Remedial Law Compiled. Codal and Cases. Atty. Tranquil.

LAND BANK VS. VILLEGAS .......................................................................................................... 42

CO N T EN T S VDA DE HERRERA VS. BERNARDO .......................................................................................... 44

I. Filing Fees ...................................................................................................................................... 2 HERALD BLACK DACASIN v. SHARON DEL MUNDO DACASIN,..................................... 47

Rule 141, Sections 1, 2 , 3, 4, 7, 8 and 19 .................................................................................. 2 FEBTC v. Shemberg Marketing Corporation......................................................................... 47

Ruby Shelter vs. Formaran ............................................................................................................ 2 ARRIOLA V. ARRIOLA ................................................................................................................... 48

Do-All Metals vs. Security Bank ................................................................................................... 2 SPS MANILA VS SPS MANZO....................................................................................................... 49

Phil. First Insurance vs. First Logistics ...................................................................................... 3 EDNA DIAGO LHUILLIER, petitioner, vs. BRITISH AIRWAYS, respondent. ............... 52

Benjamin Bautista vs. Shirley Unangst...................................................................................... 4 EDNA DIAGO LHUILLIER v. BRITISH AIRWAYS .................................................................. 52

RICHARD CHUA, vs.THE EXECUTIVE JUDGE, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, NISPEROS VS NISPEROS-DUCUSIN.......................................................................................... 54
MANILA, ............................................................................................................................................... 5
DY VS. BIBAT-PALAMOS .............................................................................................................. 58
In Re: Exemption of NPC from Payment of Filing/Docket Fees (A.M. No. 05-10-20-
SC)........................................................................................................................................................... 6

Unicapital vs. Consing...................................................................................................................... 8

Proton Pilipinas Corporation v. Banque Nacional de Paris ............................................... 9

A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC .......................................................................................................................10

RE: REQUEST OF NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID TO EXEMPT LEGAL AID

CLIENTS FROM PAYING FILING, DOCKET AND OTHER FEES. .......................................10

RE: QUERY OF MR. ROGER C. PRIORESCHI RE EXEMPTION FROM LEGAL AND

FILING FEES OF THE GOOD SHEPHERD FOUNDATION, INC. .........................................10

II. JURISDICTION ...................................................................................................................................12

BP 129 .................................................................................................................................................12

Republic Act No. 7691 ...................................................................................................................22

REVISED RULES ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE ......................................................................24

RULE OF PROCEDURE FOR SMALL CLAIMS CASES ...........................................................27

THORNTON VS. THORNTON .......................................................................................................37

NAVIDA VS. DIZON .........................................................................................................................38


I. FILING FEES
RULE 141, SECTIONS 1, 2 , 3, 4, 7, 8 AND 19
RUBY SHELTER VS. FORMARAN
FACTS:
RSB borrowed P95M (loan) from Tan and Obiedo, secured by REM over five parcels
of land located in Naga City.
RSB failed to pay the loan despite being granted several extensions.
It was agreed that RSB should execute deeds of absolute sale over the five parcel of
lands in lieu of payment (i.e. dacion en pago).
Without payment having been made by RSB, Tan and Obiedo presented the
Deeds of Absolute Sale, as a result of which, they were able to secure TCTs over
the five parcels of land in their names.
RSB filed before the RTC a Complaint against respondents Tan and Obiedo for
declaration of nullity of deeds of sales and damages. RSBs causes of actions were:
o (a) pactum commissorium; and
o (b) bad faith by Tan and Obediedo.
Upon filing its Complaint with the RTC, RSB paid the sum of P13,644.25 for
docket and other legal fees, as assessed by the Office of the Clerk of Court.
The Clerk of Court initially considered the case as an action incapable of
pecuniary estimation and computed the docket and other legal fees due thereon
according to Section 7(b)(1), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court.
Tan filed before the RTC an Omnibus Motion in which he contended that the civil
case involved real properties, the docket fees for which should be computed in
accordance with Section 7(a), not Section 7(b)(1), of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court,
as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC which took effect on 16 August 2004.
o Since petitioner did not pay the appropriate docket fees for the civil case,
the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the said case.
o Hence, respondent Tan asked the RTC to issue an order requiring
RSB to pay the correct and accurate docket fees and should RSB fail
to do so, to deny and dismiss the case.
RTC ordered RSB to pay additional filing fee and Tan was also ordered to pay
docket and filing fees on his counterclaim.
CA upheld RTC, saying that the objectives of RSB in filing the complaint were
to cancel the deeds of sale and ultimately, to recover possession of the same.
It is therefore a real action. Consequently, the additional docket fees that must be
paid cannot be assessed in accordance with Section 7(b). As a real action, Section
7(a) must be applied in the assessment and payment of the proper docket fee.
Remedial Law Compiled. Codal and Cases. Atty. Tranquil. 2
RTC, instead of dismissing outright RSBs Complaint, granted RSB time to pay the
additional docket fees. Despite the seeming munificence of the RTC, petitioner
refused to pay the additional docket fees assessed against it, believing that it had
already paid the correct amount before, pursuant to Section 7(b)(1), Rule 141 of
the Rules of Court, as amended.
Issue: For the purposes of paying the correct amount of docket fees, whether or not the
annulment of deed of sale involving a real property is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Held: No. Case is a real action.
After Tan and Obiedo had the Deeds of Absolute Sale presented to the Register of Deeds,
they were already issued TCTs over the real properties in question, in their own names.
No matter how fastidiously RSB attempts to conceal them, the allegations and reliefs it
sought in its Complaint appears to be ultimately a real action, involving as they do the
recovery by RSM of its title to and possession of the five parcels of land from Tan and
Obiedo.
While it is true that RSB does not directly seek the recovery of title or possession
of the property in question, his action for annulment of sale and his claim for
damages are closely intertwined with the issue of ownership of the building
which, under the law, is considered immovable property, the recovery of which is
RSB's primary objective. The prevalent doctrine is that an action for the annulment or
rescission of a sale of real property does not operate to efface the fundamental and
prime objective and nature of the case, which is to recover said real property. It is a real
action.
Considering that the complaint is a real action, the Rule requires that "the
assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated value thereof
shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis in computing the fees.
A real action indisputably involves real property. The docket fees for a real action would
still be determined in accordance with the value of the real property involved therein;
the only difference is in what constitutes the acceptable value.
In computing the docket fees for cases involving real properties, the courts, instead of
relying on the assessed or estimated value, would now be using the fair market value of
the real properties (as stated in the Tax Declaration or the Zonal Valuation of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue, whichever is higher) or, in the absence thereof, the stated value of
the same
DO-ALL METALS VS. SECURITY BANK
In Do-ALL Metals Industries vs. Security Bank, the Supreme Court observed that what
the plaintiffs failed to pay merely was the filing fees for their supplemental complaint.
Thus, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over plaintiffs action from the moment they filed
their original complaint accompanied by the payment of the filing fees due on the same.

In other words, the plaintiffs non-payment of the additional filing fees due on their
additional claims did not divest the RTC of the jurisdiction it already had over the case
(PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 358 Phil. 38, 62 (1998).
xxxxx
However, as to the damages that plaintiffs claim under their supplemental complaint,
their stand that the RTC committed no error in admitting the complaint even if they had
not paid the filing fees due on it since such fees constituted a lien anyway on the
judgment award is not correct. The Supreme Court clarified that the after-judgment lien,
which implies that payment depends on a successful execution of the judgment, applies
to cases where the filing fees were incorrectly assessed or paid or where the court has
discretion to fix the amount of the award. (Rules of Court, Rule 141, Section 2 (Fees in
Lien). None of these circumstances obtain in the case.
Here, the supplemental complaint specified from the beginning the actual
damages that the plaintiffs sought against the Bank. Still plaintiffs paid no filing fees on
the same. And, while petitioners claim that they were willing to pay the additional fees,
they gave no reason for their omission nor offered to pay the same. They merely said
that they did not yet pay the fees because the RTC had not assessed them for it. But a
supplemental complaint is like any complaint and the rule is that the filing fees due on a
complaint need to be paid upon its filing. (Section 1 (Payment of Fees) in relation to
Section 7 (Fees collectible by the Clerks of Regional Trial Courts for filing an action). The
rules do not require the court to make special assessments in cases of supplemental
complaints.
To aggravate plaintiffs omission, although the Bank brought up the question
of their failure to pay additional filing fees in its motion for reconsideration, plaintiffs
made no effort to make at least a late payment before the case could be submitted for
decision, assuming of course that the prescription of their action had not then set it in.
Clearly, plaintiffs have no excuse for their continuous failure to pay the fees they owed
the court. Consequently, the trial court should have treated their Supplemental
Complaint as not filed. x x x x
Plaintiffs of course point out that the Bank itself raised the issue of non-
payment of additional filing fees only after the RTC had rendered its decision in the case.
The implication is that the Bank should be deemed to have waived its objection to such
omission. But it is not for a party to the case or even for the trial court to waive the
payment of the additional filing fees due on the supplemental complaint. Only the
Supreme Court can grant exemptions to the payment of the fees due the courts and
these exemptions are embodied in its rules (DO-ALL METALS INDUSTRIES VS.
SECURITY BANK CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 176339, JANUARY 10, 2011, ABAD, J.).
PHIL. FIRST INSURANCE VS. FIRST LOGISTICS
Remedial Law Compiled. Codal and Cases. Atty. Tranquil. 3
FACTS: Pyramid Logistics and Trucking Corporation (Pyramid) alleged in its complaint
that its delivery van, which was loaded with goods belonging to California
Manufacturing Corporation (CMC) valued at 907,149.07, left the CMC Bicutan
Warehouse. However, the van, together with the goods, failed to reach its destination
and its driver and helper were nowhere to be found, to its damage and prejudice.
It filed a criminal complaint against the driver and helper for qualified theft, and a claim
with Philippine First Insurance Co., Inc., and Paramount Insurance General Corporation
as co-insurers for the lost goods. However, the insurance companies refused to
compensate for the loss in violation of their undertaking under the insurance policies.
For this reason, Pyramid suffered damages and was constrained to engage the services
of counsel to enforce and protect its right to recover compensation under the insurance
policies, and for which services, it obligated itself to pay the sum equivalent to 25% of
any recovery in the instant action, as and for
attorneys fees and legal expenses. It prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the
insurance companies to comply with their obligation under their respective insurance
policies to pay to it jointly and severally the sum of 50,000 plus 1,500 for each court
session attended by counsel until the case is terminated as attorneys fees, and the costs
of suit.
Pyramid was assessed a docket fee of 610 on the basis of the amount of 50,000. Pyramid
later filed an amended complaint containing minor changes in the body but bearing the
same prayer. Branch 148 of the Makati RTC, to which the complaint was raffled,
admitted the amended complaint.
The insurance companies filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction,
Pyramid not having paid the docket fees in full. It argued that in the body of its amended
complaint, Pyramid alleged that it suffered damages, but in the prayer, it deliberately
omitted to specify what these damages are. This deliberate omission by Pyramid was
intended to evade the payment of the correct filing fee. The insurance companies
invoked the doctrine in Manchester Development Corporation vs. CA that a pleading
which does not specify in the prayer the amount sought shall not be admitted or shall
otherwise be expunged, and that the court acquires jurisdiction only upon the payment
of the prescribed docket fee. Pyramid, on the other hand, insists the application of Sun
Insurance Office, Ltd. vs. Asuncion and subsequent rulings relaxing the Manchester
ruling by allowing payment of the docket fee within a reasonable time, in no case
beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period, where the filing of the
initiatory pleading is not accompanied by the payment of the prescribed docket fee. The
CA applied the liberal rule in Sun Insurance.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in applying the liberal rule in Sun Insurance???
 Remedial Law Compiled. Codal and Cases. Atty. Tranquil.
RULING: YES, the CA erred. The Manchester rule applies. In the case of Tacay vs.
Regional Trial Court of Tagum, Davao del Norte, the SC clarified the effect of the Sun
Insurance ruling on the Manchester ruling as follows: The requirement in Circular No. 7
that complaints, petitions, answers, and similar pleadings should specify the amount of
damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, has
not been altered. What has been revised is the rule that subsequent amendment of the
complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less
the payment of the docket fee based on the amount sought in the amended pleading, the
trial court now being authorized to allow payment of the
fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive period or
reglementary period. Moreover, a new rule has been added, governing the awards of
claims not specified in the pleading i.e., damages arising after the filing of the
complaint or similar pleading as to which the additional filing fee therefore shall
constitute a lien on the judgment. In the case at bar, Pyramid failed to specify in its
prayer the amount of claims/damages it was seeking both in the original and amended
complaint. It reasoned out that it was not aware of the extent of the liability of the
insurance companies under their respective policies. It left the matter of liability to the
trial courts determination. Even assuming that the amounts are yet to be determined,
the rule in Manchester, as modified by Sun Insurance, still applies. In the case of Ayala
Corporation vs. Madayag, the SC pronounced the following: While it is true that the
determination of certain damages x x x is left to the sound discretion of the court, it is
the duty of the parties claiming such damages to specify the amount sought on the basis
of which the court may make a proper determination, and for the proper assessment of
the appropriate docket fees. The exception contemplated as to claims not specified or to
claims although specified are left for determination of the court is limited only to any
damages that may arise after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading for then it
will not be possible for the claimant to specify nor speculate as to the amount thereof.
BENJAMIN BAUTISTA VS. SHIRLEY UNANGST
Hamilton Salak rented a car from GAB Rent-a-Car, owned by Bautista
(petitioner) for 3 days at P1k per day.
When Salak failed to return the car, Bautista filed a complaint against Salak for
estafa, carnapping and violation of BP 22.
Subsequently, Salak and his common-law wife, Unangst (respondent), were
arrested.
After Bautista made demand for payment, Salak and Unangst expressed
willingness to pay but since they were short on cash, they offered to sell to
Bautista a house and lot titled in the name of Unangst.
4
Bautistas wife, Cynthia, further agreed to pay the mortgage loan of Unangst
over the subject property to a certain Jojo Lee in the amount of Php295,000.00
as the property was then set to be publicly auctioned.
In a written agreement, they agreed that Unangst would sell, subject to
repurchase, her residential property in favor of Cynthia, Bautistas wife to
answer for the release of the mortgage on the property, and the amount due to
GAB Rent-A-Car.
It was also ageed that Unangst will pay taxes on the property and that she and
her assigns will vacate the premises and deliver its possession to Bautista if
she fails to exercise her right to repurchase w/in 30 days. Otherwise, Bautista
will take immediate possession of the property.
After Uangst failed to pay taxes, vacate premises and repurchase the property,
Bautista filed for specific performance.
The lower court ruled in favor of Bautista.
Unangst failed to interpose a timely appeal, but she filed a petition for relief
pursuant to Rules on CivPro, arguing that she learned of the decision of the
RTC only on 6 September 2004 when she received a copy of the motion for
execution filed by Bautista.
Bautista moved to dismiss the petition on the ground of insufficient payment
of docket fees, although the correct amount was subsequently paid by Unangst
beyond the 60-day reglementary period.
Unangst argued that the insufficiency was due to the incorrect assessment by
the Clerk of Court.
RTC granted the petition and ordered to file a notice of appeal within twenty-
four (24) hours from receipt of the order, which was duly accomplished.
On appeal, the CA upheld the granting of relief by the RTC.
ISSUE: W/n appeal should be dismissed merely due to the payment of
insufficient docket fees and/or payment of the same beyond the 60-day
reglementary period
RATIO: No, it should NOT be dismissed.
The right to appeal is a purely statutory right and may only be exercised in the
manner and in accordance with the rules provided by law. Payment of the full
amount of the docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period is
mandatory and jurisdictional.

However, the court has the power to relax the strict application of this rule
under exceptional circumstances so as to meet the ends of justice. The Court
must give ample opportunity for both parties to present their arguments and
defenses, even if it means having to set aside or being at least lenient in the
technicalities.
It was clear that Unangst paid the insufficient docket fee in good faith since it
was the Clerk of Court who made the error in assessing the said fee. Since it
was an error made by a public officer and not the fault of Unangst herself,
dismissing the appeal will only bring grave injustice.
Segovia v. Barrios: Every citizen has the right to assume and trust that a public
officer charged by law with certain duties knows his duties and performs them
in accordance with law. To penalize such citizen for relying upon said officer in
all good faith is repugnant to justice.
RICHARD CHUA, VS.THE EXECUTIVE JUDGE, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, MANILA,
PEREZ, J.:
At bench is a Petition for Review on Certiorari,1
assailing the Orders2
dated 26 June
2012 and 26 July 2012 of the Executive Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC),
Manila, in UDK Nos. 12001457 to 96.
The facts:
On 13 January 2012, herein petitioner Richard Chua tiled before the Office of the City
Prosecutor (OCP) of Manila, a complaint charging one Letty Sy Gan of forty (40) counts
of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP Blg.) 22 or the Bouncing Checks Law. 3 After
conducting preliminary investigation, the OCP found probable cause and, on 22 March
2012, filed forty (40) counts of violation of BP Blg. 22 before the MeTC. 4
Consequently, the MeTC informed petitioner that he has to pay a totalof P540,668.00 as
filing fees for all the forty (40) counts of violation of BP Blg. 22. 5 Finding the said amount
to be beyond his means, petitioner consulted with the MeTC clerk of court to ask
whether he could pay filing fees on a per case basis instead of being required to pay the
total filing fees for all the BP Blg. 22 cases all at once. 6 The MeTC clerk of court opined
that petitioner could not.7 Petitioner was thus unable to pay any filing fees.
Remedial Law Compiled. Codal and Cases. Atty. Tranquil. 5
Due to non-payment of the required filing fees, the MeTC designated the forty (40)
counts of violation of BP Blg. 22 as undocketed cases under UDK Nos. 12001457 to 96.
Subsequently, the OCP moved for consolidation of the said cases. 8
On 18 April 2012, petitioner filed before the Executive Judge of the MeTC a motion
entitled "
Urgent Motion to Allow Private Complainant to Pay Filing Fee on a Per Case Basis"
(Urgent Motion).9 In it, petitioner reiterated his request that he be allowed to pay filing
fees on a per case basis instead of being required to pay the total amount of filing fees in
its entirety.
On 26 June 2012, the Executive Judge issued an Order denying petitioners Urgent
Motion. In rebuffing petitioners Urgent Motion, the Executive Judge of the MeTC
ratiocinated that granting petitioners plea would constitute a deferment in the payment
of filing fees that, in turn, contravenes Section 1(b) of the Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court.10
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but to no avail.
Hence, this appeal.
OUR RULING
Prefatorily, it must be pointed out that petitioner availed of the wrong remedy in
assailing the Orders dated 26 June 2012 and 26 July 2012 of the Executive Judge of the
MeTC via the present petition for review on certiorari. The assailed orders are not,
technically, final orders that are appealable,11 let alone the proper subjects of an appeal
by certiorari.12 The assailed orders do not, at least for the moment, completely dispose
of the B.P. 22 cases filed before the MeTC.
The correct remedy for the petitioner, in view of the unavailability of an appeal or any
other remedy in the ordinary course of law, is a certiorari petition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.13 But then again, the petitioner should have filed such a petition, not
directly with this Court, but before the appropriate Regional Trial Court pursuant to the
principle of hierarchy of courts.14
In the weightier interest of substantial justice, however, this Court forgives such
procedural lapses and treats the instant appeal as a certiorari petition filed properly
before this Court. To this Court, the grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Executive Judge was patent on the undisputed facts of this case and is serious enough to
warrant a momentary deviation from the procedural norm.

Thus, We come to the focal issue of whether the Executive Judge of the MeTC committed
grave abuse of discretion, in light of the facts and circumstances herein obtaining, in
refusing petitioners request of paying filing fees on a per case basis.
We answer in the affirmative. We grant the petition.
In proposing to pay filing fees on a per case basis, petitioner was not trying to evade or
deny his obligation to pay for the filing fees for all forty (40) counts of violation of BP
Blg. 22 filed before the MeTC. He, in fact, acknowledges such obligation. He, in fact,
admits that he is incapable of fulfilling such obligation in its entirety.
Rather, what petitioner is asking is that he at least be allowed to pursue some of the
cases, the filing fees of which he is capable of financing. Petitioner manifests that, given
his current financial status, he simply cannot afford the filing fees for all the forty (40)
BP Blg. 22 cases.
We see nothing wrong or illegal in granting petitioners request.
First. The Executive Judge erred when she treated the entireP540,668.00 as one
indivisible obligation, when that figure was nothing but the sum of individual filing fees
due for each count of violation of BP Blg.22 filed before the MeTC. Granting petitioners
request would not constitute a deferment in the payment of filing fees, for the latter
clearly intends to pay in full the filing fees of some, albeit not all, of the cases filed.
Filing fees, when required, are assessed and become due for each initiatory pleading
filed.15 In criminal actions, these pleadings refer to the information filed in court.
In the instant case, there are a total of forty (40) counts of violation of BP Blg. 22 that
was filed before the MeTC.1wphi1And each of the forty (40) was, in fact, assessed its
filing fees, individually, based on the amount of check one covers.16 Under the rules of
criminal procedure, the filing of the forty(40) counts is equivalent to the filing of forty
(40) different informations, as each count represents an independent violation of BP
Blg. 22.17 Filing fees are, therefore, due for each count and may be paid for each count
separately.
Second. In an effort to justify her refusal of petitioners request, the Executive Judge
further argues that since all forty (40) counts of violation of BP Blg. 22 were brought
about by a single complaint filed before the OCP and are now consolidated before the
court, the payment of their tiling fees should be made for all or none at all. 18
That all forty (40) counts of violation of BP Blg. 22 all emanated from a single complaint
filed in the OCP is irrelevant. The fact remains that there are still forty (40) counts of
violation of BP Blg. 22 that were filed before the MeTC and, as a consequence, forty (40)
individual filing fees to be paid.
Remedial Law Compiled. Codal and Cases. Atty. Tranquil. 6
Neither would the consolidation of all forty (40) counts make any difference.
Consolidation unifies criminal cases involving related offenses only for purposes of
trial.19 Consolidation does not transform the tiling fees due for each case consolidated
into one indivisible fee.
Third. Allowing petitioner to pay for the tiling fees of some of the forty ( 40) counts of
violation of BP Big. 22 tiled before the MeTC, will concededly result into the absolute
non-payment of the filing fees of the rest. The fate of the cases which filing fees were not
paid, however, is already the concern of the MeTC.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed
Orders dated 26 June 2012 and 26 July 2012 of the Executive Judge of the Metropolitan
Trial Court, Manila, in UDK Nos.12001457 to 96 are ANNULED and SET ASIDE. The
Metropolitan Trial Court, Manila, is hereby directed to accept payments of tiling fees in
UDK Nos. 12001457 to 96 on a per information basis.
No costs.
IN RE: EXEMPTION OF NPC FROM PAYMENT OF FILING/DOCKET FEES (A.M. NO. 05-10-
20-SC)
The National Power Corporation (NPC) seeks clarification from the Court on whether or
not it is exempt from the payment of filing fees, appeal bonds and supersedeas bonds.
On December 6, 2005, the Court issued A.M. No. 05-10-20-SC, In re: Exemption of the
National Power Corporation from the Payment of Filing/Docket Fees, on the basis of
Section 13, Republic Act No. 6395 (An Act Revising the Charter of the National Power
Corporation). It reads:
The Court Resolved, upon the recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator,
to DECLARE that the National Power Corporation (NPC) is still exempt from the
payment of filing fees, appeals bond, and supersedeas bonds.
On October 27, 2009, however, the Court issued A.M. No. 05-10-20-SC stating that:
The Court Resolved, upon recommendation of the Committee on the Revision of the
Rules of Court, to DENY the request of the National Power Corporation (NPC) for
exemption from the payment of filing fees pursuant to Section 10 of Republic Act No.
6395, as amended by Section 13 of Presidential Decree No. 938. The request appears to
run counter to Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution, in the rule-making power of
the Supreme Court over the rules on pleading, practice and procedure in all courts,
which includes the sole power to fix the filing fees of cases in courts.

