FACTORS ATTRIBUTING TO THE INABILITY OF THE ASSAD REGIME

TO END THE ARMED REBELLION IN THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR

Lt Col (U) Alirupendi Perudin joined the Royal Brunei Armed Forces on 11
September 1992. He has served in the Air Regiment, Royal Brunei Air Force and held
several posts at the Ministry of Defence Brunei Darussalam. He holds a Master of
Science in Defence and Strategic Studies (University of Madras, India).

ABSTRACT

This study analyses the factors contributing to the inability of the Assad Regime to end
the protracted armed rebellion, despite tremendous support from Iran and Russia
against the fragmented opposition comprised of a weaker, limited, and divided
regional backing from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey as well as a jaded, half-
hearted Western assistance. This paper finds that there were clearly strong arguments
for domestic politics contributing to Assads incapability to end the conflict. In
addition, textual evidence also showed that regional geopolitics has a role in
preventing Assad from ending the armed rebellion. Global geopolitics, on the other
hand, favoured Assads capability in ending it. Overall, Assads regime own dire
manpower shortage, severe lack of economic and social wherewithal, and his hard,
inflexible stand on negotiation towards corruption, brutal minority regimes to fight to
the bitter end, are deemed as key reasons for the said inability. Deepening regional
Sunni-Shiite sectarianism, and resurging international East-West rivalry were the
conflicts main driving forces. The findings of this study imply the need to examine
Assads regime to better understand the conflict and by extension, surmises the
necessity for firstly greater academic scrutiny on the dictators psyche and strategy,
towards a deeper understanding of the quagmire in Syria. Secondly, it appeared that
attention should be directed towards a diplomatic scrutiny of the despotic regime
capacity and mindset, for a more effective, and peaceful negotiations.
INTRODUCTION
The conflict in Syria has been going on for half a decade. What started in the spring of
2011 as a demonstration asking for reform had descended rapidly into a violent civil
war, drawing in regional forces and extra-regional involvement. Unlike other Arab
Spring uprisings, Syrias turned into a prolonged quagmire of a civil war. Like a
whirlpool, this conflict pulled in everyone in the area deep into the abyss of tragic and
lengthy entanglement. The conflict was so catastrophic that more than 200,000 people
were killed, with over four million seeking refuge abroad, approximately eight million
were displaced internally, while about 12 million inside Syria were in need of
humanitarian assistance.1
Irans help in the issue includes assisting Syria in circumventing sanctions,
extending training regime militias, supplying weapons, and even being directly
involved with their soldiers.2 Russias support in the United Nations (UN) came in the
form of blocking proposals amounting to pressure towards political transition, and
UN-supported sanctions. Russia also continued supplying arms amid sanctions and
blockades. Later, the Russian military had intervened directly by attacking ISIS, and
the rebels. Thus, Assad Regime received strong external support from Iran and Russia,
and indirect support from China. Their support enabled the Syrian forces to maintain
control over key populated areas, regained their lost territories lost, and resume a
position of strength to negotiate for peace, should it opt to do so. Saudi Arabia and
Qatar supported the opposition by supplying arms along with channeling organised
funding, providing media power, religious influence, and political support. Turkeys
involvement was limited to the facilitation of arms flow and fighters, and
humanitarian aid, but later turned into forms of interventions and confrontations.
Western states have intervened in the form of sanctions, condemnations of the
regimes brutality, and expression of the desire for a regime change. The USA went a
step further by shipping arms, and training the rebels.3 The Western supported the lack
of consensus, with feeble and inconsequential policies being adopted.4 The support
was gradually perceived as inactive, and ambivalent, and the European Unions policy

1
S.N. Abboud, Syria, Polity Press, Massachusetts USA, 2016, p. 188.
As at Feb 2016, Syrian Center for Policy Research (SCPR) estimated death toll at 470,000.
[http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/a-staggering-new-death-toll-for-syrias-war-470000/].
UN special envoy Steffan de Mistura estimated death toll of 400,000 since according to him UN
official estimated stopped in 2014 at 250,000. [http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/04/staffan-de-
mistura-400000-killed-syria-civil-war-160423055735629.html].
Syrian Observatory for Human Rights documented 301781 human losses up to August 2016.
[http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=50612].
2
E. Hokayem, Iran, the Gulf States and the Syrian Civil War, in T. Dodge and E. Hokayem
(eds), Middle Eastern Security, The US Pivot and the Rise of ISIS, Routledge, International Institute for
Strategic Studies, ADELPHI Series 447- 448, London UK, 2014. p. 56.
3
R. Erlich, Inside Syria, Prometheus Books, New York USA, 2014, p. 214.
4
S.N. Abboud, Syria, Polity Press, Massachusetts USA, 2016, p. 135.
on Syria appeared to be inconsistent and ambiguous.5 Western states had hardly
mustered any adequate political resources to achieve regime change.6 Western support
was lackluster even after Assads usage of chemical weapons. Their focus were also
shifted towards fighting Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

