THE BATTLE OF KOTA BHARU

INTRODUCTION

1. Japanese plans and preparation to invade Malaya has started in late 1940 1. Rigorous

training, using similar terrain was done in Shanghai and South China. Taiwan Army Research

Centre was established to study and practice various courses of action. Detailed planning

and training for amphibious landing was carried out and minutest detail was tie-up to ensure

perfectness. Weather forecast was a "thing" to consider and it did make a great impact on the

surprise factor. The Japanese launched an intense offensive and means of transport was

used to speed up the progress. As part of overall strategy to capture present day South East

Asia, less Indo-China which has already been captured, the Japanese launched offensive at

0025hr on 8th December 1941, spearheaded by 56 Regt under Maj. Gen. H Takumi and

made a landing at Badang and Sabak beaches. Within a matter of about two months,

Japanese captured Malaya and took about 100,000 prisoners. Churchill described it as the

greatest reverse in World War II.2

AIM

2. The aim of this paper is to analyse the Battle of KOTA BHARU at the operational and

tactical level.

SCOPE

3. This paper will cover the following:

a. Japanese plans and preparation.

b. British Plan.

c. Battle of Kota Bharu.

1
Masanobu Tsuji, SINGAPORE, Singapore: Oxford University Press Pte Ltd, 1991, p. 2

2
Chaphekar. S.G.Capt, A Brief Study of the Malayan Campaign, Poona: Yashwant Press, 1960, p.1

1
 d. Analysis and lesson learnt.

e. Conclusion.

f. Recommendation.

JAPANESE PLAN

4. The role of economic embargo imposed by Allied Forces on Japan had made it

necessary for her to achieve self-sufficiency in oil, rubber and tin. The economic pressure

exerted on her forced her to occupy countries of South East Asia, which were the richest

sources in this commodity in the whole of the Far East. The occupying of these territories

would also mean war with USA, Great Britain and the Northlands. In doing so the Japanese

considered four possible variations of the offensive as follows:

a. To capture Java and Sumatra first, then Malaya and lastly Philippines.

b. To capture Philippines followed by Borneo, Java, Sumatra and finally Malaya.

c. To capture Malaya and then Sumatra, Java, Borneo and finally Philippines.

d. To capture Philippines and Malaya simultaneously, then converge in the

South to capture Java and Sumatra.

5. Good intelligence work was one of the chief causes of Japanese success in the initial

stage of the war in the Far East.3 The Japanese had created a highly intricate liaison system

between various intelligence post and organs of espionage in the Malaya Peninsula. 4 In

January 1941, Japanese pilots made covert high attitude photo missions to photograph

coastal sectors, airfields and the point of interest. The pilot flew into Northern Thailand down

the Malaya Peninsular and across the causeway to Singapore. Simultaneously, the Japanese

army pilots photographed bridges, airfields, beach defenses and landing areas along the

North Eastern coast of Malaya.

3
Chaphekar. S.G.Capt, A Brief Study of the Malayan Campaign, Poona: Yashwant Press, 1960, p.83
4

Robertson. Eric, The Japanese File: Pre-War Japanese Penetration in South East Asia, Kuala Lumpur:
Heinemann Asia, 1979, p. 158

2
6. By 20th October 1941, Japanese had finalised their plan to capture Philippines and

Malaya simultaneously. Burma was subsequently added in the list for its oil and rice. 25 th

Army under Lt. Gen. Yamashita was tasked by the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters

to undertake the invasion and occupation of Malaya.

7. The naval landing was planned to be prefaced by bombardment of the beach defence

and an intensive attack against air bases. The Japanese based the landing on meteorological

forecasts wherein moderate wind was predicted on 6th and 7th December and onset of

monsoon was likely to spring up from 8 th onwards, resulting in rough sea conditions. So the

8th of December was the last possible day for the landing.

8. The task of the invasion and conquest of Malaya was entrusted to 25th Japanese

Army under Lt. General Yamashita. 25 th Japanese Army was made up of four divisions; 5 th

Japanese Division, 18th Japanese Division, the Imperial Guards Division and 56th Japanese

Division. Of these 56th Japanese Division did not actually participate in the fighting in Malaya.

