Current Law Journal

350 Reprint [1983] CLJ (Rep)

a RAMLI ZAKARIA & ORS.

v.
THE GOVERNMENT OF MALAYSIA
FEDERAL COURT, KOTA BHARU
SUFFIAN LP
b LEE HUN HOE CJ (BORNEO)
ABDUL HAMID OMAR FJ
[CIVIL APPEAL NO. 182 OF 1981]
12 AUGUST 1982

CONTRACT: Vocational school teachers - Training course - Offer letter - Upon

c completion of course to be placed on the Unified Teachers Scheme (UTS) - Employed by
School Board of Governors/Management - UTS abolished upon graduation - Placed on
attachment - Offered pay under Aziz Scheme - Salary lower than UTS - Whether any breach
of agreement - Rule 103 Service Circular No. 10/1971 - Contract not fulfilled - Whether
on account of frustration - Whether discharged.
This appeal was against the decision of Mohd. Zahir J (as he then was) dismissing the
d
appellants claim with costs [1982] CLJ (Rep) 719. The appellants claim was for a
declaration that they were entitled to salaries and allowances in accordance with the Unified
Teachers Scheme (UTS) pursuant to the agreement entered into between the appellants and
the respondents on 1 May 1969. The appellants were a group of 86 vocational school teachers
who went through a course of teacher training upon their application being successful in
response to an advertisement in the local press. There were letters of offer dated 16 January
e
1969 for the training sent to appellants which inter alia stated that the appellants would
receive pay under the UTS upon completion of the training. However, upon graduation, they
were put on attachment on 1 April 1972 as they had not then successfully completed their
course of training, on a starting salary of RM230 p.m. (allowance), lower than UTS which
was RM310 for men and RM275 for women. The date of completion of the course was on
6 June 1972 and by letter dated 21 September 1972 the appellants were offered a new scale
f
under Aziz Scheme with a starting salary of RM370 as the UTS was no longer in existence
and the only salary scale in force then was the Aziz Scheme.
The sole issue before the learned trial Judge was whether the appellants were entitled to be
placed under UTS. The appellants appealed on the following grounds:
That the learned Judge erred in law and in fact in
g
(1) upholding the respondents plea that the contract could not be fulfilled on account of
frustration and that it has been discharged.
(2) not accepting the submission of the appellants that Circular 10/1971 did not apply to
the appellants who were then not yet Government servants.
h (3) not following the decision of Thambipillai v. The Government of Malaysia [1969]
Vol. 2 MLJ p. 206.
(4) holding Service Circular 10/1971 as having the force of law at the material time.
(5) ...
(6) holding that r. 103 of Service Circular No. 10/1971 barred the appellants from being placed
i under the UTS scale.
 Ramli Zakaria & Ors. v.
[1983] CLJ (Rep) The Government Of Malaysia 351

Held: a
[1] The agreement had spelt out quite clearly that the employment was to be at the option
of the respondent exercisable at any time within twelve months of the completion of the
course. The words for the time being in force relating thereto used in Clause 1(c) with
reference to scales of salaries may be construed to mean that the appellants were to be
subject to whatever scales of salaries relating to the post of a trained teacher in force at the
time of employment. b
[2] There was no substance in the appellants argument that the Government was the author
of the Aziz Scheme and itself effected the abolition of the UTS because in matters relating
to qualifications for appointments and conditions of service the Government is the deciding
authority and the power is provided by law. Such authority cannot be made subject to any
agreement that may be entered into between the Government and another. Instead such
c
agreement must be read subject to the authority by law conferred upon the Government.
Therefore, there was no question of any self-induced frustration.
[3] The learned trial Judge made a correct finding of law when he had held that the
conditions of appointment and conditions of service as embodied in Service Circular No. 10/
1971 had the force of law. The Judge had made this finding in the light particularly of
Article 132(2) of the Federal Constitution which empowers the Government to regulate the d
terms and conditions of persons in the public service.
[4] The introduction by the Government of a new salary scale cannot be said to have been
effected with a view to denying the right, contractual or otherwise, of any particular person
or group of persons. Neither was it the object of the respondent to escape performance of
a contractual obligation under any contract. The Government had accepted the Aziz
recommendations and in fact had put into force an improved salary scale and it was e
applicable to the appellants. Thus the UTS was abolished and had ceased to apply to the
appellants.
[5] The decision in Thambipillais case could not support the appellants contention. In that
case the learned Judge had regard to the nature and effect of that particular service circular
when he had held that the service circular was no more than a mere declaration of policy. f
The same cannot clearly be said of Service Circular No. 10 of 1971.
[6] The only remaining point raised by the appellants that they should first be placed on
UTS and then be allowed to opt to the salary scale under the Aziz Scheme was something
that did not come within the purview of the Judge to deal with. The Judge quite rightly had
confined himself to the appellants claim as disclosed from the pleadings.
g
[7] The learned Judge had not erred in law and in fact in arriving at his decision; the Federal
Court had reached the same conclusion although for somewhat different reasons.
[Appeal dismissed with costs.]
Cases referred to:
Thambipillai v. The Government of Malaysia [1969] 2 MLJ 206 h
C.B. Reilly v. The King [1934] AC 176
Legislation referred to:
Contracts Act 1950, s. 57(2)
Federal Constitution, art. 132(2)

