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Aspects of a theory of bullshit

Jrg Meibauer
Johannes Gutenberg-Universitt Mainz

This paper addresses the question whether bullshit is a reasonable pragmatic cat-
egory. In the first part of the paper, drawing on the insights of Harry Frankfurts
seminal essay, bullshit is defined as an act of insincere asserting where the speak-
er shows (a) a loose concern for the truth, and (b) does not want the addressee to
become aware of condition (a). The author adds to this definition the condition
(c) requiring that the bullshitter expresses more certainty than is adequate with
respect to condition (a). In the second part of the paper, it is discussed whether
the above definition can cope with special types of bullshit considered to be a
challenge to Frankfurts definition. These are evasive bullshitting, bullshit lies, and
bald-faced bullshitting. It is shown that there is hope for establishing a reason-
able pragmatic category of bullshitting if it is related to certain levels of prag-
matic description, e.g. conversational implicatures, that can explain the putative
challenges.

Keywords: bald-faced bullshitting, bullshit lies, bullshitting, certainty, evasive


bullshitting, humour

1. Introduction

The seminal essay of the philosopher Harry G. Frankfurt with the title On
Bullshit first appeared in 1986 in the Journal Raritan Review. Two years later,
it was reprinted as part of Frankfurts collection The Importance of What We
Care About: Philosophical Essays. Finally, in 2005, it appeared in book format at
Princeton University Press, and right from the start, it became a worldwide suc-
cess. On the first page, Frankfurt appeals to our intuition that there is a cultural
phenomenon called bullshit:
One of the most salient features of our culture is that there is so much bullshit.
Everyone knows this. Each of us contributes his share. But we take the situation
for granted. Most people are rather confident of their ability to recognize bullshit
and to avoid being taken in by it. So the phenomenon has not aroused much de-
liberate concern, nor attracted much sustained inquiry. (Frankfurt 2005:1)

Pragmatics & Cognition 23:1 (2016), 6891. doi 10.1075/pc.23.1.04mei


issn 09290907 / e-issn 15699943 John Benjamins Publishing Company
Aspects of a theory of bullshit 69

However, according to Frankfurt, there is no theory of bullshit.


In consequence, we have no clear understanding of what bullshit is, why
there is so much of it, or what functions it serves. And we lack a conscientiously
developed appreciation of what it means to us. In other words, we have no theory.
(Frankfurt 2005:1)
In his essay, Frankfurt famously succeeds in showing important aspects of the
phenomenon, yet he does not present a clear definition of what bullshit is.
Surprisingly, Frankfurt (2005) suggests that there is so much bullshit but
discusses only two examples in more detail: the case of the Fourth of July ora-
tor and the case of Wittgenstein. However, both cases are not clear-cut cases of
bullshitting, as will be shown here.1
The first case seems to be a case of humbug, as discussed by Black (1983),
and the second case seems to be a case of metaphor or idiomatic expression. For
Black (1983:143), humbug is deceptive misinterpretation, short of lying, espe-
cially by pretentious word or deed, of somebodys own thoughts, feelings, or at-
titudes. As an example of humbug, Frankfurt (2005:16) proposes the speech of
a Fourth of July orator, who goes on bombastically about our great and blessed
country, whose Founding Fathers under divine guidance created a new begin-
ning for mankind. Discussing Blacks definition of humbug, Frankfurt contends
that humbug and lying are necessarily deceptive (Frankfurt 2005:16). However,
Frankfurt argues that the definition of humbug should also include actions (not
merely thoughts, feeling, and attitudes), and, furthermore, being pretentious does
not belong to the essence of humbug; rather, being pretentious is the motive for
humbugging. In contrast, I assume that pretentiousness is an important aspect of
humbug while it is not essential for bullshitting and lying.2
The second case reports an exchange between Fania Pascal and Ludwig
Wittgenstein. Fania Pascal writes:
I had my tonsils out and was in the Evelyn Nursing Home feeling sorry for my-
self. Wittgenstein called. I croaked: I feel just like a dog that has been run over.
He was disgusted: You dont know what a dog that has been run over feels like.
(Fania Pascal, Wittgenstein: A Personal Memory, in: Rhees, Recollections, pp.28
29, quoted after Frankfurt 2005:24)

Our first impression is that Wittgenstein took Pascals utterance too seriously, and
that he thus ignored that it was meant as a jokey simile (or metaphor/idiomatic
expression). Yet Frankfurt (2005:29) argues: The trouble with her statement is

1. Contrary to what Carson (this volume), Fallis (2015), and Stokke (to appear) suggest.

2. Note Frankfurts characterization of the speech as bombastic. This shows that humbug has
to do with certain stylistic properties.
70 Jrg Meibauer

that it purports to convey something more than simply that she feels bad. Her
characterization of her feeling is too specific; it is excessively particular. However,
this criticism is quite finicky. After all, Pascals utterance has nothing to do with
knowledge about the feelings of run-over dogs, and how one can be certain about
these feelings.
In sum, then, both examples are not really convincing cases of bullshitting, and
we have to distinguish bullshitting from humbugging and metaphorical speech
acts. In addition, bullshitting is different from hyperbole. Hyperboles like I told
you a thousand times to shut the door! may be defined as deliberately inexact rep-
resentations of a state of affairs. They are literally false, and the speaker shows no
interest in describing states of affairs in an exact way. However, there is no intent to
deceive involved.3 The speaker wants the hearer to derive a certain conversational
implicature (like in irony or metaphor). In contrast, bullshit seems to be somehow
related to deception.
In the following, I will focus on the question whether bullshit is a reasonable
pragmatic category. By pragmatic category, I mean categories like promise or
irony that serve to identify certain types of language use. Pragmatic theory is
the place where pragmatic categories have to be defined. With respect to the no-
tion of bullshit, I will apply speech act theory as well as implicature theory, the
two theories that I consider to be an essential part of pragmatic theory. As far as
I see, numerous theoretical approaches to bullshit, especially in the philosophy of
language, are not grounded in linguistic pragmatics. In contrast, I will argue that a
convincing theory of bullshit should essentially be a pragmatic theory.
The outline of this paper is as follows. After defining bullshitting in Section2,
I will deal with recent challenges of Frankfurts conception in Section3. In par-
ticular, I will discuss the criticism put forward by Carson (2010) and Fallis (2015).
While Carson (2010) remains sceptical about a reasonable category of bullshit-
ting, Fallis (2015) principally defends Frankfurt, yet develops his own concep-
tion of bullshitting. Discussing the cases that are proposed as counterexamples to
Frankfurt, I will show that a Frankfurtian definition of bullshitting, enriched with
a condition related to too much certainty, will suffice. The final section contains
some conclusions.

