The Journal of Philosophy Volume 76 Issue 1 1979 (Doi 10.2307/2025813) Ernest Sosa - The Status of Becoming - What Is Happening Now

Journal of Philosophy, Inc.
The Status of Becoming: What is Happening Now?

Author(s): Ernest Sosa
Source: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 76, No. 1 (Jan., 1979), pp. 26-42
Published by: Journal of Philosophy, Inc.
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26 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
but logically connected with suchnesses, we may call it Moderate

Haecceitjsrn.29
ROBERT MERRIHEW ADAMS
University of California at Los Angeles
THE STATUS OF BECOMING:

WHAT IS HAPPENING NOW?-)
WX THAT is the ontological status of temporal becoming, of
the present, or the now? We shall consider in turn four
answers to this question: (I) the objective-property doc-
trine, (II) the thought-reflexive analysis, (III) the tensed-exemplifi-
cation view, and (iv) the form-of-thought account.
I. THE OBJECTIVE-PROPERTY DOCTINE (OPD)
Eternal temporal properties or relations are to be distinguished from
transitory ones. If a particular (concrete) event e1 is ever earlier than
another such event e2, then it would seem that e1 must be eternally
earlier than e2. But an event may be present (now) without being
eternally present. If so, then the relation of being-earlier-than is
eternal, but the property of being present is transitory.
Def. 1: A property (or relation) is transitory iff it may be exemplified
by some entity without being eternally exemplified by that
entity.
Def. 2: A property (or relation) is eternal iff it is not transitory.
A. The Doctrine Explained.
OPD: There are transitory temporal properties; among these are
McTaggart's A-characteristics: being present, being past,
and being future; and these are basic (objective) properties
(of events, moments, and perhaps other entities) irreducible
29 Extreme Haecceitism would involve the rejection of all logical connections
between suchnesses and the thisnesses of such beings as persons. Anti-Haecceitism

is the rejection of the primitiveness of thisnesses or the primitiveness of trans-
world identities. I think this agrees roughly with Kaplan's use of 'Anti
Haecceitism' in "How to Russell a Frege-Church."
* This paper was originally prepared for the Tufts University Lecture Series oil
the philosophy of time, which took place during the fall of 1976, and a later version
was delivered at the University of Texas, Austin. My thanks to both departments
for their valuable stimulation. Special thanks for much helpful discussion are also
due to the following among my colleagues and friends at Brown: Roderick MI.
Chisholm, Diana Ackerman, Philip Quinn, James Van Cleve, Margaret Rooney,
and Peter Tovey. Richard Gale's The Language of Time (New York: Humanities,
1968) and his collection, The Philosophy of Time (New York: Doubleday, 1967),
were also helpful.
0092-362X/79/7601/0026$01.70 (C 1979 The Journal of Philosophy, Inc.
THE STATUSOF BECONIING;WHAT IS HAPPENING NOWV? 27
to (subjective) properties of or relations to thoughts or

thinkers.'
Thus consider a present flash of lightning that occurs (comes into

being, becomes) with a causal etiology in which no subject of con-
sciousness has any role whatever. It seems true to say of that flash
that it would still have been present (would still have happened now)
even if there had never been, were not now, and were not to be any
subjects of consciousness. Thus it seems that the property of being
present which that flash has is an objective property of the flash.
It is also part of the OPD that there are temporal properties not
reducible without remainder to eternal temporal properties. For
transitory properties are not thus reducible. Thus the property that
our flash has of being present is not to be explicated in terms of any
eternal relations that it may bear to other events, for it might have
been thus related to those other events without being present, and it
might have been present without being thus related.
B. An Objection to the Doctrine. Concerning the objective-property
doctrine, what is the nature of the "having" involved when it is said
that the flash "has" the property of being present? Is this a tenseless
connection or nexus joining property to individual, or is it tensed? Is
the resulting proposition tensed or tenseless? These questions beg an-
other: What is a tenseless proposition?
Tenseless propositions are often introduced by reference to neces-
sary truths. Thus it is said that 2 is even, that redness is a color prop-
erty, and that these are tenseless truths; or it is said that the number
2 has the property of being even, that redness has the property of
being a color property, and that in each case the property attaches
tenselessly to the entity. Alternatively, a tenseless proposition is
sometimes introduced by reference to or use of so-called "eternal"
sentences. Thus in a documentary it may be said that during 1953-
1961 Eisenhower is President of the U.S. Here the speaker adopts a
point of view "outside time" and attributes (tenselessly) the triadic
relation (-being President of - - - during . . .) to the triple
(Eisenhower, the U.S., 1953-1961).
By reflection on the foregoing examples, we arrive at the following
principle:
P1. If p is a tenseless proposition,then if at any time the affirmation
of that proposition would be or would have been correct, it
would be or would have been correct at every time.
I See J. M. E. McTaggart, The Nature of Existence (New York: Cambridge,
1927), vol. II, book 5, Ch. 33.
Suppose again that there is now a flash of lightning and that I