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 Current Law Journal
352 Reprint [1983] CLJ (Rep)

a Other sources referred to:

The Law of Contract in Malaysia and Singapore - Cases and Commentary, Visu Sinnadurai,
p. 487/8
Chitty on Contracts - General Principles, 24th Edn., pp. 658/9, 660
For the appellants - A Gomez; M/s. A. Gomez & Co.
For the respondent - Abu Mansor bin Ali, SFC
b
JUDGMENT
Abdul Hamid Omar FJ:
This appeal is against the decision of Mohd. Zahir J (as he then was) dismissing the
appellants claim with costs.
c The sole issue before the learned Judge was whether the appellants were entitled to be placed
under the Unified Teachers salary scale (UTS).
The facts are not in dispute. The appellants are a group of 86 vocational school teachers
who, in response to an advertisement in the local press, submitted their applications for
teacher training and were successful. Letters of offer (surat tawaran) dated 16 January 1969
for teacher training were sent to them. One of the conditions stated in the letter of offer
d
relates to the pay they would receive upon completion of the training. Each successful
candidate had to complete a Form of Acceptance and sign a standard agreement.
Condition 3(b) in the letter of offer which is material for purposes of this case reads:
3(b) Syarat-syarat bayaran selepas tamat latihan
Selepas tamat kursus DUA tahun dan selepas lulus sekali lagi Pemeriksaan Doktor, tuan/
e puan akan di terima sebagai guru dalam Tingkatan Gaji Yang di Persatukan dan di undang
mengikut syarat-syarat Perkhidmatan bagi Peraturan Gaji Yang di Persatukan itu. Tuan/
Puan akan di beri jawatan sabagai seorang guru oleh Lembaga Pengurus atau Lembaga
Pengelola sekolah-sekolah yang berkenaan dan tidak akan di anggap sabagai pekerja
Kerajaan. Tuan/Puan juga di haruskan boleh di tempatkan di mana-mana jajahan di Tanah
Melayu ini selama lima tahun dari masa tamat latihan mengikut syarat-syarat perjanjian
f tuan/puan dengan kerajaan.
Translated it means:
Conditions of pay after the completion of the course - after the completion of two year
course and on passing medical examination you will be accepted as a teacher on the UTS
scale and shall abide by the service conditions relating thereto. You will be employed as a
teacher by the relevant School Board of Governors or Management and shall not be treated as
g a civil servant.
One of the other conditions is that upon acceptance of the offer each appellant was to
execute an agreement in five copies (p. 508 AB).
After the two years training the plaintiffs were asked to do an extra year specialist course of
training. Upon graduation they were put on attachment on 1 April 1972 on a commencing
h salary of RM230 p.m. lower than UTS which was RM310 for men and RM275 for women. In
this regard however it is to be observed that the appellants were placed on attachment as
they had not then successfully completed their course of training. The payment of RM230
was merely an allowance. The date of completion of the course was 6 June 1972. By letter
Perlantikan Kejawatan Sementara dated 21 September 1972 (AB 27-28), the appellants were
offered a new scale T2 under the Aziz scheme with a starting salary of RM370. This
i
 Ramli Zakaria & Ors. v.
[1983] CLJ (Rep) The Government Of Malaysia 353

