Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Course Outline
NATURE
Municipal Law or private law of each state which regulates relations of individuals
among themselves or with their state
It is the law of the forum that furnishes the yardstick for the presence or absence of
jurisdiction
DEFINITION
Is that part of the municipal law of the state which directs its courts and administrative
agencies, when confronted with a legal problem involving a foreign element, whether or
not, they should apply a foreign law or foreign laws (Paras)
IMPORTANCE
1. to adjust conflicting rights in international, mercantile and corporate transactions; and
2. to solve personal, family, property and successional contractual problems, possessed
of facts or elements operating in two or more states
FUNCTIONS
According to Paras
1. the determination of which country has jurisdiction
2. the applicability to a particular case of either the local or the foreign law
3. the determination of the force, validity and effectiveness of a foreign judgment
According to Coquia
1. to proscribe the conditions under which a court or agency is competent to entertain a
suit or proceeding involving facts containing a foreign element;
2. to determine the extent, validity and enforceability of foreign judgment;
3. to determine for each class of cases the particular system if law by reference to which
the rights of the parties must be ascertained
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
BASIS LAW (CONFLICT OF LAW) PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
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II. BRIEF HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (25)
In the 5th century, the Roman Empire was overthrown by the so-
called barbarian tribe: personal law replaced territorial law. This simply
means that every person, regardless of residence, was considered subject to
the law of his original nation or tribe. If the parties to a contract came from
different nations, the law of the debtor prevailed for it was then believed that
his interest were paramount.
1. Indirect sources
Natural moral law
Works of writers
2. Direct sources
constitutions
codifications
special laws
treatises and international conventions
judicial decisions
international customs such as lex situs, lex loci celebrationis, lex
nationalii/domicilii, territoriality, generality
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A. BASIS OF EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION / KINDS OF JURISDICTION
1. Jurisdiction over the person which is based on forum-defendant contacts;
2. Jurisdiction over the subject matter and
3. Jurisdiction over the res based on forum-property contacts
Acquired through
Plaintiff - institution of action by proper pleading
Defendant - voluntary appearance or by the coercive power of legal process
exerted over the person (Paras)
Jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff is acquired from the moment he
invokes the aid of the court and voluntarily submits himself by institution of the
suit through proper pleadings
Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired through voluntary
appearance or personal or substituted service of summons (Coquia)
FACTS : Paul Schenker acting through his wife Helen Schenker filed a complaint against
petitioner for the enforcement of Paul Schenkers allegedly initial subscription to
the shares of stock of the Phil. Swiss Trading Company and the exercise of his
alleged preemptive rights to the unissued original capital stock of said
corporation. Believing that the suit was only for the purpose of harassing and
degrading his reputation, he also filed a damage suit against the Schenkers. The
trial rendered in favor of Gemperle thus Helen Schenker appealed alleging that
Paul Schenker cannot be sued or joined as defendants because the trial court
never acquired jurisdiction over his person because he was outside of the Phil.
thus he is beyond the jurisdiction of our court.
ISSUE : Whether or not the court can acquire jurisdiction over the person of an alien
defendant?
HELD : Yes, where a Swiss citizen, residing abroad was served with summons through
his wife who was residing in the Phil. and who was his representative and
attorney-in-fact in a prior civil case which was filed at her behest in her
aforementioned capacity, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over his person by
means of service of summons to his wife.
As a the wife had authority to sue in his behalf, so she was also empowered to
represent him in suits filed against him, particularly in a case which is a
consequence of the action brought by her in his behalf.
FACTS : Respondent Sps. Silvestre and Patricia Pacleb filed an action before the RTC of
Rosario, Batangas against petitioners, Sps. Belen for the enforcement of a
foreign judgment rendered by Judge Green of the superior court of the State of
California, in a complaint for breach of contract against herein petitioners
ordering them to pay private respondents monetary award. The summons was
served on petitioners address in San Gregorio, Alaminos, Laguna received by a
certain Marcelo Belen as alleged in the complaint. Atty. Alcantara, whose
services were retained by the petitioners relatives, entered his appearance for
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the petitioners, filed an answer stating among others that petitioners are actually
residents of California, USA. Atty. Alcantara on a later date moved to dismiss the
complaint due to the judgment of dismissal rendered by the same foreign court
which was denied for failure to present a copy thereof. Subsequently, the RTC
ordered a judgment in favor of the respondents which judgment was not received
by Atty. Alcantara due to his death but by a certain Leopoldo Avecilla.
Thereafter, Att. Carmelo Culvera, petitioners new counsel assailed the judgment
before the CA for lack of jurisdiction over the petitioners in view of the improper
service of summons. The CA affirmed the said decision. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE : Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.
HELD : Yes. Even if the service of summons was defective upon non- resident
defendants, the appearance of Atty. Alcantara impliedly authorized by the
defendants to appear on their behalf and his filing of numerous pleadings were
sufficient to vest jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants.
1. Action in personam any judgment that the court will render in that case binds only
the parties to the action and their privies or their successors-in-interest;
2. Action in rem any judgment that the court will render in the case binds not only the
parties to the case but the whole world
3. Quasi in rem action quasi in rem is actually in personam because it is directed
only against a particular individual but the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his
property to the obligation of lien burdening it. The object of the case is the sale or
other disposition of property of the defendant which one may have a right or lien over
the property
Example: an action to subject certain property of the defendant to payment of a
claim. An action between parties where the direct object is to reach
and dispose of property owned by them, or of some interest therein
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IDONAH PERKINS V. ROXAS
June 19, 1941 GR No. 4751
ISSUE : Whether or not CFI can assume jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
HELD : Yes, because jurisdiction over the subject matter is the nature of the cause of
action which is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court. In
the case at bar the respondents action calls for the adjudication of title to certain
shares of stock of the corporation and the granting of affirmative reliefs which fall
within the general jurisdiction of the CFI of Manila.
ELEMENTS:
a. the forum state is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to;
b. it is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the
facts; and
c. it has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision
MANIFESTATIONS:
the witnesses and evidence may not be readily available
the court dockets of the forum may already be clogged; to permit
additional cases would inevitably hamper the speedy administration of
justice
the evils of forum-shopping ought to be curbed
the forum has no particular interest in the case
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other courts are open: certainly the case may be better tried in said
courts
FACTS : Plaintiffs were German nationals and residents of Germany. Defendant on the
other hand was a corporation or an entity organized in New York. Plaintiffs
brought an action against the defendants for the recovery of insurance claims on
insurance contracts issued by the defendant corporation. But the action was
brought not in New York nor in Germany but in Oregon, USA. Plaintiffs contends
that the court should take cognizance of the case because anyway it has
acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter, over the plaintiffs (because plaintiffs
filed a pleading in Oregon court) and over the defendant (by means of service of
summons having been made on its residents or statutory agents in Oregon).
ISSUE : Whether or not the Oregon court can refuse to take cognizance of the case.
HELD : Yes, the Oregon court can refuse to take cognizance or to assume jurisdiction
over the case on the ground of forum non-conveniens, were both parties are not
residents of the place where the court was located and exercising jurisdiction and
especially the courts of Germany and New York are open and functioning.
But it may also take cognizance of the case in the exercise of its sound
discretion.
As a general rule, no rule of Private International Law would be violated if the courts
should decide to dispose cases, according to the internal law of the forum
EXCEPT: where a foreign, sovereign, diplomatic, official or public vessel or property of
another state is involved, or where a state has by treaty, accepted limitations upon its
jurisdiction over certain persons of things
Examples:
i. Article 16 of the Civil Code real and personal property subject to the law of
the country where they are situated and testamentary succession governed by
lex nationalii
ii. Article 829 of the Civil Code makes revocation done outside the Philippines
valid according the law of the place where will was made or lex domicilii
iii. Article 819 of the Civil Code prohibits Filipinos from making joint wills even if
valid in foreign country
2. when the proper foreign law has not been properly pleaded and proved
NOTE: as a general rule, courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws must
be pleaded and proved
The following actions may be resorted in case of failure to prove and plead the
proper foreign law
i. Dismiss the case for inability to establish cause of action
ii. Assume that the foreign law of the same as the law of the forum
(processual presumption)
iii. Apply the law of the forum
3. when the case involves any of the exceptions to the application of the proper
foreign law as when the foreign law is
contrary to an important public policy of the forum
penal in nature
procedural in nature
purely fiscal and administrative in nature
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application of the foreign law may work undeniable injustice to the
citizens of the forum
FACTS : Petitioner was an administrator of the estate of Edward Hix. When the petitioner
went to court to have the will of deceased Edward probated, it was refused by the
court. Petitioner contends that the deceased was a resident of Virginia and the
will he executed was within the formalities of Virginia law. In fact he presented
the proof such law in a book found in a national library and thereafter he let it
certified by the director of our national library.
ISSUE : Whether or not proof of Virginia law was properly laid down.
HELD : No, because there was no showing that the book which he presented was an
official publication of West Virginia, nor there was an attestation by the officer
having the custody of the original and there was no proof that the law he
presented was still enforced at the time alleged will was executed.
Phil. court are not bound to take cognizance of a foreign law which must be
proved as a fact and in the absence of such proof it is considered as the same as
ours.
Furthermore, the due execution of the will was not established because it was not
acknowledged by the testator in the presence of two competent witnesses or that
these witnesses subscribed to the will in the presence of the testator and of each
other as the law of West Virginia seems to require.
FACTS : During the probate of the will and testament of C.O. Bohonan, it was not disputed
that testator Bohonan was a citizen of Nevada and that his will shall be disposed
in accordance with the law of Nevada. Proof of such foreign law having been
offered and taken by the probate court. After the probate becomes final
Magdalena and her children filed with the court contending that they have
deprived of the legitime so they asked the court to present again the Nevada law
to determine on whether or not the deprivation was in accordance with Nevada
laws and to determine also whether the Nevada law shall apply.
ISSUES : 1) Whether or not the court shall again take judicial notice on Nevada law
2) Whether or not Nevada law shall apply in the disposition of the estate
of a foreign individual
HELD : 1) Not anymore because it has already been presented and admitted in court
during the probate of the will and that appellant did not dispute the said law.
In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator, do not dispute the
provision of the laws of the State of Nevada. Thus, the court can taken
judicial notice without proof of such law having been offered at the hearing
of the project of partition.
2) Nevada law shall apply. Art.16 of the Civil Code provides that the validity of
testamentary disposition the amount of successional right the order of
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succession, the intrinsic validity of the will and capacity to succeed shall be
the governed by the law of the person whose succession is under
consideration regardless of the nature of the property and regardless of the
place where the property is situated.
NOTE: there is no judicial notice of any foreign law. A foreign law must be properly
pleaded and proved as a fact, otherwise, our courts will presume that the foreign
law is the same as our internal law
FACTS : Respondent, a resident of La Union, instituted an action for damages arising from
breach of contract against petitioner as well as Brand Marine Services, Inc.
(BMSI) and Rust Intl. Inc. (RUST) alleging that BMSI a foreign corp. organized
under the laws of the State of Connecticut, entered into a contract with
respondent where BMSI hired respondent to negotiate the sale of services in
government projects in which respondent was not paid his commissions from the
Pinatubo dredging project which he secured in behalf of BMSI. Petitioner sought
the dismissal of the complaint on grounds of failure to state a cause of action and
forum non conveniens since the rights and obligations of the parties shall be
governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut.
ISSUE : Whether or not the complaint should be dismissed on grounds of forum non
conveniens
HELD : No. Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court in conflict of laws cases,
may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most convenient or
available forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking remedies
elsewhere. In the said case, petitioners averments of the foreign elements in the
instant case are not sufficient to oust the trial court of its jurisdiction. The
propriety in dismissing a case based on the principle of forum non conveniens
requires a factual determination thus, it is more properly considered a matter of
defense.
CHARACTERIZATION, defined
the process by which a court at the beginning of the choice-of-law process assigns a
disputed question to an area in substantive law, such as torts, contracts, family law of
property (Coquia)
the process of determining under what category a certain set of facts or rules fall, the
ultimate purpose of which is enable the forum to select the proper law (Paras)
Factors which give rise to the problem of characterization: Different legal systems
attach to the same legal term with different meanings, that is, an identity of names
covers a difference of nature or content of legal idea;
may contain ideas or conceptions completely unknown to one another;
apply difference principles for the solution of problems, which, in general terms, are of
common nature
STEPS IN CHARACTERIZATION
1. The determination of the facts involved
determine whether or not foreign element is involved
law of the forum must be guided by its own rules of pleading and proof
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GIBBS V. GOVT. OF THE PHIL. ISLANDS
59 Phil 293 (1933)
FACTS : Petitioner Allison Gibbs was the husband of the deceased Eva Gibbs. Both were
citizen and domiciliary of California at the time of Eva Gibbs death. During the
existence of their marriage, the spouses acquire parcel of lands located in the
Phil. When Eva died Allison the petitioner then went to the Register of Deeds and
demanded the latter to issue to him a transfer certificate of title but the Register
of Deeds refused to issue and to register the transfer of title in favor of Allison. So
he went to the court praying that the Register of Deeds shall issue a
corresponding title to him without requiring previous payment of any inheritance
tax because they are citizens and residents of California therefore Californian law
will apply, which provides that community property of spouses who are citizens of
California, upon the death of the wife previous to that of the husband belongs,
absolutely to the husband without admission
ISSUE : Which law shall apply (California or Phil)
HELD : The Phil. law shall apply because the property in question was located in the Phil.
because real property as well as personal property shall be subject to the law of
the country where it is situated, irrespective of the domicile of the parties or of the
place where the marriage was celebrated. Phil. jurisprudence adopted the
doctrine of lex rei sitae therefore Phil. law shall apply.
If, upon the other hand, there is no common characterization, we are of the
belief that we may avail ourselves of the characterization that will uphold the
efficacy of the contract. If this may be attained by making use of our own
characterization, by all means, we must do.
Solution:
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consider prescriptive period or the statute of frauds that the parties had in mind at
the time the transaction took place.
Totality approach:
a. first get the law intended by the parties to govern the contract;
b. then, proceed to apply that intended law in its totality including its periods of
prescription and its statute of frauds, except if subject matter governs property
located in the Philippines, our own law on prescription and our own statute of
frauds must apply
Sec. 48, Rules of Civil Procedure if barred at the place where the cause of
action arose, it is also barred here
STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Substantive if the words of the law relate to forbidding the obligation
Procedural if the law forbids the enforcement of the obligation
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Substantive when the limitation was directed to the newly created liability
specifically to warrant a qualification of the right
Procedural if it operates to bar the legal remedy without impairing the substantive
right involved
BORROWING STATUTE
directs the state of the forum to apply the foreign statute of limitations to the
pending
claims based on a foreign law (treats the statute of limitations as a substantive law)
FACTS : Petitioners filed a class suit against ABC corporation and BRII corporation a
domestic licensed to recruit, mobilize and deploy Filipino workers abroad on
behalf of its foreign principals on the non-payment of the unexpired portion of the
employment contracts which where terminated prematurely, fringe benefits and
refund of SSS. Respondent argued that the case has already prescribed in view
of the Amari decree which provides that A claim arising out of a contract of
employment shall not be actionable after the lapse of one year from the date of
the expiry date of the contract. But the MLRC ruled that the actions has not yet
prescribed because the prescriptive period for filing of the claims was three years
and not one year as provided in the Amari decree.
A law on prescription is sui generis in conflict of laws in the sense that it may be
viewed either as procedural or substantive, depending on the characterization
given such a law.
If by the laws of the state where the cause of action arose, the action is barred, it
is also barred in the Phil.
The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the
forums public policy.
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LWV CONS. CORP. vs. MARCELO DUPO
G.R. No. 172342, July 13, 2009
FACTS : Respondent filed a complaint for payment of service award against petitioner
before NLRC invoking Saudi labor Workmens Law. Petitioner offered payment
and prescription as defenses that under Art. 13 of the Saudi Labor Law, action to
enforce payment of the service award must be filed within one year from the
termination of a labor contract for a specific period. However, the one year
prescriptive period lapsed.
ISSUE : Whether or not the Saudi Labor Law on prescription of action will apply.
HELD : No. Applicable law is Art. 291 of the Phil. Labor Code which provides that all
money claims arising from employer-employee relations shall be filed within 3
years from the time the cause of action accrued otherwise they shall be forever
barred. It is not limited to money claims recoverable under the labor code but
also applies to claims of overseas contract workers. As held in the Cadalin case,
procedural matters are governed by the laws of the forum even if the action
is based upon a foreign substantive law. Thus, respondents action has not
prescribed.
A. RENVOI, definition
procedure whereby a jural matter is presented which the conflict of laws rules of the
forum refer to a foreign law, the conflict of law of which in turn, refers the matter
back to the law of the forum (remission) or a third state (transmission)
literally means referring back : problem arises when there is doubt as to whether a
reference to a foreign law
a. is a reference to the internal law of said foreign law; or
b. is a reference to the whole of the foreign, including its conflicts rule
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apply or accept it by reference to the whole law, including the conflicts rule of
the foreign law (Paras)
if the conflicts rules of the forum refer the case to the law of another state, it is
deemed to include the totality of the foreign law (internal law and conflicts of
laws rule). Thus, the court will recognize the referral back and apply local law.
(Coquia)
a. if the foreign court would accept the renvoi, the local court shall apply the
foreign law.
b. if the foreign law would reject the renvoi, the local court shall apply lex fori
c. if the foreign court would apply the desistment theory, the local court shall
apply the foreign law
d. if the foreign court would use the foreign court theory, then international
pingpong would ensue (Coquia)
DOUBLE RENVOI
it is that which occurs when the local court, in adopting the foreign court theory,
discovers that the foreign court accepts the renvoi
TRANSMISSION
the process of applying the law of a foreign state thru the law of a second
foreign state
SUGGESTED CONCLUSION
the theory to be adopted must consider the circumstances of a given situation
that will best result in fairness, equity and justice
AZNAR V GARCIA
117 Phil 106, 7 SCRA 95 (1963)
FACTS : Edward Christensen was a citizen of California. He came to the Phl. where he
became a domiciliary till the time of his death. Before he died he executed a will
instituting his natural child Maria as his only heir to his estate but left a legacy
P3600 in favor of Helen also his acknowledge natural child. Helen claims that she
was deprived of her legitime, she claims that our Phil. law that should be applied
because Art. 16 par.2 of the Civil Code, California law should be applied, that
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under California law the matter is referred back to the law of domicile, that
therefore Phil. law is ultimately applicable, that finally therefore her share shall be
increased in view of the successional rights of illegitimate children under Phil.
law. Maria contends that it is clear that under Art.16 par.2 of Civil Code, the
national of the ceased must apply, our courts must apply the internal law of
California that there are no compulsory heirs and consequently a testator could
dispose of any property possessed by him in absolute dominion and that
illegitimate children not being entitled to anything under California law.
HELD : Phil. law shall apply. There are two rules in California on the matter, the internal
law which will apply to Californian citizens domiciled in California and the conflicts
rule which will apply to Californian citizens domiciled n other states which states
that If there is no law to the contrary in the placed where personal property is
situate, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner and is governed by the law
of his domicile.
As the domicile of the deceased who was citizen of California was the Phil., the
validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child of the
latters legacy should be governed by the Phil. law. Therefore Helens legacy
shall be increased.
BELLIS VS BELLIS
20 SCRA 359 (1968)
FACTS : Decedent Amos Bellis was a citizen and a domiciliary of Texas at the time of his
death. He made two wills before he died which are executed in the Phil., one
disposing his properties in Texas and the other his properties in the Phil.
Although respondents were given their shares in other properties, they were
however deprived in the residuary estate of the decedent. They filed an
opposition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes to which they
would be entitled if the Phil. law were to apply. But the executor contended that
since the decedent is a Texan citizen the Texas law shall be applied. There are
no compulsory heirs under Texas law and therefore no legitimes.
ISSUE : Whether or not respondents entitled to that residuary estate of the decedent.
Whether or not renvoi shall be applied.
HELD : No, because under Art.16 of the NCC that in case of intestate and testamentary
succession, both with respect to the order of success and to the amount of
successional rights, and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provision and the
capacity to succeed shall be governed by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may b e the nature of the property
and regardless of the place wherein said property may be found.
nvoi doctrine because the decedent is a resident and citizen of Texas at the time
of his death. Renvoi can be applied only if the decedent is a citizen of one
country but a resident in another at the time of his death. So that even if Texas
has a conflict rule regarding successional right the same would not result in a
reference back to Phil. law but would still refer to Texas Law.
VII. NOTICE OF PROOF OF FOREIGN LAW (RULE 132, RULES OF COURT; RULE 130,
RULES OF COURT)
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A. Extent of Judicial Notice
Section 1, Rule 129, Rules of Court , Judicial Notice, when mandatory A
court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the
existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of
government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and
maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history
of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial
departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the
geographical divisions
a foreign judgment is recognized when it is given the same effect that it has in
the state where it was rendered with respect to the parties, the subject matter of
the action and the issued involved. Where the foreign judgment is being
presented as a defense to the claim of the plaintiff, what is involved is the
recognition of a foreign judgment
Requisites:
1. foreign judgment was rendered by a judicial or a quasi-judicial tribunal
which had competent jurisdiction over the parties and the case in the proper
judicial proceedings in which the defendant shall have been given
reasonable notice and the opportunity to be heard;
2. it must be a judgment on civil and commercial matters;
3. the judgment must be valid according to the court that delivered it;
4. judgment must be final and executory to constitute res judicata in another
action
Elements of res judicata:
a. Final
b. Rendered by a competent court
c. On the merits
d. Involve the same parties, subject matter and cause of action
5. foreign judgment must not be contrary to the public policy or the good
morals of the state where it is to be enforced
6. judgment must not have been obtained by fraud, collusion, mistake of fact
or mistake of law
7. the foreign judgment must not be barred by prescription under the law of
the state in which it was promulgated or under the law of the state in which
its recognition/enforcement is sought
RECOGNITION ENFORCEMENT
OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT
Courts will allow the foreign judgment Plaintiff wants courts to positively carry out
to be presented as a defense to a local and make effective in the state a foreign
litigation judgment
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Involves merely the sense of justice Virtually implies a direct act of sovereignty
Does not require either an action of a Necessitates a separate action or
special proceeding proceeding brought precisely to make the
foreign judgment effective
May exist without enforcement Necessarily carries with it recognition
IN RE ESTATE OF JOHNSON
39 Phil 157
FACTS : Emil Johnson was a naturalized citizen of USA but he died in the Phil. He made a
holographic will before he died but was witnessed only by two witnesses instead
of three as required by Phil. law. A petition for probate was filed before the CFI of
Manila by his executor, who contended that Johnson was a citizen of USA at the
time of his death and that the will was duly executed in accordance with the laws
of Illinois, USA which pursuant to the provision of the Civil Procedure, it can be
probated here in the Phil. He then presented the proof of said law before the
court which was admitted by the same. However, Ebba, the daughter of the late
Johnson moved to annul the decree of probate and prayed for the
commencement of intestate administration of the estate on the ground that
Johnson was not a resident of the state of Illinois (became a resident in Manila,
but offering only a general statement) and that the probated will was not in
accordance with the laws of that state.
