NATURAL RESOURCES NEW CASES (ORAL QUIZ) 1
1. Gonzales v Hechanova
2. Ichong V. Hernandez
3. Tano V. Socrates
4. Lee Hong Kok vs. David, 48 SCRA 372.
5. Republic vs. Sayo, 191 SCRA 71.
6. Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002
7. Seville vs. National Development Authority, G.R. No. 129401, February 2, 2001;
8. Republic vs. Naguiat, G.R. No. 134209, January 24, 2006.
9. Sunbeam Convenience Food vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-50464, January 29, 1990
10. Director of Lands and Director of Forest Development vs. Court of Appeals, G.R.
11. Republic vs. Ruby Lee Tsai, G.R. No. 168184, June 22, 2009.
12. International Hardwood and Veneer Co. of the Philippines vs. University of the Philippines.
G.R. No. L-52518, August 13, 1991.
13. Republic vs. De Porkan, G.R. No. L-66866, June 18, 1987.
14. Director of Lands and Director of Forest Development vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-
58867, June 22, 1984.
15. Director of Lands vs. Rivas, G.R. No. L-61539, February 14, 1986,
16. Republic vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-56948, September 30, 1987.
17. Cruz vs. Secretary of DENR, G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000
G.R. No. L-21897 October 22, 1963
RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
RUFINO G. HECHANOVA, as Executive Secretary, MACARIO
PERALTA, JR., as Secretary of Defense, PEDRO GIMENEZ,
as Auditor General, CORNELIO BALMACEDA, as Secretary
of Commerce and Industry, and SALVADOR MARINO,
Secretary of Justice, respondents.
Ramon A. Gonzales in his own behalf as petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General and Estanislao Fernandez for
respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is an original action for prohibition with preliminary
injunction.
It is not disputed that on September 22, 1963, respondent
Executive Secretary authorized the importation of 67,000 tons of
foreign rice to be purchased from private sources, and created a
rice procurement committee composed of the other respondents
herein1 for the implementation of said proposed importation.
Thereupon, or September 25, 1963, herein petitioner, Ramon A.
Gonzales a rice planter, and president of the Iloilo Palay and
Corn Planters Association, whose members are, likewise,
engaged in the production of rice and corn filed the petition
herein, averring that, in making or attempting to make said
importation of foreign rice, the aforementioned respondents "are
acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction", because
Republic Act No. 3452 which allegedly repeals or amends
Republic Act No. 220 explicitly prohibits the importation of rice
and corn "the Rice and Corn Administration or any other
government agency;" that petitioner has no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; and that a
preliminary injunction is necessary for the preservation of the
rights of the parties during the pendency this case and to
prevent the judgment therein from coming ineffectual. Petitioner
prayed, therefore, that said petition be given due course; that a
writ of preliminary injunction be forthwith issued restraining
respondent their agents or representatives from implementing
the decision of the Executive Secretary to import the
aforementioned foreign rice; and that, after due hearing,
judgment be rendered making said injunction permanent.
Forthwith, respondents were required to file their answer to the
petition which they did, and petitioner's pray for a writ of
preliminary injunction was set for hearing at which both parties
appeared and argued orally. Moreover, a memorandum was filed,
shortly thereafter, by the respondents. Considering, later on, that
the resolution said incident may require some pronouncements
that would be more appropriate in a decision on the merits of the
case, the same was set for hearing on the merits thereafter. The
parties, however, waived the right to argue orally, although
counsel for respondents filed their memoranda.
I. Sufficiency of petitioner's interest.
Respondents maintain that the status of petitioner as a rice
planter does not give him sufficient interest to file the petition
herein and secure the relief therein prayed for. We find no merit
in this pretense. Apart from prohibiting the importation of rice
and corn "by the Rice and Corn Administration or any other
government agency". Republic Act No. 3452 declares, in Section
1 thereof, that "the policy of the Government" is to "engage in
the purchase of these basic foods directly from those tenants,
farmers, growers, producers and landowners in
Philippineswho wish to dispose of their products at a price that
will afford them a fair and just return for their labor and capital
investment. ... ." Pursuant to this provision, petitioner, as a
planter with a rice land of substantial proportion,2 is entitled to a
chance to sell to the Government the rice it now seeks to buy
abroad. Moreover, since the purchase of said commodity will
have to be effected with public funds mainly raised by taxation,
and as a rice producer and landowner petitioner must necessarily
be a taxpayer, it follows that he has sufficient personality and
interest to seek judicial assistance with a view to restraining
what he believes to be an attempt to unlawfully disburse said
funds.
II. Exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Respondents assail petitioner's right to the reliefs prayed for
because he "has not exhausted all administrative remedies
available to him before coming to court". We have already held,
however, that the principle requiring the previous exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not applicable where the question in
dispute is purely a legal one", 3 or where the controverted act is
"patently illegal" or was performed without jurisdiction or in
excess of jurisdiction,4 or where the respondent is a department
secretary, whose acts as an alter-ego of the President bear the
implied or assumed approval of the latter,5 unless actually
disapproved by him,6 or where there are circumstances indicating
the urgency of judicial intervention. 7 The case at bar fails under
each one of the foregoing exceptions to the general rule.
Respondents' contention is, therefore, untenable.
III. Merits of petitioner's cause of action.
Respondents question the sufficiency of petitioner's cause of
action upon the theory that the proposed importation in question
is not governed by Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452, but was
authorized by the President as Commander-in-Chief "for military
stock pile purposes" in the exercise of his alleged authority under
Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 1; 8 that in cases of
necessity, the President "or his subordinates may take such
preventive measure for the restoration of good order and
maintenance of peace"; and that, as Commander-in-Chief of our
armed forces, "the President ... is duty-bound to prepare for the
challenge of threats of war or emergency without waiting for any
special authority".
Regardless of whether Republic Act No. 3452 repeals Republic
Act No. 2207, as contended by petitioner herein - on which our
view need not be expressed we are unanimously of the
opinion - assuming that said Republic Act No. 2207 is still in force
that the two Acts are applicable to the proposed importation in
question because the language of said laws is such as to include
the within the purview thereof all importations of rice and corn into
the Philippines". Pursuant to Republic Act No. 2207, "it shall be
unlawful for any person, association, corporation orgovernment
agency to import rice and corn into any point in the Philippines",
although, by way of exception, it adds, that "the President of the
Philippines may authorize the importation of these commodities
through any government agency that he may designate", is the
conditions prescribed in Section 2 of said Act are present.
Similarly, Republic Act No. 3452 explicitly enjoins "the Rice and
Corn Administration or any government agency" from importing
rice and corn.
Respondents allege, however, that said provisions of Republic Act
Nos. 2207 and 3452, prohibiting the importation of rice and corn
by any "government agency", do not apply to importations
"made by the Government itself", because the latter is not a
"government agency". This theory is devoid of merit. The
Department of National Defense and the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, as well as respondents herein, and each and every
officer and employee of our Government, our government

agencies and/or agents. The applicability of said laws even to
importations by the Government as such, becomes more
apparent when we consider that:
1. The importation permitted in Republic Act No. 2207 is to be
authorized by the "President of the Philippines"and, hence, by or
on behalf of the Government of the Philippines;
2. Immediately after enjoining the Rice and Corn administration
and any other government agency from importing rice and corn,
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3452 adds "that the importation of
rice and corn is left to private parties upon payment of the
corresponding taxes", thus indicating that only "private parties"
may import rice under its provisions; and
3. Aside from prescribing a fine not exceeding P10,000.00 and
imprisonment of not more than five (5) years for those who shall
violate any provision of Republic Act No. 3452 or any rule and
regulation promulgated pursuant thereto, Section 15 of said Act
provides that "if the offender is a public official and/or
employees", he shall be subject to the additional penalty
specified therein. A public official is an officer of the Government
itself, as distinguished from officers or employees of
instrumentalities of the Government. Hence, the duly authorized
acts of the former are those of the Government, unlike those of a
government instrumentality which may have a personality of its
own, distinct and separate from that of the Government, as such.
The provisions of Republic Act No. 2207 are, in this respect, even
more explicit. Section 3 thereof provides a similar additional
penalty for any "officer or employee of the Government" who
"violates, abets or tolerates the violation of any provision" of said
Act. Hence, the intent to apply the same to transactions made by
the very government is patent.
Indeed, the restrictions imposed in said Republic Acts are
merely additional to those prescribed in Commonwealth Act No.
138, entitled "An Act to give native products and domestic
entities the preference in the purchase of articles for the
Government." Pursuant to Section 1 thereof:
The Purchase and Equipment Division of
the Government of the Philippines and other officers
and employees of the municipal and provincial
governments and the Government of the Philippines and
of chartered cities, boards, commissions, bureaus,
departments, offices, agencies, branches, and bodies of
any description, including government-owned
companies, authorized to requisition, purchase, or
contract or make disbursements for articles, materials,
and supplies for public use, public buildings, or public
works shall give preference to materials ...
produced ... in the Philippines or in the United States,
and to domestic entities, subject to the conditions
hereinbelow specified. (Emphasis supplied.)
Under this provision, in all purchases by the Government,
including those made by and/or for the armed forces,preference
shall be given to materials produced in the Philippines. The
importation involved in the case at bar violates this general
policy of our Government, aside from the provisions of Republic
Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452.
The attempt to justify the proposed importation by invoking
reasons of national security predicated upon the "worsening
situation in Laos and Vietnam", and "the recent tension created
by the Malaysia problem" - and the alleged powers of the
President as Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces in the
Philippines, under Section 2 of the National Defense Act
(Commonwealth Act No. 1), overlooks the fact that the protection
of local planters of rice and corn in a manner that would foster
and accelerate self-sufficiency in the local production of said
commodities constitutes a factor that is vital to our ability to
meet possible national emergency. Even if the intent in importing
goods in anticipation of such emergency were to bolster up that
ability, the latter would, instead, be impaired if the importation
were so made as to discourage our farmers from engaging in the
production of rice.
Besides, the stockpiling of rice and corn for purpose of national
security and/or national emergency is within the purview of
Republic Act No. 3452. Section 3 thereof expressly authorizes the
Rice and Corn Administration "to accumulate stocks as a national
reserve in such quantities as it may deem proper and necessary
to meet any contingencies". Moreover, it ordains that "the buffer
stocks held as a national reserve ... be deposited by the
administration throughout the country under the proper
dispersal plans ... and may be released only upon the occurrence
of calamities or emergencies ...". (Emphasis applied.)
Again, the provisions of Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 1,
upon which respondents rely so much, are not self-executory.
They merely outline the general objectives of said legislation.
The means for the attainment of those objectives are subject to
congressional legislation. Thus, the conditions under which the
services of citizens, as indicated in said Section 2, may be
availed of, are provided for in Sections 3, 4 and 51 to 88 of said
Commonwealth Act No. 1. Similarly, Section 5 thereof specifies
the manner in which resources necessary for our national
defense may be secured by the Government of the Philippines,
but only "during a national mobilization",9 which does not exist.
Inferentially, therefore, in the absence of a national mobilization,
said resources shall be produced in such manner as Congress
may by other laws provide from time to time. Insofar as rice and
NATURAL RESOURCES NEW CASES (ORAL QUIZ) 2
corn are concerned, Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452, and
Commonwealth Act No. 138 are such laws.
Respondents cite Corwin in support of their pretense, but in vain.
An examination of the work cited 10 shows that Corwin referred to
the powers of the President during "war time" 11 or when he has
placed the country or a part thereof under "martial law". 12 Since
neither condition obtains in the case at bar, said work merely
proves that respondents' theory, if accepted, would, in effect,
place the Philippines under martial law, without a declaration of
the Executive to that effect. What is worse, it would keep
us perpetually under martial law.
It has been suggested that even if the proposed importation
violated Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452, it should,
nevertheless, be permitted because "it redounds to the benefit of
the people". Salus populi est suprema lex, it is said.
If there were a local shortage of rice, the argument might
have some value. But the respondents, as officials of this
Government, have expressly affirmed again and again that there
is no rice shortage. And the importation is avowedly for
stockpile of the Army not the civilian population.
But let us follow the respondents' trend of thought. It has a more
serious implication that appears on the surface. It implies that if
an executive officer believes that compliance with a certain
statute will not benefit the people, he is at liberty to disregard it.
That idea must be rejected - we still live under a rule of law.
And then, "the people" are either producers or consumers. Now
as respondents explicitly admit Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and
3452 were approved by the Legislature for the benefit of
producers and consumers, i.e., the people, it must follow that the
welfare of the people lies precisely in the compliance with said
Acts.
It is not for respondent executive officers now to set their own
opinions against that of the Legislature, and adopt means or
ways to set those Acts at naught. Anyway, those laws permit
importation but under certain conditions, which have not
been, and should be complied with.
IV. The contracts with Vietnam and Burma
It is lastly contended that the Government of the Philippines has
already entered into two (2) contracts for the Purchase of rice,
one with the Republic of Vietnam, and another with the
Government of Burma; that these contracts constitute valid
executive agreements under international law; that such

agreements became binding effective upon the signing thereof
by representatives the parties thereto; that in case of conflict
between Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452 on the one hand, and
aforementioned contracts, on the other, the latter should prevail,
because, if a treaty and a statute are inconsistent with each
other, the conflict must be resolved under the American
jurisprudence in favor of the one which is latest in point of
time; that petitioner herein assails the validity of acts of the
Executive relative to foreign relations in the conduct of which the
Supreme Court cannot interfere; and the aforementioned
contracts have already been consummated, the Government of
the Philippines having already paid the price of the rice involved
therein through irrevocable letters of credit in favor of the sell of
the said commodity. We find no merit in this pretense.
The Court is not satisfied that the status of said tracts as alleged
executive agreements has been sufficiently established. The
parties to said contracts do not pear to have regarded the same
as executive agreements. But, even assuming that said contracts
may properly considered as executive agreements, the same are
unlawful, as well as null and void, from a constitutional
viewpoint, said agreements being inconsistent with the
provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. Although the
President may, under the American constitutional system enter
into executive agreements without previous legislative authority,
he may not, by executive agreement, enter into a transaction
which is prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto. Under the
Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce
laws enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in the
performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the
exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative
enactments that have acquired the status of law, by indirectly
repealing the same through an executive agreement providing
for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws.
The American theory to the effect that, in the event of conflict
between a treaty and a statute, the one which is latest in point of
time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar, for
respondents not only admit, but, alsoinsist that the contracts
adverted to are not treaties. Said theory may be justified upon
the ground that treaties to which the United States is signatory
require the advice and consent of its Senate, and, hence, of a
branch of the legislative department. No such justification can be
given as regards executive agreements not authorized by
previous legislation, without completely upsetting the principle of
separation of powers and the system of checks and balances
which are fundamental in our constitutional set up and that of
the United States.
As regards the question whether an international agreement may
be invalidated by our courts, suffice it to say that the
Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the
affirmative, by providing, in Section 2 of Article VIII thereof, that
the Supreme Court may not be deprived "of its jurisdiction to
review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or
writ of error as the law or the rules of court may provide, final
judgments and decrees of inferior courts in (1) All cases in
which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law,
ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question". In
other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a
treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but,
also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.
The alleged consummation of the aforementioned contracts with
Vietnam and Burma does not render this case academic,
Republic Act No. 2207 enjoins our Government not from entering
into contracts for the purchase of rice, but from importing rice,
except under the conditions Prescribed in said Act. Upon the
other hand, Republic Act No. 3452 has two (2) main features,
namely: (a) it requires the Government to purchase rice and
corn directlyfrom our local planters, growers or landowners; and
(b) it prohibits importations of rice by the Government, and
leaves such importations to private parties. The pivotal issue in
this case is whether the proposed importation which has not
been consummated as yet is legally feasible.
Lastly, a judicial declaration of illegality of the proposed
importation would not compel our Government to default in the
performance of such obligations as it may have contracted with
the sellers of the rice in question, because, aside from the fact
that said obligations may be complied with without importing the
commodity into the Philippines, the proposed importation may
still be legalized by complying with the provisions of the
aforementioned laws.
V. The writ of preliminary injunction.
The members of the Court have divergent opinions on the
question whether or not respondents herein should be enjoined
from implementing the aforementioned proposed importation.
However, the majority favors the negative view, for which reason
the injunction prayed for cannot be granted.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that
respondent Executive Secretary had and has no power to
authorize the importation in question; that he exceeded his
jurisdiction in granting said authority; said importation is not
sanctioned by law and is contrary to its provisions; and that, for
lack of the requisite majority, the injunction prayed for must be
and is, accordingly denied. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, CJ, Padilla, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon and
Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Paredes and Regala, JJ., concur in the result.
NATURAL RESOURCES NEW CASES (ORAL QUIZ) 3
================
ICHONG vs. HERNANDEZ
Facts: Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the
Retail Business." In effect it nationalizes the retail trade business.
Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending
that: (1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the
laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due
process of law ; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or
comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates
international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the
Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act against the transmission
by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession, and
those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or
entity to entitle it to engage in the retail business, violate the
spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV
of the Constitution.
In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of
Manila contend that: (1) the Act was passed in the valid exercise
of the police power of the State, which exercise is authorized in
the Constitution in the interest of national economic survival; (2)
the Act has only one subject embraced in the title; (3) no treaty
or international obligations are infringed; (4) as regards
hereditary succession, only the form is affected but the value of
the property is not impaired, and the institution of inheritance is
only of statutory origin.
Issue: Whether the conditions which the disputed law purports
to remedy really or actually exist.
Held: Yes. We hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy
a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by
alien dominance and control of the retail business and free
citizens and country from dominance and control. Such
enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of
the State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality
and insures its security and future. Furthermore, the law does not
violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because
sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and
citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due
process of law clause, because the law is prospective in
operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged
in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege. The
wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear
to us to be plainly evident as a matter of fact it seems not only
appropriate but actually necessary and that in any case such
matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose
power and discretion the Judicial department of the Government
may not interfere. Moreover, the provisions of the law are clearly
embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has
not misled the legislators or the segment of the population
affected; and that it cannot be said to be void for supposed

conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually
been entered into on the subject and the police power may not
be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other
conventional agreement.
============
TANO vs. SOCRATES
Facts: The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princessa enacted
ordinance no. 15-92 banning the shipment of live fish and lobster
outside Puerto Princessa City for a period of 5 years. In the same
light, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan also enacted a
resolution that prohibits the catching, gathering, buying, selling
and possessing and shipment of live marine coral dwelling
aquatic organisms for a period of 5 years within the Palawan
waters. The petitiones Airline Shippers Association of Palawan
together with marine merchants were charged for violating the
above ordinance and resolution by the city and provincial
governments. The petitioners now allege that they have the
preferential rights as marginal fishermen granted with privileges
provided in Section 149 of the Local Government Code, invoking
the invalidity of the above-stated enactments as violative of their
preferential rights.
Issue: Whether or not the enacted resolutions and ordinances by
the local government units violative of the preferential rights of
the marginal fishermen ?
Held: No, the enacted resolution and ordinance of the LGU were
not violative of their preferential rights. The enactment of these
laws was a valid exercise of the police power of the LGU to
protect public interests and the public right to a balanced and
healthier ecology. The rights and privileges invoked by the
petitioners are not absolute. The general welfare clause of the
local government code mandates for the liberal interpretation in
giving the LGUs more power to accelerate economic
development and to upgrade the life of the people in the
community. The LGUs are endowed with the power to enact
fishery laws in its municipal waters which necessarily includes
the enactment of ordinances in order to effectively carry out the
enforcement of fishery laws in their local community
======
G.R. No. L-30389 December 27, 1972
PEDRO LEE HONG HOK, SIMEON LEE HONG HOK, ROSITA
LEE HONG HOK and LEONCIO LEE HONG HOK, petitioners,
vs.
ANIANO DAVID, THE HON. SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS and
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Augusto A. Pardalis for petitioners.
Luis General, Jr. for respondent Aniano David.
Office of the Solicitor General for other respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:p
Petitioners 1 in this appeal by certiorari would have us reverse a
decision of respondent Court of Appeals affirming a lower court
judgment dismissing their complaint to have the Torrens Title 2 of
respondent Aniano David declared null and void. What makes the
task for petitioners quite difficult is that their factual support for
their pretension to ownership of such disputed lot through
accretion was rejected by respondent Court of Appeals. Without
such underpinning, they must perforce rely on a legal theory,
which, to put it mildly, is distinguished by unorthodoxy and is
therefore far from persuasive. A grant by the government
through the appropriate public officials 3 exercising the
competence duly vested in them by law is not to be set at
naught on the premise, unexpressed but implied, that land not
otherwise passing into private ownership may not be disposed of
by the state. Such an assumption is at war with settled principles
of constitutional law. It cannot receive our assent. We affirm.
The decision of respondent Court of Appeals following that of the
lower court makes clear that there is no legal justification for
nullifying the right of respondent Aniano David to the disputed lot
arising from the grant made in his favor by respondent officials.
As noted in the decision under review, he "acquired lawful title
thereby pursuant to his miscellaneous sales application in
accordance with which an order of award and for issuance of a
sales patent was made by the Director of Lands on June 18,
1958, covering Lot 2892 containing an area of 226 square
meters, which is a portion of Lot 2863 of the Naga Cadastre. On
the basis of the order of award of the Director of Lands the
Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued on
August 26, 1959, Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. V-1209
pursuant to which OCT No. 510 was issued by the Register of
Deeds of Naga City to defendant-appellee Aniano David on
October 21, 1959. According to the Stipulation of Facts, since the
filing of the sales application of Aniano David and during all the
proceedings in connection with said application, up to the actual
issuance of the sales patent in his favor, the plaintiffs-appellants
did not put up any opposition or adverse claim thereto. This is
fatal to them because after the registration and issuance of the
certificate and duplicate certificate of title based on a public land
patent, the land covered thereby automatically comes under the
operation of Republic Act 496 subject to all the safeguards
provided therein.... Under Section 38 of Act 496 any question
concerning the validity of the certificate of title based on fraud
should be raised within one year from the date of the issuance of
NATURAL RESOURCES NEW CASES (ORAL QUIZ) 4
the patent. Thereafter the certificate of title based thereon
becomes indefeasible.... In this case the land in question is not a
private property as the Director of Lands and the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources have always sustained the
public character thereof for having been formed by
reclamation.... The only remedy therefore, available to the
appellants is an action for reconveyance on the ground of fraud.
In this case we do not see any fraud committed by defendant-
appellant Aniano David in applying for the purchase of the land
involved through his Miscellaneous Sales Application No. MSA-V-
26747, entered in the records of the Bureau of Lands
[Miscellaneous Sales] Entry No. V-9033, because everything was
done in the open. The notices regarding the auction sale of the
land were published, the actual sale and award thereof to Aniano
David were not clandestine but open and public official acts of an
officer of the Government. The application was merely a renewal
of his deceased wife's application, and the said deceased
occupied the land since 1938." 4
On such finding of facts, the attempt of petitioners to elicit a
different conclusion is likely to be attended with frustration. The
first error assigned predicated an accretion having taken place,
notwithstanding its rejection by respondent Court of Appeals,
would seek to disregard what was accepted by respondent Court
as to how the disputed lot came into being, namely by
reclamation. It does not therefore call for any further
consideration. Neither of the other two errors imputed to
respondent Court, as to its holding that authoritative doctrines
preclude a party other than the government to dispute the
validity of a grant and the recognition of the indefeasible
character of a public land patent after one year, is possessed of
merit. Consequently, as set forth at the outset, there is no
justification for reversal.
1. More specifically, the shaft of criticism was let loose by
petitioner aimed at this legal proposition set forth in the
exhaustive opinion of then Justice Salvador Esguerra of the Court
of Appeals, now a member of this Court: "There is, furthermore, a
fatal defect of parties to this action. Only the Government,
represented by the Director of Lands, or the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, can bring an action to cancel
a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a void patent (Lucas
vs. Durian, 102 Phil. 1157; Director of Lands vs. Heirs of Ciriaco
Carlo, G.R. No. L-12485, July 31, 1959). This was not done by said
officers but by private parties like the plaintiffs, who cannot claim
that the patent and title issued for the land involved are void
since they are not the registered owners thereof nor had they
been declared as owners in the cadastral proceedings of Naga
Cadastre after claiming it as their private property. The cases
cited by appellants are not in point as they refer to private
registered lands or public lands over which vested rights have
been acquired but notwithstanding such fact the Land
Department subsequently granted patents to public land