5th and 18th Japanese divisions were to initiate the operations. 5 th Japanese Division was to

be divided into two task forces. The first task force, comprising of 9 th Infantry Brigade was to

land at or near Singora and after securing the port and aerodrome, was to advance along the

Singora Alor Star road and reach the west coast. This would cut off communications

between Burma and Malaya. The second task force was to land at or near Patani and

advance down the Patani Kroh road to threaten the right flank of the British forces in Perlis

and Kedah. 5th Japanese Division was given the task of securing the Perak River line and the

aerodromes in Kedah. It was then to advance on to Kuala Lumpur. It was expected to reach

this objective in two weeks time. Its drive was to be re-inforced by the Imperial Guards

Division and the balance of troops of 18 th Japanese Division whose two regiments were to be

used for the landings at Kota Bharu and the invasion of Borneo. 18 th Japanese Division was

to land its 56th Infantry Regiment at Kota Bharu. Its task was to secure the aerodrome and

3
town of Kota Bharu, the aerodrome at Gong Kedah and Machang. The regiment was then to

advance down the coast in the direction of Kuantan on the East Coast.5

JAPANESE PREPARATION

9. At the initial stage, the 5th Division began amphibious training near Shanghai in mid-

October 1940. In early December, three other divisions in South China started training for

tropical warfare and in particular for landing operations. A few weeks later, the Taiwan Army

Research Section was established at Taipei, Farmosa to undertake detailed examination of

the southern area and its problems. In March 1941, selected Army Staff Officers began

amphibious training.

10. The 5th Division crossed the East China Sea from Shanghai in the face of a simulated

enemy ground and naval attack. The division which was escorted by the over surface and

Army Air Units made an assault landing on the shore of Rymhn and went through the motions

of capturing local coastal defences. The two exercises were in conformity with terrain for an

assault on Singapore, after a landing on the Malayan Peninsular.

11. A second exercise was held in June in South China. The aim of the exercise was to

practise landing of the reinforcement Infantry battalion on Hainan Island. The landing site at

Hainan approximately equaled the distance from the proposed landing sites on in Singapore,

across the Straight of Johore.

12. Based on the future requirement, the Army section issued a broad training directive in

August 1941 for the Malayan Environment Campaign. The aim of the training was to enable

the troops to adjust themselves to tropical surroundings, to overcome the hardship in under

developed land and long engagement in combat. The focus was on small units exercises,

5
Chaphekar. S.G.Capt, A Brief Study of the Malayan Campaign, Poona: Yashwant Press, 1960, p.34-35

4
usually two or three infantry battalions supported by a battalion of artillery, two or three tank

companies and one or two engineer companies.

BRITISH PLAN

13. The Defence Plan of Malaya. The plan for the defence of Malaya was conceived in

1937 by Gen. Percival. Based on his appreciation, the enemy was expected to seize airfields

in Southern Thailand and Kelantan as a preliminary to the capture of Singapore. The

appreciated force level was one Japanese Division through Thailand and a seaborne attack

by up to two divisions anywhere along the coast North of Kota Bharu. Hence, the defence of

Northern Malaya was very important and in order to deny the enemy from using the airfields

in Southern Thailand, it was necessary to hold ground in Singora and Patani and also to

forestall the Japanese Thai territory. 6

14. The security of the airfields of the East Coast of Malaya was important. An advance

into South Thailand was a good option which would benefit the Allied Forces to control the

airfields in Southern Thailand and also to block the enemy advance height from the beaches

instead of letting them land unopposed. There are three routes leading from South Thailand

into Malaya:

a. The main road from Singora via Haadyai into Kedah.

b. The road from Patani via Yala to Kroh in North Perak.

c. A coastal road from Patani via Kota Bharu to the south.

15. PLAN MATADOR. It was the nickname given by the British for the advancement of

own troops into Southern Thailand (Singora). After months of deliberation on the possibility of

6
Percival. A.E. Lt. Gen., The War in Malaya, New Delhi: Sagar Publications, 1971, p.46

5
occupying part of the Isthmus of Kra, the plan was finally approved in August 1941. The time

factors, then the question of violation of Thai territory and then the problem of finding

sufficient force for the operation. To hold Singora and seaborne attack, specially trained

troops were needed for the topographical condition. It involved rapid advance by road and

rail.

16. The British had an alternative plan in case Plan MATADOR did not materialise, that

which consisted of three-prong assault. Force known as KROCOL BASED IN Kroh was to

advance to a position known as THE LEDGE some 46 to 64 km beyond the frontier. Another

force known as LAYCOL was to advance along Changloon road towards Ban Sadao, 13 km

beyond the frontier on the way to Singora, together with; a manned armoured train was to

enter Thailand from Padang Besar.

17. As far as Plan MATADOR was concerned it was not implemented mainly due to the

following reasons:

a. Poor appreciation on time and space.

b. Indecisiveness of commanders as the inadequacy of troops had forced dual

tasking on frontline troops.7

c. Bad weather.

d. Complacency of British.

e. Poor communication.

18. Defence of Kelantan. Gen. A.E. Percival placed the entire defence of Kelantan under

the 8th Indian Brigade commanded by Brig Gen. Key. The Brigade front consisted of six

7
Percival. A.E. Lt. Gen., The War in Malaya, New Delhi: Sagar Publications, 1971, p.44-45

6
beaches each of approximately five mile front. Apart from that, the 1 st Hydrabad and the 1st

Mysore State Infantry guarded three airfields namely Kota Bharu, Gong Kedak and Machang.