Hence, the subject letter of NPC for clarification as to its exemption from the payment of
filing fees and court fees.
Section 22 of Rule 141 reads:
Sec. 22. Government exempt. The Republic of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities are exempt from paying the legal fees provided in this rule. Local
government units and government-owned or controlled corporations with or without
independent charters are not exempt from paying such fees. (emphasis supplied)
Section 70 of Republic Act No. 9136 (Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001),
on privatization of NPC assets, expressly states that the NPC shall remain as a national
government-owned and controlled corporation.
Thus, NPC is not exempt from payment of filing fees.
The non-exemption of NPC is further fortified by the promulgation on ---February 11,
2010 of A.M. No. 08-2-01-0, In re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) from Payment of Legal Fees. In said case,
the Court, citing Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice,[1] stressed that the 1987 Constitution
took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure; and that the power to promulgate these rules is no
longer shared by the Court with Congress and the Executive, thus:
Since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by
this Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled,
changed or modified by Congress. As one of the safeguards of this Courts institutional
independence, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is
now the Courts exclusive domain. That power is no longer shared by this Court with
Congress, much less the Executive.
Speaking for the Court, then Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puno
traced the history of the rule-making power of this Court and highlighted its evolution
and development in Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice:
Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of this Court to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure was granted but it appeared to be co-
existent with legislative power for it was subject to the power of Congress to repeal,
alter or supplement. Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII provides:
Sec.13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law.
Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice, and
procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to
the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have
Remedial Law Compiled. Codal and Cases. Atty. Tranquil. 7
the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.
xxx xxx xxx
[T]he 1973 Constitution reiterated the power of this Court to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, x x x which, however, may be
repealed, altered or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa x x x. More completely,
Section 5(2) [sic] 5 of its Article X provided:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, and the integration of the Bar, which, however, may be
repealed, altered, or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall provide
a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of case, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights.
xxx xxx xxx
The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary.
Among others, it enhanced the rule making power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article
VIII provides:
xxx xxx xxx
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of
law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall
be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time
was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the first time the power to
 Remedial Law Compiled. Codal and Cases. Atty. Tranquil.
disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most
importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or
supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court
with Congress, more so with the Executive.
The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government has
erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure within the sole province of this Court. The other branches
trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal,
alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by this Court. Viewed from this
perspective, the claim of a legislative grant of exemption from the payment of legal fees
under Section 39 of RA 8291 necessarily fails.
With the foregoing categorical pronouncement of the Court, it is clear that NPC can no
longer invoke Republic Act No. 6395 (NPC Charter), as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 938, as its basis for exemption from the payment of legal fees.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby CLARIFIED that the National Power Corporation is not
exempt from the payment of legal fees.
UNICAPITAL VS. CONSING
Doctrine: Docket Fees; It has long been settled that while the court acquires jurisdiction
over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees, its non-payment at
the time of the filing of the complaint does not automatically cause the dismissal of the
complaint provided that the fees are paid within a reasonable period
Facts:
In 1997, Consing, Jr., an investment banker, and his mother, Cecilia Dela Cruz
(Dela Cruz), obtained an P18,000,000.00 loan from Unicapital, P12,000,000.00
of which was acquired on July 24, 1997 and the remaining P6,000,000.00 on
August 1, 1997. The said loan was secured by Promissory Notes10 and a Real
Estate Mortgage over a 42000 sqm land in Imus Cavite registered in the name
of Dela Cruz.
Prior to these transactions, Plus Builders was already interested in developing
this land into a subdivision. PB went into a joint venture with Unicapital.
The loan and mortgage was modified into an Option to Buy real property and
Dela Cruz eventually decided to sell the property. Dela Cruz appointed Consing
as attorney in fact.
8
Unicapital and PB each bought half of the property. However, before the titles
were transferred to their names, Teng and Yu informed Unicapital and PB that
they were the lawful owners of the property. PB investigated and found out
that Dela Cruzs titles were of dubious origin. Thus, Uni and PB demanded Dela
Cruz and Consing to return their money.
Consing filed charges of harassment against Uni and PB because of the
incessant demands and accused them of coercing him to commit a violation of
BP 22. He prays that he be declared a mere agent of Dela Cruz.
Uni and PB filed motions to dismiss Consings complaints because of lack of
jurisdiction of RTC Pasig, among others (lack of cause of action, defective
verification, etc) for failure of Consing to pay the proper amount of docket fees
RTC refused to dismiss Consings complaint on the ground of docket fees as
jurisdiction was already vested in it upon the filing of the original complaint.
Uni and PB MRed. Dennied. Petition for Certiorari to CA.
CA denied. it ruled that while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a
jurisdictional requirement, its non-payment will not automatically cause the
dismissal of the case. In this regard, it considered that should there be any
deficiency in the payment of such fees, the same shall constitute a lien on the
judgment award
Pet for rev on certiorari
ISSUE: WON Consings complaint should be dismissed on nonpayment of
docket fees? NO
Neither should Consing, Jr.s failure to pay the required docket fees lead to the
dismissal of his complaint. It has long been settled that while the court
acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed
docket fees, its non-payment at the time of the filing of the complaint does not
automatically cause the dismissal of the complaint provided that the fees are
paid within a reasonable period. Consequently, Unicapital, et al.s insistence
that the stringent rule on non-payment of docket fees enunciated in the case of
Manchester Development Corporation v. CA, 149 SCRA 562 (1987), should be
applied in this case cannot be sustained in the absence of proof that Consing, Jr.
intended to defraud the government by his failure to pay the correct amount of
filing fees
Plainly, while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional
requirement, even its non-payment at the time of filing does not automatically
cause the dismissal of the case, as long as the fee is paid within the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period, more so when the party involved
demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such payment.
 Remedial Law Compiled. Codal and Cases. Atty. Tranquil.
Thus, when insufficient filing fees were initially paid by the plaintiffs and there
was no intention to defraud the government, the Manchester rule does not
apply.
PROTON PILIPINAS CORPORATION V. BANQUE NACIONAL DE PARIS
Sometime in 1995, petitioner Proton Pilipinas Corporation (Proton) availed of
a loan from Banque Nationale de Paris (BNP).
To guarantee the payment of its obligation, its co-petitioners Automotive
Corporation Philippines (Automotive), Asea One Corporation (Asea) and
Autocorp Group (Autocorp) executed a corporate guarantee to the extent of
US$2M.
BNP and Proton subsequently entered into three trust receipt agreements. The
terms of such provided that Proton would receive and hold in trust for BNP
imported passenger motor vehicles.
Proton would be free to sell the vehicles subject to the condition that it would
deliver the proceeds of the sale to BNP, to be applied to its obligations to it.
In case the vehicles are not sold, Proton would return them to BNP, together
with all the accompanying documents of title.
Allegedly, Proton failed to deliver the proceeds of the sale and return the
unsold motor vehicles.
Pursuant to the corporate guarantee, BNP demanded from Automotive, Asea
and Autocorp the payment of the amount of about P1.5M+ w/c represented
Protons total outstanding obligations.
Guarantors refused to pay so BNP filed a complaint against petitioners before
RTC praying that they be ordered to pay the said amt + accrued interest and
other related charges, and an amount equivalent to 5% of all sums due from
petitioners as attorneys fees.
Makati RTC Clerk of Court assessed the docket fees which BNP paid at about
P350k+
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that BNP failed to pay the
correct docket fees to thus prevent the trial court from acquiring jurisdiction
over the case. Petitioenrs also raised prematurity of the complaint, BNP not
having priorly sent any demand letter.
9
RTC denied Motion to Dismiss, saying that docket fees were properly paid. CA
likewise denied the motion on appeal.
Thus petitioners filed an action before SC, pointing out additionally that the
clerk of court, in converting BNPs claims from US dollars to Philippine pesos,
applied the wrong exchange rate of P43 to $1, since the rate when the
complaint was filed was P43.21 to $1. Thus, BNPs claim as of August 15, 1998
should have been about P70k+ and not P69k+
ISSUE: W/n the docket fees were properly paid
RATIO: No, fees were insufficient. RTC Clerk of Court should reassess and
determine the docket fees to be paid by BNP w/in 15 days.
1) In Manchester vs. CA, the court ruled that it is not simply the filing of the
complaint but PAYMENT of the docket fee that vests the court w/ jurisdiction
over the subject matter.
Where the filing of the pleading is NOT accompanied by payment of docket fee,
court may allow payment w/in reasonable time as long as NOT beyond
reglementary period (also applies to 3rd party claims and counterclaims).
The presumption of regularity of the clerk of courts application of the
exchange rate is not conclusive, but DISPUTABLE by evidence to the contrary.
In this case, petitioners were able to prove w/ documentary evidence that the
exchange rate when the complaint was filed on September 7, 1998 was US $1 =
P43.21.
Thus, the docket fees paid by respondent were insufficient.
2) DESPITE this, the court should not dismiss the case and in fact acquired
jurisdiction. It must be noted that MANCHESTER was superseded by SUN
INSURANANCE. In Sun Insurance, even if there was underpayment, the party
was willing to pay to docket fees, as opposed to Manchester where there was
fraudulent machinations involved. Thus, CASE will NOT be dismissed as long
as there is NO intention to defraud.
Also, where the TC acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the
appropriate pleading and payment of the filing fee but, subsequently, the
judgment awards a claim NOT specified in the pleading / left to courts
determination, additional fee shall constitute LIEN ON JUDGEMENT. Clerk of
Court must enforce and assess the additional fee.
In this case, respondents relied on the clerk of courts assessment which
turned out to be incorrect (since they based it on a prior ruling/statute already

repealed in 1998). Thus, the clerk of court has the responsibility of reassessing
what respondent must pay within the prescriptive period.
Pursuant, however, to Section 2, Rule 141, as amended by Administrative
Circular No. 11-94, respondent should be made to pay additional fees which
shall constitute a lien in the event the trial court adjudges that it is entitled to
interest accruing AFTER the filing of the complaint.
A.M. NO. 08-11-7-SC
RE: REQUEST OF NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID TO EXEMPT LEGAL AID
CLIENTS FROM PAYING FILING, DOCKET AND OTHER FEES.
On September 23, 2008 the Misamis Oriental Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) promulgated Resolution No. 24. The resolution requested the IBPs
National Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA) to ask for the exemption from the payment of
filing, docket and other fees of clients of the legal aid offices in the various IBP chapters
like the exemption granted to PAO clients under RA 9406. The Court lauded the Misamis
Oriental Chapter of the IBP for its effort to help improve the administration of justice,
particularly, the access to justice by the poor. In promulgating Resolution No. 24, the
Misamis Oriental Chapter of the IBP has effectively performed its duty to "participate in
the development of the legal system by initiating or supporting efforts in law reform and
in the administration of justice."
In approving the Rule, the Court stressed that the Constitution guarantees the rights of
the poor to free access to the courts and to adequate legal assistance. It found the legal
aid service rendered by the NCLA and legal aid offices of IBP chapters nationwide
addresses the right to adequate legal assistance and that the recipients of the service of
the NCLA and legal aid offices of IBP Chapters may enjoy free access to courts by
exempting them from the payment of fees assessed in connection with the filing of a
complaint or action in court. The Court held that with these twin initiatives, the
guarantee of Section 11, Article III of the Constitution is advanced and access to justice is
increased by bridging a significant gap and removing a major roadblock.
The Court concluded with a declaration that access to justice is essential in a
democracy and in the rule of law. Recognizing the right of access to justice as the most
important pillar of legal empowerment of the marginalized sectors of our society, it has
exercised its power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights to open the doors of justice to the underprivileged and to allow
them to step inside the court to be heard of their plaints.
Remedial Law Compiled. Codal and Cases. Atty. Tranquil. 10
RE: QUERY OF MR. ROGER C. PRIORESCHI RE EXEMPTION FROM LEGAL AND FILING
FEES OF THE GOOD SHEPHERD FOUNDATION, INC.
In his letter dated May 22, 2009 addressed to the Chief Justice, Mr. Roger C. Prioreschi,
administrator of the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., wrote:
The Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. is very grateful for your 1rst. Indorsement to pay a
nominal fee of Php 5,000.00 and the balance upon the collection action of 10 million
pesos, thus giving us access to the Justice System previously denied by an up-front
excessive court fee.
The Hon. Court Administrator Jose Perez pointed out to the need of complying with OCA
Circular No. 42-2005 and Rule 141 that reserves this privilege to indigent persons.
While judges are appointed to interpret the law, this type of law seems to be extremely
detailed with requirements that do not leave much room for interpretations.
In addition, this law deals mainly with individual indigent and it does not include
Foundations or Associations that work with and for the most Indigent persons. As seen
in our Article of Incorporation, since 1985 the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. reached-
out to the poorest among the poor, to the newly born and abandoned babies, to children
who never saw the smile of their mother, to old people who cannot afford a few pesos to
pay for common prescriptions, to broken families who returned to a normal life. In
other words, we have been working hard for the very Filipino people, that the
Government and the society cannot reach to, or have rejected or abandoned them.
Can the Courts grant to our Foundation who works for indigent and underprivileged
people, the same option granted to indigent people?
The two Executive Judges, that we have approached, fear accusations of favoritism or
other kind of attack if they approve something which is not clearly and specifically
stated in the law or approved by your HONOR.
Can your Honor help us once more?

Grateful for your understanding, God bless you and your undertakings.
We shall be privileged if you find time to visit our orphanage the Home of Love and
the Spiritual Retreat Center in Antipolo City.
To answer the query of Mr. Prioreschi, the Courts cannot grant to foundations like the
Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. the same exemption from payment of legal fees granted
to indigent litigants even if the foundations are working for indigent and
underprivileged people.
The basis for the exemption from legal and filing fees is the free access clause, embodied
in Sec. 11, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, thus:
Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and quasi judicial bodies and adequate legal
assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.
The importance of the right to free access to the courts and quasi judicial bodies and to
adequate legal assistance cannot be denied. A move to remove the provision on free
access from the Constitution on the ground that it was already covered by the equal
protection clause was defeated by the desire to give constitutional stature to such
specific protection of the poor.[1]
In implementation of the right of free access under the Constitution, the Supreme
Court promulgated rules, specifically, Sec. 21, Rule 3, Rules of Court,[2] and Sec. 19, Rule
141, Rules of Court,[3] which respectively state thus:
Sec. 21. Indigent party. A party may be authorized to litigate his action, claim or
defense as an indigent if the court, upon an ex parte application and hearing, is satisfied
that the party is one who has no money or property sufficient and available for food,
shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family.
Remedial Law Compiled. Codal and Cases. Atty. Tranquil. 11
Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of docket and other lawful fees,
and of transcripts of stenographic notes which the court may order to be furnished him.
The amount of the docket and other lawful fees which the indigent was exempted from
paying shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent,
unless the court otherwise provides.
Any adverse party may contest the grant of such authority at any time before judgment
is rendered by the trial court. If the court should determine after hearing that the party
declared as an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income or property, the proper
docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by the clerk of court. If
payment is not made within the time fixed by the court, execution shall issue for the
payment thereof, without prejudice to such other sanctions as the court may impose.
(22a)
Sec. 19. Indigent litigants exempt from payment of legal fees. Indigent litigants (a)
whose gross income and that of their immediate family do not exceed an amount double
the monthly minimum wage of an employee and (b) who do not own real property with
a fair market value as stated in the current tax declaration of more than three hundred
thousand (P300,000.00) pesos shall be exempt from payment of legal fees.
The legal fees shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the
indigent litigant unless the court otherwise provides.
To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the litigant shall execute an affidavit
that he and his immediate family do not earn a gross income abovementioned, and they
do not own any real property with the fair value aforementioned, supported by an
affidavit of a disinterested person attesting to the truth of the litigants affidavit. The
current tax declaration, if any, shall be attached to the litigants affidavit.
Any falsity in the affidavit of litigant or disinterested person shall be sufficient cause to
dismiss the complaint or action or to strike out the pleading of that party, without
prejudice to whatever criminal liability may have been incurred.
The clear intent and precise language of the aforequoted provisions of the Rules of
Court indicate that only a natural party litigant may be regarded as an indigent litigant.
The Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., being a corporation invested by the State with a
juridical personality separate and distinct from that of its members,[4] is a juridical
person. Among others, it has the power to acquire and possess property of all kinds as
well as incur obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in conformity with the laws
and regulations of their organization.[5] As a juridical person, therefore, it cannot be
accorded the exemption from legal and filing fees granted to indigent litigants.
That the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. is working for indigent and
underprivileged people is of no moment. Clearly, the Constitution has explicitly

premised the free access clause on a persons poverty, a condition that only a natural
person can suffer.
There are other reasons that warrant the rejection of the request for exemption in favor
of a juridical person. For one, extending the exemption to a juridical person on the
ground that it works for indigent and underprivileged people may be prone to abuse
(even with the imposition of rigid documentation requirements), particularly by
corporations and entities bent on circumventing the rule on payment of the fees. Also,
the scrutiny of compliance with the documentation requirements may prove too time-
consuming and wasteful for the courts.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. cannot be
extended the exemption from legal and filing fees despite its working for indigent and
underprivileged people.
II. JURISDICTION
BP 129
Section 1. Title. This Act shall be known as "The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980."
Section 2. Scope. The reorganization herein provided shall include the Court of
Appeals, the Court of First Instance, the Circuit Criminal Courts, the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Courts, the Courts of Agrarian Relations, the City Courts, the
Municipal Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Courts.
CHAPTER I
COURT OF APPEALS
Section 3. Organization. There is hereby created a Court of Appeals which consists of a
Presiding Justice and fifty Associate Justice who shall be appointed by the President of
the Philippines. The Presiding Justice shall be so designated in his appointment, and the
Associate Justice shall have precedence according to the dates of their respective
appointments, or when the appointments of two or more of them shall bear the same
date, according to the order in which their appointments were issued by the President.
Any member who is reappointed to the Court after rendering service in any other
position in the government shall retain the precedence to which he was entitled under
his original appointment, and his service in the Court shall, for all intents and purposes,
be considered as continuous and uninterrupted. (as amended by Exec. Order No. 33,,
July 28, 1986.)
Remedial Law Compiled. Codal and Cases. Atty. Tranquil. 12
Section 4. Exercise of powers and functions. The Court Appeals shall exercise its
powers, functions, and duties, through seventeen (17) divisions, each composed of three
(3) members. The Court may sit en banc only for the purpose of exercising
administrative, ceremonial, or other non-adjudicatory functions. (as amended by Exec.
Order No. 33,.)
Section 5. Succession to Office of Presiding Justice. In case of a vacancy in the absence
of inability to perform the powers, functions, and duties of his office, the associate
Justice who is first in precedence shall perform his powers, functions, and duties until
such disability is removed, or another Presiding Justice is appointed and has qualified.
Section 6. Who presides over session of a division. If the Presiding Justice is present in
any session of a division of the Court, he shall preside. In his absence, the Associate
Justice attending such session who has precedence shall preside.
Section 7. Qualifications. The Presiding Justice and the Associate Justice shall have the
same qualifications as those provided in Constitution for Justice of the Supreme Court.
Section 8. Grouping of Divisions. (Expressly repealed by Section 4, Exec. Order No. 33,
July 28, 1986.)
Section 9. Jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals shall Exercise:
1. Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas
corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction;
2. Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgements of Regional
Trial Courts; and
3. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgements, resolutions, orders or
awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
commission, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security
Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service
Commission, Except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under
Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph
(1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph 4 of the fourth paragraph od Section 17 of
the Judiciary Act of 1948.
The court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive
evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases
falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and
conduct new trials or Appeals must be continuous and must be completed within three
(3) months, unless extended by the Chief Justice. (as amended by R.A. No. 7902.)

Section 10. Place of holding sessions. The Court of Appeals shall have its permanent
station in the City of Manila. Whenever demanded by public interest, the Supreme Court,
upon its own initiative or upon recommendation of the Presiding Justice, may authorize
a division of the Court to hold sessions outside Manila, periodically, or for such periods
and at such places as the Supreme Court may determine, for the purpose of hearing and
deciding cases.
Section 11. Quorum A majority of the actual members of the Court shall constitute a
quorum for its session en banc. Three members shall constitute a quorum for the
session of a division. The unanimous vote of the three members of a division shall be
necessary for the pronouncement of a decision of final resolution, which shall be
reached in consultation before the writing of the opinion by any members of the
division. In the event that the three members do not reach a unanimous vote, the
Presiding Justice shall request the Raffle Committee of the Court for the designation of
two additional Justice to sit temporarily with them, forming a special division of five
members and the concurrence of a majority of such division shall be necessary for the
pronouncement of a decision or final resolution. The designation of such additional
Justice shall be made strictly by raffle.
A month for reconsideration of its decision or final resolution shall be resolved by the
Court within ninety (90) days from the time it is submitted for resolution, and no second
motion for reconsideration from the same party shall be entertainment. (as amended by
Exec. Order No. 33, July 28, 1986.)
Section 12. Internal Rules. The court en banc is authorized to promulgate rules or
orders governing the constitution of the divisions and the assignment of Appellate
Justices thereto, the distribution of cases, and other matters pertaining to the operations
of the Court of its divisions. Copies of such rules and orders shall be furnished by the
Supreme Court, which rules and orders shall be effective fifteen (15) days after receipt
thereof, unless directed otherwise by the Supreme Court.
CHAPTER II
REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS
Section 13. Creation of Regional Trial Courts. There are hereby created thirteen (13)
Regional Trial Courts, one for each of the following judicial regions:
The First Judicial Region, consisting of the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ilocos Norte,
Ilocos Sur, La Union, Mountain Province, and Pangasinan, and cities of Baguio, Dagupan,
Laog and San Carlos;
The Second Judicial Region, consisting of the provinces of Batanes, Cagayan, Ifugao,
Kalinga-Apayao, Nueva Viscaya, and Quirino;
The Third Judicial Region, consisting of the provinces of Bataan, Bulacan (except the
municipality of valenzuela), Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, Tarlac, and Zambales, and the cities
of Angeles, Cabanatuan, Olongapo, Palayan and San Jose;
Remedial Law Compiled. Codal and Cases. Atty. Tranquil. 13
The National Capital Judicial Region, consisting of the cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay,
Caloocan and Mandaluyong, and the municipalities of Navotas, Malabon, San Juan,
Makati, Pasig, Pateros, Taguig, Marikina, Paraaque, Las Pias, Muntinlupa, and
Valenzuela;
The Fourth Judicial Region, consisting of the provinces of Batangas, Cavite, Laguna,
Marinduque, Mindoro Occidental, Mindoro Oriental, Palawan, Quezon, Rizal (except the
cities and municipalities embraced within the National Capital Judicial Region0,
Romblon, and Aurora, and the cities of Batangas, Cavite, Lipa, Lucena, Puerto Princessa,
San Pablo, Tagaytay, and Trece Martires;
The Fifth Judicial Region, consisting of the provinces of Albay, Camarines Sur, Camarines
Norte, Catanduanes, Masbate, and Sorsogon, and the cities of Legaspi, Naga and Iriga;
The Sixth Judicial Region, consisting of the provinces of Aklan, Antique, Capiz, Iloilo, La
Calota, Roxas, San Carlos, and Silay, and the subprovince of Guimaras;
The Seventh Judicial Region, consisting of the provinces of Bohol, Cebu, Negros Oriental,
and Siquijor, and the cities of Bais, Canlaon, Cebu, Danao, Dumaguete, Lapu-lapu,
Mandaue, Tagbilaran, and Toledo,
The Eighth Judicial Region, consisting of the provinces or Eastern Samar, Leyte,
Northern, Samar, Southern Leyte, Ormoc, and Tacloban:
The Ninth Judicial Region, consisting of the provinces of Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi,
Zamboanga del Sur, and the cities of Dapitan, Dipolog, Pagadian, and Zamboanga;
The Tenth Judicial Region, consisting of the provinces of Agusan del Norte, Agusan del
Sur, Bukidnon, Camiguin, Misamis Occidental, Misamis Oriental, and Surigao del Norte,
and the cities of Butuan, Cagayan de Oro, Gingoog, Ozamis, Oroquieta, Surigao, and
Tangub;
The Eleventh Judicial Region, consistingnof the provinces of Davao del Norte, Davao
Oriental, Davao del Sur, South Cotabato, and Surigao del Sur, and the cities of Davao, and
General Santos; and
The Twelfth Judicial Region, consisting of the provinces of Lanao del Norte, Lanao del
Sur, Maguindanao, North Cotabato, and Sultan Kudarat, and the cities of Cotabato, Iligan,
and Marawi.
In case of transfer or redistribution of the provinces, subprovinces, cities or
municipalities comprising the regions established by law of purposes of the
administrative field organization of the various departments and agencies of the
government, the composition of the judicial regions herein constituted shall be deemed
modified accordingly.

Section 14. Regional Trial Courts.
(a) Fifty-seven Regional Trial Judges shall be commissioned for the First Judicial Region.
There shall be.
Two branches (Branches III ans II) for the province of Abra, with seats at Bangued;
Eight branches (Branches III to X) for the province of Benguet and the city of Baguio,
Branches III to VII with seats at Baguio City, and Branches VIII to X at La Trinidad;
Nine branches (Branches XI to XIX) for the province of Ilocos Norte and the city of
Laoag, Branches XI to XVI with seats at Laoag City, Branches XVII and XVIII at Batac, and
Branch XIX at Bangui;
Six branches (Braches XX to XXV) for the province of Ilocos Sur, Branches XX and XXI
with seats at Vigan, Branch XXII at Narvacan, Branch XXIII at Candon, Branch XXIV at
Cabugao, and Branch XXV at Tagudin;
Nine branches (Branches XXVI to XXXIV) for the province of La Union, Branches XXVI to
XXX with seats at San Fernando, Branches XXXI and XXXII at Agoo, Branch XXXIII at
Bauang, and Branch XXXIV at Balaoan;
Two branches (Branches XXXV and XXXVI) for the province of Mountain province, with
seats at Bontoc; and
Twenty-one branches (Branches XXXVII to LVII) for the province of Pangasinan and the
citie sof dagupan and san Carlos, Branches XXXVII to XXXIX with seats at Lingayen,
Branches XL to XLIV at dagupan, Branches XLV to XLIX at Urdaneta, Branch L at Villasis,
Branches LI and LII at Tayug, Branch LIII at Rosalaes, Branches LIV and LV at Alaminos,
and Branch LVI and LVII at san Carlos.
(b) Thirty-two Regional Trial Judges shall be commissioned for the Second Judicial
region. There shall be:
Twelve branches (Branches I to XII) for the province of Cagayan, Branches I to V with
seats at Tuguegarao, Branches VI to X at Aparri, Branch XI at Tuao, and Branch XII at
Sanchez Mira;
One branch (Branch XIII) for the province of Batanes, with seat at Basco;
Two branches (Branches XIV and XV) for the province of Ifugao, Branch XIV with seat at
Lagawe, and Branch XV at Potia;
Nine branches (Branches XVI to XXIV) for the province of Isabela, Branches XVI to XVIII
with seats at Ilagan, Branches XIX and XX at cauayan, Branch XXI at Santiago, Branch
XXII at Cabagan, Branch XXIII at Roxas, and Branch XXIV at Echague;
Remedial Law Compiled. Codal and Cases. Atty. Tranquil. 14
Two branches (Branches XXV and XXVI) for the province of kalinga-Apayao, Branch XXV
with seat at Tabuk, and Branch XXVI at Luna;
Four branches (Branches XXVII to XXX) for the province of Nueva Vizcaya, Branches
XXVII to XXIX with seats at Bayombong, and Branch XXX at Bambang;
Two branches (Branches XXXI and XXXII) for the province of Quirino, with seats at
Cabarroguis.
(c) Seventy-five Regional Trial judges shall be commissioned for the Third Judicial
Region. There shall be:
Five branches (Branches I to V) for the province of Bataan, Branches I to III with seats at
Balanga, Branch IV at Mariveles, and Branch V at Dinalupihan;
Seventeen branches (Branches VI to XXII) for the province of Bulacan (except the
municipality of Valuenzuela), with seats at Malolos;
Eighteen branches (Branches XXIII to XL) for the province of Nueva Ecija and the cities
of Cabanatuan, San Jose and Palayan, Branches XXIII to XXX with seats at Cabanatuan
City, Branches XXXI to XXXIII at Guimba, Branches XXXIV to XXXVI at Gapan, Branch
XXXVII at Sto. Domingo, Branches XXXVIII and XXXIX at San Jose, and Branch XL at
Palayan.
Twenty-two branches (Branches XLI to LXII) for the province of Pampanga and the city
of Angeles, Branches XLI to XLVIII with seats at San Fernando, Branches XLIX to LIII at
Guagua, Branches LIV and LV at Macabebe, and Branches LVI to LXII at Angeles City;
Six branches (Branches LXIII to LXVIII) for the province of Tarlac, Branches LXVI at
Capas, Branch LXVII at Paniqui, and Branch LXVIII at Camiling; and
Seven branches (Branches LXIX to LXXV) for the province of Zambales and the city of
Olongapo, Branches LXIX to LXXI with seats at Iba and Branches LXXII to LXXV at
Olongapo City
(d) One hundred seventy-two (172) Regional Trial Judges shall be commissioned for the
National Capital Judicial Region. There shall be:
Fifty-five branches (Branches 1 to 55) for the City of Manila, wit seats thereat;
Thirty-two branches (Branches 76 to 107) for Quezon City, with seats thereat;
Twelve branches (Branches 108 to 119) for Pasay City, with seats thereat;
Twelve branches (Branches 120 to 131) for Caloocan City, with seats thereat;

Fifty-eight branches (Branches 56 to 74 and 132 to 170) for the Municipalities of
Navotas, Malabon, San Juan, Madaluyong, Makati, Pasig, Pateros, Taguig, Marikina,
Paraaque, Las Pias, and Muntinlupa; Branches 67 to 71 and 151 to 168 at Pasig; and
Branches 72 to 74, 169 and 170 at Malabon; and
Three branches (Branches 75, 171 and 172) for the municipality of Valenzuela, with
seats thereat. (As amended by EO No. 33, July 30, 1986.)
(e) Eihty-two Regional Trial Judges shall be commissioned for the Fourth Judicial
Region. There shall be:
Fourteen branches (Branches I to XIV) for the province of Batangas and the cities of Lipa
and Batangas, Branches I to VI with seats at Batangas City, Branch V at Lemery,
Branches VI to VIII at Tanuan, Branches IX to XI at Balayan, Branches XII and XIII at Lipa,
and Branch XIV at Nasugbu;
Nine branches (Branches XV to XXIII) for the province of Cavite and the cities of Cavite,
Tagaytay and Trece Matires, Branch XV with seat at Naic, Branches XVII at Cavite City,
Branch XVIII at Tagayatay City, Branch XIX at Bacoor, Branches XX to XXII at Imus, and
Branch XXIII at Trece Martires;
Fourteen branches (Branches XXIV to XXXVII) for the province of Laguna and the city of
San Pablo, Branches XXVIII at Sta. Cruz, Branches XXIX to XXXII at San Pable City, Branch
XXXIII at Siniloan, and Branches XXXIV to XXXVI at Calamba;
One branch (Branch XXXVIII) for the province of Marinduque, with seat at Boac;
Five branches (Branches XXXIX to XLIII) for the province of Mindoro Oriental, Branches
XXXIX to XL with seats at Calapan, Branches XLI and XLII at Pinamalayan, and Branch
XLII at Roxas;
Three branches (Branches XLVII to XLVI) for the province of Mindoro Occidental,
Branch XLIV with seat at Mamburao, and Branches XLV and XLVI at San Jose;
Six branches (Branches XLVII to LII) for the province of Palawan and the city of Puerto
Princesa, with seats at Puerto Princesa City;
Thirteen branches (Branches LIII to LXV) for the province of Quezon and the city of
Lucena, Branches LIII to LX with seats at Lucena City, Branches LXI and LXII at Gumaca,
Branch LXIII at Calauag, Branch LXIV at Mauban, and Branch LXV at Infanta;
One branchj(Branch LXVI) for the province of Aurora, with seat at Baler;
Fourteen branches (Branches LXVII to LXXX) for the province of Rizal except the cities
and municipalities embraced within the National Capital Judicial Region, Branches LXVII
to LXX with seats at Binangonan, Branches LXXI to LXXIV at Antipolo, Branches LXXV to
LXXVII at San Mateo, and Branches LXXVIII to LXXX at Morong; and
Remedial Law Compiled. Codal and Cases. Atty. Tranquil. 15
Two branches (Branches LXXXI and LXXXII) for the province of Romblon, Branch LXXXI
with seat at Romblon, and Branch LXXXII at Odiongan.
(f) Fifty-five Regional Trial Judges shall be commissioned for the Fifth Judicial Region.
There shall be:
Eighteen branches (Branches I to XVIII) for the province of Albay and the city of Legaspi,
Branches I to X with seats at Legaspi City, Branches XI to XIV at Ligao, and Branches XV
to XVIII at Tabaco;
Nineteen branches (Branches XIX to XXXVII) for the province of Camarines Sur and the
cities of Naga and Iriga, Branches XIX to XXVIII with seats at Naga City, Branch XXIX at
Libmanan, Branch XXX at Tigaon, Braches XXXI to XXXIII at Pili, and Branches XXXIV to
XXXVII at Iriga City;
Four branches (Branches XXXVIII to XLII) for the province of Camarines Norte, with seat
at Daet;
Two branches (Branches XLII and XLII) for the province of Catanduanes, with seats at
Virac;
Seven branches (Branches XLIV to L) for the province of Masbate, Branches XLIV to
XLVIII with seats at Masbate, Branch XLIX at Cataingan, and Branch L at San Jacinto; and
Five branches (Branches LI to LV) for the province of Sorsogon, Branches LI to LIII with
seats at Sorsogon, Branch LVI at Gubat, and Branch LV at Irosin.
(g) Sixty-three Regional Trial Judges shall be commissioned for the Sixth Judicial Region.
There shall be:
Nine branches (Branches I to IX) for the province of Aklan, with seats at Kalibo;
Four branches (Branches X to XIII) for the province of Antique, Branches X to XII with
seats at San Jose, and Branch XIII and Culasi;
Eighr branches (Branches XIV to XXI) for the province of Capiz and the city of Roxas,
Branches XIV to XIX with seats at Roxas City and Branches XX and XXI at Mambusao;
Eighteen branches (Branches XXII to XXXIX) for the province of Iloilo, the subprovince of
Guimaras, and the city of Iloilo, with seats at Iloilo City; and
Twenty-four branches (Branches XL to LXIII) for the province of Negros Occidental, and
the cities of Bacolod,Bago, Cadiz, La Carlota, San Carlos and Silay, Branch XL with seat at
Silay City, Branches XLI to LIV at Bacolod City, Branches LV and LVI at Himamaylan,
Branches LVII to LIX at Kabankalan, Branch LXII at Bago City, and Branch LXII at La
Carlota City.