HELD : 1. Johnson remains a citizen of USA. The petition does not deny the citizenship
of Johnson but only asserts that he became a resident of the Phil. Mere
residency in another country without any intention of renouncing his
citizenship does not necessary follow that he will immediately acquire
citizenship in the state of his new domicile.
2. Yes. The will was in accordance with the laws of USA. The trial judge was
fully satisfied with the proof of such law presented by the executor of the
deceased. Even presuming that the trial judge in taking judicial notice of the
law of USA, such error is not available to the petitioner daughter because she
did not offer any evidence as what the true law of USA is which would appear
that the law found by the court is different from the true law of Illinois USA.
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procedural in nature
purely fiscal and administrative in nature
application of the foreign law may work undeniable injustice to the
citizens of the forum
the case involves real or personal property situated in the forum
contrary to good morals
PARDO V. REPUBLIC
85 Phil 323
FACTS : Petitioner Vicente Pardo was a Spanish citizen born in Spain in 1895. In 1905 he
went to the Phil. and resides here wherein he married a Filipino and employed in
Manila. Petitioner arrived in the Phil. when he was only ten years old and has
already lived here for 44 years. Petitioner filed a petition for naturalization but it
was opposed by the herein respondent on the ground that he did not or the
evidence that he presented on whether the laws of Spain grant Filipinos the right
to become naturalized citizen of that country is not sufficient. Petitioner only
presented a certificate signed by the Consul Gen. of Spain in the Phil. stating that
in accordance with Art.17 and 25 of the Spanish Code, Filipinos are eligible to
Spanish citizenship in Spain besides court should have take judicial notice on this
law.
HELD : Yes, because mot of our laws comes from Spain, the court may take judicial
notice. As the Civil Code has been and still the basic code in force in the Phil.
Art.17 of thereof may be regarded as matters known to judges of the Phil. by
reason of their, judicial functions and may be judicially recognized by them
without the introduction of proof.
A copy of a foreign law certified only by the local consul of the applicants country
does not conform to the requirements concerning the certification and
authentication of such law.
FACTS : Spouses Charles and Linnie Hodges executed a mutual will wherein they
mutually made a testamentary provisions in favor of each other. Both spouses
resided in the Phil. at the time of the death of Linnie Hodges. The validity of
certain testamentary provisions made by Linnie in favor of his husband, arose a
question as to what exactly were the laws of Texas on the matter at the time of
death of Linnie. PCIB contended that since Hodges spouses were both residents
of the Phil. at the time of the death of Linnie, Texan Law would result in the
renvoi. The other party contended that no renvoi was possible therefore Texas
Law shall be the applicable law. But PCIB previous admitted that under the laws
of Texas that there is such a legitime of of said conjugal estate.
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HELD : 1. Elementary is the rule that foreign laws may not be taken judicial notice of
and have to be proven like any other fact in dispute between the parties in
any proceeding, with the rare exception in instances when the said laws are
already within the actual knowledge of the court, such as when they are well
and generally known or they have been actually ruled upon in other cases
before it and none of the parties concerned claim otherwise.
2. Yes, it creates estoppel. The existence and effects of foreign laws being
questions of fact, such previous admission thereof creates estoppels in any
further proceedings.
FACTS : During the probate of the will and testament of C.O. Bohonan, it was not disputed
that testator Bohonan was a citizen of Nevada and that his will shall be disposed
in accordance with the law of Nevada. Proof of such foreign law having been
offered and taken by the probate court. After the probate becomes final
Magdalena and her children filed with the court contending that they have
deprived of the legitime so they asked the court to present again the Nevada law
to determine on whether or not the deprivation was in accordance with Nevada
laws and to determine also whether the Nevada law shall apply.
ISSUES : 1) Whether or not the court shall again take judicial notice on Nevada law
2) Whether or not Nevada law shall apply in the disposition of the estate
of a foreign individual
HELD : 1) Not anymore because it has already been presented and admitted in court
during the probate of the will and that appellant did not dispute the said law.
In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator, do not dispute the
provision of the laws of the State of Nevada. Thus, the court can taken
judicial notice without proof of such law having been offered at the hearing
of the project of partition.
2) Nevada law shall apply. Art.16 of the Civil Code provides that the validity of
testamentary disposition the amount of successional right the order of
succession, the intrinsic validity of the will and capacity to succeed shall be
the governed by the law of the person whose succession is under
consideration regardless of the nature of the property and regardless of the
place where the property is situated.
FACTS : Two children(minors) born in China from a Chinese father and who were in the
custody of their Filipino mother were denied by the respondent to enter into the
Phil. on the ground that under Chinese immigration laws a certificate shall be
necessary in order to enter into the Phil. Petitioners contended that they are
entitled to enter, regardless of the provisions of the law since the are citizens of
the Phil. and that their mother who is entitled to their custody and charged with
their maintenance and education, is clearly entitled to take up her residence in
the Phil. and should not be required, to that end, to abandon her minor children.
But petitioners failed to prove and present the Chinese law.
ISSUE : In the absence of any evidence of the Chinese law, what law shall apply.
HELD : Infant children of a Filipino woman born in China out of lawful wedlock, whose
father was a Chinese person, seeking entry into the Phil. in the custody and
17
control of their mother for the purpose of taking up their residence here with her
are not subject to exclusion under the Chinese Immigration laws.
Since the court was not advised of any provision of Chinese law which
differentiates the status of infant children, born out of lawful wedlock, the court
therefore assumes that China law is the same in Phil. law regarding the rights
and status of infant children born out of wedlock.
BEAM V. YATCO
82 Phil 30
FACTS : A.W. Beam and his wife Lydia Beam were residents and citizens of California at
the time of Lydia Beams death. But sometime during their marriage they resided
her and acquired properties in the Phil. When Lydia Beam died half of her
properties were inherited by the plaintiffs and consequently the defendant
imposed an inheritance tax. Plaintiffs refused to pay or paid under protest on the
ground that A.W. Beam was a Utah citizen, that under the law of Utah properties
acquired by the spouses during the marriage belong to them separately however
A.W. Beam failed to prove his citizenship. Defendant contends that since he
failed to prove his Utah citizenship the law of the Phil. shall govern. And that
since the properties in questions were acquired by them during their marriage, it
should be considered as part of the community property and upon the death of
the wife, the one belong to her passed by succession to her heirs in accordance
with Art.1401 of the Civil Code and therefore subject to the inheritance tax.
ISSUE : Failure of A.W. Beam to prove Utah law, what law shall apply?
HELD : When a foreign law is pleaded and no evidence has been presented as to said
law it is presumed that Utah law is the same as in the law of the forum.
MICIANO V. BRIMO
50 Phil 67
FACTS : A Turkish national made a will wherein he stated that his property shall be
distributed in accordance with Phil. laws and not that of his nation since the
provisions of the will is void. When the judicial administrator of the Turkish filed a
scheme partition proceedings, brothers of the deceased Turkish opposed on the
ground that said provisions in the will is void being in violation of Art. 16 of the
Civil Code. However, the oppositor failed to prove that the said testamentary
provisions are not in accordance with the Turkish Laws and failed to present any
evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter.
ISSUE : Whether or not partition proceedings be refused. What law shall be applied.
HELD : No, it shall not be refused because foreign laws shall be proved as a fact and in
the absence of such proof, they are presumed to be same as these of the Phil.
Thus partition proceedings may be continued.
However, by failure to prove by the brother oppositor on what the Turkish law is
all about, the court indulged in a presumption that Turkish law was the same as
ours. And his estate shall be distributed in accordance with the Phil. laws but
testamentary provision made by the testator shall be void for being contrary to
the law.
18
COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE V. FISHER
110 Phil 636
FACTS : Stevenson was born in the Phil. of British parents and was married to Beatrice
also a British national. Stevenson died and instituted his wife as his sole heir to
certain properties acquired by both spouses while residing here in the Phil. when
the wife filed a preliminary estate4 and inheritance tax return, she claims for a
deduction of taxes on the ground that under the Phil. civil law, in the absence of
HELD : No. The pertinent English law that allegedly vests in the decedent husband full
ownership of the properties acquired during the marriage has not been proven by
the petitioner except for a mere allegation in his answer which is not sufficient. In
the absence of such proof, it is presumed that the law of England on the matter is
the same as our law.
FACTS : Yam Ka Lim, of Chinese descent, arrived at the port of Manila from the port of
Hongkong and sought admission into the Philippine Islands, claiming that he is
the legitimate minor son of Yam Long Sai, a resident Chinese merchant. The
board of special inquiry, questioned his right to enter the Philippines and after
examining the evidence submitted by the petitioner and from the testimonies of
the witnesses, refused to permit him to land upon the ground that they did not
believe him to be the legitimate son of the said Yam Long Sai. Notice of the said
decision was given to Yam Long sai and to his representative William Tracey
Page, giving them 2 days to appeal to the Insular Collector of Customs. Later a
bond was given for the release of the plaintiff. No appeal was taken from the
decision of the board of special inquiry to the Insular Collector of Customs.
Without having first decided whether the Collector of Customs had abused his
authority, the lower court proceeded to hear evidence upon the question whether
or not Yam Ka Lim was the legitimate minor son of Yam Long Sai. After hearing
the evidence and taking into consideration the laws of China, without any proof
as to what they were, the lower court decided that the said Yam Ka Lim was the
legitimate son of the said Yam Long Sai and ordered him to be released from the
custody of the Collector of Customs and that he be permitted to enter the
Philippine Islands and that the said bond theretofore given be canceled. Hence
this appeal.
ISSUE : Whether or nor the court erred in taking judicial notice of the laws of China
relative to marriage and child legitimacy, which differ from those in force in the
Philippine Islands.
HELD : Yes, the lower court committed an error in taking judicial notice of what the laws
of marriage in China are. The statutes of other countries must be pleaded and
proved the same as any other fact. In the absence of such pleading and proof the
laws of a foreign state will be presumed to be the same as our own.
19
There was ample proof in the record to show, or at least to convince the board of
special inquiry, that said Yam Ka Lim was not the legitimate minor son of the said
Yam Long Sai.
VIII. NATIONALITY
refers to membership in a political community.
The Philippines adheres to the nationality law Theory
Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad. (9a)
A. DETERMINATION OF NATIONALITY
Each State has the prerogative and authority to determine by its own municipal law
who are its nationals or citizens
The Hague Convention on Conflict of National Laws provides it is for each state to
determine who are its nationals. This law shall be recognized by other states insofar
as it is consistent with international convention, international customs, and the
principles of law generally recognized with regard to nationality.
1. NATURAL BORN CITIZENS those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.
Native born citizen is one born in the country of which he is a citizen, hence, a child
born to a Filipino mother in Germany is a natural born, but not native born citizen
Article IV of the Philippine Constitution (1987), The following are citizens of the
Philippines
a. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution;
b. Those whose fathers and mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
c. Those born before January 17. 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philppine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority (within three years)
d. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law
20
1. JUS SOLI PRINCIPLE the law of the place of ones birth determine ones
nationality
2. JUS SANGUINIS PRINCIPLE one follows the citizenship of his parents; this is
citizenship by blood
The Philippine Constitution applies the Jus Sanguinis principle which means the rule of
descent or blood.
TALAROC V. UY, 92
Phil 52 (1952)
FACTS : Respondent Yu was elected as Municipal Mayor. However his election was
questioned by the defeated candidate Talaroc, the herein petitioner, on the
ground that Uy was a Chinese and therefore ineligible for the position.
Respondent contended that his father is a Chinese citizen.while he was still a
minor his father died and that his mother without expressly expatriating herself
ipso facto reacquired her Filipino citizenship upon the death of her husband. He
thus followed his mothers citizenship and is a citizen of the Phil. by the mere fact
of his birth.
HELD : Filipino, a Filipino woman married to Chinese ipso facto reacquired her Filipino
citizenship upon the death of her husband and that thereafter her minor childrens
nationality automatically followed that of the mothers.
The rule applies only to minor children not to persons who are already in age.
FACTS : Private respondents Ongs father was a Chinese citizen married to a natural born
Filipina in 1932. They bore 8 children, one of whom is private respondent who
was born in 1948. On 1955, private respondents father took his Oath of
Allegiance and was declared a Filipino citizen. In 1984 and 1986 elections, he
registered himself as a voter of Laoang Samar. The following year he ran in the
elections for representative in the 2 nd district of Northern Samar in which he was
proclaimed winner. Petitioner then filed protests on the ground that Ong, the
private respondent was not a natural born citizen of the Phil. because he failed to
file a statement or formal declaration when he reached the age of majority to
elect Phil. citizenship which is required under the law.
ISSUE : Whether or not there is a need for Ong to file a sworn statement.
HELD : Not anymore. He was already a citizen. Not only because his mother was a
natural born citizen but also his father had been naturalized when the respondent
was still a minor. He exercises his right of suffrage and established his life here in
the Phil.
21
To require the respondent to elect Phil. citizenship, would not only have been
superfluous but would also have resulted in absurdity considering that it was the
law itself that had already elected Phil. citizenship for him.
HELD : Yes. Because of the circumstances of his birth, it was no longer necessary for
Tambunting to undergo the naturalization process to acquire American
citizenship. Clearly, Tambunting possessed dual citizenship prior to the filing of
his certificate of candidacy before the 2001 elections. The fact that Tambunting
had dual citizenship did not disqualify him from running for public office.
22
time of filing the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation
of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath" aside from the oath of allegiance prescribed in Section 3 of
R.A. No. 9225. In the present case, Tambunting, a natural-born Filipino, did not
subsequently become a naturalized citizen of another country. Hence, the twin
requirements in R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to him.
QUALIFICATIONS OF NATURALIZATION
a. The petitioner must not be less than 21 years of age on the date of the
hearing of the petition;
b. He must have, as a rule resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of
not less than 10 years;
(1) If the applicant has honourably held office under the Government of
the Philippines or under any of the provinces, cities, municipalities, or
political subdivisions thereof;
23
Philippines in his relation with the constituted government as well as with the
community in which he is living;
d. He mush own real estate in the Philippines worth not less that Php 5,000.00,
or must have some lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation;
e. He must be able to speak and write English or Spanish and any one of the
principal Philippine languages
f. He must have enrolled his minor children of school age in any of the public
schools or private schools where Philippine history, government, and civics
are taught or prescribed as part of the school curriculum during the entire
period of the residence required of him, prior to the hearing of his petition for
naturalization as citizen (Paras)
FACTS : Petitioner a citizen of China filed a petition for naturalization before the CFI of
Manila. The petition was granted, thus the respondent appealed. During the
pendency of the appeal, petitioner filed a Motion to Reopen case to enable him to
present Additional Documentary Proof of his Income, claiming that his income
has risen from P3,000 in 1957 to P5,100 in 1960 and P1,000 in 1961. The
respondent through the Sol. Gen. moved for the reversal of the decision on the
ground that the petitioner failed to prove that he has a lucrative income
considering that the increase he received was due to the bonuses given by his
employer.
1. A declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen must first be filed, with the
Office of the Solicitor General, unless the applicant is exempted from this
requirement;
Exemptions to the filing of Declaration of Intention
Persons born in the Philippines and who have received their primary and
secondary education in public schools or private schools recognized by the
government, and not limited to any race or nationality
Those who have resided continuously in the Philippines for a period of
thirty years or more before filing their application
The widow and minor children of an alien who declared his intention to
become a citizen of the Philippines and dies before he is actually
naturalized
2. The petition for naturalization must then be filed
3. After publication in the official gazette or newspaper of general publication the
petition will be heard
4. If the petition is approved, there will be a rehearing two years after the
promulgation of the judgment awarding naturalization
5. Taking of the oath of allegiance to support and defend the constitution and the
laws of the Philippines (Coquia)
NOTE: The law provides for exemptions to the filing of declaration of intention. They are the
following:
(1) Persons born in the Philippines and who have received their primary and
secondary education in public schools or private schools recognized by the
Government, and not limited to any race or nationality;
24
(2) Those who have resided continuously in the Philippines for a period of thirty years
or more before filing their application;
(3) The widow and minor children of an alien who declared his intention to become a
citizen of the Philippines and dies before he is actually naturalized.
VIVO V. CLORIBEL
25 SCRA 616
FACTS : Private respondent Chua Pre Luan, a Chinese mother and her minor children
cam here in the Phil. and were admitted as temporary visitors with an initial
authorized stay of three months. Meanwhile, her husband and the father of these
aliens had applied for naturalization. After the expiration of their temporary stay,
respondents petitioned for an indefinite extension stay however these was
opposed by the petitioner Commissioner of Immigration. However they are given
a two year extension. On the specified date of the expiration of such extension,
respondent did not leave the country but instead filed for mandamus with
injunction to implement the extension previously authorized by the Sec. of
Foreign Affairs on the ground that the eventual conversion into naturalized
Filipino of her husband will also automatically make her a Filipino citizen. The
Immigration Commissioner in his answer alleged that even if her husband will
become a Filipino citizen, she would not automatically become a Filipino citizen,
as she has yet to show that she can be lawfully naturalized.
ISSUE: Whether or not the eventual conversion of respondents husband would also
automatically make her a Filipino citizen?
HELD: No, an alien woman, married to a naturalized Filipino citizen, does not
automatically make her a Filipino citizen, since she must first prove that she
possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications of naturalization.
FACTS : Petitioner Chinese citizen came to the Phil. and contracted a marriage with
Edilberto Lim a Filipino citizen. Petitioner was allowed only to enter and stay in
the Phil. until Feb. 13, 1962, a month after she got married to a Filipino citizen
(Jan. 25, 1962). After the expiration of her authority to stay in the P.I. the
respondent ordered her to leave and causing her arrest and deportation upon her
failure to do so on the ground that mere marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien
woman does not automatically confer on the latter Phil. citizenship. The alien
wife must first posses all the qualifications required by law to become a Filipino
citizen by naturalization and none of the disqualifications. That is she must first
present proof in the naturalization proceedings that she is not disqualified and
that she possessed all the qualifications provided by law.
25
HELD : An alien woman marrying a Filipino native-born (or naturalized) becomes ipso
facto a Filipino provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Phil. under
Sec. 4 Ipso facto means that it is no longer necessary for her to prove that she
possessed the requisite qualifications in a naturalization proceedings.
These decisions in effect ruled that it is not necessary for an alien citizen to prove
in a judicial proceeding that she posses all the qualifications set forth in Sec. 2
and none of the disqualifications under Sec.4.
C. Loss of Citizenship
Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following ways (Pursuant to
Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended by Republic Act No 106) by
FRIVALDO V. COMELEC
174 SCRA 245
FACTS : Petitioner Frivaldo was proclaimed as governor of the province of Sorsogon and
subsequently assumed office. However his election was opposed by private
respondent on the ground that Frivaldo was not a Filipino citizen having been
naturalized in the US in 1983 and that he failed to repatriate himself after his
naturalization in the US. Thus being an alien he was disqualified to hold any
public office in the Phil. and his election did not cure the defect.
Petitioner admitted the allegation but pleaded a special defense that he has
sough American citizenship only to protect himself against Pres. Marcos, that his
naturalization was not impressed with voluntariness but was merely force as a
means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law
Dictators agents abroad and by actively participating in the election he
automatically forfeits his American citizenship.
HELD : No. There filing of certificate of candidacy does automatically restore his Phil.
citizenship. And even if petitioner loss his naturalized American citizenship it will
not and could not have the effect of automatic restoration of his Phil. citizenship.
26
FRIVALDO V. COMELEC
257 SCRA 727
FACTS : Frivaldo obtained the highest number of votes in 3 successive elections but was
twice declared by the Supreme Court to be disqualified to hold office due to his
alien citizenship. He now claims to have re-assumed his lost Phil citizenship thru
repatriation. It was established that he took his oath of allegiance under the
provisions of PD 725 on June 30, 1995, much later than the time he filed his Cert.
of Candidacy.
ISSUE : Whether or not Frivaldo reacquired his Phil citizenship thru repatriation
HELD : Yes. Under Phil. law citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by
naturalization or repatriation. The law does not specify any particular date or
time when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence and
age. The SC holds that the repatriation of Frivaldo retroacted to the date of the
filing of his application on August 17, 1994. Being a former Filipino, he deserves
a liberal interpretation of Phil. Laws and whatever defects there were in his
nationality should be deemed mooted by his repatriation.
FACTS : Petitioner Labo Jr. was elected as mayor of Baguio. However his election was
opposed by respondent Lardizabal on the ground that petitioner was not a citizen
of the Phil. based on the administrative decisions rendered by the Commission of
Immigration and Deportation stating that petitioner was not a citizen of the Phil.
since it was contained in the official statement of Australian citizen by reason of
his naturalization. Petitioner did not deny and admitted the allegations that he
was indeed naturalized in Australia, however he contended that since his
Australian citizenship has already been annulled, he has been therefore
automatically reacquired and reinstated as a citizen of the Phil.
ISSUE : Whether or not petitioner automatically reacquired his Phil. Citizenship on the
ground that his Australian citizenship has already been annulled?
HELD : No, the annulment of petitioners Australian citizenship did not automatically
restore his Phil. citizenship.
Lost Phil. citizenship may be reacquired only through:
1) Direct act of congress
2) Naturalization or
3) Repatriation
It does not appear however that petitioner has reacquired his Phil. citizenship by
any of these methods.
AZNAR V. COMELEC
185 SCRA 703
FACTS : Lito Osmea filed his candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of provincial
governor of Cebu however his candidacy was opposed by petitioner Aznar on the
ground that his is allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a citizen of USA
considering that Osmea was issued alien certificate of registration and was
given clearance and permit to re-enter the Phil. by the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation. Because of these petitioner assumed that private
27
respondent is an American and being an American, private respondent must
have taken and sworn to the Oath of Allegiance required by the US Naturalization
Laws.
Private respondent on the other hand maintains that he is a Filipino citizen
alleging that he is the legitimate child of a Filipino, that he is a holder of a valid
and subsisting Phil. passport and that he had been continuously residing in the
Phil. since birth and has not gone out of the country for more than six months and
that he has been a registered voter in the Phil. since 1965.