affirm that the flash is present. If the proposition that I affirm is
tenseless, then, by principle P1, it would have been correct at any
time in the past and would be correct at any time in the future to
affirm that proposition. Compare next a further relevant principle:
P2a. If at a certain time it would be correct or would have been cor-
rect to affirmthe proposition that a certain concrete event e is
present, then at that time e is present.
It follows now that our (present) flash must be eternal, which is
absurd. What has gone wrong?2
C. First Response on Behalf of OPD. The objective-property advo-
cate may respond by denying that, when he affirms that the flash is
present, the proposition affirmed is tenseless. On the contrary, he
may argue, when he says that the flash has the property of being
present, he means that it now-has that property. This response seems
self-defeating, however, since tensed propositions make transitory
temporal properties not basic but superfluous and reducible. Thus
there is no evident content in the statement that the flash now-has
the property of being present not captured in the statement that the
flash now-has the property of self-identity or in the statement that
there-is-now the flash. (A tensed copula goes with tensed quantifica-
tion, and leaves no room for transitory temporal properties such as
being present, being past, being future, etc.)
The pure objective-property doctrine, explained above as OPD,
seems run through by the following dilemma:
(a) The exemplification involved when a flash of lightning f is
thought to exemplify the property of being present is either tenseless
or tensed.
(b) If it is tenseless then the proposition thatf is present is tense-
less. But then P1 and P2a entail that being present is eternal. And,
by parity of reasoning, all McTaggart's A-characteristics turn out to
be eternal.
(c) If it is tensed (and amounts to now-exemplifying) then osten-
sible transitory temporal properties such as McTaggart's A-char-
acteristics are superfluous.
(d) So ostensible transitory temporal properties such as McTag-
gart's A-characteristics are either not really transitory or else super-
fluous.
2 It was apparentlyMcTaggart'saversion(surelynot blindness)to any con-
ception of time other than the OPD that, combined with P1 and P2a, doomed his
philosophy of time.
THE STATUSOF BECOMING: WHAT IS HAPPENING NOW? 29
D. The OPD modified. Suppose one agrees that tensed predication

should be reducible to simple tenseless predication plus temporal
properties and relations (assuming that we can quantify over con-
crete events, and perhaps moments or intervals of time). Then the
advocate of OPD can perhaps abandon the letter of his doctrine while
retaining its spirit, as follows. Over and above the temporal relations
of temporal simultaneity and precedence (and its converse) which
determine the universal temporal series of events (and times), there
are other irreducible temporal properties. For the universal temporal
series determines, for every event (for every time), which events
(times) it precedes, which events (times) precede it, and which
events (times) are simultaneous with it. But that leaves open the
important question of which events (times) are present. Thus the
property of being present is independent of simultaneity and pre-
cedence. And therefore we must simply accept the result of P1 and
P2aabove, that being present is not transitory, rather than relinquish
(either) this property (or simple, tenseless attribution or predication).
But the idea that being present is not transitory seems absurd.
How can our present flash always have the property of being present
if it occurs only now and at no other time? In defense of this idea,
the modified OPD objects to principle P2a. This principle, it alleges,
involves a simple confusion and ought to be replaced with principle
P2b below:
P2b. If at a time t it would be (would have been) correctto affirmthe
proposition that a certain concrete event e is present, then e is
present now.
But what if yesterday noon someone affirms with respect to an ex-
plosion E occurring then, the proposition that E is then present? His
affirmation is surely correct even if E is not present now. This calls
for a further principle as follows:
P2. If at a time t it would be (would have been) correct to affirm,
with respect to a time t', the proposition that a certain concrete
event e is then present, then e is present at t'.
Both P2a and P2b may be thought of as instances of the more general
P2. Thus consider their counterparts or interpretations P2,a and P2b'
which are entailed by P2:
P2a,. If at a time t it would be (would have been) correct to affirm,
with respect to that time t, the proposition that a certain con-
crete event e is then present, then e is present at t.
P2b'. If at a time t it would be (would have been) correct to affirm,
with respect to the now present time, the proposition that a
certain concrete event e is then (i.e., now) present, then e is

