Magallona v.
Ermita and classify KIG and Scarborough Shoal as regime of
(Case Digest)
MAGALLONA v. ERMITA, G.R. 187167, August 16, 2011
Facts:
In 1961, Congress passed R.A. 3046 demarcating the
maritime baselines of the Philippines as an
Archepelagic State pursuant to UNCLOS I of 9158,
codifying the sovereignty of State parties over their
territorial sea. Then in 1968, it was amended by R.A.
5446, correcting some errors in R.A. 3046 reserving
the drawing of baselines around Sabah.
In 2009, it was again amended by R.A. 9522, to be
compliant with the UNCLOS III of 1984. The
requirements complied with are: to shorten one
baseline, to optimize the location of some basepoints
islands.
Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the law
for three main reasons:
1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory under
Article 1;
2. it opens the countrys waters to innocent and sea
lanes passages hence undermining our sovereignty
and security; and
3. treating KIG and Scarborough as regime of islands
would weaken our claim over those territories.
Issue: Whether R.A. 9522 is constitutional?
Ruling:
1. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss
of territory. it is just a codified norm that regulates
conduct of States. On the other hand, RA 9522 is a
baseline law to mark out basepoints along coasts,
serving as geographic starting points to measure. it
merely notices the international community of the
scope of our maritime space.
2. If passages is the issue, domestically, the
legislature can enact legislation designating routes
within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent
and sea lanes passages. but in the absence of such,
international law norms operate.
the fact that for archipelagic states, their waters are
subject to both passages does not place them in
lesser footing vis a vis continental coastal states.
Moreover, RIOP is a customary international law, no
modern state can invoke its sovereignty to forbid such
passage.
3. On the KIG issue, RA 9522 merely followed the
basepoints mapped by RA 3046 and in fact, it
increased the Phils. total maritime space. Moreover,
the itself commits the Phils. continues claim of
sovereignty and jurisdiction over KIG.
If not, it would be a breach to 2 provisions of the
UNCLOS III:
Art. 47 (3): drawing of basepoints shall not depart to
any appreciable extent from the general configuration
of the archipelago.
Art 47 (2): the length of baselines shall not exceed
100 mm.

KIG and SS are far from our baselines, if we draw to
include them, well breach the rules: that it should
follow the natural configuration of the archipelago.
Henares v LTFRB (Environmental Law)
Henares v LTFRB
GR No. 158290
October 23, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamus commanding
respondents Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board
(LTFRB) and the Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC) to require public utility vehicles (PUVs) to use compressed natural
gas (CNG) as alternative fuel.
ISSUES:
(1) Do petitioners have legal personality to bring this petition before us?
(2) Should mandamus issue against respondents to compel PUVs to use
CNG as alternative fuel?
APPLICABLE LAWS:
Section 16,12 Article II of the 1987 Constitution
The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced
and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
Section 414 of Republic Act No. 8749 otherwise known as the "Philippine
Clean Air Act of 1999." SEC. 4. Recognition of Rights. Pursuant to the
above-declared principles, the following rights of citizens are hereby
sought to be recognized and the State shall seek to guarantee their
enjoyment:
a) The right to breathe clean air;
b) The right to utilize and enjoy all natural resources according to the
principle of sustainable development;
c) The right to participate in the formulation, planning, implementation and
monitoring of environmental policies and programs and in the decision-
making process;
d) The right to participate in the decision-making process concerning
development policies, plans and programs, projects or activities that may
have adverse impact on the environment and public health;
e) The right to be informed of the nature and extent of the potential hazard
of any activity, undertaking or project and to be served timely notice of any
significant rise in the level of pollution and the accidental or deliberate
release into the atmosphere of harmful or hazardous substances;
f) The right of access to public records which a citizen may need to
exercise his or her rights effectively under this Act;
g) The right to bring action in court or quasi-judicial bodies to enjoin all
activities in violation of environmental laws and regulations, to compel the
rehabilitation and cleanup of affected area, and to seek the imposition of
penal sanctions against violators of environmental laws; and
h) The right to bring action in court for compensation of personal damages
resulting from the adverse environmental and public health impact of a
project or activity.
