1

The Light Divisions and

Low= Intensity Conflict:
Are They Losing Sight
of Each Other?
J
Major Peter N. Kafkalas, US Army

What should be the role of the new light infantry divisions? Are
they sinsplg to augment heavy forces, or are theg to have their
own primary mission ? This author feels the Army is not etaying
with the ori.qinalpurpoee of balancin.qthe force structure.

I ~ N 1965, THE year US combat unite

were introduced into Vietnam, General
Hsrold K. Johnson deecribed what was a
problem then snd is now:
. . . the total force of the United States
over the past seueral years has posed a
paradox of sorts because, by the very
strength of our forces. tile haue not had a
major conflict. This has forced a confronta-
tion on a much lower level of conflict. Of
course, in this lou,er level of conflict we
haue particular problems because it is dif-
ficult to design a specific structure for the
express purpose of meeting all sotis of lim-
ited conflict. We continue to study ways
where we might present a reasonably fixed
organization that is designed for the ex-
press purpose of coping u,ith these wars of
subversion.
Itwas apparent that Johnson could see
problems using general purpose forces to
combat an insurgency. His concern about
not having a force structure designed for
the express purpose of coping with sub-
version was justified although Vietnam
presented other militsry problems beyond
subversion.
Tbe political and mflitsry significance of
wsrs of subversion, or insurgence% re-
mains as crit.iceJ today se it did prior to;
Vietnam. This style of wsrfme is the do.
nsnt chrmacteristic of what is now k.no% .
as low-intensity conflict (LIC). i;, > .
The introduction of light infrmtry +v}
sions into the US Army force struch-e
would appear to solve the problem descnb.ed
by Johnson since the military aspec~s of
LIC are characterized by constraints on&e
level of violence, weaponry and tactics.2
These militsry constraints negate the effec- .
tiveness of heavier forces. The light divi- v
sions, then, can be considered a potential
force of transition.
Within this counterinsurgency frsrne-

Copyr!ght C 19a6 by MaJor Pster N. Kafkalas, US Army 19

.-.. ...

The constant focus on North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) and ottir
more conc,entionalscenarios has hindered
ang real change in the allocation of forr-es
designed for LIC.
work and the appropriate role of light in-
fantry divisions in augmenting Special
Operations Forces, it appee.re that institu-
tional attitudes in the Army are changing.
They are redirecting the doctrinaf and func-
tional focus of the light divisions away from
LIC toward a more conventiomd, higher in-
tensity role. This appears to he a critical
misplacement of emphasis. .Military coun-
terinsurgency operation remain the most
misunderstood of all the missions of LIC
and require greater doctrinal emphasis for
those forces expected to prc-.+de maneuver
support.
Ktpperman Study
---
The stant focus on North Atlantic
Treat y $ rganization (hATO) and other
more conventional scenarios has hindered
any real change in the allocation of forces
designed for LIC. This NATO-centered
outlook waschallenged ina 1983 study by
Robert H. Kupperman. Kupperman pro-
posed a dhange away from heavy forces,
stating that, to meet the future LIC
threat environment, light forces are r;-
quired most specifically. Some key
features of these proposed ligh,t forces
were
e The basic unit would be the light in-
fantry brigade.
e Light infantry brigades were not
generaJ purpose forces.
e Light infantry brigades wouldnhecon-.
figured, equipped and trained for opera-
20
. .
tions in specific regiomd environments and
under relatively narrow scenario specifica-
tions.
e The light infantry brigade organiza-
tion would require a test-bed with a divi-
sionaf-levei headquarters and support
units.
Kupperman stressed that LIC doctrine
would have to emphasize small-utit in-
dependence and decentralized command
and that light infantry brigade specializa-
tion would be similar to current special
operations command (SOCOM 1forces.
Kuppermans views conflicted with cur-
rent doctrine, creating a dilemma for the
Army. Field Manuaf {FM) 100-20, Lou,-
Intensity ConfZict, emphasizes brigade-size
elements to be brought into a L IC environ-
mentif SOCOM forces need augmentation.
But the question arises as to the adequacy
of only a brigade in such a scenario. The
other problem from Kupperman, especially
in view of the US Armys doctrinal em-
phasis on large-unit, NATO-oriented opera.
tions, asespo&edin FM 100-5,0peratiorzs.
was the small-unit, decentralized approach
fora LIC environment
4
1984 White Paper
on Light Divisions
Initially. Army Chief of Staff General
John A. Wickham Jr, assessed the value of
the new light di~,isions in a LIC environ-
ment:
H%, derrzonstratlng U.S r@so/LJe and
capability, they mav u,ell prelwnt the cwf-
break ofti,ar. Thzsisparticula rl%,sou,here
10U, to mirf-interrsitv conflict threatens
u,hen their presence could decisitwlv affect
theoutcome, . ..Especiallv inlou. zntensitv
conflict. thev utll, be ab[e to weh out and
destrov the enernv on his terrain, using
initiative, stealth and surprise
January 1986 MILITARY REVIEW

