LILIUS vs MANILA RAILROAD
semaphore or sign at the crossing. The diligence of a good father of a family,
FACTS:
> Plaintiff Aleko E. Lilius has, for many years, been a well-known and reputed
journalist, author and photographer. At the time of the collision in question, he
was a staff correspondent in the Far East of the magazines The American
Weekly of New York and The Sphere of London.
> Plaintiff, his wife Sonja Maria Lilius, and his 4-year old daughter Brita Marianne
Lilius, left Manila in their Studebaker car driven by the said plaintiff Aleko E.
Lilius on a sight-seeing trip. Where the road was clear and unobstructed, the
plaintiff drove at the rate of from 19 to 25 miles an hour. He was entirely
unacquainted with the conditions of the road at said points and had no
knowledge of the existence of a railroad crossing at Dayap. Before reaching the
crossing in question, there was nothing to indicate its existence and inasmuch
as there were many houses, shrubs and trees along the road, it was impossible
to see an approaching train. The locomotive struck the plaintiff's car right in the
center. After dragging the said car a distance his wife and daughter were
thrown from the car and were picked up from the ground unconscious and
seriously hurt.
> As a result of the accident, the said plaintiff was highly nervous and very easily
irritated, and for several months he had great difficulty in concentrating his
attention on any matter and could not write articles nor short stories for the
newspapers and magazines to which he was a contributor, thus losing for some
time his only means of livelihood.
> Prior to the accident, there had been no notice nor sign of the existence of the
crossing, nor was there anybody to warn the public of approaching trains.
> Upon examination of the oral as well as of the documentary evidence which
the parties presented at the trial - court is of the opinion that the accident was
due to negligence on the part of the defendant-appellant company, for not
having had on that occasion any semaphore at the crossing at Dayap, to serve
as a warning to passers-by of its existence in order that they might take the
necessary precautions before crossing the railroad; and, on the part of its
employees the flagman and switchman, for not having remained at his post at
the crossing in question to warn passers-by of the approaching train;
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent is negligent?
RULING:
YES. Although it is probable that the defendant-appellant entity
employed the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting its aforesaid
employees, however, it did not employ such diligence in supervising their work
and the discharge of their duties because, otherwise, it would have had a
which the law requires in order to avoid damage, is not confined to the careful
and prudent selection of subordinates or employees but includes inspection of
their work and supervision of the discharge of their duties.
However, in order that a victim of an accident may recover indemnity for
damages from the person liable therefor, it is not enough that the latter has been
guilty of negligence, but it is also necessary that the said victim has not, through
his own negligence, contributed to the accident, inasmuch as nobody is a
guarantor of his neighbor's personal safety and property, but everybody should
look after them, employing the care and diligence that a good father of a family
should apply to his own person, to the members of his family and to his property,
in order to avoid any damage. It appears that the herein plaintiff-appellant Aleko
E. Lilius took all precautions which his skill and the presence of his wife and
child suggested to him in order that his pleasure trip might be enjoyable and
have a happy ending, driving his car at a speed which prudence demanded
according to the circumstances and conditions of the road, slackening his speed
in the face of an obstacle and blowing his horn upon seeing persons on the
road, in order to warn them of his approach and request them to get out of the
way, as he did when he came upon the truck parked on the left hand side of the
road seven or eight meters from the place where the accident occurred, and
upon the persons who appeared to have alighted from the said truck. If he failed
to stop, look and listen before going over the crossing, in spite of the fact that he
was driving at 12 miles per hour after having been free from obstacles, it was
because, his attention having been occupied in attempting to go ahead, he did
not see the crossing in question, nor anything, nor anybody indicating its
existence, as he knew nothing about it beforehand. The first and only warning,
which he received of the impending danger, was two short blows from the
whistle of the locomotive immediately preceding the collision and when the
accident had already become inevitable.