HELD : No, considering the fact that admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino and an
American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does
not mean that he is not still a Filipino.
Private respondent remains a Filipino and the loss of his Phil. citizenship cannot
be presumed.
Petitioner must first present proof that Osmea had his Filipino citizenship by any
of the modes provided for by law namely:
1) By naturalization in foreign country
Hence, the petitioner failed to present any of these direct proof, Osmea remains
a Filipino citizen.
REPUBLIC V. LI YAO
241 SCRA 748
FACTS : Respondent LiYao is a Chinese national and was naturalized as a Filipino citizen
in 1952, the Sol. Gen. filed a petition to cancel Li Yaos naturalization on the
ground that prior to his naturalization he obtain unlawful acts which would
disqualify for naturalization by maliciously evading the payment of his correct
income taxes for 1946-1951.
Respondent however alleged that he already settled his tax liability under PD.58
which granted tax amnesty and thereby rendered him free of any civil, criminal, or
administrative liability.
ISSUE : Whether or not tax amnesty obliterates his lack of good moral character?
HELD : No, tax amnesty does not have the effect of obliterating his lack of good moral
character and irreproachable conduct which are grounds for denaturalization.
Through the application of the jus soli and jus sanguinis principles a child born of parents
who are nationals of a country applying the principle of jus sanguinis, in a country
applying the jus soli principle has dual nationality.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9255 Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003."
28
Section 2. Declaration of Policy - It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine
citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under
the conditions of this Act.
Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act,
become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship
upon taking the aforesaid oath.
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities - Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all
attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the
following conditions:
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must Meet the requirements under
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as
"The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding
such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of
the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of
any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an
oath;
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to
their assumption of office: Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance to the
country where they took that oath;
(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the
proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice; and
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines
cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who:
(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which
they are naturalized citizens; and/or
FACTS : Mercado and Manzano were candidates for Vice Mayor of Makati City. Manzano
won but his proclamation was suspended in view of a pending petition for
disqualification filed by a certain Mamaril who allege that Maznzano was not a
Filipino citizen but an American citizen. The COMELEC granted the petition and
29
ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of MAnzano on the ground
that he is a dual citizen invoking Sec. 40 of Local Govt. Code that person having
dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position.
HELD : No. The phrase dual citizenship in RA 7160, Sec. 40 refers to dual allegiance
which differs persons with dual citizenship hence does not fall under the
disqualification. By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present
post, manzano elected Phil. Citizenship and in effect renounced his American
citizenship. Thus, the filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounced
his American citizenship, effectively removing the disqualification he might have
as a dual citizen.
In case the litigation arises in a third country, the law most consistently applied is
at that of the country of which the person is not only a national but where he has
his domicile or habitual residence, or in the absence thereof, his residence
In view of the rule set in the Hague Convention on Conflict of National Laws, each
state determines who its own nationals are. Article 5 thereof provides a third
state shall, of the nationalities which such a person possesses, recognized
exclusively in its territory either the nationality of the country of which he is
habitually and principally resident, or the nationality of the county with
which in the circumstances he appears to be closely connected. Any
question as to whether or not a person possesses the nationality of a particular
state shall be determined in accordance with the states internal law. Hence it is
possible that an individual can be claimed as a national of two or more states.
Application of the jus soli and jus sanguinis A child born of parents who are
nationals of a country applying the principle of jus sanguinis, in a country applying
the jus soli has dual nationality. Thus: A Filipino citizen who marries an alien may
acquire the citizenship of his or her spouse if the spouses national law so allows.
A Filipino citizen however, who marries an alien shall retain Philippine citizenship,
unless by his act or omission, he is deemed under the law, to have renounced it
by taking an oath of allegiance to the spouses country or by express
renunciation. Another instance of dual or multiple nationalities is the case of an
individual who is naturalized citizen of another state but has not effectively
renounced his former nationality.
30
FACTS : Petitioner a Chinese national filed a petition for naturalization as a citizen of the
Phils. He was allowed by the court to take oath of allegiance and subsequently
was issued a certificate for naturalization. Public respondent opposed on the
ground that petitioner has failed to secure from Minister of the Interior Nationalist
China a permission required by laws thereof for a valid renunciation of his
Chinese citizenships. Petitioner contends that said requirements is no longer
necessary and that the naturalization of an alien as Phil. Citizen is governed
exclusively by Phil. Laws and not by any foreign law.
ISSUE : Whether or not a permission from the petitioners country is necessary for a valid
renunciation is required for naturalization in the Phil.
HELD : Yes. Sec. 12 of the CA 473 requires the petitioner to absolutely and forever
renounce all allegiance to any foreign country particularly to the state of which he
is a subject or a citizen. Therefore an applicant cannot be naturalized as a citizen
of the Phil. Without first validly renouncing his former citizenship. The purpose is
to divest him of his former nationality before acquiring Phil. Citizenship because
otherwise he would have two distinct sovereignties which our laws do not permit
except: a) when a foreign country grants the same privilege to Filipino citizens,
and b0 such had been agredd upon by treaty between the Phils. and that foreign
state.
2. STATELESSNESS
refers to an individual who has been stripped of his nationality by his own former
government without having an opportunity to acquire another.
Stateless persons are generally subject to the law of their domicile or habitual
residence, or in default thereof, to the law of their temporary residence
4. He may have been born in a country which recognizes only the principle of
jus sanguinis -- or citizenship by blood, of parents whose law recognizes only
the principle of jus soli -- citizenship by birth in a certain place. Thus he is
neither a citizen of the country of his parents.
FACTS : Petitioner was born in Russia and grew up as a citizen of the defunct Empires of
Russia under the Czar government. After WWII, he came to the Phils. and
resided here and married a Filipina. He then petition for naturalization and the
court granted his petition. The Solicitor General appealed contending that he is
Russian and not a stateless person because he failed to show that under the
laws of Russia, he had lost his Russian citizenship. Petitioner contends that he is
a stateless person because the empire of Russian had already ceased to exist
since the Czar was overthrown by the Bolshevists and that he disclaims
allegiance or connection with the Soviet Government.
31
ISSUE : Whether or not petitioner is a stateless person.
HELD : The fact that the Czars government had been already overthrown and replaced
by the Bolshevists to which he disclaims allegiance, he is deemed to be a
stateless person. Knowing the history, nature and character of the Soviet
dictatorship which is presently the greatest menace to humanity and civilization, it
would be technically fastidious to require further evidence of petitioners claims
that he is a stateless person that his testimony that he owes no allegiance to the
Russian Communist government and because he has been at war with it, he fled
from Russia to permanently resided in the Phils. after having established his life
in the Phil., marrying a Filipina and joining the guerrillas during the Japanese
Regime, it would be fair that his petition for naturalization be granted.
XI. DOMICILE
Article 50. For the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile
of natural persons is the place of their habitual residence. (40a)
For juridical persons, domicile is determined by the law creating or recognizing it.
A. DEFINITION
Ones true, fixed permanent home and principal establishment, and to which, whenever
he is absent, he has the intention of returning
To acquire a domicile, there must be concurrence of intention to make it ones domicile
and physical presence, while residence simply requires bodily presence of an inhabitant
in a given place (Coquia)
2. Residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which he has taken up his
abode ceases; while domicile has no such intent, the abiding is animo manendi.
Domiciliary Theory
Is the theory that in general the status, condition, rights, obligations and capacity of a
person should be governed by the law of his domicile (Paras)
32
FACTS : Merito Miguel (respondent) run for the position of municipal mayor in Bolinao,
Pangasinan to which he was elected. However his election was opposed by the
petitioners on the ground that he is a green card holder, hence, a permanent
resident of the US not of Bolinao because on the back of the card, it printed that
Person identified by this card is entitled to reside permanently and work in the
US. In his answer admitted that he hold a green card but he denied that he is a
permanent resident of the US. He alleged that he obtained the green card only
for convenience in order that he may freely enter the US for his periodic medical
examination and to visit his children there. He alleged that he is a permanent
resident of Bolinao, that he voted in all elections including the plebiscite for the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution.
After hearing, the COMELEC ruled that the possession of a green card by Miguel
does not sufficiently establish that he has abandoned his residence in the Phil.
because in spite of his green card, respondent has sufficiently indicated his
intention to continuously reside in Bolinao as shown by his having voted in all
previous elections.
2. No. His act of filing a COC did not constitute a waiver of his status as a
permanent resident or immigrant in the US. The waiver of his green card
should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and done prior to
the filing of his candidacy and without such prior waiver, he is disqualified to
run for any elective office.
FACTS : Petitioner, Virginia Fule filed with the CFI of Laguna a petition for letters of
administration alleging, inter alia that Amado Garcia, a property owner of
Calamba, Laguna died intestate in Manila, leaving real estate and personal
properties in Calamba, Laguna. Private respondent, Preciosa Garcia assailed
the petition for failure to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement and improper laying
of venue. She contended that the quoted statement avers no domicile or
residence of the deceased Amado Garcia. On the contrary, Preciosa Garcia
claims that, as appearing in his death certificate presented by Virginia Fule
herself before the Calamba court and in other papers, the last residence of
Amado Garcia was at 11 Carmel, Carmel Subd. Quezon City. Parentically, in her
amended petition, Virginia Fule categorically alleged that Amado G. Garcia was
residing in Calamba, Laguna at the time of his death, and that he was a delegate
to the 1971 Constitutional Convention for the first district of Laguna.
ISSUE : 1. Whether or not the deceaseds last place of residence was at Calamba,
Laguna.
2. What does the term resides mean? Does it refer to the actual residence or
domicile of the decedent at the time of his death?
HELD : 1. No. The SC ruled that the last place of residence of the deceased Amado G.
Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City, and not
at Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is admissible to prove the residence
33
of the decedent at the time of his death. 12 As it is, the death certificate of
Amado G. Garcia, which was presented in evidence by Virginia G. Fule
herself and also by Preciosa B. Garcia, shows that his last place of residence
was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City.
2. This term "resides," like, the terms "residing" and "residence," should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it
is employed. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is
construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense.
Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile"
but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous,
and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words,
"resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the
personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place
of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In
this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal
residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily
presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily
presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. No
particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the
residence must be more than temporary.
FACTS : Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. filed a complaint for damages against the American
Express International, Inc. (AMEX) and/or its officers alleging inter alia, that
plaintiff "is a Filipino citizen, of legal age, and a member of the House of
Representatives and a resident of Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, Philippines."
The complaint's cause of action stemmed from the alleged wrongful dishonor of
petitioner Saludo's AMEX credit card and the supplementary card issued to his
daughter. Respondents raised the affirmative defenses that the complaint should
be dismissed on the ground that venue was improperly laid because none of the
parties was a resident of Leyte. Moreover, notwithstanding the claim in his
complaint, petitioner Saludo was not allegedly a resident thereof as evidenced by
the fact that his community tax certificate, which was presented when he
executed the complaint's verification and certification of non-forum shopping, was
issued at Pasay City. To buttress their contention, respondents pointed out that
petitioner Saludo's complaint was prepared in Pasay City and signed by a lawyer
of the said city. Respondents prayed for the dismissal of the complaint a quo.
Saludo asserted that such allegations was baseless and unfounded considering
that he was the congressman of the lone district thereof at the time of the filing of
his complaint. The court a quo denied the affirmative defenses interposed by
respondents stating in its order that the plaintiff at the time he filed the complaint
was and still is, the incumbent Congressman of the Lone District of Southern
Leyte with residence at Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, is enough to dispell
any and all doubts about his actual residence. As such his personal, actual and
physical habitation or his actual residence or place of abode can never be in
some other place but in Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte. Respondents sought
the reconsideration thereof but the court a quo denied the same. They then filed
with the appellate court a petition for certiorari and prohibition which the appellate
court granted the said petition.
Petitioner Saludo sought the reconsideration of the said decision but the
appellate court denied his motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition for
review.
ISSUE : Whether petitioner Saludo was a resident of Southern Leyte at the time of filing of
the complaint.
HELD : Yes. Since petitioner Saludo, as congressman or the lone representative of the
district of Southern Leyte, had his residence (or domicile) therein as the term is
construed in relation to election laws, necessarily, he is also deemed to have had
his residence therein for purposes of venue for filing personal actions. This is
34
because "residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the
intention to remain for an unlimited time.
In the instant case, since plaintiff has a house in Makati City for the purpose of
exercising his profession or doing business and also a house in Ichon, Macrohon,
Southern Leyte, for doing business and/or for election or political purposes where
he also lives or stays physically, personally and actually then he can have
residences in these two places. Because it would then be preposterous to
acknowledge and recognize plaintiff Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. as congressman of
Southern Leyte without also recognizing him as actually, personally and
physically residing thereat, when such residence is required by law.
The fact then that petitioner Saludo's community tax certificate was issued at
Pasay City is of no moment because granting arguendo that he could be
considered a resident therein, the same does not preclude his having a residence
in Southern Leyte for purposes of venue. A man can have but one domicile for
one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of
residence. It is, likewise, undeniable that the term domicile is not exactly
synonymous in legal contemplation with the term residence, for it is an
established principle in Conflict of Laws that domicile refers to the relatively more
permanent abode of a person while residence applies to a temporary stay of a
person in a given place.
FACTS : Petitioner Wilfred Uytengsu was born in the Phil. of Chinese parents. He began
his studies here from primary school to college. He filed an application for
naturalization but after the filing he immediately left the Phil. for the US not
returning until several months after the first date set for the hearing of his
application. Subsequently, the CFI of Cebu granted his application for
naturalization.
The republic appealed on the ground that petitioner failed to meet the residency
requirements laid down by law for naturalization that he will reside continuously in
the Phil from the date of the filing of the petition up to the time of his admission to
Phil. citizenship.
Petitioner contends that the word residence laid down by law is synonymous with
domicile which one acquired is not lost by physical absence until another
domicile is obtained and that he continued to be domiciled in, and hence a
resident of the Phil. his purpose in staying in the US at the time was merely to
study therein.
ISSUE : Whether or not for purposes of that law residence is synonymous with domicile.
HELD : No. for purposes of naturalization law residence requires physical presence in
that place for a longer or shorter period of time. Residence is used to indicate the
place of abode whether permanent or temporary while domicile denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which when absent, on has the intention of returning.
Residence is not domicile by domicile is residence coupled with intention to
remain for an unlimited time.
Hence, absence during period intervening between the filing of application and
hearing is an obstacle to petitioners naturalization.
MERITS
35
1. In cases where the individual who belongs to a country following the domiciliary
theory is involved in a case before the Philippine courts, his personal status,
capacity, condition, and family rights will be governed by the law of his domicile;
2. In cases of stateless persons who may claim dual or multiple nationality, in which
case the court will have to refer to their domicile;
3. When an alien domiciled in the Philippines executes a will abroad
DEMERITS
1. Ones domicile is not ascertainable without first resorting to the courts to establish
whether or not there is animo manendi
2. The notion of domicile differs widely with some states distinguishing between
residence and domicile or attributing different meanings of domicile for different
purposes;
3. If the law of the domicile of origin is given utmost significance, then it will give rise
to the same problem as in nationality
4. In cases where the individual who belongs to a country following the
ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS V. COMELEC
248 SCRA 300
FACTS : Petitioner Imelda Marcos filed her certificate of candidacy (COC) for the position
of Representative of the First District of Leyte. She stated in the COC that she is
a resident of the place for seven months. Private respondent Montejo
subsequently filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification on the ground
that Imelda failed to meet the constitutional requirement of one-year residency.
COMELEC granted the Petition for Disqualification, holding that Imelda is
deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City as her place of domicile when she
lived and even voted in Ilocos and Manila.
ISSUE : Whether or not Imelda is deemed to have abandoned her domicile of origin
HELD : An individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained
residence in different places. Residence implies a factual relationship to a given
place for various purposes. The absence from legal residence or domicile to
pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-
permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion that
she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the
time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of
many places flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in which this Court carefully
made distinctions between (actual) residence and domicile for election purposes.
36
UJANO V. REPUBLIC
17 SCRA 147
FACTS : Petitioner Ujano was born of Filipino parent in Ilocos Sur. He left the Phil. for the
US from which he acquired American citizenship by naturalization and resided
there for 20 years. He returned to the Phil. and was admitted for a temporary
stay.
HELD : Yes. One of the qualifications for reacquiring Phil. citizenship is that the applicant
shall have resided in the Phils. at least six months before he applies for
reacquisition.
Residence here has already been interpreted to mean the actual or constructive
permanent home otherwise known as domicile. A place in a country where he
lives and stays permanently and to which he intends to return after temporary
absence, no matter how long.
So an alien who has been admitted as a temporary visitor cannot be said to have
established his domicile here because the period of his stay her is only temporary
and must leave when the purpose of his coming is accomplished.
D. KINDS OF DOMICILE
2. Domicile of choice, which is also called voluntary domicile, is the place freely chosen
by a person sui juris.
VELILLA V. POSADAS
62 Phil 624 (1935)
FACTS : Arthur Moody was on American citizen who came here in the Phil. and domiciled
therein. Moody died in India, but before his death he executed a will bequeathing
all his properties, consisting mainly of bands and shares of stocks of corporations
organized under Phil. law in favor of his only sister who was then a citizen and
resident of US. The BIR imposed an inheritance tax over those properties
inherited by Moodys sister. Petitioner as administrator was a non-resident of the
Phils. and the levy and imposition of inheritance tax over the properties of Moody
constitutes a deprivation of property without due process of law.
ISSUE : Whether or not Moody was legally domiciled in the Phil. at the time of his death.
HELD : Yes. Theres nothing on record which would appear that he adopted a new
domicile while he was absent from Manila.
37
To effect the abandonment of ones domicile, there must be a deliberate and
provable choice of new domicile, coupled with actual residence in the place
chosen, with a provable intent that it should be ones fixed and permanent place
of abode.
CARABALLO V. REPUBLIC
4 SCRA 1055
FACTS : Ricardo Caraballo, petitioner, an American citizen who lives in Clark Field,
Pampanga by reason of his enlistment in the US air Force together with his wife
to adopt a minor Filipino child. However this was apposed by the respondent on
the ground that the petitioner is a non-resident-alien because being enlisted as a
staff seargent in the US Airforce, his stay in the Phils.is merely temporary.
HELD : Yes, petitioner is a non-resident alien thus disqualified to adopt. For purpose of
adoption, person is deemed to be a resident of a place in a country where he has
abode and lives there permanently. It is a place chosen by him freely and
voluntarily, although he may later on change his mind and live elsewhere.
A place in a country or stat where he lives and stays permanently and to which
he intends to return after a temporary absence no matter how long is his
domicile.
FACTS : Petitioners were minor children of Go Tuan and Tan Bon. After Go Tuans death,
Tan Bon married another Chinese. Shortly thereafter, she came to the
Philippines with her second husband. She was admitted as the wife of a Chinese
merchant, and has been residing in the Phil. For 8 years. Petitioners remained in
china until Tan bon who is engaged in furniture business in Cebu asked them to
join her in the Phil. Thereafter, Lek and Chen, arrived in Cebu and took up their
abode with their stepmother and brother.
ISSUE : Whether or not Tan Bon is entitled to bring her minor children by her first
marriage to the Phil.
HELD : No. A mans domicile is also a domicile of his wife and minor children and that he
is duty bound to protect, support and keep them in his company. A Chinamans
chinese wife and her minor children, then do not enter the Phil through their own
right but by virtue of the right of the husband or father, unless the Chinese wife
belongs to the privileged class. Tan Bon who seeks to bring in her minor
children, did not enter the Phils. by her own right but by virtue of her second
husbands right thus, she is not entitled to bring in her minor children by another
chinaman who never had a legal residence in the archipelago.
FACTS : Narcisa Geopano filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of the Province
of Iloilo against Diego de la Via, alleging That she was a resident of the
municipality of Iloilo and that the defendant was a resident of Negros Oriental;
that she was the legitimate wife of the defendant, having been married to him in
Negros oriental that defendant had been committing acts of adultery with one
Ana Calog, sustaining illicit relations with her and having her as his concubine
38
and that the defendant ejected the plaintiff from the conjugal home, for which
reason she was obliged to live in the city of Iloilo, where she had since
established her habitual residence. Upon the said allegations, she prayed for a
decree of divorce, partition of the conjugal property and alimony. Dela Vina filed a
petition for certiorari on the ground that CFI, Iloilo had no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the said action for divorce because the defendant was a resident
of Negros oriental and the plaintiff, as his wife, must also be considered a
resident of the same province because under the law, the domicile of the
husband is also the domicile of the wife. De la Vina asserted that the plaintiff,
Geopano could not acquire a residence in Iloilo before their marriage was legally
dissolved.
ISSUE : Whether or not Geopano cannot acquire a residence in Iloilo before their
marriage was legally dissolved.
HELD : No. It is true that the domicile of the wife follows that of her husband. However
there are exceptions namely:
1. The wife may acquire another and separate domicile from that of her
husband where the theoretical duty of the husband and wife is dissolved; or
2. Where the husband has given due course for divorce; or
4. Where there has been forfeiture by the wife of the benefit of the husbands
domicile.
In the case at bar, defendants case comes under one of the exceptions.
Therefore, Narcisa may acquire a residence or domicile separate to that of her
husband, during the existence of the marriage, where her husband, de La Vina
has given course for divorce.
A. DEFINITION
STATUS
Personal status is the general term that includes both condition and capacity, and
more specifically embraces such matters as the beginning and end of human
personality, capacity to have rights in general, capacity to engage in legal
transactions, protection of personal interests, family relations, particularly the
relations between husband and wife, parent and child, guardian and ward, also
transactions of family law, especially marriage, divorce, separation, adoption,
legitimation and emancipation, and finally succession both testate and intestate.
39
CHARACTERISTICS OF STATUS
CAPACITY
Capacity more often referred as Juridical capacity, is the fitness of a man to be the
subject of legal relations while capacity to act is the power to do acts with juridical
effects.
RECTO V. HARDEN
100 Phil 427
FACTS : Appelant Esperanza Harden engaged the professional service of Appealee Recto
in an action against her husband Fred Harden for divorce whereby it was agreed
that Mrs. Harden shall pay Recto 20% of the vale of her share in the conjugal
partnership after liquidation. Pending litigation, several instruments were
executed by Mr. Harden and Mrs. Harden, mutually releasing and forever
discharging each other from all actions, debts and claims to the conjugal
partnership. Subsequently Recto filed a manifestation in court that the purpose of
said instrument was to defeat his claim of Attorneys fees and praying that he be
payed of Attorneys fess. Counsel fro both spouses moved for the dismissal of
the case on the ground that the agreement between Recto and Mrs. Harden
could not bind the conjugal partnership because it was made without her
husbands consent and that the said contract has for its purpose to secure a
decree of divorce in violation of the Art. 1305, 1352, 1409 of the Civil Code.
