOTICES, ADVERTISEMENTS FOR PUBLIC BIDDINGS, NOTICES OF AUCTION
SALES AND OTHER SIMILAR NOTICES
WHEREAS, in order to better serve the public good, it is necessary to properly disseminate
information contained in judicial notices, advertisements for public biddings, notices of auction sales
and other similar notices required by Republic Act No. 4569, as amended by Republic Act No. 4883
and Presidential Decree No. 795;
WHEREAS, Presidential Decree No. 19 has further amended the above-mentioned law by
authorizing the publication of the said notices in any existing newspaper or periodical in any part of
the country during the present national emergency;
WHEREAS, there is an urgent need to revise Presidential Decree No. 19 to preclude any confusion in
the distribution of the notices referred to above;
WHEREAS, Presidential Decree No. 19 was intended merely as an emergency measure to prevent
the paralyzation of the normal transactions of the government and the private sector that might have
resulted from the scarcity of newspapers in the provinces during the early stages of martial law, which
possibility no longer exists today;
WHEREAS, to better implement the philosophy behind the publication of the above-mentioned
notices and announcements and prevent cross commercialism and unfair competition among
community newspapers, which conditions prove to be inimical to the development of a truly free and
responsible press, it is necessary to revise and consolidate all laws and decree affecting the
publication of judicial notices and other announcements herein referred to;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the
powers vested in me by law, do hereby order and decree the following:
Section 1. All notices of auction sales in extra- judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage under Act
No. 3135 as amended, judicial notices such as notices of sale on execution of real properties, notices
in special proceedings, court orders and summonses and all similar announcements arising from
court litigation required by law to be published in a newspaper or periodical of general circulation in
particular provinces and/or cities shall be published in newspapers or publications published, edited
and circulated in the same city and/or province where the requirement of general circulation applies:
Provided, That the province or city where the publication's principal office is located shall be
considered the place where it is edited and published: Provided, further, That in the event there is no
newspaper or periodical published in the locality, the same may be published in the newspaper or
periodical published, edited and circulated in the nearest city or province: Provided, finally, That no
newspaper or periodical which has not been authorized by law to publish and which has not been
regularly published for at least one year before the date of publication of the notices or
announcements which may be assigned to it shall be qualified to publish the said notices.
Section 2. The executive judge of the court of first instance shall designate a regular working day and
a definite time each week during which the said judicial notices or advertisements shall be distributed
personally by him for publication to qualified newspapers or periodicals as defined in the preceding
section, which distribution shall be done by raffle: Provided, That should the circumstances require
that another day be set for the purpose, he shall notify in writing the editors and publishers concerned
at least three (3) days in advance of the designated date: Provided, further, That the distribution of
the said notices by raffle shall be dispensed with in case only one newspaper or periodical is in
operation in a particular province or city.
Section 3. No newspaper or periodical shall charge for the publication of the said notices and
announcements less than ten pesos (P10.00) per column inch, nor more than eighty percent (80%) of
1
their regular commercial display advertising rates: Provided, That publications whose regular
commercial advertising rates are lower than ten pesos (P10.00) shall not charge below ten pesos
(P10.00) per column inch for the publication of the above- mentioned notices and announcements:
Provided, further, That in the case of publications that do not carry commercial display advertising,
the rate for the publication of legal and judicial notices shall be fixed at ten pesos (P10.00) per column
inch: Provided, finally, That newspapers or periodicals may only charge more than ten pesos
(P10.00) up to eighty percent (80%) of their regular commercial display advertising rates when there
is proper and adequate proof that the rate claimed is the regular commercial display advertising rate.
Section 4. In the publication of the legal and judicial notices referred to above, newspapers or
periodicals shall use less but not more than eight (8) points for the text, less but not more than ten
(10) points for the heading, and more but not less than nine (9) ems column width; Provided, That the
printing of the text and heading shall be solid, without slugs or leads between lines and margins;
Section 5. No publishers, editor, media personnel or any other person shall directly or indirectly offer
or give money, commission or gift of any kind to executive judges of the court of first instance or any
court employee in consideration of the award of legal and judicial notices and similar announcements
defined in section 1 hereof. Neither shall the latter directly or indirectly demand of or receive from the
former money, commission or gifts of any kind in consideration of any publication herein referred to.
Section 6. Violation of any provision of this Decree shall be punished by a fine or not less than five
thousand pesos (5,000.00) nor more than twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) and imprisonment for
not less than (6) months nor more than two (2) years. The offending executive judge or court
personnel shall be perpetually disqualified from holding any public office in the government.
Section 7. Any provision of law, decree, executive order, rule or regulation contrary to or inconsistent
with the provisions of this decree are hereby amended, modified or repealed accordingly.
Section 8. This Decree shall take effect immediately.
Done in the City of Manila, this 28th day of January in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and
seventy-seven.

2
 [G.R. No. L-67496 July 7, 1986]
TOP RATE INTERNATIONAL SERVICES, INC., vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and
RODRIGO TAN, doing business under the name and style "ASTRO AUTOMOTIVE SUPPLY
[G.R. No. L-68257 July 7, 1986]
TOP RATE INTERNATIONAL SERVICES, INC. vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
and POLARIS MOTOR SUPPLY COMPANY
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The two consolidated petitions before us seek to annul the decisions of the Intermediate Appellate
Court in G.R. No. 67496 dated January 6, 1984 and in G.R. No. 68257 dated June 6, 1984,
respectively. The two decisions both upheld the validity of the levy made on two properties whose
ownership is claimed by petitioner, notwithstanding the fact that the value of said properties are far in
excess of the amount of the liens thereon. The decisions are based on the ground that what was
attached and levied upon are not the properties themselves but only the vendor's equity of
redemption. The petitioner also asks that the resolutions of the appellate court denying its motions for
reconsideration be set aside,
In Civil Case No. 142443 now, G.R. No. 67496, the facts as found by the appellate court are:
On August 12, 1981, petitioner (Rodrigo Tan, doing business under the name Astro
Automotive Supply') filed a complaint against Consolidated Mines Inc. and Jose Marino
Olondriz, the president of said corporation, for the payment of the purchase price of certain
heavy equipment, parts and accessories sold to Consolidated Mines, Inc. with a total cost of
P271,372.20. In said complaint, plaintiff asked that a writ of preliminary attachment be issued
against defendants on the ground that said defendants were guilty of fraud in securing said
equipment.
On August 17, 1981, respondent Court granted plaintiff's motion for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment upon plaintiff's posting of a bond in the amount of P 271,372.20.
Pursuant to said order, a writ of attachment was issued on August 26, 1981. The sheriff served
notices of garnishment on the tenants of the building owned by defendant Consolidated Mines,
Inc. garnishing the rentals due from said tenants, but since there were earlier notices of
garnishment served upon said tenants issued in two (2) other cases, the sheriff was not able to
garnish any amount from said tenants. The sheriff levied on the properties of defendant
Consolidated Mines, Inc. and the notice of levy was duly annotated on Transfer Certificate of
Title No. S-68501 (143900) and Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-68500 (14329). The notice
of levy was not annotated on the transfer certificate of title of a third property covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 79776, although notice of said levy was duly entered in the
primary book of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal.
Annotated as prior encumbrances on the first two properties on December 20, 1978 was a
mortgage in favor of twelve (12) consortium banks and a notice of levy issued in Civil Case No.
136406 entitled 'Warmco Trading Company versus Consolidated Mines, Inc. and Jose Marino
Olondriz' on May 15, 1981.
Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 142598 now, G.R. No. 68257, the appellate court made the following
findings:
On August 18, 1981, the petitioner (Polaris Motor Supply, Co.) brought suit (Civil Case No.
142598) in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the respondents Consolidated Mines,
Inc. (CMI) and its president Jose Marino Olondriz for the collection of P71,855.20. The amount
represents the price of the heavy equipment and accessories which the respondent CMI had
purchased from the petitioner. On November 3, 1981, the respondent judge ordered the
attachment of CMI's properties. On November 26, 1981, notice of the attachment of real
3
 properties of the CMI was served on the Register of Deeds of Makati who on December 9,
1981 annotated the levy on Transfer Certificate of Titles Nos. S-68500 (143929), S-68501
(143900) and 79711.
On May 31, 1981, several banks, constituting the Consortium Banks, filed a third party claim
with the sheriff, alleging that they were the mortgagees of the real and personal properties of
the CMI with a total book value of P656,613,303.00 and an appraised value of
P4,497,443,040.00. They claimed that their mortgage was evidenced by a deed executed on
November 10, 1978. They, therefore, asked that the properties be released from attachment.
The petitioner filed a motion to quash the third party claim but its motion was denied by the
respondent judge in his order of August 6, 1982. The court ruled that the Consortium Banks,
as mortgagees of the real and personal properties of the CMI had a superior lien on the
properties and that the petitioner could validly levy only on the mortgagor's (CMI's) equity of
redemption after the sale of the mortgaged properties.
The personal properties were foreclosed by the Consortium Banks to which the properties
were sold as the highest bidder and the certificate of sale issued on July 6, 1982. The
petitioner then asked that it be allowed to exercise its right of redemption. But the Consortium
Banks opposed the motion on the ground that there was an equity in redemption only in case
of foreclosure sale of real properties but not in the case of chattels.
In the meantime, on March 17, 1982, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXIII, acting
as an insolvency court, authorized in Sp. Proc. No. 9623 the sale of the properties of the CMI.
Accordingly, on September 17, 1982, the properties covered by TCT Nos. S-68500 (143929)
and S-68501 (143900) were sold to the private respondent Top Rate International as assignee
of the El Grande Development Corp. The sale is evidenced by a 'Deed of Confirmation of Sale
with Assumption of Mortgage.' (Previously, a contract to sell was executed between the CMI
and the El Grande (Annex C). On the basis of the sale to it, Top Rate International filed a third
party claim with the sheriff. It asked that the properties covered by TCT No. S-68500 (143929)
and S-68501 (143900) be discharged from attachment.
On the basis of the same "Deed of Confirmation of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage," Top Rate
International, Inc. (Top Rate) also filed a third-party claim in Civil Case No. 142443 alleging that the
properties involved therein had been sold to it for Forty Million Pesos (P40,000,000.00) on December
10, 1981 with the approval of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Special Proceeding No. 69623 in
the course of the involuntary insolvency proceedings filed against Consolidated Mines. Petitioner,
therefore, asked that the attachment made on these properties be discharged.
After hearing on the merits, the trial court in Civil Case No. 142598 ordered the lifting and setting
aside of the levy on attachment on the two properties involved while in Civil Case No. 142443, the
trial court issued the same order maintaining, however, the levy on attachment on the property
covered by TCT No. 79776 in favor of plaintiff Rodrigo Tan.
The plaintiffs in the above civil cases appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court.
On January 6, 1984, the appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No.
142443, and ordered the levy on the two properties maintained. The appellate court ruled:
We find no merit in the contention of respondent Top Rate International Services that its right
over the properties in question based on the deed of sale in its favor on September 17, 1982
confirming the contract to sell of December 10, 1981 in favor of El Grande Development
Corporation, should be recognized as superior to the right of petitioner under the writ of
attachment issued in his favor and registered on October 1, 1981 because it succeeded to the
rights of the twelve (12) consortium of banks which hold a mortgage over said properties
registered on December 20, 1978. Said sale was not actually a sale or assignment by the
4
 banks of their rights as mortgagee over said properties but a sale of said properties by the
mortgagor, Consolidated Mines, Inc. with the consent of the mortgagee. The consortium of
banks could not have sold the properties to Top Rate International Services except through
foreclosure proceedings, for as mortgagees they have no right to appropriate for themselves or
dispose of the mortgaged properties (Article 2088, Civil Code Appropriation of the mortgaged
properties of sale by the mortgagee of said property even if stipulated by the parties would be
nun and void being what is known as pactum commissorium. In the present case the sale of
the properties by Consolidated Mines, Inc. to Top Rate International Services with the consent
of the mortgagee banks under an arrangement where the purchase price of P40,000,000.00
would be paid directly to the banks did not adversely affect the rights of plaintiff under the writ
of attachment issued in the present case.
The appellate court also found that the Regional Trial Court in the insolvency proceedings dismissed
the petition to declare Consolidated Mines, Inc. insolvent on the ground that it had no jurisdiction over
the same because the petitioners in said case were not residents of the Philippines and, thus, not
qualified to file said petition. It, therefore, ruled that the claim of Top Rate over said properties based
on the approval of the sale in its favor by the insolvency court must necessarily fail.
On June 6, 1984, the appellate court likewise reversed the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No.
142598 citing the same reasons it adopted in its earlier decision in the other civil case. It further ruled
that there is no merit in Top Rate's claim that the attachment is improper because the value of the
property levied upon is in excess of the total claim of the petitioners which was only P71,885.20 plus
interest from November, 1979 for what was actually attached by the petitioners (Rodrigo Tan and
Polaris) was the equity of redemption of Consolidated Mines, Inc. the levy made pursuant to the writ
of attachment being upon "all rights, titles, interests, claims and participation of the defendant
Consolidated Mines, Inc." to the properties covered by TCT No. S-68501, TCT No. S-68500 and TCT
No. 79777. However, as regards the validity of the sale of the properties to Top Rate which was
authorized by the insolvency court, the Court ruled that this matter should be threshed out in an
independent action to give Top Rate the opportunity to ventilate its claims over said properties.
On the same day, Top Rate filed a petition before this Court assailing the decision of the appellate
court in Civil Case No. 142443, docketed as G.R. No. 67496. On August 16, 1984, Top Rate again
filed a similar petition, as the decision in Civil Case No. 142598, docketed as G.R. No. 68257.
As the two petitions raised Identical issues, we issued a resolution dated January 28, 1985 ordering
the consolidation of the two petitions.
The only question raised by petitioner Top Rate in these consolidated petitions, is whether or not the
respondent appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that "because the
private respondent through the sheriff could not have levied on the properties but only on the right of
redemption or equity of redemption thereon, there could not have been an over-levy sufficient to
justify a quashal of the notice of levy on attachment on the properties claimed by the petitioner."
Top Rate states that the respondents' claims are only P271,372.20 and P71,855.20 respectively. It
contends that an over-levy is obvious because the properties levied upon are worth more than
P40,000,000.00. It alleges as error the appellate court's ruling that since the equity of redemption and
not the properties themselves were attached, its value has no way of exceeding the respondents'
individual claims because the value of the equity of redemption should be that which will effectively
release the properties, that is P40,000,000.00. This is the amount which the respondents must
necessarily pay, at the very least, to exercise such right and not the amount of their claims. There is,
therefore, no over-levy.
Equity of redemption is the right of the mortgagor to redeem the mortgaged property after his default
in the performance of the conditions of the mortgage but before the sale of the property or the
confirmation of the sale, whereas the right of redemption means the right of the mortgagor to
5
repurchase the property even after confirmation of the sale, in cases of foreclosure by banks, within
one year from the registration of the sale. (Cf. Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3, pp.
283-284, 1980 Edition; Quimson vs. Philippine National Bank, 36 SCRA 26).
As we have ruled in Northern Motors, Inc. v. Coquia, (66 SCRA 415,420):
To levy upon the mortgagor's incorporeal right or equity of redemption, it was not necessary for
the sheriff to have taken physical possession of the mortgaged taxicabs. ...Levying upon the
property itself is distinguishable from levying on the judgment debtor's interest in it
(McCullough & Co. vs. Taylor, 25 Phil. 110, 115).
Likewise, in the case of Blouse Potenciano vs. Mariano, (96 SCRA 463, 469), we ruled:
Quirino's interest in the mortgaged lots is merely an equity of redemption, an intangible or
incorporeal right (Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada vs. Gonzales Diez, 52 Phil 271; Santiago
vs. Dionisio, 92 Phil. 495; Northern Motors Inc. vs. Coquia, 66 SCRA 415).
That interest could be levied upon by means of writ of execution issued by the Manila Court as
had been done in the case of property encumbered by a chattel mortgage (Levy Hermanos,
Inc. vs. Ramirez and Casimiro, 60 Phil 978, 982; McCullough and Co. vs. Taylor, 25 Phil. 110).
It is, therefore, error on the part of the petitioner to say that since private respondents' lien is only a
total of P343,227.40, they cannot be entitled to the equity of redemption because the exercise of such
right would require the payment of an amount which cannot be less than P40,000,000.00.
When herein private respondents prayed for the attachment of the properties to secure their
respective claims against Consolidated Mines, Inc., the properties had already been mortgaged to the
consortium of twelve banks to secure an obligation of US$62,062,720.66. Thus, like subsequent
mortgagees, the respondents' liens on such properties became inferior to that of the banks, which
claims in the event of foreclosure proceedings, must first be satisfied. The appellate court, therefore,
was correct in holding that in reality, what was attached by the respondents was merely Consolidated
Mines' right or equity of redemption. Thus, in the case of Alpha Insurance and Surety Co., Inc. vs.
Reyes (106 SCRA 274, 278), we ruled:
Deciding the legal question before Us, even ff the DBP were just an ordinary first mortgage
without any preferential liens under Republic Act No. 85 or Commonwealth Act 459, the
statutes mentioned in the Associated Insurance case relied upon by the trial court, it would be
unquestionable that nothing may be done to favor plaintiff-appellant, a mere second mortgage,
until after the obligations of the debtors-appellees with the first mortgagee have been fully
satisfied and settled. In law, strictly speaking, what was mortgaged by the Reyeses to Alpha
was no more than their equity of redemption.
We, therefore, hold that the appellate court did not commit any error in ruling that there was no over-
levy on the disputed properties. What was actually attached by respondents was Consolidated Mines'
right or equity of redemption, an incorporeal and intangible right, the value of which can neither be
quantified nor equated with the actual value of the properties upon which it may be exercised.
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. No. 67496 and G.R. No. 68257 are hereby DISMISSED for lack
of merit. The decisions of the respondent court are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