3. This does not exclude the possibility of deceiving someone by the untruthful use of meta-
phors and ironies, see Meibauer (2014a) and Dynel (this volume).
Aspects of a theory of bullshit 71

2. Defining bullshit

2.1 Reconstructing Frankfurts bullshit

Following the lead of Frankfurt (2005), we have to distinguish lying from bullshit-
ting. I assume that lying is an insincere speech act of assertion (Meibauer 2005,
2011, 2014a, b, c, 2015). Insincerity is a dissociation of what is expressed and what
is believed. If the speaker asserts p and thereby represents p as true, while in fact he
does believe that not-p, then he is lying. While bullshit is also connected to the in-
tent to deceive (which follows from the insincere assertion), the bullshitter may (to
a certain extent) believe that p. Frankfurts bullshit heuristics basically comprises
two ingredients. The first ingredient is a certain lack of concern for the truth:
The fact about himself that the bullshitter hides, on the other hand, is that the
truth-values of his statements are of no central interest to him; what we are not
to understand is that his intention is neither to report the truth nor to conceal it.
(Frankfurt 2005:55)

The second ingredient is the bullshitters misrepresentational intent, also called


phoniness:
Since bullshit need not be false, it differs from lies in its misrepresentational in-
tent. The bullshitter may not deceive us, or even intend to do so, either about the
facts or about what he takes the facts to be. What he does necessarily attempt to
deceive us about is his enterprise. His only indispensably distinctive characteristic
is that in a certain way he misrepresents what he is up to. (Frankfurt 2005:54)

In the following, I will stick to Frankfurts intuitions and propose a definition of


bullshitting that is based on the idea that bullshitting is an insincere act of asserting.
So let us first have a look at my definition of asserting (Meibauer 2013):
(1) Asserting
The speaker asserted at time t that p iff
a. the speaker uttered a declarative sentence meaning p,
b. the speaker presented p as true,
c. the speaker intended that the addressee believed p.

We can then go on and define bullshitting in the following manner (Meibauer


2013):4

4. Cf. the following reconstruction provided by Wreen (2013): A piece of discourse, D, pro-
duced by a speaker, S, on an occasion, O, in relation to an audience, A, is bullshit if and only if
(a) S deceptively represents herself as engaged in the activity of conveying information (saying)
D;
(b) S is not engaged in the activity of conveying information in producing (saying) D;
72 Jrg Meibauer

Bullshitting (reconstructing Frankfurt)


(2)
The speaker was bullshitting at time t that p iff
a. The speaker acted as if he asserted that p, however:
b. [loose concern for the truth] the speaker neither intended to present p
as true nor intended to present p as not true.
c. [misrepresentational intent] the speaker intended that the addressee did
not become aware of (b).

Thus, while in a sincere assertion, the speaker presents p as true, in bullshitting,


the speaker is ignorant with respect to matters of truth and falsity.
Dynel (2011:152153) and Fallis (2009:3031) pursued the idea that is the
second submaxim of the Gricean maxim of Quality that is violated in bullshitting:5
(3) The category of Quality (Grice 1989:27)
Try to make your contribution one that is true.
1. Do not say what you believe to be false.
2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.

What matters here is the required adequacy of the evidence. The bullshitter may
have some evidence, yet their evidence is not adequate in relation to standards of
truthful speaking. Indeed, when the bullshitter shows loose concern for the truth
(see 2b), their evidence cannot be regarded as adequate because commitment to
either truth or falsity of p is required.
As we will see later, Fallis (2015) dismisses his earlier approach, believing that
Carson (2010) presented a case where the bullshitter only says things for which he
has adequate evidence, yet it is (according to Carsons intuition) bullshitting. We
will come to this case (the careful exam taker) later. Here I state that a speech-act
theoretical approach and a Gricean approach do not exclude each other all the
more the latter is required when it comes to the issue of deriving implicatures; on
the other hand, the implicature approach has not much to say on speech acts.

(c) S is attempting to manipulate the opinions and attitudes of A in producing (saying) D;


(d) S primarily cares about accomplishing such manipulation in producing (saying) D; and
(e) S is more or less indifferent to whether (S scares at most very little whether) D (or the
propositions expressed in D) is (are) true or false.

The main problems with this reconstruction are (i) the assumption that bullshitting does not
convey information, and (ii) that it introduces a new concept, manipulation, that needs its own
explication

5. Grice (1989:27) distinguishes between a supermaxim and two more specific maxims (i.e,
submaxims). While he speaks of the category of Quality, most researchers simply use the no-
tion maxim of Quality.
Aspects of a theory of bullshit 73

Let us now turn to an authentic piece of bullshitting. My first example is an


advertisement for Fractional Neck Lift Concentrate that I found in the magazine
Wallpaper in 2009. For me, it is an impressive piece of advertising bullshit (bold
face in the original).
(4) Fractional Neck Lift Concentrate
The first in fractionated topicals. With discovered-on-Mars Iron Rose
Chrystals.
Y-42 FRACTIONAL NECK LIFT CONCENTRATE More than fractional
treatments. For less than fractional treatments. In simple terms: neck
therapy as its avant-garde finest. Protein fractions maximize fibrillin
synthesis and minimize the inevitable, irreversible degradation of elastic
tissue. Discovered-on-Mars iron rose crystal comes from effusive magma
rock to increase prolyl hydroxylase activity by 381% and boost collagen
production. Our new tetrapeptide-9 from France, as well as a next-
generation tripeptide-10 citrulline and a bi-blinked dipeptide from
Switzerland, to stimulate Laminin V, Collagen IV, Collagen VII, Collagen
XVII and Integrin. A new tetrapeptide-11 from France also comes to the
rescue to stimulate Syndecan-1 synthesis and reinforce epidermal cohesion.
From Mother Nature, clinically-affirmed biotechnological derivatives of
European elder, sweet chestnut and shiitake not only firm the skin, but
also improve its protective responses dramatically. Finally, controlled
organism ferments from Spain and Switzerland offer tightening of the skins
appearance instantly and in the long term. And the active clinical results?
Too many to name, but a 350% improvement in wrinkle appearance during
an 84-day third-party study of 60 volunteers stands out as unprecedented
proof. [Avant-garde aroma: earth tones and floral roots]
[Wallpaper, October 2009]