Meanwhile, the Syrian rebels were fragmented, and regional backers

themselves were divided, lacking a coherent strategy, while fighting ISIS at the same
time. The rebels were fragmented into many groups which lacked the unity of
command partly because Saudi Arabia supported the Salafist elements, while Qatar
supported the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria.

Despite these notions, the Assad Regime could not end the armed rebellion.
The aim of this essay is to analyse the factors contributing to the Assad Regimes
inability to end the armed rebellion. This paper makes the assumption that at each
level, such as in the context of Syrias domestic politics, Middle East geopolitics, and
Global geopolitics, are contributing factors as to why Assad Regimes was unable to
end the armed rebellion. This essay addresses this by analysing Syrian domestic
politics, Middle East Geopolitics, and Global Geopolitics, by looking at the raised
arguments from each level of analysis, which had contributed more to the Assad
Regimes ability to end the rebellion or otherwise. From the analyses, the key factors
attributing to abovementioned inability were determined.

SYRIAS DOMESTIC POLITICS

Regimes Resiliency
Assads regime was corrupted, deep in cronyism, and biased towards the Alawites.
Thus, they had significantly lost the Sunnis majority which has made it more difficult
for Assad to recruit the youths. His economic reforms alienated the Sunni of poor
status, and increased the practices of cronyism among the Alawites7. He removed the
Sunnis from organizations that had traditionally featured them, which had disrupted
their rapport.

5
ibid.
6
ibid.
7
C. Phillips, Syrias Bloody Arab Spring.
https://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/pdf/SR011/FINAL_LSE_IDEAS__SyriasBloodyAra
bSpring_Phillips.pdf [11 June 2016].
 Dire manpower shortage had caused difficulties for them to launch decisive
offensive campaigns to defeat the rebels, while emboldening existing manpower with
outside fighters, instigating a shift in influence and decision-making away from the
regime to outsiders,8 notably Hezbollah, the Shabiha (pro-government militia) and the
National Defence Force (NDF).9 There were several different figures reported on the
number of manpower losses. One source estimated that 80,000 were killed, 70,000
men avoided military service, with many defected.10 One source estimated the
depletion in the region of approximately 80,000 to 100,000 due to fatigue, desertions,
and losses.11 Another estimate reported that Assads army of 300,000 was
approximately halved, which forced Assad to have made some changes to draw in the
youths.12 This was done through the manners of waiving the normal draft, and dodging
penalties. Phillips stated that the regimes military strength had shrunk from 325,000
in 2011, to approximately 178,000 in 2013, and by mid-2015 they stood at only
70,000-80,000 strong.13

The regime framed the conflict as am act of counter-terrorism,14 which allowed

brutal measures, side-line reforms, and restricting the chances of negotiations. The
regime even targeted medical facilities and civilian population in rebel areas to
achieve its target of depriving support for the rebels.15 Assads complete rejection of
any proposal of a power transition virtually shuts any room for negotiations. The
pattern of minority rule in the Middle East shows that the regimes would fight to the
bitter end, bringing everyone down with it, hence protracting the conflict. Other
examples were in Lebanon which led to the civil war which lasted from 1975 to 1990,
which saw the involvement of Saddam Husseins minority Sunni rule. Assad knew

8
Former Syrian Prime Minister Rijad Hijab exposed that Syria was occupied by Iranian
regime and that Irans General Suleimani, not Assad ran the country.
C. Phillips, The Battle for Syria: International Rivalry in the New Middle East, Yale University Press,
New Haven USA, 2016, p. 159.
9
S.N. Abboud, Syria, Polity Press, Massachusetts USA, 2016 pp. 108-111.
10
G. Mohney, Assad Admits Syrian Armys 'Shortage of Manpower' But Vows to Win
Bloody Conflict. https://news.vice.com/article/assad-admits-syrian-armys-shortage-of-manpower-but-
vows-to-win-bloody-conflict [11 June 2016].
11
I. Black, Wake-Up Call on Syrian Army Weakness Prompted Russian Intervention, The
Guardian.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/01/syrian-military-weakness-russian-intervention [11
June 2016].
12
J. Hayward, Syrian President Assad Admits Military Manpower Running Low.
http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2015/07/28/syrian-president-assad-admits-military-
manpower-running-low/ [11 June 2016].