present now.
Let us therefore focus on the more general P2.
Principle P2 presupposes that with respect to any time t there is
the proposition that e is then present. There is a straightforward in-
terpretation of this which, unfortunately for the modified-OPD ad-
vocate, is closed to him. On the straightforward interpretation, the
proposition, with respect to a time t, that e is then present is simply
the proposition that e occurs at t. And, contrary to the modified
OPD, this does reduce to simultaneity and precedence. Thus the
modified-OPD advocate seems driven to a more bizarre interpreta-
tion of P2. For his theory seems to require the following principle.
M1OPD:For each time t there is a basic, objective property 4 of
being then present such that (i) 4 is not just the propertyof
occurringat t, and (ii) for every time t' distinct from t, the
property ,6, with respect to t', of being then present, is dis-
tinct from 4.
Such a theory is acceptable only if it is preferable to any less ex-
uberantly bizarre alternatives. We must therefore consider whether
there are any such alternatives.
II. THE THOUGHT-REFLEXIVE ANALYSIS
In opposition to OPD, the thought-reflexive analysis proposes a
reduction of temporal properties and relations to temporal prece-
dence and simultaneity. As in our discussion of OPD, we shall focus
on the property of happening now or being present, while assuming
that our conclusions here would be trivially extensible to being past,
being future, being more remote in the past (future), and so on.
A. Griinbaum's proposal. Note first that we must again distinguish

between (i) an explicitly relational notion of the present: e.g., being
present at time t; and (ii) a nonrelational notion of the present: be-
ing present simpliciter. Given this distinction, it may be argued that
the nonrelational present reduces to the relational present, since it
is tantamount to being present now (at this time). Adolf GrUnbaum
apparently relies on this assumption when he proposes the following
reduction of the present to temporal precedence and coincidence.
According to his suggestion,
. . .what qualifies a physical event at a time t as belonging to the
present or as now is not some physical attribute of the event or some
relation it sustains to other purely physical events; instead, what so
qualifies the event is that at least one human or other mind-possess-
ing organism M experiencesthe event at the time t such that at t, AM
THE STATUS OF BECOMING: WHAT IS HAPPENING NOW? 31
is conceptually aware of the following complex fact: that his having

the experienceof the event coincidestemporallywith an awarenessof
the fact that he has it at all.3
But surely, it may be replied, the crossing of the Rubicon by Caesar
does not qualify as belonging to the present or as occurring now just
because at the time of the crossing Caesar is aware that his having
the experience of the crossing coincides temporally with an awareness
(on his part) of the fact that he has that experience at all. It is just
false that Caesar crosses the Rubicon now. GrUnbaum's analysis
must therefore pertain in the first instance only to the relational no-
tion of the present-being present at time t.
The foregoing speaks of the relational notion of the present. How-
ever, on reflection it appears that there are at least two such notions:
(i) being present to some subject of consciousness at time t, and (ii)
being present at t in the sense of simply occurring at I. Griinbaum's
analysis seems right or at least on the right track for the first of
these; and the second presents no problem for the reductionist, since
it amounts to simple coincidence with 1. The only remaining question
is whether that notion of the present (simpliciter) which is not ex-
plicitly relational is reducible to those which are. Thus consider again
our present flash of lightning and the attribution to it of the property
of being present. Hoowcan one reduce this to a relational present?
It may be suggested that being present reduces to being present
at the present time. But this amounts to being present at the time
that has the property of being present, and hardly yields a re-
duction of the property of being present. It thus seems at best an
open question whether the nonrelational notion of the present (being
present simpliciter) is reducible to a relational notion (e.g., being
present at t). Let us therefore consider some such proposed reduc-
tions.
B. The Russell-Smart Proposal. According to Bertrand Russell, 'now'
is "to be defined in terms of this," where "this" is the object of
attention.
In orderto define "now"it is necessarythat "this" should be a sense-
datum. Then "now" means "simultaneouswith this."4
J. J. C. Smart gives a similar account. For him,
. . . 'now' is equivalent to 'simultaneouswith this utterance'.5
3"The Status of Temporal Becoming," in Gale, ed., The Philosophy of Time,
op. cit., pp. 322-354, p. 333.
4"On the Experience of Time," The Monist, xxv, 2 (April 1915): 212-233.
6 Philosophy and ScientificRealism (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963),
p. 137.
There are several difficulties with Russell's idea. One of these it shares
with Smart's account. For if no sense datum or utterance has any
part in the causal etiology of a certain present flash of lightning, then
it seems clear that the flash would have occurred now even if there
had been no sense datum or utterance now. This is fatal to both the
Russell and Smart analyses. For if there had been no sense datum or
utterance now, then the flash would not have been simultaneous
with this sense datum or with this utterance, but it would still have
happened now.
C. The third proposal. The Russell and Smart accounts suggest a
better reflexive reduction of the now:
R. 'Now' is equivalent to 'at the time of this thought (i.e., of this
very mental act or affirmation)'.
Thus my thought that the flash happens now is just the thought that
the flash happens at the time of that very thought.
But is not R subject to the same difficulty as the accounts proposed
by Russell and by Smart? Is it not true that the flash would have oc-
curred now even if this thought had not occurred? This seems clearly
right. But by R this entails that
(1) The flash would have occurredat the time of this thought even if
this thought had not occurred.
And is this not absurd? The answer is that it is absurd only under one
of two possible interpretations, but that it is not absurd under the
following natural interpretation:
(2) The time of this thought is such that the flash would have oc-
curred at it even if this thought had not occurred.
This suggests a way of spelling out R which makes it immune to the
modal difficulties affecting such proposals as those of Russell and
Smart:
R. 'Now' is equivalent to 'at the time of this thought', where if the
definite descriptionfalls within the scope of a modal operator, the
description has primary occurrence (in Russell's terminology).6
Applying R to (1) above yields the harmless (2).
Consider also the following:
(3) S is sorry that he now has a toothache.
This is a further difficulty for Russell and Smart, for S may be un-
aware of any sense datum or utterance of mine. That it is not an
6 Russell, "On Denoting," in R. C. Marsh, ed., Logic and Knowledge (New
York: Macmillan, 1956; CapricornBooks, 1971), pp. 52/3.
immediate difficulty for R will be seen from the following:

(4) The time of this thought is such that S is sorry that he has a
toothache then.
Although (4) is not immediately problematic for R, it does raise
the question of how S has access to the time of his thought (to the
time of his sorrow), of how he picks it out. This question-which is
not answered by R-suggests the following:
(TR) The thought-reflexiveanalysis of the present: the proposition
that one affirmsat a time by thinkingthat *such-and-suchnow*
(i.e., the propositionthat in English he would properlyexpress
at that time by a use of a sentence of the sort "such-and-such
now") is equivalent to the propositionthat he would affirmat
that time by thinking that *the time of this very thought is
such that such-and-such at it* (i.e., the proposition that in
English he would properly express at that time by a use of a
sentence of the sort "the time of this very thought is such that
such-and-suchat it," where the use of 'this very thought' de-
notes the particularthought stated by the use of the sentence
of which 'this very thought' is a part).
It may now be suggested, in consonance with TR, that anyone who
picks out the present time does so by reference to the very thought
in which he picks it out, and he does this by relating the time to the
thought as the time when it occurs.
D. Two objections to TR. The account of the present given by TR
does not share the exuberance of the modified OPD. It does not re-
quire for every time t a property c of being then present such that this
is not just tantamount to occurring at t, and such that it is distinct
from the property A/ with respect to a distinct time I', of being then
present. TR requires no temporal properties or relations beyond pre-
cedence and coincidence. However, TR seems open to two objec-
tions: first, that people are generally aware of what goes on around
them at a time without being self-conscious enough to relate such
happenings to their very acts of thought at that time; and, second,
that if someone is now sorry that he now has a toothache, the object
of his sorrow is not just that his toothache occurs at the time of his
sorrow.
E. A revision of TR. The foregoing objections lead to a revision of
TR:
(TR') Anyone's thought that such-and-sutch now is equivalent to the
thought on his part, with respect to the time of his very
thought, that such-and-suchat it: where his thought refersdi-
rectly to the time in question.
TR' requires direct access to the present time on the part of the
thinker. Now whether or not the thinker also has direct access to
times other than the present time, we must face the following ques-
tion: WNhatis it about the present time t that makes one especially
sorry that his toothache occurs at it? Isn't it an obvious and required
answer simply that it is the time that is present? But this points
persuasively to OPD. For then the object of one's sorrow is not sim-
ply that the toothache occurs at t, but rather that the toothache
occurs at t and t is present. And here we seem to be left with an irre-
ducible and objective property of being present.
The response of the advocate of TR' must be to stand his ground.
And he can perhaps attempt to make his stand plausible by appeal to
an analogy between the present moment and himself. For that he
and not someone else suffers from a toothache may be particularly
disturbing to him, and the object of his sorrow would then be simply
that he himself has a toothache. Similarly, it is now argued, that his
toothache is at this time is particularly disturbing to him, and the
object of this sorrow is simply that this itself is the time of his
toothache.
However, even a moment after a toothache passes, sorrow gives
way to relief. One is now relieved that that itself is the time of one's
toothache. If it being at that very time is what a moment ago was so
disturbing about the toothache, then why is it that only a moment
later the very same object of evaluation seems so innocuous? Surely
this ought to be puzzling to the advocate of TR'.7
F. Rejection of the revision. TR' thus has at least two drawbacks.
First, it requires not only the postulation of moments of time in one's
ontology but also direct reference to (and awareness of) such mo-
ments of time (rather than just indirect reference via some uniquely
exemplified property). Secondly, even given such direct reference
(awareness) it is hard to see how a moment's simply being that mo-
ment can lead to a reasonable heightening of sorrow about bad ex-
periences occurring at it rather than at other, past moments. And
yet it does seem that we are especially sorry about our present pains
and other undesirable experiences, and not unreasonably so.
TR' represents a retreat on the part of the thought-reflexive
analyst in response to the objections to TR. But it leads to a blind
alley.
7R. M. Chisholm tells me that similar views have been suggested or held by
Aquinas and by Brentano. See Aquinas' A ristotleon Interpretation,Jean Oesterle,
tr. (Milwaukee: Marquette UP, 1962), Lesson XIII, Paragraph3. For Brentano,
see his 1899 essay classified in the Brentano Nachlass as Z 10/4; also, his Psycho-
logie, II, 143; III, 48-9. (I am indebted to Chisholmfor these references.)
G. Reconsiderationof the two objectionsto the thought-reflexiveanalysis

