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JOINT TRAINING

FOR NIGHT AIR


WARFARE
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Close air support - Study and teaching - United States; Night fighting (Military science) - Study and
teaching - United States
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Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)


Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
Joint Training for Night Air Warfare

by

Brian W. McLean, Lt Col, USAF


Research Fellow
Airpower Research Institute

Winner of the Air Force Historical Foundation's


1991 ColonelJames Cannell Memorial Award

Air University Press


Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-5532

October 1992
Library
Library of
of Congress
Congress Cataloging-in-Publication
Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Data

McLean, Brian
McLean, Brian WW..
Joint
Joint training for night
training for night air
air warfare
warfare /by
/ by Brian
Brian W.
W. McLean.
McLean,
p.
p. cm.cm.
Includes
Includes bibliographical
bibliographical references.
references.
1I.. Close
Close air
air support-Study
supportStudy and and teaching-United
teaching^United States.
States.
22.. Night
Night fighting
fighting (Military
(Military science)--Study
science)Study andand teaching-United
teachingUnited States
States..
I.
I. Title.
Title.
UG703
UG703.M38 .M38 1992
1992
358.4' 142'07073-dc20
358.4'142'07073dc20 92-27734
92-27734
CIP
CIP

DISCLAIIAER
DISCLAIMER

This
This publication
publication was was produced
produced in in the
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interest of
of academic
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advancement of of
national
national defense-related
defense-related concepts.
concepts. The
The views
views expressed
expressed inin this
this publication
publication
are those
are those of
of the
the author
author and
and do
do not
not reflect
reflect the
the official
official policy
policy or
or position
position of
ofthe
the
Department
Department of of Defense
Defense or or the
the United
United States
States government
government..
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ii
Contents
Contents

Chapter
Chapter Page
Page

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
DISCLAIMER iiii
FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
FOREWORD vii
vii
ABOUT
ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
THE AUTHOR ix
ix
PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
PREFACE xi
xi
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
INTRODUCTION xv
xv
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Notes xvii
xvii

11 HISTORY
HISTORY AND BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
AND BACKGROUND . . 11
Joint Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Joint Operations . . 11
Night Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Night Operations . . 55
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Summary . . 14
14
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Notes . . 15
15
22 DOING
DOING IT
IT IN
IN THE
THE DARKTHE
DARKTHE CHALLENGE . ..
CHALLENGE ..... 17
17
Operation Tae Kwon
Operation Tae Kwon Do Do . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
19
Mission Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mission Planning . . . . . . . . . . 22
22
Offensive Coimterair . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Offensive Counterair . . . . . . . . . . 23
23
Defensive Counterair . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Defensive Counterair . . . . . . . . . . 34
34
On-Call Close Air
On-CaU Close Air Support
Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
35
Mission Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mission Execution . . . . . . . . . . 37
37
Counterair . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Offensive Counterair
Offensive . . . . . . . . . . 38
38
Defensive Counterair
Defensive Coimterair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
47
On-Call
On-Call Close
Close Air Support . . . . . . . . .
Air Support . . . . . . . . . . 48
48
Mission Feasibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mission Feasibility . . . . . . . . . . 51
51
Summary
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
52
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Notes . . . . . . . . . . 53
53

iii
Chapter
Chapter Page
Page

PHOTO
PHOTO SECTION
SECTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
55
33 CURRENT
CURRENT TRAINING
TEIAINING PROGRAMS
PROGRAMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
61
Requirements
Requirements for for Realistic
Realistic Training
Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
62
Red
Red Flag
Hag . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
64
Naval Strike
Naval Strike Warfare
Warfare CenterCenter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
71
National
National Training
Training CenterCenter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
72
Twehtynine
Tweiitynine Palms
Palms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
74
Cope Thunder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cope Thunder . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
75
Team
Team Spirit
Spirit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
77
Summary . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
79
Notes
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
79
44 CONCLUSIONS
CONCLUSIONS AND
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
RECOMMENDATIONS .....
... 83
83
Expanding
Expanding Air Force Night
Air Force Night Capability
Capability . . . . . . . . . . . 85
85
Recommendation 1 : Implement Red
Recommendation 1: Implement Red Flag
Flag
2000 Proposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2000 Proposal 86
86
Recommendation
Recommendation 2: 2: Initiate
Initiate Annual
Annual NightNight
Cope Thunder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cope Thunder 88
88
Expanding
Expanding Joint
Joint Capability
Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
88
Recommendation
Recommendation 3: 3: Develop
Develop More More Extensive
Extensive
Joint Force Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Joint Force Tactics 89
89
Recommendation
Recommendation 4: 4: Expand
Expand Formal
Formal Joint Joint
Training Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Training Programs 89
89
Recommendation
Recommendation 5: 5: Begin
Begin Mission
Mission Commanders'
Commanders'
School
School at
at Red
Red Flag
Flag . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
90
Recommendation 6:
Recommendation 6: Initiate
Initiate Annual
Annual Unified
Unified
Command
Command Red Red Flag
Flag . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
92
Developing Joint Night Capability
Developing Joint Night Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
93
Recommendation
Recommendation 7: 7: Expand
Expand JointJoint Night
Night
Training
Training at
at Each
Each Center
Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
93
Recommendation 8: Increase
Recommendation 8: Increase Joint
Joint Night
Night
Operations
Operations atat Team
Team Spirit
Spirit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
94
Recommendation 9: Develop an
Recommendation 9: Develop an Annual
Annual
Unified Command Exercise
Unified Command Exercise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
94

iv
Chapter
Chapter Page
P"?'

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Summary 96
96
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Notes 97
97
INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
INDEX 99
99

Illustrations
Illustrations
Figure
Figure

11 The
The Korean
Korean Peninsula and Operation
Peninsula and Operation Tae
Tae Kwon
Kwon Do
Do .. .. .. 18
18
22 Aspect
Aspect Angle
Angle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
42

Table
Table

11 Available Assets for


Available Assets for Operation
Operation Tae
Tae Kwon
Kwon Do
Do . . . . . . . . 21
21
22 Bul-Go-Ki
Bul-Go-Ki OCA
OCA Mission
Mission Package
Package . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
33
Foreword
Foreword

The
The reality of today's
reality of today's world
world is is that although the
that although the threat
threat ofWorld
of World WarWar
III
in may
may bebe greatly
greatly reduced,
reduced, the the possibility
possibility of of wars involving American
wars involving American
troops remains high. These wars probably will be conducted by
troops remains high. These wars probably will be conducted by large
large
and complex
and complex jointjoint staffs and likely
staffs and likely will
wUl be be characterized
characterized by by intense
intense
activity
activity carried out regardless
carried out regardless ofweather,
of weather, time time ofof day,
day, or or seasons
seasons of of the
the
year . Our most recent experiences in Panama, Grenada, Libya, and the
year. Our most recent experiences in Panama, Grenada, Libya, and the
Persian Gulf have
Persian Gulf have proven
proven thatthat modern
modem war war requires
requires joint
joint air,
air, land,
land, and
and
naval
naval forces fighting both
forces fighting both day
day and
and night.
night. Are
Are we we preparing
preparing to do this?
to do this?
Are we training for air operations
Are we training for air operations using
using all
all forces
forces at
at our
our disposal
disposal in
in aa
war
war that
that may begin in
may begin in the
the middle
middle of of the
the night?
night?
The author's contention is that training for
The author's contention is that training for night
night air air operations,
operations,
particularly
particularly with our sister
with our sister services,
services, is is in
in its infancy. Using
its infancy. Using hishis personal
personal
experience
experience he he sets
sets out
out to
to recommend
recommend better better uses
uses ofthe
of the training
training facilities
facilities
of all the services to improve the situation . After
of all the services to improve the situation. After examining
examining the
the history
history
of joint
of joint operations
operations and night air
and night air operations,
operations, presenting
presenting aa hypothetical
hypothetical
joint night scenario to show the tremendous challenges of
joint night scenario to show the tremendous challenges of such
such
operations, and
operations, describing the
and describing the current
current status
status of joint night
of joint night training
training
programs, the
programs, the author recommends aa phased
author recommends phased building-block
buHding-block approachapproach
that should increase the Air Force's capability to
that should increase the Air Force's capability to perform
perform both
both
single-service
single-service and and joint operations any
joint operations any time
time of of the
the dayday or night. This
or night. This
will ensure that we train as we plan to fight in future air operations.
will ensure that we train as we plan to fight in future air operations.

Vii
About
About the
the
Author
Author

Lt Col Brian W. McLean

Lt
Lt Col
Col Brian
Brian W.
W. ("Bingo") McLean prepared
("Bingo") McLean prepared this this book
book as as the
the Pacific
Pacific
Air Forces (PACAF) command-sponsored research fellow for 1990-91
Air Forces (PACAF) command-sponsored research fellow for 1990-91
at
at the
the Airpower
Airpower Research Institute (ARI)
Research Institute (ARI) forfor the
the Air
Air University
University Center
Center
for
for Aerospace
Aerospace Doctrine,
Doctrine, Research,
Research, and Education (AUCADRE),
and Education (AUCADRE),
Maxwell Air Force Base (AFB), Alabama. A 1974 graduate of
Maxwell Air Force Base (AFB), Alabama. A 1974 graduate of the
the US
US
Air
Air Force
Force Academy
Academy (USAFA),
(USAFA), ColonelColonel McLean McLean holds holds an an
undergraduate
undergraduate degree
degree in in International
International Relations
Relations (Far (Far Eastern
Eastern Studies)
Studies)
from the USAFA and a master's degree
from the USAFA and a master's degree in
in history
history from
from Old
Old Dominion
Dominion
University. Professional
University. Professional military
military education
education includes Squadron Officer
includes Squadron Officer
School (in residence), Air Command and Staff College (by
School (in residence). Air Command and Staff College (by
correspondence),
correspondence), and and Air
Air War
War College
College (in(in residence).
residence).
A
A master navigator. Colonel
master navigator, Colonel McLean
McLean has has accumulated
accumulated nearlynearly 3,000
3,000
flight hours since completing navigator
flight hours since completing navigator training
training as
as a
a distinguished
distinguished
graduate
graduate inin March 1975. From
March 1975. From 1975
1975 toto 1977
1977 hehe was
was aa C-141
C-141 navigator
navigator
at Travis AFB, California, when he was selected to cross train as
at Travis AFB, California, when he was selected to cross train as aa
weapons system officer
weapons system officer (WSO)
(WSO) in in F-4s Transition training
F-4s.. Transition training at at MacDill
MacDill
AFB,
AFB, Florida,
Florida, was
was followed
followed by by assignments
assignments as as aa WSO
WSO and and instructor
instructor
WSO to Royal Air Force (RAF) Bentwaters, United
WSO to Royal Air Force (RAF) Bentwaters, United Kingdom
Kingdom (UK);
(UK);
Osan
Osan AirAir Base
Base (AB),
(AB), Korea; and Moody
Korea; and Moody AFB, AFB, Georgia
Georgia.. InIn 1983,
1983, after
after
completing his assignment at Moody AFB, Colonel McLean
completing his assignment at Moody AFB, Colonel McLean
volunteered
volunteered for for Air
Air Force-Navy
Force-Navy officer
officer exchange
exchange duty duty asas anan F-14
F-14
instructor
instructor radar
radar intercept
intercept officer
officer (IRIO)
(IRIO) in in F-14s
F-14s atat Naval
Naval AirAir Station
Station
Miramar, San Diego, California. During his exchange tour
Miramar, San Diego, California. During his exchange tour with
with the
the
Navy,
Navy, Colonel
Colonel McLean
McLean earned
earned the
the somewhat
somewhat dubious
dubious distinction
distinction of
of
being the IRIO in the first all-Air Force crew to land an F-14 aboard an
being the IRIO in the first all-Air Force crew to land an F-14 aboard an
aircraft
aircraft carrier.
carrier. From
From 1986
1986 toto 1989,
1989, Colonel
Colonel McLean
McLean served
served onon the
the staff
staff
at
at Headquarters
Headquarters Tactical
Tactical Air
Air Command
Command (TAC) (TAC) under
under the
the Deputy
Deputy Chief
Chief
of Staff for
of Staff for Requirements
Requirements followed
followed by by aa tour
tour at
at Headquarters
Headquarters PACAF
PACAF
under
under the
the Deputy
Deputy Chief
Chief ofof Staff
Staff for
for Operations
Operations.. His
His assignment
assignment at at
Hickam AFB was curtailed when PACAF selected him as the PACAF
Hickam AFB was curtailed when PACAF selected him as the PACAF
command-sponsored
command-sponsored research research fellow
fellow and,
and, simultaneously,
simultaneously, to to be
be aa
member
member of of the
the Air
Air War
War College
College class
class of
of 1991
1991..
Colonel McLean, his wife Peg, and children Alexander
Colonel McLean, his wife Peg, and children Alexander andand Mary
Mary
Eileen
Eileen are
are currently
currently stationed
stationed atat Headquarters
Headquarters United
United States
States European
European
Command,
Command, Patch Patch Barracks,
Barracks, Stuttgart,
Stuttgart, Germany,
Germany, in in the
the Theater
Theater Plans
Plans
Division
Division of of J-5,
J-5, Plans
Plans and
and Programs
Programs..

x
Preface
Preface

The
The genesis
genesis of of this
this book
book cancan be be traced
traced to to two
two specific
specific assignments,
assignments,
my
my Air
Air Force-Navy
Force-Navy officerofficer exchange
exchange duty duty inin F- 14s and
F-14s and my my tour
tour onon the
the
staff in
staff in the
the Special
Special Management
Management Organization Organization for for low-altitude
low-altitude
navigation and targeting infrared for night (LANTIRN) .
navigation and targeting infrared for night (LANTIRN).
From
From my my experiences
experiences withthe
with the Navy,
Navy, II gained
gained an an appreciation
appreciation for for how
how
well
well the
the services
services can
can work together if
work together we can
if we can overcome
overcome the the challenges
challenges
to joint operations. My experiences since then with Marine and
to joint operations. My experiences since then with Marine and Army
Army
personnel
personnel convinced
convinced me that the
me that the same
same discipline,
discipline, pride,
pride, and
and expertise
expertise
run through any warrior, regardless of what color uniform he or
run through any warrior, regardless of what color uniform he or she
she
wears
wears oror what
what service insignia is
service insignia is painted
painted on on the
the side
side ofthe
of the airplane.
airplane. ThisThis
ingrained
ingrained devotion
devotion to to duty,
duty, properly
properly directed toward mission
directed toward mission
accomplishment, can override any sense of interservice rivalry and
accomplishment, can override any sense of interservice rivalry and
greatly
greatly increase
increase the
the sum
sum total
total ofmilitary power throughjoint
of military powerthrough joint operations
operations..
This
This inherent
inherent capability
capability is is limited,
limited, though,
though, because
because of of aa lack
lack of of an
an
in-depth awareness of each other's capabilities and
in-depth awareness of each other's capabilities and limitations
limitations. .
Following this
Following this exposure
exposure to to the
the possibilities
possibilities of of joint
joint operations,
operations, my my
tour in the LANTIRN office at Headquarters TAC convinced me that
tour in the LANTIRN office at Headquarters TAG convinced me that
future air warfare
future air warfare mustmust include
include night night combat.
combat. The The tactical
tactical capability
capability
provided
provided by by the emerging night
the emerging technology was
night technology was too too great
great to to be
be
neglected. Each of the armed services had or was developing
neglected. Each of the armed services had or was developing the
the
technology
technology for night air
for night warfare, but
air warfare, but there
there waswas nono formal
formal program
program to to
develop or train forjoint night tactics or operations . When I was offered
develop or train for joint night tactics or operations. When I was offered
the opportunity in
the opportunity in February
February 1990 1990 to to compete
compete for for the
the PACAF
PACAF
command-sponsored
command-sponsored research research fellowship
fellowship at at AUCADRE,
AUCADRE, II saw saw this
this as
as
an opportunity to point out what I considered a significant oversight
an opportunity to point out what I considered a significant oversight and
and
propose
propose aa solution
solution to to the
the issue.
issue.
Although this book was started
Although this book was started wellwell before
before thethe events
events of of Operations
Operations
Desert
Desert Shield/Desert
Shield/Desert Storm,
Storm, II waswas personally
personally gratified
gratified to to see
see my my initial
initial
assumptions validated
assumptions validated.. JointJoint operations,
operations, including
including joint joint night
night
operations, are a critically important part of modern warfare . The
operations, are a critically important part of modem warfare. The
success
success ofof Operation
Operation Desert
Desert Storm
Storm was was thethe result
result ofof joint
joint development
development
and
and training
training efforts during the
efforts during the months
months of of Desert
Desert Shield.
Shield. We We mustmust
continue
continue those efforts now
those efforts now toto ensure
ensure aa future capability, particularly
future capability, particularly if if
we
we do do not have five
not have five months
months of preparation time
of preparation time inin theater
theater before
before thethe
initiation
initiation of combat. This
of combat. This report
report has proposed training
has aa proposed training method
method for for
ensuring that capability .
ensuring that capability.
II ask
ask the reader to
the reader to keep
keep twotwo key key factors
factors in mind regarding
in mind regarding the the
conclusions and recommendations in this book. First, there is nothing
conclusions and recommendations in this book. First, there is nothing
wrong with
wrong with the the way
way that that we
we have
have trained
trained for joint night
for joint night operations
operations in in
the
the past past oror in in the
the wayway we are training
we are training for for them
them today.
today. TheThe training
training
programs in place are the best that could be safely and
programs in place are the best that could be safely and prudently
prudently done,
done,
given
given the the technical capabilities in
technical capabilities in existence
existence.. This This book
book attempts
attempts to to
suggest a way that future training can be guided to incorporate new
suggest a way that future training can be guided to incorporate new
technology
technology for greater employment
for aa greater employment capabilitycapability.. Second,
Second, II am am notnot the
the
Air
Air Force Force expert
expert for for the
the definitive
defroitive jointjoint night
night training
training program.
program. DuringDuring
this last year I have been afforded the luxury of time to consider
this last year I have been afforded the luxury of time to consider
long-term possibilities ; II must
long-term possibUities; must leave
leave itit toto those
those responsible
responsible for for dealing
dealing
with short-term realities
with short-term realities to to determine
determine if if my
my suggestions
suggestions are are feasible.
feasible.
II would
would welcome
welcome the the opportunity
opportunity to to assist
assist them
them in in any
any way
way possible
possible to to
implement
implement this this plan.
plan.
II want
want to to express
express my my deepest personal gratitude
deepest personal gratitude to to LtLt ColCol JimJim
Brungess, my
Brungess, my former
former boss boss at Headquarters PACAF.
at Headquarters PACAF. Jim Jim mademade me me
aware
aware of of the
the research
research fellowfellow program
program at at AUCADRE
AUCADRE and kicked my
and kicked my
backside to get my application done in time.
backside to get my application done in time. You
You cannot
cannot ask
ask more
more from
from
aa leader
leader than than that
that he look after
he look after the
the needs
needs and and advancement
advancement of of his people..
his people
Jim personifies the very essence of an Air Force leader. I also want to
Jim personifies the very essence of an Air Force leader. I also want to
thank
thank my academic advisor,
my academic advisor, Dr Dr Lawrence
Lawrence Grinter,
Grinter, andand mymy editor,
editor, Hugh
Hugh
Richardson
Richardson.. They They took took my crude concepts
my crude concepts and and molded
molded them them intointo aa
coherent whole. I knew what I wanted to say; they
coherent whole. I knew what I wanted to say; they made
made sure
sure that
that II
really
really saidsaid it.it.
This has been
This has been aa veryvery rewarding
rewarding but but also very difficult
also aa very difficult year.
year. In In
addition
addition to to writing
writing this book, II attended
this book, attended Air War College. The
Air WarCollege. The combined
combined
study, research,
study, research, and and writing
writing work
work loadsloads of of the
the two
two programs
programs made made for for
aa typical
typical workday
workday of of about
about 1818 hours.
hours.
II cannot
cannot say say enough
enough good things about
good things about my my wife,
wife, Peg,
Peg, the
the one
one person
person
that made the whole year possible. She enabled me to keep my sanity
that made the whole year possible. She enabled me to keep my sanity
and perspective,
and perspective, picked picked up the family
up the family duties
duties when
when II had had to be off
to be off
somewhere studying
somewhere studying or or writing,
writing, and somehow understood
and somehow understood when when the the
planned trip to Disney World had to be delayed by three months.
planned trip to Disney World had to be delayed by three months. There
There

Xir
is an old
is an old saying
saying thatthat if
if the Air Force
the Air Force wanted
wanted you you toto have wife, they
have aa wife, they
would
would have have issued
issued you you one.
one. In
In Peg's
Peg's case,
case, II think they did
think they did.. Her
Her father
father
is aa retired
is retired B-52
B-52 pilot,
pilot, the sister who
the sister who introduced
introduced us us is
is married
married to an F-4
to an F-4
weapons system officer, and I first met Peg in the
weapons system officer, and I first met Peg in the Officers
Officers Club
Club at
at
Moody
Moody AFB, AFB, Georgia.
Georgia. Peg Peg might
might be be government
government spec, spec, butbut II guarantee
guarantee
she is one of a kind . Although during this past year I have forgotten to
she is one of a kind. Although during this past year I have forgotten to
thank
thank her her often
often enough
enough forfor all that she
all that she did,
did, II hope
hope sheshe knows
knows thatthat II love
love
her
her dearly and could
dearly and could not
not get
get by
by without
without herher..
As I seek to finish this, I am sitting in my
As I seek to finish this, I am sitting in my office
office at Maxwell, looking
at Maxwell, looking
out
out at the 13th
at the 13th fairway
fairway of of the
the golf
golf course, and trying
course, and trying toto convey
convey in in writing
writing
what
what thisthis last
last year
year hashas meant
meant to to meme.. The
The only
only way
way to to express
express that is to
that is to
ask myself three questions : Has the year been
ask myself three questions: Has the year been worth
worth the
the effort?
effort? Is
Is the
the
effort
effort something
something II can take pride
can take pride in in having
having done? Knowing what
done? Knowing what II know
know
now, would I do it again? The answer to all three is a resounding and
now, would I do it again? The answer to all three is a resounding and
unqualified
unqualified yes yes..

BRIAN
BRIAN W W.. McLEAN,
McLEAN, Lt Lt Col,
Col, USAF
USAF
Research
Research Fellow
Fellow
Airpower Research
Airpower Research Institute
Institute

xiii

i
Introduction
Introduction

As
As the
the United
United StatesStates enters
enters the
the decade
decade of of the
the 1990s,
1990s, we we areare faced
faced with
with
aa world
world substantially
substantially different
different fromfrom that
that which
which our our fathers faced in
fatliers faced in the
the
middle
middle decades
decades of the twentieth
of the twentieth century
century.. The The near
near paranoia
paranoia and and fear
fear ofof
aa global
global war
war between
between the the North
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (NATO)
and the Warsaw
and the Warsaw Pact Pact have been reduced
have been reduced to to the
the point
point ofof nonexistence
nonexistence..
The 40-year cold war has been "won."
The 40-year cold war has been "won."
Victory in
Victory in the cold war
the cold war has
has not,
not, however,
however, totally totally eliminated
eliminated the the need
need
for
for American
American military
military involvement
involvement outsideoutside the the NATO/Warsaw
NATO/Warsaw Pact Pact
area. The reality of conflict requiring the use of military forces has
area. The reality of conflict requiring the use of military forces has
changed
changed onlyonly in in scale
scale andand locale,
locale, not not in in kind.
kind. As As this book isis being
this book being
written
written (January
(January 1991), 1991), American
American and and allied
allied forces
forces are are deeply
deeply
committed in Operation Desert Storm, a
committed in Operation Desert Storm, a war
war to
to liberate
liberate Kuwait
Kuwait from
from
Iraq's
Iraq's unprovoked
unprovoked aggressionaggression and and toto bring
bring peace peace and and stability
stability to to the
the
region . Operation Desert Storm is the most obvious and visible conflict
region. Operation Desert Storm is the most obvious and visible conflict
involving
involving US US forces;
forces; by by no
no means
means is is itit the
the only
only partpart ofof the
the world
world in in
which
which armed
armed conflict
conflict may occur.. The
may occur The border
border between
between North North and and South
South
Korea is still some of the most heavily fortified terrain in history. Fidel
Korea is still some of the most heavily fortified terrain in history. Fidel
Castro's demonstrated
Castro's demonstrated predilection
predilection for for generating
generating tensiontension throughout
throughout
Latin America is still a reality, and the continuing war in Cambodia has
Latin America is still a reality, and the continuing war in Cambodia has
the potential of
the potential of overflowing
overflowing into into the
the territory
territory of of America's
America's ally, ally,
Thailand
ThaDand..
Although
Although the the possibility
possibility of of World
World War War lII HI has
has been
been greatly
greatly reduced,
reduced,
there
there is
is aa high
high probability
probability of of future
future wars
wars involving
involving American
American troops.troops.
The war today is in the Persian Gulf. Next week it could be in Korea or
The war today is in the Persian Gulf. Next week it could be in Korea or
Central
Central America
America.. Ifwar comes, what
If war comes, what form
form will will itit take?
take? Will
Will itit be
be aa series
series
of
of small,
small, isolated
isolated land,land, sea,sea, and
and air battles? Will
air battles? Will the the actual
actual battles
battles bebe
limited to only daytime and good weather, reserving the night and the
limited to only daytime and good weather, reserving the night and the
rainy
rainy season
season for for rest
rest and recovery while
and recovery whUe planning
planning for for the
the next
next day?
day? Both
Both
ofthese questions are
of these questions are obviously
obviously rhetorical.
rhetorical. As As Col
Col Dennis
Dennis M. M. Drew
Drew and and
Dr Donald M. Snow demonstrated in The
Dr Donald M. Snow demonstrated in The Eagle's
Eagle's Talons,
Talons, war
war in
in the
the
second half
second half ofof this
this century
century has has been
been conducted
conducted by by large
large andand complex
complex
joint staffs and characterized by a high tempo of activity carried out
joint staffs and characterized by a high tempo of activity carried out
regardless
regardless of of weather,
weather, time time of of day,
day, or or season
season of of the
the year.'
year.' TheThe mostmost
recent
recent USUS military
military experiences
experiences in in Grenada,
Grenada, Libya, Libya, andand Panama
Panama gave gave nono
indication
indication that that this
this will
will change
change.. Operation
Operation Desert Desert Storm,
Storm, begun begun with with
nearly continuous aerial bombardment by all US and allied aircraft,
nearly continuous aerial bombardment by all US and allied aircraft,
validates
validates with with emphasis
emphasis that that modern
modem war war isis joint
joint and
and around-the-clock
around-the-clock..
Our allies understand and accept this trend, particularly the
Our allies understand and accept this trend, particularly the tendency
tendency
for
for air
air warfare
warfare to to involve
involve night,
night, all-weather
all-weather operations
operations.. In In the
the Fall
Fall 1987
1987
issue
issue ofAirpower
of Airpower Journal,Journal, Air Air Vice-Marshal
Vice-Marshal R. R. A.
A. Mason
Mason of of the
the Royal
Royal
Air Force (RAF) predicted that the probable developments in air power
Air Force (RAF) predicted that the probable developments in airpower
in
in the 1990s would
the 1990s would include
include around-the-clock
around-the-clock air air operations
operations throughthrough the the
use
use of of night,
night, all-weather
all-weather weapon weapon systems.2
systems.^ As As is is being
being proven
proven in in
Operation
Operation Desert Desert Storm,
Storm, modern
modem war war requires
requires joint
joint air,
air, land,
land, andand naval
naval
forces
forces to to fight
fight both
both dayday and
and night.
night.
If we accept, therefore, that we
If we accept, therefore, that we must
must fight
fight both
both inin the
the day
day and
and at at night
night
and
and that
that we
we mustmust use use more
more than than just
just the
the forces
forces of of one
one service
service to to do
do so,
so,
the
the next
next logical
logical question
question becomes,
becomes. Are Are wewe prepared
prepared to to fight
fight this
this kind
kind
of war? Are we, the American military, trained and ready for effective
of war? Are we, the American military, trained and ready for effective
military
military air air operations
operations using using all all forces
forces at at our
our disposal
disposal in in aa war
war thatthat may
may
begin in the middle ofthe night? It is the purpose ofthis book to examine
begin in the middle of the night? It is the purpose of this book to examine
aa narrow
narrow portion
portion of of exactly
exactly that that question.
question.
This
This book
book addresses
addresses the the issue
issue of of joint
joint training
training for for night
night airair warfare
warfare..
Although intended primarily to apply to the Pacific Command
Although intended primarily to apply to the Pacific Command
(PACOM),
(PACOM), the the issues
issues andand questions
questions addressed
addressed throughout
throughout the the book
book areare
applicable to any area of potential conflict. This book is specifically
applicable to any area of potential conflict. This book is specifically
limited
limited to to joint
joint operations
operations with with American
American forces forces andand doesdoes notnot attempt
attempt
or
or intend
intend to to include
include combined
combined operations
operations with with international
international forces forces..
Further, the thrust of the book is limited to night operations . Some of
Further, the thrust of the book is limited to night operations. Some of
the
the ideas
ideas addressed
addressed are are applicable
applicable to to single-service
single-service operations
operations at at night
night
and
and joint
joint operations
operations during during the the day
day.. However,
However, day day air air warfare,
warfare, and and
specifically
specifically single-service
single-service combat,combat, are are subjects
subjects that that are
are already
already studied
studied
in
in depth
depth and and the the basis
basis of of most
most of of ourour training.
training. It It isis this
this author's
author's
contention that training for night air operations, particularly with our
contention that training for night air operations, particularly with our
sister
sister services,
services, is is at
at best
best inin its
its infancy.
infancy.
Each
Each of of the
the four
four armed
armed services
services has has spent
spent literally
literally billions
billions of of dollars
dollars
to acquire the technical means for night warfare . At the same time, the
to acquire the technical means for night warfare. At the same time, the
various
various services
services have have aa number
number of of high-technology
high-technology training training centers-
centers
Red Flag, Cope Thunder, and the National Training Center, for
Red Flag, Cope Thunder, and the National Training Center, for

Xvi
example--capable of
examplecapable of providing
providing training
training in in all aspects of
all aspects of air
air war,
war,
including regular joint-service participation . However, there is not yet
including regular joint-service participation. However, there is not yet
an existing
an existing program
program for joint training
for joint training in in night
night air
air warfare
warfare at at any
any ofof these
these
training areas.. That
training areas That which
which youyou dodo not train for
not train for in
in peacetime
peacetime you you cannot
cannot
reasonably expect to do in war . This book recommends some better uses
reasonably expect to do in war. This book recommends some better uses
of available training
of available training facilities
facilities to
to improve
improve that that situation
situation..
Chapter
Chapter 11 addresses
addresses the the history
history and and background
background of both joint
of both joint air
air
operations and night warfare to explain how we
operations and night warfare to explain how we reached
reached the
the point
point where
where
we
we areare today Chapter 22 addresses
today.. Chapter addresses the the current
current status
status of our night
of our night airair
warfare equipment and our system for planning and conducting joint
warfare equipment and our system for planning and conducting joint
warfare
warfare.. The The author uses aa hypothetical
author uses hypothetical air air operation against North
operation against North
Korean
Korean forcesforces to to illustrate
illustrate some
some of of this capability.. Chapter
this capability Chapter 33 examines
examines
the various large-scale training programs and exercises used to practice
the various large-scale training programs and exercises used to practice
for night warfare,
for night warfare, particularly
particularly to determine where
to determine where weaknesses
weaknesses or or
limitations
limitations might exist. Chapter
might exist. Chapter 44 discusses
discusses possible
possible ways
ways of of making
making
better use of available equipment and
better use of available equipment and resources
resources for
for more
more realistic
realistic
training
training in in joint night warfare
joint night warfare..
It is a recognized weakness
It is a recognized weakness of this book
of this book that
tliat the
the experiences
experiences of of
Operation
Operation Desert Storm are
Desert Storm are not
not adequately considered.. This
adequately considered This isis
unavoidable,
unavoidable, given given that
that Operation
Operation DesertDesert Storm
Storm has has just
just begun
begun and and
neither unclassified after-action reports nor lessons
neither unclassified after-action reports nor lessons learned
learned are
are yet
yet
available
available.. ItIt isis hoped
hoped that
that future authors may
future authors may be be able
able to
to build upon this
build upon this
book to add the lessons learned in the war against Iraq.
book to add the lessons learned in the war against Iraq.

Notes
Notes

11.. Col M. Drew


Dennis M.
Col Dennis Drew and and Dr
Dr Donald
Donald M.M. Snow, The Eagle's
Snow, The Eagle's Talons:
Talons: The
The
American Experience at War (Maxwell AFB, Ala .: Air
American Experience at War (MaxweU AFB, Ala.: Air University
University Press,
Press, December
December
1988),
1988), 30.
30.
Vice-Marshal R
2. Air Vice-Marshal
2. Air R.. A.
A. Mason,
Mason, RAF,
RAF, "The
'The Decade
Decade ofof Opportunity
Opportunity:: Air
Air Power
Power
in the 1990s,"AirpowerJournal, Fall 1987, 6.
in the 1990s," Airpower Journal, Fall 1987, 6.

xvii
Chapter 11
Chapter

History and Background

We
We have stressed the
have stressed the need
need for
for joint
joint night
night air warfare training.
air warfare training. Let
Let us
us
now examine briefly
now examine briefly thehistory ofjoint
the history of joint operations
operations and
and night
night air
air warfare
warfare..

Joint
Joint Operations
Operations

The American
The American military's modem experience
military's modem experience with with joint
joint operations
operations
started
started during World War
during World War II.
11. The
The integration
integration of the naval,
of the naval, ground,
ground, andand
air forces in the Pack theater was a superb
air forces in the Pacific theater was a superb example
example ofjoint
of joint operations
operations
using
using all available resources
all available resources to to accomplish
accomplish aa commoncommon objective
objective.. AirAir
assets bombarded
assets bombarded Japanese positions in
Japanese positions in advance
advance of amphibious assault
of amphibious assault
by both Marine
by both Marine and
and Army
Army forces
forces. . Once
Once ashore,
ashore, the
the land
land forces
forces were
were
supplied by
supplied by naval
naval forces and protected
forces and protected from from counterattack
counterattack by both naval
by both naval
and air assets . With the land position secured,
and air assets. With the land position seciu-ed, forward
forward airfields
airfields were
were
prepared
prepared to to allow land-based heavy
allow land-based heavy bombers
bombers to reduce resistance
to reduce resistance on on the
the
next island in
next island in the
the chain,
chain, always
always moving closer to
moving closer to bring
bring the
the Japanese
Japanese
home islands within range
home islands within range of
of aerial
aerial bombardment.
bombardment. Simultaneously,
Simultaneously,
naval and air
naval and air forces
forces interdicted
interdicted all supply lines
all supply lines into
into Japan, softening the
Japan, softening the
home islands for the final land invasion ofJapan.
home islands for the final land invasion of Japan. Although
Although the
the atomic
atomic
bombs dropped
bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki
on Hiroshimaand Nagasaki eliminated
eliminated the the need for the
need for the
final invasion, itit would
final invasion, would have have been
been the the ultimate
ultimate example
example of of joint
joint
operations.
operations.
From this experience
From this experience in in World
World War War II came aa recognition
n came recognition that that any
any
future war would have to use joint operations if we were to
future war would have to use joint operations if we were to win.
win. Such
Such
disparate individuals
disparate individuals as as Gen Douglas MacArthur
Gen Douglas MacArthur and and Adm
Adm Chester
Chester
Nimitz,
Nimitz, rival commanders throughout
rival commanders throughout the Pacific campaign,
the Pacific campaign, found found
themselves in complete agreement that joint
themselves in complete agreement that joint action
action between
between all
all the
the

1
JOINT
JOINT "TRAINING
TRAINING FOR
FOR NIGHT
NIGHT AIR
AIR WARFARE
WARFARE

services
services was
was responsible
responsible for for the
the victory
victory over over Japan.
Japan. Generals
Generals George George
Marshall
Marshall and and Omar
Omar Bradley
Bradley not not only
only agreed
agreed thatthat joint
joint action
action had had won
won
World
World WarWar 11 II but
but predicted
predicted that that aa joint
joint effort
effort would
would be be required
required for for
victory
victory inin any future war.'
any future war.' TheThe strongest
strongest support
support for for this
this concept
concept was was
advanced by Maj Gen Follet Bradley, writing to the editor ofthe New York
advanced by Maj Gen Follet Bradley, writing to the editor of the New York
Times
Times inin response
response to to aa question
question onthe
on the need
need fora
for a new
new andand separate
separate airpower
airpower
doctrine
doctrine:: "We
"We do do not
not need
need aa Mahan
Mahan of of air
air power
power so so much
much as as anan oracle
oracle of of
combined
combined operations--triphibious
operationstriphibious.. .. .. .. [With] [With] air air power
power in in combination
combination
with
with land
land andand sea
sea power
power on on aa battle,
batde, aa campaign
campaign and and aa war."
war." z^
Clearly,
Clearly, the the concept
concept and and need
need forjoint
for joint warfare
warfare was was well
weU established
established
by
by the
the end
end of of World
World War War II. n. However,
However, this this experience
experience was was apparently
apparently
forgotten
forgotten between
between the the end
end ofof World
World War War n II in
in August
August 19451945 andand thethe North
North
Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950. In his article in the
Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950. In his article in the
Spring
Spring 1990
1990 issueissue of of Air power Journal,
Airpower Journal, Maj Maj RogerRoger F. Kropf cites
F. Kropf cites
"inadequate
"inadequate joint joint training
training in in air-ground
air-ground coordination"
coordination" as as aa major
major
detriment
detriment to to the
the effectiveness
effectiveness of of the
the FarFar East
East AirAir Forces
Forces (FEAF)(FEAF) in in
supporting
supporting the the Eighth
Eighth ArmyArmy in in the
the initial
initial stages
stages of of the
the Korean
Korean War.3War.^
Before
Before the
the outbreak
outbreak of of the
the Korean
Korean War, War, FEAFFEAF and and the
the Eighth
Eighth ArmyArmy did did
not have any
not have any continuing
continuing doctrinedoctrine or or training
training program
program to to develop
develop aa
coordinated
coordinated air/ground
air/ground team team .'a* Their performance reflected
Their performance reflected thisthis lack
lack.. By
By
contrast,
contrast, thethe United
United States
States Navy
Navy (USN)(USN) and and the
the United
United States
States Marine
Marine
Corps
Corps (USMC)
(USMC) did have an
did have an ongoing
ongoing programprogram for for air
air assets
assets to to train
train with
with
the
the ground
ground unitsunits that
that they
they were
were supporting
supporting.^ .s The
The bestbest evidence
evidence of of the
the
success
success of of thethe USN/USMC
USN/USMC training training effectiveness
effectiveness was was provided
provided by by
enemy
enemy prisoners
prisoners of of war
war who who stated
stated thatthat the
the allied
allied weapon
weapon the the North
North
Koreans feared most was "the blue airplanes."6 (During the Korean War
Koreans feared most was "the blue airplanes. "^ (During the Korean War
period,
period, US
US Air Air Force
Force aircraft
aircraft were
were usually
usually silver
silver while
while USN
USN and and USMC
USMC
aircraft
aircraft were
were painted
painted aa dark dark blue
blue.) .) The
The Air Air Force/Army
Force/Army team team hadhad to to
relearn
releam at at thethe cost
cost of of American
American lives lives what
what the the USN/USMC
USNAJSMC team team
remembered
remembered about about joint
joint operations.
operations.
This cycle of learning/forgetting/relearning woiald
This cycle of leaming/forgetting/releaming would be be repeated
repeated in in the
the
time
time between
between the the Korean
Korean War War and and the
the Vietnam
Vietnam War. War. Between
Between the the wars
wars
we
we had
had once
once againagain forgotten
forgotten how how to to work
work together
together due due to to lack
lack of of
peacetime
peacetime practice
practice in in joint
joint operations.
operations. But But unlike
imlike our our joint
joint experiences
experiences

2
HISTORY
HISTORY AND
AND BACKGROUND
BACKGROUND

in
in the Korean War,
the Korean War, air air operations
operations duringduring the the Vietnam
Vietnam War War revealed
revealed
more
more resistance
resistance to to cooperation.
cooperation.
At the operational level,
At the operational level, the the command
command and and control
control systemssystems
established
established for for the air war
the air war in in Vietnam
Vietnam discouraged
discouraged rather rather than than
encouraged
encouraged possiblepossible jointjoint operations
operations.. UnderUnder Air Air Force
Force doctrine,
doctrine, all all air
air
assets, regardless of
assets, regardless of service,
service, should
should come
come under
under aa single
single air
air component
component
commander.
commander. This This principle,
principle, called
called unity
unity of of command,
command, allows allows the the air
air
commander to mass air assets for a decisive and overwhelming attack
commander to mass air assets for a decisive and overwhelming attack
against
against an an enemy's
enemy's weak weak spots.
spots.
The mechanism for
The mechanism for achieving
achieving this this unity
unity ofcommand
of command is is the air tasking
the air tasking
order (ATO), a single (albeit massive)
order (ATO), a single (albeit massive) document
document listing
listing the
the total
total daily
daily
air
air effort
effort.. Information
Information in in the
the ATO
ATO includes
includes tasked
tasked unit, assigned target,
unit, assigned target,
and required time over target (TOT) for each sortie to be flown.
and required time over target (TOT) for each sortie to be flown.
To make the
To make the system
system workwork under
under Air Air Force
Force doctrine requires that
doctrine requires that all
all
air
air assets
assets comecome under under aa single
single air air commander
commander (not (not necessarily
necessarily Air Air
Force) . Since none of the services in the Vietnam War was
Force). Since none of the services in the Vietnam War was willing
willing to
to
relinquish
relinquish command
command and and control
control of of its
its air
air assets
assets to to the
the others,
others, therethere waswas
not
not aa single
single air component commander
air component commander for the entire
for the entire war
war effort
effort.. Instead,
Instead,
Vietnam was
Vietnam was divided
divided in
in route
route packages
packages with
with the
the Navy
Navy controlling
controlling some
some
segments
segments and and thethe Air
Air Force others.^.$ Air
Force others Air Force
Force aircraft
aircraft were
were not not tasked
tasked
against targets in Navy route packages, and Navy
against targets in Navy route packages, and Navy aircraft
aircraft stayed
stayed out
out of
of
Air
Air Force
Force areas Marine air,
areas.. Marine air, because
because of of the
the physical
physical location
location of of their
their
bases in
bases in one
one ofthe
of the AirAir Force
Force designated
designated route route package
package areas,
areas, came
came underunder
Air Force command
Air Force command and
and control
control but
but only
only for
for those
those sorties
sorties that
that were
were
excess
excess to to Marine
Marine ground-support
ground-support needs needs.. The The Marines
Marines retained
retained control
control
over those air sorties that the Marine Corps determined were
over those air sorties that the Marine Corps determined were required
required
to
to support
support the the Marine
Marine ground
ground troops
troops.^ .9 In
In effect,
effect, air air power
power in in Vietnam
Vietnam
was
was split into three
split into three separate
separate wars.wars.
This command structure
This command structure prevented
prevented or
or atat least
least complicated
complicated the proper
the proper
application
application of of mass
mass combat
combat power power in in joint
joint airair operations.
operations. Even Even the the
massive attacks against Hanoi and Haiphong in Linebacker were
massive attacks against Hanoi and Haiphong in Linebacker II
n were not
not
truly joint in
truly joint in that
that nono single
single airair component
component commander commander directed directed the the
whole
whole operation.
operation. As "the most
As "the most vital
vital area
area in in North Vietnam," Hanoi
North Vietnam," Hanoi was was
declared an "integrated strike zone"
declared an "integrated strike zone" for
for both
both Navy
Navy and
and Air
Air Force
Force
attacks.
attacks.'*^ Integrated did
I Integrated did not,
not, however,
however, mean joint. Each
mean joint. Each service
service stillstill

3
JOINT
JOINT TRAINING
TRAINING FOR
FOR NIGHT
NIGHT AIR
AIR WARFARE
WARFARE

controlled
controlled its its own
own assets
assets butbut now
now could
could attack
attack targets
targets in in other
other than than its
its
assigned
assigned areaarea of of responsibility."
responsibility." Although Although this was aa good
this was good attemptattempt to to
bring
bring sufficient
sufficient combatcombat power power to to bear
bear onon aa target,
target, suchsuch aa practice
practice
violated
violated thethe principle
principle of of economy
economy of of force.
force. Without
Without aa single
single commander
comm ander
for
for aa joint
joint effort, there was
effort, there was no no easy
easy method
method of of ensuring
ensuring that that the the Navy
Navy
or
or Air
Air Force
Force did did not
not attempt
attempt to to attack
attack aa target
target that
that the other had already
the other had already
destroyed
destroyed..
Difficulty in
Difficulty in joint
joint operations
operations was was also
also revealed
revealed at at the
the tactical
tactical levellevel in in
the Vietnam
the Vietnam War. War. LackLack of of common
common radios radios complicated
complicated the the ability
ability of of
Air
Air Force
Force aircraft
aircraft to to support
support the the Army
Army ground
ground troops.
troops. The The Army Army used used
very
very high
high frequency
frequency (VHF) (VHF) or or frequency
frequency modulation
modulation (FM) (FM) radios,
radios, whilewhile
Air
Air Force
Force aircraft
aircraft werewere equipped
equipped with with ultrahigh
ultrahigh frequency
frequency (UHF) (UHF)
radios
radios.. These
These systems
systems werewere not not and
and areare not
not compatible
compatible;; communication
communication
with
with each other was
each other was impossible.
impossible.'^ 12
As
As aa result,
result, the Air Force
the Air Force pUot pilot could
could
not
not talk
talk with
with thethe Army
Army ground
ground commander
commander he he was
was supporting
supporting without without
going
going through
through aa forward
forward air air controller
controller (FAQ (F^C) who who was was equipped
equipped with with
UHF,
UHF, VHF, VHF, and and FM FM radios
radios.. TheThe FAC FAC would
would then then relay
relay the the target
target
description,
description, location
location of of friendlies,
friendlies, and and enemy
enemy air air defenses
defenses.. If If there
there waswas
no
no FAC
FAC in in the
the area,
area, the
the fighters
fighters had had no no easy
easy way
way to to talk
talk with
with the the ground
ground
commander
commander and and positively
positively identify
identify the the target.
target.
Although the system worked, it added extra
Although the system worked, it added extra layers
layers of of control,
control, the the
possibility
possibility of of confusion
confusion in in the
the ground-to-FAC-to-fighter
ground-to-FAC-to-fighter link, link, and and time
time
delays
delays in in getting
getting bombsbombs on on target.
target. Suggestions
Suggestions that that thethe fighters
fighters be be
equipped
equipped with with radios
radios that that allowed
allowed direct direct ground-to-fighter
ground-to-fighter
communication
communication were were rejected,
rejected, in in part
part because
because the the fighter
fighter pilot
pUot mightmight be be
"distracted
"distracted by by irrelevant
irrelevant information"
information" from from thethe ground.
ground. Whether
Whether or or not
not
this was aa valid
this was valid criticism
criticism was was never operationally tested
never operationally tested.'^ . 13 Joint
Joint Air Air
Force-Army
Force-Army training training before
before the the war
war maymay have
have identified
identified aa need need forfor
direct
direct communication
communication between between ground ground and and air air and
and developed
developed
appropriate
appropriate procedures
procedures to to avoid
avoid the the worrisome
worrisome irrelevant
irrelevant information
information..
The
The AirAir Force
Force foundfound that that even
even withwith the the dedicated
dedicated FACs, FACs, the the
unfamiliar
unfamiliar terminology
terminology used used by by the
the ground
ground troops
troops hampered
hampered effective effective
air
air support
support operations
operations.''* As aa minor
. 14 As minor example,
example, even even today
today the the AirAir Force
Force
pilot normally judges distance in terms of nautical miles and feet.
pUot normally judges distance in terms of nautical mUes and feet .
Aircraft
Aircraft instruments,
instruments, flightflight maps,
maps, and and weapons
weapons ballistics
ballistics are are calibrated
calibrated

4
HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
HISTORY AND BACKGROUND

in
in this
this standard.
standard. InIn contrast,
contrast, the
the Army
Army ground
ground trooptroop uses
uses kilometers
kilometers and and
teeters with instruments and maps calibrated
meters with instruments and maps calibrated accordingly
accordingly. . The
The
difference between the
difference between the two
two systems
systems is is extreme
extreme;; one one nautical
nautical mile
mile is is
nearly
nearly twotwo kilometers
kilometers while
while one
one foot
foot is less than
is less than one-third
one-third ofof aa meter.
meter.
As
As the
the reader
reader can
can readily
readUy appreciate,
appreciate, shifting
shifting your
your bomb
bomb aimpoint
aimpoint 100
100
feet
feet farther
farther away
away from
from friendly troops is
friendly troops is not
not enough
enough when when the
the ground
ground
commander wanted you to move it 100 meters . It is possible to make aa
commander wanted you to move it 100 meters. It is possible to make
relatively
relatively simple
simple mental
mental translation
translation between
between the the two systems if
two systems if you
you areare
aware
aware ofof the
the differences
differences and
and are
are trained
trained toto do
do so
so.. The
The Air
Air Force
Force wartime
wartime
preparation of a pamphlet on how to speak
preparation of a pamphlet on how to speak Army
Army is
is something
something that
that
should
should have
have been
been identified
identified inin peacetime
peacetime training.
training.
In joint operations during World War II,
In joint operations during World War U, the
the Korean
Korean War,War, andand thethe
Vietnam
Vietnam War,War, what
what wewe failed
failed to
to train
train for
for inin peacetime
peacetime we we had
had to to learn
learn
how
how to do in
to do in wartime
wartime.. AsAs chapter
chapter 44 discusses
discusses in in more
more detail,
detail, we
we are are in
in
danger of making the same mistake again.
danger of making the same mistake again.

Night
Night Operations
Operations

If
If the
the history
history of of joint
joint operations
operations can can bebe fairly
fairly characterized
characterized as as
continually
continually relearning
releaming the the same
same lessons,
lessons, night
night operations
operations can can bebe
described
described as as lessons
lessons learned
learned but but not implemented due
not implemented due to lack of
to lack of
technology. From World War H until Operation El Dorado Canyon
technology. From World War n until Operation El Dorado Canyon
against
against Libya
Libya in in 1986,
1986, night tactical air
night tactical air warriors
warriors werewere frustrated
firustrated by
by
equipment
equipment limitations.
limitations. They
They knew
knew what what they
they wanted
wanted to to do
do but
but lacked
lacked
the technical capability to do it.
the technical capability to do it.
America's
America's firstfirst experiences
experiences with with night
night air
air warfare
warfare camecame during
during
World War II, but it came primarily in the form of negative lessons .
World War II, but it came primarily in the form of negative lessons.
In
In the
the early
early stages
stages of
of the
the war Nazi Germany,
against Nazi
war against Germany, RAF RAF Bomber
Bomber
Command was
Command was forced
forced into
into night
night areabombing
area bombing as as aa method
method of of surviving
surviving the
the
German air defenses while continuing to press
German air defenses while continuing to press the
the air
air war
war over
over Europe
Europe. .
However, night
However, bombing at
night bombing at that
that time
time lacked
lacked the the precision-targeting
precision-targeting
capability
capability of of the American-conducted daylight
the American-conducted daylight bombing
bombing campaign
campaign.
According to
According to postwar
postwar testimony
testimony by
by Albert
Albert Speer,
Speer, Adolf
Adolf Hitler's
Hitler's ministe
ministei
of
of production,
production, the daylight bombing
the daylight bombing was was aa far
far more
more effective
effective weapon.
weapon.