ISSUES : 1. Whether or not the agreement between Recto and Mrs. Harden binds the
conjugal partnership.
2. Whether or not the said contract which is allegedly void shall be governed by
Art. 1305, 1352, 1409 of the Civil Code?
HELD : 1. No. The wife merely bound herself and assumed the persona obligation. The
contract neither gives any right to her lawyer whatsoever, personal or real, in
and to her aforesaid
2. No. Inasmuch as both spouses were citizens of USA, their status and the
dissolution thereof shall be governed by Art. 15 of the Civil Code, that is by
their natl law, by the laws of USA which sanction divorce. In short, the
contract between Recto and Mrs. Harden are not contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy.
BARNUEVO V. FUSTER
29 Phil 606
FACTS : Gabriel Fuster and Constanza Yaez were joined in a Catholic or canonical
marriage in the city of Malaga, Spain.On April, 1899, they made an agreement in
a public document, by which they "resolved to separate and live apart. Then,
Constanza commenced divorce proceedings against her husband alleging his
adultery. She prayed that she be granted a divorce that the conjugal society be
liquidated that her share be adjudicated to her and payment of support be
40
ordered. The court then decreed the suspension of life in common between
plaintiff and defendant, ordered payment of support and directed plaintiff and
defendant that the communal property be divided. Both parties appealed in
which both appeals have one common issue relating to the alleged dowry
brought into the marriage by the wife in the amount of 30,000 spanish dollars in
which Constanza as paraphernal.
ISSUE : W/N Phil courts may take cognizance of the case to decree the divorce on
appeal.
HELD : Yes. In the present action for divorce the Court of First Instance, Manila did not
lack jurisdiction over the persons of the litigants, for, although Spanish Catholic
subjects, they were residents of this city and had their domicile herein. Foreign
Catholics domiciled in Spain, subject to the ecclesiastical courts in actions for
divorce according to the said article 80 of the Civil Code, could not allege lack of
jurisdiction by invoking, as the law of their personal statute, a law of their nation
which gives jurisdiction in such a case to territorial courts, or to a certain court
within or without the territory of their nation.
The Courts of First Instance of the Philippine Islands have the power and
jurisdiction to try actions for divorce and have the authority to decide on
questions concerning foreigners status by applying their national law.
Article 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be
considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be
born later with the conditions specified in the following article. (29a)
Article 41. For civil purposes, the foetus is considered born if it is alive at the
time it is completely delivered from the mother's womb. However, if the
foetus had an intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it is not deemed
born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the
maternal womb. (30a)
D. ABSENCE
41
The domestic law of different countries do not treat absentees alike and this has
given rise to difficult problems in conflict of laws. There are three suggested ways
of dealing with the problem: first, there is a rebuttable presumption that a person is
dead when he has been absent for a number of years; second, a persons
unexplained absence is judicially investigated and established which results in
legal effects similar to those of death; and third, a judicial decree shall have to be
issued declaring the person dead before legal effects of death take place.
Philippine laws follow the rebuttable presumption of the common law. Our Civil
Code states:
Article 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the
absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for
those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his
succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of
seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his
succession may be opened. (n)
Article 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the
division of the estate among the heirs:
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been
missing for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances
and his existence has not been known for four years. (n)
However, for specific purposes, our laws require that a declaration of death be
issued before certain legal effects of death arise. For instance, article 41 of the
Family Code requires that for the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage,
the spouse presnt must first institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee spouse without which the subsequent marriage
is void ab initio.
E. NAME
The law expressly states that no person can change his name or surname without
judicial authority. Case law shows the courts have allowed petitions on grounds
that the name 1) is ridiculous or tainted with dishonour or extremely difficult to
pronounce; or 2) when the change is necessary to avoid confusion; 3) when the
right to a new name is a consequence of a change in status; 4) a sincere desire to
adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of a former alien nationality which unduly
hamper social and business life.
F. AGE OF MAJORITY
The legal disability attached to minority and rights recognized upn attainment of the
age of majority are aspects of personal status. It is the individuals personal law
which determines whether he has reached the age of majority. Once emancipated,
parental authority over the person and property of the child is terminated and he is
qualified and responsible all acts of civil life save the exceptions established by
existing laws in special cases, such as the parents continued observance of their
responsibilities under article 46 of P.D. 603.
Likewise, although Republic Act No. 6809 lowered the age of majority to 18 years
from 21 years, it expressly stated that parental consent for contracting marriage is
required until the age of twenty-one.
G. CAPACITY
A persons ability to act with legal effects is governed by his personal law. Ones
personal law is viewed as best qualified to decide what restrictions should be
imposed on the individual. Rules on capacity of an individual to bind himself
42
INSULAR GOVT. V. FRANK
13 Phil 236 (1909)
FACTS : Mr. Frank an American citizen entered into a contract with the Phil. govt to serve
as a stenographer for a period of two years. He only serve for six months hence
petitioner filed a suit against him. Mr. Frank alleged that he was under Phil. law a
minor at the time the contract was entered into and was therefore not responsible
under the law. However, it was disclosed that the contract was entered into in
USA in which Frank was considered an adult.
HELD : He should be held liable, because his capacity to enter into a contract should be
governed by his national law.
1. Formal Requisites, generally do not affect the validity of the marriage. Art. 3 of the
Family Code provides for three formal requisites namely
a. authority of the solemnizing officer
b. marriage license
c. marriage ceremony where the contracting parties appear before the
solemnizing officer
2. Essential Requisites, affects the validity of the marriage. Art. 3 of the Family Code
prescribes two essential requisites to marriage:
a. legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be male and female
b. consent freely given in the presence of a solemnizing officer
1. Compulsory Theory it is imperative for the parties to follow the formalities of the
place of celebration (this is followed in the Philippines)
2. Optional Theory parties may follow either the lex loci celebrationis or their national
law. This rule is followed in most countries
3. Ecclesiastical Rule The formalities of both the lex loci celebrationis and the national
law of the parties must be complied with
QUERY: Is a common-law marriage valid in the Phils. If between foreigners and if the
relationship began abroad?
ANS: Yes, provided it is valid according to their national and according to the place where
the relationship began. To avoid injustice, particular conceptions of marriage in
43
foreign jurisdiction must be considered provided it is not bigamous, polygamous or
universally considered incestuous.
If Turk brings to the Phils. 4 wives, validly married to him. Should all marriages be
considered valid here?
1. For cohabitation purposes, first wife shall be considered legitimate, the rest
concubines.
2. For purposes and determining successional rights, all wives and children,
considered as legitimate in view of the nationality theory.
FACTUAL
POINT OF CONTACT
SITUATION
Celebrated Abroad Between Filipinos G.R. Lex loci celebrationis
Exceptions:
1. Art. 26 (solemnized outside the
Philippines), Art. 35, par. 1, 4, 5 & 6,
(void ab initio), Art. 36 (incapacity), Art.
37 (incestuous), Art. 38 (public policy)
of the family code (bigamous,
polygamous & incestuous marriages
2. consular marriages
Between Foreigners G.R. Lex loci celebrationis
Exceptions:
1. Highly immoral (bigamous,
polygamous & incestuous marriages
2. Universally considered incestuous, ie.
Between brothers-sisters & between
ascendants and descendants
Mixed Apply rule on marriages between
foreigners to uphold the validity of the
marriage
Celebrated in the Between Foreigners National Law (Art. 21, Family Code)
Philippines provided the marriage is not highly immoral
or universally considered incestuous
Mixed National Law of the Filipino (otherwise,
public policy may be militated against)
Marriage by Proxy Lex loci celebrationis (with prejudice with
Note: a marriage by the foregoing rules
proxy is considered
celebrated where
the proxy appears
EXCEPTIONS:
44
The following are void marriages between Filipinos even if valid in the foreign country
where celebrated of in case of mixed marriages celebrated in the Philippines
1. When either or both parties are below 18 years of age even with parental consent;
2. Bigamous and polygamous marriages
3. Mistake at to identity of contracting party
4. A subsequent marriage performed without recording in the Civil Registry the judgment or
annulment or declaration of nullity and partition and distribution of properties and the
delivery of childrens presumptive legitimes;
5. Marriages where either spouse is psychologically incapacitated;
6. Incestuous marriages
7. Void by reason of public policy
NOTE: These exceptions put into issue the capacity of the parties to enter the marriage and
therefore relation to the substantive requirements for marriage. since the personal
law of the parties, e.g., the national law of the Filipinos, governs the questions of
intrinsic validity of marriages between the Filipinos abroad, the above enumerations
are exceptions to lex loci celebrationis precisely because they are controlled by lex
nationalii
- Filipinos national law shall be followed otherwise public policy may be militated against
MARRIAGES BY POXY
-if in the Phil. invalid due to required Physical presence-Filipinos and mixed marriages only
-if foreigners, valid if valid in their national law
-if abroad, whether between Filipinos or foreigners or mixed , rule is lex loci celebrationis, place
where proxy appears subject to exceptions.
FACTS : Cheong Boo a native of China died intestate in the Phil. His estate was claimed
on one hand by Cheong Seng Gee who alleged that he was a legitimate child of
the former by virtue of marriage to Tan Dit in China in 1895. On the other hand,
Mora Adong also claimed the said estate by vertue of her marriage to the
deceased in 1896 in the Phil. the trial court ruled that Cheong Seng Gee failed to
establish the Chinese marriage. Respondent appealed contending that the
alleged marriage in China could be sufficiently proven mainly by matrimonial
letter.
HELD : No. The rule is that all marriages contracted outside the Phil. which would be
valid by the laws of the country in which the same were contracted are valid in
the Phil. provided that it is first necessary to prove the existence of such foreign
law and the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence.
In the case at bar there is no competent testimony what the laws of China
concerning marriage were in 1895 and the respondent failed to prove the
existence of the alleged prior Chinese marriage by a clear and strong and
unequivocal evidence as to produce moral conviction of the existence of the
alleged prior Chinese marriage.
45
PEOPLE V. MORA DUMPO
62 Phil 246 (1935)
FACTS : Moro Hassan and Mora Dumpo were legally married according to the rites and
practices of the Mohammedan. Mora Dumpo allegedly contracted another
marriage with another man without her previous marriage being dissolved.
Respondent was then prosecuted and convicted of the crime of bigamy.
Respondent appealed alleging that her second marriage was null and void
according to the Mohammedan rites on the ground that her father had not given
his consent thereto.
HELD : No. it appears from the Mohammedan rites that before an Imam or
Mohammedan priest could solemnize marriage, it is first necessary to secure the
consent of the brides father or, in the absence thereof that of the chief of the
tribe to which she belongs for the marriage to be valid, otherwise absence of
such consent would make the marriage void.
In the case at bar there was a failure of the respondent to obtain such consent
hence she should not be prosecuted for bigamy.
FACTS : In the proceedings held before the Board of Special Inquiry, petitioner declared
that she was married to Perfecto Blas a Filipino in China in 1929 an that their
marriage was celebrated by a village leader. On the basis of such declaration,
the BSI admitted her into the Phil. as a non-quota immigrant. However this
decision was reversed by the new set members of the BSI on the ground that
there was no substantial basis of a husband-wife relationship between Woo and
Blas and that there was some discrepancies found in the statements made by
them in sever investigations conducted by immigration authorities concerning
their alleged marriage before a village leader in China in 1929.
ISSUE : Whether or not the alleged marriage be given effect in the Phil.
HELD : No. The rule that a marriage contracted outside the Phil. which is valid under the
law of the country in which it was celebrated is also valid in the Phil. cannot be
given effect in the case at bar because there was no proof presented relative to
the law of marriage in China.
In such case we should apply the general rule that in the absence of proof of the
foreign law, it should be presumed that it is the same as our own.
Since our law only recognizes a marriage celebrated before any of the officers
mentioned under the law and a village leader is not one of them, it is clear that
petitioners marriage, even if true, cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.
5. Effects of marriage
46
MARRIAGE AS A STATUS
1. Personal rights and obligations of the spouses personal affair between husband
and wife and will not ordinarily be interfered with the courts of justice. Includes
mutual fidelity, cohabitation, respect, assistance and support; right of wife to use
husbands surname; duty to follow husbands residence;
CASE:
Japanese woman came and admitted to the Philippines as transient. Her
passport was found to have been forged. Deportation proceedings ensued.
Later she married a Filipino. Could she still be subject to deportation?
ANS: Yes. Mere marriage to a Filipino did not automatically make her a Filipino.
It is essential that she must not be possess any of the disqualifications for
naturalization.
47
NOTE: The subsequent change of the nationality of the husband or the wife has no effect on
the spouses original property regime EXCEPT when the law of the original
nationality itself changes the marital regime, in which case the property relations
should change accordingly. This is the DOCTRINE OF IMMUTABILITY IN THE
MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY REGIME.
Reasons:
1. Marital peace in property relationship shall be more or
less guaranteed;
2. The spouse will not be able to prejudice creditors, who
in turn cannot jeopardize the interest of the spouses;
3. Even the spouses may protect themselves from each
other.
While subsequent change of nationality does not affect the original property
regime (doctrine of immutability) in the marital property relationship, it cannot be
denied that when the law of the original nationality itself changes the marital
regime, the property relations has to change accordingly.
Art. 26 of the Family Code provides that : All marriages solemnized outside the
Phil, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country except
those prohibited under Article 35, 37 and 38.
Grounds for annulment (if the marriage is voidable merely) and grounds for
declaration of nullity (if the marriage is void ab initio) are governed by the law
alleged to have been violated; in other words, it is the law of the place of
celebration (lex loci celebrationis) subject to certain exceptions, that furnished
the grounds
ABSOLUTE DIVORCES
GENERAL RULE: our courts only observe relative divorce (legal separation).
Any divorce sought in the Philippine courts will not be granted Filipino couples
cannot obtain absolute divorces abroad and neither shall a valid divorce
obtained abroad by Filipino couples be recognized here.
EXCEPTIONS:
48
1. Valid divorce abroad between foreigners whose national law allow
divorce
2. Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine Law.
Grounds for annulment (if the marriage is voidable merely) and grounds for
declaration of nullity (if the marriage is void ab initio) are governed by the law
alleged to have been violated; in other words, it is the law of the place of
celebration (lex loci celebrationis) subject to certain exceptions, that furnished
the grounds
TENCHAVEZ V. ESCANO
15 SCRA 355
FACTS : On 24 February 1948 in the University of San Carlos, Cebu City Vicenta
Escao exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, without the
knowledge of her parents, before a Catholic chaplain, was duly registered
with the local civil register. The parents of Escao, alarmed about the scandal
that would ensue from the clandestine marriage sought priestly advice. Father
Reynes suggested a recelebration to validate what he believed to be an
invalid marriage, from the standpoint of the Church, due to the lack of
authority from the Archbishop or the parish priest for the officiating chaplain to
celebrate the marriage, however, the recelebration did not take place. On 24
June 1950, she left for the United States. On 22 August 1950, she filed a
verified complaint for divorce against the herein plaintiff in the Second Judicial
District Court of the State of Nevada, on the ground of "extreme cruelty,
entirely mental in character." On 21 October 1950, a decree of divorce, "final
and absolute", was issued in open court by the said tribunal. Escanos
parents filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul their daughters
marriage with Tenchavez. Thereafter, Vicenta sought papal dispensation of
her marriage. Then, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in
Nevada. She acquired American citizenship on 8 August 1958. But on 30
July 1955, Tenchavez filed a complaint against Escao for legal separation
and damages. Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff and an equally
valid marriage to her present husband. The lower court did not decree a legal
separation but freed Tenchavez from supporting his wife, hence this appeal.
HELD : No. It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between Pastor
Tenchavez and Vicenta Escao remained subsisting and undissolved under
Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that the wife
sought from the State of Nevada, on grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely
mental in character." At the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta
Escao, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. She was then subject to
Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Rep. Act No.
386), already in force at the time, expressly provided:
49
Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon the citizens of the Philippines,
even though living abroad.
Private respondent filed a suit against petitioner before the RTC of Pasig stating
that petitioners business in Ermita, the Galleon Shop is their conjugal property
and asking that petitioner should make an accounting because even if they have
obtained a divorce in the US, the same is not valid and binding in the Phil. being
contrary to law and public policy.
Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the cause of
action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the
Nevada court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and she had no
community property.
HELD : Yes. A divorce decree granted by a US court between a Filipina and her
American husband is binding on the American husband and is recognized as
valid in the Phil.
Only Phil. nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same
being considered contrary to our public policy and morality.
This ruling does not apply if the divorce is obtained by the Filipina.
PILAPIL V. IBAY-SOMERA
174 SCRA 653
50
FACTS : Petitioner is a Filipina while private respondent Geiling is a German national.
Both parties were married in Germany. Subsequently because of some marital
disharmony Geiling filed a divorce suit in Germany. Thereafter, the German court
granted the divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses.
Subsequently after the divorce decree private respondent filed a complaint for
adultery before the CFI of Manila against petitioner, alleging that while still
married to him, petitioner had affairs with two other men. Petitioner filed for the
dismissal of the case on the ground that the court is without jurisdiction to try and
decide the case3 because there is already a divorce decree between the
spouses under the national law of his former spouse prior to the filing of the
criminal complaint hence he cannot qualify as an offended spouse.
HELD : Yes. The status of the complainant as well as the accused must be determined
as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the adultery
case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to
the accused spouse at the time of the filing of the complaint. In the case at bar
private respondent being no longer the husband of petitioner had no legal
standing to commence the adultery case, since there was already a valid divorce
obtained by him in his country by which its legal effects may be recognized in the
Phil. insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle
in our civil law on the matter of status of persons.
ISSUE : Whether or not there was a factual issue involved as to remand the case to the
trial court.
HELD : Yes, there was, because there is still a need to determine as to what is the
citizenship of the petitioner at the time of her divorce of his husband because:
a) If she is no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of the divorce, then she is
no longer entitled to inherit from her husband because a divorce
obtained by an alien abroad, is recognized in the Phil. provided they are
valid according to his/her national law.
b) But if she is still a Filipino citizen at the time of the divorce, then she is
still entitled to inherit from her husband because a divorce by a Filipino
citizen abroad is not valid and binding being contrary to law and public
policy.
FACTS : Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church
of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. In 1986, Ciprianos wife
left for the United States with their son. A few years later, Orbecido
discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. In 2000,
51
Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and
then married a certain Innocent Stanley. Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial
court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of
the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the
court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied (that
said article is not applicable to the said case because it only applies to a valid
mixed marriage). Hence this petition for review.
HELD : Yes. The SC stated the twin elements for the application of par. 2, Art. 26:
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen,
there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and
Cipriano. The naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce
capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus, Cipriano, the
divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
Par. 2, Art. 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties
who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but
later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a
divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as
if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the
marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice.
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his
allegation that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise,
before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the
party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Such foreign law must also be proved
as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact,
such laws must be alleged and proved. Furthermore, respondent must also
show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically
52
required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to
declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.
LEGAL SEPARATION
NOTE: Grounds for legal separation are the cumulative grounds provided
by the national law of the parties (lex nationalii)
The foreign decree of divorce will be recognized as valid here only if the
following conditions concur
The grounds for annulment is governed by the law of the place of the
celebration.
D. Parental Relations
1. determination of legitimacy of child
2. common law principles on legitimacy
3. parental authority over the child
E. Adoption
53
Paternity and Filiation (including 1. if legitimate national law of the father
Parental Authority and Reciprocal (Art. 15, Civil Code)
Support) legitimacy, legitimation, 2. if illegitimate national law of the
recognition, presumptions of legitimacy , mother unless recognized by the father
rights and obligations of parents and in which case, national law of the
children, including parental authority, father (Art. 15, of the Civil Code)
and reciprocal support 3. determination of whether legitimate or
illegitimate (national law of the father,
as a rule) (Art. 15, Civil Code)
Doctrine of Immutability of Status
change of parents nationality does not
affect the status of the child
Adoption creation of the status of In general, national law of the adopted
adoption; rights and obligations of NOTE: In the Philippines adoption by a
adopter and adopted Filipino does not confer Filipino
citizenship on an adopted alien child
Guardianship
1. over the person
a. appointing court court of the domicile of the ward
b. powers of guardian coextensive with those of the appointing
court (law of the appointing state)
2. over the property
a. appointing court court where the property is found (lex rei
sitae)
b. powers of guardian coextensive with those of the appointing
court (law of the appointing state)
3. over the person and over the see 3 (a) and 3 (b)
property
NOTE: Presumptions of Legitimacy are not mere rules of evidence but are
considered as substantive law, hence, governed as well by the national law
of the male parent
NOTE: The law governing the capacity to succeed and the amount of successional
rights of the legitimate children are governed by the national law of the
decedent
LEGITIMATION
Is the act by which a person not born legitimate, is placed upon the same footing as a
legitimate child
54
Personal law of the father controls the rights and duties of parents and
children;
EXCEPT: parental interest in the immovable property of the child which may be
regulated by the lex situs
NOTE: Reference to the personal law of the father may result in joint exercise of
parental authority over the property of the child by father and mother (Art.
221, Family Code). Fathers personal law could grant parental authority to
the mother of the illegitimate children (Art. 176, Family Code)
NOTE: Change in the nationality of the male parent affects the consequent
relations between the parents and child
ADOPTION
is the process of making a child whether related or not to the adoption, possess in
general the rights accorded to a legitimate. (Paras)
the act by which relations of paternity and affiliation are recognized as legally
existing between person not so related by nature. (Coquia)
NOTES:
ISSUE : Whether or not the spouses can successfully adopt the three Filipino minors?
55
HELD : In the case of James being an alien he is not qualified to adopt because under
the Family Code, an alien is not qualified to adopt except:
a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity
b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his/her Filipino spouse or
c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his
or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter.
In the case of Lenita, although she is qualified to adopt under par. 3(a) of Art.
184 FC, the problem is under Article 185 of the said law, which requires a joint
adoption by the husband and wife which is a condition that must be read along
together with Art.184. Because Art. 185 of the Family Code provides that:
The husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.
They will not also fall under par.3(c) because Lenita is already naturalized in other
country. For joint adoption, it must be necessary that one of them is a Filipino.
HELD : Yes, the New Civil Code only disqualifies from being adopters those aliens that
are either:
a) Non-residents or
b) Who are residents but the Republic of the Phil. has broken diplomatic
relations with their govt. Outside of these two cases, alienage by itself
alone does not disqualify a foreigner from adopting a person under the
law.
There is no requirement that in order for an alien to adopt, it must be that the
adopted Filipino minor becomes a citizen of his country.
