A.M. No.

MTJ-99-1221 March 16, 2000

(Formerly OCA IPI No. 98-524-MTJ)

JOSEFINA M. VILLANUEVA, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE BENJAMIN E. ALMAZAN, respondent.

FACTS: Complainant Villanueva filed an administrative case against respondent Judge Almazan
for grave oral defamation. Explaining his aforementioned action complained of, respondent
Judge contended that he conducted a preliminary examination of the complainant and her two
eyewitnesses, and thereafter, arrived at the conclusion that the acts allegedly committed were not
grave oral defamation, as averred in the complaint, such that he issued his questioned Order to
the effect that the accused in subject cases should be charged with simple slander only.
Villanueva contended that the judge has no authority to downgrade subject accusation from
grave oral defamation to simple slander.

ISSUE: Whether or not the preliminary examination conducted by the judge is proper.

HELD: No. When the respondent Judge concluded that the proper charge should be simple
slander, after examining the complainant and her witnesses in subject criminal cases, respondent
Judge, in effect, conducted a preliminary investigation. Not only was such preliminary
investigation defective; it was a patent error because no preliminary investigation is required for
criminal cases cognizable by Municipal Trial Courts. It is only required for those cognizable by
the Regional Trial Court. Consequently, the respondent judge was devoid of jurisdiction or
authority to reduce the charge to simple slander.

G.R. No. 138364 October 15, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
ROGELIO VILLANUEVA, appellant.

FACTS: The trial court convicted appellant Rogelio Villanueva of rape qualified by the minority
of the victim and her relationship with appellant as father and daughter, and sentenced him to
death under Sec. 11, RA 7659, amending Art. 335, of The Revised Penal Code.

Appellant posits that in the event he is found guilty he should be convicted only of simple rape,
and not qualified rape. He argues that the Information against him failed to allege the qualifying
circumstance of relationship between him and Reseilleta.

ISSUE: Whether or not qualifying circumstances must be strictly and exclusively stated in the
accusatory paragraph of an Information.
HELD: No. There is no law or rule prescribing a specific location in the Information where the
qualifying circumstances must "exclusively" be alleged before they could be appreciated against
the accused. The information sheet must be considered, not by sections or parts, but as one whole
document serving one purpose, i.e., to inform the accused why the full panoply of state authority
is being marshalled against him. Our task is not to determine whether allegations in an
indictment could have been more artfully and exactly written, but solely to ensure that the
constitutional requirement of notice has been fulfilled. Accordingly, the sufficiency of the
allegations of qualifying circumstances therein must be judged objectively, and measured by
practical considerations. Allegations of qualifying circumstances should not be declared
insufficient merely by virtue of a perceived formal defect in their locations, which do not
otherwise prejudice the substantial rights of the accused. As long as they are adequately pleaded
within the four corners of the charge sheet, as in the instant case, they could not be invalidated by
the fact that they are found only in the introductory paragraph.

ALLEN A. MACASAET, NICOLAS V. QUIJANO, JR., and ALFIE LORENZO,

petitioners,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and JOSELITO TRINIDAD, respondents.

FACTS: Alfie Lorenzo, Allen Macasaet, Nicolas Quijano, Jr., and Roger Parajes, columnist,
publisher, managing editor, and editor, respectively of the newspaper "Abante" were charged
with the crime of libel for exposing respondent Trinidad to public hatred and dishonor.

Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the libel case on the ground that the trial court did not have
jurisdiction over the offense charged. According to petitioners, as the information discloses that
the residence of private respondent was in Marikina, the RTC of Quezon City did not have
jurisdiction over the case. Subsequently, the trial court received by way of registered mail,
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration and to Withdraw Plea. Petitioners argued therein that the
trial court committed grave error when it denied the petitioners Urgent Motion to Suspend
Arraignment and/or Defer Proceedings and continued with the scheduled arraignment. According
to petitioners and their co-accused, by the trial judges denial of their Urgent Motion to Defer
Arraignment and/or Defer Proceedings, he had effectively denied them their right to obtain relief
from the Department of Justice.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in denying the motion of the petitioners

HELD: No. It is jurisprudentially settled that jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is
determined by the allegations of the complaint or information.In resolving a motion to dismiss
based on lack of jurisdiction, the general rule is that the facts contained in the complaint or
information should be taken as they are. The exception to this rule is where the Rules of Court
allow the investigation of facts alleged in a motion to quash43 such as when the ground invoked is
the extinction of criminal liability, prescriptions, double jeopardy, or insanity of the accused. In
these instances, it is incumbent upon the trial court to conduct a preliminary trial to determine the
merit of the motion to dismiss. As the present case obviously does not fall within any of the
recognized exceptions, the trial court correctly dismissed this action.

GEORGE MANANTAN, petitioner

vs. COURT OF APPEALS, defendant

G.R. No. 107125. January 29, 2001

FACTS: In the evening of September 25, 1982, at the National Highway of Malvar, Santiago,
Isabela, George Manantan was driving a Toyota car going home. At that time, he was with Fiscal
Ambrocio, Miguel Tabangin and Ruben Nicolas. Suddenly, a jeepney, coming from the opposite
direction hit the driver side of the car, driven by Manantan. Consequently, Manantan, Ambrocio
and Tabangin were injured while Nicolas died. Trial followed.

The lower court acquitted the accused of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide.
The respondents filed their notice of appeal on the civil aspect of the lower courts judgment.
Even if the accused was acquitted from his criminal liability, the Appellate Court held him civilly
liable and ordered him to indemnify the aggrieved party for the death of Nicolas.

ISSUE: Whether or not the acquittal of petitioner extinguished his civil liability.

HELD: NO. The acquittal was based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. Article 29
of the Civil Code provides that a civil liability is not extinguished in criminal cases. Therefore,
the accused cannot be exempted from paying civil damages which may only be proven by
preponderance of evidence.

Manantan claimed that he was placed on double jeopardy but the courts did not give merit to this
contention. The following elements must be present for double jeopardy to exist: (1) A first
jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) The first jeopardy must have terminated;
and (3) the third jeopardy must be for the same offense as the first.

In the case at bar, the initially put into jeopardy but he it was terminated by his discharge. When
the case was elevated to the Court of Appeals, the issue was about the civil aspect of the criminal
case. Thus, there could be no double jeopardy.