The main task was to guard these airfields so that the Allied Forces could use them. One the

other hand it was also for the purpose to deny them to the enemy. This was a difficult task for

the Brigade Commander in view of the limited force available to him.

19. There were two concepts, which could be adopted for the defence:

a. To keep the beaches under surveillance with minimal troops and to keep the

main force concentrated further back so as to fight on prepared position astride the

road communications.

b. To hold the beaches at the most likely landing places in strength so as to hit

the enemy when he was most vulnerable and where it would be easiest to combine

the action of the three services.

20. The C-in-C decided the later course of action. The GOC then ordered the Brigade

Commander to execute the defence and to keep the reserve on the main road, which ran

from Kota Bharu to Kuala Krai where the main reserves of supplies and stores were kept and

held.

21. It was assessed that the most likely point of attack was immediately North East of

Kota Bharu airfield as this point of landing would be as possible to the objective. Thus, one

battalion was given a beach with a stretch of nine miles and the second battalion a beach

with a stretch of 26 miles to cover for the defence. The other two battalions were retained as

reserves.

22. The defences along the beach consisted of pillboxes and few obstacles. Preparation

and training for MATADOR interfered in troops preparation of defences. There was no money

7
for civil labour and mechanical diggers bogged down due to monsoon, resulting in incomplete

defences.8 Majorities of the pillboxes were not manned and were merely dummies. No

attempts were ever made to test the defences. As for the air offensive air support of the

defence, it only consisted of the ten Hudsons from the 1 st Squadron stationed at Kota Bharu

airfield.

23. The force level allocated for the defence of Kota Bharu was the 8 th Indian Brigade,

which comprised of:

a. Brigade HQ }

b. 2/12th Frontier Forces Regiment }

c. 1/13th Frontier Forces Regiment } At Kota Bharu

d. 73rd Field Battery }

e. 3/17th Dogras } Guarding the Coast of Sabak

f. 21st Mountain Battery } Coast of Bachok/Besut

g. 2/10th Baluch }

BATTLE OF KOTA BHARU

THE BATTLE SITUATION

24. On 5th December 1941 C-in-C Far East approved the implementation of Plan

MATADOR, under following circumstances;

a. If sufficient information about Japanese landing in South Thailand, was

received and / or;

8
Percival. A.E. Lt. Gen., The War in Malaya, New Delhi: Sagar Publications, 1971, p.46

8
 b. If there was any Japanese violation of entry into Thailand.

25. On 6th December 1941 at 1130 hrs air reconnaissance in the area of the Gulf of

Thailand, reported having sighted two Japanese convoys consisting of warship and transport

ships, located about eighty miles off point Camo, south of Indochina. One convoy consisted

of twenty 10,000 ton ships, supported by one battleship, five cruisers and seven destroyers.

26. At 1600 hrs on the same day the British sent out two Hudsons reconnaissance aircraft

to shadow the Japanese convoys but failed to make contact due to bad weather. On 7th

December two Hudson aircraft were again sent to the same area for reconnaissance but only

managed to sight a local merchant vessel in Gulf of Thailand. Certainly the Japanese made

full use of visibility due to bad weather, to move closer to Kota Bharu. The lack of

reconnaissance aircraft to cover the entire area properly was also another factor for the

failure in locating the Japanese convoy.

27. Shortly before midnight on 7th December 1941, three transport ships namely

Awagisan Maru, Ayatason Maru and Sakura Maru appeared off the coast of Kota Bharu. Five

Japanese battleships escorting the transport vassels immediately started shelling the British

beach defences partly to soften the targets. The first landing took place at the junction of the

Badang and Sabak beaches at about 0025 hrs on 8th December 1941 by 56th (TAKUMI

Regiment) under the covering fire of five Japanese battleships.

28. This Japanese regiment was supported by the following units:

a. One Battery of the 18th Mountain Arty Regiment.

b. Two Quick Firing Guns.

c. One Independent Battery of Anti Aircraft Gun.

d. One Company of 12th Engineer Regiment.

9
 e. One section of Medical and Sanitation Unit.

f. One section of Signal Unit.

g. One Field Hospital.

29. Bombardment of the coast between Sabak and Badang by Japanese naval guns was

the signal for the commencement of the landing. To repulse the Japanese landing, the 73rd

Field Artillery engaged them along with the Dogras who were manning the pillboxes along the

beaches. The Dogras fought bravely but it was not long before the Japanese got control of

the beaches by 0100 hrs.

30. The Allied Airforce that consisted of small strength of Hudson and Vildebeeste also

joined in the fight for the defence of Kota Bharu. The Allied bombers and fighters achieved

minimal victories by successfully setting ablaze two Japanese ships. Overall, the Allied

airforce was helpless because the Japanese airforce simultaneously crippled most of the

aerodrome in Northern Malaya on the same night.