FACTS : Marcosa Jiongco was born in the Phil. of a Filipino mother and a Chine3se father.
She was married to a Chinese citizen. Marcosa Jiongco adopted the child of his
husband in the former marriage named Ng Hian, the herein petitioner. When
Jiongco and her adopted child arrived at the port of Manila, the respondent
refused Ng Hian, the petitioner, to enter the Phil.
56
HELD : Yes. In the case of Ex parte Fong Yim, the Federal Court of the United States
held that A Chinese merchant domiciled in the US has the right to bring into this
country with his wife and minor children legally adopted by him in China, where it
is shown that the adoption was confide and that the children have lived as
members of his family and have been supported by him for several years.
In the case at bar, the fact that Ng Hian had been adopted by his stepmother who
has the right to enter territory of the Phil., we are of the opinion and so hold that
Ng Hian has also the right to enter the Phil. as her adopted son.
Exceptions: Exceptions
(a) successional rights (a) national law of decedent (Art. 16, par.2)
(b) capacity to succeed (b) national law of decedent (Art. 16, par 2)
(c) contracts involving real property (c) the law intended will be the proper law of
but which do not deal with the title the contract (lex loci voluntatis or lex loci
thereto intentionis)
(d) contracts where real property is (d) the principal contract is governed by the
given as security proper law of the contract (lex loci
voluntatis or lex loci intentionis)
(a) In general, tangible personal (a) Lex re sitae (Art. 16, par. 1, Civil Code)
property (extrinsic and intrinsic
validity of alienations, transfers,
mortgages, capacity of parties,
interpretation of documents,
effects of ownership, co-
ownership, accession, usufruct,
lease, easement, police power,
eminent domain, taxation, quieting
of title, registration and
prescription
Exceptions: Exceptions
(a) successional rights (a) national law of decedent (Art. 16, par.2)
(b) capacity to succeed (b) national law of decedent (Art. 16, par 2)
(c) contracts involving real property (c) the law intended will be the proper law of
but which do not deal with the title the contract (lex loci voluntatis or lex loci
thereto intentionis)
(d) contracts where real property is (d) the principal contract is governed by the
given as security proper law of the contract (lex loci
voluntatis or lex loci intentionis)
57
place of registration
2) other means 2) Law of the depot (storage place for
supplies) or resting place
(c) thing in transit (these things have a (c)
58
A. The Controlling Law
The old law on movables was mobilia sequuntur personam which meant that the
rights over movables were governed by the law of the owners domicile.
The applicable law is the lex situs. The conventional wisdom for lex situs is the
execise of power, the state where the property is situated having the sole power to
decide the validity and effects of the transfer of property.
The rationale for the lex situs or lex re sitae rule now universally recognized is that
being physically a part of the country, it should be subject to the laws thereof.
The capacity of the person to transfer or acquire real property is governed by the
law of the place where the property is located.
FACTS : Petitioners spouses leased their lands in favor of the respondent who was a
Chinese national. Knowing that the lease would end in 1967, the Llantinos
requested respondent for a conference but the latter did not honor the request
and instead informed them that he had already constructed a commercial
building on the land, that the lease was for a period of 60 years and that he was
already a Filipino citizen. Petitioners filed a case contending that respondent had,
at the execution of the contract, no right to hold by lease the property involved for
being an alien.
CHEESMAN V. IAC
193 SCRA 93
59
HELD : No. The fundamental law prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land. Sec. 14,
Art. XIV of the l1973 Constitution ordains that Save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private land shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals
xxx qualified to acquire lands of public domain. Thus, he had no capacity or
peronality to question the subsequent sale of the same property by his wife on
the theory that in doing so, he is merely excersing the prerogative of a husband
in respect of a conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would permit in direct
controversies of the constitutional prohibition.
The theory of lex sitae governs the following things connected with real property:
Example:
(b) The law of which country governs the capacity of the Japanese to make
the alienation? Why?
Answer: The law of the Philippines the lex rei sitae governs the
capacity of the Japanese to alienate. (Art. 16, par. 1 Civil Code) Here
the doctrine of national law under Art. 15, of the Civil Code yields
precisely because the subject matter is land.
(c) The law of which country governs the intrinsic validity of the donation?
Why?
Answer: The law of the Philippines lex re sitae governs the
intrinsic validity of the donation. (Art. 16, par. 1, Civil Code). The
general rule of lex voluntatis or lex intentionis yields to the lex re sitae
rule because the subject matter is land.
Example: A Turkish citizen died leaving parcels of land in the Philippines. How should the
court distribute the successional rights of his heirs to said real property?
Suppose one of the compulsory heirs is a Chinese, what law governs the
capacity of this Chinese heir to inherit land in our country?
Answer: The successional rights of the heir to the parcels of land in the Philippines shall
be governed by the national law of the deceased that is Turkish law.
60
The capacity of the Chinese heir to inherit Philippine realty is also determined
by Turkish law for this is the decedents national law.
3.) Contracts involving real property but which do not deal with the title to such real
property
Example: In Manila, a German, owning land in Switzerland, agreed to pay as salary to a
Japanese employee, 10% of the annual produce of the land in Switzerland, on
condition thats said land would not be expropriated by the Swiss authorities. It
was the mutual desire of both parties that the stipulation of their employment
contract should be governed by Philippine laws. What law governs the extrinsic
and intrinsic validity of their agreement?
Answer: The extrinsic validity of the agreement is governed by Philippine law because
the contract was celebrated in our country.The intrinsic validity shall also be
determined by Philippine law for this was likewise the lex loci voluntatis. The
fact that the contract involved land located in Switzerland is of no moment, for
the agreement does not concern itself with any transfer of title thereto, at least
as between the parties.
4.) Contracts where real property is given by way of security, the principal contract
(generally the contract of loan)
Example: Two Frenchmen in France entered into a contract of loan, with Philippine land
as security by way of mortgage. Assuming that in France, a contract of loan
to be valid must be in public instrument, in the Philippines it does not have to
be. Now, then if the contract of loan and contract of mortgage are in private
instrument, can the mortgage be enforced in the Philippines?
Answer: No. Since the contract of loan is in a private instrument and therefore void in
France, the contract of mortgage is rendered automatically void in our country
for when a principal contract fails, the assessory obligations shall also be
void.
61
Answer: Yes, the carrier can invoke the clause in question. It does not matter that
in the state where the damages occurred the stipulation is not recognized.
What is important is the recognition given to the stipulation at the place of
destination. Art. 1753 of the civil code provides that thelaw of country to
which the goods are to be transported shall govern the liability of the
common carrier for their loss, destruction or deterioration.
Answer: Generally, the suit must be instituted in California because the debtor is
domiciled and found there. However, should he be in Japan, for instance,
litigation may be commenced in Japan because this is the convenient and
practical solution.
Example: A Filipino is the creditor of a German domiciled in Manila. The credit is the
result of a business transaction entered into in Manila. Payment is
stipulated to be in Manila. If the Filipino while vacationing in Japan
assigns his credit in favor of a Russian, also domiciled in Manila. What law
governs the validity and effectiveness of the assignment?
Answer: The proper law that should control the validity and effectiveness of the
assignment should be Philippine law, for it is evident that it is this law that
the parties intended to be applicable . (lex loci intentionis)I
There are at least three (3) exceptions to the application of the lex situs rule: (Co-quia)
1. Where the transaction does not affect transfer of title to or ownership of the
land.The governing law is lex intentionis or lex voluntatisI
2. In contracts where real property is offered by way of a security for the
performance of an obligation.
Example: Mortgage of the land is governed by lex situs but the loan contract
is governed by the rules on ordinary contracts.
3. Testate or intestate succession and capacity to succeed are governed by the
national law of the decedent.
FACTS : Co Quico entered into a contract of agency with Asiatic by virtue of which the
former became the sales agent on commission of the latter. Respondent was in
default in the sum of P2,213 and without rendering account to Asiatic left for
China. Asiatic filed a complaint and after summons by publication Co Quico was
decalred in default and thereafter Cos deposit in the Bank was levied. Cos
counsel moved to declare the proceedings as null and void on the ground that
the court never acquired jurisdiction over the person of the respondent because
the action is one in personam against a non-resident who was summoned by
publication and did not appear.
ISSUE : Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
62
HELD : Yes. Although respondent was outside the Philippines at the time the action was
instituted, he possessed property found and located here in the Philippines and
such property was within the reach of our courts. It is well emphasized in this
connection that all property within the state is subject to the jurisdiction of its
courts and they have the right to adjudicate title thereto, to enforce liens therupon
and to subject it to the payment of the debts of its owners, whether resident or
not.
2. Money
3. Debts
2 kinds of movable property:
a) choses in possession embraces all types of tangible physical objects
b) choses in action refers to intangible objects
4. corporate shares of stocks
FACTS : Respondent Calamba Sugar Estate Inc. (CSEI), represented by its trustee, the
Anglo Cal. Natl Bank is a foreign corporation organized under the laws of
California, duly licensed to do business in the Phils. Petitoner notified CSEI of an
assessment for an alleged deficiency income taxes. Based on the allegation that
the sale of its shares of stocks was perfected and payment took place in USA
and that the sale was made in accordance with the laws of USA, the CTA
absolved CSEI from liability on the ground that the capital gains which constituted
income were derived from abroad and not subject to income tax. Petitioner
appealed contending that the situs of shares of stock of corporation is considered
to be at the domicile of the latter.
ISSUE : WON the situs of the corporate shares of stock is within the Philippines
Under the law, any foreign corporation or juristic person to which a mark or trade
name has been registered or assigned under this Act may bring an action hereunder
for infringement, for unfair competition or false designation of origin or false description
whether or not it has been licensed to do business in the Philippines under the
corporation code, at the time it brings the complaint: provided that the country of which
said foreign corporation or juristic person is a citizen or in which it is domiciled, by
treaty, convention or law, grants a similar privilege to corporations or juristic persons of
the Philippines.
The Court decided that although the company has bot done business in the
Philippines, it has the right to protect its reputation.The Court sustained the well
established rule that the right to the use of companys corporate and trade name is a
property right which may be asserted against the whole world.
63
PHILIPS EXPORT BV V. CA
206 SCRA 457
FACTS : Philips Export B. V. (PEBV), a foreign corporation organized under the laws of
the Netherlands, is the registered owner of the trademark Philips and Philips
Shield Emblem issued by the Philippine Patent Office. The other petitioner,
Philips Electrical Lamps & Philips Industrial Devt Inc. authorized users of the
trademark and logo, were incorporated and registered with the SEC. Respondent
Standard Philips Corp. (Standard) on the other hand was issued a certificate of
Registration by the SEC. Petitioners filed a letter of complaint with the SEC for
cancellation of the word Philips from Standards corporate name in view of the
prior registration with the Bureau of Patents of such trademark and logo.
Standard refused to amend its articles of incorporation. Hence, petitioners filed
with SEC a petition praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injuction
alleging inter alia, infringement of trademark. Private respondent contended that
petitioner PEBV has no legal capacity to sue.
ISSUE : WON the foreign corporation although not doing business in the Philippines can
sue action for infringement under the IPC.
HELD : Yes. The Court declared that a corporations right to use its corporate and trade
name is a property right, a right in rem, which it may assert and protect against
the world in the same manner as it may protect against the world in the same
manner as it may protect its tangible property, real or personal, against tresspass
or conversion. It is regarded, to a certain extent, as a property right and one
whcih cannot be impaired or defeated by subsequent appropriation by another
corporation in the same field.
FACTS : Private respondent H.D. Lee Co. Inc., a foreign corporation organized under the
laws of Delaware, USA filed with the Bureau of Patents Trademark & Technology
Transfer (BPTTT), a petition for cancellation of registration for the trademark.
Stylistic Mr. Lee used on skirts, jeans etc. Issued in the name of petitioner
Emerald Mnfg. Corp, a domestic corporation. Private respondent averred that
petitioners trademark so closely resembled its own trademark LEE as to cause
confusion, mistake and deception on the part of the purchasing public as to the
origin of the goods. Petitioner in its anwer, contended that its trademark was
entirely and unmistakably different from that of private respondent and that its
certificate of registration was legally and validly granted. As a defense Emerald
questioned the capacity to sue of Lee Co., being a foreign corporation not
licensed to do business in the country.
ISSUE : Whether or not H.D. Lee Co., a foreign corporation had the capacity to sue action
for infringement
HELD : Yes. The Supreme Court ruled in the case that H.D Lee Co., Inc. had the
capacity to sue for infringement irrespective of its lack of license to engage in
business in the Philippines but denied the company protection for it failed to
prove actual use of the emblem in the local market, a requirement of Secs. 2 and
2-a of the of the same law. Finally, in 1998, the Intellectual Property Code of the
Phils. (RA 8293) was passed into law. This law allowed foreign corporation not
engaged in business in the Phis. to file civl or administrative action for opposition,
cancellation, infringement or unfair competition.
64
XIII. Choice of Law in Contracts (21)
(3) Intrinsic validity (including (3) the proper law of the contract lex
interpretation of instruments and amount contractus meaning the lex loci
of damages for breach voluntatis or the lex loci intentionis
Other theories:
(a) lex loci celebrationis defect: this
makes possible the invasion of the
national law
(b) lex nationalii defect: this may
impede commercial transactions
(c) lex loci solutionis law of the place
of
performance defect: there may be
several places of performance
(d) Prof. Minors solution:
1) perfection lex loci celebrationis
2) cause or consideration lex loci
considerations
3) performance lex loci solutionis
65
CONFLICTS RULES FOR SPECIFIC CONTRACTS
(8) Money Deposits (8) Law of the place governs the deposit
(9) Contracts with Arbitration Clause (9) Forum that has been agreed by the
parties
66
(a) extrinsic validity (a) lex loci celebrationis
(b) capacity of parties (b) national law
(c) intrinsic validity (c) lex loci voluntatis or lex loci
intentionis
Note:These are also accessory
contracts;
if the principal contract is
defective,
the accessory contract is also
generally defective.
By reason of these differing rules, the forum court presented with a contracts case
involving a foreign element must be aware that the parties may have entered into a
contract with a particular state law in mind, expecting it to govern questions that may
arise from the contract. To do otherwise would defeat the parties reasonable
ecpectations.
Lex loci celebrationis governs the formal or extrinsic validity of contracts. Art. 17
The forms and solemnties of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be
governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed. These principles are
derived from a broader proposition that the place governs the act (locus regit actum).
Query: How about contracts entered into by cablegram, telex or fax messages
between persons from different countries? What is deemed to be the
place of execution of the contract?
Answer: Art. 1319 of the civil code states that Acceptance made by letter or
telegram does not bind the offeror except from the time it came to his
knowledge. The contract in such case is presumed to have been
entered into the place where the offer was made.
Example: A Chinese sold in Chile to a Filipino a parcel of land in the Phils. The
Philippine formalities of such a sale should be followed. (Art. 16 par 1 of
the civil code)
Bar Q: Suppose our law provides that certain instrument shall be void and
unenforceable unless they beat a documentary stamps, and a written
contract is enteres into in the Phils. to be performed in France. The
contract was not stamped in the Philippines as required by its law. The
placing of stamp on written contract is not however required by the laws
of France. In an action brought on the contract in France, may the
defendant avail himself of the invalidity of contract?
Anwer: Since the forum of the problem is France, the answer will depend not on
Philippine Conflict of laws but on French conflict of laws. On the
assumption that the French conflicts rule on the matter is identical with
ours, it is believed that the contract should be considered valid, and the
defense of invalidity cannot be sustained. The rule to apply is evidently
lex loci voluntatis or the lex loci intentionis that which was voluntarily
agreed upon or intended by the parties.
The intrinsic validity of contracts including the considerations or cause thereof, the
interpretation of the instruments, and the nature or amount of damages for breach or
non-performance must be governed by the proper law of the contract (lex contractus).
This is the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties (lex loci voluntatis) or the law
intended by them expressly or implicitly (lex lcoci intentionis)
The law of the place of the making or lex loci contractus refers to the place
where the contract is made.
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2. lex loci solutionis
The law of the place of performance calls for the reference to a law other
than the place where the acts of offer and acceptance took place. All matters
relating to the time, place and manner of performance, sufficiency of
performance and valid excuses for non-performance are determined by lex
loci solutionis which is useful because it is undoubtedly always connected to
the contract in a significant way.
Art. 1306 of the civil code The contracting parties may establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient
provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public oerder or
public policy
Another exception. is that case of Insular Govt v. Frank which disregarded the
nationality law principle. Frank had the capacity to enter into a contract whether in the
US or in the Phils. since he was of majority age as determined by his national law. The
SC held that in a case not involving property that instead of national law, what should
determine capacity to enter into a contract is the lex loci celebrationis.
Bar Q: X and Y entered into a contract in Madrid, Spain wherein it was agreed that
X would construct for Y an apartment in Manila, in consideration being Ys
house and lot in San Francisco California. The laws of what country would
govern the:
(a)validity of the contract;
(b) its performance and
(c) its consideration?
Answer: (a) The validity of the contract would depend on the lex situs namely the
Philippine law since the contract deals with a building to be constructed in
Manila. Philippine law should govern everything about the contract. (Art. 16,
par 1 civil code)
(b)Prof. Minor however would say that the validity of the contract would be
governed by the lex loci celebrationis Spanish law; performance and
damages in case of breach would depend on the lex loci intentionis
Philippine law; and the sufficiency of consideration would depend on lex loci
considerationis California law.
Under the principle of freedom of contract, the parties may stipulate on the law to
govern their contract agreement.
68
KING MAU v. SYCIP
94 Phil 784
FACTS : King Mau, as agent of defendant Francisco Sycip, sold and caused the shipment
of 1,000 tons of coconut oil emulsion to Jas Maxwell Fasset, under the agency
agreement set forth in a letter in New York addressed to Sycip and accepted by
the latter. King was made the exclusive agent of Sycip in the sale of Philippine
coconut oil and its derivatives outside the Phils., King filed this action to collect
P50,089.92 as his share as agent in the sale of 1,000 tons of coconut oil
emulsion. Sycip however contends that the transaction for the sale of coconut oil
emulsion was not covered by the agency contract because it was agreed upon in
another contract and that it was an independent and separate transaction for
which King has been duly compensated.
HELD : No. There is no conflcit of laws involved in the case because it is only a question
of enforcing an obligation created by or arising from contract, and unless the
enforcement of the contract be against public policy of the forum, it must be
enforced. The contention that as the contract was executed in New York, the CFI
of Manila has no jurisdiction over this case, is without merit, becuase a non-
resident may sue a resident in the courts of this country where the defendant
may be summoned and his property leviable upon execution in case of favorable,
final and executory judgment.
HSBC v. SHERMAN
176 SCRA 331
FACTS : Eastern Book Supply Service Co., a company incorporated in Singapore was
granted by petitioner bank an overdraft facility of Singapore $200,000. As a
security for the repayment, both private respondent Sherman, Reloj and a certain
Lowe executed a Joint and Several Guarantee in favor or petitioner bank. The
company failed to pay its obligation even after demand was made. Petitioner
bank filed a case in the RTC of Quezon City. Private respondents claim that
Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over the case because a stipulation in their
guarantee which states that we hereby agree that the courts of Republic of
Singapore shall have jurisdiction over all disputes arising under this guarantee.
ISSUE : Whether or not the venue stipulation in the Guarantee divested of Philippine
courts of jurisdiction
HELD : No, becuase the parties did not thereby stipulate that only the courts of
Singapore to the exclusion of all the rest has jurisdiction. Neither did the clause in
question operate to divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction. In international law,
jurisdiction is defined as the right of a State to exercise authority over persons
and things within its boundaries, subject to certain exceptions. A State is
competent to take hold of any judicial matter it sees fit by making its courts and
agencies assume jurisdiction over all kinds of cases brought before them.
PUROMINES INC. v. CA
220 SCRA 281
FACTS : Puromines Inc., and Makati Agro Track Inc., contracted with Philip Brothers
Oceanic Inc., for the sale of prilled urea in bulk. The contract provided inter alia
an arbitration clause which states that disputes arising therefrom shall be settled
by arbitration clause in London. On May 22, 1988 "M/V Liliana Dimitrova loaded
69
on board at Yuzhay UUSR, a shipment of 15,500 metric tons of urea fro
transport to Iloilo and Manila to be delivered for Puromines. About 13,500 metric
tons were discharged in Manila in bad order and condition. Damages were
valued at P683,056.29. Puromines filed a complaint with RTC Manila for breach
of contract of carriage against Maritime Factors Inc., as ship agent of the vessel
in the Phils., while Philip Brothers was impleaded as charter of the vessel. It filed
a motion to dismiss asserting the application of arbitration clause.
ISSUE : Whether or not the arbitration clause agreed upon in the Sales Contract is valid
and applicable
HELD : Yes. Whether the liability of respondent should be based on the sales contract or
that of the bill of lading, the parties are nevetheless obligated to respect the
arbitration provisions on the sales contract and/or the bill of lading. Petitioner
being a signatory and party to the sales contract cannot escape from his
obligation under arbitration clause therein.
CONTRACTS OF ADHESION
It is one that is not negotiated by the parties, having been drafted by the dominant
party and usually embodied in a standardized form. It is called a contract of adhesion
because the only participation of the other party is in affixing her signature or adhering
thereto. Likewise known as a take it or leave it contract
ISSUE : Whether or not the said notice (a contract of adhesion) be cosidered adequate
under the circumstances of the case.
HELD : Yes. There is no dispute that there was such a Notice appearing on page 2 of the
airline ticket stating that the Warsaw Convention governs in case of death or
injury to passenger of the loss, damage or destruction to passengers luggage.
The plane ticket is what is known as a contract of adhesion and these contracts
are not entirely prohibited. The Court, finds the provisions in the plane ticket
sufficient to govern the limitations of liabilities of the airline for loss of luggage. If
the passenger fails to adhere evidence to oversome the stipulaions, he cannot
avoid tha application of the liability limitations.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES v. CA
255 SCRA 48
FACTS : Gilda Mejia shipped through PAL a one-unit microwave from San Franciso,
California to Mania. Upon arrival of the unit, Mejia discovered that the front glass
door was broken and the damage rendered it unserviceable. Oral and written
demands were made for reimbursement of the value of the oven and
transportation charges paid by Mejia to PAL, which the latter ignored. Mejia
demanded through an Attorney P30,000 for actual damages, P10,000 for moral
damages and P15,000 monthly loss for income in her catering and restaurant
business. PAL alleged that there was no valid cause of action since it acted in
good faith and in compliance with the Warsaw Convention and had exercised
due diligence in the selection, hiring and supervision of its employees.