While the text as a whole is bullshit, from a speech-act theoretical point of view it
suffices to isolate a single act of bullshitting. For the moment, I would like to draw
attention to the last lines:
And the active clinical results? Too many to name, but a 350%
improvement in wrinkle appearance during an 84-day third-party study of
60 volunteers stands out as unprecedented proof. [Avant-garde aroma: earth
tones and floral roots]

In particular, the assertion a 350% improvement in wrinkle appearance during


an 84-day third-party study of 60 volunteers stands out as unprecedented proof
strikes me, intuitively, as bullshit. Also, from the point of view of information
structure, the (dis)connection of the information in brackets to the preceding text
supports the impression of bullshit. Applying the above definition of bullshitting,
74 Jrg Meibauer

I assume that the writer acted as if he/she were sincerely asserting something, yet
shows a loose concern for the truth since it is not clear how a 350% in wrinkle
appearance could ever be measured. Furthermore, I assume that the author of the
text does not want a potential consumer to realise that the author has this particu-
lar loose concern for the truth.

2.2 Too much certainty

My intuition is that certainty and uncertainty play an important role in bullshit, a


role that has hitherto been neglected. For instance, the A 350% improvement in
wrinkle appearance during an 84-day third-party study of 60 volunteers stands
out as unprecedented proof is presented with outstanding certainty on the part
of the writer. It is backed by scientific authority, as the whole text demonstrates, a
text that is nearly incomprehensible for the average reader.
There are of course numerous definitions of certainty in epistemology (see
Kahnemann and Tversky 1982; Reed 2008). I stick to a classical definition of (sub-
jective) certainty proposed by Chisholm (1976:27):
(5) Certainty
p is certain for S at t =df
i. Accepting p is more reasonable for S at t than withholding p (i.e., not
accepting p and not accepting not-p) and
ii. there is no q such that accepting q is more reasonable for S at t than
accepting p.

The intuition that the bullshitter expresses too much certainty with respect to p
might have to do with a Certainty Norm for Assertion occasionally touched upon
in the literature (Unger 1975, Stanley 2008):
(6) Certainty Norm for Assertion:
Assert that p only if you are certain that p.

In bullshitting, this norm appears to be systematically broken. Moreover, there


seem to be Degrees of Certainty, that is, certainty is a scalar notion:
(7) Degrees of Certainty
The speaker is at t certain that p to a high degree, iff
i. the addition of q to her knowledge would not make her more certain,
and
ii. the addition of r to her knowledge would not make her less certain.

Hence, the revised definition of bullshitting contains a new condition (d) that re-
fers to too much certainty of the bullshitter.
Aspects of a theory of bullshit 75

Bullshitting (revised)
(8)
The speaker was bullshitting at time t that p iff:
a. The speaker acted as if he asserted that p, however:
b. [loose concern for the truth] the speaker neither intended to present p
as true nor intended to present p as not true.
c. [misrepresentational intent] the speaker intended that the addressee
does not become aware of (b).
d. [too much certainty] the speaker presented p with far more certainty
than would be adequate considering his loose concern for the truth (see
(b)).

Let us consider how this can be applied to my second example. The second ex-
ample (9) is a press release concerning the separation of the German model Heidi
Klum and singer Seal. We do not really know who produced this text; maybe a
reputation manager, maybe a ghost-writer. Nevertheless, the couple is credited
with saying (and thus being committed to) what is quoted in (9). The addressees
are those readers, e.g. of gossip columns, who are interested in the life of the fa-
mous couple (or the life of celebrities in general). As a text genre, separation state-
ments are connected to a question under discussion (QUD), namely, what are the
reasons for the separation. Then, the lure of bullshitting is to circumvent a clear
answer to the QUD.
(9) Separation of Heidi Klum and Seal
In a joint statement to E! News, the couple said, While we have enjoyed
seven very loving, loyal and happy years of marriage, after much soul-
searching we have decided to separate. We have had the deepest respect
for one another throughout our relationship and continue to love each
other very much, but we have grown apart. This is an amicable process and
protecting the well-being of our children remains our top priority, especially
during this time of transition. We thank our family, friends, and fans for
their kind words of support. And for our childrens sake, we appreciate you
respecting our privacy.
[http.prweb.com/releases/actingauditions/modelingauditions/
prweb9142093.htm [January 27th, 2012]

Here my intuition is that the utterance While we have enjoyed seven very loving,
loyal and happy years of marriage, after much soul-searching we have decided to
separate is a good example of bullshit, all the more the authors assert that they
76 Jrg Meibauer