applicants." 5 Petitioner ought to have known better. The above
excerpt is invulnerable to attack. It is a restatement of a principle
that dates back to Maninang v. Consolacion, 6 a 1908 decision. As
was there categorically stated: "The fact that the grant was
made by the government is undisputed. Whether the grant was
in conformity with the law or not is a question which the
government may raise, but until it is raised by the government
and set aside, the defendant can not question it. The legality of
the grant is a question between the grantee and the
government." 7 The above citation was repeated ipsissimis
verbis in Salazar v. Court of Appeals. 8 Bereft as petitioners were
of the right of ownership in accordance with the findings of the
Court of Appeals, they cannot, in the language of Reyes v.
Rodriguez, 9"question the [title] legally issued." 10 The second
assignment of error is thus disposed of.
2. As there are overtones indicative of skepticism, if not of
outright rejection, of the well-known distinction in public law
between the government authority possessed by the state which
is appropriately embraced in the concept of sovereignty, and its
capacity to own or acquire property, it is not inappropriate to
pursue the matter further. The former comes under the heading
of imperium and the latter of dominium. The use of this term is
appropriate with reference to lands held by the state in its
proprietary character. In such capacity, it may provide for the
exploitation and use of lands and other natural resources,
including their disposition, except as limited by the Constitution.
Dean Pound did speak of the confusion that existed during the
medieval era between such two concepts, but did note the
existence of res publicae as a corollary to dominium." 11 As far as
the Philippines was concerned, there was a recognition by Justice
Holmes in Cario v. Insular Government, 12 a case of Philippine
origin, that "Spain in its earlier decrees embodied the universal
feudal theory that all lands were held from the Crown...." 13 That
was a manifestation of the concept of jura regalia, 14 which was
adopted by the present Constitution, ownership however being
vested in the state as such rather than the head thereof. What
was stated by Holmes served to confirm a much more extensive
discussion of the matter in the leading case of Valenton v.
Murciano, 15 decided in 1904. One of the royal decrees cited was
incorporated in the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias 16 in
these words: "We having acquired full sovereignty over the Indies
and all lands, territories, and possessions not heretofore ceded
away by our royal predecessors, or by us, or in our name, still
pertaining to the royal crown and patrimony, it is our will that all
lands which are held without proper and true deeds of grant be
restored to us according as they belong to us, in order that after
reserving before all what to us or to our viceroys audiences, and
governors may seem necessary for public squares, ways,
pastures, and commons in those places which are peopled,
taking into consideration not only their present condition, but
also their future and their probable increase, and after
distributing to the natives what may be necessary for tillage and
pasturage, confirming them in what they now have and giving
NATURAL RESOURCES NEW CASES (ORAL QUIZ) 5
them more if necessary, all the rest of said lands may remain provisions of Chapter VI of the Public Land Law are the same in
free and unencumbered for us to dispose of as we may wish." 17 that both are against the whole world, both take the nature of
judicial proceedings, and for both the decree of registration
issued is conclusive and final." 30 Such a view has been followed
It could therefore be affirmed in Montano v. Insular
since then. 31 The latest case in point is Cabacug v. Lao. 32 There
Government" 18 that "as to the unappropriated public lands
is this revealing excerpt appearing in that decision: "It is said,
constituting the public domain the sole power of legislation is
and with reason, that a holder of a land acquired under a free
vested in Congress, ..." 19 They continue to possess that
patent is more favorably situated than that of an owner of
character until severed therefrom by state grant. 20 Where, as in
registered property. Not only does a free patent have a force and
this case, it was found by the Court of Appeals that the disputed
effect of a Torrens Title, but in addition the person to whom it is
lot was the result of reclamation, its being correctly categorized
granted has likewise in his favor the right to repurchase within a
as public land is undeniable. 21 What was held in Heirs of Datu
period of five years." 33 It is quite apparent, therefore, that
Pendatun v. Director of Lands 22 finds application. Thus: "There
petitioners' stand is legally indefensible.
being no evidence whatever that the property in question was
ever acquired by the applicants or their ancestors either by
composition title from the Spanish Government or by possessory WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals of
information title or by any other means for the acquisition of January 31, 1969 and its resolution of March 14, 1969 are
public lands, the property must be held to be public affirmed. With costs against petitioners-appellants.
domain." 23 For it is well-settled "that no public land can be
acquired by private persons without any grant, express or
=========
implied, from the government." 24 It is indispensable then that
there be a showing of a title from the state or any other mode of
G.R. No. L-60413 October 31, 1990
acquisition recognized by law. 25 The most recent restatement of
the doctrine, found in an opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes,
follows: 26"The applicant, having failed to establish his right or REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
title over the northern portion of Lot No. 463 involved in the vs.
present controversy, and there being no showing that the same HON. SOFRONIO G. SAYO, Judge, Br. I, C I, Nueva Vizcaya,
has been acquired by any private person from the Government, HEIRS OF CASIANO SANDOVAL, HEIRS OF LIBERATO
either by purchase or by grant, the property is and remains part BAYAUA, JOSE C. REYES, and PHILIPPINE CACAO AND
of the public domain." 27 To repeat, the second assignment of FARM PRODUCTS, INC.,respondents.
error is devoid of merit.
3. The last error assigned would take issue with this portion of
the opinion of Justice Esguerra: "According to the Stipulation of
Sought to be annulled and set aside in this special civil action
Facts, since the filing of the sales application of Aniano David and
of certiorari is the decision of respondent Judge Sofronio G. Sayo
during all the proceedings in connection with said application, up
rendered on March 5, 1981 in Land Registration Case No. N-109,
to the actual issuance of the sales patent in his favor, the
LRC Record No. 20850, confirming, by virtue of a compromise
plaintiffs-appellants did not put up any opposition or adverse
agreement, the title of the private respondents over a tract of
claim thereto. This is fatal to them because after the registration
land.
and issuance of the certificate and duplicate certificate of title
based on a public land patent, the land covered thereby
automatically comes under the operation of Republic Act 496 The spouses, Casiano Sandoval and Luz Marquez, filed an original
subject to all the safeguards provided therein ... Under Section application for registration of a tract of land identified as Lot No.
38 of Act 496 any question concerning the validity of the 7454 of the Cadastral Survey of Santiago, BL Cad. 211 (July 17,
certificate of title based on fraud should be raised within one 1961) and having an area of 33,950 hectares. The land was
year from the date of the issuance of the patent. Thereafter the formerly part of the Municipality of Santiago, Province of Isabela,
certificate of title based thereon becomes but had been transferred to Nueva Vizcaya in virtue of Republic
indefeasible ..." 28 Petitioners cannot reconcile themselves to the Act No. 236.
view that respondent David's title is impressed with the quality of
indefeasibility. In thus manifesting such an attitude, they railed to
Oppositions were filed by the Government, through the Director
accord deference to controlling precedents. As far back as 1919,
of Lands and the Director of Forestry, and some others, including
in Aquino v. Director of
the Heirs of Liberato Bayaua. 1 In due course, an order of general
Lands, 29 Justice Malcolm, speaking for the Court, stated: "The
default was thereafter entered on December 11, 1961 against
proceedings under the Land Registration Law and under the
the whole world except the oppositors.

The case dragged on for about twenty (20) years until March 3,
1981 when a compromise agreement was entered into by and
among all the parties, assisted by their respective counsel,
namely: the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval (who had since died), the
Bureau of Lands, the Bureau of Forest Development, the Heirs of
Liberato Bayaua, and the Philippine Cacao and Farm Products,
Inc. Under the compromise agreement, the Heirs of Casiano
Sandoval (as applicants) renounced their claims and ceded
1) in favor of the Bureau of Lands, an area of 4,109 hectares;
2) in favor of the Bureau of Forest Development, 12,341
hectares;
3) in favor of the Heirs of Liberato Bayaua, 4,000 hectares; and
4) in favor of Philippine Cacao & Farm Products, Inc., 8,000
hectares.
The remaining area of 5,500 hectares was, under the
compromise agreement, adjudicated to and acknowledged as
owned by the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval, but out of this area,
1,500 hectares were assigned by the Casiano Heirs to their
counsel, Jose C. Reyes, in payment of his attorney's fees. In
consideration of the areas respectively allocated to them, all the
parties also mutually waived and renounced all their prior claims
to and over Lot No. 7454 of the Santiago Cadastre.
In a decision rendered on March 5, 1981, the respondent Judge
approved the compromise agreement and confirmed the title and
ownership of the parties in accordance with its terms.
The Solicitor General, in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines,
has taken the present recourse in a bid to have that decision of
March 5, 1981 annulled as being patently void and rendered in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The
Solicitor General contends that
1) no evidence whatever was adduced by the parties in support
of their petitions for registration;
2) neither the Director of Lands nor the Director of Forest
Development had legal authority to enter into the compromise
agreement;
3) as counsel of the Republic, he should have been but was not
given notice of the compromise agreement or otherwise
accorded an opportunity to take part therein;
4) that he was not even served with notice of the decision
approving the compromise; it was the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
of Quirino Province that drew his attention to the "patently
erroneous decision" and requested him to take immediate
remedial measures to bring about its annulment.
The respondents maintain, on the other hand, that the Solicitor
considered a title to property, it not being one of the grants
General's arguments are premised on the proposition that Lot
7454 is public land, but it is not. According to them, as pointed
out in the application for registration, the private character of the
land is demonstrated by the following circumstances, to wit:
1) the possessory information title of the applicants and their
predecessors-in-interest;
2) the fact that Lot 7454 was never claimed to be public land by
the Director of Lands in the proper cadastral proceedings;
3) the pre-war certification of the National Library dated August
16, 1932 to the effect that the (Estadistica de Propiedades) of
Isabela issued in 1896 and appearing in the Bureau of Archives,
the property in question was registered under the 'Spanish
system of land registration as private property owned by Don
Liberato Bayaua, applicants' predecessors-in-interest;
4) the proceeding for registration, brought under Act 496 (the
Torrens Act) presupposes that there is already a title to be
confirmed by the court, distinguishing it from proceedings under
the Public Land Act where the presumption is always that the
land involved belongs to the State.
Under the Regalian Doctrine 2 all lands not otherwise appearing
to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to
the State. Hence it is that all applicants in land registration
proceedings have the burden of overcoming the presumption
that the land thus sought to be registered forms part of the
public domain. 3Unless the applicant succeeds in showing by
clear and convincing evidence that the property involved was
acquired by him or his ancestors either by composition title from
the Spanish Government or by possessory information title, or
any other means for the proper acquisition of public lands, the
property must be held to be part of the public domain . 4 The
applicant must present competent and persuasive proof to
substantiate his claim; he may not rely on general statements, or
mere conclusions of law other than factual evidence of
possession and title. 5
In the proceeding at bar, it appears that the principal document
relied upon and presented by the applicants for registration, to
prove the private character of the large tract of land subject of
their application, was a photocopy of a certification of the
NATURAL RESOURCES NEW CASES (ORAL QUIZ) 6
National Library dated August 16, 1932 (already above
mentioned) to the effect that according to the
Government's (Estadistica de Propiedades) of Isabela issued in
1896, the property in question was registered under the Spanish
system of land registration as private property of Don Liberato
Bayaua. But, as this Court has already had occasion to rule, that
Spanish document, the (Estadistica de Propiedades,) cannot be
made during the Spanish regime, and obviously not constituting
primary evidence of ownership. 6 It is an inefficacious document
on which to base any finding of the private character of the land
in question.
And, of course, to argue that the initiation of an application for
registration of land under the Torrens Act is proof that the land is
of private ownership, not pertaining to the public domain, is to
beg the question. It is precisely the character of the land as
private which the applicant has the obligation of establishing. For
there can be no doubt of the intendment of the Land Registration
Act, Act 496, that every applicant show a proper title for
registration; indeed, even in the absence of any adverse claim,
the applicant is not assured of a favorable decree by the Land
Registration Court, if he fails to establish a proper title for official
recognition.
It thus appears that the decision of the Registration Court a
quo is based solely on the compromise agreement of the parties.
But that compromise agreement included private persons who
had not adduced any competent evidence of their ownership
over the land subject of the registration proceeding. Portions of
the land in controversy were assigned to persons or entities who
had presented nothing whatever to prove their ownership of any
part of the land. What was done was to consider the compromise
agreement as proof of title of the parties taking part therein, a
totally unacceptable proposition. The result has been the
adjudication of lands of no little extension to persons who had
not submitted any substantiation at all of their pretensions to
ownership, founded on nothing but the agreement among
themselves that they had rights and interests over the land.
The assent of the Directors of Lands and Forest Development to
the compromise agreement did not and could not supply the
absence of evidence of title required of the private respondents.
As to the informacion posesoria invoked by the private
respondents, it should be pointed out that under the Spanish
Mortgage Law, it was considered a mode of acquiring title to
public lands, subject to two (2) conditions: first, the inscription
thereof in the Registry of Property, and second, actual, public,
adverse, and uninterrupted possession of the land for twenty
(20) years (later reduced to ten [10] years); but where, as here,
proof of fulfillment of these conditions is absent, the informacion

posesoria cannot be considered as anything more thanprima
facie evidence of possession. 7
Finally, it was error to disregard the Solicitor General in the
execution of the compromise agreement and its submission to
the Court for approval. It is, after all, the Solicitor General, who is
the principal counsel of the Government; this is the reason for
our holding that "Court orders and decisions sent to the fiscal,
acting as agent of the Solicitor General in land registration cases,
are not binding until they are actually received by the Solicitor
General." 8
It thus appears that the compromise agreement and the
judgment approving it must be, as they are hereby, declared null
and void, and set aside. Considerations of fairness however
indicate the remand of the case to the Registration Court so that
the private parties may be afforded an opportunity to establish
by competent evidence their respective claims to the property.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Judge complained of
is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Land Registration Case No. N-109
subject of the petition is REMANDED to the court of origin which
shall conduct further appropriate proceedings therein, receiving
the evidence of the parties and thereafter rendering judgment as
such evidence and the law may warrant. No pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.
============
Chavez v Public Estate Authority GR No. 133250, July 9,
2002
Facts: On November 20, 1973, the government through the
Commissioner of Public Highways signed a contract with the
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines
(CDCP) to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila
Bay. The contract also included the construction of Phases I and II
of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP obligated itself to carry
out all the works in consideration of fifty percent of the total
reclaimed land. On April 25, 1995 the PEA entered into a Joint
Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI to develop the Freedom
Islands.
This JVA was entered into through negotiation without public
bidding. The Senate Committee on Government Corporations and
Public Enterprises, and the Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers and Investigations, conducted a joint investigation.
Among the conclusion are: that the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to
transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain
which the government has not classified as alienable lands and
therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands, the certificates of the
title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and the JVA
itself is illegal. On December 5, 1997, President Ramos created a
Legal Task Force to conduct a study on the legality of the JVA.
The Task Force upheld the legality of the JVA, contrary to the
conclusions of the Senate Committees. On April 27, 1998,
Petitioner as taxpayer filed the instant petition for mandamus
with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
and TRO.
Petitioner contends the government stands to lose billions of
pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI.
Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any
renegotiation of the JVA. Furthermore, petitioner assails the sale
to AMARI of lands of the public domains as blatant violation of
Sec 3, Art XII of the Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable
lands of the public domain to private corporations. Petitioner
assert that he seeks to enjoin the loss of billion of pesos in
properties of the State that are of public dominion.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to bring
the suit.
Ratio Decidendi:
The petitioner has standing to bring the taxpayers suit because
the petition seeks to compel PEA to comply with its constitutional
duties. This duties are particularly in answer of the right of
citizens to information on matters of public concern, and of a
constitutional provision intended to insure the equitable
distribution of alienable lands of the public domain among
Filipino citizens. Furthermore, the court considered that the
petition raised matters of transcendental importance tot eh
public.
The mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen satisfies the
requirement of personal interest when the proceeding involves
the assertion of a public right. Also, ordinary taxpayers have a
right to initiate and prosecute actions questioning the validity of
acts or orders of government agencies or instrumentalities if the
issues raise are of paramount public interest and if they
immediately affect the social, economic and moral well being of
the people.
The amended JVA does not make the issue moot and academic
since this compels the court to insure the government itself does
NATURAL RESOURCES NEW CASES (ORAL QUIZ) 7
not violate a provision of the Constitution intended to safeguard
the national patrimony. The content of the amended JVA seeks to
transfer title and ownership of reclaimed lands to a single
corporation. The court does not hesitate to resolve the legal or
constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling principles to
guide the bench, bar and the public.
The instant case raises constitutional issues of transcendental
importance to the public. Court can resolve this case without
determining any factual issue related to the case. The instant
case is a petition for mandamus which falls under the original
jurisdiction of the Court. Furthermore, PEA was under a positive
legal duty to disclose to the public the terms and conditions for
the sale of its lands. The principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies does not apply when the issue involved is purely legal
or constitutional question.
The right to information includes official information on on-going
negotiations before a final agreement as required by the
constitution. The Supreme Court granted the petition. PEA and
Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation are permanently
enjoined from implementing the amended JVA which is hereby
declared null and void ab initio.
============
[G.R. No. 129401. February 2, 2001]
FELIPE SEVILLE in his capacity as judicial administrator of
the estate of JOAQUIN ORTEGA and/or FELIPE
SEVILLE, EMILIA ESTRADA, MARIA S. TELLDER,
MA. ISABEL SEVILLE, MA. TERESITA LICARDO,
FRANCISCO SEVILLE, RAMON O. SEVILLE, JOSE
MARIE SEVILLE, GEMMA ALVAREZ-ASAYAS,
ANNABELLE ALVAREZ-GONZALES, SYLVIA
ALVAREZ-LIOK, ADOLFO O. ALVAREZ JR., DIANA
ALVAREZ-DABON, MARIA SALVADOR O. POLANCOS
and JOAQUIN ORTEGA II as successors-in-interest
of JOAQUIN ORTEGA and his estate, petitioners,
vs. NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, LEYTE
SAB-A BASIN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATED SMELTING AND REFINING
CORPORATION, LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING
CO., PHILIPPINE PHOSPHATE FERTILIZER
CORPORATION, CALIXTRA YAP and REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF LEYTE, respondents.
Unless a public land is shown to have been reclassified as
alienable or actually alienated by the State to a private person,
that piece of land remains part of the public domain. Hence,
occupation thereof, however long, cannot ripen into ownership.

The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the
November 29, 1996 Decision of the Court of Appeals [1] (CA), as
well as the May 19, 1997 CA Resolution [2] denying the Motion for
Reconsideration. The dispositive part of the CA Decision reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Another judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the
complaint. The counterclaims of appellants are denied. Costs
against plaintiffs-appellees.[3]
The Facts
The appellate court narrated the undisputed facts in this
manner:
1. By virtue of Presidential Decree No. 625, Leyte Sab-A Basin
Development Authority (LSBDA) was created to integrate
government and private sector efforts for a planned
development and balanced growth of the Sab-a Basin in the
[P]rovince of Leyte, empowered to acquire real property in the
successful prosecution of its business. Letter of Instruction No.
962 authorized LSBDA to acquire privately-owned lands
circumscribed in the Leyte Industrial Development Estate (LIDE)
by way of negotiated sales with the landowners.
2. On June 14, 1980, [Respondent] Calixtra Yap sold to LSBDA
Lot No. 057 SWO 08-000047 consisting of 464,920 square
meters, located at Barangay Sto. Rosario, Isabel, Leyte, covered
under Tax Declarations Nos. 3181, 3579, 3425, 1292 and 4251
under the name of said vendor.
3. On June 1, 1982, appellant LSBDA filed a Miscellaneous Sales
Application with the Bureau of Lands covering said lot together
with other lots acquired by LSBDA with an aggregate area of
442, 7508 square meters.
4. After due notice and investigation conducted by the Bureau
of Lands, Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 9353 was issued in the
name of [Respondent] LSBDA on the basis of which Original
Certificate of Title No. P-28131 was transcribed in the
Registration Book for the [P]rovince of Leyte on August 12, 1983
in the name of [Respondent] LSBDA. On December 14, 1989,
LSBDA assigned all its rights over the subject property to its [Co-
respondent] National Development Company (NDC) as a result of
which a new Transfer Certificate of Title was issued on March 2,
1990 by the Registry of Deeds for the province of Northern Leyte
in the name of NDC. The subject property was leased to
[Respondents] Philippine Associated Smelting & Refining
Corporation (PASAR), Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation
(PHILPHOS) and Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co., Inc.
(LEPANTO).
5. On November 29, 1988, the Estate of Joaquin Ortega
represented by judicial administrator Felipe Seville filed with the
Regional Trial Court (Branch 12) of Ormoc City, a complaint for
recovery of real property, rentals and damages against the
above-named [respondents] which complaint was later on
amended on May 11, 1990. [Respondents] filed their respective
Answers. After trial, the trial court rendered judgment the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, [a] decision is hereby rendered for [petitioners]
and against [respondents].
1. The Deed of Sale executed by Calixtra Yap on June 14, 1980
in favor of LSBDA, (Exhibit PP and 25) conveying the subject
property to said LSBDA is declared NULL and VOID ab initio;
2. The intestate estate of JOAQUIN ORTEGA is declared the
owner in fee simple of the 735,333 square meters real property
subject of the present action and defendant NDC is ordered to
segregate the same area from OCT P-28131 and CONVEY the
same to the Estate of Joaquin Ortega;
3. Upon the segregation of the 735,333 square meters from
OCT No. P-28131 the Register of Deeds of the Province of Leyte is
ordered to issue a new title to the said portion in the name of the
Intestate Estate of Joaquin Ortega;
4. [Respondents] LSBDA, NDC, PASAR, are ordered to pay jointly
and severally to [petitioners] the sum of FOUR MILLION SEVEN
HUNDRED EIGHTY FOUR THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SIX
PESOS (P4,784,846.00) as rentals due from 1979 to the present,
plus accrued interest pursuant to par. 2 of the Lease Contract
between NDC and PASAR. (Exhibit 54)
5. [Respondents] LSBDA, NDC, and PHILPHOS are also ordered
to pay jointly and severally [petitioners] the sum of TWO MILLION
EIGHTY SIX THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED NINETY EIGHT PESOS
AND SIXTY CENTAVOS (P2,086,398.60) as accrued rentals of
PHILPHOS from 1979 to present, plus the accrued interest for
non-payment pursuant to paragraph 2 of the same Lease
Contract cited above;
6. [Respondents] are ordered to pay jointly and severally
[petitioners] P200,000.00 as indemnity for the value of the
ancestral home;
NATURAL RESOURCES NEW CASES (ORAL QUIZ) 8
7. [Respondents] are also ordered to pay jointly and severally
[petitioners] the sum of P250,000.00 as reimbursement for
attorneys fees and the further sum of P50,000.00 as expenses
for litigation;
8. Finally, [petitioners] and [respondents] are ordered to sit
down together and discuss the possibility of a compromise
agreement on how the improvements introduced on the
landholding subject of the present suit should be disposed of and
for the parties to submit to this Court a joint manifestation
relative thereto. In the absence of any such compromise
agreement, such improvements shall be disposed of pursuant to
Article 449 of the New Civil Code.
Costs against [respondents].
SO ORDERED.[4]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Citing the Regalian doctrine that lands not appearing to be
privately owned are presumed to be part of the public domain,
the CA held that, first, there was no competent evidence to prove
that the property in question was private in character. Second,
possession thereof, no matter how long, would not ripen into
ownership, absent any showing that the land had been classified
as alienable. Third, the property had been untitled before the
issuance of the Miscellaneous Sales Patent in favor of the
LSBDA. Fourth, petitioners were guilty of laches, because they
had failed to apply for the judicial confirmation of their title, if
they had any. Fifth, there was no evidence of bad faith on the
part of LSBDA in dealing with Yap regarding the property.
Hence, this Petition.[5]
The Issues
In their Memorandum, petitioners submit the following
issues for the consideration of the Court: [6]
A. Whether or not the sale by Calixtra Yap of the Estate of the
Late Joaquin Ortega in favor of LSBDA was null and void.
B. Whether or not the issuance of a Miscellaneous Sales Patent
and an Original Certificate of Title in favor of LSBDA was valid.
C. Whether or not petitioners are guilty of laches.

D. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to the remedy of
reconveyance and the damages awarded by the trial court.
In the main, the Court is called upon to determine the
validity of LSBDAs title. In resolving this issue, it will also
ascertain whether, before the issuance of the title, the land was
private or public.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Main Issue:
Validity of LSBDAs Title
Petitioners argue that LSBDAs title to 73 hectares of the
402-hectare Leyte Industrial Development Estate was void,
having allegedly been obtained from Calixtra Yap who had no
right to it. They maintain that they acquired title to the disputed
property by acquisitive prescription, because they and their
predecessors in interest had been in possession of it for more
than thirty years.[7] Although it was the subject of settlement
proceedings, petitioners further claim that Yap sold the same to
LSBDA without the permission of the trial court.
Disputing these contentions, respondents and the appellate
court maintain that petitioners have not shown that the land had
previously been classified as alienable and disposable. Absent
such classification, they argue that possession of it, no matter
how long, could not ripen into ownership.
We agree with respondents and the appellate
court. First. There was no showing that the land had been
classified as alienable before the title was issued to LSBDA;
hence, petitioners could not have become owners thereof
through acquisitive prescription. Second, petitioners challenge
to LSBDAs title cannot be granted, because it is based on a
wrong premise and amounts to a collateral attack, which is not
allowed by law.
Public Character of the Land
Under the Regalian doctrine, all the lands of the public
domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted
right to ownership of land. All lands not otherwise appearing to
be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to
the State.[8] In Menguito v. Republic,[9] the court held that
[u]nless public land is shown to have been reclassified or
alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the
inalienable public domain. Indeed, occupation thereof in the
concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into
ownership and be registered as a title. To overcome such
presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the
applicant. Absent such evidence, the land sought to be
registered remains inalienable.
A person in open, continuous, exclusive an notorious
possession of a public land for more than thirty years acquires an
imperfect title thereto. That title may be the subject of judicial
confirmation, pursuant to Section 48 of the Public Land Act,
which provides:
SECTION 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of public domain or claiming to own any such
lands or an interest thereon, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance
of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title therefore, under
the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) those who by themselves or through their predecessor in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for
at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by
war or force majeure. They shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall he entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this Chapter.
Under Section 4 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1073,
[10]
paragraph b of the aforecited provision applies only to
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. The
provision reads:
SEC. 4. The provisions of Section 48 (b) and Section 48 (c),
Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act, are hereby amended in the
sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
NATURAL RESOURCES NEW CASES (ORAL QUIZ) 9
by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under
a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12,
1945.
It should be stressed that petitioners had no certificate of
title over the disputed property. Although they claim that their
title was based on acquisitive prescription, they fail to present
incontrovertible proof that the land had previously been
classified as alienable. They simply brush aside the conclusion of
the CA on this crucial point by saying that it was without factual
basis.[11] Instead, they maintain that the private character of the
land was evidenced by various tax declarations, Deeds of Sale,
and Decisions of the trial court and even the Supreme Court. [12]
Petitioners arguments are not convincing. Tax declarations
are not conclusive proofs of ownership, let alone of the private
character of the land. At best, they are merely indicia of
a claim of ownership.[13] In Spouses Palomo v. CA,[14] the Court
also rejected tax declarations as proof of private ownership,
absent any showing that the forest land in question had been
reclassified as alienable.
Moreover, the Deeds of Sale of portions of the disputed
property, which Joaquin Ortega and several vendors executed, do
not prove that the land was private in character. The question
remains: What was the character of the land when Ortega
purchased it? Indeed, a vendee acquires only those rights
belonging to the vendor. But petitioners failed to show that, at
the time, the vendors were already its owners, or that the land
was already classified as alienable.
Also misplaced is petitioners reliance on Ortega v. CA,
[15]
in which the Supreme Court allegedly recognized the private
character of the disputed property. In that case, the sole issue
was whether the respondent judge xxx acted in excess of
jurisdiction when he converted Civil Case No. 1184-O, an action
for quieting of title, declaration of nullity of sale, and annulment
of tax declaration of a parcel of land, into an action for the
declaration of who is the legal wife, who are the legitimate
children, if any, and who are the compulsory heirs of the
deceased Joaquin Ortega.[16] The Court did not all make any
ruling that the property had been classified as alienable.
In any event, Ortega arose from a suit for quieting of title,
an action quasi in rem that was binding only between the parties.
[17]
The present respondents as well as the Bureau of Lands,
which subsequently declared that the land was public, are not
bound by that ruling, because they were not impleaded therein.
While petitioners refer to the trial court proceedings
supposedly recognizing the private character of the disputed
 NATURAL RESOURCES NEW CASES (ORAL QUIZ) 10

property, they make no claim that these cases directly involve
the classification of the land, or that the Bureau of Lands is a
party thereto.
Clearly, the burden of proof that the land has
classified as alienable is on the claimant. [18] In the present
petitioners failed to discharge this burden. Hence,
possession of the disputed property, however long, cannot
into ownership.
There is another reason for denying the present
Petition. Petitioners insist that they are not seeking the re-
opening of a decree under the Torrens system. Supposedly,
they are only praying for the segregation of 735,333 square
meters of land, or 73 hectares more or less from the OCT No. P-
been
28131 issued to LSBDA.[21] This disputation is mere quibbling
case,
over the words, plain and simple.
their
ripen
Semantics aside, petitioners are effectively seeking the
modification of LSBDAs OCT, which allegedly encompassed even
instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his
stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the [Republic] of the
Philippines.
Verily, the prayer for reconveyance and, for that matter, the
entire case of petitioners rest on the theory that they have
acquired the property by acquisitive prescription; and that Yap,
without any right or authority, sold the same to LSBDA.
Conclusion

LSBDAs Title
Equally unmeritous is the argument of petitioners that the
title of LSBDA is void. As earlier stated, they claim that such title
was derived from Calixtra Yap, who was allegedly not the owner
of the property. Petitioners assume that LSBDA, having acquired
the rights of Yap, resorted to a confirmation of her imperfect title
under Section 48 of the Public Land Act. This argument is devoid
of factual or legal basis.
Petitioners fail to consider that the title of LSBDA was
based, not on the conveyance made by Yap, but on
Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 9353 issued by the director of the
Bureau of Lands. In fact, after LSBDA had filed an application for
patent, the Bureau of Lands conducted an investigation and
found that the land was part of the public domain. After
compliance with the notice and publication requirements, LSBDA
acquired the property in a public auction conducted by the
Bureau of Lands.[19]
Petitioners insist, however, that LSBDA was estopped from
claiming that the land was public, because the Deed of Sale
executed by Yap in its favor stipulated that the seller is the
absolute owner in fee simple of the xxx described property. [20] It
is scarcely necessary to address this point. To begin with, the
power to classify a land as alienable belongs to the State, not to
private entities. Hence, the pronouncements of Yap or LSBDA
cannot effect the reclassification of the property. Moreover, the
assailed misrepresentation was made by Yap as seller. Hence,
objections thereto should be raised not by petitioners but by
LSBDA, the contracting party obviously aggrieved.
In any case, the actions of LSBDA after Yaps conveyance
demonstrated its position that the disputed land was part of the
public domain. That this was so can be inferred from LSBDAs
subsequent application for a Miscellaneous Sales Patent and, in a
public auction, its purchase of the property from the Bureau of
Lands. Indeed, Yap merely conveyed a claim, not a title which
she did not have.
Collateral Attack
a parcel of land allegedly belonging to them. Hence, the present
suit, purportedly filed for the recovery of real property and
damages, is tantamount to a collateral attack not sanctioned by In the light of our earlier disquisition, the theory has no leg
law. Section 48 of PD 1529, the Property Registration Decree, to stand on. Absent any showing that the land has been
expressly provides: classified as alienable, their possession thereof, no matter how
lengthy, cannot ripen into ownership. In other words, they have
not become owners of the disputed property. Moreover, LSBDAs
SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. -- A
title was derived from a Miscellaneous Sales Patent, not from
certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It
Yap. Finally, petitioners cannot, by a collateral attack, challenge
cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct
a certificate of title that has already become indefeasible and
proceeding in accordance with law.
incontrovertible.
It has been held that a certificate of title, once registered,
If petitioners believe that they have been defrauded by Yap,
should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified,
they should seek redress, not in these proceedings, but in a
enlarged or diminished, except in a direct proceeding permitted
proper action in accordance with law.
by law. Otherwise, the reliance on registered titles would be lost.
[22]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the
assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
Moreover, the title became indefeasible and
incontrovertible after the lapse of one year from the time of its
registration and issuance.[23] Section 32 of PD 1529 provides that SO ORDERED.
[u]pon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of
registration and the certificate of title shall become
Melo (Chairman), Gonzaga-Reyes, and Sandoval-Gutierrez,
incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved buy such decree of
JJ., concur.
registration in any case may pursue his remedy by action for
damages against the applicant or other persons responsible for
the fraud. Although LSBDAs title was registered in 1983, Vitug, J., in the result.
petitioners filed the amended Complaint only in 1990.
==============
Reconveyance
Petitioners also claim that the disputed property should be G.R. No. 134209 January 24, 2006
reconveyed to them. This cannot be allowed. Considering that
the land was public before the Miscellaneous Sales Patent was
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
issued to LSBDA, petitioners have no standing to ask for the
vs.
reconveyance of the property to them. The proper remedy is an
CELESTINA NAGUIAT, Respondent.
action for reversion, which may be instituted only by the Office of
the Solicitor General, pursuant to section 101 of the Public Land
Act, which reads as follows: DECISION
SEC. 101. All actions for the reversion to the Government of GARCIA, J.:
lands of the public domain or improvements thereon shall be

Before the Court is this petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Decision 1 dated May
29, 1998 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
37001 which affirmed an earlier decision2 of the Regional Trial
Court at Iba, Zambales, Branch 69 in Land Registration Case No.
N-25-1.
The decision under review recites the factual backdrop, as
follows:
This is an application for registration of title to four (4) parcels of
land located in Panan, Botolan, Zambales, more particularly
described in the amended application filed by Celestina Naguiat
on 29 December 1989 with the Regional Trial Court of Zambales,
Branch 69. Applicant [herein respondent] alleges, inter alia, that
she is the owner of the said parcels of land having acquired them
by purchase from the LID Corporation which likewise acquired
the same from Demetria Calderon, Josefina Moraga and Fausto
Monje and their predecessors-in-interest who have been in
possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years; and that to
the best of her knowledge, said lots suffer no mortgage or
encumbrance of whatever kind nor is there any person having
any interest, legal or equitable, or in possession thereof.
On 29 June 1990, the Republic of the Philippines [herein
petitioner]. . . filed an opposition to the application on the ground
that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the lands in question since 12 June 1945 or
prior thereto; that the muniments of title and tax payment
receipts of applicant do not constitute competent and sufficient
evidence of a bona-fide acquisition of the lands applied for or of
his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation thereof in the concept of (an) owner; that the
applicants claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of
Spanish title or grant can no longer be availed of . . .; and that
the parcels of land applied for are part of the public domain
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private
appropriation.
On 15 October 1990, the lower court issued an order of general
default as against the whole world, with the exception of the
Office of the Solicitor General, and proceeded with the hearing of
this registration case.
After she had presented and formally offered her evidence . . .
applicant rested her case. The Solicitor General, thru the
Provincial Prosecutor, interposed no objection to the admission of
the exhibits. Later . . . the Provincial Prosecutor manifest (sic)
that the Government had no evidence to adduce. 3
In a decision4 dated September 30, 1991, the trial court rendered
judgment for herein respondent Celestina Naguiat, adjudicating
unto her the parcels of land in question and decreeing the
registration thereof in her name, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby adjudicates
the parcels of land situated in Panan, Botolan, Zambales,
appearing on Plan AP-03-003447 containing an area of 3,131
square meters, appearing on Plan AP-03-003446 containing an
area of 15,322 containing an area of 15,387 square meters to
herein applicant Celestina T. Naguiat, of legal age, Filipino citizen,
married to Rommel Naguiat and a resident of Angeles City,
Pampanga together with all the improvements existing thereon
and orders and decrees registration in her name in accordance
with Act No. 496, Commonwealth Act No. 14, [should be 141] as
amended, and Presidential Decree No. 1529. This adjudication,
however, is subject to the various easements/reservations
provided for under pertinent laws, presidential decrees and/or
presidential letters of instructions which should be annotated/
projected on the title to be issued. And once this decision
becomes final, let the corresponding decree of registration be
immediately issued. (Words in bracket added)
With its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the
trial court, petitioner Republic went on appeal to the CA in CA-
G.R. CV No. 37001.
As stated at the outset hereof, the CA, in the herein assailed
decision of May 29, 1998, affirmed that of the trial court, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the Republics present recourse on its basic submission
that the CAs decision "is not in accordance with law,
jurisprudence and the evidence, since respondent has not
established with the required evidence her title in fee simple or
imperfect title in respect of the subject lots which would warrant
their registration under (P.D. 1529 or Public Land Act (C.A.)
141." In particular, petitioner Republic faults the appellate court
on its finding respecting the length of respondents occupation of
the property subject of her application for registration and for not
considering the fact that she has not established that the lands
in question have been declassified from forest or timber zone to
alienable and disposable property.
Public forest lands or forest reserves, unless declassified and
released by positive act of the Government so that they may
form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public
NATURAL RESOURCES NEW CASES (ORAL QUIZ) 11
domain, are not capable of private appropriation. 5 As to these
assets, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not
apply.6 Given this postulate, the principal issue to be addressed
turns on the question of whether or not the areas in question
have ceased to have the status of forest or other inalienable
lands of the public domain.
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act 7 and the
Constitution8 classifying lands of the public domain into
"agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands and national
parks," do not necessarily refer to a large tract of wooded land or
an expanse covered by dense growth of trees and underbrush.
As we stated in Heirs of Amunategui 9-
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain
does not lose such classification simply because loggers or
settlers have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land
classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or
planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest
lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way
places. xxx. The classification is merely descriptive of its legal
nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the
land actually looks like. xxx
Under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, 10 which embodies
the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to
the State the source of any asserted right to ownership of
land.11 All lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion
presumptively belong to the State.12 Accordingly, public lands not
shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable
agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State
remain part of the inalienable public domain.13 Under Section 6 of
the Public Land Act, the prerogative of classifying or reclassifying
lands of the public domain, i.e., from forest or mineral to
agricultural and vice versa, belongs to the Executive Branch of
the government and not the court. 14 Needless to stress, the onus
to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that
the land subject of an application for registration is alienable or
disposable rests with the applicant.15
In the present case, the CA assumed that the lands in question
are already alienable and disposable. Wrote the appellate court:
The theory of [petitioner] that the properties in question are
lands of the public domain cannot be sustained as it is directly
against the above doctrine. Said doctrine is a reaffirmation of the
principle established in the earlier cases . . . that open, exclusive
and undisputed possession of alienable public land for period
prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land,
upon completion of the requisite period, ipso jure and without the
need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and

becomes private property . (Word in bracket and underscoring
added.)
The principal reason for the appellate courts disposition, finding
a registerable title for respondent, is her and her predecessor-in-
interests open, continuous and exclusive occupation of the
subject property for more than 30 years. Prescinding from its
above assumption and finding, the appellate court went on to
conclude, citing Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court (IAC)16 and Herico vs. DAR,17 among other cases, that, upon
the completion of the requisite period of possession, the lands in
question cease to be public land and become private property.
Director of Lands, Herico and the other cases cited by the CA are
not, however, winning cards for the respondent, for the simple
reason that, in said cases, the disposable and alienable nature of
the land sought to be registered was established, or, at least, not
put in issue. And there lies the difference.
Here, respondent never presented the required certification from
the proper government agency or official proclamation
reclassifying the land applied for as alienable and disposable.
Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be
assumed. It calls for proof. 18 Aside from tax receipts, respondent
submitted in evidence the survey map and technical descriptions
of the lands, which, needless to state, provided no information
respecting the classification of the property. As the Court has
held, however, these documents are not sufficient to overcome
the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part
of the public domain.19
It cannot be overemphasized that unwarranted appropriation of
public lands has been a notorious practice resorted to in land
registration cases.20 For this reason, the Court has made it a
point to stress, when appropriate, that declassification of forest
and mineral lands, as the case may be, and their conversion into
alienable and disposable lands need an express and positive act
from the government.21
The foregoing considered, the issue of whether or not respondent
and her predecessor-in-interest have been in open, exclusive and
continuous possession of the parcels of land in question is now of
little moment. For, unclassified land, as here, cannot be acquired
by adverse occupation or possession; occupation thereof in the
concept of owner, however long, cannot ripen into private
ownership and be registered as title.22
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the assailed
decision dated May 29, 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 37001 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly,
respondents application for original registration of title in Land
Registration Case No. N-25-1 of the Regional Trial Court at Iba,
Zambales, Branch 69, is DENIED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
===========
G.R. No. L-50464 January 29, 1990
SUNBEAM CONVENIENCE FOODS INC., CORAL BEACH
DEVELOPMENT CORP., and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
BATAAN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Filoteo T. Banzon for petitioners.
SARMIENTO, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, Convenience Foods
Corporation (hereafter simply SUNBEAM) and Coral Beach
Development Corporation (hereafter simply CORAL BEACH) bring
to our attention the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals in
"Republic of the Philippines v. Hon. Pedro T. Santiago, et al.,"
disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is granted. The order of the
respondent judge dated October 7, 1977, dismissing Civil Case
No. 4062 is set aside, and respondent judge is ordered to require
private respondents to file their answer to the complaint in said
Civil Case No. 4062 and thereafter to proceed with the trial of the
case on the merits and to render judgment thereon.'
The following facts stated by the respondent Court in its decision
and restated by the petitioners in their petition are accurate:
(a) On April 29, 1963, the Director of Lands caused the issuance
of a Sales Patent in favor of defendant Sunbeam Convenience
Foods, Inc., over the parcels of land both situated in Mariveles,
Bataan and more particularly described and bounded as follows:
Lot 1-Sgs-2409 (area 3,113,695 sq. m )
NATURAL RESOURCES NEW CASES (ORAL QUIZ) 12
Lot 2-Sgs-2409 area 1,401,855 sq. m
(b) On May 3, 1963, the aforesaid Sales Patent was registered
with the defendant Register of Deeds of Bataan who in turn
issued Original Certificate of Title No. Sp-24 in favor of defendant
Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc., for the two parcels of land
above-described;
(c) Subsequently, Original Certificate of Title No. Sp-24 was
cancelled and in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
12421 was issued over Lot 1, Sgs-2409, while Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 12422 was issued over Lot 2, Sgs-2409, both in favor
of defendant Coral Beach Development Corporation I
(d) On May 11, 1976, the Solicitor General in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines instituted before the Court of First
Instance of Bataan, an action for reversion docketed as Civil Case
No. 4062. 2
SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
following grounds:
1. The Republic of the Philippines should have exhausted all
administrative remedies before filing the case in court;
2. The title issued to SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH had become
indefeasible and imprescriptible;
3. The action for reversion was defective, having been initiated
by the Solicitor General and not by the Director of Lands. 3 The
then Court of First Instance of Bataan dismissed the complaint in
the Order of October 7, 1977,4adopting mainly the theory that
since the titles sought to be cancelled emanated from the
administrative act of the Bureau of Lands Director, the latter, not
the courts, had jurisdiction over the disposition of the land.
The Solicitor General received the copy of the Order on October
11, 1977 and filed a Notice of Appeal dated October 25,
1977 . 5 The Solicitor General then moved for an extension of
thirty days within which to file the Record on Appeal and to pay
the docket fee in order to perfect the appeal. This was to be
followed by another motion for extension filed by the Solicitor
General, resulting in the Court of Appeals granting the petitioner
another extension of fifteen days from December 10, 1977.
Finally before this period of extension lapsed, instead of an
appeal, a petition for certiorari with the respondent Court of
Appeals was filed.

According to the Solicitor General, the Court of First Instance
committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint
and in
a. Not finding that since the lower court acted in a Motion to
Dismiss, the correctness of its decision must be decided in the
assumed truth and accuracy of the allegations of the complaint.
The complaint alleges that the lands in question are forest lands;
hence, inalienable.
b. Finding that Lots I and 2 are alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain under the jurisdiction of the Director of Lands
despite clear and positive evidence to the contrary.
c. Concluding that the complaint for reversion is defective as it
was not initiated by the Director of Lands.
d. Finding that the complaint for reversion states no cause of
action for alleged failure of petitioner to exhaust administrative
remedies. 6
The Court of Appeals gave due course to the petition for
certiorari, set aside the Order of Dismissal rendered by the Court
of First Instance in Civil Case No. 4062, and ordered the presiding
judge Hon. Pedro T. Santiago to receive the answers of the
private respondents SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH in the action
for reversion.
Hence Sunbeam and Coral Beach filed this petition for review.
A review is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion,
and is granted only when there are special and important
reasons therefore. The following, while neither controlling nor
fully measuring the Court's discretion, enumerates the premises
for granting a review:
(a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of
substance, not theretofore determined by the Supreme Court or
has decided it in a way probably not in accord with law or the
applicable decisions of the Supreme Court; and
(b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings or so far
sanctioned such departure by a lower court as to call for
supervision . 7
We agree with the Court of Appeals' granting of the petition filed
by the Republic of the Philippines charging the then Court of First
Instance with grave abuse of discretion. The filing of the Motion
NATURAL RESOURCES NEW CASES (ORAL QUIZ) 13
to Dismiss the complaint for reversion by SUNBEAM and CORAL advancement of public policy dictate; or when the broader
BEACH on the ground of lack of cause of action, necessarily interests of justice so require, or when the writs issued are
carried with it the admission, for purposes of the motion, of the null, 16 or when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive
truth of all material facts pleaded in the complaint instituted by exercise of judicial authority. 17
the Republic.
We find nothing disagreeable with the action of the Court of
An important factual issue raised in the complaint was the Appeals to give due course to the petition considering that the
classification of the lands as forest lands. This material allegation issue affected a matter of public concern which is the disposition
stated in the Republic's complaint' was never denied of the lands of our matrimony No less than the Constitution
specifically 9 by the defendants (petitioners herein) SUNBEAM protects its policy.
and CORAL BEACH.
We therefore find no compelling reason to disturb the findings of
If it is true that the lands are forest lands, then all these the appellate court, in the absence of a clear showing that the
proceedings become moot and academic. Land remains Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance in a
unclassified land until it is released therefrom and rendered open manner inconsistent with jurisprudence, or that the respondent
to disposition. 10 Court has departed from the accepted and usual course of
judicial proceedings. In sum, no reversible error has been
committed by the respondent court. 18
Our adherence to the Regalian doctrine subjects all agricultural,
timber, and mineral lands to the dominion of the State. 11 Thus,
before any land may be declassified from the forest group and WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court
converted into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or of Appeals is affirmed. Costs against the petitioners.
other purposes, there must be a positive act from the
government. Even rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do
SO ORDERED.
not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is
released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may
form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public
domain. 12 =================
G.R. No. 83609 October 26, 1989
The mere fact that a title was issued by the Director of Lands
does not confer any validity on such title if the property covered DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
by the title or patent is part of the public forest. 13 vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, IBARRA BISNAR and AMELIA
BISNAR, respondents.
The only way to resolve this question of fact as to the
classification of the land is by remanding the case to the lower
court for a full- dress trial on the issues involved. Ibarra L. Bisnar for himself and for and in behalf of co-private
respondent Amelia Bisnar.
Generally, the rules of procedure must be observed so that the
efficient administration of justice is ensured. However, the rules
of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice.14 They must lead to the
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
proper and just determination of litigation, without tying the
hands of the law or making it indifferent to realities.
Petitioner Director of Lands, through the Solicitor General, seeks
a review of the decision dated May 27, 1988, of the Court of
Certiorari is one such remedy. Considered extraordinary, it is
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66426, entitled "Ibarra Bisnar, et al.
made available only when there is no appeal, nor any plain,
vs. Director of Lands," affirming in toto the decision of the Court
speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the
of First Instance of Capiz, granting the private respondents'
law. 15 The long line of decisions denying the petition for
application for confirmation and registration of their title to two
certiorari, either before appeal was availed of or specially in
(2) parcels of land in LRC Cad. Rec. 1256.
instances where the appeal period has lapsed, far outnumbers
the instances when certiorari was given due course. The few
significant exceptions were: when public welfare and the