70
ISSUE : Whether or not the petitioners liability for damage to Mejias microwave should
be limited by the provisions of the airway bill.
HELD : No. While the Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law in the
Philippines, being a treaty commitment by the government and as a signatory
thereto, the same does not operate as an exclusive enumeration of the instances
when a carrier shall be liable for breach of contract or as an absolute limit of the
extent of liability, nor does it preclude the operation of the Civil Code or other
pertinent laws.
However, the limits of liability shall not apply if it is proved that the damage
resulted from an act or omission of the carrier, his servants or agents done with
intent to cause damage or recklessly and with knowledge that damage would
probably result provided in such case, it is proved that the servant or agent was
acting within the scope of his employment.
FACTS : Spouses Mendoza went on a world tour with their children and niece. They were
issued KLM tickets for their entire trip. However, their coupon for Aer Lingus,
which would carry them from Barcelona Spain to Lourdes France was marked
RQ or on request. When they checked in at the airport of Barcelona, only the
young wards were allowed to take the plane to Lourdes while the spouses were
loaded by the manager in an inhumane manner. So they had to take a train to
reach their destination. The respondents filed a complaint against KLM as the
principal of the Aer Lingus for damages arising from breach of contract of
carriage and for the humiliating treatment they had received. The KLM sought
complete exoneration on the ground that tickets issued to respondents stipulate
that carriage thereunder is subject to Art. 30 of the Warsaw Convention, which
provides that in case of transportation to be performed by various successive
carriers, the liability of carrier for damages shall be limited to occurrences on its
own lines
ISSUE : Whether or not the limited liability condition printed on the respondents ticket is
binding upon them.
HELD : No. The applicability insisted upon by the KLM of Article 30 of the Warsaw
Convention cannot be sustained because the article presupposes the occurrence
of either an accident or delay, neither of which took place at the Barcelona
airport. What is here manifest instead is that the Aer Lingus through its manager
there refused to transport the respondents to their planned and contracted
destination.
As noted by the CA that condition was printed in letters so small that one
would have to use a magnifying glass to read the words.The KLM was
chargeable with the duty and responsibility specifically informing the respondents
of conditions prescribed in their tickets or in the vary least to ascertain the
respondents read them before they accepted their passage tickets.
71
XIV. Choice of Law in Wills, Succession and Administration (20)
(5)
(5) Revocation of the wills
(a) lex loci actus (of the revocation) (Art.
(a) if done in the Philippines 1039, civil code)
(b)
(b) if done outside the Philippines 1) lex loci celebrationis (of the making
1) by a non-domiciliary of will, not the revocation) or lex
domicilii (Art. 829, civil code)
(b) if already probated abroad (b) lex fori of the Philippines agains
applies the procedural aspects
that is the will must also be
probated here but instead of
proving the due execution,
generally it is enough to ask for
the enforcement here of the
foreign judgment on the probate
(7) Executors and Administrators abroad
(a) where appointed
(7)
(a) place where domiciled at death
72
or in case of non-domiciliary,
(b) powers where assets are found
Extrinsic validity of will deals with the forms and solemnities in the making
of wills; the number of witnesses; the form of the will oral, private instrument, public
instrument
.
Art. 17 The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public
instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they
are executed.
Art. 816 The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if
made with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he
resides or according to the formalities observed in his country or in
conformity with those which this Code prescribes
Art. 817 A will made in the Philippines by a citizen or subject of another country,
which is executed in accordance with the law of the country of which he
is a citizen or subject and which might be proved and allowed by the
law of his own country, shall have the same effect as if executed
according to the laws of the Philippines.
The following are our conflicts rules on the extrinsic validity of wills:
1. if the will was made by an alien abroad, he must comply with the formalities of the
lex nationalii or lex domicilii or Philippine law (Art. 816, civil code) or lex loci
celebrationis (Art. 17, par. 1, civil code)
2. If a Filipino makes a will abroad, he may comply with the formalities of the lex
nationalii (Philippine law) or lex loci celebrationis (law of the place where he may
be or where he makes a will) (Art. 815, civil code)
Art. 818 Two or more persons cannot make a will jointly or in the same instrument,
either for their reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person.
73
Art. 819 Wills prohibited by the preceding article executed by Filipinos in a foreign
country shall not be valid in the Philippines, even though authorized by the
laws of the country where they may have been executed
2. joint wills made by aliens abroad shall be considered valid in the Philippines if valid
according to the lex nationalii or lex domicilii or lex loci celebrationis
3. joint wills made by aliens in the Phils., even if valid in accordance with their national
law, will not be countenanced in the Phils. because otherwise our public policy may
be militated against.
The rules contained in Art. 816 & 817 on wills made by aliens abroad or in the
Phils., apply to holographic wills.
Art. 810 of the civil code defines holographic will as one entirely written, dated and
signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is not subject to any other form, need
not be witnessed and may be made in or out of the Phils.
IN RE ESTATE OF JOHNSON
39 Phil 156
FACTS : A petition was filed for probate of the holographic will of Emil Johnson, a native
of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of the US, who died in Manila on the
ground that Johnson was at the time of his death a citizen of Illinois, USA and
that the will was duly executed in accordance with the law of Illinois, hence
could be properly probated here in the Phils. pursuant to Sec. 636 of the Code
of Civil Procedure. After the will was admitted to probate, an alleged daughter
of Johnson moved for the annulment of the decree of probate and the
commencement of the intestate administration of the estate on the ground that
the deceased testator was not a resident of the State of Illinois and that the
probated will was not in accordance with the laws of said State
ISSUE : Whether or not order of probate be set aside on the ground invoked by the
appellant
HELD : No. The proof adduced by the trial court shows that the testator was at the time
of his death a citizen of the US and of the State of Illinois, his will was provable
under this section in the Courts of the Phils., provided the instrument was so
executed as to be admissible to probate under the laws of the State of Illinois.
Nevertheless, even supposing that the trial court may have erred in taking judicial
notice of the law of Illinois on the point in question such error is not available to
the petitioner because the petition does not state any fact from which it would
appear that the law of Illinois is different from what the court found.
The intrinsic validity of the wills including the order of succession, the amount of
successional rights, and the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will shall be
governed by the lex nationalii of the deceased regardless of the location and nature of
the property whether real or personal. (Art. 16, par. 2, civil code)
Example: A Chinese died in Manila leaving a BMW car and a parcel of land in
Pampanga, Phils. The law of which country governs the
successional rights of his heirs to both the car and land?
74
Suppose the Chinese also left parcels of land in China and Cuba, what should
our courts do?
Answer: The law of China, being the lex nationalii of the deceased, governs
the successional rights to both the car and the parcel of land. (Art.
16 par. 2, civil code)
Our courts have no jurisdiction to award the Chinese and Cuban lands in favor
of the heirs of the deceased since they are outside the Philippines. As a matter of fact,
in the inventory of the assets of the deceased, these lands will ordinarily not be
included unless the properties are themselves within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Phils. (Gibbs v. Govt)
CAYETANO v. LEONIDAS
129 SCRA 522
FACTS : Adoracion Campos died leaving Hermogenes Campos as the only compulsory
heir. Nenita Paguia on the other hand, filed a petition of the reprobate of the will
of the deceased, which was allegedly executed in the US and for her
appointment as the administratrix of the estate. The will of the deceased was
admitted to and allowed probate in the Phils. and Paguia was then appointed as
administratrix. Although the parties admit that the Pennsylvania law does not
provide for legitimes, the petitioner-father of the deceased argued that such law
should not apply because it would be contrary to the sound and established
public policy and would ran counter to the specific provisions of Philippine law.
ISSUE : Which law shall govern the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the Philippine law
HELD : The private respondents have sufficiently established that Adoracion was at
the time of her death an American citizen and a permanent resident of
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA. Therefore, the law which governs her will is
the law of Pennsylvania, USA, which is the national law of the decedent. It is a
settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the will, as provided for by
Art. 16 par 2 and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent
must apply.
HELD : Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues
best proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will
was executed in accordance with the formalities required is answered by
referring to the Philippine law. In this case, the court remanded the case to the
trial court for ruling on the intrinsic validity of the will of the deceased.
75
C. Interpretation of wills
Pursuant to the nationality principle in our Civil Code, the interpretation of a will or
testament must be governed by the rules of interpretation of the decedents national law.
In contracts, the principal rule in wills is that where the terms are clear and
unambiguous, the lex intentionis of the parties should be followed. When there are
ambiguous provisions, the intention of the party or the exact meaning he may have ascribed
to them can be inferred by referring to the context of the instrument or the testators
contemporaneous and subsequent acts.
D. Revocation
Being a unilateral and purely personal act, a will is revocable at any timr before the
death of the testator. Any waiver or restriction of this right is void.
If a revocation done outside the Philippines by a person who does not have a
domicile in this country is valid when it is done according to:
1. the law of the place where the wil was made (lex loci celebrationis)
2. the law of the place where the testator had his domicile at that time (lex loci
domicilii)
If a revocation is done outside the Phils. by one domiciled in the Philippines, the
law of the domicile, which is Phlippine law or the law of the place of the revocation (lex loci
actus) controls.
Under the Philippine law, wills are deemed revoked except in the following cases:
1. by implication of law
QUERY: When a testator revokes his will in the state where he is domiciled and then
changes his domicile to another state where he dies. If the revocation of his will
was valid by the laws of the State where he revoked it but invalid by the laws of
the state of domicile at the time of his death, which law will control the
situation?
ANSWER: Common law countries apply law of the domicile at the time of the testators
death. However, Philippine law clearly provides the law of the place of
revocation
E. Probate
Probate is an adjudication that the last will and testament of a person was executed
with all the formalities required by law.
Under Rule 70, Sec. 9 of the Revised Rules of Court, a will shall be disallowed in any of
the following cases:
1. If not executed and attested as required by law
2. If the testator was insane or otherwise incapable to make a will at the time
of its execution
76
5. If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick and he did not
intend that the instruments should be his will at the time of fixing the
signature thereat
SUNTAY v. SUNTAY
95 Phil 500
FACTS : Jose Suntay, a Filipino citizen died in China leaving real and personal
properties in the Phils. and a house in Amoy China. Intestate proceedings were
instituted in the CFI of Bulacan and Federico, the child of the deceased on his
first marriage was appointed as an administrator of the estate. Subsequently,
the surviving widow, filed a petition for probate of the will claiming that it has
been executed and signed in the Phils. by the deceased. However, the petition
was denied because the will was lost before hearing. After the war, Selvino,
the son of the deceased on his second marriage petitioned for testate
proceedings praying for the probate of the will executed in China in 1931,
which he claimed was already probated there. CFI of Bulacan disallowed the
alleged will. Selvino appealed contending that the wills proved and allowed in a
foreign country, according to the laws of such foreign countries, may be
allowed, filed and recorded by the CFI in the Phils.
ISSUE : Whether or not the will executed in China be probated here in the Philippines
HELD : No. In the absence of proof that the municipal court of China is a probate court
and on the Chinese law of procedure in probate matters, it may be presumed
that the proceedings in the matter of probating a will in the Chinese courts are
the same as those provided in out laws on the subject. Hence, in the absence
of notice to the interested heirs residing in the Phils., probate of a will can be
denied.
FACTS : Jose and Evelyn lived in New York with their three children. They make a will
executd separately but containing the same provisions that if any of them
survived, theiir properties would go to their children with Rafael, brother of the
deceased Jose as trustee. In January 1982, Jose and his entire family perished
in a fire that gutted their home. Rafael filed a separate proceedings for the
probate of the two wills in New York. They were admitted to probate and letters
testamentary were issued in his favor. On the other hand, Salud, the mother of
Evelyn filed in CFI Bulacan, a petition to reprobate the wills and insisted that the
separate wills of Cunanan spouses should be probated jointly.
HELD : Yes. Sec. 1 of RRC provides that the rules shall be liberally construed in order
to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceedings. What the law
expressly prohibits is the making of joint wills. In this case, the Cunanan
spouses executed separate wills. Since the two wills contain essentially the
same provisions and pertain to property which in all probability are conjugal in
nature, practical considerations dictate their joint probate.
Moreover, the evidence necessary for the reprobate of the wills which
have been probated outside the Phils. are as follows:
77
1. the due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws
F. Administration of estates
The administration of the estate of the deceased consists of the duties to manage
and settle the decedents debts and distribute the residuum of the estate to the
deceaseds heirs. When the will has been proved and allowed, it is the duty of the
probate court to issue letters testamentary thereon to the person so named in the will
upon the latters application
FACTS : Perkins died leaving two stock certificates in the Benguet Consolidated Inc., a
Phil. Corporation. The certificates were in possession of Country Trust Co. of
New York, which was the domiciliary adminstrator of the estate of the deceased.
Meanwhile, anciliary administration proceedings in the CFI of Manial were
instituted and the court appointed Lazaro Marquez as anciliary administrator, wo
was substituted by Renato Tayag. A dispute arose between the domiciliary and
anciliary administratoes as to which of them was entitled to the possession of the
stock certificates. The CFI ordered the domiciliary administrator to produce and
deposit the certificates with Tayag or with the Cerk of Court, but the former did
not comply with the said order. Tayag petitioned the Court to issued an order
declaring the stocks certificates as lost, which the court granted. Hence, this
appeal by the oppositor Benguet Consolidated Inc.
ISSUE : Whether or not ancillary administrator is entitled to the possession of the stock
certificates
HELD : Yes. The ancillary administration is proper, whenever a person dies, leaving in a
country other than that of is last domicile, property to be administered in the
nature of assets of the deceased liable for his individual debts or to be distributed
among his heirs. It would follow then that the authority of the probate court to
require that anciliary administratos right to the stock certificatesstanding in her
name in the books of appellant-Benguet Consolidated Inc., be respected is
equally beyond question. For appellant is a Phil. Corporation owing full allegiance
and subject to the unrestricted jurisdiction of the local courts. Its shares of stock
cannot therefore be considered in any wise as immune from lawful court orders
G. Trusts
Trust is a right of property real or personal held by one party for the benefit of
another. It may be created by deed during the lifetime of the settler or by will.
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Testamentary trusts depend for their extrinsic validity on the will which created
them. The rules governing wills as to capacity and extrinsic requirements apply. Since
a trust involves a property, the rule of lex situs determines the validity of a trust created
by a last will and testament.
NOTE: the locus delicti (place of NOTE: liability of foreign torts may be
commission of torts) is faced by the enforced in the Philippines if:
problem of characterization. In civil the tort is not
law countries, the locus delicti is penal in character
generally where the act began; in if the enforcement
common law countries, it is where the of the tortuous liability would not
act first became effective contravene our public policy
if our judicial
machinery is adequate for such
enforcement
Article 20 of the Civil Code provides Every person who, contrary to law, willfully
and negligently cause damage to another, shall indemnity the latter for the
same.
As a general rule, the liability and damages for torts are governed by lex loci delicti
(law of the place where the delict was committed)
1. Common law theory looks at the place where the last event necessary to make
an actor liable for an alleged tort occurs (where the injury is sustained)
2. Civil law theory view the situs of torts as the place where the tortuous act was
committed
1. Obligation Theory the tortuous act gives rise to an obligation, which is transitory
and follows the person committing the tortuous act and may be enforced
wherever he may be found
2. Doctrine of Elective Concurrence either the laws of the state where the actor
engaged in this conduct and where the injury was incurred may be invoked
3. Theory of Most Significant Relationship the applicable law shall be the law of
the country which has the most significant relationship to the situation. In
determining the state which has the most significant relationship, the following
factors are to be taken into account:
a. place where the injury occurred
b. place of conduct causing the injury
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c. domicile, residence, nationality place of incorporation and place of
business
d. place where relationship between the parties is centered (Saudi Arabian
Airlines v. CA, 297 SCRA 469)
1. if interested forum apply the law of such State which has greater
interest in upholding its tort law;
2. if disinterested forum dismiss on the ground of non forum
conveniens
Philippine Rule
Salonga suggests for the following methodology in solving tort problems in the
Philippines:
a. ascertain and weigh the purpose underlying the tort law of the forum. If the tort
law of the Philippines embodies a social or economic policy, then the law of the
forum on torts shall be applied;
b. if the Philippines has no concern or interest in the application of the internal law
and the other states have interest, apply the law of such state
NOTE : The state where an injury has occurred has interest in compensating the
injured party. Whereas, the state where the action has acted has interest
in regulating conduct of persons found in its territory
SPECIAL RULES
1. If the tort committed aboard a public vessel, whether on the high seas or in a
foreign territorial waters, the country to which the vessel belongs is the locus delicti;
the law of the flag is thus the lex loci delicti commissi;
2. if the tort takes place aboard a private or merchant vessel on the high seas, the law
of the flag is likewise the lex loci delicti commissi;
3. if the tort concerns property, whether real or personal, the lex situs is usually also
the lex loci delicti commissi;
4. maritime torts
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a. if the colliding vessels are of the same state, or carry the same flag, said law is
the lex loci delicti commissi;
b. if the vessels come from different states, whose laws however, on the matter
are identical, said laws constitute the lex loci delicti commissi;
c. if the vessels come from different states with different laws, the lex loci
commissi is the general maritime law as understood and applied by the forum
where the case is tried
liability and damages for torts in general, are governed the lex loci delicti commissi
(the law of the place where the delict or wrong was committed)
C. LOCUS DELICTI
GENERAL RULE : The essential elements of a crime and its penalties are
generally determined by the law of where the crime was committed (locus regit
actum)
EXCEPTIONS:
1. crimes committed by state officials, diplomatic representatives and officials
of recognized international organizations (base on the theory of state
immunity from suits)
2. crimes committed on board a foreign vessel even if within the territorial
waters of the coastal state, as long as the effect of such crime does no
affect the peace and order of the coastal state;
3. crimes which, although committed by Philippine nationals aboard are
punishable under the local law pursuant to the protective principle of
criminal jurisdiction (Article 2 of the RPC)
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a. The English Rule here the territory where the crime was committed
(Philippines) will have jurisdiction except:
c. The French Rule under this rule, founded on the opinion of the
French Council of State in 1806, the state whose flag is flown by the
vessel, would have jurisdiction except if the crime affects the peace,
order, security and safety of the territory.
frustrated and consummated, where the victim was injured (not where
homicide, murder, infanticide, and the aggressor wielded his weapon
parricide
frustrated and consummated, where the intended victim was (not
homicide, murder, infanticide, and where the aggressor was situated) so
parricide long as the weapon or the bullet either
touched him or fell inside the territory
where he was
bigamy where the illegal marriage was
performed
theft and robbery where the property was unlawfully
taken from the victim (not the place to
which the criminal went after the
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commission of the crime)
conspiracy to commit treason, where the conspiracy was formed (not
rebellion, or sedition note: other where the overt act of treason, rebellion
conspiracies are not penalized by or sedition was committed)
our laws
libel where published or circulated
continuing crime any place where the offense begins,
exists or continues
complex crimes any place where any of the essential
elements of the crime took
D. CRIMES V. TORTS
TORT is an injury to an individual who may be situated in any place, while a CRIME
is an injury to the state where it is committed
TORTS law assign liability to the perpetrators in order to indemnify the victim for
injuries he sustained while PENAL laws are promulgated to punish and reform the
perpetrators and deter them and others from violating the law
Bar Question: A French vessel in transit is anchored along a pier at Port Area,
Manila. There was found in a cabin of one of the members of the
crew, who is a Frenchman, a package of opium. The French sailor
admitted possession of the same. May he be criminally
prosecuted for illegal possession of opium in our courts? Why?
Suppose the package opium was already lowered from the boat
and placed on a banca that was floating on the water alongside the
vessel ready to be brought ashore, amy a criminal prosecution be
filed in the Philippines? Why?
Answer: (a) No prosecution will succeed in the case involving merely the
illegal possession of opium because there is actually no disturbance
of the public order in the Phils.
(b) The act of placing the opium aboard that banca ready to be
brought ashore is a violation of our public policy, morals, safety and
order consequently the act should be punished.
FACTS : Milagros Morada, a flight attendant of the petitioner SAUDIA was attemptedly
raped by a certain Saudi national. Three years later after the said incident, before
the departure of her flight from Riyadh for Manila, an officer of the petitioner
brought her to the Saudi court where she was made to sign a document written in
Arabic and interrogated by a judge. Petitioner assure her that these were merely
a routine procedure necessary to drop the case against the two men who
attemptedly raped her. But to her shock, she was sentenced to imprisonment and
to 286 lashes of adultery, going to the disco and listening to the music and
socializing with male crew, all in violation of Islamic law. Petitioner terminated her
contract before she was allowed to return to Manila. Morada then filed a case for
damages against the petitioner based on violations of these provisions which are
actionable Art. 19 Every person must in the exercise of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his dues and observe honesty and good faith and Art 21
Ny person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy shall compensate the latter for
damage The petitioner questioned the jurisdcition of the Philippine courts to try
the case for lack of substantial interest in the case and that Philippine law shall
not govern this case.
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(2)Whether or not Philippine court has jurisdiction to try the case.
HELD : (1)Yes, because Philippines is the situs of the tort complained of and the place
having the mist interest in the problem. It is in the Philippines where the petitioner
allegedly deceived private respondent, a Filipina residing and working here.
Under the State of the Most Significant Relationship Rules, the following contacts
are to be taken into account:
a. Place where the injury occured
(2) Yes. Where the action is one involving torts, the connecting poin of contract
could be the place where tortious conduct occurred. The RTC of Quezon City
possesses jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit. A party whose cause of
action is based on a Philippine law particularly Arts. 19 & 21 has no obligation to
plead and prove the law of another State.
FACTS : Villegas and Enrile filed a case for libel against TIME Inc., a foreign corporation
for an alleged libel arising from a publication of TIME magazine that Villeas was
the source of graft and corruption and nepotism in Asia and that it was Enrile who
helped Villegas borrow an amount without interest. TIME Inc., moved to dismiss
the case for lack of jurisdiction and improper venue relying upon the provisions of
RA 4363 that if the offended party is a public officer with office in Manila, the
proviso limits him to two choices of venue namely in the CFI of Manial or in the
city or province where the libelous acrticle was printed and first published.
However, the complaint was lodged in the CFI of Rizal despite the fact that the
plaintiffs are public officers with offices in Manila.
ISSUE : Whether or not the CFI of Rizal has jurisdiction to try the case
HELD : No. A libeled public official must sue in court of the locality where he holds office
in order that the prosecution of action should interfere as a little as possible with
the discharge of his official duties and labors. The only alternative allowed him by
law is to prosecute those responsible for the libel in the place where the offending
article was printed and first published. Since the offending publication was not
printed in the Philippines, the alternative venue was not open to respondent
Mayor Villegas of Manila and Undersecretary of Finance Enrile who were the
offended parties. Hence, the venue provisions of RA 4363 should be deemed
mandatory for the party bringing the action, unless tha question of venue should
be waived by the defendant, which is not the case here.