13
C. Phillips, The Battle for Syria: International Rivalry in the New Middle East, Yale
University Press, New Haven USA, 2016, p. 150.
14
Transcript of Exclusive AFP Interview with Syria's Assad on 11 February 2016,
https://www.yahoo.com/news/transcript-exclusive-afp-interview-syrias-assad-185240901.html?ref=gs
[15 March 2016].
15
C. Glass, Syria Burning: A Short History of a Catastrophe, Verso, London, UK, 2016, p. 33.
that if they were to lose power after a prolonged, brutal, and corrupted reign, they
would face dire consequences.

Fragmented Opposition
Rebels strength of 100,000 - a third of the regime forces initial strength - was large
enough to prolong attrition, while the many different rebel groupings (1,000 groups)
had attracted a wider base of the population (Islamist, secular, urban, rural, middle
class etc.), not just a few sectors and made it difficult for the Assad Regime, and
peace negotiators to satisfy all their needs.16 Occasional unity among rebels had
resulted in greater achievement making it harder for the regime forces to defeat the
rebels.

However, lack of rebel leadership gave rise to Sunnis appeal, increasing the
sectarian effect, which in turn prolonged the conflict. Abboud pointed out that the
rebels had failed to unite in order to bring any political changes, thus, making them
unable to formulate a plan to account for post-Assad Syria and providing material
support to the demonstrators on ground.17 The Local Coordination Committee (LCC)
prefers non-violence and was initially against Western intervention. The Syrian
National Coalition (SNC) initially chose the non-violent route, but later shifted
otherwise. SNC had also strongly advocated for a Western intervention.18 Lund
pointed out that the lack of organized opposition leadership has driven the protest
movement towards Sunni identity politics which had rose to give guidance to the
rebellion.19

Syrian Economy
Pre-civil war economic decline and poor economic policy which had neglected the
rural populace, had contributed to the lack of support for the regime. Economic
liberalisation had benefitted mainly the urban classes, economic elites, and regime
officials, thus marginalising the middle and lower class citizens.20

16
BBC,What's happening in Syria? http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsround/16979186 [18 June
2016].
17
S.N. Abboud, Syria, Polity Press, Massachusetts USA, 2016 pp. 73-77.
18
ibid.
19
A. Lund, Syria: The First Five Years. http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/63076 [11 Oct 2016].
20
Abboud S.N., 2016. Syria, Polity Press, Massachusetts USA, pp.34-40.
 Economic collapse and damaged basic health services and education due to
sanctions and war reduced support for the regime. It was difficult to sustain the war
without outside support, either to recruit, enforcing a good security standard, or
attracting the youths. These would have been able to enhance the chances of the
regime forces, to gain leverage and confidence of the population by effective
governance. The Syrian Center for Policy Research (SCPR) estimated an economic
loss of approximately US$254.7 billion by the end of 2015. 85 per cent of the
country were living in below the poverty line, with almost 7 in 10 Syrians in extreme
poverty and unemployment reaching 52.9 per cent, a surge from 14.9 per cent in
2011.21 House Research Paper estimated22 economy contracted by more than 50 per
cent, inflation averaging 51 per cent, Syrian pound depreciated by about 80 per cent,
dwindling of oil production from 387,000 barrels per day (b/d) to less than 10,000 b/d.
There were other indications as well, such as effective electricity generation falling by
more than 70 per cent, fiscal deficit (excluding subsidies) maintaining at 20 per cent
of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and natural gas production declining by 2014.