In their joint application for registration of title to two (2) parcels
of land filed on July 20,1976, the applicants Ibarra and Amelia
Bisnar claimed to be the owners in fee simple of Lots 866 and
870 of the Pilar Cadastre Plan AP-06-000869, respectively
containing an area of 28 hectares (284,424 sq. m.) and 34
hectares (345,385 sq. m.) situated in barrio Gen. Hizon,
Municipality of President Roxas, Province of Capiz (p. 14, Rollo).
The applicants alleged that they inherited those parcels of land
(p. 41, Rollo) and they had been paying the taxes thereon (p. 40,
Rollo).
On December 16,1976, the Director of Lands and the Director of
the Bureau of Forest Development, opposed the application on
the grounds that:
1. Neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest
possess sufficient title to acquire ownership in fee simple of the
land or lots applied for, the same not having been acquired by
any of the various types of title issued by the Spanish
Government, such as, (1) 'titulo real' or royal grant, (2) the
'concession especial' or special grant, (3) the 'composicion con el
estado titulo' or adjustment title, (4) the 'titulo de compra 'or title
by purchase, and (5) the 'informacion possessoria' or possessory
information under the Royal Decree of 13 February 1894, or any
other recognized mode of acquisition of title over realty under
pertinent applicable laws.
2. Neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the land in question for at least thirty (30)
years immediately preceding the filing of the application.
3. The properties in question are a portion of the public domain
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, not subject to
private appropriation, (pp. 17-19, Record on Appeal). (pp. 14-15,
Rollo.)
On February 24,1977, the applicants filed an amended
application, which was approved on March 14, 1977, and
included the following allegation:
Should the Land Registration Act invoked be
not applicable to the case, they hereby apply
for the benefits of Chapter 8, Commonwealth
Act 141, as amended, as they and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the land as owners for more than
fifty (50) years. (p. 16, Rollo.)
After hearing, the trial court ordered the registration of the title
of the lots in the names of the applicants, herein private
respondents. It found that applicants and their predecessors- in-
interest have been in open, public, continuous, peaceful and
adverse possession of the subject parcels of land under bona
fide claims of ownership for more than eighty (80) years (not
only 30) prior to the filing of the application for registration,
introduced improvements on the lands by planting coconuts,
bamboos and other plants, and converted a part of the land into
productive fishponds (p. 68, Rollo).
On appeal, the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's decision.
It held that the classification of the lots as timberland by the
Director of Forestry cannot prevail in the absence of proof that
the said lots are indeed more valuable as forest land than as
agricultural land, citing as authority the case of Ankron vs.
Government of the Philippine Islands (40 Phil. 10). In this
petition, the government alleges that:
1. the classification or reclassification of public lands into
alienable or disposable agricultural land, mineral land or forest
land is a prerogative of the Executive Department of the
government and not of the courts;
2. that possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot
ripen into private ownership; and
3. that an applicant for registration of title has the burden of
proving that he meets the requirements of Section 48 of Com.
Act No. 141, as amended. (p. 19, Rollo.)
The principal issue in this appeal is whether the lots in question
may be registered under Section 48 (b) of CA 141, as amended.
The petition is impressed with merit.
In the case of Bureau of Forestry vs. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA
351, we ruled:
As provided for under Section 6 of Commonwealth Act 141,
which was lifted from Act 2874, the classification or
reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable,
mineral or forest lands is now a prerogative of the Executive
Department of the government and not the courts. With these
rules, there should be no more room for doubt that it is not the
court which determines the classification of lands of the public
domain into agricultural, forest or mineral but the Executive
Branch of the government, through the Office of the President.
Hence, it was grave error and/or abuse of discretion for
respondent court to ignore the uncontroverted facts that (1)
the disputed area is within a timberland block, and (2) as
NATURAL RESOURCES NEW CASES (ORAL QUIZ) 14
certified to by the then Director of Forestry, the area is needed
for forest purposes. (pp. 21-22, Rollo.)
It bears emphasizing that a positive act of the government is
needed to declassify land which is classified as forest and to
convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or
other purposes (Republic vs. Animas, 56 SCRA 499). Unless and
until the land classified as forest is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply (Amunategui vs.
Director of Forestry, 126 SCRA 69; Director of Lands vs. Court of
Appeals, 129 SCRA 689; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals,
133 SCRA 701; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 148 SCRA 480;
Vallarta vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 151 SCRA 679).
Thus, possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into
private ownership (Vano vs. Government, 41 Phil. 161 [1920];
Adorable vs. Director of Forestry, 107 Phil. 401 [1960]). A parcel
of forest land is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral
court to register under the Torrens System (Republic vs. Court of
Appeals, 89 SCRA 648; Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210 [1983];
Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 689 [1984]).
Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended,
applies exclusively to public agricultural land. Forest lands or
areas covered with forests are excluded (p. 26, Rollo). We
reiterate our ruling in Amunategui that:
In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders
the burden of proving that he meets the requirements of
Section 48, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by
Republic Act 1942. He must overcome the presumption that the
land he is applying for is part of the public domain but that he
has an interest therein sufficient to warrant registration in his
name because of an imperfect title such as those derived from
old Spanish grants or that he has had continuous, open and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership for at least thirty (30) years preceding the filing of
his application. (Heirs of Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry,
126 SCRA 69.)
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is reversed and set aside.
The application for registration in LRC Cad. Rec. 1256 of the
former Court of First Instance, is hereby dismissed without costs.
SO ORDERED.
=========

G.R. No. 168184 June 22, 2009
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
RUBY LEE TSAI, Respondent.
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review 1 assailing the 30 January
2004 Decision2 and 12 May 2005 Resolution 3of the Court of
Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 70006. The 30 January 2004 Decision
affirmed the 21 September 1998 Decision 4 of the Regional Trial
Court of Tagaytay City, Branch 18 (trial court) in LRC Case No.
TG-7885which approved the application of respondent Ruby Lee
Tsai for the confirmation and registration of Lot No. 7062,
described in plan Ap-04-010084, Cad-355, Tagaytay Cadastre,
with an area of 888 square meters (subject property). The 12
May 2005 Resolution denied the motion for reconsideration of
petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic).
The Facts
On 3 December 1996, respondent filed an application 6 for the
confirmation and registration of the subject property under
Presidential Decree No. 1529 (PD 1529). 7 Respondent alleged
that she is the owner of the subject property and the
improvements thereon. Respondent stated that on 31 May 1993,
she purchased the subject property from Manolita Gonzales Vda.
de Carungcong (Carungcong), through Wendy Mitsuko Sato,
Carungcongs daughter and attorney in fact. 8 Respondent
declared that she and her predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject property for more than 30 years.
Except for the Republic, there were no other oppositors to the
application. The Republic opposed respondents application on
the following grounds: (1) that respondent and her predecessors-
in-interest failed to present sufficient evidence to show that they
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject property since 12 June
1945 or earlier as required by Section 48(b) 9 of Commonwealth
Act No. 141 (CA 141),10 as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1073 (PD 1073);11 (2) that the tax declarations and tax receipt
payments attached to the application do not constitute
competent and sufficient evidence of abona fide acquisition of
the land applied for or of respondents open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject
property in the concept of an owner since 12 June 1945 or
earlier; and (3) that the subject property forms part of the public
domain and is not subject to private appropriation. 12
NATURAL RESOURCES NEW CASES (ORAL QUIZ) 15
After establishing the jurisdictional facts, respondent presented Tagaytay, containing an area of Eight Hundred Eighty Eight (888)
the following documents to support her application: Square Meters in the name of RUBY LEE TSAI, married to Tsai Yu
Lung, both of legal age and residents of Sun Valley Subdivision,
Sta. Ana Drive, Paraaque, Metro Manila.lawphil.net
1. Deed of Absolute Sale dated 31 May 1993 between
respondent and Carungcong;
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the
corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith issue.
2. Tax Declarations corresponding to different years
showing that the subject property has been declared
under the name of Carungcong for tax purposes: Tax SO ORDERED.18
Declaration No. 02226-A for the year 1948, Tax
Declaration No. 010158-A for the year 1960, Tax
The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals on the ground
Declaration No. 013976-A for the year 1965, Tax
that the trial court erred in granting the application for
Declaration No. 07209-B for the year 1974, Tax
registration despite respondents failure to prove open,
Declaration No. 016-0635 for the year 1980, Tax
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject
Declaration No. GR-016-0735 for the year 1985 and Tax
property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. According to the Republic,
Declaration No. GR-016-1610 for the year 1992;13
it is not sufficient that respondent proved possession of the
subject property for more than 30 years.
3. Tax Declaration Nos. GR-016-1776-R and 016-1084
for the year 1994 showing that the subject property has
In the assailed 30 January 2004 Decision, the Court of Appeals
been declared under the name of respondent for tax
affirmed the trial courts decision.
purposes;14
The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration. The Court of
4. Official Receipts corresponding to different years
Appeals denied Republics motion.
showing the payment of real property taxes under the
name of Carungcong: Official Receipt No. 4641772
dated 27 May 1991, Official Receipt No. 2326477 dated Hence, this petition.
10 December 1992, Official Receipt No. 0535585 dated
10 June 1992, Official Receipt No. 4879666 dated 28
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
May 1993 and Official Receipt No. 4879620 dated 3 June
1993;15
According to the trial court, respondent was able to establish her
title and interest over the subject property. The trial court found
5. Official Receipts corresponding to different years
that respondent and her predecessors-in-interest have been in
showing the payment of real property taxes under the
actual possession of the subject property for more than 30 years.
name of respondent: Official Receipt No. 4997840 dated
The trial court also declared that the subject property was
10 January 1994, Official Receipt No. 7304615 dated 15
residential and not within any forest zone or the public domain.
February 1995 and Official Receipt No. 9115050 dated
31 March 1997;16 and
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
6. Certification of the City Treasurer of Tagaytay City
stating that the real property taxes for the years 1994 The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts finding that
to 1997 were paid.17 respondent and her predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject
property in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years.
On 21 September 1998, the trial court granted respondents
According to the Court of Appeals, respondent need not prove
application for registration. The dispositive portion states:
that she and her predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the subject property since 12 June 1945 or earlier
WHEREFORE, this court hereby approves this application for because Section 48(b) of CA 141 was already superseded by
registration and thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act Republic Act No. 1942 (RA 1942),19 which provides for a simple
496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration 30 year prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for
Law, the land, Lot 7062 described in plan Ap-04-010084, Cad- judicial confirmation of title.
355, Tagaytay Cadastre, situated in the Brgy. of San Jose, City of

The Issue
The Republic raises the sole issue of whether the trial court can
grant the application for registration despite the lack of proof of
respondents open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the subject property since 12 June 1945 or earlier.
The Courts Ruling
The petition has merit.
The Republic argues that respondent failed to present sufficient
evidence to show that she and her predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of
the subject property in the concept of an owner since 12 June
1945 or earlier. According to the Republic, respondent only
proved possession since 1948, which is in violation of Section
48(b) of CA 141, as amended by PD 1073.20
On the other hand, respondent insists that it is sufficient that she
proved that she and her predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject property under a bona fide claim of
ownership for more than 30 years.
The Court notes that in respondents original application before
the trial court, she claimed that she was entitled to the
confirmation and registration of her title to the subject property
under PD 1529. However, respondent did not specify under what
paragraph of Section 14 of PD 1529 she was filing the
application. But going over respondents application and the
evidence she presented before the trial court, it appears that
respondent filed her application under Section 14(1) of PD 1529,
which states:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in the
proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of
title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, there are three requisites for the filing of an application for
registration of title under Section 14(1) of PD 1529: (1) that the
property in question is alienable and disposable land of the
public domain; (2) that the applicant by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation; and (3) that
such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership
since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The right to file the application
for registration derives from a bona fide claim of ownership going
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in
back to 12 June 1945 or earlier, by reason of the claimants open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of alienable and
disposable land of the public domain.
A similar right is given under Section 48(b) of CA 141, as
amended by PD 1073, which provides:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any
such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance
of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under
the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title,
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis
supplied)
According to the Court of Appeals, respondent need not prove
possession of the subject property since 12 June 1945 or earlier
because Section 48(b) of CA 141 was amended by RA 1942,
which provided for a simple 30-year prescriptive period. The
Court of Appeals appears to have an erroneous interpretation of
Section 48(b) of CA 141.
Through the years, Section 48(b) of the CA 141 has been
amended several times.21 The Court of Appeals failed to consider
the amendment introduced by PD 1073. In Republic v.
Doldol,22 the Court provided a summary of these amendments:
The original Section 48(b) of C.A. No.141 provided for possession
and occupation of lands of the public domainsince July 26,
1894. This was superseded by R.A. No. 1942, which provided for
a simple thirty-year prescriptive period of occupation by an
applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The same,
NATURAL RESOURCES NEW CASES (ORAL QUIZ) 16
however, has already been amended by Presidential Decree No.
1073, approved on January 25, 1977. As amended, Section 48(b)
now reads:
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title,
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter.23 (Emphasis supplied)
As the law now stands, a mere showing of possession and
occupation for 30 years or more is not sufficient. Therefore, since
the effectivity of PD 1073 on 25 January 1977, it must now be
shown that possession and occupation of the piece of land by the
applicant, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest,
started on 12June 1945 or earlier. This provision is in total
conformity with Section 14(1) of PD 1529.24
In this case, respondent failed to comply with the period of
possession and occupation of the subject property, as required
by both PD 1529 and CA 141. We agree with the Republic that
respondents evidence was not enough to prove that her
possession of the subject property started since 12 June 1945 or
earlier because respondents earliest evidence can be traced
back to a tax declaration issued in the name of her predecessors-
in-interest only in the year 1948. In view of the lack of sufficient
showing that respondent and her predecessors-in-interest
possessed the subject property under a bona fide claim of
ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier, respondents application
for confirmation and registration of the subject property under
PD 1529 and CA 141 should be denied.
Finally, we note that respondent also failed to prove that the
subject property has been declared alienable and disposable by
the President or the Secretary of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources. InRepublic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,25 the
Court said:
[T]he applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR
Secretary had approved the land classification and released the
land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that
the land subject of the application for registration falls within the
approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or
CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must
present a copy of the original classification approved by the
DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal

custodian of the official records. These facts must be established
to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.26
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the 30
January 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No.
70006 and the 21 September 1998 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Tagaytay City, Branch 18, in LRC Case No. TG-788.
We DENY respondent Ruby Lee Tsais application for
confirmation and registration of Lot No. 7062 described in plan
Ap-04-010084, Cad-355, Tagaytay Cadastre.
SO ORDERED.
=============
G.R. No. L-52518 August 13, 1991
INTERNATIONAL HARDWOOD AND VENEER COMPANY OF
THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES and JOSE C. CAMPOS,
JR., respondents-appellants.
Taada, Vivo & Tan for petitioner-appellee.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:p
From an adverse decision of the then Court of First Instance (now
RTC) Laguna dated 3 June 1968 in a special civil action for
declaratory relief with injunction, Civil Case No. SC-650 entitled
International Hardwood and Veneer Company of the Philippines
vs. University of the Philippines and Jose Campos, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders
judgment in favor of petitioner and against the
respondents:
(a) Declaring that Rep. Act No. 3990 does not
empower the University of the Philippines, in
lieu of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and
Bureau of Forestry, to scale, measure and seal
the timber cut by the petitioner within the tract
of land referred to in said Act, and collect the
corresponding forest charges prescribed by the
National Internal Revenue Code therefor; and
(b) Dismissing the respondents' counterclaim.
respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appeal was
docketed as C.A.-G.R. No. 49409-R.
After the parties filed their respective Briefs in 1971, the Court of
Appeals (Sixth Division) promulgated on 28 December 1979 a
resolution elevating the case to this Court as the "entire case
hinges on the interpretation and construction of Republic Act
3990 as it applies to a set of facts which are not disputed by the
parties and therefore, is a legal question. 1
Civil Case No. SC-650 was filed by petitioner Hardwood before
the trial court on 28 June 1966. 2 Petitioner seeks therein a
declaration that respondent University of the Philippines
(hereafter referred to as UP) does not have the right to supervise
and regulate the cutting and removal of timber and other forest
products, to scale, measure and seal the timber cut and/or to
collect forest charges, reforestation fees and royalties from
petitioner and/or impose any other duty or burden upon the
latter in that portion of its concession, covered by License
Agreement No. 27-A issued on 1 February 1963, ceded in full
ownership to the UP by Republic Act No. 3990; asks that
respondents be enjoined from committing the acts complained of
and prays that respondents be required to pay petitioner the sum
of P100,000.00 as damages and costs of the suit.
5. Plaintiff, on the strength of the License Agreement executed
Its motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue having
been unfavorably acted upon, and pursuant to the order of the
trial court of 26 August 1967, respondents filed their Answer on
13 September 1987, 3 wherein they interpose the affirmative
defenses of, among others, improper venue and that the petition
states no cause of action; they further set up a counterclaim for
the payment of it by petitioner of forest charges on the forest
products cut and felled within the area ceded to UP under R.A.
No. 3990 from 18 June 1964, with surcharges and interests as
provided in the National Internal Revenue Code.
4
Petitioner filed a Reply and Answer to Counterclaim.
On 18 October 1967, the parties submitted a Joint Stipulation of
Facts and Joint Submission of the Case for Judgment, 5 which
reads as follows:
COME NOW the parties in the above entitled
case by the undersigned counsel, and
respectfully submit the following JOINT
STIPULATION OF FACTS AND JOINT SUBMISSION
OF THE CASE FOR JUDGMENT, without
prejudice to the presentation of evidence by
either party:
xxx xxx xxx
NATURAL RESOURCES NEW CASES (ORAL QUIZ) 17
2. Plaintiff is, among others, engaged in the manufacture,
processing and exportation of plywood and was, for said purpose,
granted by the Government an exclusive license for a period of
25 years expiring on February 1, 1985, to cut, collect and remove
timber from that portion of timber land located in the
Municipalities of Infanta, Mauban and Sampaloc Province of
Quezon and in the Municipalities of Siniloan, Pangil, Paete, Cavite
and Calauan, Province of Laguna under License Agreement No.
27-A (Amendment) issued and promulgated by the Government
through the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on
January 11, 1960. ... ;
3. That aforementioned Timber License No. 27-A (Amendment) is
a renewal of the Timber License Agreement No. 27-A previously
granted by the Government to the plaintiff on June 4, 1953 to
February 1, 1963. ... ;
4. Plaintiff, since June 4, 1953, continuously up to the present,
has been in peaceful possession of said timber concession and
had been felling cutting and removing timber therefrom pursuant
to the aforementioned Timber License Agreement No. 27-A
(Amendment) of January 11, 1960;
by the Government on June 4,1953 (License Agreement No. 27-A)
and of the License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) of January
11, 1960, has constructed roads and other improvements and
installations of the aforementioned area subject to the grant and
purchased equipment in implementation of the conditions
contained in the aforementioned License Agreement and has in
connection therewith spent more than P7,000,000.00 as
follows: ... ;
6. Sometime on September 25, 1961, during the effectivity of
License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) of January 11, 1960,
the President of the Philippines issued Executive Proclamation
No. 791 which reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
RESERVING FOR THE COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE, UNIVERSITY
OF THE PHILIPPINES, AS EXPERIMENT STATION FOR THE
PROPOSED DAIRY RESEARCH AND TRAINING INSTITUTE AND
FOR AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION STUDIES OF
THIS COLLEGE A CERTAIN PARCEL OF LAND OF THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN, SITUATED PARTLY IN THE MUNICIPALITIES OF PAETE
AND PAKIL ,PROVINCE OF LAGUNA, AND PARTLY IN THE
MUNICIPALITY OF INFANTA, PROVINCE OF QUEZON, ISLAND OF
LUZON.

Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources and pursuant to the authority vested in me
by law, I, Carlos P. Garcia, President of the Philippines, do
hereby withdraw from sale or settlement and reserve for the
College of Agriculture, University of the Philippines, as
experiment station for the proposed Dairy Research and
production studies of this College, a certain parcel of land of
the Public domain situated partly in the municipalities of Paete
and Pakil province of Laguna, and partly in the municipality of
Infants, Province of Quezon, Island of Luzon, subject to private
rights, if any there be, and to the condition that the disposition
of timber and other forest products found therein shall be
subject to the forestry laws and regulations, which parcel of
land is more particularly described as follows, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused
the seal of the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila this 25th day of
September, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
hundred and sixty-one, and of the
Independence of the Philippines, the sixteenth.
Upon the foregoing Stipulation of Facts, the trial court rendered
its judgment on 3 June 1968 in favor of the petitioner, the
dispositive portion of which is quoted at the beginning of this
decision. In deciding the case against UP, it held:
... the court finds that the respondents' demand on the petitioner
has no legal basis. In the first place, the cession in full ownership
of the tract of land referred to in the Act was expressly made
'subject to any existing concessions.' Inasmuch as at the time of
the enactment of the Act, the petitioner's timber concession over
the tract of land was existing and would continue to exist until
February 1, 1985, the University of the Philippines will acquire full
ownership' and exclusive jurisdiction to control and administer the
property only after February 1, 1985. The cession of the property
to the University of the Philippines is akin to the donation of a
parcel of land, subject to usufruct. The donee acquires full
ownership thereof only upon the termination of the usufruct. At the
time of the donation, all what the donee acquires is the 'naked'
ownership of the property donated. In the second place, the
respondents' demand cannot be valid unless the provisions of
Sees. 262 to 276 of the National Internal Revenue Code regarding
the measuring of timber cut from the forest and the collection of
the prescribed forest charges by the Bureau of Internal Revenue
and Bureau of Forestry are first amended. In their arguments, the
respondents tried to stretch the scope of the provisions of Republic
Act No. 3990 in order to include therein such amendment of the
provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code and Revised
Administrative Code, but they failed to convince the Court, not
only because of the first reason above stated, but also because it
clearly appears that such amendment is not intended in Republic
Act No. 3990, which does not contain even a remote allusion
thereto in its title or a general amendatory provision at the end. In
the third place, under Republic Act No. 3990, the University of the
Philippines cannot legally use the tract of land ceded to it for
purposes other than those therein expressly provided, namely, 'for
the use of the University of the Philippines in connection with its
research and extension functions, particularly by the College of
Agriculture, College of Veterinary Medicine and College of Arts and
Sciences.' Hence, upon the expiration of the petitioner's timber
concession, the University of the Philippines cannot even legally
renew it or grant timber concession over the whole tract of land or
over portions thereof to other private individuals and exercise the
functions of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Bureau of Forestry
by scaling and measuring the timber cut within the area and
collecting from them the forest charges prescribed by the National
Internal Revenue Code.
Respondents claim in their Brief that the trial court erred:
I all respect, as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such
... WHEN IT DID NOT DISMISS THE PETITION
FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF WITH INJUNCTION INSPITE OF ITS
INHERENT JURISDICTIONAL DEFECTS THAT SHOULD WARRANT A
DISMISSAL.
II
... WHEN IT DECLARED THAT REPUBLIC ACT NO.
3990 DOES NOT EMPOWER THE RESPONDENT UNIVERSITY OF
THE PHILIPPINES, IN LIEU OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL
REVENUE AND BUREAU OF FORESTRY, TO SCALE, MEASURE AND
SEAL THE TIMBER CUT BY THE PETITIONER WITHIN THE TRACT OF
LAND REFERRED TO IN SAID ACT, AND COLLECT THE
CORRESPONDING FOREST CHARGES PRESCRIBED BY THE
NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE.
1. The first assigned error is without merit. In the Joint Stipulation
of Facts, the parties jointly move and pray that the trial court
render judgment granting full and appropriate remedy on the
following issues:
l. Whether plaintiff, as of the date of present case was filed,
should pay forest charges due and payable under its Timber
License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) as set forth in
paragraph 2 hereof, to the Bureau of Internal Revenue, or to the
University of the Philippines; and
NATURAL RESOURCES NEW CASES (ORAL QUIZ) 18
2. In the event that it be found by this
Honorable Court that said forest charges are to be paid to the
University of the Philippines, whether or not the University of the
Philippines is entitled to supervise, through its duly appointed
personnel, the logging, felling and removal of timber within the
Central Experiment Station area as described in Republic Act No.
3990, and to scale the timber thus felled
These issues bring the matter within the scope of an action for
declaratory relief under Section 1, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court
and render meaningless the appeal to the rule laid down
in Sarmiento, et al. vs. Caparas, et al. 6that declaratory relief
cannot be joined by injunction, because herein petitioner, for all
legal intents and purposes, abandoned it by its failure to raise it
in the Stipulation of Facts. Thus, what attains is an amendment
to both pleadings (the complaint and the answer), which is
authorized by Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court. Said
section pertinently provides:
SEC. 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of
evidence. When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by
express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in
amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them
to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be
made upon motion of any party at any time, even after
judgment; but failure to so amend does not affect the result of
the trial by these issues. ...
The stipulation of facts and the agreement as to the issues
unquestionably satisfy the requisites for declaratory relief. (a)
there must be a justiciable controversy; (b) the controversy must
be between persons whose interests are adverse; (c) the party
seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the
controversy; and (d) the issue invoked must be ape for judicial
determination. 7
There is a justiciable controversy where there is an actual
controversy, or the ripening seeds of one existsbetween the
parties, all of whom are sui juris and before the court, and that
the declaration sought will help in ending the controversy. A
doubt becomes a justiciable controversy when it is translated
into a claim of right which is actually contested. 8
2. On the second assigned error, respondents assert that: (a)
Under R.A. No. 3990, the Republic of the Philippines may effect
collection of forest charges through the University of the
Philippines because the License Agreement does not expressly
provide that the forest charges shall be paid to the Bureau of
Internal Revenue; in the absence of a specific contractual
provision limiting it to a particular agency in collecting forest
charges owing to it, the Republic may effect such collection