continue to love each other very much. More precisely, it is (evasive) bullshit with
respect to the QUD mentioned above, since relevant information is omitted.6
Let us look at this example in more detail:
a. The authors assert that they enjoyed seven very loving, loyal and happy years
of marriage (=p1) and that they continue to love each other very much
(=p2). Normally, one would not infer from p1 and p2 the necessity of a sepa-
ration.
b. The authors want neither to present p1, p2 as true nor to present p1, p2 as not
true. How p1, p2 are related with the growing apart of the authors motivat-
ing the separation remains unclear. Quite possibly, it is unclear to the authors
themselves.
c. The authors want the addressee not to become aware of the fact that they are
indifferent to the truth. After all, they present p1, p2 neither as true (although
they assert these propositions) nor as not true (since something must be the
reason for the separation just mentioning the growing apart is too unspe-
cific for the curious and potentially disappointed fan of the ex-couple).
d. The authors lack the necessary certainty for the assertion of p1, p2 (otherwise
they would not separate), yet assert p1, p2 with certainty. For instance, Heidi
Klum may not be certain that she enjoyed all these seven very loving, loyal and
happy years of marriage, that she was engaged in much soul-searching, and
that she continues to love her husband very much.
In sum, then, I suppose that the above definition can serve as a starting point of
getting deeper into bullshit (analysis).
Note that the condition of too much certainty may be related to the viola-
tion of the second maxim (submaxim) of the supermaxim/category of Quality, as
Dynel (2011) and Fallis (2009) assumed. When a speaker presents p without hav-
ing adequate evidence for p (in fact he is indifferent to the truth of p), then he is
far too much certain with respect to his epistemological basis.
As Marsili (2014) convincingly showed, the dimension of certainty uncer-
tainty plays also a role with lying. In particular, this can be seen from the use of
hedges in assertions. In lying, you can use markers of certainty (It is obvious that
p) as well as markers of uncertainty (As far as I see, p) both markers are compat-
ible with the act of lying. In contrast, I suspect that in bullshitting only markers
of certainty are adequate. Bullshitting with markers of uncertainty, e.g. As far as I

6. Even when the couple is honest (or prosocially lying with respect to their potentially disap-
pointed fans or their children), it seems to me that the particular way of presenting and leaving
out information qualifies this statement as a statement that shows a loose concern for the truth,
misrepresentational intent, and too much certainty, as defined in (8).
Aspects of a theory of bullshit 77

see there is a 350% improvement in wrinkle appearance (but you can never know for
sure) will not work.
From the perspective of persuasion, it can be concluded that bullshitting may
have the effect to render a reader basically trusting the speaker with more or less
certainty. Suppose that, initially, Ken does not believe that it is possible to get a
350% improvement in wrinkle appearance. However, if he comes to know of the
clinical study (by reading the advertisement), he is getting almost certain of this
possibility. Certainty has to do with potential justification. Ken is certain insofar
as he now assumes that (i) the addition of another proposition q to his knowl-
edge would not make him more certain, and (ii) the addition of another proposi-
tion r to his knowledge would not make him less certain. If, on the other hand,
Ken is doubtful with respect to p or detects that the speaker asserted p with more
certainty than it would be adequate (on the basis of the speakers putative loose
concern for the truth), then this could Ken render more uncertain. For example,
while he always had confidence into the relationship of Heidi Klum and Seal, after
reading their press release, his confidence is shaken to the core. In fact, he can even
imagine that there might be further information that would render him still more
uncertain.7
Yet we know that readers have also the ability to be epistemically vigilant
(Sperber et al. 2010.) Thus, it is possible to be amused by the above Wallpaper
advertisement or even laugh about it, instead of feeling offended by this obvious
bullshit. When humour has to do with incongruity and disappointed expecta-
tions (see below), it seems that the certainty condition can easily be brought into
connection with humour: The greater the attempts at persuading the reader and
expressing far too much certainty, the greater the readers fun in detecting the
contrast between the activated schemas for advertising on the one hand, and for
scientific reports on the other hand.
That epistemic vigilance plays an important role in bullshit reception, has re-
cently been shown in a series of experimental studies by Pennycook et al. (2015).
In particular, the authors tested for the participants ability to detect so-called
pseudo-profound bullshit, for instance Wholeness quiets infinite phenomena. These
examples were contrasted with conventionally profound (A wet person does not

7. Fredal (2011:254) sees the affective element of disregard as a defining trait of bullshit and ex-
plains that: bullshit is that variety of semiotic interaction in which one participant perceives the
positive social value claimed for a party in interaction to have been denigrated. Furthermore,
Bullshit usually includes a sense of surprise the slight is felt to be undeserved and unex-
pected and it arises in encounters with asymmetrical power relations. This neatly ties in with
Kens disappointment. He wouldnt have expected to be bullshitted, Heidi Klum and Seal are
superior to him, and he feels disregard since the true reason for the separation is not communi-
cated albeit he always firmly believed into the honesty and truthfulness of the couple.
78 Jrg Meibauer

fear rain) as well as mundane statements (New-born babies require constant at-
tention). The authors found that detecting the bullshit is not merely a matter of
indiscriminate scepticism but rather a discernment of deceptive vagueness in oth-
erwise impressive sounding claims (Pennycook et al. 2015:549). Furthermore,
a tendency to believe in the truth of others statement may play a role with some
poor bullshit detectors.

3. Challenges to Frankfurts bullshit

3.1 Evasive bullshitting

Carson (2010:62) suspects that the concept of bullshit is too loose and amorphous
to admit of a definition in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. Carsons
scepticism is backed up by three claims: (a) bullshitters can be concerned with the
truth of what they say (against condition 8b in the above definition of bullshit-
ting), (b) bullshit does not require the intention to deceive (against the condition
8c in the above definition), and (c) lying can constitute producing bullshit, i.e.,
bullshitting can overlap with lying.8 The latter claim is also made by Fallis (2015)
to whom I will turn into the next section. Claims (a) and (b) are supported by what
Carson calls evasive bullshit.
Carson presents two examples, namely the case of the politician (evasive
bullshit answer) and the case of the careful exam taker. The first is situated in a
televised presidential debate (Carson 2010:60):
(10) Evasive bullshit reply
Interviewer: I want to ask you about your criteria for nominating people
to the US Supreme Court. Would you be willing to nominate anyone who
supports the Roe v. Wade decision? Or, will you make opposition to abortion
and Roe v. Wade a requirement for anyone you nominate?
Candidate: Look, there are lots of things to be taken into account when
nominating someone for the Supreme Court. This isnt the only relevant
consideration. I want someone with a good legal mind and judicial

8. As for (a), already Reisch (2006:3940) pointed out that bullshitters are not indifferent to
truth. His counterexamples include members of bull sessions, advertisers, and politicians who
draw our attention ostensibly to one set of truths and purposes while in fact quietly engaging
us about different matters. Still, one could argue that these actors are only loosely concerned
with the (whole) truth. See also Bernal (2006:64).- As for (c), Wreen (2013:109) presents a case
in which a students bullshit excuse consists of lies, arguing that bullshit and lying need not to
be distinct.
Aspects of a theory of bullshit 79

experience who supports my judicial philosophy of following the


constitution as it is written.