according to the appellants would still be lower than the salary they would have got if they a
had been placed first under UTS and then opted into Aziz. The appellants claim that there
was a breach of the agreement and pray for an order declaring that they are entitled to
salaries and allowances in accordance with UTS as it existed on 1 May 1969.
It is clear that at the time the agreement was entered into between the appellants and the
respondent the only salary scale in force relating to trained teachers applicable to the
b
appellants was the UTS scale but on completion of the course of training the UTS was no
longer in existence. The only salary scale in force then was the salary scale under the Aziz
scheme.
In this appeal the appellants rely on the following grounds:
That the learned Judge erred in law and in fact in
c
(1) upholding the respondents plea that the contract could not be fulfilled on account of
frustration and that it had been discharged
(2) not accepting the submission of the appellants that Circular 10/1971 did not apply to
the appellants who were then not yet Government servants.
(3) not following the decision of Thambipillai v. The Government of Malaysia [1969] 2 d
MLJ 206.
(4) holding Service Circular 10/1971 as having the force of law at the material time.
(5) ...
(6) holding that r. 103 of Service Circular No. 10/1971 barred the appellants from being placed
under the UTS scale. e

Before dealing with the merits of the appeal, we would observe that the Judge has held that
the agreement (AB5-8) provided not only for training but also for employment. Reference
was made to Clause 1(c) thereof. We see no reason to disagree.
In our view the agreement has spelt out quite clearly that the employment was to be at the
option of the respondent exercisable at any time within twelve calendar months of the f
completion of the course. A student required to serve was to be appointed upon terms and
conditions for the time being applicable to the post and at a salary in accordance with the
scales of salaries for the time being in force relating thereto. The words for the time being
in force relating thereto used in Clause 1(c) with reference to scales of salaries may be
construed to mean that the appellants were to be subject to whatever scales of salaries
relating to the post of a trained teacher in force at the time of the employment. The Judge g
however ruled this out and held that in the light of the respondents admission the scale
intended was the UTS. The Judge also held that at the time of the execution of the contract
the consensus ad idem of both parties as regards the salary scale related to the UTS and
hence posed to himself this question: Can the defendants of their own motion alter the
scale to one of a different character from what was agreed before?
h
Now, one of the respondents defences in the Court below was that the contract could not
be fulfilled on account of frustration and the Judge found substance in this plea.
It is common ground that on the coming into force of the Aziz scheme the UTS was
abolished. The Aziz scheme was embodied in Circular 10/1971 (15 December 1971). It is
stipulated under para. 2 of the circular that teachers will only be recruited to the Education
Service under the scheme. The scheme was adopted by the Government upon acceptance of i
 Current Law Journal
354 Reprint [1983] CLJ (Rep)

a the report of the Aziz Commission appointed by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong under the
Commission of Enquiry Act 1950 (PU (B) 41 - 27 January 1970) to review teachers salaries.
After due consideration the Judge concluded that the contract between the parties was
frustrated. He further concluded that in consequence the respondent could not legally place
the appellants under UTS and to do so would be illegal. Reference was made by the Judge
to the case of C.B. Reilly v. The King [1934] AC 176, to support his finding that the
b respondent could not within the law employ the appellants under the UTS and the contract
was therefore discharged.
The appellants have contended that there was no frustration of the contract. C.B. Reillys
case, they said, cannot apply to the present case. It is submitted that the UTS was not
abolished but merely suspended and was therefore still in existence. The appellants have
also contended that if there was to be a frustration of the contract it had to be such that the
c
whole of the contract could not be performed. In this case, they maintained, it was possible
to amend circular 10/1971 to accommodate this group to enable performance of the contract.
The appellants case was in substance founded on contract and to succeed in their claim
fundamentally they have to establish that there was a breach of the contract. It is not in
dispute that they accepted the offer and executed the agreement as required under para. (b)
d of the letter of offer and it is their contention that one of the terms of the contract was that
they should be placed on UTS if on completion of their course they were required by the
respondent to serve. The Judge quite rightly held that it was the parties consensus ad idem
that the scale intended was the UTS. What seems clear to our mind is that it was outside
the contemplation of and unforeseen by the parties that UTS would cease to be in force at
the time of the appellants employment. It is also clear that it was not in the minds of the
e parties that the UTS would be reviewed and substituted or replaced by another salary scheme
as had happened in this particular case. In the present case the appellants are not questioning
the Governments right to accept the recommendation of a salaries commission and to effect
changes in the terms and conditions of any particular service. The question therefore is if
another salary scale is substituted and such scale would cover the appellants should they,
if required to serve, be not appointed upon the terms and conditions for the time being
f applicable to such post and at a salary in accordance with the scales of salaries for the time
being in force relating thereto? We are not strictly concerned with the terms and conditions
applicable to the post. They are not in issue. The sole issue here is the salary or rather the
salary scale in particular the quantum. What we therefore have to consider is whether by
reason of the substitution of the salary scale as set out in Service Circular 10/1971 consequent
upon the acceptance by the Government of the Aziz Report it became impossible for the
g respondent to perform that part of its contractual obligation and that therefore the
contract was discharged by frustration.
Assuming there was in law frustration, then in that event the Judge was perfectly right in
holding that the contract was discharged on ground of impossibility of performance. With
respect we do not agree. We are inclined to think that there was no frustration and the
reason is that it was capable of being performed. The relevant provision on the doctrine of
h frustration is set out under our Contracts Act 1950, s. 57(2) which reads:
(2) A contract to do an act which, after the contract is made, becomes impossible, or by
reason of some event which the promisor could not prevent, unlawful, becomes void when
the act becomes impossible or unlawful.