RULING:
(1) YES. There is no dispute that petitioners have standing to bring their
case before this Court. Moreover, as held previously, a party's standing
before this Court is a procedural technicality which may, in the exercise of
the Court's discretion, be set aside in view of the importance of the issue
raised. We brush aside this issue of technicality under the principle of the
transcendental importance to the public, especially so if these cases
demand that they be settled promptly.
(2) NO. plain, speedy and adequate remedy herein sought by petitioners,
i.e., a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to require PUVs to
use CNG, is unavailing. Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of
an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that
mandates the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor
vehicles to use CNG. Mandamus will not generally lie from one branch of
government to a coordinate branch, for the obvious reason that neither is
inferior to the other.
It appears that more properly, the legislature should provide first the
specific statutory remedy to the complex environmental problems bared by
herein petitioners before any judicial recourse by mandamus is taken.
Oposa vs. Factoran Case Digest (G.R.
No. 101083, July 30, 1993)
FACTS:
The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by
their parents. The first complaint was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the
Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the Regional Trial Court, National
capital Judicial Region against defendant (respondent) Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs
alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the
natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests. They
further asseverate that they represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn and asserted that continued deforestation have
caused a distortion and disturbance of the ecological balance and have
resulted in a host of environmental tragedies.
Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his
agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all
existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and
desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
TLAs.
Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
the complaint had no cause of action against him and that it raises a
political question.
The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that
granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts
which is prohibited by the Constitution.
Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari
and asked the court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the
ground that the respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his discretion in
dismissing the action.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.
(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.
(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the
impairment of contracts.
RULING:
First Issue: Cause of Action.
Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a
specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any
relief is provided by law. The Court did not agree with this. The complaint
focuses on one fundamental legal right -- the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology which is incorporated in Section 16 Article II of the
Constitution. The said right carries with it the duty to refrain from impairing
the environment and implies, among many other things, the judicious
management and conservation of the country's forests. Section 4 of E.O.
192 expressly mandates the DENR to be the primary government agency
responsible for the governing and supervising the exploration, utilization,
development and conservation of the country's natural resources. The
policy declaration of E.O. 192 is also substantially re-stated in Title XIV
Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and
Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as
the bases for policy formation, and have defined the powers and functions
of the DENR. Thus, right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to
a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's duty to protect and
advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty
or obligation to respect or protect or respect the same gives rise to a
cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLA, which
they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a
balance and healthful ecology. Hence, the full protection thereof requires
that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to
be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their
rights.
or public welfare as in this case. The granting of license does not create
irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights.
Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of
contract is limit by the exercise by the police power of the State, in the
interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare. In short, the
non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the State.

The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby GRANTED and
the RTC decision is SET ASIDE.

Second Issue: Political Issue.

Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for

the expanded jurisdiction vested upon the Supreme Court. It allows the
Court to rule upon even on the wisdom of the decision of the Executive
Land Titles And Deeds Case
and Legislature and to declare their acts as invalid for lack or excess of
jurisdiction because it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Digest: Carino V. Insular
Government (1909)
449 February 23, 1909
Lessons Applicable: (Land Titles and Deeds)
Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.

Sec. 2 Art. XII 1987 Constitution

The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by

which the state regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources FACTS:
to the end that public welfare is promoted. It is not a contract within the
purview of the due process clause thus, the non-impairment clause cannot
be invoked. It can be validly withdraw whenever dictated by public interest
 Carino is an Igorot of the Province of Benguet, where
the land lies filed for writ of error because the CFI and SC
dismissed his petition for application
For more than 50 years before the Treaty of Paris, April
11, 1899, he and his ancestors had held the land as
recognized owners by the Igorots. (grandfather maintain
fences for holding cattle>father had cultivated parts and
used parts for pasturing cattle>he used it for pasture)
1893-1894 & 1896-1897: he made an application but with no avail
1901: petition alleging ownership under the mortgage law and the
lands were registered to him but process only established possessory title
Even if the applicant have title, he cannot have it registered, because
the Philippine Commission's Act No. 926, of 1903, excepts the Province
of Benguet among others from its operation
ISSUE: W/N Carino has ownership and is entitled to registration.