THE COUNTER ATTACK

31. Heavy fighting continued on the beach and the Japanese managed to make their first

narrow breach in the beach defences and began to widen it by fanning out along and in the

rear of the beaches. With this Japanese victory, the Kota Bharu airfield which was

approximately 1 miles away, was threatened. Brig. Gen. Key, decided to reinforce the

defence of the airfield and dispatched 2/12th Frontier Force Regiment (less one Coy ) and the

73rd Field Battery for this purpose. The Japanese pushed southward and gradually extended

their foothold. The counter attack by 1/13th Frontier Force Rifles and the coy of 2/12th Frontier

Force Regiment on the enemy position between Sabak and Badang failed due to the difficult

terrain and because the Japanese were already in a good defensive position. The Japanese

continued to push southward with their aircrafts carrying out strike on the air fields causing

heavy damage to the British aircrafts. As a result, the British decided to abandon Kota Bharu

10
airfield. On 8th December 1941, serviceable aircrafts and crew were withdrawn to Kuantan.

With this withdrawal, the Japanese had achieved air superiority in the northeastern part of

Malaya.

END OF THE BATTLE

32. Brig. Gen. Key received permission from Gen. Berstow ( 8 th Indian Div) to withdraw, if

necessary. By noon on 9th December 1941, the 8th Brigade was withdrawn to the general line

of Peringat Mulong. The 1/13 Frontier Force Rifles took up positions south of Peringat, 2/12 th

Frontier Regiment at Mulong and 3/17th Dogras was kept as reserve. The 4/19th Hyderabad

was well at the rear around Ketereh. These positions were not held for long because the

Japanese, superior in numbers, kept on pushing southwards and the British had to withdraw

further South to Chondong during the night of 9th December. Many troops, including officers,

previously missing as a result of the initial attack, rejoined their units. This included the

Commanding Officer of 2/12th Frontier Force Regiment.

33. The 2/10th Baluch, which was deployed along the Eastern beaches, was also

withdrawn and occupied new positions at Peringat. On receiving the report of Japanese

landing at Besut, a hasty decision was made to withdraw whatever aircrafts and crews were

left at the nearby airfields of Gong Kodak and Machang. In the rush to leave the airfields, the

runways at both airfields and equipments were left intact. The withdrawal, besides creating

confusion in some sectors, gave an opportunity to the ground forces, involved in the first

assault, to reconsolidate.

34. By 10th December, units were reorganised. More stragglers joined their units and by

the fall of night the three battalions, which were involved in the fighting, managed to collect

their manpower and brought their strength to about 600 each. As the Japanese pushed

southwards, it was found necessary to destroy bridges to delay the enemys advance. One of

11
the bridges destroyed was the Guillemard Bridge over the Kelantan River. It was evident from

the momentum that the Japanese was using fresh troops.

35. By 11th December, the British were holding ground at Machang. As the situation

became worse, the British had to consider whether to withdraw completely from Kelantan or

otherwise. Some of the factors involved were possible loss of materials and equipment, the

effect on morale of troops and most important of all then were the vulnerability of the lines of

communications and the need to concentrate the forces to meet the threat on the West

Coast.

36. Lt. Gen. A E Percival submitted his recommendation to the C-in-C to withdraw all the

forces from Kelantan and it was approved. The transport was made available and the

withdrawal started.

37. After a few days, stores and equipment were evacuated. The 4/19 th Hydrabads was

the first unit to be pulled out to join her parent brigade. Machang was attacked by the

Japanese on 12th December and was resisted by 2/10th Baluch. Further to the West, the

airfield at Tanah Merah was captured.

38. The British forces who could not defend any longer, decided to withdraw from its last

location at Machang to a railhead at Kuala Krai and the to a new position in Lipis-Jerantut. A

rear guard under Lt Col Mackeller, known as Macforce, which comprised of the Pahang

Volunteer Force and the Malay Regt Company was left behind to prevent the Japanese from

carrying out immediate repair to the railway bridge at Kuala Krai. They carried out a

commendable job. On 22nd December, the 8th Indian Infantry Bde completes its withdrawal

from Kelantan.

12
THE RESULT OF THE BATTLE

38. The casualties on both sides were comparatively heavy. By the time the British

withdrew from Kelantan, the statistic on casualties on both sides were as follows: 9

a. Japanese Casualties (Estimated by the Japanese)

(1) KIA 320 men.

(2) WIA 538 men.

(3) Missing Not known.

b. British Casualties

(1) KIA,WIA and Missing } Unknown

(2) 27 pieces field guns }

(3) 73 heavy and light machine gun }

(4) 7 aircrafts }

(5) 157 various tubes of vehicles }

(6) 33 railway wagons }

39. Inspire of being ill trained, the British forces defended the ground very bravely and

held to it with determination. Though the British were outnumbered in most fields, courage

and determination made them stand for as long as they possibly could. With limited air

support available to the British troops the Japanese had air superiority compared to the

British. This was a major setback to the British defence. It was a clear indication as to what

9
Masanobu Tsuji, SINGAPORE, Singapore: Oxford University Press Pte Ltd, 1991, p. 96

13
might have happened if the RAF had been reinforced by 336 aircrafts promised to them by

the end of 1941. It might well have destroyed the Japanese invasion fleet or at least a good

portion of them, to tip the scale in favour of the defender.

