Chapter20RightsoftheAccusededited 2

1. Sales v.
Sandiganbayan
Cruz (2007) citation
It should be noted that the right to a preliminary investigation is not among the rights granted to the accused in the Bill of
Rights. It is purely statutory. Even so, denial of this right, in the absence of a valid waiver, will violate due process.
As Justice Ynares-Santiago put it in Sales v.Sandiganbayan:
While the right (to preliminary investigation) is statutory rather than constitutional in its fundament, it is a component part of
due process in criminal justice. The right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over to trial for a
criminal offense and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a
substantive right. To deny the accused's claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive him of the full measure of his
right to due process.
Case Digest
FACTS:
Petitioner, the incumbent town mayor of Pagudpud, Ilocos Norte, fatally shot the former mayor and his political rival, Atty.
Rafael Benemerito, in an alleged shootout after a heated altercation between them. After the shooting incident, petitioner
surrendered and placed himself under the custody of the municipal police. The next day, a criminal complaint for Murder
against petitioner was filed. Municipal Judge Calvan then conducted a preliminary investigation as under the old rules, with
two stages: (1) the determination of whether there is reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been committed and the
accused is probably guilty thereof, so that a warrant of arrest may be issued and the accused held for trial; and (2) the
preliminary investigation proper where the complaint or information is read to the accused after his arrest and he is informed
of the substance of the evidence adduced against him, after which he is allowed to present evidence in his favor if he so
desires.Municipal Judge then forwarded the case records to the Provincial Prosecutor who,instead of conducting a preliminary
investigation of his own, merely forwarded the said records to the Ombudsman for the latter to conduct the same. The
Ombudsman then directed the petitioner to file his counter-affidavit, which the latter found superfluous as he previously
submitted such to the Provincial Prosecutor. An Information for Murder was filed against petitioner.This Court is tasked to
resolve the issue of whether or not the proper procedure was followed and whether petitioner's constitutional rights were
safeguarded during the preliminary investigation conducted before the filing of an Information for Murder against him and
theissuance of a warrant for his arrest by respondent Sandiganbayan. Petitioner asserts that theInformation was hastily filed
and the warrant for his arrest was improper because of an incomplete preliminary investigation. Respondents say otherwise.
ISSUES:
(1)Whether or not the preliminary investigation conducted by the municipal judge was proper.
(2)Whether or not the preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman was proper.
HELD:
(1)NO. Presidential Decree 911 (further amending Sec. 1, R.A. 5180, as amended by P.D.77) upon which the present rule is
based, removed the preliminary examination stage and integrated it into the preliminary investigation proper. Now the
proceedings consists of only one stage.Respondent Judge did not conduct the requisite investigation prior to issuance of the
arrest warrant. The Rules require an examination in writing under oath in the form of searching questions and answers. The
statements of witnesses were not sworn before him but before the Provincial Prosecutor. The purported transcript of
stenographic notes do not bear the signatur of the stenographer.Moreover, he did not complete the preliminary investigation.
He claimed to have examined only the witnesses of the complainant. He issued a Resolution and forwarded the records to the
Provincial Prosecutor without giving the accused (petitioner) an opportunity to submit counter-affidavits and supporting
documents. While it is true that the usual remedy to an irregular preliminary investigation is to ask for a new preliminary
investigation, such normal remedy would not be adequate to free petitioner from the warrant of arrest which stemmed from
that irregular investigation. The Provincial Prosecution has no power to recall the warrant of arrest.
(2)NO . As this Court pointed out in Duterte v. Sandiganbayan, "the purpose of a preliminary investigation or a previous
inquiry of some kind, before an accused person is placed on trial, is tosecure the innocent against hasty, malicious and
oppressive prosecution and to protect him froman open and public accusation of a crime, from the trouble, expenses and
anxiety of a public trial.It is also intended to protect the state from having to conduct useless and expensive trials. Whilethe
right is statutory rather than constitutional in its fundament, it is a component part of dueprocess in criminal justice. The right
to have a preliminary investigation conducted before beingbound over to trial for a criminal offense and hence formally at risk
of incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive right. To deny the
accused'sclaim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive him of the full measure of his right to dueprocess."Although
a preliminary investigation is not a trial and is not intended to usurp the functionof the trial court, it is not a casual affair. The
officer conducting the same investigates or inquires into the facts concerning the commission of the crime with the end in
view of determining whether or not an information may be prepared against the accused. Indeed, preliminary investigation is
in effect a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the case. Sufficient proof of the guilt of the accused must be adduced so
that when the case is tried, the trial court may not be bound as a matter of law to order an acquittal. A preliminary investigation
has been called a judicial inquiry.It is a judicial proceeding. An act becomes a judicial proceeding when there is an opportunity
to be heard and for the production of and weighing of evidence, and a decision is rendered thereon.
2. Salonga v. Pano
In the landmark case of Salonga v. Pano the petitioner moved for the dismissal of the subversion charges against him on the
ground of the lack of a prima facie case. The motion was denied and he went to the Supreme Court, where he was upheld. The
Court found the supposed evidence against him extremely tenuous; the testimony of the prosecution witnesses was
contradictory and incredible, if not at times exculpatory; a photograph in which he and another accused appeared was rejected
as evidence of subversion, as so too was the claim that his house had been used as a "contact point" of the conspirators; and
certain remarks made by the petitioner which were critical of the Marcos administration were considered protected by freedom
of expression.
"The respondent judge should have taken these factors into consideration before concluding that a prima facie case exists
against the petitioner," Justice Gutierrez declared. Stressing "the citizen's right to be free not only from arbitrary arrest and
punishment but also from unwarranted and vexatious prosecution," he declared that "the integrity of a democratic society is
corrupted if a person is carelessly included in the trial of around forty persons when on the face of the record no evidence
linking him to the alleged conspiracy exists."
... in order to satisfy the due process clause, it is not enough that the preliminary investigation is conducted in the sense
of making sure that the transgressor shall not escape with impunity. A preliminary investigation serves not only the
purposes of the State. More important, it is a part of the guarantee of freedom and fair play which are birthrights of all
who live in our country. It is therefore imperative upon the fiscal or the judge, as the case may be, to relieve the accused
from the pain of going through a trial once it is ascertained that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima facie case
or that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused.
The sincerity of this decision was weakened, however, by the fact that it was rendered after the prosecution, on instruction
from above, had itself moved for the dismissal of the charges against Salonga. According to Justice Gutierrez, the Court had
earlier decided to grant the petition,
but it was only on February 18,1985, after President Marcos had instructed the prosecutor to re-study the charges, that the
decision was released. In his concurring opinion, Justice Abad Santos commented, 'The decision could have had a greater
impact had it been promulgated prior to the executive action," meaning after the consensus was reached on October 24,1984
and the ponencia started to circulate for signature on November 2, 1984. What delayedor triggeredits release? So much
then for the retroactive courage of the Supreme Court of that time.
Case Digest
FACTS:
A rash of bombings occurred in the Metro Manila area in the months of August, September and October of 1980. On
September 1980, one Victor Burns Lovely, Jr., a Philippine-born American citizen from Los Angeles, California, almost killed
himself and injured his younger brother, Romeo, as a result of the explosion of a small bomb inside his room at the YMCA
building in Manila. Found in Lovely's possession by police and military authorities were several pictures taken sometime in
May 1980 at the birthday party of former Congressman Raul Daza held at the latter's residence in a Los Angeles suburb. Jovito
R. Salonga and his wife were among those whose likenesses appeared in the group pictures together with other guests,
including Lovely. As a result of the serious injuries he suffered, Lovely was brought by military and police authorities to the
AFP Medical Center (V. Luna Hospital)where he was place in the custody and detention of Col. Roman P. Madella, under the
over-all direction of General Fabian Ver, head of the National Intelligence and Security Authority (NISA). Shortly afterwards,
Mr. Lovely and his two brothers, Romeo and Baltazar Lovely where charged with subversion, illegal possession of explosives,
and damage to property. Bombs once again exploded in Metro Manila including one which resulted in the death of an
American lady who was shopping at Rustan's Supermarket in Makati and others which caused injuries to a number of persons.
The President's anniversary television radio press conference was broadcast. The younger brother of Victor Lovely, Romeo,
was presented during the conference. The next day, newspapers came out with almost identical headlines stating in effect that
Salonga had been linked to the various bombings in Metro Manila. Meanwhile, Lovely was taken out of the hospital's
intensive care unit and transferred to the office of Col. Madella where he was held incommunicado for some time. More
bombs were reported to have exploded at 3 big hotels in Metro Manila. The bombs injured 9 people. A meeting of the General
Military Council was called for 6 October 1980. Minutes after the President had finished delivering his speech before the
International Conference of the American Society of Travel Agents at the Philippine International Convention Center, as mall
bomb exploded. Within the next 24 hours, arrest, search, and seizure orders (ASSOs) were issued against persons, including
Salonga, who were apparently implicated by Victor Lovely in the series of bombings in Metro Manila. Elements of the
military went to the hospital room of Salonga at the Manila Medical Center where he was confined due to his recurrent and
chronic ailment of bronchial asthma and placed him under arrest. The arresting officer showed Salonga the ASSO form which
however did not specify the charge or charges against him.
ISSUE: Whether the Court may still elaborate on a decision when the lower courts have dropped the case against petitioner
Salonga.
HELD: YES. The setting aside or declaring void, in proper cases, of intrusions of State authority into areas reserved by the
Bill of Rights for the individual as constitutionally protected spheres where even the awesome powers of Government may not
enter at will is not the totality of the Court's functions. The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling
constitutional principles, precepts,doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of
protection given by constitutional guarantees. In dela Camara v. Enage (41 SCRA 1), the petitioner who questioned a
P1,195,200.00 bail bond as excessive and,therefore, constitutionally void, escaped from the provincial jail while his petition
was pending. The petition became moot because of his escape but we nonetheless rendered a decision. In Gonzales v. Marcos
(65 SCRA 624) whether or not the Cultural Center of the Philippines could validly be created through an executive order was
mooted by Presidential Decree 15, the Center's new charter pursuant to the President's legislative powers under martial law.
Still, the Court discussed the constitutional mandate on the preservation and development of Filipino culture for national
identity. In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile (59 SCRA183), during the pendency of the case, 26 petitioners
were released from custody and one withdrew his petition. The sole remaining petitioner was facing charges of murder,
subversion, and illegal possession of firearms. The fact that the petition was moot and academic did not prevent the Court in
the exercise of its symbolic function from promulgating one of the most voluminous decision sever printed in the Reports.
Herein, the prosecution evidence miserably fails to establish a prima facie case against Salonga, either as a co-conspirator of a
destabilization plan to overthrow the government or as an officer or leader of any subversive organization. The respondents
have taken the initiative of dropping the charges against Salonga. The Court reiterates the rule, however, that the Court will
not validate the filing of an information based on the kind of evidence against Salonga found in the records.
3. Galman v. Sandiganbayan
In Galman v. Sandiganbayan? the Supreme Court, acting on a second motion for reconsideration of the decision of
respondent court acquitting all the accused in the slaying of Benigno S. Aquino and Rolando Galman, created a fact-finding
commission which, after holding extensive hearings, concluded that the trial had been rigged and the acquittal pre-ordained by
no less than President Marcos himself. The Court, adopting these findings, annulled the proceedings and ordered a new trial of
the case, declaring that the interference and pressure of the President was violative of due process and prevented a fair and im
partial trial. Chief Justice Teehankee wrote: (page 302 304 excerpt)
Case Digest
FACTS: Assassination of former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. He was killed from his plane that had just landed at the
Manila International Airport. His brain was smashed by a bullet fired point-blank into the back of his head by an assassin. The
military investigators reported within a span of three hours that the man who shot Aquino (whose identity was then supposed
to be unknown and was revealed only days later as Rolando Galman) was a communist-hired gunman, and that the military
escorts gunned him down in turn.
President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to investigate due to large masses of people who joined in the ten-
day period of national mourning yearning for the truth, justice and freedom.
The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military version stating that "the evidence shows
to the contrary that Rolando Galman had no subversive affiliations. Only the soldiers in the staircase with Sen. Aquino could
have shot him; that Ninoy's assassination was the product of a military conspiracy, not a communist plot. Only difference
between the two reports is that the majority report found all the twenty-six private respondents above-named in the title of the
case involved in the military conspiracy; " while the chairman's minority report would exclude nineteen of them.
Then Pres. Marcos stated that evidence shows that Galman was the killer.
Petitioners pray for issuance of a TRO enjoining respondent court from rendering a decision in the two criminal cases before
it, the Court resolved by nine-to-two votes 11 to issue the restraining order prayed for. The Court also granted petitioners a
five-day period to file a reply to respondents' separate comments and respondent Tanodbayan a three-day period to submit a
copy of his 84-page memorandum for the prosecution.
But ten days later, the Court by the same nine-to-two-vote ratio in reverse, resolved to dismiss the petition and to lift the TRO
issued ten days earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision. The same Court majority denied petitioners'
motion for a new 5-day period counted from receipt of respondent Tanodbayan's memorandum for the prosecution (which
apparently was not served on them).
Thus, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the dismissal did not indicate the legal ground for such action
and urging that the case be set for a full hearing on the merits that the people are entitled to due process.
However, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the accused of the crime charged, declaring them
innocent and totally absolving them of any civil liability. Respondents submitted that with the Sandiganbayan's verdict of
acquittal, the instant case had become moot and academic. Thereafter, same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.
Hence, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for reconsideration alleging that respondents committed
serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross violation of the constitutional rights
of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the Philippines to due process of law.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused.
(2) Whether or not there was a violation of the double jeopardy clause.
RULING: Petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted and ordering a re-trial of the said cases which should be
conducted with deliberate dispatch and with careful regard for the requirements of due process.
Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera (made his expose 15 months later when former Pres. was no longer around) affirmed the
allegations in the second motion for reconsideration that he revealed that the Sandiganbayan Justices and Tanodbayan
prosecutors were ordered by Marcos to whitewash the Aquino-Galman murder case. Malacaang wanted dismissal to the
extent that a prepared resolution was sent to the Investigating Panel. Malacaang Conference planned a scenario of trial where
the former President ordered then that the resolution be revised by categorizing the participation of each respondent; decided
that the presiding justice, Justice Pamaran, (First Division) would personally handle the trial. A conference was held in an
inner room of the Palace. Only the First Lady and Presidential Legal Assistant Justice Lazaro were with the President. The
conferees were told to take the back door in going to the room where the meeting was held, presumably to escape notice by
the visitors in the reception hall waiting to see the President. During the conference, and after an agreement was reached, Pres.
Marcos told them 'Okay, mag moro-moro na lamang kayo;' and that on their way out of the room Pres. Marcos expressed his
thanks to the group and uttered 'I know how to reciprocate'.
The Court then said that the then President (code-named Olympus) had stage-managed in and from Malacaang Palace "a
scripted and predetermined manner of handling and disposing of the Aquino-Galman murder case;" and that "the prosecution
in the Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who tried and decided the same acted under the compulsion of some pressure
which proved to be beyond their capacity to resist. Also predetermined the final outcome of the case" of total absolution of the
twenty-six respondents-accused of all criminal and civil liability. Pres. Marcos came up with a public statement aired over
television that Senator Aquino was killed not by his military escorts, but by a communist hired gun. It was, therefore, not a
source of wonder that President Marcos would want the case disposed of in a manner consistent with his announced theory
thereof which, at the same time, would clear his name and his administration of any suspected guilty participation in the
assassination. such a procedure would be a better arrangement because, if the accused are charged in court and subsequently
acquitted, they may claim the benefit of the doctrine of double jeopardy and thereby avoid another prosecution if some other
witnesses shall appear when President Marcos is no longer in office.
More so was there suppression of vital evidence and harassment of witnesses. The disappearance of witnesses two weeks after
Ninoy's assassination. According to J. Herrera, "nobody was looking for these persons because they said Marcos was in power.
The assignment of the case to Presiding Justice Pamaran; no evidence at all that the assignment was indeed by virtue of a
regular raffle, except the uncorroborated testimony of Justice Pamaran himself. The custody of the accused and their
confinement in a military camp, instead of in a civilian jail. The monitoring of proceedings and developments from
Malacaang and by Malacaang personnel. The partiality of Sandiganbayan betrayed by its decision: That President Marcos
had wanted all of the twenty-six accused to be acquitted may not be denied. In rendering its decision, the Sandiganbayan
overdid itself in favoring the presidential directive. Its bias and partiality in favor of the accused was clearly obvious. The
evidence presented by the prosecution was totally ignored and disregarded.
The record shows that the then President misused the overwhelming resources of the government and his authoritarian powers
to corrupt and make a mockery of the judicial process in the Aquino-Galman murder cases. "This is the evil of one-man rule at
its very worst." Our Penal Code penalizes "any executive officer who shall address any order or suggestion to any judicial
authority with respect to any case or business coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of justice."
Impartial court is the very essence of due process of law. This criminal collusion as to the handling and treatment of the cases
by public respondents at the secret Malacaang conference (and revealed only after fifteen months by Justice Manuel Herrera)
completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its verdict. The courts would have no reason to exist if
they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth. More so, in
the case at bar where the people and the world are entitled to know the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is at stake.
There was no double jeopardy. Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void judgment for having been issued without
jurisdiction. No double jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are
divested. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts and all claims flowing out of it are void.
Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit should have been resolved ahead. In this case, petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the
abrupt dismissal of their petition and lifting of the TRO enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision had been
taken cognizance of by the Court which had required the respondents', including the Sandiganbayan's, comments. Although no
restraining order was issued anew, respondent Sandiganbayan should not have precipitately issued its decision of total
absolution of all the accused pending the final action of this Court. All of the acts of the respondent judge manifest grave
abuse of discretion on his part amounting to lack of jurisdiction which substantively prejudiced the petitioner.
With the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, the cases must now be tried before an impartial court with an unbiased
prosecutor. Respondents accused must now face trial for the crimes charged against them before an impartial court with an
unbiased prosecutor with all due process.
The function of the appointing authority with the mandate of the people, under our system of government, is to fill the public
posts. Justices and judges must ever realize that they have no constituency, serve no majority nor minority but serve only the
public interest as they see it in accordance with their oath of office, guided only the Constitution and their own conscience and
honor.
4. Rochin v. California
In Rochin v. California police authorities forced an emetic solution through a tube into the stomach of a suspect to eject two
narcotic pills he had swallowed to prevent their use as evidence against him. The U.S. Supreme Court described the act as "too
close to the rack and the screw" and absolved the accused.
Case Digest
Brief Fact Summary. The Appellant, Rochin (Appellant), alleged that the Due Process Clause had been violated when police
forced him to vomit two capsules that he had swallowed.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The police cannot extract evidence from inside of a persons body by force.
Facts. Three officers entered the Appellants home and saw two capsules on a nightstand. When they inquired as to who
owned the capsules, the Appellant swallowed them. After an unsuccessful attempt to dislodge the capsules from Appellants
mouth, the officers took the Appellant to a hospital. At the hospital, the Appellants stomach was pumped against his will to
induce vomiting. Two capsules containing morphine were found within the vomited material.
Issue. Can the police forcibly extract evidence from a persons stomach?
Held. No. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution) prohibits the
use of coerced confessions. There is no distinction between a coerced verbal confession and a coerced physical confession. To
hold otherwise would be to sanction police brutality in obtaining physical evidence, while prohibiting police brutality in
obtaining a verbal confession.
Concurrence.
Justice Black: The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) used the nebulous standard of the Fourteenth
Amendment instead of the specific standards of the Bill of Rights to invalidate Californias (Appellee) use of the evidence. By
using a nebulous standard, the Supreme Court substitutes its own judgment for the Constitution. A nebulous standard changes,
and a changing standard endangers civil liberties.
Justice Douglas: The Fifth Amendment should have been used to invalidate the Appelees use of this evidence. Freeing the
states from the Bill of Rights, while nullifying state laws which offend the Supreme Court through the use of the Fourteenth
Amendment, has led to an erosion of civil rights by allowing states to do what the Federal government cannot.
Discussion. Obtaining confessions by beating or torture was one practice that the right against self-incrimination was intended
to prevent. Because the value of the confession was its evidentiary value, the police cannot beat or torture a person to obtain
evidence contained in a persons body.
5. Breithanpat v. Abram
But where in Breithanpat v. Abram a doctor extracted a small amount of blood from a person while he was unconscious to
determine whether or not he was intoxicated at the time of a vehicular accident in which he was involved, it was held that the
said act and the subsequent use of the results of the blood test as evidence against him did not violate due process.
Case Digest
Petitioner, while driving a pickup truck on a state highway, was involved in a collision which resulted in the deaths of three
persons and his serious injury. While he was lying unconscious in the emergency room of a hospital, the smell of liquor was
detected on his breath, and a state patrolman requested that a sample of his blood be taken. An attending physician, using a
hypodermic needle, drew a blood sample which, on laboratory analysis, contained about .17% alcohol. Thereafter, petitioner
was convicted in a state court voluntary manslaughter. At his trial, the evidence of the blood test, together with expert
testimony that a person with .17% alcohol in his blood was under the influence of intoxicating liquor, was admitted over
petitioner's objection.
Held: petitioner was not deprived of due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 352 U. S. 433-440.
(a) In a prosecution in a state court for a state crime, the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid the use of evidence obtained
by an unreasonable search and seizure violative of the Fourth Amendment, nor of compelled testimony violative of the Fifth
Amendment, even if the evidence in this case were so obtained. P. 352 U. S. 434.
(b) The taking of a blood test by a skilled technician is not "conduct that shocks the conscience," nor such a method of
obtaining evidence as offends a "sense of justice." Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165, and Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S.
278, distinguished. Pp. 352 U. S. 435-438.
(c) The right of the individual to immunity from such invasion of the body as is involved in a properly safeguarded blood test
is far outweighed by the value of its deterrent effect due to public realization that the issue of driving while under the influence
of alcohol can often by this method be taken out of the confusion of conflicting contentions. Pp. 352 U. S. 439-440.
58 N.M. 385, 271 P.2d 827, affirmed.
6. Martelino v. Alejandrino
In Martelino v. Alejandrino our Supreme Court declared that "the spate of publicity in this case before us did not focus on
the guilt of the petitioners but rather on the responsibility of the Government for what was claimed to be a 'massacre' of
Muslim trainees. If there was 'trial by newspaper' at all, it was not of the petitioners but of the Government. Absent here is a
showing of failure of the court martial to protect the accused from massive publicity encouraged by those connected with the
conduct of the trial either by a failure to control the release of information or to remove the trial to another venue or to
postpone it until the deluge of prejudicial publicity shall have subsided."
7. Pesigan v. Angeles
In the interesting case of Pesigan v. Angeles the carabaos plaintiffs were taking from Camarines Sur to Batangas were
confiscated in Camarines Norte pursuant to Executive Order No. 626-A prohibiting transporting of carabaos from one
province to another. Plaintiffs sued for the recovery of the animals and for damages. The Supreme Court held that the
executive order should not have been enforced against them on April 2, 1982, because it was published only in the Official
Gazette dated June 14,1982, more than twomonthslater. The penal regulation became effective only after 15 days from June
14, 1982, under Article 2 of the Civil Code and Section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Case Digest
FACTS:Petitioners Anselmo and Marcelino Pesigan, carabao dealers, transported in a 10-wheeler truck in April 1982, 26
carabaos and a calf, from Camarines Sur to Batangas. Despite the health certificate, permit to transport, and certificate of
inspection issued to them by the provincial veterinarian, provincial commander and constabulary command, respectively,
while petitioners were negotiating the town of Basud, Camarines Norte, the carabaos were confiscated by private respondents,
Police Station Commander Lt. Zanarosa, and provincial veterinarian Dr. Miranda. The confiscation was based on Executive
Order 626-A which prohibited the transport of carabaos from one province to another. Pursuant to EO 626-A, Dr Miranda
distributed the carabaos to 25 farmers of Basud. Petitioners filed for recovery of the carabaos and damages, against private
respondent Judge Angeles who heard the case in Daet and later transferred to Caloocan City, and dismissed the case for lack of
cause of action.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 626-A be enforced before its publication in the Official Gazette.
HELD: Said executive order should not be enforced against the Pesigans on April 2, 1982 because, as already noted, it is a
penal regulation published more than two months later in the Official Gazette dated June 14, 1982. It became effective only
fifteen days thereafter as provided in article 2 of the Civil Code and section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code.
The word "laws" in article 2 (article 1 of the old Civil Code) includes circulars and regulations which prescribe penalties.
Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the regulations and make the said penalties binding on the
persons affected thereby.
8. People v. Veridiano
The above ruling was amended five months later in the case of People v. Veridiano involving the issuance of a bouncing
check in May 1979 allegedly in violation of BP 22 as published in the Official Gazette dated April 9,1979. The Solicitor
General argued that the law became effective 15 days from the said date as, according to Section 11 of the Revised
Administrative Code, the Gazette is conclusively presumed to be published on the day indicated, therein as the date of issue.
However, the accused obtained a certification from the Government Printing Office that the said issue was "officially released
for circulation on June 14, 1979." The Supreme Court held that the law became effective 15 days from the date of release, i.e.,
June 14, 1979, which it considered the date of publication. The dismissal of the charge was affirmed.
Case Digest
Issue: w/n BP 22 which was circulated a month after private respondent issued the dishonored check is applicable
Facts: On 2nd week of May in 1979, private respondent Benito Go Bio Jr. issued a check amounting to P200,000 to one
Filipinas Tan. Said check was subsequently dishonored and despite repreated demands, the respondent failed to make the
necessary payment hence the filing of charges against him for violation of BP 22 or the Bouncing Check law.
Go Bio filed a Motion to Quash alleging that the information did not charge an offense on ground that BP 22 has not yet taken
effect when the offense was committed on May 1979. Said law took into effect on June 29, 1979. The prosecution opposed the
motion and contended that the date of the dishonor of the check -- September 26, 1979, is the date of the commission of the
offense, hence BP 22 is applicable.
The respondent judge granted Go Bio's motion and dismissed the criminal action. Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that
BP 22 was published in the Official Gazette on April 4, 1979, and hence became effective 15 days thereafter or on April 24,
1979. PR contends however that said publication was only released on June 14, 1979 but since the questioned check was
issued about the second week of May 1979, then he could not have violated BP 22 because it was not yet released for
circulation at the time.
Issue: W/N BP 22 was already in effect when the offense was committed
HELD: NO. It is proved that the penal statute in question was made public or circulated only on June 14, 1979 and not on its
printed date of April 9, 1979. Publication of the law is necessary so that the public can be apprised of the contents and or
penalties of a penal statute before it can be bound by it. If a statute had not been published before its violation, then in the eyes
of the law there was no such law to be violated. Hence, the accused could not have committed the alleged crime. When the
alleged offense was committed there was still no law penalizing it.
The term "publication" in BP 22 must be given the ordinary accepted meaning -- or to make known to the people in general.
Moreover, if BP 22 intended to make the printed date of issue of the Gazette as the point of reference in the determination of
its the effectivity, it could have provided a special effectivity provision.
9. Tunada v. Tuvera
The ambiguity of the original decision of Tanada v. Tuvera was finally clarified in the resolution17 of the motion for
reconsideration where the Supreme Court unanimously declared that the laws, presidential decrees and other executive
issuances intended to have the force of law should first be published in the Official Gazette (and not elsewhere) before they
may become effective fifteen days after publication, unless a different period is prescribed.
10. US v. Tan Teng