In view of the foregoing considerations, this court is of the opinion that the
defendant the Manila Railroad Company alone is liable for the accident by
reason of its own negligence and that of its employees, for not having employed
the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of the said
employees in the discharge of their duties.
1

UMALI vs BACANI
FACTS:
> A storm with strong rain hit the Municipality of Alcala Pangasinan -
transmission line of the Alcala Electric Plant were blown down and fell on the
electric wire. As a result, the live electric wire was cut, one end of which was left
hanging on the electric post and the other fell to the ground under the fallen
banana plants.
> Barrio captain who was passing by saw the broken electric wire and so he
warned the people in the place not to go near the wire for they might get hurt. A
laborer of the Alcala Electric Plant near the place and notified him right then and
there of the broken line and asked him to fix it, but the latter told the barrio
captain that he could not do it but that he was going to look for the lineman to fix
it.
> A small boy of 3 years and 8 months old by the name of Manuel P. Saynes,
whose house is just on the opposite side of the road, went to the place where
the broken line wire was and got in contact with it. The boy was electrocuted and
he subsequently died. It was only after the electrocution of Manuel Saynes that
the broken wire was fixed.
> Petitioner claims that he could not be liable under the concept of quasi-delict
or tort as owner and manager of the Alcala Electric Plant because the proximate
cause of the boy's death electrocution could not be due to any negligence on his
part, but rather to a fortuitous event-the storm that caused the banana plants to
fall and cut the electric line-pointing out the absence of negligence on the part of
his employee Cipriano Baldomero who tried to have the line repaired and the
presence of negligence of the parents of the child in allowing him to leave his
house during that time.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant is liable?
RULING:
YES. Series of negligence on the part of defendants' employees in the
Alcala Electric Plant resulted in the death of the victim by electrocution. First, by
the very evidence of the defendant, there were big and tall banana plants at the
place of the incident standing on an elevated ground which were high and which
were higher than the electric post supporting the electric line, and yet the
employees of the defendant who, with ordinary foresight, could have easily seen
that even in case of moderate winds the electric line would be endangered by
banana plants being blown down, did not even take the necessary precaution to
eliminate that source of danger to the electric line. Second, even after the
employees of the Alcala Electric Plant were already aware of the possible
damage the storm, they did not cut off from the plant the flow of electricity along
the lines. Third, employee Cipriano Baldomero was negligent on the morning of
the incident because even if he was already made aware of the live cut wire, he
did not have the foresight to realize that the same posed a danger to life and
property, and that he should have taken the necessary precaution to prevent
anybody from approaching the live wire.
On defendants' argument that the proximate cause of the victim's death could be
attributed to the parents' negligence in allowing a child of tender age to go out of
the house alone, We could readily see that because of the aforementioned
series of negligence on the part of defendants' employees resulting in a live wire
lying on the premises without any visible warning of its lethal character, anybody,
even a responsible grown up or not necessarily an innocent child, could have
met the same fate that befell the victim. It may be true, as the lower Court found
out, that the contributory negligence of the victim's parents in not properly taking
care of the child, which enabled him to leave the house alone on the morning of
the incident and go to a nearby place cut wire was very near the house (where
victim was living) where the fatal fallen wire electrocuted him, might mitigate
respondent's liability, but we cannot agree with petitioner's theory that the
parents' negligence constituted the proximate cause of the victim's death
because the real proximate cause was the fallen live wire which posed a threat
to life and property on that morning due to the series of negligence adverted to
above committed by defendants' employees and which could have killed any
other person who might by accident get into contact with it. Stated otherwise,
even if the child was allowed to leave the house unattended due to the parents'
negligence, he would not have died that morning where it not for the cut live wire
he accidentally touched.
Art. 2179 of the Civil Code provides that if the negligence of the plaintiff (parents
of the victim in this case) was only contributory, the immediate and proximate
cause of the injury being the defendants' lack of due care, the plaintiff may
recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. This
law may be availed of by the petitioner but does not exempt him from liability.