40. Along with the superiority in manpower and equipment, the Japanese were

aggressive and determined. They also took advantage of their similarity in physical features

with the locals by disguising as locals to penetrate through the British defence and on

occasions caught the British by surprise. During withdrawal, the British left all their runways,

equipment, logistic facilities and bombs at the airfields intact, which gave the Japanese

tactical advantage. Whatever was the result of the landing in Kelantan, the Japanese

admitted that it was one of the most violent actions in the Malayan Campaign.

ANALYSE OF THE BATTLE AND LESSON LEARNT

One must not go to war before one is familiar with the countrys topography;
the mountain, forest, obstacles, lakes, river, etc
Sun Tzu

41. Initial Training and Preparation. Training of troops in case of opposing forces

showed a marked difference and ultimately led to the victory of the better-trained force. The

British had given priority to the Middle East and Iraq, which was at the cost of South East

Asia. Most of the Indian and Australian units sent to Malaya were composed largely of young

soldiers wherein many of them had just completed their recruit training, Most of the British

officers of these units were newly-commissioned and lacked experience. These units had

never been tested in major exercises and they did not have adequate training in a terrain

similar to the area of operation. As a result of inadequate training, the commanders planning

and capability of the troops could not match. This mismatch resulted in frequent change of

plans.10

10
E.G.K.,Malaya 1941-42, Melbourne: 1961, p.52

14
42. On the other hand, the Japanese emphasized on realistic training, which was

conducted in Indochina. Their focus of their training included, acclimatizing the troops to the

tropical environment of Malaya. They were familiarized with various types of terrain to include

mountainous, jungle and swamps. Troops were conditioned to live off the land and extensive

training on survival was carried out. They rehearsed on the similar terrain and carried out a

number of exercises involving amphibious landing.11

43. Intelligence. The Japanese totally out manoeuvred the British in this aspect.

Whereas the Japanese started their intelligence network years in advance and obtained all

the required details, the British could not even discover the movement of opposite force well

prior to landing. The British outside intelligence were mainly dependent upon the Far East

Combined Bureau which was under the control of the naval C-in-C. Within Malaya the

intelligence mostly came from the Civil Police Intelligence Branch.12

44. As per Sun Tzu, there are five classes of spies, namely locals, insiders, covert, deadly

and secure. The Japanese successfully applied local and secure spies. Local spies were

those who were living in the enemys country and employed as suppliers of reliable

information.13

45. Japanese intelligence agents infiltrated and mingled in the Malayan environment as

early as 1930s.14 They were mainly retired soldiers from the Sino-Japanese and Russo-

Japanese war who establish themselves as businessmen, photographers, barber etc.

Japanese estates located at South Johore, astride the strategically important road to

11
Masanobu Tsuji, SINGAPORE, Singapore: Oxford University Press Pte Ltd, 1991, p. 46

12
Percival. A.E. Lt. Gen., The War in Malaya, New Delhi: Sagar Publications, 1971, p.62
13
Tsai Chih Chung, The Art of War, Singapore: Asiapac, 1987, p 121

14
Percival. A.E. Lt. Gen., The War in Malaya, New Delhi: Sagar Publications, 1971, p.41

15
Singapore, were used as landing points by the Japanese. 15 This was coupled by real

time intelligence gathering using aerial photography.16

46. Morale. State of morale of the opposing forces was a reflection of their training and

preparedness for war. Leadership and training were the main factors that effected morale.

The reinforcements from the Australian and the Indian Army that came to Malaya were poorly

trained and ill equipped. Malaya, from the point of view of the British in 1941, was at a low

priority. As such most of the well trained officers and units were sent to more active theatre in

Africa and the Middle East.17

47. The defence of Malaya was based on or around a number of important aerodromes.

The British Army was distributed in small units instead of being employed for battle

manoeuvres. In order to conserve itself for the worse situation, the Air Force and Army

personnel on hearing rumours that the enemy had broken through and advancing towards

the air field, decided to withdraw without authority and failed to destroy infrastructure, run-

way and the stocks of bombs and petrol.18

48. On the other hand, when United States and Britain exerted economic pressure, Japan
realised that they had to prepare for war against them. In anticipation a research unit known
as DORO NAWA was formed in 1941. This unit was tasked to conduct research and gather
intelligence on tropical warfare, which resulted in the production of pamphlet on fighting in
tropical climate.19 As a result, the troops were well trained and equipped with the knowledge
of tropical environment, which was a source of encouragement and high morale.