6
 [G.R. No. 115068. November 28, 1996]
FORTUNE MOTORS (PHILS.) INC., petitioner, vs. METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST
COMPANY, and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 38340
entitled Fortune Motors (Phils.) Inc., v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company et al.[1] The appellate
courts decision reversed the decision in Civil Case No. 89-5637 of Branch 150 of the Regional trial
Court of Makati City.
It appears that Fortune Motors (Phils.) Inc. obtained the following loans from the Metropolitan Bank
and Trust company: (1) P20 Million, on March 31, 1982; (2) P8 Million, on April 30, 1983;
(3) P2,500,000.00, on June 8, 1983 and; (4) P3 Million, on August 16, 1983.
On January 6, 1984, respondent bank consolidated the loans of P8 Million and P3 Million into one
promissory note, which amounted to P12,650,000.00. This included the interest that had accrued
thereon in the amount of P1,650,000.00.
To secure the obligation in the total amount of P34,150,000.00, petitioner mortgaged certain real
estate in favor of respondent bank.
Due to financial constraints, petitioner failed to pay the loan upon maturity. Consequently on May 25,
1984, respondent bank initiated extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings and in effect, foreclosed the real
estate mortgage.
The extrajudicial foreclosure was actually conducted by Senior Deputy Sheriff Pablo Y. Sy who had
sent copies of the Notice of Extrajudicial Sale to the opposing parties by registered mail. In
accordance with law, he posted copies of the Notice of Sheriffs Sale at three conspicuous public
places in Makati -- the office of the Sheriff, the Assessors office and the Register of Deeds
in Makati. He thereafter executed the Certificates of Posting on May 20, 1984. The said notice was in
fact published on June 2, 9 and 16, 1984 in three issues of The New Record. An affidavit of
publication, dated June 19, 1984,[2] was executed by Teddy F. Borres, publisher of the said
newspaper.
Subsequently, the mortgaged property was sold at public auction for P47,899,264.91 to the
mortgagee bank, the highest bidder.
Petitioner failed to redeem the mortgaged property within the one-year redemption period and so, the
titles thereto were consolidated in the name of respondent bank by which token the latter was entitled
to the possession of the property mortgaged and, in fact possessed the same.
Petitioner then filed a complaint for the annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure, which covered TCT
Nos. 461087, 432685, 457590, 432684, S-54185, S-54186, S-54187, and S-54188.
On December 27, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment annulling the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
mortgage.
On May 14, 1992, an appeal was interposed by the respondent to the Court of Appeals. Acting
thereon, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision rendered by the lower court. Subsequently, the
motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied on April 26, 1994.
Aggrieved by the decision rendered by the Court of appeals, petitioner appealed before this
Court. On May 30, 1994, however, we issued a Resolution denying said petition. Hence, this motion
for reconsideration.
Petitioner raises the following issues before us, to wit:

7
 I
THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE PUBLICATION OF
THE NOTICE OF EXTRAJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE WAS VALID.[3]
II
THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE
NOTICES OF EXTRAJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE, AND SALE WERE DULY RECEIVED BY
THE PETITIONER.[4]
III
THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO ADJUDGE THE
IRREGULARITIES IN THE BIDDING, POSTING, PUBLICATION, AND
THE SALE OF FORTUNE BUILDING.[5]
IV
THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RENDERING A JUDGMENT
BASED ON PRESUMPTION.[6]
Petitioner contends that the newspaper Daily Record[7] where the notice of extrajudicial foreclosure
was published does not qualify as a newspaper of general circulation.
It further contends that the population that can be reached by the Daily Record is only .004% as its
circulation in Makati in 1984, was 1000 to 1500 per week. Hence, it concludes that only 1648 out of a
population of 412,069 were probable readers of the Daily Record, and that this is not the standard
contemplated by law when it refers to a newspaper of general circulation.
In the case of Bonnevie v. Court of Appeals,[8] we had already made a ruling on this point:
The argument that the publication of the notice in the Luzon Weekly Courier was not in
accordance with law as said newspaper is not of general circulation must likewise be
disregarded. The affidavit of publication, executed by the publisher, business/advertising
manager of the Luzon Weekly Courier, states that it is a newspaper of general circulation
in x x x Rizal; and that the notice of Sheriffs sale was published in said paper on June 30,
July 7 and July 14, 1968. This constitutes prima facie evidence of compliance with the
requisite publication. (Sadang v. GSIS, 18 SCRA 491).
To be a newspaper of general circulation, it is enough that it is published for the
dissemination of local news and general information; that it has a bona fide subscription list
of paying subscribers; that it is published at regular intervals. (Basa v. Mercado, 61 Phil.
632). The newspaper need not have the largest circulation so long as it is of general
circulation. (Banta v. Pacheco, 74 Phil. 67).
In the case at bench, there was sufficient compliance with the requirements of the law regarding
publication of the notice in a newspaper of general circulation. This is evidenced by the affidavit of
publication executed by the New Records publisher, Teddy F. Borres, which stated that it is a
newspaper edited in Manila and Quezon City and of general circulation in the cities
of Manila, Quezon City et al., and in the Provinces of Rizal xxx, published every Saturday by the Daily
Record, Inc. This was affirmed by Pedro Deyto, who was the executive editor of the said newspaper
and who was a witness for petitioner. Deyto testified: a) that the New Record contains news; b) that it
has subscribers from Metro Manila and from all over the Philippines; c) that it is published once a
week or four times a month ; and d) that he had been connected with the said paper since 1958, an
indication that the said newspaper had been in existence even before that year.[9]
Another contention posited by petitioner is that the New Record is published and edited in Quezon
City and not in Makati where the foreclosed property is situated, and that, when New Records

8
publisher enumerated the places where said newspaper is being circulated, Makati was not
mentioned.
This contention of petitioner is untenable. In 1984, when the publishers affidavit relied upon by
petitioner was executed, Makati, Mandaluyong, San Juan, Paraaque et. al., were still part of
the province of Rizal. Apparently, this is the reason why in the New Records affidavit of publication
executed by its publisher, the enumeration of the places where it was being circulated, only the cities
of Manila, Quezon, Caloocan, Pasay, Tagaytay, et. al., were named. Furthermore, as aptly
ratiocinated by the Court of Appeals:
The application given by the trial court to the provisions of P.D. No. 1079 is, to our mind,
too narrow and restricted and could not have been the intention of the said law. Were the
interpretation of the trial court (sic) to be followed, even the leading dailies in the country
like the Manila Bulletin, the Philippine Daily Inquirer, or The Philippine Star which all enjoy
a wide circulation throughout the country, cannot publish legal notices that would be
honored outside the place of their publication. But this is not the interpretation given by the
courts. For what is important is that a paper should be in general circulation in the place
where the properties to be foreclosed are located in order that publication may serve the
purpose for which it was intended.[10]
Petitioner also claims that the New Record is not a daily newspaper because it is published only once
a week.
A perusal of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1079 and Act 3135 shows that the said laws do not
require that the newspaper which publishes judicial notices should be a daily newspaper. Under P.D.
1079, for a newspaper to qualify, it is enough that it be a newspaper or periodical which is authorized
by law to publish and which is regularly published for at least one (1) year before the date of
publication which requirement was satisfied by New Record. Nor is there a requirement, as stated in
the said law, that the newspaper should have the largest circulation in the place of publication.
Petitioner claims that, when its representative went to a newspaper stand to look for a copy of the
new Record, he could not find any. This allegation can not be made a basis to conclude that the
newspaper New Record is not of general circulation. By its own admission, petitioners representative
was looking for a newspaper named Daily Record. Naturally, he could not find a newspaper by that
name as the newspapers name is New Record and not Daily Record. Although it is the Daily Record
Inc. which publishes the New Record, it does not mean that the name of the newspaper is Daily
Record.
Petitioner contends that, since it was the Executive Judge who caused the publication of the notice of
the sale and not the Sheriff, the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage should be deemed annulled.
Petitioners contention in this regard is bereft of merit, because Sec. 2 of P.D. No. 1079 clearly
provides that:
The executive judge of the court of first instance shall designate a regular working day and
a definite time each week during which the said judicial notices or advertisements shall
be distributed personally by him[11] for publication to qualified newspapers or periodicals
xxx, which distribution shall be done by raffle.
The said provision of the law is clear as to who should personally distribute the judicial notices or
advertisements to qualified newspapers for publication. There was a substantial compliance with the
requirements when it was the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati who caused the
publication of the said notice by the newspaper selected by means of raffle.
With regard to the second assigned error wherein petitioner claims that it did not personally receive
the notices of extrajudicial foreclosure and sale supposedly sent to it by Metrobank, we find the same
unmeritorious.
9
Settled is the rule that personal notice to the mortgagor in extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings is not
necessary. Section 3 of Act No. 3135 governing extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgages, as
amended by Act No. 4118, requires only the posting of the notice of sale in three public places and
the publication of that notice in a newspaper of general circulation. It is pristine clear from the above
provision that the lack of personal notice to the mortgagor, herein petitioner, is not a ground to set
aside the foreclosure sale.[12]
Petitioners expostulation that it did not receive the mailed notice to it of the sale of the mortgaged
property should be brushed aside. The fact that respondent was able to receive the registry return
card from the mail in regular course shows that the postal item presented by the return card had been
received by the addressee. Otherwise, as correctly contended by respondent, the mailed item should
have been stamped Returned to Sender, still sealed with all the postal markings, and the return card
still attached to it.
As to the contention that the signature appearing on the registry return card receipt appears to be
only a dot and that the photostat copy does not contain a signature at all we find, after a close
scrutiny of the registry return card, that there are strokes before and after the dot. These strokes
appear to be a signature which signifies: a) that the registry claim card was received at the given
address; b) that the addressee had authorized a person to present the claim card at the post office
and receive the registered mail matter; and c) that the authorized person signed the return card to
acknowledge his receipt of the mail matter. Even the trial court in its decision ruled that:
x x x the Court finds no cogent reason to overcome the presumption that Sheriff Pablo Sy
performed his task regularly and in accordance with the rules. A closer look at the assailed
xerox copy of the registry receipt and the original form which said xerox was admittedly
copied would indeed show that the xerox is not a faithful reproduction of the original since
it does not bear the complete signature of the addressee as appearing on the original. It
does not, however, follow that the xerox is a forgery. The same bears slight traces of the
signature appearing on the original but, there is no indication that the one was altered to
conform to the other. Rather, there must have been only a misprint of the xerox but not
amounting to any attempt to falsify the same. [13]
Petitioner also claims that it had transferred to a different location but the notice was sent to its old
address. Petitioner failed to notify respondent of its supposed change of address. Needless to say, it
can be surmised that respondent had sent the notice to petitioners official address.
Anent its third assigned error, petitioner assails the posting of the notices of sale by the Sheriff in the
Office of the Sheriff, Office of the Assessor and the Register of Deeds as these are not the
conspicuous public places required by law. Furthermore, it also questions the non-posting of the
notice of sale on the property itself which was to be sold.
Apparently, this assigned error of petitioner is tantamount to a last ditch effort to extricate itself from
the quagmire it is in. Act 3135 does not require posting of the notice of sale on the mortgaged
property. Section 3 of the said law merely requires that the notice of the sale be posted for not less
than twenty days in at least three public places of the municipality or city where the property is
situated. The aforementioned places, to wit: the Sheriffs Office, the Assessors Office and the Register
of Deeds are certainly the public places contemplated by law, as these are places where people
interested in purchasing real estate congregate.
With regard to the fourth assigned error of petitioner, we do not subscribe to the latters view that the
decision of the Court of Appeals was mainly based on the presumption of the regularity of the
performance of official function of the officers involved. A perusal of the records indubitably shows
that the requirement of Act No. 3135 on the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage had been
duly complied with by Senior Deputy Sheriff Sy.