MIDDLE EASTS GEOPOLITICS AND INTERVENTIONS

Arab Spring
The Arab Spring was a contributing factor in the rise of Saudi Arabias prominence as
the leading anti-Shiite power, and a popular Western ally. Arab Spring successes in
other states made Assad Regime irreversibly unpopular. Egypt, a traditional key
player at that point of time was also facing its own power transition. Libya was in the
midst of its own civil war. There was a lack of consensus among the Arab states on
how to deal with Syria. Algeria and Iraq were suspicious of Arab Leagues increasing
involvement. Due to this, Iraq and Lebanon refused to accept the sanctions. The Arab
states were also divided in recognising Syrias political opposition, whose officials
had encouraged for a military intervention.23
The force of the Arab Spring had made it difficult for the general Arab public
to back brutal dictators. Even benevolent monarchies in the region were concerned of
their popularity. Assads own brutal crackdown made any hope for support from the
Syrian populace impossible. This was one of the key reasons why it was difficult for

21
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/a-staggering-new-death-toll-for-syrias-war-
470000/ [11 Oct 2016].
22
D. Butter, Syrias Economy: Picking Up the Pieces, The Royal Institute of International
Affairs Chatham House, London, UK, 2015.
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20150623SyriaEconomy
Butter.pdf [18 June 2016].
23
Abboud S.N., 2016. Syria, Polity Press, Massachusetts USA, p.123.
the Assad Regime to recruit youths to join, thus the regime continued to face
manpower depletion.

Sectarianism
The shift from a nationalist nature of uprisings to sectarian fighting made the supply
of recruits for either side virtually limitless, making the conflict more protracted and
difficult to be solved decisively. The Middle East being a Sunni majority region
ensured that the supply of recruits on the Sunni side (rebels) is consistent, thus making
it harder for the Assad Regime to gain the advantage. The sectarian nature had
evolved during the militarisation process. Polarisation of regional support was also
sectarian in nature, for example, how Iran and Hezbollah were on the Alawi regimes
side, while Saudi and Qatar being the Sunnis regional power were on the rebels side.
Each sides respective regional backers would ensure that the balance of power, this in
turn made it ripe for protraction of the conflict.

Support for the Assad Regime: Shiite Backers

Support from Iran was indeed strong: giving arms, training, military personnel,
financing, and political support. There were significant support that came from
Hezbollah. However, Irans exhaustion could be seen by its offer of asylum protection
to Assad, and its commitment elsewhere, notably Yemen.

It was estimated that there were around 10,000 Iranian operatives in Syria as of
December 2013.24 According to the UN, Iran spent at least US$6 billion every year to
support Assad.25 Iran was also experiencing fatigue as it had commitments in Iraq and
Yemen, and on-going concerns over the Golan region.26 Iran offered Assad and his
family asylum in the Islamic Republic. From Iran, Assad could continue orchestrating
his military campaign in Syria, however, Assad rejected the offer.27 Taken from a
different perspective, Iran itself was under sanctions, and the nuclear programme deal
with the US was seen as a way of lifting those sanctions. Continuous support for
24
Email Interview Answers by Miss Zuwara Razali, Senior Civilian Analyst (Middle East and
International Organisation), Defence Intelligence Staff Division, Ministry of Defence Malaysia [17
August 2016].

25
ibid.
26
R. Flores, Flash Points: Is Syria's Assad losing power?, CBS News.
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/flash-points-syria-assad-losing-power/ [11 June 2016].
27
i24news, Iran offered Syrian president Assad and his family asylum: report.
http://www.i24news.tv/en/news/international/middle-east/110770-160423-iran-offered-syrian-
president-bashar-Al-Assad-and-his-family-asylum-report [11 June 2016].
Assad would only distant Irans relation with the US, which will be damaging for
Iran in the long term. This element, coupled with the drop in oil prices had caused
prolonged support for Assad Regime unsustainable.28

Syria was pivotal to the Hezbollah-Iran alliance. Iran provided as much as

US$200 million annually to Hezbollah.29 In mid-2016, Hezbollah promised to send
more fighters to defend Aleppo, a city critical to the defence of Damascus.30 It could
be seen that the support from Hezbollah was an integral part to ensure the regimes
survival. It showed that Hezbollah had remained relentless in their support, even after
years of fighting in Syria. Hezbollah was not a part of the Syrian forces, so there was
only so much Assad could do to control them.