15
Robertson. Eric, The Japanese File: Pre-War Japanese Penetration in South East Asia, Kuala Lumpur:
Heinemann Asia, 1979, p.23-28

16
Masanobu Tsuji, SINGAPORE, Singapore: Oxford University Press Pte Ltd, 1991, p. 49

17
E.G.K.,Malaya 1941-42, Melbourne: 1961, p.52

18
Chaphekar. S.G.Capt, A Brief Study of the Malayan Campaign, Poona: Yashwant Press, 1960, p.37

19
Masanobu Tsuji, SINGAPORE, Singapore: Oxford University Press Pte Ltd, 1991, p.13

16
49. Priority and Co-operation. Malaya was important to the British only because of her
raw material and economic strength and as such defence of Malaya was last priority to the
British Government when it was undergoing odds at critical fronts. Within Malaya there was a
clash of interest between the military and the civilians. The military obviously placed defence
requirement on top, where as the civil authorities were more concerned on the political and
economic aspects. This lack of mutual understanding towards each others viewpoint further
hindered in the planning for defence of Malaya. This resulted in undue delay by the C-in-C in
making decision on the OPERATION MATADOR. This operation would have almost certainly
meant war with Japan and since it was against the British governments policy to avoid, war if
possible, critical military decisions were delayed.20

50. There was a problem of inter-service co-operation. The Army and the Air Force had
different view on the defence of Singapore. The Army was more interested in Johore area
and accordingly most of the defence preparations were concentrated in Singapore and south
of Johore. On the other hand, the Air Force was seeking to increase the range of its aircraft
seawards.21 The Army and the Air Force were not able to carry out their task effectively due to
lack of co-operation.

51. On the other hand, Gen. Tojo, the Japanese Minister of War announced that the war
against Britain and America would be brought to a conclusion as rapidly as possible by co-
ordination of political and military strategy. The serious concern by their minister boosted the
soldier morale and their will to fight for their country.22

52. Command and Control. Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke Popham was appointed
as the C-in-C of Far East located in Singapore. He was responsible directly to the Chief of
Staff for the operational control and training of all British Army and Air Force in Malaya,
Burma and Hong Kong. This also included the coordination of defence plans of those
territories. However, he was not responsible for the Naval Forces. He dealt primarily with
major military policies and strategy. Matters pertaining to administration and finance were
exercised by the GOCs of Malaya, Burma and Hong Kong and the AOC Far East, all of
whom came under the C-in-C. These officers corresponded direct with the War office, Air
Ministry, Colonial office and Burma office and kept the C-in-C informed as and when
required.23
20
Percival. A.E. Lt. Gen., The War in Malaya, New Delhi: Sagar Publications, 1971, p.101

21
E.G.K.,Malaya 1941-42, Melbourne: 1961, p.42

22
Masanobu Tsuji, SINGAPORE, Singapore: Oxford University Press Pte Ltd, 1991, p.22
23
Percival. A.E. Lt. Gen., The War in Malaya, New Delhi: Sagar Publications, 1971, p.17

17
53. Lt. Gen. Percival had no authority over the Australia Imperial Force. Even though
Maj. Gen. Gordon Bennet agreed to the use of his troops, yet he still preferred them to
remain as a complete force. Due to non-centralization of command and control at the highest
level, decisions had to wait approval from England. Moreover, consultation with the Australian
Government was necessary in events where the Australia Imperial Force was involved.24

54. Concentration of Force. The events in Europe the Middle East compelled Britain in
a manner that the force level recommended by the C-in-C Far East were not fully met for
both Army and the Air Force. As for the Navy, the reinforcement were planned from the
Mediterranean Fleet which would only be dispatched on commencement of war.

55. Prior of the war, they had planned to start an offensive on a large scale and a very
large force was to be sent to Malaya. But, of this large force only the hospital and elements of
ambulances arrived in Malaya. The combatant troops were sent elsewhere through oversight.
One mechanized unit was sent to Malaya without their tanks and an artillery regiment found
that their guns had been sent to Burma.25 As a result, the force level required to defend
Malaya was inadequate. The Army was widely dispersed throughout the country and no
concentration of force was achieved at the landing and break though points.

56. Speed and Deception. As per Sun Tzu, speed is the crucial in warfare. Attack when
the opponent is not prepared.26 During the invasion, British did not expect the Japanese to
use the rough seas during the northeast Monsoon. Landing during the rough weather not
only concealed their movement by the sea but also forced the British to disperse their troops.
The landing was followed by advance to south on three axis in order to put the British off
balance.

57. The British appreciated that the terrain of Malaya is generally untankable. They were
taken by surprise on seeing the Japanese offensive being spearheaded by medium and light
tank. Although contingencies had been adopted to deal with the tank threat by making anti-

24
Ibid.p.23
25
Chaphekar. S.G.Capt, A Brief Study of the Malayan Campaign, Poona: Yashwant Press, 1960, p.27

26
Tsai Chih Chung, The Art of War, Singapore: Asiapac, 1987, p.108

18
tank weapons available, there were no thought given to induct tanks, which is the most
effective anti tank weapon.