(h) Forty-six Regional Trial Judges shall be commissioned for the Seventh Judicial
Region. There shall be:
Four branches (Branches I to IV) for the province of Bohol and the city of Tagbilaran,
with seats at Tagbilaran City;
Twenty-five branches (Branches V to XXIX) for the province of Cebu and the cities of
Cebu, Danao, Lapu-Lapu, Mandaue and Toledo, Branches V to XXIV with seats at Cebu
City, Branch XXV at Danao City, Branch XXVI at Argao, Branch XXVII at Lapu-Lapu City,
Branch XXVIII at Mandaue City, and Branch XXIX at Toledo City;
Sixteen branches (Branches XXX to XLV) for the province of Negros Oriental and the
cities of Dumaguete, Bais and Canlaon, Branches XXX to XLIV with seats at Dumaguete
City, and Branch XLV at Bais City; and
One branch (Branch XLVI) for the province of Siquijor, with seat at Larena.
(i) Thirty-three Regional Trial Judges shall be commissioned for the Eighth Judicial
Region. There shall be:
Five branches (Branches I to V) for the province of Eastern Samar, Branches I and II
with seats at Borongan, Branch III at Guiuan, Branch IV at Dolores, and Branch V at Oras;
Thirteen branches (Branches VI to XVIII) for the province of Leyte, the sub-province of
Biliran, and the cities of Ormoc and Tacloban, Branches VI and IX with seats at Tacloban
City, Branch X at Abuyog, Branch XI at Calubian, Branch XII at Ormoc City, Branch XIII at
Carigara, Branch XIV at Baybay, Branch XV at Burauen, Branch XVI at Naval, Branch XVII
at Palompon, and Branch XVIII at Hilongos;
Five branches (Branches XIX to XXIII) for the province of Northern Samar, Branches XIX
and XX with seats at Catarman, Branches XXI and XXII at Laoang, and Branch XXIII at
Allen;
Three branches (Branches XXIV to XXVI) for the province of Southern Leyte, Branches
XXIV and XXV with seats at Maasin, and Branch XXVI at San Juan; and
Seven branches (Branches XXVII to XXXIII) for the province of Samar and the city of
Calbayog, Branches XXVII to XXIX with seats at Catbalogan, Branch XXX at Basey,
Branches XXXI and XXXII at Calbayog City, and Branch XXXIII at Calbiga.
(j) Twenty-four Regional Trial Judges shall be commissioned for the Ninth Judicial
Region. There shall be:
Two branches (Branches I and II) for the province of Basilan, with seats at Isabela;
Remedial Law Compiled. Codal and Cases. Atty. Tranquil. 16
Two branches (Branches III and IV) for the province of Sulu, Branch III with seat at Jolo,
and Branch IV at Parang;
One branch (Branch V) for the province of Tawi-Tawi, with seat at Bongao;
Six branches (Branches VI to XI) for the province of Zamboanga del Norte, and the cities
of Dipolog and Dapitan, Branches VI to X seats at Dipolog City, and Branch XI at
Sindangan; and
Thirteen branches (Branches XII to XXIV) for the province of Zamboanga del Sur and the
cities of Pagadian and Zamboanga Branches XII to XVII with seats at Zamboanga City,
Branches, XVIII to XXII at Pagadian City, Branch XXIII at Molave, and Branch XXIV at Ipil.
(k) Thirty-two Regional Trial Judges shall be commissioned for the Tenth Judicial
Region. There shall be:
Five branches (Branches I to V) for the province of Agusan del Norte and the city of
Butuan, with seats at Butuan City;
Two branches (Branches VI and VII) for the province of Agusan del Sur, Branches VI
with seat at Prosperidad and Branch VII with seat at Bayugan;
Four branches (Branches VIII to XI) for the province of Bukidnon, Branches VIII to X
with seats at Malaybalay and Branch XI at Manalo Fortich;
Five branches (Branches XII to XI) for the province of Misamis Occidental and the cities
of Oroquieta, Ozamis, and Tangub, Branches XII to XIV with seats at Oroquieta City,
Branch XV at Ozamis City, and Branch XVI at Tangub City;
Eleven branches (Branches XVII to XXVII) for the province of Misamis Oriental and the
cities of Cagayan de Oro and Gingoog, Branches XVII to XXV with seats at Cagayan de
Oro City, Branch XXVI at Medina, and Branch XXVII at Gingoog City;
One branch (Branch XXVIII) for the province of Camiguin, with seat at Mambajao; and
Four branches (Branches XXIX to XXXII) for the province of Surigao del Norte and the
City of Surigao, Branches XXIX and XXX with seats at Surigao City, Branch XXXI at Dapa,
and Branch XXXII at Dinagat, Dinagat Island.
(l) Twenty-nine Regional Trial Judges shall be commissioned for the Eleventh Judicial
Region. There shall be
Four branches (Branches I to IV) for the province of Davao del Norte, Branches I and II
with seats at Tagum, Branch III at Nabunturan, and Branch IV at Panabo;
Three branches (Branches V to VII) for the province of Davao Oriental, Branches V and
VI with seats at Mati and Branch VII at Banganga;

Fourteen branches (Branches VIII to XXI) for the province of Davao del Sur and the city
of Davao, Branches VIII to XVII with seats at Davao City, Branches XVIII and XIX at Digos,
Branch XX at Malinta, and Branch XXI a Bansalan;
Five Branches (Branches XXII to XXVI) for the province of South Cotabato and the city of
General Santos, Branches XXII and XXIII with seats at General Santos City, Branches
XXIV and XXV at Koronadal, and Branch XXVI at Surallah; and
Three branches (Branches XXVII to XXIX) for the province of Surigao del Sur, Branch
XXVII with seat at Tandag, Branch XXVIII at Lianga, and Branch XXIX at Bislig.
(m) Twenty Regional Trial Judges shall be commissioned for the Twelfth Judicial Region.
There shall be:
Seven branches (Branches I to VII) for the province of Lanao del Norte and the city of
Iligan, Branches I to VI with seats at Iligan City, and Branch VII at Tubod;
Five branches (Branches VIII to XII) for the province of Lanao del Sur and the city of
Marawi, Branches VIII to X with seats at Marawi City, and Branches XI and XII at
Malabang;
Three branches (Branches XIII to XV) for the province of Maguindanao and the city of
Cotabato, Branches XIII and XIV with seats at Cotabato City, and Branch XV at Maganoy;
Three branches (Branches XVI to XVIII) for the province of North Cotabato, Branch XVI
with seat at Kabacan, Branch XVII at Kidapawan, and Branch XVIII at Missayap; and
Two branches (Branches XIX and XX) for the province of Sultan Kudarat, Branch XIX,
with seat at Isulan, and Branch XX at Tacurong.
Section 15. Qualifications. No persons shall be appointed Regional Trial Judge unless
he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, at least thirty-five years of age, and for at
least ten years, has been engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines or has held a
public office in the Philippines requiring admission to the practice of law as an
indispensable requisite.
Section 16. Time and duration of sessions. The time and duration of daily sessions of
the Regional Trial Courts shall be determined by the Supreme Court: Provided, however,
That all motions, except those requiring immediate action, shall be heard in the
afternoon of every Friday, unless it falls on a holiday, in which case, the hearing shall be
held on the afternoon of the next succeeding business day: Provided, further, That the
Supreme Court may, for good reasons, fix a different motion day in specified areas
Section 17. Appointment and assignment of Regional Trial Judges. Every Regional Trial
Judge shall be appointed to a region which shall be his permanent station, and his
appointment shall state the branch of the court and the seat thereof to which he shall be
Remedial Law Compiled. Codal and Cases. Atty. Tranquil. 17
originally assigned. However, the Supreme Court may assign temporarily a Regional
Trial Judge to another region as public interest may require, provided that such
temporary assignment shall not last longer than six (6) months without the consent of
the Regional Trial Judge concerned.
A Regional Trial Judge may be assigned by the Supreme Court to any branch or city or
municipality within the same region as public interest may require, and such
assignment shall not be deemed an assignment to another station within the meaning of
this section.
Section 18. Authority to define territory appurtenant to each branch. The Supreme
Court shall define the territory over which a branch of the Regional Trial Court shall
exercise its authority. The territory thus defined shall be deemed to be the territorial
area of the branch concerned for purposes of determining the venue of all suits,
proceedings or actions, whether civil or criminal, as well as determining the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
over the said branch may exercise appellate jurisdiction. The power herein granted shall
be exercised with a view to making the courts readily accessible to the people of the
different parts of the region and making the attendance of litigants and witnesses as
inexpensive as possible.
Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation;
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such the value
exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and
unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred
upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts;
(3) In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where he demand or claim
exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or , in Metro Manila, where such
demand or claim exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (200,000.00);
(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of the
estate exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in probate matters in
Metro Manila, where such gross value exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos
(200,000.00);
(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations;

(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or
body exercising jurisdiction or any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions;
(7) In all civil actions and special proceedings falling within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court and of the Courts of Agrarian
Relations as now provided by law; and
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever
kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in
controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (100,000.00) or, in such other
abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (200,000.00). (as
amended by R.A. No. 7691*)
Section 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any
court, tribunal or body, except those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance
of by the latter.
Section 21. Original jurisdiction in other cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
original jurisdiction:
(1) In the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus and injunction which may be enforced in any part of their respective regions;
and
(2) In actions affecting ambassadors and other public ministers and consuls.
Section 22. Appellate jurisdiction. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise appellate
jurisdiction over all cases decided by Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts,
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Such cases
shall be decided on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of
origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or
required by the Regional Trial Courts. The decision of the Regional Trial Courts in such
cases shall be appealable by petition for review to the
Court of Appeals which may give it due course only when the petition shows prima facie
that the lower court has committed an error of fact or law that will warrant a reversal or
modification of the decision or judgment sought to be reviewed.
Section 23. Special jurisdiction to try special cases. The Supreme Court may designate
certain branches of the Regional Trial Courts to handle exclusively criminal cases,
juvenile and domestic relations cases, agrarian cases, urban land reform cases which do
not fall under the jurisdiction of quasi-judicial bodies and agencies, and/or such other
special cases as the Supreme Court may determine in the interest of a speedy and
efficient administration of justice.
Remedial Law Compiled. Codal and Cases. Atty. Tranquil. 18
Section 24. Special Rules of Procedure. Whenever a Regional Trial Court takes
cognizance of juvenile and domestic relation cases and/or agrarian cases, the special
rules of procedure applicable under present laws to such cases shall continue to be
applied, unless subsequently amended by law or by rules of court promulgated by the
Supreme Court.
CHAPTER III
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, AND MUNICIPAL
CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS
Section 25. Establishment of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. There shall be created a Metropolitan Trial Court in
each metropolitan area established by law, a Municipal Trial Court in each of the other
cities or municipalities, and a Municipal Circuit Trial Court in each circuit comprising
such cities and/or municipalities as are grouped together pursuant to law.
Section 26. Qualifications. No person shall be appointed judge of a Metropolitan Trial
Court, Municipal Trial Court, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court unless he is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, at least 30 years of age, and, for at least five years, has been
engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines, or has held a public office in the
Philippines requiring admission to the practice of law as an indispensable requisite.
Section 27. Metropolitan Trial Courts of the National Capital Region. There shall be a
Metropolitan Trial Court in the National Capital Region, to be known as the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Metro Manila, which shall be composed of eighty-two (82) branches.
There shall be:
Thirty branches (Branches I to XXX) for the city of Manila with seats thereat;
Thirteen branches (Branches XXXI to XLIII) for Quezon City with seats thereat;
Five branches (Branches XLIV to XLVIII) for Pasay City with seats thereat;
Five branches (Branches XLIX to LIII) for Caloocan City with seats thereat;
One branch (Branch LIV) for Navotas with seat thereat;
Two branches (Branches LV and LVI) for Malabon with seats thereat;
Two branches (Branches LVII and LVIII) for San Juan with seats thereat;
Two branches (Branches LIX and LX) for Mandaluyong with seats thereat;
Seven branches (Branches LXI and LXVII) for Makati with seats thereat;
Five branches (Branches LXVIII to LXXII) for Pasig with seats thereat;
 Remedial Law Compiled. Codal and Cases. Atty. Tranquil. 19

Two branches for Batangas City;

One branch (Branch LXXIII) for Pateros with seat thereat;
Two branches for Lucena City;
One branch (Branch LXXIV) for Taguig with seat thereat;
Three branches for Naga City;
Two branches (Branches LXXV and LXXVI) for Marikina with seats thereat;
Two branches for Iriga City;
Two branches (Branches LXXVII and LXXVIII) for Paraaque with seats thereat;
Three branches for Legaspi City;
One branch (Branch LXXIX) for Las Pias with seat thereat;
Two branches for Roxas City;
One branch (Branch LXXX) for Muntinlupa with seat thereat;
Four branches for Iloilo City;
Two branches (Branches LXXXI and LXXXII) for Valenzuela with seats thereat;
Seven branches for Bacolod City;
Section 28. Other Metropolitan Trial Courts. The Supreme Court shall constitute
Metropolitan Trial Courts in such other metropolitan areas as may be established by law Two branches for Dumaguete City;
whose territorial jurisdiction shall be co-extensive with the cities and municipalities
comprising the metropolitan area. Two branches for Tacloban City;

Every Metropolitan Trial Judge shall be appointed to a metropolitan area which shall be Eight branches for Cebu City;
his permanent station and his appointment shall state branch of the court and the seat
thereof to which he shall be originally assigned. A Metropolitan Trial Judge may be Three branches for Mandaue City;
assigned by the Supreme Court to any branch within said metropolitan area as the
interest of justice may require, and such assignment shall not be deemed an assignment Two branches for Tagbilaran City;
to another station within the meaning of this section.
Two branches for Surigao City;
Section 29. Municipal Trial Courts in cities. In every city which does not form part of a
metropolitan area, there shall be a Municipal Trial Court with one branch, except as Two branches for Butuan City;
hereunder provided:
Five branches for Cagayan de Oro City;
Two branches for Laoag City;
Seven branches for Davao City;
Four branches for Baguio City;
Three branches for General Santos City;
Three branches for Dagupan City;
Two branches for Oroquieta City;
Five branches for Olongapo City;
Three branches for Ozamis City;
Three branches for Cabanatuan City;
Two branches for Dipolog City;
Two branches for San Jose City;
Four branches for Zamboanga City;
Three branches for Angeles City;
Two branches for Pagadian City; and
Two branches for Cavite City;
Two branches for Iligan City.

Section 30. Municipal Trial Courts. In each of the municipalities that are not comprised
within a metropolitan area and a municipal circuit there shall be a Municipal Trial Court
which shall have one branch, except as hereunder provided:
Two branches for San Fernando, La Union;
Four branches for Tuguegarao;
Three branches for Lallo, and two branches for Aparri, both of Cagayan;
Two branches for Santiago, Isabela;
Two branches each for Malolos, Meycauayan and Bulacan, all of Bulacan Province;
Four branches for San Fernando and two branches for Guagua, both of Pampanga;
Two branches for Tarlac, Tarlac;
Two branches for San Pedro, Laguna; and
Two branches each for Antipolo and Binangonan, both in Rizal.
Section 31. Municipal Circuit Trial Court. There shall be a Municipal Circuit Trial Court
in each area defined as a municipal circuit, comprising one or more cities and/or one or
more municipalities. The municipalities comprising municipal circuits as organized
under Administrative Order No. 33, issued on June 13, 1978 by the Supreme Court
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 537, are hereby constituted as municipal circuits for
purposes of the establishment of the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, and the
appointment thereto of Municipal Circuit Trial Judges: Provided, however, That the
Supreme Court may, as the interests of justice may require, further reorganize the said
courts taking into account workload, geographical location, and such other factors as
will contribute to a rational allocation thereof, pursuant to the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 537 which shall be applicable insofar as they are not inconsistent with this
Act.
Every Municipal Circuit Trial Judge shall be appointed to a municipal circuit which shall
be his official station.
The Supreme Court shall determine the city or municipality where the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court shall hold sessions.
Section 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in criminal cases. Except in cases falling within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
shall exercise:
Remedial Law Compiled. Codal and Cases. Atty. Tranquil. 20
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinances
committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction; and
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other
imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such
offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof:
Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal
negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof. (as amended by R.A,
No. 7691)
Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, testate and
intestate, including the grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, where the value of
the personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed One hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in Metro Manila where such personal property, estate,
or amount of the demand does not exceed Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00)
exclusive of interest damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and
costs, the amount of which must be specifically alleged: Provided, That where there are
several claims or causes of action between the same or different parties, embodied in
the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all
the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same
or different transactions;
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer:
Provided, That when, in such cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership in
his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the
issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue
of possession.
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession
of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or
interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions
in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses and costs: Provided, That value of such property shall be determined by the
assessed value of the adjacent lots. (as amended by R.A. No. 7691)
Section 34. Delegated jurisdiction in cadastral and land registration cases.
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
may be assigned by the Supreme Court to hear and determine cadastral or land
registration cases covering lots where there is no controversy or opposition, or
contested lots the where the value of which does not exceed One hundred thousand

pesos (P100,000.00), such value to be ascertained by the affidavit of the claimant or by
agreement of the respective claimants if there are more than one, or from the
corresponding tax declaration of the real property. Their decisions in these cases shall
be appealable in the same manner as decisions of the Regional Trial Courts. (as
amended by R.A. No. 7691)
Section 35. Special jurisdiction in certain cases. In the absence of all the Regional Trial
Judges in a province or city, any Metropolitan Trial Judge, Municipal Trial Judge,
Municipal Circuit Trial Judge may hear and decide petitions for a writ of habeas corpus
or applications for bail in criminal cases in the province or city where the absent
Regional Trial Judges sit.
Section 36. Summary procedures in special cases. In Metropolitan Trial Courts and
Municipal Trial Courts with at least two branches, the Supreme Court may designate one
or more branches thereof to try exclusively forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases,
those involving violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations, violations of the rental
law, and such other cases requiring summary disposition as the Supreme Court may
determine. The Supreme Court shall adopt special rules or procedures applicable to
such cases in order to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination thereof
without regard to technical rules. Such simplified procedures may provide that
affidavits and counter-affidavits may be admitted in lieu of oral testimony and that the
periods for filing pleadings shall be non-extendible.
Section 37. Preliminary investigation. Judges of Metropolitan Trial Courts, except those
in the National Capital Region, of Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts shall have authority to conduct preliminary investigation of crimes alleged to
have been committed within their respective territorial jurisdictions which are
cognizable by the Regional Trial Courts.
The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in accordance with the procedure
prescribed in Section 1, paragraphs (a), (b), (c), and (d), of Presidential Decree No. 911:
Provided, however, That if after the preliminary investigation the Judge finds a prima
facie case, he shall forward the records of the case to the Provincial/City Fiscal for the
filing of the corresponding information with the proper court.
No warrant of arrest shall be issued by the Judge in connection with any criminal
complaint filed with him for preliminary investigation, unless after an examination in
writing and under oath or affirmation of the complainant and his witnesses, he finds
that a probable cause exists.
Any warrant of arrest issued in accordance herewith may be served anywhere in the
Philippines.
Section 38. Judgments and processes.
(1) All judgments determining the merits of cases shall be in writing, stating clearly the
facts and the law on which they were based, signed by the Judge and filed with the Clerk
Remedial Law Compiled. Codal and Cases. Atty. Tranquil. 21
of Court. Such judgment shall be appealable to the Regional Trial Courts in accordance
with the procedure now prescribed by law for appeals to the Court of First Instance, by
the provisions of this Act, and by such rules as the Supreme Court may hereafter
prescribe.
(2) All processes issued by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, in cases falling within their jurisdiction, may be served
anywhere in the Philippines without the necessity of certification by the Judge of the
Regional Trial Court.
CHAPTER IV
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 39. Appeals. The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards,
judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from
the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from:
Provided however, That in habeas corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be forty-
eight (48) hours from the notice of the judgment appealed from.
No record on appeal shall be required to take an appeal. In lieu thereof, the entire record
shall be transmitted with all the pages prominently numbered consecutively, together
with an index of the contents thereof.
This section shall not apply in appeals in special proceedings and in other cases wherein
multiple appeals are allowed under applicable provisions of the Rules of Court.
Section 40. Form of decision in appealed cases. Every decision of final resolution of a
court in appealed cases shall clearly and distinctly state the findings of fact and the
conclusions of law on which it is based, which may be contained in the decision or final
resolution itself, or adopted by reference from those set forth in the decision, order, or
resolution appealed from.
Section 41. Salaries. Intermediate Appellate Justices, Regional Trial Judges,
Metropolitan Trial Judges, Municipal Trial Judges, and Municipal Circuit Trial Judges
shall receive such compensation and allowances as may be authorized by the President
along the guidelines set forth in Letter of Implementation No. 93 pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 985, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1597.
Section 42. Longevity pay. A monthly longevity pay equivalent to 5% of the monthly
basic pay shall be paid to the Justices and Judges of the courts herein created for each
five years of continuous, efficient, and meritorious service rendered in the judiciary;
Provided, That in no case shall the total salary of each Justice or Judge concerned, after
this longevity pay is added, exceed the salary of the Justice or Judge next in rank.
Section 43. Staffing pattern. The Supreme Court shall submit to the President, within
thirty (30) days from the date of the effectivity of this Act, a staffing pattern for all courts

constituted pursuant to this Act which shall be the basis of the implementing order to be
issued by the President in accordance with the immediately succeeding section.
Section 44. Transitory provisions. The provisions of this Act shall be immediately
carried out in accordance with an Executive Order to be issued by the President. The
Court of Appeals, the Courts of First Instance, the Circuit Criminal Courts, the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Courts, the Courts of Agrarian Relations, the City Courts, the
Municipal Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Courts shall continue to function as
presently constituted and organized, until the completion of the reorganization
provided in this Act as declared by the President. Upon such declaration, the said courts
shall be deemed automatically abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold
office. The cases pending in the old Courts shall be transferred to the appropriate Courts
constituted pursuant to this Act, together with the pertinent functions, records,
equipment, property and the necessary personnel.
The applicable appropriations shall likewise be transferred to the appropriate courts
constituted pursuant to this Act, to be augmented as may be necessary from the funds
for organizational changes as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 80. Said funding shall
thereafter be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.
Section 45. Shari'a Courts. Shari'a Courts to be constituted as provided for in
Presidential Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the "Code of Muslim Personal Laws
of the Philippines," shall be included in the funding appropriations so provided in this
Act.
Section 46. Gratuity of judges and personnel separated from office. All members of the
judiciary and subordinate employees who shall be separated from office by reason of
the reorganization authorized herein, shall be granted a gratuity at a rate equivalent to
one month's salary for every year of continuous service rendered in any branch of the
government or equivalent nearest fraction thereof favorable to them on the basis of the
highest salary received: Provided, That such member of the judiciary or employee shall
have the option to retire under the Judiciary Retirement Law or general retirement law,
if he has met or satisfied the requirements therefor.
Section 47. Repealing clause. The provisions of Republic Act No. 296, otherwise known
as the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, of Republic Act No. 5179 as amended, of the
Rules of Court, and of all other statutes, letters of instructions and general order or parts
thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or accordingly
modified.
Section 48. Date of Effectivity. This Act shall take effect immediately.
Approved: August 14, 1981
Footnotes
Remedial Law Compiled. Codal and Cases. Atty. Tranquil. 22
*Other provisions of the Act:
"Section. 5. After five(5) years from the effectivity of this Act, the jurisdictional amounts
mentioned in Sec. 19(3), (4), and (8); and Sec. 33(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as
amended by this Act, shall be adjusted to Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00).
five (5) years thereafter, such jurisdictional amounts shall be adjusted further to Three
hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00): Provided, however, That in the case of Metro
Manila, the abovementioned jurisdictional amounts shall be adjusted after five (5) years
from the effectivity of this Act of Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00).
Section. 7. The provisions of this Act shall apply to all civil cases that have not yet
reached the pre-trial stage. However, by agreement of all the parties, civil cases
cognizable by municipal and metropolitan courts by the provisions of this Act may be
transferred from the Regional Trial Courts to the latter. The executive judge of the
appropriate Regional Trial Court shall define the administrative procedure of
transferring the cases affected by the redefinition of jurisdiction to the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court."
*Criminal cases falling within the jurisdiction of Family Courts (established by the
Family Courts Act of 1997 [R.A. No. 8369]) have been transferred from Metropolitan
trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts,
Municipal trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
to Regional trial Courts under A.M. No. 99-1-13-SC effective March 1, 1999.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7691
March 25, 1994
AN ACT EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS,
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS, AMENDING
FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA, BLG. 129, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
"JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980"
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled::

Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980", is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction.
"(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation;
"(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or
any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000,00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value
exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and
unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred
upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts;
"(3) In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where the demand or
claim exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in Metro Manila, where
such demand or claim exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00);
"(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of
the estate exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in probate matters in
Metro Manila, where such gross value exceeds Two Hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00);
"(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations;
"(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person
or body exercising jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions;
Remedial Law Compiled. Codal and Cases. Atty. Tranquil. 23
"(7) In all civil actions and special proceedings falling within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court and of the Court of Agrarian
Relations as now provided by law; and
"(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property
in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other
cases in Metro Manila, where the demand exclusive of the abovementioned items
exceeds Two Hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00)."
Section 2. Section 32 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. Except in cases falling within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
"(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal
ordinances committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction; and
"(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment
not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other
imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such
offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof:
Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal
negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof."
Section 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts,
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
 Remedial Law Compiled. Codal and Cases. Atty. Tranquil. 24

"(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings,
testate and intestate, including the grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, where
the value of the personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed One
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in Metro Manila where such personal
property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed Two hundred thousand
pesos (P200,000.00), exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses, and costs, the amount of which must be specifically alleged:
Provided, That interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses,
and costs shall be included in the determination of the filing fees: Provided, further, That
where there are several claims or causes of actions between the same or different
parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality
of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action
arose out of the same or different transactions;
Section 5. After five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act, the jurisdictional amounts
mentioned in Sec. 19(3), (4), and (8); and Sec. 33(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as
amended by this Act, shall be adjusted to Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00).
Five (5) years thereafter, such jurisdictional amounts shall be adjusted further to Three
hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00): Provided, however, That in the case of Metro
Manila, the abovementioned jurisdictional amounts shall be adjusted after five (5) years
from the effectivity of this Act to Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00).
Section 6. All laws, decrees, and orders inconsistent with the provisions of this Act shall
be considered amended or modified accordingly.