(TR)). On reflection, the second of the two objections to TR seems to
me inconclusive. It is true that I might now have an evaluative atti-
tude about my now undergoing a certain experience such that the
now-ness (of my experience) within the object of my attitude seems
crucial and ineliminable. But then this can surely be generalized as
follows: For every time, I might then have an evaluative attitude
about my then undergoing a certain experience such that the then-
ness (of my experience) within the object of my attitude seems cru-
cial and ineliminable. And why should one's attitude, at a certain
time, about one's then undergoing a certain experience focus on that
particular time? Isn't one being unreasonably fickle by changing
one's attitude, or at least its intensity, as soon as that time is past?
What is so important or special about that time when one is having
one's attitude at it? Why not reply that what is so special about that
time at the time of the attitude is that it is the time of the attitude?
But then perhaps the object of his sorrow at that time is after all
simply that the experience (the toothache) occurs at the time of that
sorrow.
Whether that reply is ultimately acceptable or not, it should be
noted that we do not have here a point in favor of the modified OPD,
with its multitude of bizarre properties. What is so special about the
time of one's sorrow that makes one then sorry that one's toothache
happens at it cannot be just that it has the objective property 0, with
respect to that time t, of being then present. For the case of toothache
in question does not lose that property a moment later, since it never
loses that property. And yet a moment later one's intense sorrow
that the experience has q stops abruptly. At the later time t' one is
no longer sorry-or at least not nearly so sorry-that the case of
toothache in question has the property X, with respect to the earlier
time t, of being present then. It seems then that OPD has, if any-
thing, a more serious problem of accounting for our apparent evalu-
ative fickleness as an object of value or disvalue fades into the past.
So much for the second of the two objections to TR. As for the
first, in my opinion it does present a serious difficulty. For it seems
inescapable that simple, unself-conscious folk can be well aware that
certain things are happening now without relating these things to
their very acts of awareness. It is difficult to see bow this might be
reconciled with TR.
In fairness, it must be added that OPD has an easier time with
this first objection. For, according to that doctrine, if someone S is
aware that a flash of lightning happens now, there is a property 0,
with respect to the present time, of happening then, such that the
object of S's awareness is simply that the flash has (tenselessly) the
property q. Since this property is a simple, sui generis property, its
attribution by simple folk does not require that they relate anything
to their very acts of attribution or that they be in any way self-
conscious.
We seem to have a standoff between the modified-objective-prop-
erty doctrine and the thought-reflexive analysis, as these accounts
of the present have been developed thus far. Is there a third alter-
native?
III. THE TENSED-EXEMPLIFICATION VIEW (TE)
According to this view, tenses are basic and irreducible. (Thus it ac-
cepts the second horn of the dilemma for the OPD presented on p.
I I | above.) If states of affairs are objects of acceptance (and other
attitudes), then it would seem that there is no such state of affairs as
one's exemplifying the property of having a toothache. For it seems
obvious that one cannot simply accept(or reject)-as-holding any
such state of affairs. Such a state would hold at some times and not
hold at others. Which times would be relevant, and why? According
to TE, what one can accept is rather the state of affairs of one's now-
exemplifying the property of having a toothache. And this requires
tensed exemplification. As already noted, tenses drive out transitory
temporal properties. Thus the state of affairs of x now-exemplifying
being-present seems tantamount to the state of affairs of x now-ex-
emplifying self-identity, or to the state of affairs of x now-existing.
Note that what is proposed by TE is not a relation between oneself
and the time t that is present, a relation that yields the state of
affairs of one's being in pain at t. For that would amount to tenseless
exemplification of the pain relation by the ordered pair (oneself, t)-
and thus would reduce to the view TR' already rejected above.
Rather, the state of affairs suggested by TE involves a basic tensed
exemplification nexus of presently-exemplifying: one's presently-
exemplifying the property of being in pain.
According to the advocate of tensed exemplification, therefore,
when I accept (as holding) my now having a toothache, I accept (as
holding) the state of affairs of my now-exemplifying the property of
having a toothache. But what state of affairs did I accept (as hold-
ing) yesterday when I believed then that I then had a toothache? Is
it not the state of affairs of my then-exemplifying the property of
having a toothache? Generalizing from this, it seems clear that the
advocate of tensed exemplification is committed to the following
(principle of tensed exemplification):