In U.S. v. Tan Teng for example, where a person charged with rape was examined for gonorrhea, which might have been
transmitted to the victim, the Supreme Court held the examination to be valid, saying it was no different from examining his
fingerprints or other parts or features of his body for identification purposes.
Case Digest
Facts: The defendant herein raped Oliva Pacomio, a seven-year-old girl. Tan Teng was gambling near the house of the victim
and it was alleged that he entered her home and threw the victim on the floor and place his private parts over hers. Several
days later, Pacomio was suffering from a disease called gonorrhea. Pacomio told her sister about what had happened and
reported it to the police.
Tan Teng was called to appear in a police line-up and the victim identified him. He was then stripped of his clothing and was
examined by a policeman. He was found to have the same symptoms of gonorrhea. The policeman took a portion of the
substance emitting from the body of the defendant and turned it over to the Bureau of Science. The results showed that the
defendant was suffering from gonorrhea.
The lower court held that the results show that the disease that the victim had acquired came from the defendant herein. Such
disease was transferred by the unlawful act of carnal knowledge by the latter. The defendant alleged that the said evidence
should be inadmissible because it was taken in violation of his right against self-incrimination.
Issue: Whether or Not the physical examination conducted was a violation of the defendants rights against self-incrimination.
Held: The court held that the taking of a substance from his body was not a violation of the said right. He was neither
compelled to make any admissions or to answer any questions. The substance was taken from his body without his objection
and was examined by competent medical authority.
The prohibition of self-incrimination in the Bill of Rights is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communications from him, and not an exclusion of his body as evidence, when it may be material. It would be the same as if
the offender apprehended was a thief and the object stolen by him may be used as evidence against him.
11. Villaflor v. Summers

A similar ruling was announced in the case of Villaflor v. Summers involving the examination of a woman accused of
adultery to ascertain if she was pregnant.
Case Digest
Facts: In a criminal case pending before the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, Emeteria Villaflor and Florentino
Souingco were charged with the crime of adultery. On trial before the Hon. Pedro Concepcion, Judge of First Instance, upon
the petition of the assistant fiscal for the city of Manila, the court ordered Emeteria Villaflor to submit her body to the
examination of one or two competent doctors to determine if she was pregnant or not. Villaflor refused to obey the order on
the ground that such examination of her person was a violation of the constitutional provision in contempt of court and was
ordered to be committed to Bilibid Prison until she should permit the medical examination required by the court. Villaflor filed
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Issue: Whether the compelling of a woman to permit her body to be examined by physicians to determine if she is pregnant,
violates that portion of our Code of Criminal Procedure, providing that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself.
Held: Obviously a stirring plea can be made showing that under the due process of law clause of the Constitution every
person has a natural and inherent right to the possession and control of his own body. It is extremely abhorrent to one's sense
of decency and propriety to have to decide that such inviolability of the person, particularly of a woman, can be invaded by
exposure to another's gaze. To compel any one, and especially a woman, to lay bare the body, or to submit to the touch of a
stranger, without lawful authority, is an indignity, an assault, and a trespass. However, between a sacrifice of the ascertainment
of truth to personal considerations, between a disregard of the public welfare for refined notions of delicacy, law and justice
cannot hesitate. Fully conscious that the Court is resolving a most extreme case in a sense, which on first impression is a shock
to one's sensibilities, it must nevertheless enforce the constitutional provision in this jurisdiction in accord with the policy and
reason thereof, undeterred by merely sentimental influences. Once again the Court lays down the rule that the constitutional
guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition
against compulsory testimonial selfincrimination. The corollary to the proposition is that, on a proper showing and under an
order of the trial court, an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible. The proviso is that torture or force shall
be avoided. Whether facts fall within or without the rule with its corollary and proviso must, of course, be decided as cases
arise. It is a reasonable presumption that in an examination by reputable and disinterested physicians due care will be taken not
to use violence and not to embarrass the patient any more than is absolutely necessary. Indeed, no objection to the physical
examination being made by the family doctor of the accused or by doctor of the same sex can be seen.
12. Holt v. US
The Supreme Court quoted Justice Holmes in the case of Holt v. United States where he said: "The prohibition of compelling
a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material."
13. Beltran v Samson