"(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful
detainer: Provided, That when, in such cases, the defendant raises the questions of Section 7. The provisions of this Act shall apply to all civil cases that have not yet
ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without reached the pre-trial stage. However, by agreement of all the parties, civil cases
deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to cognizable by municipal and metropolitan courts by the provisions of this Act may be
determine the issue of possession; and transferred from the Regional Trial Courts to the latter. The executive judge of the
appropriate Regional Trial Courts shall define the administrative procedure of
transferring the cases affected by the redefinition of jurisdiction to the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
"(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the
property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in
civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand Section 8. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in the
pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, Official Gazette or in two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.
litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation
purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the
adjacent lots."
Approved: March 25, 1994

Section 4. Section 34 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:

REVISED RULES ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE

"Sec. 34. Delegated Jurisdiction in Cadastral and Land Registration Cases. RESOLUTION OF THE COURT EN BANC DATED OCTOBER 15, 1991 PROVIDING FOR
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts THE REVISED RULE ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE FOR METROPOLITAN TRIAL
may be assigned by the Supreme Court to hear and determine cadastral or land COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND
registration cases covering lots where there is no controversy or opposition, or MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS.
contested lots where the value of which does not exceed One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00), such value to be ascertained by the affidavit of the claimant or by
agreement of the respective claimants if there are more than one, or from the
corresponding tax declaration of the real property. Their decisions in these cases shall
be appealable in the same manner as decisions of the Regional Trial Courts."

Pursuant to Section 36 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P Blg. 129) and to
achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of the cases referred to herein,
the Court Resolved to promulgate the following Revised Rule on Summary Procedure:
I. Applicability
Section 1. Scope. This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases falling within their jurisdiction:
A. Civil Cases:
(1) All cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, irrespective of the amount of
damages or unpaid rentals sought to be recovered. Where attorney's fees are awarded,
the same shall not exceed twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00).
(2) All other civil cases, except probate proceedings, where the total amount of the
plaintiff's claim does not exceed ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00), exclusive of interest
and costs.
B. Criminal Cases:
(1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
(2) Violations of the rental law;
(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances;
(4) All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged
is imprisonment not exceeding six months, or a fine not exceeding (P1,000.00), or both,
irrespective of other imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability
arising therefrom: Provided, however, that in offenses involving damage to property
through criminal negligence, this Rule shall govern where the imposable fine does not
exceed ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00).
This Rule shall not apply to a civil case where the plaintiffs cause of action is pleaded in
the same complaint with another cause of action subject to the ordinary procedure; nor
to a criminal case where the offense charged is necessarily related to another criminal
case subject to the ordinary procedure
Remedial Law Compiled. Codal and Cases. Atty. Tranquil. 25
Sec. 2. Determination of applicability. Upon the filing of a civil or criminal action, the
court shall issue an order declaring whether or not the case shall be governed by this
Rule A patently erroneous determination to avoid the application of the Rule on
Summary Procedure is a ground for disciplinary action.
II. Civil Cases
Sec. 3. Pleadings.
A. Pleadings allowed. The only pleadings allowed to be filed are the complaints,
compulsory counterclaims and cross-claims' pleaded in the answer, and the answers
thereto.
B. Verifications. All pleadings shall be verified.
Sec. 4. Duty of court. After the court determines that the case falls under summary
procedure, it may, from an examination of the allegations therein and such evidence as
may be attached thereto, dismiss the case outright on any of the grounds apparent
therefrom for the dismissal of a civil action. If no ground for dismissal is found it shall
forthwith issue summons which shall state that the summary procedure under this Rule
shall apply.
Sec. 5. Answer. Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the defendant shall
file his answer to the complaint and serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff. Affirmative and
negative defenses not pleaded therein shall be deemed waived, except for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter. Cross-claims and compulsory counterclaims not
asserted in the answer shall be considered barred. The answer to counterclaims or
cross-claims shall be filed and served within ten (10) days from service of the answer in
which they are pleaded.
Sec. 6. Effect of failure to answer. Should the defendant fail to answer the complaint
within the period above provided, the court, motu proprio, or on motion of the plaintiff,
shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and
limited to what is prayed for therein: Provided, however, that the court may in its
discretion reduce the amount of damages and attorney's fees claimed for being
excessive or otherwise unconscionable. This is without prejudice to the applicability of
Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, if there are two or more defendants.
Sec. 7. Preliminary conference; appearance of parties. Not later than thirty (30) days
after the last answer is filed, a preliminary conference shall be held. The rules on pre-
trial in ordinary cases shall be applicable to the preliminary conference unless
inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule.
The failure of the plaintiff to appear in the preliminary conference shall be a cause for
the dismissal of his complaint. The defendant who appears in the absence of the plaintiff

shall be entitled to judgment on his counterclaim in accordance with Section 6 hereof.
All cross-claims shall be dismissed.
If a sole defendant shall fail to appear, the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment in
accordance with Section 6 hereof. This Rule shall not apply where one of two or more
defendants sued under a common cause of action who had pleaded a common defense
shall appear at the preliminary conference.
Sec. 8. Record of preliminary conference. Within five (5) days after the termination
of the preliminary conference, the court shall issue an order stating the matters taken up
therein, including but not limited to:
(a) Whether the parties have arrived at an amicable settlement, and if so, the terms
thereof;
(b) The stipulations or admissions entered into by the parties;.
(c) Whether, on the basis of the pleadings and the stipulations and admissions made by
the parties, judgment may be rendered without the need of further proceedings, in
which event the judgment shall be rendered within thirty (30) days from issuance of the
order;
(d) A clear specification of material facts which remain controverted; and
(e) Such other matters intended to expedite the disposition of the case.
Sec. 9. Submission of affidavits and position papers. Within ten (10) days from
receipt of the order mentioned in the next preceding section, the parties shall submit the
affidavits of their witnesses and other evidence on the factual issues defined in the
order, together with their position papers setting forth the law and the facts relied upon
by them.
Sec. 10. Rendition of judgment. Within thirty (30) days after receipt of the last
affidavits and position papers, or the expiration of the period for filing the same, the
court shall render judgment.
However should the court find it necessary to clarify certain material facts, it may,
during the said period, issue an order specifying the matters to be clarified, and require
the parties to submit affidavits or other evidence on the said matters within ten (10)
days from receipt of said order. Judgment shall be rendered within fifteen (15) days
after the receipt of the last clarificatory affidavits, or the expiration of the period for
filing the same.
The court shall not resort to the clarificatory procedure to gain time for the rendition of
the judgment.
III.
Remedial Law Compiled. Codal and Cases. Atty. Tranquil. 26
Criminal Cases
Sec. 11. How commenced. The filing of criminal cases falling within the scope of this
Rule shall be either by complaint or by information: Provided, however, that in
Metropolitan Manila and in Chartered Cities. such cases shall be commenced only by
information, except when the offense cannot be prosecuted de oficio.
The complaint or information shall be accompanied by the affidavits of the compliant
and of his witnesses in such number of copies as there are accused plus two (2) copies
for the court's files.If this requirement is not complied with within five (5) days from
date of filing, the care may be dismissed.
Sec. 12. Duty of court.
(a) If commenced by compliant. On the basis of the compliant and the affidavits and
other evidence accompanying the same, the court may dismiss the case outright for
being patently without basis or merit and order the release of the amused if in custody.
(b) If commenced by information. When the case is commenced by information, or is
not dismissed pursuant to the next preceding paragraph, the court shall issue an order
which, together with copies of the affidavits and other evidence submitted by the
prosecution, shall require the accused to submit his counter-affidavit and the affidavits
of his witnesses as well as any evidence in his behalf, serving copies thereof on the
complainant or prosecutor not later than ten (10) days from receipt of said order. The
prosecution may file reply affidavits within ten (10) days after receipt of the counter-
affidavits of the defense.
Sec. 13. Arraignment and trial. Should the court, upon a consideration of the
complaint or information and the affidavits submitted by both parties, find no cause or
ground to hold the accused for trial, it shall order the dismissal of the case; otherwise,
the court shall set the case for arraignment and trial.
If the accused is in custody for the crime charged, he shall be immediately arraigned and
if he enters a plea of guilty, he shall forthwith be sentenced.
Sec. 14. Preliminary conference. Before conducting the trial, the court shall call the
parties to a preliminary conference during which a stipulation of facts may be entered
into, or the propriety of allowing the accused to enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense
may be considered, or such other matters may be taken up to clarify the issues and to
ensure a speedy disposition of the case. However, no admission by the accused shall be
used against him unless reduced to writing and signed by the accused and his counsel. A
refusal or failure to stipulate shall not prejudice the accused.
Sec. 15. Procedure of trial. At the trial, the affidavits submitted by the parties shall
constitute the direct testimonies of the witnesses who executed the same. Witnesses
who testified may be subjected to cross-examination, redirect or re-cross examination.

Should the affiant fail to testify, his affidavit shall not be considered as competent
evidence for the party presenting the affidavit, but the adverse party may utilize the
same for any admissible purpose.
Except in rebuttal or surrebuttal, no witness shall be allowed to testify unless his
affidavit was previously submitted to the court in accordance with Section 12 hereof.
However, should a party desire to present additional affidavits or counter-affidavits as
part of his direct evidence, he shall so manifest during the preliminary conference,
stating the purpose thereof. If allowed by the court, the additional affidavits of the
prosecution or the counter-affidavits of the defense shall be submitted to the court and
served on the adverse party not later than three (3) days after the termination of the
preliminary conference. If the additional affidavits are presented by the prosecution, the
accused may file his counter-affidavits and serve the same on the prosecution within
three (3) days from such service.
Sec. 16. Arrest of accused. The court shall not order the arrest of the accused except
for failure to appear whenever required. Release of the person arrested shall either be
on bail or on recognizance by a responsible citizen acceptable to the court.
Sec. 17. Judgment. Where a trial has been conducted, the court shall promulgate the
judgment not later than thirty (30) days after the termination of trial.
IV. COMMON PROVISIONS
Sec. 18. Referral to Lupon. Cases requiring referral to the Lupon for conciliation
under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1508 where there is no showing of
compliance with such requirement, shall be dismissed without prejudice and may be
revived only after such requirement shall have been complied with. This provision
shall not apply to criminal cases where the accused was arrested without a
warrant.chanrobles virtual law library chanrobles virtual law library
Sec. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. The following pleadings, motions or
petitions shall not be allowed in the cases covered by this Rule:
(a) Motion to dismiss the complaint or to quash the complaint or information except on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or failure to comply with the
preceding section;
(b) Motion for a bill of particulars;
(c) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment, or for opening of trial;
(d) Petition for relief from judgment;
Remedial Law Compiled. Codal and Cases. Atty. Tranquil. 27
(e) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper;
chanrobles virtual law library
(f) Memoranda;
(g) Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order
issued by the court;
(h) Motion to declare the defendant in default; chanrobles virtual law library
(i) Dilatory motions for postponement;
(j) Reply;
(k) Third party complaints;
(l) Interventions.
Sec. 20. Affidavits. The affidavits required to be submitted under this Rule shall state
only facts of direct personal knowledge of the affiants which are admissible in evidence,
and shall show their competence to testify to the matters stated therein.
A violation of this requirement may subject the party or the counsel who submits the
same to disciplinary action, and shall be cause to expunge the inadmissible affidavit or
portion thereof from the record.
Sec. 21. Appeal. The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate
regional trial court which shall decide the same in accordance with Section 22 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129. The decision of the regional trial court in civil cases governed by this
Rule, including forcible entry and unlawful detainer, shall be immediately executory,
without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom. Section 10 of Rule
70 shall be deemed repealed.
Sec. 22. Applicability of the regular rules. The regular procedure prescribed in the
Rules of Court shall apply to the special cases herein provided for in a suppletory
capacity insofar as they are not inconsistent herewith. chanrobles virtual law library
Sec. 23. Effectivity. This revised Rule on Summary Procedure shall be effective on
November 15, 1991.
RULE OF PROCEDURE FOR SMALL CLAIMS CASES
Section 1. Title. - This Rule shall be known as " The Rule of Procedure for Small Claims
Cases."

Section 2. Scope. - This Rule shall govern the procedure in actions before the
Metropolitan trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts for payment of money where the value of the claim does
not exceed One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) exclusive of interest and costs.
Section 3. Definiton of Terms. - For purposes of this Rule:
(a) Plaintiff - refers to the party who initiated a small claims action. The term
includes a defendant who has filed a counterclaim against plainfill;
(b) Defendant - is the party against whom the plaintiff has filed a small claims
action. The term includes a plaintiff against whom a defendant has filed a
claim, or a person who replies to the claim;
(c) Person - is an individual, corporation, partnership, limited liability
partnership, association, or other juridical entity endowed with personality by
law;
(d) Individual - is a natural person;
(e) Motion - means a party's request, written or oral, to the court for an
orderaction. It shall include an informal written request to the court, such as a
letter;
(f) Good cause - means circumtances sufficient to justify the requested order or
other action, as determined by the judge; and
(g) Affidavit - means a written statement or declaration of facts that are shown
or affirmed to be true.
Section 4. Applicability - The Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall apply this Rule in all
actions which are; (a) purely civil in nature where the claim or relief prayed for by the
plaintiff is solely for payment or reimbursement of sum of money, and (b) the civil
aspect of criminal action, or reserved upon the filing of the criminal action in court,
pursuant to Rule of 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
These claims or demands may be;
(a) For money owned under any of the following;
1. Contract of Lease;
Remedial Law Compiled. Codal and Cases. Atty. Tranquil. 28
2. Contract of Loan;
3. Contract of Services;
4. Contract of Sale; or
5. Contract of Mortgage;
(b) For damages arising from any of the following;
1. Fault or negligence;
2. Quasi-contract; or
3. Contract;
(c) The enforcement of a barangay amicable settlement or an arbitration
award involving a money claim covered by this Rule pursuant to Sec. 417 of
Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991.
Section 5. Commencement of Small Claims Action. - A small claims action is commenced
by filing with the court an accomplished and verified Statement of Claim (Form 1 -
SCC) in duplicate, accompanied by a Certification of Non-forum Shopping (Form 1-
A,SCC), and two (2) duly certified photocopies of the actionable document/s subjects of
the claim, as well as the affidavits of witnesses and other evidence to support the claim.
No evidence shall be allowed during the hearing which was not attached to or submitted
together with the Claim, unless good cause is shown for the admission of additional
evidence.
No formal pleading, other than the Statement of Claim described in this Rule, is
necessary to initiate a small claims action.
Section 6. Joinder of Claims - Plaintiff may join in a single statement of claim one or
more separate small claims against a defendant provided that the total amount claimed,
exclusive of interest and costs, does not exceed P100,00.00.
Section 7. Affidavits - The affidavits submitted under this Rule shall state only facts of
direct personal knowledge of the affiants which are admissible in evidence.
A violation of this requirement shall subject the party, and the counsel who assisted the
party in the preparation of the affidavits, if any, to appropriate disciplinary action. The
inadmissible affidavit(s) or portion(s) thereof shall be expunged from the record.

Section 8. Payment of Filing Fees. - The plaintiff shall pay the docket and other legal fees
prescribed under Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court, unless allowed to litigate as an
indigent.
A claim filed with a motion to sue as indigent (Form 6-SCC) shall be referred to the
Executive Judge for immediate action in case of multi-sala courts, or to the Presiding
Judge of the court hearing the small claims case. If the motion is granted by the
Executive Judge, the case shall be raffled off or assigned to the court designated to hear
small claims cases. If the motion is denied, the plaintiff shall be given five (5) days within
which to pay the docket fees, otherwise, the case shall be dismissed without prejudice.
In no case shall a party, even if declared an indigent, be exempt from the payment of the
P1,000.00 fee for service of summons and processes in civil cases.
Section 9. Dismissal of the Claim. - After the court determines that the case falls under
this Rule, it may, from an examination of the allegations of the Statement of Claim and
such evidence attached thereto, by itself, dismiss the case outright of any of the grounds
apparent from the Claim for the dismissal of a civil action.
Section 10. Summons and Notice of Hearing - If no ground for dismissal is found, the
court shall forthwith issue Summons (Form 2-SCC) on the day of receipt of the
Statement of Claim, directing the defendant to submit a verified Response.
The court shall also issue a Notice (Form 4-SCC) to both parties, directing them to
appear before it on a specific date and time for hearing, with a warning that no
unjustified postponement shall be allowed, as provided in Section 19 of this Rule.
The summons and notice to be served on the defendant shall be accompanied by a copy
of the Statement of Claim and documents submitted by plaintiff, and a copy of the
Response (Form 3-SCC) to be accomplished by the defendant. The Notice shall contain
an express prohibition against the filing of a motion to dismiss or any other motion
under Section 14 of this Rule.
Section 11. Response - The defendant shall file with the court and serve on the plaintiff a
duly accomplished and verified Response within a non - extendible period of ten (10)
days from receipt of summons. The Response shall be accompanied by certified
photocopies of documents, as well as affidavits of witnesses and other evidence in
support thereof. No evidence shall be allowed during the hearing which was not
attached to or submitted together with the Response, unless good cause is shown for the
admission of additional evidence.
Section 12. Effect of Failure to File Response - Should the defendant fail to file his
response within the required period, the court by itself shall render judgement as may
be warranted by the facts alleged in the Statement of claim limited to what is prayed for.
The court however, may, in its discretion, reduce the amount of damages for being
excessive or unconscionable
Remedial Law Compiled. Codal and Cases. Atty. Tranquil. 29
Section 13. Counterclaims Within the Coverage of this Rule - If at the time the action is
commenced, the defendant possesses a claim against the plaintiff that (a) is within the
coverage of this rule, exclusive of interest and costs; (b) arises out of the same
transaction or event that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim; (c) does not
require for its adjudication the joinder of third parties; and (d) is not the subject of
another pending action, the claim shall be filed as a counterclaim in the response;
otherwise, the defendant shall be barred from suit on the counterclaim.
The defendant may also elect to the file a counterclaim against the plaintiff that does not
arise out of the same transaction or occurrence , provided that the amount and nature
thereof are within the coverage of this Rule and the prescribed docket and the other
legal fees are paid.
Section 14. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions - The following pleadings, motions, and
petitions shall not be allowed in the cases covered by this Rule:
(a) Motion to dismiss the compliant except on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction;
(b) Motion for a bill of particulars;
(c) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgement, or for
reopening of trial;
(d) Petiton for relief from judgement;
(e) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits, or any other paper;
(f) Memoranda;
(g) Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory
order issued by the court;
(h) Motion to declare the defendant in default;
(i) Dilatory motions for postponement;
(j) Reply;
(k) Third-party complaints; and
(l) Interventions.

Section 15. Availability of Forms; Assistance by Court Personnel. - The Clerk of Court or
other personnel shall provide such assistance as may be requested by a plaintiff or a
defendant regarding the availability of forms and other information about the coverage,
requirements as well as procedure for small claims cases.
Section 16. Appearance. - the parties shall appear at the designated date of hearing
personally or through a representative authorized under a Special Power of
Attorney (Form 5-SCC ) to enter into an amicable settlement, to submit of Judicial
Dispute Resolution (JDR) and to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts and of
documentary exhibits
Section 17. Appearance of Attorneys Not Allowed. - No attorney shall appear in behalf of
or represent a party at the hearing, unless the attorney is the plaintiff or defendant.
If the court determines that a party cannot properly present his/her claim or defense
and needs assistance, the court may, in its discretion, allow another individual who is
not an attorney to assist that party upon the latter's consent.
Section 18. Non-appearance of Parties. - Failure of the plaintiff to appear shall be cause
for the dismissal of the claim without prejudice. The defendant who appears shall be
entitled to judgement on a permissive counterclaim.
Failure of the defendant to appear shall have the same effect as failure to file a Response
under Section 12 of this Rule. This shall not apply where one of two or more defendants
who are sued under a common cause of action and have pleaded a common defense
appears at the hearing.
Failure of both parties to appear shall cause the dismissal with prejudice of both the
claim and counterclaim.
Section 19. Postponement When Allowed. - A request for postponement of a hearing may
be granted only upon proof of the physical inability of the party to appear before the
court on the scheduled date and time. A party may avail of only one (1) postponement.
Section 20. Duty of the Court. - At the beginning of the court session, the judge shall read
aloud a short statement explaining the nature, purpose and the rule of procedure of
small claims cases.
Section 21. Judicial Dispute Resolution. - At the hearing, the judge shall conduct Judicial
Dispute Resolution (JDR) through mediation, conciliation, early neutral evaluation, or
any other mode of JDR. Any settlement (Form 7-SCC) or resolution (Form 8-SCC) of the
dispute shall be reduced into writing, signed by the parties and submitted to the court
for approval (Form 12-SCC).
Remedial Law Compiled. Codal and Cases. Atty. Tranquil. 30
Section 22. Failure of JDR. - If JDR fails and the parties agree in writing (Form 10-
SCC) that the hearing of the case shall be presided over by the judge who conducted the
JDR, the hearing shall so proceed in an informal and expeditious manner and terminated
within one (1) day.
Absent such agreement, (a) in case of a multi-sala court , the case shall, on the same day,
be transmitted (Form 11-SCC) to the Office of the Clerk of Court for immediate referral
by the Executive Judge to the pairing judge for hearing and decision within five (5)
working days from referral; and (b) in case of single sala court, the pairing judge shall
hear and decide the case in the court of origin within five (5) working days from referral
by the JDR judge.
Section 23. Decision. - After the hearing, the court shall render its decision on the same
day, based on the facts established by the evidence (Form 13-SCC). The decision shall
immediately be entered by the Clerk of Court in the court docket for civil cases and a
copy thereof forthwith served on the parties.
The decision shall be final and unappealable.
Section 24. Execution. - If the decision is rendered in favor of the plaintiff, execution
shall issue upon motion (Form 9-SCC).
Section 25. Applicability. of the Rules of Civil Procedure - The Rules of Civil procedure
shall apply suppletorily insofar as they are not inconsistent with this rule.
Section 26. Effectivity. - This Rule shall take effect on October 01, 2008 for the pilot
courts designated to apply the procedure for small claims cases following its publication
in two newspaper of general circulation.
RATIONALE OF THE PROPOSED RULE OF PROCEDURE FOR SMALL CLAIMS
CASES
a. Introduction
The most significant recurring theme of every program for judicial reform of
the Supreme Court is the pressing need for a more accessible, much swifter
and less expensive delivery of justice. Undeniably, the slow grind of the wheels
of justice is the result of a variety of factors, foremost of which is the perennial
congestion of court dockets which has transformed court litigation into a
protracted battle, that invariably exhausts the time, effort and resources of
 Remedial Law Compiled. Codal and Cases. Atty. Tranquil.
party-litigants, especially the poor. Many strategies have been devised to
unclog heavy court dockets, and one such approach is the use on mandatory
Pre-trial and Alternative Dispute Resolutions mechanisms such as mediation,
arbitration and conciliation. Another scheme that has been widely used in
many foreign legal system but which has yet to be tried in the Philippines is the
small claims case processing method used by small claims courts, often
referred to as the "Peoples Court," as it comes most directly into contact with
the citizenry of a jurisdiction.
Small claims courts are courts of limited jurisdiction that hear civil cases
between private litigants. Courts authorized to try small claims may also have
other judicial functions, and the name by which such a court is known varies
by jurisdiction: it may be known by such names as county court or magistrates
court. Small claims courts can be found in Australia, Canada, Ireland, Israel,
New Zealand, South Africa, Hong Kong, Singapore, the United Kingdom and the
United States.
b. The History and the Reforms of Small Claims Court
1.In the United States1
For almost a century now, small claims courts have
provided a form of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in
the United States. Originating around 1912 or 1913, these
courts were established primarily as a means for small
businesses to collect money from borrowers through a
process that was faster, less formal, and less expensive than
traditional civil litigation.
Following the lead of the establishment of the initial small
claim court in Kansas, USA in 1912 or 1913, every state in
the United States has created some form of a small claims
court system. Although the financial claims limits, methods
or procedure, and overall structure vary from state to state,
the concept is essentially the same, i.e., that relatively minor
disputes, involving dollar amounts that are insufficient to
warrant processing the case through the normal court
procedure, justify expeditious and simplified handling.
The consumer justice reform movements of the 1960s and
1970s brought renewed research and interest in the small
claims courts. This movement emphasized the need for
reform of small claims courts to facilitate the adjudication of
consumer grievances. Although "consumer justice
reformers" were concerned that businesses and
31
corporations were more likely to use attorneys in small
claims courts thereby placing inexperienced individual
defendants at a disadvantage, studies showed that
defendants with an attorney were more likely to win against
plaintiffs than unrepresented defendants, whereas
palintiffs without attorneys did just as well as represented
plaintiffs against unrepresented defendants. The result
was an appraisal of the need to bar attorneys and
collection agencies from the small claims
courts.lawphil.net
Small claims courts in the United States are often
considered courts of equity and are not necessarily bound
by the letter of the law. The courts have flexibility to use
more holistic approaches to problem solving and dispute
resolution than what is typical. Most judges act according to
what makes sense to them, even if this means setting aside
legal formalities. Moreover, traditional rules of evidence
and court processes do not apply. The rules of small claims
courts emphasize conciliation and pragmatism over
winning, and rules of evidence and evil procedure have
been simplified to allow maximum access to the courts by
individuals unable to afford an attorney.
2. Small Claims Courts in Canada2
All provinces in Canada have procedures for small claims. In
general, there are two different models. In most provinces,
as in British Columbia, Alberta, and new Brunswick, small
claims courts operate independently of the superior courts.
In other jurisdictions, the small claims courts are either
branches or divisions of the superior courts.
The small claims courts are meant to be an easier and less
expensive way to resolve disputes than in the superior
courts. Small Claims Court procedure is regulated both by
provincial legislation and rules in most provinces. It is
simplified and less costly with no strict pleading
requirements and formal discovery process.
3. Small Claims Courts in England and Wales?3
From early times, England had a tradition of local courts
where ordinary men could pursue justice in the form of civil
claims without the aid of lawyers. Some were set up by local