(PTE) For every time t, individual x, and property 4), there is the
state of affairs of x then-exemplifying4; and, for every time
tl 5 t, the state of affairs, with respect to I', of x then-exem-
plifying 4 is distinct from the state of affairswith respect to
t, of x then-exemplifying4).
Because of this, the tensed-exemplification view is just as exuber-
antly bizarre as the modified-objective-property doctrine (MOPD).
Earlier we found MOPD committed to the existence of a distinct
property 0 of being present for each distinct time t. Now we find TE
committed to the existence of a distinct exemplification nexus for
each distinct time t.
In all our reflection we have not found a framework for thinking in
and about time that is free of apparent difficulties. It may of course
be replied, in behalf of any of the several views considered, that the
apparent difficulties besetting it are illusory. Thus two of the views
have been charged with bizarre exuberance: MOPD, with exuber-
ance of temporal properties (for each time t, a distinct property it of
being then present); TE, with exuberance of temporal forms of ex-
emplification (for each distinct time t, a distinct form of exemplifica-
tion: then-exemplification). In each case it may be argued that the
exuberance of the view is only just, and a true reflection of reality.
But I doubt that this would carry conviction in either case.
So much for two of the views considered earlier. A third view was
the thought-reflexive analysis (TR). In behalf of TR it may be
argued that when simple folk are aware at a certain time of happen-
ings around them and of the fact that they are happening then, these
folk do really relate the happenings to their various acts of awareness
as occurring at the time of the acts. I can only report that for me this
carries no more conviction than the bald acceptance of exuberance
in the earlier two cases.
A better defense of the thought-reflective analysis is based on the
observation that successful philosophical analysis very rarely attains
or requires synonymy. Even if knowledge had been justified true
belief, 'knowledge' would not have ineant 'justified true belief';
otherwise, to believe that knowledge is justified true belief would
have been to believe that knowledge is knowledge, a result hardly
worth much analysis.
According to the thought-reflexive analysis, the proposition that
in English one would properly express at a time by a use of a sentence
"such-and-such now" is equivalent to the proposition that in English
one would properly express at that time by a use of a corresponding

sentence "the time of this very thought is such that such-and-such
at it." It may now be added that the equivalencealleged here is only
that required for philosophical analysis, which is not identity-for
that would make the two sentences "such-and-such now" and "the
time of this very thought is such that such-and-such at it" mere
synonyms of one another. Thus, even though simple folk believe
one of such a pair of propositions without believing the other, the
two may yet be equivalent for all that.
The foregoing defense of the thought-reflexive analysis calls for an
assessment of the point and value of such philosophical analyses, and
for a fuller explanation of philosophical analysis itself.
Finally, it should also be mentioned concerning TR that it ap-
parently requires commitment to concrete events and to moments
or intervals of time. The question whether or not it can rid itself of
such baggage will arise if we can find a competing view that travels
more lightly.
Of all the views considered, we have now reviewed three-the
modified OPD, the tensed-exemplication view, and the thought-
reflexive analysis. These have all been found wanting, or at least
questionable. Wileare thus led back to the view considered at the
very outset: the pure objective-property doctrine.
The pure OPD seemed felled by the following dilemma. Either the
predication of transitory temporal properties is tenseless or it is
tensed. But it cannot be tenseless, for then the properties could not
be transitory (given P1 and P2a). And if it is tensed, then transitory
temporal properties are superfluous (and reducible to tensed propo-
sitions with no transitory temporal properties).
Accepting the first horn of this dilemma leads to the modified
OPD. Accepting the second horn leads to the tensed-exemplification
view. And these are two of the three views that we have already
found wanting or at least questionable. There now appears a further
response to the dilemma which seems worth following out, and that
is to break the first horn.
IV. THE FORM-OF-THOUGHT ACCOUNT (FT)
A statement of this account may be given in two parts as follows.
FT: (i) There are transitory temporal propertiesand these are basic
(objective) properties (of events, moments, and perhaps other
entities) irreducible to (subjective) properties of or relations to
thoughts of thinkers. (Thus FT incorporates much of OPD.)
(ii) Tenselesslypredicating a transitory temporal property of an
entity can be correct.
But how can FT be right if the following are all true?
THE STATUSOF BECOMING: WHAT IS HAPPENING Now? 39
(a) Necessarily, if tenselessly predicating a property of a thing is
correct at any one time, it would be correct at any other time as
well.
(b) A thing can have a transitory property at one time and not at
another.
(c) If at a time t tenselessly predicating a property of a thing is cor-
rect, then the thing has the property at that time.
It follows from (a), (b), and (c) that tenselessly predicating a prop-
erty of a thing can never be correct unless the thing always has that
property. FT responds by rejecting (a) and with it P1. But how can
it do so with any plausibility? This can perhaps be answered in
several stages as follows. Consider first of all the following distinction
between the present-boundand the present-free.
A. The Distinction.
(a) Present-bound properties: being presently (now) 4
being today 4
having been yesterday 4,
being to be tomorrow 4
having been n days ago 4
being to be n days hence 4
(b) Present-free properties: being 4

