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+ Approved For Release 2007/08/29 : CIA-RDP79T00826A001800010072-7 ie) . 1 ww DBUKEL ww ‘DIA review(s) completed. No. 0804/67 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence State Dept. review completed ar apa wey INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM Military Takeover in Greece (Situation Report Number I--2:00 AM EST) 1. The government of Premier Kanellopoulos has been overthrown by a fast-moving and well-planned military coup, apparently under the direction of the Greek Army high command. 2. Kanellopoulos and his defense minister have been taken into custody and other political leaders have been arrested, including Andreas Papandreou and leaders of the crypto-Communist United Democratic Left party. King Constantine has been reported to be under guard at the summer palace at Tatoi on the outskirts of Athens. 3. The Greek Armed Forces Radio announced a Royal proclamation suspending certain articles of the constitution under Article 91 of that document which provides for the maintenance of public order and sec- urity in an emergency. Vehicle and pedestrian traffic in the streets has been prohibited and the stock ex- change and schools havecbeen closed. Bank withdrawals and gold and foreign exchange transfers have been pro- hibited. Hoarding of food is to be punishable by the military courts. 4. At last report, the streets in downtown Athens were quiet and access to the city center was obstructed by military roadblocks. Telephone communications had been cut and both the national radio and Athens airport had been seized by military elements. The US consul general reports that the northern city of Thessaloniki has been taken over by the military but is quiet. NOTE? This méemorandim Was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Current In- telligence and coordinated with the Clandestine Services. SECRET Approved For Release 2007/08/29 : CIA-RDP79T008264001800010072-7 I Pp pe MMI : . ' oct No. 0723/67 : |), CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. 5 f ||. DArectprate of Inveliigencen : f. "21 April 1967 INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUH Military’ Takeover in Greece : (situation Report, Number 2=-L180 BST) © . 1, Atheng has been quick the Inst fey hours. . Recent suhow CHAE tho cap: was-engingered -by m. group. o! who had 1 "Revolutionary of lanlle ocholon army and Aix Lovee oft tie! hreviowsly.reforred (¢ thensolvos as the {hac the Commnasts were propering ito ptakt ‘vtote, -« Besikog An@ general uphedval in Athons" on Saturady fing Constantino and most of the mititary’high conndud Kane com to auppore the coup and Li. Gon, Spendidelsss Mitel of the Hellenic Arny Goneral Staff is reported fe have assumed command of tho, group. - It rewains to he pean Af tho high-ranking officers w4L1 soally have Paap in the Luluko aotivities of tho Junta or whathor - thay ws1L only be Used Lor windos! dressing. 2. Tho. MRevolutionary Councii," which has been £0 exislence since about 1962, ‘has Wecowe progressively pore ore eusioned with the deteriorating political situation, Gistihe dnabLlity af the politicians to wolve Greece's prablons.. Many of thom had hogn transforrod from Aehens prethe provinces’ in 1964 After George Papandveot bevsne ine Minisler, : . : 3. The spokession fat" tha coup, Geheral Patalos, . told tho US Air Attache.that the coup yas designed . ito insure domestic tranquillity, Loyalty to the ling, SUT HSRETAIRITA was ‘pesduced ROLoLy by CIAL" Ss ofe was prepared ‘hy the OLfkco of Current. Inet | Borvicor. neil They Aliegé that tiey liad Koléd snfoynation. ~~ - ‘Gelligonco and coordipaged with the Clahiledtipo * oe ee a Ly ftay 67 + Approved figy Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP79T0@§6A002000010036-4 “a emo W/. Gan ocr alréLL MMO N67 26K1ADL, DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Intelligence Memorandum THE GREEK JUNTA - Secret 25X1 23 ‘ARCHIVAL RECORD PLEASE RETURN_TO 24 May 1967 ‘AGENCY ABCHIVES,| No. 1113/67 20 atL/V9 Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP79T00826A002000010036-4 25X1 25X1 ‘Approved PeeRelease 2005/03 RAAP79T90839A002000010036-4 25X1A, Colonel Papadopoulos 5. Papadopoulos, touted frequently as the most powerful member of the triumvirate, was born in northern Greece. At 48, he has had a distih~ guished military career, graduating first in his cadet class in 1940, serving with General Grivas' resistance forces in World War I1| 25X1 In dealing with the press and others who have quizzed him on the future course of events in Greece, he has fielded questions well and has given forthright and reasonable answers, but has occasionally demon- strated a touch of asperity. 