Mendoza 1

Jocelyn Mendoza

Greg Spendlove

PHIL1000- 011

19 April 2017

Are Physical Determinism and Human Freedom Compatible

Most of us would agree that we have human freedom, in the form of freewill. Physical

determinism is a different story, not many of us like the idea that something is determined. When

physical determinism and human freedom are put together, we get a huge argument between

philosophers based on this idea. Physical determinism and human freedom are not compatible.

This is because if physical determinism is true, then moral responsibility is false, therefor human

freedom must be false. In this paper, I will define the terms I will use for my argument, then I

will include both positions for this argument and explain why I support one of these positions. I

will then explain and critique the opposing position and discuss why it is not a very appealing

position. I will conclude my paper by restating my thesis and argument.

In this paper, determinism means that something is determined, just in case it is the

necessary consequence of what came before it, as discussed in class. This refers to the inability

or lack of power to change an action or outcome in a deterministic world. Human freedom will

be referred to as free will. Free will is defined as the choice of acting or not acting, according to

the determination of the will according to David Hume (Timpe). Free will also covers the idea

or argument of origination as well as voluntariness, which is the kind of freedom which at

bottom is absence of compulsion or constraint (Honderich). This means that to have free will,

one must choose to do something unforced, with the ability to do otherwise. Because one has a

choice, free will must come with the ability to be blameworthy or praiseworthy of an action or
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belief. This means that one must take responsibility for the action done, and is referred to as

moral responsibility. To be morally responsible for something, one must be worthy of a

particular kind of reaction- praise, blame, or something akin to these- for having performed it

(Eshleman). Compatibilism is the idea that something is consistent with what is said to be a

single idea of freedom that really concerns us and with a related kind of moral responsibility

(Honderich). When put together, these words can form an argument that is for or against the idea

of compatibilism when it comes to physical determinism and free will.

People who think that physical determinism and human freedom are not compatible are

called incompatibilists. In other words, one can say an incompatibilist believes that determinism

is true of the actual world, and thus no agent in the actual world possesses free will,

incompatibilists can also be called hard determinists (freewill). Other people argue that free

will and determinism is compatible, they are called compatibilism. This means that they believe

it is possible that an agent is both fully determined and yet free (freewill). Meaning, that

because something is determined, one can choose to do the action, and therefore is free and can

be morally responsible.

An argument known as the origination argument presented by an incompatibilist, states

that an agent acts with free will only if she originates her action, or if she is the ultimate source

or first cause of her action (freewill). It means that an agent who acts on a belief or desire

doesnt necessarily mean that theyre the cause of that action, but by something outside of their

control. Therefore, the agent is not the originator of the action or belief, and because of this we

cannot hold an agent morally responsible for the action or belief done. A summary of this

argument goes as follows: An agent acts with free will only if she is the originator of her

actions. If determinism is true, then everything any agent does is ultimately caused by events and
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circumstances out of her control the agent is not the originator of her actions. Therefore, if

determinism is true, no agent has free will (Timpe). A compatibilist can reject this argument by

denying the first sentence; an agent acts with free will only if she is the originator of her

actions (Timpe). Compatibilists argue that an agent can be free, only if the action goes through

the agent 1st and 2nd order desires. This denies the requirement for an agent to be the originator of

an action by saying that the agent could have willed differently had she had different reasons,

ultimacy is again not required (Timpe). Making the agent morally responsible for its actions.

Physical determinism and human freedom is not compatible. This is because having

freewill means that one has the choice to do otherwise, determinism on the other hand, states that

something is required to happen because of a past action. Therefore, if determinism is true, then

free will is false. Freewill is the idea that one does something freely or unforced, determinism

doesnt give us the choice to do otherwise. Therefore, if determinism is true, then freewill is

false. This also means that the universe, God, or anything else one believes that has the power to

determine something, is the one responsible for that doing that action. This doesnt allow for one

to be morally responsible for an action done. Moral responsibility has to do with the ability of

one to be worthy of praise or blame. If a person does an action unwillingly with no option/choice

to do otherwise, then that person is forced to do an action. Resulting with one not being able to

be morally responsible because that person is not worthy of having done such action willingly.

This also means that if a person is not morally responsible for something, then that person cannot

be free.

Some people would argue against this by saying that an action or belief is not forced, if it

comes from a 1st or 2nd order desire. Meaning that one accepts the nature of ones being. If an

action or desire comes from the 2nd order desire it means it comes from human nature that one
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needs to do something, not necessarily to live, but just because theyre accepting the nature. This

argument is invalid because just because someone has the need to do something doesnt

necessarily make them free. A mosquito bite comes with the after effect of itching. Just because

it is itching and one reaches to scratch the mosquito bite it doesnt make them free. It is

something that was caused by the environmental consequence of nature. One did not have a

choice whether the mosquito bit or whether it didnt. The mosquito was acting on its 1st order

desire. The itch itself is the necessary consequence from the mosquito.

Physical determinism and human freedom are not compatible. This is because if physical

determinism is true, then moral responsibility is false, therefor human freedom must be false. I

support this argument by using the origination argument which states that to be free, one must

be the originator of that action or belief. This leads to the ability to be morally responsible for an

action done if determinism is true. I also compare the definitions of determinism and free will

and state the compatibility between those two.

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References

Doyle, Bob. "The Problem of Free Will." The Problem of Free Will. N.p., n.d. Web. 18 Apr.

2017. <http://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/problem/>.

Eshleman, Andrew, "Moral Responsibility", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter

2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =

<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/moral-responsibility/>.

Honderich, Ted. "The Determinism and Freedom Philosophy Website." 620pixeltable. London's

Global University, n.d. Web. 18 Apr. 2017.

<http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctytho/dfwIntroIndex.htm>.

Hughes, Christopher. The Consequence Argument and the Definition of Determinism. Revista

Portuguesa De Filosofia, vol. 71, no. 4, 2015, pp. 705724.,

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/43744655>

Timpe, Kevin. "Free Will." Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. N.p., n.d. Web. 18 Apr. 2017.

<http://www.iep.utm.edu/freewill/>.