HELD: YES. Petition Granted.
Land was not registered, and therefore became, if it was not always,
public land.
Spanish Law: "Where such possessors shall not be able
to produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall
show that ancient possession, as a valid title by
prescription." For cultivated land, 20 years, uninterrupted,
is enough. For uncultivated, 30.
Applicant's possession was not unlawful, and no attempt at any such
proceedings against him or his father ever was made.
Every native who had not a paper title is not a trespasser.
There must be a presumption against the government when a private
individual claims property as his or her own. It went so far as to say that
the lands will be deemed private absent contrary proof.
Cruz vs Secretary of DENR
Natural Resources and Environmental Law; Constitutional
Law; IPRA; Regalian Doctrine
GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for
prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing
the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No.
8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of
1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR).
The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR
on the ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of
the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as
minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the
regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution.
ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?
HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution.
Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to
the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their
ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the
ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights granted
by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their
ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants
of the land on which the resources are found, the right to the
small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a
priority in their large scale development and exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part
of the lands of the public domain. They are private lands and
belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of
private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from
the State. However, the right of ownership and possession by the
ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of
ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.
PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO VS
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES
Posted by kaye lee on 9:43 PM
G.R. No. 183591 October 14 2008
Province of North Cotabato vs Government of the Republic of the
Philippines
FACTS:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a
Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the
GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the
petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them
the complete and official copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit the
slated signing of the MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation
thereon. They also pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional.
The Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the same.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is
ripe for adjudication;
2. Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to
information on matters of public concern (Art 3 Sec. 7) under a state
policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest
(Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local
Government Code of 1991)
3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines would be binding itself
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE)
as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political
subdivision not recognized by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to
conform to the MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act
No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
RULINGS:
1. Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of the
respondents to consult the local government units or communities
affected constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate
under EO No. 3. Moreover, the respondents exceeded their authority
by the mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution. Any
alleged violation of the Constitution by any branch of government is a
proper matter for judicial review.
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount
public interest or of transcendental importance, the Court grants the
petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents
the requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in
David v. Macapagal- Arroyo.
In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, this Court held:
x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the
approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have
ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt
act . Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the
law is enough to awaken judicial duty.x x x x
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our
constitutional scheme is a coequal of Congress, is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x x settling the dispute
becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts.
That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate
ripeness.
2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the
Constitution involved in the matters of public concern (Sec 7 Art III)
under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA
7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).
(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees the right of the
people to demand information, while Sec 28 recognizes the duty of
officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The complete
and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its
complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same self-
executory nature, subject only to reasonable safeguards or limitations
as may be provided by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern
involving public interest in the highest order. In declaring that the right
to information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to the
consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to
the executory nature or commercial character of the agreement.
E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations
on both national and local levels and for a principal forum for
consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on
the Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant
information, comments, advice, and recommendations from peace
partners and concerned sectors of society.
3.
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE)
as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political
subdivision not recognized by law;
Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other
things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the
status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status
closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present
Constitution.
No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is
recognized under our laws as having an associative
relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept
implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the
Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies
the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The
Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this
jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it
provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of
Philippine territory for independence.
The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the
autonomous region recognized in the Constitution. It is not
merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its
relationship with the national government being fundamentally
different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all
but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in
the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent
population, a defined territory, a government, and a
capacity to enter into relations with other states.
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily
sever any portion of Philippine territory, the spirit animating it
which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of
association runs counter to the national sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Republic.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the
national government and the BJE being itself contrary to the
present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific
provisions of the MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE
are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws. The BJE is more
of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it
is covered by the term autonomous region in the constitutional
provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it.
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to
conform to the MOA:
The MOA-AD provides that any provisions of the MOA-AD
requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall
come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact
and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal
framework, implying an amendment of the Constitution to
accommodate the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect,
guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the
Constitution .
It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in
her oath of office, only to preserve and defend the Constitution.
Such presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing
her to change the Constitution, but simply to recommend
proposed amendments or revision. As long as she limits herself
to recommending these changes and submits to the proper
procedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her mere
recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional
act.
The suspensive clause in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the
above-discussed standards.