The World War II view was that light divisions lacked adequate fighting strength and
sustainability. . . . A 11light diuisions except the IOth Mountain Division were concerted
to standard infantry divisions by 1944 . . . . It was not used in Central Europe, but in Its. ,
ly. The US Army has neuer emploged a light dinision as current[g envisioned.

Two problems exist here. In LIC. vou do
not necessaril.v seek out and destroy the
enemy. If force cannot be avoided, then
combat forces are to be used at decisive
points for specific payoffs .fi rather
than a possible long-term sustained effort.
The light division mission statement
reads: Rapidly deploys to defeat enemy
forces in Low Intensity Conflict and. when
properlv augmented. reinforces US forces
committed to a mid-high intensit,v con-
flict. This aspect of rapid deployability y
suggests that LIC. as a mission, is con-
sidered similar to a short, ~onvention~
Grenada-type scenario rather than a less
conventional conflict Thus, the miseion
statement is at once contradictory. es-
pecially since LIC ie considered short of
conventional warfare.
Beyond this initiaJ concern for [,IC in the
conventional sense, the red reason for the
establishment of the light divisions was
emphasized:
It is important for all of us to recog.ni#
the geo-strate~ic ualue as wt=l[as battle fie{@
utilitv of the light infantrv division co~-
cept The concept has relevance becaus~;{t S.
in uolues del,elopment of highly depl@-
able [emphasis added]. hard hit ring com bat
units. From bases in the United S$ates,
these divisions uill be capable of mpidlv
rein forcing foru~ard-deplo,ved U.S, forces in
NATO or the Far East.s
This view closely aligns the light divi. ;
sions purpose with the Reagan administra.
tions policy of developing capabilities to
counter Soviet threats across the globe, or
the horizontal escalation theory.0 The light

t
MILITARY REVIEW . Janua, y 1986 21 .

Doctrinally, it appears the Army is more
concerned with light infantry as an
augmenting reinforcing asset rather than
an ina%pendentforce for LIC.
divisions could be seen as being redirected
away from LIC in favor of larger. more in-
tense scenarios.
What is the light divisione place in a mid
to high-intensity war? Wickham provided
some clarification by saying that:
in such situations light infantry diui-
sions can be assigned missions which will
free up mechanized, and armored elements
for decisive employment elsewhere on the
battlefield. 1
The use of light divisions in Europe has
caught the in?erest of the US military
establishment. Articles in current military
publications seek to establish doctrinal
guidance for light forces in Europe, taking
Wickharns statement about light forces
freeing heavier forces and running with it.
Essentially, conventional light infantry
doctrine is in a state ~f flux, better known
as emergi g doctrine. This situation can
beattrK@dtoalackof US Mstoric~ per.
spective regarding light divisions. The
World War II view was that fight divisions
lacked adequate fighting strength and sus-
tainability, and theater commanders did
not want them. All light divisions except
the IOth Mountsin Division were convert-
ed to standard infantry divisions by 1944.
The 10th simply converted from a light,
8,400-man division to an enlarged moun-
tain division with 14,000 men. It was not
used in Centrsf Europe, but in Italy. The
US Army has never employed a light divi-
sion as currently envisioned.
Representative of the Armys approach
to the use of light infantry is the US Army
Command and General Staff Colleges
Field Circular (FC) 71-101, Light Infantry
Division Operations. In the preface, Major
22
Gsneraf Dave R. Palmer correctly discues-
es their use in low to mid-intensity con-
flicts. However, he also stresees their rapid
deployability as a show of force.
Wbiie FM 100-5 is the doctrinal basis for
FC 71-101, there is no mention of FM
100-zo as a reference manual. Other thtirr
a brief section referring to the enemy most
likely to be faced in a LIC, the circulars
emphasis is on light infantry operations as
a part of a larger force. Doctrinally, it ap
pears the Army is more concerned with
light infantry as an augmenting reinforcing
asset rather than an independent force for
LIC.
Evidence of a conventional mid-intensity
emphasis comes from a current Low-Mid
Intensity Scenario used by the Depart-
ment of Tactics, US Army Command and
Genernf Staff College. to help clarify
emerging doctrinal principle which ex-
plain how to fight . . . the Iight infantry di-
vision. . in a contingency environment.> 7
The light infantry division opposes a
motorized rifle division. Ah hnugh guerrilla
forces are part of this scenario, operations
against guerrilla forces will include only
those necessary for local secur~t y.
Finaf evidence that the light divisions are
not LIC-oriented can be seen in their struc-
ture. Each of the divisions (except for the
7th which is trooplisted for Europe) wilf
only have two Active brigades, with the
third brigade being a roundout unit from
the National Guard. It would be acceptable
to activate the roundout units in the more
conventional contingencies listed. But,
given the politicsf reaction over the requeet
for Reserve component units during V.iet-
nsm, it would be unlikely that they would
be activated for LIC.
The inescapable conclusions are that
each division could only be committed to a
LIC scenario with its two Active brigades,
limiting its effectiveness, or tbe light divi-
sions are not LIC-oriented bnt are force
January 1986 MILITARY REVIEW