through another agency. (b) Having been vested with
administrative jurisdiction over and being the owner of the tract
of land in question, the UP acquired full control and benefit of the
timber and other resources within the area. Timber areas within
the ceded property but outside the concession of petitioner can
be fully exploited by UP. However, in respect to timber areas
within the ceded property but covered by the concession of
petitioner, only forest charges (or more appropriately, royalties)
may be enjoyed by UP until the expiration of petitioner's license.
To deny it such charges would render its "full ownership" empty
and futile. (c) The UP is clearly entitled to the income derived
from the tract of land ceded to it, for Section 3 of R.A. No. 3990
expressly provides:
All operations and activities carried on in the central experiment
station shall be exempt from taxation, local or general, any
provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, and any
incidental receipts or income therefrom shall pertain to the
general fund of the University of the Philippines. (emphasis
supplied for emphasis).
(d) As provided by R.A. No. 3990, the UP is duty bound to operate
and maintain a central experiment station; since this law does
not provide for appropriations for such purpose, it is clearly the
legislative intention that the establishment and maintenance
thereof must be financed by the earnings or income from the
area, which can only come from the timber and the royalties or
charges payable therefrom. This is in accordance with the
general principle that a grant of authority or jurisdiction extends
to all incidents that may arise in connection with the matter over
which jurisdiction is exercised. (e) Supervision of the License
Agreement in favor of petitioner by UP was intended by R.A. No.
3990. (f) Finally, the two government agencies affected by R.A.
No. 3990 have issued specific rulings recognizing the authority of
UP to collect royalties or charges and to supervise petitioner's
logging operations.
Petitioner refutes the foregoing arguments of respondents by
asserting that: (a) The UP has not been granted by R.A. No. 3990
the authority to collect forest charges or the authority to
supervise the operation by the petitioner of the timber
concession affected by said Act.
The rule is well-settled that legislative grants must be construed
strictly in favor of the public and most strongly against the
grantee, and nothing will be included in the grant except that
which is granted expressly or by clear implication. Under Section
262 of the Tax Code, as amended, the duties incident to the
measuring of forest products and the collection of the charges
thereon shall be discharged by the Bureau of Internal Revenue
under the regulations of the Department of Finance. The
reforestation fee shall be collected by the Bureau of
Forestry.9 The supervision and regulation of the use of forest
products and of the cutting and removal of forest products are
vested upon the Bureau of Forestry. 10 R.A. No. 3990 does not
expressly, or even impliedly, grant the UP any authority to collect
from the holders of timber concessions on the area ceded to it
forest charges due and payable to the Government under the Tax
Code, or to enforce its provisions relating to charges on forest
products or to supervise the operations of the concessions by the
holders thereof; (b) The cession in full ownership of the land in
question was expressly made "subject to any concession, if any",
and that petitioner's concession would continue until 1 February
1985; the UP then would acquire full ownership and exclusive
jurisdiction to control and administer the property only after 1
February 1985. The position of UP is akin to that of a donee of a
parcel of land subject to usufruct. (c) The rulings of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Acting Director of the
Bureau of Forestry are patently incorrect; moreover, said
agencies do not have the power to interpret the law, which is
primarily a function of the judiciary. (d) Finally, it has acquired a
vested right to operate the timber concession under the
supervision and control of the Bureau of Forestry.
There is merit in the second assigned error.
Under Proclamation No. 791, dated 25 September 1961, a parcel
of land of the public domain described therein, with an area of
3,500 hectares, which is the very parcel of land subject of R.A.
No. 3990, was withdrawn from sale or settlement and was
reserved for the College of Agriculture of the UP as experiment
station for the proposed Dairy Research and Training Institute
and for research and production studies of said college, subject
however to private rights, if any, and to the condition that the
disposition of timber and other forest products found thereon
shall be subject to forestry laws and regulations.
The above reservation is within the area covered by petitioner's
timber license.
Pursuant, however, to R.A. No. 3990 which establishes a central
experiment station for the use of the UP in connection with its
research and extension functions, particularly by the College of
Agriculture, College of Veterinary Medicine and College of Arts
and Sciences, the above "reserved" area was "ceded and
transferred in full ownership to the University of the Philippines
subject to any existing concessions, if any."
When it ceded and transferred the property to UP, the Republic
of the Philippines completely removed it from the public domain
and, more specifically, in respect to the areas covered by the
timber license of petitioner, removed and segregated it from a
public forest; it divested itself of its rights and title thereto and
relinquished and conveyed the same to the UP; and made the
NATURAL RESOURCES NEW CASES (ORAL QUIZ) 19
latter the absolute owner thereof, subject only to the existing
concession. That the law intended a transfer of the absolute
ownership is unequivocally evidenced by its use of the word "full"
to describe it. Full means entire, complete, or possessing all
particulars, or not wanting in any essential quality. 11 The proviso
regarding existing concessions refers to the timber license of
petitioner. All that it means, however, is that the right of
petitioner as a timber licensee must not be affected, impaired or
diminished; it must be respected. But, insofar as the Republic of
the Philippines is concerned, all its rights as grantor of the
license were effectively assigned, ceded and conveyed to UP as a
consequence of the above transfer of full ownership. This is
further home out by Section 3 of R.A. No. 3990 which
provides, inter alia, that "any incidental receipts or income
therefrom shall pertain to the general fund of the University of
the Philippines. Having been effectively segregated and removed
from the public domain or from a public forest and, in effect,
converted into a registered private woodland, the authority and
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry over it were likewise
terminated. This is obvious from the fact that the condition in
Proclamation No. 971 to the effect that the disposition of timber
shall be subject to forestry laws and regulations is not
reproduced iii R.A. No. 3990. The latter does not likewise provide
that it is subject to the conditions set forth in the proclamation.
An owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing without
other limitations than those established by law. 12 The right to
enjoy includes the jus utendi or the right to receive from the
thing what it produces, and the jus abutendi or the right to
consume the thing by its use. 13 As provided for in Article 441 of
the Civil Code, to the owner belongs the natural fruits, the
industrial fruits and the civil fruits. There are, however,
exceptions to this rules, as where the property is subject to a
usufruct, in which case the usufructuary gets the fruits. 14 In the
instant case, that exception is made for the petitioner as licensee
or grantee of the concession, which has been given the license to
cut, collect, and remove timber from the area ceded and
transferred to UP until I February 1985. However, it has the
correlative duty and obligation to pay the forest charges, or
royalties, to the new owner, the UP, at the same rate as provided
for in the Agreement. The charges should not be paid anymore to
the Republic of the Philippines through the Bureau of Internal
Revenue because of the very nature of the transfer as
aforestated. Consequently, even the Bureau of Internal Revenue
automatically lost its authority and jurisdiction to measure the
timber cut from the subject area and to collect forestry charges
and other fees due thereon.
The foregoing disposes of the contention of petitioner that R.A.
No. 3990 does not grant the UP the authority to collect forest
charges and to supervise the operations of its concession insofar
as the property of the UP within it is concerned. Its argument that
it has acquired vested rights to operate its concession under the
supervision and control of the Bureau of Forestry is preposterous.
The grantor, Republic of the Philippines, was by no means bound

under the License to perpetuate the Bureau as its agent. Neither
is there force to its contention that legislative grants must be
construed strictly in favor of the public and most strongly against
the grantee. The grant under R.A. No. 3990 is transfer of
absolute, full and entire ownership which leaves no room for a
strict interpretation against the grantee, the UP. The reservation
therein made is in favor of the private party pursuant to the
license, which is nevertheless protected. It is the concession in
favor of the petitioner which should, on the contrary, be bound
by the rule.
It follows then that respondent UP is entitled to supervise,
through its duly appointed personnel, the logging, felling and
removal of timber within the area covered by R.A. No. 3990.
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby
rendered REVERSING the decision of the trial court in Civil Case
No. C-650, rendered on 3 June 1968; DECLARING that forest
charges due from and payable by petitioner for timber cut
pursuant to its License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) within
the area ceded and transferred to the University of the Philippine
pursuant to R.A. No. 3990 shall be paid to the University of the
Philippines; DECLARING that the University of the Philippines is
entitled to supervise, through its duly appointed personnel, the
logging, felling and removal of timber within the aforesaid area
covered by R.A. No. 3990.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
================
G.R. No. L-66866 June 18, 1987
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
MINDA DE PORKAN, SADIN MARAUG, GORGONIO
BERMUDEZ, LOLITA MACATINDOG, MEDORI DE PORKAN,
JUAN ARANGALI, ANTONINA ESTARES, REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF DAVAO DEL NORTE and the INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT [Fourth Civil Cases
Division], respondents.
Rolando C. Rama for private respondents.
FERNAN, J.:
NATURAL RESOURCES NEW CASES (ORAL QUIZ) 20
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner, Republic of the (sic) during the cadastral survey of Tagum but the said
Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, thru the applicant has not filed any application for the land.
Solicitor General, seeks the reversal of the decision 1 of the
Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, dated
Fifteen [15] years after, or on November 12, 1968, Medori de
February 29, 1984, which affirmed the joint decision 2 of the then
Porkan relinquished her rights and interests over Lot No.
Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch I [Tagum] dismissing
1099 7 to her daughter, Lolita Macatindog, who thereafter filed
petitioner's complaint in Civil Cases Nos. 1247 and 1248 for
her own free patent application 8 on November 14, 1968. The
cancellation of the Homestead Patent of private respondent
Free Patent Application No. V-271162 of Medori de Porkan
Minda de Porkan and her successors-in-interest and the Free
covering Lot No. 1099 was thereafter ordered transferred to,
Patent of private respondent Lolita Macatindog and her
recorded and given due course in the name of Lolita Macatindog
successors-in-interest, respectively.
in an order dated February 8, 1971. 9 On May 27, 1971, the
Director of Lands approved the Free Patent Application of Lolita
The undisputed facts appearing on the records are as follows: Macatindog and ordered that the said application be entered in
the records of the Bureau of Lands as Free Patent Entry No.
431343 and that the corresponding Free Patent be issued in her
The family of Sadin de Porkan, father of Medori and Macampon
favor over Lot No. 1099. 10Free Patent No. 488112 was issued to
de Porkan, both native Muslims of La Paz, Carmen, [formerly
Lolita Macatindog on June 7, 1971, and on July 13, 1971, she was
Panabo] Davao del Norte, had been in actual possession as
issued Original Certificate of Title No. P-9742 11 over said Lot No.
owner since the Spanish colonial period of a tract of land planted
1099.
with coconuts situated in said municipality. 3 During the Tagum
Cadastral Survey of July 22, 1937, this tract of land, Identified as
Lots Nos. 1099 and 1546 were respectively allocated to Medori On June 6, 1978, or after seven [7] years from the issuance of
and Macampon de Porkan, the predecessors-in-interest of herein the Free Patent, Lolita Macatindog conveyed 60,000 sq. meters of
private respondents. 4 said Lot No. 1099 to Juan Arangali who secured Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-25142 12over said area. Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-25143 13 was issued for the remaining
On April 30, 1953, or sixteen [16] years after the Tagum
102,983 sq. meters in the name of Lolita Macatindog.
Cadastral Survey, Medori de Porkan filed her Free Patent
Application No. V-27162 5 over Lot No. 1099 containing an area of
16.2983 hectares. The following day, or on May 1, 1953, Vicente On the other hand, Macampon de Porkan died before he could
J. Villena, Junior Public Lands Inspector, submitted a final file any application and improve Lot No. 1546 containing an area
investigation report 6recommending that the patent be granted of 15.2406 hectares allocated to him. In his stead, the
to Medori de Porkan. The report was subsequently endorsed for Homestead Application No. V-76456 14of Sadin Maraug, who
approval to the Director of Lands on May 30, 1953 by, Juan showed much interest in acquiring said tract of land, was
Tapales, Head, Special Investigation Party, Davao, who accepted on May 1, 1953 on the basis of the investigation
recommended that the entry of applicant be favorably confirmed report 15 of Vicente J. Villena, Junior Public Lands Inspector,
and a free patent be issued to Medori de Porkan, thus: dated May 1, 1953, which was favorably endorsed by Juan
Tapales, Head, Special Investigation Party, Davao, on May 31,
1953. Sadin Maraug's homestead application was subsequently
9. That the said land has been surveyed, and the survey
approved and recorded as Homestead Entry No. V-68302 16in an
records are known as Tagum Cad Survey No. 25-B. It
order dated January 13, 1954 issued by Zoilo Castrillo, Director of
corresponds to Lots 1099, B.L. Case No. 4, Cadastral Record No.
Lands.
276 which was allocated to the herein applicant, Medori de
Porkan during the cadastral survey of Tagum.
On June 1, 1971, or seventeen [17] years after the approval of
his homestead application, Sadin Maraug sought authority from
10. FURTHER REMARKS: Due to the long possession and
the Director of Lands to transfer his rights over Lot No. 1546, and
occupation by Medori de Porkan of the land, who also
on June 8, 1971, he executed a transfer of homestead rights in
introduced considerable improvements thereon the
favor of Minda de Porkan. This was approved by Vicente A.
undersigned believed beyond reasonable doubt that she is
Valdellon, Director of Lands, in an order dated December 3,
entitled to a free patent. Information gathered from other
1971, which likewise ordered that the Homestead Application No.
persons, settlers and homesteaders in the vicinity reveals that
V-76456 of Sadin Maraug be recorded in the name of the
no other persons had been allowed to have any interests in,
transferee, Minda de Porkan. 17
rights to, the improvements now existing therein. Records show
that the land applied for was allocated to the herein application

Minda de Porkan thereafter filed her Homestead Application No.
V-76456. 18 After she made a final proof on July 8, 1971, she was
issued Homestead Patent No. 135029 approved by the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources on December 8, 197I. On
March 17, 1972 she was issued original Certificate of Title. No. P-
10095 19over Lot No 1546.
In 1977, or after six [6] years from the issuance of the
homestead patent, Minda de Porkan conveyed 80,000 sq. meters
of Lot No. 1546 to Gorgonio S. Bermudez who secured his
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-23598 20 on September 26,
1977. Transfer Certificate No. T-23599 21 was issued in the name
of Minda de Porkan for the remaining 72,406 sq. meters.
Meanwhile, Mrs. Viola C. Azurin, a resident of 629 Sta. Ana
Avenue, Davao City, obtained from the then Philippine Fisheries
Commission on March 4, 1966, Ordinary Fishpond Permit No. F-
5551-V 22 Covering an area of 20 hectares situated at La Paz,
Panabo [now Carmen], Davao del Norte, described and indicated
in the sketch on the sheet 23 attached to permit, subject to the
additional rules on the next page 24 and, among others, to the
following terms and conditions:
4. Upon the expiration of the permit or upon its cancellation, all
permanent improvements on the area shall pass to the
ownership of the Government without any obligation on the part
of said Government to indemnify or reimburse the holder of the
permit therefor.
5. The decision of the Commissioner of Fisheries as to the exact
location of the boundary lines of the area shall be accepted as
final.
This permit will expire on December 31, 1966 or at an earlier
date under the conditions stated in Rules 10, 11 and 12 hereof.
Thereafter, Viola C. Azurin had the area surveyed by Geodetic
Engineer Roman F. Joaquin, a private surveyor, who found out
that her fishpond permit actually covered 33.6586 hectares, and
not 20.0 hectares. 25 On November 29, 1967, Geodetic Engineer
R.F. Joaquin prepared and submitted for approval by the Director
of Lands the allegedly corrected plan of the land [fishpond] 26 but
the same was not approved by the Director of Lands.
On January 17, 1968, the spouses Condi Mama and Cadingaga
Mora, both native Muslims of La Paz, Panabo [Carmen], Davao
del Norte, sold to Viola C. Azurin, their rights and interests over
all the nipa plants and improvements in the parcel of land
covered by Viola C. Azurin's Fishpond Permit No. F-5551-V for and
in consideration of P3,500.00. 27
On March 1, 1968, Viola C. Azurin filed with the Bureau of Lands
a sales application 28 over an agricultural land to be used solely
for agricultural purposes, containing an area of 33.6586
hectares, bounded on the northeast by Tagum River and on the
southwest by public land, situated at La Paz, Panabo [now
Carmen], Davao del Norte, for which purpose she stated that she
would invest the sum of P20,000.00. Prior to the said sales
application, she asked the Director of Lands, in a survey request
dated February 12, 1968, to have a private surveyor, Geodetic
Engineer Roman F. Joaquin, survey the 33.6586 hectares
allegedly covered by her sales application, but she agreed that
she would take only such title as may be issued to her by the
Director of Lands irrespective of the result of the survey of the
area which was allegedly occupied by her under Ordinary
Fishpond Permit No. F-5551-V.
The sales application of Viola C. Azurin over the alleged 33.6586
hectares was not approved by the Director of Lands. 29
On April 24, 1969, Viola C. Azurin filed Fishpond Application No.
27257 over 13.6586 hectares allegedly representing the excess
area over the 20 hectares under her Fishpond Permit No. F-5551-
V which, as found by Geodetic Engineer Roman F. Joaquin,
actually covered 33.6586 hectares. Before her application over
the said 13.6586 hectares was filed, a certain Moonyeen
Rodriguez-Beleno filed on April 20, 1969 a protest with the
Philippine Fisheries Commission against Viola Azurin's fishpond
permit claiming that the latter had not improved the area under
her permit; that it was she [Beleno] who was in actual possession
and occupation of the area and who had introduced
improvements thereon, and that she entered the area in good
faith since the area was heavily forested with mangroves. 30
The Philippine Fisheries Commission directed an investigation to
verify the allegations of Moonyeen Rodriguez-Beleno.
On September 29, 1969, Moonyeen R. Beleno filed Fishpond
Application No. 27649 over 35.5 hectares stated to represent the
20 hectares under Viola C. Azurin's Fishpond Permit No. F-5551-V
and the 13.5 hectares excess of said permit. 31
On November 26, 1969, the Philippine Fisheries Commissioner
ordered the Regional Director at Davao City to investigate the
conflict of fishpond applications between Viola C. Azurin and
Moonyeen R. Beleno over an area reportedly containing 13.6586
hectares, entitled "Fishpond Application No. 27649, Beleno,
Moonyeen Rodriguez, applicant-Complainant versus Fishpond
Application No. 27257, Azurin, Viola C. Permittee." 32
On May 26, 1972, while the fishpond conflict case was pending
investigation by the Philippine Fisheries Commission [Davao
NATURAL RESOURCES NEW CASES (ORAL QUIZ) 21
City], Viola C. Azurin filed with the Bureau of Lands a
complaint 33 for the correction, amendment or cancellation of
Homestead Patent No. 135029 of Minda de Porkan over Lot No.
1546 and Free Patent No. 488112 of Lolita Macatindog over Lot
No. 1099 situated at La Paz, Panabo [now Carmen], Davao del
Norte, alleging, among others, that the patentees secured their
patents and titles through fraud, misrepresentation and illegal
machinations, after which a relocation survey of their lots was
made, and on April 24, 1972, Minda de Porkan forcibly entered
the northeastern portion of her [Azurin] landholding while Lolita
Macatindog likewise forcibly entered the southeastern portion of
the same landholding. 34
After an investigation, Acting Assistant District Land Officer
Lazaro G. Berania recommended in his findings dated July 9,
1973 35 that a petition be filed in the proper court for the
amendment of Homestead Patent No. 135029 of Minda de Porkan
over Lot No. 1546, Cad 276 and Free Patent No. 488112 of Lolita
Macatindog over Lot No. 1099, Cad 276 in order to exclude
therefrom the portion of around seven [7] hectares of Viola C.
Azurin and that the Land Inspector, Mr. Amer Yusop, be charged
administratively for gross negligence and grave misconduct for
submitting false report.
Meanwhile, on January 10, 1978, the Director of Fisheries issued
an order resolving the conflict of the fishpond applications
between Viola C. Azurin [FPA No. 27257] and Moonyeen R.
Beleno [FPA No. 27649] over 13.6586 hectares which, for the
purpose of Identifying the disputed land involved in the instant
case, We quote, thus:
Considering the actuations of both parties in this case and of the
fact that there is considerable difficulty in distinguishing the
excess area from the area of 20.0 hectares granted under Permit
No. F-5551-V owing to the absence of hearings in the technical
descriptions of the area as released by the Bureau of Forestry, it
is only proper, for the sake of justice and equity, that the claims
of the parties herein be resolved by taking into consideration the
actual conditions existing at the time the controversy arose and
also to consider the principle that no one shall unjustly enrich
himself at the expense of another.
Moreover, in a more recent ocular inspection and/or relocation of
the area involved in the above-entitled case conducted by
representatives of this Office based on the sketch plan prepared
by Fortunato I. Javellana, Jr., Geodetic Engineer of Fisheries
Regional Office No. XI, Davao City, the three [3] parcels of areas
appears thereon, thus

Parcel I consisting of 6.1010 hectares and is bounded on the
North by Parcel II and a portion of Parcel III on the East by Tagum
River; on the South by the junction of Tagum and Taganay rivers;
and on the West by portion of Parcel III along the irrigation canal;
Parcel II consisting of 11.7869 hectares and is bounded on the
North by Tagum River; on the East by Tagum River; on the South
by Parcel I; and on the West by portion of Parcel III; and
Parcel III consisting of 16.5655 hectares and is bounded on the
North by Tagum River; on the East by Parcels I and II; on the
South by Mangrove area; and on the West by Agricultural land.
Said verification further disclose that Parcel I is a developed
portion of the fishpond area and is outside of the present
conflicts. Parcel II was also found to be developed and is the
portion that Beleno claimed to have introduced her
improvements. Parcel III was found to be undeveloped and is the
subject of the land title claim of the De Porkans. Records also
show that the representatives of Viola C. Azurin also informed the
investigators that 60 to 70% of the area in Parcel III is presently
involved in the land title conflict with the De Porkans and that
there is a pending case with the Bureau of Lands on this matter.
However, with respect to Parcel II, the representatives of Mrs.
Azurin assured them that it is outside of the land title conflict
with the De Porkans, hence, resolution on the instant controversy
is believed well-taken.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, FPA No. 27649 of Moonyeen R.
Beleno be given due course to cover Parcel II as indicated in the
sketch plan prepared by Engineer Fortunato P. Javellana covering
11.7869 hectares and wherein her improvements are indicated;
and that the area of Mrs. Viola C. Azurin under OFP No. F-5551-V
shall be confined to Parcel Nos. I and III of said sketch, after the
adverse claims of the Muslim claimants shall have been finally
resolved by competent authority. 36
The aforequoted order of the Director of Fisheries giving due
course to the Fishpond Application No. 27649 of Moonyeen R.
Beleno over Parcel II covering 11.7869 hectares was appealed by
Viola C. Azurin to the Minister of Natural Resources.
On April 11, 1980, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by
the Director of Lands, thru the Solicitor General, filed two [2]
separate complaints 37 with the then Court of First Instance of
Davao del Norte, seeking the cancellation in Civil Case No. 1247
of Homestead Patent No. 135029 of Minda de Porkan and its
derivative titles, TCT No. T-23598 and T-23599, in the names of
Minda de Porkan and spouses Gorgonio S. Bermudez and
Benecita Duluan Bermudez insofar as the portion covered by the
Ordinary Fishpond Permit No. F-5551-V of Viola C. Azurin, with an
NATURAL RESOURCES NEW CASES (ORAL QUIZ) 22
area of 3.9 hectares, more or less [subject to the result of a final rejecting the Fishpond Application No. 27649 of Moonyeen R.
survey] was concerned; and the cancellation in Civil Case No. Beleno, and declaring, among others, that the Ordinary Fishpond
1248 of Free Patent No. V-488112 and OCT No. P-8742 in the Permit No. F-5551-V of Viola C. Azurin should cover Parcels I, II
name of Lolita Macatindog and its derivative titles, TCT Nos. T- and III subject to the final resolution by competent authorities of
25143 and T-25142 in the names of Lolita Macatindog and the the adverse claims of certain Muslim occupants over Parcel III.
spouses Juan Arangali and Antonina Estares, respectively, insofar [Emphasis supplied]
as the portion covered by Fishpond Permit No. F-5551-V of Viola
C. Azurin, with an area of seven [7] hectares, more or less
On February 29, 1984, the Intermediate Appellate Court, now
[subject to the result of a final survey] was concerned.
Court of Appeals, affirmed the decision of the lower court.
The Solicitor General claimed that the disputed portions of land
The Solicitor General thus elevated the case to this Court by way
in Civil Cases Nos. 1247 and 1248 were actually claimed,
of petition for review on certiorari raising eleven [11] errors
occupied and developed by Viola C. Azurin, a holder of Fishpond
which, in its entirety, seeks to cancel and declare as null and void
Permit No. F-5551-V, which portion the Director of Lands could
the titles of private respondents over Lot No. 1099, Cad 276 and
not dispose of under the Public Land Act 38 hence, the patents
Lot No. 1546, Cad. 276, and their eventual reversion to the State
and titles issued to Minda de Porkan and Lolita Macatindog and
without prejudice to the claim of Viola C. Azurin to a portion of
all derivative titles issued to their successors-in-interest are null
seven [7] hectares of Lot No. 1099 and a portion of 3.9 hectares
and void insofar as that portion occupied and covered by the
of Lot No. 1546 under her Fishpond Permit No. F-5551-V. 43 In
fishpond permit of Viola C. Azurin.
other words, the Solicitor General seeks to cancel and declare as
null and void the titles of private respondents over Lot Nos. 1099
Minda de Porkan, et al. in Civil Case No. 1247 and Lolita and 1546, but he takes exception to the eventual reversion of
Macatindog in Civil Case No. 1248 similarly claimed in their the entire area of the two [2] disputed lots to the State insofar as
separate answers 39 that they were the ones who first protested, 10.9 hectares, more or less, in favor of the claim of Viola C.
along with their Muslim relatives, the intrusion of the families of Azurin under Fishpond Permit No. F-5551-V.
the Azurins, Rodriguezes, and Belenos into their "ancestral
lands," now the site of Barrio La Paz, Carmen [formerly Panabo],
Davao del Norte, which from time immemorial had been
occupied and cultivated by their ancestors and predecessors-in-
interest.
Upon motion of the Solicitor General for consolidation of cases,
Civil Cases Nos. 1247 and 1248 were ordered consolidated in an
order 40 dated August 19, 1980 issued by the then Court of First
Instance, Branch II, Davao del Norte for joint hearing in the Court
of First Instance of Davao del Norte, Branch I.
After a joint hearing, the Court of First Instance of Davao del
Norte, Branch [Tagum] rendered its decision 41 on November 18,
1980 dismissing the complaints for cancellation of titles and
upholding the validity of the patents/titles of Lolita Macatindog
and Minda de Porkan, as well as the titles of their transferees co-
defendants Juan Arangali and Gorgonio Bermudez, who were
adjudged to be innocent purchasers for value and in good faith.
The Solicitor General appealed the decision of the lower court to
the then Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals.
In the meantime, on March 31, 1981, the Minister of Natural
Resources, thru his Acting Assistant Secretary, Jose A. Janolo,
rendered a decision 42 setting aside the order of the Director of
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources dated January 10, 1978, thereby