5
JOIh,,'I"TRAINING
JOINT TRAINING FORFOR NIGHT
NIGHT AIR
AIR WARFARE
WARFARIi

The
The night
night area area bombing
bombing of of the the cities
cities diddid not not achieve
achieve sufficiently
sufficiently
accurate bombs on target to
accurate bombs on target to effectively
effectively destroy or disrupt
destroy or disrupt the
the German
German
strategic
strategic war-fighting
war-fighting capability.
capability.'^ 15

These early experiences


These early experiences could could have have mademade airmenairmen believe
believe that that night
night
air
air warfare
warfare was was too
too tough
tough to to do.
do. It It is
is fortunate
fortunate that that air
air power
power advocates
advocates
of World War
of World War II El recognized
recognized that that the the problem
problem lay lay in in the
the technology
technology
available, not in the basic concept. Even with the limited accuracy
available, not in the basic concept. Even with the limited accuracy
available
available at at that
that time,
time, thethe combination
combination ofUS of US Army
Army Air Air Forces
Forces (USAAF)
(USAAF)
daylight
daylight bombing
bombing and and RAF RAF night
night bombingbombing did did have
have the the benefit
benefit of of not
not
giving
giving thethe German defenders
German defenders any
any rest and recovery
rest and recovery time
time in
in which
which they
they
could
could feel
feel completely
completely immune immune from from attack
attack.'*. 16 The
The nightnight attacks
attacks maymay
have been more harassing than they were militarily effective, but they
have been more harassing than they were militarily effective, but they
still
still provided
provided aa continuing
continuing threat threat whichwhich the the German
German defensesdefenses could could not
not
totally
totally ignore.
ignore.
While the
WhUe strategic air
the strategic air war
war gainedgained some benefit from
some benefit from around-the-
around-the-
clock
clock operations,
operations, itit was was at at the
the tactical
tactical level .that the
levelthat the real
real advantages
advantages to to
be realized from
be realized from aa nightnight air-war
air-war capability
capability were demonstrated.. For
were demonstrated For
instance,
instance, one one of of the
the keykey lessons
lessons learned learned during during the the interdiction
interdiction
campaign
campaign in in Europe
Europe was was thethe importance
importance of of continuous
continuous attack attack on on the
the
enemy's lines of communication (LOC).1' Our inability to find and hit
enemy's lines of communication (LOG).'^ Our inability to find and hit
interdiction
interdiction targets
targets in in the
the dark
dark in in effect
effect gave
gave thethe Nazis
Nazis aa night
night sanctuary
sanctuary
in
in which
which theythey could
could operate
operate almost almost at at will.
wUl. Although
Although some some limited
limited
success
success was was achieved
achieved by by B-25s
B-25s droppingdropping aerialaerial flares
flares to locate and
to locate and
illuminate targets for
illuminate targets for attack
attack by by RAF Mosquito bombers,
RAF Mosquito bombers, the the lack
lack ofof aa
night precision capability was a source of constant frustration to both
night precision capability was a source of constant frustration to both
air and ground
air and ground commanders
commanders.'* .' 8
Interdiction
Interdiction was was not not the
the only
only tactical
tactical air air mission
mission hurt hurt by by aa lack
lack of of
night
night capability
capability.. The The Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, taking taking aa lesson
lesson from from the the RAF's
RAF's nightnight
bombing campaign earlier
bombing campaign earlier in the war,
in the war, demonstrated
demonstrated the the importance
importance of of
having an effective night defensive counterair (DCA) capability during
having an effective night defensive counterair (DCA) capability during
the
the Battle
Battle of the Bulge
of the Bulge.. By By using
using teams teams of pathfinding flare
of pathfinding flare ships
ships and
and
attack
attack aircraft
aircraft at at night,
night, the the Germans
Germans were were able able to to maintain
maintain
around-the-clockpressure
around-the-clock pressure on
on the
the fixed
fixed American
American positions
positions in
in Bastogne
Bastogne. .
The
The Luftwaffe's
Luftwaffe's task task waswas considerably
considerably easier easier because
because of of the
the total
total lack
lack
of effective Allied resistance . 19 The presence of a properly equipped
of effective Allied resistance.'^ The presence of a properly equipped

6
HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
HISTORY AND BACKGROUND

and
and trained
trained nightnight fighter
fighter could could have have considerably
considerably reduced reduced the the
effectiveness of the German attack by destroying either
effectiveness of the German attack by destroying either the
the pathfinders
pathfinders
or
or the
the attack aircraft. In
attack aircraft. In anyany event,
event, aa night
night DCADCA capability
capability wouldwould havehave
made
made thethe Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe planningplanning problem considerably greater.
problem considerably greater.
While we
While we forgot
forgot the
the lessons
lessons learned
learned in
in joint
joint air
air operations
operations between
between
World
World WarWar II n and
and Korea,
Korea, the same statement
the same statement cannot
cannot be be made
made about
about thethe
lessons of night air warfare. At the start of the Korean War, we
lessons of night air warfare. At the start of the Korean War, we
remembered
remembered and and applied
applied the the lessons
lessons we we hadhad learned
learned aboutabout nightnight
interdiction
interdiction andand night
night close
close air air support
support (CAS)(CAS) in in the
the skies
skies over
over Europe.
Europe.
The major interdiction operations were
The major interdiction operations were carried
carried out
out around-the-clock
around-the-clock to
to
deny the
deny the enemy
enemy aa periodperiod of of rest
rest andand repair.
repair. One particularly effective
One particularly effective
tactic was the practice of scheduling a late-night reattack against aa
tactic was the practice of scheduling a late-night reattack against
known
known LOC LOC that that had had already
already been been cut cut during
during the day. Since
the day. Since the the
Communist
Communist forces forces used used the the cover
cover of of night
night to to repair
repair andand reopen
reopen the the
damaged LOCs, this tactic had a dual benefit. First,
damaged LOCs, this tactic had a dual benefit. First, the
the reattack
reattack kept
kept
the
the LOC closed, preventing
LOC closed, preventing the the enemy
enemy from from using
using itit to
to move
move supplies
supplies..
Second,
Second, with
with proper timing, the
proper timing, the reattack
reattack couldcould occur
occur just
just asas the
the repair
repair
crew was
crew was completing
completing their
their work,
work, making
making a
a wasted
wasted effort
effort of
of their
their
supplies
supplies and
and manpower
manpower.^^ .
Unfortunately, although we
Unfortunately, although we had
had aa good
good idea
idea ofwhat
of what we we wanted
wanted to to dodo
with
with night
night airair war, technology had
war, technology had notnot substantially
substantially improved
improved our our
capability
capability to to dodo itit in
in the
the interval
interval between
between the wars.. The
the wars The FEAFFEAF B-29s,
B-29s,
operating
operating in
in a
a tactical
tactical support
support role,
role, achieved
achieved reasonable
reasonable accuracy
accuracy
against
against fixed
fixed targets
targets suchsuch as as bridges,
bridges, supply depots, and
supply depots, and large
large troop
troop
concentrations by the use of both onboard radar and ground-positioned
concentrations by the use of both onboard radar and ground-positioned
radar
radar beacons.
beacons. Although
Although this interdiction effort
this interdiction effort contributed
contributed greatly
greatly to to
the Allied
the Allied effort
effort by by preventing
preventing the the enemy
enemy from massing sufficient
from massing sufficient
supplies to support a
supplies to support a continued
continued assault,
assault, it
it could
could not
not completely
completely halt
halt the
the
very small
very small amount
amount of of supplies necessary for
supplies necessary the Chinese
for the Chinese and and North
North
Koreans to fight a defensive holding war during the prolonged peace
Koreans to fight a defensive holding war during the prolonged peace
negotiations
negotiations."^'.21 To
To achieve
achieve that that goal,
goal, thethe AirAir Force
Force would
would havehave needed
needed
the
the capability
capability to to locate
locate and and destroy
destroy supplies
supplies either
either at at the
the source
source or or inin
convoy. Because the source was the
convoy. Because the source was the politically
politically sacrosanct
sacrosanct Manchuria,
Manchuria,
the interdiction campaign
the interdiction campaign had had to to bebe directed
directed against
against LOCs LOCs and and thethe
convoys
convoys en en route.
route. Technical capability for
Technical capability for this
this mission
mission was was still
still limited
limited

7
JOINT
JOINT TRAINING
TRAINING FOR
FOR NIGHT
NIGHT AIR
AIR WARFARE
WARFARE

to
to the
the World
World WarII War n solution
solution of of using
using flare
flare ships
ships to to first
first acquirethe
acquire the target
target
and
and then
then illuminate
illuminate it it for
for the
the fighters
fighters or or light
light bombers
bombers that that followed
foUowed.^^ .
While
While thisthis tactic
tactic was
was somewhat
somewhat effectiveeffective in in the
the undefended
undefended or or lightly
lightly
defended
defended night night skies
skies over
over South
South Korea,
Korea, itit was
was completely
completely ineffective
ineffective
and
and too
too dangerous
dangerous in in the
the more
more heavily
heavily defended
defended areas areas over
over North
North Korea
Korea
near
near Pyongyang.
Pyongyang. Aerial Aerial flares,
flares, necessary
necessary for for the
the attacking
attacking aircraft
aircraft toto
see the target, also served to illuminate the attacker for the antiaircraft
see the target, also served to illuminate the attacker for the antiaircraft
artillery
artillery (AAA).
(AAA). In In addition
addition to to simple
simple illumination,
illumination, the the flares
flares helped
helped
the
the AAA
AAA gunnersguimers findfind thethe proper
proper elevation
elevation in in aiming
aiming their
their fire
fire at
at the
the
attackers.
attackers. SinceSince the
the attacking
attacking aircraft
aircraft hadhad toto remain
remain below
below the the flares
flares in
in
order
order toto seesee the
the target,
target, thethe height
height of of the
the flares
flares showed
showed the the maximum
maximum
23
height of the attackers.
height of the attackers P
Although
Although the the experiences
experiences in in night
night airair warfare
warfare with with the
the use
use ofof flare
flare
ships
ships andand fighter
fighter teams
teams were were only only moderately
moderately effective,
effective, they they diddid
provide
provide some some of of the
the earliest
earliest examples
examples of of true
true joint
joint night
night operations
operations..
Beginning
Begiiming in in March
March 1951, 1951, aa US US Marine
Marine night-fighter
night-fighter squadron,
squadron,
VMF(N)-513,
VMF(N)-513, equipped equipped with with F4U F4U Corsairs
Corsairs and and F7FF7F Tigercats,
Tigercats, beganbegan
conducting
conducting extensive extensive night night interdiction
interdiction missionsmissions out out of of Pusan
Pusan
Airfield
Airfield.. The The Marine
Marine night
night fighters
fighters worked
worked with with AirAir Force
Force C-47C-47 flare
flare
ships
ships as as hunter-killer
hunter-kUler teams teams.. TheThe flare
flare ships
ships would
would provide
provide illumination
illumination
to
to locate
locate convoys
convoys or or marshaling
marshaling areas areas along
along an assigned road.
an assigned road. Once
Once
these
these targets
targets were were located,
located, the the flare
flare ships
ships illuminated
illuminated them them for for the
the
attacking
attacking Marine Marine fighters
fighters.. Close
Close teamwork
teamwork was was required
required between
between the the
two
two services
services to to ensure
ensure that that the the target
target was was properly
properly illuminated
illuminated
throughout the attack . From 1 March through 31 May 1951,
throughout the attack. From 1 March through 31 May 1951, this
this
joint-team
joint-team missionmission claimed
claimed to to have
have attacked 11,980 enemy
attacked 11,980 enemy vehicles
vehicles andand
destroyed 1,420
destroyed 1,420.^ .
Night
Night jointjoint airair warfare
warfare was was not not limited
limited to to interdiction
interdiction missions,
missions,
however.
however. Early Early in in 1951,
1951, Communist
Communist air air defenses
defenses over over North
North Korea
Korea
forced the Air Force B-29s to operate almost exclusively at night. By
forced the Air Force B-29s to operate almost exclusively at night. By
July
July 1952
1952 NorthNorth Korean
Korean use use of of ground-controlled
ground-controlled radar radar waswas able
able toto
direct
direct enemy
enemy night night fighters
fighters to to within
within five
five miles
miles of of the
the attacking
attacking B-29sB-29s..
From
From thatthat distance,
distance, enemy
enemy groundground searchlights
searchlights could could then illuminate
then illuminate
the
the bomber
bomber for for the
the nonradar-equipped
nonradar-equipped MiG MiG to to complete
complete the the attack
attack
visually
visually.^^ . 25 To
To counter
counter this this threat,
threat, the the B-29s
B-29s required
required some some formform of of
HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
HISTORY AND BACKGROUND

night fighters for


night fighters for escort
escort or or for
for preattack
preattack sweeps
sweeps to to survive
survive in in the
the nownow
dangerous
dangerous nightnight skies
skies over
over North
North Korea. Although the
Korea. Although the Fifth
Fifth Air
Air Force
Force
had
had night-capable
night-capable F-94B
F-94B Starfires
Starfires at
at Suwon,
Suwon, the
the radar
radar in
in these
these aircraft
aircraft
was
was soso new
new andand soso valuable
valuable that the F-94s
that the F-94s were
were restricted
restricted to to only
only local
local
air defense operations . Once again, joint operations provided the
air defense operations. Once again, joint operations provided the
solution.
solution. VMF(N)-513
VMF(N)-513 provided provided night-fighter
night-fighter supportsupport for for the
the B-29s
B-29s
using first the
using first the older
older F7FF7F Tigercats,
Tigercats, then then reequipping
reequipping with with thethe newnew
F3D-2 Skynight jets in early November 1952
F3D-2 Skynight jets in early November 1952. . Following
Following the
the removal
removal
of operational restrictions
the operational
of the restrictions on on Air
Air Force
Force F-94s
F-94s in in November
November 1952, 1952,
Marine
Marine F3D-2s
F3D-2s continued flying joint
continued flying escort missions
joint escort missions for for the
the B-29s
B-29s
while
while the
the F-94s
F-94s tooktook over
over the
the barrier
barrier patrol
patrol and
and sweep
sweep operations
operations.'^* . 26
These
These joint
joint Air Air Force-Marine
Force-Marine Corps Corps night
night experiences
experiences shouldshould
demonstrate two points . First, joint operations can
demonstrate two points. First, joint operations can provide
provide increased
increased
capability
capability by by covering shortfalls in
covering shortfalls in single-service
single-service equipment.
equipment. For For
interdiction
interdiction missions,
missions, the the Air
Air Force
Force provided
provided the the flare
flare ship
ship capability
capability
that the Marines lacked,
that the Marines lacked, while
while the
the Marine
Mariije night
night fighters
fighters augmented
augmented
the
the limited
limited numbers
numbers of of Air
Air Force
Force night aircraft.. For
attack aircraft
night attack air escort,
For air escort,
the Marines initially covered a lack of available Air Force assets, then
the Marines initially covered a lack of available Air Force assets, then
provided
provided increased
increased numbers
nimibers of of night
night fighters
fighters to escort the
to escort the B-29s.
B-29s.
Second,
Second, but but moremore important,
important, even even when
when properly
properly planned
planned and and
coordinated, night air warfare is tough
coordinated, night air warfare is tough. . The
The joint
joint Air
Air Force-Marine
Force-Marine
Corps
Corps night
night interdiction
interdiction missions,
missions, even even with
with proper
proper missionmission planning,
planning,
was barely able to achieve a 12 percent kill ratio of trucks destroyed
was barely able to achieve a 12 percent kill ratio of trucks destroyed
versus
versus munitions
munitions expended
expended..
The
The North
North Koreans
Koreans and and Communist
Communist ChineseChinese were were well aware of
well aware of thethe
tactical benefits to be gained by taking advantage of the
tactical benefits to be gained by taking advantage of the FEAF's
FEAF's lack
lack
of night
of night capability
capability.. As As related
related byby Robert
Robert Futrell
Futrell in in The
The United
United States
States
Air
Air Force
Force in
in Korea
Korea 1950-1953,
1950-1953,
A Soviet-prepared manual
A Soviet-prepared manual published
published by by the
the ChineseRedsin
Chinese Reds in Manchuria
Manchuria inin 1947
1947
well illustrated the
well illustrated the importance
importance of
of night
night attack
attack as
as a
a Communist
Communist military
mihtary
technique.
technique. "Night
"Night combat," stated this
combat," stated this manual,
manual, "is
"is aa normal
normal occurrence
occurrence under
under
conditions of modem warfare.
conditions of modem warfare. Night
Night combat
combat can
can be
be conducted
conducted by
by a
a small
small unit,
unit,
large unit, orby a combined force ofthe
large unit, or by a combined force of the various
various arms.
amis . . . Despite
Despite the
the difficulty
difficulty
of control
of control during
during night
night attacks, offers many
attacks, itit offers many opportunities
opportunities for success in
for success in an
an
attack ."'
attack."

9
JOIN'r TRAINING FOR
JOINT TRAINING FOR NIGHT
NIGHT AIR
AIR WARFARE
WARFARE

The
The greatest
greatest example
example of of the
the enemy's
enemy's understanding
understanding of of the
the importance
importance
of
of night
night capability
capability was was demonstrated
demonstrated by by the
the Chinese
Chinese surprise
surprise attackattack
against
against the the United
United NationsNations (UN) (UN) ForcesForces near near thethe Yalu
Yalu River River in in
November
November 1950 1950.. By By moving
moving only only at at night
night andand remaining
remaining well well
camouflaged during the day, the Chinese were able to sneak 300,000
camouflaged during the day, the Chinese were able to sneak 300,000
combat
combat troops
troops across
across thethe Yalu
Yalu and into the
and into the UNUN rear
rear area
area in in October
October
1950.
1950. They
They remained
remained essentially
essentially undetected
undetected until until their
their opening
opening assaultassault
in
in November
November.'^^ . 28 Even
Even aa rudimentary
rudimentary night night reconnaissance
reconnaissance and and attack
attack
capability
capability could
could have
have substantially
substantially depleted
depleted this
this force or, at
force or, at aa minimum,
minimum,
provided tactical warning of Chinese presence before the attack began.
provided tactical warning of Chinese presence before the attack began.
If the
If the interval
interval between
between WorldWorld War War II II and
and the
the Korean
Korean War War brought
brought
only
only slight
slight improvement
improvement in in night
night air air warfare
warfare capability,
capability, the the period
period
between
between Korea
Korea and and Vietnam brought essentially
Vietnam brought essentially no improvement. The
no improvement. The
North Vietnamese
North Vietnamese recognized
recognized the the overwhelming
overwhelming equipment
equipment advantageadvantage
that the
that the USUS AirAir Force
Force possessed,
possessed, especially
especially in in our
our interdiction
interdiction and and
attack
attack capability
capability.. Taking
Taking aa lesson
lesson from from thethe experiences
experiences of of their
their fellow
fellow
Communists
Communists in in Korea,
Korea, the the North
North Vietnamese
Vietnamese countered
countered American
American air air
interdiction by shifting their main resupply efforts to the sanctuary of
interdiction by shifting their main resupply efforts to the sanctuary of
night operations.
night operations. The The North
North Vietnamese
Vietnamese Army Army (NVA)(NVA) and and Vietcong
Vietcong
went beyond
went beyond supply
supply at at night
night and
and tooktook advantage
advantage of the night
of the night sanctuary
sanctuary
to enhance
to enhance their their offensive
offensive capability
capability.. By staging major
By staging major ground ground
assaults
assaults at at night,
night, the the NVA
NVA was was able able toto largely
largely avoid
avoid the the American
American
CAS and battle area interdiction that they would have encountered
CAS and battle area interdiction that they would have encountered
in
in daylight operations.. 29
daylight operations
The
The initial
initial Air
Air Force
Force counter
counter to to enemy
enemy night
night operations
operations followed
followed the the
classic
classic patterns
patterns established
established in in World
World War War II n and
and Korea-flare
Korea^flare ships ships
marking and
marking and illuminating
illuminating the the target
target forfor attack
attack aircraft
aircraft to bomb . In
to bomb. In
some cases, even the equipment was the same, with the use of
some cases, even the equipment was the same, with the use of
Korean War-vintage
Korean War-vintage A-26s A-26s in in thethe early
early days
days ofof the
the Vietnam
Vietnam War War..
Although the
Although the equipment
equipment used used would
would soon soon change
change to to more
more modern
modem F-4s F-4s
and B-57s,3 the technology required to change
and B-57s,^^ the technology required to change from
from the World War II
the World War II
tactic of
tactic of externally
externally illuminated
illuminated night night bombing
bombing had had not
not yet
yet arrived.
arrived. And,And,
just as was demonstrated in Korea, flare ship and bomber teams could
just as was demonstrated in Korea, flare ship and bomber teams could
not survive
not sirrvive inin thethe heavy
heavy AAAAAA environment
environment of of North Vietnam . 31
North Vietnam.

10
10
HISTORY
HISTORY AND
AND BACKGROUND
BACKGROUND

Technology
Technology had, had, however,
however, brought
brought some increased night
some increased night capability
capability
in the form of more onboard sensor systems . Improvements in aircraft
in the form of more onboard sensor systems. Improvements in aircraft
ground-mapping radar
ground-mapping radar provided
provided somesome increased
increased nightnight accuracy
accuracy for F-4s
for F-4s
and
and F-105s
F-105s against
against large,
large, radar-significant targets, such
radar-significant targets, such as port facilities
as port facilities
or buildings, but
or buildings, but lacked
lacked sufficient
sufficient detail
detail to
to discriminate
discriminate truck
truck convoys
convoys
or
or infantry
infantry attacks
attacks.^^. Low-light-level
32
Low-light-level television
television and and infrared
infrared sensors
sensors
made the AC-130 an extremely effective night interdiction weapon, but,
made the AC-130 an extremely effective night interdiction weapon, but,
like
like the
the flare
flare ships,
ships, the the AC-130
AC-130 lacked lacked the the necessary
necessary speed speed and and
maneuverability
maneuverability to to survive
survive inin aa surface-to-air
surface-to-air missilemissile (SAM)
(SAM) or or AAA
AAA
environment
environment?^ .
The
The limitations
limitations imposedimposed on on air
air power
power by by aa lack
lack of night capability
of night capability
frustrated
frustrated thethe American commanders in
American commanders in Vietnam
Vietnam just just as
as much
much as as it did
it did
their
their predecessors
predecessors in in World
World War War Il. II. In
In April
April 19671967 AdmAdm U. U. SS.. Grant
Grant
Sharp,
Sharp, commander
commander in in chief of Pacific
chief of Command (PACOM),
Pacific Command (PACOM), formally
formally
identified the development of increased capability to accurately hit
identified the development of increased capability to accurately hit
targets
targets atat night
night and and in in bad
bad weather
weather as as aa high
high priority requirement for
priority requirement for
prosecution
prosecution of the Vietnam
of the Vietnam War. War.^'* ThisThis need
need waswas emphasized
emphasized by by Air
Air
Force Chief of Staff
Force Chief of Staff Gen
Gen John
John P.
P. McConnell
McConnell that
that same
same month.
month. In
In
testimony before Congress,
testimony before Congress, General
General McConnell
McConneU stated stated that
that theAir
the Air Force
Force
was deficient in tactical air power, particularly in its ability to
was deficient in tactical air power, particularly in its ability to hit
hit
pinpoint
pinpoint targets
targets at at night and in
night and in bad weather.^^ However,
bad weather. 35
However, identifying
identifying aa
need
need isis not
not sufficient
sufficient to to ensure
ensure aa capability
capability.. By By 1971,
1971, despite
despite thethe best
best
efforts ofAdmiral Sharp and
efforts of Admiral Sharp and General
General McConnell,
McConnell, the
the North
North Vietnamese
Vietnamese
continued to
continued to move
move 500 500 toto 1,000
1,000 trucks
trucks per night, down
per night, down the the HoHo Chi
Chi
Minh
Minh Trail with an
Trail with an average
average load
load of of 8,000
8,000 pounds
pounds of of cargo
cargo perper truck
truck.^^ 36

Little progress
Little progress was was made
rnade in
in the
the development
development of of night-capable
night-capable tactical
tactical
aviation during the
aviation during the three
three decades
decades between
between World World War War H 11 and
and the
the end
end of of
the Vietnam War. Nor would the
the Vietnam War. Nor would the remainder
remainder of the 1970s see
of the 1970s see a
a marked
marked
improvement
improvement.. InJune In June 1978 1978 Lt
Lt Gen
Gen Howard
Howard Fish,Fish, the
the Air
Air Force assistant
Force assistant
vice chief
vice chief of of staff, identified the
staff, identified the same
same deficiency
deficiency in in night
night attack
attack
capability
capability in in modem
modem NATO NATO that that Allied
Allied airmen
airmen had had seen
seen during
during thethe war
war
against
against Hitler
Hitler.^^ . TheThe real impact of
real impact of this
this deficiency
deficiency can be realized
can be realized when
when
you consider that the weather in northern Germany during January
you consider that the weather in northern Germany during January
averages
averages lessless than
than 8.58.5 hours
hours ofof daylight
daylight per per day.
day. Of Of this
this short
short period,
period,
only
only 6.3
6.3 hours
hours per per dayday have
have thethe mandatory 1,000-foot ceiling
mandatory 1,000-foot ceiling and and

11
11
JOINTTRAINING
JOINT TRAINING FOR
FOR NIGHT
NIGHT AIR
AIR WARFARE
WARFARE

three-mile
three-mile horizontal visibility that
horizontal visibility that tactical
tactical aircraft
aircraft without
without specific
specific
.38
night
night capability
capability require
require.^* Tactical
Tactical air air power
power did did not
not have
have clear
clear weather
weather
for
for nearly
nearly 75 75 percent
percent of of the
the day
day..
Fortunately, technology finally caught
Fortunately, technology finally caught up up with
with required
required capability
capability
during
during the the mid-1980s
mid-1980s.. As As waswas amply
amply demonstrated
demonstrated by by the
the joint
joint AirAir
Force-Navy
Force-Navy actions actions against
against Libya
Libya during
during Operation
Operation El El Dorado
Dorado Canyon
Canyon
in
in 1986,
1986, airpower
air power has has achieved
achieved an an initial
initial capability
capability to to hit
hit isolated
isolated targets
targets
with
with pinpoint
pinpoint accuracy
accuracy at at night
night.. AnAn excellent
excellent demonstration
demonstration of of this
this
capability
capability was was shown
shown by by the
the crew
crew of of the
the F-111
F-111 that,
that, armed
armed with
with aa Pave
Pave
Tack
Tack infrared
infrared acquisition
acquisition and and targeting
targeting pod pod andand 500-pound
500-pound bombs,
bombs,
obliterated
obliterated an an Ilyushin
Ilyushin E-76
11-76 Candid
Candid jet jet transport
transport on on the
the ramp
ramp atat Tripoli
Tripoli
alrport.39
airport.
Nor is
Nor is the
the Air
Air Force
Force alone
alone in in new
new night
night tactical
tactical air
air warfare
warfare capability
capability..
While
While the the AirAir Force
Force F-1 11 s attacked
F-111s attacked the the airfield,
airfield, the Sidi Bilal
the Sidi Bilal naval
naval
training
training base, base, and and the
the Azziyah
Azziyah barracks
barracks in in Tripoli,
Tripoli, Navy
Navy A-6s A-6s
equipped
equipped with with both
both infrared
infrared and and low-light-level
low-light-level sensors sensors destroyed
destroyed
the Benina
the Benina military
military airfield
airfield and and thethe terrorist
terrorist training
training barracks
barracks at at
Benghazi .4 The
Benghazi.'*^ technical capability
The technical capability for for precision-night
precision-night operations
operations
that airmen
that airmen had had been
been seeking
seeking for for over
over 40 40 years
years hadhad finally
finally arrived.
arrived.
El Dorado
El Dorado CanyonCanyon can can be be considered
considered significant
significant for for more
more than
than just
just
the
the precision-night
precision-night capability
capability.. It It was
was anan excellent
excellent example
example of of theproper
the proper
integration of
integration of joint
joint assets
assets for for mission
mission accomplishment.
accomplishment. To To achieve
achieve
tactical
tactical surprise
surprise and and minimize
minimize US US losses,
losses, the the attack
attack waswas planned
planned to to hit
hit
all
all five
five selected targets during
selected targets during the the hours
hours of of darkness.
darkness. To To minimize
minimize
collateral damage, but ensure optimum target destruction, precision
collateral damage, but ensure optimum target destruction, precision
guided
guided bombs
bombs were were specified.
specified. The The only
only aircraft
aircraft that
that the
the Navy
Navy hadhad that
that
could
could do do this
this mission
mission was was the A-6E Grumman
the A-6E Grumman Intruder Intruder.. However,
However,
between
between the the two
two carriers
carriers inin the
the area,
area, the
the Coral
Coral SeaSea andand the
the America,
America, the the
Navy
Navy hadhad onlyonly aa total
total of
of 18
18 A-6s,
A-6s, notnot aa sufficient
sufficient number
number to to hit
hit all
all five
five
targets simultaneously .4r The choice was to either reduce the number
targets simultaneously.'*^ The choice was to either reduce the number
of
of targets
targets or or provide
provide extra extra aircraft
aircraft withwith precision-night-attack
precision-night-attack
capability
capability.. In In aa reverse
reverse of of the
the Korean
Korean experience
experience in in which Navy and
which Navy and
Marine
Marine aircraft
aircraft provided
provided extraextra aircraft
aircraft toto augment
augment Air Air Force
Force assets,
assets, in in
El
El Dorado
Dorado Canyon Canyon the the Air
Air Force
Force provided
provided F-111s F-1 Us fromftom bases
bases in in the
the
United
United Kingdom
Kingdom to to augment
augment the the Navy
Navy forcesforces already
already on on the
the scene.
scene.

12
12
HISTORY
HISTORY AND
AND BACKGROUND
BACKGROUND

Meanwhile,
Meanwhile, carrier-based
carrier-based F-14s, F-14s, F/A-18s,
F/A-18s, and and E-2Cs
E-2Cs provided
provided air air
superiority combat
superiority combat air air patrol
patrol (CAP),
(CAP), suppression
suppression of of enemy
enemy air air
defenses
defenses (SEAD),(SEAD), and and airborne
airborne commandcommand and and control
control support
support for for
both
both Air
Air Force
Force and
and Navy
Navy attacks
attacks/^ . The
The end
end result
result was
was the
the successful
successful
attack
attack of all five
of all five targets
targets with
with the the loss
loss of of only
only oneone F-111-a
F-111a well-run,
well-run,
highly successful joint night operation by any measure.
highly successful joint night operation by any measure.
To
To judge
judge from from the unclassified information
the unclassified information that that is
is available
available through
through
the
the Cable
Cable News News Network
Network (CNN) (CNN) and and various
various newspaper
newspaper agencies,
agencies.
Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm appear to be an even greater
Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm appear to be an even greater
example
example of of aa successful
successful joint joint night
night air air war.
war. Joint
Joint operations
operations were were
established
established from from the the start
start of of Operation
Operation Desert Desert Shield
Shield.. AsAs GenGen Colin
Colin
Powell,
Powell, chairman
chairman of of the
the Joint
Joint Chiefs
Chiefs of,Staff,
of Staff, explained
explained in in his
his televised
televised
briefing
briefing on on 88 August
August 1990, 1990, US US Navy
Navy assets
assets provided
provided initial
initial air
air cover
cover
for Air Force and Army forces that were deploying into Saudi Arabia .
for Air Force and Army forces that were deploying into Saudi Arabia.
En
En route
route Air Air Force
Force F-15s
F-15s and and transport
transport aircraft
aircraft carrying
carrying the the 82d
82d
Airborne
Airborne Division
Division to to Saudi
Saudi Arabia
Arabia were-vulnerable
were.vulnerable to to Iraqi
Iraqi fighter
fighter
attack
attack in
in flight
flight. . Once on the ground, US forces would
Once on the ground, US forces would still
stUl be vulnerable
be vulnerable
to
to Iraqi
Iraqi attack
attack on on the
the airfield
airfield until
until thethe fighters
fighters could could bebe refueled
refueled andand
manned
manned by by fresh pilots . Navy
fresh pilots. Navy F-14sF-14s and and F-18s
F-18s operating
operating from from aircraft
aircraft
carriers
carriers in in the
the RedRed SeaSea provided
provided initial initial airair cover
cover until
until the
the Air
Air Force
Force
43
F-15s
F-15s were
were in in place
place andand combat
combat readyready.'*^.
This same principle of joint operations was
This same principle of joint operations was carried
carried toto an
an even
even greater
greater
degree
degree during
during Operation
Operation DesertDesert Storm.
Storm. Air Air Force F- 11 ls, F-1
Force F-llls, 17s, and
F-117s, and
F-15Es,
F-15Es, Navy Navy and and Marine
Marine A-6Es A-6Es and and F/A-18s,
F/A-18s, plus plus British,
British, French,
French,
and
and Italian
Italian Tornados
Tornados worked worked together
together in in an an integrated
integrated air air campaign
campaign
that devastated Iraq's
that devastated Iraq's offensive
offensive military
military capability
capability..
Substantive lessons learned are not yet available,
Substantive lessons learned are not yet available, but but some
some trends
trends
appear
appear to to be emerging. First,
be emerging. some of
First, some of the the coordination
coordination problems
problems
inherent
inherent in in joint
joint operations
operations have been resolved
have been resolved by by the
the designation
designation of of Lt
Lt
Gen
Gen Charles
Charles Homer Homer as as the
the joint
joint forces
forces air air component
component commander
commander
(JFACC)
(JFACC) for for allall air
air assets
assets.. As As General
General Homer Homer mentioned
mentioned in in his
his 17
17
January 1991 press briefing, all air missions were published and
January 1991 press briefing, aU air missions were published and
distributed
distributed in in aa single
single daily
daily ATO.44
ATO.''^ The The use use of joint ATO
of aa joint ATO is is an
an
important
important improvement
improvement over over ourour practices
practices during during thethe Vietnam
Vietnam War War in in
which each service had its
which each service had its own
own daily
daily air
air plan.
plan. By
By publishing
publishing aa single
single

13
13
JOINT
JOINT "TRAINING
TRAINING FOR
FOR NIGHT
NIGHT AIR
AIR WARFARE
WARFARE

ATO
ATO under under the the command
command and and control
control of of aa single
single airair component
component
commander,
commander, Desert Desert StormStorm can can minimize
minimize the the problem
problem of of one
one aircraft
aircraft
bombing
bombing aa target target that
that aa previous
previous aircraft
aircraft hadhad already destroyed or,
already destroyed or, even
even
worse, no one hitting a target on the assumption that "the other guy will
worse, no one hitting a target on the assumption that "the other guy will
do
do itit."
."
A
A second
second trendtrend of of Desert
Desert Storm
Storm appears
appears to to be
be single
single aircraft
aircraft attacks
attacks
on
on aa target,
target, not not formation
formation attacks.
attacks. Apparently
Apparently each each individual target is
individual target is
being
being bombed
bombed by by aa single
single aircraft
aircraft atat aa time,
time, not
not by by simultaneous
simultaneous attacks
attacks
on the same aim point. For instance, the videotapes that General
on the same aim point. For instance, the videotapes that General
Homer
Homer showed showed of the F-111
of the F-111 laser
laser guided
guided bomb bomb attackattack against
against thethe
chemical
chemical weapons weapons storage storage bunker
bunker and and thethe F-117
F-117 bombing
bombing of of the
the
Iraqi
Iraqi airair force
force headquarters
headquarters building;building both both appear
appear to to be single aircraft
be single aircraft
missions
missions.'*^ . 45 Whether
Whether sequential
sequential attacks
attacks werewere mademade by by another
another aircraft
aircraft
separated
separated by by TOT
TOT or simultaneous attacks
or simultaneous attacks were
were made against physically
made against physically
separated
separated aim aim points
points on on the
the same
same general
general target
target has has not
not yet
yet been
been
revealed
revealed.. Nor Nor is is there
there anyany information
information as as to;whether
to whether Air Air Force
Force and Navy
and Navy
aircraft are attacking the same target at different times or attacking
aircraft are attacking the same target at different times or attacking
geographically
geographically separatedseparated targettarget areas,
areas, as as was
was done
done withwith the route pack
the route pack
system
system in Vietnam.. These
in Vietnam These are are important
important mission
mission areas areas that
that should
should bebe
investigated
investigated for for lessons
lessons learned
learned as as soon
soon as as itit is operationally feasible.
is operationally feasible.
There
There is is one important fact
one important that was
fact that was evident
evident in in Operation
Operation Desert
Desert
Storm. The night campaign was a total effort in all mission areas. Even
Storm. The night campaign was a total effort in all mission areas. Even
at night,
at night, the the attacking
attacking bombers
bombers were were protected
protected by by fighter
fighter CAP
CAP and and
SEAD
SEAD aircraft
aircraft.. Unlike
Unlike the the normal
normal practice
practice duringduring the the Vietnam
Vietnam War, War,
CAP
CAP and and SEAD
SEAD assets assets were
were tasked
tasked for for joint
joint missions,
missions, not not assigned
assigned toto
cover
cover onlyonly their
their particular
particular service
service.. The
The designation
designation of of General
General Homer
Homer
as the single JFACC made this the most efficient use of air power
as the single JFACC made this the most efficient use of air power
possible.
possible.

Summary
Summary

This
This chapter
chapter has provided aa briefoverview
has provided of the
brief overview of the history
history ofbothjoint
of both joint
and night
and night tactical
tactical air
air operations
operations from
from World
World War
War II
11 through
through thepresent.
the present.
Limitations
Limitations onjoint
on joint operations have been
operations have been caused
caused by
by conflicts
conflicts in
in doctrine
doctrine

14
14
HISTORY
HISTORY AND
AND BACKGROUND
BACKGROUND

or
or aa lack
lack of realistic training
of realistic training injoint
in joint operations.
operations. ByBy contrast,
contrast, limitations
limitations
and problems with night tactical air power have
and problems with night tactical air power have been
been the
the result
result of
of
technical limitations and
technical limitations and the nonavailability of
the nonavailability of the
the necessary
necessary
equipment.
equipment. Despite
Despite these
these problems, joint night
problems, joint night operations
operations inin time
time of
of
actual combat have
actual combat have proven
proven successful,
successful, as
as was
was demonstrated
demonstrated by
by the
the Air
Air
Force-Marine
Force-Marine Corps Corps teams
teams in
in Korea
Korea and the Air
and the Air Force-Navy
Force-Navy teamwork
teamwork
in Libya. The preliminary reports from Operation Desert Storm
in Libya. The preliminary reports from Operation Desert Storm
emphasized
emphasized that that given enough preparation
given enough preparation time,
time, wewe can
can operate
operate
successfully
successfully as as aa joint
joint team
team.. The
The next
next chapter
chapter discusses the current
discusses the current
challenges to continued joint success in
challenges to continued joint success in the
the night
night air
air war.
war.

Notes
Notes

1.
1. Robert
Robert F. F. Futrell,
Futrell, Ideas,
Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic
Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking
Thinking inin the
the United
United
States
States Air
Air Force,
Force, vol.vol. 1,
1, 1907-1960 (Maxwell AFB,
1907-1960 (Maxwell AFB, Ala Ala.:. : Air
Air University
University Press,Press,
December 1989), 169
December 1989), 169.. ,
2. Ibid., 2-3
2. Ibid., 2-3..
3. Maj
3. Maj RogerF.
Roger F. Kropf,
Kropf, "The
"The US US Air
Air Force
Force in
in Korea," Airpower Journal 4,
Korea," AirpowerJournal no. 11
4, no.
(Spring 1990)::44
(Spring 1990) 44..
4.
4. Ibid.,
Ibid., 36.
36.
5. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Russell F.
6. Russell F. Weigley,
Weigley, TheThe American
American WayWay of of War (Bloomington, Ind
War (Bloomington, Ind.:. : Indiana
Indiana
University
University Press,
Press, 1973),384-85 .
1973), 384-85.
7. Air
7. Force Manual
Air Force Manual (AFM)
(AFM) 1-1,1-1, Basic
Basic Aerospace
Aerospace Doctrine
Doctrine ofthe of the United
United States
States
Air Force, 16
Air Force, 16 March
March 1984, 2-11.
1984,2-11.
8. Gen William
8. Gen William W. W. Momyer,
Momyer, Airpower
Airpower in in Three
Three WarsWars (Washington,
(Washington, D.C.: D.C.:
Department ofthe
Department of the Air
Air Force,
Force, 1978),
1978), 91
91. .
9. FutreU, vol.
9. Futrell, vol. 2,1961-1984,
2,1961-1984,283. 283 .
10.
10. Momyer,
Momyer, 98. 98.
11 . Ibid., 99.
11. Ibid., 99.
12.
12. Donald
Donald J. Mrozek, Air
J. Mrozek, Air Power
Power andand the
the Ground
Ground War War in in Vietnam
Vietnam:: Ideas
Ideas and and
Actions (Maxwell AFB,
Actions (Maxwell AFB, Ala
Ala.:.: Air
Air University
University Press,
Press, January
January 1988),
1988), 43.
43.
13.
13. Ibid.
Ibid.
14.
14. Ibid.,
Ibid., 108
108..
15. Weigley, 358
15. Weigley, 358..
16. Col Dennis M.
16. Col Dennis M. Drew
Drew and and Dr Donald M.
Dr Donald M. Snow,
Snow, TheThe Eagle's
Eagle's Talons:
Talons: The The
American Experience at War (Maxwell AFB,
American Experience at War (Maxwell AFB, Ala
Ala.:.: Air
Air University
University Press,
Press, December
December
1988), 192
1988), 192..
17. Momyer,
17. Momyer, 167 167..

15
15
JOINT
JOINT TRAINING
TRAINING FOR
FOR NIGHT
NIGHT AIRWARFARE
AIR WARFARE

18.
18. Richard
Richard P. P. Hallion,
HaUion, "Strike
"Strike from
from the
the Sky,"
Sky," inin Strike
Strikefrom
from the Sky (Washington,
the Sky (Washington,
D.C.
D.C.:: Smithsonian
Smithsonian Institute, 1989), 149-227
Institute, 1989), 149-227..
19. Col
19. Col William
William R. R. Carter,
Carter, "Air
"Air Power
Power in the Battle
in the Battle ofof the
the Bulge
Bulge:: AA Theater
Theater
Campaign
Campaign Perspective,"AirpowerJournal
Perspective," Airpower Journal 3, no. 44 (Winter
3, no. (Winter 1989)
1989):: 21
21..
20.
20. Momyer,
Momyer, 178 178..
21
21.. Futrell,
Futrell, vol.
vol. 1, 303 .
1,303.
22.
22. Ibid
Ibid.,., 338.
338 .
23.. Momyer,
23 Momyer, 180 180..
24.
24. Robert
Robert F. F. Futrell,
Futrell, TheThe United
United States
States Air
Air Force
Force in in Korea
Korea 1950-1953,
1950-1953, rev.
lev. ed.
ed.
(Washington, D.C.: Office of
(Washington, D.C.: Office of Air
Air Force History, 1983), 330.
Force History, 1983), 330.
25.
25. Ibid., 612-15 .
Ibid., 612-15.
26.
26. Ibid., 614-15 .
Ibid., 614-15.
27. Ibid.,
27. 355 .
Ibid., 355.
28.
28. Drew
Drew and and Snow,
Snow, 253253..
29. Momyer, 188, 280, 302 .
29. Momyer, 188,280,302.
30.
30. Ibid., 204..
Ibid., 204
31. Ibid., 180
31. Ibid., 180..
32. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33.
33. Ibid.,
Ibid., 214.
214.
34. Futrell, Ideas,
34. Futrell, Ideas, volvol.. 2, 479.
2,479. ' '.
35. Donald J. Mrozek, The US Air ForceAfter Vietnam : Postwar
35. Donald J. Mrozek, The US Air Force After Vietnam: Postwar Challenges
Challenges and
and
PotentialforResponses
Potentialfor Responses (Maxwell (Maxwell AFB,AFB, Ala.:
Ala.: Air
Air University Press, December
University Press, December 1988),
1988),
24.
24.
36.
36. Futrell,
Futrell, Ideas,
Wea5, vol vol.. 2, 309.
2,309.
37.
37. Ibid.,
Ibid., 509.
509.
38.
38. Ibid.,
Ibid., 558
558..
39.
39. Maj
Maj Gregory
Gregory L. L. Trebon,
Trebon, "Libyan
"Libyan State
State Sponsored
Sponsored Terrorism-What
Terrorism^What Did Did
Operation
Operation El El Dorado
Dorado Canyon
Canyon Accomplish?"
Accomplish?" Reportno. 88-2600 (Maxwell
Report no. 88-2600 (MaxweU AFB,AFB, Ala
Ala.:.:
Air
Air Command
Command and and Staff
Staff College,
College, April
AprU 1988),
1988), 23-24.
23-24.
40.
40. Ibid.
Ibid.
41.
41. Ibid.,
Ibid., 24.
24.
42.
42. Ibid.,
Ibid., 26.
26.
43. Gen Colin
43. Gen Colin Powell,
Powell, Pentagon
Pentagon news
news conference,
conference, CNN,CNN, 88 August 1990.
August 1990.
44.
44. Lt
Lt Gen Charles Homer,
Gen Charles press briefing,
Homer, press briefing, CNN,
CNN, 17 17 January 1991..
January 1991
45.
45. Ibid.
Ibid.

16
16
Chapter
Chapter 22

Doing
Doing It
It in
in the
the Dark-The
DarkThe Challenge
Challenge

Chapter 11 examined
Chapter examined the the history
history of of both
both joint
joint operations
operations and and night
night
operations
operations.. This chapter discusses
This chapter discusses some some ofthe
of the challenges
challenges to to conducting
conducting
joint night air warfare with the equipment available today. To help
joint night air warfare with the equipment available today. To help the
the
reader
reader better
better understand
understand the the assets
assets and
and their
their possible
possible employment,
employment, this this
chapter presents a hypothetical joint night operation code-named
chapter presents a hypothetical joint night operation code-named
Operation
Operation TaeTae Kwon
Kwon Do. Do. The
The operation,
operation, to to be
be conducted
conducted on on the
the Korean
Korean
Peninsula, uses land-
Peninsula, uses land- andand carrier-based aircraft plus
carrier-based aircraft plus Army
Aimy helicopters
helicopters
to support a ground attack. The scenarios described in Operation Tae
to support a ground attack. The scenarios described in Operation Tae
Kwon
Kwon Do Do are
are by
by nono means
means meant
meant to to be
be exhaustive
exhaustive descriptions
descriptions ofjoint
of joint
operations
operations butbut merely
merely serve
serve as as examples
examples ofhowof how multiservice
multiservice assets
assets may
may
be
be employed
employed..
While reading
While reading thisthis chapter,
chapter, please note that
please note that this
this entire
entire operation
operation is is
strictly a figment of the author's imagination . Although physical
strictly a figment of the author's imagination. Although physical
descriptions of
descriptions of enemy
enemy and and friendly
friendly air air orders
orders of of battle
battle and and their
their
capabilities
capabilities areare realistic,
realistic, they
they areare based
based on unclassified information
on unclassified information
only.
only. Actual
Actual performance
performance or
or employment
employment tactics
tactics may
may be
be markedly
markedly
different
different.. The
The friendly
friendly assets
assets listed
listed areare based
based on on current
current USUS inventory
inventory
and may not actually be available for employment in Korea . The North
and may not actually be available for employment in Korea. The North
Korean
Korean airfield
airfield described
described and and the attack itself
the attack itself are
are purely
purely fictional
fictional andand
are
are not
not based
based on on any
any actual
actual plans
plans that
that the
the author
author has
has read
read or
or isis aware
aware of.
of.
All
All other place names
other place names are are selected
selected at at random
random from from anan atlas
atlas of
of the
the
Korean
Korean Peninsula
Peninsula (fig (fig.. 1).
1). Finally,
Finally, suchsuch anan operation
operation would
would probably
probably
include combined operations with US and allied nations' forces. For
include combined operations with US and allied nations' forces. For
ease
ease ofdiscussion,
of discussion. Operation
Operation Tae Tae Kwon
Kwon Do Do will
wUl include
include US forces only
US forces only
and
and not
not the
the combined
combined forcesforces of of allied
allied nations
nations..

17
17
JOINT TRAINING FOR NIGHT AIR WARFARE

Figure 1. The Korean Peninsula and Operation Tae Kwon Do

18
THE
THE CI-IALLENGE
CHALLENGE

Operation
Operation Tae
Tae Kwon
Kwon Do
Do

For purposes of
For purposes of this
this discussion;
discussion, and and to make the
to make the example
example more more
realistic,
realistic, let
let us assume that
us assume that open
open conflict
conflict erupted
erupted between
between NorthNorth Korea Korea
and South Korea
and South Korea less less than
than 48 48 hours
hours ago ago.. The
The United
United States
States finds
finds itself itself
in a situation similar to
in a situation similar to that
that which
which we
we faced
faced in
in June
June 1950
1950. . North
North
Korean (NK)
Korean (NK) x forces
forces are attacking all
are attacking all along
along the the border
border withwith South South
Korea. So far, US and Republic of Korea (ROK) forces are holding
Korea. So far, US and Republic of Korea (ROK) forces are holding
their
their defensive
defensive positions
positions but but must
must taketake action
action soon
soon to to regain
regain the the
initiative
initiative and avoid being
and avoid being overrun.
overrun.
The commander in chief United
The commander in chief United Nations
Nations Command
Command (CINCUNC)
(CINCUNC)
plans
plans to regain the
to regain the initiative
initiative through
through Operation
Operation Tae Tae Kwon
Kwon Do, Do, aa
counteroffensive
counteroffensive drive drive by elements of
by elements of thethe USUS Army
Army 2d 2d Infantry
Infantry
Division
Division north
north from
from Chorwon
Chorwon along
along the
the main
main road
road system
system to
to the
the port
port ofof
Wonsan.
Wonsan. The The ground
ground offensive
offensive is is to be supported
to be supported by by Air
Air Force,
Force, Navy, Navy,
and Marine air attacks, plus organic aviation assets of
and Marine air attacks, plus organic aviation assets of the
the 2d
2d Division
Division. .
Operations
Operations are are scheduled
scheduled to to commence
commence at at H-hour,
H-hour, 4:00
4:00 A.MA.M.. local
local time time
(0400L), tomorrow
(0400L), tomorrow (D (D day)
day)..
Unlike the situation in Operations
Unlike the situation in Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm,
Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the the
attack by
attack by North
North Korea
Korea has has caught
caught US forces by
US forces by surprise.
surprise. They
They have have not not
had five months to deploy forces into the theater.
had five months to deploy forces into the theater. Additional
Additional air
air and
and
ground
ground forces
forces are deploying from
are deploying from the the Continental
Continental UnitedUnited States States
(CONUS)
(CONUS) bases, bases, but but they
they willwUl notnot arrive
arrive in in time
time to support the
to support the initial
initial
attack ; only PACOM theater assets
attack; only PACOM theater assets are
are in
in place
place for
for the
the attack
attack. . These
These
include
include thethe Army
Army and and AirAir Force
Force units permanently stationed
units permanently stationed in in Korea,
Korea,
Air Force and Marine air units deployed in from Okinawa and Japan,
Air Force and Marine air units deployed in from Okinawa and Japan,
and US Navy
and US Navy Carrier
Carrier AirAir Wing 11 (CVW-11) aboard
Wing 11(CVW-11) aboard thethe USS
USS Abraham
Abraham
Lincoln, currently operating
Lincoln, currently operating in in the
the Sea
Sea of Japan. The
of Japan. The USSUSS Midway,
Midway,
normally based in Japan, is
normally based in Japan, is undergoing
undergoing refit
refit from
from its
its last
last deployment
deployment
and
and will
will not
not be under way
be under way for for at
at least
least 9696 hours
hours..
The
The ground
ground forcesforces are directly opposed
are directly opposed by by three North Korean
three North Korean
armored divisions at
armored divisions at Pyongyang.
Pyongyang. Enemy
Enemy air
air order
order of
of battle
battle includes
includes aa
wing
wing ofof ground
ground attack MiG-27 Flogger
attack MiG-27 Flogger Ds Ds atat Bul-Go-Ki
Bul-Go-Ki AB AB and and aa
wing of air-to-air MiG-23 Flogger Es at
wing of air-to-air MiG-23 Flogger Es at Yakimando
Yakimando AB,
AB, both
both in
in the
the
vicinity
vicinity of of Wonsan
Wonsan..