augmenters for a conventional higher
intensity conflict.
Ironically, as light infantry doctrine is
directed toward the higher end of the con-
flict scale, the most applicable organiza-
tional size for light infantry in Europe ap-
pears to be brigade-sized rather than divi-
sions. Concurrently, LIC requirements
stress brigade-sized units when, in f?ct, a
divisional-sized unit would be more appro-
priate when the historical ratios necessary
to combat insurgents are considered.
It has been noted that:
standing forces such as Airborne, Air-
mobile, and Ranger battalions in the army
not to mention the entire Marine Corps
leave many officials doubt ful that more
light forces for quick insertions are needed.
The idea of using the Marine Corps has
occurred to others. During an interview in
July 1984, Lieutenant General Fred K.
Mahaffey, the Armys deputy chief of staff
for operations and plans, centered his re-
sponse on this question to the M arines
mieeion to bperate as part of a naval fleet
and make a forced entry to secu-e a beach-
head. Mahaffey also stated that the Ma-
rines are not designed to carry out sus-
tained land comb at. 27 When reminded
that the Marines did just that in Vietnam,
he replied that the Marine effort in Viet-
nam was an adaptation to the require-
ments of the time.
Luttwak Study
Edward N. Luttwak is the current guru
on light infantry by virtue of hie ongoing,
systematic evaluation of the strategic util-
ity of US light divisions. This study looke
at light division use in varied theaters, with
a top-down approach:
e Mature theater, Central Army Group.
Central Europe. area, NATO.
MILITARY REVIEW * January 1986
LIGHT DIVISION
Ironically, as light infantry doctrine is
directed toward the higher end of the con-
flict scale, the most applicable organiza-
tional size for light infantry in Europe
appears to be brigah-eized rather than
divisional.
@ Contingency theater. Southwest Asia.
e Low intensity, Central America.
.S Intervention, including rescue and ter.
rorism.
Luttwak presents an overall light infan-
try framework based on a rather radical
outlook:
Because the reason for being of the Light
Division arises preciselv from the need to
transcend the dep[ovabilitv and operation-
al limitations of standard formations, its
potential combat deficiencies cannot be
remedied bv adding reinforcing elements
with heavier{comp[ex equipment. Instead
the equipment limitations must be over-
come bv (a) achieving context-adaptability, ,
through the structunng and training proc.
ess. and (b) exploiting that qualitv bv ap-
propriate tactics. within operational
schemes. The alternative solution, to add i
heauler extra-divisional rein forcements.
would have no logi?a[ stopping point until
full equipment paritv is attained yith the
standard formations which u~ould eptfi~
the re-emergence of the original depl&kb&
it.v and operational limitations ,,?1,
The studys key is rapid deployability, .
with appropriate warnings on limitatjqni.
Yet. the NATO scenario has the light infan-
try in a hedgehog type, in-depth defense on
close terrain rather than more independent
missions of rear battle or antiarmor tim-
bushes.
As for a LIC scenario, Luttwak is on the:
right track when he refers to the Marine{
Corps combined action platoon (CAP) ex-
periment in Vistnam ae the appropriate,
light infantry strategy. Although his
23 ,