CRUZ CITATION:
Scope of the Privilege of the Right Against Self Incrimination
Prohibition against self-incrimination also protects the accused against any attempt to compel to furnish a specimen of his
handwriting in connection with his prosecution for falsification, as held in Beltran v Samson.
The Supreme Court here said: Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hand, or the fingers, because it
requires the application of intelligence and attention; and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish
a means to determine whether or not he is the falsifier
DIGEST
FACTS:
Francisco Beltran filed a writ of prohibition, contending that Judge Felix Samson ordered him to appear before the Provincial
Fiscal of Isabela to take dictations in his own handwriting from the latter. The fiscal to compare Beltran's handwriting and to
determine if it was he who wrote certain documents supposedly falsified.
ISSUE:
Whether the writing from the fiscal's dictation by Beltran for the purpose of comparing the latter's handwriting and
determining whether he wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified, constitutes evidence against himself within the
scope and meaning of the constitutional provision (i.e. "Nor shall he be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself.").
HELD:
As to its scope, this privilege is not limited precisely to testimony, but extends to all giving or furnishing of evidence. Writing
is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it
requires the application of intelligence and attention; and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish
a means to determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states.
The present case is more serious than that of compelling the production of documents or chattels, because here the witness is
compelled to write and create, by means of the act of writing, evidence which does not exist, and which may identify him as
the falsifier.
It cannot be contended in the present case that if permission to obtain a specimen of the petitioner's handwriting is not granted,
the crime would go unpunished. Considering the circumstance that the petitioner is a municipal treasurer, it should not be a
difficult matter for the fiscal to obtained genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to obtain
specimen or specimens without resorting to the means complained herein, that is no reason for trampling upon a personal right
guaranteed by the constitution. It might be true that in some cases criminals may succeed in evading the hand of justice, but
such cases are accidental and do not constitute the raison d' etre of the privilege. This constitutional privilege exists for the
protection of innocent persons.
The Court ordered the respondents to desist and abstain absolutely and forever from compelling the petitioner to comply with
the order.
14. Chavez v Court of Appeals

CRUZ CITATION
When is the right against self-incrimination available
In Chavez v. Court of Appeals, the prosecutor called on one of the accused, the petitioner herein, as his first witness. The
petitioner demurred, invoking his right against self-incrimination, but was finally compelled to testify under pressure from the
court. Convicted on the strength of testimony elicited from him as the "star witness for the prosecution," in the words of the
judge, he filed a petition for habeas corpus. The Supreme Court granted the writ, declaring inter alia through Justice Sanchez:
Petitioner is a defendant in a criminal case. He was called by the prosecution as the first witness in that case to testify for the
People during the first day of trial thereof. Petitioner objected and invoked the privilege of self-incrimination. This he
broadened by the clear cut statement that he will not testify. But petitioner's protestations were met with the judge's emphatic
statement that it is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on the witness-stand including the accused, and
that defense counsel could not object to have the accused called on the witness stand. The cumulative impact of all these is
that accused-petitioner had to take the stand. He was thus peremptorily asked to create evidence against himself. The
foregoing situation molds a solid case for petitioner, backed by the Constitution, the law and jurisprudence.
Petitioner, as accused, occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness. Whereas an ordinary witness may be
compelled to take the witness stand and claim the privilege as each question requiring an incriminating answer is shot at him,
an accused may altogether refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to answer any and all questions. For, in reality, the
purpose of calling an accused as a witness for the People would be to incriminate him. The rule positively intends to avoid and
prohibit the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction."
DIGEST
FACTS:
Judgment of conviction was for qualified theft of a motor vehicle (a thunderbird car together with accessories). An information
was filed against the accused together with other accused that they conspired, with intent to gain and abuse of confidence
without the consent of owner Dy Lim, took the vehicle. All the accused plead not guilty. During the trial, the fiscal Grecia
(prosecution) asked roger Chavez to be the first witness. Counsel of the accused opposed. Fiscal Grecia contends that the
accused (Chavez) will only be an ordinary witness not a state witness. Counsel of accused answer that it will only incriminate
his client. But the judge ruled in favor of the fiscal.
Petitioner was convicted.
ISSUE:
Whether or not constitutional right of Chavez against self incrimination had been violated to warrant writ of Habeas
Corpus?
HELD:
YES. Petitioner was forced to testify to incriminate himself, in full breach of his constitutional right to remain silent. It cannot
be said now that he has waived his right. He did not volunteer to take the stand and in his own defense; he did not offer
himself as a witness;
Juxtaposed with the circumstances of the case heretofore adverted to, make waiver a shaky defense. It cannot stand. If, by his
own admission, defendant proved his guilt, still, his original claim remains valid. For the privilege, we say again, is a rampart
that gives protection even to the guilty
15. Miranda v Arizona

CRUZ CITATION
In the landmark case of Miranda v. Arizona, the US Supreme Court declared through Chief Justice Earl Warren:
Our holding will be spelled out with some specificity in the pages which follow but briefly stated it is this: the prosecution
may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it
demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incriminations.
By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. As for the procedural safe guards to be
employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused-persons of their right of silence and to assure a
continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must be
warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he
has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.
The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If,
however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking
there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be
interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some
statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted
with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned.
DIGEST
FACTS:
The Supreme Courts decision in Miranda v. Arizona addressed four different cases involving custodial interrogations. In each
of these cases, the defendant was questioned by police officers, detectives, or a prosecuting attorney in a room in which he
was cut off from the outside world. In none of these cases was the defendant given a full and effective warning of his rights at
the outset of the interrogation process. In all the cases, the questioning elicited oral admissions and, in three of them, signed
statements that were admitted at trial.
1. Miranda v. Arizona:
Miranda was arrested at his home and taken in custody to a police station where he was identified by the complaining witness.
He was then interrogated by two police officers for two hours, which resulted in a signed, written confession. At trial, the oral
and written confessions were presented to the jury. Miranda was found guilty of kidnapping and rape and was sentenced to 20-
30 years imprisonment on each count. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona held that Mirandas constitutional rights were
not violated in obtaining the confession.
2. Vignera v. New York:

Vignera was picked up by New York police in connection with the robbery of a dress shop that had occurred three days prior.
He was first taken to the 17th Detective Squad headquarters. He was then taken to the 66th Detective Squad, where he orally
admitted the robbery and was placed under formal arrest. He was then taken to the 70th Precinct for detention, where he was
questioned by an assistant district attorney in the presence of a hearing reporter who transcribed the questions and answers. At
trial, the oral confession and the transcript were presented to the jury. Vignera was found guilty of first degree robbery and
sentenced to 30-60 years imprisonment. The conviction was affirmed without opinion by the Appellate Division and the Court
of Appeals.
3. Westover v. United States:

Westover was arrested by local police in Kansas City as a suspect in two Kansas City robberies and taken to a local police
station. A report was also received from the FBI that Westover was wanted on a felony charge in California. Westover was
interrogated the night of the arrest and the next morning by local police. Then, FBI agents continued the interrogation at the
station. After two-and-a-half hours of interrogation by the FBI, Westover signed separate confessions, which had been
prepared by one of the agents during the interrogation, to each of the two robberies in California. These statements were
introduced at trial. Westover was convicted of the California robberies and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment on each count.
The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
4. California v. Stewart:
In the course of investigating a series of purse-snatch robberies in which one of the victims died of injuries inflicted by her
assailant, Stewart was identified as the endorser of checks stolen in one of the robberies. Steward was arrested at his home.
Police also arrested Stewarts wife and three other people who were visiting him. Stewart was placed in a cell, and, over the
next five days, was interrogated on nine different occasions. During the ninth interrogation session, Stewart stated that he had
robbed the deceased, but had not meant to hurt her. At that time, police released the four other people arrested with Stewart
because there was no evidence to connect any of them with the crime. At trial, Stewarts statements were introduced. Stewart
was convicted of robbery and first-degree murder and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of California reversed, holding
that Stewart should have been advised of his right to remain silent and his right to counsel.
ISSUES:
Whether statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial police interrogation are admissible against
him in a criminal trial and whether procedures which assure that the individual is accorded his privilege under the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate himself are necessary.
HELD:
The Court held that there can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege is available outside of criminal court
proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way
from being compelled to incriminate themselves. As such, the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards
effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way.
The Court further held that without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused
of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individuals will to resist and to compel him
to speak where he would otherwise do so freely. Therefore, a defendant must be warned prior to any questioning that he has
the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence
of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Arizona in Miranda, reversed the judgment of the New
York Court of Appeals in Vignera, reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Westover, and
affirmed the judgment of the Supreme Court of California in Stewart.
16. Gideon v Wainwright