Petitioner's liability for injury caused by his employees negligence is well defined
in par. 4, of Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
The owner and manager of an establishment or enterprise are likewise
responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter are employed or on tile occasion of their functions.
The negligence of the employee is presumed to be the negligence of the
employer because the employer is supposed to exercise supervision over the
work of the employees. This liability of the employer is primary and direct. In fact
the proper defense for the employer to raise so that he may escape liability is to
prove that he exercised, the diligence of the good father of the family to prevent
damage not only in the selection of his employees but also in adequately
supervising them over their work. This defense was not adequately proven as
found by the trial Court, and We do not find any sufficient reason to deviate from
its finding.
2

PICART vs SMITH
FACTS:
> Plaintiff, Amado Picart, seeks to recover of the defendant, Frank Smith, jr., as
certain sum as damages alleged to have been caused by an automobile driven
by the defendant.
> Plaintiff was riding on his pony over said bridge. Before he had gotten half way
across, the defendant approached from the opposite direction in an automobile,
going at the rate of about ten or twelve miles per hour. As the defendant neared
the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his
approach. He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he gave
two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback
before him was not observing the rule of the road.
> As the automobile approached, the defendant guided it toward his left, that
being the proper side of the road for the machine. In so doing the defendant
assumed that the horseman would move to the other side. When he had gotten
quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the other
side, the defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting
the horse alongside of the railing where it as then standing; but in so doing the
automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became
frightened and turned its body across the bridge with its head toward the railing.
In so doing, it as struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car
and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some
violence. As a result of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff received
contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical
attention for several days.
duty either to bring his car to an immediate stop or, seeing that there were no
other persons on the bridge, to take the other side and pass sufficiently far away
from the horse to avoid the danger of collision. Instead of doing this, the
defendant ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse. He was, we think,
deceived into doing this by the fact that the horse had not yet exhibited fright.
But in view of the known nature of horses, there was an appreciable risk that, if
the animal in question was unacquainted with automobiles, he might get exited
and jump under the conditions which here confronted him. When the defendant
exposed the horse and rider to this danger he was, in our opinion, negligent in
the eye of the law.
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was
guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road.
But as we have already stated, the defendant was also negligent; and in such
case the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and directly
responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were not
contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the
negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances
the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending
harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference
to the prior negligence of the other party.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defendant in maneuvering his car in the manner

above described was guilty of negligence?

RULING:

YES. As the defendant started across the bridge, he had the right to
assume that the horse and the rider would pass over to the proper side; but as
he moved toward the center of the bridge it was demonstrated to his eyes that
this would not be done; and he must in a moment have perceived that it was too
late for the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving vehicle. In the nature
of things this change of situation occurred while the automobile was yet some
distance away; and from this moment it was not longer within the power of the
plaintiff to escape being run down by going to a place of greater safety. The
control of the situation had then passed entirely to the defendant; and it was his

3
PLDT vs CA
FACTS:
> Action for damages instituted in the former Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental by private respondent spouses against petitioner Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company (PLDT, for brevity) for the injuries they sustained
when their jeep ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open trench, an
excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its underground
conduit system. The complaint alleged that respondent Antonio Esteban failed to
notice the open trench which was left uncovered because of the creeping
darkness and the lack of any warning light or signs. As a result of the accident,
respondent Gloria Esteban allegedly sustained injuries on her arms, legs and
face, leaving a permanent scar on her cheek, while the respondent husband
suffered cut lips. In addition, the windshield of the jeep was shattered.
> PLDT, in its answer, denies liability on the contention that the injuries sustained
by respondent spouses were the result of their own negligence and that the
entity which should be held responsible, if at all, is L.R. Barte an independent
contractor which undertook the construction of the manhole and the conduit
system. Accordingly, PLDT filed a third-party complaint against Barte alleging
that, under the terms of their agreement, PLDT should in no manner be
answerable for any accident or injuries arising from the negligence or
carelessness of Barte or any of its employees.