10
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision rendered in CA-G.R. CV No. 38340 is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 106418. July 11, 1996]

DANIEL L. BORDON II AND FRANCISCO L. BORBON, petitioners, vs. SERVICEWIDE
SPECIALISTS, INC. & HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
From the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 30693 which affirmed that of the
Regional Trial Court, NCJR, Branch 39, Manila, in Civil Case No. 85-29954, confirming the disputed
possession of a motor vehicle in favor of private respondent and ordering the payment to it by
petitioners of liquidated damages and attorney's fees, the instant appeal was interposed.
The appellate court adopted the factual findings of the court a quo, to wit:
"The plaintiff's evidence shows among others that on December 7, 1984, defendants Daniel L.
Borbon and Francisco Borbon signed a promissory note (Exh. A) which states among others
as follows:
"'PROMISSORY NOTE
Acct. No. 115008276
Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines
December 7, 1984
'P122,856.00
'For value received (installment price of the chattel/s purchased), I/We jointly and severally
promised to pay Pangasinan Auto Mart, Inc. or order, at its office at NMI Bldg. Buendia
Avenue, Makati, MM the sum of One Hundred Twenty Two Thousand Eight Hundred Fifty Six
only (P122,856.00), Philippine Currency, to be payable without need of notice or demand, in
installments of the amounts following and at the dates hereinafter set forth, to wit: P10,238.00
monthly for Twelve (12) months due and payable on the 7 day of each month starting January,
1985, provided that a late payment charge of 3% per month shall be added on each unpaid
installment from due date thereof until fully paid.
xxx xxx xxx
'It is further agreed that if upon such default, attorney's services are availed of, an additional
sum equal to twenty five percent (25%) of the total sum due thereon, which shall not be less
than five hundred pesos, shall be paid to the holder hereof for attorney's fees plus an
additional sum equivalent to twenty five percent (25%) of the total sum due which likewise shall
not be less than five hundred pesos for liquidated damages, aside from expenses of collection
and the legal costs provided for in the Rules of Court.
'It is expressly agreed that all legal actions arising out of this note or in connection with the
chattel(s) subject hereof shall only be brought in or submitted to the jurisdiction of the proper
court either in the City of Manila or in the province, municipality or city where the branch of the
holder hereof is located.
'Acceptance by the holder hereof of payment of any installment or any part thereof after due
dated (sic) shall not be considered as extending the time for the payment or any of the
11
 installments aforesaid or as a modification of any of the conditions hereof. Nor shall the failure
of the holder hereof to exercise any of its right under this note constitute or be deemed as a
waiver of such rights.
'Maker:
(S/t) DANIEL L. BORBON, II
Address: 14 Colt St., Rancho Estate I, Concepcion Dos, Marikina, MM
(S/t) FRANCISCO BORBON
Address: 73 Sterling Life Home Pamplona, Las Pias, MM
"WITNESSES
(illegible) ____(illegible)_____
'PAY TO THE ORDER OF
FILINVEST CREDIT CORPORATION
without recourse, notice, presentment and demand waived
PANGASINAN AUTO MART, INC.
BY:
(S/T) K.N. DULCE
Dealer'
"To secure the Promissory Note, the defendants executed a Chattel Mortgage (Exh. B) on
'One (1) Brand new 1984 Isuzu
KCD 20 Crew Cab (Conv.)
Serial No. KC20D0F 207685
Key No. 5509
(Exhs. A and B, p. 2 tsn, September 10, 1985)
"The rights of Pangasinan Auto Mart, Inc. was later assigned to Filinvest Credit Corporation on
December 10, 1984, with notice to the defendants (Exh. C, p. 10, Record).
"On March 21, 1985, Filinvest Credit Corporation assigned all its rights, interest and title over the
Promissory Note and the chattel mortgage to the plaintiff (Exh. D; p. 3, tsn, Sept. 30, 1985).
"The promissory note stipulates that the installment of P10,238.00 monthly should be paid on the 7th
day of each month starting January 1985, but the defendants failed to comply with their obligation (p.
3, tsn, Sept. 30, 1985).
"Because the defendants did not pay their monthly installments, Filinvest demanded from the
defendants the payment of their installments due on January 29, 1985 by telegram (Exh. E; pp. 3-4,
tsn, Sept. 30, 1985).
"After the accounts were assigned to the plaintiff, the plaintiff attempted to collect by sending a
demand letter to the defendants for them to pay their entire obligation which, as of March 12, 1985,
totaled P185,257.80 (Exh. H; pp. 3-4, tsn, Sept. 30, 1985).
"For their defense, the defendants claim that what they intended to buy from Pangasinan Auto Mart
was a jeepney type Isuzu K. C. Cab. The vehicle that they bought was not delivered (pp. 11-12, tsn,
Oct. 17, 1985). Instead, through misrepresentation and machination, the Pangasinan Motor, Inc.
delivered an Isuzu crew cab, as this is the unit available at their warehouse. Later the representative
of Pangasinan Auto Mart, Inc. (assignor) told the defendants that their available stock is an Isuzu Cab
but minus the rear body, which the defendants agreed to deliver with the understanding that the
Pangasinan Auto Mart, Inc. will refund the defendants the amount of P10,000.00 to have the rear
body completed (pp. 12-34, Exhs. 2 to 3-3A).
12
"Despite Communications with the Pangasinan Auto Mart, Inc., the latter was not able to replace the
vehicle until the vehicle delivered was seized by order of this court. The defendants argue that an
assignee stands in the place of an assignor which, to the mind of the court, is correct. The assignee
exercise all the rights of the assignor (Gonzales vs. Rama Plantation Co., C.V. 08630, Dec. 2, 1986).
"The defendants further claim that they are not in default of their obligation because the Pangasinan
Auto Mart was first guilty of not fulfilling its obligation in the contract. The defendants claim that
neither party incurs delay if the other does not comply with his obligation. (citing Art. 1169, N.C.C.)"[1]
In sustaining the decision of the court a quo, the appellate court ruled that petitioners could not avoid
liability under the promissory note and the chattel mortgage that secured it since private respondent
took the note for value and in good faith.
In their appeal to this Court, petitioners merely seek a modification of the decision of the appellate
court insofar as it has upheld the court a quoin the award of liquidated damages and attorney's
fees in favor of private respondent. Petitioners invoke the provisions of Article 1484 of the Civil Code
which reads:
ART. 1484. In a contract of sale of personal property the price of which is payable in installments, the
vendor may exercise any of the following remedies:
"(1) Exact fulfillment of the obligation, should the vendee fail to pay;
"(2) Cancel the sale, should the vendee's failure to pay cover two or more installments;
"(3) Foreclose the chattel mortgage or the thing sold, if one has been constituted, should the
vendee's failure to pay cover two or more installments. In this case, he shall have no further action
against the purchaser to recover any unpaid balance of the price. Any agreement to the contrary shall
be void."
The remedies under Article 1484 of the Civil Code are not cumulative but alternative and
exclusive,[2] which means, as so held in Nonato vs. Intermediate Appellate Court and Investor's
Finance Corporation,[3] that -
"x x x Should the vendee or purchaser of a personal property default in the payment of two or more of
the agreed installments, the vendor or seller has the option to avail of any of these three remedies
either to exact fulfillment by the purchaser of the obligation, or to cancel the sale, or to foreclose the
mortgage on the purchased personal property, if one was constituted. These remedies have been
recognized as alternative, not cumulative, that the exercise of one would bar the exercise of the
others."[4]
When the seller assigns his credit to another person, the latter is likewise bound by the same
law. Accordingly, when the assignee forecloses on the mortgage, there can be no further recovery of
the deficiency,[5] and the seller-mortgagee is deemed to have renounced any right
thereto.[6] A contrario, in the event the seller-mortgagee first seeks, instead, the enforcement of the
additional mortgages, guarantees or other security arrangements, he must then be held to have lost
by waiver or non-choice his lien on the chattel mortgage of the personal property sold by any
mortgaged back to him, although, similar to an action for specific performance, he may still levy on it.
In ordinary alternative obligations, a mere choice categorically and unequivocally made and then
communicated by the person entitled to exercise the option concludes the parties. The creditor may
not thereafter exercise any other option, unless the chosen alternative proves to be ineffectual or
unavailing due to no fault on his part. This rule, in essence, is the difference between alternative
obligations, on the one hand, and alternative remedies, upon the other hand, where, in the latter
case, the choice generally becomes conclusive only upon the exercise of the remedy.For instance, in
one of the remedies expressed in Article 1484 of the Civil Code, it is only when there has been a
foreclosure of the chattel mortgage that the vendee-mortgagor would be permitted to escape from a
deficiency liability. Thus, if the case is one for specific performance, even when this action is selected
13
after the vendee has refused to surrender the mortgaged property to permit an extrajudicial
foreclosure, that property may still be levied on execution and an alias writ may be issued if the
proceeds thereof are insufficient to satisfy the judgment credit.[7] So, also, a mere demand to
surrender the object which is not heeded by the mortgagor will not amount to a foreclosure, [8] but the
repossession thereof by the vendor-mortgagee would have the effect of foreclosure.
The parties here concede that the action for replevin has been instituted for the foreclosure of the
vehicle in question (now in the possession of private respondent). The sole issue raised before us in
this appeal is focused on the legal propriety of the affirmance by the appellate court of the awards
made by the court a quo of liquidated damages and attorney's fees to private respondent. Petitioners
hold that under Article 1484 of the Civil Code, aforequoted, the vendor-mortgagee or its assignees
loses any right "to recover any unpaid balance of the price" and any "agreement to the contrary
(would be) void."
The argument is aptly made. In Macondray & Co. vs. Eustaquio[9] we have said that the phrase "any
unpaid balance" can only mean the deficiency judgment to which the mortgagee may be entitled to
when the proceeds from the auction sale are insufficient to cover the "full amount of the secured
obligation which x x x include interest on the principal, attorney's fees, expenses of collection, and
costs." In sum, we have observed that the legislative intent is not to merely limit the proscription of
any further action to the "unpaid balance of the principal" but, as so later ruled in Luneta Motor Co.
vs. Salvador,[10] to all other claims that may likewise be called for in the accompanying promissory
note against the buyer-mortgagor or his guarantor, including costs and attorney's fees.
In Filipinas Investment & Finance Corporation vs. Ridad[11] while we reiterated and expressed our
agreement on the basic philosophy behind Article 1484, we stressed, nevertheless, that the
protection given to the buyer-mortgagor should not be considered to be without circumscription or as
being preclusive of all other laws or legal principles. Hence, borrowing from the examples made
in Filipinas Investment, where the mortgagor unjustifiably refused to surrender the chattel subject of
the mortgage upon failure of two or more installments, or if he concealed the chattel to place it
beyond the reach of the mortgagee, that thereby constrained the latter to seek court relief, the
expenses incurred for the prosecution of the case, such as attorney's fees, could rightly be awarded.
Private respondent bewails the instant petition in that petitioners have failed to specifically raise the
issue on liquidated damages and attorney's fees stipulated in the actionable documents. In several
cases, we have ruled that as long as the questioned items bear relevance and close relation to those
specifically raised, the interest of justice would dictate that they, too, must be considered and
resolved and that the rule that only theories raised in the initial proceedings may be taken up by a
party thereto on appeal should only refer to independent, not concomitant matters, to support or
oppose the cause of action.[12]
Given the circumstances, we must strike down the award for liquidated damages made by the court a
quo but we uphold the grant of attorney's fees which we, like the appellate court, find to be
reasonable. Parenthetically, while the promissory note may appear to have been a negotiable
instrument, private respondent, however, clearly cannot claim unawareness of its accompanying
documents so as to thereby gain a right greater than that of the assignor.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is MODIFIED by deleting therefrom the award for liquidated
damages; in all other respects the judgment of the appellate court is AFFIRMED. No cost.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla (Chairman), Bellosillo, Kapunan, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