CRUZ CITATION
Inspired by Miranda v Arizona and the earlier decisions of the same court in Gideon v. Wainwright and Escobedo v. Illinois,
our Bill of Rights now provides in Section 12 for the several rights available to the person facing custodial investigation.
DIGEST
FACTS:
Clarence Earl Gideon was a man with an eighth-grade education who ran away from home when he was in middle school. He
spent much of his early adult life as a drifter, spending time in and out of prisons for nonviolent crimes.
Gideon was charged with breaking and entering with the intent to commit a misdemeanor, which is a felony under Florida law.
At trial, Gideon appeared in court without an attorney. In open court, he asked the judge to appoint counsel for him because
he could not afford an attorney. The trial judge denied Gideons request because Florida law only permitted appointment of
counsel for poor defendants charged with capital offenses.
At trial, Gideon represented himself he made an opening statement to the jury, cross-examined the prosecutions witnesses,
presented witnesses in his own defense, declined to testify himself, and made arguments emphasizing his innocence. Despite
his efforts, the jury found Gideon guilty and he was sentenced to five years imprisonment.
Gideon sought relief from his conviction by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Florida Supreme Court. In his
petition, Gideon challenged his conviction and sentence on the ground that the trial judges refusal to appoint counsel violated
Gideons constitutional rights. The Florida Supreme Court denied Gideons petition.
Gideon next filed a handwritten petition in the Supreme Court of the United States. The Court agreed to hear the case to
resolve the question of whether the right to counsel guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution applies to
defendants in state court.
ISSUE:
A prior decision of the Courts, Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), held that the refusal to appoint counsel for an indigent
defendant charged with a felony in state court did not necessarily violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court granted Gideons petition for a writ of certiorari that is, agreed to hear Gideons case and review the
decision of the lower court in order to determine whether Betts should be reconsidered.
HELD:
Reversed and remanded. Court unanimously overruled Betts v. Brady.
The Sixth Amendments guarantee of counsel is a fundamental right essential to a fair trial and, as such, applies the states
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In overturning Betts, Justice Black stated that reason and
reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person hauled into court, who is too
poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. He further wrote that the noble ideal
of fair trials before impartial tribunals in which ever defendant stands equal before the law cannot be realized if the poor
man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him.
17. Escobedo v Illinois

CRUZ CITATION See citation for Gideon v Wainwright
DIGEST
FACTS:
After being arrested and taken into police custody as a suspect in the murder of his brother-in-law, the petitioner asked to
speak to his attorney. His attorney arrived at police headquarters soon after the petitioner did and was not allowed to speak to
his client as the officers said they had not completed questioning. The petitioner also was not warned of his right to remain
silent before the interrogation. He was convicted of murder and the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed. He was then granted
certiorari.
ISSUE:
If a suspect has been taken into police custody and interrogated by police without their request to see an attorney being
honored, nor being advised of their right to remain silent, have they been denied effective assistance of counsel under the
Sixth Amendment?
HELD:
Yes. Reverse the petitioners conviction and remand the case.
The Sixth Amendment protects the right to effective assistance of counsel. Here, because the police investigation focused on
the accused as a suspect rather than a less specific investigation, refusing to allow an accused to speak with his attorney is a
denial of this Sixth Amendment right. The incriminating statements he made must thus not be admitted into evidence.
A law enforcement system that relies too much on the confession is more subject to abuses than one that depends on evidence
obtained through skillful investigation. The result here recognizes this idea.
DISSENT:
Justice John Marshall Harlan dissented on grounds that this result will place obstacles in the way of legitimate methods of
criminal law enforcement. Also, he thought Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958) demanded a different result.
Justice Potter Stewart believed that the right to assistance of counsel should not arise until indictment or arraignment, and that
this contrary result would cause problems for fair administration of criminal justice.
Justice Byron White expressed the opinion that this result would make statements made to police inadmissible without the
accused waiving their right to counsel. He believed this would effectively render the voluntariness test of the Fourteenth
Amendment useless, and make law enforcement more difficult.
18. People v Buscato

CRUZ CITATION
More protection is thus accorded the suspect who otherwise could be easily pressured, by physical force or other forms of
compulsion, including the condition of being held incommunicado or in solitary confinement or being held in secret detention
places and thus unable to seek the advice and moral support of counsel, into making damaging confessions.
In People v. Buscato, the accused were convicted on the basis of extrajudicial confessions extracted through their maltreatment
during their custodial investigation from January 15 to 18, 1973. Their conviction was reversed on the ground that the
physical, mental and moral coercion exerted upon them rendered the confessions inadmissible as contrary to the right against
self-incrimination.
19. People v Bagasala

CRUZ CITATION People v Bagasala was quoted in People v Buscato
The Court quoted from People v. Bagasala, where Justice Fernando declared:
It is likewise timely to impress anew on police officials that the imperative requirements of truth and humanity condemn the
utilization of force and violence to extract confessions from unwilling victims. Crimes must be punished and the guilty must
not be allowed to escape. A desirable end cannot, however, be attained by unconstitutional means. There should be less than
full respect for the law if in the process of enforcing it lawless methods are employed.
DIGEST
FACTS:
2AM, Macario Ongkit and wife, Juliana, awoke when they heard the barking of their dog. Tomas Bagasala, Juanito Bagasala,
and three other men broke into their house. An altercation ensued, causing the head injury to Macario (by Juan) and the death
of Juliana (beaten up by Juanito with an iron pipe). Macario then told the Philippine Constabulary that the perpetrators were
Tomas and Juanito Bagasala, who were brought to the hospital where Macario was and was readily identified by him.
Juanito Bagasala then extra judicially confessed under oath that he was among the group of five persons who went into the
house of the Ongkit spouses precisely for taking away the palay therein. That admission, along with the testimony of Macario,
led the lower court to convict Juanito and Tomas Bagasala for the crime of robbery with homicide and serious physical injuries
and sentenced them to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. During appeal, Tomas escaped from prison, thus forfeiting his right to
the said appeal.
ISSUE:
W/N Juanito Bagasala should be acquitted because of the inadmissibility of his extrajudicial confession.
HELD:
NO. If Bagasalas conviction were predicated solely on the confession, he would be entitled to acquittal, his attack on its
voluntary character having support in the evidence of record (it was shown that he was beaten up by the police officers while
he was being questioned in jail). A conviction resting on such proof, and such proof alone, certainly cannot be allowed to
stand.
Nonetheless, a reversal is not called for, as there is sufficient basis for the finding of guilt as the testimonial evidence is
sufficiently weighty and his defense of alibi utterly unconvincing. In the light of the foregoing, the guilt of the accused having
been demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt, the inadmissibility of the confession extorted from Juanito could not justify a
reversal of his conviction.
There is, in the Constitution, a safeguard against the disclosure of incriminating facts. It does not bar the conviction of an
accused on a voluntary extrajudicial statement. Certainly, however, where the confession is involuntary being due to
maltreatment or induced by fear or intimidation, there is a violation of this constitutional provision. Any form of coercion
whether physical, mental, or emotional thus stamps it with inadmissibility. What is essential for its validity is that it proceeds
from the free will of the person confessing. This is the prevailing principle even prior to the Constitution.
Involuntary confessions are rejected by all courts by some on the ground that a concession so obtained is unreliable and by
some on the grounds of humanitarian principles which abhor all forms of torture or unfairness toward the accused in criminal
proceedings. But either theory arrives at the same goal. Such a confession is not legal evidence and must be rejected. If the
accused satisfactorily shows that it was made involuntarily, the confessions stand discredited in the eyes of the law and is a
thing which never existed.
The provision that no one is bound to criminate himself is older than the Government of the United States. At an early day it
became a part of the common law of England. It was established on the grounds of public policy and humanityof policy,
because if the party were required to testify, it would place the witness under the strongest temptation to commit the crime of
perjury, and of humanity, because it would prevent the exhorting of confessions by duress.
It is likewise timely to impress anew on police officials that the imperative requirements of truth and of humanity condemn the
utilization of force and violence to extract confessions from unwilling victims. Crime must be punished and the guilty must
not be allowed to escape. A desirable end cannot, however, be attained by unconstitutional means. There should be less than
full respect for the law if in the process of enforcing it lawless methods are employed. The Supreme Court manifests in the
strongest possible language its abhorrence for the employment of force to compel a person to sign a statement acknowledging
guilt. A decent regard for the dignity that attaches to every human being as such will be satisfied with nothing less.
20. People v Ramos, 122 SCRA 312

CRUZ CITATION
Likewise excluded in the case of People v. Ramos were the admissions of the accused during his custodial investigation.
Although there was evidence that he had been apprised of his rights under this provision, the Court observed that "appellant
has only finished Grade VI, which means that he is not adequately educated to understand fully and fairly the significance of
his constitutional rights to silence and to counsel. As mandated it is not enough that the police investigator merely inform him
of his constitutional right to silence and to counsel, and then taking statements down, the interrogating officer must have
patience in explaining these rights to him. The records do not reveal that these requirements have been fully complied with,
nor was there any showing that appellant has been represented by counsel during custodial investigation." The conviction was
reversed.
DIGEST
FACTS:
The police officers, placed Malcon Olevere under arrest after they found in his possession dried marijuana leaves, which the
suspect declared that he bought the recovered marijuana leaves from one Rogelio Ramos. Mr. Ramos was arrested and place
under custodial investigation by the Drug Enforcement Section of the WPD.
Malcon Olevere executed a written sworn statement implicating the accused as the source of the marijuana leaves The
accused, allegedly, verbally admitted for the commission of the offense charged
Court of First Instance of Manila found the accused appellant Ramos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in
view of the verbal admission given by the appellant himself and the evidence offered and admitted in court
[DIGEST FOUND ONLINE WAS INCOMPLETE)
21. People v Galit