Given the limited nature of the Presidents authority to
propose constitutional amendments, she cannot
guarantee to any third party that the required
amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even be
submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is submit
these proposals as recommendations either to Congress or the
people, in whom constituent powers are vested.
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act
No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
This strand begins with the statement that it is the birthright of
all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify
themselves and be accepted as Bangsamoros. It defines
Bangsamoro people as the natives or original inhabitants of
Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu residing in such locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one
archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and their
peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership
descendants whether mixed or of full blood, including their
spouses. of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively
and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great
number of inhabitants from their total environment.
Thus, the concept of Bangsamoro, as defined in this strand of
the MOA-AD, includes not only Moros as traditionally
understood even by Muslims, but all indigenous peoples of
Mindanao and its adjacent islands. The MOA-AD adds that the
freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall be respected. What
this freedom of choice consists in has not been specifically PANDACAN OIL DEPOT MUST GO:
defined. The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the Bangsamoro
homeland, the ownership of which is vested exclusively in the
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY VS.
Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior rights of occupation. ATIENZA CASE DIGEST
Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral domain
does not form part of the public domain. By: Atty.Fred | February 15, 2008 in Elections and
Constitutional Law, Obiter/News

Leave a reply | Related posts at the bottom of article

Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997
provides for clear-cut procedure for the recognition and delineation of
ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance
of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant
the Executive Department or any government agency the power to
delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement
or compromise.
Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991
requires all national offices to conduct consultations beforeany project
or program critical to the environment and human ecology including
those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people
(Just the other day, the Supreme Court affirmed the authority of Manila
City to issue and enforce an Ordinance reclassifying certain areas
within the city. The reclassification adversely affected the oil
companies, which are now forced to relocate their oil terminals in
Pandacan. This is a digest of Social Justice Society vs. Atienza, G.R.
No. 156052, 13 February 2008. Other procedural issues are not
discussed.)
Facts:
The Social Justice Society sought to compel respondent Hon. Jose L.
Atienza, Jr., then mayor of the City of Manila, to enforce Ordinance
No. 8027 that was enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Manila in 2001. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described
therein from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and
operators of businesses disallowed under the reclassification to
cease and desist from operating their businesses within six months
from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses
situated in the area are the so-called Pandacan Terminals
of the oil companies (the brief history of the Pandacan Oil
Terminals is here).
In 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE)
entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the oil
companies. They agreed that the scaling down of the Pandacan
Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable option. The
Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97. In
the same resolution, the Sanggunian declared that the MOU was
effective only for a period of six months starting 25 July 2002, which
period was extended up to 30 April 2003.
This is the factual backdrop of the Supreme Courts 7 March 2007
Decision. The SC ruled that respondent had the ministerial duty
under the Local Government Code (LGC) to enforce all laws
and ordinances relative to the governance of the city, including
Ordinance No. 8027. After the SC promulgated its Decision,
Chevron Philippines Inc. (Chevron), Petron Corporation (Petron)
and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Shell) (the oil
companies) and the Republic of the Philippines, represented by
the DOE, sought to intervene and ask for a reconsideration of
the decision.
Intervention of the oil companies and the DOE allowed in the
interest of justice
Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally
impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant therein to enable
him, her or it to protect or preserve a right or interest which may
be affected by such proceedings. The allowance or disallowance of
a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the
court. While the motions to intervene respectively filed by the oil
companies and the DOE were filed out of time, these motions were
granted because they presented novel issues and arguments.
DOEs intervention was also allowed considering the
transcendental importance of this case.
Ordinance No. 8119 did not impliedly repeal Ordinance No.
8027
Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute
of later date clearly reveals the intention of the legislature to
abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be given
effect. Implied repeals are not favored and will not be so declared
unless the intent of the legislators is manifest.
There are two kinds of implied repeal. The first is: where the
provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter are
irreconcilably contradictory, the latter act, to the extent of the
conflict, constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one. The
second is: if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one
and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal the
earlier law. The oil companies argue that the situation here falls
under the first category.