According to Carson (2010:60) the candidate gives a bullshit reply since he does
not answer the question directly. Yet, according to Carson, the candidate is con-
cerned with the truth of what he says. He wants the addressee to think that he
is answering or trying to answer their question; in this sense the candidate acts
deceptively (Carson 2010:60).
Carson is certainly right in observing that the candidate acts evasively.
However, it is not clear whether his answer constitutes bullshit. What he is con-
cerned with is not the truth but how he can avoid a truthful statement. In this
sense, it does not constitute bullshit since it does not display an indifference to
what is true.
Note in addition that situations in which coercion plays a role have special
properties. Recently, Kenyon (2010) argued that putative assertions being uttered
under conditions of torture are not real assertions but capitulations. Also, Keiser
(2016) argues that the kind of communication plays a role. She argues that coerced
bald-faced lies are not really contributions to conversation but merely a move in
a language game. If they are right then one cannot simply assume that the evasive
politician is really bullshitting because he cannot pretend to make assertions in
the first place.
In terms of implicature theory, the candidate flouts the Gricean maxim of
Relation since he does not directly answer the interviewers question. Moreover,
he flouts the Gricean maxim of Manner (Be perspicuous), especially two of the
Manner submaxims (1. Avoid obscurity of expression, and 3. Be brief (avoid un-
necessary prolixity).). On the basis of the flouting of these maxims the interviewer
may very well derive the implicature I am not willing to answer this question.9
The second of Carsons examples is constructed in order to demonstrate that
someone can produce a bullshit answer without intending to deceive anyone
(Carson 2010:61). It is presupposed that the teacher will give the student partial
credit for turning in something, however incompetent and far off the topic, and
that the student might even want his bullshitting to be transparent to the teacher
in order to amuse or annoy her.
(11) Evasive bullshit essay

9. Cf. Grice (1989:35) the example in which an implicature is achieved by real, as distinct from
apparent, violation of the maxim of Relation: A: Mrs. X is an old bag. B: The weather has been
quite delightful this summer. +> As remark should not be discussed.
80 Jrg Meibauer

Teacher: Briefly describe the facts of the case of Dodge v. Ford and answer
the following question: Was Henry Ford morally justified in his actions in
this case? Defend your answer.
Student: In todays society there are many important ethical questions about
the role of business in the larger society. These are important questions
since business and its actions play such a large role in todays society. We
have addressed these questions in our class. Milton Friedman holds that
the only obligation of business is to make money for the shareholders,
provided that it avoids fraud, deception, and unfair competition. Others say
that corporations should be run for the benefit of all their stakeholders.
Utilitarians hold that corporations should promote the social good. The Ford
Motor company had many obligations in this case. In this case, I think that
the obligation to society was the most important obligation. The company
failed to live up to this obligation, to an extent, but this is not a black or
white issue. In any case, Henry Ford didnt adequately fulfil his duty to the
public.

This case is construed in close parallel to the case of the cheating student that
plays a role in the debate on bald-faced lies (Meibauer 2014c, 2016a). Just as bald-
faced lies are often taken as evidence that the liar need not deceive the addressee,
bald-faced bullshitting happens without any intention to deceive on the part of the
bullshitter.
However, as in the cases of bald-faced lying in which some authors (the non-
deceptionists) argue that they are no lies at all, it is not clear that the students an-
swer exemplifies a clear-cut case of bullshitting. The students essay does not really
answer the exam question albeit it assembles pieces of argumentation that stand in
some relation to this question. So the student is neither indifferent to the truth nor
does he want to deceive the teacher about this; hence, according to the above defi-
nition in (8), it is not bullshit. Note that an irrelevant and prolix answer is prohib-
ited by the Gricean maxims of Relation and Manner. Their violation can constitute
the basis of deriving a conversational implicature making the students strategy
transparent: I am unable to answer the question appropriately, but I do my best.

3.2 Bullshit lies

As already said above, Carson (2010) also doubts that bullshitting note that he
does not provide his own definition of this notion and lying are strictly distinct.
In fact, he argues that there are cases of bullshit lies. For instance, when someone
is asked whether a close colleague is an atheist, he responds by saying As a boy he
always went to church and loved singing Christmas Carols. According to Carson,
this is a lie (since the speaker knows that this is false) as well as bullshit. I agree
Aspects of a theory of bullshit 81

that this utterance is a lie. However, the inference that going to church and sing-
ing Christmas Carols is evidence for being a believer is a deceptive conversational
implicature. Hence, I would not count this case as a convincing case of bullshit.
More recently, Fallis (2015:1) has developed an analysis of bullshit according
to which most lies count as bullshit. This conclusion is reached on the basis of a
special definition of bullshitting that has to do with the distance to the truth of p:10
(12) a. An assertion is bullshit if and only if the speaker does not care whether
the inquiry gets closer to the truth, gets further from the truth, or stays
in the same place. (p.3)
b. Someone is bullshitting if and only if she does not care whether or not
her assertion gets the inquiry closer to the truth. (p.4)

As his theoretical background, Fallis adopts Stalnakers (1999) work on assertion.


Basically, communication is about information sharing. It is important for the
communicators to get true information by an inquiry that reduces the set of pos-
sible worlds to the actual worlds. Bullshitting is, like lying, dangerous testimony,
insofar it leads to a wrong reduction in the course of inquiry. Yet both kinds of as-
sertions are distinct: Unlike someone who is lying, she [= the bullshitter] does not
intend to take the inquiry further from the truth, but she certainly puts the inquiry
at risk of this happening. (Fallis 2015:4)
Fallis (2015) claims that his analysis is Frankfurtian in spirit; moreover, it vin-
dicates Frankfurt from Carsons criticism according to which bullshitters can care
about the truth of their utterances. With respect to Carsons case of the evasive
bullshit essay in (11), Fallis (2015:6) argues that this case does not constitute a
counter-example to his own analysis: Since she wants what she literally says to be
true, the student does care about her assertion taking the common ground closer
to the truth. But since she is not concerned with providing an accurate answer to
the exam question, the student does not care about her assertion taking the inquiry
closer to the truth. Therefore, Fallis counts this case as proper bullshitting.
As a forgotten species of bullshit (Fallis 2015:5), he presents a case where
Thelma wants to sell her umbrella. When she is asked whether it is raining in
Chicago she insincerely asserts that this is the case. In fact, she does not know
whether it is raining or not. This lie is solely motivated by her wish to sell the um-
brella. For Fallis, this is simultaneously a lie and bullshit.