14
 [G.R. No. 97872 March 1, 1994]
STA. IGNACIA RURAL BANK, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. CONRADO PABLO and JUANITA
GONZALES, respondent.
MELO, J.:
Aired in the petition for certiorari before us is the propriety of sustaining the decretal portion of the
decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 25653 rendered on February 1, 1991 by the Court of Appeals (Mendoza
V., Chua, Victor [P], JJ.) which authorized private respondents to repurchase the subject realty from
petitioner in this manner:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED, and in its stead judgment is
rendered as follows:
1. Annulling and cancelling the sale made by the appellee Sta. Ignacia Rural Bank, Inc. of the
subject house and lots to and in favor of appellee-spouses Alberto Lucas and Nelia Rico as
well as Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 184687 and 184688 issued by the Register of Deeds
of Tarlac;
2. Ordering said appellee Sta. Ignacia Rural Bank, Inc. to allow the appellants to repurchase
the subject house and lots for such amount as may correspond to the principal obligation and
the accumulated interests up to and including the time of actual repurchase;
3. Ordering the appellee Sta. Ignacia Rural Bank, Inc. to return to the appellee-spouses the
purchase price of said house and lots which is P47,500.00 including all the expenses incident
thereto.
4. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 27-28, Rollo.)
The generative facts of the legal controversy, as synthesized by respondent court, are acceptable to
herein petitioner, and are accordingly adopted thusly:
On January 14, 1980, the defendants Sta. Ignacia Rural Bank, Inc. extended to the plaintiff-
spouses Conrado Pablo and Juanita Gonzales a loan totalling P12,109.75. As a security, the
plaintiff-spouses executed in favor of the defendant bank a Real Estate Mortgage (Exh. "A")
over their residential house and two (2) lots covered by Free Patent Title, OCT No. P-7941
(Exh. "E") located at Poblacion Norte, Mayantoc, Tarlac. The plaintiff-spouses defaulted in the
payment of their obligation, as a result of which, the defendant bank filed with the Provincial
Sheriff of Tarlac a petition for extra-judicial foreclosure of their real estate mortgage under Act
3135. On July 28, 1981, the aforecited house and lots of the plaintiff-spouses were sold at
public auction with the defendant bank as the highest bidder for P13,168.35 (Exhs. "B"-"D",
inclusive).
Thereafter, the Certificate of Sale (Exh. "D") was executed in favor of the defendant bank on
September 29, 1981 and the same was registered with the Register of Deeds of Tarlac on
November 5, 1981 (Exh. "E-2"). The ownership of the subject house and lots was consolidated
in favor of the defendant bank virtue of the final deed of sale executed on November 5, 1983
(Exh. "I"). On December 19, 1984, the defendant bank sold the aforementioned real estates to
defendant-spouses Alberto Lucas and Nelia Rico for P47,500.00 (Exh. "K"), and Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 184687 and 184688 (Exhs. "L" and "M") over the house and lots were
subsequently issued in the name of said defendant-spouses.

15
 Hence, the complaint for the repurchase of the subject house and lots, annulment of title and
damages filed on March 20, 1986 by the plaintiff-spouses. After trial, the lower court rendered
the appealed decision, the decretal portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, this case is hereby DISMISSED without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 21-22, Rollo.)
With respect to the principal question of redemption, the court of origin expressed the view that
private respondents' cause of action could no longer prosper because:
While Section 119, C.A. 141 provides for a five-year period of redemption involving homestead
and free patent lands, Section 5, R.A. No. 720, as amended, provides for a two-year
redemption period in mortgage loans with rural banks. R.A. 720, as amended, being a special
law and of later enactment prevails over C.A. 141 which is a general law.
The Certificate of Sale was registered on November 5, 1981. The redemption period is
counted from the registration of the certification of foreclosure sale (Gorospe vs. Santos, 69
SCRA 191). Pursuant to Section 5, R.A. 720, therefore, plaintiffs' right to redeem within the
two-year period has already expired.
(pp. 9-10, Rollo.)
When the same issue was ventilated by private respondents on appeal, respondent Court of Appeals
saw no conflict between the pertinent provisions of the Public Land Act and the Rural Banks Act. In
consequence, reversal followed upon the following apt observations:
. . . The lower court failed to consider that the subject parcels of residential lots were acquired
by the appellants under the provisions of the Public Land Law (C.A. 141). Section 119 thereof
provides, inter alia:
Every conveyance of land acquired under the Free Patent provisions, when proper,
shall be subject to repurchase by the applicants, his widow, or legal heirs within a period
of five years from date of the conveyance.
Accordingly, we do not sustain the trial court's above pronouncement. We base our finding on
the case of Oliva vs. Lamadrid, 21 SCRA 737, a case in point, in which the High Tribunal ruled
that there is no conflict between Section 119 of C.A. 141 and Section 5, R.A. 720, as
amended, thus:
It should be noted that the period of two (2) years granted for the redemption of property
foreclosed under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 720, as amended by Republic Act No.
2670, refers to lands "not covered by a Torrens Title, a homestead or free patent", or to
owners of lands "without torrens title", who can "show five years or more of peaceful,
continuous and uninterrupted possession thereof in the concept of an owner, or of
homesteads or free patent lands pending the issuance of titles but already approved", or
"of lands pending homestead or free patent titles". Plaintiff, however, had, on the land in
question, a free patent and a Torrens title, which were issued over 26 years prior to the
mortgage constituted in favor of the Bank. Accordingly, there is no conflict between
Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 and Sections 5 of Republic Act No. 720, as
amended, and the period of two (2) years prescribed in the latter is not applicable to
him.
The case before us indubitably shows that the disputed house and lots were covered by a Free
Patent Title, Original Certificate of Title No. P-7941 (Exh. "E"). Thus, Section 5 of R.A. 720, as
amended, which provides for two (2) years from the date of foreclosure within which to
redeem, is clearly not applicable as said section refers to lands "not covered by a torrens title,
16
a homestead or free patent", or to owners of land "without torrens titles" who can "show five
years or more of peaceful, continuous, and uninterrupted possession in the concept of an
owner, or of homesteads or free patent lands pending the issuance of titles but already
approved", or "lands pending homestead or free patent titles". The applicable law, therefore, is
Section 119 of the Public Land Law (C.A. 141), and not Section 5 of R.A. 720, as amended.
Now, as to whether the appellants had exercised their right to redeem within the redemption
period or whether such right had already prescribed, We again cite the ruling of the Supreme
Court in the recent case of Belisario vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 165 SCRA 101, in which
it was held, inter alia:
The subject piece of land was sold at public auction to respondent PNB on January 31,
1963. However, the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale was registered only on July 22, 1971.
The redemption period, for purposes of determining the time when a final Deed of Sale
may be executed or issued and the ownership of the registered land consolidated in the
purchaser at an extrajudicial foreclosure sale under Act 3135, should be reckoned from
the date of the registration of the Certificate of Sale in the Office of the Register of
Deeds concerned and not from the date of public auction (PNB vs. CA, et. al., G.R. L-
30831 and L-31176, Nov. 21, 1979, 94 SCRA 357, 371). In this case, under Act 3135,
petitioners may redeem the property until July 22, 1972. In addition, Section 119 of
Commonwealth Act 141 provides that every conveyance of land acquired under the free
patent or homestead patent provisions of the Public Land Act, when proper, shall be
subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow or legal heirs, within the period of five
years from the date of conveyance.
The five-year period of redemption fixed in Section 119 of the Public Land Law of
homestead sold at extrajudicial foreclosure begins to run from the day after the
expiration of the one-year period of repurchase allowed in an extrajudicial foreclosure.
(Manuel vs. PNB, et al., 101 Phil. 968). Hence, petitioners still had five (5) years from
July 22, 1972 (the expiration of the redemption period under Act 3135) within which to
exercise their right to repurchase under the Public Land Act.
In this case, it will be recalled that the mortgaged house and lots were sold at public auction to
the appellee bank on July 28, 1981. However, the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale was registered
only on November 5, 1981. Under Act 3135, the appellants may redeem the subject house and
lots until November 5, 1982 being the last day of the one-year period of repurchase allowed by
said law. Following, then, the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Belisario vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, supra, the appellants still had five (5) years from November 5,
1982 (the expiration of the redemption period under Act 3135), or until November 5, 1987,
within which to exercise their right to repurchase under the Public Land Act.
Moreover, for purposes of ascertaining whether appellants exercised their right to repurchase
effectively, we have only to consider their filing of the action for the "repurchase of the subject
house and lots, annulment of title and damages" on March 20, 1986 against the appellee bank
and the appellee-spouses, which was filed within the five-year period to repurchase. The
question now of whether the appellant had actually tendered, deposited or consigned in court
the redemption price for the subject house and lots becomes immaterial in view of the filing of
said action to repurchase which has been equivalent to an offer to redeem and has the
effect per se of preserving their right of recovering the disputed house and lots. (Tolentino vs.
Court of Appeals, 106 SCRA 513; Tioseco vs. Court of Appeals, 143 SCRA 705).
Foregoing considered, the issue of whether or not the appellants are still entitled to
redeem the subject house and lots is already settled in their favor. The question to be
determined now at this juncture is whether the appellants should repurchase the
17
 property from the appellee bank or from the appellee-spouses because the amount to
be paid by the appellants as consideration for the repurchase would depend upon
whether the appellants should repurchase from the former or from the latter. In the case
of Philippine National Bank vs. Landeta, 18 SCRA 272, the Supreme Court concurring
with this Court held, inter alia, that the mortgagor is entitled to repurchase the
mortgaged property from the mortgagee bank and the amount to be paid therefor
should be only "such amount as may correspond to the principal obligation and the
accumulated interest up to and including the time of actual repurchase". The High
Tribunal rationalized that a different ruling would render it easy for the buyer at the
foreclosure sale to render nugatory the right of repurchase granted by law to the owner
who acquired the property under the Public Land Act, by making conveyance of the
property for amounts beyond the capacity of said owner to pay. The High Court further
stated that this right of repurchase, as long as within the redemption period, may be
exercised irrespective of whether or not the mortgagee bank had subsequently
conveyed the property to some other party. (Villaflor vs. Barreto, 92 Phil. 297).
Following the above pronouncement, it is correct to state that herein appellants may
redeem the subject house and lots from the appellee bank despite the conveyance
thereof to and in favor of the appellee-spouses. Anent the redemption price, as held in
PNB vs. Landeta, supra, it should be only such amount as may correspond to the
principal obligation and the accumulated interest thereon up to and including the time of
actual repurchase. Hence, the appellants should pay as redemption price, the amount
of the principal obligation which is P10,000.00 plus 12% interest per annum thereon, in
addition, up to and including the time of actual repurchase.
(pp. 23-26, Rollo.)
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration did not merit favorable action
(p. 30, Rollo), hence the petition at bench which practically reiterates the similar disquisition below
towards upholding the supremacy of the 2-year period under the Rural Banks Act over the 5-year limit
for repurchase fixed by the Public Land Act (pp. 66-67, Rollo).
The query raised by petitioner is far from novel or unsettled, since the matter of whether the time
frame under the Rural Bank Act had superseded the repurchase period prescribed by the Public Land
Act involving the foreclosure sale property acquired via a homestead patent was again recently
resolved in the negative by this Division (Gutierrez, Bidin, Davide [P], Romero, Melo, JJ.) in Rural
Bank of Davao City. Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (217 SCRA 554 [1993]) in this fashion:
The policy of homestead laws and the reason behind the foregoing provision are expressed by
this Court in Pascua vs. Talens in this wise:
It is well-known that the homestead laws were designed to distribute disposable
agricultural lots of the State to land-destitute citizens for their home and cultivation.
Pursuant to such benevolent intention the State prohibits the sale or encumbrance of
the homestead (Section 116) within five years after the grant of the patent. After that
five-year period the law impliedly permits alienation of the homestead, but in line with
the primordial purpose to favor with the homesteader and his family the statute provides
that such alienation or conveyance (Section 117) shall be subject to the right of
repurchase by the homesteader, his widow or heirs within five years. This Section 117
is undoubtedly a complement of Section 116. It aims to preserve and keep in the family
of the homesteader that portion of public land which the State had gratuitously given to
him. It would, therefore, be in keeping with this fundamental idea to hold, as we hold,
that the right to repurchase exists not only when the original homesteader makes the

18
 conveyance, but also when it is made by his widows or heirs. This construction is clearly
deducible from the terms of the statute.
As pointedly stated earlier in Jocson vs. Soriano, in connection with homestead statutes:
Acts Nos. 1120 and 926 were patterned after the laws granting homestead rights and
special privileges under the laws of the United States and the various states of the
Union. The statutes of the United States as well as of the various states of the Union
contain provisions for the granting and protection of homesteads. Their object is to
provide a home for each citizen of the Government, where his family may shelter and
live beyond the reach of financial misfortune, and to inculcate in individuals those
feelings of independence which are essential to the maintenance of free institutions.
Furthermore, the state itself is concerned that the citizens shall not be divested of a
means of support, and reduced to pauperism. (Cook and Burgwall vs. McChristian, 4
Ca., 24; Franklin vs. Coffee, 70 Am.. Dec., 292; Richardson vs. Woodward, 104 Fed.
Rep., 873; 21 Cyc., 459).
The conservation of a family home is the purpose of homestead laws. The policy of the
state is to foster families as the factors of society, and thus promote general welfare.
The sentiment of patriotism and independence, the spirit of free citizenship, the feeling
of interest in public affairs, are cultivated and fostered more readily when the citizen
lives permanently in his own home, with a sense of its protection and durability. (Waples
on Homestead and Exemptions, p. 3)
Because of such underlying policy and reason, the right to repurchase under Section 119
cannot be waived by the party entitled thereto, and applies with equal force to both voluntary
and involuntary conveyances. And, as early as 1951, in Cassion vs. Banco Nacional Filipino,
this Court declared that such right is available in foreclosure sales of lands covered by
homestead or free patent. Consistently therewith, We have ruled in a number of cases that
said Section 119 prevails over statutes which provide for a shorter period of redemption in
extrajudicial foreclosure sales. We thus have consistent pronouncement in Paras vs. Court of
Appeals, Oliva vs. Lamadrid, Belisario vs. Intermediate Appellate Court and Philippine National
Bank vs. De los Reyes. These cases, with the exception of Oliva, involved the question of
which between the five (5) year repurchase period provided in Section 119 of C.A. No. 141 or
the one (1) year redemption period under Act No. 3135 should prevail. While Oliva is the only
case, among those cited, that involves the Rural Banks' Act, the other cases reveal the clear
intent of the law on redemption in foreclosure sales of properties acquired under the free
patent or homestead statutes which have been mortgaged to banks or banking institutions
i.e., to resolutely and unqualifiedly apply the 5-year period provided for in Section 119 of C.A.
No. 141 and, as categorically stated in Paras and Belisario, to reckon the commencement of
the said period from the expiration of the one-year period of redemption allowed in extrajudicial
foreclosure. If such be the case in foreclosure sales of lands mortgaged to banks other than
rural banks, then, by reason of the express policy behind the Rural Banks' Act, and following
the rationale of Our ruling in Oliva, it is with greater reason that the 2-year redemption period in
Section 5 of the Rural Banks' Act should yield to the period prescribed in Section 119 of C.A.
No. 141. Moreover, if this Court is to be consistent with Paras and Belisario, the 5-year
repurchase period under C.A. No. 141 should begin to run only from the expiration of the 2-
year period under the Rural Banks' Act. It may be observed in this connection that Oliva was
decided in 31 October 1967, before the Rural Banks' Act, as amended by R.A. No. 2670, the
pertinent portion of Section 5 only reads as follows:

19
 Sec. 5. . . . Provided, That when a land not covered by a Torrens Title, a homestead or free
patent land is foreclosed, the homesteader or free patent holder, as well as their heirs shall
have the right to redeem the same within two years from the date of foreclosure: . . .
As amended later by R.A. No. 5939, it reads:
Sec. 5. . . . Provided, That when a homestead or free patent land is foreclosed, the
homesteader or free patent holder, as well as their heirs shall have the right to redeem the
same within two years from the date of foreclosure in case of a land not covered by a Torrens
title or two years from the date of the registration of the foreclosure in the case of a land
covered by a Torrens title: . . . .
The amendment clarifies the rather vague language of Section 5 as amended by R.A. No.
2670. The ambiguity lies in the fact that although the latter seems to speak of three (3) classes
of lands, namely (a) those not covered by a Torrens title, (b) homesteads lands and (c) free
patent lands, the two-year redemption period may only be enjoyed by the homesteader, the
free patent holder or their heirs. Moreover, the clause does not clarify whether the land not
covered by a Torrens title refers to unregistered land merely, or includes land acquired by a
homestead or free patent not yet issued certificates of title under the Torrens system. As
amended, however, by R.A. No. 5939, land acquired under the free patent or homestead
patent statutes may be redeemed within a two-year period; however, the commencement of
said period is reckoned from the date of foreclosure, if such land is not yet covered by the
Torrens title, or from the registration of the foreclosure meaning, the certificates of sale if
it is already covered by Torrens title.
Thus, following the clear intent of Oliva, since private respondents' foreclosed property was
acquired under the homestead laws, they had two (2) years from 7 December 1979 when
the certificate of sale was registered or until 7 December 1981, within which to redeem the
land. And, pursuant to Section 119 of C.A. No. 141, they had five (5) years from 7 December
1981, within which to repurchase it. Since the private respondents offer to repurchase was
made well within the said 5-year period, the two (2) courts below correctly ruled in their favor.
Furthermore, We wish to stress here that We are unable to read in Section 5 of R.A. No. 720,
as amended, any legislative intent to modify or repeal Section 199 of the Public Land Act.
Each speaks of and deals with a different right. Specifically, the former merely liberalized the
duration of an existing right of redemption in extrajudicial foreclosure sales by extending the
period of one (1) year fixed in Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, to two (2) years
insofar as lands acquired under free patent and homestead statutes are concerned. The
second speaks of the right to repurchase and prescribes the period within which it may be
exercised. These two (2) rights are by no means synonymous. Under Act No. 3135, the
purchaser in a foreclosure sale has, during the redemption period, only an inchoate right and
not the absolute right to the property with all the accompanying incidents. He only becomes an
absolute owner of the property if it is not redeemed during the redemption period. Upon the
other hand, the right to repurchase is based on the assumption that the person under
obligation to reconvey the property has the full title to the property because it was voluntarily
conveyed to him or that he had consolidated his title thereto by reason of redemptioner's
failure to reason of a redemptioner's failure to exercise his right of redemption. Thus, in Paras
vs. Court of Appeals, this Court, adverting the Gonzalez vs. Calimbas, stated:
After a careful study of the point raised in the present appeal by certiorari, we agree with
the Court of Appeals that the five-year period within which a homesteader or his widow
or heirs may repurchase a homestead sold at public auction or foreclosure sale under
Act 3135 as amended, begins not at the date of the sale when merely a certificate is
issued by the Sheriff or other official, but rather on the day after the expiration of the
20
 period of repurchase, when deed of absolute sale is executed and the property formally
transferred to the purchaser. As this Court said in the case of Gonzales (sic) vs.
Calimbas and Poblete, 51 Phil. 355, the certificate of sale issued to the purchaser at an
auction sale is intended to be a mere memorandum of the purchase. It does not transfer
the property but merely identifies the purchaser and the property, states the price paid
and the date when the right of redemption expires. The effective conveyance is made
by the deed of absolute sale executed after the expiration of the period of redemption.
As a consequence of the inchoate character of the right during the redemption period, Act No.
3135 allows the purchaser at the foreclosure sale to take possession the property only upon
the filing of a bond in an amount equivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve
(12) months, indemnify the mortgagor in case it be shown that the sale was made without
violating the mortgage or without complying with the requirements of the Act. That bond is not
required after the purchaser has consolidated his title to the property following the mortgagor's
failure to exercise his right of redemption for in such a case, the former has become the
absolute owner thereof.
Thus, the rules on redemption in the case of an extrajudicial foreclosure of land acquired under
free patent or homestead statutes may be summarized as follows: If the land is mortgaged to a
rural bank under R.A. No. 720, as amended, the mortgagor may redeem the property within
two (2) years from the date of foreclosure or from the registration of the sheriff's certificate of
sale at such foreclosure if the property is not covered or is covered, respectively, by a Torrens
title. If the mortgagor fails to exercise such right, he or his heirs may still repurchase the
property within five (5) years from the expiration of the two (2) year redemption period pursuant
to Section 119 of the Public Land Act (C.A. No. 141). If the land is mortgaged to parties other
than rural banks, the mortgagor may redeem the property within one (1) year from the
registration of the certificate of sale pursuant to Act No. 3135. If he fails to do so, he or his
heirs may repurchase the property within five (5) years from the expiration of the redemption
period also pursuant to Section 119 of the Public Land Act.
(pp. 563-569.)
Following the doctrine enunciated in the Rural Bank of Davao City case, it is clear from a perusal of
the factual antecedents at bar that the plea for repurchase was not time-barred at the time it was
made. When the certificate of sale in favor of petitioner was registered with the Register of Deeds on
November 5, 1981, private respondents had two years, reckoned from said date, within which to
redeem the property from petitioner, and another five years, under Commonwealth Act No. 141,
counted from the expiration of the redemption period, to effect repurchase which private respondents
precisely did when the suit below was initiated on March 20, 1986.
Neither can petitioner's invocation of Presidential Decree No. 1403 dated June 6, 1978, which
amended the relevant proviso on redemption under the Rural Banks Act, be of significant relevance
to the resolution of the perceived predicament at hand in default of any repealing clause therein.
Withal, it is axiomatic in statutory construction that repeals of statute by implication are not favored
(Valdez vs. Tuazon, 40 Phil., 943 [1920]); Philippine American Management Co., Inc., vs. Philippine
American Management Employees Association, 49 SCRA 194 [1973]; Agpalo, Statutory
Construction, 1986 ed., p. 295).
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of Appeals
AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

21
 [G.R. No. L-24920 November 24, 1970]
ROSA QUIMSON, SONIA QUIMSON and FRANCISCO QUIMSON, Heirs of the late Dr. Francisco
Quimson, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, thru its SPECIAL ASSETS
DEPARTMENT and RICARDO MENDOZA, defendants-appellees.
BARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IV, dismissing its Civil Case No.
8300 after trial on the merits, holding that under the charter of the Philippine National Bank the right to
redeem property sold in a judicial foreclosure sale of real estate mortgage to said Bank can be
exercised only within one year from the date of the judicial confirmation thereof and not from the date
of its registration, without passing on the question raised in the pleadings before it as to whether in an
instance where the property sought to be repurchased is only one of several properties separately
mortgaged by the same mortgagor to the said Bank at different times but sold in a single foreclosure
proceeding together with the others because the separate deeds of mortgage commonly provide that
each shall be security for all obligations of the mortgagor to the Bank, as in this case, should be the
amount of the particular loan for which the property being redeemed was mortgaged or the total of all
the loans covered by all the mortgages involved in the said foreclosure.
The trial court's judgment of dismissal was predicated thus:
Francisco Quimson during his lifetime mortgaged several properties with the Philippine National Bank
among which was a parcel of land situated in San Juan, Rizal, having an area of 465 square meters
and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 47769 of the Land Records of Rizal. The property was
mortgaged for P2,500.00. Because of the failure of said Francisco Quimson to pay the mortgage
loans, the Philippine National Bank filed foreclosure proceedings in the Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija.
On December 1, 1956, a Writ of Execution was issued by the said Court of First Instance and the
Provincial Sheriff of Rizal was directed by the said Court to sell at public auction the property in
question covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 47769. The property was sold to the Philippine
National Bank, it being the highest bidder.
On January 10, 1957, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal issued a certificate of sale in favor of the
Philippine National Bank which certificate of sale was given judicial confirmation on September 27,
1957.
On April 24, 1959, the Branch Manager of the Philippine National Bank wrote a letter to plaintiff's son,
Francisco Quimson, Jr. who is occupying the property, informing him that the property in question
was sold by the bank to Ricardo S. Mendoza for the sum of P7,763.36.
The certificate of sale dated January 10, 1957 as well as the judicial confirmation of the court was
registered only with the Register of Deeds of Rizal on September 19, 1963.
Plaintiffs who are the heirs of the late Francisco Quimson want to redeem the property from the
Philippine National Bank. Defendant Philippine National Bank, however, refused alleging that the
period of redemption which is to be counted from the date of judicial confirmation has already expired
and that the property has already been sold to Ricardo S. Mendoza.
Plaintiffs argued that the period of redemption should be counted from the date that the sale and the
judicial confirmation were registered on September 19, 1963. In support of their argument, plaintiffs
cited the case of Ernesto Salazar, et al. vs. Flor de Lis Meneses, et al., G.R. No. 15378, which was
decided and promulgated by the Supreme Court on July 31, 1963.
The court cannot sustain the argument of the plaintiffs. The above cited case, "Ernesto Salazar, et al.
vs. Flor de Lis Meneses, et al." refers to an extra-judicial foreclosure and does not apply to the case
at bar. The rule in judicial foreclosure is different in that the period of redemption is counted from the
22
time of judicial confirmation. This is a well settled rule enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of
Ernesto Gonzales vs. Philippine National Bank, 48 Phil. 824 as well as in the very case cited by the
plaintiffs.
In appellants' brief, they have assigned two alleged errors, the first one being:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ONE-YEAR PERIOD OF REDEMPTION
GRANTED BY SECTION 20, REPUBLIC ACT 1300, CHARTER OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
BANK, IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS IN THIS CASE SHOULD BE COUNTED
FROM SEPTEMBER 27, 1957, THE DATE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF THE
SHERIFF'S CERTIFICATE OF SALE DATED JANUARY 10, 1957, INSTEAD OF FROM
SEPTEMBER 19, 1963, THE DATE WHEN THE CERTIFICATE OF SALE AND THE DECREE OF
CONFIRMATION OF THE SAME BY THE COURT WERE REGISTERED WITH THE OFFICE OF
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR THE PROVINCE OF RIZAL, AND THAT, CONSEQUENTLY, THE
PERIOD OF REDEMPTION AS FAR AS PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS ARE CONCERNED HAD
ALREADY EXPIRED.
In their discussion of this alleged error of the trial court, appellants rely on the firm and uniform rulings
of this Court that the period of redemption of real property with Torrens title and sold in an execution
sale under Sections 24 and 30 of Rule 39 must be computed from the date of registration. Cited by
them is this Court's holding in Agbulos v. Alberto, 5 SCRA 790, 792 that:
The property involved in the present case is registered land. It is the law in this jurisdiction that when
property brought under the operation of the Land Registration Act is sold, the operative act is the
registration of the deed of conveyance. The deed of sale does not "take effect as a conveyance, or
bind the land" until it is registered (Section 50, Act No. 496; Tuason v. Raymundo, 28 Phil. 635;
Sikatuna v. Guevara, 43 Phil. 371; Worecester v. Ocampo, 34 Phil. 646). Undoubtedly, to be in
consonance with this well settled rule, Section 24, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, provides that a
duplicate of the certificate of sale given by the sheriff who made the auction sale to the purchaser
must be filed (registered) in the office of the register of deeds of the province where the property is
situated.
In Garcia v. Ocampo, G.R. No. L-13029, June 30, 1959, we held that the twelve months period of
redemption provided for in Sec. 26, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court "begins to run not from the date of
the sale, but from the time of registration of the sale in the office of the register of deeds." The entry or
annotation made on the back of the certificate of title of the property in question on July 18, 1959
(supra) was in accordance with this ruling when it provided that the execution sale was 'subject to
redemption within one (1) year from registration hereof.
A case similar to the present is that of Gonzales, et al. v. Philippine National Bank, et al., 48 Phil. 824,
where we held that the provision of Section 32, Act 2938 (Charter of the Philippine National Bank)
providing for a right of redemption in favor of the bank's mortgagor 'within one year after the sale of
the real estate as a result of the foreclosure' should be construed to mean one year after the
confirmation of the foreclosure sale, because the sale becomes valid only after confirmation. Along
the same line we may say in this case that the period of one year after the sale must likewise start
only from the date of registration of the certificate of sale, because it is only then that the certificate
takes 'effect as a conveyance' in accordance with Act 496.
It is true that this case of Agbulos v. Alberto involved a sale on an ordinary execution and not a
foreclosure sale, but it must be borne in mind that exactly one year after Agbulos, in Salazar v.
Meneses, 8 SCRA 495, this Court speaking again thru Mr. Justice Arsenio Dizon who penned
Agbulos after quoting the above portions thereof, held that:
The above ruling is squarely applicable to the present case which involves also registered land,
inspite of the fact that the sale in question is not an execution sale but a foreclosure sale.