For the first kind of implied repeal, there must be an irreconcilable
conflict between the two ordinances. However, there was no
legislative purpose to repeal Ordinance No. 8027. There is no
conflict since both ordinances actually have a common
objective, i.e., to shift the zoning classification from industrial to
commercial (Ordinance No. 8027) or mixed residential/commercial
(Ordinance No. 8119). While it is true that both ordinances relate to
the same subject matter, i.e., classification of the land use of the
area where Pandacan oil depot is located, if there is no intent to
repeal the earlier enactment, every effort at reasonable
construction must be made to reconcile the ordinances so that
both can be given effect.
Moreover, it is a well-settled rule in statutory construction that a
subsequent general law does not repeal a prior special law on the
same subject unless it clearly appears that the legislature has
intended by the latter general act to modify or repeal the earlier
special law. The special law must be taken as intended to constitute
an exception to, or a qualification of, the general act or provision.
Ordinance No. 8027 is a special law since it deals specifically with a
certain area described therein (the Pandacan oil depot area)
whereas Ordinance No. 8119 can be considered a general law as it
covers the entire city of Manila.
Mandamus lies to compel respondent Mayor to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027
The oil companies insist that mandamus does not lie against
respondent in consideration of the separation of powers of the
executive and judiciary. However, while it is true that Courts will not
interfere by mandamus proceedings with the legislative or
executive departments of the government in the legitimate
exercise of its powers, there is an exception to enforce mere
ministerial acts required by law to be performed by some officer
thereof. A writ of mandamus is the power to compel the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from office, trust or station.
The oil companies also argue that petitioners had a plain, speedy
and adequate remedy to compel respondent to enforce Ordinance
No. 8027, which was to seek relief from the President of the
Philippines through the Secretary of the Department of Interior and
Local Government (DILG) by virtue of the Presidents power of
supervision over local government units. This suggested process,
however, would be unreasonably long, tedious and consequently
injurious to the interests of the local government unit (LGU) and its
constituents whose welfare is sought to be protected. A party need
not go first to the DILG in order to compel the enforcement of an
ordinance. Besides, the resort to an original action for mandamus
before the SC is undeniably allowed by the Constitution.
Ordinance No. 8027 is constitutional and valid
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. For an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate
powers of the LGU to enact and be passed according to the
procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following
substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution
or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be
partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate
trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy and (6)
must not be unreasonable. There is no showing that the Ordinance
is unconstitutional.
The City of Manila has the power to enact Ordinance No. 8027
Ordinance No. 8027 was passed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Manila in the exercise of its police power. Police power is the
plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes and
ordinances to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good
order or safety and general welfare of the people. This power flows
from the recognition that salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of
the people is the supreme law).
While police power rests primarily with the national legislature,
such power may be delegated. Section 16 of the LGC, known as the
general welfare clause, encapsulates the delegated police power to
local governments. LGUs like the City of Manila exercise police
power through their respective legislative bodies, in this case, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod or the city council. Specifically, the
Sanggunian can enact ordinances for the general welfare of the
city.
This police power was also provided for in RA 409 or the Revised
Charter of the City of Manila. Specifically, the Sanggunian has the
power to reclassify land within the jurisdiction of the city. remove these terminals to dissipate the threat. Wide discretion is
The enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 is a legitimate exercise
of police power
As with the State, local governments may be considered as having
properly exercised their police power only if the following
requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise;
and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. In short, there must be a concurrence of a lawful
subject and a lawful method.
Ordinance No. 8027 is a valid police power measure because there
is a concurrence of lawful subject and lawful method. It was
enacted for the purpose of promoting sound urban planning,
ensuring health, public safety and general welfare of the
residents of Manila. The Sanggunian was impelled to take
measures to protect the residents of Manila from catastrophic
devastation in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals.
Towards this objective, the Sanggunian reclassified the area
defined in the ordinance from industrial to commercial.
The ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life, security
and safety of all the inhabitants of Manila and not just of a
particular class. The depot is perceived, rightly or wrongly, as a
representation of western interests which means that it is a
terrorist target. As long as it there is such a target in their midst, the
residents of Manila are not safe. It therefore became necessary to
vested on the legislative authority to determine not only what the
interests of the public require but also what measures are
necessary for the protection of such interests. Clearly, the
Sanggunian was in the best position to determine the needs of its
constituents.