statutes, others by custom. These local courts could not
keep pace with the changes in the society brought about by
the Industrial Revolution. By the 1830s, the decade of great
liberal reform, there was a great public awakening to the
urgent need for constitutional reform in the administration
of justice. The result was the County Courts Act of 1846,
described in its preamble as an "Act For The More Easy
Recovery of Small Debts and Demands in England. " It was
initially a poor mans court. Andrew Amos, the first judge at
Marylebone County, described regular litigants as being "a
great proportion of the poorer classes, gaining their
livelihoods by bricklaying, gardening or other out of door
occupations against whom are usually issued in the summer
months." The county courts jurisdiction for claims brought
in contract and tort gradually increased from 50 in1888 to
5,000 in 1894.
The purpose and structure of the county court system has in
many ways remained the same since 1846. The aim is still
to make civil justice available locally there are now 223
county courts in England and Wales. They have continued to
be responsive to the needs of smaller cases which, although
small in terms of their financial value, are important to the
litigants involved. However, recent decades have seen two
major changes in relation to small claims first, the
introduction of the Civil procedure Rules reforms of 1998
with emphasis on proportionality.
4 prosecute and defend a small claims action through ready-made forms. He
Since January 1996, when the small claims limits in England
and Wales was trebled overnight to 3,000, district judges
have been expected to play the role of "interventionist" and
assist litigants in presenting their own cases personally at
small claims hearings. Like adjudicators in other parts of the
world, district judges in these countries have been
encouraged to intervene to an increasing extent at small
claims hearings. Such interventionism is, indeed, vital and
although there may be wide variations between
jurisdictions in the methods that are adopted to deal with
small claims, the idea of the adjudicator freely entering the
arena of the dispute to assist unrepresented litigants is
fundamental in almost all matters about small claims.
4. Small Claims Tribunals in Singapore5
Remedial Law Compiled. Codal and Cases. Atty. Tranquil. 32
The Small Claims Tribunals in Singapore have been in
operation since 1 February 1985. The tribunals have
fulfilled an integral role in providing the community with
accessible justice for civil claims involving small amounts.
Various features and programs have been put in place to
enhance access to justice for the community, by removing
barriers such as cost, delay, distance, time and
inconvenience. The Tribunals, constituted as part of the
Subordinate Courts of Singapore, were established for the
primary purpose of providing a quick and inexpensive
avenue for the resolution of small claims arising from
disputes between consumers and suppliers. There was a
need for a less expensive and less formal forum to deal with
such small claims. Hence, in 1985, the Small Claims
Tribunals Act was passed, which authorized the setting up
of one or more Tribunals to help consumers who have
claims of up to $2,000 relating to disputes arising from
contracts for the sale of goods or the provision of services.
c. Introduction of the Concept of Small Claims Court in the Philippines
The idea of establishing Small Claims Courts in the Philippines was first
proposed to the Supreme Court through a study conducted in 1999 by Justice
Josue N. Bellosillo, former Senior Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. After
observing small claims courts and interviewing judges of such courts in Dallas,
Texas, United States in 1999, Justice Bellosillo proposed in a Report that courts
can be established in the Philippines to handle exclusively small claims
without the participation of lawyers and where ordinary litigants can
envisioned the small claims courts as another positive approach, in addition to
mandatory pre-trial, for solving court congestion and delay. 6The study and
report was subsequently endorsed for legislative action to Senator Franklin
Drilon who later funded a project for this purpose.
At the regular session of the Fourteenth Congress, House Bill No. 2921 entitled
"An Act Establishing Small Claims Courts" was introduced by Congressman
Jose V. Yap. Thereafter, on July 3, 2007, Senate Bill No. 800 entitled
"Philippines Small Claims Court Act" was filed by Senator Ramon A. Revilla, Jr.
and, on September 3, 2007, the bill passed First Reading and was referred to
the Committee(s) on Justice and Human Rights and Finance. The same is still
pending with these committees at present.
In 2007, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
awarded a two-year grant to the American Bar Association Rule of Law
Initiative (ABA-ROLI) to pursue judicial reform activities in the Philippines for
the fiscal period October 2007 to September 30, 2009. 7In a letter to Chief
 Remedial Law Compiled. Codal and Cases. Atty. Tranquil.
Justice Reynato S. Puno dated October 10, 2007, ABA-ROLI proposed the
establishment of small claims pilot courts among first level courts in different
regions of the Philippines. The small claims pilot court project was proposed
by ABA to USAID after consultation with various Supreme Court officials in
conjunction with the 2000 Action Plan for Judicial Reform.
Among the critical issues being addressed by the APJR are case congestion and
delay. The congestion of case dockets is central to a multitude of problems,
either as cause or effect; it is either the manifestation of the source of other
difficulties. Addressing this concern is thus an imperative 8 which is why
present reforms in judicial systems and procedures have included the
following:
1. streamlining procedural rules to eliminate provisions that cause
delay and permit dilatory tactics;
2. re-engineering the jurisdictional structure of the courts to ensure
easy geographical access to the courts particularly by the poor
litigants.
9 claims tribunals.
3. improving the case management system toward more transparency,
accountability and integrity of the judicial process and for better
efficiency; and
4. strengthening of the mediation mechanism to promote early dispute
resolution nationwide. This involves the institutionalization of court-
annexed mediation, and the establishment of a Mediation Center to
continually monitor and assess the performance of the system and
provide training and research.
Notwithstanding the absence of a law at the present time creating small claims
courts in our country, 10the Supreme Court through a program in partnership
with ABA-ROLI and USAID, can promulgate and implement a simplified rule of
procedure exclusively for small claims and assign a certain number of existing
first level courts to take cognizance of small claims. 11This does not need
legislative action as the Court can designate several first level courts all over
the country to jump-start the pilot project. Thus, pursuant to its rule-making
power, 12the Court under the present Constitution can adopt a special rule of
procedure to govern small claims cases and select pilot courts that would
empower the people to bring suits before them pro se to resolve legal disputes
involving simple issues of law and procedure without the need for legal
representations and extensive judicial intervention. This system will enhance
access to justice especially by those who cannot afford the high costs of
litigation even in cases of relatively small value. 13 It is expeditious rules and
means, our Court can improve the perception of justice in this country, thus
33
giving citizens a renewed "stake" in preserving peace in the land. This is a
hopeful message to our people that "there is no need to despair for there is
deliverance in law; that is a promise that has been fulfilled by law in the past; it
is a promise law will again fulfill in the future."14
In December 2007, the Supreme Court established a Technical Working Group
composed of the Court Administrator, the Program Management Office
Administrator, selected judges and other officials of the Supreme Court and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines to undertake the following activities:
5. The development of Rules and Procedures to Implement pilot Small
Claims Courts;
6. The establishment of Criteria to Select Appropriate regions/Judges
for pilot Small Claims Courts and set Peso Limits for the Small Claims
Courts;
7. Through the Philippine Judicial Academy, the conduct of training
programs for Judges and their personnel participating in the Pilot
Small Claims Courts project; and
8. The employment of "justice on Wheels" buses to launch pilot small
15
On June 23, 2008, the Technical Working Group finalized its draft of a Rule of
procedure for Small Claims Cases. Highlights of the Proposed Rule are the
following;
IX. The Rule governs the procedure in actions before the first level
courts, i.e., Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trials Courts in
Cities, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
(excluding Sharia Circuit Courts) for the payment of money
where the value of the claim does not exceed One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (100,000.00) exclusive of interest and costs.
Explanatory note: The purpose of a small claims process is to provide
an inexpensive and expeditious means to settle disputes over small
amounts. For purposes of the project, the amount has been set for
claims involving amounts of not more than 100,000.00.
The theory behind the small claims system is that ordinary litigation
fails to bring practical justice to the parties when the disputed claim
is small, because the time and expense required by the ordinary
litigation process is so disproportionate to the amount involved that
it discourages a just resolution of the dispute. The small claims
process is designed to function quickly and informally. There are no

attorneys, no formal pleadings and no strict legal rules of evidence.
The small claims court system is not a " typical inferior court." Parties
are encouraged to file small claims court actions to resolve their
minor disputes as opposed to resorting to self-help or forcible means
to seek their remedy. (Pace v. Hillcrest Motor Co.,161 Cal. Rptr. 663,
664 Ct. App. 1980)
X. This Rule applies to all actions that are: (a) purely civil in nature
where the claim or relief prayed for by the plaintiff is solely for
payment/reimbursement of a sum of money, and (b) the civil
aspect of criminal actions, either filed prior to the institution of
the criminal action, or reserved upon the filing of the criminal
action in court, pursuant to Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. These claims or demands may be:
a. For money owed under any of the following:
1. Contract of lease;
2. Contract of loan;
3. Contract of services;
4. Contract of sale; or
5. Contract of mortgage;
b. For damages arising from:
1. Fault or negligence;
2. Quasi-contract; or
3. Contract;
c. Enforcement of a barangay amicable settlement or
an arbitration award involving money claims
covered by this Rule pursuant to Sec. 417 of
Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the
"Local Government Code of 1991."
Explanatory Note: The kinds of cases that can be filed in
Small Claims Court vary, but the case must seek money only.
For example, a suit cannot be brought in Small Claims Court
to force a person or business to fix a damaged good; or to
demand fulfillment of a promised obligation which is not
purely for money, or to seek money to compensate for pain
and suffering. Some of the kinds of cases which are allowed
as small claims include the following:
4. Actual damage caused to vehicles, other personal
property, real property or person;
5. Payment or reimbursement for property, deposit,
or money loaned;
6. Payment for services rendered, insurance claim,
rent, commissions, or for goods sold and
delivered;
Remedial Law Compiled. Codal and Cases. Atty. Tranquil. 34
7. Money claim pursuant to contact, warranty or
agreement; and
8. Purely civil action for payment of money covered
by bounced or stopped check.
A small claims action is commenced by filing with the court an
accomplished and verified Statement of Claim in duplicate, accompanied by
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping, a nd two (2) duly certified photocopies of
the actionable document/s subject of the claim. No evidence shall be allowed
during the hearing which was not attached to or submitted together with the
Claim, unless good cause is shown for the admission of additional evidence.
Plaintiff may join in a single Statement of Claim one or more separate
small claims against a defendant as long as the costs, does not exceed
P100,000.00.
The plaintiff shall pay the prescribed fees upon filing, unless allowed to
litigate as an indigent.
For the purposes of this rule: (a) Plaintiff is the party who has filed a
small claims action. The term includes a defendant who has filed a counterclaim
against a plaintiff, (b) Defendant is the party against whom the plaintiff has a filed
a small claims action. The term includes a plaintiff against whom defendant has
filed a claim, or a person who replies to the claim; (c) Person is an individual,
corporation, partnership, limited liability partnership, association, or other
entity; (d) Individual is natural person: (e) Motion means a partys request,
written or oral, to the court for an order or other action. It shall include an
informal written request to the court, such as a letter; (f) Good cause means
circumstances sufficient to justify the requested order or other action, as
determined by the judge; and (g) Affidavit means a written statement or
declaration of facts that are sworn or affirmed to be true.
Explanatory Note: A plaintiff may commence an action in the small
claims court by filing a Statement of claim under oath with the Clerk
of the first level court in person or by mail. The claim form shall be a
simple non technical form approved or adopted by the Supreme
Court. The claim form shall set forth (1) the name and address of the
defendant, if known; (2) the amount and the basis of the claim: (3)
that the plaintiff, where possible, has demanded payment and, in
applicable cases, possession of the property; (4) that the defendant
has failed or refused to pay, and where applicable, has refused to
surrender the property; and (5) that the plaintiff understands that
the judgement on his or her claim will be conclusive and without a
right of appeal. The plaintiff should attach to the claim all documents
necessary to proved his/her right to reliefs prayed for. The form or
accompanying instructions shall include information that the plaintiff
(1) may not represented by an attorney; (2) has no right to appeal;
and (3) may ask the court to waive fees for filing and serving the

claim on the ground that the plaintiff is indigent unable to pay them,
using the forms approved by the Supreme Court for the purpose.
The Court may dismiss the case outright on any of the grounds for
dismissal of a civil actions provided by the Rules of the Civil Procedure. A
defendant may challenges jurisdiction or venue or court location by including
these defenses in his Response before appearing in the hearing, the court shall
inquire into the facts sufficiently to determine whether jurisdiction and authority
of the court over the action are proper, and shall make its determination
accordingly.
Explanatory Note: Jurisdiction and venue requirements in small
claims action shall be the same as in other civil actions provided in
the Rules of Civil Procedure. A defendant may challenge jurisdiction
or venue or court location by including these defenses in his
Response before appearing in the scheduled hearing. In all cases,
even if the defendant does not ask for dismissal of the case in the
Response or appear at the hearing, the court shall inquire into the
facts sufficiently to determine whether jurisdiction and authority of
the court over the action are proper, and shall make its determination
accordingly.
No Motion to Dismiss shall be allowed except on the grounds under
Section 13 thereof (See No. X below).
Should the defendant fail to file a response within the required period,
the court shall render judgement as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the
Statement of Claim and limited to what prayed for therein. The court may, in its
discretion, reduce the amount of damages for being excessive or otherwise
unconscionable.
If at the time the action is commenced, a defendant possesses a claim
against the plaintiff that (a) is within the coverage of this Rule, exclusive of
interest and costs; (b) arises out of the same transaction or event that is the
subject matter of the plaintiffs claim; (c) does not require, for its adjudication, the
joiner or third parties; and (d) is not the subject of another pending action, this
claim shall be included as a counterclaim in the Response, otherwise, such
counterclaim shall be barred.
The defendant may also elect to include in the Response a
counterclaim against the plaintiff that does not arise out of the
transaction or occurrence provided that the amount and nature
thereof are within the coverage of this Rule and the prescribed
docket fees are paid.
Explanatory Note: If a defendant has claim against a plaintiff that
exceeds the limits stated in Section 2 of this Rule, and the claim
Remedial Law Compiled. Codal and Cases. Atty. Tranquil. 35
relates to the contract, transaction, matter, or event which is the
subject of the plaintiffs claim, the defendant may commence an
action against the plaintiff in a court of competent jurisdiction. If said
claim which is beyond the limit of money claim provided in this Rule
is filed with the Response befire the Small Claims Court, the latter
shall dismiss the counterclaim.
Prohibited pleadings and motions: (a) Motion to dismiss the complaint
except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction; (b) Motion for bill of particulars; (c)
Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgement, or for reopening of
trial; (d) Petition for relief from judgement; (e) Motion for extension of time to file
pleadings, affidavits, or any other paper; (f) Memoranda; (g) Petition
for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by
the court; (h) Motion to declare the defendant in default; (i) Dilatory motions for
postponement; (j) Reply; (k) Third-party complaints; and (l) Interventions.
Availability of Forms for the Parties who shall be assisted by Clerk of
Court.
The parties must personally appear at the hearing; if unable, then
through a designated representative who must be duly authorized to enter into an
amicable settlement.
Attorneys are not allowed at the hearing, except as plaintiff or defendant.
However this does not preclude them from offerings their services in assisting the
party to small claims case to prepare for the hearing or for other matters outside
of the hearing. If the court determines that a party cannot properly present
his/her claim of defense and needs assistance, the court may, in its discretion,
allow another individual, who is not an attorney, to assist that party upon the
latters consent.
Explanatory Note: Except as permitted by this section, no attorney
shall appear in a small claims action except when the latter shall
maintain or defend an action in any of the following capacities:
0. By or against himself or herself;
1. By or against a partnership in which he or she is general
partner and in which all the partners are attorneys; or
2. By or against a professional corporation of which he or she
is an officer or director and of which all other officers and
directors are attorneys.
Nothing in this section shall prevent an attorney from doing any of
the following:
3. Providing advice to a party to a small claims action, either
before or after the commencement of the action; or
 Remedial Law Compiled. Codal and Cases. Atty. Tranquil.
4. Submitting an affidavit as a witness for a party in order to
state facts of which he or she has personal knowledge and
about which he or she competent to do so.
If the court determines that the party does not speak or understand
English or Filipino sufficiently to comprehend the proceedings or give
testimony, to the questions of the court, if any, and needs assistance
in so doing, the court may permit another individual (other than an
attorney) to assist that the party. Any additional continuances shall
be at the sound discretion of the court. If the court interpreter or
other competent interpreter of the language or dialect known to the
party is not available to aid that party in a small claims action, at the
first hearing of the case the court shall postpone the hearing one time
only to allow the party the opportunity to obtain another individual
(other than an attorney) to assist that party An additional
continuances shall be at the sound discretion of the court.
XV. Non-appearance of Parties. Failure of the plaintiff to appear
shall be a cause for the dismissal of the complaint without
prejudice. The defendant who appears shall be entitled to
judgement on a permissive counterclaim.
On the other hand failure of the defendant to appear shall have
the same effect as failure to file a Response under Section 12 of
this Rule. This is however shall not apply where one of two or
more defendants sued under a common cause of action and who
pleaded a common defense shall appear at the hearing.
Failure of both parties to appear shall causes the dismissal with
prejudice of both the claim and counterclaim.
XVI. A request for postponement of a hearing may be granted only
upon proof of the physical inability of the party to appear before
the court on that date and time. Every party may avail of only
one (1) postponement.
Explanatory Note: A Party may submit an oral or written request to
postpone a hearing date for good cause, as follows:
0. If the written request is writing, it may be made either by
letter or on a form adopted or approved by the Supreme
Court;
1. The request shall be filed before the hearing date and
accompanied by proof of physical inability, unless the court
36
determines that the requesting party has good cause to file
the request on the date of hearing itself: and
2. If the court finds that the interest of justice would be served
by postponing the hearing, the court shall do so and shall
notify all parties by mail on the same day of the new hearing
date, time and place.
This section does not limit the inherent power of the court to order
postponement of hearing in strictly appropriate circumstances. The
postponement fee of One Hundred Pesos (or as provided in Rule 141,
Revised Rules of Court, as amended on Legal Fees) shall be charged
and collected before the filing of a request for postponement and
rescheduling of a hearing date.
XVII. Judicial Dispute Resolution. At the hearing, the court shall exert
all efforts to encourage the parties to resolve their dispute
through mediation, conciliation, early neutral evaluating or any
other mode of JDR. Any settlement or resolution of the dispute
shall be reduced into writing, signed by the parties, and
submitted to the court for approval.
XVIII. If JDR fails and the parties agree in writing (Form 10-SCC) that
the hearing of the case shall be presided over by the judge who
conducted the JDR, the hearing shall so proceed in an informal
and expeditious manner and terminated within one (1) day.
Absent such agreement, (a) in case of a multi-sala court, the
court shall, on the same day, be transmitted (Form 11-SCC) to the
Office of the Clerk of Court for immediate referral by the
Executive Judge to the pairing judge for hearing and decision
within five (5) working days from referral; and )b) in case of a
single sala court, the pairing judge shall hear and decide the case
in the court of origin within five (5) working days from referral
by the JDR judge.
Explanatory Note: In hearing before the small claims court, witnesses
shall still be sworn in. The judge shall conduct the hearing in an
informal manner so as to do substantial justice between the parties.
The judge shall have the discretion to admit all evidence which may
be of probative value although not in accordance with formal rules of
practice, procedure, pleading or evidence provided in the Rules of
Court, except that privileged communications shall not be admissible.
The object of such hearings shall be to determine the rights of the
litigants on the merits and to dispense expeditious justice between
the parties.

An interventionist role by judges in such hearings is effective in
eliciting evidence from litigants in person. It is seen by unrepresented
parties as a "helping hand" which they appreciate, provided that
judges avoid the danger of appearing to be partial. By discussing the
facts of the case, judges find what common ground does exist
between the parties. This tends to narrow the differences between
the parties and make the final judicial decision easier whereas
traditional open court trials, with the presence of lawyers and the use
of cross-examination tend to polarize the parties, increase
antagonism and heighten the differences.
In this regard, Lord Woolf, Great Britains case management expert,
has observed:
"The role of the judge in small claims is not only that of an
adjudicator. It is a key safeguard of the rights of both
parties. In most cases, the judge is effectively a substitute
for a legal representative. His duty is to ascertain the main
matters at issue, to elicit the evidence, to reach a view on
the facts of the matter and to give a decision. In some cases
he may encourage the parties to settle. In doing so he
should ensure that both parties have presented the
evidence and called the witnesses germane to their case and
that he has identified and considered any issue of law which
is pertinent to the case in hand. He must also hold the ring
and ensure that each party has a fair chance to present his
own case and to challenge that of his opponent."
The key judicial skills in conducting such hearings are to maintain a
balance between informality and fairness, to ensure a level playing
field and to protect the weak and the scrupulous. In practice, this is
achieved by preventing interruptions and parties talking over each
other, and making it clear that both parties will have plenty of time to
say all that they wish before the end of the hearing.
XIX. Decision. After the hearing, the court shall, on the same day,
render its decision using the form provided. The decision shall
immediately be entered by the Clerk of Court in the court docket
for civil cases and a copy thereof served on the parties. The
decision is final and unappealable.
Explanatory Note: Despite the relative informality of the procedure,
judgements are based upon a strict application of the substantive law
and an objective judicial analysis of the facts. The judge is duty-bound
to give the legal basis for the findings.
Remedial Law Compiled. Codal and Cases. Atty. Tranquil. 37
The prohibition against appeals assures immediate and swift justice.
The right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part due process. It is
merely a statutory privilege and a procedural remedy of statutory
origin, a remedy that may be exercised only in the manner and in
accordance with the provisions of the law authorizing such exercise.
The applicable provisions of the law allowing appeals from decisions
of the first level courts are Sections 36 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended,
also known as "The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980." The
procedure on appeal is subject to the limitations and restrictions
provided by this Act and any such rules as the Supreme Court may
hereafter prescribe. Sec. 36 of B.P. Blg. 129 provides an instance
wherein the Supreme Court may adopt special procedures, including
cases where appeal may not be allowed, to achieve an expeditious
and inexpensive determination of particular cases requiring
summary disposition.
XX. Execution. If the decision is rendered in favor of the plaintiff,
execution shall issue upon motion (Form 9-SCC).
THORNTON VS. THORNTON
FACTS: American husband and Filipina wife got married here and had a daughter. Three
years into the marriage, wife became bored as a housewife and wanted to go back to her
life as a GRO. Because of this, their relationship turned sour and one day, the wife left
the family home with her daughter without notifying her husband. Husband filed a
petition for habeas corpus before the Family Court of Makati. Dismissed since the child
daw was in Basilan and hence it did not have jurisdiction. Husband went to Basilan but
could not find his wife and child there. He had a lead that his wife and child may be
somewhere in Cavite, Nueva Ecija, or Manila.
Therefore, he filed a petition for habeas corpus before the CA (para enforceable within
the country) but CA denied the petition, claiming that it does not have jurisdiction
because the Family Courts Act (which gave the FC jurisdiction regarding petition for
habeas corpus in cases involving custody of minors) impliedly repealed BP129 (which
gave CA jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases)
CA: Family Courts Act (RA 8369) uses the word exclusive in granting the FC
jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases.
Issue: Does CA have jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving custody of minors?
YES.
 Remedial Law Compiled. Codal and Cases. Atty. Tranquil. 38

SC: The CA should take cognizance of the case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that consolidated in, the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston
revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors. Division. The defendants in the consolidated cases prayed for the dismissal of all the
actions under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

CAs reasoning will result in an iniquitous situation, leaving individuals like petitioner
without legal recourse in obtaining custody of their children. Individuals who do not In a Memorandum Order, the Federal District Court conditionally granted the
know the whereabouts of minors they are looking for would be helpless since they defendants motion to dismiss provided the defendants:
cannot seek redress from family courts whose writs are enforceable only in their
respective territorial jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is being transferred from one place
to another, which seems to be the case here, the petitioner in a habeas corpus case will
be left without legal remedy. (1) participated in expedited discovery in the United States

The primordial consideration is the welfare and best interests of the child. In the case at
bar, a literal interpretation of the word exclusive will result in grave injustice and
negate the policy to protect the rights and promote the welfare of children under the
Constitution and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. This mandate
must prevail over legal technicalities and serve as the guiding principle in construing the
provisions of RA 8369.
(2) either waived or accepted service of process and waived any other jurisdictional
defense in any action commenced by a plaintiff in these actions in his home country or
the country in which his injury occurred.
(3) waived any limitations-based defense that has matured since the commencement of
these actions in the courts of Texas;

The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the CA
and SC to issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the custody of minors. Further, it
cannot be said that the provisions of RA 8369 and BP 129 are absolutely incompatible
since RA 8369 does not prohibit the CA and the SC from issuing writs of habeas corpus
in cases involving the custody of minors.
(4) stipulated that any discovery conducted during the pendency of these actions may
be used in any foreign proceeding to the same extent as if it had been conducted in
proceedings initiated there; and

In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been settled with the adoption of A.M.
No. 03-03-04-SC Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to
Custody of Minors(SEC20: The petition may likewise be filed with the SC, CA, or with any
of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the
Philippines.
NAVIDA VS. DIZON
Facts:
(5) submitted an agreement binding them to satisfy any final judgment rendered in
favor of plaintiffs by a foreign court.
In the event that the highest court of any foreign country finally affirms the dismissal for
lack of jurisdiction of an action commenced by a plaintiff in these actions in his home
country or the country in which he was injured, that plaintiff may return to this court
and, upon proper motion, the court will resume jurisdiction over the action as if the case
had never been dismissed for.

Beginning 1993, a number of personal injury suits were filed in different Texas state
courts by citizens of twelve foreign countries, including the Philippines. The thousands
of plaintiffs sought damages for injuries they allegedly sustained from their exposure to Case 1 (125078) and 2 (125598):
dibromochloropropane (DBCP), a chemical used to kill nematodes (worms), while
working on farms in 23 foreign countries. The cases were eventually transferred to, and

336 plaintiffs from General Santos City filed a Joint Complaint in the RTC of General
Santos City. Named as defendants therein were: Shell Oil Co. (SHELL); Dow Chemical Co.
(DOW); Occidental Chemical Corp. (OCCIDENTAL); Dole Food Co., Inc., Dole Fresh Fruit
Co., Standard Fruit Co., Standard Fruit and Steamship Co. (hereinafter collectively
referred to as DOLE); Chiquita Brands, Inc. and Chiquita Brands International, Inc.
(CHIQUITA); Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A. and Del Monte Tropical Fruit Co.
(hereinafter collectively referred to as DEL MONTE); Dead Sea Bromine Co., Ltd.;
Ameribrom, Inc.; Bromine Compounds, Ltd.; and Amvac Chemical Corp. (The
aforementioned defendants are hereinafter collectively referred to as defendant
companies.)
NAVIDA, et al., prayed for the payment of damages in view of the illnesses and injuries to
the reproductive systems which they allegedly suffered because of their exposure to
DBCP. They claimed, among others, that they were exposed to this chemical during the
early 1970s up to the early 1980s when they used the same in the banana plantations
where they worked at; and/or when they resided within the agricultural area where
such chemical was used. NAVIDA, et al., claimed that their illnesses and injuries were
due to the fault or negligence of each of the defendant companies in that they produced,
sold and/or otherwise put into the stream of commerce DBCP-containing products.
According to NAVIDA, et al., they were allowed to be exposed to the said products, which
the defendant companies knew, or ought to have known, were highly injurious to the
formers health and well-being.
Without resolving the motions filed by the parties, the RTC of General Santos City issued
an Order dismissing the complaint. First, the trial court determined that it did not have
jurisdiction to hear the case because the substance of the cause of action as stated in the
complaint against the defendant foreign companies cites activity on their part which
took place abroad and had occurred outside and beyond the territorial domain of the
Philippines. These acts of defendants cited in the complaint included the manufacture of
pesticides, their packaging in containers, their distribution through sale or other
disposition, resulting in their becoming part of the stream of commerce. The subject
matter stated in the complaint and which is uniquely particular to the present case,
consisted of activity or course of conduct engaged in by foreign defendants outside
Philippine territory, hence, outside and beyond the jurisdiction of Philippine Courts,
including the present Regional Trial Court.
Second, the RTC of General Santos City adjudged that NAVIDA, et al., were coerced into
submitting their case to the Philippine courts, merely to comply with the U.S. District
Courts Order and in order to keep open to the plaintiffs the opportunity to return to the
U.S. District Court.
Remedial Law Compiled. Codal and Cases. Atty. Tranquil. 39
Third, the trial court ascribed little significance to the voluntary appearance of the
defendant companies. Defendants have appointed their agents authorized to accept
service of summons/processes in the Philippines pursuant to the agreement in the U.S.
court that defendants will voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of this court. While it is
true that this court acquires jurisdiction over persons of the defendants through their
voluntary appearance, it appears that such voluntary appearance of the defendants in
this case is conditional. Thus in the Defendants Amended Agreement Regarding
Conditions of Dismissal for Forum Non Conveniens filed with the U.S. District Court,
defendants declared that (t)he authority of each designated representative to accept
service of process will become effective upon final dismissal of these actions by the
Court. The decision of the U.S. District Court dismissing the case is not yet final and
executory since both the plaintiffs and defendants appealed therefrom. Consequently,
since the authority of the agent of the defendants in the Philippines is conditioned on
the final adjudication of the case pending with the U.S. courts, the acquisition of
jurisdiction by this court over the persons of the defendants is also conditional.
Fourth, the RTC of General Santos City ruled that the act of NAVIDA, et al., of filing the
case in the Philippine courts violated the rules on forum shopping and litis pendencia.
This court frowns upon the fact that the parties herein are both vigorously pursuing
their appeal of the decision of the U.S. District court dismissing the case filed thereat. To
allow the parties to litigate in this court when they are actively pursuing the same cases
in another forum, violates the rule on forum shopping so abhorred in this jurisdiction.
Moreover, the filing of the case in the U.S. courts divested this court of its own
jurisdiction. This court takes note that the U.S. District Court did not decline jurisdiction
over the cause of action. The case was dismissed on the ground of forum non
conveniens, which is really a matter of venue. By taking cognizance of the case, the U.S.
District Court has, in essence, concurrent jurisdiction with this court over the subject
matter of this case. It is settled that initial acquisition of jurisdiction divests another of
its own jurisdiction.
Case 3 (126654), 4 (127856), 5(128398)
Another joint complaint for damages against SHELL, DOW, OCCIDENTAL, DOLE, DEL
MONTE, and CHIQUITA was filed before Branch 16 of the RTC of Davao City by 155
plaintiffs from Davao City. They alleged that as workers in the banana plantation and/or
as residents near the said plantation, they were made to use and/or were exposed to
nematocides, which contained the chemical DBCP. According to ABELLA, et al., such
exposure resulted in serious and permanent injuries to their health, including, but not
limited to, sterility and severe injuries to their reproductive capacities.