23
We reiterated this ruling in all subsequent cases having similar factual circumstances: Reyes v.
Noblejas, 21 SCRA 1027; Rosario v. Tayug Rural Bank, Inc., 22 SCRA 1220; and Reyes v. Manas,
29 SCRA 736. Even the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Teehankee in Lazo vs. Republic Surety &
Insurance Co., 31 SCRA 329 emphasized Our unbroken adherence to it.
Appellees insist that the said ruling cannot apply to this case because, according to them, what is
here involved is a sale resulting from judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage and not, as in those
cases, one by virtue of an extrajudicial foreclosure under Act 3135 as amended by Act 4118. It is
pointed out that in judicial foreclosures under Rule 68 (formerly 70) of the Rules of Court, a mortgage
debtor has no right of redemption after the judicial confirmation of the sale of the mortgaged property,
all that he has being the equity of redemption which must be exercised within ninety days from the
finality of the judgment, and that it is only by virtue of the Charter of the Philippine National Bank that
such a right of redemption after the foreclosure sale is recognized as regards properties mortgaged to
the said Bank. In this connection, appellees cite the decision of this Court in the case of Gonzales v.
Philippine National Bank, 48 Phil. 824, the same case referred to by Justice Dizon in Agbulos,
wherein We held:
The sales of real property by the Philippine National Bank under foreclosure proceedings are more or
less sui generis. Strange as it may seem, the question of redemption in such cases is separate and
distinct from, and unlike, that of any other foreclosure proceeding.
The law in question was enacted for a special reason, and should not be construed to defeat its
purpose and intent. Giving it a liberal construction, it is apparent that in this class of cases, the words
"within one year after the sale of real estate, etc." should be construed to mean within one year after
the confirmation of the sale. It is the confirmation only which consummates the sale. Prior to that, the
purchaser's bid is nothing more than an executory contract, which may or may not be executed
depending upon the confirmation of the sale. That is the spirit and intent of the law in question.
and they argue that this is the ruling that should control in the case at bar, hence the period of
redemption of appellants should be considered as having started on September 27, 1957 when the
public auction sale in question to the appellee Bank was confirmed.
We do not agree. The property therein involved is registered land. While, indeed, sales on foreclosure
of properties mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank may partake of being sui generis, they need
not depart from the sound principles governing registration of transactions concerning lands coming
under the Land Registration Act or the Torrens system. As already stated, this Court has uniformly
ruled that redemption from execution sales under ordinary judgments pursuant to Section 30, Rule 39
of the Rules of Court should be made within twelve (12) months from the registration of the same and
We have as uniformly applied the same rule to sales upon extrajudicial foreclosure of registered
lands. We see no valid reason why the rule in foreclosure of mortgages of registered real estate
where the mortgagee is the Philippine National Bank should not be the same.
Section 32 of Act 2938 (now Section 20 of Republic Act 1300), the Bank's charter, provides:
SEC. 20. Right of Redemption of property foreclosed.-The mortgagor shall have the right, within the
year after the sale of real estate as a result of the foreclosure of a mortgage, to redeem the property
by paying the amount fixed by the court in the order of execution, with interest thereon at the rate
specified in the mortgage, and all the costs and other judicial expenses incurred by the bank by
reason of the execution and for the custody of said property.
This is practically the same language as that of Section 6 of Act 3135 governing redemption in
extrajudicial foreclosures and Section 30 of Rule 39 governing redemption from sales on execution of
ordinary judgments. Nothing said in the Gonzales case relied upon by appellees precludes the
desirability and propriety of having a uniform procedure to govern matters or transactions of the same
nature or in pari materia. It is to be noted that nowhere in the Gonzales case does it appear that what

24
was involved therein was registered land. Of course, it is understandable that with regard to
unregistered land, the most natural date from which the period of redemption should be company
computed should be that of the judicial confirmation of the sale as it is only then that, in the language
of Section 3 of Rule 68, the sale "operates to divest the rights of all the parties to the action and to
vest their rights in the purchaser." Withal, the qualification contained in the same Section 3 of Rule 68
to the effect that the vesting of the rights of all the parties to the foreclosure in the purchaser is
"subject to such rights of redemption as may be authorized by law" verily implies that the applicable
rules of redemption, particularly as to the period thereof, must be premised on the character of finality
imparted by the judicial confirmation upon the sale but it need not be computed from the date thereof
but, rather, according to what the particular applicable law providing for the right of redemption may
ordain or specify. It is thus clear that it is preferable that even in foreclosure of mortgage of registered
real property by the Philippine National Bank by virtue of its charter, the period of redemption should
start from the registration of the deed of sale conducted by the sheriff and not from the date of
confirmation thereof, and We so hold.
Incidentally, appellee Mendoza contends that if the above rule of registration is to be followed, and
not the Gonzales ruling regarding the date of confirmation, this Court should also apply as to him the
familiar rule, with respect to registered land, that actual knowledge is equivalent to registration, and
since it appears that appellants were notified by the appellee Bank on April 24, 1959 that the property
in question had been sold to him on April 16, 1959 yet, he maintains that appellants' period of
redemption should be computed from the date of said notice, April 24, 1959. The contention is not
correct. We have already held in Reyes v. Manas, supra, that "Of course, appellant maintained that
the said ruling is good for third parties but should not apply to a case 'where no third party to the sale
is involved'. This contention, however, overlooks that the rule laid down is precisely for the person
entitled to exercise the right of redemption, who necessarily is the owner of the property sold and not
any third party." In other words, when it comes to the period of redemption of registered real estate
sold on execution, whether in foreclosure proceedings or in ordinary cases, actual notice of the sale
by the judgment debtor or redemptioner is immaterial, the period must always be computed from the
date of registration of the corresponding auction sale.
Accordingly, We hold that appellants' first assignment of error is well taken and, therefore, appellants'
period of redemption should be computed from September 19, 1963. It may be stated, however, that
since the record is not very clear as to what concrete steps have been taken by appellants towards
the actual redemption in controversy, outside of the letter they have written to appellee Bank on June
17, 1964 "requesting information as to proper steps to be taken in order to repurchase the (subject)
property," We are not in a position to hold now whether or not appellants' right to make the said
redemption may be considered as still subsisting.
In view, therefore, of the possibility that appellants might still be able to exercise the redemption in
question, We have to consider the second alleged error which they have assigned in their brief, to wit:
AS A LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE OF THE FOREGOING ERROR, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
NOT DECLARING THAT THE SALE MADE BY DEFENDANT-APPELLEE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
BANK IN FAVOR OF ITS CO-DEFENDANT-APPELLEE RICARDO MENDOZA ON APRIL 16, 1959,
IS NULL AND VOID, AND IN NOT FIXING THE AMOUNT OF THE REDEMPTION PRICE FOR THE
PROPERTY INVOLVED IN THIS CASE.
To start with, since, as already stated, We are not now in a position to decide whether or not
appellants' pretended right of redemption herein in controversy may still be exercised because it is
not clear whether or not they have made within one year after registration of the sale the appropriate
tender to the proper party, it follows that We cannot now also pass upon the question of whether or
not the sale of the subject property to appellee Mendoza by appellee Bank on April 16, 1959 is null
and void. All that We can rule upon in connection with appellants' second assignment of error just