In the exercise of police power, property rights of individuals may
be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the
objectives of the government. Otherwise stated, the government
may enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty,
property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote the
general welfare. However, the interference must be reasonable and
not arbitrary. And to forestall arbitrariness, the methods or means
used to protect public health, morals, safety or welfare must have a
reasonable relation to the end in view.
The means adopted by the Sanggunian was the enactment of a
zoning ordinance which reclassified the area where the depot is
situated from industrial to commercial. A zoning ordinance is
defined as a local city or municipal legislation which logically
arranges, prescribes, defines and apportions a given political
subdivision into specific land uses as present and future projection
of needs. As a result of the zoning, the continued operation of the
businesses of the oil companies in their present location will no
longer be permitted. The power to establish zones for industrial,
commercial and residential uses is derived from the police power
itself and is exercised for the protection and benefit of the
residents of a locality. Consequently, the enactment of Ordinance
No. 8027 is within the power of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the
City of Manila and any resulting burden on those affected cannot
be said to be unjust.
Ordinance No. 8027 is not unfair, oppressive or confiscatory
which amounts to taking without compensation
According to the oil companies, Ordinance No. 8027 is unfair and
oppressive as it does not only regulate but also absolutely prohibits
them from conducting operations in the City of Manila. However,
the oil companies are not prohibited from doing business in other
appropriate zones in Manila. The City of Manila merely exercised its
power to regulate the businesses and industries in the zones it
established.
The oil companies also argue that the ordinance is unfair and
oppressive because they have invested billions of pesos in the
depot, and the forced closure will result in huge losses in income
and tremendous costs in constructing new facilities. This argument
has no merit. In the exercise of police power, there is a limitation
on or restriction of property interests to promote public welfare
which involves no compensable taking. Compensation is necessary
only when the states power of eminent domain is exercised. In
eminent domain, property is appropriated and applied to some
public purpose. Property condemned under the exercise of police
power, on the other hand, is noxious or intended for a noxious or
forbidden purpose and, consequently, is not compensable. The
restriction imposed to protect lives, public health and safety from
danger is not a taking. It is merely the prohibition or abatement of
a noxious use which interferes with paramount rights of the public.
In the regulation of the use of the property, nobody else acquires
the use or interest therein, hence there is no compensable taking.
In this case, the properties of the oil companies and other
businesses situated in the affected area remain theirs. Only their
use is restricted although they can be applied to other profitable
uses permitted in the commercial zone.
Ordinance No. 8027 is not partial and discriminatory
The oil companies take the position that the ordinance has
discriminated against and singled out the Pandacan Terminals
despite the fact that the Pandacan area is congested with buildings
and residences that do not comply with the National Building Code,
Fire Code and Health and Sanitation Code.
An ordinance based on reasonable classification does not violate
the constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of the law. The
requirements for a valid and reasonable classification are: (1) it
must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions
only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class.
The law may treat and regulate one class differently from another
class provided there are real and substantial differences to
distinguish one class from another.
Here, there is a reasonable classification. What the ordinance seeks
to prevent is a catastrophic devastation that will result from a
terrorist attack. Unlike the depot, the surrounding community is
not a high-value terrorist target. Any damage caused by fire or
explosion occurring in those areas would be nothing compared to
the damage caused by a fire or explosion in the depot itself.
Accordingly, there is a substantial distinction. The enactment of the
ordinance which provides for the cessation of the operations of
these terminals removes the threat they pose. Therefore it is
germane to the purpose of the ordinance. The classification is not
limited to the conditions existing when the ordinance was enacted
but to future conditions as well. Finally, the ordinance is applicable
to all businesses and industries in the area it delineated.
Ordinance No. 8027 is not inconsistent with RA 7638 and RA
8479
The oil companies and the DOE assert that Ordinance No. 8027 is
unconstitutional because it contravenes RA 7638 (DOE Act of 1992)
and RA 8479 (Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Law of 1998).