19
19
JOMT
JOINT TRAINING
TRAINING FOR
FOR NIGHT
NIGHT AIR
AIR WARFARE
WARFARE

A
A major
major threat
threat to
to the
the success
success ofof this
this counteroffensive
counteroffensive is is the
the wing
wing of
of
NK
NK ground
ground attack
attack MiG-27 Flogger Ds
MiG-27 Flogger Ds at Bul-Go-Ki AB.
at Bul-Go-Ki AB . This
This isis on
on the
the
east
east coast
coast of
of North Korea, 30
North Korea, 30 miles
mUes north
north ofof the
the demilitarized
demilitarized zonezone
(DMZ)
(DMZ) andand 15
15 miles
miles inland
inland.. It
It is
is within
within range
range of
of USAF
USAF bases
bases in in South
South
Korea
Korea and
and US
US Navy
Navy carrier-based
carrier-based airair in
in the
the Sea
Sea of
of Japan,
Japan, but
but beyond
beyond
the range of friendly artillery or naval gunfire.
the range of friendly artillery or naval gunfire.
In
In support
support of of the
the ground
ground phase
phase of of Operation
Operation Tae Tae Kwon
Kwon Do, Do,
CINCUNC
CINCUNC has has directed
directed the
the air
air component
component commander
commander to to accomplish
accomplish
the
the following
following missions,
missions, not
not necessarily
necessarily in in order
order of
of priority
priority::
11.. Conduct
Conduct offensive
offensive counterair
counterair (OCA)
(OCA) operations
operations toto neutralize
neutralize
Bul-Go-Ki
Bul-Go-Ki AB AB for
for at
at least
least 12
12 hours,
hours, from
from 0400L
0400L toto 1600L
1600L on on D
D day.
day.
2.
2. Provide
Provide DCA
DCA asas required
required against
against the
the MiG-23s
MiG-23s out
out of
of Yakimando
Yakimando
and
and whatever
whatever MiG-27s
MiG-27s maymay survive
survive the
the attack
attack on Bul-Go-Ki.
on Bul-Go-Ki.
33.. Provide
Provide CAS for the
CAS for the initial
initial ground
ground offensive
offensive as
as required
required..
Readers
Readers with
with aa knowledge
knowledge of of air
air power
power willwill recognize
recognize that that there
there are
are
some
some significant
significant omissions
omissions in in the
the total
total support
support that
that air
air power
power couldcould
provide
provide for
for Operation
Operation Tae Tae Kwon
Kwon Do. Do. For
For instance,
instance, there
there is no mention
is no mention
of
of aa strategic
strategic bombing
bombing phase; phase; no no requirement
requirement to to destroy
destroy North North
Korea's
Korea's command,
command, control,
control, and and communications
communications nets nets;; andand no no
consideration
consideration of of air
air interdiction
interdiction to to prevent
prevent possible
possible reinforcement
reinforcement of of
the
the ground
ground divisions.
divisions. Similarly,
Similarly, the the reader
reader should
should note
note in in the
the ensuing
ensuing
discussion
discussion that not all
that not all available
available aircraft
aircraft will be tasked
will be tasked forfor the
the specific
specific
missions listed above . It is not the author's intent to imply that those
missions listed above. It is not the author's intent to imply that those
aircraft
aircraft not
not specifically
specifically selected
selected forfor the
the OCA,
OCA, DCA,DCA, or or CAS
CAS missions
missions
described
described would
would not
not be used at
be used at all
aU.. Rather, they would
Rather, they would be be available
available and and
would
would bebe tasked
tasked for
for other
other missions,
missions, suchsuch asas interdiction,
interdiction, that
that this
this section
section
does
does not
not discuss.
discuss. Operation
Operation Tae Tae Kwon
Kwon Do Do isis not
not meant
meant to to bebe an
an
exhaustive discussion of the definitive joint night air campaign but
exhaustive discussion of the definitive joint night air campaign but
merely
merely anan illustration
illustration of
of some
some ofofthe
the challenges
challenges that
that can
can be
be encountered
encountered
in
in such
such operations.
operations. ToTo that
that endand
end and in in the
the interests
interests ofof brevity,
brevity, thisthis section
section
is
is deliberately
deliberately limited in scope to the OCA, DCA, and CAS missions .
limited in scope to the OCA, DCA, and CAS missions.
For
For purposes
purposes ofof internal
internal consistency,
consistency, the the missions
missions willwill bebe discussed
discussed
in
in the
the order
order presented
presented above.
above. TheThe reader
reader should
should bear
bear inin mind,
mind, however,
however,
that in
that in practice
practice the
the missions
missions would
would not not necessarily
necessarily be be executed
executed in in that
that

20
20
TUE
THE CZIALLENGE
CHALLENGE

order.
order. The OCA mission
The OCA mission against
against Bul-Go-Ki
Bul-Go-Ki is considered first
is considered first because
because
of
of the
the complexity
complexity of of the mission and
the mission and the
the size
size ofof the
the mission
mission package
package
required . Many of the mission elements and
required. Many of the mission elements and requirements
requirements of
of this
this OCA
OCA
mission
mission will
wUl bebe repeated
repeated to lesser degree
to aa lesser degree as as parts
parts of
of the
the DCA
DCA and and CAS
CAS
missions. To avoid
missions. To avoid repetition
repetition and
and for
for the
the sake
sake ofof brevity,
brevity, the
the discussion
discussion
ofthe DCA and the CAS
of the DCA and the CAS missions
missions will
will be
be brief
brief and
and will
wUl emphasize
emphasize only
only
those areas that
those areas that are different from
are different from the OCA mission.
the OCA mission. This
This abbreviated
abbreviated
treatment, however, is not meant to indicate that the DCA and
treatment, however, is not meant to indicate that the DCA and CAS
CAS
missions are
missions are any
any less
less important.
important.
The various air
The various air missions
missions of of Operation
Operation Tae Tae Kwon
Kwon Do Do will
wiU bebe
considered in two parts, mission
considered in two parts, mission planning
planning and
and mission
mission execution.
execution.
Mission execution
Mission execution will will be
be further
further broken
broken down
down into
into three main phases
three main phases::
(1) ingress to the target area, (2) target acquisition and attack, and
(1) ingress to the target area, (2) target acquisition and attack, and (3)
(3)
egress from the
egress from the target
target area
area and
and return
return toto friendly
friendly territory.
territory.
Total air assets
Total air assets available
available to the air
to the air component
component commander
commander are are listed
listed
in table 1 . The bases listed are the normal bases, not the wartime
in table 1. The bases listed are the normal bases, not the wartime
locations
locations of
of the
the aircraft
aircraft..

Table
Table 11

Available Assets for


Available Assets for Operation
Operation Tae
Tae Kwon
Kwon Do
Do
Aircraft
Aircraft Base
Base Mission(s)
Mission(s)

USAF
USAF
F-15C/D
F-15C/D Kadena,
Kadena, Okinawa
Okinawa Air-to-Air
Air-to-Air
F-15C/D
F-15C/D Elmendorf, Alaska
Elmendorf, Alaska Air-to-Air
Air-to-Air
F-15E*
F-15E* Elmendorf, Alaska
Elmendorf, Alaska Multirole
Multirole
F-16C/D
F-16C/D Misawa, Japan
Misawa, Japan Multirole
Multirole
F-16C/D
F-16C/D Kunsan,
Kunsan, Korea
Korea Multirole
Multirole
F-16 (LANTIRN)*
F-16(LAN1'1RN)* Osan, Korea
Osan, Korea Multirole
Multirole
F-16 GANTIRN)*
F-16(LANTIRN)* Eielson, Alaska
Eielson, Alaska Multirole
Multirole
A-10
A-10 Eielson, Alaska
Kelson, Alaska CAS
CAS

Aircraft equipped
*Aircraft equipped and
and aircrew
aircrew trained
trained for normal employment
for normal employment in
in night
night missions.
missions.

2211
JOINT
JOINT TRAINING
TRAINING FOR
FOR NIGHT
NIGHT AIR
AIR WARFARE
WARFARE

Tabled--Continued
Table 1Continued

Aircraft
Aircraft Base
Base Mission(s)
Mission(s)

USN
USN
F-14
F-14 USS
USS Abraham
Abraham Lincoln
Lincoln Air-to-Air
Air-to-Air
A-6E*
A-6E* USS
USS Abraham
Abraham Lincoln
Lincoln Surface
Surface Attack
Attack
F/A-18*
F/A-18* `' USS
USS Abraham
Abraham Lincoln
Lincoln Multirole
Multirole
EA-6B*
EA-6B* USS
USS Abraham
Abraham Lincoln
Lincoln SEAD
SEAD
USMC
USMC
AV-8B*
AV-8B* Marine Corps Air
Marine Corps Air CAS
CAS
Station (MCAS),
Station (MCAS),
Iwakuni,
Iwakuni, Japan
Japan
F/A-18*
F/A-18* MCAS, Iwakuni, Japan
MCAS, Iwakuni, Japan Multirole
Multirole
USA
USA
AH-64
AH-64 Apache*
Apache* CAS/Battlefield
CAS/BatUefield
Air
Air Interdiction
Interdiction
OH-58D Kiowa*
OH-58DKiowa* FAC/ Observation
FAC/Observation

*Aircraft
*Aircraft equipped
equipped and
and aircrew
aircrew trained
trained for
for normal
normal employment
employment in
in night
night missions
missions..

Mission
Mission Planning
Planning

A
A major
major purpose
purpose ofof mission
mission planning
plaiming is is to
to select
select the
the appropriate
appropriate type
type
and
and numberofaircraft
number of aircraft forfor amission
a mission package
package.. The package must
The package must be
be sized
sized
and
and equipped
equipped to to deal
deal with
with all
all aspects
aspects ofof the
the mission,
mission, including
including ingress
ingress
to
to the
the target
target area
area through
through the
the enemy's
enemy's integrated
integrated airair defense
defense system
system
(LADS),
(IADS), target
target acquisition
acquisition andand attack,
attack, and
and safe
safe return
return to
to base.
base. Because
Because
of
of the
the diversity
diversity ofof missions
missions toto be
be accomplished
accomplished simultaneously
simultaneously and and the
the
scarcity
scarcity of
of air
air assets
assets available,
available, eacheach of
of the
the mission packages must
mission packages must bebe
chosen
chosen toto make
make both
both effective
effective andand efficient
efficient use
use of
of available
available resources
resources..
These
These considerations
considerations are are defined
defined in in the
the complementary
complementary principles
principles ofof
war
war known
known as as mass
mass and
and economy
economy of of force.
force. The
The package
package must
must have
have
sufficient
sufficient power
power to to accomplish
accomplish the the objective
objective (mass)
(mass) but
but must
must not
not be
be so
so
large
large as
as to
to waste
waste scarce
scarce air
air resources
resources on on secondary
secondary objectives
objectives oror
"overkill"
"overkill" (economy
(economy of of force)
force).'.'

22
22
'I'I
THE IE CHALLENGE
CHALLENGE

Offensive Counterair
Offensive Counterair
As described
As described in in AFM
AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace
1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine
Doctrine of of the
the United
United
States Air Force,
States Air Force, and and as as proven
proven by historical experience,
by historical experience, the the first
first
objective for air power is to control
objective for air power is to control the
the aerospace
aerospace environment.
environment. This
This
is described as
is described as counterair,
counterair, aa generalgeneral mission
mission thatthat isis divided
divided into into three
three
specific missions : defensive counterair, offensive counterair, and
specific missions: defensive counterair, offensive counterair, and
suppression
suppression of of enemy
enemy air air defenses
defenses (SEAD).3
(SEAD).
As
As the
the name
name implies,
implies, DCA DCA missions
missions are are designed
designed to to protect
protect friendly
friendly
assets-either ground, naval, or air-against enemy aerospace forces
assetseither ground, naval, or airagainst enemy aerospace forces..
This
This can
can be accomplished with
be accomplished with interceptors,
interceptors, antiaircraft
antiaircraft artillery,
artillery,
surface-to-air missiles
surface-to-air missiles (SAM),
(SAM), or or some combination of
some combination of the
the three.
three. The The
classic example of a
classic example of a DCA
DCA operation
operation was
was the
the RAF's
RAF's defeat
defeat of
of the
the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe in in 1940
1940 during
during the the Battle
Battle ofof Britain.
Britain.
By contrast, an OCA mission seizes the initiative
By contrast, an OCA mission seizes the initiative from
from the the enemy
enemy to to
"seek out
"seek out and neutralize or
and neutralize destroy enemy
or destroy enemy aerospace
aerospace forces forces at at aa time
time
andplace
and place of of our
our choosing
choosing." ." 5^ This
This may
may involve
involve offensive
offensive fighter
fighter sweeps
sweeps
for air-to-air combat or air-to-surface
for air-to-air combat or air-to-surface bombing
bombing attacks
attacks against
against enemy
enemy
airfields and aircraft
airfields and aircraft on on the
the ground.
ground. The The classic
classic example
example of of anan OCAOCA
operation was the Israeli air force's destruction of the Egyptian air
operation was the Israeli air force's destruction of the Egyptian air
force on the
force on the ground
ground in in the
the opening
opening hours of the Six-Day
hours ofthe Six-Day War War in in 1967
1967..
The
The SEAD
SEAD mission "allows friendly
mission "allows friendly aerospace
aerospace forces
forces to to perform
perform their their
other missions effectively without
other missions effectively without interference
interference from
from enemy
enemy air
air
defenses."
defenses." 6* It requires successful
It requires successful negation
negation of of the
the enemy's
enemy's IADS, IADS, aa
combination
combination of of warning
warning radars,radars, enemy fighter aircraft,
enemy fighter aircraft, SAMs,SAMs, and and
AAA. This can be done
AAA. This can be done through
through either
either electronic
electronic disruption
disruption of
of theLADS
the IADS
radar
radar and
and communication
communication systems systems or or physical
physical destruction
destruction of of the
the
individual component parts. The opening phases of
individual component parts. The opening phases of Operation
Operation Desert
Desert
Storm,
Storm, including
including the electronic jamming
the electronic jamming of of the
the Iraqi
Iraqi radar
radar nets
nets and and the
the
F-4G destruction of
F-4G destruction of the
the SAMSAM radars,
radars, illustrated very well-planned
illustrated aa very weU-planned
SEAD operation.
SEAD operation.
Note
Note thatthat inin the above mission
the above mission descriptions
descriptions there there is is nono
differentiation as to either the type of aircraft to be used or the
differentiation as to either the type of aircraft to be used or the time
time
of day. A
of day. A daylight
daylight airfield
airfield attack using B-52s
attack using B-52s is is just
just as as much
much an an
OCA
OCA mission
mission as as is night attack
is aa night attack against
against the the same airfield using
same airfield using
F-111 s. The mission is defined by the
F-111 s. The mission is defined by the objectives
objectives to
to be
be accomplished,
accomplished.

23
23
JOINT'
JOINT TRAINING
TRAINING FORNIGHT
FOR NIGHT AIR
AIR WARFARE
WARFARE

not
not by
by the
the capabilities
capabilities and and tactics
tactics ofthe
of the aircraft
aircraft to to be
be used.
used. TheThe decision
decision
for
for daylight
daylight or or night
night attack
attack is is driven
driven by by the
the threat
threat to be faced
to be faced and and the
the
aircraft
aircraft available,
available, not not byby the
the mission
mission to to be
be accomplished
accomplished..
An
An OCA OCA mission
mission against
against an an enemy
enemy airfield
airfield is is one
one of of thethe most
most
difficult
difficult types
types to to plan
plan because
because of of the
the diversity
diversity of of threats
threats thatthat will
will be
be
faced
faced and and the the tasks
tasks that
that must
must be be performed
performed to to accomplish
accomplish the the
mission.
mission. The The -mission
mission requires
requires that that anan aircraft
aircraft penetrate
penetrate behind behind
enemy
enemy lines,
lines, find
find and
and attack
attack aa target
target in in the
the face
face of of enemy
enemy defenses,
defenses,
and
and then
then return
return to to friendly
friendly lines
lines while
while avoiding
avoiding pursuit.
pursuit. Obviously,
Obviously,
some
some aircraft
aircraft must
must carry
carry bombs
bombs to to attack
attack thethe airfield
airfield and and the the aircraft
aircraft
on
on itit (OCA).
(OCA). The The package
package must must also also include
include protection
protection againstagainst
enemy
enemy defenses
defenses on on the
the ground
ground (SEAD) (SEAD) and and protection
protection from from enemy
enemy
fighters in the air (escort).
fighters in the air (escort).
Planning
Planning for for any
any tactical
tactical mission
mission starts
starts with
with the the mission
mission objective
objective
and
and target
target description.
description. The The objective
objective in in this
this case
case is is to
to neutralize
neutralize
Bul-Go-Ki
Bul-Go-Ki AB AB forfor the
the next
next 12 12 hours
hours.. Note
Note that
that this
this does
does notnot necessarily
necessarily
require
require complete
complete destruction
destruction of of the
the target,
target, just
just putting
putting itit out
out of of action
action
for a finite period of time . Bul-Go-Ki AB has a single runway with
for a finite period of time. Bul-Go-Ki AB has a single runway with
parallel
parallel taxiway
taxiway oriented
oriented west-to-east
west-to-east.. It It is
is bordered
bordered on on the
the south
south and
and
west
west byby mountains
mountains and and onon the
the north
north and and east
east byby lowlands
lowlands leading
leading to to the
the
Sea
Sea ofof Japan.
Japan. A A wing
wing of of MG-27
MiG-27 Flogger-D
Flogger-D aircraft aircraft is is dispersed
dispersed in in
hardened
hardened shelters
shelters throughout
throughout the the field.
field. The
The fieldfield is is defended
defended by by aa
mixture
mixture of of fixed
fixed and mobile AAA
and mobile AAA with with both
both radar
radar and and optical
optical aiming.
aiming.
Yakimando
Yakimando AB, AB, approximately
approximately 20 20 miles
miles north
north of of Bul-Go-Ki,
Bul-Go-Ki, has has aa
wing
wing of of MiG-23
MiG-23 FloggerFlogger Es Es on on airair defense
defense alert. alert. Intelligence
Intelligence
confirms four of the MiG-23 aircraft on five-minute alert and
confirms four of the MiG-23 aircraft on five-minute alert and anan
additional
additional 20 20 available
available within
within 30 30 minutes.
minutes.
Exact
Exact tactics
tactics andand weapons
weapons for for this
this type
type of of mission
mission are are varied
varied.. At
At
the
the low
low end end of of the
the spectrum,
spectrum, aa Special Special Forces
Forces team team is is inserted
inserted on on
base
base toto capture
capture or or kill
kill all the MiG
aU the MiG pilots
pilots in in their
their sleep
sleep.. The
The highhigh end
end
of the spectrum could be a Minuteman III nuclear missile launched
of the spectrum could be a Minuteman IE nuclear missile launched
from
from Montana.
Montana. It is not
It is not thethe purpose
purpose of of this
this section,
section, however,
however, to to
engage
engage in in aa prolonged
prolonged debate debate on on OCA
OCA tacticstactics.. Therefore,
Therefore, for for
purposes
purposes of of this
this example,
example, mission
mission planners
planners have have chosen
chosen to to crater
crater the
the
runway,
runway, taxiway,
taxiway, and and selected
selected choke
choke points
points on on the
the airfield
airfield to to prevent
prevent

24
24
THE
THE CHALLENGE
CHALLENGE

the
the MiGs
MiGs from from taking
taking off.off. The
The aircraft
aircraft themselves
themselves are are too
too dispersed
dispersed
and
and too
too well
well protected
protected by by their
their shelters
shelters to to bebe feasible
feasible targets
targets.. ToTo ensure
ensure
sufficient
sufficient accuracy
accuracy and and bomb
bomb damage
damage to to close
close the field, the
the field, the attackers
attackers
will be loaded with precision guided munitions, specifically improved
will be loaded with precision guided munitions, specifically improved
2,000-pound
2,000-pound Mark-84s
Mark-84s with Paveway III
with Paveway III laser-guidance
laser-guidance packages.packages . This This
munition
munition is is commonly
commonly known known as either aa GBU-27
as either GBU-27 or or laser
laser guided
guided bombbomb
(LGB
(LOB).).
Working
Working backward
backward from from the
the target
target itself,
itself, thethe next
next step
step is
is to
to determine
determine
how
how toto defeat
defeat thethe enemy
enemy threat
threat that
that would prevent accomplishment
would prevent accomplishment of of
the
the mission.
mission. In In this
this case,
case, thethe threat
threat is is the
the MiG-23s
MiG-23s on on alert
alert at at
Yakimando,
Yakimando, plus plus the
the AAA
AAA and and the
the SAM
SAM sitessites atat Bul-Go-Ki.
Bul-Go-Ki. The The MiGs
MiGs
can be countered by escort fighters, self-protection with onboard
can be countered by escort fighters, self-protection with onboard
weapons,
weapons, or or preemptive
preemptive strikesstrikes against
against thethe airfield
airfield.. The
The SAM
SAM and and AAA
AAA
can
can be
be destroyed
destroyed by by dropping
dropping bombs bombs on on thethe sites
sites themselves
themselves or or byby
destroying
destroying their
their controlling
controlling radar
radar systems
systems with with high-speed
high-speed antiradiation
antiradiation
missiles
missiles (HARM)
(HARM).. The The defenses
defenses couldcould also
also be be avoided
avoided by by going
going below
below
their minimum altitude (for visual AAA, that is zero feet) or deceived
their minimum altitude (for visual AAA, that is zero feet) or deceived
through
through the the use
use ofof electronic
electronic warfare
warfare (EW) (EW) assets
assets.. For For purposes
purposes of of
this
this example,
example, the the air
air component
component commander
commander has has decided
decided to to follow
follow
General
General Homer's
Homer's example example in in Operation
Operation Desert Desert StormStorm and and provide
provide
escort
escort fighters
fighters and and SEAD
SEAD assets
assets forfor the
the attack
attack package
package..
Having
Having considered
considered the the target
target and
and the
the threat,
threat, thethe next
next point
point toto consider
consider
is
is the
the time
time forfor the
the attack.
attack. Lacking
Lacking any any other
other mission
mission considerations,
considerations,
planners
planners must
must select
select the
the TOT
TOT thatthat would
would provide
provide the the greatest
greatest possibility
possibility
of
of hitting
hitting the
the target with a minimal amount of risk to the aircrew . In
target with a minimal amount of risk to the aircrew. In this
this
case,
case, however,
however, mission
mission considerations
considerations dictatedictate thatthat thethe air
air attack
attack must
must
coincide
coincide withwith CINCUNC's counteroffensive at
CINCUNC's counteroffensive at 0400L,
0400L, D day. This
D day. This
requires
requires aa night
night attack
attack against
against Bul-Go-Ki.
Bul-Go-Ki.
Luckily,
Luckily, in in addition
addition to best meeting
to best meeting CINCUNC's
CINCUNC's objectives, objectives, aa nightnight
attack has certain tactical advantages . Target acquisition and attack is
attack has certain tactical advantages. Target acquisition and attack is
usually
usually better
better during
during daylight
daylight whenwhen the the target
target can can be be seen
seen withwith thethe
human
human eye.eye. Unfortunately,
Unfortunately, the the same
same daylight
daylight that that makes
makes the the target
target
visible
visible to
to the
the attacker
attacker makes
makes the the attacking
attacking aircraft
aircraft visible
visible toto the
the ground
ground
defenders.
defenders. In In daylight,
daylight, defenders
defenders are are not
not restricted
restricted to to radar-aimed
radar-aimed
weapons but can also use optically aimed AAA and SAMs. By
weapons but can also use optically aimed AAA and SAMs. By contrast,
contrast.

25
25
JOINT
JOINT "TRAINING
TRAINING FOR
FOR NIGHT
NIGHT AIR
AIR WARFARE
WARFARE

force
force protection
protection is is usually
usually greater
greater at at night
night because
because the the enemy
enemy has has less
less
opportunity
opportunity to to see
see attacking
attacking aircraft
aircraft andand less
less available
available weapons
weapons to to shoot
shoot
at them.. Even
at them Even whenwhen thethe enemy
enemy detects
detects thethe attackers,
attackers, aa night
night attack
attack limits
limits
the enemy
the enemy defense
defense capability.
capability. One One choice
choice is is to
to expend
expend hugehuge quantities
quantities
of munitions
of munitions in in unaimed
unaimed barrage
barrage fire fire in
in the
the hopes
hopes of of hitting
hitting something
something..
This
This was
was graphically
graphically demonstrated
demonstrated in in the
the televised
televised videotapes
videotapes of of action
action
in the
in the night
night skysky over
over Baghdad
Baghdad on on 1717 January
January 1991 1991.. Alternatively,
Alternatively, the the
enemy
enemy cancan attempt
attempt to to improve
improve the the chances
chances of ofhitting
hitting anan attacker
attacker byby using
using
radar-aimed
radar-aimed and and guided
guided SAMs S AMs and and AAA.
AAA. RadarRadar guidance
guidance is is vulnerable
vulnerable
to
to either
either disruption
disruption by by EWEW assets,
assets or or destruction
destruction by by Wild
Wild Weasels.
Weasels. WhenWhen
properly
properly combined
combined with with aa low-altitude
low-altitude approach
approach to to delay
delay thethe possibility
possibility
of radar detection, a night, low-level attack has an excellent chance
of radar detection, a night, low-level attack has an excellent chance of of
achieving
achieving tactical
tactical surprise
surprise and and enhancing
enhancing force force survivability
survivability..
This
This possibility
possibility of of achieving tactical surprise
achieving tactical through aa night
surprise through night attack
attack
undoubtedly
undoubtedly contributed
contributed to to the
the timing
timing of of Desert
Desert StormStorm.. The
The political
political
deadline
deadline forfor the
the start
start ofof military
military operations
operations expired
expired at at 0800
0800 local
local Iraqi
Iraqi
time
time onon 1616 January
January 1991 1991.. HadHad Operation
Operation DesertDesert Storm
Storm commenced
commenced
then,
then, approximately
approximately the the first
first 10 10 hours
hours of of fighting
fighting would
would have been in
have been in
broad
broad daylight.
daylight. Instead,
Instead, the the airair attacks
attacks commenced
commenced at at 0130L
0130L on on 1717
January,
January, exploiting
exploiting the the tactical
tactical advantages
advantages of of darkness
darkness with with enough
enough
time
time toto accomplish
accomplish the the opening
opening phases phases of of thethe air
air campaign
campaign beforebefore
sunrise
sunrise.. This
This tactical
tactical advantage
advantage will will also
also be be exploited
exploited against
against
Bul-Go-Ki
Bul-Go-Ki..
Having
Having set set the
the mission
mission objectives,
objectives, threat,
threat, andand general
general plan
plan ofof attack,
attack,
the
the next
next appropriate
appropriate step step isis to
to determine
determine what what forces
forces areare available
available forfor
this
this mission
mission.. The The mission
mission packagepackage will will consist
consist of of four
four main
main
components
components:: (1) (1) low-altitude,
low-altitude, night-capable
night-capable attack attack aircraft
aircraft armed
armed with
with
LGBs;
LGBs; (2) (2) escort
escort fighters
fighters withwith air-to-air
air-to-air ordnance
ordnance;; (3) (3) SEAD
SEAD aircraft
aircraft
carrying
carrying HARMs
HARMs;; and and (4)(4) EWEW aircraft
aircraft forfor radar
radar jamming.
jamming. Necessary
Necessary
supporting aircraft will include tankers for poststrike refueling and
supporting aircraft will include tankers for poststrike refueling and
airborne
airborne warning
warning and and control
control system
system (AWACS)
(AWACS) aircraft aircraft..
With
With that
that mission
mission package
package in in mind,
mind, we we cancan look
look at at what
what tactical
tactical
aircraft
aircraft are
are available
available in in theater
theater to to support
support this this mission.
mission. Again,
Again, this
this
operation
operation is is deliberately
deliberately limited
limited to to those
those forces
forces thatthat are
are present
present in in
PACOM
PACOM on on DD dayday and
and does
does not
not include
include assets
assets that
that may
may be be en
en route
route from
fi-om

26
26
THE
THE CHALLENGE
CHALLENGE

CONUS.
CONUS. For For that
that reason,
reason, aircraft such as
aircraft such as the
the F-117,
F-117, the the F-111,
F-111, the the A-7,
A-7,
and
and the
the B-52
B-52 are are not
not included.
included. In-theater
In-theater assets
assets are assumed to
are assumed to have
have
had
had time
time to to deploy
deploy to to the
the Korean
Korean Peninsula.
Peninsula.
From that list of available assets in
From that list of available assets in table
table l, 1, let
let usus try
try to
to put
put aa mission
mission
package
package together.
together. To To enhance
enhance tactical
tactical surprise
surprise and and force
force survivability,
survivability,
only
only aa single
single coordinated
coordinated missionmission package
package will will be be used
used instead
instead of of
successive attacks by several different mission packages over a period
successive attacks by several different mission packages over a period
of
of time
time.. If
If the
the CINCUNC
CINCUNC were were toto follow
follow the the route
route package
package example
example of of
the
the Vietnam
Vietnam War, War, he he would
would assign
assign thethe mission
mission to to either
either the
the Air
Air Force
Force
or
or the
the Navy
Navy based based on on area
area ofof responsibility.
responsibility. BecauseBecause of of the
the number
number of of
different
different tasks
tasks that
that must
must alsoalso be
be carried
carried out out in the total
in the total execution
execution of of
Operation Tae Kwon Do, the use of route packages could cause aa
Operation Tae Kwon Do, the use of route packages could cause
shortfall
shortfall in in one
one of the missions
of the missions andand aa surplus
surplus of of air
air in
in aa different sector..
different sector
A
A method
method that that may
may provide
provide moremore efficient
efficient use use of of available
available aircraft
aircraft
would
would be be to to consider
consider the the total
total amount
amount of of air
air power
power available
available and and assign
assign
targets
targets based
based on on mission
mission requirements,
requirements, not not geographical
geographical location.location.
Although not a common employment practice, there is historical
Although not a common employment practice, there is historical
precedent
precedent for for such
such aa package
package.. The The most
most recent
recent example
example for for which
which
unclassified
unclassified information
information is is available
available is is Operation
Operation El El Dorado
Dorado Canyon,
Canyon,
described in chapter 1 . This system of joint use of the totality of
described in chapter 1. This system of joint use of the totality of air
air
power
power is is the
the planning
plarming methodmethod we we will use in
will use in Operation
Operation Tae Kwon Do.
Tae Kwon Do.
The
The first
first aircraft
aircraft to to be chosen will
be chosen wiU bebe the
the actual
actual bomb carriers.. The
bomb carriers The
technical
technical capabilities
capabUities required
required for for aa night,
night, low-altitude,
low-altitude, LGB LGB attackattack
include
include either
either an an infrared
infrared or or low-light
low-light level
level sensor
sensor for for target
target acquisition
acquisition
and designation, a terrain-following radar system for ground avoidance,
and designation, a terrain-following radar system for ground avoidance,
and
and aa laser
laser target
target tracker
tracker and and designator
designator for for bomb
bomb guidance.
guidance. From From tabletable
1,
1, the
the available
available aircraft
aircraft with
with those
those capabilities
capabilities are are the
the F-16
F-16 andand F-15E
F-15E
with
with LANTIRN,
LANTERN, the the A-6E,
A- 6E, and
and the
the F/A-18.
F/A-18. ThereThere are are not
not enough
enough ofanyof any
one
one type
type of aircraft in
of aircraft the country
in the country to to perform
perform this this mission
mission with with aa single
single
type aircraft . Therefore, two different bombers are selected-the F-15E
type aircraft. Therefore, two different bombers are selected^the F-15E
and the F/A-18.
andtheF/A-18.
The
The F-15E
F-15E is is chosen
chosen as as the
the lead
lead aircraft
aircraft because
because of of its
its unique
unique
capabilities
capabilities as as aa dual-role
dual-role aircraft
aircraft.. Because
Because of of its
its advanced
advanced radar radar andand
air-to-air
air-to-air weapons
weapons (AIM-7,(AIM-7, AIM-9,
AIM-9, and and gun),
gun), thethe F- 15E can
F-15E can perform
perform as as
aa self-escorting
self-escorting aircraft.
aircraft. ThisThis increases
increases the the total
total mission
mission package's
package's

27
27
JOINT
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NIGHT AIR
AIR WARFARE
WARFARE

protection
protection capability
capability while while keeping
keeping the the package
package size size at
at aa minimal
minimal level.level.
The
The fewer
fewer thethe aircraft,
aircraft, the the less
less chance
chance of of them
them being
being detected
detected by by the
the
enemy.. As
enemy As aa bomb
bomb carrier,
carrier, the the F-15E
F-15E can can deliver
deliver andand guide
guide to'impact
to impact
its
its own LGBs . Using
own LGBs. Using aa tactic
tactic called
called "buddy-lasing,"
"buddy-lasing," the the F-15E
F-15E can can also
also
designate
designate aa target
target for
for an an aircraft
aircraft that
that can
can carry
carry LGBsLGBs but but does
does not not have
have
aa laser
laser designator
designator to to guide
guide thethe bomb
bomb intointo impact
impact.'. WhenWhen facedfaced withwith aa
limited
limited number,
number of of laser-equipped
laser-equipped aircraft,aircraft, buddy-lasing
buddy-lasing can increase the
can increase the
number
number of of LGBs
LGBs on on target
target by by using
using nonlaser-equipped
nonlaser-equipped aircraft aircraft such
such as as
the
the F/A-18
F/A-18 as as additional
additional bomb bomb carriers
carriers..
Both
Both self-designation
self-designation and and buddy-lasing
buddy-lasing tactics tactics are are inherent
inherent
capabilities
capabilities of of any
any laser-equipped
laser-equipped aircraft,aircraft, including
including the the F-16
F-16 withwith
LANTIRN
LANTIRN and and the
the A-6E.
A-6E. From From hishis own
own experience
experience in in local
local training
training and and
Red
Red FlagFlag exercises,
exercises, the the author
author recognizes
recognizes that that even
even in in the
the daytime;
daytime,
buddy-lasing
buddy-lasing in in aa high-threat
high-threat environment
environment is is aa highly
highly demanding
demanding task task
that
that is is better
better suited
suited to to aa two-man
two-man aircraft.
aircraft. ThisThis allows
allows the the pilot
pilot toto
concentrate
concentrate on on flying
flying the the aircraft
aircraft while
while the the weapons
weapons systemsystem officer
officer
(WSO),
(WSO), or or backseater,
backseater, concentrates
concentrates on on designating
designating the the targets.
targets. The The
single-seat
single-seat F-16, F-16, particularly
particularly in in the
the night
night environment
environment that that this
this
mission
mission callscalls for,
for, is
is less
less suited
suited toto be
be the
the designator
designator aircraft
aircraft thanthan is is the
the
F-1
F-15E.5E. Of
Of course, the A-6E is a two-seat aircraft that could perform the
course, the A-6E is a two-seat aircraft that could perform the
buddy-lasing
buddy-lasing tactic, tactic, butbut this
this aircraft
aircraft lacks
lacks the the previously
previously mentioned
mentioned
advanced
advanced air-to-air
air-to-air capability
capability of of the
the F-15E
F-15E and and would
would be be less
less capable
capable
of
of self-defense
self-defense on on this
this mission.
mission. Further,
Further, the the A-6E
A-6E lacks
lacks the the speed
speed
capability
capability of of the
the F-15E,
F-15E, increasing
increasing the the flight
flight time
time inin enemy territory.
enemy territory.
Therefore,
Therefore, the the tactically
tactically correct
correct choice
choice is is the
the F-15E.
F-15E.
The
The choice
choice of of the
the F/A-18
F/A-18 as as the
the second
second bomb bomb carrier
carrier is is driven
driven
primarily
primarily by by its
its self-defense
self-defense capabilities
capabilities.. Like
Like the the F-15E,
F-15E, itit can can carry
carry
and
and employ
employ both both the the close-range,
close-range, heat-seeking
heat-seeking AIM-9 AIM-9 and and thethe
longer-range,
longer-range, radar-guided
radar-guided AIM-7 AIM-7 whilewhile still
still loaded
loaded withwith LGBsLGBs and and
external
external fuelfuel tanks.
tanks. TheThe A-6EA-6E cannot
caimot carry
carry thethe AIM-7.
AIM-7. The The F-16
F-16 can can
carry
carry andand employ
employ the the AIM-7
AIM-7 but does not
but does not have
have enough
enough mounting
mounting points points
to
to carry
carry the AIM-7, LGBs,
the AIM-7, LGBs, and and the
the necessary
necessary external
external fuelfuel tanks
tanks at at the
the
same
same timetime.. As
As anan additional
additional LGB LGB platform,
platform, the the F/A-18
F/A-18 is is aa better
better choice
choice
for
for this
this mission.
mission.

28
28
THE
THE CI IALLENGE
CHALLENGE

Having
Having selected
selected the the bomb
bomb carriers,
carriers, mission
mission planners
planners must must next next
choose
choose the
the escort
escort aircraft
aircraft. . Any
Any of
of the
the air-to-air
air-to-air or
or multirole
multirole aircraft
aircraft
listed
listed inin table
table 11 would
would be be suitable
suitable for for this
this mission
mission during
during the the daytime,
daytime,
when escort aircraft can expect air-to-air combat to include aa
when escort aircraft can expect air-to-air combat to include
combination
combination ofbeyond
of beyond visualvisual range
range (BVR)
(BVR) intercept
intercept radar
radar missile
missile shotsshots
and close-in maneuvering
and close-in maneuvering for for IR IR and
and gun
gun shots.
shots. This
This isis not
not necessarily
necessarily
true at night : According to Lt Col John
true at night: According to Lt Col John ("Lucky")
("Lucky") Rivers, an
Rivers, an
experienced
experienced F-15 F-15 pilot
pUot andand Fighter
Fighter Weapons
Weapons Instructor
Instructor Course
Course (FWIC)(FWIC)
graduate,
graduate, night
night air-to-air combat will
air-to-air combat will probably
probably be be all
all BVR,
BVR, nontuming
nontuming
engagements.
engagements. Although
Although the the FWIC
FWIC syllabus
syllabus included
included somesome training
training in in
night
night air-to-air
air-to-air maneuvering,
maneuvering, they do not
they do not realistically
realistically expect
expect to to have
have to to
employ those skills since no other air force trains in that environment.$
employ those skills since no other air force trains in that environment.*
Colonel
Colonel Rivers's
Rivers's views
views agreeagree with
with those
those of of Lt
Lt Col
Col Mel
Mel Copeland,
Copeland,
another
another experienced
experienced F-15 F-15 pilot
pilot and
and former
former commander
commander of of thethe 54th
54th
Tactical
Tactical Fighter Squadron, an
Fighter Squadron, an F-15C
F-15C air air superiority
superiority squadron
squadron at at
Elmendorf
Elmendorf AFB, AFB, Alaska.
Alaska. Colonel
Colonel Copeland
Copeland also also expects
expects thatthat night
night airair
superiority will be primarily BVR and will require both launch-and-
superiority wiU be primarily BVR and wiU require both launch-and-
leave
leave missile
missile capability
capability and and "big-picture"
"big-picmre" (situational)
(situational) awareness
awareness..
Launch-and-leave
Launch-and-leave missiles, missiles, such such as as provided
provided by by thethe advanced
advanced
medium-range
medium-range air-to-air
air-to-air missile
missile (AMRAAM)
(AMRAAM) now now being fielded, are
being fielded, are
necessary
necessary so so that
that the escort fighters
the escort fighters are
are free
free to to maneuver
maneuver after after firing
firing
either to avoid being shot themselves or to attack following targets .
either to avoid being shot themselves or to attack following targets.
Postlaunch
Postlaunch radar
radar guidance
guidance requirements
requirements of of the
the current
current AIM-7
AIM-7 missiles
missiles
limit
limit the
the F-15's
F-15's freedom
freedom to to maneuver
maneuver..
The concept of situational awarenessrefers
The concept of situational awareness refers to the ability
to the ability ofthe
of the fighter
fighter
pilot
pilot to
to keep
keep track
track ofof the
the position
position of of his
his aircraft
aircraft in in space,
space, thethe position
position of of
both friendly
both friendly andand enemy
enemy aircraft
aircraft relative
relative to to his
his own
own aircraft,
aircraft, and and the
the
state
state ofthe
of the air
air battle
battle atat that
that moment,
moment, plus plus aa reasonable
reasonable prediction
prediction ofthe of the
next
next moment.
moment. Situational
Situational awareness
awareness requires
requires aa nearly nearly instinctive
instinctive
knowledge of which enemy aircraft can be attacked, which ones
knowledge of which enemy aircraft can be attacked, which ones maymay
be
be attacking,
attacking, andand the
the capability
capability of of dealing
dealing withwith thethe enemy
enemy attack.
attack. TheThe
pilot
pilot must
must make
make decisions
decisions and and take
take action
action quickly
quickly in in the
the faceface ofof aa
constantly
constantly changing
changing situation
situation whilewhile continuing
continuing to to fly
fly the
the aircraft,
aircraft, talktalk
on
on the
the radio,
radio, and
and (hopefully)
(hopefuUy) shoot shoot down
down MiGs
MiGs.. In In either
either day
day or or night,
night,
the pilotbuilds mental situational awareness through the use ofonboard
the pUot buUds mental situational awareness through the use of onboard

29
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TRAINING FOR NIGHT AIR
AIR WARFARE
WARFARE

radar,
radar, radio
radio communication
communication with with other
other aircraft,
aircraft, andand external
external support
support
assets such as airborne or surface radar controllers. During the day, this
assets such as airborne or surface radar controllers. During the day, this
mental
mental picture
picture is is increased
increased and and confirmed
confirmed by by visual
visual references.
references. ThisThis can
can
be
be done
done by by either
either physically
physically seeing seeing the the other
other aircraft
aircraft or
or by
by reference
reference to to
visible
visible landmarks.
landmarks. At At night,
night, external
external visual
visual situational
situational awareness
awareness is is
extremely
extremely limited,
limited, forcing
forcing the the aircrew
aircrew to to rely
rely onon onboard
onboard displays
displays andand
mental images from radio calls .
mental images from radio calls.
Some
Some formform of of big-picture
big-picture display inside the
display inside the cockpit
cockpit is is necessary
necessary so so
that the escort
that the fighters can
escort fighters can quickly
quickly determine
determine where where the
the fight
fight is,
is, where
where
the
the friendlies
friendlies are are inin relation
relation to to the
the target,
target, andand which
which ofthe
of the radar
radar returns
returns
are
are the
the enemy.
enemy. At At present,
present, this this situational
situational awareness
awareness is is provided
provided in in the
the
F-15 and the F-16 by a combination of onboard radar and radio voice
F-15 and the F-16 by a combination of onboard radar and radio voice
communications
communications with with the the ground
ground or or airborne
airborne radarradar controller
controller..
Preferably,
Preferably, this this big
big picture
picture shouldshould be be aa real-time,
real-time, in-cockpit
in-cockpit visual
visual
display to cut down on the number of radio transmissions. In daytime,
display to cut down on the number of radio transmissions. In daytime,
some
some of of this
this situational
situational awareness
awareness can can bebe provided
provided by by visual
visual cues
cues
outside
outside thethe cockpit.
cockpit. There
There are are nono such
such visual
visual references
references at at night.
night. Colonel
Colonel
Copeland
Copeland considers
considers that that some
some formform of of internal
internal big-picture
big-picture display
display is is
absolutely essential for
absolutely essential for night
night air-to-air
air-to-air missions.9
missions.^
Although not all of the mission results from
Although not all of the mission results from Desert
Desert Storm
Storm havehave been
been
declassified
declassified yet, yet, at at least
least oneone unclassified
unclassified report report validates
validates Colonel
Colonel
Rivers's
Rivers's andColonel
and Colonel Copeland's
Copeland's viewpoints
viewpoints concerning
concerning BVR B VR ordnance
ordnance
and
and internal
internal situational
situational awareness.
awareness. During During aa televised
televised CNN interview,
CNN interview,
Capt
Capt Steve
Steve Tate,
Tate, an an F-15
F-15 pilot
pilot inin Operation
Operation Desert Desert Storm,
Storm, related
related his
his
experiences in the predawn hours of 17 January 1991 . While flying as
experiences in the predawn hours of 17 January 1991. WhUe flying as
air cover for
air cover for aa number
number of of allied
allied attackers, Captain Tate's
attackers, Captain Tate's radar
radar detected
detected
an
an unidentified
unidentified aircraftaircraft heading
heading toward toward his his formation.
formation. Following
Following
confirmation
confirmation by by the allied air
the allied air control
control system
system thatthat the
the radar
radar contact
contact waswas
aa hostile
hostile Iraqi
Iraqi fighter, Captain Tate
fighter. Captain Tate destroyed
destroyed it it with
with aa single
single
radar-guided
radar-guided AIM-7 AIM-7 missile.missile. His His first
first visual
visual contact
contact withwith the
the Iraqi
Iraqi
target
target was
was thethe resulting
resultiag fireball
fireball.'^.I0
Two
Two important
important points points should should be be noted
noted from from Captain
Captain Tate'sTate's
engagement. First, as Colonel Rivers predicted, the entire fight took
engagement. First, as Colonel Rivers predicted, the entire fight took
place
place without
without visualvisual contact
contact by by either
either aircraft
aircraft andand with
with little
little or
or no
no
maneuvering.
maneuvering. A A BVR
BVR missile
missile shot shot was was thethe key
key toto Captain
Captain Tate's
Tate's

30
30
THE
THE CFIALLENGE
CHALLENGE

success. Second, Colonel


success. Second, Colonel Copeland's
Copeland's points stressing the
points stressing the need
need for for
launch-and-leave ordnance and
launch-and-leave ordnance and in-cockpit
in-cockpit big
big picture
picture are
are not
not
invalidated. The
invalidated. The fighter
fighter that
that Captain
Captain Tate Tate destroyed
destroyed was was thethe only
only enemy
enemy
aircraft in
aircraft in the
the area;
area; Captain
Captain Tate could afford
Tate could afford to to keep
keep illuminating
illuminating the the
target until the
target untU the AIM-7
AIM-7 hit.
hit. If
If there
there had
had been
been more
more enemy
enemy fighters
fighters
airborne, one
airborne, one could
could havehave fired
fired atat Captain
Captain Tate Tate while
while he he was
was illuminating
illuminating
the first Iraqi . Launch-and-leave ordnance reduces this danger .
the first Iraqi. Launch-and-leave ordnance reduces this danger.
As
As regards
regards the the need
need forfor aa big
big picture
picture in in the
the cockpit,
cockpit. Captain
Captain Tate Tate used
used
aa combination
combination of of onboard
onboard radar radar and
and external
external control
control systems
systems to to confirm
confirm
before firing that the radar contact
before firing that the radar contact was
was an
an enemy.
enemy. Only
Only one
one contact
contact on
on
internal radar
his internal
his radar and and clear
clear radio communications with
radio communications with the the external
external
control system made this a comparatively easy thing to do. Multiple
control system made this a comparatively easy thing to do. Multiple
engagements
engagements from from several
several different fighters might
different fighters might have have overloaded
overloaded
both
both the
the control system and
control system and Captain
Captain Tate's
Tate's situational
situational awareness
awareness to to the
the
point that the Iraqi was never confirmed hostile
point that the Iraqi was never confirmed hostile and
and escaped.
escaped.
The
The desirability
desirabUity of an internal,
of an internal, nonverbal
nonverbal big-picture capability can
big-picture capability can
perhaps
perhaps bestbest bebe explained
explained by by the
the concept
concept of"brain bytes." As
of "brain bytes." As explained
explained
by Capt Jane Patterson,
by Capt Jane Patterson, an
an instructor/senior
instructor/senior director
director in
in the
the E-3A
E-3A
AWACS,
AWACS, and and MajMaj DickDick Embry, former F-106
Embry, aa former F-106 and and F-16
F-16 interceptor
interceptor
pilot currently flying the E-3A, both a radar controller
pilot currently flying the E-3A, both a radar controller and
and a
a fighter
fighter pilot
pilot
only
only have
have so so many
many brain bytes available
brain bytes available to to receive,
receive, process,
process, and and act
act onon
information.
information. The The radarradar controller receives information
controller receives information from from the the
AWACS radar display and
AWACS radar display and mentally
mentally processes
processes it
it to
to determine
determine if
if the
the
radar contact is
radar contact is friend
friend or or foe.
foe. The controller then
The controller then transmits
transmits this this
information to the fighter pilot for action . It takes a certain amount of
information to the fighter pilot for action. It takes a certain amoimt of
brain
brain bytes
bytes for for the the controller
controller to to dodo thisthis verbally
verbally throughthrough radio radio
communication
communication and and aa corresponding
corresponding amount amount for for the fighter pilot to
the fighterpilot to hear
hear
the transmission and decide to act on
the transmission and decide to act on it.
it. The
The pilot
pilot must
must be
be listening
listening at
at
the
the same
same timetime the the controller
controller is talking or
is talking or must request aa retransmittal.
must request retransmittal.
In contrast, if using a nonverbal data link (DL), the controller uses
In contrast, if using a nonverbal data link (DL), the controller uses
fewer brain bytes
fewer brain bytes to to transmit information in
transmit information in symbology
symbology to to thethe
fighter's
fighter's internal displays.. The
internal displays The pilot does not
pilot does not have
have to to use
use brain
brain bytes
bytes
to form and say the necessary words, and the
to form and say the necessary words, and the information
information can
can be
be sent
sent
more
more quickly.
quickly. Since Since the the DL DL symbology
symbology remains remains on on thethe display,
display,
fighter pilots can
fighter pilots can receive
receive and and act
act upon
upon itit at their own
at their own pace.pace. Meanwhile,
Meanwhile,

31
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the radar
the radar controller
controller can can be
be transmitting
transmitting DL DL to
to other
other fighters
fighters against
against other
other
targets . From
targets. From theirtheir personal
personal experiences
experiences in in both
both types
types of of control
control
systems,
systems, Captain
Captain Patterson
Patterson and and Major
Major Embry
Embry state
state that
that the
the DL
DL system
system
is'faster
is faster and
and easier
easier to to use
use for
for both
both controllers
controllers and and the
the fighter
fighter pilots.'
pilots.''I
From
From the
the list
list of
of aircraft
aircraft inin table
table 1,1, only
only the
the F-14
F-14 possesses
possesses the the desired
desired
characteristics
characteristics of of launch-and-leave
launch-and-leave ordnance ordnance and and in-cockpit
in-cockpit big-picture
big-picture
(situational) awareness.
(situational) awareness. The The F-14's AIM-54 Phoenix air-to-air missile
F-14's AIM-54 Phoenix air-to-air missile
has
has the
the desired
desired long-range,
long-range, launch-and-leave
launch-and-leave capability
capability that that the
the AIM-7
AIM-7
does
does not
not.. Even with AMRAAM,
Even with AMRAAM, the the F-15s,
F-15s, -16s,
-16s, and
and -18s-18s dodo not
not have
have
the big picture
the big picture thatthat the
the F-14
F-14 has has.. The
The Tomcat's
Tomcat's tactical
tactical information
information
display,
display, continuously
continuously updatedupdated by by both
both onboard
onboard radar
radar andand either
either airborne
airborne
or
or ground
ground radar control DL, provides 360 degrees of real-time visual
radar control DL, provides 360 degrees of real-time visual
situational awareness to
simational awareness to the
the aircrew
aircrew.. Therefore,
Therefore, the the selected
selected escort
escort
aircraft
aircraft for
for this
this mission
mission is is the
the F-14 Tomcat.. The
F-14 Tomcat The number
number of of F-14s
F-14s
required
required for for this
this role
role can
can be be kept
kept to to aa minimum
minimum because because of of the
the
self-defense
self-defense capabilities
capabilities of of the
the bomb
bomb carriers
carriers.. This
This reduces
reduces the the overall
overall
size
size ofof the
the package
package whilewhile retaining
retaining sufficiency
sufficiency of of firepower.
firepower.
The
The next
next aircraft
aircraft to to be selected are
be selected are the
the SEAD
SEAD assets.
assets. The The EA-6B
EA-6B is is
the
the only
only available
available in-theater
in-theater aircraft
aircraft capable
capable of of independently
independently locating locating
and
and destroying
destroying enemy enemy threat
threat radars.
radars. It It also
also hashas the the ability
ability to to
electronically
electronically deceivedeceive and and disrupt
disrupt enemy
enemy radars
radars through
through electronic
electronic
jamming
jamming in in addition
addition to to destroying
destroying them them with
with HARMS.
HARMs. In In the
the Air
Air Force,
Force,
this
this electronic
electronic jamming
jamming mission
mission is is performed
performed by by the
the EF-111A
EF-111A Raven. Raven.
Unfortunately,
Unfortunately, they they have
have not
not yet
yet been
been deployed
deployed in in theater;
theater; the the EA-6B
EA-6B
is part of
is part of the
the standard
standard wing wing inventory
inventory on on an
an aircraft
aircraft carrier
carrier..
The
The EA-6B
EA-6B can can also serve as
also serve as the
the hunters
hunters inin aa hunter-killer
hunter-killer team team with
with
other
other aircraft
aircraft.. Since
Since therethere are are only
only aa limited
limited number number of of the
the
high-technology
high-technology hunters hunters in in theater,
theater, pairing
pairing them
them withwith aa suitable
suitable killer
killer
aircraft
aircraft capable
capable of of HARM
HARM employment
employment increases
increases the the overall
overall SEAD SEAD
protection for the whole package . The F-16, F/A-18, and A-6E are
protection for the whole package. The F-16, F/A-18, and A-6E are all
all
capable
capable of of performing
performing as as SEAD
SEAD killers.
killers. Since
Since the the EA-6B
EA-6B and and the
the
F/A-18
F/A-18 are are both
both Navy
Navy aircraft
aircraft andand operate
operate from
from thethe same
same aircraft
aircraft carrier,
carrier,
any
any difficulties
difficulties in in mission
mission planning
planning and and coordination
coordination are are minimized
minimized by by
pairing
pairing thethe EA-6B
EA-6B with with the
the F/A-18
F/A-18 as as aa SEAD
SEAD hunter-killer
hunter-killer team team..