25
quoted is the question of how much they should pay as principal repurchase price, on the assumption
that they can still make such repurchase. Appellants contend that the amount that they should be
made to pay should be only P6,045.00, the amount for which appellee Bank acquired the subject
property at the foreclosure sale of January 10, 1957. On the other hand, both appellees maintain that
such principal amount should be P64,400.73, the amount stated in the writ of execution under which
the mortgaged properties of appellants' predecessor in interest were sold at the foreclosure sale.
Appellees are right. Although nothing is said about it in the decision of the trial court, it is nevertheless
clear in the stipulation of facts and its annexes, which were submitted at the trial and which are the
only evidentiary matters appellants have incorporated in their record on appeal, that the foreclosure
judgment under which the land herein involved was sold was not solely for the loan and mortgage
over said land but for all the other several indebtedness and mortgage, that Francisco Quimson,
predecessor of appellants, had incurred and executed in favor of appellee bank, all of which had
already matured and had not been paid, and, what is more important, that in each and everyone of
the deeds covering the said foreclosed mortgages, beginning with the very one hereby directly
affected, there is the common stipulation worded thus:
That for and in consideration of certain loans-overdrafts and other credit accommodations obtained
from the Mortgagee, and to secure the payment of the same and those that may hereafter be
obtained the principal of all which is hereby fixed at - TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED -
(P2,500.00) Pesos, Philippine currency, as well as those that the Mortgagee may extend to the
Mortgagor, including interest and expenses or any other obligation owing to the Mortgagee whether
direct or indirect, principal or secondary, as appears in the accounts, books, and records of the
Mortgagee, the Mortgagor, does hereby transfer and convey by way of mortgage unto the mortgagee,
its successors or assigns, the parcels of land which are described in the list inserted on the back of
this document together with all the buildings and improvements now existing or which may hereafter
be erected or constructed thereon, of which the Mortgagor declares that he is the absolute owner free
from all liens and incumbrances. (p. 64, Rec. on Appeal)
In other words, it is undisputed and plainly obvious from the real evidence in the record that, contrary
to the impression given by appellants in their brief, the judgment against them or their predecessor for
which the subject property was sold, together with their other properties, was for more than
P64,400.73 and that is the amount that appears in the writ of execution. In such circumstances, We
have no alternative but to apply the pertinent provision of Section 20 of the appellee bank's charter,
aforequoted, the language of which is unmistakable and unequivocal - "The mortgagor shall have the
right, ... to redeem the property by paying the amount fixed by the court in the order of execution, with
interest thereon at the rate specified in the mortgage, and all the costs and other judicial expenses
incurred by the Bank by reason of the execution and sale and for the custody of said property.
That, indeed, the property in question was the subject of a separate and distinct earlier mortgage
from the others involved in the foreclosure, the said mortgage being on a loan of only P2,500.00 and
it was purchased by appellee bank at the execution sale for only P6,045.00 and was later on sold by
it to appellee Mendoza for only P6,500.00, payable in five years, cannot alter the fact that in the very
deed of mortgage relied upon by them, appellants' predecessor agreed to make the same property a
security not only for the P2,500.00 loan already obtained by him but for all other obligations he may
subsequently have to the appellee bank and subsequently, he did incur other such obligations, all
amounting to over P64,000.00 albeit secured by other mortgages. Appellee bank must have had its
reasons for imposing such a condition and from all that is extant in the records, appellants'
predecessor agreed to it. Such being the case, We can only say that this Court is without power to
alter or modify the terms and conditions of contractual obligations freely agreed upon by the parties
on a mere plea of the obligor that he is without means to fully comply with it or that he feels the same
to be inequitable. Besides, if it is considered that it is possible that the other collaterals given by
appellants' predecessor may not yield enough to cover the full amount of his indebtedness secured
26
thereby, the justification for the all-inclusive provision can easily be perceived. After all, as long as all
the properties mortgaged are returned to appellants upon their payment of the full amount of over
P64,000.00 appellees are insisting upon, We cannot see any inequity in the posture of appellee Bank.
As already stated, We are aware that the lower court made no findings, whether of fact or of law on
the point under discussion, but in instances like the one at bar where in the appeal before Us both
parties have joined issues in their briefs on a matter not touched upon by the trial court because it is
inconsistent with the theory on which the decision is premised, but which may be a necessary
alternative in the event of reversal or modification of the trial court's theory, and the relevant and
material facts are undisputed or indisputable, by stipulation of the parties or as found by the court
from indubitable evidence, and are incorporated in the record on appeal, We hold that it is within the
prerogative of this Court in the pursuit of substantial justice to consider such matter and thus avoid
the necessity, otherwise, of returning the case to the trial court for further proceedings, with
concomitant added expenses and loss of time for the parties.
Accordingly, We hold that the amount which appellants should pay for the redemption of the property
in question must be the one fixed in the writ of execution under which it was sold, which as stated
above is more than P64,000.00.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision of the lower court is modified in the sense that the
appellants may be allowed to redeem the subject property after this decision has become final, if they
have taken the proper steps to enable them to exercise their right thereto by having made within one
(1) year from the registration of the execution sale the appropriate tender to the proper party, and
provided that they pay the full amount fixed in the writ of execution of over P64,000.00, without
pronouncement as to costs.
[G.R. No. L-30079 January 30, 1976]
MATILDA GOROSPE and MARIANO GOROSPE, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
DOLORES M. SANTOS, defendant-appellant.
DOLORES M. SANTOS, counterclaimant- defendant,
vs.
CARIDAD J. TORRENTO, THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF RIZAL, and THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY, defendants-appellees.
ANTONIO, J.:
This case was certified to this Court from the Court of Appeals on the ground that the appeal raises
purely legal questions.
The legal questions posed by this appeal involve the propriety of the summary judgment rendered by
the Court of First Instance of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-5794, 1 and the correctness of the trial
court's resolution of the other substantive issues, such as on the right of plaintiffs-appellees as
assignees of the mortgagor to redeem the property sold on foreclosure and the legal efficacy of the
redemption thus made.
At bottom is the action filed by plaintiffs-appellees in the aforementioned Civil Case No. Q-5794,
against defendant-appellant Dolores M. Santos, wherein said plaintiffs-appellees sought the
confirmation of their rights of ownership over the parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 43761, of the Quezon City land registry, redeemed by them as successors in interest, 2 and for
the surrender to them of the afore-mentioned transfer certificate of title which is in the ion of the
defendant-appellant, or in default thereof, its cancellation and the issuance to them of a new
certificate of title.
In the afore-mentioned complaint, 3 the following facts are alleged: On October 19, 1958, Caridad J.
Torrento in order to secure her indebtedness in the amount of P7,000, executed a deed of first
27
mortgage over her parcel of land, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 43761, of the Registry of
-Deeds of Quezon City, in favor of defendant-appellant Dolores M. Santos. The deed was duly
registered and the corresponding owner's duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 43761 was
delivered to defendant-appellant.
On September 1, 1959, "with the consent of . the first mortgagee the mortgagor, Caridad J. Torrento
executed a second mortgage (Annex "A") over the same property, in favor of plaintiffs-appellees, to
secure a principal indebtedness in the amount of P6,000.00. This deed of second mortgage was not,
however, registered. In the meantime, the first mortgage was extra-judicially foreclosure and the land
sold at public auction on March 10, 1960 to Dolores M. Santos, the highest bidder, for the sum of
P3,500.00. The corresponding Sheriffs Certificate of Sale was issued in her favor, which certificate
was registered on October 20, 1960 and the same annotated in the original of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 43761.
On February 3, 1961, Dolores M. Santos filed a complaint against Caridad J. Torrento in Civil Case
No. 6479, with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, for the recovery of the deficiency resulting between
the price obtained in the sale of the real property at public auction and the outstanding obligation at
the time of the foreclosure. On February 9, 1961, the court issued, in the aforesaid case, a writ of
preliminary attachment on the properties of Caridad J. Torrento and on February 24, 1961, the Sheriff
of Rizal caused the attachment of the rights and interests of Caridad J. Torrento particularly her right
of redemption over the parcel of land sold at public auction. In consideration of the discharge of the
second mortgage, Caridad J. Torrento assigned to the second mortgagee (Matilda Gorospe, wife of
Mariano Gorospe) all her rights, interests and title over said property, particularly her statutory right of
redemption "subject to the attachment in favor of the plaintiffs (second mortgagee) who took over the
possession of the property as a consequence thereof." 4
The deed of assignment of Caridad J. Torrento in favor of Matilda Gorospe, which was made part of
the complaint as Annex "B", contained the following stipulation:
4. That the ASSIGNEE shall, with the consent of her husband Mariano Gorospe, release the
ASSIGNOR of her obligations on the Second Mortgage referred to above and that the said
Second Mortgage indebtedness shall be considered paid by the execution of this instrument.
On March 10, 1961, Caridad J. Torrento filed, in Civil Case No. 6479, an ex parte motion to lift the
preliminary attachment on her right of redemption upon the filing of a bond, which ex parte motion
was granted by the court on the same date. Likewise on the same occasion, plaintiffs-appellees, as
successors-in-interest of Caridad J. Torrento paid to the Sheriff the amount of P3,920.00, which
represented the amount of the purchase, with one per centum (1%) interest per month thereon in
addition, to effect the redemption of the foreclosed property. Upon the filing of the requisite bond by
Caridad J. Torrento on March 11, 1961 and its approval by the court in Civil Case No. 6479, the
corresponding order dissolving the attachment was issued.
On March 13, 1961, the Sheriff of Rizal, who conducted the sale of the foreclosed property, issued a
Certificate of Redemption in favor of plaintiffs-appellees as successors in interest of Caridad J.
Torrento over the foreclosed property. The Certificate of Redemption was registered a on March 13,
1961 with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, and the corresponding entry and annotation made
on the original of said certificate of title.
Alleging that they became owners in fee simple of the aforementioned property by virtue of the
aforesaid ..redemption, plaintiffs-appellees demanded from Dolores M. Santos the surrender to them
of the owner's duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 43761, but defendant-appellant "with
malice aforethought and in wanton disregard of the plaintiffs' right to the possession of the title ...
refused and still continue to refuse to recognize the right and ownership of the plaintiffs over the said
property ... and to, deliver to the plaintiffs the' duplicate of the said certificate-of title." They, therefore,
prayed that judgment be rendered 'confirming the rights of ownership of the plaintiffs" over said
28
property, and ordering the defendant-appellant to deliver to them the said owner's duplicate of
Transfer Certificate of title No. 43761, or declaring the same null and void and directing the Register
of Deeds of Quezon City to issue a new certificate of title in favor of plaintiffs.
Defendant-appellant, in her answer, denied that Matilda J. Gorospe had validly redeemed the
property because: (a) under Section 26, Rule 39, Rules of Court, if the purchaser at public auction is
also a creditor having a prior lien (first mortgage and a levy on attachment) to that of the
redemptioner, the redemptioner can redeem only if she pays the purchaser at public auction not only
the amount of her purchase in the sum of P3,500.00 with one per centum per month interest thereon
in addition, up to the time of redemption, but also the balance of the mortgage indebtedness
(P5,910.00); (b) the order lifting the levy on attachment of the right of redemption of the debtor
Caridad J. Torrento was issued only on March 11, 1961 one day after the expiration of the period of
redemption and, therefore, the redemption made on March 13, 1961 was after the expiry of the period
of redemption; (c) the so-called certificate of redemption, Annex "C" 6f the complaint, is not even
acknowledged before any officer authorized to take acknowledgment of conveyances of real property,
contrary to Section 27, Rule 39 of the Rules, and the same is, therefore, unregisterable; (d) the
document of assignment of the debtor's right of redemption, Annex "B", does not show the amount
then actually due on the lien of the supposed assignee, contrary to Section 28 (c), Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court; (e) the same document, Annex "B' of the complaint, had never been registered with
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City and hence the same cannot affect third persons like the herein
defendant Dolores M. Santos. Besides, under the law, said document should, and ought to be subject
to the prior lien of herein defendant Dolores M. Santos consisting of a levy on attachment of said right
of redemption of the debtor Caridad J. Torrento. 5
As a first counterclaim, defendant Dolores M. Santos that the Deed of Assignment whereby Caridad
J. Torrento transferred to Matilda Gorospe her right of redemption should be declared void and/or
rescinded as in fraud of creditors, because (a) the alleged deed of assignment of Torrento's right to
redeem dated March 1, 1961, was simulated and fictitious (b) the transfer was made after suit-Civil
Case No. 6479-CFI-Rizal, entitled "Dolores M. Santos v. Caridad J. Torrento" had been begun and
while the same was pending against the said debtor; and (e) the plaintiffs consented to the said
assignment knowing that Caridad J. Torrento's right to redeem the property was already subject to
the levy on attachment under Civil Case No. 6479, Court of First Instance of Rizal. 6
As a second counterclaim, defendant-appellant alleged that plaintiffs- appellees' action is "clearly
unfounded. and malicious as even previous to the present action, plaintiff Matilda J. Gorospe had
already filed against the defendant a petition entitled "Caridad J. Torrento and Matilda J. Gorospe,
petitioners, v. Dolores M. Santos, oppositor, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 5975" before Branch IV wherein said
Matilda J. Gorospe and the mortgage debtor Caridad J. Torrento sought-the surrender of the Owner's
Duplicate of TCT No. 43761-Quezon City from the defendant, which case, as a result of defendant's
opposition, was dismissed . 7
And in support of her third counterclaim, she averred that the defendant Provincial Sheriff of Rizal
notwithstanding that his attention was called to the fact that no valid redemption was made, failed to
issue the officer's Deed of Absolute Sale contrary to Section 31, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court and
Section 78 of Act 496, as amended, and since no valid redemption was made before March 10, 1961,
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City should be ordered to cancel the present TCT NO. 43761-
Quezon City and a new certificate of title issued in her name. 8
On the same day that she filed her answer to the complaint, defendant-appellant filed a "Motion to
Bring in New Parties", praying that Caridad J. Torrento the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, in his official
capacity as Sheriff -of Quezon City, and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City be brought in as
parties defendants, 'in order that she may be granted complete and final determination" of her
counterclaims.