It is true that ordinances should not contravene existing statutes
enacted by Congress. However, a brief survey of decisions where
the police power measure of the LGU clashed with national laws
shows that the common dominator is that the national laws were
clearly and expressly in conflict with the ordinances/resolutions of
the LGUs. The inconsistencies were so patent that there was no
room for doubt. This is not the case here. The laws cited merely
gave DOE general powers to establish and administer
programs for the exploration, transportation, marketing,
distribution, utilization, conservation, stockpiling, and storage of
energy resources and to encourage certain practices in the
[oil] industry which serve the public interest and are intended to
achieve efficiency and cost reduction, ensure continuous supply of
petroleum products. These powers can be exercised without
emasculating the LGUs of the powers granted them. When these
ambiguous powers are pitted against the unequivocal power of the
LGU to enact police power and zoning ordinances for the general
welfare of its constituents, it is not difficult to rule in favor of the
latter. Considering that the powers of the DOE regarding the
Pandacan Terminals are not categorical, the doubt must be
resolved in favor of the City of Manila.
The principle of local autonomy is enshrined in and zealously
protected under the Constitution. An entire article (Article X) of the
Constitution has been devoted to guaranteeing and promoting the
autonomy of LGUs. The LGC was specially promulgated by
Congress to ensure the autonomy of local governments as
mandated by the Constitution. There is no showing how the laws
relied upon by the oil companies and DOE stripped the City of
Manila of its power to enact ordinances in the exercise of its police
power and to reclassify the land uses within its jurisdiction.
The DOE cannot exercise the power of control over LGUs
Another reason that militates against the DOEs assertions is
that Section 4 of Article X of the Constitution confines the
Presidents power over LGUs to one of general supervision.
Consequently, the Chief Executive or his or her alter egos, cannot
exercise the power of control over them. The President and his or
her alter egos, the department heads, cannot interfere with the
activities of local governments, so long as they act within the scope
of their authority. Accordingly, the DOE cannot substitute its own
discretion for the discretion exercised by the sanggunian of the City
of Manila. In local affairs, the wisdom of local officials must prevail
as long as they are acting within the parameters of the Constitution
and the law.
Ordinance No. 8027 is not invalid for failure to comply with RA
7924 and EO 72
The oil companies argue that zoning ordinances of LGUs are
required to be submitted to the Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority (MMDA) for review and if found to be in compliance with
its metropolitan physical framework plan and regulations, it shall
endorse the same to the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB). Their basis is Section 3 (e) of RA 7924 and Section 1 of E.O.
72. They argue that because Ordinance No. 8027 did not go
through this review process, it is invalid.
The argument is flawed. RA 7942 does not give MMDA the authority
to review land use plans and zoning ordinances of cities and
municipalities. This was only found in its implementing rules which
made a reference to EO 72. EO 72 expressly refers to
comprehensive land use plans (CLUPs) only. Ordinance No. 8027 is
admittedly not a CLUP nor intended to be one. Instead, it is a very
specific ordinance which reclassified the land use of a defined area
in order to prevent the massive effects of a possible terrorist
attack. It is Ordinance No. 8119 which was explicitly formulated as
the Manila [CLUP] and Zoning Ordinance of 2006. CLUPs
are the ordinances which should be submitted to the MMDA for
integration in its metropolitan physical framework plan and
approved by the HLURB to ensure that they conform with national
guidelines and policies. Moreover, even assuming that the MMDA
review and HLURB ratification are necessary, the oil companies did
not present any evidence to show that these were not complied
with. In accordance with the presumption of validity in favor of an
ordinance, its constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the
absence of proof showing that the procedure prescribed by law
was not observed.
Chavez v. Pea and Amari
24 SEP
Chavez v. Pea and Amari
Fact:
In 1973, the Comissioner on Public Highways entered into a contract to
reclaim areas of Manila Bay with the Construction and Development
Corportion of the Philippines (CDCP).
PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President Marcos under
P.D. 1084, tasked with developing and leasing reclaimed lands. These
lands were transferred to the care of PEA under P.D. 1085 as part of
the Manila Cavite Road and Reclamation Project (MCRRP). CDCP and
PEA entered into an agreement that all future projects under the
MCRRP would be funded and owned by PEA.
By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 transferring
lands to PEA. It was followed by the transfer of three Titles (7309, 7311
and 7312) by the Register of Deeds of Paranaque to PEA covering the
three reclaimed islands known as the FREEDOM ISLANDS.