32
32
THE
THE CHALLENGE
CHALLENGE

As was
As was demonstrated
demonstrated in the opening
in the opening minutes
minutes of of Operation
Operation Desert
Desert
Storm, the presence of
Storm, the presence of the
the Army's
Army's night-capable
night-capable attack
attack helicopters
heUcopters can
can
bring
bring an
an interesting
interesting new
new SEAD
SEAD asset to the
asset to the theater.
theater. AsAs was
was revealed
revealed inin
the 25 February 1991 issue of the Air Force Times,
the 25 February 1991 issue of the Air Force Times, Army
Army AH-64
AH-64
Apache
Apache helicopters
helicopters armed
armed with laser guided
with laser guided Hellfire
Hellfire tactical
tactical air-to-
air-to-
surface missiles knocked
surface missiles knocked out out three
three Iraqi early-warning radars
Iraqi early-warning radars along
along the
the
Saudi Arabian border at approximately
Saudi Arabian border at approximately 0130L,
0130L, 17
17 January
January 1991,
1991, just
just as
as
the
the first
first wave
wave of of USAF
USAF aircraft
aircraft turned
turned north
north from their holding
from their holding points .12
points.'^
This
This opened
opened aa blind
blind spot
spot inin the Iraqi coverage,
the Iraqi coverage, allowing
allowing the the first
first waves
waves
of F-15Es to cross
of F-15Es to cross into
into Iraq
Iraq basically
basically undetected
undetected. . This
This was
was a
a superb
superb
example
example of of the
the proper
proper joint
joint use
use ofof night-capable
night-capable assetsassets for
for overall
overall
mission success. Again following the lesson
mission success. Again following the lesson from
from Desert
Desert Storm,
Storm,
planning
plaiming for Operation Tae
for Operation Tae Kwon
Kwon Do will include
Do will include joint SEAD
joint SEAD
employment with
employment with Army
Army Apaches
Apaches..
The proposed attack package
The proposed attack package against
against Bul-Go-Ki
Bul-Go-Ki AB AB is listed in
is listed in
table 2.
table 2. The
The author
author accepts
accepts that
that there
there are other possible
many other
are many possible mixtures
mixtures
that may be as effective, or even more effective. However, since the
that may be as effective, or even more effective. However, since the
purpose
purpose of of the
the example
example is to illustrate
is to potential challenges
illustrate potential challenges injoint
in joint night
night
employment,
employment, theform
the form of the example
of the example usedused isis more
more important
important thanthan the
the
substance.
substance.

Table
Table 22

Bul-Go-Ki
Bul-Go-Ki OCA Mission Package
OCA Mission Package
Aircraft
Aircraft Type
Type Armament
Armament

Attack
Attack F-15E
F-15E with
with LANTIRN
LANTIRN pods
pods (both aircraft):
(both aircraft): GBU-27s,
GBU-27s,
F/A-18
F/A-18 with
with FLIR
H.TR pod
pod AIM-7,
AIM-7, AIM-9,20-mm
AIM-9,20-mm gungun

Escort
Escort
Fighters
Hghters F-14
F-14 AIM-45
AIM-45 Phoenix,
Phoenix, AIM-7,
AIM-7,
AIM-9, 20-mm gun
AIM-9,20-inm gun

SEAD
SEAD EA-6B hunter-killer
EA-6B hunter-ldller HARM
HARM
killer
F/A-18 killer
F/A-18 HARM, AIM-9, AIM-7
HARM, AIM-9, AIM-7
AH-64
AH-64 Apache
Apache Hellfire, 30-mm gun
Hellfire, 30-mm gun

33
JOINT
JOINT TRAINING FOR NIGHT
TRAINING FOR NIGHT AIR
AIR WARFARE
WARFARE

Table
Table 2--Continued
2Continued

Aircraft
Aircraft Type
Type Armament
Armament

EW
EW
Support
Support EA-6B
EA-6B
Legend
Legend:: AIM-air
AIMair intercept
intercept missile
missile
EW-electronic
EWelectronic warfare
warfare
FLIR-forward
FLIRforward loolang
looking infrared
infrared radar
radar
HARM-high-speed
HARM^high-speed antiradiation
antiradiation missile
missile
LANTIRN-low-altitude
LANTIRN^low-altitude navigation
navigation and
and
targeting
targeting infrared
infrared at
at night
night
OCA-offensive
OCAoffensive counterair
counterair
SEAR-suppression
SEADsuppression of of enemy
enemy air
air defense
defense

Defensive
Defensive Counterair
Counterair

Defensive
Defensive counterair
counterair missions
missions are are toto "detect,
"detect, identify,
identify, intercept;
intercept, and
and
destroy enemy aerospace forces that are attempting to attack friendly
destroy enemy aerospace forces that are attempting to attack friendly
13
forces
forces oror penetrate
penetrate friendly
friendly airspace ." DCA
airspace."'^ DCA over over the
the battlefield
battlefield
provides
provides thethe ground
ground troops
troops with
with the
the freedom
freedom to to carry
carry out
out the
the ground
ground
war
war without
without interference
interference from from enemy
enemy air air threats.
threats. DCADCA operations
operations
involve
involve many
many of of the
the same
same problems
problems as as faced
faced by by the
the escort
escort aircraft
aircraft for
for
the OCA mission. DCA aircraft at night should still expect to employ
the OCA mission. DCA aircraft at night should still expect to employ
BVR
BVR missile
missUe shots
shots with
with minimal
minimal maneuvering
maneuvering and and to to depend
depend on on
nonvisual
nonvisual methods
methods for for enemy
enemy detection
detection and and identification
identification..
In
In some
some respects,
respects, though,
though, the the DCA
DCA role role for
for this
this mission
mission should
should bebe
easier
easier.. The
The fighters
fighters escorting
escorting the the OCA
OCA package
package against
against Bul-Go-Ki
Bul-Go-Ki will will
expect
expect toto fight over enemy
fight over enemy airspace
airspace.. Under
Under such such conditions,
conditions, theythey must
must
be
be prepared
prepared to to deal
deal with
with aa threat
threat from
from anyany direction.
direction. In In contrast,
contrast, this
this
DCA
DCA mission
mission involves
involves airair operations
operations overover friendly
friendly lines,
lines, notpenetration
not penetration
into enemy territory . This provides two important advantages . First,
into enemy territory. This provides two important advantages. First, the
the
threat
threat of
of enemy
enemy SAMsSAMs and and AAA
AAA is is greatly
greatly reduced
reduced or or nonexistent.
nonexistent. By By
staying
staying over
over our own territory
our own territory andand beyond
beyond the the range
range ofthe enemy threat,
of the enemy threat,
we
we can
can eliminate
eliminate thethe need
need for
for SEAD
SEAD support,
support, freeing
freeing those
those assets
assets for
for
other
other missions.
missions. Second,
Second, thethe bandits
bandits will
will probably
probably be be coming
coming through
through
airspace friendly to us from a single predictable direction (i.e., north)
airspace friendly to us from a single predictable direction (i.e., north)..

34
34
TI
THEIE CHALLENGE
CHALLENGE

Even
Even though
though thisthis mission
mission still
still involves
involves night
night operations,
operations, thethe DCA
DCA forces
forces
do
do not
not need
need the
the same
same bigbig picture
picture that
that the
the escort
escort fighters
fighters required
required for
for the
the
OCA mission against Bul-Go-Ki.
OCA mission against Bul-Go-Ki.
Based
Based on on the
the above
above considerations,
considerations, any any ofof the
the air-to-air
air-to-air oror multirole
multirole
fighters
fighters listed
listed in table 11 could
in table could be appropriate for
be appropriate for this mission.. Although
this mission Although
the
the multirole
multirole F-16sF-16s or or F/A-18s
F/A-18s couldcould be be tasked
tasked forfor DCA
DCA overover the
the
battlefield,
battlefield, the
the relative
relative scarcity
scarcity of assets for
of assets for Operation
Operation Tae Tae Kwon
Kwon Do Do
may make it necessary to save these multirole aircraft for either air
may make it necessary to save these multirole aircraft for either air
interdiction
interdiction (AI)
(AI) oror CAS
CAS.. InIn contrast,because
contrast, because ofaircraft
of aircraft design
design features,
features,
the
the air-to-air
air-to-air specialized
specialized F-15s
F-15s andand F-14s
F-14s cannot
cannot bebe as
as effectively
effectively used
used
for
for CAS
CAS or or AI AI missions
missions.. Further,
Further, thethe F-15s
F-15s andand F-14s
F-14s have
have the
the
advantages
advantages ofgreater
of greater loiter
loiter time
time and
and greater
greater missile
missile capacity
capacity compared
compared
to the multirole aircraft . Therefore, either of these two aircraft is
to the multirole aircraft. Therefore, either of these two aircraft is
preferable
preferable to to the
the multirole
multirole aircraft
aircraft for
for the
the DCA
DCA overover the
the battlefield.
battlefield.
Since
Since the
the F-14s
F-14s havehave already
already been
been tasked
tasked toto provide escort for
provide escort for the
the OCA
OCA
mission against Bul-Go-Ki, the F-15s will be used for the DCA over
mission against Bul-Go-Ki, the F-15s will be used for the DCA over
the
the battlefield.
battlefield.

On-Call Close Air


On-Call Close Air Support
Support
The
The final
final mission
mission areaarea toto consider
consider forfor Operation
Operation Tae Tae Kwon
Kwon Do Do is is the
the
on-call
on-caU CASCAS for for thethe ground offensive. By
ground offensive. By definition,
definition, CASCAS supports
supports
"surface
"surface operations
operations by by attacking
attacking hostile
hostile targets
targets inin close
close proximity
proximity to to
friendly surface forces
Mendly surface forces."." Because
Because of of this
this "close
"close proximity,"
proximity," CAS CAS
missions "require detailed coordination and integration" with friendly
missions "require detailed coordination and integration" with fi:iendly
surface
surface forces . 14 As
forces.''* As was discussed in
was discussed in chapter
chapter 1,1, the
the traditional tactic for
traditional tactic for
night
night CAS
CAS intois to illuminate
illuminate the the target
target with
with aerial
aerial flares
flares for
for bombing
bombing from from
medium
medium altitude.
altitude. In In the
the face
face ofof today's high-threat air
today's high-threat air defenses,
defenses, this this
tactic is
tactic probably aa good
is probably good wayway toto ensure
ensure getting
getting killed!
killed! The
The flares
flares that
that
illuminate the enemy target also serve to highlight the attacking aircraft
illuminate the enemy target also serve to highlight the attacking aircraft
and
and the
the friendly
friendly ground
ground forces
forces.. Its
Its superior
superior capability
capability to to operate
operate in in the
the
dark
dark gives
gives thethe American
American Army Army aa tactical
tactical advantage
advantage for for our
our soldiers.
soldiers.'^ 15
Flares take away some ofthe
Flares take away some of the night-fighting
night-fighting advantages such as
advantages such as surprise
surprise
and
and concealment
concealment that that American
American technology
technology gives
gives ourground
our ground troops
troops.. To To
survive in the night CAS role, an aircraft must have the same high-speed,
survive in the night CAS role, an aircraft must have the same high-speed.

35
35
JOINT
JOINT TRAINING
TRAINING FOR
FOR NIGHT
NIGHT AIR
AIR WARFARE
WARFARE

low-altitude
low-altitude capability
capability of of day
day CASCAS aircraft
aircraft.'*. 16 The
The night
night CAS
CAS pilot
pilot must
must
fly
fly at
at low
low level,
level, bebe able
able to to navigate
navigate to to the
the target
target area,
area, avoid
avoid thethe "rocks,
"rocks,
trees,
trees, and
and boulders"
boulders" along along the the way,
way, identify
identify the the target,
target, successfully
successfully
attack
attack it,
it, then
then egress
egress backback to to safety
safety..
At
At first
first glance,
glance, these
these appear
appear to to bebe the
the same
same challenges
challenges faced faced on on aa
night
night OCA
OCA mission,
mission, so so any
any ofthe
of the bombing
bombing aircraft
aircraft listed
listed inin table
table 11 could
could
be
be used
used inin the
the CAS
CAS role
role.. However,
However, there there areare some
some important
important differences
differences
that
that can
can make
make one one aircraft
aircraft better
better suited
suited thanthan another
another to to aa night
night CASCAS role.
role.
The
The OCAOCA mission
mission is is against
against aa largelarge target
target in in aa known
known position
position..
(Runways
(Runways do do not
not tend
tend to to move
move around.)
around.) Because
Because the the position
position is is known,
known,
attacks
attacks cancan be
be preplanned
preplanned from from an an optimum
optimum axis axis so so that
that the
the pilot
pilot can
can
ensure
ensure target
target identification.
identification.
On-call CAS
On-call CAS has has some
some different
different requirements,
requirements, however. however. Targets
Targets for for
on-call CAS
on-call CAS areare not
not identified
identified untiluntil after
after the
the battle
battle starts
starts and
and therefore
therefore
cannot be
cannot be preplanned
preplanned.. An An enemy
enemy tank platoon that
tank platoon that suddenly
suddenly comes comes out out
from
from under camouflage directly
under camouflage directly across
across the the line
line ofadvance
of advance could could require
require
on-call
on-call CAS CAS to to clear
clear the the way.
way. Typically,
Typically, aircraft
aircraft suitable
suitable forfor on-call
on-call
CAS
CAS mustmust be be capable
capable of of quick
quick response
response to to reach
reach the the target
target area,
area, have
have
some system
some system for for positive
positive targettarget identification
identification in in the
the middle
middle of of aa
battle-confused
battle-confused environment,
environment, and and bring
bring aa large
large variety
variety and and amount
amount of of
ordnance
ordnance.. TheyThey should
should also also have
have goodgood maneuverability
maneuverability to to stay
stay close
close toto
an
an active
active battle
battle areaarea whilewhile avoiding
avoiding enemy enemy defensesdefenses and and havehave
reasonable
reasonable loiter
loiter time
time to be able
to be able toto stay
stay andand get
get the
the job
job done
done.. TheThe AH-64
AH-64
Apache,
Apache, the the AV-8B
AV-8B Harrier
Harrier 11, II, and
and the
the A-10
A-10 Thunderbolt
Thunderbolt II 11 (Warthog)
(Warthog)
are all designed
are all designed for for exactly
exactly thesethese requirements
requirements.. The The Apache
Apache and and the
the
Harrier,
Harrier, withwith integral
integral FUR FLIR and and night
night vision
vision goggles
goggles (NVG),(NVG), are are
especially
especially well well equipped
equipped for for night
night CAS CAS missions
missions withoutwithout external
external
illumination
illumination.. The The A-10
A-10 has has neither
neither FUR FLIR nor nor NVGs
NVGs and and normally
normally
requires
requires external
external lighting
Ughting such such as as air-dropped
air-dropped flares flares or or artillery-fired
artiUery-fired
illumination
illumination rounds
rounds for for target
target identification
identification and and attack
attack.. However,
However, recent recent
experiences
experiences in in Operation
Operation Desert Desert StormStorm show show that that thethe Warthog
Warthog can can bebe
effectively
effectively employed
employed at at night
night without
without illumination
illumination of of the
the target
target by by using
using
the
the AGM-65D
AGM-65D with with imaging
imaging infrared
infrared (11R) (IIR) Maverick
Maverick for for both
both target
target
acquisition
acquisition and and attack
attack.. Burning
Burning enemy enemy vehicles
vehicles from from previous
previous attacks
attacks

36
36
THE
THE CHALLENGE
CHALLENGE

have also proven


have also proven highly
highly effective
effective in
in illuminating
illuminating the
the remainder
remainder ofof the
the
convoy
convoy for
for subsequent
subsequent attack.
attack. 17
To follow
To follow the
the principle
principle of
of mass,
mass, all
all three
three aircraft-the
aircraft^the Apache,
Apache, the
the
Harrier, and the Warthogwill be tasked to provide on-call CAS at
Harrier, and the Warthog^wUl be tasked to provide on-call CAS at
night
night for
for Operation
Operation Tae
Tae Kwon
Kwon Do.Do. As
As will
will be
be discussed
discussed in
in the
the execution
execution
section,
section, the
the night
night CAS
CAS mission
mission hashas some
some interesting
interesting challenges
challenges in
in the
the
target
target acquisition and attack
acquisition and attack phase.
phase.

Mission
Mission Execution
Execution

With
With the
the packages
packages selected,
selected, letlet us
us walk
walk through
through the the missions
missions to to see
see
what
what challenges
challenges must
must bebe met
met during
during Operation
Operation TaeTae Kwon
Kwon Do.Do. As As stated
stated
in
in chapter
chapter 1, 1, this
this study
study focuses
focuses on on those
those areas
areas that
that are
are both
both joint
joint and
and
night
night operations.
operations. In In keeping
keeping withwith this
this focus,
focus, thethe mission
mission execution
execution
section of this chapter addresses only those areas that are peculiar to
section of this chapter addresses only those areas that are peculiar to
joint
joint night
night operations
operations..
There
There are
are aa number
number of of challenges
challenges in in joint
joint mission
mission accomplishment,
accomplishment,
whether
whether itit is
is aa day
day oror night
night mission.
mission. For For instance,
instance, how how well
well does
does the
the
Air
Air Force
Force ATO
ATO system
system pass
pass assigned
assigned targets
targets toto the
the Navy
Navy squadrons
squadrons
involved? What process can land-based Air Force aircrews use
involved? What process can land-based Air Force aircrews use for
for
premission
premission planning
planning with carrier-based Navy
with carrier-based Navy aircrews?
aircrews? What
What areare the
the
correct
correct start,
start, taxi,
taxi, and
and takeoff
takeoff times
times for
for all
all the
the squadrons
squadrons to to ensure
ensure aa
properly coordinated attack?
properly coordinated attack? Since
Since Navy
Navy aircraft can only
aircraft can only aerial
aerial refuel
refuel
off
off certain
certain Air
Air Force
Force tankers
tankers andand Air
Air Force
Force fighters
fighters cannot
cannot refuel
refuel off
off
any Navy
any Navy tankers,
tankers, what
what are are the
the required
required prestrike
prestiike andand poststrike
poststrike
refueling
refueling assets?
assets? AllAH ofof these
these are
are important
important joint
joint employment
employment issuesissues
that
that must
must be
be resolved
resolved before
before thethe mission,
mission, butbut they
they are not peculiar
are not peculiar toto
night
night operations
operations.. More important, they
More important, they are
are all
all issues that are
issues that are regularly
regularly
practiced
practiced inin local
local exercises,
exercises, joint
joint command
command post post exercises,
exercises, andand such
such
large-scale operations as
large-scale operations as Red
Red Flag
Flag and Cope Thunder.
and Cope Thunder.

37
37
JOINT
JOINT TRAINING
TRAINING FOR
FOR NIGHT
NIGHT AIR
AIR WARFARE
WARFARE

Offensive
Offensive Counterair
Counterair
By
By its
its nature,
nature, the the OCAOCA mission
mission against
against Bul-Go-Ki
Bul-Go-Ki is is the
the largest
largest and
and
most
most complex
complex of of the
the three.
three. Accordingly,
Accordingly, itit will wUl encounter
encoimter the the largest
largest
number
number of of challenges
challenges to to joint
joint night-mission
night-mission accomplishment.
accomplishment. The The
challenges
challenges considered
considered are are not
not meant
meant toto be
be exhaustive,
exhaustive, nor nor isis the
the order
order
in
in which
which they they areare considered'
considered intendedintended to to reflect
reflect anyany particular
particular mission
mission
priority
priority.. TheyThey are are included
included simplysimply to to illustrate
illustrate somesome of of the
the areas
areas inin
which
which jointjoint night
night training
training can can improve
improve future
future operations.
operations.
Target
Target Ingress.
Ingress. The The first
first obstacle
obstacle encountered
encountered during during target
target ingress
ingress
is
is penetration
penetration ofthe of the enemy
enemy IADS,IADS, beginning
begiiming with with the
the early
early warning
warning and and
ground-controlled
ground-controlled intercept intercept radars
radars.. These
These areare the
the systems
systems that
that initially
initially
detect
detect incoming
incoming aircraft
aircraft and and control
control the
the overall
overall fighter,
fighter, SAM,
SAM, and and AAA
AAA
responses
responses.. EA-6BsEA-6Bs are are available
available for for passive
passive disruption
disruption and and deception
deception
of
of thethe IADS
IADS while while they,
they, in in conjunction
conjunction with with F/A-18s
F/A-18s and and Apache
Apache
helicopters,
helicopters, can can be be used
used forfor destruction.
destruction.
There
There are are two
two challenges
challenges to to effective
effective employment
employment ofthisjoint
of this joint SEAD
SEAD
package.
package. First, First, Army
Army helicopters
helicopters are are organic
organic to their assigned
to their assigned division
division..
They
They do do notnot normally
normally come come underunder the
the control
control of of the
the air
air component
component
commander
commander and, and, as as such,
such, areare not
not detailed
detailed in in the
the daily
daily ATO
ATO.. The The impact
impact
of
of this
this isis that
that helicopter
helicopter operations
operations are are usually
usually planned independently
planned independently
and
and are are not
not coordinated
coordinated through through the the ATO
ATO system
system.. In In effect,
effect, they
they can
can
become
become "wild "wild cards,"
cards," potentially
potentially operating
operating in in the
the same
same target
target area
area as
as
fixed-wing
fixed-wing aircraftaircraft but but neither
neither would
would have
have knowledge
knowledge of of the
the other's
other's
presence.
presence. And And at at night,
night, withwith external
external lights
lights off,
off, they
they cannot
cannot depend
depend on on
visual
visual lookout
lookout to to avoid
avoid each each other.
other.
The
The overall
overall mission
mission commander
commander must must have some way
have some way of of fmding
finding outout
which
which unitsunits areare supporting
supporting his his oror her
her package
package and and coordinate
coordinate with with the
the
aircrews
aircrews for for the
the exact
exact times
times andand location
location ofthe
of the SEAD
SEAD suppression.
suppression. This This
challenge
challenge is is relatively
relatively easy easy to to overcome
overcome:: include
include the the Apaches
Apaches in in the
the
ATO
ATO for for coordination
coordination purposespurposes.. ThisThis will
will not
not require
require aa change
change in in the
the
command
command and and control
control relationship
relationship of of the
the Army
Army aviation
aviation but but would
would
require
require aa firmfirm commitment
commitment on on aa mission-by-mission
mission-by-mission basis basis toto ensure
ensure that
that
the
the SEAD
SEAD support
support is is there
there when
when needed.
needed. TheThe challenge
challenge for the Air
for the Air Force
Force
to
to include
include the the Army
Army in in the
the ATO
ATO and and for
for the
the Army
Army to to decipher
decipher and and carry
carry
out
out thethe ATO
ATO are are suitable
suitable subjects
subjects of of training.
training.

38
38
THE
THE CHALLENGE
CHALLENGE

The
The second
second challenge
challenge to to the
the joint
joint SEAD SEAD packagepackage is even more
is even more
appropriate to
appropriate to training
training.. This This is the problem
is the problem of of communications,
communications,
specifically the syndrome known as "what the captain
specifically the syndrome known as "what the captain means." means."
Terminology
Terminology that that is is familiar
familiar to to one one service
service may may be be totally
totally without
without
meaning
meaning to another service.
to another service. For For instance,
instance, the EA-6B is
the EA-6B is anan extremely
extremely
scarce and high-value air asset with a very
scarce and high-value air asset with a very limited
limited capability
capability to
to defend
defend
against enemy
itself against
itself qnemy fighters
fighters.. If If MiGs
MiGs are approaching missile
axe approaching missile firing
firing
range, AWACS
range, AWACS will will normally
normally warn warn such such aircraft
aircraft to to depart
depart the the threat
threat
area rather than
area rather than risk
risk being
being shot
shot down.
down. In
In Air
Air Force
Force terminology,
terminology, the
the
radio call
radio call for
for that
that action
action is "retrograde." However,
is "retrograde." However, in in Navy
Navy parlance,
parlance,
retrograde has no meaning. The Navy terms are fade
retrograde has no meaning. The Navy terms are fade or
or scram,
scram,
s
depending
depending on on the
the range
range of of the
the threat
threat.'^ . 1 The
The wrong
wrong radio
radio call call at at the
the wrong
wrong
time
time isis at best confusing
at best confusing and and at at worst
worst lethallethal.. Again,
Again, the the challenge
challenge can can
be met with relative ease through
be met with relative ease through joint
joint training.
training. But
But without
without such
such
training,
training, we we maymay not not even
even be be aware
aware of of the language differences.
the language differences.
The next obstacle in target ingress is the enemy air-to-air threat
The next obstacle in target ingress is the enemy air-to-air threat.. TheThe
mission elements
mission elements in in tables
tables 11 andand 22 were selected fortheirself-protection
were selected for their self-protection
air-to-air
air-to-air capability Proper use
capability.. Proper use of of this
this capability
capability requires
requires the the maximum
maximum
possible situational awareness for
possible situational awareness for all
aU aircraft
aircraft to
to increase
increase force
force survival
survival
and
and toto avoid fratricide.. For
avoid fratricide For instance,
instance, if if the
the bombers
bombers know know that that thethe radar
radar
contact
contact heading
heading towardtoward them them is is aa MiG-23
MiG-23 that that slipped
slipped past past the the escorting
escorting
F-14s, they can
F-14s, they can eliminate
eliminate the
the threat
threat with
with an
an AIM-7
AIM-7 in
in the
the face
face of
of the
the
NEG.
MiG. However,
However, if if the bombers are
the bombers are confused
confused as as toto whether
whether the the radar
radar
contact is a hostile MiG or an egressing
contact is a hostile MiG or an egressing SEAD
SEAD aircraft,
aircraft, they
they will
wiU be
be
forced
forced to to hold
hold their fire, allowing
their fire, allowing the the possible
possible threat
threat too too close
close to to firing
firing
parameters
parameters.. The The key key to to this
this challenge
challenge is is having
having the the most most accurate
accurate
situational awareness
situational awareness possible
possible. .
The
The escorting
escorting Tomcats can maximize their
Tomcats canmaximize their situational
situational awarenesswith
awareness with
onboard radar and external DL signals from either
onboard radar and external DL signals fi-om either surface
surface or
or airborne
airborne
radar
radar control
control systems
systems.. The The Air Force bombers
Air Force bombers and and SEAD
SEAD aircraft aircraft cannot
cannot
receive
receive this same DL;
this same DL; they
they are are dependent
dependent upon upon onboard
onboard radar radar and and voice
voice
radio communications to build
radio communications to build their
their situational
situational awareness
awareness. . The
The
equipment limitations
equipment limitations that that prevent
prevent joint joint use use ofof the
the DLDL displaydisplay cannot
cannot
be solved by joint training. However, building situational
be solved by joint training. However, building situational awareness
awareness

39
39
JOINT
JOINT TRAINING
TRAINING FOR
FOR NIGHT
NIGHT AIR
AIR WARFARE
WARFARE

through
through voice radio communications,
voice radio communications, particularly
panicularly in in joint
joint operations,
operations,
can
can be
be improved
improved by by joint
joint training
training..
Achieving
Achieving aa big big picture
picture is is an
an additive
additive process
process in in which
which thethe total
total
situational
situational awareness
awareness of of thethe mission
mission package
package and and of of each
each package
package
member
member can can bebe increased
increased by by all
all elements
elements monitoring
monitoring the the same
same radio
radio
channels.
channels. By By listening
listening to the radio calls between the escort fighters, the
to the radio calls between the escort fighters, the
bombers
bombers and and SEAD
SEAD aircraft
aircraft can can form
form aa mental
mental image
image of of where
where the the
bandits
bandits are
are and
and what
what areas
areas to to avoid.
avoid. "Bandits
"Bandits over
over Herman's
Herman's manor"
manor" is is
aa very
very common
common call call at
at Cope
Cope Thunder
Thunder thatthat alerts
alerts everybody
everybody wherewhere to to
head
head for
for apiece
apiece of of the
the action
action.. Alternatively,
Alternatively, fromfrom thethe calls
calls ofthe
of the SEAD
SEAD
and
and bomber
bomber aircraft,
aircraft, the
the escorts
escorts can can build
build their
their own
own situational
situational
awareness
awareness as as to
to where
where somesome bandits
bandits got got through,
through, whichwhich formation
formation
needs
needs help,
help, and
and when
when thethe escorts
escorts cancan gogo home
home because
because thethe friendlies
friendlies
have
have all
all safely
safely egressed
egressed.. "Last
"Last friendly
friendly off off target"
target" opens
opens upup the
the target
target
area
area as
as aa free-fire
free-fire zone
zone since
since any any radar
radar contact
contact in in that
that area
area must
must now
now be be
aa bandit
bandit.. Each
Each individual
individual piece
piece of of information
information can can be
be processed
processed intointo aa
clearer
clearer big
big picture.
picture.
This will
This will only
only work,
work, though,
though, if if all
all elements
elements on on the
the net
net are
are using
using the
the
same
same terminology
terminology.. Unfortunately,
Unfortunately, just just asas was
was thethe case
case with
with the
the terms
terms
retrograde
retrograde and and fade/scram,
fadelscram, there there is is no
no strict
strict commonality
commonality of of terms
terms
between
between the the services,
services, nor
nor is is there
there universal
universal recognition
recognition of of where
where thethe
terminology may
terminology may be be different.
different. Two Two shortshort examples
examples will will serve
serve to to
illustrate
illustrate this
this point.
point.
Example
Example OneAir
OneAir Force
Force Fighter,
Fighter, Navy
Navy AWACS.
AWACS. The The first
first
example involves
example involves an
an Air Force F-15E
Air Force F-15E (Eagle
(Eagle 1)
1) receiving
receiving voice
voice threat
threat
warnings
warnings from
from aa Navy
Navy E-2C
E-2C AWACS
AWACS (Hawkeye)
(Hawkeye).. Voice
Voice calls
calls are
are
necessary
necessary because
because the
the Air
Air Force
Force aircraft
aircraft cannot
caimot receive
receive the
the E-2C's
E-2C's DL:
DL:
Hawkeye
Hawkeye to
to Eagle:
Eagle: "Multiple
"Multiple bandits,
bandits, 25
25 miles
miles and
and closing."
closing."
Hawkeye
Hawkeye hashas just
just warned
warned Eagle
Eagle 11 of
of enemy fighters coming
enemy fighters toward
coming toward
the
the latter.
latter. Eagle
Eagle then
then looks
looks into
into his
his or
or her
her own
own radar
radar scope,
scope, detects
detects two
two
separate
separate contacts
contacts coming
coming toward
toward his
his or
or her
her aircraft,
aircraft, and transmits to
and transmits to
Hawkeye:
Hawkeye: "Reno
"Reno two,
two, judy
judy angle."
angle."
In Air Force terminology, this
In Air Force terminology, this means
means that Eagle 11 can
that Eagle can distinguish
distinguish two
two
separate
separate contacts
contacts ("Reno
("Reno two")
two") and
and is
is turning
turning toto counter
counter the
the threat
threat

40
40
THE
THE CHALLENGE
CHALLENGE

("judy angle")
("judy angle").. AsAs such,
such, Hawkeye
Hawkeye is is relieved
relieved from
from any
any more
more calls
calls asas to
to
the direction of the
the direction of the MiGs,
MiGs, but
but should
should keep
keep Eagle
Eagle 1
1 advised
advised as
as to
to their
their
range. This
range. This serves
serves as mental prompt
as aa mental prompt to to Eagle
Eagle 11 asas to
to how close they
how close they
are getting to shooting at each other. Simple, right?
are getting to shooting at each other. Simple, right? Unfortunately,
Unfortunately, not
not
in this case.
in this case. InIn Navy terminology, Reno
Navy terminology, Reno has
has nono meaning.
meaning. It It is
is anan
unfamiliar
unfamiliar term that adds
term that adds to to confusion.
confusion. Worse, judy angle
Worse, judy angle can can have
have the the
wrong meaning. Judy by itself,
wrong meaning. Judy by itself, is
is a
a common
common term
term to
to both
both Air
Air Force
Force
and
and Navy
Navy that means the
that means the fighter
fighter is is taking
taking control
control of of the
the intercept
intercept and and
the AWACS should cease all transmissions. Judy angle is
the AW ACS should cease all transmissions. Judy angle is only
only an
an
Air
Air Force term;; itit is
Force term is not
not used
used in in Navy parlance, and
Navy parlance, and itit is
is possible
possible that that
the
the Hawkeye
Hawkeye controller
controller has has never
never heard
heard itit before
before.. If Hawkeye gets
If Hawkeye gets
confused by Eagle's call, it is conceivable
confused by Eagle's call, it is conceivable that
that Hawkeye
Hawkeye will
will think
think
judy
judy angle
angle means
means the same thing
the same thing as as judy
judy and stop all
and stop all radio
radio calls
calls..
This would
This would leave
leave Eagle without aa vital
Eagle without vital piece
piece of of information-the
information^the
range to the target .
range to the target.
Example
Example Two Air Force
TwoAir Force Fighter, Navy Fighter.
Fighter, Navy Fighter. The
The second
second
example involves Eagle
example involves Eagle 1,
1, an
an F-15E
F-15E on
on the OCA mission,
the OCA mission, and
and Hornet
Hornet
an F/A-18
1, an
1, F/A-18 flying
flying as
as his
his or her wingman:
or her wingman:
Eagle to Hornet
Eagle to Hornet:: "Contact
"Contact on
on the nose, high
the nose, high aspect ."
aspect."
Aspect
Aspect is is verbal shorthand for
verbal shorthand for aspect
aspect angle,
angle, aa termterm expressing
expressing the the
angular relationship between a target
angular relationship between a target aircraft
aircraft and
and your
your fighter.
fighter. In
In Air
Air
Force
Force terminology,
terminology, aspectaspect angle
angle isis defined
defined as as where
where youyou are
are in
in relation
relation
to
to the target's tail,
the target's tail, taking
taking into account the
into account the target's heading. It
target's heading. It is
is
expressed in increasing
expressed in increasing angles
angles from
from 0
0 to
to 180
180 degrees
degrees beginning
begirmuig at
at the
the
tail
taU of the enemy
of the enemy aircraft to the
aircraft to position of
the position of your aircraft (fig
your aircraft (fig.. 2).
2). Thus,
Thus,
in Air Force terminology, high aspect means
in Air Force terminology, high aspect means the
the radarcontact
radar contact is
is coming
coming
toward you
toward you and
and could
could be threat.. The
be aa threat The Navy, however, defines
Navy, however, defines aspect
aspect
angle
angle as as where
where youyou are
are in
in relation
relation toto the nose, not
the nose, not the
the tail
tail of
of the target.
the target.
To the Navy, high aspect
To the Navy, high aspect means
means the
the target
target is
is going
going away
away from
from you,
you, not
not
coming toward
coming toward you you.. You
You can derive exactly
can derive exactly the opposite meaning
the opposite meaning of of
the information provided because of an
the information provided because of an unknown
unknown difference
difference in
in
19
terminology.
terminology.'^
Could
Could these same problems
these same problems occur during joint
occur during joint day
day operations?
operations? Of Of
course . The radio terminology
course. The radio terminology would
would still
still cause
cause confusion.
confusion. However,
However,

41
41
JOINT TRAINING FOR NIGHT AIR WARFARE

Air Force Standard


170-

90-L k- 90"R 90'L H90-R

Figure 2. Aspect Angle

the
the confusion
confusion would
would be be magnified
magnified by by the
the other
other problems
problems of of flying
flying
at night
at night.. Without
Without daylight
daylight visual
visual references,
references, moremore of of your
your attention
attention
must
must bebe devoted
devoted to to flying
flying the
the jet,
jet, leaving
leaving lessless time
time to to study
study other
other
sensors
sensors such
such as
as air-to-air
air-to-air radar.
radar. Since
Since the
the F-15E
F-15E is is aa two-seat
two-seat aircraft,
aircraft,
the backseater may not need range calls from Hawkeye . The F/A-18
the backseater may not need range calls from Hawkeye. The F/A-18
pilot,
pUot, even at night,
even at night, may
may have
have the
the time
time to to study
study hishis oror her
her radar
radar in
in
more
more detail
detail and
and come
come to to the
the right
right conclusion
conclusion.. But But itit will
will take
take more
more
time
time and
and concentration
concentration to to sort
sort through
through thethe confusion
confusion than than during
during the
the
day.
day. Although
Although joint
joint daylight
daylight training
training maymay point
point outout some
some of of these
these
confusion factors, the full impact of these factors on night operations
confusion factors, the fuU impact of these factors on night operations
may
may not
not be
be recognized
recognized because
because of of this
this natural
natural tendency
tendency to to adapt
adapt and
and
work
work through
through the
the confusion
confusion.. These
These examples
examples pose pose real
real challenges
challenges toto
operations in
joint operations a dynamic combat environment . They are simple,
joint in a dynamic combat enviroimient. They are simple,
but
but by
by no
no means
means minor
minor problems
problems.. Such
Such problems
problems can can and
and should
should be
be
identified
identified and and solved
solved through
through common
common experience
experience and and joint
joint
peacetime
peacetime training
training before
before they
they cancan become
become big big (albeit
(albeit simple)
simple)

42
42
THE
THE CHALLENGE
CHALLENGE

problems
problems in in wartime operations. The
wartime operations. The next
next warwar might
might not not havehave fivefive
months
months of of preparation
preparation time time before
before the
the shooting
shooting beginsbegins..
The next challenge to be considered
The next challenge to be considered forthis
for this mission
mission is what formation
is what formation
should
should be flown? During
be flown? During daylight operations, the
daylight operations, the most
most common common
formation is a widespread, line-abreast fonnation for mutual
formation is a widespread, line-abreast formation for mutual protection.
protection.
This
This formation requires the
formation requires the wingman
wingman to to maintain
maintain visualvisual contact
contact with with
the leader either
the leader either directly
directly to to the
the right or directly
right or directly to to the
the left.
left. In this manner,
In this manner,
each pilot can detect a threat to the other aircraft
each pilot can detect a threat to the other aircraft and
and turn
turn to
to help
help defeat
defeat
it. In daylight,
it. In daylight, thethe wingman
wingman can can easily
easily seesee the lead aircraft,
the lead aircraft, but but this
this
visual
visual contact
contact is is quickly
quickly lost lost atat night.
night. In peacetime, at
In peacetime, at night,
night, the the lead's
lead's
external position lights would
external position lights would be
be on,
on, giving
giving the
the wingman
wingman a
a point
point of
of
reference.
reference. In In wartime,
wartime, to to maximize surprise, the
maximize surprise, the night
night fighters
fighters would would
not turn on their lights .20 The wingman, not having these
not turn on their lights.^^ The wingman, not having these external
external cues
cues
to keep sight
to keep sight of of the
the lead,
lead, would
would havehave to to depend
depend upon upon some some internal
internal
sensor
sensor to maintain formation.
to maintain formation. This This is capability that
is aa capability that the the fixed
fixed
forward-looking sensors of Air Force
forward-looking sensors of Air Force night
night fighters
fighters in
in use
use today
today cannot
cannot
provide. Therefore, Air
provide. Therefore, Air Force
Force units
units frequently
frequently traintrain forfor trail
trail formations
formations
in which the
in which the wingman
wingman can maintain sensor
can maintain sensor contact
contact with with the the lead
lead aircraft
aircraft
with forward-looking
with forward-looking radar
radar (FLR)
(FLR) and
and FLIR?'
FLIR.
There
There are are at
at least three drawbacks
least three drawbacks to to such
such trail formations.. First,
trail formations First, itit
tends to lengthen the attack package into
tends to lengthen the attack package into a
a "bomber
"bomber stream,"
stream," with
with aa
specked
specified minimum
minimum spacing spacing between
between aircraft
aircraft to ensure that
to ensure that thethe trailing
trailing
aircraft do
aircraft do not
not flyfly through
through the the fragmentation
fragmentation pattern pattern of of the the bombs
bombs
dropped by the previous
dropped by the previous aircraft.
aircraft. This
This minimum
minimum interval
interval between
between
aircraft
aircraft increases
increases total mission package
total mission package exposure
exposure time time behind
behind enemy enemy
lines. Since the escort fighters must provide cover
lines. Since the escort fighters must provide cover from
from the
the time
time the
the first
first
bomber
bomber crosses
crosses into into enemy territory until
enemy territory until the
the lastlast one leaves, this
one leaves, this
"vulnerability window"
"vulnerability window" can can be critical factor
be aa critical factor.. IfIf the
the window
window exceeds exceeds
the fuel supply of the escorts,
the fuel supply of the escorts, either
either sequential
sequential escorts
escorts must
must be
be provided
provided
or some bombers
or some bombers must must be be left
left exposed.
exposed.
The second drawback to a bomber
The second drawback to a bomber stream
stream is the element
is the element of of attack
attack
predictability. The
predictability. The firstfirst man through highlights
man through highlights the the remainder
remainder of of the
the
package
package for the defenders.
for the defenders. The The third drawback is
third drawback is that
that in in order
order to to
maintain formation, the entire package
maintain formation, the entire package must
must limit
limit its
its maximum
maximum speed
speed
to
to the maximum speed
the maximum speed of of the
the slowest member in
slowest member in the
the formation.
formation. This This

43
43
JOINT
JOINT TRAINING
TRAINING FOR
FOR NIGHT
NIGHT AIR
AIR WARFARE
WARFARE

may
may be considerably less
be considerably less than
than the the desired
desired employment
employment speed speed of of the
the
other aircraft,
other aircraft, resulting
resulting in in aa mission
mission compromise
compromise that that does
does notnot really
really
meet
meet anybody's
anybody's desires.desires .
Unlike
Unlike current
current Air Air Force
Force aircraft,
aircraft. NavyNavy night night fighters
fighters are are equipped
equipped
with helmet-mounted night vision goggles. Since NVGs move with
with helmet-mounted night vision goggles. Since NVGs move the
with the
pilot's
pilot's head,
head, theythey areare not
not fixed
fixed to to forward
forward view view onlyonly.. This
This may
may provide
provide
some
some capability
capabUity for for maintaining
maintaining line-abreast
line-abreast formation
formation at at night,
night, even
even
without external lights on the leader's aircraft . This could cut the
without external lights on the leader's aircraft. This could cut the
vulnerability
vulnerability windowwindow at at least
least inin half.
half. ItIt may
may even even be be possible
possible to to use
use the
the
NVGs
NVGs for for ingress
ingress otherother than
than aa single
single route
route bomber
bomber stream stream.. Because
Because
NVGs
NVGs are are not
not limited
limited to to strictly
strictly straight
straight ahead,
ahead, the the mission
mission package
package
might
might bebe able
able to to use
use multiple
multiple parallel
parallel or or intersecting
intersecting ingress ingress routes
routes with
with
lateral separation instead of depending solely on nose-to-tail separation.
lateral separation instead of depending solely on nose-to-tail separation.
Planners
Planners must decide if
must decide if aa night line-abreast formation
night line-abreast formation is is tactically
tactically
preferable
preferable to to aa trail
trail formation,
formation, what what special
special techniques
techniques need need to to be
be used
used
for either type of
for either type of formation,
formation, or
or if
if neither
neither formation
formation is
is tactically
tactically feasible .
feasible.
These
These areare all
all examples
examples ofthe of the types
types of of decisions
decisions that that should
should be be made
made in in
peacetime training and not postponed for wartime employment .
peacetime training and not postponed for wartime employment.
Target
Target Acquisition
Acquisition and and Attack.
Attack. Assuming
Assuming the the joint
joint package
package doesdoes
not
not become
become lost, lost, separated,
separated, or or destroyed
destroyed somewhere
somewhere en en route,
route, target
target area
area
tactics are the next significant challenge. To a certain extent, ingress
tactics are the next significant challenge. To a certain extent, ingress
and egress
and egress routes
routes can can bebe deconflicted
deconflicted by by choosing
choosing different
different flight
flight paths.
paths.
However, all paths ultimately converge at Bul-Go-Ki, where mutual
However, aU paths ultimately converge at Bul-Go-Ki, where mutual
deconfliction
deconfliction becomesbecomes aa big big problem,
problem, assumingassuming aa near-simultaneous
near-simultaneous
time over target
time over target.. If If the
the SEAD
SEAD aircraft
aircraft go go in in first
first to
to suppress
suppress the the SAMs
SAMs
and AAA and then depart the target area, how do they avoid running
and AAA and then depart the target area, how do they avoid running
into the
into the bombers
bombers that that areare coming
coming into into the the target
target area?area? How
How do do the
the
bombers
bombers and and escorts
escorts keepkeep track
track of of which
which radar radar contacts coming toward
contacts coming toward
them
them are
are the
the egressing
egressing SEAD
SEAD aircraft
aircraft and
and which
which are
are attacking
attacking MiGs?
MiGs?
If
If the
the SEAD aircraft remain
SEAD aircraft remain in the target
in the target areaarea toto continue
continue to to keep
keep the
the
threat down, where do they fly to avoid running into the bombers or
threat down, where do they fly to avoid running into the bombers or
through the
flying through
flying the frag pattern from
frag pattern from thethe exploding
exploding LGBs? LGBs? What target
What target
attack route
attack route doesdoes thethe third
third element
element fly fly toto avoid
avoid running
rurming into into the
the first
first
element? If target area
element? If target area deconfliction
deconfliction is
is based
based on
on timing
timing and
and one
one of
of the
the

44
44
THE
THE CHALLENGE
CHALLENGE

attackers
attackers is is late,
late, can
can hehe still
still drop
drop his
his bombs
bombs on on target
target or
or must
must hehe abort
abort
the
the attack?
attack?
The
The above
above questions
questions are are not
not peculiar
peculiar to
to night
night operations
operations but
but are
are made
made
significantly
significantly moremore difficult
difficult byby darkness
darkness.. In In daytime,
daytime, most
most ofof these
these
questions
questions can can be
be handled
handled by by the
the principles
principles of of "big
"big sky,
sky, small
small airplane"
airplane"
and "see and avoid." If the egressing SEAD aircraft and ingressing
and "see and avoid." If the egressing SEAD aircraft and ingressing
bombers
bombers can can visually
visually acquire
acquire eacheach other,
other, they
they can
can quickly
quickly solve
solve the
the
identification
identification and and avoidance
avoidance problems.
problems. Attack
Attack routes
routes and
and timing
timing must
must
still
stUl bebe deconflicted
deconflicted to to avoid
avoid fratricide,
fratricide, but
but they
they can
can be
be more
more flexible
flexible
during
during thethe day.
day. The
The latelate element
element can can see
see if
if the
the other
other elements
elements areare in
in the
the
way and
way and possibly
possibly attack
attack anyway.
anyway.
Night,
Night, however,
however, complicates
complicates things
things.. As
As wewe learned
learned inin Operation
Operation El El
Dorado
Dorado Canyon,
Canyon, strictstrict dependence
dependence on on timing
timing deconfliction
deconfliction cancan cause
cause
aborted attacks if the timing is off. Adm William Crowe explained in
aborted attacks if the timing is off. Adm William Crowe explained in
testimony
testimony to to the
the Senate
Senate concerning
concerning the pUot of
the pilot of anan otherwise
otherwise
mission-capable
mission-capable F-111 F-111 who aborted his
who aborted his mission
mission without
without ever
ever reaching
reaching
the
the target
target area:
area:
Since
Since he
he was
was late
late he
he just
just aborted.
aborted The
The problem
problem [with]
[with] coordination
coordination atat night
night is
is
you can't depend
you can't depend upon
upon the
the eyeball
eyebaU at
at all.
all. The
The coordination
coordination is
is all
all timing
timing andand
22
routes
routes.. Once
Once he
he got
got out
out of
of sequence,
sequence, he
he didn't
didn't believe
believe he
he should
should go
go in .
in.^^

One
One possible
possible solution
solution toto handling
handling thisthis deconfliction
deconfliction problem
problem is is aa
large TOT window at night instead of a fixed TOT. This allows
large TOT window at night instead of a fixed TOT. This allows
increased flexibility
increased flexibility forfor unplanned
unplarmed mission
mission delays,
delays, such
such as as the
the
avoidance of
avoidance of aa MiG
MiG oror SAM.
SAM.^^ SuchSuch TOTTOT windows,
windows, however,
however, willwill
increase
increase the
the required
required coverage
coverage time
time for both the
for both the DCA
DCA and the SEAD
and the SEAD
aircraft and
aircraft and may
may exceed
exceed thethe possible
possible time
time onon station
station for
for the
the number
number
of available aircraft . In such circumstances, spatial deconfliction
of available aircraft. In such circumstances, spatial deconfliction
(one aircraft
(one aircraft hits
hits the
the east
east end
end and
and another
another hitshits the
the west
west end
end of
of the
the
runway)
runway) is is better
better than
than time
time deconfliction.24
deconfliction.^ Using Using spatial
spatial separation
separation
gets back to
gets back to the
the problem of
problem of being
being able to see and avoid all the
able to see and avoid all the other
other
players,
players, oror at
at least
least the
the ones
ones inin your
your area.
area. Again,
Again, night
night makes
makes itit
tougher .
tougher.
Egress
Egress from
from thethe Target
Target Area
Area andand Return
Return to to Friendly
Friendly Territory.
Territory.
Once
Once the
the attackers
attackers have dropped their
have dropped bombs, the
their bombs, the next
next challenge
challenge isis how
how
to get home. Unless the bombers are flying in close formation during
to get home. Unless the bombers are flying in close formation during

45
45
JOINT
JOINT "TRAINING
TRAINING FOR
FOR NIGHT
NIGHT AIR
AIR WARFARE
WARFARE

the
the bombing
bombing run ran (a (a viable
viable tactic
tactic but
but not
not without
without training
training challenges
challenges of of
its
its own),
own), they
they havehave probably
probably becomebecome physically
physically separated
separated during during thethe
attack
attack.. DoDo you you egress
egress alone,
alone, or or do
do you
you attempt
attempt to to find
find aa wmgman?
wingman? At At
night,
night, without
without lightslights on,on, howhow do do you
you find
find aa wingman?
wingman? Even Even if if you
you see
see
another
another airplane,
airplane, how how can can you
you tell
tell at
at aa safe
safe distance
distance if if itit is
is friend
friend or or foe?
foe?
If
If you
you plan
plan to to egress
egress single
single ship, what route
ship, what route do do you
you follow
follow to to avoid
avoid
hitting
hitting other
other aircraft
aircraft in in the
the target
target area
area oror to
to deconflict
deconflict from from follow-on
follow-on
attackers?
attackers? How How will will thethe escort
escort fighters
fighters and and thethe BEAD
SEAD aircraft aircraft know
know
that
that they
they areare clear
clear to depart the
to depart the target area?
target area?
Visual
Visual reference
reference at at night
night cannot
cannot be be depended
depended on on to to provide
provide thesethese
answers.
answers. Extensive
Extensive premission
premission planning
planning can can analyze
analyze and and answer
answer these
these
questions if the aircrews have the opportunity to do so . But with the
questions if the aircrews have the opportunity to do so. But with the
operating
operating basesbases of of the
the different
different mission
mission elements
elements physically
physically separated,
separated,
such
such opportunities
opportunities will will be be limited
limited at at best
best.. If If each
each membermember of of the
the
package is
package is familiar
familiar with the others' capabilities, tactics, and limitations,
with the others' capabilities, tactics, and Limitations,
the
the amount
amount ofpremission
of premission coordination
coordination that that is
is required
required may may be be reduced
reduced
to
to what
what cancan be handled with
be handled with aa simple
simple secure
secure voice
voice radio
radio transmission
transmission..
This
This could
could eveneven be be enhanced
enhanced by by aa baseline
baseline set set ofof agreed-upon
agreed-upon standard standard
employment
employment techniquestechniques that, that, with
with minimal
minimal time, time, cancan bebe modified
modified to to fit
fit
the exact tactical situation. Thekey to making such a system work would
the exact tactical situation. The key to making such a system work would
be
be thorough
thorough familiarity
familiarity through
through jointjoint practice
practice and and training.
training.
There
There is is atat least
least one other important
one other important aspect of joint night
aspect ofjoint night operations
operations
that
that the
the OCA
OCA portionportion of of Operation
Operation Tae Tae Kwon
Kwon Do Do must
must plan plan for:
for: How
How
do you return
do you return through
through friendly
friendly defenses without getting
defenses without getting shot down by
shot down by
your own side? Over land, the returning aircraft must penetrate the
your own side? Over land, the returning aircraft must penetrate the
friendly
friendly fighters,
fighters, missile
missile zone, zone, andand even
even small
small armsarms firefire fromfrom ground
ground
troops
troops.. Confusion
Confusion between between ingressing
ingressing MiGs MiGs and and egressing
egressing friendly friendly
aircraft
aircraft can
can be be sorted
sorted out out with
with preplanned
preplanned radar radar identification
identification signals, signals,
established
established air routes through
air routes through the the defenses,
defenses, or or assigned
assigned altitudesaltitudes forfor
crossing friendly airspace . These last two techniques are commonly
crossing friendly airspace. These last two techniques are commonly
known
known as as "safe passage procedures"
"safe passage procedures" and and are
are frequently
frequently practicedpracticed in in
peacetime
peacetime training
training programs
programs at at wing
wing level
level and
and higher
higher..
The presence ofa naval
The presence of a naval force
force adds
adds another
another dimension
dimension to
to the
the problem
problem
of
of avoiding
avoiding being being hit hit byby friendly
friendly fire
fire.. For
For those
those portions
portions of of the
the ingress
ingress
and egress routes that are over water, the friendlies must follow
and egress routes that are over water, the friendlies must follow

46
46
THE
THE CHALLENGE
CHALLENGE

specific "delousing"
specific "delousing" procedures
procedures and and avoid
avoid overflying
overflying any any US
US Navy
Navy
ships or
ships or risk
risk being
being fired upon.. As
fired upon As waswas demonstrated
demonstrated in in Operation
Operation ElEl
Dorado Canyon, there are at least two problems with this . First, the old
Dorado Canyon, there are at least two problems with this. First, the old
problem
problem of of unfamiliar
unfamiliar terminology
terminology.. Delousing
Delousing is is aa Navy
Navy term
term andand
procedure,
procedure, totally
totally without
without meaning
meaning to to Air
Air Force
Force aircrews
aircrews.. Second,
Second,
you cannot avoid
you cannot avoid overflying
overflying Navy
Navy ships
ships in
in the
the dark
dark when
when the
the Navy
Navy
refuses
refuses to
to tell
tell you
you where
where they
they are. 25 Although
are.^^ Although the the delousing
delousing andand ship
ship
deconfliction problems would still exist in the day, they are made
deconfliction problems would still exist in the day, they are made
greater at
greater at night
night because
because of of the
the reduced
reduced capability
capability to to see
see and
and avoid.
avoid.
This
This is
is not
not an equipment problem,
an equipment problem, but but aa prime
prime example
example of of an
an
operational challenge that can be overcome by familiarity with each
operational challenge that can be overcome by familiarity with each
other's
other's procedures
procedures through
through joint
joint training.
training.