29
On May 26, 1961, plaintiffs-appellees filed la "Manifestation and Countermotion" wherein they alleged
that defendant's answer does not specify which of the paragraphs of the complaint "are specifically
denied because of defendants claim of lack of knowledge" and which paragraphs are denied
"because some of the allegations therein made are completely false and knowingly made false by the
plaintiffs to suit their unlawful purpose." Plaintiffs-appellees, therefore, prayed that defendant-
appellant be ordered to make the necessary specifications.
On May 27, 1961, defendant-appellant filed an opposition to the Manifestation and Countermotion of
the plaintiffs-appellees. On May 31, 1961, plaintiffs-appellees filed their Answer to the
counterclaims, 9 contending that the deed of assignment (Annex "B") may not be rescinded as in
fraud of creditors, considering:
b) That defendant as alleged creditor could not have been defrauded nor could it have been
possible to defraud said defendant because at the date the said deed of assignment, Annex 'B'
of the complaint, was made and executed, the preliminary attachment, in defendant's favor
was already effected on the right of redemption over the property herein in question early as
February 24, 1961, particularly on the original of TCT No. 43761 in the office of the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City;
c) That defendant should know or ought to know that whoever acquires the right of redemption
of the said mortgagor-debtor-assignor Caridad J. Torrento subsiquent to the preliminary
attachment is subject to the right of defendant as attaching creditor;
d) That, as clearly appearing in the deed of assignment of the right of redemption, Annex 'B' of
the complaint the assignment is subject to the rights of defendant (Dolores M. Santos, ...
e) That the said preliminary attachment having been ordered lifted upon the filing of a bond
which was approved by the court to guaranty the payment of defendant's claim Civil Case No.
6479- CFI, Rizal and that defendant is, in fact, secured from her claim against the mortgagor-
debtor-assignor Caridad J. Torrento by virtue of the bond, defendant's right as attaching
creditor over the subject property covered by T.C.T. No. 48761 is thereby extinguished;
and denying the averments contained in defendant-appellant's second counterclaim because their
petition in G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 5795 was dismissed by the court on the ground "that there are. issues
raised in the pleadings which are outside of the jurisdiction of this court, acting as a Land Registration
Court, to resolve." 10
On June 9, 1961, the court. a quo issued an order granting defendant-appellant's Motion to Bring in
New Parties and ordering that summons be issued to Caridad J. Torrento the Provincial Sheriff of
Rizal and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, who were made parties defendants in the case.
On June 11, 1961, plaintiffs filed a "Motion for Summary Judgment", alleging:
I. That, from the complaint, the answer with counterclaims and the answer to counterclaims
filed herein, including the exhibits attached hereto, there appears no genuine issue as to any
'material fact in this ease;
II. II That, other than the amounts of damages, attorney's fees, and costs, which are within the
discretion of the court to fix, the determination of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief
sought in the complaint and, particularly, the questions of law raised by defendant's answer,
can be made on the basis of those facts, together with supporting documents, alleged in pars.
1 to 14, inclusive, of the complaint; and that the said facts will likewise be the ultimate basis of
this court in determining whether the defendant has a valid counterclaim against the plaintiffs
and against the counterclaim-defendants Caridad J. Torrento the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City, and the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal;
V. That, therefore, actually the only issues raised in the answer remaining are issues of law,
which should be resolved in favor of the plaintiffs. more particularly as follows:
30
 1. Has the period of redemption expired? If so, when? If the last day for redemption was on
March 10, 1961, what was the effect of the attachment of the right of redemption?
xxx xxx xxx
2. Is the payment of the amount of P3,920 made by the plaintiffs to the Sheriff on March 10,.
1961 covering the purchase price and interest, without including in the redemption price the
payment of the amount of the lien by virtue of the preliminary attachment effected on the right
of redemption in favor of the mortgagor purchaser and attaching creditor (herein defendant), in
compliance with the requirements of Sec. 26, Rule 39, with respect to the amount to be paid as
redemption price?
xxx xxx xxx
3. Is it required under the provisions of Sec. 27, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court that the
certificate of redemption issued by the sheriff be acknowledged or approved before a notary
public or other officer authorized to take acknowledgment of conveyance of real property?
xxx xxx xxx
4. Whether the certificate of redemption, Annex "C" of the complaint is registerable?
xxx xxx xxx
5. Does the deed of assignment, of the mortgagor-debtor/s right of redemption, Annex '3'
hereof, comply with the requirements of Section 28 (c), Rule 39?
xxx xxx xxx
6. is the deed of assignment of the right of redemption of the mortgagor in favor of the
plaintiffs, Annex '3' hereof, void and/or rescissible as in fraud of creditors, particularly with
respect to the defendant herein as mortgagor-purchaser of the property and as attaching
creditor of the right of redemption of the mortgagor-debtor-assignor?" 11
On June 16, 1961, defendant Dolores M. Santos filed an opposition to the Motion for Summary
Judgment, 12 on the following grounds: (1) the issues as to all the parties in the case at bar have not
as yet been joined, as plaintiffs' motion for a bill of particulars"(or specifications) directed against
defendant's answer and dated May 25, 1961, is still pending resolution by the court, and the persons
ordered by the court to be brought in as parties-defendants, namely, Caridad J. Torrento the
Provincial Sheriff of Rizal and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, have not yet filed their answers;
and (2) a reading of the various allegations in the Complaint, Answer with Counterclaims and Answer
to Counterclaims will show that there are numerous issues raised which should be tried and on which
evidence should be taken, being incapable of proof by mere affidavits.
On June 30, 1961, the court a quo rendered a "Summary Judgment", 13 stating that:
... the Court finds no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the issues raised in
defendants answer are purely questions of law which may be the property subject of a
summary judgment, and this conclusion of the Court, becomes more patent by defendants
failure to contest the truth and genuineness of the documents attached to the motion.
xxx xxx xxx
In her answer with counterclaims, defendant Santos practically admits all the allegations of first
in the complaint, and her allegations in her special and affirmative defenses are mere
conclusions of law and are not material to the issues involved. The main issue in this case is
whether or not the plaintiffs have substantially complied with the provisions of law. relative to
the redemption of the real property in question, or whether or not the redemption made by the
plaintiffs was valid.
xxx xxx xxx
31
Of the issues of law raised in defendant's answer, the only material issue of law relative to the
validity of the redemption is the defendant's contention that there has been no valid redemption
in the sense that the amount that plaintiffs, as redemptioners, should have paid must not only
consist of the purchase price and interest but also the amount due on the lien by virtue of the
preliminary attachment in favor of the defendant. Under the liberal construction of the rule on
redemption, however, the Court believes that the plaintiffs were not strictly bound to have
included the amount of said lien in the redemption price that was to be paid, although they
were bound to respect the existence of such lien, because certainly the attachment issued in
the aforesaid Civil Case No. 6479 could not have been so issued to prevent or defeat the right
of redemption but rather was issued merely to secure the satisfaction of a judgment that may
be rendered in said case in favor of the mortgage creditor. The Court, therefore, holds that the
amount of P3,920.00 paid on March 10, 1961 by the plaintiffs as redemption price of the
property in question was in accordance with law, and the fact that the attachment was ordered
lifted and dissolved upon the filing of a bond approved by the Court on March 11, 1961 after
the right of redemption was exercised, the lien over the property was thereby extinguished.
Defendant Santos also raised other questions of law as to the alleged defect of the certificate
of redemption which was not acknowledged before a Notary Public, and the failure of the deed
of assignment of right to redeem to comply with the requirements of the Rule. The requirement
that the certificate of redemption be acknowledged or ratified before a Notary Public is only for
the purpose of registration, but failure to comply with the same could not be a 'valid ground to
invalidate the redemption. The validity of a redemption lies on the existence of the right to
redeem, the amount to be paid, and the date of payment which must be made within the period
provided for by law. As to the defendant's contention that the deed of assignment does not
comply with the requirements of Sec. 28 (c), Rule 39, the fact remains that the plaintiffs have
exercised the right of redemption as successors-in-interest by virtue of the assignment and, as
such, it is enough for them to have presented the said deed as required by sub-paragraph (b),
Sec. 28 of the Rule.
From the pleadings and the evidence as regards the first counterclaim relative to the validity of
the deed of assignment, the Court is also convinced that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact. Taking the facts presented as a whole, the Court is inclined to uphold the validity
of the deed of assignment, and this is more so considering the fact that the plaintiffs, 'as
assignees, are creditors by themselves. Moreover, the deficiency claim of defendant Santos in
the civil case referred to in the counterclaim is now secured by a bond which was duly
approved by the Court where said case is pending. Consequently, there could be no possible
damage or prejudice that the defendant Santos may suffer. Our Supreme Court, in the case of
Enage v. Vda. de Hijos F. Escano, 38 Phil. 657 laid down the doctrine that a 'liberal
construction will be given to statutes governing the redemption of property; that when a
judgment creditor permits the debtor's land to be sold for less than it is worth, he exposes
himself to the risk of the loss of the surplus value by the assignment of the right of redemption
or its exercise by another creditor; that redemption are looked upon with favor, and, where no
injury is to follow, a liberal construction will be given our redemption laws, to the end that the
property of the debtor may pay as many of debtor's liabilities as possible.' Therefore, to uphold
the validity of the redemption would not cause any injury to the defendant Santos because at
any rate 'the deficiency claim of the latter against counterclaim defendant Torrento was
secured by a bond approved by the Court.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, summary judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiffs and against the defendant, as follows:
a) Confirming the rights and ownership of the plaintiffs, as successors-in-interest of the
mortgage debtor Caridad J. Torrento, over the parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of
32
 title No. 43761 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City by virtue of the legal exercise of the
right of redemption by the plaintiffs, which redemption is hereby declared valid;
b) Ordering the defendant to deliver to the plaintiffs the ion and ownership of the duplicate of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 43761;
c) Dismissing the counterclaims of defendant; and,
d) Ordering the defendant to pay the costs.
On July 13, 1961, defendant-appellant Dolores M. Santos, after receipt of the above Summary
Judgment, filed her Record on Appeal, Notice of Appeal and Appeal Bond. On August 2, 1961,
plaintiffs filed a Motion for Immediate Execution of the Summary Judgment, which motion was op by
defendant-appellant on August 5, 1961.
On August 16, 1961, defendant-appellant Dolores M. Santos filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
summary judgment, after leave of court therefor had been obtained. This was denied by the 'lower
court in its order dated October 2, 1961. A second motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on
October 14, 1961. On March 24, 1962, the court a quo approved defendant-appellant's Record on
Appeal and ordered the transmittal of the records of the case to the Court of Appeals. As afore-
mentioned, the Court of Appeals certified the case to the Court on the ground that it involves the
purely legal question of whether or not summary judgment had been properly rendered by the court of
origin.
I
The purpose of Rule 34 of the Revised Rules is to eliminate trial in those cases where there is no
genuine issue of fact, since a trial under such circumstances is unnecessary and results in delay and
expense which may operate to defeat in whole or in part the recovery of a just claim. As explained by
Moore, 14 'The very object of a motion for summary judgment is to separate what is formal or
pretended in denial or averment from what is genuine and substantial, so that only the latter may
subject a suitor to the burden of a trial. To attain this end, the rule permits a party to pierce the
allegations of fact in the pleadings and to obtain relief by summary judgment where facts set forth in
detail in affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file show that there are no genuine issues of facts
to be tried. The court is authorized to examine evidence, not for the purpose of trying an issue but to
determine whether there is a genuine issue of fact proper for trial.'"
We have examined the pleadings and the affidavits as well as other documents attached thereto, and
We find that there is no genuine issue of fact. It is true that appellant Dolores M. Santos asserted that
the deed of assignment of the right to redeem of March 1, 1961 was simulated and fictitious, but said
party was unable to serve upon the other party any affidavit or other proof to overcome the probative
weight of the public documents submitted by appellees in support of the assignment. In any event,
the transfer made by Caridad J. Torrento of her right of redemption could not, in any manner, legally
affect appellant Dolores M. Santos, nor cause her damage. As We held in a previous case, if such
transfer of the right of redemption "has not caused him any damage, it matters not to him whether
same was, or was not, fraudulently executed." 15
Basically, the only issue then in the aforesaid Civil Case No. Q-5794 was whether or not plaintiff-
appellee Matilda J. Gorospe had validly made the redemption of the aforesaid property on March 10,
1961. This is a question purely of law. In short, "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
... the moving party" was "entitled to a judgment as a matter of law," 16 so that the lower court properly
rendered a summary judgment.
Appellant likewise contends that issues have not been joined in so far as Caridad J. Torrento, the
Provincial Sheriff of Rizal and the Register of Deeds who were ordered to be brought in as parties
defendant, are concerned, for the reason that they have not as yet filed their answers. Let it be noted
that Caridad J. Torrento adopted plaintiffs-appellees' answer to defendant-appellant's counterclaim as
33
her own. The claim against the Sheriff and Register of Deeds. of Quezon City is exclusively against
them and any answer of said officials could not be relevant to the resolution of the basic issue which
is the validity of the redemption. Indeed, plaintiffs-appellees are not bound to wait for these persons to
file their answer which, anyway, are not material to their claim. Under the Rules, plaintiffs-appellees
may file a motion for summary judgment "at any time after the pleading in answer" to their claim had
been served.
II
Having disposed of this procedural point, We now turn to the basic legal issue-whether or not the
plaintiffs-appellees have complied with the requirements of the law relative to the redemption of the
real property in question.
There is no question that Caridad J. Torrento had a perfect right to redeem said property in view of
the provisions of Section 6 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4148, which provides as follows:
Section 6. In all cases in which an extra-judicial sale is made under the special power
hereinbefore referred to, the debtor, his successors-in-interest or any judicial creditor or
judgment creditor of said debtor, or any person having a lien on the property subsequent to the
mortgage or deed of trust under which the property is sold, may redeem the same at any time
within the term of one year from and after the date of the sale, and such redemption shall be
governed by the provisions of sections four hundred and sixty-four to four hundred and sixty-
six, inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure, in so far as these are not inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act.
The right of redemption provided for by the aforequoted provision, like any other property right, may
be transferred or assigned by its owner. 17 The transferee of such right stands in the position of a
successor-in-interest of the mortgagor within the purview of Section 29 of Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court, which states:
SEC. 29. Who may redeem real property so sold. Real property sold as provided in the last
preceding section, or any part thereof sold separately, may be redeemed in the manner
hereinafter provided by the following persons:
(a) The judgment debtor, or his successor in interest in the whole or any part of the property;
xxx xxx xxx
This latter provision, which ordinarily refers to redemptions of real property sold on execution of
judgments, is likewise applicable to redemption of real property sold on extra-judicial foreclosure of
mortgage, by virtue of the afore-mentioned Section 6 of Act No. 3135, as amended, which states that
"such redemption shall be governed by the provisions of sections four hundred and sixty-four to four
hundred and sixty-six, inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure, in so far as these are not inconsistent
with the provisions of this Act." Sections 464, 465 and 466 of the Code of Civil Procedure are now
embodied in Sections 29, 30 and 31 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
We held in Magno v. Viola 18 that the term "successor-in-interest' includes one to whom the debtor
has transferred his statutory right of redemption; or one to whom the debtor has conveyed his interest
in the property for the purpose of redemption; or one who succeeds to the interest of the debtor by
operation of law; or one or more joint debtors who were not owners of the property sold;. or the wife
as regards her husband's homestead by reason of the fact that some portion of her husband's title
passes to her. There is no question, therefore, that plaintiff-appellee Matilda J. Gorospe is a
"successor-in-interest" of the debtor Caridad J. Torrento and as such could exercise the right to
redeem the property at any time within the period provided by law.
Appellant, nevertheless, insists that the redemption was made "at a mere fraction of the mortgage
debt, one day after the expiration of the right to redeem." Apparently, appellant is of the view that the
redemption should have been made on or before March 10, 1961, or within one year from the date of
34
the Sheriff's sale. Time and again, this Court has held that in cases of redemption of registered land,
the period should be reckoned from the date the certificate of sale of the property involved was
registered, since it is only from the date of its registration that a certificate of sale takes effect as a
conveyance. The purpose of the rule is to notify the delinquent registered owners or third parties
interested in the redemption that the property had been sold, and that they have one year from the
time of constructive notice by means of registration within which to redeem the property, if they wish
to do so.
In the case at bar, registration of the certificate of sale in favor of the purchaser at public auction was
e only on October 20, 1960. Appellee Matilda J. Gorospe had, therefore, a period of one year from
that date within which to exercise the right of redemption assigned to her by Caridad J. Torrento. The
redemption having been made on March 10, 1961, it is evident that the same had been timely made.
Equally without merit is appellant's contention that appellees should have paid not only the amount of
the purchase price, with interest, but also the amount of the deficiency which is the subject matter of
Civil Case No. 6479. In redeeming the property from the purchaser, the judgment debtor must pay the
amount of the purchase with one per centum per month interest thereon, up to the time of redemption
and the amount of any assessments or taxes which the purchaser may have paid thereon after
purchase, and interest on the- last named amount at the same rate. Appellee Matilda J. Gorospe
cannot be required to pay a greater amount than that imposed upon the judgment debtor. The reason
is that, this assignee of such right, the assignee is subrogated to the position of the debtor-mortgagor
and is bound by exactly the same conditions that bound the assignor. If the mortgagor, Caridad J.
Torrento herself, has offered to redeem the property sold on foreclosure, it would have been
untenable for the purchaser at public auction to have refused to resell to her the property on the
ground that the total amount of the debt had not been completely paid by her part from the fact that
the matter of deficiency is the subject of another case (Civil Case No. 6479), it should be noted that
the portion of Section 30 of Rule 39 invoked by appellant is not relevant to the case at bar. Certainly,
defendant-appellant cannot be considered a "purchaser who is a creditor having a prior lien to that of
the redemptioner, other than the judgment under which such purchase was made ..." within the
meaning and intendment of the Rule. It is not applicable to defendant-appellant because she claims a
lien precisely arising from the extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgage (which is equivalent to the
judgment in case of execution of judgment) pursuant to which she purchased said
properties. Consequently, Matilda J. Gorospe, as successor-in-interest of the debtor, was bound to
pay to the appellant only the amount of the purchase price with the corresponding interest.
The last issue to be disposed of is whether or not the preliminary attachment on the right of
redemption, effected in favor of Dolores M. Santos in Civil Case No. 6479, adversely affected the
redemption me by Matilda J. Gorospe. The preliminary attachment in question was lifted on March
11, 1961, on motion of Caridad J. Torrento, defendant in Civil Case No. 6479, and upon the filing of a
bond. For all intents and purposes, the bond so filed takes the place of the property released from
attachment, and secures to Dolores M. Santos the payment of whatever amount may be adjudged in
her favor in said case. We do not decide herein the issue of whether or not a preliminary attachment
of the right to redeem may be validly effected in favor of a mortgagee at whose instance the
foreclosure sale was had, in order to secure the payment of a deficiency. It would be unnecessary for
Us to do so, considering that the preliminary attachment has been lifted. It is sufficient to say that
appellant has no more, right, if she had any to begin with, over the right of redemption exercised by
Matilda J. Gorospe.
In a last attempt to repudiate the redemption made by plaintiff-appellee Matilda J. Gorospe, appellant
assails the validity of the certificate of redemption issued by the Sheriff on the ground that the same
had not been acknowledged before a Notary Public or other officer authorized to take
acknowledgments of conveyances of real property. On this point, We agree with the court a quo that

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this omission is not sufficient cause for the nullification of the redemption. This requirement is only
necessary for purposes of registering the deed.
In passing, let it be noted that, notwithstanding that in the case at bar, the parties have, in their
respective memoranda, primarily discussed only the issue with respect to the propriety of the
rendition of the summary judgment, this Court has deemed it necessary to dispose of the substantive
legal issues as well, in order to expeditiously and finally settle the rights of the parties herein. Those
questions were raised in the court a quo and are of record, having some bearing on the issue
submitted. There is no question that this Court is empowered the review matters which are not
specifically assigned as errors on appeal, when their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just
decision of the case.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is hereby affirmed, and defendant-appellant Dolores
M. Santos is hereby ordered to deliver to plaintiffs-appellees the Owner's Duplicate of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 43761. Costs against defendant-appellant.

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