Zke battie for Suez Gtg occurred during the closing daus of the

1973 October War. Suez Ci@ was tacticaiig importan~ sitting

ostride the Third Eguption Arm@ on~ line of comm~ication. It
was strategical~ importan4 controlling the entrance to the Suez
CanaL It was politicaiig importan~ being the keg to ciaiow of both
belligerent. The battle wos won bu the Eggpti~ armu who% lead-
ers had studied their enemg well and wkow oddiers fought with
courage.

1979
27
 HE battle for Suez city in the 1973
Arab-Israeli conflict can best be ap-
preciated when it is examined within the
+

d
context of the overall military-political
situation. Coming as it did at the end of
1 the 1973 October War, a brief timetabIe
~w~- of major evente of tihewar is in ordw.

6 October 1973: 1400 War S&tS on Gob rindSinaifronts.

6-8 Octobe= Egyptian crossing of SuezCanaland Syrianattackinto
Gobmboth achievedramaticsuccess,
8 October IsraeIicountmattacksfailmiserablyinSinaiandachieve ~
considerablesuccessintbe GokurHeights.
D- 9 Octobe~ Stabifimtionof Sinaifrontbegiw lastbig Syrianattack
is brokenin Gofan.
10Octoben Israelrecapturesaflof Gofan.
11-13 Octobe~ tsraelattacks into Syria. Stabilizationof Syrianfront
begin%IsraefiDefenseForces(IDF}begbrto trrmeferair
andgroundassets tmSk@ front. In trouble,SyriateUs
Egyptto increescpressure.
i Dawm One of the largest tenk battles in history as 7
* 14be Egypt attacks out of tbe bridgehead.Egypt suffers
heavylosses.
15 Octobex PM:Battleof Chinesefarmbegins.
16 Octoben 120028 IDF tanksferriedacrosscanalattack west in
)
smallteamsto expandbridgeheadanddestroysurface
to-airmissile(SAM)sitxs. Egypt recognizesa crossing
by lsrael,but believesthat it is fimitedta six or seven
amphibioustanks.
i 17October: IDF pontoon bridge completed. Counterattackby
Egyptianarmorbrigadeon EastBankis defested.
~ 18-22 Octobe~ fkrcondandthirdIDF bridgescompleted;Israelisattack *
north towsrd Ismailia,srmtb towardCairo-Suezroad.
Egyptiansbegbrto stockpilemoundsof suppfiesin Suez
City, transportingby camel,horse and car. Until the
21st. Emmt was not awareof the magnitudeof tbe
lsraefi c;o&ing. Peaceinitiativesby the-UnitedStates
to Egypt, Israel,USSRundertaken by fCissinger.Sadst
not fulfyawareof the dangerto ThirdArmy. Egyptian
SAM umbrdfa weakening.United States is caught in
superpowerconfrontationwith USSR. Israel not fully
awarethat UnitedStatesintendsh step thewarat this
poirrc Israelintenton destructionor captureof Third
ArmY.Cairo-Suezroadstillopsn,thoughraidingparties
eutii sporadically. !
_ 22Ott.abet UnitedNstions(UN~SecurityCounciImeetingimposes
ceasefire and cessationof sIIndfitaryactivity at 1852. v -*
Both sides realizeidly tfrstwarie mar end 8nd try to *.
extendareasof controlfor propagandaandpofiticslpur-
~ses. Egypt cays that smallraidingptiles haveirdil-
trated on the West Bankof the canaland are on the w
verge of elimination.,Israelclaims to hsve surrounded
the ThirdArmy and to controla bu~ chunkof Egypt.
23October: IsracJattemptsto completeits encirclement of tfv?Third
Army.Egypt fightsh clearfinesof ccanmunications for s
theThird,klllly.