Support for Syrian Opposition: Sunni Challengers

Strong support (arms and finance) from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, and Jordan, has
made Assad virtually surrounded by states opposing him. Nonetheless, Saudi and
Qatars divergence in their support for the rebels caused fragmentation among the
rebels. Western restriction of the supply of arms to the rebels, limited leeway for
regional backers, while the regime faced no such restriction. This had made the rebels
to be less effective something Assad could have taken advantage of. The Saudi
Qatar divergence had given more challenges to the mediators, or Assad to satisfy
these key regional backers of the opposition in any negotiation. Turkeys stand on
Assads oust and accusations of an ISIS-Syrian regime tactical alliance, further
hindered the prospects of effective negotiation.

Recently there was an improved cohesion among the rebels and increased
regional support to rebels in the face of Russian intervention. In fact, the rebels made
some gains with the intensified Saudi support. It was cited that the supply of anti-tank
weapons was a significant factor.31 In February 2016, the Saudi Foreign Minister had
even proposed supplying the rebels with surface-to-air missiles (SAM).32 Qatar also
28
Abboud S.N., 2016. Syria, Polity Press, Massachusetts USA, p.132.
29
Institute for the Study of War, Hezbollah in Syria,
http://www.understandingwar.org/report/hezbollah-syria. [30 July 2016].

30
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/06/hezbollah-send-fighters-syria-aleppo-
160624180847854.html [30 July 2016].
31
L. Bassam and T. Perry, Saudi Arabia's 'Intensified' Support to Syrian Rebels is Reportedly
Slowing Regime Advances, Business Insider. http://www.businessinsider.com/saudi-arabias-intensified-
support-to-syrian-rebels-is-reportedly-slowing-regime-advances-2015-11?IR=T&r=US&IR=T [19 June
2016].

32
L. Dearden, Saudi Arabia Recommends Giving Surface-To-Air Missiles to Syrian Rebels to
'Change Balance of Power', Independent. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-
east/saudi-arabia-recommends-giving-surface-to-air-missiles-to-syrian-rebels-to-change-balance-of-
power-a6886206.html [19 June 2016].
used its powerful media tool the Al-Jazeera Network - for propaganda. Qatars
support for groups linked to the Muslim Brotherhood and Al-Qaedas affiliates were
against Saudis interests. The rift between Qatar and Saudi had also put the US in an
awkward position. Saudi has been a long-time ally and a main oil supplier to the US.
Qatar, on the other hand, is host to the US Pentagons main forward operation centre.

Turkey remains the main route for the supply of arms and fighters into Syria.
If there was one country that could initially reduce tensions and mediate the process, it
would have been Turkey. Yet Turkey opted to side with Saudi Arabia and Qatar. The
rebels recent progress and improved cohesion were due to changes in the regional
posture brought about by the Saudis new King Salman who sees Iran as a more
pressing threat. This recent development could have contributed to greater resistance
by the rebels, making it harder for the Assad Regime to win.33

The March of ISIS

ISIS intervention shifted the Western and regional focus to ISIS, especially following
the ISIS terror attacks on Western cities. ISIS also fights against the Syrian rebels.
ISIS entry justifies Russias intervention, which the Russians use to attack the rebels
too. ISIS adds another front for the regime to fight in addition to fighting against the
rebels and Kurds. ISIS, unlike the rebel groups would never feature in any negotiation
table and is likely to have no interest in negotiations. This presents Assad with limited
opportunity to regain the grounds lost to ISIS through negotiations. This leaves him
with the military option. In May 2016, ISIS detonated car bombs and suicide bombs in
the coastal cities of Jableh and Tartous, killing 150 people and wounding more than
255. This shows that despite sustaining some loss after Russias intervention, ISIS was
still capable of attacks at the core of the Assad Regime. 34 ISIS considerable income
has helped it to sustain the conflict. As of September 2014, ISIS earned US$2 million
per day from the sale of oil in Syria and Iraq, not including income from taxation,
extortion, and the black market.35

The Assad Regime would need significant ground forces to drive ISIS out,
something Assad simply did not have while fighting the rebels. Even General Martin

33
N. Walsh, Analysis: Syrias Al-Assad Regime in Trouble, Losing Ground.
http://www.govtslaves.info/analysis-syrias-Al-Assad-regime-in-trouble-losing-ground/ [11 June 2016].