10. See also De Waal (2006) who contrasts bullshitting with genuine inquiry, sham reasoning
(Charles S. Peirce) and fake reasoning (Susan Haack). For Wreen (2013:113), humbug and
bullshit are noxious nonsense, with noxious meaning being worthless or less than worthless,
positively repellant or harmful, and nonsense meaning not fitting in with or contributing to un-
derstanding or knowledge of an issue or topic, or not being relevant to the solution of a problem
or the accomplishment of a task at hand.
82 Jrg Meibauer

However, it can be argued that Thelmas utterance is certainly a lie but she is
not bullshitting. Her lie is motivated by the wish to sell her umbrella. Generally,
lies are connected to strategic goals of the speaker. This does not mean that most
lies are bullshit only because there is something that they [= the liars] want us
believe, and they would want us to believe it even if it were true (), as Fallis
(2015:9) puts it. Quite on the contrary, the mere existence of a strategic goal does
not qualify a lie as being bullshit at the same time.
I think that Fallis proposal is a misconception because it can lead to the idea
that many sincere assertions are bullshit in the sense that they do not get the
inquiry closer to the truth (cf. 11b). For instance, if a speaker utters (13), then,
according to (12b), the speaker would be a bullshitter.
(13) I dont care whether refugees are welcome or not.

But this is counterintuitive since the speaker simply asserts that he does not care
about the truth of p. What is lacking in Fallis account is the condition of the mis-
representational intent (phoniness) in (8c), i.e. the intention of the speaker to de-
ceive the hearer about his lack of concern with the truth.

3.3 Bald-faced bullshit

According to Fallis (2015:4, Fn. 5), drawing on Carson (2010:6061), there may
be bald-faced bullshit, since people who bullshit can sometimes achieve their
goals without hiding the fact that they are bullshitting. For instance, the politician
under pressure produces coerced bullshit to the extent that this becomes trans-
parent to their audience. She lets it shine through that she is forced to evade the
journalists question.
However, such a behaviour would violate the condition of the misrepresenta-
tional intent in (8c). Like in the case of bald-faced lies, I endorse the deceptionist
assumption that lying is connected to an intention to deceive on the part of the
speaker. In contrast, non deceptionists like Fallis would argue that bald-faced lies
show that an intention to deceive is not necessary in the case of lying, and that
bald-faced bullshitting constitutes a parallel case (Meibauer 2014b, 2016b).
The only case in which bullshitters act in a transparent way, is the bull session.
Frankfurt (2005:34) explains that it is understood by everyone in a bull session
that the statements people make do not necessarily reveal what they really be-
lieve of how they really feel. Thus, he adds, the usual assumptions about the con-
nection between what people say and what they believe is suspended (Frankfurt
2005:37).
Therefore, I would like to argue, speech acts within the bull session share an
important property with speech acts made by actors on the stage. It is commonly
Aspects of a theory of bullshit 83

understood that speakers act as if they would believe in p but are neither commit-
ted to p nor held responsible for p. In sum, I would question the assumption that
bald-faced bullshitting is a reasonable pragmatic category.
If, for some reason, a speaker decides to bullshit without hiding his misrepre-
sentational intention while not assuming that he acts within the context of a bull
session then his speech acts are arrogant or brazen. This is the case because he
deliberately opts out from the operation both of the maxim and the Cooperative
Principle, as Grice (1989:30) put it.

4. Two further dimensions of bullshitting

4.1 On the structure of bullshitting

Above, we have been isolating single speech acts as parts of texts in order to ap-
ply the above definition to them. Following the lead of Frankfurt (2005), we have
defined bullshitting as a covertly pretended act of assertion (8). In this section, I
will shortly discuss these issues.
First, let us consider textual bullshit. Remarkably, the typical cases of bullshit-
ting discussed in the literature are not single speech acts but texts (i.e., sequences
of speech acts). Thus, we can ask whether there are bullshitting texts, i.e., how is
the bullshit connected to textual properties. Let us assume that texts have to be co-
herent (semantic structure) as well as cohesive (syntactic structure), and that they
belong to a genre that is connected to specific vocabulary and stylistic patterns.
Deviations from normal textual properties should give rise to bullshit effects.
For instance, in (4) we find several textual properties that support bullshit ef-
fects. The readers expectations with respect to a typical advertisement concerning
cosmetic products are disappointed. Basically, he or she finds a list of ingredi-
ents of the product, lists being incohesive. Coherence, in contrast, is created by a
SOURCE frame, since the ingredients come from different places: Mars, France,
Switzerland, Mother Nature, and Spain. Incoherence, on the other hand, we find,
as already shown, in the sequence And the active clinical results? Too many to
name, but a 350% improvement in wrinkle appearance during an 84-day third-
party study of 60 volunteers stands out as unprecedented proof. [Avant-garde aroma:
earth tones and floral roots]. Also, the combination of different graphic devices
such as bold face, capitals, and square brackets supports incoherence. Most impor-
tantly, a highly specialized vocabulary is used that certainly seeks to impress the
non-specialist reader, leading to their conviction that Y-42 FRACTIONAL NECK
LIFT CONCENTRATE is indeed avant-garde (this catchword is mentioned two
times), all the more its effects are already proved in clinical tests.
84 Jrg Meibauer

This said, we see that there are bullshit genres, e.g. advertising bullshit, po-
litical and propaganda bullshit, social media bullshit, religious bullshit, erotic
bullshit, and so on. The pervasiveness of bullshit in everyday life that Frankfurt
(2005) in his introductory paragraph speaks of could very well have to do with the
fact that many areas of life have their own species of bullshit genre. Below, we will
go into academic bullshit.
Second, we compared bullshitting to lying, the latter being standardly defined
as an insincere speech act of assertion. Bullshitting, in contrast, is a covertly pre-
tended act of assertion, as defined in (8). However, it may be asked, are there not
bullshit questions, bullshit commands, bullshit love declarations, and bullshit in-
sults? Intuitively, I tend to agree. Yet the concept of bullshit x-ing amounts to the
concept of inadequate or inapt talk and thus is not the same as the Frankfurtian
concept of bullshitting that has to do with an indifferent attitude to truth.