In the main, the cancellation of titles of private respondents over
the disputed two [2] lots and their eventual reversion to the
State primarily rests on the contentions of the Solicitor General
that Lot Nos. 1099 and 1546 could not be the subject of
disposition under the Homestead [Chapter IV] and Free Patent
[Chapter VII] provisions of the Public Land Act 44 since they are
marshy and swampy, certified as such as more suitable for
fishpond development, disposable only thru lease under Chapter
IX of the Public Land, and private respondents' non-compliance
with certain statutory requirements of possession and cultivation,
and the disqualification of applicant Minda de Porkan to apply for
a homestead patent, she being a married woman. On the other
hand, the argument on retention of 10.9 hectares in favor of the
fishpond claim of Viola C. Azurin in the event that the titles of
private respondents are declared null and void is predicated on
the assumption that Viola C. Azurin's Fishpond Application No.
27257 filed on April 24, 1969 over the alleged excess area of
13.6586 hectares over her 20-hectare fishpond under her
Fishpond Permit No. F-5551-V was, in fact, granted by the Bureau
of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources of the Ministry of Natural
Resources. And on the basis of said assumption, the Solicitor
General then contended that despite the presence of other
claimants in the area, Amer Yusop, a public land inspector of the
Bureau of Lands, misled the Director of Lands into erroneously
approving private respondents' application and causing the
fraudulent issuance of patents in their favor by stating in his
report that "there are no claimants" to the land applied for by
Minda de Porkan and that the land applied for by Lolita
Macatindog "is claimed by nobody."
At the outset, it is significant to note that the tract of public land
then possessed, occupied, developed and planted to coconuts by
the family of Sadin de Porkan and his predecessors-in-interest, all
native Muslims of La Paz, Carmen [formerly Panabo], Davao del
Norte, which, by virtue of its being part of the unregistered lands,
was included in the Tagum Cadastral Survey of July 22, 1937 and
formed part of the disposable or alienable agricultural lands of
the public domain referred to under Section 6, par. [a] in relation
to Section 9, par. [a] of the Public Land Act [C.A. 141, as
amended]. The nature and character of said tract of public land,
more particularly Lot No. 1099, as one found inside an
"agricultural zone", and that of Lot No. 1546, as one suitable for
rice cultivation, which were categorically stated in the separate
investigation reports in 1953 of Vicente J. Villena, junior public
land inspector of the Bureau of Lands [Davao] is binding on the
courts inasmuch as it is the exclusive prerogative of the
Executive Department of the Government to classify public
lands . 45 The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or
status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land
actually looks like. 46 This Court, speaking thru Justice Moir, in the
case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, 39 Phil. 560 [1919],
traced the meaning of public agricultural lands, and the same
was restated 29 years later inKrivenko vs. Register of Deeds of
Manila, 79 Phil. 461 [1948] thus:
In the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil. 175, this court
said that the phrase 'agricultural lands' as used in Act No. 926
means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not
timber or mineral. Whatever may have been the meaning of the
term 'forestry' under the Spanish law, the Act of Congress of July
1st, 1902, classifies the public lands in the Philippine Islands as
timber, mineral or agricultural lands, and all public lands that are
not timber or mineral lands are necessarily agricultural public
lands, whether they are used as nipa swamps, manglares, fisheries
or ordinary farm lands. [Emphasis supplied.]
Since the disputed tract of public land is neither timber nor
mineral lands, the same is alienable or open to disposition as
public agricultural lands, under Section 11, C.A. 141 thru
homestead settlement or free patent.
The basic preliminary issue in resolving the overlapping claims
over the 10.9 hectares is whether or not the predecessors-in-
interest of private respondents Minda de Porkan, et al. in Civil
Case No. 1247 and Lolita Macatindog, et al. in Civil Case No.
1248 had acquired valid and registrable titles over Lot No. 1099
and 1546, respectively, by virtue of a grant by the State under
the Public Land Act. 47 We rule in the affirmative.
The doctrine established in the 1909 case of Carino vs. Insular
Government, 42 Phil. 935, 944, affirmed in Susi vs. Razon, 48
Phil. 424, and re-affirmed in a number of cases 48 the most recent
of which are the cases of Herico vs. Dar, 95 SCRA 437
and Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court and Acme
Plywood and Veneer Co., Inc., G.R. No. 73002 [Dec. 29, 1986]
sustains on all fours the ruling of the trial court that the herein
private respondent Lolita de Porkan Macatindog and her
predecessors-in-interest, as early as 1953, had already acquired
by operation of law not only a right to a grant over Lot No. 1099,
but a grant of the Government over the same alienable land by
virtue of their proven, open, exclusive and undisputed possession
for more than 30 years since the Spanish colonial period.
The case of Susi vs. Razon, supra, in particular, puts the doctrine
in a clearer and more precise language which militates against
the belated theory of the Solicitor General after a period of 19
years since 1953 that in view of its being swampy and marshy in
nature, Lot No. 1099 is still public land which the Director of
Lands could not dispose of under the Public Land Act, thus:
... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the
presumption juris et dejure established in paragraph [b] of
section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the
necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were
complied with, for he has been in actual and physical possession,
personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land
of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and
NATURAL RESOURCES NEW CASES (ORAL QUIZ) 23
publicly since July 26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of title to
said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that
when Angela Razon applied for a grant in her favor, Valentin Susi
had already acquired by operation of law not only a right to a
grant but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that
a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may
be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefor is
sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If
by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question
by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public
domain and had become private property, at least by
presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director
of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question to Angela
Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he
had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was
void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire
any right. [Emphasis supplied]
Where, as in the instant case, the possession of a public land
later Identified as Lot No. 1099 by Sadin de Porkan, father of
Medori de Porkan, and their predecessors-in-interest who were
native Muslims of la Paz, Panabo [now Carmen], Davao del Norte,
dates back to the time of the Spanish colonial period, such
possession of the said tract of public land has attained the
character and duration prescribed by law as the equivalent of an
express grant from the Government. The mandate of the law
itself is that the possessors "shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title" and by legal
fiction, the land ceases to be public and thus becomes private
land. In the language of Herico vs. Dar, supra, title over the land
has vested on the possessor so as to segregate the land from the
mass of the public domain. And as stressed in Susi vs. Razon,
supra, it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be
issued in order that said grant may be sustained by the courts,
an application therefor being sufficient.
On the other hand, as regards the homestead patent over Lot No.
1546, Cad 276, the ruling in the case ofBalboa vs. Fartales, 51
Phil. 498 [1928], that when a homesteader has complied with all
the terms and conditions which entitle him to a patent for a
particular tract of public land, he acquires a vested interest
therein, and is to be regarded as the equitable owner thereof,
and once the right to a patent has become vested in a purchaser
of public lands, it is equivalent to a patent actually issued,
sustains, the conclusion of the trial court that a tract of public
land later Identified as Lot No. 1546 ceased to be part of the
public domain and became private land over which the Director
of Lands is divested of control and possession when the
homestead application of Sadin Maraug was approved and
recorded as Homestead Entry No. V-68362 on January 13, 1954
which was later confirmed by the approval of the transfer of

homestead rights in favor of Minda de Porkan. The Court stated
inBalboa vs. Farrales, supra, thus:
A party who has complied with all the terms and conditions which
entitle him to a patent for a particular tract of public land
acquires a vested interest therein, and is to be regarded, as the
equitable owner thereof [Wirth vs. Branson, 98 U.S. 118]. Where
the right to a patent has once become vested in a purchaser of
public lands, it is equivalent so far as the Government is
concerned, to a patent actually issued. The execution and
delivery of the patent after the right to it has become complete
are mere ministerial acts of the officers charged with that duty
[Simmons vs. Wagner, 101 U.S. 260]. ... A perfected valid
appropriation of public lands operates as a withdrawal of the
tract from the body of the public domain and, so long as such
appropriation remains valid and subsisting, the land covered
thereby is deemed private property. A perfected homestead
under the law, is property in the highest sense, which may be
sold and conveyed and will pass by descent. ... Even without a
patent a perfected homestead is a property right in the fullest
sense, unaffected by the fact that the paramount title to the land
is in the Government. Such land may be conveyed or
inherited. [Emphasis supplied]
Corollary to the ruling in Balboa vs. Farrales, it was held in Diaz
and Reyes vs. Macalinao, et al, 102 Phil. 999, a 1958 case, that a
homestead entry having been permitted by the Director of
Lands, the homestead is segregated from the public domain and
the Director Lands is divested of the control and possession
thereof except if the application is finally disapproved and the
entry annulled or revoked. In Dauan vs. Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, 19 SCRA 223, involving a dispute as to
whether a pre-war homestead application was approved by the
Director of Lands, the Court held that where the person had all
the qualifications to apply for a homestead and he was in actual
possession of the homestead at the time he transferred his rights
thereto, the presumption is that his application for said
homestead was approved by the Director of Lands.
In that sense, there is then no legal obstacle for Lolita de Porkan
Macatindog, successor-in-interest of Medori de Porkan, to
complete the imperfect or incomplete title of her predecessor-in-
interest over Lot No. 1099 by means of confirmation of imperfect
or incomplete title by administrative legalization [free patent]
under Section 11 and Section 44 of the Public Land Act, as
amended by R.A. 3872 [June 18, 1964] 49 which she did when she
filed her free patent application on November 14, 1968; and for
Minda de Porkan to confirm her title over Lot No. 1546 which was
deemed vested on her predecessor-in-interest, Sadin Maraug, as
early as 1954, by filing her homestead application on June 8,
1971. In both parcels of land, the application for confirmation is a
mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal
sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and
the Torrens Title to be issued upon the strength of said patent. 50
There is therefore no equitable justification for the Director of
Lands to divest private respondents of their titles by claiming,
after 19 years, that the lots in question remain public lands
because the same are swampy and marshy in nature subject to
lease only under Chapter IX of the Public Land Act, and on a
mere technical objection that Minda de Porkan is disqualified to
apply for a homestead patent because she is married. As clearly
found by the trial court, Viola C. Azurin entered the 20-hectare
fishpond in 1966 and, admittedly, she excavated and constructed
dikes in the disputed portion she assertively believed to be within
her 20-hectare fishpond permit. The conversion of the disputed
portion into a fishpond will not change the agricultural nature of
the land subject to disposition by the Bureau of Lands as
alienable lands of the public domain in accordance with the State
policy of "land for the landless"; and more importantly in line
with the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 3872 [June
18, 1964] to the Public Land Act intended to benefit the
members of the national cultural minorities. In fact, the original
registered owners of Lot No. 1099 and Lot No. 1546 were issued
their respective patents pursuant to the 1971 land Patent Drive
for Cultural Minorities signed by Vicente A. Valdellon. 51
Inasmuch as Lot No. 1099 and Lot No. 1546 ceased to be part of
the public domain as early as 1953 and 1954, respectively, We
need not dwell further on the allegations of fraud advanced by
the Solicitor General in the issuance of the patents of Lolita
Macatindog and Minda de Porkan who were the successors-in-
interest of Medori de Porkan and Sadin Maraug whose titles to
the lots in question become vested by operation of law and by
the equitable application of doctrinal jurisprudence on the land
dispute in the instant case.
The next issue then is whether or not the fishpond claim of Viola
C. Azurin over the 13.6586 hectares allegedly representing the
excess area over her 20-hectare fishpond under her Fishpond
Permit No. F-5551-V has attained the character of a final grant
from the Government as would warrant the exclusion of the
same from Lot No. 1099 of Lolita Macatindog and Lot No. 1546 of
Minda de Porkan.
We rule in the negative.
A review of the records of the case show that Viola C. Azurin has
not sufficiently established her right to a grant by the
Government under any of the modes of dispossession or
concession of public lands authorized under the Public Land Act
or any special law governing her alleged fishpond claim over the
disputed lots. The inaction, if not disapproval, of her land claims
over the disputed lots, thru applications separate and distinct
NATURAL RESOURCES NEW CASES (ORAL QUIZ) 24
from each other, by the concerned administrative agencies of the
Government renders untenable the Solicitor General's contention
that in the event Lot No. 1099 and Lot No, 1546 are finally
reverted to the State, the said 13.6586 hectares should be
excluded from the reversion in favor of the fishpond claim of
Viola C. Azurin under her Fishpond Permit No. F-5551-V.
First, it must be noted that on January 17, 1968, Viola C. Azurin
obtained by purchase and sale from Condi Mama and Cadingaga
Mora, both native Muslims of La Paz, Panabo [now Carmen],
Davao del Norte, all the rights and interests over all the nipa
plants and other improvements in the parcel of land covered by
her Fishpond Permit No. F-5551-V. 52 Thereafter, on March 1,
1968, she filed with the Bureau of Lands a sales
application 53 over an agricultural land with an area of 33.6586
hectares allegedly covered by her 20-hectare fishpond permit.
But the sales application was not approved by the Director of
Lands.
Second, after Viola C. Azurin was granted on March 4, 1966 her
Fishpond Permit No. F-5551-V by the Philippine Fisheries
Commission, she had the area surveyed by a private land
surveyor, Roman F. Joaquin, who allegedly found out that her
fishpond permit actually covered 33.6586 hectares, resulting in
an excess of 13.6586 hectares. On November 29, 1967, Roman F.
Joaquin submitted a plan of the land [fishpond], allegedly the
correct plan of the survey, but the Director of Lands did not
approve the same. So Viola C. Azurin opted to file a fishpond
application [FPA No. 27257] on April 24, 1969 ver the excess area
of 13.6586 hectares over her 20-hectare fishpond under her
Fishpond Permit No. F-5551-V. A protest over Azurin's application
was filed earlier or on April 20, 1969 by a certain Moonyeen
Rodriguez-Beleno which was decided by the Director of Fisheries
on January 10, 1978 by giving due course to the fishpond
application of Moonyeen R. Beleno over Parcel II. However, on
March 31, 1981, the Minister of Natural Resources, thru his
Acting Secretary, Jose A. Janolo set aside the order by declaring
that the Fishpond Permit No. F-5551-V of Viola C. Azurin covers
Parcel I, II, and III subject to the final resolution by competent
authorities of the adverse claim of certain Muslim occupants
over Parcel III. In other words, Viola C. Azurin's claim over Parcel
III has not attained the status of finality unless and until the
conflict of land claims, now subject of the instant case, is finally
resolved by the courts.
Third, the instant case now before this Court for review is an
offshoot of Viola C. Azurin's complaint for correction, amendment
or cancellation of the Homestead Patent of Minda de Porkan and
Free Patent of Lolita Macatindog filed with the Bureau of Lands on
May 26, 1972 involving the same portion of land subject of the
sales application filed on March 1, 1968 and fishpond application
filed on April 24, 1969 by Viola C. Azurin.

Fourth, the Fishpond Permit No. F-5551-V of Viola C. Azurin had
technically expired on December 31, 1966. Obviously,
recognizing the extent and limits of her occupation, use and
possession of the fishpond area, she filed the said sales
application over the same area on March 1, 1968, but said
application was not approved.
Considering that Viola C. Azurin was not able to legitimize her
claim over the disputed portion, there is then no justifiable
reason for the Director of Lands to divest Lolita Macatindog and
Minda de Porkan and their successors-in-interest of their titles,
which had long been vested on their predecessors-in-interest.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is denied and
the decision of the Court of Appeals on February 29, 1984 is
hereby affirmed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
=========
G.R. No. L-66866 June 18, 1987
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
MINDA DE PORKAN, SADIN MARAUG, GORGONIO
BERMUDEZ, LOLITA MACATINDOG, MEDORI DE PORKAN,
JUAN ARANGALI, ANTONINA ESTARES, REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF DAVAO DEL NORTE and the INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT [Fourth Civil Cases
Division], respondents.
Rolando C. Rama for private respondents.
FERNAN, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner, Republic of the
Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, thru the
Solicitor General, seeks the reversal of the decision 1 of the
Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, dated
February 29, 1984, which affirmed the joint decision 2 of the then
Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch I [Tagum] dismissing
petitioner's complaint in Civil Cases Nos. 1247 and 1248 for
cancellation of the Homestead Patent of private respondent
Minda de Porkan and her successors-in-interest and the Free
Patent of private respondent Lolita Macatindog and her
successors-in-interest, respectively.
The undisputed facts appearing on the records are as follows:
The family of Sadin de Porkan, father of Medori and Macampon
de Porkan, both native Muslims of La Paz, Carmen, [formerly
Panabo] Davao del Norte, had been in actual possession as
owner since the Spanish colonial period of a tract of land planted
with coconuts situated in said municipality. 3 During the Tagum
Cadastral Survey of July 22, 1937, this tract of land, Identified as
Lots Nos. 1099 and 1546 were respectively allocated to Medori
and Macampon de Porkan, the predecessors-in-interest of herein
private respondents. 4
On April 30, 1953, or sixteen [16] years after the Tagum
Cadastral Survey, Medori de Porkan filed her Free Patent
Application No. V-27162 5 over Lot No. 1099 containing an area of
16.2983 hectares. The following day, or on May 1, 1953, Vicente
J. Villena, Junior Public Lands Inspector, submitted a final
investigation report 6recommending that the patent be granted
to Medori de Porkan. The report was subsequently endorsed for
approval to the Director of Lands on May 30, 1953 by, Juan
Tapales, Head, Special Investigation Party, Davao, who
recommended that the entry of applicant be favorably confirmed
and a free patent be issued to Medori de Porkan, thus:
9. That the said land has been surveyed, and the survey records
are known as Tagum Cad Survey No. 25-B. It corresponds to Lots
1099, B.L. Case No. 4, Cadastral Record No. 276 which was
allocated to the herein applicant, Medori de Porkan during the
cadastral survey of Tagum.
10. FURTHER REMARKS: Due to the long possession and
occupation by Medori de Porkan of the land, who also introduced
considerable improvements thereon the undersigned believed
beyond reasonable doubt that she is entitled to a free patent.
Information gathered from other persons, settlers and
homesteaders in the vicinity reveals that no other persons had
been allowed to have any interests in, rights to, the
improvements now existing therein. Records show that the land
applied for was allocated to the herein application (sic) during
the cadastral survey of Tagum but the said applicant has not filed
any application for the land.
Fifteen [15] years after, or on November 12, 1968, Medori de
Porkan relinquished her rights and interests over Lot No.
1099 7 to her daughter, Lolita Macatindog, who thereafter filed
her own free patent application 8 on November 14, 1968. The
Free Patent Application No. V-271162 of Medori de Porkan
covering Lot No. 1099 was thereafter ordered transferred to,
NATURAL RESOURCES NEW CASES (ORAL QUIZ) 25
recorded and given due course in the name of Lolita Macatindog
in an order dated February 8, 1971. 9 On May 27, 1971, the
Director of Lands approved the Free Patent Application of Lolita
Macatindog and ordered that the said application be entered in
the records of the Bureau of Lands as Free Patent Entry No.
431343 and that the corresponding Free Patent be issued in her
favor over Lot No. 1099. 10Free Patent No. 488112 was issued to
Lolita Macatindog on June 7, 1971, and on July 13, 1971, she was
issued Original Certificate of Title No. P-9742 11 over said Lot No.
1099.
On June 6, 1978, or after seven [7] years from the issuance of
the Free Patent, Lolita Macatindog conveyed 60,000 sq. meters of
said Lot No. 1099 to Juan Arangali who secured Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-25142 12over said area. Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-25143 13 was issued for the remaining
102,983 sq. meters in the name of Lolita Macatindog.
On the other hand, Macampon de Porkan died before he could
file any application and improve Lot No. 1546 containing an area
of 15.2406 hectares allocated to him. In his stead, the
Homestead Application No. V-76456 14of Sadin Maraug, who
showed much interest in acquiring said tract of land, was
accepted on May 1, 1953 on the basis of the investigation
report 15 of Vicente J. Villena, Junior Public Lands Inspector,
dated May 1, 1953, which was favorably endorsed by Juan
Tapales, Head, Special Investigation Party, Davao, on May 31,
1953. Sadin Maraug's homestead application was subsequently
approved and recorded as Homestead Entry No. V-68302 16in an
order dated January 13, 1954 issued by Zoilo Castrillo, Director of
Lands.
On June 1, 1971, or seventeen [17] years after the approval of
his homestead application, Sadin Maraug sought authority from
the Director of Lands to transfer his rights over Lot No. 1546, and
on June 8, 1971, he executed a transfer of homestead rights in
favor of Minda de Porkan. This was approved by Vicente A.
Valdellon, Director of Lands, in an order dated December 3,
1971, which likewise ordered that the Homestead Application No.
V-76456 of Sadin Maraug be recorded in the name of the
transferee, Minda de Porkan. 17
Minda de Porkan thereafter filed her Homestead Application No.
V-76456. 18 After she made a final proof on July 8, 1971, she was
issued Homestead Patent No. 135029 approved by the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources on December 8, 197I. On
March 17, 1972 she was issued original Certificate of Title. No. P-
10095 19over Lot No 1546.
In 1977, or after six [6] years from the issuance of the
homestead patent, Minda de Porkan conveyed 80,000 sq. meters
of Lot No. 1546 to Gorgonio S. Bermudez who secured his

Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-23598 20 on September 26,
1977. Transfer Certificate No. T-23599 21 was issued in the name
of Minda de Porkan for the remaining 72,406 sq. meters.
Meanwhile, Mrs. Viola C. Azurin, a resident of 629 Sta. Ana
Avenue, Davao City, obtained from the then Philippine Fisheries
Commission on March 4, 1966, Ordinary Fishpond Permit No. F-
5551-V 22 Covering an area of 20 hectares situated at La Paz,
Panabo [now Carmen], Davao del Norte, described and indicated
in the sketch on the sheet 23 attached to permit, subject to the
additional rules on the next page 24 and, among others, to the
following terms and conditions:
4. Upon the expiration of the permit or upon its cancellation, all
permanent improvements on the area shall pass to the
ownership of the Government without any obligation on the part
of said Government to indemnify or reimburse the holder of the
permit therefor.
5. The decision of the Commissioner of Fisheries as to the exact
location of the boundary lines of the area shall be accepted as
final.
This permit will expire on December 31, 1966 or at an earlier
date under the conditions stated in Rules 10, 11 and 12 hereof.
Thereafter, Viola C. Azurin had the area surveyed by Geodetic
Engineer Roman F. Joaquin, a private surveyor, who found out
that her fishpond permit actually covered 33.6586 hectares, and
not 20.0 hectares. 25 On November 29, 1967, Geodetic Engineer
R.F. Joaquin prepared and submitted for approval by the Director
of Lands the allegedly corrected plan of the land [fishpond] 26 but
the same was not approved by the Director of Lands.
On January 17, 1968, the spouses Condi Mama and Cadingaga
Mora, both native Muslims of La Paz, Panabo [Carmen], Davao
del Norte, sold to Viola C. Azurin, their rights and interests over
all the nipa plants and improvements in the parcel of land
covered by Viola C. Azurin's Fishpond Permit No. F-5551-V for and
in consideration of P3,500.00. 27
On March 1, 1968, Viola C. Azurin filed with the Bureau of Lands
a sales application 28 over an agricultural land to be used solely
for agricultural purposes, containing an area of 33.6586
hectares, bounded on the northeast by Tagum River and on the
southwest by public land, situated at La Paz, Panabo [now
Carmen], Davao del Norte, for which purpose she stated that she
would invest the sum of P20,000.00. Prior to the said sales
application, she asked the Director of Lands, in a survey request
dated February 12, 1968, to have a private surveyor, Geodetic
Engineer Roman F. Joaquin, survey the 33.6586 hectares
NATURAL RESOURCES NEW CASES (ORAL QUIZ) 26
allegedly covered by her sales application, but she agreed that Macatindog likewise forcibly entered the southeastern portion of
she would take only such title as may be issued to her by the the same landholding. 34
Director of Lands irrespective of the result of the survey of the
area which was allegedly occupied by her under Ordinary
After an investigation, Acting Assistant District Land Officer
Fishpond Permit No. F-5551-V.
Lazaro G. Berania recommended in his findings dated July 9,
1973 35 that a petition be filed in the proper court for the
The sales application of Viola C. Azurin over the alleged 33.6586 amendment of Homestead Patent No. 135029 of Minda de Porkan
hectares was not approved by the Director of Lands. 29 over Lot No. 1546, Cad 276 and Free Patent No. 488112 of Lolita
Macatindog over Lot No. 1099, Cad 276 in order to exclude
therefrom the portion of around seven [7] hectares of Viola C.
On April 24, 1969, Viola C. Azurin filed Fishpond Application No.
Azurin and that the Land Inspector, Mr. Amer Yusop, be charged
27257 over 13.6586 hectares allegedly representing the excess
administratively for gross negligence and grave misconduct for
area over the 20 hectares under her Fishpond Permit No. F-5551-
submitting false report.
V which, as found by Geodetic Engineer Roman F. Joaquin,
actually covered 33.6586 hectares. Before her application over
the said 13.6586 hectares was filed, a certain Moonyeen Meanwhile, on January 10, 1978, the Director of Fisheries issued
Rodriguez-Beleno filed on April 20, 1969 a protest with the an order resolving the conflict of the fishpond applications
Philippine Fisheries Commission against Viola Azurin's fishpond between Viola C. Azurin [FPA No. 27257] and Moonyeen R.
permit claiming that the latter had not improved the area under Beleno [FPA No. 27649] over 13.6586 hectares which, for the
her permit; that it was she [Beleno] who was in actual possession purpose of Identifying the disputed land involved in the instant
and occupation of the area and who had introduced case, We quote, thus:
improvements thereon, and that she entered the area in good
faith since the area was heavily forested with mangroves. 30
Considering the actuations of both parties in this case and of the
fact that there is considerable difficulty in distinguishing the excess
The Philippine Fisheries Commission directed an investigation to area from the area of 20.0 hectares granted under Permit No. F-
verify the allegations of Moonyeen Rodriguez-Beleno. 5551-V owing to the absence of hearings in the technical
descriptions of the area as released by the Bureau of Forestry, it is
only proper, for the sake of justice and equity, that the claims of
On September 29, 1969, Moonyeen R. Beleno filed Fishpond
the parties herein be resolved by taking into consideration the
Application No. 27649 over 35.5 hectares stated to represent the
actual conditions existing at the time the controversy arose and
20 hectares under Viola C. Azurin's Fishpond Permit No. F-5551-V
also to consider the principle that no one shall unjustly enrich
and the 13.5 hectares excess of said permit. 31
himself at the expense of another.
On November 26, 1969, the Philippine Fisheries Commissioner
Moreover, in a more recent ocular inspection and/or relocation of
ordered the Regional Director at Davao City to investigate the
the area involved in the above-entitled case conducted by
conflict of fishpond applications between Viola C. Azurin and
representatives of this Office based on the sketch plan prepared by
Moonyeen R. Beleno over an area reportedly containing 13.6586
Fortunato I. Javellana, Jr., Geodetic Engineer of Fisheries Regional
hectares, entitled "Fishpond Application No. 27649, Beleno,
Office No. XI, Davao City, the three [3] parcels of areas appears
Moonyeen Rodriguez, applicant-Complainant versus Fishpond
thereon, thus
Application No. 27257, Azurin, Viola C. Permittee." 32
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, FPA No. 27649 of Moonyeen R.
On May 26, 1972, while the fishpond conflict case was pending
Beleno be given due course to cover Parcel II as indicated in the
investigation by the Philippine Fisheries Commission [Davao
sketch plan prepared by Engineer Fortunato P. Javellana covering
City], Viola C. Azurin filed with the Bureau of Lands a
11.7869 hectares and wherein her improvements are indicated;
complaint 33 for the correction, amendment or cancellation of
and that the area of Mrs. Viola C. Azurin under OFP No. F-5551-V
Homestead Patent No. 135029 of Minda de Porkan over Lot No.
shall be confined to Parcel Nos. I and III of said sketch, after the
1546 and Free Patent No. 488112 of Lolita Macatindog over Lot
adverse claims of the Muslim claimants shall have been finally
No. 1099 situated at La Paz, Panabo [now Carmen], Davao del
resolved by competent authority. 36
Norte, alleging, among others, that the patentees secured their
patents and titles through fraud, misrepresentation and illegal
machinations, after which a relocation survey of their lots was The aforequoted order of the Director of Fisheries giving due
made, and on April 24, 1972, Minda de Porkan forcibly entered course to the Fishpond Application No. 27649 of Moonyeen R.
the northeastern portion of her [Azurin] landholding while Lolita