58. Air Superiority. Douhet mentioned in his theory that aircrafts are instruments of
offense of incomparable potentialities, against which no effective defence can be foreseen.
Air support was to play a large part in the initial plan, thus achieving air superiority towards
further advance into Malaya. The air plan also involved securing of air bases initially in Indo
China and later in Malaya, as the invasion progressed. By doing so, the ground troops were
assured of air cover throughout. The Japanese enjoyed air superiority, which enabled them
to enhance their speed and momentum of advance with little interference from the Royal Air
Force. The sinking of the Repulse and The Prince of Wales was an example of their
achievement.27

59. On the second day, only 50 of the 110 aircraft, based in Northern Malaya, were fit for
operations and practically ceased to support ground operations. By the end of the day, all
British aircraft had been withdrawn from forward airfields and it ensured Japanese air
superiority over the whole of the forward area.28

60. Devolution of Command. Devolution of command was one of the secrets of

Japanese success. Larger formations were given definite objectives but its attainment was
left to the commander by using means of their liking. This devolution was carried right down
to the platoon level and gave full scope to the junior commanders to use their initiative. These
threats to the British rear and flanks; forced them to retire continuously and wore down their
morale.29

61. Flexibility and Maintenance of Momentum. These two principles were amply
demonstrated when Japanese force used organic and local transport to get to their
objectives. All officers and men who did not ride with the trucks were provided with
bicycles.30 The use of engineers ahead of the tanks to repair or built bridges and beach other
obstacles also helped to maintain the momentum of advance.

27
Chaphekar. S.G.Capt, A Brief Study of the Malayan Campaign, Poona: Yashwant Press, 1960, p.115

28
E.G.K.,Malaya 1941-42, Melbourne: 1961, p.68

29
Chaphekar. S.G.Capt, A Brief Study of the Malayan Campaign, Poona: Yashwant Press, 1960, p.91-92

30
Masanobu Tsuji, SINGAPORE, Singapore: Oxford University Press Pte Ltd, 1991, p.183

19
62. Flexibility was exercised in varied forms. The Japanese avoided frontal attacks and
resorted to flanking manoeuvres leading through swamps and difficult terrain or resulted in
night attacks when the opposition was too strong for frontal attacks.

63. Underestimation of the Enemy. The Japanese were considered to be soft and an
easy enemy to be defeated. Reports of the Japanese soldiers inefficiency originating from
China were accepted bluntly. However, the accurate reports received from the British
Attach in Tokyo were ignored. The general opinion was that, there were little to fear even if
the Japanese came. The British underestimated the Japanese too much.

64. Political Implication. Plan MATADOR was conceived to forestall the Japanese
advance into Malaya at Singora. The plan appeared logical based on force level and the
terrain in South Thailand. However it had several weaknesses. Firstly, it lacked air support
for the ground forces and secondly the attachment of political conditions to the execution of
the plan. It is a lesson that if such a plan were to succeed, political implications must first be
solved and decided at the highest level and as early as possible. This was to ensure that the
military commander responsible for such an operation could concentrate on military aspects
only.

65. Selection and Sitting of the Defence Area. The defence of Kota Bharu was
basically a linear defence along the beaches, without much depth, with each group manning
the pillboxes. This is very much against the principle of defence. As a result when the
Japanese broke through the forward defensive position, they were able to push through quite
easily and rapidly.

66. War Equipment and Stores. The British equipment and logistics support was
heavier. They had British, Indian and Australian troops, wherein each of them not only had a
separate ration scale, but they consumed altogether different articles of food. 31 Crucial items
such as weapons, ammunition, petrol, vehicle, boats and rations were mostly left behind
intact by the retreating British forces. This tremendously helped the Japanese forces in
replenishing themselves and added to their momentum.
67. Counter Attack. 8th Indian Brigade conducted two counter attacks but both were a

failure. The difficulty in maneuvering the reserve due to creeks, lagoons and swamps was the

main reason. Proper planning and coordination are at the defenders initiative, but they fail to

use it at their advantage; specially the knowledge about own terrain.

31
Chaphekar. S.G.Capt, A Brief Study of the Malayan Campaign, Poona: Yashwant Press, 1960, p.94

20
68. Use of Armour. The Japanese proved that armour could be manouevred across the

Malayan terrain. From the first week of war the Japanese using tanks in the flat country. The

tank enabled them to advance more rapidly.32 This was the decisive factor to their victory. The

British were caught off balanced without coordinated anti armour defensive layout.