The RTC of Davao City, however, junked Civil Cases. The Court however is constrained to
dismiss the case at bar not solely on the basis of the above but because it shares the
opinion of legal experts given in the interview made by the Inquirer in its Special report
Pesticide Cause Mass Sterility, Former Justice Secretary Demetrio Demetria in a May
1995 opinion said: The Philippines should be an inconvenient forum to file this kind of
damage suit against foreign companies since the causes of action alleged in the petition
do not exist under Philippine laws. There has been no decided case in Philippine
Jurisprudence awarding to those adversely affected by DBCP. This means there is no
available evidence which will prove and disprove the relation between sterility and
DBCP.
Eventually, the cases reached the SC!
Present case:
The main contention of the petitioners states that the allegedly tortious acts and/or
omissions of defendant companies occurred within Philippine territory. Said fact
allegedly constitutes reasonable basis for our courts to assume jurisdiction over the
case.
DOLE similarly maintains that the acts attributed to defendant companies constitute a
quasi-delict, which falls under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. DOLE also argues that if
indeed there is no positive law defining the alleged acts of defendant companies as
actionable wrong, Article 9 of the Civil Code dictates that a judge may not refuse to
render a decision on the ground of insufficiency of the law. The court may still resolve
the case, applying the customs of the place and, in the absence thereof, the general
principles of law.
CHIQUITA (another petitioner) argues that the courts a quo had jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the cases filed before them. CHIQUITA avers that the pertinent matter
is the place of the alleged exposure to DBCP, not the place of manufacture, packaging,
distribution, sale, etc., of the said chemical. This is in consonance with the lex loci delicti
commisi theory in determining the situs of a tort, which states that the law of the place
where the alleged wrong was committed will govern the action. CHIQUITA and the other
defendant companies also submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the RTC by
Remedial Law Compiled. Codal and Cases. Atty. Tranquil. 40
making voluntary appearances and seeking for affirmative reliefs during the course of
the proceedings.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTCs have jurisdiction over the subject matter in these cases.
Held: Yes.
1. The rule is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by
law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief
sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to all or some of the claims
asserted therein. Once vested by law, on a particular court or body, the jurisdiction over
the subject matter or nature of the action cannot be dislodged by anybody other than by
the legislature through the enactment of a law.
At the time of the filing of the complaints, the jurisdiction of the RTC in civil cases under
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, was:
In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy
exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro
Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds Two
hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00).
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 09-94, states:
The exclusion of the term damages of whatever kind in determining the jurisdictional
amount under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No.
7691, applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of
the main cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main
cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be
considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.

It is clear that the claim for damages is the main cause of action and that the total
amount sought in the complaints is approximately P2.7 million for each of the plaintiff
claimants. The RTCs unmistakably have jurisdiction over the cases filed in General
Santos City and Davao City.
2. The jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in
the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction
would almost entirely depend upon the defendants. What determines the jurisdiction of
the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the
complaint. The averments therein and the character of the relief sought are the ones to
be consulted.
Clearly then, the acts and/or omissions attributed to the defendant companies
constitute a quasi-delict which is the basis for the claim for damages filed by NAVIDA, et
al., and ABELLA, et al., with individual claims of approximately P2.7 million for each
plaintiff claimant, which obviously falls within the purview of the civil action jurisdiction
of the RTCs.
3. It is, therefore, error on the part of the courts a quo when they dismissed the cases on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the mistaken assumption that the cause of action
narrated by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., took place abroad and had occurred
outside and beyond the territorial boundaries of the Philippines, i.e., the manufacture
of the pesticides, their packaging in containers, their distribution through sale or other
disposition, resulting in their becoming part of the stream of commerce, and, hence,
outside the jurisdiction of the RTCs.
Certainly, the cases below are not criminal cases where territoriality, or the situs of the
act complained of, would be determinative of jurisdiction and venue for trial of cases. In
personal civil actions, such as claims for payment of damages, the Rules of Court allow
the action to be commenced and tried in the appropriate court, where any of the
plaintiffs or defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant, where he
may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
In a very real sense, most of the evidence required to prove the claims of NAVIDA, et al.,
and ABELLA, et al., are available only in the Philippines. First, plaintiff claimants are all
residents of the Philippines, either in General Santos City or in Davao City. Second, the
specific areas where they were allegedly exposed to the chemical DBCP are within the
territorial jurisdiction of the courts a quo wherein NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al.,
Remedial Law Compiled. Codal and Cases. Atty. Tranquil. 41
initially filed their claims for damages. Third, the testimonial and documentary evidence
from important witnesses, such as doctors, co-workers, family members and other
members of the community, would be easier to gather in the Philippines.
----
Re: Jurisdiction over the person
The RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City validly acquired jurisdiction
over the persons of all the defendant companies. All parties voluntarily, unconditionally
and knowingly appeared and submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the courts a
quo. All the defendant companies submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the courts
a quo by making several voluntary appearances, by praying for various affirmative
reliefs, and by actively participating during the course of the proceedings below.
In line herewith, this Court, in Meat Packing Corporation of the Philippines v.
Sandiganbayan, held that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in civil cases is
acquired either by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority
or by service of summons. Furthermore, the active participation of a party in the
proceedings is tantamount to an invocation of the courts jurisdiction and a willingness
to abide by the resolution of the case, and will bar said party from later on impugning
the court or bodys jurisdiction.
---
Jurisdiction v Exercise of Jurisdiction
It may also be pertinently stressed that jurisdiction is different from the exercise of
jurisdiction. Jurisdiction refers to the authority to decide a case, not the orders or the
decision rendered therein. Accordingly, where a court has jurisdiction over the persons
of the defendants and the subject matter, as in the case of the courts a quo, the decision
on all questions arising therefrom is but an exercise of such jurisdiction. Any error that
the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is merely an error of judgment,
which does not affect its authority to decide the case, much less divest the court of the
jurisdiction over the case.

----
Re: Bad faith in filing cases to procure a dismissal and to allow petitioners to return to
the forum of their choice.
This Court finds such argument much too speculative to deserve any merit.
It must be remembered that this Court does not rule on allegations that are unsupported
by evidence on record. This Court does not rule on allegations which are manifestly
conjectural, as these may not exist at all. This Court deals with facts, not fancies; on
realities, not appearances.
* We REMAND the records of this case to the respective Regional Trial Courts of origin
for further and appropriate proceedings in line with the ruling herein that said courts
have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the amended complaints.
LAND BANK VS. VILLEGAS
These consolidated cases[1] are about the jurisdiction of a Regional Trial Court (RTC),
acting as a Special Agrarian Court, over just compensation cases involving agricultural
lands located outside its regular territorial jurisdiction but within the province where it
is designated as agrarian court under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
The Facts and the Case
Petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank) filed cases for determination
of just compensation against respondent Corazon M. Villegas in Civil Case 2007-14174
and respondent heirs of Catalino V. Noel and Procula P. Sy in Civil Case 2007-14193
before the RTC of Dumaguete City, Branch 32, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court for the
province of Negros Oriental. Respondent Villegas property was in Hibaiyo, Guihulngan
City, Negros Oriental, while respondent heirs land was in Nangca, Bayawan City, Negros
Remedial Law Compiled. Codal and Cases. Atty. Tranquil. 42
Oriental. These lands happened to be outside the regular territorial jurisdiction of RTC
Branch 32 of Dumaguete City.
On September 13, 2007 RTC, Branch 32 dismissed Civil Case 2007-14174 for lack
of jurisdiction.[2] It ruled that, although it had been designated Special Agrarian Court
for Negros Oriental, the designation did not expand its territorial jurisdiction to hear
agrarian cases under the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC, Branch 64 of Guihulngan City
where respondent Villegas property can be found.
On November 16, 2007 RTC, Branch 32 also dismissed Civil Case 2007-14193 for
lack of jurisdiction. It pointed out that RTC, Branch 63 of Bayawan City had jurisdiction
over the case since respondent heirs property was within the latter courts territorial
jurisdiction.
Petitioner Land Bank moved for the reconsideration of the dismissal of the two
cases but RTC, Branch 32 denied both motions.[3] Aggrieved, Land Bank directly filed
this petitions for certiorari[4] before this Court, raising a purely question of law.
Sole Question Presented
The sole question presented in these cases is whether or not an RTC, acting as Special
Agrarian Court, has jurisdiction over just compensation cases involving agricultural
lands located outside its regular jurisdiction but within the province where it is
designated as an agrarian court under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1998.
The Courts Ruling
The RTC, Branch 32 based its order on Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) Zenaida
Elepaos opinion that single sala courts have jurisdiction over agrarian cases involving
lands located within its territorial jurisdiction. An RTC branch acting as a special
agrarian court, she claimed, did not have expanded territorial jurisdiction. DCA Elepao
said:

x x x [B]eing a single sala court, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 64, Guihulngan,
Negros Oriental, has jurisdiction over all cases, including agrarian cases, cognizable by
the Regional Trial Court emanating from the geographical areas within its territorial
jurisdiction.
Further, the jurisdiction of the Special Agrarian Courts over agrarian cases is co-
extensive with its territorial jurisdiction. Administrative Order No. 80 dated July 18,
1989, as amended by Administrative Order No. 80A-90 dated February 23, 1990, did not
expand the territorial jurisdiction of the courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts.[5]
Respondent Villegas[6] adopts DCA Elepaos view. Villegas points out that the
designation of RTC, Branch 32 as a Special Agrarian Court did not expand its territorial
jurisdiction. Although it has been designated Special Agrarian Court for the Province of
Negros Oriental, its jurisdiction as an RTC did not cover the whole province.
Respondent Villegas adds that, in hearing just compensation cases, RTC, Branch 64 in
Guihulngan City should be no different from the situation of other single sala courts that
concurrently hear drugs and family-related cases even as the Supreme Court has
designated family and drugs courts in Dumaguete City within the same province.
Further, Guihulngan City is more than 100 kilometers from Dumaguete City where RTC,
Branch 32 sits. For practical considerations, RTC, Branch 64 of Guihulngan City should
hear and decide the case.
For their part, on June 19, 2009 respondent heirs of Noel informed[7] the Court that
petitioner Land Bank had already paid them for their land. Consequently, they have no
further interest in the outcome of the case. It is not clear, however, if the trial court had
already approved a settlement.
Jurisdiction is the courts authority to hear and determine a case. The courts
jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by law.[8] In
this case, the law that confers jurisdiction on Special Agrarian Courts designated by the
Supreme Court in every province is Republic Act (R.A.) 6657 or the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. Sections 56 and 57 are the relevant provisions:
Remedial Law Compiled. Codal and Cases. Atty. Tranquil. 43
SEC. 56. Special Agrarian Court. - The Supreme Court shall designate at least one
(1) branch of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) within each province to act as a Special
Agrarian Court.
The Supreme Court may designate more branches to constitute such additional
Special Agrarian Courts as may be necessary to cope with the number of agrarian cases
in each province. In the designation, the Supreme Court shall give preference to the
Regional Trial Courts which have been assigned to handle agrarian cases or whose
presiding judges were former judges of the defunct Court of Agrarian Relations.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) judges assigned to said courts shall exercise said
special jurisdiction in addition to the regular jurisdiction of their respective courts.
SEC. 57. Special Jurisdiction. - The Special Agrarian Courts shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to
landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. The Rules of
Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts unless modified
by this Act.
The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their special
jurisdiction within thirty (30) days from submission of the case for decision.
The law is clear. A branch of an RTC designated as a Special Agrarian Court for a
province has the original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the
determination of just compensation in that province. In Republic v. Court of Appeals,[9]
the Supreme Court ruled that Special Agrarian Courts have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over two categories of cases: (1) all petitions for the determination of just
compensation to landowners, and (2) the prosecution of all criminal offenses under R.A.
6657.
By special jurisdiction, Special Agrarian Courts exercise power in addition to or over
and above the ordinary jurisdiction of the RTC, such as taking cognizance of suits
involving agricultural lands located outside their regular territorial jurisdiction, so long
as they are within the province where they sit as Special Agrarian Courts.

R.A. 6657 requires the designation by the Supreme Court before an RTC Branch can
function as a Special Agrarian Court. The Supreme Court has not designated the single
sala courts of RTC, Branch 64 of Guihulngan City and RTC, Branch 63 of Bayawan City as
Special Agrarian Courts. Consequently, they cannot hear just compensation cases just
because the lands subject of such cases happen to be within their territorial jurisdiction.
Since RTC, Branch 32 of Dumaguete City is the designated Special Agrarian Court
for the province of Negros Oriental, it has jurisdiction over all cases for determination of
just compensation involving agricultural lands within that province, regardless of
whether or not those properties are outside its regular territorial jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petitions, SETS ASIDE the orders of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 32 of Dumaguete City dated September 13, 2007 and
October 30, 2007 in Civil Case 2007-14174, entitled Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Corazon Villegas, and its orders dated November 16, 2007 and December 14, 2007 in
Civil Case 2007-14193, entitled Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Catalino V. Noel
and Procula P. Sy, which orders dismissed the cases before it for lack of jurisdiction.
Further, the Court DIRECTS the Regional Trial Court, Branch 32 of Dumaguete City to
immediately hear and decide the two cases unless a compromise agreement has in the
meantime been approved in the latter case.
VDA DE HERRERA VS. BERNARDO
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
reverse and set aside the Decision[1] and Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 73674.
The antecedents are as follows:
Respondents heirs of Crisanto S. Bernardo, represented by Emelita Bernardo, filed a
complaint before the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) against
Alfredo Herrera (Alfredo) for interference, disturbance, unlawful claim, harassment and
trespassing over a portion of a parcel of land situated at Barangay Dalig, Cardona, Rizal,
Remedial Law Compiled. Codal and Cases. Atty. Tranquil. 44
with an area of 7,993 square meters. The complaint was docketed as COSLAP Case No.
99-221.
Respondents claimed that said parcel of land was originally owned by their
predecessor-in-interest, Crisanto Bernardo, and was later on acquired by Crisanto S.
Bernardo. The parcel of land was later on covered by Tax Declaration No. CD-006-0828
under the name of the respondents.
Petitioner, on the other hand, alleged that the portion of the subject property
consisting of about 700 square meters was bought by Diosdado Herrera, Alfredo's
father, from a certain Domingo Villaran. Upon the death of Diosdado Herrera, Alfredo
inherited the 700-square-meter lot.
The COSLAP, in a Resolution[3] dated December 6, 1999, ruled that respondents
have a rightful claim over the subject property. Consequently, a motion for
reconsideration and/or reopening of the proceedings was filed by Alfredo. The COSLAP,
in an Order[4] dated August 21, 2002, denied the motion and reiterated its Order dated
December 6, 1999. Aggrieved, petitioner Celia S. Vda. de Herrera, as the surviving
spouse of Alfredo, filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.[5] The CA, Twelfth Division,
in its Decision dated April 28, 2005, dismissed the petition and affirmed the resolution
of the COSLAP. The CA ruled that the COSLAP has exclusive jurisdiction over the present
case and, even assuming that the COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the land dispute of the
parties herein, petitioner is already estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction
because Alfredo failed to raise the issue of lack of jurisdiction before the COSLAP and he
actively participated in the proceedings before the said body. Petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated October 17, 2005.
Hence, petitioner elevated the case to this Court via Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, with the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT COSLAP HAD JURISDICTION TO DECIDE THE QUESTION OF
OWNERSHIP.
II

WHETHER OR NOT THE ISSUANCE OF A TORRENS TITLE IN THE NAME OF THE
PETITIONER'S HUSBAND IN 2002 RENDERED THE INSTANT CONTROVERSY ON THE
ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTY MOOT AND ACADEMIC.[6]
Petitioner averred that the COSLAP has no adjudicatory powers to settle and
decide the question of ownership over the subject land. Further, the present case cannot
be classified as explosive in nature as the parties never resorted to violence in resolving
the controversy. Petitioner submits that it is the Regional Trial Court which has
jurisdiction over controversies relative to ownership of the subject property.
Respondents, on the other hand, alleged that the COSLAP has jurisdiction over the
present case. Further, respondents argued that petitioner is estopped from questioning
the jurisdiction of the COSLAP by reason of laches due to Alfredo's active participation
in the actual proceedings before the COSLAP. Respondents said that Alfredo's filing of
the Motion for Reconsideration and/or Reopening of the proceedings before the
COSLAP is indicative of his conformity with the questioned resolution of the COSLAP.
The main issue for our resolution is whether the COSLAP has jurisdiction to decide
the question of ownership between the parties.
The petition is meritorious.
The COSLAP was created by virtue of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 561, issued on
September 21, 1979 by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos. It is an administrative body
established as a means of providing a mechanism for the expeditious settlement of land
problems among small settlers, landowners and members of the cultural minorities to
avoid social unrest.
Section 3 of E.O. No. 561 specifically enumerates the instances when the COSLAP
can exercise its adjudicatory functions:
Section 3. Powers and Functions. - The Commission shall have the following powers and
functions:
Remedial Law Compiled. Codal and Cases. Atty. Tranquil. 45
xxxx
2. Refer and follow up for immediate action by the agency having appropriate
jurisdiction any land problem or dispute referred to the Commission: Provided, That the
Commission may, in the following cases, assume jurisdiction and resolve land problems
or disputes which are critical and explosive in nature considering, for instance, the large
number of the parties involved, the presence or emergence of social tension or unrest,
or other similar critical situations requiring immediate action:
(a) Between occupants/squatters and pasture lease agreement holders or timber
concessionaires;
(b) Between occupants/squatters and government reservation grantees;
(c) Between occupants/squatters and public land claimants or applicants;
(d) Petitions for classification, release and/or subdivision of lands of the public domain;
and
(e) Other similar land problems of grave urgency and magnitude.[7]
Administrative agencies, like the COSLAP, are tribunals of limited jurisdiction that
can only wield powers which are specifically granted to it by its enabling statute.[8]
Under Section 3 of E.O. No. 561, the COSLAP has two options in acting on a land dispute
or problem lodged before it, to wit: (a) refer the matter to the agency having
appropriate jurisdiction for settlement/resolution; or (b) assume jurisdiction if the
matter is one of those enumerated in paragraph 2 (a) to (e) of the law, if such case is
critical and explosive in nature, taking into account the large number of parties involved,
the presence or emergence of social unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring
immediate action. In resolving whether to assume jurisdiction over a case or to refer the
same to the particular agency concerned, the COSLAP has to consider the nature or
classification of the land involved, the parties to the case, the nature of the questions
raised, and the need for immediate and urgent action thereon to prevent injuries to
persons and damage or destruction to property. The law does not vest jurisdiction on
the COSLAP over any land dispute or problem.[9]
In the instant case, the COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of
respondents' complaint. The present case does not fall under any of the cases
enumerated under Section 3, paragraph 2 (a) to (e) of E.O. No. 561. The dispute
between the parties is not critical and explosive in nature, nor does it involve a large
number of parties, nor is there a presence or emergence of social tension or unrest. It

can also hardly be characterized as involving a critical situation that requires immediate
action.
It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial officer or
government agency, over the nature and subject matter of a petition or complaint is
determined by the material allegations therein and the character of the relief prayed for,
irrespective of whether the petitioner or complainant is entitled to any or all such
reliefs.[10]
Respondents' cause of action before the COSLAP pertains to their claim of
ownership over the subject property, which is an action involving title to or possession
of real property, or any interest therein,[11] the jurisdiction of which is vested with the
Regional Trial Courts or the Municipal Trial Courts depending on the assessed value of
the subject property.[12]
The case of Banaga v. Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems,[13] applied
by the CA and invoked by the respondents, is inapplicable to the present case. Banaga
involved parties with conflicting free patent applications over a parcel of public land and
pending with the Bureau of Lands. Because of the Bureau of Land's inaction within a
considerable period of time on the claims and protests of the parties and to conduct an
investigation, the COSLAP assumed jurisdiction and resolved the conflicting claims of
the parties. The Court held that since the dispute involved a parcel of public land on a
free patent issue, the COSLAP had jurisdiction over that case. In the present case, there
is no showing that the parties have conflicting free patent applications over the subject
parcel of land that would justify the exercise of the COSLAP's jurisdiction.
Since the COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the action, all the proceedings therein,
including the decision rendered, are null and void.[14] A judgment issued by a quasi-
judicial body without jurisdiction is void. It cannot be the source of any right or create
any obligation.[15] All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it
have no legal effect.[16] Having no legal effect, the situation is the same as it would be as
if there was no judgment at all. It leaves the parties in the position they were before the
proceedings.[17]
Respondents allegation that petitioner is estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the COSLAP by reason of laches does not hold water. Petitioner is not
estopped from raising the jurisdictional issue, because it may be raised at any stage of
the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.[18] The fact
that a person attempts to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of a court does not estop him
Remedial Law Compiled. Codal and Cases. Atty. Tranquil. 46
from thereafter challenging its jurisdiction over the subject matter, since such
jurisdiction must arise by law and not by mere consent of the parties.[19]
In Regalado v. Go,[20] the Court held that laches should be clearly present for the
Sibonghanoy[21] doctrine to apply, thus:
Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length
of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier, it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable length of time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it.
The ruling in People v. Regalario that was based on the landmark doctrine enunciated
in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction by estoppel is the exception rather
than the rule. Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction
only in cases in which the factual milieu is analogous to that in the cited case. In such
controversies, laches should have been clearly present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must
have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party entitled to
assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it.
In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction was raised for the first time in a
motion to dismiss filed by the Surety almost 15 years after the questioned ruling had
been rendered. At several stages of the proceedings, in the court a quo as well as in the
Court of Appeals, the Surety invoked the jurisdiction of the said courts to obtain
affirmative relief and submitted its case for final adjudication on the merits. It was only
when the adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up
to raise the question of jurisdiction.[22]
The factual settings attendant in Sibonghanoy are not present in the case at bar
that would justify the application of estoppel by laches against the petitioner. Here,
petitioner assailed the jurisdiction of the COSLAP when she appealed the case to the CA
and at that time, no considerable period had yet elapsed for laches to attach. Therefore,
petitioner is not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the COSLAP. Additionally, no
laches will even attach because the judgment is null and void for want of
jurisdiction.[23]
Anent the issuance of OCT No. M-10991 in favor of petitioners husband Alfredo
Herrerra in 2002, respondents alleged that there was fraud, misrepresentation and bad
faith in the issuance thereof. Thus, respondents are now questioning the legality of OCT
No. M-10991, an issue which this Court cannot pass upon in this present petition. It is a
rule that the validity of a Torrens title cannot be assailed collaterally.[24] Section 48 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529 provides that:
Certificate not Subject to Collateral Attack. A certificate of title shall not
be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or canceled, except in a
direct proceeding in accordance with law.

The issue of the validity of the Title was brought only during the proceedings
before this Court as said title was issued in the name of petitioner's husband only during
the pendency of the appeal before the CA. The issue on the validity of title, i.e., whether
or not it was fraudulently issued, can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for
that purpose[25] and the present appeal before us, is simply not the direct proceeding
contemplated by law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and the Resolution of the
Court of Appeals, dated April 28, 2005 and October 17, 2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP
No. 73674 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision and Order of the Commission on
the Settlement of Land Problems, dated December 6, 1999 and August 21, 2002,
respectively, in COSLAP Case No. 99-221, are declared NULL and VOID for having been
issued without jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.
HERALD BLACK DACASIN V. SHARON DEL MUNDO DACASIN,
Facts:
Herald, American, and Sharon, Filipino, weremarried in Manila in April 1994. They have
one daughter, Stephanie, born on September 21, 1995. In June 1999, Sharon sought and
obtained a divorce decree from the Circuit Court, 19th Judicial Circuit, Lake County,
Illinois (Illinois court). In its ruling, the Illinois court dissolved the marriage of petitioner
and respondent, awarded to respondent sole custody of Stephanie and retained
jurisdiction over the case for enforcement purposes.
On January 28, 2002, both executed in Manila a contract for joint custody over
Stephanie.
In 2004, Herald filed a case against Sharon alleging that Sharon had exercised sole
custody over Stephanie contrary to their agreement.
The trial court held that (1) it is precluded from taking cognizance over the suit
considering the Illinois courts retention of jurisdiction to enforce its divorce decree,
including its order awarding sole custody of Stephanie to respondent; (2) the divorce
decree is binding on petitioner following the nationality rule prevailing in this
Remedial Law Compiled. Codal and Cases. Atty. Tranquil. 47
jurisdiction; and (3) the Agreement is void for contravening Article 2035, paragraph 5 of
the Civil Code prohibiting compromise agreements on jurisdiction and dismissed the
case.
Issue:
WON the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioners suit and enforce
the Agreement on the joint custody of the parties child
Held/ Rationale:
The trial courts refusal to entertain petitioners suit was grounded not on its lack of
power to do so but on its thinking that the Illinois courts divorce decree stripped it of
jurisdiction. This conclusion is unfounded. What the Illinois court retained was
jurisdiction x x x for the purpose of enforcing all and sundry the various provisions of
[its] Judgment for Dissolution. Petitioners suit seeks the enforcement not of the
various provisions of the divorce decree but of the post-divorce Agreement on joint
child custody. Thus, the action lies beyond the zone of the Illinois courts so-called
retained jurisdiction
FEBTC V. SHEMBERG MARKETING CORPORATION
Shemberg Corporations (major stockholders were the members of the Dacay
family) owned several realties. (9 parcels of land were mentioned in the table
provided in the original case).
Shemberg loaned from Far East Bank an approximate aggregate amount of
39M secured by 11 different real properties in varied amounts.
The mortgage contracts states that upon failure of the mortgagor to pay the
obligations when due, the entire principal, interest, penalties and other
charges shall be immediately demandable and payable WITHOUT need of
notice/demand. Also, if such happens, FEBTC would have the absolute
discretion to foreclose the mortgage extrajudicially pursuant to Act No. 3135.
Shemberg Corporations issued promissory notes on the principal amounts of
the obligations.