Beleno over Parcel II covering 11.7869 hectares was appealed by
Viola C. Azurin to the Minister of Natural Resources.
On April 11, 1980, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by
the Director of Lands, thru the Solicitor General, filed two [2]
separate complaints 37 with the then Court of First Instance of
Davao del Norte, seeking the cancellation in Civil Case No. 1247
of Homestead Patent No. 135029 of Minda de Porkan and its
derivative titles, TCT No. T-23598 and T-23599, in the names of
Minda de Porkan and spouses Gorgonio S. Bermudez and
Benecita Duluan Bermudez insofar as the portion covered by the
Ordinary Fishpond Permit No. F-5551-V of Viola C. Azurin, with an
area of 3.9 hectares, more or less [subject to the result of a final
survey] was concerned; and the cancellation in Civil Case No.
1248 of Free Patent No. V-488112 and OCT No. P-8742 in the
name of Lolita Macatindog and its derivative titles, TCT Nos. T-
25143 and T-25142 in the names of Lolita Macatindog and the
spouses Juan Arangali and Antonina Estares, respectively, insofar
as the portion covered by Fishpond Permit No. F-5551-V of Viola
C. Azurin, with an area of seven [7] hectares, more or less
[subject to the result of a final survey] was concerned.
The Solicitor General claimed that the disputed portions of land
in Civil Cases Nos. 1247 and 1248 were actually claimed,
occupied and developed by Viola C. Azurin, a holder of Fishpond
Permit No. F-5551-V, which portion the Director of Lands could
not dispose of under the Public Land Act 38 hence, the patents
and titles issued to Minda de Porkan and Lolita Macatindog and
all derivative titles issued to their successors-in-interest are null
and void insofar as that portion occupied and covered by the
fishpond permit of Viola C. Azurin.
Minda de Porkan, et al. in Civil Case No. 1247 and Lolita
Macatindog in Civil Case No. 1248 similarly claimed in their
separate answers 39 that they were the ones who first protested,
along with their Muslim relatives, the intrusion of the families of
the Azurins, Rodriguezes, and Belenos into their "ancestral
lands," now the site of Barrio La Paz, Carmen [formerly Panabo],
Davao del Norte, which from time immemorial had been
occupied and cultivated by their ancestors and predecessors-in-
interest.
Upon motion of the Solicitor General for consolidation of cases,
Civil Cases Nos. 1247 and 1248 were ordered consolidated in an
order 40 dated August 19, 1980 issued by the then Court of First
Instance, Branch II, Davao del Norte for joint hearing in the Court
of First Instance of Davao del Norte, Branch I.
After a joint hearing, the Court of First Instance of Davao del
Norte, Branch [Tagum] rendered its decision 41 on November 18,
1980 dismissing the complaints for cancellation of titles and
upholding the validity of the patents/titles of Lolita Macatindog
NATURAL RESOURCES NEW CASES (ORAL QUIZ) 27
and Minda de Porkan, as well as the titles of their transferees co- 27257 filed on April 24, 1969 over the alleged excess area of
defendants Juan Arangali and Gorgonio Bermudez, who were 13.6586 hectares over her 20-hectare fishpond under her
adjudged to be innocent purchasers for value and in good faith. Fishpond Permit No. F-5551-V was, in fact, granted by the Bureau
of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources of the Ministry of Natural
Resources. And on the basis of said assumption, the Solicitor
The Solicitor General appealed the decision of the lower court to
General then contended that despite the presence of other
the then Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals.
claimants in the area, Amer Yusop, a public land inspector of the
Bureau of Lands, misled the Director of Lands into erroneously
In the meantime, on March 31, 1981, the Minister of Natural approving private respondents' application and causing the
Resources, thru his Acting Assistant Secretary, Jose A. Janolo, fraudulent issuance of patents in their favor by stating in his
rendered a decision 42 setting aside the order of the Director of report that "there are no claimants" to the land applied for by
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources dated January 10, 1978, thereby Minda de Porkan and that the land applied for by Lolita
rejecting the Fishpond Application No. 27649 of Moonyeen R. Macatindog "is claimed by nobody."
Beleno, and declaring, among others, that the Ordinary Fishpond
Permit No. F-5551-V of Viola C. Azurin should cover Parcels I, II
At the outset, it is significant to note that the tract of public land
and III subject to the final resolution by competent authorities of
then possessed, occupied, developed and planted to coconuts by
the adverse claims of certain Muslim occupants over Parcel III.
the family of Sadin de Porkan and his predecessors-in-interest, all
[Emphasis supplied]
native Muslims of La Paz, Carmen [formerly Panabo], Davao del
Norte, which, by virtue of its being part of the unregistered lands,
On February 29, 1984, the Intermediate Appellate Court, now was included in the Tagum Cadastral Survey of July 22, 1937 and
Court of Appeals, affirmed the decision of the lower court. formed part of the disposable or alienable agricultural lands of
the public domain referred to under Section 6, par. [a] in relation
to Section 9, par. [a] of the Public Land Act [C.A. 141, as
The Solicitor General thus elevated the case to this Court by way
amended]. The nature and character of said tract of public land,
of petition for review on certiorari raising eleven [11] errors
more particularly Lot No. 1099, as one found inside an
which, in its entirety, seeks to cancel and declare as null and void
"agricultural zone", and that of Lot No. 1546, as one suitable for
the titles of private respondents over Lot No. 1099, Cad 276 and
rice cultivation, which were categorically stated in the separate
Lot No. 1546, Cad. 276, and their eventual reversion to the State
investigation reports in 1953 of Vicente J. Villena, junior public
without prejudice to the claim of Viola C. Azurin to a portion of
land inspector of the Bureau of Lands [Davao] is binding on the
seven [7] hectares of Lot No. 1099 and a portion of 3.9 hectares
courts inasmuch as it is the exclusive prerogative of the
of Lot No. 1546 under her Fishpond Permit No. F-5551-V. 43 In
Executive Department of the Government to classify public
other words, the Solicitor General seeks to cancel and declare as
lands . 45 The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or
null and void the titles of private respondents over Lot Nos. 1099
status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land
and 1546, but he takes exception to the eventual reversion of
actually looks like. 46 This Court, speaking thru Justice Moir, in the
the entire area of the two [2] disputed lots to the State insofar as
case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, 39 Phil. 560 [1919],
10.9 hectares, more or less, in favor of the claim of Viola C.
traced the meaning of public agricultural lands, and the same
Azurin under Fishpond Permit No. F-5551-V.
was restated 29 years later inKrivenko vs. Register of Deeds of
Manila, 79 Phil. 461 [1948] thus:
In the main, the cancellation of titles of private respondents over
the disputed two [2] lots and their eventual reversion to the
In the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government, 10
State primarily rests on the contentions of the Solicitor General
Phil. 175, this court said that the phrase
that Lot Nos. 1099 and 1546 could not be the subject of
'agricultural lands' as used in Act No. 926
disposition under the Homestead [Chapter IV] and Free Patent
means those public lands acquired from Spain
[Chapter VII] provisions of the Public Land Act 44 since they are
which are not timber or mineral. Whatever may
marshy and swampy, certified as such as more suitable for
have been the meaning of the term 'forestry'
fishpond development, disposable only thru lease under Chapter
under the Spanish law, the Act of Congress of
IX of the Public Land, and private respondents' non-compliance
July 1st, 1902, classifies the public lands in the
with certain statutory requirements of possession and cultivation,
Philippine Islands as timber, mineral or
and the disqualification of applicant Minda de Porkan to apply for
agricultural lands, and all public lands that are
a homestead patent, she being a married woman. On the other
not timber or mineral lands are necessarily
hand, the argument on retention of 10.9 hectares in favor of the
agricultural public lands, whether they are
fishpond claim of Viola C. Azurin in the event that the titles of
used as nipa swamps, manglares, fisheries or
private respondents are declared null and void is predicated on
ordinary farm lands. [Emphasis supplied.]
the assumption that Viola C. Azurin's Fishpond Application No.

Since the disputed tract of public land is neither timber nor
mineral lands, the same is alienable or open to disposition as
public agricultural lands, under Section 11, C.A. 141 thru
homestead settlement or free patent.
The basic preliminary issue in resolving the overlapping claims
over the 10.9 hectares is whether or not the predecessors-in-
interest of private respondents Minda de Porkan, et al. in Civil
Case No. 1247 and Lolita Macatindog, et al. in Civil Case No.
1248 had acquired valid and registrable titles over Lot No. 1099
and 1546, respectively, by virtue of a grant by the State under
the Public Land Act. 47 We rule in the affirmative.
The doctrine established in the 1909 case of Carino vs. Insular
Government, 42 Phil. 935, 944, affirmed in Susi vs. Razon, 48
Phil. 424, and re-affirmed in a number of cases 48 the most recent
of which are the cases of Herico vs. Dar, 95 SCRA 437
and Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court and Acme
Plywood and Veneer Co., Inc., G.R. No. 73002 [Dec. 29, 1986]
sustains on all fours the ruling of the trial court that the herein
private respondent Lolita de Porkan Macatindog and her
predecessors-in-interest, as early as 1953, had already acquired
by operation of law not only a right to a grant over Lot No. 1099,
but a grant of the Government over the same alienable land by
virtue of their proven, open, exclusive and undisputed possession
for more than 30 years since the Spanish colonial period.
The case of Susi vs. Razon, supra, in particular, puts the doctrine
in a clearer and more precise language which militates against
the belated theory of the Solicitor General after a period of 19
years since 1953 that in view of its being swampy and marshy in
nature, Lot No. 1099 is still public land which the Director of
Lands could not dispose of under the Public Land Act, thus:
... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover,
the presumption juris et dejure established in paragraph [b] of
section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the
necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were
complied with, for he has been in actual and physical possession,
personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land
of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and
publicly since July 26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of title to
said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that
when Angela Razon applied for a grant in her favor, Valentin Susi
had already acquired by operation of law not only a right to a
grant but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that
a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may
be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefor is
sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If
by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question
by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public
domain and had become private property, at least by
presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director
of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question to Angela
Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he
had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was
void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire
any right. [Emphasis supplied]
Where, as in the instant case, the possession of a public land
later Identified as Lot No. 1099 by Sadin de Porkan, father of
Medori de Porkan, and their predecessors-in-interest who were
native Muslims of la Paz, Panabo [now Carmen], Davao del Norte,
dates back to the time of the Spanish colonial period, such
possession of the said tract of public land has attained the
character and duration prescribed by law as the equivalent of an
express grant from the Government. The mandate of the law
itself is that the possessors "shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title" and by legal
fiction, the land ceases to be public and thus becomes private
land. In the language of Herico vs. Dar, supra, title over the land
has vested on the possessor so as to segregate the land from the
mass of the public domain. And as stressed in Susi vs. Razon,
supra, it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be
issued in order that said grant may be sustained by the courts,
an application therefor being sufficient.
On the other hand, as regards the homestead patent over Lot No.
1546, Cad 276, the ruling in the case ofBalboa vs. Fartales, 51
Phil. 498 [1928], that when a homesteader has complied with all
the terms and conditions which entitle him to a patent for a
particular tract of public land, he acquires a vested interest
therein, and is to be regarded as the equitable owner thereof,
and once the right to a patent has become vested in a purchaser
of public lands, it is equivalent to a patent actually issued,
sustains, the conclusion of the trial court that a tract of public
land later Identified as Lot No. 1546 ceased to be part of the
public domain and became private land over which the Director
of Lands is divested of control and possession when the
homestead application of Sadin Maraug was approved and
recorded as Homestead Entry No. V-68362 on January 13, 1954
which was later confirmed by the approval of the transfer of
homestead rights in favor of Minda de Porkan. The Court stated
inBalboa vs. Farrales, supra, thus:
A party who has complied with all the terms and conditions which
entitle him to a patent for a particular tract of public land
acquires a vested interest therein, and is to be regarded, as the
equitable owner thereof [Wirth vs. Branson, 98 U.S. 118]. Where
the right to a patent has once become vested in a purchaser of
public lands, it is equivalent so far as the Government is
concerned, to a patent actually issued. The execution and
delivery of the patent after the right to it has become complete
are mere ministerial acts of the officers charged with that duty
NATURAL RESOURCES NEW CASES (ORAL QUIZ) 28
[Simmons vs. Wagner, 101 U.S. 260]. ... A perfected valid
appropriation of public lands operates as a withdrawal of the
tract from the body of the public domain and, so long as such
appropriation remains valid and subsisting, the land covered
thereby is deemed private property. A perfected homestead
under the law, is property in the highest sense, which may be
sold and conveyed and will pass by descent. ... Even without a
patent a perfected homestead is a property right in the fullest
sense, unaffected by the fact that the paramount title to the land
is in the Government. Such land may be conveyed or
inherited. [Emphasis supplied]
Corollary to the ruling in Balboa vs. Farrales, it was held in Diaz
and Reyes vs. Macalinao, et al, 102 Phil. 999, a 1958 case, that a
homestead entry having been permitted by the Director of
Lands, the homestead is segregated from the public domain and
the Director Lands is divested of the control and possession
thereof except if the application is finally disapproved and the
entry annulled or revoked. In Dauan vs. Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, 19 SCRA 223, involving a dispute as to
whether a pre-war homestead application was approved by the
Director of Lands, the Court held that where the person had all
the qualifications to apply for a homestead and he was in actual
possession of the homestead at the time he transferred his rights
thereto, the presumption is that his application for said
homestead was approved by the Director of Lands.
In that sense, there is then no legal obstacle for Lolita de Porkan
Macatindog, successor-in-interest of Medori de Porkan, to
complete the imperfect or incomplete title of her predecessor-in-
interest over Lot No. 1099 by means of confirmation of imperfect
or incomplete title by administrative legalization [free patent]
under Section 11 and Section 44 of the Public Land Act, as
amended by R.A. 3872 [June 18, 1964] 49 which she did when she
filed her free patent application on November 14, 1968; and for
Minda de Porkan to confirm her title over Lot No. 1546 which was
deemed vested on her predecessor-in-interest, Sadin Maraug, as
early as 1954, by filing her homestead application on June 8,
1971. In both parcels of land, the application for confirmation is a
mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal
sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and
the Torrens Title to be issued upon the strength of said patent. 50
There is therefore no equitable justification for the Director of
Lands to divest private respondents of their titles by claiming,
after 19 years, that the lots in question remain public lands
because the same are swampy and marshy in nature subject to
lease only under Chapter IX of the Public Land Act, and on a
mere technical objection that Minda de Porkan is disqualified to
apply for a homestead patent because she is married. As clearly
found by the trial court, Viola C. Azurin entered the 20-hectare
fishpond in 1966 and, admittedly, she excavated and constructed
dikes in the disputed portion she assertively believed to be within

her 20-hectare fishpond permit. The conversion of the disputed
portion into a fishpond will not change the agricultural nature of
the land subject to disposition by the Bureau of Lands as
alienable lands of the public domain in accordance with the State
policy of "land for the landless"; and more importantly in line
with the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 3872 [June
18, 1964] to the Public Land Act intended to benefit the
members of the national cultural minorities. In fact, the original
registered owners of Lot No. 1099 and Lot No. 1546 were issued
their respective patents pursuant to the 1971 land Patent Drive
for Cultural Minorities signed by Vicente A. Valdellon. 51
Inasmuch as Lot No. 1099 and Lot No. 1546 ceased to be part of
the public domain as early as 1953 and 1954, respectively, We
need not dwell further on the allegations of fraud advanced by
the Solicitor General in the issuance of the patents of Lolita
Macatindog and Minda de Porkan who were the successors-in-
interest of Medori de Porkan and Sadin Maraug whose titles to
the lots in question become vested by operation of law and by
the equitable application of doctrinal jurisprudence on the land
dispute in the instant case.
The next issue then is whether or not the fishpond claim of Viola
C. Azurin over the 13.6586 hectares allegedly representing the
excess area over her 20-hectare fishpond under her Fishpond
Permit No. F-5551-V has attained the character of a final grant
from the Government as would warrant the exclusion of the
same from Lot No. 1099 of Lolita Macatindog and Lot No. 1546 of
Minda de Porkan.
We rule in the negative.
A review of the records of the case show that Viola C. Azurin has
not sufficiently established her right to a grant by the
Government under any of the modes of dispossession or
concession of public lands authorized under the Public Land Act
or any special law governing her alleged fishpond claim over the
disputed lots. The inaction, if not disapproval, of her land claims
over the disputed lots, thru applications separate and distinct
from each other, by the concerned administrative agencies of the
Government renders untenable the Solicitor General's contention
that in the event Lot No. 1099 and Lot No, 1546 are finally
reverted to the State, the said 13.6586 hectares should be
excluded from the reversion in favor of the fishpond claim of
Viola C. Azurin under her Fishpond Permit No. F-5551-V.
First, it must be noted that on January 17, 1968, Viola C. Azurin
obtained by purchase and sale from Condi Mama and Cadingaga
Mora, both native Muslims of La Paz, Panabo [now Carmen],
Davao del Norte, all the rights and interests over all the nipa
plants and other improvements in the parcel of land covered by
her Fishpond Permit No. F-5551-V. 52 Thereafter, on March 1,
NATURAL RESOURCES NEW CASES (ORAL QUIZ) 29
1968, she filed with the Bureau of Lands a sales WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is denied and
application 53 over an agricultural land with an area of 33.6586 the decision of the Court of Appeals on February 29, 1984 is
hectares allegedly covered by her 20-hectare fishpond permit. hereby affirmed. No costs.
But the sales application was not approved by the Director of
Lands.
SO ORDERED.
Second, after Viola C. Azurin was granted on March 4, 1966 her
Fishpond Permit No. F-5551-V by the Philippine Fisheries
========
Commission, she had the area surveyed by a private land
surveyor, Roman F. Joaquin, who allegedly found out that her
fishpond permit actually covered 33.6586 hectares, resulting in G.R. No. L-61539 February 14, 1986
an excess of 13.6586 hectares. On November 29, 1967, Roman F.
Joaquin submitted a plan of the land [fishpond], allegedly the
DIRECTOR OF LANDS and DIRECTOR OF FOREST
correct plan of the survey, but the Director of Lands did not
DEVELOPMENT, petitioners,
approve the same. So Viola C. Azurin opted to file a fishpond
vs.
application [FPA No. 27257] on April 24, 1969 ver the excess area
LOPE GUZMAN RIVAS, PACIFICO V. VIJANDRE, FERNANDO
of 13.6586 hectares over her 20-hectare fishpond under her
A. PASCUA, and COURT OF APPEALS,respondents.
Fishpond Permit No. F-5551-V. A protest over Azurin's application
was filed earlier or on April 20, 1969 by a certain Moonyeen
Rodriguez-Beleno which was decided by the Director of Fisheries
on January 10, 1978 by giving due course to the fishpond
application of Moonyeen R. Beleno over Parcel II. However, on
AQUINO, C.J.:
March 31, 1981, the Minister of Natural Resources, thru his
Acting Secretary, Jose A. Janolo set aside the order by declaring
that the Fishpond Permit No. F-5551-V of Viola C. Azurin covers This is a land registration case involving what the Republic of the
Parcel I, II, and III subject to the final resolution by competent Philippines claims to be grazing land, a part of the forest reserve.
authorities of the adverse claim of certain Muslim occupants
over Parcel III. In other words, Viola C. Azurin's claim over Parcel
The evidence shows that on March 14, 1873 the Alcalde
III has not attained the status of finality unless and until the
Mayor and judge of the Court of First Instance in Tuguegarao,
conflict of land claims, now subject of the instant case, is finally
Cagayan purportedly granted to Domingo Bunagan a possessory
resolved by the courts.
information title for a tract of land,called Nottab, "3,500 brazas
de largo y 3,000 brazas de ancho", "destinado al pasto de sus
Third, the instant case now before this Court for review is an ganados" y bajo la condicion de sin perjuicio del derecho que el
offshoot of Viola C. Azurin's complaint for correction, amendment Estado o otro tercero pudiera tener en referida finca rustica"
or cancellation of the Homestead Patent of Minda de Porkan and (Exh. I and K).
Free Patent of Lolita Macatindog filed with the Bureau of Lands on
May 26, 1972 involving the same portion of land subject of the
The Gaceta de Manila dated November 3, 1885 mentions
sales application filed on March 1, 1968 and fishpond application
Bunagan as having obtained a "composicion gratuita" for a
filed on April 24, 1969 by Viola C. Azurin.
parcel of land in Enrile, Cagayan (Exh. J-1) or a gratuitous
adjustment title as distinguished from an onerous adjustment
Fourth, the Fishpond Permit No. F-5551-V of Viola C. Azurin had title. **
technically expired on December 31, 1966. Obviously,
recognizing the extent and limits of her occupation, use and
What happened to the Nottab land? The conflicting evidence of
possession of the fishpond area, she filed the said sales
the oppositor Cagayan Valley Agricultural Corporation (Cavaco)
application over the same area on March 1, 1968, but said
and petitioner Pacifico Vijandre shows that two persons, the
application was not approved.
brothers Luis Guzman Rivas and Lope Guzman Rivas, sons of
Pablo Guzman, played decisive roles in its disposition.
Considering that Viola C. Azurin was not able to legitimize her
claim over the disputed portion, there is then no justifiable
The evidence is conflicting because, according to Cavaco's
reason for the Director of Lands to divest Lolita Macatindog and
evidence, the whole land was sold to Luis Guzman Rivas and
Minda de Porkan and their successors-in-interest of their titles,
later to Cavaco, whereas, according to Vijandre's evidence, only
which had long been vested on their predecessors-in-interest.
a portion was sold to Luis and the remainder was sold to Lope