34
http://theconversation.com/islamic-state-strikes-in-assad-territory-expose-his-and-russias-
weaknesses-59854 [11 June 2016]

35
C. Lister, Assessing Syrias Jihad, in T. Dodge and E. Hokayem (eds), Middle Eastern
Security, The US Pivot and the Rise of ISIS, Routledge, International Institute for Strategic Studies,
ADELPHI Series 447- 448, London UK, 2014. pp. 75-77.
Dempsey, the US Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, had hinted on the need for
ground forces in order to degrade and ultimately destroy ISIS.36 Assad took
advantage of ISIS involvement in fighting the Syrian rebels, in which he branded all
opposition fighters as terrorists.

GLOBAL GEOPOLITICS AND INTERVENTIONS

The Wilted Wrath of the West
Westerns supply of arms, non-lethal aid, and training helped to sustain the rebellion.
However, Westerns limit of supply of advanced weapons (especially anti-air) to
rebels due to concerns on Jihadist receiving them reduced rebels effectiveness. The
Pentagon in October 2015 ended its program of equipping and training the rebels, a
program which had amounted to an expense of USD500 million.37

Western policies towards Syria was inconsistent, lackluster, and lack of will to
intervene. Westerns action after the Assad Regime had opted for chemical weapons
was also limited. Assad realised that if the West would not intervene even after the
application of chemical weapons, there would hardly likely be any Western direct
attack on them in the future. This was partly due the US fatigue on their War on
Terror campaign. Without any direct Western attacks, there was no prospect of a
rebels decisive victory. Dr Maszlee viewed this as an indication that the West were
not serious in stopping the conflict for fear of escalation of tensions with Russia.38
Assad should have been able to capitalise on this to end the rebellion, especially
before the incursion of ISIS.

Western sanctions were ineffective in changing Assads behaviour or inducing

massive defections. Western sanctions made it difficult for the Assad Regime to be
militarily effective or to rule provinces it controls. In turn, this prolonged the
situation, and made it difficult for the Assad Regime to end the conflict.

36
J. Stern and J.M. Berger, ISIS: The State of Terror, William Collins, London, UK, 2015, p.
234.
37
Email Interview Answers by Miss Zuwara Razali, Senior Civilian Analyst (Middle East and
International Organisation), Defence Intelligence Staff Division, Ministry of Defence Malaysia. [17
August 2016]. In some way it can be seen as the US acknowledging it had not achieved its objective.
38
Email Interview Answers by Dr Maszlee Malik, Assistant Professor, Department of Fiqh
and Usul al-Fiqh, International Islamic University Malaysia [29 September 2016].
 Direct Western military intervention against the Assad forces would bring
many difficulties. Firstly, even if direct attacks would force Assad to seek negotiation,
there were no clear and reliable negotiation partner among the rebels. In fact, as the
jihadist groups were the dominant ones. Western intervention would in some way
hand over the power to the extremists. Additionally, there is no clear credible
competitor to Assads leadership whom the West could promote to come into power
should the opposition side wins. Experts were also of the view that the Western
governments had sabotaged UN peace proposals by vetoing Assads inclusion in
negotiations.39 Westerns resistance to include Assad as part of peace negotiations
hindered effective negotiations.

Enter Russian Hordes

Russia had provided strong support in the form of supply of arms, training, and direct
military intervention to help the regime regain some grounds. It was reported that in
December 2012, Russian troops disguised as military advisers had manned Russian-
supplied anti-air weapons. It was alleged that Syrias credible air defences was an
important factor of the US non-interference against Assad or the imposing of a no-fly
zone.40 In late 2013, Russia supplied various equipment and weapons, including new
armoured vehicles, radar and guided bombs.41 Politically, Russias Veto vote at the
UN (strongly backed by Chinas Veto) was vital for Assad Regimes survival.
However, it might have given Assad a false sense of guarantee to do as they please
and stall one peace proposal after another in hope to regain control of the whole state.
In turn, this contributed to the prolonging of the conflict.