Defensive
Defensive Counterair
Counterair
The
The execution requirements for
execution requirements for the
the defensive
defensive counterair
counterair mission
mission of of
Operation
Operation Tae Tae Kwon
Kwon Do Do are
are considerably
considerably lessless complex
complex than than were
were the
the
requirements
requirements for
for the OCA
the OCA mission.
mission. Since
Since DCA
DCA is
is conducted
conducted over
over
friendly
friendly territory,
territory, targettarget ingress
ingress andand egress
egress challenges
challenges are are greatly
greatly
simplified: get to the right piece of sky and stay there until you have to
simplified: get to the right piece of sky and stay there until you have to
go
go homehome.. There There are, are, of
of course,
course, challenges
challenges of of nonstandard
nonstandard radio radio
terminology
terminology if if we
we areare working
working withwith aa joint
joint control
control system
system to to reach
reach the
the
assigned area, but these
assigned area, but these have
have already
already been
been addressed.
addressed. Joint
Joint night
night DCA
DCA
does,
does, however,
however, involveinvolve some
some challenges
challenges in in the
the target
target acquisition
acquisition and and
attack
attack phase.
phase.
The
The major
major challenge
challenge to to the
the night
night DCA
DCA mission
mission is is similar
similar to to the
the one
one
faced
faced by by the
the OCAOCA mission
mission during
during egress.
egress. How
How do do you
you sort
sort out
out the
the good
good
guys from the bad guys and avoid shooting the
guys from the bad guys and avoid shooting the wrong
wrong ones?
ones? Changing
Changing
classified
classified identification
identification friend
friend or or foe
foe (IFF)
(IFF) radio
radio signals
signals thatthat only
only
friendly aircraft have the necessary equipment to transmit can help sort
friendly aircraft have the necessary equipment to transmit can help sort
out, but
itit out, but itit will
will only
only show
show that
that aradar
a radar contact
contact isis afriendly.
a friendly. The The presence
presence
of
of aa correct
correct IFF IFF cancan demonstrate
demonstrate that that the unknown is
the unknown is aa friendly,
friendly, butbut
the absence of the correct signal does not automatically mean it is aa
the absence of the correct signal does not automatically mean it is
hostile
hostile.. Battle
Battle damagedamage may may prevent
prevent the the friendly
friendly equipment
equipment from from
working
working correctly
correctly.. Compliance
Compliance with with classified
classified safe passage procedures,
safe passage procedures.

47
47
JOINT
JOINT TRAINING
TRAINING FOR
FOR NIGHT
NIGHT AIR
AIR WARFARE
WARFARE

sanctuary
sanctuary altitudes,
altitudes, andand controlled
controlled crossing points all
crossing points all help
help toto identify
identify
friend
friend from
from foe. foe. This
This greatly
greatly simplifies
simplifies the the DCADCA problem
problem since since
high-speed
high-speed radarradar contacts
contacts heading toward friendly
heading toward friendly airspace
airspace and and not
not in in
compliance
compliance with with safe
safe passage
passage procedures
procedures can can be be assumed
assumed to to be
be hostile.
hostile.
Joint
Joint DCA
DCA missions
missions for Operation Tae
for Operation Tae Kwon
Kwon Do Do involve
involve additional
additional
challenge for target acquisition and attack--the presence of Army
challenge for target acquisition and attack-the presence of Army air air
defense
defense artillery
artillery (ADA)
(ADA) for self-protection of
for self-protection the ground
of the ground forces
forces.. There
There
must
must bebe aa positive
positive command
command and and control
control system
system to to determine
determine whichwhich
enemy aircraft are engaged by
enemy aircraft are engaged by friendly
friendly DCA
DCA aircraft
aircraft and
and which
which are
are
fired on by
fired on by friendly
friendly SAMsSAMs or or AAA.
AAA. Firing
Firing on on aa single
single target
target by
by allall
three
three systems
systems is an inefficient
is an inefficient use use of
of scarce
scarce weapons
weapons whilewhile notnot firing
firing
on the
on the target
target by by any
any weapon
weapon is is noneffective
noneffective.. In In the
the same
same vein,
vein, there
there
must
must be be aa common
common joint joint identification
identification system system for for Army
Army ADA ADA to to
avoid fratricide ofrecovering friendlies . In the day, this last problem
avoid fratricide of recovering friendlies. In the day, this last problem
can partially
can partially be be alleviated
alleviated by by visual
visual identification
identification before
before firing
firing.. The
The
ADA
ADA willwill not
not have
have this
this luxury
luxury at at night.
night.
All
All of these challenges
of these challenges can can be be overcome,
overcome, but but they
they will
wiU probably
probably
require frequent
require frequent realistic
realistic training
training by all participants
by all participants to avoid mistakes
to avoid mistakes..
Just as Air Force crews must be familiar with Navy delousing
Just as Air Force crews must be familiar with Navy delousing
procedures
procedures if if operating
operating near ships, Navy
near ships, Navy crews
crews mustmust follow
foUow Air Air Force
Force
safe
safe passage
passage procedures
procedures if if operating
operating in in anan Air
Air Force
Force areaarea of of
responsibility.
responsibihty. And
And the
the DCA
DCA pilot
pilot must
must be
be trained
trained in
in and
and be
be familiar
familiar
with
with whichever
whichever systemsystem is is in
in effect
effect atat that
that time
time andand place
place.. Both
Both AirAir Force
Force
and Navy crews operating near ground forces must be thoroughly
and Navy crews operating near ground forces must be thoroughly
familiar
familiar with
with thethe ADA
ADA procedures,
procedures, just just as
as the
the missile
missUe operator must be
operator must be
trained in
trained in the
the appropriate
appropriate IFF IFF procedures
procedures.. As As was
was true
true before,
before, thethe
natural confusion that occurs at
natural confusion that occurs at night
night magnifies
magnifies the
the confusion
confusion that
that
can
can be
be caused
caused by by joint
joint operations
operations.. These
These are are not equipment problems
not equipment problems
but
but training
training challenges
challenges..

On-Call
On-Cali Close
Close Air
Air Support
Support

Like
Like the
the DCA missions, on-call
DCA missions, on-call CAS
CAS missions
missions have
have less
less complex
complex
target ingress
target ingress and
and egress
egress challenges
challenges since
since they
they are conducted primarily
are conducted primarily

48
48
THE
THE CHALLENGE
CHALLENGE

over friendly lines.


over friendly lines. However,
However, the the target acquisition and
target acquisition and attack
attack phase
phase is is
considerably
considerably more more challenging,
challenging, given given the
the nature
nature of of the
the targets.
targets.
On-call CAS missions involve targets
On-call CAS missions involve targets that
that are
are not
not identified
identified until
until after
after
the
the battle
battle starts and, therefore,
starts and, therefore, cannot
cannot be be as
as well preplanned.. An
well preplanned An enemy
enemy
tank platoon that suddenly comes out from under camouflage directly
tank platoon that suddenly comes out from under camouflage directly
across
across thethe line
line ofof advance
advance could
could require
require on-call
on-call CAS CAS to clear the
to clear the way.
way.
On-call
On-call CAS CAS brings
brings the added challenge
the added challenge offinding
of finding time-critical
time-critical mobile mobile
targets, such as moving tanks, whose exact position is not always known
targets, such as moving tanks, whose exact position is not always known
to the
to the pilot
pUot before
before takeoff.
takeoff. The attackiag aircraft
The attacking aircraft must
must thenthen be be directed
directed
to
to the
the target
target by FAC, located
by aa FAC, located either
either on on the
the ground
ground with with thethe Army
Army troops
troops
or in an airplane near the battle area.
or in an airplane near the battle area. During
During the
the day,
day, highly
highly prominent
prominent
terrain features
terrain features (rivers,
(rivers, solitary
solitary hills,
hills, etc.), easily recognizable
etc.), easily recognizable structures
structures
(towers), flashing mirrors, or colored smoke markers are all used
(towers), flashing mirrors, or colored smoke markers are all used as as
reference
reference points
points fromfrom which
which the the CAS pilot can
CAS pilot can be be directed
directed to to the
the target
target..
At
At night,
night, such
such cuescues maymay notnot bebe visible
visible ifif they
they are are outside
outside the the field
field ofof
view of the night-fighter's sensor equipment.
view of the night-fighter's sensor equipment. This
This is
is particularly
particularly aa
problem
problem for for the
the F-15E
F-15E and and F-16
F-16 LANTIRN
LANTIRN aircraft,aircraft, which
which are are equipped
equipped
with aa comparatively
with comparatively narrow narrow field-of-view
field-of-view sensor sensor thatthat is is optimized
optimized for for
use straight ahead
use straight ahead but,
but, unfortunately,
unfortunately, not
not for
for the
the CAS
CAS mission.
mission. In
In the
the
dynamic
dynamic CAS CAS environment,
environment, the the pilot
pUot must
must be be able
able to
to acquire
acquire and and attack
attack
targets that may not be directly ahead of the aircraft .
targets that may not be directly ahead of the aircraft. Since
Since exact
exact target
target
location
location will
will probably
probably not be known
not be known before
before reaching
reaching the the target
target area,
area, itit
may not be
may not be possible
possible to to preplan
preplan an an attack
attack axis that ensures
axis that ensures the the target
target is is
26
within a narrow forward-fixed
within a narrow forward-fixed field
field of
of view
view.^^.
Aircrews equipped
Aircrews equipped with with NVGs
NVGs such such as the Navy
as the Navy F/A-18F/A-18 and and the
the
Marine F/A-18D and AV-8B have considerably less restricted
Marine F/A-18D and AV-8B have considerably less restricted fields
fields of
of
view.. Since
view Since the the NVGs
NVGs look where the
look where the pilot's
pilot's headhead looks,
looks, suitably
suitably
equipped aircraft can
equipped aircraft can acquire
acquire targets
targets andand reference
reference pointspoints in in positions
positions
other than straight ahead of
other than straight ahead of the
the aircraft.
aircraft. The
The ability
ability of
of the
the Air
Air Force
Force
airborne
airborne FAC FAC to to recognize
recognize what what the Marine AV-8B
the Marine AV-8B pilot pilot can can seesee oror
for the Army ground FAC to understand what things an Air Force
for the Army ground FAC to understand what things an Air Force
F-16 pilot with
F-16 pilot with LANTIRN
LANTIRN can can identify
identify is is aa skill
skill that
that can can onlyonly be be
acquired
acquired through frequent realistic
through frequent realistic training
training..
A second critical skill in any CAS mission
A second critical skill in any CAS mission is is how
how to to sort
sort outout the
the
friendlies
friendlies fromfrom the enemy. Even
the enemy. Even in in the
the daytime,
daytime, this this is is not
not an an easily
easily

49
49
JOINT
JOINT TRAINING
TRAINING FORNIGHT
FOR NIGHT AIRWARFARE
AIR WARFARE

acquired
acquired skill,
skill, especially
especially when when using
using joint
joint forces
forces that
that may
may notnot have
have
had
had the
the opportunity
opportunity to to practice
practice together
together.. During
During the the 2929 January
January 1991 1991
night
night battle
battle toto retake
retake the the Saudi
Saudi town town of of Khafji
Khafji from from an an Iraqi
Iraqi armored
armored
force,
force, an an Air
Air Force
Force A-10
A-10 mistook
mistook aa US US Marine
Marine Corps Corps lightlight armored
armored
vehicle
vehicle (LAV)(LAV) for for an an Iraqi
Iraqi armored
armored vehicle vehicle.. The The subsequent
subsequent
Maverick
Maverick attackattack destroyed
destroyed the the LAV
LAV and and resulted
resulted in seven Marines
in seven Marines
being
being killed
killed by 27
by friendly fire. Slightly more than two weeks later,
friendly fire.^' Slightly more than two weeks later,
aa US
US ArmyArmy Apache
Apache helicopter
helicopter mistakenly
mistakenly destroyed destroyed one one USUS ArmyArmy
Bradley
Bradley infantry
infantry fighting
fighting vehiclevehicle and and one one US US Army Army armored
armored
personnel
personnel carrier
carrier usingusing Hellfire
Hellfire missiles
missiles during
during aa nightnight skirmish
skirmish with with
Iraqi
Iraqi troops
troops nearnear the the Saudi
Saudi border
border.^* .28 Positive
Positive targettarget identification
identification in in
close
close air air support,
support, particularly
particularly at at night,
night, is is aa difficult
difficult problem
problem.. Some Some
method
method of of positively
positively identifying
identifying targetstargets fromfrom friendlies
friendlies is is aa critical
critical
skill
skill when
when aa CAS CAS mission
mission is is supporting
supporting ground ground troopstroops in in close
close
proximity
proximity to to thethe enemy.
enemy.
Colored
Colored smoke,
smoke, large large fabric
fabric panels,
panels, even even visual
visual recognition
recognition of of aa
particular
particular tank silhouette are
tank silhouette are all
all daytime
daytime targettarget identification
identification techniques
techniques
that
that are
are not
not suitable
suitable at night. But
at night. But an an enemy
enemy tank tank looks
looks pretty
pretty much
much like like
aa friendly
friendly tanktank when when you you can can only
only see see itit as
as aa monochromatic
monochromatic FLIR FLIR
display.
display. Infrared
Infrared strobestrobe lights
lights to to mark
mark friendly
friendly positions
positions or or friendly
friendly
equipment
equipment and and troops
troops marked
marked with with special
special low low florescent
florescent camouflage
camouflage
that
that isis visible
visible in in the
the NVGs
NVGs but but not
not to
to the
the naked
naked eye eye are some suggestions
are some suggestions
of
of what
what might
might be be feasible
feasible at at night
night..
If
If the
the CAS
CAS aircraft
aircraft is is equipped
equipped with with aa laser-sensing
laser-sensing display, display, suchsuch asas
the
the Pave
Pave Penny
Penny pods pods on on some
some A-10 A-10 attack aircraft, then positive target
attack aircraft, then positive target
identification
identification can can bebe made
made by by an
an airborne
airborne or or ground
ground FAC FAC usingusing aa laser
laser
to
to illuminate
illuminate the the target
target.. Using
Using thisthis technique,
technique, either either an an airborne
airborne FAC FAC in in
an
an Apache
Apache helicopter
helicopter or or aa ground
ground FAC FAC with with aaman-portable
man-portable ground ground laser
laser
locator
locator designator
designator (GLLD) (GLLD) illuminates
illuminates the the target
target with
with aa specific
specific laser
laser
code
code and and frequency.
frequency. (The (The latter
latter option
option may may be be particularly
particularly desirable
desirable
since
since the the person
person on on the
the ground
ground has has aa better
better understanding
understanding of of exactly
exactly
where
where he he or
or she
she needs
needs the the bombs
bombs to to support
support the the ground
ground war.) war.) When
When the the
Pave
Pave Penny
Penny system
system detects
detects the the reflectedlaser
reflected laser energy, energy, itit provides
provides aa target
target
cue
cue inin the pilot's heads
the pilot's heads up up display
display (HUD)(HUD) to to show
show target
target location
location.. With
With
this
this cue,
cue, the
the pilot
pilot can can then
then point
point thethe airplane
airplane at at the
the target
target andand useuse the
the

50
50
THE
THE CHALLENGE
CHALLENGE

1IR Maverick's
nR Maverick's sensor
sensor for
for final
final target
target acquisition
acquisition and attack.. If
and attack the HUD
If the HUD
also can provide a FLIR display with the Pave Penny cue overlaid on
also can provide a FLIR display with the Pave Penny cue overlaid on
it,
it, the
the pilot
pilot could
could also
also attack
attack with
with guns
guns oror nonprecision bombs."^ Like
nonprecision bombs .29
Like
any other skill,
any other skUl, though,
though, these
these target-identification
target-identification (ID)
(ID) techniques
techniques must must
be trained for by the forces that expect to
be trained for by the forces that expect to employ
employ them
them. .

Mission
Mission Feasibility
Feasibility

At this
At this point,
point, itit is
is appropriate
appropriate to to ask
ask whether
whether or or not
not such
such aa joint
joint
mission
mission with
with both
both Air
Air Force
Force and
and Navy
Navy aircraft
aircraft on
on a
a single
single target
target is
is
realistic
realistic.. It
It is
is the
the author's
author's contention
contention that that not
not only
only isis itit realistic
realistic but
but isis
tactically and doctrinally sound and has historic precedent. First, as was
tactically and doctrinally sound and has historic precedent. First, as was
mentioned
mentioned above,above, one one of of the fundamental principles
the fundamental principles of of war
war isis the
the
principle of mass.
principleof mass. AFM
AFM 1-1 1-1 states,
states, "Aerospace
"Aerospace forces forces possess
possess the the ability
ability
to concentrate enormous decisive
to concentrate enormous decisive striking
striking power
power upon selected
upon selected targets
targets
when
when andand where
where it it is
is needed
needed most
most." ." 3
^ This
This applies
applies toto all
aU airair forces,
forces, notnot
just
just the
the Air
Air Force
Force.. AA well-known
well-known large large force
force mission-packaging
mission-packaging concept concept
in
in the
the tactical
tactical air
air force
force is is what
what isis commonly
commonly called called the
the "gorilla
"gorilla." .,3^'1 This
This
involves aa large
involves large number
number of of various
various types
types of of aircraft
aircraft attacking
attacking aa single
single
target. Each type of aircraft is selected for its particular
target. Each type of aircraft is selected for its particular capability,
capability, such
such
as F-16s
as F-16s for bomb deliveries,
for bomb deliveries, F-15s
F-15s for for air
air superiority,
superiority, and and F-4Gs
F-4Gs for for
SEAD.
SEAD. With With the the proper
proper combination
combination of of the
the strengths
strengths of of various
various
components,
components, we we can form aa much
can form much stronger
stronger and and more
more effective
effective whole
whole..
A
A joint
joint force
force gorilla
gorilla such
such as as is
is proposed
proposed here here is
is merely
merely the the logical
logical
extension of a proven concept.
extension of a proven concept.
Aside
Aside from
from being
being tactically sound, the
tactically sound, the concept
concept of of ajoint
a joint force
force gorilla
gorUla
has
has historical
historical precedent.
precedent. As As was
was discussed
discussed in chapter 1,
in chapter 1, USAF
USAF bombers
bombers
were protectedby
were protected by Marinenight
Marine night fighters
fighters to
to make
make up
up for
for a
a lackofrequired
lack of required
capability,
capability, whilewhile AirAir Force
Force CASCAS and interdiction missions
and interdiction missions were were
augmentedby Marine and Navy assets toprovide the necessary numbers
augmented by Marine and Navy assets to provide the necessary numbers
of
of aircraft
aircraft (or
(or mass)
mass) forfor mission
mission effectiveness
effectiveness..
More recently,
More recently, USAFUSAF F-11 F-lllsIs were
were usedused in in Operation
Operation El El Dorado
Dorado
Canyon because the Navy did not have enough
Canyon because the Navy did not have enough A-6Es
A-6Es in
in place
place to
to
accomplish
accomplish the the mission
mission objectives
objectives independently
independently.. Navy Navy aircraft
aircraft

51
51
JOINT
JOINT TRAINING
TRAINING FOR
FOR NIGHT
NIGHT AIR
AIR WARFARE,
WARFARE

provided
provided the the necessary
necessary air-to-air
air-to-air protection
protection (F-14s)
(F-14s) andand SEAD
SEAD assets
assets
(F/A-18s,
(F/A-18s, A-7s)
A-7s) for
for both
both the
the Air
Air Force
Force andand Navy
Navy attacks.
attacks. Joint
Joint force
force
employment was a required and logical decision
employment was a required and logical decision. . The
The inclusion
inclusion of Air
of Air
Force
Force aircraft
aircraft as
as aa joint
joint package
package had had the
the added
added benefit
benefit of of enhancing
enhancing
tactical surprise. While Libyan defenses concentrated mainly on
tactical surprise. WhUe Libyan defenses concentrated mainly on the
the
known,
known, in-place
in-place carriers
carriers toto the
the east,
east, the
the unexpected
unexpected F-1 F-lllsl is out
out of
of the
the
northwest provided
northwest provided aa second
second andand totally
totally unexpected
unexpected axis axis ofof attack
attack for
for
the overall mission.
the overall mission.
Finally,
Finally, the
the idea
idea of
of aa joint
joint force
force package
package is is doctrinally
doctrinally sound.
sound. Again,
Again,
AFM
AFM 1-1 1-1 says,
says, "Unity
"Unity of of Command
Command is is imperative
imperative to employing all
to employing all
aerospace
aerospace forces
forces effectively.
effectively. .. .. .. Aerospace
Aerospace forces
forces are
are employed
employed as as an
an
entity
entity through
through thethe leadership
leadership of of an an air
air commander
commander." ." 32 Since all
^^ Since all air
air
assets, regardless of service, should be under a single commander, force
assets, regardless of service, should be under a single commander, force
packaging
packaging should
should be based mainly
be based mainly on on required
required capability
capability for for mission
mission
accomplishment,
accomplishment, not not on
on whether
whether the the airplane
airplane has has "USN"
"USN" or or "USAF"
"US AF" on on
the side .
the side.

Summary
Summary

By
By no
no means
means is is this
this example
example meant to illustrate
meant to illustrate all of the
all of the problems
problems
and solutions
and solutions of of joint
joint Air
Air Force-Navy
Force-Navy night night operations.
operations. Neither
Neither isis itit
meant to conclusively
meant to conclusively prove
prove to
to the
the reader
reader that
that joint
joint night
night operations
operations are
are
tactically
tactically desirable
desirable in all cases.
in all cases. There
There will
wUl bebe times
times when
when the the challenges
challenges
outweigh the benefits and joint night operations should not
outweigh the benefits and joint night operations should not bebe
attempted.
attempted. However,
However, as as this
this example
example hopefully
hopefully demonstrated
demonstrated to to the
the
reader,
reader, there
there isis at
at least
least aa possibility
possibility ofof increased
increased tactical
tactical capability
capability
operations if
through joint operations the challenges can
through joint if the challenges can be
be met.
met. How
How to
to meet
meet and
and
overcome these
overcome these challenges,
challenges, and and even
even what some of
what some of the
the challenges
challenges are, are,
should be identified in peacetime training . Writing off joint night
should be identified in peacetime training. Writing off joint night
operations
operations as as too
too hard
hard toto do
do without
without first
first trying
trying isis just
just asas bad
bad asas hoping
hoping
wartime experiences
that wartime
that experiences will wUl provide
provide solutions
solutions to to wartime
wartime problems
problems
that were not identified in peacetime training . Accordingly, chapter
that were not identified in peacetime training. Accordingly, chapter 33
addresses the
addresses the current
current status
status ofof joint
joint night
night training.
training.

52
52
THE CHALLENGE
THE CHALLENGE

Notes
Notes

11.. AFM
AFM 1-1,l-l, BasicAerospace
Basic Aerospace Doctrine
Doctrine of of the
the UnitedStatesAir
United States Air Force,
Force, 16
16 March
March
1984,2-7.
1984,2-7.
2. Ibid., 2-11.
2. Ibid., 2-11.
3. Ibid., 3-3
3. Ibid., 3-3..
4. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5.
5. Ibid.
Ibid.
6.
6. Ibid.
Ibid.
7.
7. Multicommand
Multicommand Manual Manual (MCM)(MCM) 3-1, 3-1, Tactical Employment, vol.
Tactical Employment, 6, F-111
vol. 6, F-Ill
Tactics,
Tactics, 14 14 October
October 1988, 2-3 .
1988,2-3.
8.
8. Lt
Lt Col
Col John
John Rivers,
Rivers, Air
Air War
War College, Maxwell AFB,
College, Maxwell AFB, Ala
Ala., interview with
., interview with
author,
author, September
September 1990. 1990.
9.
9. Lt
Lt Col
Col MelMel Copeland,
Copeland, Air Air War College, Maxwell
War College, Maxwell AFB,AFB, Ala.,
Ala., interview
interview with
with
author,
author, September
September 1990. 1990.
10.
10. Capt
Capt Steve
Steve Tate,
Tate, F-15
F-15 pilot,
pilot, lst
1st Tactical
Tactical Fighter
Fighter Wing,
Wing, television
television interview
interview
from
from Saudi Arabia, CNN,
Saudi Arabia, CNN, 17 17 January
January 1991.
1991.
11.
11. Capt
Capt Jane Patterson, instructor/senior
Jane Patterson, instructor/senior director,
director, and
and Maj
Maj Dick
Dick Embry,
Embry, pilot,
pilot,
964th
964th AWACS,
AWACS, Red Red Flag
Hag 91-2,
91-2, Nellis
Nellis AFB,
AFB, Nev
Nev.,., interview
interview with
with author,
author, 13
13 February
February
1991..
1991
12.
12. Edith
Edith M.
M. Lederer
Lederer and
and David
David Evans,
Evans, "The
"The Air
Air Campaign:
Campaign: A A Look
Look atat How
How ItIt All
All
Began,"
Began," Air AJ> Force
Force Times
Times 51,
51, no.
no. 29
29 (25
(25 February
February 1991)
1991):: 18.
18.
13.. AFM
13 AFM 1-1,1-1, 3-3
3-3..
14.. Ibid.,
14 3-4..
Ibid., 3-4
15
15.. Col
Col Paul
Paul J.J. Kern,
Kern, commander,
commander, 2d 2d Brigade,
Brigade, XVIII
XVIII Airborne
Airborne Corps,
Corps, "Soldiers
"Soldiers
`Oriented
'Oriented on on the
the enemy',"
enemy'," AirA/r Force
Force Times,
Times, 1717 September
September 1990, 68.
1990,68.
16.
16. "U.S.
"U.S. Tactical
Tactical Forces
Forces Close
Close toto Adding
Adding Three
Three New
New Night-Fighting
Night-Fighting Aircraft,"
Aircraft,"
Aviation
Aviation WeekWeek & & Space
Space Technology,
Technology, 12 12 November
November 1990, 63 .
1990,63.
17.
17. Julie
Julie Bird,
Bird, "`Warthogs'
"'Warthogs' Do Do Their
Their Hunting
Hunting after
after Sunset,"
Sunset," Air
Air Force
Force Times
Times 51,
51,
no.
no. 28
28 (18
(18 February
February 1991):
1991): 8.8.
18.
18. Patterson
Patterson interview
interview..
19.
19. Both
Both of these examples
of these examples are drawn from
are drawn from the
the author's personal experiences
author's personal experiences as as an
an
Air
Air Force-Navy
Force-Navy exchangeexchange officer
officer serving
serving as as an
an F-14 instructor radar
F-14 instructor intercept officer
radar intercept officer
from September 1983
from September 1983 through
through March
March 1986.
1986.
20.
20. Lederer
Lederer and and Evans,
Evans, 18.18.
21
21.. "Three
"Three NewNew Night-Fighting
Night-Fighfing Aircraft,"
Aircraft," 63.
63.
22.
22. "Weinberger,
"Weinberger, Crowe Crowe Provide
Provide Additional
Additional Details
Details onon Libya
Libya Raid,"
Raid," Aerospace
Aerospace
Daily,
Daily, 26 26 June
June 1986, 495.
1986,495.

53
53
POINT TRAINING
JOINT TRAINING FOR
FOR NIGHT
NIGHT AIR
AIR WARFARE
WARFARE

23
23.. 4440th
4440th Tactical
Tactical Fighter
Fighter Training
Training Group,
Group, Final
Final Report
Report.. Red
Red Flag 88-], 24
Flag 88-1, 24
October 1987-21
October 1987-21 November
November 19871987 (Nellis
(NeUis AFB,
AFB, Nev
Nev.:. : The
The EC
EC Corporation,
Corporation, 1987),
1987), 6. 6.
24.
24. MCM
MCM 3-1,
3-1, vol.
vol. 1,
1, General
General Planning
Planning and
and Employment Considerations, 44 July
Employment Considerations, July
1989, A7-4.
1989, A7-4.
25
25.. Maj
Maj Roger
Roger L. L. Smith,
Smith, A A Two-Edged
Two-Edged Sword
Sword:: Preparing
Preparing USAFE
USAFE for
for the the
Arena (FOUO/No
F-ow-Intensity Arena
Low-Intensity (FOUO/No Contract/NOFORN)
Contract/NOFORN) (Maxwell (Maxwell AFB,AFB, Ala
Ala.:. : Air
Air
University Press,
University Press, April
April 1990), 28, 42. (Information
1990), 28,42. (Information extracted
extracted is
is not
not FOUO.)
FOUO.)
26.
26. Capt
Capt Robert
Robert H. H. Brown,
Brown, "A "A Real Hog War
Real Hog War:: TheThe A-10
A-10 in in Low-Intensity
Low-Intensity
Airpower Journal 4,
Conflict,"AirpowerJournal
Conflict," no. 44 (Winter
4, no. (Winter 1990):
1990): 65.65.
27.. "Allied
27 "AUied Fire
Fire May
May Have
Have Killed
Killed Marines,"
Marines," Montgomery Advertiser, 22 February
Montgomery Advertiser, February
1991, 4A; and
1991, 4A; and "Gulf,"
"Guli," Montgomery Advertiser, 44 February
Montgomery Advertiser, February 1991,
1991, 10A
lOA..
28 John King,
28.. John King, "Friendly
"Friendly Fire
Fire Kills
Kills Two,"
Two," Montgomery Advertiser, 18
Montgomery Advertiser, 18 February
February
1991, IA.
1991, lA.
29. Brown,
29. Brown, 6464..
30.
30. AFM
AFM 1-1, 2-7.
1-1,2-7.
31.. Robert K.
31 Robert George and
K. George and Lonnie
Lonnie C. C. Goodson,
Goodson, "Planning,
"Planning, Leading
Leading andand Executing
Executing
at Large
Large Force
Force Package
Package:: TheThe Gorilla
Gorilla Lives,"
Lives," USAF
USAF Fighter
Fighter Weapons Review, Summer
Weapons Review, Summer
1985,5-8 .
1985,5-8.
32.
32. AFM
AFM 1-1, 2-8.
1-1,2-8.

54
54
PHOTO
PHOTO SECTION
SECTION
Pilot's helmet with night vision goggles.

i-

The USAF Tactical Fighter Weapons Center at Nellis AFB, Nevada, is responsible
for aU Red Flag activities, (Photo courtesy of TFWC/HO, Nellis AFB, Nevada.)

56
A pilot from a Red Hag Aggressor squadron checks his equipment. (Photo courtesy
of TFWC/HO, NeUis AFB, Nevada.)

An F-16 Ufts off from a NeUis runway. (Photo courtesy of TFWC/HO, NelUs AFB,
Nevada.)

57
-Tf:- ; -^Tl!!^ r'SlKiH"" ;''Eg5^

A silhouetted A-10 awaits the beginning of night operations. (Photo courtesy of


TFWC/HO. Nelhs AFB, Nevada.)

Crew chiefs prepare to launch Iheir F-16s during a Red Flag exercise. (Photo courtesy
of TFWC/HO, Nellis AFB, Nevada.)

58
An A-10 pulls up after bombing a tank target on the Nellis range. (Photo
counesy of TFWC/HO, Nellis AFB, Nevada.)

59
A busy ranip during a Red Hag exercise. (Photo courtesy of IhWC/HO, Nellis AFB,
Nevada.)

m
Chapter
Chapter 33

Current
Current Training
Training Programs
Programs

Chapter
Chapter 22 described
described aa scenario
scenario forfor possible
possible employment
employment of of joint
joint air
air
assets
assets in
in night
night warfare.
warfare. As As the
the reader
reader cancan see, such operations could be
see, such operations could be
extremely
extremely complex
complex and and require
require aa great
great deal
deal ofof planning
planning and and skill
skUl toto be
be
successful . The appropriate skills and experience can only be achieved
successful. The appropriate skills and experience can only be achieved
through
through regular
regular training
training under
under thethe most
most realistic
realistic conditions
conditions possible
possible..
This
This chapter
chapter examines
examines some some of of the
the current training programs
current training programs and and
exercises
exercises involving
involving joint joint night
night operations.
operations.
The
The intended
intended focusfocus of of this chapteris
this chapter is on
on large-scale
large-scale (above
(above wingwing level)
level)
training
training oror exercises
exercises involving
involving two two or or more
more services
services.. Air
Air Force
Force training
training
programs
programs at at wing
wing levellevel and
and below
below havehave already
already been
been the the subject
subject of of at
at
least
least two
two studies
studies.. In In his
his ARI
ARI research report, LANTIRN
research report, LANTIRN Operational
Operational
Training
Training forfor the
the F-15E
F-15E and F-16CID, Lt Col David G. Blair proposed
andF-16CID, Lt Col David G. Blair proposed
aa detailed
detailed training
training plan plan for
for aircrews
aircrews to to achieve
achieve individual
individual proficiency
proficiency
in
in night
night operations.'
operations.' In In aa 1988
1988 research
research report
report for
for Air
Air Command
Command and and
Staff
Staff College,
College, AndrewAndrew M. M. Gecelosky
Gecelosky recommended
recommended aa comprehensive
comprehensive
wing
wing training
training schedule
schedule to to ensure
ensure thatthat allall assigned
assigned squadrons
squadrons could could
achieve and maintain unit proficiency in night operations.2 Although
achieve and maintain unit proficiency in night operations.^ Although
the
the emphasis
emphasis in in both
both of of these
these reports
reports waswas specifically
specifically on on LANTIRN
LANTIRN
training,
training, thethe recommended
recommended number number and and types
types of of training
training programs
programs are are
applicable
applicable to to other
other kinds
kinds of of night
night training
trairring..
Neither
Neither of of the
the above
above studies
studies considered
considered the the requirement
requirement for for joint
joint
night training. This chapter discusses why such a training program is
night training. This chapter discusses why such a training program is
needed
needed todaytoday and and where
where the the opportunities
opportunities for for such
such training
training exist.
exist.
Specifically,
Specifically, this this chapter
chapter addresses
addresses what what joint
joint night
night training
training is is now
now
being
being carried
carried out out inin the
the following
following exercises
exercises and and locations:
locations: Red Red Flag,
Flag,
Nellis
Nellis AFB,
AFB, Nevada;
Nevada; Naval Naval Strike
Strike Warfare
Warfare Center,
Center, Naval
Naval Air Air Station
Station
(NAS),
(NAS), Fallon,
Fallon, Nevada;
Nevada; National
National Training
Training CenterCenter (NTC),
(NTC), Fort Fort Irwin,
Irwin,

61
61
CURRENT
CURRENT "TRAINING
TRAINING PROGRAMS
PROGRAMS

Naval Strike
Naval Strike Warfare
Warfare Center
Center

The
The US US Navy
Navy equivalent
equivalent to to Red
Red FlagFlag is is the
the Naval Strike Warfare
Naval Strike Warfare
Center (Strike) located at NAS Fallon, near Reno, Nevada. The facilities
Center (Strike) located at NAS Fallon, near Reno, Nevada. The facilities
and training
and training capability
capability at at Fallon
Fallon areare similarto
similar to those
those at at Nellis
Nellis andand provide
provide
thecapability for large-scale, day
the capability forlarge-scale, day and
and night
night employment
employment with with composite
composite
forces . Missions at Fallon include air-to-air attacks against simulated
forces. Missions at FaUon include air-to-air attacks against simulated
enemy aircraft, air-to-surface
enemy aircraft, air-to-surface attackattack missions,
missions, and and electronic
electronic warfare
warfare
training.
training. However,
However, Fallon's
Fallon's facilities
facilities are considerably smaller
are considerably smaller and and less
less
sophisticated than those at
sophisticated than those at Nellis
Nellis. . For
For instance,
instance, a
a surface
surface attack
attack target
target
for
for an
an OCAOCA mission
mission at at Nellis
Nellis could
could veryvery well
well include
include aa bulldozed
bulldozed
runway, taxiway, and parking ramp; tires outlining the operations and
runway, taxiway, and parking ramp; tires outlining the operations and
maintenance
maintenance facilities and actual
facilities;; and actual aircraft
aircraft hulks
hulks forfor targets.
targets. TheThe samesame
target array on
target array on the
the Fallon
FaUon ranges
ranges may may be be limited
limited to to aa bulldozed
buUdozed runwayrunway
airstrip with a collection of
airstrip with a collection of old
old tires or
tires or two-dimensional
two-dimensional plywood
plywood targets
targets
to simulate
to simulate parked
parked aircraft
aircraft.. Despite
Despite thisthis lack
lack ofof sophistication,
sophistication, aircrews
aircrews
who
who havehave participated
participated in in both
both RedRed Flag
Flag andand Strike
Strike regard
regard the the training
training
20
at
at Fallon
Fallon to to be
be very
very comparable
comparable and and effective.
effective.^''
In
In addition
addition to the differences
to the differences in in the
the level
level of of sophisticated
sophisticated equipment,
equipment.
Strike has two differences in operational
Strike has two differences in operational training
training as
as compared
compared to
to Red
Red
Flag.. First,
Flag First, at
at Fallon,
Fallon, thethe air-to-air
air-to-air warwar isis not
not as
as fully integrated with
fully integrated with thethe
air-to-surface war. During Red Flag, air-to-air sorties are scheduled and
air-to-surface war. During Red Flag, air-to-air sorties are scheduled and
integrated
integrated in in support
support of of the
the air-to-ground
air-to-ground missions
missions.. At At Strike,
Strike, the the
21
air-to-air
air-to-air phase
phase is separated from
is separated from thethe air-to-ground
air-to-ground war. war. ' This
This allows
allows
the aircrews to concentrate more on developing their particular skills,
the aircrews to concentrate more on developing their particular skills,
but
but itit lessens
lessens thethe learning
learning experience
experience that that could
could bebe provided
provided by by aa more
more
fully
fuUy integrated
integrated campaign
campaign scheme.
scheme.
The second difference
The second difference involves
involves the the method
method by by which
which the the units
units areare
scheduled
scheduled to to participate
participate in in Strike
Strike.. As was discussed
As was discussed earlier,
earlier. RedRed Flag
Flag
scheduling is based on unit availability and does not necessarily
scheduling is based on unit availability and does not necessarily reflect
reflect
the
the expected
expected combat organization.. By
combat organization By contrast,
contrast, an an entire
entire carrier
carrier air
air wing
wing
(CVW)
(CVW) is is scheduled
scheduled for for training
training at at Strike
Strike as as part
part oftheir
of their regular
regular workup
workup
training before deployment.
training before deployment. The
The CVW
CVW includes
includes all
all of
of the
the aircraft
aircraft that
that
will
wiU be deployed on
be deployed on the
the carrier
carrier inin their
thek anticipated
anticipated combat structure and
combat structure and
strength. Through training at Strike, the CVW gets to train with those
strength. Through training at Strike, the CVW gets to train with those

71
71
CURRENT
CURRENT "TRAINING
TRAINING PROGRAMS
PROGRAMS

EXPLAN
EXPLAN 323, 323, Air Air Warrior
Warrior involves
involves CAS CAS and and backup
backup aircraft
aircraft
inventory
inventory in in support
support of of Army
Army ground
ground forces
forces at at all
all levels
levels of of combat
combat?^ Zs

Army
Army units
vmits deploy
deploy to to Fort
Fort Irwin
Irwin as as two-battalion
two-battalion task task forces
forces forfor aa
two-week
two-week training
training period
period.. While
While one one battalion
battalion is is conducting
conducting live-fire
live-&e
exercises
exercises against
against simulated
simulated targets,
targets, the the second
second battalion
battalion is is practicing
practicing
against
against specially
specially trained
trained US US Army Army adversary
adversary units units in in large-scale,
large-scale,
force-on-force
force-on-force exercises.
exercises. After After the the first
first week,
week, the the battalions
battalions swap swap
roles .
roles.^^
Air Force
Air Force units tasked in
units tasked in CASCAS and and BAI BAI missions
missions at at the
the NTC
NTC
participate
participate in in both
both phases
phases of of training.
training. Techniques
Techniques and and procedures
procedures for for
integrating artillery fire and tactical air power are trained for during the
integrating artillery fire and tactical air power are trained for during the
live-fire
live-fire phase
phase with with live-ordnance
live-ordnance deliveries
deliveries.. Realistic
Realistic problems
problems of of
controlling and
controlling and integrating
integrating tactical
tactical air air power
power in in aa dynamic
dynamic battle, battle,
including
including basicbasic communications
communications procedures procedures and and identification
identification of of
friendly
friendly and
and enemy
enemy forces,
forces, areare practiced
practiced with with simulated
simulated attacks attacks against
against
live
live adversaries
adversaries in in the
the force-on-force
force-on-force phase, phase. Air Air Force
Force aircraft
aircraft that
that are
are
used
used inin Air
Air Warrior
Warrior include
include A-7s,
A-7s, A-1Os,
A-lOs, F-4s,F^s, andand F- lbs. The intent of the
F-16s. The intent of the
program
program is is to
to "exercise
"exercise joint
joint USUS Anny
Army-AirAir ForceForce planning,
planning, coordination,
coordination,
and
and execution,"
execution," and and toto "train
"train the
the way
way wewe plan
plan to fight." 27
to fight." ^''
Despite
Despite these
these excellent
excellent goals,
goals, there
there is is aa significant
significant gap gap in in the
the training
training
experience
experience at at the
the NTC.
NTC. Army Army battalions participating at
battalions participating at NTCNTC train
train for
for
around-the-clock
around-the-clock combat. combat. Each Each training
training rotation
rotation includes
includes at at least
least one
one
night
night battle
battle with
with all
all Army
Army assets,
assets, including
including helicopters.
helicopters.^^ 28
However,
However, at at
this
this time
time AirAir Force
Force aircraft
aircraft do do not
not fly
fly night
night CASCAS or or BAI
BAI missions
missions at at
NTC
NTC.^^ .29 Air
Air Force
Force nonparticipation
nonparticipation at at night
night hashas at at least
least two two negative
negative
impacts
impacts on on overall
overall joint
joint mission
mission effectiveness
effectiveness.. First,First, ground
ground forcesforces do do
not
not train
train in
in night
night operations
operations against
against aa realistic
realistic night
night airair threat
threat.. Air
Air Force
Force
sorties
sorties asas adversary
adversary air air during
during the the force-on-force
force-on-force phase phase couldcould provide
provide
more
more realistic
realistic exposure
exposure to to the
the difficulties
difficulties of of night
night movement
movement against against an an
air
air threat
threat.. Air
Air Force
Force missions
missions as as both
both friendly
friendly and and adversary
adversary air air with
with
different
different types
types of aircraft could
of aircraft provide ground
could provide ground forces
forces training
training in in how
how
to
to identify
identify and
and defend
defend against
against an an enemy
enemy air air attack
attack at at night
night..
A
A second
second negative
negative effect
effect isis that
that aircrews
aircrews do do not
not get
get the
the most realistic
most realistic
training
training possible
possible in in joint
joint CAS/BAI
CAS/BAI target target location
location and and identification
identification at at
night.
night. Tasking
Tasking as as either
either friendly
friendly or or adversary
adversary air air during
during the the night
night

73
73
JOINT
JOINT TRAINING FOR NIGHT
TRAINING FOR NIGHT AIR
AIR WARFARE
WARFARE

California;
California; the
the Marine
Marine Corps
Corps Air-Ground
Air-Ground Combat Center, Twentynine
Combat Center, Twentynine
Palms, California; Cope Thunder, Clark AB, Philippines (as
Palms, California; Cope Thunder, Clark AB, Philippines (as of
of this
this
writing);
writing); and Team Spirit,
and Team Spirit, Republic of Korea
Republic of Korea..