i
 Ramli Zakaria & Ors. v.
[1983] CLJ (Rep) The Government Of Malaysia 355

The introductory passage in a chapter dealing with discharge by frustration in The Law of a
Contract in Malaysia and Singapore - Cases and Commentary by Visu Sinnadurai at
p. 487/8 reads:
A contract is frustrated when there is a change in the circumstances which renders a contract
legally or physically impossible of performance. According to the House of Lords in the case
of Joseph Constantine Steamship Line, Ltd. v. Imperial Smelting Corpn. Ltd. [1942] AC 154,
the doctrine `is only a special case of the discharge of contracts by an impossibility of b
performance arising after the contract was made. Section 57(2) of the Contracts Act, 1950
states the doctrine thus:
A contract to do an act which, after the contract is made, becomes impossible, or by
reason of some event which the promisor could not prevent, unlawful, becomes void
when the act becomes impossible or unlawful.
c
The Act does not define the word impossible. However, it appears that the wording of
the section envisages two main instances of frustration - when a contract to do an act becomes
(a) impossible or (b) unlawful. It is clear that the frustration should be supervening and
subsequent to the formation of the contract. Furthermore, it should be some event which the
promisor could not prevent, as a 'self-induced frustration does not discharge a party of his
contractual obligation. Maritime National Fish, Ltd. v. Ocean Trawlers, Ltd. [1935] AC 524.
d
With reference to the present case, the question is whether the change in the salary scale
rendered performance impossible. Before answering the question we would refer to the English
law with regard to the proper test of frustration. The law on this point is succinctly set out
in Chitty on Contracts - General Principles 24th Edn., p. 658/9 as follows:
In view of the decision of the House of Lords in Davis Contractors Ltd. v. Fareham UDC
[1956] the proper test for frustration may be formulated as follows: If the literal words of e
the contract were to be enforced in the changed circumstances, would this involve fundamental
or radical change from the obligation originally undertaken? In this case Lord Radcliffe said:
... frustration occurs whenever the law recognises that without default of either party
a contractual obligation has become incapable of being performed because the
circumstances in which performance is called for would render it a thing radically
different from that which was undertaken by the contract. Non haec in foedera veni. f
It was not this that I promised to do ... There must be...such a change in the significance
of the obligation that the thing undertaken would, if performed, be a different thing
from that contracted for [1956] AC 696, 729.
Lord Reid put the test for frustration in a similar way. The question is whether the contract
which they did make is, on its true construction, wide enough to apply to the new situation:
if it is not, then it is at an end. (Ibid at p. 721). Later in his speech, (Ibid at p. 723) he
g
approved the words of Asquith LJ that the question is whether the events alleged to frustrate
the contract were fundamental enough to transmute the job the contractor had undertaken
into a job of a different kind, which the contract did not contemplate and to which it could
not apply. Parkinson (Sir Lindsay) & Co. Ltd. v. Comissioners of Works [1949] 2 KB 632,
667.
It would seem that the question is one of construction of the contract and in this regard we
h
again refer to Chitty on contracts, same edition at p. 659/60 where it is stated:
Both Lord Reid and Radcliffe emphasised that the first step was to construe 'the terms
which are in the contract read in the light of the nature of the contract, and of the relevant
surrounding circumstances when the contract was made', [1956] AC 696, 720 -721 (per Lord
Reid). From this construction the Court should reach an impression of the scope of the original
obligation, that is, the Court should ascertain what the parties would be required to do in
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 Current Law Journal
356 Reprint [1983] CLJ (Rep)