> Trial court rendered a decision in favor of private respondents. CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was negligence on the part of the plaintiff?
RULING:
YES. First. Plaintiff's jeep was running along the inside lane of Lacson
Street. If it had remained on that inside lane, it would not have hit the
ACCIDENT MOUND.
Second. That plaintiff's jeep was on the inside lane before it swerved to hit the
ACCIDENT MOUND could have been corroborated by a picture showing Lacson
Street to the south of the ACCIDENT MOUND.
Third. Plaintiff's jeep was not running at 25 kilometers an hour as plaintiff-
husband claimed. At that speed, he could have braked the vehicle the moment it
struck the ACCIDENT MOUND. The jeep would not have climbed the
ACCIDENT MOUND several feet as indicated by the tiremarks in Exhibit B. The
jeep must have been running quite fast. If the jeep had been braked at 25
kilometers an hour, plaintiff's would not have been thrown against the windshield
and they would not have suffered their injuries.
Fourth. With the drizzle, he should not have run on dim lights, but should have
put on his regular lights which should have made him see the ACCIDENT
MOUND in time. If he was running on the outside lane at 25 kilometers an hour,
even on dim lights, his failure to see the ACCIDENT MOUND in time to brake the
car was negligence on his part. The ACCIDENT MOUND was relatively big and
visible, being 2 to 3 feet high and 1-1/2 feet wide. If he did not see the
ACCIDENT MOUND in time, he would not have seen any warning sign either.
He knew of the existence and location of the ACCIDENT MOUND, having seen it
many previous times. With ordinary precaution, he should have driven his jeep
on the night of the accident so as to avoid hitting the ACCIDENT MOUND.
The above findings clearly show that the negligence of respondent Antonio
Esteban was not only contributory to his injuries and those of his wife but goes
to the very cause of the occurrence of the accident, as one of its determining
factors, and thereby precludes their right to recover damages. The perils of the
road were known to, hence appreciated and assumed by, private respondents.
By exercising reasonable care and prudence, respondent Antonio Esteban could
have avoided the injurious consequences of his act, even assuming arguendo
that there was some alleged negligence on the part of petitioner.
The presence of warning signs could not have completely prevented the
accident; the only purpose of said signs was to inform and warn the public of the
presence of excavations on the site. The private respondents already knew of
the presence of said excavations. It was not the lack of knowledge of these
excavations which caused the jeep of respondents to fall into the excavation but
the unexplained sudden swerving of the jeep from the inside lane towards the
accident mound. As opined in some quarters, the omission to perform a duty,
such as the placing of warning signs on the site of the excavation, constitutes
the proximate cause only when the doing of the said omitted act would have
prevented the injury. It is basic that private respondents cannot charge PLDT for
their injuries where their own failure to exercise due and reasonable care was
the cause thereof. It is both a societal norm and necessity that one should
exercise a reasonable degree of caution for his own protection. Furthermore,
respondent Antonio Esteban had the last clear chance or opportunity to avoid
the accident, notwithstanding the negligence he imputes to petitioner PLDT. As a
resident of Lacson Street, he passed on that street almost everyday and had
knowledge of the presence and location of the excavations there. It was his
negligence that exposed him and his wife to danger, hence he is solely
responsible for the consequences of his imprudence.
A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of
proving the existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof. The facts
constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively established by competent
evidence. Whosoever relies on negligence for his cause of action has the burden
in the first instance of proving the existence of the same if contested, otherwise
his action must fail.
4
CHINA AIRLINES vs CA
FACTS:
> Private respondents planned to travel to Los Angeles, California to pursue a
cable business deal involving the distribution of Filipino films and programs in
Los Angeles. Initially, Morelia Travel Agency ("Morelia") booked private
respondents' flight with CAL but Morelia charged higher rates than American
Express Travel Service Philippines ("Amexco"), private respondents dropped the
services of Morelia and engaged the services of Amexco through Lao who was
an Amexco cardholder.