Requirements
Requirements for
for Realistic
Realistic Training
Training

Successful military
Successful military operations
operations requirerequire more
more than than equipment
equipment;; theythey
also
also require
require people
people who who are are skilled
skilled at at using
using that equipment.. The
that equipment The key
key toto
proper
proper employment
employment is is realistic
realistic training.
training. WhenWhen properproper andand realistic
realistic
training
training has
has been
been absent,
absent, employment
employment has suffered. This
has suffered. This was just as
was just as true
true
in World War 11 as it was in Operation Desert Storm . A few brief
in World War II as it was in Operation Desert Storm. A few brief
examples
examples willwill serve
serve to to emphasize
emphasize this this point.
point.
One
One early
early example
example of of how
how the the lack
lack ofof training
training has has had
had anan impact
impact on on
employment is found the
employment is found in
in the first
first B-29
B-29 night
night bombing
bombing raid
raid against
against Japan
Japan
on
on 10
10 March
March 19451945.. Night
Night bombing
bombing was was anew
a new tactic
tactic in
in which
which the
the B-29
B-29
crews had no experience. A significant concern for Gen Curtis E.
crews had no experience. A significant concern for Gen Curtis E.
LeMay,
LeMay, the the commander
commander of of thethe XXI
XXI Bomber
Bomber Command,Command, was was thethe
possibility
possibility of of fratricide
fratricide.. SinceSince the the B-29
B-29 crews
crews were were untrained
untrained in in night
night
operations, General LeMay feared that the gunners
operations. General LeMay feared that the gunners might
might get
get confused
confused
and
and shoot
shoot down
down somesome of of their
their ownown B-29s
B-29s in in the
the dark.
dark. ToTo prevent
prevent this,
this,
LeMay ordered all of the guns and gunners removed from the attacking
LeMay ordered all of the guns and gunners removed from the attacking
B-29s.3
B-29s.^ This
This was
was aa somewhat
somewhat radical radical solution
solution that
that was
was forced
forced onon LeMay
LeMay
because
because of of aa lack
lack of of time
time to to conduct
conduct nightnight training
training before
before the
the attack
attack..
A more recent example that pointed out a lack ofjoint force training
A more recent example that pointed out a lack of joint force training
occurred during
occurred during Operation
Operation Urgent Urgent Fury, Fury, the invasion of
the invasion of Grenada
Grenada in in
October
October 1983.
1983. Because
Because the the entire
entire operation
operation was was planned
planned and and executed
executed
in
in less
less than
than four
four days,
days, there
there was was no no time
time forfor specific
specific training
training and and
practice.
practice. This
This was further complicated
was further complicated by by the
the fact
fact that
that the
the planning
plaiming and and
execution staffs for Operation Urgent Fury had also been
execution staffs for Operation Urgent Fury had also been hastily
hastily
assembled
assembled and and had
had not worked together
not worked together before.
before. The The stafflacked
staff lacked certain
certain
critical
critical skills
skills for
for joint
joint operations,
operations, such such as as how
how to plan and
to plan and coordinate
coordinate
joint air and naval fire support
joint air and naval fire support for
for ground
groimd forces
forces.'*. A
A continuing
continuing joint
joint
stafftrainingprogram
staff training program in in peacetime
peacetime could have identified
could have identified andand eliminated
eliminated
some ofthese problem areas before the operation was even conceived .
some of these problem areas before the operation was even conceived.

62
62
CURRENT
CURRENT TRAINING
TRAINING PROGRAMS
PROGRAMS

A
A lack
lack ofof joint
joint training
training also also affected
affected operations
operations in in Operation
Operation Desert
Desert
Storm
Storm.. During
During aa newspaper
newspaper interview interview on on 29
29 January
January 1991, 1991, Col
Col Charles
Charles
Burke,
Burke, aviation
aviation officer
officer of of thethe USUS Army
Army 3d 3d Armored
Armored Division,Division, stated
stated
that
that the
the first
first ofhis
of his unit's
unit' s tank-killing
tank-killing ApacheApachehelicopters
helicopters hadjusthad just arrived
arrived
near
near the
the front
front lines
lines aa fewfew days
days earlier.
earlier. Although
Although the the airair phase
phase ofof Desert
Desert
Storm
Storm hadhad started nearly two
started nearly two weeks
weeks before
before andand thethe ground
ground phase
phase could
could
be expected to commence at any time, Colonel Burke said that his pilots
be expected to commence at any time, Colonel Burke said that his pilots
wanted
wanted "more
"more timetime to to practice
practice night night flying
flying andand to to participate
participate in in joint
joint
training
training with
with A-10
A-10 jets jets before
before goinggoing into
into ground
ground war."war." 5^ Colonel
Colonel Burke
Burke
and
and his
his pilots
pilots were
were fortunate
fortunate that that they
they had
had thethe time
time to to conduct
conduct what
what
should
should have
have been
been peacetime
peacetime training training during
during an an ongoing
ongoing war. war.
Not all examples have had such fortunate outcomes, though. During
Not all examples have had such fortunate outcomes, though. During
joint
joint night
night operations
operations in in the
the recapture
recapture of of Khafji,
Khafji, Saudi Saudi Arabia,
Arabia, anan Air
Air
Force
Force A-10 pilot mistook
A-10 pilot mistook aa US US Marine
Marine light
light armored
armored vehicle vehicle (LAV)
(LAV) forfor
an
an Iraqi
Iraqi vehicle
vehicle and and attacked
attacked itit with
with aa Maverick
Maverick missile.
missile. As As explained
explained
by
by Maj
Maj PatPat Hoy,
Hoy, an an experienced
experienced A-10 A-10 pilot
pilot assigned
assigned to to the
the 422d
422d
Operational
Operational Test Test and and Evaluation
Evaluation SquadronSquadron at at Nellis
Nellis AFB,AFB, A-10A-10
threat-recognition
threat-recognition trainingtraining emphasizes
emphasizes US US Army
Army and and some
some other
other allied
allied
equipment
equipment but but does
does not not include
include US US Marine
Marine equipment.
equipment. The The friendly
friendly
equipment that is included has one feature in common-they all
equipment that is included has one featxu-e in common^they all have
have
treads,
treads, not
not wheels
wheels.. The The BTR-60,
BTR-60, aa Soviet-built
Soviet-built armored armored personnel
personnel
carrier
carrier used
used by by Iraq,
Iraq, however,
however, has has wheels.
wheels. In In the
the midst
midst ofof aa battle,
battle,
particularly
particularly when
when seen seen at at night
night through
through an an infrared
infrared sensor,
sensor, thethe presence
presence
oftreads
of treads would
would meanmean that that itit could
could be be friendly,
friendly, butbut aa vehicle
vehicle with
with wheels
wheels
was presumed to be enemy.6 Unfortunately, the LAV uses wheels, not
was presumed to be enemy.^ Unfortunately, the LAV uses wheels, not
treads
treads.. Since
Since Air Force A-10
Air Force A-10 pilots
pilots dodo not
not regularly
regularly train train with
with Marines,
Marines,
this
this was
was anan unrecognized
unrecognized ambiguity.
ambiguity. Although
Although the the official
official findings
findings have
have
not
not yet
yet been
been published,
published, itit is is at
at least
least possible
possible thatthat aa lack
lack ofof joint
joint night
night
training
training between
between Air Air Force
Force and and Marine
Marine forces
forces waswas aa contributing
contributing factor
factor
in this incident.
in this incident.
The
The necessity
necessity for for joint
joint training
training is is recognized
recognized throughout
throughout the the armed
armed
services
services.. Air
Air Force
Force basic basic doctrine
doctrine states
states that
that "to"to accomplish
accomplish national
national
military objectives, our military forces trainto fight as an interdependent
military objectives, our military forces train to fight as an interdependent
team
team ofof land,
land, naval,
naval, and and aerospace
aerospace forces ." 7 In
forces."' Army Field
In Army Field Manual
Manual
100-5,
100-5, Operations,
Operations, this this is
is expressed
expressed as as "commanders
"commanders must must understand
understand

63
63
JOINT
JOINT TRAINING
TRAINING FOR NIGHT AIRWARFARE
FOR NIGHT AIR WARFARE

the
the techniques
techniques of of integrating Air Force,
integrating Air Force, Naval,
Naval, and
and Army firepower
Army firepower
effectively in the
effectively in the conduct
conduct of
of campaigns
campaigns and
and major
major operations."'
operations." But
But
how
how are
are those
those necessary
necessary skills practiced and
skills practiced and trained
trained for?
for? The
The remainder
remainder
of this chapter discusses some of those joint
of this chapter discusses some of those joint training
training exercises
exercises that
that we
we
have
have today.
today.

" Red
Red Flag
Flag

The
The first
first major
major training
training program
program to to bebe discussed
discussed is is Red
Red Flag,
Flag,
conducted by the 4440th Tactical Fighter Training Group (TFTG) at the
conducted by the 4440th Tactical Fighter Training Group (TFTG) at the
USAF
USAF Tactical
Tactical Fighter Weapons Center,
Fighter Weapons Center, Nellis
Nellis AFB.
AFB. As As described
described in in
COMTAC EXPLAN
COMTAC EXPLAN 80, 80, Red
Red Flag
Flag is
is aa six-week exercise divided
six-week exercise divided intointo
33 two-week
two-week periods.
periods. Each
Each period
period has has nine
nine and
and one-half
one-half daysdays of
of flying
flying
(Monday
(Monday throughthrough Friday)
Friday) against
against progressively
progressively more more challenging
challenging
targets
targets and
and threats.
threats. The
The flying
flying dayday has
has two
two launch
launch periods,
periods, an an "AM
"AM Go" Go"
and a "PM Go."
and a "PM Go." To
To ensure
ensure participation
participation by
by the
the maximum
maximum number
number of
of
aircrews
aircrews in in aa limited time, individuals
limited time, individuals are are restricted
restricted to to one
one mission
mission per per
day. Participating squadrons rotate out at
day. Participating squadrons rotate out at the
the end
end of
of the
the second
second and
and
fourth
fourth weeks
weeks to to allow other squadrons
allow other squadrons to to participate
participate in in the same exercise
the same exercise
schedule.9
schedule.^ The The Tactical
Tactical Air Command conducts
Air Command conducts fivefive Red
Red Flag
Flag exercises
exercises
each year, plus
each year, plus one
one Green
Green Flag
Flag (Red
(Red Flag
Flag with
with enhanced
enhanced electronic
electronic
warfare
warfare training)
training) and and one
one Maple
Maple FlagFlag (conducted
(conducted at at Cold
Cold Lake,
Lake, Alberta,
Alberta,
Canada). Given the similar nature of the three
Canada). Given the similar nature of the three different
different types
types of
of
exercises,
exercises, and and for
for purposes
purposes of of simplicity,
simplicity, we we will
will use
use Red
Red Flag
Flag as as aa
generic term
generic term forfor all
all three.
three.
The purpose of Red Flag
The purpose of Red Flag isis to
to expose
expose aircrews
aircrews to to the most realistic
the most realistic
combat
combat conditions
conditions possible
possible in peacetime environment.
in aa peacetime environment. In In these
these
exercises, the emphasis is on large-force composite
exercises, the emphasis is on large-force composite training
training with
with joint
joint
US forces
US forces andand composite
composite forcesforces from allied nations.
from allied nations. This
This affords
affords the the
aircrew
aircrew thethe opportunity
opportunity to to practice
practice withwith other
other types
types of of aircraft
aircraft andand
against a more challenging threat than
against a more challenging threat than would
would be
be available
available at
at their
their home
home
station. Conducted in
station. Conducted in the
the mountains
mountains and and desert
desert north
north of of Las
Las Vegas,
Vegas,
Nevada, a typical Red Flag mission package includes ingress through
Nevada, a typical Red Flag mission package includes ingress through
enemy fighters and
enemy fighters and SAMs,
SAMs, low-level
low-level navigation
navigation to to and attack on
and attack on aa

64
64
CURRENT
CURRENT TRAINING
TRAINING PROGRAMS
PROGRAMS

tactical
tactical target
target (truck park, airfield,
(truck park, airfield, railroad
raUroad station,
station, etc.)
etc.) defended
defended by by
SAMS
S AMs and
and AAA,
AAA, and and egress
egress backback through
through the the enemy
enemy defenses. Through
defenses. Through
remote
remote sensors,
sensors, aircraft-mounted
aircraft-mounted transmitters,
transmitters, and and computer
computer graphics,
graphics,
aa mission
mission in in progress
progress can can be
be monitored
monitored on on large-screen
large-screen video video at at the
the Red
Red
Flag operations building and then can be recorded for a complete
Flag operations building and then can be recorded for a complete
mission
mission review
review and and debriefing
debriefing.. This This debriefing
debriefing includes
includes the the effects
effects of of
enemy
enemy airair and-surface
and surface defenses, simulated air-to-air
defenses, simulated air-to-air missile
missile shots,
shots, andand
bomb
bomb scores
scores from from bothboth practice
practice and and live
live ordnance
ordnance drops.drops. Red Red FlagFlag
missions
missions can can bebe conducted
conducted either either during
during the the dayday or at night
or at night..
The
The current
current purpose
purpose and and intent
intent of Red Flag
of Red Flag is is to
to serve
serve as as the
the
culmination
culmination point point of of aa unit's
unit's training
training program,
program, not not asas the
the test
test bed
bed forfor
new
new tactics
tactics.. ToTo gain
gain the
the maximum
maximum benefit benefit fromfrom thethe short
short exposure
exposure time time
available,
available, aircrews
aircrews are are encouraged
encouraged to to use
use those
those tactics
tactics that
that they
they have
have
first
first practiced
practiced and and developed
developed at at home
home station,
station, notnot attempt
attempt to to develop
develop
new
new tactics
tactics in in aa new
new environment.
environment.' I If
If the
the aircrews
aircrews wantwant to to try
try aa new
new
employment
employment tactic, tactic, such
such as as aa newnew formation
formation or or aa new
new attack
attack pattern,
pattern,
they must first
they must first practice
practice it it at
at home
home station
station before
before attempting
attempting itit at at Red
Red
Flag . This is a valid and valuable building-block approach to training
Flag. This is a valid and valuable building-block approach to training
that
that changes
changes one one variable
variable (the (the combat
combat environment)
environment) while while keeping
keeping all all
other
other factors
factors constant
constant (the(the tactics)
tactics).. Attempting
Attempting to to change
change too too many
many
variables
variables at at once
once cancan overload
overload the the aircrew
aircrew andprevent
and prevent the the identification
identification
of
of which
which factor
factor (tactic
(tactic or or environment)
environment) may may be be responsible
responsible for for
ineffective employment .
ineffective employment.
Since
Since Red
Red Flag Flag exposes
exposes the the participants
participants to to more
more thanthan one one type
type of of
aircraft,
aircraft, thethe participants
participants learn learn whatwhat skills
skUls and capabilities can
and capabilities can be be
provided
provided by by other
other types
types ofof aircraft
aircraft and and crews
crews." ." This exposure does not
This exposure does not
require
require participation
participation in in oror development
development of of new
new tactics
tactics but but simply
simply
provides
provides information
information ofwhat of what another
another assetasset can
can dodo using
using itsits own
own already
already
developed
developed equipment
equipment and and techniques
techniques.. For For instance,
instance, the the third
third period
period of of
Red
Red Flag
Hag 91-2 91-2 included
included USAF USAF F-15Es,F-15Es, F-111s,
F-llls, and and F-16s
F-16s plusplus Navy
Navy
A-6Es and EA-613s. None of the Air Force aircraft were equipped for
A-6Es and EA-6Bs. None of the Air Force aircraft were equipped for
SEAD
SEAD missions
missions using using thethe high-speed antiradiation missile
high-speed antiradiation missile (HARM),
(HARM),
but
but the
the Navy
Navy A-6EsA-6Es werewere.. During
During the the first
first few
few days
days ofof the
the exercise,
exercise, the the
Air
Air Force
Force crews
crews werewere notnot aware
aware of of this
this Navy
Navy capability,
capability, and and the
the Navy
Navy
crews
crews were
were not aware of
not aware of the
the AirAir Force's
Force's lack lack ofof capability
capability.. Through
Through

65
65
JOINT
JOINT TRAINING
TRAINING FOR NIGHT AIR
FOR NIGHT AIR WARFARE
WARFARE

exposure
exposure to each other
to each other in the mission-planning
in the mission-planning and and debriefing
debriefing
processes, the
processes, the participants
participants became
became aware aware of of this
this overlooked
overlooked capability
capability
and
and started
started including
including Navy Navy A-6EsA-6Es for for SEAD missions in
SEAD missions in support
support ofAirof Air
Force
Force bombing
bombing missions
missions.'^ . 12
Simultaneously,
Simultaneously, the
the Air
Air Force
Force F-15Es
F-15Es and
and
F-16s,
F-16s, with with their
their greater air-to-air capability,
greater air-to-air capability, could could provide
provide increased
increased
protection for the A-6Es en route to the target . This did not
protection for the A-6Es en route to the target. This did not involve
involve any
any
new
new tactics,
tactics, just just aa simple
simple act act of of scheduling
scheduling the the appropriate
appropriate times times and and
targets for
targets for the the aircrews
aircrews to to use
use theirtheir own developed skills
own developed skills on on aa
coordinated attack . The net result
coordinated attack. The net result was
was better
better package
package protection
protection and
and
greater
greater mission
mission effectiveness
effectiveness for for both
both services.
services. This This isis aa simple
simple but but very
very
illustrative example of exactly the type of joint training benefits that
illustrative example of exactly the type of joint training benefits that
Red
Red Flag
Flag provides
provides..
Although
Although the the joint
joint experiences
experiences and and training
training benefits
benefits ofRedof Red FlagFlag have
have
been excellent, night training, particularly joint
been excellent, night training, particularly joint night
night training,
training, has
has been
been
very
very limited
limited.. As was discussed
As was discussed in in chapter
chapter 1, 1, this
this has
has been
been driven
driven by by aa
lack
lack of of aircraft
aircraft technology
technology to to dodo the night mission
the night mission.. BecauseBecause the the AirAir
Force did
Force did not
not have
have a
a broad-based
broad-based technical
technical capability
capability to
to dotactical
do tactical night
night
operations, there
operations, there waswas little
little incentive
incentive to to train
train in
in this
this mission,
mission, eithereither as as aa
single service or in joint operations. Between Red Flag
single service or in joint operations. Between Red Flag 82-2
82-2 and
and Red
Red
Flag
Flag 90-2,
90-2, therethere waswas no no night
night flying
flying during
during Red
Red Flag Flag exercises
exercises.. Night
Night
missions in
missions in Red
Red FlagFlag 82-2
82-2 werewere limited
limited to to ground
ground attack attack missions
missions with with
F-1 I lDs and
F-11 IDs and intercepts
intercepts with
with F-4Ds
F-4Ds and
and F-15s
F-15s. . The
The F-111
F-111 missions
missions were
were
single-ship
single-ship operations
operations using terrain-following radar
using terrain-following radar and and providing
providing
positive separation by flying geographically different ingress and egress
positive separation by flying geographically different ingress and egress
routes
routes.'^. 13 Night
Night intercepts
intercepts were conducted under
were conducted imder positive
positive radarradar control
control
with BVR missile
with BVR missile shots.
shots. InIn their
their after-action
after-action report,
report, the F-15 squadrons
the F-15 squadrons
stated thatnight intercepts at
stated that night intercepts at Red
Red Flag
Flag were
were so
so similar
similar to
to training
training at their
at their
home station
home station that that they
they produced
produced limited limited or or no effective training
no effective training benefit
benefit..
The training to be gained by flying Red Flag intercepts at night did
The training to be gained by flying Red Flag intercepts at night did not
not
outweigh
outweigh the the disadvantages
disadvantages caused caused by by having
having to to sacrifice
sacrifice aa day day sortie
sortie
14
to
to fly
fly aa night
night sortie.
sortie.'"*
Red Flag 90-2
Red Flag conducted night
90-2 conducted night operations
operations during during the the middle
middle
two-weekperiod
two-week period of of the
the exercise.
exercise. Again,Again, participation
participation was was limited
limited to to Air
Air
Force
Force only,only, but but aa greater number and
greater number type of
and type of aircraft
aircraft werewere involved.
involved.
LANTIRN-equipped
LANTIRN-equipped F-15Es
F-15Es and
and F-16s
F-16s plus
plus F-111
F-llls s and
and F-117s
F-117s were
were

66
66
CURRENT
CURRENT TRAINING
TRAINING PROGRAMS
PROGRAMS

scheduled for
scheduled for night
night interdiction,
interdiction, while whUe A-10s A-10s flew flew CASCAS missions
missions..
Simulated enemy defenses
Simulated enemy defenses included
included the
the normal
normal range
range of
of Red
Red Flag
Flag AAA
AAA
and SAM
and SAM threats
threats plusplus F-15s
F-15s in in aa DCA DC A role Target deconfliction
role.. Target deconfliction
procedures in 90-2 required a minimum of five-minutes' spacing
procedures in 90-2 required a minimum of five-minutes' spacing
between TOT
between TOT for for interdiction
interdiction missions missions.. The The CAS missions were
CAS missions were
controlled
controlled by OA-lOs and
by OA-10s and required
required air-dropped
air-dropped flares flares for for target
target
illumination and attack . As was discussed in chapters and
illumination and attack. As was discussed in chapters 1
1 and 2,
2, combat
combat
experience
experience has has shown
shown that that "bomber
"bomber streams" streams" and and flare
flare illumination
illumination are are
not the most
not the most desirable
desirable tactics
tactics in in aa high-threat
high-threat environment
environment such such as as Red
Red
Flag is supposed to
Flag is supposed to simulate
simulate. . However,
However, tactical
tactical training
training desires
desires must
must
frequently
frequently yield
yield toto peacetime
peacetime safety requirements.. Although
safety requirements Although experience
experience
in Operation Desert Storm subsequently proved that A-10s could
in Operation Desert Storm subsequently proved that A-lOs could
operate
operate at at night
night without
without flare flare illumination,
illumination, there there waswas no no overriding
overriding
necessity
necessity to practice for
to practice for that
that in in peacetime
peacetime when when Red Red FlagFlag 90-290-2 was
was
conducted.
conducted.
Red
Red Flag 91-2, the
Flag 91-2, the most
most recent
recent Red Red Flag
Flag at at the
the time
time this
this book
book is is being
being
written,
written, waswas the
the most
most aggressive
aggressive night night exercise
exercise to to date.
date. Nightoperations
Night operations
were
were scheduled
scheduled in
in all
all three
three periods
periods and
and included
included F-15Es,
F-15Es, F-16s
F-16s withwith
LANTIRN,
LANTIRN, FB-llls, FB-llls, F-15Cs, F-15Cs, and and US US Navy
Navy A-6EsA-6Es and and EA-6Bs.
EA-6Bs.
Although considerably reduced in size due to Operation
Although considerably reduced in size due to Operation Desert
Desert Storm,
Storm,
Red
Red Flag 91-2 did
Flag 91-2 did include
include joint joint night
night operations
operations with with the the Navy.
Navy.
Although
Although the the final
final report
report has has not not yet
yet been published, this
been published, this author
author had had
the privilege of
the privilege of attending
attending the
the final
final week
week of
of period
period three
three as
as an
an observer
observer. .
Comparing
Comparing my my personal
personal observations
observations to the previous
to the previous after-action
after-action
reports, Red Flag 91-2 appeared to be tactically similar to Red
reports. Red Flag 91-2 appeared to be tactically similar to Red Flag
Flag
90-2 in
90-2 in that
that the
the participants
participants used used the the skills
skills and
and tactics
tactics that
that they
they were
were
familiar with from
familiar with from unit
unit training.
training. They They then
then coordinated
coordinated their targets and
their targets and
timing to achieve a more
timing to achieve a more effective
effective overall
overall mission
mission package,
package, such
such as
as the
the
use
use ofof A-6Es
A-6Es withwith HARMS
HARMs in in aa SEAD
SEAD role role for the Air
for the Air Force bombers.
Force bombers.
Timing intervals between bombers were shorter than at Red Flag 90-2
Timing intervals between bombers were shorter than at Red Flag 90-2
but still
but still resulted
resulted in in aa "bomber-stream"
"bomber-stream" type attack.. There
type attack There werewere no no night
night
CAS
CAS missions
missions in in Red
Red Flag Rag 91-291-2..
The reader may conclude from
The reader may conclude from the above after-action
the above after-action reportsreports of of
limited
limited night activity during
night activity during previous
previous Red Red Flag
Flag exercises
exercises that that the
the Air
Air
Force
Force does
does not
not have
have aa very serious commitment
very serious commitment to to night
night air air warfare.
warfare.

67
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JOINT
JOINT TRAINING
TRAINING FOR
FOR NIGHT
NIGHT AIR
AIR WARFARE
WARFARE

This
This isis the
the wrong
wrong conclusion
conclusion.. NightNight training
training at at Red
Red Flag
Flag today
today is is at
at aa
proper
proper level
level andand pace
pace given
given the the equipment
equipment and and aircrew
aircrew experience
experience
available
available for for night
night operations.
operations. The The reader
reader should
should remember
remember that that before
before
the
the operational
operational fielding
fielding of of the
the LANTIRN
LANTIRN system system in in 1989,
1989, thethe tactical
tactical
air
air forces
forces (TAF)
(TAF) were were equipment-limited
equipment-limited as as to
to what
what theythey could
could do do atat
night
night.. As
As the
the LANTIRN
LANTIRN system system and and similar
similar night
night equipment
equipment are are fielded,
fielded,
individual
individual unitsunits and
and the
the TAF
TAF as as aa whole
whole mustmust undergo
undergo aa building-block
buUding-block
period
period to to gain
gain experience
experience in in night
night operations
operations.. As As each
each squadron
squadron gainsgains
night
night experience,
experience, squadronsquadron night night operations
operations can can become
become more more
aggressive
aggressive in in nature
nature.. AsAs this
this experience
experience base base expands
expands throughout
throughout the the
TAF,
TAF, large-scale
large-scale exercises
exercises with with numerous
numerous participants,
participants, such such as as Red
Red
Flag,
Flag, can
can bebe made
made progressively
progressively more more challenging.
challenging. Note Note thatthat operations
operations
during
during RedRed Flag 91-2 were
Flag 91-2 were considerably
considerably larger larger in in scope
scope and and difficulty
difficulty
than the ones in 90-2 had been . At this time, given the relatively narrow
than the ones in 90-2 had been. At this time, given the relatively narrow
experience
experience base base with
with night
night tactical
tactical operations,
operations, the the Air
Air Force
Force is is correctly
correctly
proceeding
proceeding on on aa deliberate
deliberate and and cautious
cautious pathpath to to safely
safely build
build greater
greater
capability
capability throughout
throughout the the TAF.
TAF. Chapter
Chapter 44 explores
explores in in more
more detail
detail
alternative
alternative paths that may
paths that may be be followed
followed to to build
buUd this
this experience
experience..
The
The 4440th
4440th TFTGTFTG commander,
commander. Col Col James
James D. D. Woodall,
Woodall, and and his
his Red
Red
Flag
Flag staff
staff have
have proposed
proposed aa phasedphased increase
increase to to Red
Red Flag Flag toto develop
develop aa
training
training program
program that that is
is more
more challenging
challenging and and realistic
realistic from from aa tactical
tactical
standpoint. One of the impediments to more realistic combat training
standpoint. One of the impediments to more realistic combat training
that
that Colonel
Colonel Woodall
Woodall and and his
his staff
staff have
have identified
identified is is aa lack
lack of of realism
realism
in
in force
force packaging
packaging for for Red
Red Flag
Flag exercises.
exercises. Squadrons
Squadrons are are scheduled
scheduled to to
attend
attend RedRed Flag
Flag based
based on on their
their availability
availability whenwhen compared
compared to to all
all other
other
unit
unit commitments,
commitments, such such asas overseas
overseas deployments
deployments and and Joint
Joint Chiefs
Chiefs ofof
Staff (JCS)-directed exercises. They are not scheduled based on the
Staff (JCS)-directed exercises. They are not scheduled based on the
organizational
organizational structure
structure in in which
which they they would
would expect
expect to to go
go to war." For
to war.'^ For
instance,
instance, aa particular
particular wing wing of of F-16s
F-16s maymay be be based
based in in the
the CONUS
CONUS but but
assigned
assigned to to the
the Pack
Pacific AirAir Forces
Forces (PACAF)
(PACAF) in in time
time of of war.
war. Under
Under thethe
appropriate
appropriate war war plans,
plans, this
this wing
wing of of F- 16s would
F-16s would expect
expect to to operate
operate with
with
PACAF-based
PACAF-based F-16s F-16s plus
plus CONUS-based
CONUS-based F-15s F-15s and and US US Navy
Navy aircraft
aircraft
assigned
assigned to to the
the Pacific
Pacific Fleet.
Fleet. However,
However, because because of of scheduling
scheduling
commitments
commitments between between the the various
various unitsunits involved,
involved, the the CONUS-based
CONUS-based
F-16s
F-16s maybe
may be participating
participating in in Red
Red Flag
Flag with
with F-15s
F-15s committed
committed to to Europe
Europe

68
68
CURRENT
CURRENT TRAINING
TRAINING PROGRAMS
PROGRAMS

and
and Navy
Navy aircraft
aircraft assigned
assigned to the Atlantic
to the Atlantic Fleet.
Fleet. As As aa result,
result, thethe Red
Red
Flag
Flag participants
participants may may notnot have
have the
the opportunity
opportunity for for realistic
reaUstic training
training with
with
the
the units
units that
that they
they would
would go go into
into combat
combat with. with. As As was discussed earlier
was discussed earlier
in this chapter,
in this simple exposure
chapter, simple exposure to to each
each other
other does
does have have very
very valuable
valuable
training
training benefits
benefits.. These
These benefits
benefits could could be even greater
be even greater if if aircrews
aircrews
participated with the units they expected to go to combat with, not
participated with the units they expected to go to combat with, not with
with
just
just any
any generic
generic unit
unit.. Joe Montana didn't
Joe Montana didn't practice
practice with with just
just any
any wide
wide
receiver before
receiver before the 1989 Super
the 1989 Super BowlBowl;; he he practiced
practiced with with Jerry
Jerry Rice.
Rice.
The 4440th TFTG has some specific
The 4440th TFTG has some specific recommendations
recommendations for
for more
more
effective training
effective training atat Red
Red Flag
Flag.. One
One of of the
the key
key recommendations
recommendations is is to
to
plan
plan each
each Red
Red Flag
Flag exercise around aa particular
exercise around particular combatant
combatant command,
command,
such
such as as PACAF
PACAF or or US
US Air
Air Forces,
Forces, Central
Central Command
Command (CENTAF) (CENTAF).. Those Those
squadrons
squadrons assigned
assigned to to the particular command,
the particular command, including including overseas-
overseas-
based squadrons, would then be tasked to participate that particular
based squadrons, would then be tasked to participate in
in that particular
Red
Red Flag
Flag.. By also including
By also including thosethose Navy,
Navy, Marine,
Marine, and and Army
Army units
units with
with
tasking
tasking in in the
the appropriate
appropriate geographical
geographical area area ofof responsibility,
responsibility, this this would
would
make Red Flag
make Red Flag training
training more
more representative
representative of
of expected
expected combat
combat
employment
employment..
The
The 4440th
4440th TFTG
TFTG also also has
has aa proposed
proposed programprogram of of enhancements
enhancements to to
Red
Red Flag,
Flag, called
called Red
Red Flag
Flag 2000
2000.. A A portion
portion of of this
this proposal
proposal wouldwould build
buUd
on
on the
the present
present night
night airair warfare
warfare experience
experience base base and schedule aa
and schedule
dedicated night Red Flag exercise
dedicated night Red Flag exercise once
once a
a year
year. . Current
Current night
night Red
Red Flags
Flags
involve
involve oneone daytime
daytime flying
flying period
period per per exercise
exercise day day and one night
and one night flying
flying
period . In effect, a "night go" replaces the "AM Go ." Under the
period. In effect, a "night go" replaces the "AM Go." Under the
dedicated
dedicated "Night
"Night Flag"
Flag" program,
program, all all units
units would
would have have twotwo "night
"night go's,"
go's,"
the first
the fu:st with
with aa twilight
twilight takeoff
takeoff and and night
night landing,
landing, the the second
second withwith aa
night takeoff and landing. This would be
night takeoff and landing. This would be aa more
more aggressive
aggressive and
and
16
hopefully
hopefully more more realistic
realistic night
night training
training program
program than than thethe current
current one.
one.**^
Another
Another key key feature
feature of of the Red Flag
the Red Flag 2000
2000 proposal
proposal would would expand
expand
Red
Red Flag
Flag from
from the
the current
current six six weeks
weeks to to nine weeks. The
nine weeks. The first
first week
week of of
each
each three-week period would
three-week period would include
include aa mission
mission commanders'
commanders' school school
to indoctrinate exercise mission package
to indoctrinate exercise mission package commanders
commanders in
in some
some of
of the
the
difficulties of
difficulties of planning
planning and and coordinating
coordinating aa composite
composite force force "gorilla
"gorilla." ." It
It
could be
could be particularly
particularly valuable
valuable for joint familiarization
for joint familiarization with with other
other than
than
US Air Force equipment
US Air Force equipment and
and would
would formalize
formalize the
the process
process of
of learning
learning

69
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JOINT
JOINT TRAINING
TRAINING FOR
FOR NIGHTAIR
NIGHT AIR WARFARE
WARFARE

each
each other's
other's strengths
strengths and and weaknesses
weaknesses before before any any flying
flying is is done.
done. TheThe
Red
Red Flag
Flag exercise
exercise itself
itself would
would thenthen be be oriented
oriented around
around aa tactical
tactical mission
mission
17
objective,
objective, not not just
just unit
unit training
training objectives
objectives.'^ . If If the
the RedRed FlagHag 2000
2000
proposal is approved and adopted, there should then be fewer planning
proposal is approved and adopted, there should then be fewer planning
unknowns
unknowns beforebefore the the first
&st mission
mission is is flown,
flown, whichwhich would would increase
increase the the
overall
overall effectiveness
effectiveness of of Red
Red Flag
Flag..
There
There is,is, however,
however, aa deliberate
deliberate limitation
limitation to to the
the ability
ability of of Red
Red Flag
Flag
to
to be
be used
used to to develop
develop or or validate
validate new new tactics,
tactics, particularly
particularly new new joint
joint
tactics . As was previously mentioned, Red Flag is viewed as the
tactics. As was previously mentioned. Red Flag is viewed as the
culmination
culmination of of aa unit's
unit's training
training program,
program, not not aa test
test bed
bed forfor new
new tactics
tactics..
Any
Any new
new tactics,
tactics, particularly
particularly thosethose involving
involving joint joint assets,
assets, must
must be be
practiced
practiced and and perfected
perfected at at home
home station
station before
before theythey are are allowed
allowed to to bebe
attempted
attempted in in the
the more
more demanding
demanding Red Red Flag
Flag environment.
environment.'* I8 However,
However,
there is no existing program to encourage or authorize joint tactic
there is no existing program to encourage or authorize joint tactic
development.
development. Units Units scheduled
scheduled to to participate
participate in in aa Red
Red Flag
Flag exercise
exercise are are
provided
provided aa list
list of
of what
what other
other squadrons
squadrons are are scheduled
scheduled for for that
that same
same time
time
period, but the squadrons are not required to contact each other for
period, but the squadrons are not required to contact each other for
workup
workup training
training before
before arrival
arrival atat Red
Red FlagFlag.. The
The firstfirst contact
contact thatthat they
they
may
may have
have with with each
each other
other could
could very very wellwell be be during
during the the mission-
mission-
planning
planning period
period before
before their
their first
first Red
Red FlagFlag flight
flight..
Even
Even if if aparticular
a particular squadron
squadron does does wish
wish to include training
to include training withwith other
other
Red Flag participants as part of its workup schedule, there is an
Red Flag participants as part of its workup schedule, there is an
additional
additional block
block to to joint
joint night
night training.
training. Air Air Force
Force operational
operational fighter
fighter
squadrons
squadrons are are not
not authorized
authorized to to train
train with
with tactics
tactics that that have
have not not already
already
been
been validated
validated by by the
the director
director of of tactics
tactics and test operations
and test operations ofthe of the 57th
57th
Fighter
Fighter Weapons
Weapons Wing Wing (FWW)
(FWW) at at Nellis
NeUis AFB.AFB. This This organization
organization is is
specially tasked and manned with highly experienced fighter crews for
specially tasked and manned with highly experienced fighter crews for
the
the specific
specific purpose
purpose of perfecting new
of perfecting techniques in
new techniques in aa safe
safe andand
controlled
controlled environment
environment before before employment
employment by by thethe general
general tactical
tactical airair
forces
forces.. At
At present,
present, the
the 57th
57th FWW
FWW has
has no
no joint
joint night
night tactics
tactics development
development
program
program under
under way,way, nornor does
does itit have
have direction
direction or or authorization
authorization to to begin
begin
such a program.I9 Until such authorization is given, the 57th FWW
such a program.'^ Until such authorization is given, the 57th FWW
cannot
cannot develop
develop jointjoint night
night tactics
tactics;; therefore,
therefore, Air Air Force
Force squadrons
squadrons
cannot train
cannot train inin joint
joint night
night tactics
tactics either
either at at home
home station
station or or at
at Red
Red Flag.
Flag.

70
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JOINT
JOINT TRAINING
TRAINING FOR
FOR NIGHT
NIGHT AIR
AIR WARFARE
WARFARE

exact
exact squadrons
squadrons and and aircrews
aircrews with
with which
which they
they expect
expect toto go
go into
into combat.
combat.
As a result, there is a greater knowledge of each other's
As a result, there is a greater knowledge of each other's capabilities
capabilities and
and
aa sense
sense of team unity
of team unity at at the
the start
start of
of Strike
Strike than
than there
there isis at
at Red
Red Flag
Flag..
Aircrews
Aircrews who who have participated in
have participated both exercises
in both exercises reported
reported that
that the
the team
team
spirit
spirit that was developed
that was developed over over the
the first
first week
week of of Red
Red Flag
Rag was was present
present
on
on day
day one
one atat Strike
Strike?^.
Despite the similar nature
Despite the similar nature ofof the
the two
two training
training facilities,
facilities, there
there isis no
no
formal interchange or
formal interchange or joint
joint training
training program between the
program between the Naval
Naval Strike
Strike
23
Warfare
Warfare Center
Center and and Red
Red Flag . The
Flag.^^ The two
two programs
programs are are aware
aware of of each
each
other and have occasional informal exchanges of
other and have occasional informal exchanges of information,
information, but
but there
there
is
is not
not aa formalized
formahzed programprogram for for joint
joint participation
participation in in each
each other's
other's
training programs . As was discussed above, Navy and Marine units
training programs. As was discussed above. Navy and Marine units
regularly
regularly participate
participate in in Red
Red Flag
Rag based
based on schedule availability,
on schedule availability, not not on
on
an anticipated wartime
an anticipated wartime structure.
structure. However,
However, therethere isis no
no equivalent
equivalent
program for regularly scheduling Air Force units to
program for regularly scheduling Air Force units to participate
participate in
in joint
joint
training
training atat Strike
Strike.. Since
Since the
the Navy
Navy has has never
never stated
stated aa requirement
requirement for for
continuing
continuing Air Air Force
Force participation,
participation, there
there is no funding
is no funding program
program for for Air
Air
Force
Force units
units toto go
go TDY
TDY to to NAS
NAS Fallon
Fallon for
for formal
formal joint
joint training.
training.^'* Any
Any
Air
Air Force
Force missions
missions at at Strike
Strike are
are on
on anan informal,
informal, as as available
available basis
basis and
and
usually involve flights out of nearby Air Force bases, such as
usually involve flights out of nearby Air Force bases, such as F-111s
F-llls
out of Mountain
out of Mountain Home Home AFB,AFB, Idaho.
Idaho.

National Training
National Training Center
Center

The
The primary
primary location for large-scale
location for large-scale joint
joint training
training between
between Army
Army
and Air Force units is the NTC, located
and Air Force units is the NTC, located in
in the
the Mojave
Mojave Desert
Desert near
near
Fort Irwin, California
Fort Irwin, California.. Training
Training at at the
the NTC
NTC includes
includes day
day and
and night
night
operations
operations for
for Army
Army ground
ground and and air
air forces
forces and
and day
day training
training for
for Air
Air
Force tactical
Force tactical aircraft,
aircraft, but
but it
it does
does not
not include
include Air
Air Force
Force night
night air
air
activity
activity..
Air Force participation
Air Force participation atat the
the NTC,
NTC, known
known as as Air
Air Warrior
Warrior I,I, is
is
controlled
controlled byby the
the 4443d Tactical Training
4443d Tactical Training Squadron
Squadron (TTS)
(TTS) atat Nellis
NeUis
AFB and the
AFB and the 4445th
4445th TTS
TTS atat Fort
Fort Irwin.
Irwin. As described in
As described in COMTAC
COMTAC

72
72
CURRENT
CURRENT TRAINING
TRAINING PROGRAMS
PROGRAMS

EXPLAN
EXPLAN 323, 323, Air Air Warrior
Warrior involves
involves CAS CAS and and backup
backup aircraft
aircraft
inventory
inventory in in support
support of of Army
Army ground forces at
ground forces at all
all levels
levels of of combat
combat?^ .
Army
Army unitsunits deploy
deploy to to Fort
Fort Irwin
Irwin as as two-battalion
two-battalion task forces for
task forces for aa
two-week
two-week training
training period
period.. While
While one one battalion
battalion is is conducting
conducting live-fire
live-fire
exercises
exercises against
against simulated
simulated targets,
targets, thethe second
second battalion
battalion is is practicing
practicing
against specially trained US Army adversary units in large-scale,
against specially trained US Army adversary units in large-scale,
force-on-force
force-on-force exercises
exercises.. After
After the the first
first week,
week, the the battalions
battalions swap swap
26
roles.
roles.^^
Air
Air Force
Force units
units tasked
tasked in in CASCAS and and BAIBAI missions
missions at at the
the NTC
NTC
participate in
participate in both
both phases
phases of of training.
training. Techniques
Techniques and and procedures
procedures for for
integrating
integrating artillery
artillery fire
fire and
and tactical
tactical airair power
power are are trained
trained for for during
during the the
live-fire phase with
live-fire phase with live-ordnance
live-ordnance deliveries
deliveries.. Realistic
Realistic problems
problems of of
controlling
controlling and and integrating
integrating tactical
tactical air air power
power in in aa dynamic
dynamic battle,battle,
including
including basic basic communications
communications procedures procedures and and identification
identification of of
friendly
friendly and enemy forces,
and enemy forces, are
are practiced
practiced with with simulated
simulated attacksattacks against
against
live adversaries
live adversaries in in the
the force-on-force
force-on-force phase. phase. AirAir Force
Force aircraft
aircraft that
that are
are
used
used inin Air
Air Warrior
Warrior include
include A-7s,
A-7s, A-IOs,
A-lOs, F-4s, and F-
F-4s, and lbs. The intent ofthe
F-16s. The intent of the
program
program is is to
to "exercise
"exercise joint
joint US
US Anny-Air
Army-Air Force Force planning,
planning, coordination,
coordination,
and
and execution,"
execution," and and to
to "train
"train the
the way
way wewe plan
plan to fight." 27
to fight." ^
Despite these
Despite these excellent
excellent goals,
goals, there
there is is aa significant
significant gap gap inin the
the training
training
experience at
experience the NTC.
at the NTC. ArmyArmy battalions
battalions participating
participating at at NTC
NTC train
train forfor
around-the-clock combat.
around-the-clock combat. EachEach training
training rotation
rotation includes
includes at at least
least one
one
night
night battle
battle withwith all
all Army
Army assets,
assets, including
including helicopters.
helicopters.^* 28
However,
However, at at
this
this time
time Air Air Force
Force aircraft
aircraft dodo not
not fly
fly night
night CASCAS or or BAI
BAI missions
missions at at
NTC.29
NTC.^^ Air Air Force
Force nonparticipation
nonparticipation at at night
night has
has at at least
least twotwo negative
negative
impacts
impacts on on overall
overall joint
joint mission
mission effectiveness
effectiveness.. First,
First, ground
ground forces
forces do do
not
not train
train in
in night
night operations
operations against
against aa realistic
realistic night
night airair threat
threat.. Air
Air Force
Force
sorties
sorties as as adversary
adversary air air during
during the the force-on-force
force-on-force phase phase couldcould provide
provide
more
more realistic
realistic exposure
exposm-e to to the
the difficulties
difficulties of of night
night movement
movement against against an an
air threat.. Air
air threat Air Force
Force missions
missions as as both
both friendly
friendly and and adversary
adversary air air with
with
different
different types
types ofof aircraft
aircraft could
could provide
provide ground
ground forces
forces training
training in in how
how
to
to identify
identify and defend against an enemy air attack at night.
and defend against an enemy air attack at night.
A
A second
second negative
negative effect
effect is
is that
that aircrews
aircrews do do not
not get
get the
the most
most realistic
realistic
training possible in
training possible in joint
joint CAS/BAI
CAS/B AI targettarget location
location and identification at
and identification at
night.
night. Tasking
Tasking as as either
either friendly
friendly or or adversary
adversary air air during
during the the night
night

73
73
JOINT
JOINT TRAINING
TFLMNING FOR
FOR NIGHT
NIGHT AIR
AIR WARFARE
WARFARE

force-on-force phase would


force-on-force phase would provide extremely realistic
provide extremely realistic training
training in in the
the
problems
problems of identifying friendly
of identifying friendly and
and enemy
enemy ground forces, coordinating
ground forces, coordinating
night helicopter and
night helicopter and fixed-wing
fixed-wing action, and locating
action, and locating BAI BAI targets
targets on on the
the
move at night. As was discussed
move at night. As was discussed in
in chapter
chapter 1,
1, the
the lack
lack of
of technical
technical
capability for
capability for night against convoys
interdiction against
night interdiction convoys seriously hampered the
seriously hampered the
overall interdiction efforts in World War 11, Korea, and
overall interdiction efforts in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam.
Vietnam. Now
Now
the Air
that the
that Air Force
Force has
has the
the technical
technical means
means to to do
do the
the mission,
mission, we we still
still are
are
not
not making
making thethe most
most effective use of
effective use of the
the available training to
available training to achieve
achieve
an overall mission capability .
an overall mission capability.
As
As was graphically demonstrated
was graphically demonstrated by by the
the A-10s
A-lOs in in Operation
Operation DesertDesert
Storm, night
Storm, night CAS
CAS andand BAI
BAI cancan be done if
be done if aircrews
aircrews are are properly
properly trained
trained
for them . Although
for them. Although the
the A-10s
A-10s were
were not
not specifically
specifically equipped
equipped for
for night
night
operations, their
operations, their pilots
pilots were
were able
able to
to use the 11R
use the IIR Maverick
Maverick and and limited
limited
natural illumination for highly effective night
natural illumination for highly effective night BAI
BAI missions
missions against
against
Scud missile
Scud missile launchers,
launchers, supply convoys, and
supply convoys, and SAM
SAM sites. This mission
sites. This mission
effectiveness was
effectiveness not the
was not the product
product ofof any special night
any special equipment but
night equipment but
was the direct result of four
was the direct result of four months
months of
of night
night training
training in
in the
the Saudi
Saudi
.3
desert before
Arabian desert
Arabian before Operation
Operation Desert Storm started
Desert Storm started.^" The
The NTCNTC
provides the opportunity for such training in peacetime in
provides the opportunity for such training in peacetime in the
the event
event that
that
we do not
we do not have
have four
four toto five
five months
months to to practice
practice before
before the the next war..
next war

Twentynine
Twentynine Palms
Palms

The last large-scale


The last large-scale training program located
training program located inin the
the CONUS
CONUS to to
discuss is the US Marine Corps Air-Ground
discuss is the US Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat
Combat Center
Center at
at
Twentynine
Twentynine Palms, California. Although
Palms, California. Although itit is is equipped with less
equipped with less
sophisticated equipment
sophisticated equipment than than the NTC, Twentynine
the NTC, Twentynine Palms Palms
provides the same type of
provides the same type of training
training in
in all
aU aspects
aspects and
and levels
levels of
of ground
ground
warfare fully
warfare fully integrated
integrated with tactical aviation
with tactical support.. This
aviation support This
includes full nighttime operations with both
includes full nighttime operations with both ground
ground and
and air
air
forces However, the
forces.. However, the Marine training center
Marine training center is almost exclusively
is almost exclusively
single
single service, not aa joint
service, not joint training program.. Since
training program Since the
the Marine
Marine
air/ground task force (MAGTF) includes
air/ground task force (MAGTF) includes its
its own
own Marine
Marine tactical
tactical
aviation
aviation assets,
assets, there is less
there is less of requirement for
of aa requirement for Air
Air Force
Force tactical
tactical

7a
74
CURRENT
CURRENT TRAINING
TRAINING PROGRAMS
PROGRAMS

aviation support for


aviation support for Marine
Marine ground forces . Any
ground forces. Air Force
Any Air Force
participation
participation atat Twentynine
Twentynine Palms Palms is more informal
is more informal in in nature,
nature,
similar to Air Force flying at NAS Fallon .
similar to Air Force flying at NAS Fallon.
The
The potential
potential shortfall
shortfall in
in this
this limitedjoint
limited joint training
training should
should be
be obvious
obvious
from
from the
the recent
recent experiences
experiences in in Operation Desert Storm.
Operation Desert Storm. As
As was
was shown
shown
during the recapture of Khafji, Air Force
during the recapture of Khafji, Air Force air
air can expect to be used to
can expect to be used to
augment
augment Marine
Marine air
air in
in support
support of of Marine
Marine ground
ground troops
troops.. If
If the
the two
two
services
services expect
expect to
to operate
operate together,
together, they
they must
must have
have aa program
program to to train
train
together.
together.