Cruz (2007) Citation
In People v. Galit, the Supreme Court reiterated Morales v. Enrile36 concerning the treatment of a person under custodial
investigation. The confession was rejected because of the proven torture inflicted on the accused. Moreover, before his
interrogation, he was informed of his rights in a lengthy statement followed by the question of whether hewas ready to make
his statement, to which he replied: "Opo." According to Justice Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr., "Such a long question, followed
by a monosyllabic answer does not satisfy the requirements of the law that the accused be informed ofhis rights."
Case Digest
Facts: In the morning of 23 August 1917, Mrs. Natividad Fernando, a widow, was found dead in the bedroom of her house
located at Barrio Geronimo, Montalban, Rizal, as a result of 7 wounded inflicted upon different parts of her body by a blunt
instrument. More than 2 weeks thereafter, police authorities of Montalban picked up Francisco Galit, an ordinary construction
worker (pion) living in Marikina, Rizal, or suspicion of the murder. On the following day, however, 8 September 1977, the
case was referred to the Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 20 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) for further investigation in view of the alleged limited facilities of the Montalban police station. Accordingly, Galit was
brought to the NBI where he was investigated by a team headed by NBI Agent Carlos Flores. NBI Agent Flores conducted a
preliminary interview of the suspect who allegedly gave evasive answers to his questions. But the following day, 9 September
1977, Francisco Galit allegedly voluntarily executed a Salaysay admitting participation in the commission of the crime. He
implicated Juling Dulay and Pabling Dulay as his companions in the crime. Actually, Galit had been obtained and interrogated
almost continuously for 5 days, to no avail as he consistently maintained his innocence. The investigating officers began to
maul him and to torture him physically. They covered his face with a rag and pushed his face into a toilet bowl full of human
waste. With Galit's will having been broken, he admitted what the investigating officers wanted him to admit and he signed
the confession they prepared. Galit was charged with the Crime of Robbery with Homicide, in an information filed before the
Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal. Trial was held, and on 11 August 1978, immediately after the accused had terminated
the presentation of his evidence, the trial judge dictated his decision on the case in open court, finding Galit guilty as charged
and sentencing him to suffer the death penalty; to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of P110,000.00, and to pay the
costs. Hence, the automatic review.
Issue: Whether a monosyllabic answer to a long question suffices as a voluntary admission that may be used against the
accused.
Held: As held in Morales vs. Ponce Enrile, "At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to
inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him. The
person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient
means by telephone if possible or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it
that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the
person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by
anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of
counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole
or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence." Herein, there were no eyewitnesses, no property recovered from the accused, no
state witnesses, and not even fingerprints of the accused at the scene of the crime. The only evidence against Galit is his
alleged confession. A long question followed by a monosyllabic answer does not satisfy the requirements of the law that the
accused be informed of his rights under the Constitution and our laws. Instead there should be several short and clear
questions and every right explained in simple words in a dialect or language known to the person under investigation. Galit is
from Samar and there is no showing that he understands Tagalog. Moreover, at the time of his arrest, Galit was not permitted
to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or a friend. In fact, his sisters and other relatives did not know that he had been
brought to the NBI for investigation and it was only about two weeks after he had executed the salaysay that his relatives were
allowed to visit him. His statement does not even contain any waiver of right to counsel and yet during the investigation he
was not assisted by one. At the supposed reenactment, again Galit was not assisted by counsel of his choice. These constitute
gross violations of his rights. Trial courts are cautioned to look carefully into the circumstances surrounding the taking of any
confession, especially where the prisoner claims having been maltreated into giving one. Where there is any doubt as to the
voluntariness, the same must be rejected in toto.
22. Morales v. Enrile

Same as with People v. Galit
Case Digest
FACTS:
On April 21, 1982, the petitioners were arrested by elements of Task Force Makabansa of the AFP. Since then, they have been
under detention. Petitioners filed with this Court a petition for habeas corpus. Subsequently, on July 20, 1982, they were
charged with rebellion before the Court of First Instance of Rizal which was filed by the City Fiscal of Quezon City. The trial
of the case has yet to be terminated.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners continued detention is legal.
HELD:
Yes. Their continued detention is legal for the reason that a proper case of rebellion had been filed against them in the proper
court and the trial has yet to be terminated.
Although martial law was terminated on Jan 17, 1981 by the President, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus continues to
be suspended in all other places with respect to certain offenses such as rebellion or insurrection, subversion, conspiracy or
proposal to commit such crimes, among others. Thus the right to bail is also suspended.
The petitions are without merit and hereby dismissed.
23. People v. Pecardal

In People v. Pecardal, the Supreme Court said: We note that at the time the accused-appellant was apprehended and
interrogated, he was only seventeen years old. That is a susceptible age. One can accept how easily a teenager can succumb to
the pressure exerted upon him by hardened investigators experienced in extracting confessions through the use of methods less
than legal. That pressure was in this case irresistible.
24. People v. Capitin

And in People v. Capitin, it was held:The confession was completely inadmissible because it was taken without observance of
the safeguards provided by the Bill of Rights for the protection of the suspect facing custodial investigation. A reading of the
supposed confession shows there was the usual mechanical advise of the suspect's rights, including the right to assistance of
counsel, followed by the sacramental query as to whether or not she was waiving her right to such assistance, followed by the
stereotyped answer so familiar in statements of this nature. As unacceptable as the question was, the answer thereto was no
less so and could not have been possibly composed by the accused-appellant in her state of mind at the time and given her
limited knowledge of Tagalog... It is not believablethat the organized and ready answer, with all its legal overtones, could have
come fromthis 22-yearold housemaid,who on top other deficiencies in the language (and the law), was presumably not
thinking clearly then (even assuming she was sane) because she had just killed her child and was under strong emotional
stress. If confessions written in advance by the policefor persons of limited intelligence or educational attainment have been
outlawed, the same disapprobation applies where a confession was signed by a person whose sanity was dubious, where the
intelligence was not only limited but impaired.
25. People v. Barros

It is worth noting that in People v. Barros, the Court made the salutary reminder that swearing officers should
have the confessants physically examined by independent doctors before administering the oath, to discourage at
tempts to secure confessions through violence.
26. People v. Cabrera
One such confession was rejected in People v. Cabrera on the strength of the medical evidence of the defendants' man
handling by the police authorities.
27. People v. Macam

In People v. Macam, Justice Camilo D. Quiason said for the Supreme Court: In Gamboa v. Cruz, 162 SCRA 642 (1988), we
held that the right to counsel attached upon the start of an investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask
questions to elicit information, confessions or admissions from the accused (See also People v.Dimaano, 209 SCRA
809[1992]). Historically, the counsel guarantee was intended to assure the assistance of counsel at the trial,inasmuch as the
accused was "confronted with both the intricacies of the law and the advocacy of the public prosecutor." However, as a result
of the changes in patterns of police investigation, today's accused confronts both expert adversaries and the judicial system
well before his trial begins (Citations omitted). It is therefore appropriate to extend the counsel guarantee to critical stages of
prosecution even before the trial.
The law enforcement machinery at present involves critical confrontations of the accused by the prosecution at pre-trial pro
ceedings "where the result might well settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality." A police line-up
is considered a "critical'' stage ofthe proceedings (Citations omitted). After the start of the custodial investigation, any
identification of an uncounseled accused made in a police line-up is inadmissible. This is particularly true in the case at bench
where the police officers first talked to victims before the confrontation was held. The circumstances were such as to impart
improper suggestions on the minds of the victims that may lead to a mistakenidentification. Appellants were handcuffed and
had contusions ontheir faces.
Case digest
Facts: Accused was charged and prosecuted for robbery with homicide as guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Defense assails the
court decision contending the constitutional rights of the accused were violated for subjecting them to a police line up at the
hospital where they were identified by the victims without the presence of their counsel and without any warrant.
IssueL Whether or not the constitutional rights of the accused were violated.
Held: Although the accused were arrested without a warrant such defect was cured during the proceeding when the defense
failed to object on the issue during the initial proceedings before the court. Having failed to assail the issue beforehand the
accused is estopped to assail the validity of their arrest as they further voluntarily submitted their self before the court by
entering the plea of not guilty instead of moving to quash the information before the court on ground of an invalid arrest. It is
also held that any identification of an uncounseled accused made in a police line-up is inadmissible. HOWEVER, the
prosecution did not present evidence regarding appellants identification at the line-up. The witnesses identified the accused
again in open court. Also, accused did not object to the in-court identification as being tainted by illegal line-up. The witnesses
and victims positively identified the accused thereby further affirming the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. SC
affirmed the decision of the lower co
28. People v. Lamsing

Without stating reasons, however, the Supreme Court seems to have overturned the above case in People v. Lamsing and
People v. Salvatierra.
29. People v. Salvatierra

Without stating reasons, however, the Supreme Court seems to have overturned the above case in People v. Lamsing and
People v. Salvatierra.
30. De la Torre v. Court of Appeals

In De la Torre v. Court of Appeals, it reiterated the rule in the Gamboa Case that the right to counsel is not available during a
police line-up as this is not considered part of the custodial investigation
31. People v. Compil

In People v. Compil, the accused was upon his arrest in Quezon, where he had fled, subjected by the police to informal
inculpatory interrogation that continued during their trip back to Manila, where his formal investigation was conducted at the
police station. He was not even then assisted by counsel, who arrived the following day. The Supreme Court held that his right
to counsel began when the interrogation started in Quezon. 'The operative act," according to Justice Bellosillo, "is when the
police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect who
has been taken into custody by the police to carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to eliciting incriminatory
statements."
32. People v. Lucero