To consider light infantrg similar to
heavier emzventional forces creates the
posrdbility of puffing light forces in the
wrong place, at the wrong time, against
point defense concept as conventional
;=
where.
generally the employment of supporting w
tillery and heavy forces is unnecessary or
even counter-productive.
ilc:
The Challenge Not Taken
For all of the doctrinal analysis given Lo
the light divisions in other scenarios, the in-
verse istruewhen applied to LIC. Itis as if
we assume the light divisions will automat.
ically know how to fight in an unconven-o
tional low-intensity environment. This
assumption may not bevnlid, considering
, thelacko Mstoricalp erspectivein t in 1968, orientation courses at Forts
LIC do ine and how the light i f try
4
could hesthe usedin a LIC sceneri w
As negative as Vietnam was to our
psyche, there is a wealth of lessons from
that conflict applicable in a LIC scenario
today. Forinstmrce. haserryone ever really
analyzed Sir Robert Thompsons thesis as
it could be applied to a LIC environment
and the light division today:
. . u~hat uould happen if a new divisional
commander. instead of merelv chasing the
enem.v around the jungle. though touta
plan u,hereby heusedpart of his forces to
help [the host countr,yl to protect and con-
trol the villages from which the supplies
must be going, [and/ another part to con-
duct small-unit Iemphasis. addedl deep
pene~ n operations against the moun-
tain. %s pl.v routes.
24 . January 1986
Or what about the success of the Marine
Corps CAP program? The CAPS were
squada who trained, advised and lived in
the villages. They were force multiplfere
who taught the vfflagers how to defend
themselves by using patrols, both day end
night, that keep the guerrillas away from
the village or made them come out and
fight. The CAPS chose not to use artiflery
because of its devastation: instead, they
just emphasized light infantry tactics. The
strengthof this approachwae eeen during
the 1968 Tet offensive when alf CAP
villagee held together, even when the
Marines left to fight elsewhere.As William
R. Corson noted:
the CAP, urzderthe leadership of the
Marines,. provided the how, and for the
first time since rue have confronted a war of
national liberation, we know how to defeat
the Communists in an imwrgenc.v.=g
Finally, no oue has expanded on the idea
of constant pressure in a LIC environment.
This wasiniti@ly described by Lieutenmrt
General Julian J. Ewell and Major General
Ira A. Hunt:
Benning, Sill. and Rucker still ft%tured bat-
talion-sized operations. cloverleaf patrols,
heavy firepouwr, digging in every night,
and large (10 to 20 ship) airmo bile assaults. !
It was recognized that changes were due
but there was no coherent doctrine or over-
al[ concept forcharrging to a more delicate
approach.0
Small-unit light infantry tactics were
stressed, albeit against North Vietnamese
regular units as well as Vietcong. Their
operation, called constant pressure. ccm-
ducted continuous operations against the
enemy anddisrupted enemy timetables. It
contradicted traditional thinking about
Iarger unit operations: Oncewebeganto
stress small unit operations, it was estab-
lished that the great majority of the enemy
losses 180?oto 90%) came in very small con-
MILITARY REVIEW
. . . CAPSwere[Marine Corps] squads who trained, advised and lived in the villages. They
were force multipliers who taught the villagers how to defend themselves. , . . The CAPS
chose not to use artillery because of its devastation andjust emphasized tight infantry
tactics. The strength of this approach was seen during the 1968Tet offensive when all
CAP villages hetd together, even when the Marines left to fight elsewhere.

tacts. Thus, search-and-destroy opera- sis of US counterinsurgency performance

tions, or multibattalion sweeps. slowly died
out
These lessons are often overshadowed by
portions of F.M 100-20 which stress that
counterguerrilla operations are character-
ized by:
rnobilitv, to find, fix. destroy, or cap-
ture the guerntlas [including/ such
offensiue tactics as reconnaissance-in-force,
raids, movement to contact, hast v or deliber-
ate attacks, and exploitation and pursuit. 32
The strike campaign is emphasized:
[It[ consists of a series of major combat
operations targeted against insurgent tac-
tical forces and bases in contested or insur-
gent-controlled zones. Strike campaign
operations are usually of relatiuelv short
duration (generally one dav to several
u,eeks) {as opposed to a constant pressure
approach /.3
Douglas S. Blauferb charged in his analy-
in Vietnam that the Army is still guilty of
making counterinsurgency warfare an
additional task within the larger fcame- i
work of conventional doctrine. This prob.
lem promises to be exacerbated by redirect-
ing the emphasis of the light divisions
away from LIC toward higher inte~si~y
scenmios.
i
,.
Proposal:
A Bottom-Up Approach :
There is an undeniable link betweenli~ht
infantry and LIC where the veritable round
peg fits the round hole. Wickhams state- ;
ment about light forces freeing heavier ,
forces for other actions on the battlefield
can be applied strategically. This would
sflow light divisions to focus primarily on