Cope
Cope Thunder
Thunder

The
The PACAF
PACAF equivalent
equivalent to to Red
Red Flag
Flag and
and thethe Naval
Naval Strike
Strike Warfare
Warfare
Center
Center is Cope Thunder.
is Cope Thunder. Cope Cope Thunder
Thunder is large composite
is aa large composite forceforce
tactical
tactical air
air exercise
exercise based
based at at Clark
Clark AB AB on
on the
the island
island ofof Luzon,
Luzon, Republic
Republic
of
of the
the Philippines
Philippines.. Available
Available training
training includes air-to-air and
includes air-to-air and
air-to-ground missions and an electronic warfare range. The range
air-to-ground missions and an electronic warfare range. The range
monitoring
monitoring and and debriefing
debriefing facilities
facilities at Cope Thunder
at Cope Thunder allowallow both
both dayday
and
and night
night operations
operations but but are
are less
less sophisticated
sophisticated than than those
those atat Red
Red Flag.
Flag.
For
For instance,
instance, CopeCope Thunder
Thunder range range equipment
equipment does does notnot include
include the the
computer-aided
computer-aided video video systems
systems that that Red
Red Flag
Flag has has to
to allow
allow real-time
real-time
mission overview and comprehensive mission playback.
mission overview and comprehensive mission playback.
Although
Although lacking
lacking the the technically
technically moremore advanced
advanced equipment
equipment thatthat isis
available
available at at Red
Red Flag,
Flag, Cope
Cope Thunder
Thunder doesdoes include
include one one feature
feature that
that Red
Red
Flag is developing
Flag is developing. . For
For several years
several years now,
now, the Cope
the Cope Thunder
Thunder staff
staff has
has
used
used thethe week
week before
before commencing
commencing aa Cope Cope Thunder
Thunder operation
operation forfor a a
mission commanders' school at Clark AB. This week-long class trains
mission commanders' school at Clark AB. This week-long class trains
selected
selected aircrews
aircrews inin some
some of of the
the planning
planning and
and coordination
coordination difficulties
difficulties
that
that they
they will
will experience
experience as as large-scalejoint
large-scale joint forceforce mission
mission commanders
commanders
during the upcoming Cope Thunder. This is the same type of
during the upcoming Cope Thunder. This is the same type of training
training
that
that Red
Red FlagFlag planners
plaimers are are now
now attempting
attempting to to add
add to
to their
their exercise
exercise..
The
The stated
stated purpose
pmpose of of Cope
Cope Thunder
Thunder is is toto provide realistic combat
provide realistic combat
training
training to to PACAF
PACAF forces.
forces. ByBy directive,
directive, joint
joint forces
forces may
may be be included
included for for
enhanced
enhanced training but "will
training but not interfere
"will not interfere with
with USAF
USAF participation."
participation."^^ 31 On
On

75
75
JOINT
JOINT "TRAINING
TRMNING FOR
FOR NIGHT
NIGHT AIR
AIR WARFARE
WARFARE

the
the surface,
surface, thisthis would
would seem seem to to bebe aa hindrance
hindrance to to the
the amount
amount of of joint
joint
training
training that
that could
could be be scheduled,
scheduled, but but inin practice
practice itit has has not been such.
not been such.
Historically,
Historically, approximately
approximately 25 25 percent
percent ofallof all Cope
Cope Thunder
Thunder sorties sorties havehave
32
been flown by either US
been flown by either US Navy
Navy or US
or US Marine
Marine Corps
Corps aircrews
aircrews.^^ .
In
In at
at least
least two two ways,
ways, joint
joint training
training at at Cope
Cope Thunder
Thunder is is in
in aa more
more
realistic environment
realistic environment than than atat Red
Red FlagFlag or or Strike
Strike.. First,
First, Navy
Navy aircrews
aircrews
train
train at
at Red
Red Flag Flag and and Strike
Strike during
during the the time period between
time period between carrier carrier
deployments,
deployments, not whUe their
not while their carrier
carrier is under way.. The
is underway The aircraft
aircraft and
and crews
crews
physically deploy to either Nellis or Fallon for the duration of the
physically deploy to either NeUis or Fallon for the duration of the
exercise.. In
exercise In contrast,
contrast, US US Navy
Navy aircrews
aircrews flyingflying in in Cope
Cope Thunder
Thunder
regularly
regularly launch
launch and and recover
recover from from their
their assigned
assigned aircraft aircraft carrier
carrier
operating
operating offoff the
the coast
coast of Luzon. The
of Luzon. The participants
participants miss miss the the face-to-face
face-to-face
mission
mission planning
planning and and debriefing
debriefing opportunities
opportunities that that they would have
they would have if if
the Navy crews and aircraft were based at Clark for Cope Thunder.
the Navy crews and aircraft were based at Clark for Cop>e Thunder.
However,
However, by by being
being physically
physically separated
separated and and forced
forced to to rely
rely onon thethe same
same
communications
communications networks networks thatthat would
would be be used
used in in combat
combat operations,
operations, all aU
participants do learn some of the
participants do learn some of the real-world
real-world difficulties
difficulties that
that would
would be
be
encountered
encountered when when conducting
conducting joint joint operations
operations with with both both land-
land- and and .
sea-based air
sea-based air assets
assets..
Cope
Cope Thunder
Thunder also also provides,
provides additional
additional realism
realism for for training
training by by
default,
default, if
if not
not by by design
design.. Squadrons
Squadrons participating
participating in in Cope
Cope Thunder
Thunder are are
those Air Force and allied units that are stationed the
those Air Force and allied units that are stationed in
in the Pacific
Pacific andthose
and those
Navy
Navy and
and Marine
Marine units units that
that are
are deployed
deployed to to the
the area
area.. Cope
Cope Thunder
Thunder thus thus
allows joint
allows joint training
training with with many
many ofthose units that
of those units that would
would go go to
to combat
combat
together
together inin the
the event
event of of aa war
war inin the
the PACOM
PACOM region region.. The The training
training is is not
not
completely realistic, though,
completely realistic, though, since since itit does
does not not include
include regular regular
participation by those CONUS-based units that would be deployed to
participation by those CONUS-based units that would be deployed to
PACOM
PACOM duringduring time time ofwar.
of war. Given
Given the the long
long distances
distances andtheand the associated
associated
costs
costs that
that would
would be be involved
involved in such aa deployment,
in such deployment, frequent frequent Cope Cope
Thunder
Thunder training
training by by CONUS-based
CONUS-based units units isis probably
probably not not operationally
operationally
or
or financially
financially feasible. Using the
feasible. Using same argument,
the same argument, itit is is probably
probably also not
also not
feasible for PACAF-based squadrons to train with their CONUS-based
feasible for PACAF-based squadrons to train with their CONUS-based
augmentation
augmentation squadrons
squadrons by by deploying
deploying to to Red
Red Flag
Flag on on aa regular
regular basis.
basis.
Although
Although joint joint training
training at at Cope
Cope Thunder
Thunder may may be be somewhat
somewhat more more
realistic than at Red
realistic than at Red Flag,
Flag, night
night training-either
trainingeither joint
joint or
or Air
Air Force
Force

76
76
CURRENT
CURRENT TRAINING
TRAINING PROGRAMS
PROGRAMS

exclusive-is
exclusiveis less less advanced
advanced.. The The last
last Cope
Cope Thunder
Thunder to to include
include night
night
flying
flying was Cope Thunder
was Cope Thunder 86-486-4 inin March 1986. Night
March 1986. operations in
Night operations in Cope
Cope
Thunder
Thunder 86-486-4 were
were limited
limited to to night
night CAS
CAS withwith aerial
aerial flares
flares used
used for
for target
target
illumination . After-action reports for Cope Thunder 86-4 were highly
illumination. After-action reports for Cope Thunder 86-4 were highly
critical
critical ofthis
of this training.
training.^^ The
The opinion
opinion ofthe
of the participating
participating squadrons
squadrons was was
that the limited
that the limited benefits
benefits ofof this
this night CAS training,
night CAS training, which
which could
could bebe done
done
at home station, did not outweigh the disadvantages of having to give
at home station, did not outweigh the disadvantages of having to give
up
up day Cope Thunder
day Cope Thunder sorties
sorties tomeet the night
to meet the night schedule 34
. (Interestingly,
schedule.^"* (Interestingly,
this
this is
is the
the same
same type type of
of complaint
complaint thatthat was
was voiced
voiced byby the
the F-15
F-15 pilots
pilots
flying
flying night
night intercept
intercept missions
missions in in Red
Red Flag
Flag 82-2.)
82-2.)
Given
Given the the limited
limited Air Air Force
Force night
night capability
capability available
available at at that
that time,
time,
this was probably a realistic assessment of night training at Cope
this was probably a realistic assessment of night training at Cope
Thunder
Thunder in in 1986
1986.. However,
However, with with thethe recent
recent introduction
introduction of of the
the
LANTIRN
LANTIRN system system into into the
the Pacific
Pacific theater,
theater. Cope
Cope Thunder
Thunder is is being
being
expanded to include
expanded to include night
night flying on a regular basis. Cope Thunder
flying on a regular basis. Cope Thunder
92-6,
92-6, scheduled
scheduled for for April
April 1992,
1992, will
will include
include night
night operations
operations with with Air
Air
Force
Force squadrons
squadrons and and with the Navy
with the Navy squadrons
squadrons embarked
embarked aboardaboard thethe
USS
USS Midway
Midway?^ . 35 The
The scope
scope andand extent
extent of of future
future night
night Cope
Cope Thunders
Thunders
will
wUl draw
draw on on this
this experience
experience base.
base.

Team Spirit
Team Spirit

Although
Although itit is
is not
not aa training
training program
program in in the
the same
same sense
sense as
as those
those that
that
were
were previously
previously described,
described, Team
Team Spirit
Spirit is
is aa very
very valuable
valuable training
training
experience
experience forfor PACOM
PACOM aircrews.
aircrews. Team
Team Spirit
Spirit is
is aa yearly
yearly joint
joint andand
combined
combined air,
air, land, and sea exercise on the Korean
land, and sea exercise on the Korean Peninsula
Peninsula. . It is not
It is not
aa controlled-range
controlled-range training
training program
program like
like Red
Red Flag
Flag or
or Cope
Cope Thunder
Thunder but but
aa full-scale
full-scale exercise
exercise of of US
US and
and Korean
Korean combat
combat capability
capability.. Ground
Ground and and
air
air operations
operations are are around-the-clock
around-the-clock.. Air Air operations
operations include
include livelive
ordnance
ordnance deliveries
deliveries on on controlled
controlled bombing
bombing ranges
ranges and simulated
and simulated
deliveries over a designated ground maneuver area in support ofArmy
deliveries over a designated groimd maneuver area in support of Army
and Marine
and Marine ground
ground troops. 36
troops.^^
Because
Because ofthe
of the less structured training
less structured training environment
environment ofTeam Spirit in
of Team Spirit in
comparison
comparison to to Cope
Cope Thunder
Thunder or or Red
Red Flag,
Flag, there
there is
is less
less capability
capability forfor aa

77
77
JOINT
JOINT TRAINING FOR NIGHT
TRAINING FOR NIGHT AIR
AIR WARFARE
WARFARE

comprehensive
comprehensive debriefing debriefing and and forfor lessons
lessons learned.
learned. For For those
those readers
readers
who
who appreciate
appreciate sports
sports analogies,
analogies, this
this might
might be
be compared
compared to
to the
the
difference
difference between between aa football
football team team practice
practice withwith full
full gear
gear andand an an
exhibition game. In the team practice (Red Flag or Cope
exhibition game. In the team practice (Red Flag or Cope Thunder),
Thunder), there
there
is
is aa great
great deal
deal of of control
control and and an an ability
abUity to to structure
structure bothboth offense
offense and and
defense
defense to to stress
stress execution
execution of of specific plays.. In
specific plays the exhibition
In the exhibition game game
(Team Spirit), .there is less
(Team Spirit), there is less control
control over
over the
the opposition
opposition but
but aa greater
greater
degree
degree of of realism
realism.. Both
Both are are valuable
valuable training
training experiences,
experiences, but but with
with
different focuses. Just as the exhibition game allows a coach to evaluate
different focuses. Just as the exhibition game allows a coach to evaluate
how
how well well his his total
total team
team performs
performs in in anan uncontrolled
uncontrolled but but realistic
realistic
environment,
environment, Team Team SpiritSpirit offers
offers aa moremore comprehensive
comprehensive training training
experience in conditions that more
experience in conditions that more closely
clpsely approximate
approximate the
the "fog
"fog and
and
friction
friction of of war."
war." JustJust like
like the
the football
football team,
team, though,
though, the the coach
coach doesn't
doesn't
try the full-scale exhibition game (Team Spirit) until he has instilled
try the fuU-scale exhibition game (Team Spirit) until he has instUled
fundamentals
fundamentals at at team
team practice
practice (Cope
(Cope Thunder
Thunder and and Red
Red Flag).
Flag).
The
The mission structure at
mission structure at Team
Team Spirit
Spirit emphasizes
emphasizes large,large, joint-force
joint-force
employment in a realistic scenario. Unlike Red Flag and Cope Thunder,
employment in a realistic scenario. Unlike Red Flag and Cope Thunder,
where mission objectives
where mission objectives are are atat least
least partially
partially determined
determined by by individual
individual
squadron
squadron trainingtraining desires,
desires. TeamTeam Spirit
Spirit missions
missions are are directed
directed from
from the the
top down
top down in
in keeping
keeping with
with the
the exercise
exercise combat
combat scenario.
scenario. Flying
Flying tasking
tasking
isis based
based around
around five large-force mission
five large-force mission packages
packages per per day
day using
using joint
joint
and combined assets in an integrated effort. These large-force packages
and combined assets in an integrated effort. These large-force packages
are
are not carried over
not carried over into
into thethe night
night missions,
missions, which
which are are single-service
single-service
oriented
oriented.^^' .
Night flying is
Night flying is included
included in in all
all types
types of of missions
missions during
during TeamTeam Spirit,
Spirit,
with
with one one notable
notable exception.
exception. Navy Navy and and Marine
Marine aircrews
aircrews flying
flying in,in Team
Team
Spirit fly all types of tactical missions during both day and night. At
Spirit fly all types of tactical missions during both day and night. At
present,
present. Air Air Force crews fly
Force crews fly interdiction,
interdiction, air air superiority,
superiority, and and SEAD
SEAD
missions at
missions at night
night butbut specifically
specifically do do not
not fly
fly night
night CAS missions ..^^ This
CAS missions 31
This
is a direct result of the previous
is a direct result of the previous lack
lack oftechnical
of technical capability
capability in
in Air
Air Force
Force
aircraft
aircraft for for night
night CAS CAS missions
missions.. With With the increased night
the increased night capability
capability
afforded by introduction of LANI'IRN into the PACAF inventory,
afforded by introduction of LANTIRN into the PACAF inventory,
future
future Team Team SpiritSpirit exercises
exercises can can and should include
and should include Air Air Force
Force CAS CAS
missions
missions at at night
night by the appropriately
by the appropriately equipped
equipped and and trained
trained units.
units.

78
78
CURRENT
CURRENT TRAINING
TRAINING PROGRAMS
PROGRAMS

Summary
Summary

This
This chapter
chapter has has discussed
discussed the the major
major programs
programs that that offer
offer the
the
opportunity
opportunity forjoint
for joint night
night training
training today.
today. InIn general,
general, itit appears
appears that
that there
there
exists
exists unused
unused opportunity
opportunity for for more
more aggressive
aggressive andand realistic
realistic training
training in in
joint service, around-the-clock warfare. Red Flag, the NTC, and Cope
joint service, around-the-clock warfare. Red Flag, the NTC, and Cope
Thunder
Thunder all all have
have excellent programs in
excellent programs place for
in place for training
training aircrews
aircrews in in
joint
joint missions
missions in in the
the daytime
daytime but but do
do not
not yet
yet extend
extend this
this same
same level
level of
of
training
training into
into thethe night
night arena.
arena. TheThe Naval
Naval Strike
Strike Warfare
Warfare Center,
Center,
Twentynine
Twentynine Palms,
Palms, TeamTeam Spirit,
Spirit, and
and the
the Army
Army portion
portion ofthe
of the NTC
NTC havehave
comprehensive single-service training programs for day and night
comprehensive single-service training programs for day and night
warfare,
warfare, butbut have
have notnot fully
fully integrated
integrated joint
joint forces
forces into
into their
their training
training
programs
programs.. TheThe Naval
Naval Strike
Strike Warfare
Warfare Center
Center and
and Twentynine
Twentynine Palms Palms inin
particular are
particular are examples
examples of of missed
missed training
training opportunities
opportunities sincesince there
there is
is
no
no formal
formal program
program for for regular
regular andand frequent
frequent AirAir Force
Force unit
unit participation.
participation.
The current
The current amount
amount of of joint night training
joint night training isis understandable
understandable and and
appropriate
appropriate given given the the very
very recent
recent introduction
introduction of of night-capable
night-capable
technology
technology.. We We nownow must
must increase
increase the
the intensity
intensity ofof training
training toto match
match thethe
level oftechnology andthus increase the overall employment capability .
level of technology and thus increase the overall employment capability.
We
We need
need toto take
take advantage
advantage of of all
all training
training opportunities
opportunities to to ensure
ensure that
that
the previous
the previous limited
limited capability
capability for for joint
joint night
night operations
operations due due to
to
equipment
equipment limitations
limitations is is not
not replaced
replaced by by an
an equally
equally limited
limited capability
capability
due
due toto training
training limitations
limitations.. To To that
that end, chapter 44 discusses
end, chapter discusses somesome
recommendations for more comprehensivejoint nighttraining that build
recommendations for more comprehensive joint night training that build
on
on the
the experiences
experiences and and capabilities
capabilities of of the present programs
the present programs..

Notes
Notes

11.. Lt Col David


Lt Col David G.G. Blair,
Blair, LANTIRN
LANTIRN Operational
Operational Training
Training for
for the
the F-15E
F-15E and
and
F-16C/D
F-16CID (Maxwell
(MaxweU AFB,
AFB, Ala
Ala.:.: Air
Air University
University Press,
Press, 1986),79-83.
1986), 79-83.
2.
2. Andrew
Andrew M.M. Gecelosky,
Gecelosky, "Integration
"Integration of
of LANTIRN
LANTIRN into into Operational
Operational Fighter
Fighter
Training,"
Training," Research
Research Report
Report 88-1015
88-1015 (Maxwell
(Maxwell AFB,
AFB, Ala.:
Ala.: Air
Air Command
Command and and Staff
Staff
College,
CoUege, 1988),7-14,25-32.
1988), 7-14,25-32.
33.. Robert
Robert F.
F. Futrell, Ideas, Concepts,
Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine
Doctrine:: Basic
Basic Thinking
Thinking inin the
the United
United
States
States AirAir Force,
Force, vol.
vol. 1,
1, 1907-1960
1907-1960 (Maxwell
(Maxwell AFB,
AFB, Ala.
Ala.:: Air
Air University
University Press,
Press,
December 1989),
December 1989), 164.
164.

79
79
JOINT
JOINT TRAINING
TRAINING FOR
FOR NIGHT
NIGHT AIR
AIR WARFARE
WARFARE

4.
4. Mark Adkin, Urgent
Mark Adkin, Urgent Fury:
Fury: The The Battle
Battle for
for Grenada
Grenada (Lexington,
(Lexington, MassMass.:.: D.
D. C.
C.
Heath
Heath andand Company,
Company, 1989), 127.
1989), 127.
5.
5. Joan
Joan Lowy,
Lowy, "Supplies
"Supplies Slow
Slow to to Reach Forces," Montgomery
Reach Forces," Montgomery Advertiser,
Advertiser, 29 29
January
January 1991,
1991, IA lA..
6.
6. Maj
Maj PatPat Hoy,
Hoy, A-10
A-10 pilot
pilot assigned
assigned to to the
the 422d
422d Operational
Operational Test
Test and
and Evaluation
Evaluation
Squadron,
Squadron, Nellis
Nellis AFB, AFB, Nev.,
Nev., interview
interview withwith author,
author, 1414 February
Febniary 1991
1991..
7. AFM 1-1,
7. AFM l-l, Basic
Basic Aerospace
Aerospace Doctrine
Doctrine of of the
the United
United StatesAir
States Air Force,
Force, 16 16 March
March
1984,1-3 .
1984,1-3.
8.
8. FM 100-5, Operations,
FM 100-5, Operations, 55 MayMay 1986,
1986,13.13 .
9.
9. COMTAC
COMTAC EXPLAN
EXPLAN 80,
80, Red
Red Flag
Hag (Langley
(Langley AFB,AFB, Va Va.:.: Headquarters
Headquarters
TAC/DOO,
TAC/DOO, 11 October October 1988).
1988).
10.. Maj
10 Maj Karl
Karl Ludolph,
Ludolph, RedRed Flag
Hag director
director of
of current
current operations,
operations, 4440th
4440th TFTG
TFTG Nellis
Nellis
AFB,
AFB, Nev.,
Nev., interview
interview with with author,
author, 12 12 February
February 19911991..
11
11.. Maj
Maj Al Al Pavsner, USMC, Navy-Marine
Pavsner, USMC, Navy-Marine liaison
liaison officer
officer toto Red
Red Flag
Hag staff,
staff, 4440th
4440th
TFTG,
TFTG, Nellis
Nellis AFB,AFB, Nev.,
Nev., interview
interview withwith author,
author, 14 14 February
February 19911991..
12
12.. Capt
Capt Micah
Micah Killian,
Killian, Air
Air Force-Navy
Force-Navy exchange
exchange officer,
officer, Attack
Attack Squadron
Squadron 52 52
(VA-52), participant in
(VA-52), participant in Red Hag 91-2,
Red Flag 91-2, Nellis
Nellis AFB,
AFB, Nev.,
Nev., interview
interview with
with author,
author, 14
14
February 1991 .
February 1991.
13
13.. James
James M. M. Hildebrandt, ed. Red
Hildebrandt, ed., Flag 82-2
Red Flag 82-2 Final
Final Report
Report (Nellis
(Nellis AFB,
AFB, Nev.:
Nev.:
4440th TFTG, 1 April 1982), 2-13 . (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.
4440th TFTG, 1 April 1982), 2-13. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.
14
14.. Ibid
Ibid.,., 1-3.
1-3.
15 . Col James D.
15. Col James D. Woodall, commander, 4440th
Woodall, commander, TFTG, Nellis
4440th TFTG, NeUis AFB,AFB, Nev Nev.,.,
interview with author, 12 February 1991 .
interview with author, 12 February 1991.
16
16.. Briefing,
Briefing, 4440th 4440th TFTG,
TFTG, Nellis
Nellis AFB,
AFB, NevNev.,., subject:
subject: Red
Red Flag
Hag 2000,
2000, February
February
1991, 29 .
1991,29.
17
17.. Ibid
Ibid.,., 23-28.
23-28.
18 . Ludolph interview.
18. Ludolph interview.
19 . Lt Col Terry Wallace,
19. Lt Col Terry Wallace, director
director of of tactics
tactics andand test
test operations,
operations, 57th
57th Fighter
Fighter
Weapons Wing (FWW), Nellis AFB, Nev., telephone interview with author, 8 March
Weapons Wing (FWW), Nellis AFB, Nev., telephone interview with author, 8 March
1991..
1991
20
20.. Pavsner
Pavsner and and Killian
KiUian interviews
interviews..
21 . Pavsner interview.
21. Pavsner interview.
22
22.. Killian
KiUian interview.
interview.
23 . Lt Col James Wisdom,
23. Lt Col James Wisdom, deputy
deputy commander
commander for for operations,
operations, 4440th
4440th TFTG,
TFTG, Nellis
Nellis
AFB, Nev., interview with author, 13 February 1991 .
AFB, Nev., interview with author, 13 Febraary 1991.
24
24.. Maj
Maj LarryLarry Wilder,
Wilder, Headquarters
Headquarters TAC/DOXE,
TAC/DOXE, deputy deputy chief
chief of of staff
staff for
for
operations, Current Operations Division, Exercise Branch, Langley AFB, Va.,
operations. Current Operations Division, Exercise Branch, Langley AFB, Va.,
telephone interview
telephone interview with with author,
author, 2727 March 1991..
March 1991
25 . COMTAC EXPLAN 323, Air Warrior (Langley
25. COMTAC EXPLAN 323, Air Warrior (Langley AFB,AFB, Va Va.:.: Headquarters
Headquarters
TAC/DOX,
TAC/DOX, 29 29 January 1990), iii.
January 1990), iii.
26
26.. Ibid.,
Ibid.,C-l.C-1 .
27
27.. Briefing, 4443dTTS, Nellis AFB, Nev., subject : AirWarrior,
Briefing,4443dTTS,NeUisAFB,Nev.,subject: AirWarrior,4June4 June 1990,6-9
1990,6-9..

80
80
CURRENT
CURRENT TRAINING
TRAINING PROGRAMS
PROGRAMS

28.
28. Maj
Maj Jerry
Jerry Sisco,
Sisco, USUS Army
Army ground
ground liaison
liaison officer
officer to to Red
Red Flag
Hag and
and Air
Air Warrior,
Warrior,
Nellis
Nellis AFB,
AFB, Nev
Nev.,., interview
interview with
with author,
author, 14
14 February
February 1991 1991..
29. Lt
29. Lt Col
Col Jim
Jim Wilson,
Wilson, commander,
commander, 4443d
4443d TTS,
TTS, Nellis
NeUis AFB,AFB, Nev.,
Nev., telephone
telephone
interview
interview withwith author,
author, 1111 September
September 19901990;; and
and MajMaj Randy
Randy Chapman,
Chapman, operations
operations
officer,
officer, 4443d
4443d TTS,
TTS, at at Nellis,
Nellis, interview
interview with
with author,
author, 14 14 February 1991..
February 1991
30.
30. Julie
Julie Bird,
Bird, "Warthogs
"Warthogs Do Do Their
Their Hunting
Hunting after Sunset," Air
after Sunset," Air Force
Force Times,
Times, 18
18
February
February 1991,1991,8. 8.
31 . CINCPACAF EXPLAN
31.CINCPACAF EXPLAN C-108, Cope Thunder
C-108, Cope Thunder (Hickam(Hickam AFB,AFB, Hawaii
Hawaii::
Headquarters PACAF
Headquarters PACAF DCS/Operations,
DCS/Operations, 11 July
July 1990),
1990), 3.3.
32.. Capt
32 Capt Mark
Mark Sutton,
Sutton, background
background paper
paper on
on Cope
Cope Thunder
Thunder (Hickam
(Hickam AFB,
AFB, Hawaii
Hawaii::
Headquarters
Headquarters PACAF,PACAF, DCS/Operations,
DCS/Operations, Exercise
Exercise Plans
Plans Division,
Division, 22 October
October 1990),
1990), 11..
33.
33. Message,
Message, 170430Z,
170430Z, 25th 25th Tactical
Tactical Fighter
Fighter Squadron,
Squadron, Suwon Suwon AB,
AB, Korea,
Korea, to
to
6200th
6200th TFTG,
TFTG, 17 17 March
March 1986,
1986, subject:
subject: Cope
Cope Thunder
Thunder 86-4 86-4 After-Action
After-Action Report,
Report, 5.
5.
34.
34. Message,
Message, 040730Z,
040730Z, 6200th
6200th TFTG,
TFTG, Clark
Clark AB,
AB, Philippines,
Philippines, to to PACAF
PACAF DO&I,
DO&I,
44 March
March 1986,
1986, subject:
subject: Cope
Cope Thunder
Thunder After-Action
After-Action Report,
Report, 6.6.
35.
35. Capt
Capt Mark
Mark Sutton,
Sutton, Cope
Cope Thunder
Thunder exercise
exercise action
action officer,
officer. Headquarters
Headquarters
PACAF,
PACAF, HickamHickam AFB, AFB, Hawaii,
Hawaii, interview
interview with
with author,
author, 26 26 February 1991..
February 1991
36.
36. Maj Marty Gage,
Maj Marty Gage, "Major
"Major PACAF
PACAF Exercises
Exercises in in Korea,"
Korea," background
background paper
paper
(Hickam
(Hickam AFB,Hawaii
AFB, Hawaii:: Headquarters
Headquarters PACAF,
PACAF, DCS/Operations,18
DCS/Operations, 18 September
September 1990),
1990),
2.
2. "' '
37.
37. Maj
Maj Marty
Marty Gage,
Gage, Team
Team Spirit exercise action
Spirit exercise action officer,
officer, Headquarters
Headquarters PACAF,
PACAF,
Hickam
Hickam AFB, AFB, Hawaii,
Hawaii, interview
interview with author, 27
with author, 27 February
February 1991 1991..
38.
38. Ibid.
Ibid.

81
81
Chapter
Chapter 44

Conclusions and Recommendations


Conclusions and Recommendations

As
As has
has been
been discussed
discussed in the previous
in the previous chapters,
chapters, before
before mid-1989
mid-1989 the the
Air Force's ability
Air Force's ability toto conduct
conduct tactical
tactical missions
missions at at night
night waswas limited
limited by by
technology
technology.. Any radar-equipped aircraft
Any radar-equipped aircraft has
has the
the technical
technical meansmeans to to drop
drop
bombs at night against large targets. Before the
bombs at night against large targets. Before the introduction
introduction of
of
LANTIRN,
LANTIRN, very very fewfew AirForce
Air Force tactical
tactical aircraft
aircraft were
were equipped
equipped with with bothboth
an accurate target-ID system and a terrain-following system for very
an accurate target-ID system and a terrain-following system for very
low-altitude flights
low-altitude flights in in aa high-threat
high-threat environment.
environment. This This technical
technical
capability
capability was
was confined
confined to to approximately
approximately 250 250 F-111
F-111 s, s, of
of which
which lessless than
than
75 had an enhanced night capability with Pave Tack infrared targeting
75 had an enhanced night capability with Pave Tack infrared targeting
pods,
pods, and
and slightly
slightly more
more thanthan 50 50 F-117 stealth fighters
F-117 stealth fighters..
With this quantitatively
With this quantitatively limitedlimited capability,
capability, employment
employment practice practice was was
kept to the simplest level possible .
kept to the simplest level possible. As
As previously
previously discussed,
discussed, missions
missions
were planned
were planned for for single
single aircraft
aircraft bombing attacks with
bombing attacks with multiple
multiple attacks
attacks
separated by time or space. Training supported this employment
separated by time or space. Training supported this employment
concept
concept by by developing
developing aircrew aircrew proficiency
proficiency in in single-ship,
single-ship, single- single-
service,
service, night attack.. Because
night attack Because therethere is is no
no employment
employment concept concept for for
multiship night attack or for joint-service
multiship night attack or for joint-service night
night attack,
attack, no
no training
training is
is
conducted
conducted in in these
these tactics.
tactics.
The
The much
much larger
larger breadth
breadth ofnight capability that
of night capability that exists
exists today
today provides
provides
the opportunity
the opportunity for
for more
more aggressive
aggressive employment
employment practices.
practices. When
When
LANTIRN
LANTIRN is is fully
fully fielded
fielded by June 1994,
by June 1994, the
the tactical
tactical airair forces
forces will
will have
have
nearly 200 F-15Es and 350 F-16s optimized
nearly 200 F-15Es and 350 F-16s optimized for
for night
night operations
operations to
to
augment
augment thethe remaining
remaining 100 100 F-1 l1 s and
F-111s and 5555 F-117s
F-117s.'.1 These
These are just the
are just the
night systems that
night systems that exist
exist today.
today. Given
Given thethe success
success of of Operation
Operation Desert Desert
Storm, we should expect that
Storm, we should expect that any
any future
future tactical
tactical aircraft
aircraft will
wiU include
include
night operations in
night operations in their
their design criteria.. This
design criteria This willwill provide
provide an an even
even
broader base of night capability throughout the tactical
broader base of night capability throughout the tactical air
air forces
forces. .

83
83
JOINT
JOINT TRAINING
TRAINING FOR
FOR NIGHT
NIGHT AIR
AIR WARFARE
WARFARE

At
At the
the same
same timetime thatthat this
this increased
increased tactical
tactical quality
quality is is reaching
reaching the the
Air
Air Force,
Force, thethe total
total military
military force
force structure
structure is is decreasing
decreasing quantitatively
quantitatively..
The previous Air Force goal of 40 fighter wings is being reduced
The previous Air Force goal of 40 fighter wings is being reduced to to 26
26
wings.
wings. TheThe Navy
Navy planplan for for 16
16 aircraft
aircraft carriers
carriers is is being
being scaled
scaled down
down to to 13
13
or
or possibly
possibly 12. 12. Even
Even more more so so than
than was was the the case
case in in Operation
Operation Desert
Desert
Storm,
Storm, future
future military
military operations
operations must must planplan on on being
being joint
joint efforts.
efforts. Future
Future
training
training programs
programs must must be be tailored
tailored to to develop
develop the the most
most capable
capable force
force
possible
possible in in all
all areas,
areas, including
including jointjoint night
night operations
operations..
A
A possible
possible alternative
alternative to to aa broad
broad base base of of experience
experience throughthrough joint
joint
training
training isis the
the extensive
extensive use use ofinterservice
o/interservice liaison liaison officers
officers onon the
the various
various
joint
joint planning
planning staffs
staffs.. This
This approach
approach has has two
two drawbacks.
drawbacks. First,First, unless
unless thethe
program
program is is carried
carried downdown to to atat least
least the-wing
the wing level, level, such
such liaison
liaison officers
officers
become
become aa limited
limited resource
resource that that may
may not not be be available
available in in the
the right
right place
place
at the right
at the right time
time.. Second,
Second, unlessunless eacheach liaison
liaison officer
officer isis fully
fully trained
trained in in
large-scale
large-scale operations,
operations, one one liaison
liaison officer
officer may may not not have
have all
all the
the necessary
necessary
information
information.. This This problem
problem surfaced
surfaced in in the
the planning
planning for for Operation
Operation El El
Dorado
Dorado Canyon.
Canyon. The The AirAir Force
Force sentsent seven
seven officers
officers to to the
the joint
joint task
task force
force
planning
planning sessions
sessions to to cover
cover all all the
the various
various Air Air Force
Force elements
elements of of the
the airair
raid
raid on
on Libya.
Libya. EachEach officerwas
officer was an an expert
expert in in his
his particular
particular areabut
area but lacked
lacked
in-depth
in-depth knowledge
knowledge of of the
the other
other areas
areas of of the
the operation.
operation. The The Navy
Navy sentsent
just one officer who, through training and operational experience, was
just one officer who, through training and operational experience, was
familiar
familiar with
with allall elements
elements ofthe of the Navy
Navy portion
portion ofthe of the operation.
operation.^ A A broad
broad
base
base ofof experience
experience in in joint
joint operations
operations throughthrough training
training can can make
make eacheach
and
and every
every pilot,
pilot, in in effect,
effect, aa knowledgeable
knowledgeable liaison liaison officer.
officer. This
This will
will
provide
provide greater
greater flexibility
flexibility for for future
future combat
combat employment
employment..
As was amply demonstrated in Operation Desert
As was amply demonstrated in Operation Desert Storm,
Storm, night
night air air
warfare
warfare andand joint
joint operations
operations are are arenas
arenas in in which
which the the United
United States
States now
now
has
has an
an overwhelming
overwhelming advantage advantage that that should
should be be exploited.
exploited. SinceSince victory
victory
on
on the
the battlefield
battlefield frequently
frequently goes goes to to the
the side
side that
that makes
makes the the best
best use
use ofof
the
the existing
existing military
military technology,
technology, the the question
question is is how
how toto best
best use
use thethe
technical advantages we now possess .3
technical advantages we now possess.^
One
One method
method is is toto fit
fit the
the new
new technology
technology into into existing
existing doctrine
doctrine andand
tactics.
tactics. This
This method
method can, can, however,
however, fail fail toto realize
realize thethe best
best useuse of
of aa new
new
technology formaximum combat effectiveness. For example, following
technology for maximum combat effectiveness. For example, following
World
World WarWar I, I, the
the existing
existing US US Army
Army doctrine
doctrine and and tactics
tactics held
held toto the
the view
view

84
84
CONCLUSIONS
CONCLUSIONS AND
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
RECOMMENDATIONS

that
that the tank was
the tank was toto be
be used
used in
in support
support ofof the infantry.. In
the infantry In keeping
keeping withwith
this
this tactic,
tactic, the
the tank's
tank's maximum
maximum speed speed ofof advance
advance waswas limited
limited to to the
the
speed of
speed of the
the foot
foot soldier.
soldier. The
The German
German army
army recognized
recognized that
that the
the new
new
technology
technology provided
provided by the armored
by the armored tanktank could
could better
better bebe used
used as as aa
high-speed assault weapon supported by
high-speed assault weapon supported by truck-transported
truck-transported soldiers.
soldiers.
The
The alternative
alternative to to forcing
forcing technology
technology intointo existing
existing doctrine
doctrine and and
tactics
tactics is
is to evolve new
to evolve new doctrine
doctrine andand tactics
tactics to match the
to match the new
new
capabilities . It is this
capabilities. It is this second
second method
method of
of matching
matching new
new doctrine
doctrine to
to new
new
technology which
technology which thisthis book
book advocates.
advocates. This
This chapter discusses nine
chapter discusses nine
recommendations for a phased or building-block approach to
recommendations for a phased or building-block approach to
developing
developing amore
a more comprehensive
comprehensive jointjoint night
night airwarfare
air warfare capability
capability.. The
The
recommendations, which
recommendations, which areare discussed
discussed in in more
more detail
detaU later,
later, are
are as
as
follows:
follows:
11.. Implement
Implement Red Red Flag
Flag 2000
2000 proposal
proposal..
2.
2. Initiate
Initiate annual
annual night
night Cope
Cope Thunder.
Thunder.
3 . Develop more
3. Develop more extensive
extensive joint
joint force
force tactics.
tactics.
44.. Expand
Expand formal
formal joint
joint training
training programs
programs..
5 . Begin mission commanders' school
5. Begin mission commanders' school at
at Red
Red Flag.
Flag.
6.
6. Initiate annual unified
Initiate annual unified command
command Red Red Flag.
Flag.
77.. Expand
Expand joint
joint night
night training
training atat each center..
each center
8 . Increase joint
8. Increase joint night
rught operations
operations at
at Team
Team Spirit.
Spirit.
9. Develop
9. Develop an an annual
annual unified
unified command
command exercise.
exercise.
The
The intent
intent of the building-block
of the building-block approach
approach is
is to
to initially
initially broaden
broaden and
and
increase
increase Air
Air Force
Force night experience while
night experience while simultaneously
simultaneously increasing
increasing
joint warfare capability
joint warfare capability in
in the
the daytime.
daytime. Once
Once these
these two
two experience
experience bases
bases
have been developed they
have been developed they would
would then
then be
be combined
combined into
into a
a joint
joint night
night
program..
program

Expanding Air
Expanding Air Force
Force Night
Night Capability
Capability

As the Air
As the Air Force
Force increases
increases the
the quantity
quantity of its night-capable
of its night-capable
equipment, the first night training
equipment, the first night training priority
priority should
should be
be givento
given to developing
developing
individual service
individual service expertise
expertise.. As
As was discussed in
was discussed in chapter
chapter 3,
3, the
the TAFs
TAFs

85
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JOINT
JOINT TRAINING
TRAINING FOR
FOR NIGHT
NIGHT AIR
AIR WARFARE
WARFARE

already
already have
have aa well-developed
well-developed training
training plan
plan toto build
build and
and sustain
sustain
individual aircrew proficiency at night. There are also training plans in
individual aircrew proficiency at night. There are also training plans in
place
place to
to ensure
ensure that
that aa squadron
squadron maintains
maintains the
the desired
desired number
number ofaircrews
of aircrews
qualified
qualified in
in the
the night
night mission.
mission. This
This section
section discusses
discusses aa plan
plan to
to build
build aa
broad base of experience
broad base of experience in
in night
night warfare for the TAFs as a whole.
warfare for the TAFs as a whole.

Recommendation
Recommendation 1:
1: Implement
Implement Red
Red Flag
Flag 2000
2000 Proposal
Proposal
As
As the
the first
first step
step toto this
this plan,
plan, the
the author
author recommends
recommends that that the
the
commander of TAC approve the implementation of the Red Flag 2000
commander of TAC approve the implementation of the Red Flag 2000
proposal for
proposal for aa dedicated
dedicated Night
Night Flag
Flag atat least
least once
once perper calendar
calendar year year.. The
The
emphasis
emphasis should
should be be on
on Air
Air Force
Force participants,
participants, although
although joint-service
joint-service
participation
participation should
should not
not be
be excluded
excluded.. However,
However, in in the
the initial
initial stages,
stages, asas
Air
Air Force
Force night
night expertise
expertise is is expanded,
expanded, any any joint
joint night
night mission
mission should
should
remainlimited
remain limited to to integrating
integrating sister-service
sister-service aircraft
aircraft into
into the
the timing
timing of ofthe
the
mission
mission package
package but but not
not yet
yet attempting
attempting to-develop
to develop joint joint formations
formations or or
tactics
tactics..
To
To ensure
ensure thethe maximum
maximum training
training benefit
benefit of of aa dedicated
dedicated Night Night Flag,
Flag,
all
all units
units tasked
tasked with with aa night
night mission
mission shouldshould be be scheduled
scheduled to to
participate. This
participate. This exercise
exercise should
should not not necessarily
necessarily be be limited
limited to to
night-optimized
night-optimized aircraft aircraft such
such as as the
the F-111s,
F-llls, F-117s,
F-117s, F-15Es,F-15Es, and and
LANTIRN
LANTIRN F-16s F-16s but but should
should include
include allall squadrons
squadrons that have night
that have night
operations in their unit mission descriptions . To make this plan
operations in their unit mission descriptions. To make this plan
work,
work. Headquarters
Headquarters TAC/DO TAC/DO may may need
need to make the
to make annual Night
the annual Night
Flag
Flag aa top-priority
top-priority exercise
exercise forfor the
the desired
desired units.
units. Under
Under the the present
present
scheduling
scheduling method,method, there there is is nono guarantee
guarantee that that allall the
the desired
desired
squadrons
squadrons will will bebe available
available at at the
the same
same time.
time.
During these Air Force Night Flags, the tasked
During these Air Force Night Flags, the tasked missions
missions should should notnot
include
include aa single
single type of aircraft
type of aircraft exclusively
exclusively (all (all F-16,
F-16, allall F-111,
F-111, etc.)
etc.) but
but
should
should be be aimed
aimed at at developing
developing aa mixed-force
mixed-force capability
capability with with other
other Air
Air
Force
Force assets
assets.. For
For instance,
instance, this
this would
would be be the
the appropriate
appropriate time time andand place
place
to
to train
train in
in night
night delivery
delivery tactics
tactics with
with F-15Es
F-15Es usingusing buddy
buddy lasinglasing toto
support
support F-16s
F-16s dropping
dropping LGBs.
LGBs. Again,
Again, the
the emphasis
emphasis at at first
first must
must bebe onon
developing
developing aa highlyhighly skilled,
skilled, broad-based,
broad-based, night-capable
night-capable Air Air Force
Force

86
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CONCLUSIONS
CONCLUSIONS AND
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
RECOMMENDATIONS

before attempting
before attempting the the even
even more
more challenging
challenging aspects aspects of joint night
of joint night
employment .
employment.
One
One particularly
particularly important
important mission
mission area area that
that should
should be be included
included in in
the Night Flags is night CAS. In keeping with the recent experiences of
the Night Flags is night CAS. In keeping with the recent experiences of
Operation
Operation Desert
Desert Storm,
Storm, CAS CAS at at Night
Night Flag should be
Flag should be done
done without
without
external
external illumination,
illumination, either either aerial
aerial or or ground
ground flares
flares..
Ultimately, night CAS should include simulated attacks
Ultimately, night CAS should include simulated attacks against
against live
live
targets
targets during force-on-force training
during force-on-force training at at the
the NTC.
NTC. This This would
would not not bebe
incorporated
incorporated until
until moving
moving into into the
the joint night training
joint night training that that isis covered
covered in in
recommendation 7.
recommendation 7. Under
Under the
the building-block
building-block approach,
approach, the
the initial
initial night
night
CAS
CAS training
training should
should be be against ground array
against aa ground array ofof stationary
stationary targets
targets onon
the Nellis range . The goal should be identification and attack of aa
the Nellis range. The goal should be identification and attack of
specific
specific target,
target, not
not just
just anyany ofof aa cluster
cluster of of targets.
targets. OneOne possible
possible method
method
of practicing
of practicing this
this would
would be be to
to mount
mount aa remotely controlled ground
remotely controlled ground laserlaser
locator designator on the same
locator designator on the same television
television ordnance
ordnance scoring
scoring system
system
(TOSS)
(TOSS) camera
camera thatthat is is used
used by by the
the RedRed Flag
Flag range
range groupgroup to record and
to record and
score bomb deliveries . The GLLD could be used to positively identify
score bomb deliveries. The GLLD could be used to positively identify
the
the specific
specific target
target for for aircraft
aircraft equipped
equipped with with Pave Pave PennyPenny pods pods
simulating aa FAC
simulating FAC.. Being Being mounted
mounted on on the
the TOSS
TOSS camera,
camera, this this system
system
can give immediate feedback on the success of
can give immediate feedback on the success of the
the bomb
bomb run.
run. By
By using
using
the TOSS
the TOSS controls,
controls, the the GLLD
GLLD spot spot can can then
then be be shifted
shifted to second or
to aa .second or
third target as the first one is "destroyed," allowing even greater realism.
third target as the first one is "destroyed," allowing even greater realism.
This
This isis the
the most
most ambitious
ambitious training
training methodmethod for for target
target ID ID in in night
night CAS.
CAS.
Simpler
Simpler methods
methods might include aa remotely
might include remotely controlled
controlled or or time-activated
time-activated
electronic heating circuit to highlight the appropriate target .
electronic heating circuit to highlight the appropriate target.
The current level
The current level ofof night
night training
training in in OCA,
OCA, air air interdiction,
interdiction, and and DCA
DCA
appears
appears toto be
be appropriate,
appropriate, but but itit can
can be be improved
improved to to provide
provide aa greater
greater
training opportunity
training opportunity for
for mixed-force
mixed-force employment
employment. . For
For instance,
instance, F-111
F-1 Uss
can
can train
train at
at home
home station
station in in single-ship
single-ship LGB LGB attacks
attacks against
against aa target.
target.
Night Flag should allow them to train in such tactics as
Night Flag should allow them to train in such tactics as planning
planning and
and
coordinating
coordinating abuddy-lasing
abuddy-lasing attack attack for for LGB-equipped
LGB-equipped F- 16s. The
F-16s. The policy
policy
that
that you perfect itit at
you perfect at home
home before
before tryingtrying itit atat Red
Red FlagFlag might
might require
require
some workup training between
some workup training between the
the units
units before
before deployment
deployment to
to Nellis
NeUis
AFB.. A
AFB A reasonable
reasonable substitution
substitution might might be be for each unit
for each unit to to perfect
perfect thethe
basic technique at home using like aircraft, then simply employ that
basic technique at home using like aircraft, then simply employ that

87
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JOINT
JOINT TRAINING
TRAINING FOR
FOR NIGHT
NIGHT AIR
AIR WARFARE
WARFARE

practiced
practiced tactic
tactic at
at Night
Night Flag
Flag using
using dissimilar
dissimilar aircraft
aircraft.. Night
Night Flag
Flag should
should
concentrate
concentrate onon bringing
bringing the
the different
different elements
elements together
together into
into aa more
more
effective
effective whole
whole andand on
on flying
flying training
training missions
missions that
that are
are qualitatively
qualitatively
different from those which they can do at home station. The goal
different from those which they can do at home station. The goal ofRed
of Red
Flag
Flag should
should be
be toto train
train with
with tactics
tactics that
that you
you would
would expect
expect to
to employ
employ
in
in combat
combat but
but which
which you
you cannot
cannot regularly
regularly practice
practice atat home
home duedue either
either
to equipment limitations or range space.
to equipment limitations or range space.

Recommendation
Recommendation 2:
2: Initiate
Initiate Annual
Annual
Night
Night Cope
Cope Thunder
Thunder
At
At the
the same
same time
time that
that the
the Night
Night Flag
Fl^ag program
program is is being
being adopted
adopted at at
Nellis,
Nellis, the
the Headquarters
Headquarters PACAF/DO
PACAF/DO should should incorporate
incorporate aa similarsimilar
annual
annual Night
Night Thunder
Thunder exercise
exercise as
as part
part of
of the
the Cope
Cope Thunder
Thunder program
program..
Again,
Again, thethe emphasis
emphasis should
should bebe on
on Air
Air Force
Force expertise,
expertise, but but joint
joint and
and
combined
combined services
services should
should bebe integrated
integrated into
into the
the mission
mission packages
packages as as
much
much as as possible
possible.. AsAs was
was mentioned
mentioned in in chapter
chapter 3, 3, the
the facilities
facilities at at Cope
Cope
Thunder
Thunder are are not
not nearly
nearly asas sophisticated
sophisticated as as are
are those
those at at Red
Red Flag
Hag.. IfIf
financially
financially andand operationally
operationally feasible,
feasible, night
night units
units in
in PACAF
PACAF shouldshould be be
included in the Night Flag operations at Nellis. If this is not feasible,
included in the Night Flag operations at Nellis. If this is not feasible,
night
night training
training atat Cope
Cope Thunder
Thunder cancan still be highly
still be highly effective
effective withwith the
the
equipment
equipment available.
available. Such
Such ideas
ideas as
as remotely
remotely controlled
controlled GLLDs GLLDs for for
night
night CAS
CAS training
training may
may not
not be
be possible
possible atat Cope
Cope Thunder.
Thunder. Electrically
Electrically
heated
heated targets
targets powered
powered by by portable
portable generators
generators or or even
even empty
empty oil oU drums
drums
heated
heated with
with charcoal
charcoal may may provide
provide adequate
adequate substitutes
substitutes.. Again,
Again, thethe
point
point should
should be to train
be to train with
with other
other Air
Air Force
Force assets
assets inin aa different
different wayway
than
than is
is possible
possible at at home
home..

Expanding
Expanding Joint
Joint Capability
Capability

At
At the
the same
same time
time that
that the
the Air
Air Force
Force is
is perfecting its night
perfecting its night expertise,
expertise,
we
we should
should begin
begin to to increase
increase our
our overall
overall joint
joint capability
capability and
and
interoperability
interoperability.. As
As part
part of
of aa phased
phased or
or building-block
buUding-block approach
approach to to
training,
training, joint
joint training
training should
should be
be done
done inin the
the daytime
daytime first
first before
before

88
88
CONCLUSIONS
CONCLUSIONS AND
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
RECOMMENDATIONS

attempting
attempting the
the relatively more complex
relatively more complex problems
problems of
of joint
joint night
night
employment
employment..

Recommendation Develop More


Recommendation 33:: Develop More Extensive
Extensive
Joint
Joint Force
Force Tactics
Tactics
The
The first
first step
step to
to enhanced
enhanced joint capability must
joint capability must be be development
development of of
the appropriate joint
the appropriate joint procedures
procedures and and employment
employment tactics tactics.. This
This will
will
require
require Air
Air Staff
Staff direction
direction toto the 57th Fighter
the 57th Fighter Weapons
Weapons Wing Wing director
director
of
of tactics
tactics and
and test
test operations
operations (57th
(57th FWW/DTT)
FWW/DTT) at
at Nellis
Nellis to
to initiate
initiate aa
tactics
tactics development
development program between the
program between the Air
Air Force,
Force, Navy,
Navy, Marine
Marine
Corps, and Army . The actual development effort will be joint, but some
Corps, and Army. The actual development effort will be joint, but some
service
service must
must take the initiative
take the initiative to get theprogram
to get the program started.
started. AsAs the
the nation's
nation's
primary
primary aerospace
aerospace service,
service, the
the Air
Air Force
Force should
should be be the
the lead service in
lead service in
this effort .
this effort.
The
The hypothetical
hypothetical scenario
scenario in in chapter
chapter 22 mentioned
mentioned just just aa few
few ofof the
the
areas in which joint force formations and tactics may provide an
areas in which joint force formations and tactics may provide an
enhanced
enhanced capability
capability;; there
there are
are probably
probably others
others that
that the
the author
author hashas not
not
considered.
considered. This This recommendation
recommendation isis for for aa total
total joint
joint development
development effort,effort,
including both day and
including both day and night
night capability .
capability. In
In keeping
keeping with
with the
the overall
overall
building-block
building-block approach
approach beingbeing considered,
considered, initial
initial efforts
efforts should
should be be
directed to developing joint day capability . At the same time, the
directed to developing joint day capability. At the same time, the
groundwork
groundwork can can be be laid
laid for
for subsequent
subsequent development
development of joint night
of joint night
capability
capability fromfrom the baseline day
the baseline day experiences
experiences..

Recommendation Expand Formal


Recommendation 44:: Expand Formal
Joint Training
Joint Training Programs
Programs
Again,
Again, as
as the
the premier
premier air
air service, the Air
service, the Air Force,
Force, through
through the
the 4440th
4440th
Tactical Fighter
Tactical Fighter Training
Training Group
Group (TFTG),
(TFTG), should
should initiate
initiate a
a formal
formal and
and
regular
regular program
program of of interaction
interaction between Red Flag,
between Red Flag, Naval
Naval Strike
Strike Warfare
Warfare
Center, NTC, and Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center. This
Center, NTC, and Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center. This
interaction
interaction should
should include
include regular and continuing
regular and continuing participation
participation byby Air
Air
Force units
Force at the
units at the other
other training
training centers,
centers, as
as well
weU as as sister-service
sister-service
participation at Red Flag .
participation at Red Flag.