However, when the loans that matured, they were unable to pay. FEBTC sought
to foreclose the properties extrajudicially.
Shemberg Corporations filed with RTC of Mandaue the following: 1) Declatory
Releif, 2) Injuction, 3)Damages, 4) Annulment of Promissory notes, documents
and contracts with FEBTC because FEBTC employees allegedly filled the blanks
in their pre-printed contracts with fraudulent information.
RTC granted the TRO against the foreclosure of the Shemberg Corporations
Properties.
FEBTC alleged that RTC did not have jurisdiction over the case because the
docket fees were not fully paid yet.
ISSUE: W/N the cancellation of mortgage is capable of pecuniary estimation
NO
W/N the RTC acquired jurisdiction of the case for annulment of the mortgage
YES
RATIO: To determine whether the subject matter of an action is incapable of
pecuniary estimation, one must ascertain the NATURE of the principal action
sought:
If the action is primarily for recovery of money, the claim IS considered
capable of pecuniary estimation. Court acquires jurisdiction depending on the
AMT of claim.
When the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is only
incidental or a consequence of the principal relief sought, the action in
INCAPABLE of pecuniary estimation.
Under RA 7691, RTC has sole, exclusive, and original jurisdiction to hear, try
and decide all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of
pecuniary estimation.
In this case, the primary action sought is the annulment of the Real Estate
Mortgage. THUS, the recovery of the amount of the loans is only incidental.
The docket fees to be paid are FIXED docket fees because it is not capable of
pecuniary estimation. If it a question on validity of the mortgage then it is not
capable of pecuniary estimation.
Simply put, if it is a question on validity of mortgage, it is NOT capable of
pecuniary estimation.
Remedial Law Compiled. Codal and Cases. Atty. Tranquil. 48
ARRIOLA V. ARRIOLA
FACTS: John Arriola (respondent) filed a case with the RTC for judicial partition of the
properties of decedent Fidel Arriola against herein petitioners Vilma and Ronald Arriola.
John is a son of the decedent with the 1st wife; Vilma is the 2nd wife, Ronald her kid
with the deceased.
The RTC rendered a decision ordering partition of the subject lot into 1/3 share to each
party. This decision became final in March 4, 2004. However, since the parties failed to
agree on how to partition the lot, John sought its sale through public auction, which the
court ordered. After the date for the public auction had been scheduled, it had to be
reset because the petitioners Vilma and Roland refused to include in the auction sale the
house standing on the land. Thus, John filed with the RTC an Urgent Manifestation and
Motion for Contempt of Court praying that petitioners be held in contempt.
RTC denied the motion, ruling that the non-inclusion of the house was justified since the
decision of the court earlier shows that nothing was mentioned about the house. Even
Johns initiatory complaint never mentioned the house. The court said it could not grant
a relief not alleged and prayed for in the complaint. MR with the RTC also denied.
In a petition for certiorari with CA, the court granted the petition, reversing and setting
aside the RTC ruling. It ordered the sale of the lot, including the house standing thereon.
Petitioners filed MR with CA, but it was denied, hence the present case.
Issue: Did the lower court err in taking jurisdiction over the contempt proceeding?
Yes, it was wrong for it to do so for failure to comply with reqts
Ruling: The contempt proceeding initiated by the John Arriola is one for indirect
contempt. Under Rule 71, it is to be initiated by the court motu propio or by a verified
petition, with supporting particulars and certified true copies of docs/papers involved
and with full compliance with the reqts for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions.
The law is clear. The filing of a verified petition that has complied with the reqts for the
filing of initiatory pleading is mandatory and for failure to do so, the court should
dismiss it outright. Here, John Arriola merely filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion
for Contempt. It was not verified, and it failed to conform with the reqts for initiatory
pleadings such as submission of certification against non-forum shopping and payment
of docket fees. The RTC clearly erred in taking jurisdiction over the contempt
proceeding. Even if the contempt proceedings stemmed from the main case over which
the court already acquired jurisdiction, the rules direct that the petition for contempt be
treated independently of the principal action. Consequently, the necessary prerequisites
for the filing of initiatory pleadings, such as the filing of a verified petition, attachment of
a certification on non-forum shopping, and the payment of the necessary docket fees,

must still be faithfully observed. (Before, it was actually allowed that contempt
proceedings be initiated by mere motion and without compliance with the reqts for
initiatory pleadings, but since the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, such practice
was no longer countenanced).
[Substantive part: even if the motion complied with the reqts of the Rules of Court, it
should still fail on substantive grounds since it turned out that the house is a family
home and despite the death of one or both spouses, it shall continue for a period of 10y
or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition it unless
there is a compelling reason. No such reason here.]
CA ruling is modified. The house is declared part of the lot, but it is exempted from
partition by public auction until the period provided for in the law.
SPS MANILA VS SPS MANZO
This resolves the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the Decision[1] dated February 27, 2004 and
Resolution[2] dated May 14, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 49998
which granted the petition for annulment of judgment filed by the respondents.
The controversy stemmed from an action for ejectment[3] filed by the
respondents, spouses Ederlinda Gallardo-Manzo and Daniel Manzo, against the
petitioners, spouses Ramon and Eulogia Manila, before the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Las Pias City, Branch 79 (Civil Case No. 3537). The facts as summarized by
the said court are as follows:
On June 30, 1982, Ederlinda Gallardo leased two (2) parcels of land situated along Real
St., Manuyo, Las Pias, Metro Manila, to Eulogia Manila for a period of ten (10) years at a
monthly rental(s) of P2,000.00 for the first two years, and thereafter an increase of ten
(10) percent every after two years. They also agreed that the lessee shall have the
option to buy the property within two (2) years from the date of execution of the
contract of lease at a fair market value of One Hundred and Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P150,000.00)
The contract of lease expired on July 1, 1992 but the lessee continued in possession of
the property despite a formal demand letter dated August 8, 1992, to vacate the same
and pay the rental arrearages. In a letter reply dated August 12, 1992, herein defendant
claimed that no rental fee is due because she allegedly became the owner of the
property at the time she communicated to the plaintiff her desire to exercise the option
to buy the said property.
Remedial Law Compiled. Codal and Cases. Atty. Tranquil. 49
Their disagreement was later brought to the Barangay for conciliation but the parties
failed to reach a compromise, hence the present action.[4]
On July 14, 1993, the MeTC rendered its decision,[5] the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, a judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiffs ordering the defendants:
1) To vacate the subject parcels of land and surrender possession thereof upon the
payment by the plaintiff of one-half of the value of the building constructed by the
lessee. Should the lessor refuse to reimburse the aforesaid amount, the lessee shall have
the option to exercise her right under Article 1678 of the New Civil Code;
2) To pay rental arrearages up to July 1, 1992 in the amount of Two Hundred Twenty
Eight Thousand and Forty Four 80/100 Pesos (P228,044.80);
3) To pay, as reasonable compensation for their continued withholding of possession
of the subject lots, the sum of Three Thousand Two Hundred and Twenty One Pesos
(P3,221.00) every month, commencing July 2, 1992 up to such time that they finally
yield possession thereof to the plaintiffs, subject to an increase of ten percent (10%)
after every two (2) years from said date; and
4) To pay plaintiffs attorneys fees in the sum of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00)
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Petitioners appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 63 (Civil
Case No. 93-3733) which reversed the MeTC. The RTC found that petitioners have in
fact exercised their option to buy the leased property but the respondents refused to
honor the same. It noted that respondents even informed the petitioners about
foreclosure proceedings on their property, whereupon the petitioners tried to intervene
by tendering rental payments but the respondents advised them to withhold such
payments until the appeal of respondents in the case they filed against the Rural Bank of
Bombon (Camarines Sur), Inc. (Civil Case No. 6062) is resolved. It further noted that
respondents intention to sell the lot to petitioners is confirmed by the fact that the
former allowed the latter to construct a building of strong materials on the premises.
The RTC thus decreed:
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered reversing the decision
of the lower court dated July 14, 1993 and ordering as follows:
1) That plaintiffs execute a deed of absolute sale over that parcel of land subject of
the Contract of Lease dated June 30, 1982 after full payment of defendants of the
purchase price of P150,000.00;
2) That plaintiffs pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.[7]
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration on December 23, 1994. In its
Order dated March 24, 1995, the RTC denied the motion for having been filed beyond
the fifteen (15)-day period considering that respondents received a copy of the decision
on December 7, 1994.[8] Consequently, the November 18, 1994 decision of the RTC
became final and executory.[9]
On December 22, 1998, respondents filed a petition for annulment of the RTC
decision in the CA. Respondents assailed the RTC for ordering them to sell their
property to petitioners arguing that said courts appellate jurisdiction in ejectment cases
is limited to the determination of who is entitled to the physical possession of real
property and the only judgment it can render in favor of the defendant is to recover his
costs, which judgment is conclusive only on the issue of possession and does not affect
the ownership of the land. They contended that the sale of real property by one party to
another may be ordered by the RTC only in a case for specific performance falling under
its original exclusive jurisdiction, not in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction in an
ejectment case. Respondents also alleged that the petition for annulment is the only
remedy available to them because the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition
for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault on their
part.
By Decision dated February 27, 2004, the CA granted the petition, annulled the
November 18, 1994 RTC decision and reinstated the July 14, 1993 MeTC decision. On
the issue of lack of jurisdiction raised by the respondents, the CA ruled as follows:
It must be stressed that the main action before the Metropolitan Trial Court is one for
ejectment grounded on the expiration of the parties contract of lease. And said court,
finding that petitioners have a valid right to ask for the ejectment of private
respondents, ordered the latter to vacate the premises and to pay their rentals in
arrears. To Our mind, what the respondent court should have done in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction, was to confine itself to the issue of whether or not petitioners
have a valid cause of action for ejectment against the private respondents.
Unfortunately, in the decision herein sought to be annulled, the respondent court went
further than what is required of it as an appellate court when it ordered the petitioners
to sell their properties to the private respondents. In a very real sense, the respondent
court materially changed the nature of petitioners cause of action by deciding the
question of ownership even as the appealed case involves only the issue of prior
physical possession which, in every ejectment suit, is the only question to be resolved.
As it were, the respondent court converted the issue to one for specific performance
which falls under its original, not appellate jurisdiction. Sad to say, this cannot be done
by the respondent court in an appealed ejectment case because the essential criterion of
appellate jurisdiction is that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already
instituted and does not create that cause (Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch (U.S.), 137, 172,
2 L. edition 60, cited in 15 Corpus Juris 727).
Remedial Law Compiled. Codal and Cases. Atty. Tranquil. 50
It follows that the respondent Regional Trial Court clearly acted without jurisdiction
when it ordered the petitioners to sell their properties to the private respondents. The
order to sell can be made only by the respondent court in an action for specific
performance under its exclusive original jurisdiction, and not in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction in an appealed ejectment suit, as in this case. Worse, the relief
granted by the same court was not even prayed for by the private respondents in their
Answer and position paper before the MTC, whereat they only asked for the dismissal of
the complaint filed against them.[10] (Emphasis supplied.)
With the denial of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed the present
petition raising the following issues:
A
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR IN ANNULLING THE
JUDGMENT BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI CITY NOTWITHSTANDING
THE FINDING THAT THE ORDINARY REMEDIES OF NEW TRIAL, APPEAL, PETITION
FOR RELIEF OR OTHER APPROPRIATE REMEDIES WERE LOST THROUGH THE FAULT
OF THE RESPONDENTS
B
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR IN ANNULLING THE
JUDGMENT BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI CITY ON THE GROUND OF
LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN THAT THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI CITY HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE
RESPONDENTS OR THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CLAIM[11]
The petition is meritorious.
A petition for annulment of judgments or final orders of a Regional Trial Court in civil
actions can only be availed of where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition
for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner.[12] It is a remedy granted only under exceptional circumstances and such
action is never resorted to as a substitute for a partys own neglect in not promptly
availing of the ordinary or other appropriate remedies.[13] The only grounds provided
in Sec. 2, Rule 47 are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
In this case, respondents alleged that the loss of remedies against the RTC decision was
attributable to their former counsels late filing of their motion for reconsideration and
failure to file any proper petition to set aside the said decision. They claimed that they
had been constantly following up the status of the case with their counsel, Atty. Jose
Atienza, who repeatedly assured them he was on top of the situation and would even get
angry if repeatedly asked about the case. Out of their long and close relationship with
Atty. Atienza and due regard for his poor health due to his numerous and chronic
illnesses which required frequent prolonged confinement at the hospital, respondents
likewise desisted from hiring the services of another lawyer to assist Atty. Atienza, until
the latters death on September 10, 1998. Thus, it was only on November 1998 that

respondents engaged the services of their new counsel who filed the petition for
annulment of judgment in the CA.
We are not persuaded by respondents asseveration. They could have directly followed
up the status of their case with the RTC especially during the period of Atty. Atienzas
hospital confinement. As party litigants, they should have constantly monitored the
progress of their case. Having completely entrusted their case to their former counsel
and believing his word that everything is alright, they have no one to blame but
themselves when it turned out that their opportunity to appeal and other remedies from
the adverse ruling of the RTC could no longer be availed of due to their counsels neglect.
That respondents continued to rely on the services of their counsel notwithstanding his
chronic ailments that had him confined for long periods at the hospital is unthinkable.
Such negligence of counsel is binding on the client, especially when the latter offered no
plausible explanation for his own inaction. The Court has held that when a party retains
the services of a lawyer, he is bound by his counsels actions and decisions regarding the
conduct of the case. This is true especially where he does not complain against the
manner his counsel handles the suit.[14] The oft-repeated principle is that an action for
annulment of judgment cannot and is not a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal.[15]
In any event, the petition for annulment was based not on fraudulent assurances or
negligent acts of their counsel, but on lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioners assail the CA in holding that the RTC decision is void because it granted a
relief inconsistent with the nature of an ejectment suit and not even prayed for by the
respondents in their answer. They contend that whatever maybe questionable in the
decision is a ground for assignment of errors on appeal or in certain cases, as ground
for a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 and not as ground for its
annulment. On the other hand, respondents assert that the CA, being a higher court, has
the power to adopt, reverse or modify the findings of the RTC in this case. They point
out that the CA in the exercise of its sound discretion found the RTCs findings
unsupported by the evidence on record which also indicated that the loss of ordinary
remedies of appeal, new trial and petition for review was not due to the fault of the
respondents.
We agree with the petitioners.
Lack of jurisdiction as a ground for annulment of judgment refers to either lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the
claim.[16] In a petition for annulment of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction,
petitioner must show not merely an abuse of jurisdictional discretion but an absolute
lack of jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction means absence of or no jurisdiction, that is, the
court should not have taken cognizance of the petition because the law does not vest it
with jurisdiction over the subject matter. Jurisdiction over the nature of the action or
subject matter is conferred by law.[17]
There is no dispute that the RTC is vested with appellate jurisdiction over ejectment
cases decided by the MeTC, MTC or MCTC. We note that petitioners attack on the
Remedial Law Compiled. Codal and Cases. Atty. Tranquil. 51
validity of the RTC decision pertains to a relief erroneously granted on appeal, and
beyond the scope of judgment provided in Section 6 (now Section 17) of Rule 70.[18]
While the court in an ejectment case may delve on the issue of ownership or possession
de jure solely for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession de facto, it has no
jurisdiction to settle with finality the issue of ownership[19] and any pronouncement
made by it on the question of ownership is provisional in nature.[20] A judgment in a
forcible entry or detainer case disposes of no other issue than possession and
establishes only who has the right of possession, but by no means constitutes a bar to an
action for determination of who has the right or title of ownership.[21] We have held
that although it was proper for the RTC, on appeal in the ejectment suit, to delve on the
issue of ownership and receive evidence on possession de jure, it cannot adjudicate with
semblance of finality the ownership of the property to either party by ordering the
cancellation of the TCT.[22]
In this case, the RTC acted in excess of its jurisdiction in deciding the appeal of
respondents when, instead of simply dismissing the complaint and awarding any
counterclaim for costs due to the defendants (petitioners), it ordered the respondents-
lessors to execute a deed of absolute sale in favor of the petitioners-lessees, on the basis
of its own interpretation of the Contract of Lease which granted petitioners the option to
buy the leased premises within a certain period (two years from date of execution) and
for a fixed price (P150,000.00).[23] This cannot be done in an ejectment case where the
only issue for resolution is who between the parties is entitled to the physical
possession of the property.
Such erroneous grant of relief to the defendants on appeal, however, is but an exercise
of jurisdiction by the RTC. Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction. As
distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the authority to decide a
cause, and not the decision rendered therein.[24] The ground for annulment of the
decision is absence of, or no, jurisdiction; that is, the court should not have taken
cognizance of the petition because the law does not vest it with jurisdiction over the
subject matter.[25]
Thus, while respondents assailed the content of the RTC decision, they failed to show
that the RTC did not have the authority to decide the case on appeal. As we held in
Ybaez v. Court of Appeals:[26]
On the first issue, we feel that respondent court acted inadvertently when it set aside the
RTC ruling relative to the validity of the substituted service of summons over the
persons of the petitioners in the MTC level. We must not lose sight of the fact that what
was filed before respondent court is an action to annul the RTC judgment and not a
petition for review. Annulment of judgment may either be based on the ground that a
judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or that the judgment was obtained by extrinsic
fraud. There is nothing in the records that could cogently show that the RTC lacked
jurisdiction. Chiefly, Section 22 of B.P. Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, vests upon the RTC the exercise of an appellate jurisdiction
over all cases decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Clearly then,

when the RTC took cognizance of petitioners appeal from the adverse decision of the
MTC in the ejectment suit, it (RTC) was unquestionably exercising its appellate
jurisdiction as mandated by law. Perforce, its decision may not be annulled on the basis
of lack of jurisdiction as it has, beyond cavil, jurisdiction to decide the appeal.[27]
(Emphasis supplied.)
The CA therefore erred in annulling the November 18, 1994 RTC decision on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction as said court had jurisdiction to take cognizance of
petitioners appeal.
On the timeliness of the petition for annulment of judgment filed with the CA, Section 3,
Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for annulment of judgment based
on extrinsic fraud must be filed within four years from its discovery; and if based on lack
of jurisdiction, before it is barred by laches or estoppel. The principle of laches or stale
demands ordains that the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been
done earliernegligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has abandoned it or declined
to assert it.[28] There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of
demand; each case is to be determined according to its particular circumstances.[29]
Here, respondents failure to assail the RTC ruling in a petition for review or certiorari
before the CA, rendered the same final and executory. Having lost these remedies due to
their lethargy for three and a half years, they cannot now be permitted to assail anew
the said ruling rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Their
inaction and neglect to pursue available remedies to set aside the RTC decision for such
length of time, without any acceptable explanation other than the word of a former
counsel who already passed away, constitutes unreasonable delay warranting the
presumption that they have declined to assert their right over the leased premises
which continued to be in the possession of the petitioners. Clearly, respondents petition
to annul the final RTC decision is barred under the equitable doctrine of laches.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated
February 27, 2004 and Resolution dated May 14, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 49998 are SET ASIDE. The petition for annulment of judgment filed by herein
respondents is DISMISSED.
EDNA DIAGO LHUILLIER, PETITIONER, VS. BRITISH AIRWAYS, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 171092. March 15, 2010.
Remedial Law Compiled. Codal and Cases. Atty. Tranquil. 52
FACTS: On April 28, 2005, petitioner Edna Diago Lhuillier filed a Complaint for damages
against respondent British Airways before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City.
The tortuous conduct by the flight attendants of said Airways, which prompted
petitioner to file a case for damages, allegedly transpired when petitioner boarded
respondents flight 548 from London, United Kingdom to Rome, Italy. On May 30, 2005,
respondent, by way of special appearance through counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss on
grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the case and over the person of the respondent.
Respondent alleged that only the courts of London, United Kingdom or Rome, Italy, have
jurisdiction over the complaint for damages pursuant to the Warsaw Convention, Article
28(1) of which provides:
An action for damages must be brought at the option of the plaintiff, either before the
court of domicile of the carrier or his principal place of business, or where he has a place
of business through which the contract has been made, or before the court of the place
of destination.
ISSUE: Whether or not Philippines, a signatory to the Warsaw Convention, should
adhere to the provision of the Warsaw Convention in the determination of its
jurisdiction with respect to a case for damages involving a tortuous conduct committed
by an airline personnel while in an international carrier against a Filipino citizen.
HELD: Yes. It is settled that the Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law in
this country.
In Santos III v. Northwest Orient Airlines, 210 SCRA 256 (1992), we held that: The
Republic of the Philippines is a party to the Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, otherwise known as the Warsaw
Convention. It took effect on February 13, 1933. The Convention was concurred in by
the Senate, through its Resolution No. 19, on May 16, 1950. The Philippine instrument of
accession was signed by President Elpidio Quirino on October 13, 1950, and was
deposited with the Polish government on November 9, 1950. The Convention became
applicable to the Philippines on February 9, 1951. On September 23, 1955, President
Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 201, declaring our formal adherence
thereto, to the end that the same and every article and clause thereof may be observed
and fulfilled in good faith by the Republic of the Philippines and the citizens thereof.
The Convention is thus a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by the Philippine
government and, as such, has the force and effect of law in this country.
EDNA DIAGO LHUILLIER V. BRITISH AIRWAYS
G.R. No. 171092, March 15, 2010, SECOND DIVISION (Del Castillo, J.)
Where the matter is governed by the Warsaw Convention, jurisdiction takes on a
dual concept. Jurisdiction in the international sense must be established in accordance

with Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, following which the jurisdiction of a
particular court must be established pursuant to the applicable domestic law. Only after
the question of which court has jurisdiction is determined will the issue of venue be taken
up. This second question shall be governed by the law of the court to which the case is
submitted.
Edna Diago Lhuillier took British Airway flight 548 from London to Rome.
Once on board, she requested Julian Halliday, one of its flight attendants, to assist her in
placing her hand-carried luggage in the overhead bin. Halliday allegedly refused to help
and assist her, and even sarcastically remarked that "If I were to help all 300 passengers
in this flight, I would have a broken back!". Edna further alleged that when the plane was
about to land in Rome, another flight attendant, Nickolas Kerrigan (Kerrigan), singled
her out from among all the passengers in the business class section to lecture on plane
safety. Upon arrival in Rome, petitioner complained to British Airwayss ground
manager and demanded an apology. However, the latter declared that the flight
stewards were "only doing their job."
Edna then filed a complaint against British Airways before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati City. Summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served
on British Airways through Violeta Echevarria, General Manager of Euro-Philippine
Airline Services, Inc. British Airways filed a Motion to Dismiss on grounds of lack of
jurisdiction over the case and over the person of the respondent. It alleged that only the
courts of London, United Kingdom or Rome, Italy, have jurisdiction over the complaint
for damages pursuant to the Warsaw Convention, Article 28(1). The RTC of Makati City
granted the Motion to Dismiss. Edna filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the motion
was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
Whether Philippine Courts have jurisdiction over a tortious conduct
committed against a Filipino citizen and resident by airline personnel of a foreign
carrier travelling beyond the territorial limit of any foreign country
HELD:
Petition DENIED.
It is settled that the Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law in this
country. xxx The Convention is thus a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by the
Philippine government and, as such, has the force and effect of law in this country. The
Warsaw Convention applies because the air travel, where the alleged tortious conduct
occurred, was between the United Kingdom and Italy, which are both signatories to the
Warsaw Convention.
Article 1 of the Warsaw Convention provides:
1. This Convention applies to all international carriage of persons,
luggage or goods performed by aircraft for reward. It applies equally to
Remedial Law Compiled. Codal and Cases. Atty. Tranquil. 53
gratuitous carriage by aircraft performed by an air transport
undertaking.
Thus, when the place of departure and the place of destination in a contract of
carriage are situated within the territories of two High Contracting Parties, said carriage
is deemed an "international carriage". The High Contracting Parties referred to herein
were the signatories to the Warsaw Convention and those which subsequently adhered
to it.
In the case at bench, petitioners place of departure was London, United
Kingdom while her place of destination was Rome, Italy. Both the United Kingdom and
Italy signed and ratified the Warsaw Convention. As such, the transport of the petitioner
is deemed to be an "international carriage" within the contemplation of the Warsaw
Convention. Since the Warsaw Convention applies in the instant case, then the
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action is governed by the provisions of the
Warsaw Convention.
Under Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, the plaintiff may bring the
action for damages before
1. the court where the carrier is domiciled;
2. the court where the carrier has its principal place of business;
3. the court where the carrier has an establishment by which the contract has
been made; or
4. the court of the place of destination.
In this case, it is not disputed that respondent is a British corporation
domiciled in London, United Kingdom with London as its principal place of business.
Hence, under the first and second jurisdictional rules, the petitioner may bring her case
before the courts of London in the United Kingdom. In the passenger ticket and baggage
check presented by both the petitioner and respondent, it appears that the ticket was
issued in Rome, Italy. Consequently, under the third jurisdictional rule, the petitioner
has the option to bring her case before the courts of Rome in Italy. Finally, both the
petitioner and respondent aver that the place of destination is Rome, Italy, which is
properly designated given the routing presented in the said passenger ticket and
baggage check. Accordingly, petitioner may bring her action before the courts of Rome,
Italy. The Court finds that the RTC of Makati correctly ruled that it does not have
jurisdiction over the case filed by the petitioner.
The Court further held that Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention is
jurisdictional in character:

A number of reasons tends to support the characterization of Article
28(1) as a jurisdiction and not a venue provision. First, the wording of
Article 32, which indicates the places where the action for damages
"must" be brought, underscores the mandatory nature of Article 28(1).
Second, this characterization is consistent with one of the objectives of
the Convention, which is to "regulate in a uniform manner the
conditions of international transportation by air." Third, the
Convention does not contain any provision prescribing rules of
jurisdiction other than Article 28(1), which means that the phrase
"rules as to jurisdiction" used in Article 32 must refer only to Article
28(1). In fact, the last sentence of Article 32 specifically deals with the
exclusive enumeration in Article 28(1) as "jurisdictions," which, as
such, cannot be left to the will of the parties regardless of the time
when the damage occurred.
xxxx
In other words, where the matter is governed by the Warsaw Convention,
jurisdiction takes on a dual concept. Jurisdiction in the international sense must be
established in accordance with Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, following which
the jurisdiction of a particular court must be established pursuant to the applicable
domestic law. Only after the question of which court has jurisdiction is determined will
the issue of venue be taken up. This second question shall be governed by the law of the
court to which the case is submitted.
Tortious conduct as ground for the Lhuillers complaint is within the purview
of the Warsaw Convention. It is thus settled that allegations of tortious conduct
committed against an airline passenger during the course of the international carriage
do not bring the case outside the ambit of the Warsaw Convention. British Airways, in
seeking remedies from the trial court through special appearance of counsel, is not
deemed to have voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the trial court. xxx In
refuting the contention of petitioner, respondent cited La Naval Drug Corporation v.
Court of Appeals where the Court held that even if a party "challenges the jurisdiction of
the court over his person, as by reason of absence or defective service of summons, and
he also invokes other grounds for the dismissal of the action under Rule 16, he is not
deemed to be in estoppel or to have waived his objection to the jurisdiction over his
person."
NISPEROS VS NISPEROS-DUCUSIN
Remedial Law Compiled. Codal and Cases. Atty. Tranquil. 54
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the July 13, 2009 Decision1 and September 14,
2009 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 105898. The appellate
court affirmed the Decision3 of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) upholding the validity of the Deed of Voluntary Land Transfer and Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. CLOA-623 issued in favor of respondent Marissa Nisperos-
Ducusin.
The instant case stemmed from a complaint4 filed by petitioners with the DARAB
alleging the following antecedents:
The 15,837-square-meter parcel of land subject of the instant case is part of the 58,350-
square-meter agricultural land in Pao Sur, San Fernando City, La Union acquired by
Santiago Nisperos, the predecessor of petitioners, during his lifetime. He declared said
property for taxation purposes starting December 1947.5
When Santiago and his wife Estefania died, they were survived by their nine children:
Tranquilino, Felix, Olling, Maria, Lenardo, Millan, Fausto, Candido and Cipriana. The
heirs of Santiago, petitioners herein, claim that the subject property was occupied,
controlled and tilled by all nine children of Santiago. They paid taxes for it and even
hired farm workers under Maria and Ciprianas supervision for the cultivation of the
same. For taxation purposes, however, it was initially declared only under the name of
Maria.6 Starting 1988, it was declared under the names of Maria and Cipriana.7
During the time when Maria and Cipriana were overseeing the property, Maria took
respondent Marissa Nisperos-Ducusin, a daughter of their cousin Purita, as her ward
and raised her like her own child.
On February 12, 1988, Maria and Cipriana, acting as representatives of their other
siblings, executed a Deed of Donation Mortis Causa8 in favor of petitioners over the
58,350-square-meter property and another 46,000-square-meter property.
On April 28, 1992, a Deed of Voluntary Land Transfer9 (VLT) over the subject property
was executed between Maria and Cipriana as landowners, and respondent, who was
then only 17 years old, as farmer-beneficiary. The instrument was signed by the three in
the presence of witnesses Anita, Lucia and Marcelina Gascon and Municipal Agrarian