having been (earlier) 4
being to be (later) 4
having been n days earlier 4
being to be n days later 4
Concerning the present-bound properties or the corresponding states
of affairs, we can say either (i) that if they ever hold, they hold only
presently or now, or (ii) that if they ever hold, they always hold.
Whichever option we take, present-free properties and states of
affairs will be different. For these hold (held, will hold) at times other
than the present time without always holding.
It is present-bound properties that lead to bizarre exuberance.
Thus consider the property of being presently in its new-moon phase
which I attribute to the moon now, and compare it with the property
that I attributed to the moon a month ago when I believed that it
was then in its new-moon phase. The property that I then attributed
to the moon was not of course that of being presently in its new moon
phase, for that would have been at best to make a prediction,
whereas my belief then was not predictive but was rather about the
phase of the moon at that time. WN7hiat then was the property that a
month ago I attributed to the moon in believing that it was then in
its new-moon phase? Was it the property of having been in its new-
moon phase a month ago? But that property is presumably just the
property of having been in its new-moon phase a month before the
present time. And it seems wrong to suppose that in believing a
month ago that the moon was then in its new-moon phase I must
then have made reference to the present time. So it appears that in
believing a month ago that the moon was then in its new-moon
phase I was attributing to the moon some property other than being
now in its new-moon phase and other than having been in its new-
moon phase a month ago. And if we restrict outselves to present-
bound properties, there is no apparent alternative to the conclusion
that there must have been some primitive property 4 with respect
to a month ago, the property of being then in its new-moon phase,
which is different from the property 4', with respect to two months
ago, of being then in its new-moon phase, and so on ad absurdum.
The form-of-thought view offers a different way of looking at the
matter. Instead of supposing that there is the present-bound prop-
erty of being-presently-in-its-new-noon-phasewhich I attribute to the
moon, FT proposes that there is the present-free property of being-
in-its-new-moon-phase which I attribute-as-present to the moon.
With respect to states of affairs rather than properties, the proposal
is this. Instead of supposing that there is the present-bound state of
affairs of the moon being presently in its new moon phase, let us suppose
that there is the present-free state of affairs of the moon being in its
new-moon phase, which at any given time we may accept as holding.
Since this state of affairs is the very same state of affairs that a
month ago I accepted as holding, FT is not subject to the bizarre ex-
uberance that flaws some of its earlier alternatives.
An important feature of the form-of-thought account (FT) is that
it has the propositional attitudes absorb "the now." Thus FS hopes
(fears) that a now1 is interpreted as FS hopes-present (fears-pre-
sent) that al and rS believes that now ao] is interpreted as rS ac-
cepts-as-present that ao1.
B. Elimination of the Present-bound. FT eliminates present-bound
temporal properties. It makes no room for them for them in states of
affairs. There is a sense in which FT has the propositional attitudes
absorb all such temporal properties. But this requires explanation as
follows.
(a) If a declarative present-tense sentence a makes no time refer-
ence, either explicitly or implicitly, then rFaTwill represent the
gerundive form of a and will pick out a possible state of affairs.
(b) Let FAJt:ao1stand for rAt I, S accepts (as-then-holding) Oa.
(c) The use of the variable 'T'in (b) may be misleading, since we
THE STATUS OF BECOMING: WHAT IS HAPPENING NOWV? 4I
do not necessarily require quantification over times. Thus we can