The stated aim of Russias intervention is to fight the ISIS and other terrorists.
Russias intervention against ISIS indirectly improved Assads image as a force to
fight ISIS directly. While undeniably that its intervention did cause damage to ISIS,
Russia had also ended up attacking moderate Syrian rebels. Framing the intervention
as counter-terrorism was convenient for Russia since the rebels were comprised of
several groups, many of which were either actual extremists or are linked to the
movement. The more the international community branded these groups as terrorists,
the greater the latitude for Russia and the Assad Regime has, to attack while
restricting the Westerns support for the rebels. Russia had even attempted to persuade

39
I. Sinclair, Has Wester Intervention Prolonged the Syrian Civil War? And Has Our Press Covered It
Up? http://www.juancole.com/2016/03/has-western-intervention-prolonged-the-syrian-civil-war-has-
our-press-covered-it-up.html [11 June 2016]. The UN viewed that since Assad was part of the problem
he should also be part of the solution.
40
Email Interview Answers by Miss Zuwara Razali, Senior Civilian Analyst (Middle East and
International Organisation), Defence Intelligence Staff Division, Ministry of Defence Malaysia.
41
ibid.
the UNSC to include the Islam Army and Ahrar al-Sham in the UNs terror group
list.42

However, Russias intervention was also largely for Russias geopolitical and
domestic benefits, not entirely for Assads victory. Firstly, it was to reassert itself
politically and militarily beyond its neighbourhood. In doing so, they can still be
recognised as a major world power. Linked to this reason, is their chance to gain
leverage and advantage over the West with regards to the Ukraine issue and the lifting
of sanctions related to it. Russia had hoped to assert its influences in the Middle East,
and this was reflected by their actions of securing its naval base at Tartus, and playing
a key role in peace negotiations. Russias early withdrawal indicated the unwillingness
to be engaged for a long period, and as criticism of Assads intention to recapture
whole country, bringing in the possibility of easing out Assad eventually. Russias
agreement on the eradication of chemical weapons indicated that Russia did not just
gave a blank cheque to Assad, and its support is not unconditional. Even after its
partial withdrawal, Russias military support remained considerable. Kozhanov
pointed out that Russia had continued keeping military bases at Tartus, and
Khmeimim. This was alongside maintaining advanced jets, strike helicopters, and
modern air defence systems in the region. Yet again, Assad had failed to achieve any
major military victory.43

Olive Branch: International Peace Proposals

In 2012, Kofi Annan, the then UN Special Representative for Syria had
proposed a peace initiative which would serve as a transitional plan. It proposed for an
end to violence, access to humanitarian assistance, President Assads resignation, and
a transition leading to a multi-party democratic system. Interestingly, the negotiation
did not include representatives from the Syrian government nor the opposition, but
rather only included countries supporting both sides to discuss the proposed agenda.
The regime rejected the proposal due to the participation of terrorists, while the
opposition insisted on Assads resignation. An UN Observers mission was deployed
beginning April 2012, but was suspended in August due to violence and lack of
cooperation from the regime.44 The proposal (Geneva I) had also failed because the
countries supporting either side were not fully committed. Iran and Saudi Arabia
seemed stuck in their tunnel vision situation of a geopolitical contest. Western states
were reluctant to back their support with political pressure on the opposition. Russia

42
A. Lund, A Ceasefire in Syria? http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/62765 [11 Oct 2016].
43
N. Kozhanov, Russias Withdrawal from Syria is Nothing of the Kind.
http://carnegie.ru/2016/03/21/russia-s-withdrawal-from-syria-is-nothing-of-kind-pub-63137 [11 Oct
2016].
44
Abboud S.N., 2016. Syria, Polity Press, Massachusetts USA, pp. 150-151.
and China were skeptical and had opposed the proposal for Assads resignation.
Failure of the proposal had led to Annans resignation.

Lakhdar Brahimi who replaced Annan had brought in regime and opposition
representatives in the subsequent talks. By then, the opposition was so fragmented,
they could not come to an agreement and was left unsatisfied with the representation.
Both warring sides did not attend the meeting in good faith. The Syrian National
Council had withdrawn its participation from the talks, and the armed rebel groups
rejected the dialogue. The Islamist elements of the armed rebels gained more
influence, and by then, ISIS had already entered the battle scene. This enabled the
regime to frame the conflict as a counter-terrorism effort, considering that the
opposition was allegedly composed of terrorists, and that they should not be
negotiated with. Meanwhile, regional backers continued to be flippant on the issue.45
There were lack of political incentives from international players to bring the parties
together to the negotiation table.46 Thus, Brahimis Geneva II had failed, and had to
resign, only to be replaced by Stefan de Mistura.
Stefan de Mistura adopted a radically approach through a bottoms-up strategy
of freezing local areas. This approach had focused on local ceasefires starting with
Aleppo, rather than proposing a larger picture peace plan like a transition government.
This was done with the hope of allowing access to humanitarian aid, and building the
momentum and confidence towards a larger peace settlement. While the plan ensured
engagement with actors on the ground, unlike the previous two which were more
disconnected with reality, it did not provide clearly the incentives for the fighters to
lay down arms. Additionally, there was nothing that encourages the fighters to stop
from simply moving from the frozen area to another area to fight. 47 The plan did not
bear any significant achievement as of mid-2016. Moscow had also made a peace
proposal in 2014, led by its Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov. The proposal
was problematic as it only includes carefully selected opposition who were essentially
loyal to the regime, and does not pose any serious threats to the regime. Another
reason why it was an issue was that, it did not address the oppositions key demands,
in particular Assads resignation which was not an agenda the opposition was
prepared to discuss at all. Not surprisingly, all key opposition groups rejected it.48