At 1700 on 23 O~tober, the lead@
tankcompanyfiom enerel Bren Adans
division reached St ez City and at-
tempted to enter by the gate on the
Ismailia-Suez road. Itwas beaten off by
artillery fire from the Eaet Bank (di-
rected from talf buildings in Suez) and by
direct fire from the gate. General Adan
aeked General Gonenif he should attack
Suez. The reply wae to attack if Suez wae
empty or lightly defended, but not if it
was heavily fortified and defended.
At this point, Suez City was important
for severaf reaeone. It sat aetride the
only fine of communication to the Third
Egyptian Armfi it contained 4moun-
taine of supplies of elf typee for the
Third Army (although the Israelis were
ignorant of this); it controlled the
entrance to the Suez Canal and wae itself
a port on the Gulf of Suez. An Ieraeli
capture of Suez would squash Egypts
claims to be on the verge of eliminating
the infiltrating raiding parties and
would establish Israeli control over the
area in the eyes of the UN forcee. (UN
Emergency Forcee (UNEF ) were tasked
with implementing the cease-fire and
marking zonee controlled by each army.)
On the other hand, failure by the Israelis
to establish their control over the area
might lead to a situation where the
UNEF recognized Sadate claims, and
IDF succeeses minimized.
At this point, neither army was clearly
in control of the area west of Suez,
including the Cairo-Suez road. The Ie-
raelis were unaware of the extent of
Egyptian preparation in Suez and hoped
for a quick victory which would serve
them well, both politically and psychw
logically. Egypt was furious with Israel
for violating the cease-fire and was
determined not to lose Suez.
Ieraeli experience and doctrine for
attacking, whether in open terrain or in
BATTLE FOR SUEZ CITY
builtup areas, calls for mobile armored
forces attacking on roade in column. Sur-
prise, epeed, firepower and shock effect
are used by these forces to break through
the enemys defeneee, enabling the IDF
to mop up from within the defendere
position or behind it. In the Golan, the
rocky terrain inhibits rapid croes+ountry
movement and damagee tracks and sue-
peneion systems. In Sinai and in the
deeert west of Suez, deep sand slowe
cross-country movement considerably
and increases the chances of getting
etuck.
In the Sii-Day War of 1967, nearly all
IDF attacks, both in the Golan and in
Sinai, were made mounted and on roads.
In Jerusalem in 1967, the attack that iso-
lated the city and the break-in and cap-
ture of the Temple Mount wae made on
roade with tanks leading, infantry in
armored personnel carriers (APCe) and
half-tracks following considerably to the
rear. In fact, the operation order stated
that if enemy artillery fire wae particu-
larly heavy, the tmrke would attack
alone.
Israels welldocumented success in the
Six-Day War eerved to convince the IDF
that tanks can do it all, alone, and that a
rapid, violent attack right down the road
wilf unhinge the defending enemy. This
doctrine was apparently ahnost univer-
sally accepted for both open terrain and
in builtup areas. The Israelis brought
this charge of the light brigade con-
cept with them to Suez.
The great preponderance of buildmge
in Suez are two and three-story resi-
dences constructed of dried mud and
stucco. The larger government buildings
end some of the bueinesees are reinforced
concrete and brick. The brick used in
Egypt ie said to be much etronger than
the type used in America.
There are a number of large apartment
29
MILITARY :REVIEVI!
houses of kix ta eight ffoom, constructed
of reinfor~ed concrete. These buildings
are in rows of four or six, and were, for
the most part, shot out in the upper
etoriee by Ieraefi artilIery during the
war of attrition that foflowed the 1967
war. In residential areas, the buildings
are only 1 to 2 meters apart. The narrow
alle s formed by this arrangement are
near\ y always shaded and too narrow for
easy passage of vehicles. (Vehicles can
pass through some side streets, but will
be forced to turn and double back several
times.)
Most buildings have flat roofs with
easy access from within. Window open-
ings are universally free of glass or other
windows. Many buildings have porchee
on upper floors with large open windows.
This type of construction allows plenty
of ventilation but stays shadowed. The
effect is an excellent location for anti-
tank weapons. The problem with back-
blast of recoillees weapons is minimal
compared to European-type construc-
tion. There are no underground passage-
ways, but the third dimeneion of the bat-
tlefield is present in that in many areas,
infantrymen can advance by eimply step
ping fi-om roof to roof.
Although there are only a few main
streets, they are very wide, in one case,
at least 200 meters between buildinge on
either side of the street. These main
streets are etraight, allowing the use of
antitank guided missiles (ATGMs) and
other direc~fire weapons at ranges not
ueually found in cities.
There are three main gates %0 the city:
one each on the road. to Ismailia, Cairo
end Adabiah. Outside the city, the road
to Ismeilia is en asphalt road just wide
enough to accommodate one column of
tapks. The road to Cairo is wide enough
for at least two columns of tanks outside
the city. Within the gates, it widens tQ
30
form a broad avenue 200 meters wide,
leading to the heart of the city. The road
from Adabmh enters the city from the
south, then swinge west into an indus.
trial area. Apparently, thie is not a good
avenue of approach to the center of the
city.
There are numerous other gates inta
Suez, come of which are large enough for
vehicles. However, the larger ones had
been blocked by rubble and mines, and
the smaller once were inadequate for
maneuver of an armored column. Along
the Suez Canal to the eaet of the city,
dense vegetation prohibite observation
at ground level and would seriously
.kupede off-road movement. Suez creek is
a marshy area impassable to vehiclee. An
Israeli strongpoint, captured at the be-
ginning of the war, providee the ordy
point of intervisibfity between the city
end the East Bank (see map).
Egypt had begun to pkm for the d~
fense of Suez at Ieeet a year before the
war. The description of wh t follows
aPPlies equdy to Suez, Ie cilia and
Quentara (West). A parallel . %wy+ivff
government had been establie 4 ed. In the
event of war, the military godemor had
complete authority over efl military,
civilian and civil government aesete.
Sixty percent of the population of Suez
wae evacuated a year before the war.
Only essential civiliane remained. These
were police, firemen, government offl-
ciale, bankers, store ownere, bakers,
pharmacists, hospital workere end the
like. Mifitary police from the Third
Army were tasked to control the main
gates to the city. Civilians were given
weapons training and were organized to
defend the outer perimeter of the city,
less the three main gatee.
One mqnth before the start of the war,
the civilian militia were issued weapons
and given stepped-up treiniqg. Smell
Novembor
 BATTLE FOR SUEZ CITY