adopt an adverbial theory of time according to which the "time ref-
erences" replacing the 't' above would function as adverbs modifying
the verb 'to accept'. There would then be "one-day-earlier accept-
ance," "two-day-earlier acceptance," and so on.
(d) Let fPast (a)l stand for the past-tense form of a.
(e) FA t: a-1 is true iff either (i) FAt t, S believed that past (a)
then1 is true, or (ii) rAt 1, S believes that ao1is true, or (iii) FAt t, S
will believe that a then1 is true. [Which of (i), (ii), of (iii) is true
depends on whether the time reference t is to the past, the present,
or the future, respectively.]
(f) Note that e above gives only a truth and not an analysis.
In a sense, analysis would go in the opposite direction. Thus, if I
consider whether n days ago I believed that I was then alive, what I
consider is the state of affairs A: my n days earlier accepting (as-
then-holding) my being alive. And A contains no tensed exemplifica-
tion and no present-bound properties.
(g) The acceptance attributed to S by FA8t:a-1 is correct iff the
state of affairs represented by rFalholds at t.
(h) Again the use of the variable '1' may mislead one to the con-
clusion that [because of (g)] FT requires quantification over times.
But here again it is not at all certain that FT carries this commit-
ment to times. For there seems to be the alternative option of adopt-
ing an adverbial theory of time according to which time specifications
replacing the 'T'in (g) would function as adverbs modifying the verbs
'to accept' and 'to hold'. There would then be "one-day-earlier ac-
ceptance," "one-day-earlier holding," and so on. [Note, however,
that, unlike TE, this theory does not require that each time have its
own peculiar form of exemplification. For "one-day-earlier holding"
and the like are present-free properties of states of affairs. Thus the
state of affairs of its being Sunday has that same property (of one-
day-earlier holding) on every Monday throughout eternity, but fails
to have it on Tuesdays.)
According to FT, we can accommodate all the relevant data if we
think of propositional attitudes in accordance with the model pre-
sented by (a)-(h) above for acceptance. If so, we can then eliminate
all present-bound properties in favor of present-free properties.
C. Assessment of FT.
(a) FT incorporates much of the OPD, for it does accept transi-
tory temporal properties as objective and irreducible to eternal
properties or relations, but it rejects that part of the OPD which
includes MIcTaggart's A-characteristics among such properties.
(b) FT avoids the exuberance of the modified OPD by restricting

its transitory temporal properties to such as are present-free.
(c) Since FT insists on a tenseless exemplification nexus, it avoids
the exuberance of the tensed exemplification view (TE).
(d) Since FT does not propose a subjectivist reduction of trans-
itory temporal properties-unlike the thought-reflective analysis
TR-it does not require simple folk to be aware of their own thoughts
in being aware of what happens now in their surroundings, nor does
it bring our acts of evaluation about current experiences within their
own scope.
(e) FT is ontologically lighter than the thought-reflective analy-
sis. For TR carries an apparent commitment both to concrete events
and to moments or intervals of time, whereas FT is free of such
baggage.
We thus seem entitled to conclude that of all the alternatives con-
sidered the form-of-thought view is the most eligible. If this is right,
then there is a sense in which the present-bound properties of past-
ness, presentness, and futurity (McTaggart's A-characteristics) are
part of the form of our thought and not part of its content (or
objects).
ERNEST SOSA
Brown University
BOOK REVIEWS
Berkeley. GEORGE PITCHER. Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1977. 277 p. $16.50.
George Pitcher's Berkeley is a volume in the series that is now be-
ginning to appear, The Arguments of the Philosophers, intended
to provide "an essentially analytic and critical account" of "the
great and the influential philosophers." There hasn't been such a
series in a while, providing a contemporary assessment of historical
figures intended for the general philosophical reader, and this one
is very welcome. The relationship of philosophy with its past is
uneasy. It seems that philosophers cannot jettison their past as
scientists do, that philosophical progress does not permit rejecting
or ignoring the conclusions from the past, for stich conclusions
don't end up either conclusively refuted or hopelessly outdated.
It is nevertheless unrealistic to expect philosophers from the past
to address our contemporary issues directly, for their problems are
0022-362X/79/7601/0042$01.10 (? 1979 The Journal of Philosophy, Inc.

The Journal of Philosophy Volume 76 Issue 1 1979 (Doi 10.2307/2025813) Ernest Sosa - The Status of Becoming - What Is Happening Now

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The Journal of Philosophy Volume 76 Issue 1 1979 (Doi 10.2307/2025813) Ernest Sosa - The Status of Becoming - What Is Happening Now

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Journal of Philosophy, Inc.

The Status of Becoming: What is Happening Now?

but logically connected with suchnesses, we may call it Moderate

THE STATUS OF BECOMING:

between suchnesses and the thisnesses of such beings as persons. Anti-Haecceitism

to (subjective) properties of or relations to thoughts or

Thus consider a present flash of lightning that occurs (comes into

Suppose again that there is now a flash of lightning and that I

D. The OPD modified. Suppose one agrees that tensed predication

certain concrete event e is then (i.e., now) present, then e is

A. Griinbaum's proposal. Note first that we must again distinguish

is conceptually aware of the following complex fact: that his having

immediate difficulty for R will be seen from the following:

G. Reconsiderationof the two objectionsto the thought-reflexiveanalysis

(principle of tensed exemplification):

one would properly express at that time by a use of a corresponding

(b) Present-free properties: being 4

do not necessarily require quantification over times. Thus we can

(b) FT avoids the exuberance of the modified OPD by restricting

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