CONCLUSION

45
Abboud S.N., 2016. Syria, Polity Press, Massachusetts USA, pp. 152-156.
International actors like the US were ambivalent, apparently more concerned with the entry and spread
of ISIS control in Syria and their global threat, added by the refugee crisis and on-going nuclear
weapons program deal with Iran. This resulted in the West themselves began framing their on
involvement as counter-terrorism effort.
46
ibid.
47
Abboud S.N., 2016. Syria, Polity Press, Massachusetts USA, pp. 156-158.
48
Abboud S.N., 2016. Syria, Polity Press, Massachusetts USA, pp. 158-160.
Domestically, while the oppositions fragmentation was a significant weakness that
Assad should have capitalised on, there were overwhelmingly greater arguments
happening in Syrias domestic politics that prevented Assad from being able to end
the rebellion. Several factors were deemed to be the significant reasons behind this
situation. These are the dire manpower shortage, and the lack of economic and social
facilities, which made it extremely hard for the Assad Regime to seize the opportunity
to win militarily. Likewise, Assads complete rejection of any proposal of a power
transition and the pattern of minority rule tend to fight to the bitter end also hinder
likelihood of ending rebellion through peace negotiations. Hence the above finding
agrees that Syrian domestic politics contribute more to the Assad Regimes inability to
end the armed rebellion.

Looking at Middle East geopolitics, the weightage of both sides of argument is

more balanced or less distinctive, in comparison to the situation with their domestic
politics. The growing sectarian (Sunni-Shiite) divide had not only become the catalyst
of the conflict at the beginning, but had sustained it.49 Nonetheless since regional
geopolitics were geared towards protracting the conflict, the overall regional
geopolitics, albeit by a narrow margin, did not favour Assad to end the rebellion.
Middle East geopolitics therefore had contributed more to the Assad Regimes
inability to end the armed rebellion.

At global level, the arguments on both sides were also quite balanced
compared to domestic politics. However, due to clearly strong Russias support and
weaker Western support, global geopolitics was deemed to slightly favour Assad in
ending the rebellion. Hence this rejects with the third assumption. Global geopolitics
on the whole does not contribute more to the inability of the Assad Regime to end the
armed rebellion.

This study therefore broadly deduces that it is the regimes own lack of
manpower, effective command, and inadequate economic and social means as well as
the tendency of its brutal dictators who came from the ethnic minority to fight to the
bitter end, that acted as the principal reason to Assads inability to end the civil war. It
is arguably because of this, that Assad could not ride on Russias direct military
intervention, and Irans virtually limitless support to win militarily or negotiate
peacefully. It is because of these reasons that the regime could not capitalise on the
fragmentation of the rebels, the divergence of regional backers, and the lack of
political will from the Western region. Thus, without adequate means for Assad to
decisively win, the war can only be prolonged.

The main implication of the findings is the need to scrutinize deeper or focus
academic studies on the Assad Regime to help end the quagmire. This study had
identified the regime as the main component in finding the preferred solution. In order

49
The fiercely competing regional sectarian powers tremendously shaped the course of the
conflict which otherwise were just domestic political unrests.
to studying the regime, it is not sufficient to study Assads biography alone. The
regime structure, evolution, and comparison with other regional regimes would
provide better context and understanding. The study had extended its breadth, as it
infers for diplomats closer examination on the regimes mind-set, which drives not
only the domestic behaviour but also foreign policies. Only with deeper understanding
of Assad and his regime, both through academic study and diplomatic engagement,
one can unlock the stubbornness of the regime to consider negotiating power
transition and to make it abandoning the fight to the severe and catastrophic end.

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