6. Papadopoulos’ present post is that of minister to the prime minister, which allows him to exercise the authority of the prime minister's office while permitting a civilian--Kollias--to hold the title. Colonel Makarezos 7. Makarezos, also 48, was born near Athens, promoted to full colone: 25X1 an aS ‘an academic background in economics, political science, and industrial management. Makarezos speaks limited English but fluent German, possibly acquired during his tour as Greek military attache in Bonn in 1963 and 1964. Although at ease in) pub- lic appearances; he has kept more in the background than have the other two members of the trio. He, too, appears to be entirely pro-NATO and pro-US. 8. As minister of coordination, Makarezos is chiefly concerned with matters of economic develop~ ment and--apparently--with the "cleansing" and re- organization of the government bureaucracy; -3- 25X1A, SECRET Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP79T00826A002000010036-4 Approved Fo@}lease 2001/08/14 : C1A-RDP79T008gg002300140001-5 Secret No Foreign Dissem DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Intelligence Memorandum THE SITUATION IN GREECE Secret 23 6 guly 1 No. Approved For Release 2001/08/14 : CIA-RDP79T00826A002300140001-5 Approved FonBelease 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R0096%000200010002-0 Secret 25X1 MEMORANDUM OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES Greece, Europe, and the US Secret 23 April 1970 ao Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000200010002-0 Approved For Release 2008/11/18 ear Prk Rev Secret 25x1 DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Intelligence Memorandum PAPADOPOULOS—4 Question of Survival CIA DOCUMENT SERVICES BRANCH Secret Fil COPY 25 soptetber 2992 DO NOT DESTROY 73 Approved For Release 2008/11/18 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130101-0 Tq Approved For Release 2007/08/05 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000120026-4 . ¢/4A NE /meme TAf/- OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES 9 November 1972 MEMORANDUM” SUBJECT: Some Alternatives to the Papadopoulos Regime NOTE This memorandum looks at the political situation in Greece today. It finds some atirringe of opposition to Papadopoulos. It judges that abrupt change to not likely in the near term, but speculates as to the nature of the regime(s) which might come after the present one if and when tt should be replaced. This memorandum was prepared by the Office of National Estimates. It has been discussed with the Office of Current Intelligence and with the Clandestine Services vho ave in general agreement with ite judgments. 28X1 SECRET Approved For Release 2007/08/05 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000120026-4 Approved For Relggse 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79R01099A0%i4 00080004-4 25X1 Secret Greece Under Ioannidis: Implications for US-Greek Relations Secret 48 Apr 1974 Copy No. ab Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79R01099A001100080004-4 Approved FoeRelease 206/ROBE GiA-RDP79R0 1086001 100080004-4 20. In addition to assurance that the US would supply modern weapons in some quantities, the Greeks will press for changes to give them greater control of US military activities and to limit the privileges and immunities of American personnel in Greece. We regard this as essentially a bargaining ploy, but it may nonetheless lead to significant alteration of the US position in Greece. During the October war, the Papadopoulos regime, while adopting a policy publicly at variance with that of the US, was nonetheless covertly helpful in various ways For example, it provided useful data on Soviet resupply flights and allowed more extensive use of US facilities in Greece than iis provided by bilateral agreements. In the future, we could not expect this type of cooperation from the Ioannidis regime, unless the US were prepared to be more forthcoming in a variety of military matters. 21. US willingness to continue to deal with the military rulers would not be popular with civilian politicians within Greece. In the unlikely event that Andreas Papandreou (or some one of his political stripe) were to return to head a new Greek regime, he probably would use alleged US support for the Toannidis government as a pretext for action against the US. Tt seems unlikely, however, that popular resentment against the US would impel Karamanlis, if he should be recalled by a military regime, for example, to sever major ties with Washington. There is some risk that a more representative regime would feel under popular pressure to retaliate against the US for its alleged identification with military dictator- ship, but the US and NATO's role in Greece's security system is substantial; a likely successor regime would be very re- luctant to destroy this connection. 22. Efforts by the US to distance itself from the present rulers would complicate bilateral working arrangements. Given the sensitivity of the Ioannidis regime, it would probably react by pressing the US on the use of facilities. How far the gov- ernment would go in restricting US activities in Greece would depend on how much open displeasure the US expressed. Merely urging the Greeks to permit an early return to parliamentary procedures would not appear to the Athens regime nor to its Opposition to be much of a change in the policy the US pursued toward Papadopoulos. Public characterization of the present regime as repressive -- thus encouraging additional opprobrium from other NATO allies -- would be seen by Ioannidis as unneces~ sarily irritating and would provoke him to retaliate, without, however, convincing most critics of the regime that the US had abandoned Ioannidis. It is likely that under these circumstances the Greek attitude toward military relations with the US would become much less cooperative across a broad range of issues. -10- SECRET Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79R01099A001100080004-4

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