a order to fulfil their literal promises in the original circumstances. This impression will depend
on the Courts estimate of what performance would have required in time, labour, money and
materials, if there had been no change in the circumstances existing at the time the contract
was made. The Court should then examine the situation existing after the occurrence of the
event alleged to have frustrated the contract, and ascertain what would be the obligation of
the parties if the words of the contract were enforced in the new circumstances. Having
discovered what was the original obligation and what would be the new obligation if the
b contract were still binding in the new circumstances, the last step in the process is for the
Court to compare the two obligations in order to decide whether the new obligation is a radical
or fundamental, change from the original obligation, Per Lord Reid, in Tsakiroglou & Co.
Ltd. v. Noblee Thorl GmbH, [1962] AC 93 at p. 118. It is not simply a question whether
there has been a radical change in the circumstances, but whether there has been a radical
change in the obligation or the actual effect of the promises of the parties construed in the
c light of the new circumstances. Was performance ... fundamentally different in a commercial
sense? (Ibid at p. 119).
Their Lordships also agreed that it is a matter of law [1956] AC 696, 723 for the Court to
construe the contract in the light of the facts existing at its formation and then to determine
whether the ultimate situation ... is or is not within the scope of the contract so construed.
[1956] AC 696, 721. It is submitted that the House of Lords has accepted the view that the
test for frustration is objective [1956] AC at p. 728 and that frustration is a matter of positive
d judicial intervention. It is not a subjective inquiry into the actual or presumed intention of the
parties, as was suggested by the older theory of the implied term, since the discharge of a
contract on the ground of frustration occurs automatically upon the happening of the frustrating
event, and does not depend upon any repudiation or other act of volition on the part of
either party.
In short it would appear that where after a contract has been entered into there is a change
e
of circumstances but the changed circumstances do not render a fundamental or radical
change in the obligation originally undertaken to make the performance of the contract
something radically different from that originally undertaken, the contract does not become
impossible and it is not discharged by frustration.
Before we embark upon an inquiry whether, in view of the change of circumstances namely
f the substitution of a new salary scale under the Aziz scheme and the abolition of the UTS,
there was frustration of the contract, it is appropriate at this point to consider the merit of
the appellants contention that the respondent should not be allowed to rely on frustration
if it itself created the frustration, that is, if it was a self-induced frustration. The appellants
have alleged that the Government was the author of the Aziz scheme and itself effected the
abolition of the UTS. We are unable to see substance in this argument because in matters
g relating to qualifications for appointments and conditions of service the Government is the
deciding authority and the power is provided by law. Such authority cannot be made subject
to any agreement that may be entered into between the Government and another. Instead
such agreement must be read subject to the authority by law conferred upon the Government.
It is our view therefore that there was no question of any self-induced frustration. Basically
the question remains whether in fact there was frustration of the contract. It is in this regard
h that the test laid down in Davis Contractors case seems relevant. The test is an objective
one to determine whether there has been a radical change in the actual effect of the promises
of the parties construed in the light of the new circumstances.
As a first step in the enquiry we would consider the status of the Service Circular. It is to
be observed that the Judge has said and we quote:
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 Ramli Zakaria & Ors. v.
[1983] CLJ (Rep) The Government Of Malaysia 357