II GULF OF SdEZ

SUEZ (OCTOBER /973) BATTLE 5A=ErCH

1979

gates were blocked with mines and
rubble. Gates required for normal uee
were prepared for demolition but not
executed. Artillery and reconnaissance
teams were given designated poeitions in
selected tall buildings. Commend posts
and eupply pointe for criticsf items were
located in bank vaulte where they would
be virtually guaranteed physicrd safety.
Supply pointe for food and so forth were
designated in etoree and werehousee.
Communications means of the mifitary
end civif government were centralized.
A number of kilf zonee were pre-
pared within the city on main streete.
Structures blocking pf.anned $ire were
razed to cleef fields of fire, and positions
were chosen in the bottom two floors of
strongly constructed buildinge. Between
16 and 21 October, an artillery defense
plan was made in order to facilitate
artillery eupport from the East Bank.
Two tenk battalion were positioned in
the area of the bridge across the canal to
defend the bridge and provide over-
watcbing fire to the northeast of Suez.
Each brigade of the n~w.surrounded
Third Army wae asked to eupply one
Stigger team and three RPG teems to
defend the gates of Suez and to man the
32
positions at the kill zAnes. Each bat-
talion was asked for one machinegun
team. Alf these requeste were fifled by
volunteers.
The Egyptian mifitary governor had
decided that the best way to eneure euc-
cese in the defense of Suez wae to draw
the Israelie into the kill zones before
engaging them. The second UN cease-
fire went into effect at 0700, 24
October. Shortly after the new cease-fire
went inta effect, the Israelis tired a
sort of reconnaissance-by-fire int.a Suez
as their attack formed up. The lack of
responee from Suez helped to convince
them that the defendera had fled, or were
very weak. At about 1330, the Israelis
attacked down the Cairo-Suez road and
the Ismsifia road with an armored bri-
gade and at least a battalion of para-
troops mounted in APCS and half-
tracke.
The tanks led in column down the main
s]reets followed by the mounted in-
fantry. Apparently, the attack wae made
at high speed. When the main column
reached the kifl zone near the police sta-
tion, the firet three tanks were hit by
RPGs, and the last vehicles in the COL
umn were hit juet outeide the gate to the
city, partially blocking the road. The
Israelis, reafiziig that they had mn into
a trap, drove the remaining tanks and
tracks off the main road onto eide streete
in an attempt to get out of the kill zone.
ID a little over an hour, the pehicles were
all hit. .
Egyptian militia had good success
with RPGs, Molotov cocktails, and the
~arn grenade. Thie ie a shaped+harge
grenade, shaped roughly like a fat wine
bottle, with a strong magnet on the base.
The idee is to run up end place it on the
side or rear of a tank, pull the pin and
run. The Egyptians apparently had con-
siderable success against half-tracks by
November