FACTS : Petitioner is a foreigner and economist working with the Asian Devt Bank.
Sometime in 1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB
worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the MeTC Mandaluyong City with
two counts of grave oral defamation. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the case
based on the protocol submitted by the DFA to the counrt stating that the
petitioner is covered by the immunity from legal process based on the agreement
between the ADB and Philippine government regarding the headquarters of ADB
in the country which provides that staffs and officers of the bank including the
consultants and experts performing missions in the bank shall enjoy immunity
from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity
except when the bank waives the immunity.
ISSUE : Whether or not the said immunity clause can be invoked by the petitioner.
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HELD : No. The mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the
dropping of the charges. The immunity mentioned therein is not absolute but
subject to exception that the act was done in official capacity. The commission of
the said crime is not part of of his official functions.
FACTS : Wong Cheng, a Chinese citizen, is accused of having illegally smoked opium
aboard the English mercahnt vessel Changsa, wile it was anchored in Manila
Bay, two and a half miles from the shore of the city. Womg Cheng filed a
demurrer to the information alleging lac of jurisdiction of the lower court, whcih
granted the demurrer and dismissed the case. Petitioner appealed to the
Supreme Court contending that the court has jurisdiction over the case because
the crime was committed aboard merchant vessel within our jurisdictional waters.
ISSUE : Whether or not Philippine courts acquire jurisdiction over the crime committed
aboard merchant vessels within our jurisdictional waters.
HELD : Yes. Under the English Rule, which is based on the territorial principle and
followed in the US crimes perpetrated under such circumstances are in general
triable in the courts of the country within whose territory they were committed.
Hence, if the passenger starts smoking opium within our territorial waters aboard
a foreign merchant vessel that offense becomes a breach of public order and
therefore triable in our courts.
A. CORPORATIONS
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forum is not militated against
Domicile If not fixed by the law creating or
recognizing the corporation or by any
other provision the domicile is where
its legal representation is established or
where it exercises its principal functions
(Article 15)
Receivers (appointment and powers) Principal receiver is appointed by the
courts of the state of incorporation;
ancillary receivers, by the courts of any
state where the corporation has assets
(authority is co-extensive) with the
authority of the appointing
FACTS : Defendant Corporation is a corporation organized under the laws of New York
and is licensed to engage business in the Philippines to which plaintiff is a
stockholder. However, plaintiff M.E. Gray does not own 3% of the total capital
stock nor does he represent stockholders who own 3% of its capital. Plaintiff
asked the corporation to let him examine its books but the corporation refused on
the ground that under New York laws, only stockholder owning at least 3% of the
total capital stock are entitled to such right. Plaintiff contends that under the
Philippine law, he is entitled to examine the books of the corporation to which he
is a stockholder.
ISSUE : Whether or not Philippine law shall govern in this case giving the plaintiff the right
to examine the books of the corporation.
HELD : No. The stipulation of facts is binding upon the parties and cannot be altered by
either of them.The plaintiff is bound to adhere the agreement made by him with
the defendant corporation because the personal law of the corporation is the law
of the State where it is incoporated.The defendant is a corporation under New
York law licensed to do business in the Philippines. Under the laws of New York,
the rights of a stockholder to examine the books of corporation organized under
said laws consist in making a written request within 30 days. The plaintiff not
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being a stockholder owning at least 3% of the capital stocks of the defendant
corporation has no right to examine its books and records nor to require a
statement of its affairs.
A state, if it sees fit, may by legislation exclude a foreign corporation altogether, subject
to constitutional limitations or prescribe any conditions it may see fit as prerequisite to
the corporations right to do business within its territory.
FACTS : San Jose Petroleum, a Panamanian Corporation filed with the Philippine SEC a
sworn registration statement for the registration and licensing for sale in the
Philippine Voting Trust Certificates representing 2M shares of its capital stock
with a par value of $0.35 a share at P1.00. allegedly, the entire proceeds of the
sale will be devoted exclusively to finance the operations of San Jose Oil, Co.
Inc., a domestic mining corporation. Petitioner Plating anf others, who were
prospective investors in the shares of respondent corporation opposed on such
registration and licensing on the ground that the tie-up between the issuer San
Jose Petroleum Oil, Investment, a Panamanian corporation and San Jose Oil, a
domestic corporation violates the Philippine Constitution that the privilege to
utilize, exploit, and develop our natural resources was granted to corporation
60% of its capital stock belongs to Filipino with parity rights granted to the US
citizen. Respondent corporation contends that it was an American business
enterprise entitled to parity rights in the Philippines as embodied in the Laurel-
Langley agreement.
ISSUE : Whether or not San Jose Petroleum, an American business enterprise is entitled
to parity rights in the Philippines.
HELD : No. Respondent corporation was not owned and controlled directly by the
citizens of the US because it was owned and controlled by a corporation
organized in Panorama. Neither it was indirectly owned and controlled by
American citizens through Oil Investment , for the latter was owned and
controlled by two Venezuelan corporation. The tie-up violates the constitution.
Granting arguendo that these individual stockholders are American citizens, it is
necessary to establish that the different status of which they are stockholders are
citizens, allow Filipino citizens, or corporation or association owned and
controlled by Filipino citizens to engage in the exploitation of the natural
resources of said states.
In wartime, the courts may pierce the veil of corporate identity and look into the
nationality of the controlling stockholders to determine the citizenship of the
corporation
FACTS : Christern Huenefeld & Co., Inc. obtained from petitioner fire insurance in the sum
of P100,000 covering merchandise contained in a building in Binondo Manila. In
1942, during the Japanese military occupation, the building and insured
merchandise were burned. The total loss was fixed at P92,650.00. At first, the
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petitioner refused to pay the claim, however in pursuance of the order of the
Director of the Philippine Executive Commission, it paid to the respondent the
said amount of loss. The petitioner then filed in the CFI of Manila for recovery of
the amount it paid to respondent on the gound that the policy issued in 1941 had
ceased to be effective because of the outbreak of the war between the U.S. and
Germany and that the payment made by the petitioner to respondent corporation
during the Japanese military occupation was under pressure.
ISSUE : Whether or not petitioner is entitled to recover what was paid to respondent.
HELD : Yes. In wartime, the courts may pierce the veil of corporate identity and look into
the nationality of the controlling stockholders to determine the citizenship of the
corporation. Under Phil. Insurance Law in Sec. 8 provides that any one except a
public enemy may be insure. An insurance policy ceases to be allowable as
soon as an insured becomes a public enemy. The respondent having become an
enemy corporation on December 10, 1941, the insurance policy issued in its
favor by the petitioner, a Philippine corporation had ceased to be valid and
enforceable. Hence, the petitioner is entitled to recover what was paid to the
respondent.
A foreign corporation that has been granted license to operate in the Philippines
acquires domicile in the Philippines. The object of the Corporation Code in requiring
a foreign corporation to secure a license to transact business in the Philippines is to
prevent it from acquiring a domicile for the purpose of business without taking steps
necessary to render it amenable to suit in the local courts.
FACTS : Respondent banks, the Bank of America N.T., & Citibank N.A. and Hongkong &
Shanghai Banking Corporation jointly filed with the CFI of Rizal for involuntary
solvency of Consolidated Mines Inc., (CMI) on the ground that the latter
committed specific acts of insolvency. The petitioners State Investment House
Inc., & State Financing Center Inc. opposed on the ground that the court had no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition because respondent banks are not
resident creditors and they were merely licensed to do business and being
branches in the Philippines could not be deemed as resident creditors as
contemplated under the insolvency law.
ISSUE : Whether or not the respondent banks being branches in the Philippines may be
considered residents of the Phil Islands as that term is used in Sec. 20, of the
Insolvency law.
HELD : Yes. A foreign corporation that has been granted license to operate in the
Philippines acquires domicile in the Philippines. Our laws and jurisprudence
indicate a purpose to assimilate foreign corporation, duly licensed to do business
here to the status of domestic corporations. What effectively makes such a
foreign corporation a resident corporation in the Philippines is its actually being in
the Philippines and licitly doing business here locality of existence being to
repeat the necessary element in the signification of the term resident corporation.
The prevailing rule is that with the consent of a state, a foreign corporation shall be
recognized and will be allowed to transact business in any state which gives its
consent. The consent doctrine is established in Secs. 125, 126, 127, & 129 of the
Corporation Code.
Art. 29 of the Corporation Code mandates that all foreign corporations lawfully doing
business in the Philippines shall be bound by all laws, rules and regulations
applicable to domestic corporations.
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Service upon foreign corporations doing business in the Philippines may be made
on:
1. Its resident agent
The right of a private corporation to bring suit in the forum and its amenability to court
processes and suits against it, are governed by the lex fori. From the theoretical
viewpoint, the country like ours may completely prohibit a foreign corporation from
transacting business in the Philippines; we may even prohibit it from filing suit here.
Bar Question: A issued in the RTC of Manila by California Candy Corporation, a corporation
organized under the laws of California for damages in the amount of P5M
arising from a breach of contract whereby A had agreed to sell to said
corporation 500 tons of sugar to be delivered in San Francisco, where the
contract was entered into. Would you grant As motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that the plaintiff corporation has no capacity to sue,
it not having previously obtained a license to transact business in the
Philippines? State your reasons briefly.
Answer: I would deny the motion to dismiss. (1) The contract was an isolated
transaction. (2) The plaintiff was not transacting business in the Philippines
the contract having entered into in San Francisco and expressly agreed upon
to be consummated there. So long, therefore as the jurisdictional
requirements are complied with, the plaintiffs suit may properly be
entertained by our tribunals of justice.
Bar Question: A New York Corporation takes part in bidding for the construction of a
building in Makati. The New York Corporation won the bid, but the
construction company which opened the bid refused to sign the contract with
the New York corporation for the construction of the building. The New York
Corporation then sued. As New York Corporation had not expressly obtained
a license to engage in business in the Philippines, the construction company
moved to dismiss the suit on the ground that New York has no right or
personality to sue in the Philippine courts. How should the motion to dismiss
be resolved?
Answer: The motion to dismiss should be denied. To take part in the bidding does not
constitute transacting business as the term is understood in the Philippine
law for this is an isolated act.
FACTS : Petitioner Home Insurance was the insurer of the two consignees Atlas
Consolidated Mining Devt Corp. and Hansa Transport Kantor, whose goods
were transported by herein respondent shipping lines. When the shipments
arrived in Manila, some of the goods were in bad order. Hence, the petitioner, a
foreign insurance company paid for the damaged goods. Upon payment,
petitioner became subrogated of the right to claim against respondent.
Respondent in its answer to petitioners complaint however denied the latters
capacity to sue by asserting that at the time the contract of insurance was
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entered into petitioner was not yet licensed to do business in the Philippines.
Petitioner however contends that the company was duly licensed to do business
in the Philippines through its agent Mr. Victor Bello.
ISSUE : Whether or not the petitioner has the capacity to sue before the Philippine
Courts.
HELD : Yes. The lack of capacity to sue at the time of the execution of the contract was
cured by the subsequent registration and was strengthened by the procedural
aspect of this case. A foreign corporation duly licensed to do business in the
Philippines has the right to bring suit before our courts. When the complaints in
these two cases were filed the petitioner had already secured the necessary
license to conduct its insurance business in the Philippines. It could alreay file
suits. Moreover, the general denials made by private respondents were
inadequate to attack the foreign corporations lack of capacity to sue in the light
of its positive averment that it is authorized to do so.
FACTS : Petitioners, both foreign corporations existing under the laws of the US sued
Cebu Stevedoring Co., a domestic corporation for recovery of a sum of money.
They alleged that the latter, as a common carrier undertook to carry a shipment
of copra for delivery to Procter and Gamble in Cebu, however upon discharge,
the copra was found damaged. Plaintiffs as subrogees to the shipper and
consignee demand settlement from defendant due to its failure to comply with its
obligation as carrier to deliver the copra in good order. Defendant moved to
dismiss the case on the grounds that plaintiffs had no legal personality to appear
before Philippine courts and had no capacity to sue.
ISSUE : Whether or not the plaintiffs had the capacity to sue before our courts.
HELD : No. Sec. 69 of the Corp. Law provides that no foreign corporation shall be
permitted to transact business in the Phils unless it shall have the license
required by law and until it complies with this law, shall not be permitted to
maintain any suit in the local courts. Sec. 4, Rule 8 of RRC requires that fact
showing the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to
sue or be sued in a representative capacity or the legal existence of an organized
association of persons that is made a party must be averred. In the case at bar,
all that was averred was that they are both foreign corporations existing under
the laws of the U.S.
a. Isolated Transactions
b. Action to protect trademark, trade name, good will, patent or for unfair competition
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LEVITON INDUSTRIES v. SALVADOR
114 SCRA 420
FACTS : Private respondent Leviton Mfg. Co. Inc., a foreign corporation organized and
existing under the laws of New York USA, is the largest manufacturer of electrical
devices under the trademark,Leviton Said electrical devices are being exported
to the Philippines and well known to Filipino consumers under the trademark
leviton. Petitioners Leviton Industries, a partnership organized in the Phils.
began manufacturing electrical devices under the tradename Leviton Industries
and claimed that they had registered with the Philippine Patent Office the
trademarks Leviton Label and Leviton. Private respondent filed a complaint for
unfair competition against petitioner because the trademark on its products would
cause confusion in the minds of the consumers. Petitioners moved to dismiss on
the ground that the private respondent failed to allege its capacity to sue and no
license to business in the Philippines.
ISSUE : Whether or not private respondent has the capacity to sue for unfair competition
before Philippine Courts.
HELD : Yes. A foreign corporation engaging in business without a license may file a
complaint for unfair competition since that is essentially a suit enjoining the unfair
trader pursuing the unlawful competition and in order to allow the aggrieved party
to recover damages. An action to protect trademark, trade name, goodwill patent
or unfair competition is one of the exceptions to license requirement in bringing
suit before the Philippine courts by a foreign corporation. However Sec. 21-A of
RA 166 is without qualification. Its literal tenor indicates as a condition sine qua
non the registration of the trademark of the suing foreign corporation with the
Philippine Patent Office.
FACTS : Petitioner which was not doing business in the Phils. entered into two continuing
guarantee agreements with Cordova Chin San in Hongkong whereby the latter
agreed to pay on demand all sums of money which may be due the bank from
Worlder Enterprise. When Worlder Enterprise defaulted its payment, petitioner
filed a suit in Hongkong against Worlder and Chin San, a resident of Philippines
and thereafter obtained a favorable judgment ordering Worlder and Chin San to
pay the petitioner. A demand letter was sent by the petitioner to Chin San at his
Philippine address but the latter made no reply. Petitioner then filed an action
before RTC of Makati to enforce his claim for a sum of money which was
perfected, esecuted and consummates in Hongkong. Chin San moved to dismiss
the action on the ground that petitioner has no capacity to sue before our courts.
ISSUE : Whether or not petitioner foreign bank has the capacity to sue before the Phil.
courts.
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HELD : Yes. A foreign corporation is allowed to maintain an action on a transaction
wholly celebrated and consummated abroad. Petitioner may not be denied the
privilege of pursuing its claims against private respondent for a contract which
was entered into and consummated outside the Philippines. Otherwise we will be
hampering the growth and devt of business relations between Filipinos and
foreign nationals. The vital policy of estabilizing commercial transactions will be
greatly jeopardized if our laws deprived foreign corporations of this privilege.
A foreign corporation is not maintaining a suit in our courts but is merely defending itself
when it files a complaint for the sole purpose of preventing the lower court from
exercising jurisdiction over the case. As suc, a foreign corporation is not required to
allege and prove that it has capacity to sue.
FACTS : Plaintiff Katoh & Co., Inc. is a foreign corporation organized in Japan while
defendant is a domestic corporation. Plaintiff filed an action against the defendant
for the collection of ten different shipments of steel products allegedly ordered by
the defendant but the latter refused to pay after duly receiving the said
shipments. Defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiff had not
engaged in business in the Philippines and that the transactions were made and
consummated in Japan. Hence, the plaintiff had no capacity to sue before the
Philippine courts. Plaintiff contends that since defendant filed a counterclaim
against the plaintiff, they would be recognizing the plaintiffs legal capacity to sue.
ISSUE : Whether or not plaintiff has the capacity to sue before Philippine courts
HELD : Yes. Petition filed is merely a corollary defense in a suit against it. The filing of a
counterclaim, by a Philippine corporation does not constitute an implied
recognition of the foreign corporations legal capacity. This is because in a
counterclaim, the plaintiff (foreign corporation) in the main case becomes the
defendant. Thus, the prohibition does not apply.
B. Special Corporation
2. Transnational Corporations
The personal law of the transnational corporation is that of the host country,
the major decisions regarding its operation and management come from the
parent corporation in the industrialized state.
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The main characteristic of a transnational is that all the locally incorporated
branches are joined together by the common control and management of
higher officials in the home state.
Can be said to have been done in the course for the parent
corporation or on its behalf
C. Partnership
Philippine internal law provides that if the domicile of the partnership is not
identified by the law creating it , it is deemed domiciled in the place where its legal
representation is established or where it exercises its principal functions.
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D. Foundations
Answer: (a) If aside from doing business here and obtaining a license therefor, it is
incorporated under our laws, it becomes a domestic corporation. It becomes
anew juristic entity and its foreign personality and foreign charter are
automatically disregarded.
Foreign judgment refers to all decisions rendered outside the forum and
encompasses judgments, decrees and orders of courts of foreign countries as well as
those of sister states in a federal system of government.
A foreign judgment does not itself have any extra-territorial application. Thus, it may
ordinarily be enforced only within the territory of the tribunal issuing it. For a foreign
judgment to be effective in our country, it is imperative that it be proved in accordance with
our prescribed rules on the matter.
RECOGNITION ENFORCEMENT
OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT
Courts will allow the foreign judgment Plaintiff wants courts to positively carry out
to be presented as a defense to a local and make effective in the state a foreign
litigation judgment
Involves merely the sense of justice Virtually implies a direct act of sovereignty
Does not require either an action of a Necessitates a separate action or
special proceeding proceeding brought precisely to make the
foreign judgment effective
May exist without enforcement Necessarily carries with it recognition
Reasons why not all foreign judgments can be recognized or enforced in our country:
94
B. Bases for Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
a) Theory of Comity under this theory, we apply the foreign law because of
its convenience and finally because we want to give protection to our
citizens, residents, and transients in our land.
c) Theory of Local Law foreign law is applied not because it is foreign but
because our own laws, by applying similar rules, require us to do so, hence,
it is as if the foreign law has become part and parcel of our own local law.
3. Theory apparently leaves the application of the foreign law to the discretion of
the forum. Clearly, this will prevent the adoption of definite rules and principles
for COL.
Kinds of Comity:
95
2. Comity based on persuasiveness of the foreign judgment it
says that if the forum is persuaded that a foreign judgment is
meritorious and has been rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction, it will not hesitate to enforce that foreign judgment in the
forum even if the foreign forum does not reciprocate
Collateral Matters:
The following collateral matters must first be examined before proper foreign law is
to be applied:
1) Res Judicata under this principle those who have contested an issue
shall be bound by the result of the contest and that matters once tried and
decided with finality in one jurisdiction shall be considered settled as
between the parties.
1. There must be proof of the foreign judgment; for the recognition, there is
no necessity for a separate action or proceeding
Note:
96
a. Fraud here must be Extrinsic fraud that is fraud based on facts
not controverted or resolved in the case where the judgment was
rendered
4. The judgment must not contravene a sound established policy of the forum.
Note:
5. The judgment must be res judicata in the state that rendered it.
97
Provisions of the Rules of Court on Foreign Judgments:
FACTS : Plaintiff Northwest Airlines and defendant C.F. Sharp & Co., through its Japan
branch entered into an international passenger sales agency agreement,
whereby it authorized the latter to sell its airline tickets. Defendant was unable to
remit the proceeds of the ticket sales, hence plaintiff sued the defendant for the
collection of the unremitted proceeds with a claim for damages in a Tokyo court.
A writ of summons were issued against defendant at its office in Yokohama but
the bailiff failed twice to serve the writs. The Tokyo court decided to have the
writs of summons served at defendants head office in Manila, in which the
defendant accepted but failed to appear at the hearings. The Tokyo court
decided in favor of the plaintiff. However the judgment remained unsatisfied.
Hence, petitioner filed a suit for the enforcement of judgment before RTC of
Manila. Defendant filed its answer, and averred that the judgment of the
Japanese court was void having been rendered without due and proper notice to
them. The said case for enforcement was tried on the merits and defendant
moved for demurrer of evidence on the ground that the foreign judgment sought
to be enforced is void for want of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
ISSUE : Whether or not the foreign judgment can be recognized and enforced under
Philippine courts.
HELD : Yes. A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from
which it comes, until the contrary is shown. It is also proper to presume the
regularity of the proceedings ang the giving of due notice therein.
Alternatively, in the light of the absence of proof regarding Japanese law, the
processual presumption may be invoked. Apllying it, the Japanese law on the
matter is presumed to be similar with the Philippine law on service of summons
on a private corporation doing business in the Philippines. Sec. 14 of the Rules of
Court provides that if defendant is a foreign corporation doing business in the
Philippines, the service may be made:
1) on its resident agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose;
2) absence thereof, on the government offcial designated by law to that
effect or
98
3) on any of its officers or agents within the Philippines.
BOUDARD v. TAIT
67 Phil 170
FACTS : Mr. Boudard, as widow of Maria Boudard and as guardian of their children
obtained a favorable judgment from the CFI of Hanoi, French Indo-China, for the
sum of 40,000 piastras against Tait who had been declared in default for his
failure to appear at the trial. Said judgment was based on the fact that Mr.
Boudard, who was an employee of Tait, was killed in Hanoi by co-employees
although outside the fulfillment of a duty. Boudard filed a petition with the CFI of
Manila for the execution of the Hanoi judgment but the court dismissed on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Hanoi Court, Tait not being a resident of that
country. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE : Whether or not the judgment of Hanoi Court is conclusive in our jurisdiction.
HELD : No. The exhibits presented by the appellant show that the summons alleged to
have been adressed to the appellee, was delivered in Manila to J.M. Shotwell, a
representative or agent of Churchwill & Tait Inc., which is an entity entirely
different from the appellee. The rule in matters of this nature is that judicial
proceedings in a foreign country, regarding payment of money, are only effective
against a party if summons is duly served on him within such foreign country
before the proceedings. The fundamental rule is that jurisdiction in personam
over non-residents, so as to sustain a money judgment, must be based upon
personal service within the state which renders the judgment.