4.2 On the unclarifiability of bullshitting

While I have assumed that bullshitting can be defined in the style of speech act
theory, along the lines of (8), it might also be plausible to assume different kinds
of bullshitting, e.g., as related to text genres. One particular proposal along these
lines is made by Cohen (2002:338) who draws a distinction between general
bullshit (Frankfurt bullshit) and academic bullshit (Cohen bullshit). The former
is connected to everyday life, its primary focus is the activity of bullshitting and
its essence the speakers indifference to truth. The latter, in contrast, is connected
to the academy, its primary focus is the output of bullshitting, and its essence the
unclarifiability of bullshit.
According to Cohen, unclarifiability of a text can be tested using the negation
test: () adding or subtracting (if it has one) a negation sign from a text makes
no difference to its level of plausibility. (Cohen 2002:333) If a text is unclarifi-
able, then it survives the negation test. However, the crucial point is how to define
plausibility. After all, for different readers, texts can be plausible to different de-
grees, quite differently form the applicability of the negation test. Truth and falsity
may matter not so much as evidence or partly evidence even when borrowed from
third parties.
Also the translatability test proposed by Frankfurt (2002) in his reply to Cohen
is not convincing. This test aims at making an unclear text more clear. To the de-
gree that this procedure has good results the original text was unclear. However,
Evans (2006:199, Fn. 13) convincingly remarks: Frankfurt plausibly clarifies it:
[]. But if it is clarifiably unclear, then it may still qualify as a different form of
bullshit. That is, translated bullshit may still remain bullshit.
Aspects of a theory of bullshit 85

Recall that the first maxim of the supermaxim of Manner is Avoid obscurity
of expression. As a case of exploitation of this maxim, Grice (1989:36) mentions
a case in which A and B are having a conversation in the presence of a third
party, for example, a child, then A might be deliberately obscure, though not too
obscure, in the hope that B would understand and the third party not. The result-
ing implicature would be that the contents of his communication should not be
imparted to the third party (Grice 1989:37).
Some academic writings seem to be obscure without any intended implica-
ture of this sort. They show the traits of obscurantism which is a good candidate
for Cohen bullshit. Arguably, famous obscurantist writers are Martin Heidegger,
Jacques Lacan, and Jacques Derrida. Their obscurantism is often enhanced by
their ambitions to act as gurus (Sperber 2010).
Recently, Buekens and Boudry (2015:127) warn against the confusion of
bullshitting and obscurantism. According to them, both concepts are distinct:
The bullshitters pronouncements can be crystal clear: it is just that he does not
care about commitments that come with the language game of assertoric language
use. Obscurantism, on the other hand, seems to apply, first and foremost, to the
content of what is being asserted: although often presented with utmost serious-
ness and intellectual bravado, it is never quite clear what the obscurantist is get-
ting at, even though he explicitly presents his nebulous discourse as serious and
profound insights into some subject matter that, we are told, requires indirect
approaches. Yet, being indifferent to the truth the core property of bullshit is
a property of obscurantism, too, since the truth is not treated as something that is
intersubjectively understandable. Furthermore, the obscurantist would not allow
that the hearer becomes aware of this indifference. Thus, at least some academic
bullshit can be conceived of as obscurantism.

5. Outlook

In this paper, I have defended a traditional speech-act theoretical definition of


bullshitting, as explicated in (8) that interacts with a number of other pragmatic
concepts, most prominently conversational implicatures. In particular, I have tried
to show that counterexamples by Carson (2010, this volume) and Fallis (2015)
against the (reconstructed) Frankfurtian analysis are not convincing. I agree, how-
ever, that Frankfurt wasnt bullshitting!, as Fallis (2015) exclaims.
Certainly, progress in bullshit research can be made, but there is much on the
agenda. I wish to single out four areas.
86 Jrg Meibauer

5.1 Taxonomy of bullshitting and its relatives

There are many bullshit-related categories such as humbug (Black 1983, Frankfurt
2005), hot air (Frankfurt 2005), obscurantism (Buekens and Boudry 2015), mind-
fucking (McGinn 2008), as well as putative subtypes of bullshitting such as perfor-
mative bullshitting (Richardson 2006), pseudo-profound bullshitting (Pennycook
et al. 2015) or bullshit conversational implicature (Webber 2013). Again, we have
to ask whether these are separate pragmatic categories or whether they can be
derived from basic categories.
First, let us consider the concept of mindfucking. McGinn (2008) explicitly
relates his study on mindfucking to Frankfurt (2005). Bullshit and mindfucking
are both related to the concept of truth, yet are distinct concepts. According to
McGinn (2008), mindfucking is some sort of assault on the mind, an invasive
operation performed on the psychological state of the person (McGinn 2008:1).
There are positive (e.g. movies like Fight Club) and negative variants of mind-
fucking (e.g. brainwashing). Negative mindfucking always goes together with the
production of a negative feeling in the addressee. Contrasting bullshitting with
mindfucking, McGinn (2008:36) points out: [] the point I am making is that it
is not intrinsic to bullshitting that it aims at psychological disturbance of an emo-
tional kind, whereas this is intrinsic to mindfucking. This negative feeling can lead
to a general loss of trust (McGinn 2008:41).
While there is a concept of mindfucking, it is not clear whether this can be
restricted as a single speech act, as in the case of bullshitting. All I can think of
is slurring which can be seen as a mindfucking attack on the addresses aiming
at triggering negative feelings (Meibauer 2016). The relation of mindfucking to
manipulation and propaganda, however, hints at more general techniques of in-
fluencing other minds (see Stanley 2015).
Second, consider the concept of a bullshit conversational implicature, as devel-
oped by Webber (2013). Webber draws a distinction between lying (insincere asser-
tion) and misleading. The notion of misleading has been developed by Saul (2012).
In Meibauer (2014a, c, 2015) I argue that this notion amounts to deceptive (delib-
erately false/untruthful) implicating. In fact, this is what Webber (2013) seems to
assume. He then goes on to argue that lying is related to bullshit in the same way
as misleading (deceptive implicature) is to bullshit conversational implicature. The
core of bullshitting is always indifference to truth. So, insofar conversational im-
plicatures can be evaluated as true or false, there must be bullshit conversational
implicatures, too. Unfortunately, Webber (2013) gives no examples. Drawing on a
classical example from Grice (1989), we can think of Pete who gossips that he has
recently seen Paul with a woman, thereby implicating that the respective woman
was not Pauls wife (nor another close relative). If Pete is indifferent towards the
Aspects of a theory of bullshit 87