simply dropping the grenades into the
open half-track from second-floor
windowe.
Some bits were registered by Egyptian
Army Sagger teams, flying the ATGMe
down the main street at a range of ab ut
600 meters. When Israeli vehiclee w% e
bit, their crewe jumped out and ran into
nearby buildinge. A large number forced
their way into the police etation and
defended euccesefully until dark when
Egyptian comrnandoe jumped onto the
roof from a nearby building and forced
the Israelis out of the building.
The force that attacked down the
Ismailia-Suez road ran into a number of
ambuehes rather than one large kill zone,
but the effect was the came. About 20
tanks and armored vehiclee were de
stroysd on the Cairo-Suez road and eight
on the Iemailia road. The Ieraelie later
admitted to 88 killed or captured soldiere
and 28 tanks and armored vehicles de-
stroyed in thie attack. Egyptian losses
were very light.
Adsne divieion spent 25 October prob-
ing the perimeter of the city for a week
spot. Apparently, it was looking for an
undefended opening. Ten more tanke
were destroyed, mostly juet outeide the
city. Egyptian artillery support wae par-
ticularly effective. It had not been ueed
at all in the battle on the 24th.
On 28 October, juet prior to the arrival
of UN observers who had been held on
Major Glenn F. Rogers Jr. is S3 of the 2d
Brigade, 3d Armored Division,
West Germany. He received a masters
from Virginia Polytechnic Institute
1979 gmduate
ments
of the USACGSC.
include serving as commander of a
mobih aduiso~ team in Vietnam and as an
operations
Germany.
officer for a tank
1979
BATTLE FOR SUEZ CITY
the Cairo-Suez road by an Ieraeli road-
block, the Ieraeli Defenee Forces tried
one more time to get into Suez, but gave
up when they found that it wae still
defended.
The Ieraeli attacks failed becauee ofi
Poor Ieraeli intelligence on defenees.
No use, of maneuver, no dismounted
infantry. (Tanks led the attack. )
c Poor knowledge of Suez maps, pho-
tographs, reconnaissance.
Good organization of the city by de-
fenders.
QCoordk&tion between Egyptian mil-
itary defenders and militia enhanced
through training, cooperation and unity
of command,
High morale and willingness to stay
and fight among civil militia.
Effective use of weapons by de-
fendereRPG, Hosam, Sagger, Molotov
cocktail.
Excellent epotting for Egyptian
artillery used with reetreint.
Weak Israeli artillery (not much was
on the West Bank, and most of that was
in the north near Ismsilia ).
Israeli air power not used. The Third
Egyptian Armys air defense artillery
umbrella provided partial coverage. Aleo,
the Ieraeli Defense Forcee could not use
air in cloee support becauee they did not
know exactly where their own forces
were.
a
n
in Gelnhausen,
degree
and IS a
His assign-
;:$;:.
battalion in
J+
- .-
,1
33