In People v. Lucero, the counsel de oficio was present at the start of the custodial investigation of the accused but left after a
while to attend the wake of a friend. The next morning, two CIS agents police took Lucero and his signed confession to the
lawyer's house, and the lawyer asked him if he had freely signed it. When the accused said yes, obviously under pressure from
his military escort, the lawyer also signed the confession to authenticate its regularity. The Court rejected the confession,
holding that the Constitution requires not just "any kind of counsel but effective and vigilant counsel."
Case Digest
Facts: Alejandro Lucero, Bienvenido Echavez, Balbino Echavez, Peter Doe, Richard Doe and John Doe were charged with the
crime of robbery with homicide.
The prosecution:
Accused-appellant (alighted from a gray-reddish car), armed with handgun, blocked the way of the said complainant who was
on board a Mercedes Benz passing along Road 14, Mindanao Avenue, Pag-asa, QC, rob and carry away cash money; one gold
necklace with cross pendant, 7 karat; one gold Rolex watch; one 3 karat gold ring; one 2 karat gold ring, domino style; one
solid gold bracelet; all worth P363,600.00, belonging to DR. DEMETRIO Z. MADRID. Accused shot LORENZO
BERNALES y ALERIA, a driver of the said offended party, thus inflicting upon him mortal wounds, which resulted to the
instantaneous death of ALERIA.
Only the accused Echavez brothers and Alejandro Lucero were apprehended.
When Lucero told him that he had no lawyer, in due time, Atty. Diosdado Peralta conferred with Lucero. He apprised Lucero
of his constitutional rights. He observed no reaction from Lucero. Nonetheless, Atty. Peralta gathered the impression that
Lucero understood his advice.
When the investigator started asking the preliminary questions, Atty. Peralta left to attend the wake of his friend. The next
morning, Lucero was accompanied by CIS agents to Atty. Peralta's house. The extrajudicial statement of Lucero was presented
to Atty. Peralta. It was already signed by Lucero.
The three accused denied complicity in the crime charged.
Appellant Lucero's defense is alibi. He testified that he was at his house in Caloocan City.
He said he was surprised when several unidentified men accosted him while he was walking towards his house. They chased
him, handcuffed and blindfolded him and pushed him into a jeep. He was blindfolded the whole night and did not know where
he was taken. The men turned out to be police officers.
The next day, he learned he was in Camp Crame. He claimed that he was tortured. He was not informed of the offense for
which he was being investigated. Neither did they reveal the identity of the complainant.
Lucero denied knowing Dr. Madrid, the Echavez brothers and the other accused in this case. He said he only met Dr. Madrid
at the CIS Office during the police line-up. He was made to line-up four (4) times before Dr. Madrid finally identified him on
the fourth time.
Lucero also claimed he signed the extrajudicial confession under duress. He denied engaging the services of Atty, Peralta. He
likewise confirmed that Atty. Peralta was not present during his actual custodial interrogation.
After trial, the court a quo acquitted the Echavez brothers for insufficient evidence. The trial court, however, convicted
accused Lucero GUILTY as principal by direct participation of Robbery with Homicide and sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment term of RECLUSION PERPETUA.
Issue: Whether or Not the lower court erred in convicting accused-appellant.
Held: Appellant's conviction cannot be based on his extrajudicial confession.
Constitution requires that a person under investigation for the commission of a crime should be provided with counsel. The
Court have constitutionalized the right to counsel because of hostility against the use of duress and other undue influence in
extracting confessions from a suspect. Force and fraud tarnish confessions can render them inadmissible.
The records show that Atty. Peralta, who was not the counsel of choice of appellant. Atty. Peralta himself admitted he received
no reaction from appellant although his impression was that appellant understood him. More so, it was during his absence that
appellant gave an uncounselled confession.
Constitution requires the right to counsel, it did not mean any kind of counsel but effective and vigilant counsel. The
circumstances clearly demonstrate that appellant received no effective counseling from Atty. Peralta.
Whereof, Decision convicting appellant Alejandro Lucero y Cortel is hereby reversed.
33. People v. Suarez

A re-enactment of the crime in the absence of counsel is inadmissible evidence against the accused, according to People v.
Suarez
Case Digest
FACTS: On or about the 8th day of December, 1987 in the Municipality of Pasig, Estrelita Guzman was robbed and was killed
in her own house.
Suarez wanted his aunt killed so that he and his wife, Marivic Suarez, also the victims adopted daughter, could get at once
any property that Marivic might inherit from Estrellita upon the latter's death. In exchange for the job, Suarez would allow the
other accused to steal what they wanted from the house, in addition to giving them P100,000.00 after one month from the
killing of Estrellita.
Two of the accused, Reyes and Lara, gave their sworn statement detailing what transpired from the planning until the
execution of the crime.
Relying on the extrajudicial confessions of the accused and on the circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution, the
trial court found Suarez, Reyes and Lara guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide.
While Suarez and Reyes have already accepted the trial court's verdict, Lara now questions the lower court's decision by
challenging the admissibility of their extrajudicial declarations. He claims that their extrajudicial confessions were obtained
through force and intimidation and without the benefit of an effective counsel.
ISSUES: WON accused Laras extrajudicial confessions were freely and voluntary given and without the benefit of an
effective counsel.
HELD: After a thorough review of the records of the case, we agree with the lower court's factual finding and conclusion that
the extrajudicial confessions of accused Reyes and appellant Lara were freely and voluntarily given and that their retraction
and claims of violence and coercion were merely belated contrivances and efforts at exculpation. Their claim that they were
forced to sign their respective statements was sufficiently refuted by the witnesses for the prosecution who were present on the
day and time the duo gave and signed their sworn statements.
We find no merit in herein appellant's contention that Atty. Saunar was not Reyes' own choice as counsel for the interrogation.
While the initial choice of the lawyer in cases where a person under custodial investigation cannot afford the services of a
lawyer is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the accused really has the final choice as he may reject the counsel
chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where he
never raised any objection against the former's appointment during the course of the investigation and the accused thereafter
subscribes to the veracity of his statement before the swearing officer. 37
Here, while the lawyers of the accused were provided by the NBI, the accused never signified their desire to have a lawyer of
their own choice. Thus, we also disagree with appellant's claim that the lawyer who assisted him in his waiver came in only
after he had executed his waiver. His own statements show that he waived his rights in the presence and with the advice of
Atty. Rodolfo Dahiroc.
34. People v. Bonola

In People v. Bonola, the Supreme Court held as invalid the waiver of the suspect's custodial rights without the assistance of
counsel
35. People v. Andan

Where the suspect's confession was taken by the police before advising him of his custodial rights, the Supreme Court held in
People v. Andan that the evidence against him was inadmissible. Re.: Extrajudicial Confessions to Mayor and Media
Admissible
Case digest
Facts:
Pablito Andan alias "Bobby" was accused of the crime of rape with homicide. The offense was committed on February
19,1994 in Baliuag, Bulacan; the victim being Marianne Guevarra, 22 and a 2nd year student at the Fatima School of
Nursing.On said day, victim left her home for her school dormitory in Valenzuela. While on her way, appellant invited her to
his house. He used the pretext that the blood pressure of his wife's grandmother should be taken. Marianne agreed to do so as
the old woman was her distant relative. She did not know that nobody was inside the house. Appellant then punched her in the
abdomen,brought her to the kitchen and raped her. By night time, Marianne, who was still unconscious, was dragged by
appellant to their backyard that was adjacent to a vacant lot. Appellant was to transfer Marianne to the vacant lot when she
moved, prompting appellant to hit her head with a piece of concrete block. No longer moving, he dragged her to the lot and
abandoned her. At 11am her body was discovered. The autopsy revealed that she died of "traumatic injuries."Marianne's
gruesome death drew public attention and prompted Baliuag Mayor Cornelio Trinidad to form an investigation team. The
investigation pointed to the appellant. Appellant's nearby house was searched but he was not there. On February 24, a police
team led by Mayor Trinidad traced appellant in his parents' house. They took him and brought him to the police headquarters
where he was interrogated. Initially, he denied any knowledge of Marianne's death. However, when the police confronted him
with evidence, appellant relented but implicated two of his neighbours, and that he was merely a lookout. Larin and Dizon
were likewise brought there by the police. The following day a physical examination conducted on the suspects revealed that
appellanthas multiple scratches on the neck, chest and back.By that time, people and media representatives were already at the
police headquarters awaiting the results of theinvestigation. Mayor Trinidad arrived. Upon seeing the mayor, appellant
approached him and whispered that they talk privately.The mayor led him to the office of the Chief of Police and there, he
broke down and said "Mayor, patawarin mo ako! I will tell you the truth. I am the one who killed Marianne." The mayor
opened the door of the room to let the public and media representatives witness the confession. Since no lawyer was available
he ordered the proceedings photographed and videotaped. In the presenceof the mayor, the police, representatives of the media
and appellant's own wife and son, appellant confessed his guilt. He asked for forgiveness from Larin and Dizon whom he
falsely implicated saying he did it because of ill-feelings against them. He also said that the devil entered his mind because of
the pornographic magazines and tabloid he read almost everyday. After his confession,appellant hugged his wife and son and
asked the mayor to help him. His confession was captured on videotape and covered by the media nationwide.On arraignment,
however, appellant entered a plea of "not guilty." He testified that on said date he was at his parent's house for the birthday
party of his nephew. He, his wife and son went home after 5pm, slept at 8pm, and woke up at 6am the nextday. Appellant
claimed that after he was picked up by the police on February 24, he was coerced to confess that he raped and killed Marianne.
Fearing for his life, appellant did as he was told.The trial court convicted the appellant and sentenced him to death. He was
found guilty of the crime charged in the Information (Rape with Homicide) and penalized accordingly. Hence, the automatic
review.
Issue:
W/N the appellants confession not being assisted by a counsel is in violation of the constitution, and is therefore
inadmissible as evidence against him.
Held:
Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that appellant's confession before the mayor is inadmissible. It is
true that a municipal mayor has "operational supervision and control" over the local police and may arguably be deemed a law
enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. However, appellant's
confession to the mayor was not made in response to any interrogation by the latter. In fact, the mayor did not question
appellant at all. No police authority ordered appellant to talk to the mayor. It was appellant himself who spontaneously, freely
and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor did not know that appellant was going to confess his guilt
to him. When appellant talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounseled confession
to him did not violate his constitutional rights. Thus, it has been held that the constitutional procedures on custodial
investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an
ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory
disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of
coercion by the state as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling
the truth. Hence we hold that appellant's confession to the mayor was correctly admitted by the trial court. Appellant's
confessions to the media were likewise properly admitted. The confessions were made in response to questions by news
reporters, not by the police or any other investigating officer. We have held that statements spontaneously made by a suspect to
news reporters on a televised interview are deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence. The Court therefore held
accused-appellant Pablito Andan guilty of the special complex crime of rape with homicide.
36. People v. Serzo