Subsquently, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with
AMARI, a Thai-Philippine corporation to develop the Freedom Islands.
Along with another 250 hectares, PEA and AMARI entered the JVA
which would later transfer said lands to AMARI. This caused a stir
especially when Sen. Maceda assailed the agreement, claiming that
such lands were part of public domain (famously known as the mother
of all scams).
Peitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for
mandamus, a writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO against the sale
of reclaimed lands by PEA to AMARI and from implementing the JVA.
Following these events, under President Estradas admin, PEA and
AMARI entered into an Amended JVA and Mr. Chaves claim that the
contract is null and void.
Issue:
w/n: the transfer to AMARI lands reclaimed or to be reclaimed as part
of the stipulations in the (Amended) JVA between AMARI and PEA
violate Sec. 3 Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution
w/n: the court is the proper forum for raising the issue of whether the
amended joint venture agreement is grossly disadvantageous to the
government.
Held:
On the issue of Amended JVA as violating the constitution:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom
Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are
alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to
private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these
lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to
Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987
Constitution and existing laws.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain
inalienable natural resources of the public domain until classified as
alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no
longer needed for public service. The government can make such
PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government
can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further
declare them no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of
such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be
void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987Constitution which
prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable
land of the public domain.

Francisco Chavez
classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these
submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural
lands of the public domain, which are the only natural resources the
government can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares of
submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man. vs Public Estates
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private
corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares110 of the Freedom Islands,
Authority (July
such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring 2002)
any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
384 SCRA 152 Civil Law Land Titles and Deeds Lands of
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership the Public Domain
of 290.156 hectares111 of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such
transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 The Public Estates Authority (PEA) is the central implementing
Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects nationwide. It
than agricultural lands of the public domain. took over the leasing and selling functions of the DENR
(Department of Environmental and Natural Resources) insofar
as reclaimed or about to be reclaimed foreshore lands are
concerned.
PEA sought the transfer to the Amari Coastal Bay and
Development Corporation, a private corporation, of the
ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands. PEA also
sought to have 290.156 hectares of submerged areas of Manila
Bay to Amari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid.
HELD: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public
domain to be transferred to Amari as private lands will sanction a
gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations
from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of
reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered
by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of
the public domain. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of
Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public
domain. The transfer (as embodied in a joint venture
agreement) to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34
hectares of the Freedom Islands, is void for being contrary to
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of
the public domain. Furthermore, since the Amended JVA also
seeks to transfer to Amari ownership of 290.156 hectares of still
submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being
contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which
prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than
agricultural lands of the public domain.
Legaspi v CSC 150 SCRA 530 (1987)
Facts: The petitioner invokes his constitutional right to information
on matters of public concern in a special civil action for mandamus
against the CSC pertaining to the information of civil service
eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health
Department of Cebu City. The standing of the petitioner was
challenged by the Solicitor General of being devoid of legal right to
be informed of the civil service eligibilities of government employees
for failure of petitioner to provide actual interest to secure the
information sought.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner may invoke his constitutional right
to information in the case at bar.
Held: The court held that when the question is one of public right
and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a
public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and
the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need
not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it
being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in
the execution of the laws. The Constitution provides the guarantee
of adopting policy of full public disclosure subject to reasonable
conditions prescribed by law as in regulation in the manner of
examining the public records by the government agency in custody
thereof. But the constitutional guarantee to information on matters
of public concern is not absolute. Under the Constitution, access to
official records, papers, etc., are "subject to limitations as may be
provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7, second sentence). The law may
therefore exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny,
such as those affecting national security.
The court delves into determining whether the information sought
for by the petitioner is of public interest. All appointments in the Civil
Service Commission are made according to merit and fitness while
a public office is a public trust. Public employees therefore are
accountable to the people even as to their eligibilities to their
positions in the government. The court also noted that the
information on the result of the CSC eligibility examination is
released to the public therefore the request of petitioner is one that
is not unusual or unreasonable. The public, through any citizen, has
the right to verify the civil eligibilities of any person occupying
government positions.