> Amexco called up CAL to finalize private respondents' reservation for CAL's.
Amexco used the record locator number given by Lao in confirming the
reservations of private respondents. CAL confirmed the booking. Amexco then
issued to private respondents the confirmed tickets. On the same day, CAL
called up Morelia to reconfirm the reservations of private respondents. Morelia
cancelled the reservations of private respondents.
> Private respondents were at the airport to board CAL but CAL personnel
prevented them from boarding the airplane because their names were not in the
passengers' manifest. CAL cancelled the reservations when Morelia revoked the
booking it had made for private respondents.
> Private respondents filed with the RTC a complaint for damages against CAL
and Amexco.
> RTC issued its decision in favor of private respondents confirmed by CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is entitled to damages?
RULING:
CAL's negligence caused it to breach its contract of carriage. CAL's negligence
is, however, not so gross to amount to bad faith. Mere negligence, even if it
causes the plaintiff to suffer mental anguish or serious fright, is not a ground for
awarding moral damages.
The law distinguishes a contractual breach effected in good faith from one
attended by bad faith. Absent fraud or bad faith on defendant's part in breaching
his contract, his liability for damages is limited to the natural and probable
consequences of the breach of the obligation, which the parties had foreseen or
could have reasonably foreseen. In such a case, the liability would not include
moral damages. For this reason, not every case of mental anguish, fright or
serious anxiety calls for the award of moral damages.
As for exemplary damages, Article 2232 of the Civil Code provides that in a
contractual or quasi-contractual relationship, exemplary damages may be
awarded only if the defendant had acted in "a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive or malevolent manner." CAL was not in bad faith and its employees
did not act in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.
The award of exemplary damages is therefore unwarranted in this case.
Private respondents' remaining claim is for actual damages. However, private
respondents did not shell out any money for their CAL tickets. Amexco voided
the CAL tickets when private respondents requested Amexco to book them in
another airline. Amexco eventually booked their flight with Northwest. Private
respondents would have been entitled to the price difference between the tickets
of CAL and Northwest had the latter cost more than the former. The price
difference would have been a damage reasonably attributed to CAL's breach of
its contract of carriage because private respondents would not have flown via
Northwest were it not for CAL's non-performance of its obligation. The evidence,
however, shows that the Northwest tickets at US$625 each cost less than the
CAL tickets priced at US$629 each. We cannot also order a reimbursement of
the Northwest tickets because this would have enabled private respondents to
fly to Los Angeles without paying any fare. As correctly pointed out by the trial
and appellate courts, the costs of the airplane tickets were a necessary expense
that private respondents could not pass on to CAL.
Undeniably, however, private respondents soldered some form of injury. CAL
confirmed the reservations of private respondents carelessly. Private
respondents relied on this confirmation. Private respondents went through the
trouble of going to the airport at the appointed time expecting that they would be
able to board CAL Flight 632. To their consternation, CAL personnel prevented
them from boarding because Morelia cancelled their reservations. When plaintiff
suffers some species of injury not enough to warrant an award of actual
damages, the court may award nominal damages. The court may award nominal
damages purely to vindicate a right of a plaintiff which defendant has violated
and not to indemnify any loss the plaintiff has suffered. The court may award
nominal damages in every obligation arising from any source enumerated in
Article 1157 of the Civil Code, or in any case where there is an invasion of any
property right. We find P5,000 as a reasonable award of nominal damages to
each of the private respondents.
The fact that private respondents were compelled to litigate and incur expenses
to protect and enforce their claim does not justify the award of attorney's fees.
The court may award attorney's fees only in the instances mentioned in Article
2208 of the Civil Code, and this case is not one of them Moreover, when there is
no basis to award moral and exemplary damages, there is also no basis to
award attorney's fees.