The UTS upon coming into force of the Aziz Scheme has been suspended and from the a
date of Circular No. 10 of 1971 (13 December 1971) which embodied the Aziz Scheme, it is
stipulated under Clause 2 that teachers will only be recruited to the Education Service under
the Scheme. This Aziz Scheme was adopted by the Government and gazetted as a result of
the Aziz Commission report. The Commission was appointed by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong
under the Commission of Enquiry Act 1950 and gazetted in PU (B) 41 dated 27 January
1970 with the terms of reference generally to review teachers salary. The Commission having
completed their enquiry submitted their report and which was accepted by the Government b
in the form of Service Circular No. 10/1971 aforesaid.
Clearly the Service Circular came to be issued after the Government had approved the Aziz
Commission Recommendations. The Commission was an independent body established under
an Act of Parliament and charged by law with specific terms of reference. One of its functions
was to submit recommendations on salary schemes relating to teachers to form not only the c
basis of a revision of salaries of those in the service but also to provide terms and conditions
of service and salary scales for new teachers.
In our view, the Judge made a correct finding of law when he held that the conditions of
appointment and conditions of service as embodied in Service Circular No. 10/1971 had the
force of law. The Judge made this finding in the light particularly of Article 132(2) of the
Federal Constitution which empowers the Government to regulate the terms and conditions d
of persons in the public service. The introduction by the Government of a new salary scale
cannot be said to have been effected with a view to denying the right, contractual or
otherwise, of any particular person or group of persons. Neither was it the object of the
respondent to escape performance of a contractual obligation under any contract. The
Government accepted the Aziz recommendations and in fact put into force an improved salary
scale and it was applicable to the appellants. Thus the UTS was abolished and ceased to e
apply to the appellants. After that the appellants were given a higher commencing salary
and a more favourable scale than that of the UTS.
Our view is that it is wrong to say that the contract was not capable of being performed. It
is also the appellants contention that the contract was not frustrated and that the respondent
could perform the contract but the respondent must amend Circular 10/1971 to accommodate f
them. We do not see the necessity to do that. The Circular was applicable to the appellants.
We also see no merit in the appellants contention that the Circular could not apply to them
as throughout the Circular the word employee was used and they were not employees.
Paragraph 3 of the Circular specifically provides that:
3. From the date of this Circular, recruitment of teachers into the existing Government
Education and Teaching Services and the Unified Teaching Service shall be suspended and, g
thereafter, teachers will only be recruited to the Education Service referred to in para. 1 above,
except that Missionary Teachers may continue to be employed in accordance with reg. 24 of
the Regulations for Aided English Schools in the Straits Settlements, 1936, and reg. 23 of the
Regulations for Aided English Schools in the Federated Malay States, 1936.
And para. 1 of the Circular reads:
h
Following the recommendations of the Royal Commission on the Teaching Services, West
Malaysia (the Aziz Commission), the Government has set up the Education Service. The
Education Service is an open service and its members, who will be known as Members of
the Education Service (hereinafter referred to as Members) will be directable and deployable
to perform teaching, administration or other duties that may be reasonably required of them.

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 Current Law Journal
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a Paragraph 2 sets out the four categories of the education service and category T relates to
the appellants. The salary scales are to be found on pp. 61 and 62 of the circular.
Apart from para. 3 of the Circular which provides that thereafter, teachers will only be
recruited to the Education Service referred to in para. 1 above ... there is revealed that as
from the date when the Circular came into force the intake of teachers to the teaching service
would be in accordance with the terms and conditions and salary scales provided under the
b
Circular. This is reinforced by the provisions which govern the terms such as entry
qualifications, application, probationary period and so forth. These provisions clearly
invalidate the appellants contention that the appellants were not covered by Service Circular
10/1971. It is a fact that they were eligible for direct intake under one of the categories
provided thereunder. The appropriate category was T2.
c As for Thambipillais case we do not see how that decision could support the appellants
contention. In that case the learned Judge had regard to the nature and effect of that particular
service circular when he held that the service circular was no more than a mere declaration
of policy. The same cannot clearly be said of Service Circular 10 of 1971.
Paragraph 1 of the Service Circular reinforced by para. 127 and 128 shows that the new terms
and conditions of service as set out in the Circular supersede those rules and regulations
d which would cease to have effect and that steps were being taken to cancel and amend the
relevant laws circulars, orders and instructions to being them in conformity with the terms of
this circular.
The only remaining point raised by the appellants is that they should first be placed on
UTS and then be allowed to opt to the salary scale under the Aziz scheme. We are in
e sympathy with the appellants and we fully appreciate the anomaly they alleged has arisen,
particularly where it affects the total emoluments compared to those who a year earlier were
placed on UTS and later converted to the Aziz salary scale. This is something that does not
come within the purview of the Judge to deal with. The Judge quite rightly confined himself
to the appellants claim as disclosed from the pleadings.
Moreover, we so not see how the appellants could on one hand claim the Circular 10/1971
f is not applicable to them and on the other sought to be placed, or at any rate, to be allowed
to opt into the Aziz Scale.
For the above reasons, it is our judgment that the learned Judge had not erred in law and in
fact in arriving at his decision. We ourselves have reached the same conclusion although
for somewhat different reasons.
g Accordingly we would dismiss this appeal with costs.

Also found at [1983] 1 CLJ 73