RAMIREZ v. GMUR
42 Phil 855
FACTS : Samuel, a native of Switzerland and domiciliary of the Philippines for many years
died in Iloilo, leaving a valuable estate which he disposed by will. He had one
natural daughter Leona Castro. It was shown that in 1985, Castro married to
Frederick Kauffman, a British subject. Three children were born of this marriage.
In 1904, Kauffman went to Pari, France pusposely for obtaining a divorce from
Castro under French law. A divorce decree was then issued. Castro married Dr.
Earnest Mory in England. Two children were born of that marriage. In 1910,
Castro died. Both sets of children claim that Leona Castro was the recognized
natural daughter of Bischoff and she would have been his forced heir had she
been alive at the time of her fathers death.
ISSUE : Whether or not the divorce decree obtained in France be recognized as valid in
the courts of the Philippines
HELD : No. The decree of divorce upon which reliance is placed by the representation of
the Mory children cannot be recognized as valid in the Philippines. The French
tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain an action for the dissolution of a marriage
contracted in these Islands by persons domiciled here, such marriage being
indissoluble under the laws then prevaling in this country. The claims of Mory
children to participate in the estate of Samuel Bischoff must therefore be
rejected. The right to inherit is limited to legitimate, legitimated and acknowledged
natural children. The children of adulterous relations are wholly excluded.
BORTHWICK v. CASTRO
152 SCRA 229
99
FACTS : Petitioner William Borthwick, an American citizen living in the Philippines owned
real property interests in Hawaii. Private respondent Joseph Scallon sued
Borthwick on the promissory notes which the latter issued and became due.
Petitioner was declared in default by the Circuit Court of Hawaii due to his failure
to appear and answer the complaint. However, private respondent failed to have
the foreign judgment executed in Hawaii and California be enforced because
petitioner had no assets in those States. The foreign judgment was sought to be
enforced in the Philippines by filing before CFI of Makati, a complaint to enforce
the same, on the ground that petitioner had real properties in Madaluyong City.
Petitioner was again declared in default and was ordered to pay Scallon the
amount prayed for. The court issued an amendatory order and upon receipt,
petitioner moved for new trial but the same was denied. Hence, this petition
contending that the foreign judgment was unenforceable in the Phils.for bwing
rendered without jurisdiction over his person.
HELD : Yes, because both the Hawaii court and Philippine court accorded Borthwick the
opportunity to answer the complaint and impugn the complaints against him
which opoortunities he failed to do so, hence he was declared in default. It is true
that the foreign judgment against the person is merely presumptive evidence of a
right as between the parties and rejection threof may be justified, among others
by evidence of want of jurisdiction of the issuing authority under Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court. Unfortunately, petitioner was not able to impugn the judgment
against him. Thus, the verdict must go against him.
QUERUBIN v. QUERUBIN
87 Phil 124
ISSUE : Whether or not the interlocutory decree can be given effect within the Philippine
courts.
HELD : No. The decree is by no means final. It is subject to change with the
circumstancess. Because the decree is interlocutory, it cannot be implemented in
the Philippines where the judgment is merely intelocutory, the determination of
the question by the court which rendered it did not settle and adjudge finally the
rights of the parties.
100
ST. AVIATION SERVICES CO. v. GRAND INTL AIRWAYS INC
GR 140288, October 23, 2006
ISSUES : (1) Whether or not Singapore Court acquired jurisdiction over the person of
respondent
(2) Whether or not foreign judgment by default is enforceable in the Phils.
HELD : (1) Yes. Generally, matters of remedy an procedure such as those relating to the
service of process upon a defendant are governed by the lex fori, which is the
law Singapore. The service of summons outside Singapore is in accordance with
the Rules of Court of Singapore which provides that the originating process may
be served:
In this case, the writ of summons issued by the Singapore Court was served
upon respondent at its office at Pasay City and was received by Joyce Austria,
Secretary of the General Manager of the respondent company. Considering, that
the writ of summons was served upon respondent in accordance with our rules,
the jurisdiction was acquired by Singapore High Court over its person.
101
Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgment The effect of a judgment of final
order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment
or final order is as follows:
a. In case of judgment or final order upon a specific ting, the judgment
or final order is conclusive upon the title of the thing
The party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the
presumption of its validity.
ISSUES : (1) Whether or not Malaysian court acquired jurisdiction over the person of
private
respondent
(2) Whether or not the CA erred in denying recognition and enforcement to said
foreign
judgment
In the instant case, records show that upon filing of the case, Messrs. Allen &
Gledhill, Advocates and Solicitors with address in Kuala Lumpur, entered their
conditional apperance for private respondent questioning the regularity of the
writ of service of summons but subsequently withdrew the same when it
realized that the writ was properly served and that the matter was represented
by their counsel Mr. Tee. Supported also by documentary evidence shows that
summons in chambers abs affidavit of Khaw Chay Tee, counsel for private
respondent.
102
(2) Yes. There is no merit to the argument that the foreign judgment is not
enforceable in the Philippines in view of the absence of any statement of facts
and law upon which the award in favor of the petitioner is based. Considering
that under Malaysian court, a valid judgment may be rendered even without
stating in the judgment every fact and law upon which the judgment is based,
then the same must be accorded respect and the courts in this jurisdiction
cannot invalifate the judgment of the foreign court simply because our rules
provide otherwise.
1) The judgment was rendered under a system which does not provide
impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due
process of law
2) The foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant
3) The foreign court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter
1) The defendant in the proceedings in the foreign court did not receive notice
of the proceedings in sufficient time to enable him to defend
3) The cause of action or claim for relief on which the judgment is based is
repugnant to the public policy of this state
4) The foreign judgment conflicts with another final and conclusive judgment
6) In the case of jurisdiction based only on personal service, the foreign court
was a seriously inconvenient forum for the trial of the action (forum non-
conveniens)
Authentication calls for the Philippine consul assigned to the country where
the foreign judgment was decreed to certify that had been rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction
2. The petition must comply with all the requisites of an enforceable judgment
103
Under Sec. 24, the RTC does not have jurisdiction over disputes that are
properly the subject of arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause and mandates
the referral to arbitration in such cases.
Foreign arbitral awards when confirmed by the RTC are deemed not as a
judgment of the foreign court but as a foreign arbitral award and when confirmed,
are enforced as final and executor decisions of our courts of law.
While the RTC does not have jurisdiction over disputes governed by
arbitration mutually agreed upon by the parties, still the foreign arbitral award is
subject to judicial review by the RTC which can set aside, reject or vacate it.
4. Grounds for judicial review different in domestic and foreign arbitral awards
For final domestic arbitral award also need confirmation by the RTC
pursuant to Sec 23 of RA 786 and shall be recognized as final and executor
decisions of the RTC, they may only be assailed before the RTC and vacated on
the grounds provided under Sec. 25 of RA 876.
The losing party who appeals from the judgment of the court confirming an
arbitral award shall be required by the appellate court to post a counterbond
executed in favour of the prevailing party equal to the amount of the award in
accordance with the rules to be promulgated by the SC.
104
Distinctions between foreign arbitral award from foreign judgment:
1. Foreign arbitral award is a better alternative because the same is readily enforceable
whereas foreign judgment is not readily enforceable for it requires proof and allegations of
a foreign law.
2. Foreign arbitral award, when confirmed by the RTC shall be recognized and enforced as
foreign arbitral award and not as judgment of a foreign court, whereas foreign judgment
when confirmed by the RTC shall be enforced as a judgment of the foreign court.
3. Foreign arbitral award when validly stipulated upon by the parties shall be final and binding
whereas in foreign judgment there is no stipulation involved executed by the parties.
4. Foreign arbitral award is done thru alternative dispute resolution whereas foreign judgment
does not involved alternative dispute resolution because the same should be done in
regular courts proceedings.
Grounds for the rejection of a foreign arbitral award under Art. V of New York
Convention:
a. Recognition & enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of the
party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent
authority where the recognition and enforcement is sought proof that:
1. parties to the agreement referred to in Art. II were, under the law applicable to
them under some incapacity or said agreement is not valid under the law to
which the parties have subjected it or under the law of the country where the
award was made.
2. Party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the
appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or otherwise
unable to present his case.
3. Award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the
terms of the submission to arbitration
5. Award has not yet become binding on the parties or has been set aside or
suspended by a competent authority in which the award was made.
FACTS : Petitoner Korea Technologies Co. Ltd. (KOGIES), A Koren Corp. engaged in the
supply and installation of LPG Cylinder manufacturing plants and private
105
respondent Pacific General Steel Mfg. Corp. (PGSMC), a domestic corp.,
executed a contract in the Philippines whereby KOGIES would set up an LPG
cylinder mfg. plant in Carmona, Cavite. For allegedly altering the quantity and
lowering the quality of the machineries & equipment delivered by KOGIES,
PGSMC cancelled the contract and would dismantle & transfer the machineries
in Carmona plant. KOGIES asserted that PGSMC could not unilaterally rescind
the contract and that their dispute should be settled by arbitration as agreed upon
in Art. 15, the arbitration clause of their contract. KOGIES then instituted an
Application for Arbitration before KCAB in Seoul, Korea pursuant to said Art. 15
as amended and resolved said dispute in their favor. Meanwhile, KOGIES, filed a
complaint for specific performance against PGSMC before RTC of Muntinlupa
alleging among others that PGSMC violated Art. 15 of the contract by unilaterally
rescinding the same without resorting to arbitration and thus praying that PGSMC
be restrained from dismantling & transferring the machinery. PGSMC opposed to
the TRO since Art. 15 was null and void for being against public policy as it ousts
the local courts of jurisdiction. The RTC denied said application of TRO and held
that Art. 15 was invalid which later affirmed by the CA.
HELD : Yes. Established is the rule that the law of the place where the contract is made
governs. The contract was perfected in the Philippines. Therefore our laws ought
to govern. Nonetheless Art. 2044 of the Civil Code sanctions the validity of
mutually agreed arbitral clause or finality of an arbitral award. The arbitration
clause was mutually agreed upon by the parties. It has not been shown to be
contrary to any law or against public policy.
FACTS : Petitoner Oil & Natural Gas Commission, a foreign corporation controlled by the
govt of India entered into a contract with private respondent PACEMCO whereby
the latter undertook to supply petitioner 4,300 metric tons of oil well cement. The
oil well cement was loaded on board by the ship MV Surutana Nava at the port of
Surigao City. Due to a dispute between the shipowner & private respondent, the
cargo did not reach its destination in India and instead it was withheld in Bangkok.
Despite the fact the private respondent had already received payment and
despite several demands, it failed to deliver the oil well cement. Petitioner then
informed private respondent that they referred the claim to an arbitrator pursuant
to clause 16 of their contract. The chosen arbitrator, one Shri Malhotra resolved
the dispute in petitioners favor. To enable to execute the arbitral award, petitioner
filed before the Court of Civil Judge in Dehra Dun, India, praying that the decision
of arbitrator be made The Rule of Court in India. The foreign court issued an
order in favor of the petitioner, in which the said arbitral award shall be a part of
the decree. Accordingly, petitioner filed a complaint with RTC of Surigao City for
the enforcement of the foreign judgment. The RTC dismissed the complaint for
lack of valid cause of action and held that the referral of the dispute to the
arbitrator is erroneous. The CA affirmed the trial courts decision declaring that
arbitrator did not have jurisdiction, thus the foreign court could not validly adopt
the arbitrators award. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE : Whether or not the foreign judgment is valid and enforceable in the Philippines.
106
FACTS : Vicente Bayot, A Filipino citizen and Rebecca Makapugay, identified as an
American citizen were married in Mandaluyong City on April 20, 1979, & were
later blessed with a child named Alix. Sometime in 1996, Rebecca initiated
divorce proceedings in the Dominican Republic. The Dominican Court issued
Civil Decree on February 22, 1996 ordering the dissolution of their marriage and
leaving them to remarry after completing the legal requirements but giving them
the joint custody and guardianship over Alix. One year later, the same Court
issued another civil decree settling the couples property relations pursuant to an
agreement they executed which states that the conjugal property, which they
acquired during their marriage consists only of real and personal properties at
Muntinlupa. On March 14, 1996, Rebecca filed a petition before the RTC of
Makati City for declaration of nullity of marriage pursuant to said civil decree
issued by the Dominican Court. On May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit
of Acknowledgment stating under oath that she is an American citizen and that
since 1993 she and Vicente have been living separately. In 2001, Rebecca filed
another petition before RTC of Muntinlupa for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage. Vicente then moved to dismiss the case on grounds of lack of cause of
action and that petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce which motion
was denied. Rebecca on the other hand interposed an opposition insisting her
Filipino citizenship as affirmed by the DOJ and that there is no valid divorce to
speak of. On appeal, the CA effectively dismissed the petition of Rebecca.
HELD : Yes. At the time of the divorce, Rebecca was still to be recognized as an
American citizen. At the very least, she chose before, during & shortly after her
divorce, her American citizenship to govern her marital relationship. Being an
American citizen she was bound by the national laws of the US, a country which
allows divorce. Given the validity of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same shall
be given a res judicata effect in this jurisdiction. As an obvious result of divorce
decree, the marital vinculum between Rebecca and Vicente is considered
severed.
ROEHR v. RODRIGUEZ
404 SCRA 495
FACTS : Petitioner Wolfgang Roehr, A German citizen and resident of Germany married
private respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina in Harmburg, Germany in 1980.
Their marriage was subsequently ratified in Negros Oriental in 1981. In 1996,
private respondent filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before
RTC of Makati City. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case but the same was
denied. On December 16, 1997, petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the
CFI of Hamburg-Blankenese, wherein the court awarded to him the custody of
their two children. In view of said decree, petitioner filed a second motion to
dismiss on action filed by private respondent on the ground that the trial court
had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action as a decree of divorce
had already been promulgated dissolving the marriage of petitioner and private
respondent. The trial court thru public respondent Judge Salonga granted the
motion. Private respondent filed a motion for partial reconsideration praying that
the case proceed for the purpose of determining the issues of custody of children
and the distribution of properties. Public respondent reversed her previous order
and allowed the case to proceed.
ISSUE : Whether or not the case be allowed to proceed despite the decree of divorce
already obtained in Germany.
HELD : Yes. As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries
are cognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof e.g. custody, care
and support of the children must still be determined by our courts. Before our
courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award
of custody of petitioner by the German court, it must be shown that the parties
opposed to the judgment, had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds
under Rule 39, Sec 50(now Sec. 48) of the Rules of Court.
107
RULE 39, SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments. - The effect of a
judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to
pronounce the judgment is as follows:
FACTS : Petitioner LIRL, a Hongkong corp., licensed to operate a resort Casino hotel in
Subic Bay Phils. filed a complaint for annulment of contract, specific performance
with damages & application for TRO before RTC of Olongapo against PAGCOR
& SBMA on the basis of the agreement it entered into with the latter which was
later amended which in effect suspend, limit, reduce, or modify petitioners
license to operate the Subic Bay Casinos and from entering with any agreement
from other entities for the operation of other Casinos in the Subic Free Port Zone.
The trial court annulled the amendment of the aforesaid agreement. Meanwhile,
petitioner LIRLs companies filed before the Hongkong Court for winding up,
which ordered the appointment of Kelvin Flynn & Borrelli, as liquidators of
petitioner LIRL and further granting to them the power to manage its business.
Pursuant to said orders, Flynn sent a letter to private respondent Boon, informing
him that he had already been terminated as CEO of LIRL-Subic as well as private
respondent Picazo law office notifying that its legal services had also been
terminated. Petitioner LIRL later engaged the legal services of petitioner Quasha
Law office as its new counsel to represent in all proceedings in the Phils.
Petitioner Quasha Law Office filed its Entry of Appearance as counsel of
petitioner in a case pending before the appellate court. The appellate court
refused to recognize their appearance because being a foreign judgment, our
courts could not take judicial notice thereof and further concludes that untill the
alleged order of the Hongkon Court had been recognized before our local courts,
it was still the private respondent Picazo Law Office was recognized as the only
counsel entitled to represent petitioner LIRL.
ISSUE : Whether or not the order of the Hongkong Court can be recognized and enforced
in our Courts.
HELD : No. The act of terminating the legal services of private respondent Picazo law
Office and engaging in its place petitioner Quasha law office was a mere exercise
of petitioner LIRLs prerogative, thru its appointed liquidators, which was an
internal affair that requires no prior recognition in a separate action. Therefore,
the court can no longer pass upon the issue.
FACTS : Based on their distributorship agreement executed in US, petitioner PAWI, a Phil.
Corp., shipped 8,594 wheels to respondent FASGI, a Californian corp.,and the
latter paid the FOB value of said wheels. After finding that the shipment was
defective and in non-compliance with the requirement, FASGI filed an action
against PAWI and FPS, an Italian corp., for breach of contract with recovery of
damages before the California District Court. Pending resolution of the case, the
parties entered into a settlement agreement whereby petitioner had to execute
several letters of credit (LC) in favor of FASGI. However, dispite its assurances
and FASGIs insistence, PAWI still failed to open the first LC allegedly due to
Central Bank inquiries and restrictions. The parties subsequently entered into a
108
Supplemental Settlement of Agreeement and motion for entry of judgment, which
was executed by FASGIs president and PAWIs counsel Mr. Thomas Ready. For
failure again to comply with their agreement, respondent pursue the case with
California Court, which obtained a favorable judgment. Unable to satisfy said
foreign judgment, respondent filed a complaint for its enforcement before RTC of
Makati City. The trial court dismissed the case on grounds that the decree was
tainted with collusion, fraud and clear mistake of law. On appeal, the CA ordered
the full enforcement of the California judgment. Hence this appeal. Petitioner
contends that the foreign judgment cannot be enforced because Mr. Ready had
already terminated his services from them and that the motion for entry of
judgment is void.
ISSUE : Whether or not foreign judgment is enforceable before the Philippine courts.
HELD : Yes. From the time the stipulation for judgment was entered until the certificate of
finality of judgment was issued by the California Court, no notification was issued
by PAWI to FASGI regarding its termination of Mr. Readys services. If PAWI
were indeed hoodwinked by Mr. Ready, who purportedly acted in collusion with
FASGI, it should have aptly raised the issue before the forum which issued the
judgment, in line with the principle of international comity.
MIJARES v. RANADA
455 SCRA 397
FACTS : Plaintiffs filed a class suit with the US District Court of Hawaii against the estate
of Pres. Marcos alleging that they suffered tortious acts in the hands of military
forces during the Marcos regime. The US District Court awarded to the plaintiff
class an amount of $1.96B, as compensatory & exemplary damages. Meanwhile,
present petitioners filed a complaint with Makati RTC for the enforcement of
foreign judgment, claiming that they are members of the plaintiff class in whose
favor said foreign court awarded damages and that the same should be
recognized and enforced in our courts pursuant to Rule 39, Sec, 48 of the Rules
of Court. Respondent Marcos estate moved to dismiss the case raising non-
payment of correct filing fees. Petitioners however claimed that the required filing
fees are exorbitant despite the fact that said action is not capable of pecuniary
estimation. On the other hand, respondent Judge Ranada ruled against
petitioners. In its present petition for certiorari, petitioners assailed the twin
orders of respondent Judge and asserted that said action belongs to the class
where the Court has recognized as being incapable of pecuniary estimation.
CHR likewise intervened in this case asserting the immediate enforcement &
execution of the said foreign judgment because once the case has been decided
between the same parties in one country on the same issue with finality; it can no
longer be relitigated in another country invoking principle of comity and vested
rights.
ISSUES : (1) Whether or not foreign judgment can be recognized in our courts as the same
is
capable of pecuniary estimation.
(2) Whether or not foreign judgment should outrightly be enforced before our
courts
even without filing a separate action.
HELD : (1) Yes. The Court ruled that the complaint to enforce foreign judgment is one
capable of pecuniary estimation and that petitioners payment of docket fees of
only P410.00 corresponds to the same amount required for other actions not
involving property
109
(2) No. Sec. 48, Rule 39 acknowledges that the final judgment is not conclusive
yet but presumptive evidence of a right of petitioner against the Marcos Estate.
Marcos Estate is not precluded to present evidence; if any of want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud or clear mistake of law
or fact. Such issues are to be litigated before the trial court but within the
confines of the matters for proof as laid down in the aforesaid rule.
FACTS : Heller, an American citizen & Airman First Class of US Air Force, presently
assigned and stationed at Clark Air Base, Pampanga, who sustained serious
physical injuries due to bus collision filed an action for damages before CFI of
Pampanga against petitioners Dangwa, a domestic corp. & owner of the bus
company and James Gayot, the bus driver. Petitioners moved to dismiss the
complaint on the ground of improper venue since Heller is not a resident of
Pampanga in view of his allegation in the complaint. Heller opposed contending
that he has the privilege to elect with court to file his action and he had chosen
CFI of Pampanga because he is a resident thereof not only at the time of the
commencement of present action but even before the accident happened.
Respondent Judge Sarmiento ruled in favor of Heller declaring that his action
was properly instituted in CFI of Pampanga because residence under this action
need not be continuous, it is sufficient that a party, though a foreign subject has
is actual residence in the place where the action was brought. Hence, this
petition for prohibition.
HELD : Yes. There is no question that private respondent Heller has his fixed place of
abode at Clark Air Base Pampanga. There is no showing that Heller has not
resided consistently and with continuity in his place of abode at Clark Air Base at
the time he filed his action. As held in Koh v. CA, the term resides as employed
in the rule on venue on personal action filed with the CFI means the place of
abode, whether permanent or temporary of the plaintiff or the defendant as
distinguished from domicile which denotes a fix permanent residence, to which,
when absent, one has the intention of returning.
FELICITAS AMOR-CATALAN v. CA
514 SCRA 607
110
marriage with Eusebio. Respondents moved to dismiss on the ground of lack of
cause of action as petitioner was allegedly not a real-party-in-interest, however it
was denied. The trial court decided in favor of the petitioner. On appeal, the CA
reversed the decision of the trial court. Hence this instant petition for review
contending that petitioner has the personality to file petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage.
ISSUE : Whether or not petitioner has the personality to file petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage.
HELD : No. Petitioners personality to file said petition cannot be ascertained because of
the absence of divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. It is true that under
the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents were
married or even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can
file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage however only a party who can
demonstrate a proper interest can file the same. The said petition must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest and must be
based on a cause of action.
Hence, the case was remanded to the trial court for reception of additional
evidence necessary to determine whether respondent Orlando was granted a
divorce decree and whether foreign law which granted the same allows or
restricts remarriage.
- nothing follows -
111