5
GAID vs PEOPLE
FACTS:
> Petitioner Norman A. Gaid was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide.
> petitioner was driving his passenger jeepney along a two-lane road where the
Laguindingan National High School is located toward the direction of Moog in
Misamis Oriental. Meanwhile, a 14 year-old student, Michael Dayata (Dayata),
was seen by eyewitness Artman Bongolto (Bongolto) sitting near a store on the
left side of the road. From where he was at the left side of the road, Dayata
raised his left hand to flag down petitioners jeepney which was traveling on the
right lane of the road. However, neither did petitioner nor the conductor, Dennis
Mellalos (Mellalos), saw anybody flagging down the jeepney to ride at that point.
Dayatas feet was pinned to the rear wheel of the jeepney, after which, he laid flat
on the ground behind the jeepney. DOA
> MCTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
> CA affirmed the trial courts judgment with modification in that it found petitioner
guilty only of simple negligence resulting in homicide petitioner was not driving
recklessly at the time of the accident.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner was negligent?
RULING:
NO. The presence or absence of negligence on the part of petitioner is
determined by the operative events leading to the death of Dayata which
actually comprised of two phases or stages. The first stage began when Dayata
flagged down the jeepney while positioned on the left side of the road and ended
when he was run over by the jeepney. The second stage covered the span
between the moment immediately after the victim was run over and the point
when petitioner put the jeepney to a halt. During the first stage, petitioner was
not shown to be negligent.
Reckless imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without
malice, an act from which material damage results by reason of an inexcusable
lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such
act.
It appears from the evidence Dayata came from the left side of the street.
Petitioner, who was driving the jeepney on the right lane, did not see the victim
flag him down. He also failed to see him go near the jeepney at the left side.
Understandably, petitioner was focused on the road ahead. In Dayatas haste to
board the jeep which was then running, his feet somehow got pinned to the left
rear tire, as narrated by Bongolto. Actub only saw Dayata after he heard a strong
impact coming from the jeep.
Petitioner can not be held liable during the first stage. Specifically, he cannot be
held liable for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The proximate cause
of the accident and the death of the victim was definitely his own negligence in
trying to catch up with the moving jeepney to get a ride. Petitioner had exercised
extreme precaution as he drove slowly upon reaching the vicinity of the school.
He cannot be faulted for not having seen the victim who came from behind on
the left side.
Negligence has been defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the
interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which
the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. The
elements of simple negligence: are (1) that there is lack of precaution on the part
of the offender; and (2) that the damage impending to be caused is not
immediate or the danger is not clearly manifest.
The standard test in determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act
whereby injury or damage results to the person or property of another is this:
could a prudent man, in the position of the person to whom negligence is
attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of
the course actually pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to
refrain from that course or to take precautions to guard against its mischievous
results, and the failure to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of
harm, followed by the ignoring of the admonition born of this provision, is always
necessary before negligence can be held to exist.
Proximate cause is defined as that which, in the natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred. In order to establish a
motorist's liability for the negligent operation of a vehicle, it must be shown that
there was a direct causal connection between such negligence and the injuries
or damages complained of. Thus, negligence that is not a substantial
contributing factor in the causation of the accident is not the proximate cause of
an injury.
The evidence on record does not show that the jeepney dragged the victim after
he was hit and run over by the jeepney. Quite the contrary, the evidence
discloses that the victim was not dragged at all. In fact, it is the other way
around. Bongolto narrated that after the impact, he saw Dayata left behind the
jeepney. Actub saw Dayata in a prone position and bleeding within seconds after
impact. Right after the impact, Mellalos immediately jumped out of the jeepney
and saw the victim lying on the ground.
Clearly then, the prosecution was not able to establish that the proximate cause
of the victims death was petitioners alleged negligence, if at all, even during the
second stage of the incident. Petitioner was ACQUITTED.
6
7