89
89
JOINTTRAINING
JOINT TRAINING FOR
POR NIGII"1'
NIGHT AIRAIR \VARFARI:
WARl-'ARl-:

To the maximum
To the maximum extent extent that
that operational
operational coin initments allow,
commitments allow, this
this
joint
joint service
service scheduling
scheduHng should should reflect
reflect anticipated
anticipated combatcombat employment
employment..
For example, an Air Force squadron
For example, an Air Force squadron with
with aa wartime
wartime commitment
commitment to
to
PACAF
PACAF shouldshould be be scheduled
scheduled to to participate
piirticipate atat Strike
Strike with
with aa carrier
carrier air
air
wing
wing assigned
assigned to to the
the Pacific
Pacific Fleet,
Fleet, notnot with
with an an Atlantic
Atlantic Fleet
Fleet unit
unit..
Participation should be formally scheduled, not put on an "as
Participation should be formally scheduled, not put on an "as available"
available"
basis
basis.. Participants
Participants should should operate
operate under
under the
the rules
rules and and policies
policies ofof the
the host
host
service
service for
for that
that center
center.. Air
Air Force crews participating
Force crews participating at at Strike
Strike would
would be be
expected
expected to to comply
comply with with Navy
Navy procedures,
procedures, justjust as as Navy
Navy crews
crews at at Red
Red
Flag
Flag must
must comply
comply with with AirAir Force
Force procedures
procedures..
An increased and formalized program of
An increased and formalized program of interaction
interaction between
between the the
various
various centers
centers will will have
have two benefits. First,
two benefits; First, itit will
will provide
provide increased
increased
opportunities
opportunities forjoint
for joint training
training to to more
more aircrews
aircrews.. The The benefits
benefits gained
gained by by
simple exposure to each
simple exposure to each other's
other's capabilities,
capabilities, as
as discussed
discussed in
in chapter
chapter 3,
3,
will
will be
be available
available to to more
more aircrews
aircrews on on aa more
more regular
regular basis
basis.. This
This will
will
broaden
broaden the the joint
joint knowledge
knowledge base base of of all
all the
the services
services.. Second,
Second, more more
opportunities
opportunities for for joint
joint exposure
exposure will will more
more rapidly
rapidly highlight
highlight challenges
challenges
in
in joint
joint operations
operations and and possibly
possibly identify
identify the
the mostmost efficient
efficient wayway of of
meeting the challenges . A procedure or equipment incompatibility that
meeting the challenges. A procedure or equipment incompatibility that
,w as identified
was identified as as aa minor
minor irritant
irritant that could be
that could be worked
worked around
around at at Red
Red
Flag
Flag might
might be be aa major
major difficulty
difficulty withwith nono apparent
apparent solution
solution atat Strike
Strike.. AA
formal program for joint interaction,
formal program for joint interaction, including
including comparisons of lessons
comparisons of lessons
learned
learned andand actions
actions taken,
taken, could
could smooth
smooth these
these challenges
challenges..

Recommendation
Recommendation 5: 5: Begin
Begin Mission
Mission Commanders'
Commanders'
School
School at
at Red
Red Flag
Flag

A key part
A key part of
of successful
successful large-force
large-force operations,
operations, either
either joint
joint or
or single
single
service,
service, is that the
is that the overall
overall commander
commander must must have
have aa firm
firm understanding
understanding
ofhis total force capability . Ofgreat benefit to this understanding would
of his total force capability. Of great benefit to this understanding would
be
be aa Mission
Mission Commanders'
Commanders' SchoolSchool atat Red
Red Flag,
Flag, similar
similar to
to the
the one
one
currently
currently conducted
conducted atat Cope
Cope Thunder.
Thunder. As
As was
was discussed
discussed in in chapter
chapter 3,
3,
the current proposal by the
the current proposal by the 4440th
4440th TFTG
TFTG would
would increase
increase Red
Red Flag
Flag to
to aa
total
total of
of nine
nine weeks
weeks instead
instead of of the
the current
current six.
six. There
There would
would be be 33
three-week periods with
three-week periods with the
the first
first week
week ofeach
of each period
period devoted
devoted toto Mission
Mission

90
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Commanders' School
Commanders' School.. To To save
save time
time and and TDYTDY expenses,
expenses, the the author
author
recommends
recommends that that this
this proposal
proposal be be changed
changed to to aa total
total of of seven weeks per
seven weeks per
Red Flag.. This
Red Flag This change
change would
would maintain
maintain the the 33 two-week
two-week periods periods but but add
add
aa seventh
seventh weekweek at the beginning
at the beginning of of the
the exercise
exercise.. This
This first week would
first week would
be
be devoted
devoted to to Mission
Mission Commanders'
Commanders' School School for the entire
for the entire exercise
exercise..
As a preliminary step to enhance the overall training of Red
As a preliminary step to enhance the overall training of Red Flag,
Flag,
participants should
participants should provide
provide aa background
background paper paper on on their
their units.
units. These
These
background
background papers would include
papers would include short
short descriptions
descriptions of of the
the performance
performance
capabilities and limitations of the assigned
capabilities and limitations of the assigned aircraft,
aircraft, typical
typical ordnance
ordnance
loads,
loads, mission-planning
mission-planning factors such as
factors such as employment
employment speed speed and and combat
combat
radius, and
radius, and the
the primary
primary and and subsidiary missions the
subsidiary missions the squadron
squadron trains trains for.
for.
They would be compiled
They would be compiled into
into a
a facts
facts book
book for
for all
all participants
participants in
in that
that
particular
particular RedRed FlagFlag..
Such a fact book
Such a fact book would
would be be aa useful
useful complement
complement to to the
the proposed
proposed
Mission
Mission Commanders'
Commanders' School School but should not
but should not be be assumed
assumed to to be
be anan
adequate substitute for
adequate substitute for more
more comprehensive
comprehensive training training.. Instructional
Instructional
books, while valuable reference works and
books, while valuable reference works and essential
essential parts
parts of
of training,
training,
are
are not
not sufficient
sufficient by by themselves
themselves.. For For example,
example, when when participating
participating in in
joint exercises with the Navy, E-3 AWACS aircraft carry reference
joint exercises with the Navy, E-3 AW ACS aircraft carry reference
books
books on Navy procedures,
on Navy procedures, radio radio frequencies,
frequencies, and and other
other information.
information.
Unless
Unless you you are
are very experienced with
very experienced with the the content
content and organization of
and organization of
these books, it is very difficult and time-consuming
these books, it is very difficult and time-consuming to
to find
find the
the particular
particular
information
information you need. Even
you need. Even with
with positive reinforcement through
positive reinforcement through joint joint
exercises, itit can
exercises, can take
take as as long
long as as two
two weeks
weeks of of training
training for for Air
Air Force
Force
AWACS crews to become
AW ACS crews to become comfortable
comfortable with
with Navy
Navy procedures
procedures. . Without
Without
frequent repetition,
frequent repetition, these
these skills can deteriorate
skills can deteriorate and and cannot
carmot be be relearned
releamed
a
simply
simply by by reading
reading aa bookbook.'*
The
The suggestion
suggestion for for such
such aa fact book has
fact book has been
been rejected
rejected during during previous
previous
Red
Red Flags
Flags on the grounds
on the grounds that that "everybody
"everybody knows knows that." that." ThisThis may may be be
true for all Air Force Red Flags, but
true for all Air Force Red Flags, but as
as was
was discussed
discussed in
in chapter
chapter 3,
3, the
the
empirical evidence
empirical evidence in in Red
Red Flag
Flag 91-2 indicates that
91-2 indicates that everybody
everybody does does not
not
know everything about joint assets . For the first few days of
know everything about joint assets. For the first few days of the
the third
third
period
period of Red Flag
of Red Flag 91-2,
91-2, the
the Air Force aircrews
Air Force aircrews were were suffering
suffering losses
losses
in
in the
the exercise
exercise to enemy defenses
to enemy defenses because
because they they did did not
not know
know that that the
the
Navy A-6Es and EA-613s could provide
Navy A-6Es and EA-6Bs could provide them
them with
with protection
protection.^ 5

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Ideally,
Ideally, aa similar
similar Mission
Mission Commanders'
Commanders' School School program
program should
should be
be
held
held atat each
each ofof the
the training
training centers
centers as
as aa precursor
precursor to
to aa joint
joint exercise
exercise..
Once
Once thethe 4440th
4440th TFTG
TFTG has has established
established thethe Red
Red Flag
Flag program,
program, they
they
should
should make
make itit available
available toto the
the other
other training
training centers
centers asas part
part of
of the
the
formalized
formalized interchange
interchange proposed
proposed in in recommendation
recommendation 4. 4. The
The author
author
realizes
realizes that
that the
the Air
Air Force
Force cancan only
only recommend
recommend such such aa program
program toto our
our
sister
sister services
services;; there
there isis no
no requirement
requirement that
that they
they accept
accept it.
it.

Recommendation
Recommendation 6:
6: Initiate
Initiate Annual
Annual Unified
Unified
Command Red Flag
Command Red Flag
As
As was
was discussed
discussed in in chapter
chapter 3, 3, aa limitation
limitation to to the
the realism
realism ofRed
of Red FlagFlag
is
is caused
caused by by its
its scheduling
scheduling procedures
procedures.. The The RedRed FlagFlag exercise
exercise is is not
not
given
given scheduling
scheduling priority
priority toto ensure
ensure that
that units
units participate
participate withwith thethe same
same
squadrons
squadrons thatthat they
they would
would expect
expect to go into
to go into combat
combat with.with. ToTo enhance
enhance
the
the joint
joint training
training benefit
benefit ofof Red
Red Flag,
Flag, the
the author
author recommends
recommends that that the
the
DCS
DCS Plans
Plans and
and Operations
Operations at at Air
Air Stafftake
Staff take thethe lead
lead toto establish
establish one one Red
Red
Flag
Flag exercise
exercise per per year
year designed
designed around
around the the airair component
component of of aa
combatant
combatant command.
command. This This would
would be be aapriority
priority exercise with all assigned
exercise with all assigned
units
units required
required to to participate.
participate. Some
Some method
method of of rotating
rotating units
units between
between the the
CONUS
CONUS and and overseas
overseas might
might be be necessary
necessary to to enable
enable overseas-based
overseas-based
units
units to
to participate
participate without
without weakening
weakening overseas
overseas strength
strength..
As
As thethe anticipated
anticipated air air component
component commander
commander for for anyany future
future
operations,
operations, thethe Air
Air Force
Force should
should bebe the
the lead
lead service
service to to initiate
initiate this
this action
action..
Since
Since any
any such
such action
action will
will require
require cooperation
cooperation amongamong all all the
the TAF,
TAF, not not
just
just TAC,
TAC, the
the Air
Air Staff
Staff is
is the
the appropriate
appropriate level
level toto direct
direct this
this initiative
initiative..
Under
Under this
this recommendation,
recommendation, one one RedRed Flag
Flag per per year
year would
would be be
dedicated
dedicated to to the
the air
air component
component of of aa specific
specific CINC.
CINC. This This isis in
in addition
addition
to
to the
the dedicated
dedicated NightNight Flag
Flag described
described earlier
earlier inin this
this chapter.
chapter. Since
Since thethe
emphasis
emphasis forfor this
this "CINC
"CINC Flag"
Flag" isis to
to develop
develop aa greaterjoint
greater joint employment
employment
capability,
capability, the
the initial
initial emphasis
emphasis should
should be be on
on joint
joint daylight
daylight operations.
operations.
In
In anticipation
anticipation of of ongoing
ongoing force force reductions
reductions and and thethe proposed
proposed
realignment
realignment of of the
the unified
unified command
command structure,
structure, thisthis CINC
CINC Flag Flag would
would
rotate
rotate annually
annually between
between thethe Pacific
Pacific Force,
Force, thethe Atlantic
Atlantic Force,
Force, and and the
the
Contingency
Contingency Force.Force. This
This three-year
three-year rotation
rotation period
period matches
matches the the normal
normal

92
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CONCLUSIONS
CONCLUSIONS AND
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
RECOMMENDATIONS

operational
operational tour
tour length
length for
for the
the Air
Air Force
Force and
and should
should enable
enable all
all aircrews
aircrews
to
to participate
participate in
in at
at least
least one CINC Flag
one CINC during their
Flag during their tour
tour of
of duty
duty..

Developing
Developing Joint
Joint Night
Night Capability
Capability

Following
Following the the simultaneous
simultaneous development
development of of aa broad
broad base
base of
of
experience
experience in in night
night operations
operations throughout
throughout the
the TAF
TAF andand an
an expanded
expanded
experience
experience level
level in
in joint
joint operations,
operations, the
the next
next phase
phase is
is to
to begin
begin extensive
extensive
joint
joint night
night training.
training.

Recommendation
Recommendation 7: 7: Expand
Expand Joint,Night
Joint Night
Training at Each Center
Training at Each Center
Drawing
Drawing uponupon the
the lessons
lessons learned
learned during
during thethe simultaneous
simultaneous TAF TAF night
night
and
and joint
joint daylight phases in
daylight phases in recommendations
recommendations 11 through through 6, 6, this
this next
next
phase would change the single-service Night Flag and Night Thunder
phase would change the single-service Night Flag and Night Thunder
into
into aa fully
fully integrated
integrated joint
joint night-training
night-training exercise
exercise.. Those
Those joint
joint tactics
tactics
and
and procedures
procedures thatthat were
were developed
developed as as aa result
result of
of the
the first
first phase
phase would
would
now
now bebe shifted
shifted into
into the
the relatively
relatively more more demanding
demanding night night arena.
arena.
When
When to to begin
begin this
this phase
phase ofjoint
of joint nightnight training
training will
will depend
depend on on the
the
lessons learned and incorporated during the TAF night and joint day
lessons learned and incorporated during the TAF night and joint day
development phases.. The
development phases The author
author recommends
recommends three three years
years as
as aa guideline.
guideline.
This
This will
will allow
allow for
for two
two annual
annual NightNight Flags
Flags toto determine
determine lessons
lessons learned
learned
and
and recommended
recommended improvements
improvements in in night
night operations,
operations, plus
plus aa third
third Night
Night
Flag
Flag to
to validate
validate and
and refine
refine those
those tactics.
tactics. ItIt will
will also
also allow
allow forfor one
one full
fiill
rotation
rotation ofof the
the three
three CINC
CINC Flags Flags for for joint
joint operations
operations..
This
This recommendation
recommendation would would also also include
include initiating
initiating aa fully
fully integrated
integrated
annual
annual joint
joint night-training
night-training exercise
exercise at at NAS
NAS Fallon,
Fallon, atat the
the NTC,
NTC, and and at
at
Twentynine Palms. It is at this point that the night CAS training against
Twentyrune Pakns. It is at this point that the night CAS training against
actual
actual targets
targets mentioned
mentioned earlierearlier would
would be be developed.
developed. As As was
was discussed
discussed
in
in chapter
chapter 3,3, night
night CAS
CAS against
against live live targets
targets atat either
either NTC
NTC or or Twentynine
Twentynine
Palms
Palms has
has two
two benefits.
benefits. First,
First, itit trains
trains aircrews
aircrews in in the
the problems
problems of of night
night
target
target ID
ID and
and attack
attack in in the
the face
face of enemy air
of enemy air and
and ground
ground defenses.
defenses.

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Simultaneously,
Simultaneously, itit provides
provides the
the ground
ground troops
troops under
under attack
attack training
training in
in
the
the problems
problems of of operating
operating atat night
night in
in the
the face
face of
of aa significant
significant air
air threat
threat..
Note
Note that
that this
this is
is aa recommendation
recommendation to to change
change the
the scope
scope and
and nature
nature of
of
aa currently
currently scheduled
scheduled exercise,
exercise, not
not to
to add
add an
an additional
additional exercise
exercise toto the
the
existing
existing schedule
schedule.. This
This will
will increase
increase the
the opportunity
opportunity forfor aircrews
aircrews to to
participate
participate in
in more
more regular
regular joint
joint night
night operations
operations without
without having
having to
to incur
incur
the
the financial
financial cost
cost ofof creating
creating an
an additional
additional exercise
exercise..

Recommendation
Recommendation 8:8: Increase
Increase Joint
Joint Night
Night
Operations
Operations at
at Team
Team Spirit
Spirit
At
At approximately
approximately the the same
same time
time as as the
the CINC
CENC Flag Flag program
program is is
initiated,
initiated, Team
Team Spirit
Spirit should
should bebe expanded
expanded to to include
include joint
joint night
night
operations.
operations. Joint
Joint night
night operations
operations atat Team
Team Spirit
Spirit could
could incorporate
incorporate
lessons
lessons learned
learned from
from Night
Night Thunder,
Thunder, Night
Night Flag,
Flag, andand the
the joint
joint exercises
exercises
that
that are
are held
held in
in the
the CONUS
CONUS.. Since
Since Team
Team Spirit
Spirit includes
includes unitsunits from
from the
the
Pacific
Pacific theater
theater and
and units
units deployed
deployed to
to Korea
Korea fromfrom the
the CONUS,
CONUS, the the crews
crews
will
wUl be
be able
able to
to share
share experiences
experiences in in the
the various
various programs
programs.. ThisThis should
should
accelerate
accelerate the
the overall
overall learning
learning experience
experience for for all
all the
the crews.
crews. At At the
the same
same
time,
time, each
each ofof the
the programs
programs can can be
be improved
improved by by comparing
comparing the the lessons
lessons
learned.
learned.
To
To realize
realize the
the maximum
maximum benefit
benefit from
from this
this recommendation,
recommendation, Team Team
Spirit
Spirit will
wUl need
need toto establish
establish aa debriefing
debriefing system
system toto tie
tie together
together allall lessons
lessons
learned
learned from
from the
the various
various participants
participants.. A A comprehensive
comprehensive debriefingdebriefing
similar
similar toto Cope
Cope Thunder
Thunder or or Red
Red Flag
Flag is is not
not feasible;
feasible; TeamTeam Spirit
Spirit is
is
simply
simply too too large
large in in scale
scale over
over too
too large
large aa geographical
geographical area. area. AA
centralized
centralized reporting
reporting system
system run
run by
by the
the Team
Team Spirit
Spirit exercise
exercise staff
staff with
with
daily
daily mission
mission reports
reports filed
filed by
by the
the participating
participating unitsimits viavia telefacsimile
telefacsimile
then
then collated
collated into
into anan end-of-exercise
end-of-exercise report
report may
may be be workable
workable..

Recommendation
Recommendation 9:
9: Develop
Develop an
an Annual
Annual
Unified
Unified Command
Command Exercise
Exercise
After
After at
at least
least six
six years'
years' experience
experience with
with the
the CINC
CINC Flag
Flag program,
program,
CINC
CINC Flag
Flag should
should be
be expanded
expanded into
into an
an annual
annual coordinated
coordinated exercise
exercise that
that

94
94
CONCLUSIONS
CONCLUSIONS AND
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
RECOMMENDATIONS

would integrate
would integrate all all four
four ofof the
the major
major training centers in
training centers in the
the CONUS
CONUS
with centralized tasking from a specific CINC . Six years is
with centralized tasking from a specific CINC. Six years is
recommended as
recommended as the
the minimum
minimum interval interval to to provide
provide each each unified
unified
command
command the opportunity for
the opportunity for at at least
least two
two CINCCINC FlagsFlags as as building
building
blocks before this more ambitious program
blocks before this more ambitious program. .
Under
Under thisthis recommendation,
recommendation, units units participating
participating at at Red Flag, NAS
Red Flag, NAS
Fallon,
Fallon, Twentynine
Twentynine Palms, Palms, and and the NTC would
the NTC would all all be
be tasked
tasked together
together
under a single campaign
under a single campaign plan
plan for
for mission
mission objective
objective tasking.
tasking. This
This
exercise is
exercise is envisioned
envisioned as as aa 24-hour-a-day
24-hour-a-day exercise exercise conducted
conducted
simultaneously from all four training centers and using all available
simultaneously from all four training centers and using all available
assets in
assets in aa coordinated
coordinated mission
mission effort
effort..
As
As with
with thethe previously
previously described
described CINC CINC Flags,
Flags, this
this exercise
exercise wouldwould be be
aa high-priority
high-priority scheduling
scheduling event event to to ensure
ensure that
that the
the correct
correct units
units were
were
available at
available at the
the correct
correct time.time. During
During aa PacificPacific Force
Force exercise,
exercise,
PACAF-tasked Air Force units, Pacific Fleet air wings, Fleet Marine
PACAF-tasked Air Force units, Pacific Fleet air wings, Fleet Marine
Force, Pacific
Force, Pacific airair and
and ground
ground troops,
troops, and,and Pacific-tasked
Pacific-tasked Army Army unitsunits
should
should be be scheduled simultaneously.. As
scheduled simultaneously As with
with thethe existing
existing Red Red Flag,
Flag,
Strike, and NTC programs, units could be scheduled
Strike, and NTC programs, units could be scheduled in
in 3
3 two-week
two-week
training
training rotations
rotations to to provide
provide the the maximum
maximum possible opportunity for
possible opportunity for
participation.
participation.
Following the
Following the principle
principle of of unity
unity of command, all
of command, all air assets would
air assets would be be
tasked
tasked by by aa single
single air component commander
air component commander (ACC), (ACC), similarsimilar to to
Operation Desert Storm . Tasking would be based upon
Operation Desert Storm. Tasking would be based upon capability,
capability, not
not
service.
service. Under
Under this recommendation. Air
this recommendation, Air Force
Force CAS CAS aircraft
aircraft flying
flying out
out
of Nellis AFB
of Nellis AFB could
could be be tasked
tasked to to augment
augment MarineMarine air air for
for support
support of of
Marine ground troops at
Marine ground troops at Twentynine
Twentynine Palms
Palms. . Air
Air Force
Force F-15Es
F-15Es or
or F- 16s,
F-16s,
flying simulated
flying simulated antiship
antiship missions
missions in in support
support of of the
the Navy,
Navy, could
could strike
strike
targets at NAS Fallon while being escorted by F-14s or
targets at NAS Fallon whUe being escorted by F-14s or F-18s
F-18s. .
By
By operating
operating from from all four training
all four training centers
centers simultaneously,
simultaneously, the the
physical separation of
physical separation of the
the participating
participating units would simulate
units would simulate the the
problems that would be caused by
problems that would be caused by geographical
geographical separation
separation in
in wartime.
wartime.
It
It would provide training
would provide training in in such
such possible
possible challenges
challenges as as coordinating
coordinating
Air Force fighter support for Navy carrier-based aircraft flying
Air Force fighter support for Navy carrier-based aircraft flying
interdiction missions in
interdiction missions in support
support of of aa Marine ground war.
Marine ground war. At At present,
present,
training
training inin coordinating physically separated
coordinating physically separated unitsunits isis done
done during
during somesome

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Red
Red Flag
Flag exercises
exercises by by having
having selected
selected units
units operate
operate outout of
of bases
bases other
other
than
than Nellis
Nellis.. The
The recommendation
recommendation applies applies the
the same
same precedent
precedent to to aa greater
greater
scope
scope..
This
This recommendation
recommendation should should be be implemented
implemented specifically
specifically in in the
the
CONUS because of the physical proximity of the already existing
CONUS because of the physical proximity of the already existing
training
training centers.
centers. Close
Close location
location of of such
such diverse
diverse training
training facilities
facilities does
does
not
not exist
exist overseas
overseas at at this
this time
time.. ItIt would
would be be cost
cost prohibitive
prohibitive to to try
try toto build
build
such
such aa system
system of of training
training centers,
centers, even even if if we
we had
had the
the available
available air air and
and
land
land space
space to
to do
do soso.. The
The economic
economic costs costs ofof attempting
attempting to to establish
establish suchsuch
aa system
system overseas
overseas outweigh
outweigh the the operational
operational challenges
challenges of of deploying
deploying
overseas-based
overseas-based unitsunits backback toto the
the CONUS
CONUS for for training.
training.
The
The author
author recognizes
recognizes that that this this isis an
an extremely
extremely ambitious
ambitious and and
complex proposal.. That
complex proposal That is is why
why itit is is recommended
recommended as as the
the final
final step
step of
of aa
phased
phased or or building-block
buUding-block approachapproach.. Full Full implementation
implementation can can bebe delayed
delayed
as
as necessary
necessary to to ensure
ensure that that bases
bases adequately
adequately experienced
experienced in in night
night
operations
operations andand joint
joint operations
operations are are established
established before
before such
such aa program
program
is
is attempted.
attempted. Properly
Properly planned
planned and and executed,
executed, though,
though, itit does
does provide
provide aa
method for a full-scale training exercise in joint operations, including
method for a full-scale training exercise in joint operations, including
joint
joint night
night operations.
operations. SinceSince the
the exercise
exercise would
would be be conducted
conducted on on all
all four
four
controlled
controlled ranges
ranges in in coordination,
coordination, the the proposal
proposal approaches
approaches the the realism
realism
ofexercises
of exercises such
such as as Team
Team Spirit,
Spirit, butbut provides
provides aa greater
greater degree
degree of of control
control
and
and feedback
feedback on on results
results and and lessons
lessons learned.
learned. TheThe keykey is
is that
that all
all of
of the
the
assets available to the air component commander of a unified command
assets available to the air component commander of a unified command
would
would have
have the
the opportunity
opportunity to to train
train together
together as as aa whole,
whole, notnot just
just asas
individual
individual parts.
parts.

Summary
Summary

This
This book
book has
has discussed
discussed some
some of of the
the challenges
challenges ofof joint
joint force
force
operations in
operations in night
night air
air warfare.
warfare. It
It introduced
introduced the
the rationale
rationale for
for why
why wewe
need
need to
to train
train for
for joint
joint operations
operations atat night.
night. Chapter
Chapter 11 described
described some
some of
of
the
the history
history ofof joint
joint air operations in
air operations in general and night
general and night air
air operations,
operations,
both
both single
single service
service and
and joint.
joint. Chapter
Chapter 22 presented
presented aa hypothetical
hypothetical joint
joint
night
night scenario
scenario toto illustrate
illustrate some
some ofof the
the benefits of such
benefits of operations and
such operations and

96
96
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

aa few
few of
of the
the potential challenges.. Chapter
potential challenges Chapter 33 described
described thethe current
current status
status
of
of night training programs
night training programs andand joint training programs
joint training programs and and identified
identified
some areas where these
some areas where these might
might be
be improved
improved. . Finally,
Finally, this
this chapter
chapter
recommended aa building-block
recommended approach for
buUding-block approach for increased
increased training
training to to
develop an even greater employment capability in joint
develop an even greater employment capability in joint night
night air
air
warfare.. Although
warfare Although the the desired emphasis is
desired emphasis is on
on joint
joint night
night capability,
capability, thethe
proposal,
proposal, if if fully implemented, will
fully implemented, will increase
increase Air Force night
Air Force night capability
capability
as a single service and joint operations
as a single service and joint operations in
in general,
general, both
both day
day and
and night.
night.
The
The programs recommended in
programs recommended in this
this chapter
chapter are are not the definitive
not the definitive
training scheme for
training scheme for future
future air
air operations they are
operations;; they are aa method
method of of ensuring
ensuring
that we can train as we
that we can train as we plan
plan to
to fight.
fight.

Notes
Notes

1.1. Maj
Maj Gary
Gary Myers, Headquarters TAC,
Myers, Headquarters TAG, Special Management Organization-
Special Management Organization-
LANTIRN,
LANTIRN, telephone
telephone interview with author,
interview with author, 12
12 April
April 1991
1991..
2. Maj Roger
2. Maj Roger L.L. Smith,
Smith, USAFE:
USAFE: A A Two-Edged
Two-Edged Sword:
Sword: Preparing
Preparing USAFEfor
USAFEfor thethe
Low-Intensity
Low-Intensity Arena (FOUO/No Contract/NOFORN)
Arena (FOUO/No Gontract/NOFORN) (Maxwell (MaxweU AFB, Ala.: Air
AFB, Ala.: Air
University
University Press,
Press, April
April 1990),
1990), 27. (Information extracted
27. (Information extracted is is not
not FOUO.)
FOUO.)
3.
3. Col
Gol Dennis
Dennis M.
M. Drew
Drew and
and Dr
Dr Donald
Donald M.
M. Snow,
Snow, The
The Eagle's
Eagle's Talons:: The
Talons The
American
American Experience
Experience at at War (Maxwell AFB,
War (Maxwell AFB, Ala
Ala.:. : Air
Air University
University Press,
Press, December
December
1988),
1988), 28.
28.
4. Gapt Jane
4. Capt Jane Patterson, instructor/senior director,
Patterson, instructor/senior director, 964th
964th AWACS, participant in
AWACS, participant in
Red Flag
Red Flag 91-2,
91-2, Nellis
Nellis AFB,
AFB, Nev
Nev.,., interview
interview with
with author,
author, 13
13 February
February 1991
1991..
5. Gapt Micah
5. Capt Micah Killian,
KiUian, Air Force-Navy exchange
Air Force-Navy exchange officer,
officer. Attack
Attack Squadron
Squadron 5252
(VA-52),
(VA-52), participant
participant in
in Red
Red Flag
Hag 91-2,
91-2, Nellis
Nellis AFB,
AFB, Nev .,
Nev., interview
interview with
with author,
author, 14
14
February 1991
February 1991. .

7
997
Index
Index

Advanced
Advanced medium-range
medium-range air-to-air
air-to-air F/A-18
F/A-18::13, 13, 27-28, 32, 35, 38, 49,
27-28,32,35,38,49,
missile
missile (AMRAAM).
(AMRAAM). See See missiles
missiles:: 95
95
AMRAAM
AMRAAM F-94
F-94 Starfire:
Starfire: 99
AIM
AFM 1-1,
1-1, Basic
Basic Aerospace
Aerospace Doctrine
Doctrine of of F-105
F-105:11: 11
the
the United States Air
United States Air Force
Force:: 51-52,
51-52, F-106:31
F-106:31
63
63 F-111
F-IU::12-14,27,51,65-67,72,
12-14,27,51,65-67,72,
AIM-54.
AIM-54. SeeSee missiles
missiles:: AIM-54
AIM-54 Phoenix
Phoemx 83,86-87
83, 86-87
Airborne
Airborne warning
warning and
and control
control system
system F-117
F-117:: 13-14, 27, 83, 86
13-14,27,83,86
(AWACS):
(AWACS): 26,31,40-41
26,31,40-41 11-76
11-76 Candid
Candid:: 12 12
Air
Air component
component commander:
commander: 3-4, 34, 14,
14, Mosquito:
Mosquito: 66
20-21,25,38,92,95-96
20-21,25,38,92,95-96 OH-58
OH-58 Kiowa:
Kiowa: 22 22
Aircraft
Aircraft types
types Tornado
Tornado:: 13 13
A-6:
A-6: 1212 Air
Air Force-Army
Force-Army
A-6E
A-6E Grumman
Grumman Intruder
Intruder:: 12-13,
12-13, Joint
Joint operations
operations:: 2, 4, 72-73
2,4,72-73
22,27-28,32,39,51,65-67,
22, 27-28, 32, 39,51, 65-67, Joint
Joint training
training:: 4, 4, 72-74
72-74
91
91 Air
Air Force-Marine
Fprce-Marine Corps Corps
A-7:
A-7: 2727 Joint air
Joint operations :
air operations:
A-10 Warthog: 21,36-37,50,63,
A-lOWarthog: 21,36-37,50,63, Korean
Korean War: War: 2, 9, 15
2,9,15
67,74
67,74 Vietnam
Vietnam War: War: 33
A-18.
A-18. See F/A-18
SceF/A-18 World
World War Warn: II: 22
A-26:
A-26:10 10 Joint
Joint training
training: : 72-73
72-73
AC-130:
AC-130:11 11 Air
Air Force-Navy
Force-Navy
AH-64
AH-64 Apache:
Apache: 32,36-38,50,63
32,36-38,50,63 Joint operations
Joint operations:: 51-52 51-52
AV-8
AV-8 Harrier:
Harrier: 22, 36-37; 49
22,36-37,49 El
m Dorado
Dorado CanyonCanyon:: 12-13,
12-13,1515
B-29
B-29:: 7-9,
7-9, 62
62 World War II: 2-3
World Warn: 2-3
BTR-60
BTR-60:: 63 63 Joint
Joint training
training:: 71-72
71-72
E-2C: 13
E-2C: 13 Air interdiction. .
Air interdiction See interdiction
See interdiction
E-3A:
E-3A: 31, 38
31,38 Air power doctrine : 2,
Air power doctrine: 2,8484
EA-6B: 32-34,
EA-6B: 39, 65, 67,
32-34,39,65, 91
67,91 Air support:
Air support: 4
4
F-4:
F-4: 10-11, 51, 66
10-11,51,66 Air
Air tasking
tasking order
order (ATO):
(ATO): 3, 13-14. See
3,13-14. See
F4U
F4U Corsair:
Corsair: 88 also air component commander;
also air component commander;
F7F Tigercats : 8-9
F7FTigercats: 8-9 joint
joint air
air operations
operations
F-14: 9, 13, 22
F-14: 9,13,22 Air-to-air combat: 27,
Air-to-air combat: 29. See
27,29. See also
also
F-14
F-14 Tomcat:
Tomcat: 32-35,39
32-35,39 specific weapon names or systems
specific weapon names or systems
F-15: 13,21,27-28,32-33,35,
F-15: 13,21, 27-28,32-33, 35, AirWarrior
Air Warrior 1I:: 72-7372-73
49,51,65-67,83,86,95
49,51,65-67,83,86,95 Antiaircraft artillery (AAA):
Antiaircraft artillery (AAA): 8, 10-11,
8,10-11,
F-16:
F-16: 21,27-28,30,32,35,49,
21,27-28,30,32,35,49, 23, 25, 34, 38, 65
23,25,34,38,65
51,57,65-66,83,86,95
51,57,65-66,83,86,95 Apportionment
Apportionment and and allocation
allocation:: 2727

99
99
Around-the-clock
Around-the-clock operations:
operations: 6-7,
6-7, Fish,
Fish, Howard:
Howard: 11 11
77-79
77-79 FM
VMimS,100-5, Operations
Operations:: 63 63
AWACS
AWACS.. See See airborne
airborne warning
warning and
and Force
Force packaging,
packaging, "gorilla"
"gorilla":: 51, 68-69 .
51,68-69.
control
control system
system See
See also
also principles
principles ofof war,
war, mass
mass
Battlefield
Batdefield airair interdiction
interdiction (BAI):
(B AI): 73-74
73-74 Formations,
Formations, types
types of:
of: 14,43-45,
14,43-45,65, 65, 86,
86,
Battle
Battle of
of Britain:
Britain: 23 23 89
89
Battle
Battle of
of the
the Bulge:
Bulge: 66 Forward
Forward air air controller
controller (FAQ
(FAC):: 4, 49-50
4,49-50
Beyond
Beyond visual
visual range
range (BVR)
(BVR) missiles
missiles.. Forward
Forward looking
looking infrared
infrared radar
radar (FLIR)
(FLIR)::
See
See missiles
missiles:: BVR
BVR 34, 36, 42
34,36,42
Blair,
Blair, David
David G.:G.: 6161 422d
422d Operational
Operational TestTest and
and Evaluation
Evaluation
Bradley,
Bradley, Follett
Follett:: 22 Squadron:
Squadron: 63 63
Bradley,
Bradley, Omar
Omar:: 22 4440th
4440th Tactical
Tactical Fighter
Fighter Training
Training
Buddy-lasing
Buddy-lasing:: 28, 86-87
28,86-87 Group:
Group: 64,64, 68-69,
68-69, 89-90,
89-90,9292
Building-block
Building-block approach.
approach. See
See joint
joint air
air 4445th
4445th Tactical
Tactical Training
Training Squadron:
Squadron: 72,
72,
operations
operations;; night
night operations;
operations; joint
joint 87
87
planning
planning 4443d
4443d Tactical
Tactical Training
Training Squadron:
Squadron: 7272
Burke,
Burke, Charles
Charles:: 63 63 Fratricide
Fratricide:: 45,
45, 62-63.
62-63. SeeSee also
also
deconfliction
deconfliction;; situational
situational awareness;
awareness;
Central
Central Command
Command (CENTAF)
(CENTAF):: 69 69
target, identification
target, identification
China/Chinese
China/Chinese:: 7, 10
7,10
Futrell,
Futrell, Robert
Robert F.:
F.: 99
CINC
CINC Flag,
Hag, proposed:
proposed: 92-95
92-95
Close
Close air
air support
support (CAS)
(CAS):: 7, 20-21, 23,
7,20-21,23, GBU-27
GBU-27.. SeeSee laser
laser guided
guided bomb
bomb (LGB)
(LGB)
34-37,48-49,51,67,74,77-78,
34-37,48-49, 51, 67, 74,77-78, Gecelosky, Andrew M. : 61
Gecelosky, Andrew M.: 61
87-88,93,95
87-88, 93, 95 Germans/Germany:
Germans/Germany: 5-7, 5-7,11 11
Combat
Combat air
air patrol
patrol (CAP):
(CAP): 13-14
13-14 Gorilla.
Gorilla. See
See force
force packaging;
packaging; principles
principles
Command
Command and and control
control:: 3, 31, 40
3,31,40 ofwar, mass
of war, mass
Problems:
Problems: 4, 31, 40-41
4,31,40-41 Green
Green Flag
Flag:: 64.
64. See
See also Red Flag
also'RsA'Fidig
Copeland,
Copeland, Mel:
Mel: 29-30
29-30 Ground laser locator designator
Ground laser locator designator
Cope
Cope Thunder,
Thunder, Clark
Clark AB,
AB, Philippines
Philippines:: (GLLD)
(GLLD):: 50,87-88
50, 87-88
37,40,62,75-79,85,88-90,94
37,40, 62, 75-79, 85,88-90,94 Gulf war: 13-14, 19, 23, 25-26, 30-31,
Gulf war: 13-14,19,23,25-26,30-31,
Crowe,
Crowe, William
William:: 45 45 33,
33, 36,
36, 63,
63, 67, 74-75, 83.
67,74-75, 83. See
See also
also
joint air operations, lessons learned,
joint air operations, lessons learned.
Deconfliction:
Deconfliction: 44-45,47,67
44-45,47,67 Desert
Desert Storm
Storm
Defensive
Defensive counterair
counterair (DCA)
(DCA):: 6-7,
6-7,
20-21,23,34-35,45,47-48,57
20-21,23,34-35,45,47-48,57 Haiphong.
Haiphong. See
See operations
operations:: Linebacker
Linebacker II
n
Hanoi. See operations : Linebacker II
Hanoi. See operations: Linebacker n
Embry, Dick: 31-32
Embry.Dick: 31-32
High-speed antiradiation
High-speed antirad jtion missile
missile
Far East Air
Far East Forces (FEAF)
Air Forces (FEAF):: 2, 9
2,9 (HARM). See missiles : HARM
(HARM). 5ce missiles: HARM
54th Tactical Fighter
54th Tactical Fighter Squadron:
Squadron: 29
29 Hitler, Adolf: 5, 11
Hitler, Adolf: 5,11
57th
57th Fighter
Fighter Weapons Wing (FWW): 70 Homer,
Weapons Wing (FWW): 70 Homer, Charles
Charies:: 13-14
13-14
Fighter
Fighter Weapons
Weapons Instructor
Instructor Course
Course Hoy,
Hoy, Pat:
Pat: 63
63
(FWIC)
(FWIC):: 2929

100
100
Identification
Identification friend
friend or
or foe
foe (IM
:
(IFF): 31,
31, Korea,
Korea, Republic of:: 62,
Republic of 77, 94
62,77, 94
47-48
47--48 Korean War: 2-3, 5, 10, 12, 74
Korean War: 2-3, 5, 10, 12, 74
Integrated
Integrated air
air defense
defense system
system (TADS)
(IADS)::
22-23,38
22-23,38 LANTIRN
LANTIRN (low-altitude
(low-altitude navigation
navigation and
and
Integrated strike zones
Integrated strike zones:: 3.
3. See
See also
also targeting
targeting infrared
infrared for
for night)
night):: 27-28,
27-28,
route
route packages
packages 49, 61, 66-68, 77-78, 83, 86
49,61,66-68,77-78,83,86
Interdiction
Interdiction:: 6-11, 35, 67
6-11,35,67 LANTIRN
LANTIRN Operational
Operational Training
Trainingfor
for the
the
Korean
Korean War:
War: 7-97-9 F-1SE and F-16C/D: 61
F-15EandF-16ClD\ 61
Vietnam
Vietnam War:War: 10-11
10-11 Laser
Laser guided
guided bomb
bomb (LGB):
(LGB): 14, 25-28,
14,25-28,
World
World WarWar II:
II: 6-7
6-7 86-87
86-87
Interservice
Interservice communications,
communications, Launch-and-leave
Launch-and-leave missiles
missiles.. See
See
problems:
problems: 4,39-41
4,39-41.. SeeSee also
also missiles
missiles:: launch-and-leave
launch-and-leave
command
command and aixi control
control LeMay,
LeMay, Curtis
Curtis E.
E.:: 62
62
Interservice
Interservice liaison
liaison.. See
See joint
joint planning
planning Luftwaffe:
Luftwaffe: 6-7,23
6-7,23

Japan/Japanese
Japan/Japanese:: 1-2,
1-2, 6262 MacArthur,
MacArthur, Douglas
Douglas:: 11
Joint
Joint air
air operations
operations:: 2-4, 13-14, 27,
2-4,13-14,27, Maple
Maple Flag,
Flag, Cold
Cold Lake,
Lake, Alberta,
Alberta,
37, 43-45, 51-52,
37,43^5, 51-52,75. 75. See
See also
also air
air Canada:
Canada: 64.64. See
5ee also
a/so Red
Red Flag
Hag
component
component commander;
commander; fratricide;
fratricide; Marine
Marine air/ground
air/ground task
task force
force
unity of command
unity of command (MAGTF):
(MAGTF): 74 74
Coordination
Coordination:: 2-4, 13-14, 43-45,
2-4,13-14,43-45, Marine
Marine Corps
Corps Air-Ground
Air-Ground Combat
Combat
62,72
62,72 Center.. See
Center See Twentynine
Twentynine Palms,
Palms,
Lessons
Lessons learned:
learned: 55 Calif.
Calif.
Desert Storm:
Desert Storm: 13-14,
13-14,19,19, Mark-84
Mark-84 bombs:
bombs: 25 25
25-26, 30--33, 36, 50,
25-26,30-33,36, 62-63
50,62-^3 Marshall, George:: 22
Marshall, George
Korean War:
Korean War: 2, 5, 9-10, 12
2,5,9-10,12 McConnell,
McConnell, John
John P.P.:: 11
11
Urgent
Urgent Fury:
Fury: 62 62 Missiles
Missiles
Vietnam War:: 3-5,
Vietnam War 11, 13-14
3-5,11,13-14 AGM-65D:
AGM-65D: 36 36
World
World War
War II:
II: 1-2, 4-5, 6, 8,
1-2,4-5,6,8, AIM-7
AIM-7:: 27-30,32-33,
27-30,32-33,39 39
10-11,62
10-11,62 AIM-9:
AIM-9: 27-28,33
27-28,33
Night
Night operations:
operations: 17-52,
17-52,68,68, AIM-54
AIM-54 Phoenix:
Phoenix: 32 32
85-96
85-96 AMRAAM
AMRAAM:: 29,32 29,32
Problems:
Problems: 4, 4, 31, 40--41, 43-47,
31,40-41, 43-47, BVR:
BVR: 29, 34, 66
29,34,66
62-63
62-63 HARM:
HARM: 25-26,65,67
25-26,65,67
Tactics
Tactics:: 43-47,
43-47, 65,
65, 69-70,
69-70, 84-96
84-96 Hellfire
Hellfire:: 33,
33,5050
Training:
Training: 2, 4, 39, 42, 46, 48, 49,
2,4,39,42,46,48,49, Launch-and-leave
Launch-and-leave:: 29, 31-32
29,31-32
61-79,85-96
61-79, 85-96 SAM:
SAM: 11, 23, 25, 34, 38
11,23,25,34,38
Joint
Joint doctrine
doctrine:: 2,
2, 84
84 Mission
Mission Commanders'
Commanders' School,
School,
Joint
Joint forces
forces air
air component
component commander
commander proposed:
proposed: 90-92
90-92
(JFACC)
(JFACC):: 13-14
13-14 Mission
Mission planning:
planning: 24, 66
24,66
Joint
Joint planning
planning:: 62, 72, 84
62,72,84 Multirole
Multirole aircraft:
aircraft: 3535

Khafji,
Kha^i, Saudi
Saudi Arabia:
Arabia: 50, 63
50,63

101
National
National Training
Training Center,
Center, Fort
Fort Irwin,
Irwin, Pave
Pave Tack:
Tack: 12 12
Calif.:
Calif.: 61-62,
61-62, 72,
72, 74, 79, 87,
74, 79, 87, 89, 93
89,93 Paveway
PavewaylH: III: 25
25
Naval
Naval Strike
Strike Warfare
Warfare Center,
Center, Fallon
Fallen Powell,
PoweU, Colin:
CoHn: 13 13
NAS, Nev.: 61,
NAS,Nev.: 71-72, 75-76, 79,
61,71-72,75-76,79, Principles
Principles ofwar
of war
89-90,93,95
89-90, 93,95 Economy
Economy of of force
force:: 22
22
Night
Night air
air operations
operations:: 5-12,
5-12, 61
61 Mass:
Mass: 22, 51 . See
22,51. See also
also force
force
Capabilities
CapabiUties:: 9-11, 29, 85-96
9-11,29, 85-96 packaging
packaging
Korean
Korean War:
War: 9-109-10
Tactics:
Tactics: 6, 8-9, 35
6,8-9,35 Red
Red Flag,
Hag, Nellis
NeUis AFB,
AFB, Nev.:
Nev.: 56-58,
56-58,
Vietnam
Vietnam WarWar:: 10 10 6"1,64-72,75-79,85,89-92,
60-61,64-72, 75-79, 85, 89-92,
World
World WarWarm II: 10
10 94-96
94-96
Night
Night Flag:
Flag: 69,86-88,92-94
69, 86-88, 92-94 Red
Red FlagHag 2000:
2000: 64,64, 86-88
86-88
Night
Night Thunder:
Thunder: 88, 93-94
88,93-94 Rivers,
Rivers, John
John ("Lucky"):
("Lucky"): 29-30
29-30
Night
Night vision
vision goggles
goggles (NVG):
(NVG): 36, 44,
36,44, Route
Route packages:
packages: 3, 3, 27.
27. See
See also
also
49,56
49,56 ''' integrated
integrated strike
strike zones
zones
Nimitz,
Nimitz, Chester:
Chester: 11 Royal
Royal Air Air Force
Force (RAF)
(RAF) Bomber
Bomber
Nonverbal
Nonverbal data
data link
link (DL):
(DL): 31-32,
31-32,39 39 Command:
Command: 5-6 5-6
North
North Korea:
Korea: 7-97-9
Safe
Safe passage
passage procedures
procedures:: 46-47
46-47
NorthVietnam
North Vietnam:: 3, 3, 11
11
SEAD.
SEAD. See See suppression
suppression of of enemy
enemy air
air
North
North Vietnamese
Vietnamese Army Army (NVA):
(NVA): 10 10
defenses
defenses
Offensive
Ofifensive counterair
counterair (OCA):
(OCA): 20-21
20-21, Sharp,
Sharp, U.U. S.
S. Grant:
Grant: 1111
23-24,34,36,38-47,87
23-24,34,36,38^7, 87 Sidi
Sidi Bilal,
Bilal, Libya:
Libya: 1212
On-call
On-call close
close airsupport
air support:: 35-37, 48-51
35-37,48-51 Single
Single air
air component
component commander.
commander. See See
Operations
Operations - air
air component
component commander.
commander. See See also
also
El
e Dorado
Dorado Canyon:
Canyon: 5, 12, 27, 45,
5,12,27,45, unity
unity ofof command
command
47, 51, 84
47,51,84 Situational
Situational awareness:
awareness: 29-32, 39-40
29-32,39-40
Desert
Desert Shield/Storm
Shield/Storm:: 13-14, 19,
13-14,19, Six-Day
Six-Day WarWar (1967):
(1967): 23
23
23, 26, 30, 33, 36, 63, 67,
23,26,30,33,36,63,67, Speer,
Speer, Albert:
Albert: 55
74-75,83-84
74-75, 83-84 Suppression ofenemy
Suppression of enemy airair defenses
defenses
Linebacker
Linebacker II: II: 3-4
3^ (SEAD) : 13-14,23-26,32-34,
(SEAD): 13-14, 23-26, 32-34,
Tae
Tae Kwon
Kwon Do Do (fictional):
(fictional): 17-52
17-52 38-40,44-46,51,66-67,78
38-40,44-^6,51,66-67,78
Urgent
Urgent Fury
Fury (Grenada):
(Grenada): 62 62 Surface-to-air
Surface-to-air missile
missile (SAM).
(SAM). SeeSee
missiles : SAM
missiles: SAM
Pacific
Pacific Air
Air Forces
Forces (PACAF)
(PACAF):: 68-69,
68-69,
78,
78, 88, 90, 95
88,90,95 Tactical
Tactical Air
Air Command
Command:: 64 64
Pacific
Pacific campaign/theater:
campaign/theater: 1, 94
1,94 Tactical air forces : 68, 83
Tactical air forces: 68,83
Pacific
Pacific Command
Command (PACOM):
(PACOM): 11,11, Tactical
Tactical Fighter
Fighter Weapons
Weapons Center
Center
76-77
76-77 (TFWC) : 56-57, 64
(TFWC): 56-57, 64
Patterson,
Patterson, Jane:
Jane: 31-32
31-32
Pave
Pave Penny:
Penny: 50
50

10
1022
Target
Target United
United States
States Army
Army Air Air Forces
Forces
Acquisition
Acquisition andand attack
attack:: 21, 25, 44,
21,25,44, (USAAF)
(USAAF):: 66
50,
50,73,73, 87
87 United
United States
States Marine
Marine Corps
Corps (USMC)
(USMC):: 22
Egress:
Egress: 21-22,
21-22, 36, 39-40, 65
36,39-40, 65 Air-Ground
Air-Ground Combat
Combat Center.
Center. See
See
Identification:
Identification: 36, 50-51, 63, 73,
36,50-51,63,73, Twentynine
Twentynine Palms,Palms, Calif.
CaUf.
87,93
87,93 Air
Air operations
operations:: 3, 3, 88
Ingress
Ingress:: 21-22,
21-22, 38-39,
38-39,46,46, 64
64 United
United States
States Navy
Navy (USN):
(USN): 22
Tate,
Tate, Steve:
Steve: 30-31
30-31 Air
Air operations
operations:: 33
Team Spirit, Republic
Team Spirit, Republic of Korea: 62,
of Korea: 62, Air
Air training
training:: . 71
71
77-79,85,94,96
77-79, 85,94,96 CarrierAir
Carrier Air Wing
Wing 11 11 (CVW-11)
(CVW-11)::
Television
Television ordnance
ordnance scoring
scoring system
system 19
19
(TOSS):
(TOSS): 87 87 Unity
Unity of
of command
command:: 3-4. 3-4. SeeSee also
also air
air
Time
Time over
over target
target (TOT):
(TOT): 3,3, 14,
14, 25, 45,
25,45, component
component commander
commander
67
67
Twentynine
Twentynine Palms,
Palms, Calif,
Calif., USMC
USMC Vietcong:
Vietcong: 10
10
Air-Ground
Air-Ground Combat
Combat Center:
Center: 62,
62, Vietnam
Vietaam War:
War: 2-5, 11, 13-14, 27, 74
2-5,11,13-14,27,74
74-75, 79, 93, 95 WILD
74-75,79,93,95 Wild Weasels
Weasels:: 26
26
Woodall,
Woodall, James
James D.:
D.: 68
68
World
World War
War Il:
H: 1-2,
1-2, 6, 8, 10-11, 74
6,8,10-11, 74

103

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