Guzman Rivas who in turn sold portions to Vijandre and Fernando
A. Pascua.
The Solicitor General's view is that the whole Nottab land,
whatever its area, is forestal and grazing land, and consequently,
was inalienable land and, therefore, all supposed sales regarding
that land were void.
According to Cavaco's evidence, after Bunagan's death, his son-
in-law, Ceferino Saddul, as apoderado of Bunagan's heirs, sold
the land to one Manuel Guzman sometime in 1904 or 1905 or
1908.
The administratrix of Manuel Guzman's estate, with the approval
of the probate court, sold the land in 1934 toLuis Guzman
Rivas who died in 1944. The land passed to his widow, Dolores
Enriquez, who sold the northern portion of the land to Saturnino
Moldero in 1944 and the southern portion to Rafael Gonzales in
1951.
Moldero in 1948 sold his northern portion to the spouses Antonio
and Josefa Estrada. In 1951 the Estrada spouses and (Gonzales
sold the land to Cavaco (Exh. 12-A to 15Pascua, 242 Joint
Record on Appeal).
The trial court and the Court of Appeals in a land registration
case adjudicated to Cavaco 1,222 hectares of the Nottab land. It
is the registered owner of the land. Right or wrong that decision
is the law of the case. (Cagayan Valley Agricultural Corporation
vs. Director of Lands, CA-G.R. No, 24931-32, December 9, 1960).
The trial court correctly held that the said adjudication means
that the respondent herein cannot use anymore in this case the
supposed 1873 informacion posesoria and the 1885 composicion
gratuita as bases of their application for registration. The reason
is that said Spanish titles were already used in the Cavaco case.
Under those Spanish titles a land grant could not exceed 1,000
hectares (Director of Lands vs, Reves, L-27594, November 28,
1975, 68 SCRA 177, 191 and other cases). It may be repeated
that Cavaco obtained more than 1,000 hectares by virtue of the
said Spanish titles. Parenthetically, it may be stated that
Presidential Decree No. 892 since 1976 discontinued the use of
Spanish titles as evidence in land registration proceedings.
It is the supposed remainder of Bunagan's land that is now
involved in this case, the portion transferred to Lope Guzman
Rivas as differentiated from the Cavaco land which came from
Lope's brother Luis. It should be stressed that according to the
NATURAL RESOURCES NEW CASES (ORAL QUIZ) 30
Cavaco case the whole land was sold to Luis and, therefore, no concept of owner: (3) in not finding that Domingo Bunagan's
remainder could have been transferred to Lope. Spanish titles were not authentic and (4) in not finding that the
1960 decision in favor of Cavaco is not res judicata.
On the other hand, according to Vijandre's evidence in this case,
on July 26, 1915, Manuela Bunagan, the sole heir of Domingo, On the other hand, lawyer Pascua argues (1) that the disputed
sold to Pablo Guzman for Pl,000 the remainder of the land in land was already private in the hands of Domingo Bunagans (2)
Nottab, Enrile, Cagayan, "una parcela de pasto de ganaderia", that portions of said land, 1,222 hectares and 9 hectares, were
covered by Tax Declaration No. 626 (Exh. H). titled in the names of Cavaco and Melardo Agapay (Benjamin V.
Pascua) respectively; (3) that the pasture lease agreements did
not convert private land into public land and (4) that Bunagan's
Pablo Guzman died in 1927. The Nottab land was inherited by his
Spanish titles were authentic and valid.
son, petitioner Lope Guzman Rivas, who leased the land for
grazing purposes to other persons. Lope has been residing in
Makati, Metro Manila since 1961 because he has a heart ailment. We hold that the disputed land is inalienable public grazing land,
being a part of the forest reserve. It is part of Timberland Project
No. 15-A of Enrile, Cagayan. It is included in the Bureau of
In 1958 about 800 hectares of the said land were sold by Lope to
Forestry Map L. C. 2263, comprising the Timberland of the
Ignacio Pascua who in 1962 sold the same portion to his son,
Cagayan Land Classification, containing an area of 8,249
Fernando.
hectares, situated in Enrile, Solana and Amulong, Cagayan. It is
non-registerable (Exh. 2-Rep.). It cannot be appropriated by
Lope Guzman Rivas and Vijandre filed in May, 1968 an private persons. It is not disposable public agricultural land.
application for the registration of two parcels of land located at
Sitio Nottab, the same Nottab land previously applied for by
Said land is a part of the to forest reserve under Presidential
Cavaco. It is covered by Plan Psu-178846, embracing thirteen
Proclamation No. 159 dated February 13, 1967. It is intended
lots with an area of 1,033 hectares, and Plan Psu-179101
for "wood production watershed soil protection and other forest
covering fifteen lots with an area of 890 hectares, or a total of
uses" (Exh. 1-B and 7, Rep.; 63 OG 3364). The reservation was
1,92.7 hectares.
made prior to the instant 1968 application for registration.
Before the application was filed, Lope Guzman Rivas sold to his
Applicant Lope Guzman Rivas and oppositor Pascua and their
co-petitioner Vijandre l/2 of the entire land at P50 a hectare.
predecessors have always treated the 1,923 hectares as pasture
Vijandre undertook to finance the registration of the land. Should
land. Portions of the land had been the object of pasture lease
the registration of the land not materialize for causes not
agreements with the Bureau of Forestry. Among the lessees were
imputable to Vijandre, then Lope would return to mall
oppositor Fernando A. Pascua himself, Eliseo Lasam and
scashadvances(9-16, Joint Record on Appeal).
J.T.Torres, Jr. (Exh. 3 and 4, Rep.).
The learned trial court declared the disputed land public land and
The 1960 and 1968 tax declarations of applicant Lope Guzmian
dismissed the applications of Lope Guzman Rivas and Vijandre
Rivas describe the 2,000 hectares of land in question as for
and the claims of Pascua and Cavaco.
"pasture exclusively", meaning it is grazing land (Exh. R and S).
Similarly, the 1960 and 1962 tax declarations submitted in
The Appellate Court reversed the trial court's decision. It granted evidence by oppositor Pascua describe 790 or 767 hectares of
the application of Lope and Vijandre, except with respect to Lot the land as "pasture land" (Exh. 27 and 28Pascua).
No. 13, which was already covered by OCT No. 0-393. The
Directors of Lands and Forest Development appealed to this
We have stated that the supposed possessory information title
Court. Lope Guzman Rivas and Vijandre did not file any
issued in 1873 to the original claimant, Domingo Bunagan,
appellees' brief.
describes the land as "una estancia de ganado al terreno"
(grazing land), or "un terreno destinado al pasto de sus ganados"
The Solicitor General contends that the Appellate Court erred (1) or la estancia para ganados denominada Nottab".
in not declaring that the disputed land is part of a forest
reservation; (2) in not finding that Lope Guzman Rivas and
The application for the possessory information title was
Vijandre and their predecessors have not been in the open,
approved "bajo la condicion de sin perjuicio determination
continuous, uninterrupted, exclusive and notorious possession of
derecho que el Estado o otro tercero pudiera tener en referida
the disputed land and that their possession was not in the

finca rustica" (Exh. 1). (Note that Exhibit J, the 1885 resolution
published in Gaceta de Manila, is not a composition title at all).
Manuela Bunagan, the supposed heir to Domingo Bunagan, sold
in 1915 the 2,000 hectares in question to Pablo Guzman at fifty
centavos a hectare as "una parcela de pasto de ganaderia (Exh.
H). Similarly, Ignacio A. Pascua bought from Lope Guzman Rivas
the 800 hectares in 1962 as "a parcel of pasture land" (Exh. I
Pascua).
Grazing lands and timber lands are riot alienable under section 1,
Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution and sections 8, 10 and 11 of
Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution. Section 10
distinguishes strictly agricultural lands(disposable) from grazing
lands (inalienable).
Lands within the forest zone or timber reservation cannot be the
object of private ownership (Republic vs. Animas, L- 37682,
March 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 499; Director of Forestry vs. Munoz,
132 Phil. 637; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 56077,
February 28, 1985, 135 SCRA 156 and other cases).
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Appellate Court is reversed and
set aside. The application for registration of Lope Guzman Rivas
and Pacifico V. Vijandre and the counter-application of lawyer
Fernando A. Pascua are dismissed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
============
G.R. No. L-56948 September 30, 1987
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
Director of Forest Development and the Director of
Lands, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and MARTINA
CARANTES for and in behalf of the Heirs of SALMING
PIRASO, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the decision
of the Court of Appeals affirming in toto the judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet, Branch III, at La
NATURAL RESOURCES NEW CASES (ORAL QUIZ) 31
Trinidad in LRC Case No. N-287, Record No. 37205, the dispositive That the aforementioned parcel of land is a
portion of which reads as follows: portion of the public domain belonging to the
Republic of the Philippines. (pp. 13-14, Rollo)
It having been proven convincingly that this
land was owned and possessed by the late On April 7, 1970, the Director of Forestry also filed an opposition
Salming Piraso and later by his successors-in- to the application for registration on the following grounds:
interest, who are his children for a period of
more than thirty years up to this date, they
That the whole area applied for registration is
have shown to have a registerable title on the
within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve
property which this Court therefore confirms
established under Proclamation No. 217 dated
and affirms in accordance with the law. Let the
February 16, 1929;
land so described in the technical description
of the survey made of the same and in
accordance with the corresponding plan be so That the area sought to be registered is neither
registered. (p. 50, Rollo) release for disposition nor alienation; and that
the herein applicant has no registerable title
over the whole parcel of land either in fact or in
On May 9, 1968, respondent Martina S. Carantes for and in
law. (p. 14, Rollo)
behalf of the Heirs of Saying Piraso filed with the Court of Firing
Instance of Baguio and Benguet, Land Registration No. N-287,
covering the following describe property: After trial, a decision was rendered by the land registration court,
as earlier stated, adjudicating the parcel of land to the
applicants. The motion for reconsideration filed by Government
A parcel of land (as shown on plan PSU-43639)
oppositor's having been denied, an appeal was made to the
situated in the Barrio of Ansagan Municipality
Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the decision of the land
of Tuba, Mountain Province. Bounded in the,
registration court.
NE., along line 1-2 by property of Sioco Carino
(PSU-43643, Lot 1); on the SE., and SW., along
lines 2-3-4-5 by public land, on the We, along In this petition, the petitioner assigns the following alleged errors
lines 5-6-1 by property of Tunccalo. Containing of the Court of Appeals:
an area of TWO MILLION ONE HUNDRED
NINETY SEVEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED
A. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE
AND SEVENTY NINE (2,197,879) SQUARE
LAND IN QUESTION IS NOT CAPABLE OF REGISTRATION BEING
METERS. ... (p. 13, Rollo)
PART OF THE PUBLIC FORESTS WITHIN THE CENTRAL
CORDILLERA FOREST RESERVE:
On January 13, 1970, the Director of Lands, through the Solicitor
General, filed an opposition to the application for registration
B. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
stating, among others:
ALLEGED POSSESSION OF THE LAND BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
AND THEIR PREDECESSORSINTEREST WAS NOT IN CONCEPT OF
That neither the applicant nor her OWNER UNDER SECTION 48 of the PUBLIC LAND LAW, THE LAND
predecessors-in-interest possess sufficient title BEING INALIENABLE;
to said parcel of land the same not having been
acquired by them either by composition title
C. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE LAND IS
from the Spanish Government or by possessory
AGRICULTURAL BECAUSE THE GOVERNMENT FAILED TO SUBMIT
information title under the Royal Decree of
PROOF THAT THE LAND IS MORE VALUABLE FOR FOREST
February 13, 1894;
PURPOSES;
That neither the applicant nor her
D. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PROPERTY
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
BECAME SEGREGATED FROM THE LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
continuous, exclusive, notorious possession
AND ASSUMED THE CHARACTER OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP UPON
and occupation of the land in question for at
APPROVAL OF ITS SURVEY PLAN BY THE DIRECTOR OF LAND IN
least thirty years immediately preceding the
1925;
filing of the present application;

E. ASSUMING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAD POSSESSED
AND CULTIVATED 10 TO 15 HECTARES OF THE LAND APPLIED
FOR, RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THEY HAD
ACQUIRED OWNERSHIP THRU CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION OVER
THE REST OF THE (219.7879) HECTARES APPLIED FOR. (p. 18,
Rollo)
The issues raised are:
1. Whether or not the land in question is part of
the public forest within the Central Cordillera
Forest Reserve; and
2. Whether or not private respondents have
established registerable title over the land in
question.
It is the stand of the petitioner that the land in question covered
by the Plan-Psu-43639 is part of the public forests within the
Central Cordillera Forest Reserve established under Proclamation
No. 217 of Governor General Henry Stimson dated February 16,
1929. On February 27, 1980, an ocular inspection of said
property was made by Land Inspector Crisogono Bartolo, Jr., of
the Bureau of Lands together with representatives of the Bureau
of Forestry, the Land Registration Court, and the applicants for
registration. During the ocular inspection, the land was found to
be rolling and stony in nature. Bartolo, Jr., submitted a report on
April 17, 1970 stating among others, that the land is covered
with trees, bushes and grasses and being also stony is not
suitable for agricultural purposes.
The representative of the Bureau of Forestry, Forester Ricardo D.
Zapatero, submitted to the Provincial Fiscal a separate report
dated April 6, 1970 to the effect that the whole area falls within
the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve and that the same has not
been released for agricultural purposes by the Director of
Forestry who had administrative jurisdiction over the same.
The petitioner states that since the land in question is
indubitably part of the public forest and has not been reclassified
or released from the forest zone, the same can not be the subject
of registration either under Act 496, otherwise known as the Land
Registration Act, or under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act
No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act. The petitioner
points out that lands within the forest zone or within a duly
established reservation do not form part of the disposable
portion of the public domain nor can the same be alienated as
said lands are not capable of private appropriation or ownership
and possession thereof, however long, cannot convert that same
into private property.
NATURAL RESOURCES NEW CASES (ORAL QUIZ) 32
It is further argued by the petitioner that the private respondents There is an erroneous assumption implicit in the challenged
or their predecessors-in-interest, Salming Piraso, had not decision of the Court of Appeals which the government
acquired ownership over the land prior to its classification as part oppositors also appear to have overlooked. This is the reliance on
of the Cordillera Forest Reserve use there is no evidence on Proclamation No. 217 of Governor General Henry L. Stimson as
record that Salming Piraso had possessed the property for any the operative act which converted the lands covered by the
appreciable period prior to 1929 when the land became part of Central Cordillera Forest Reserve into forest lands. This is wrong.
the Cordillera Forest Reserve. The land was not non-forest or agricultural land prior to the 1929
proclamation. It did not ease a classification from non-forest into
forest land because of the proclamation. The proclamation
On the other hand, the private respondents assert that the
merely declared a special forest reserve out of already existing
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals show that the land subject
forest lands. The land was already forest or timber land even
of application is not within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve
before the proclamation. The alleged entry in 1915 of Salming
and the same land applied for registration is disposable and
Piraso and the cultivation of 15 hectares out of a (219.7879)
alienable. The private respondents, as applicants, claim to have
hectares claimed area has no legal significance. A person cannot
sufficiently shown by preponderance of evidence that the land
enter into forest land and by the simple act of cultivating a
being applied for registration had been possessed by Salming
portion of that land, earn credits towards an eventual
Piraso as far back as 1915 when he and his workers planted the
confirmation of imperfect title. The Government must first
arable portion of about 15 hectares to rice and other products
declare the forest land to be alienable and disposable agricultural
and raised cows on the other portion suited for pasture. The late
land before the year of entry, cultivation, and exclusive and
Salming Piraso had the land surveyed by private surveyor Jose
adverse possession can be counted for purposes of an imperfect
Castro on April 3-9, 1924 as Plan Psu-43639 which was approved
title.
by the then Director of Lands, Jorge B. Vargas on March 6, 1925,
while Proclamation No. 217 was promulgated only on February
16, 1929. They state that the approval of the said survey by the The records positively establish that the land in question is part
government thru the Director of Lands Jorge B. Vargas can only of the public forest which the Executive formally proclaimed as
mean that said land was no longer included in the overall survey the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve to further preserve its
of the government as it was no longer part of the public land. As integrity and to give it a status which is more special for certain
applicants, they contend that they have possessed the land purposes than that of ordinary forest lands.
applied for in concept of owner, openly and publicly, adverse
against the whole world and continuously for more than thirty
One reason for the respondent court's decision finding a
(30) years before they filed the application over the land which is
registerable title for the private respondents is its observation
agricultural and separate from the public domain.
that the Government failed to show that the disputed land is
more valuable for forest purposes. The court noted a failure to
We find the petition to be meritorious. It is already a settled rule prove that trees are thriving in the land.
that forest lands or forest reserves are not capable of private
appropriation and possession thereof, however long, of convert
The Court of Appeals finding is based on a wrong concept of what
them into private property (Vano vs. Government of Philippine
is forest land. There is a big difference between "forest" as
Islands, 41 Phil. 161; Adorable v. Director of Forestry, 107 Phil.
defined in a dictionary and "forest or timber land" as a
401; Director of Forestry vs. Muoz, 23 SCRA 1183; Republic vs.
classification of lands of the public domain in the Constitution.
De la Cruz 67 SCRA 221; Director of Lands vs. Reyes & Azurin vs.
(Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, Section 10, Article
Director of Lands, 68 SCRA 177; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 89
XIV of the 1973 Constitution, as amended; and Section 1, Article
SCRA 648; and Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA
XIII of the 1935 Constitution).
701) unless such lands are reclassified and considered
disposable and alienable by the Director of Forestry, but even
then, possession of the land by the applicants prior to the One is descriptive of what appears on the land while the other is
reclassification of the land as disposable and alienable cannot be a legal status a classification for legal purposes.
credited as part of the thirty-year requirement under Section 48
(b) of the Public Land Act (Director of Lands vs. Court of
The "forest land" started out as a "forest" or vast tracts of
Appeals, supra). In this case, there is no showing of
wooded land with dense growths of trees and underbush.
reclassification by the Director of Forestry that the land in
However, the cutting down of trees and the disappearance of
question is disposable or alienable. This is a matter which cannot
virgin forest and not automatically convert the lands of the public
be assumed. It calls for proof.
domain from forest or timber land to alienable agricultural land.

As stated by this Court in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of
Forestry (126 SCRA 69, 75);
On February 27, 1970, an ocular inspection of the questioned
property was conducted by Land Inspector Crisogono Bartolo, Jr.,
of the Bureau of Lands, together with Forester Ricardo D.
Zapatero of the Bureau of Forestry, Deputy Clerk of Court
Roberto Gogoling as representative of the land registration court,
Fiscal Navarro and Andres Carantes as representative of the
applicant.
Land Inspector Crisogono Bartolo, Jr., submitted his report dated
April 17, 1970, which states, among others, that the land is
covered with trees, bushes and grasses and being stony is not
suitable for agricultural purposes. This negates the claim of the
private respondents that the land has been cultivated since
1915.
More important, however, than the appearance of the land is its
status, as stated in the separate report dated April 6, 1970
submitted to the Provincial Fiscal of Benguet Province by Forester
Ricardo D. Zapatero which declares that the whole area applied
for by the applicant fails within the Central Cordillera Forest
Reserve and that the same has not been released for agricultural
purposes by the Director of Forestry who has administrative
jurisdiction over the same. This has not been successfully
refuted. It has not been proved erroneous.
The reports and testimonies of Land Inspector Bartolo and
Forester Zapatero support the contention of the petitioner that
the area applied for by the applicant is forest land within the
Central Cordillera Forest Reserve. In the case of Ramos v.
Director of Lands (39 Phil. 175) we have ousted:
Great consideration, it may be stated, should,
and undoubtedly will be, Paid by the courts to
the opinion of the technical expert who speaks
with authority on Forestry matters.
There is no factual basis for the conclusion of the appellate court
that the property in question was no longer part of the public
land when the Government through the Director of Lands
approved on March 6, 1925, the survey plan (Plan Psu-43639) for
Salming Piraso. The existence of a sketch plan of real property
even if approved by the Bureau of Lands is no proof in itself of
ownership of the land covered by the plan. (Gimeno v. Court of
Appeals, 80 SCRA 623). The fact that a claimant or a possessor
has a sketch plan or a survey map prepared for a parcel of land
which forms part of the country's forest reserves does not
convert such land into alienable land, much less private property.
Assuming that a public officer erroneously approves the sketch
plan, such approval is nun and void. There must first be a formal
Government declaration that the forest land has been re-
classified into alienable and disposable agricultural land which
may then be acquired by private persons in accordance with the
various modes of acquiring public agricultural lands.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of
the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the land
registration court which granted the private respondents'
application for registration of the land in question is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The application for land registration is
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
===================
CRUZ vs. SECRETARY of DENR
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit
for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers,
assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act
No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples
Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations (Implementing Rules).
In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required
respondents to comment.[1] In compliance, respondents
Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government agency created
under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on October 13,
1998 their Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the
constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the petition be
dismissed for lack of merit.
On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and
Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM)
filed through the Solicitor General a consolidated Comment. The
Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly
unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over
natural resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the
petition be granted in part.
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed
of Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the authors of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano
Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission,
and the leaders and members of 112 groups of indigenous
peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for Leave to
Intervene. They join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality
of IPRA and praying for the dismissal of the petition.
NATURAL RESOURCES NEW CASES (ORAL QUIZ) 33
On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights
(CHR) likewise filed a Motion to Intervene and/or to Appear as
Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the
principle of parens patriae and that the State has the
responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those who
are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this
reason it prays that the petition be dismissed.
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the
Ikalahan Indigenous People and the Haribon Foundation for the
Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a
motion to Intervene with attached Comment-in-
Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that
IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and pray that the petition
for prohibition and mandamus be dismissed.
The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and
organizations were granted.
Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter,
the parties and intervenors filed their respective memoranda in
which they reiterate the arguments adduced in their earlier
pleadings and during the hearing.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following
provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules on the ground
that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States
ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals
and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian
doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution:
(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and
coverage of ancestral domains, and Section 3(b)
which, in turn, defines ancestral lands;
(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which
provides that ancestral domains including
inalienable public lands, bodies of water, mineral
and other resources found within ancestral
domains are private but community property of
the indigenous peoples;
(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b)
which defines the composition of ancestral
domains and ancestral lands;
(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the
rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral
domains;

(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the
rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral
lands;
(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the
indigenous peoples in the harvesting, extraction,
development or exploration of minerals and other
natural resources within the areas claimed to be
their ancestral domains, and the right to enter into
agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the
development and utilization of natural resources
therein for a period not exceeding 25 years,
renewable for not more than 25 years; and
(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples
the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and
conserve the ancestral domains and portions
thereof which are found to be necessary for critical
watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries,
wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or
reforestation.[2]
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-
encompassing definition of ancestral domains and ancestral
lands which might even include private lands found within said
areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private
landowners.[3]
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA
defining the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and making
customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving
ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the ground that these
provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution.[4]
These provisions are:
(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process
of delineation and recognition of ancestral
domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole
authority to delineate ancestral domains and
ancestral lands;
(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon
certification by the NCIP that a particular area is an
ancestral domain and upon notification to the
following officials, namely, the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary of
Interior and Local Governments, Secretary of
Justice and Commissioner of the National
Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of said
officials over said area terminates;
(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law,
traditions and practices of indigenous peoples shall
be applied first with respect to property rights,
claims of ownership, hereditary succession and
settlement of land disputes, and that any doubt or
ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be
resolved in favor of the indigenous peoples;
(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and
practices shall be used to resolve disputes
involving indigenous peoples; and
(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the
jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving
rights of the indigenous peoples.[5]
Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II,
Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998,
which provides that the administrative relationship of the NCIP
to the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral but
autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program
coordination. They contend that said Rule infringes upon the
Presidents power of control over executive departments under
Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.[6]
Petitioners pray for the following:
(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57,
58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and other related provisions
of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid;
(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the
Chairperson and Commissioners of the NCIP to
cease and desist from implementing the assailed
provisions of R.A. 8371 and its Implementing
Rules;
(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the
Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources to cease and desist from
implementing Department of Environment and
Natural Resources Circular No. 2, series of 1998;
(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the
Secretary of Budget and Management to cease
and desist from disbursing public funds for the
implementation of the assailed provisions of R.A.
8371; and
NATURAL RESOURCES NEW CASES (ORAL QUIZ) 34
(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding
the Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources to comply with his duty of carrying out
the States constitutional mandate to control and
supervise the exploration, development, utilization
and conservation of Philippine natural
resources.[7]
After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the
Court voted as follows:
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan
filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo,
Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the
challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a
separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law
with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA
which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with the
large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read
in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to
dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does not raise a
justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have standing to
question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the
petition. Justice Panganiban filed a separate opinion expressing
the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related
provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves
judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66
of the law, which he believes must await the filing of specific
cases by those whose rights may have been violated by the
IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the
view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes,
and De Leon join in the separate opinions of Justices Panganiban
and Vitug.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the
necessary majority was not obtained, the case was redeliberated
upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the
same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.
Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the
separate opinions of Justices Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
and Panganiban.