Reform Officer Susimo Asuncion. The same was notarized by Notary Public Atty.
Roberto E. Caoayan.
On June 24, 1992, Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) No. 000212245390210
was issued to respondent by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) over the subject
property. By virtue of said CLOA, OCT No. CLOA-62311 was issued to respondent a
month later, or on July 24, 1992.
Alleging fraud on the part of respondent which petitioners claim to have discovered only
in August 2001, petitioners filed a complaint on September 6, 2001 with the Municipal
Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of San Fernando City, La Union. Unfortunately, no
settlement between petitioners and respondent was reached prompting the MARO to
issue a Certificate to File Action.12
On January 23, 2002, petitioners filed with the DARAB a complaint for annulment of
documents and damages against respondent. Petitioners contended that the transfer of
ownership over the subject land was made without the consent of the heirs of Santiago
and that respondent took advantage of Marias senility and made it appear that Maria
and Cipriana sold said property by virtue of the VLT. They further alleged that said
document was falsified by respondent because Maria could not anymore sign but could
only affix her thumbmark as she did in a 1988 Deed of Donation. To support their
complaint, they attached a Joint Affidavit of Denial13 by Anita and Lucia Gascon the
supposed instrumental witnesses to the VLT. In said affidavit, Anita and Lucia claimed
that the signatures appearing therein are not theirs as they never affixed their
signatures on said document. They further stated that they were never aware of said
document.
Petitioners likewise asseverated in their complaint that respondent committed fraud
because she was not a bona fide beneficiary as she was not engaged in farming since she
was still a minor at that time and that she could not validly enter into a contract with
Maria and Cipriana.
On March 6, 2002, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss14 petitioners complaint. She
argued that the action for annulment of the VLT and the OCT/CLOA and the claim for
damages have already prescribed.
Remedial Law Compiled. Codal and Cases. Atty. Tranquil. 55
In an Order15 dated April 17, 2002, the DARAB Regional Adjudicator denied
respondents Motion to Dismiss and ordered her to file her answer to the complaint.
In respondents Answer with Counterclaim16 dated July 7, 2002, respondent alleged
that Maria and Cipriana acquired the property from Santiago and possessed the same
openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly; thus, the consent of petitioners is not
necessary to the VLT. She denied the allegations of fraud and falsification, and insisted
that she is a bona fide beneficiary as she has been tilling the land with her parents even
before 1992. She added that her minority does not disqualify her from availing the
benefits of agrarian reform.
On October 16, 2002, DARAB Regional Adjudicator Rodolfo A. Caddarao rendered a
Decision17 annulling the VLT and OCT/CLOA in respondents name. The fallo of the said
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Declaring Deed of Voluntary [L]and Transfer dated April 28, 1992 executed by Maria
Nisperos in favor of Marissa Nisperos annulled or cancelled and without force and effect
for having been executed not in accordance with agrarian laws;
2. Declaring OCT No. 00021224 in the name of Marissa D. Nisperos annulled or cancelled
on the ground of material misrepresentation of the alleged agrarian reform beneficiary.
3. Directing the Register of Deeds of La Union to cause the cancellation of the
aforementioned title;
4. Directing the concerned Assessors Office to reinstate the tax declaration of said
landholding in the name of Maria and Cipriana Nisperos;
5. Directing the parties to refer this problem with the court so that the issue of
ownership of the landholding could be finally resolved; and

6. Dismissing the other ancillary claims and counterclaims for lack of merit and
evidence.
SO ORDERED.18
The Regional Adjudicator noted that the land supposedly owned by Maria and Cipriana
(which includes the 15,837-square-meter subject property) has a total area of 58,350
square meters. Considering that there are two owners, he ruled that the individual share
of each would be less than five hectares each and well within the retention limit.
The Regional Adjudicator also held there was reason to believe that Maria and
Ciprianas names were stated in the tax declaration for purposes of taxation only as no
evidence was presented that they lawfully acquired the property from their parents. It
was also ruled that the issuance of the title in respondents name was not in accordance
with agrarian laws because she cannot be considered as a tenant but more of an heir of
the transferors.
Respondent contested the Regional Adjudicators decision before the DARAB alleging
that the Regional Adjudicator committed grave abuse of discretion. Respondent
contended that the complaint should not have been given due course since other
parties-in-interest such as Maria, the Register of Deeds of La Union and duly authorized
representatives of the DAR were not impleaded and prescription had already set in
insofar as the contestability of the CLOA is concerned. She likewise argued that being a
farmer or a tenant is not a primordial requisite to become an agrarian reform
beneficiary. She added that the Regional Adjudicator went beyond the scope of his
authority by directing the parties to litigate the issue of ownership before the court.
On September 16, 2008, the DARAB rendered a Decision19 reversing the decision of the
Regional Adjudicator and upholding the validity of the VLT and respondents title. The
decretal portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, a new judgment is hereby rendered:
Remedial Law Compiled. Codal and Cases. Atty. Tranquil. 56
1. DECLARING the VLT executed on April 28, 1992, between respondent-appellant
Marissa Nisperos-Ducusin and Maria and Cipriana Nisperos as valid and regular;
2. DECLARING the validity of the Original Certificate of Title (OCT) CLOA No. 623 issued
in the name of respondent-appellant Marissa Nisperos-Ducusin covering 15,837 square
meter portion of the disputed lot; and
3. MAINTAINING respondent-appellant Marissa Nisperos-Ducusin in peaceful
possession and cultivation of the subject lot.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.20
The DARAB dismissed petitioners claim of fraud since the VLT was executed in the
presence of DAR-MARO Susimo Asuncion, signed by three instrumental witnesses and
notarized by Atty. Roberto E. Caoayan of the DAR. It likewise held that the records are
bereft of any indication that fraud was employed in the transfer, and mere conjectures
that fraud might have been exerted just because Maria was already of advanced age
while respondent was her care giver or ward is not evidence. The DARAB also did not
give credence to the Affidavit of Denial by the instrumental witnesses since the
statements there are mere hearsay because the affiants were not cross-examined.
The DARAB likewise ruled that the fact that respondent was a minor at the time of the
execution of the VLT does not void the VLT as this is the reason why there is an active
government involvement in the VLT: so that even if the transferee is a minor, her rights
shall be protected by law. It also held that petitioners cannot assert their rights by virtue
of the Deed of Donation Mortis Causa allegedly executed by Maria and Cipriana in their
favor since before the operative condition (the death of the donors) was fulfilled, the
donation was revoked by virtue of the VLT. The DARAB further ruled that when OCT No.
CLOA-623 was issued in respondents name, she acquired absolute ownership of the
landholding. Thus her right thereto has become fixed and established and is no longer
open to doubt or controversy.

Aggrieved, petitioners elevated the case to the CA via a petition for review21 where they
raised the following issues: (1) whether the subject property is covered by the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP); (2) whether the VLT is valid having
been issued through misrepresentation and fraud; and (3) whether the action for
annulment had already prescribed.
On July 13, 2009, the appellate court rendered the assailed decision dismissing the
petition for review and upholding the DARAB decision. It ruled that the Regional
Adjudicator acted with grave abuse of discretion when it held that the subject property
was no longer covered by our agrarian laws because of the retention rights of
petitioners. The CA held that retention rights, exclusion of a property from CARP
coverage and the qualification and disqualification of agrarian reform beneficiaries are
issues not cognizable by the Regional Adjudicator and the DARAB but by the DAR
Secretary. The appellate court nevertheless held that petitioners failed to discharge
their burden of proving that fraud attended the execution of the VLT. It also agreed with
the DARAB that considering a certificate of title was already issued in favor of
respondent, the same became indefeasible and incontrovertible by the time petitioners
instituted the case in January 2002, and thus may no longer be judicially reviewed.
Hence this petition before this Court raising the issues of whether the appellate court
erred in:
I lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations
x x x DECLARING THAT THE PARAB HAS NO JURISDICTION TO RULE THAT THE
SUBJECT PIECE OF LAND WAS NO LONGER COVERED BY AGRARIAN LAWS.
II
x x x AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE DARAB DESPITE CLEAR AND CONVINCING
EVIDENCE REGARDING THE EXISTENCE OF FRAUD.
III
x x x RULING THAT THE CERTIFICATES OF TITLE ISSUED IN THE NAME OF THE
RESPONDENT IS INDEFEASIBLE.22
We set aside the assailed Decision and Resolution.
The complaint should have been lodged with the Office of the DAR Secretary and not
with the DARAB.
Section 1, Rule II of the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure, the rule in force at the time of
the filing of the complaint by petitioners in 2001, provides:
Remedial Law Compiled. Codal and Cases. Atty. Tranquil. 57
SECTION 1. Primary and Exclusive Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. The Board shall
have primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and
adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the implementation of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos.
228, 229 and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389,
Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and
regulations. Specifically, such jurisdiction shall include but not be limited to cases
involving the following:
xxxx
f) Those involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of Certificates of Land
Ownership Award (CLOAs) and Emancipation Patents (EPs) which are registered with
the Land Registration Authority;
xxxx
However, it is not enough that the controversy involves the cancellation of a CLOA
registered with the Land Registration Authority for the DARAB to have jurisdiction.
What is of primordial consideration is the existence of an agrarian dispute between the
parties.23
Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 6657 defines an agrarian dispute as "any controversy relating to
tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over
or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to
arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements" and includes "any
controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms
and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and
other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate
relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee."
Thus, in Morta, Sr. v. Occidental,24 this Court held that there must be a tenancy
relationship between the parties for the DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case. It is
essential to establish all of the following indispensable elements, to wit: (1) that the
parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) that the subject
matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; (3) that there is consent between the
parties to the relationship; (4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about
agricultural production; (5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or
agricultural lessee; and (6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the
tenant or agricultural lessee.25
In the instant case, petitioners, as supposed owners of the subject property, did not
allege in their complaint that a tenancy relationship exists between them and
respondent. In fact, in their complaint, they described respondent as a "ward" of one of

the co-owners, Maria, who is "not a bona fide beneficiary, she being not engaged in
farming because she was still a minor" at the time the VLT was executed.26
It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial officer or
government agency, over the nature and subject matter of a petition or complaint is
determined by the material allegations therein and the character of the relief prayed for,
irrespective of whether the petitioner or complainant is entitled to any or all such
reliefs. Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the
Constitution and the law, and not by the consent or waiver of the parties where the
court otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the nature or subject matter of the
action. Nor can it be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission of the parties.
Moreover, estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over
the cause of action. The failure of the parties to challenge the jurisdiction of the DARAB
does not prevent the court from addressing the issue, especially where the DARABs lack
of jurisdiction is apparent on the face of the complaint or petition.27
Considering that the allegations in the complaint negate the existence of an agrarian
dispute among the parties, the DARAB is bereft of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
same as it is the DAR Secretary who has authority to resolve the dispute raised by
petitioners. As held in Heirs of Julian dela Cruz v. Heirs of Alberto Cruz:
The Court agrees with the petitioners contention that, under Section 2(f), Rule II of the
DARAB Rules of Procedure, the DARAB has jurisdiction over cases involving the
issuance, correction and cancellation of CLOAs which were registered with the LRA.
However, for the DARAB to have jurisdiction in such cases, they must relate to an
agrarian dispute between landowner and tenants to whom CLOAs have been issued by
the DAR Secretary. The cases involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of the
CLOAs by the DAR in the administrative implementation of agrarian reform laws, rules
and regulations to parties who are not agricultural tenants or lessees are within the
jurisdiction of the DAR and not of the DARAB.28 (Emphasis supplied.)
What the P ARAD should have done is to refer the complaint to the proper office as
mandated by Section 4 of DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 2000:
SEC. 4. Referral of Cases.- If a case covered by Section 2 herein is filed before the DARAB,
the concerned DARAB official shall refer the case to the proper DAR office for
appropriate action within five (5) days after said case is determined to be within the
jurisdiction of the Secretary.
Likewise, if a case covered by Section 3 herein is filed before any office other than the
DARAB, the concerned DAR official shall refer the case to the DARAB for resolution
within the same period provided herein.
While it is true that the PARAD and the DARAB (which was upheld by the CA)
thoroughly discussed in their respective decisions the issues pertaining to the validity of
the VLT and the OCT/CLOA issued to respondent, the fact that they are bereft of
jurisdiction to resolve the same prevents this Court from resolving the instant petition
Remedial Law Compiled. Codal and Cases. Atty. Tranquil. 58
on its merits. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not allow a court to arrogate
unto itself authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is initially
lodged with an administrative body of special competence.29 To assume the power is to
short-circuit the administrative process, which has yet to run its regular course. The
DAR must be given a chance to correct its administrative and procedural lapses in the
issuance of the CLOA.30 Moreover, it is in a better position to resolve the particular
issue at hand, being the agency possessing the required expertise on the matter and
authority to hear the same.
WHEREFORE, the July 13, 2009 Decision and September 14, 2009 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 105898 are SET ASIDE. The complaint is REFERRED
to the Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform Secretary for appropriate action.
No pronouncement as to costs.
DY VS. BIBAT-PALAMOS
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
questions the December 13, 2010 and March 7, 2011Orders1 of the Regional Trial Court
of Makati, Branch 64 (RTC), in Civil Case No. 92-2311, granting the motion for execution
of petitioner, but denying his prayer for the return of his cargo vessel in the condition
when the possession thereof was seized from him.
The Facts
The present controversy finds its roots in the Courts decision in Orix Metro Leasing and
Finance Corporation v. M/V "Pilar-I" and Spouses Ernesto Dy and Lourdes Dy2 involving
the same parties. The facts, as culled from the Courts decision in the said case and the
records, are not disputed by the parties.
Petitioner Ernesto Dy (petitioner) and his wife, Lourdes Dy (Lourdes), were the
proprietors of Limchia Enterprises which was engaged in the shipping business. In
1990, Limchia Enterprises, with Lourdes as co-maker, obtained a loan from Orix Metro
Leasing and Finance Corporation (respondent) to fund its acquisition of M/V Pilar-I, a
cargo vessel. As additional security for the loan, Limchia Enterprises executed the Deed
of Chattel Mortgage over M/V Pilar-I.3
Due to financial losses suffered when M/V Pilar-I was attacked by pirates, Spouses Dy
failed to make the scheduled payments as required in their promissory note. After
receiving several demand letters from respondent, Spouses Dy applied for the
restructuring of their loan. Meanwhile, Lourdes issued several checks to cover the
remainder of their loan but the same were dishonored by the bank, prompting
respondent to institute a criminal complaint for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law.
Lourdes appealed to respondent with a new proposal to update their outstanding loan
obligations.4

On August 18, 1992, respondent filed the Complaint and Petition for Extrajudicial
Foreclosure of Preferred Ship Mortgage under Presidential Decree No. 1521 with Urgent
Prayer for Attachment with the RTC. Following the filing of an affidavit of merit and the
posting of bond by respondent, the RTC ordered the seizure of M/V Pilar-I and turned
over its possession to respondent. On September 28, 1994, respondent transferred all of
its rights, title to and interests, as mortgagee, in M/V Pilar-I to Colorado Shipyard
Corporation (Colorado).5
On July 31, 1997, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Spouses Dy, ruling that they
had not yet defaulted on their loan because respondent agreed to a restructured
schedule of payment. There being no default, the foreclosure of the chattel mortgage on
M/V Pilar-I was premature. The RTC ordered that the vessel be returned to Spouses
Dy.6 This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA), with the modification that Spouses
Dy be ordered to reimburse the respondent for repair and dry docking expenses while
the vessel was in the latters possession.7 On appeal, the Court promulgated its Decision,
dated September 11, 2009, upholding the findings of the CA but deleting the order
requiring Spouses Dy to reimburse respondent.8
Consequently, on August 17, 2010, petitioner filed a motion for execution of judgment
with the RTC. In the intervening period, Colorado filed its Manifestation/Motion, dated
July 29, 2010, informing the RTC that M/V Pilar-I, which was in its possession, had
sustained severe damage and deterioration and had sunk in its shipyard because of its
exposure to the elements. For this reason, it sought permission from the court to cut the
sunken vessel into pieces, sell its parts and deposit the proceeds in escrow.9 In his
Comment/Objection, petitioner insisted that he had the right to require that the vessel
be returned to him in the same condition that it had been at the time it was wrongfully
seized by respondent or, should it no longer be possible, that another vessel of the same
tonnage, length and beam similar to that of M/V Pilar-I be delivered.10 Colorado,
however, responded that the vessel had suffered severe damage and deterioration that
refloating or restoring it to its former condition would be futile, impossible and very
costly; and should petitioner persist in his demand that the ship be refloated, it should
be done at the expense of the party adjudged by the court to pay the same. 11
The RTC issued its questioned December 13, 2010 Order granting the motion for
execution but denying petitioners prayer for the return of M/V Pilar-I in the same state
in which it was taken by respondent. In so resolving, the RTC ratiocinated:
First, the judgment of the Supreme Court does not require the delivery of M/V Pilar in
the state the defendants wanted it to be. Secondly, said judgment has now become final
and it is axiomatic that after judgment has become executory, the court cannot amend
the same, except: x x x None of the three circumstances where a final and executory
judgment may be amended is present in this case. And third, the present deplorable
state of M/V Pilar certainly did not happen overnight, thus, defendants should have
brought it to the attention of this Court, the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court after
it became apparent. Their inaction until after the judgment has become final, executory
Remedial Law Compiled. Codal and Cases. Atty. Tranquil. 59
and immutable rendered whatever right they may have to remedy the situation to be
nugatory. [Underlining supplied]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied by the RTC in its March
7, 2011 Order.12
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues in its Memorandum:
1. Whether or not the rule on hierarchy of courts is applicable to the instant
petition?
2. Whether or not the honorable trial court gravely abused its discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in finding that petitioner is not
entitled to the return of M/VPilar-1 in the condition that it had when it was
wrongfully seized by Orix Metro, or in the alternative, to a vessel of similar
tonnage, length, beam, and other particulars as M/VPilar-1;
3. Whether or not petitioner is estopped from asking for the return of the
vessel in the condition it had at the time it was seized?
4. Whether or not it was petitioners duty to look out for the vessels
condition?13
To be succinct, only two central issues need to be resolved: (1) whether petitioner was
justified in resorting directly to this Court via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65; and
(2) whether petitioner is entitled to the return of M/V Pilar-I in the same condition
when it was seized by respondent.
The Courts Ruling
The Court finds the petition to be partly meritorious.
Hierarchy of Courts; Direct Resort To The Supreme Court Justified
Petitioner argues that his situation calls for the direct invocation of this Courts
jurisdiction in the interest of justice. Moreover, as pointed out by the RTC, what is
involved is a judgment of the Court which the lower courts cannot modify. Hence,
petitioner deemed it proper to bring this case immediately to the attention of this Court.
Lastly, petitioner claims that the present case involves a novel issue of law that is,

whether in an action to recover, a defendant in wrongful possession of the subject
matter in litigation may be allowed to return the same in a deteriorated condition
without any liability.14
Respondent, on the other hand, contends that the petition should have been filed with
the CA, following the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. It pointed out that petitioner failed
to state any special or important reason or any exceptional and compelling
circumstance which would warrant a direct recourse to this Court.15
Under the principle of hierarchy of courts, direct recourse to this Court is improper
because the Supreme Court is a court of last resort and must remain to be so in order for
it to satisfactorily perform its constitutional functions, thereby allowing it to devote its
time and attention to matters within its exclusive jurisdiction and preventing the
overcrowding of its docket. 16 Nonetheless, the invocation of this Courts original
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari has been allowed in certain instances on the
ground of special and important reasons clearly stated in the petition, such as,(1) when
dictated by the public welfare and the advancement of public policy; (2) when
demanded by the broader interest of justice; (3) when the challenged orders were
patent nullities; or (4) when analogous exceptional and compelling circumstances called
for and justified the immediate and direct handling of the case. 17
This case falls under one of the exceptions to the principle of hierarchy of courts. Justice
demands that this Court take cognizance of this case to put an end to the controversy
and resolve the matter which has been dragging on for more than twenty (20) years.
Moreover, in light of the fact that what is involved is a final judgment promulgated by
this Court, it is but proper for petitioner to call upon its original jurisdiction and seek
final clarification.
Wrong Mode of Appeal; Exception
Petitioner asserts that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it failed to
rule in his favor despite the fact that he had been deprived by respondent of his
property rights over M/V Pilar-I for the past eighteen(18) years. Moreover, the change
in the situation of the parties calls for a relaxation of the rules which would make the
execution of the earlier decision of this Court inequitable or unjust. According to
petitioner, for the RTC to allow respondent to return the ship to him in its severely
damaged and deteriorated condition without any liability would be to reward bad
faith.18
Conversely, respondent submits that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the RTC as the latter merely observed due process and followed the principle that an
execution order may not vary or go beyond the terms of the judgment it seeks to
enforce.19 Respondent adds that the proper remedy should have been an ordinary
appeal, where a factual review of the records can be made to determine the condition of
Remedial Law Compiled. Codal and Cases. Atty. Tranquil. 60
the ship at the time it was taken from petitioner, and not a special civil action for
certiorari.20
There are considerable differences between an ordinary appeal and a petition for
certiorari which have been exhaustively discussed by this Court in countless cases. The
remedy for errors of judgment, whether based on the law or the facts of the case or on
the wisdom or legal soundness of a decision, is an ordinary appeal. 21 In contrast, a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is an original action designed to correct errors of
jurisdiction, defined to be those "in which the act complained of was issued by the court,
officer, or quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion which is tantamount to lack of in excess of jurisdiction." 22 A court or tribunal
can only be considered to have acted with grave abuse of discretion if its exercise of
judgment was so whimsical and capricious as to be equivalent to a lack of jurisdiction.
The abuse must be extremely patent and gross that it would amount to an "evasion of a
positive duty or to virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion and hostility."23
Therefore, a misappreciation of evidence on the part of the lower court, as asserted by
petitioner, may only be reviewed by appeal and not by certiorari because the issue
raised by the petitioner does not involve any jurisdictional ground. 24 It is a general rule
of procedural law that when a party adopts an inappropriate mode of appeal, his
petition may be dismissed outright to prevent the erring party from benefiting from his
neglect and mistakes.25 There are exceptions to this otherwise ironclad rule, however.
One is when the strict application of procedural technicalities would hinder the
expeditious disposition of this case on the merits,26 such as in this case.
Petitioner Not Barred from Demanding Return of the Vessel in its Former
Condition
Petitioner insists that it is respondent who should bear the responsibility for the
deterioration of the vessel because the latter, despite having in its possession the vessel
M/V Pilar-I during the pendency of the foreclosure proceedings, failed to inform the
court and petitioner himself about the actual condition of the ship. For estoppel to take
effect, there must be knowledge of the real facts by the party sought to be estopped and
reliance by the party claiming estoppel on the representation made by the former. In
this case, petitioner cannot be estopped from asking for the return of the vessel in the
condition that it had been at the time it was seized by respondent because he had not
known of the deteriorated condition of the ship.27
On the contrary, respondent argues that petitioner is barred from asking for a
modification of the judgment since he never prayed for the return of M/V Pilar-I in the
same condition that it had been at the time it was seized. 28Petitioner could have prayed
for such relief in his prior pleadings and presented evidence thereon before the
judgment became final and executory. During the course of the trial, and even at the

appellate phase of the case, petitioner failed to ask the courts to look into the naturally
foreseeable depreciation of M/V Pilar-I and to determine who should pay for the wear
and tear of the vessel. Consequently, petitioner can no longer pursue such relief for the
first time at this very late stage.29 Moreover, respondent posits that it can only be held
liable for the restoration and replacement of the vessel if it can be proven that M/V
Pilar-I deteriorated through the fault of respondent. Nowhere in the prior decision of
this Court, however, does it appear that respondent was found to have been negligent in
its care of the vessel. In fact, respondent points out that, for a certain period, it even paid
for the repair and maintenance of the vessel and engaged the services of security guards
to watch over the vessel. It reasons that the vessels deterioration was necessarily due to
its exposure to sea water and the natural elements for the almost twenty years that it
was docked in the Colorado shipyard.30
On this matter, the Court finds for petitioner.
This Court is not unaware of the doctrine of immutability of judgments. When a
judgment becomes final and executory, it is made immutable and unalterable, meaning
it can no longer be modified in any respect either by the court which rendered it or even
by this Court. Its purpose is to avoid delay in the orderly administration of justice and to
put an end to judicial controversies. Even at the risk of occasional errors, public policy
and sound practice dictate that judgments must become final at some point. 31
As with every rule, however, this admits of certain exceptions. When a supervening
event renders the execution of a judgment impossible or unjust, the interested party can
petition the court to modify the judgment to harmonize it with justice and the facts.32 A
supervening event is a fact which transpires or a new circumstance which develops
after a judgment has become final and executory. This includes matters which the
parties were unaware of prior to or during trial because they were not yet in existence
at that time.33
In this case, the sinking of M/V Pilar-I can be considered a supervening
event.1wphi1 Petitioner, who did not have possession of the ship, was only informed of
its destruction when Colorado filed its Manifestation, dated July 29, 2010, long after the
September 11, 2009 Decision of this Court in Orix Metro Leasing and Finance
Corporation v. M/V "Pilar-I" and Spouses Ernesto Dy and Lourdes Dy attained finality on
January 19, 2010. During the course of the proceedings in the RTC, the CA and this
Court, petitioner could not have known of the worsened condition of the vessel because
it was in the possession of Colorado.
It could be argued that petitioner and his lawyer should have had the foresight to ask for
the return of the vessel in its former condition at the time respondent took possession of
the same during the proceedings in the earlier case. Nonetheless, the modification of the
Courts decision is warranted by the superseding circumstances, that is, the severe
damage to the vessel subject of the case and the belated delivery of this information to
the courts by the party in possession of the same.
Remedial Law Compiled. Codal and Cases. Atty. Tranquil. 61
Having declared that a modification of our earlier judgment is permissible in light of the
exceptional incident present in this case, the Court further rules that petitioner is
entitled to the return of M/V Pilar-I in the same condition in which respondent took
possession of it. Considering, however, that this is no longer possible, then respondent
should pay petitioner the value of the ship at such time.
This disposition is not without precedent. In the case of Metro Manila Transit
Corporation v. D.M. Consortium, Inc.,34D.M. Consortium, Inc. (DMCI) acquired 228 buses
under a lease purchase agreement with Metro Manila Transit Corporation (MMTC).
MMTC later alleged that DMCI was in default of its amortization, as a result of which,
MMTC took possession of all the buses. This Court upheld the right of DMCI, after having
been unjustly denied of its right of possession to several buses, to have them returned
by MMTC. Considering, however, that the buses could no longer be returned in their
original state, the Court sustained the resolution of the CA ordering MMTC to pay DMCI
the value of the buses at the time of repossession.
The aforecited case finds application to the present situation of petitioner. After having
been deprived of his vessel for almost two decades, through no fault of his own, it would
be the height of injustice to permit there turn of M/V Pilar-I to petitioner in pieces,
especially after a judgment by this very same Court ordering respondent to restore
possession of the vessel to petitioner. To do so would leave petitioner with nothing but a
hollow and illusory victory for although the Court ruled in his favor and declared that
respondent wrongfully took possession of his vessel, he could no longer enjoy the
beneficial use of his extremely deteriorated vessel that it is no longer seaworthy and has
no other commercial value but for the sale of its parts as scrap.
Moreover, the incongruity only becomes more palpable when consideration is taken of
the fact that petitioner's obligation to respondent, for which the now practically
worthless vessel serves as security, is still outstanding. 35 The Court cannot countenance
such an absurd outcome. It could not have been the intention of this Court to perpetrate
an injustice in the guise of a favorable decision. As the court of last resort, this Court is
the final bastion of justice where litigants can hope to correct any error made in the
lower courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLYGRANTED. Respondent is ordered to pay
petitioner the value of M/V Pilar- I at the time it was wrongfully seized by it. The case is
hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 64, Makati City, for the proper
determination of the value of the vessel at said time.