MILITARY REVIEW . January 1986 .25 ,

 LIC and free heavy units to train for those
environments where they are best suited.
Mechanized forces would not have to
gear down to prepare for a LIC environ-
ment. FM 100-20 says units require inten-
sive treiuing in countefguerrilla operations
to combat guerrilla tactical forces. This
training is a radical change to normal pro-
cedures: For example, vehicles may he
withdrawn from the units to emphasize
reliance on foot mobilit~.6
Since light irrfmrtry is suitable for a LIC
environment. what is wrong with making
LIC the primary mission? By constantly
stressi d small-unit, detached operations,
the light divisions would adhere to their
forte:
operating at night or under conditions
of limited visibility terrain-using
forces, expert in camouflage, skilled in
countermobility . [where] small unit
training will be crucial.
These attributes are crucial in a LIC envi-
ronment. and they must be constantly
practiced in conjunction with constant
analysis of LIC doctrine.
The key to a LIC doctrinal emphasis is
that it can easily be the basis for light
infantry use in what should be considered
the last-resort contingency of higher inten-
sity conflict. If we can limit its use in this
situation to match light infantry capabili-
ties and training, then we will keep the
round hole from squaring. Luttwak claims
that the relevance of counterinsurgency ex-
perience for the light infantrys mission is
almost everywhere but that counterguer-
rilla tactics may not be applicable in high-
intensity combat against heavy forces.g I
claim these tactics are.
For instance, light infantry in Europe is
suitable for rear battle, fighting Soviet ai~
borne or even some Spetsnaz elements.
Light infantry is suitable for small-unit in-
filtration through enemy lines. Multiple,
widespread antiarmor ambushes could be
conducted at choke points behind the for.
ward edge of the battle area, allowing
mechanized forces to concentrate on other
reserve missions. Military operations on
urbanized terrain are certainly within the
purview of light infantry capabilities. The
point is that these missions, although sec-
ondary to the proposed primary mission of
LIC, would not require an intensive trein-
~ng period because they are compatible
with light infantry missions in LIC.
i)
This may all seem obvious to the casuet
reader, but we often fail to grasp the obvi-
ous or take it for granted. To consider light
infantry similar to heavier conventional
forces creates the possibility of putting
light forces in the wrong place, at the
wrong time, against the wcong enemy.
Light forces are not designed to fight as
large, conventional units.
It must be conchrded that light divisions
cannot be considered general purpose
forces. This more specialized role should
not, however, be viewed from the negative.
This specialization can be applied, within
reason. across the spectrum of conflict.
What is qeeded is a better appreciation
for LIC and how the light diyisions carI
best fight in such a scenario. This should be
their functional and doctrinal basis. These
divisions should all possess a full comple-
ment of Active brigades. Let the Reserve
component light infantry brigades concen-
trate on other contingencies.
Tbe Army would do well to heed the ad-
vice of Sun ~i who said, He who under-
stands how to use both large end smell
forcek will be victorious. g We understand
the use of large forces. Yet, the breakup of
large forces into small units seems to mnke
us insecure. I contend that the light divi-
sions, with appropriate emphasis, cerr cure ~
us of that insecurity and allow us to incor-
porate frmctionaf and doctrinal reality into
our view of LIC. rnsurgencies remain poli-
tically and militarily significant; thus, we
January 1986 . MILITARY REVIEW
 LIGHT DIVISION

must treat this aspect of LIC as such rath- ing for the Wrong War? The proper view
er than as an unwanted aberration. of fight divisions could make the Armye
The Army has progressed somewhat from uphill fight to deal with LIC much lese of a
its former attitude regarding counterineur- struggle. In essence, the Army finally hae
gency. The question ie, how far have we the chance, ae Rlchsrd A. Gabriel once
come from now retired Lieutenant Colonel complained, to indeed see light in the tun-
Donald B. Voughts 1977 article, Prepar~ nel. %