CONCLUSION

69. The loss of Malaya and Singapore to Japan in 1942 was described as the worst

disaster and largest capitulation in British history. Singapore is mentioned here is because of

its strategic importance coupled with the geographical importance of the Straits of Malacca

as the gateway from the Pacific to Atlantic, as this strait passes the direct trade route

between the present South East Asia, Australia and Europe.

70. The strategic plan shows that the Japanese had prepared them adequately before the

invasion. The tactical commanders had come up with elaborate plan up to the minutest

details, which included detail of population, terrain, weather and also the capability and

weaknesses of the enemy defence. Armed with all the detail and intelligence, the Japanese

came up with an immaculate invasion plan.

71. The defence of the Northern Malaya was important to the British in order to provide

depth for security of Singapore. Deployment of troops to defend the forward air bases of

Kedah, Kelantan and Pahang was carried out with a view to avoid Japanese from capturing

these airfield and subsequently using as forward bases for capture of Singapore. However,

the defences were untenable as they were not fully prepared and were thinly held. The

ground situation forced them to conduct a retrograde battle along successive delaying

positions along the way to Singapore. The weaknesses of the British defence allowed the
32
Chaphekar. S.G.Capt, A Brief Study of the Malayan Campaign, Poona: Yashwant Press, 1960, p.94

21
Japanese to complete their mission of capturing Singapore about 40 days earlier than the

planned 100 days.

72. The operation in the north east of Malaya involved the 8 th Indian Brigade with four-

infantry battalion, two batteries of gun and other supporting units. In Kota Bharu 3/17 th

Dogras organised the defence of the airfields by deploying all the way from Sabak beach up

to the airfield. Due to the aggressive amphibious landing by the TAKUMI detachment of 23 rd

Inf. Bde from 25th Army with 5,300 men on the midnight on 8 th December 1941 the defenders

were unable to withstand, resulting in withdrawal to Peringat-Mulong line on 8 th December

1941 after a number of unsuccessful counter attacks. Within four days, Gen. Key was forced

to abandon Kelantan and withdraw to Kuala Lipis.

73. With this; Maj. Gen. TAKUMI achieved his first mission to capture the airfield in Kota

Bharu, which was left vacant by British on the evening of 8 th December 1941. The whole of

Kelantan was abandoned by British by 22nd December 1941.

74. The success of Gen. TAKUMI through his group landing in Kota Bharu on 8 th

December 1941 can be attributed to the following:

a. A very near perfect and detailed plan backed by thorough preparation.

b. The morale of commanders and troops was very high coupled with courage

and dogged determination.

c. The landing operations were well coordinated with the support of the Air

Force and Navy.

d. The dates selected by Gen. TAKUMI, with the factor of weather in mind,

surprised the British.

22
 RECOMMENDATION

75. The deployments of the British force in the Malaya bring out a number of good

lessons and experience from the past. Plan MATADOR was adopted by Gen. Percival to

prevent Malaya from any intervention. This plan emphasized the importance of extending

defences beyond the northern borders with sufficient naval and air power to safeguard the

interest in the Exclusive Economic Zone. To ensure the security of coastal area, there is a

requirement of layered defences on beach rather then a single liner defence, which is easy to

be penetrated.

76. We must understand the British rationale and attitude at that time. Whatever

battle they fought overseas was a sequence of stages in their forward defence of

their homeland. If Malaya fell, they could fall back to Burma and then retreat to India.

With that situation a plan to reinforce in capturing back the lost territory would be

definite. The idea of the British in transferring conflict away from her territories is one

of the good contemporary concepts, as well as in the planning of our national future

defence.

77. The East Coast of Peninsular Malaysia can be characterised as follows:

a. Amphibious landing can be effected all along the coast from Tumpat in

the north of Kelantan to the south.

b. The airfield at Kota Bharu, Gong Kedak and Kuala Terengganu have good

road accesses to Kuala Lumpur and further south, thus facilitating movement of

troops and supplies.

23
 c. There are key installations along the coast as Microwave Station in Kota

Bharu and Kuantan, Earth Stellite in Beserah, Kuantan and the Seacomm Station at

Cherating. They could all be targets for enemy actions to cause panic and confusion.

78. In order to avoid any military intervention toward our territory, it is recommended that

the coastal defence is not only the responsibility of the Army but the Air Force and Navy; and

also include all the government agencies and the other private organizations as part of ears

and eyes. With these, all information on whatever threat can be relayed fast to the

responsible authority for future actions.

79. In coastal defence, the Navy is to provide a long-range surveillance and a strong

strike force against the enemy threat. On the other hand a regular marine patrol along the

coastline including the Exclusive Economic Zone should be enhanced.

80. The Air Force should also have maritime capabilities to conduct a regular air

observation around the clock. By doing this, it can also provide the depth towards our

surveillance system. Apart from that, the Air Force can be deployed as a quick deployment in

engaging the enemy target and any seaborne threat to our land.

81. Finally it is proposed that a detail study be made to consider these recommendations.

24