truth of this implicature (and does conceal his indifference) then we can speak
of a bullshit conversational implicature. On the whole, this concept is supported
by my view that a speaker who intends a certain implicature to be derived by the
speaker is committed to its content (Dynel 2015, Meibauer 2014a, c, 2015, 2016a),
independently of the characteristic property of implicatures of being cancellable.

5.2 Domains of bullshitting

Frankfurt (2005) suggested that bullshitting is ubiquitous. Yet, bullshit research-


ers have identified certain domains of social life in which bullshit texts are per-
vasive. Such domains are politics (Evans 2006, Seymour 2014), advertising, reli-
gion (Reisch 2006), academia (Cohen 2002), psychoanalysis, social media (Kleis
Nielsen 2015), etc. Further domains are sketched by Law (2011).
Within every domain, there may exist specific rivalling strategies. For instance,
within the rhetoric of International Relations, Seymour (2014:576) draws a dis-
tinction between arguing (typically involving truth-telling), bargaining (typically
involving lying), hypocrisy (mismatch between words and deeds), and bullshitting
(indifference to truth). These processes may all play a role in a given case, as he
demonstrates with respect to the US politics concerning the Darfur crisis in 2003.
It goes without saying that political bullshitting may go hand in hand with spe-
cific genres, such as official statements, interviews, bulletins, etc. Another aspect
is group agency, i.e., who exactly is held responsible for bullshitting (Hughes 1984,
List and Pettit 2011).

5.3 Bullshitting and humour

In his strict verdict of bullshit, Frankfurt characterizes the bullshitter as follows:


He does not reject the authority of truth, as the liar does, and oppose himself to
it. He pays no attention to it at all. By virtue of this, bullshit is a greater enemy of
the truth than lies are. (Frankfurt 2005:61). However, the question arises why
we are so tolerant of bullshit compared to lies. This could have to do with the tol-
erance towards the overarching goals of speakers, for instance, to sell Fractional
Neck Lift Concentrate or to avoid loss of image, as in the case of Heidi Klum and
Seal. It could also have to do with humorous effects triggered by bullshitting. This
latter aspect is already observed by Frankfurt when he mentions so-called bull
sessions. It is also present in plays like bullshit bingo, numerous merchandising
articles related to bullshit, and last but not least many funny titles of academic
88 Jrg Meibauer

papers playing with the taboo character of the word bullshit.11 How can we ex-
plain the humorous effects of bullshit? A standard assumption in humour research
is that humour has to do with incongruity and disappointed expectations (Suls
1972). For instance, in the case of the ad for Fractional Neck Lift Concentrate, we
find incongruity between a stereotypical text advertising cosmetic products and a
list of ingredients that would be expected from a chemical report. To find out the
dimensions of incongruity that play a role when we perceive bullshitting as trig-
gering humour is a task for the future.

5.4 Ethics of bullshitting

Frankfurt (2005:61) famously states that bullshitting is a greater enemy of the


truth than lying (see also Frankfurt 2006). Buekens and Boudry (2015:127) point
out that the obscurantist is a more dangerous and pernicious character than the
bullshitter. Can we derive from such assertions moral scales such as liar > bullshit-
ter > obscurantist with > meaning worse than?12 Or, as Webber (2013:659)
does, a scale lie > bullshit > misleading? A pragmaticist, so much is certain, is not
concerned with ethics in the first place. Yet actors have to act in contexts in which
ethical decisions may influence their choice how to act, i.e. which specific speech-
act (including their grammatical and lexical make-up) they choose to convey
in a given situation. This said, we can assume that lying and bullshitting are not
necessarily bad. In fact, just as we have prosocial lying, we have also prosocial
bullshitting. Kimbrough (2006), in an attempt at explaining our tolerance against
bullshitting, mentioned respecting the feelings of others, keeping the peace, and
entertaining.
Throughout this paper, it has become clear that the concept of bullshitting is
connected to many fields. In fact, the aspects of a theory of bullshit are so mani-
fold that we can understand scepticism of the sort that bullshit might constitute
a bullshitty concept itself. However, as I have tried to show, there is hope to make
it more precise and to show how it can be located in pragmatic theory.

11. Most notably Cohen (2002) and the papers in Hardcastle and Reisch (2006). The latter col-
lection displays also numerous instances of self-ironical bullshit, for instance in the advance
praises or the bio blurbs.

12. See also the debate on the question whether mere misleading is worse than lying, e.g. Saul
(2012), Webber (2013), Rees (2014).
Aspects of a theory of bullshit 89

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Authors address
Jrg Meibauer
German Department
Johannes Gutenberg University
55099 Mainz, Germany
meibauer@uni-mainz.de

About the author


Jrg Meibauer is professor of German language and linguistics at the Johannes Gutenberg
University in Mainz, Germany, and affiliated professor at the University of Stockholm, Sweden.
His research focuses on the semantics-pragmatics interface, the grammar of German, word for-
mation, lexical acquisition, and the linguistics of childrens literature. His monographs include
Rhetorische Fragen (1986), Modaler Kontrast und konzeptuelle Verschiebung (1994), Pragmatik
(1999), and Lying at the Semantics-Pragmatics Interface (2014). Currently, he is editing The
Oxford Handbook of Lying.

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