+ NOTES

17 B,!,flg Pmk.t, DeParlnmt01 Tactics uSACG$C,Fort

LewewOrlh,Km 70WI,,! 1W5 Q7
18 lbfd, D 3
19 Lle.t@ant Colonel Clayton R Newell, ,Hewy.LOQht Forces
D,vlslo.s or a.waabs?.InfantryJa.uawF.LwaI! 79=, VP 7213
20 Most books that consider CO.nterlnwrwnw operations use
me cwantlt.ttve figures.? somewhere between 8 to 1 t. 10 tc!l.$ the
m!nlm.m umber of SOld!.rs nece$sam !0 . . ..es.l.lly comb.! l..
srgent$
23 M4chael Duff, Ltght 0,,s,0s ,Wiw,es the Bee f?,,, 0,}.s.
Week 19 March 1984, P 4
4 mm 22 lntmwe~ with Lleuteat General Fre(l K M.halfeY W La. Ew
5 General John A W,ckharn
Jr, W!utePaw .n LlshtDlv,smns dg anti Larry Came Army T>.,, 23 July 19S-4 P 4
,wmntedm theArm, Trees 7 Ma, 1984m 10.Wd12 23 !0!0 P 58
6 US ArmvInfer,mOD.r?mmIal Cmmem{orLOW!nfensw Cm 24 Edward N Luttwa% ), S[rategm UI,I,lY of US L!ght DWiSrOS.
?,,.,, OD .,[ P 34 4 Swfem.tm Fvar.at!on S181.s Reoort for 2nd SAG Meefmg ad
7 OrgIan,z mm.: Table.1 Organlzatron a.d Ewwne.t 77000J4 Pam.! Draft ReDorf, contract Number DABT6084C4X99, Chew
L!qht Dw<s!O (Ann, 01 E.ce!leml D. Partmet Of the Army Chase, Md .19 FebrafV 1985
Wasfl#L!tOn D C 1 Aorll19SdSect,O1 P?.rwrarJh t. DI 1 25 !br# m 54
8 US Armylnferm OwralmnalCo.ceotmr t.. !.!.. s8,,con 26 !0)0 P 49
;)!., O!Jcff p 1 27 !0(0 p 4
9 W,cknam00 01, D 12 28 Robert Thompson No EM Fmm Vwmam, Davta McKay Co,
10 Horlm.lal ewalalmn,.1s0known as geographic.1 esc.latm. N ), 1970, 045
and war WKJemng sirat.gy 1$ . Pollcy Wuch seeks m overcome 23 W,ltam R C.ar$ cm, The Betrav.3!, W w Norton. $ co N Y., 1SS3,
Sovlel strength m me central Notih Atlarmc ireaty Orwmcatl.n o 1s4
theater, or soviet forays ,nto the Persta. Gull, bv threate. mg Soviet 30 Lle.te. ant Genera, J.l#a. J Ewell a.d MaIor General Ika A
v.!e,ab,!,t,es elsewhere o. the globe to include Dortmns 0! !, Hunt Jr V!emam St.dre$ Sharpening the combat 6%7=s The Use 01
As,.. Ina!land An,!,,, to Re{nlO,ce Mfl,tam JOgmet US Government Pr,tog Of
flee. Wash, ngto, D C 1974. P 77
34 !b!a P S3
32 F,eld h%nual lFMI 10*2O Lowlnl.nwv Con fl$ct. Demtment,
01 tn. Army Wash, gto, D C 16 January 1981. D S?
33 fb,d D 204
34 Douglas S Blwfarb. The Co.ntermwrgency Era u S Docmne
..s Performance,7950to Present Free Press N V 1977, D SO
35 FM ob20. low !nte.s:tv conmct, OD .,1 D 263
% Jb,d ,,

August 1984. C@ 1922 -

13 Kent Roberts Gree.twa. RoberI R Palmer ..0 Bell I Wiley
U<ted States Army , World War II The A r, Gmnd Forces The
Org.. oal,on of Gm.no
combat Tmws, .storm.l 01.,s10.DeDarl
want.1 me ArmyWasmn.atonD c 1947m 34749
14 IBrd
15 Fteld C$rc.1.r 71 101, Light I. fa. tw D,v8sron Owr. tmns
USACGSC F.rl Leaew.rth R. 22 J, 19S4 D
d 16 <we 9$ I

k;
. P
..
MajorPeter N. Kafkalnsis the deputy inspee
to? geneml for the I&h Mountain Diuision
[Light Infantry), Fort Drum, Neu York. He
receiveda B A. tim WashingtonandJefferson
Collegeand an MA. fmm HarvardUniversity
and M a graduate of the USAC SC. His
assignments include seruing as the d puty chief
L
~b %~~~;;;~;%~~~;?i~mkit~~

MILITARY REVIEW o January 1986 27,