But the right to counsel is not unlimited, according to People v. Serzo where the accused repeatedly asked for postponement of
his trial on the ground that he was still looking for a lawyer de parte. The court should then appoint a counsel de oficio for
him. As Justice Artemio V. Panganiban observed: The right to counsel of an accused is guaranteed by our Constitution, our
laws and our Rules of Court. During custodial investigation, arraignment, trial and even on appeal, the accused is given the
option to be represented by a counsel of his choice. But when he neglects or refuses to exercise this option during arraignment
and trial, the court shall appoint one for him. While the right to be represented by counsel is absolute, the accused's option to
hire one of his own choice is limited. Such option cannot be used to sanction reprehensible dilatory tactics, to trifle with the
Rules or to prejudice the equally important rights of the State and the offended party to speedy and adequate justice.
Subsection 4 is a new provision and was most likely inspiredperhaps "provoked" is the better wordby the widespread
rumors and open complaints during the martial law regime of the many abuses committed by the military, including
hamleting, salvaging, and "zona" operations, which were consistently denied and, during that time, seldom proved. By this
provision, it is hoped that such abuses may be deterred and, if committed, punished with appropriate civil and criminal
sanctions that, besides compensating the victims for their injuries, should also serve as a warning against the repetition of such
acts.
Case digest
Facts:
1. Appellant Mario Serzo was convicted of murder by the lower court for the stabbing/killing of Alfredo Casabal after the
latter rescued minors being held by the former.
2. Pre-trial was waived and the case proceeded to trial on the merits.
3. The accused alleged that he was denied the right to counsel. During the arraignment he appeared without counsel,so the
court appointed a counsel de officio. Thereafter, he moved that the arraignment be reset so he can engage the services of his
own counsel however, during the arraignment, he still appeared without one. The arraignment proceeded with him being
assisted by the counsel de officio.
4. During the trial, the same counsel appeared and cross-examined for the accused.
Issue: Whether or not the accused was denied of his right to counsel
HELD: NO. Herein, the accused was provided with a counsel de officio who assisted him in all stages of the proceedings.The
option to hire ones counsel cannot be used to sanction reprehensible dilatory tactics, trifle with the Rules or prejudice the
equally important right of the State and the offended party to speedy and adequate justice.
The right to counsel is guaranteed by the Constitution to minimize the imbalance in the adversarial system where an accused is
pitted against the awesome prosecution machinery of the state. It is also a recognition of the accused not having the skill to
protect himself before a tribunal which has the power to take his life or liberty.
The right covers the period from custodial investigation until judgment is rendered, even on appeal. RA 7438 provides that any
person arrested or detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel.
The right is however not absolute and is waivable; a) the state must balance the private against the state's and offended party's
equally important rightto speedy and adequate justice, and b) the right is waivable as long as the waiver is unequivocal,
knowing, and intelligently made.
37. Guazon v. De Villa

In Guazon v. De Villa, the petitioners challenged the practice of the military of rounding up the residents in a particular area
and requiring them to line up for inspection, to ferret out fugitives from justice and suspected criminals. The Supreme Court,
rather than addressing the issue frontally, merely remanded the petition to the Regional Trial Courts of Manila, Malabon and
Pasay City, "where the petitioners may present evidence supporting their allegations and where specific erring parties may be
pinpointed and prosecuted." In his dissent, Justice Cruz said in part: The saturation drive is not unfamiliar to us. It is like the
"zona" of the Japanese Occupation. An area was surrounded by soldiers and all residents were flushed out of their houses and
lined up, to be looked over by a person with a bag over his head. This man pointed to suspected guerrillas, who were
immediately arrested and eventually if not instantly executed. To be sure, there are some variations now. The most important
difference is that it is no longer 1943 and the belligerent occupation is over. There is no more war. It is now 1990, when we are
supposed to be under a free Republic and safeguarded by the Bill of Rights. Justice Sarmiento also dissented, observing inter
alia: That "the problem is not initially for the Supreme Court" is to me,an abdication of judicial duty. As I indicated, the
controversy is purely one of lawthe facts being indisputed. Law, needless to say, is the problem of the Supreme Court, not
the Executive. Worse, it is passing the buck. The petitioners, precisely, have a grievance to raise, arising from abuses they
pinpoint to the lower offices of the Executive (which presumably has its imprimatur). To make it an executive problem, so I
hold, is to make the Executive judge and jury of its own acts, and hardly, a neutral arbiter. Under R.A. 7309, victims of unjust
imprisonment, arbitrary or illegal detention, or of violent crimes may file a claim for damages with the Board of Claims under
the Department of Justice. For victims of unjust imprisonment or detention, the award shall be not more than P1,000.00 for
each month of imprisonment. In all other cases, the award shall not exceed P10,000.00 or the expenses incurred for
hospitalization, medical treatment, loss of wage, loss of support or other expenses directly related to the injury, whichever is
lower, without prejudice to the right of the claimant to seek other remedies under existing laws."
Case digest
Facts: The 41 petitioners alleged that the "saturation drive" or "aerial target zoning" that were conducted in their place (Tondo
Manila) were unconstitutional. They alleged that there is no specific target house to be search and that there is no search
warrant or warrant of arrest served. Most of the policemen are in their civilian clothes and without nameplates or identification
cards. The residents were rudely rouse from their sleep by banging on the walls and windows of their houses. The residents
were at the point of high-powered guns and herded like cows. Men were ordered to strip down to their briefs for the police to
examine their tattoo marks. The residents complained that they're homes were ransacked, tossing their belongings and
destroying their valuables. Some of their money and valuables had disappeared after the operation. The residents also reported
incidents of maulings, spot-beatings and maltreatment. Those who were detained also suffered mental and physical torture to
extract confessions and tactical informations. The respondents said that such accusations were all lies. Respondents contends
that the Constitution grants to government the power to seek and cripple subversive movements for the maintenance of peace
in the state. The aerial target zoning were intended to flush out subversives and criminal elements coddled by the communities
were the said drives were conducted. They said that they have intelligently and carefully planned months ahead for the actual
operation and that local and foreign media joined the operation to witness and record such event.
Issue: Whether or Not the saturation drive committed consisted of violation of human rights.
Held: It is not the police action per se which should be prohibited rather it is the procedure used or the methods which "offend
even hardened sensibilities" .Based on the facts stated by the parties, it appears to have been no impediment to securing search
warrants or warrants of arrest before any houses were searched or individuals roused from sleep were arrested. There is no
showing that the objectives sought to be attained by the "aerial zoning" could not be achieved even as th rights of the squatters
and low income families are fully protected. However, the remedy should not be brought by a tazpaer suit where not one
victim complaints and not one violator is properly charged. In the circumstances of this taxpayers' suit, there is no erring
soldier or policeman whom the court can order prosecuted. In the absence of clear facts no permanent relief can be given.
In the meantime where there is showing that some abuses were committed, the court temporary restraint the alleged violations
which are shocking to the senses. Petition is remanded to the RTC of Manila.
38. Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile

It is stressed that Section 13 has reversed Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile by preserving the right to bail even if the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus has been suspended
Case Digest
FACTS:
The case is an application for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus on behalf of 14 detainees. Sabino Padilla and 8 others
out of the 14 detainees were then having a conference in the dining room at Dr. Parong's residence. Prior thereto, all the 14
detainees were under surveillance as they were then identified as members of the Communist Party of the Philippines.
engaging in subversive activities. They were arrested and later transferred to a facility only the PCs know, hence, the present
petition of Josefina, mother of Sabina, for writ of habeas corpus.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the arrests done to the present detainees are valid
HELD:
The suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus raises a political, not a judicial, question and that the right to bail
cannot be invoked during such a period. PD 1836 and LOI 1211 have vested, assuming a law is necessary, in the President the
power of preventive arrest incident to the suspension of the privilege of the writ. In addition, however, it should be noted that
the PCO has been replaced by Preventive Detention Action (PDA) pursuant to PD 1877. As provided for in the said decree, a
PDA constitute an authority to arrest and preventively detain persons committing the aforementioned crimes, for a period of
one year, with the cause or causes of their arrest subjected to review by the President or the by the Review Committee created
for the purpose.
39. Enrile v. Salazar

In the case of Enrile v. Salazar, the petitioners were charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder
allegedly committed in connection with the failed coup d'etat that took place in late 1989. Arrested and detained without bail,
they went to the Supreme Court and inter alia invoked People v. Hernandez, which held that the crime of rebellion could not
be complexed with murder. Simple rebellion is punished only with prision mayor and a P20,000.00 fine and is therefore
bailable. The Court, after giving the petitioners provisional liberty pending resolution of the case, finally ruled that "based on
the doctrine enunciated in the Hernandez Case, the ques tioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the
spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only; hence said petitioners are entitled
Case Digest
Facts:
In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law enforcement
officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau of Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime
Salazar of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal Case No. 9010941.
The warrant had issued on an information signed and earlier that day filed by a panel of prosecutors composed of Senior State
Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr.,
charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with
murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to
December 10, 1990.
Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila, without bail, none having
been recommended in the information and none fixed in the arrest warrant. The following morning, February 28, 1990, he was
brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City where he was given over to the custody of the Superintendent of the
Northern Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres.
On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition for habeas corpus herein (which was
followed by a supplemental petition filed on March 2, 1990), alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights.
Issue:
(a) Whether the petitioner has committed complex crimes (delito compleio) arising from an offense being a necessary means
for committing another, which is referred to in the second clause of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code?
Held:
There is one other reason and a fundamental one at that why Article 48 of the Penal Code cannot be applied in the case at bar.
If murder were not complexed with rebellion, and the two crimes were punished separately (assuming that this could be done),
the following penalties would be imposable upon the movant, namely: (1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding
P20,000 and prision mayor, in the corresponding period, depending upon the modifying circumstances present, but never
exceeding 12 years of prision mayor, and (2) for the crime of murder, reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death,
depending upon the modifying circumstances present. In other words, in the absence of aggravating circumstances, the
extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him. However, under Article 48 said penalty would have to be meted out to him,
even in the absence of a single aggravating circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in conformity with the theory of
the prosecution, would be unfavorable to the movant.
The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist in the statute books, while technically
correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be complexed with other offenses committed on the occasion
thereof, must therefore be dismissed as a mere flight of rhetoric. Read in the context of Hernandez, the information does
indeed charge the petitioner with a crime defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple rebellion.
Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of the Court's reaffirmation of Hernandez as
applicable to petitioner's case, and of the logical and necessary corollary that the information against him should be considered
as charging only the crime of simple rebellion, which is bailable before conviction, that must now be accepted as a correct
proposition. But the question remains: Given the facts from which this case arose, was a petition for habeas corpus in this
Court the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial? The criminal case before the respondent
Judge was the normal venue for invoking the petitioner's right to have provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The
original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said respondent. The correct course was for petitioner to invoke that
jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of the evidence
against him. Only after that remedy was denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have been
invoked, and even then, not without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also available there.
The Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the questioned information filed against
petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only,
hence said petitioners are entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right. The Court's earlier grant of bail to
petitioners being merely provisional in character, the proceedings in both cases are ordered remanded to the respondent Judge
to fix the amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners. Once bail is fixed by said respondent for any of the petitioners, the
corresponding bail bond flied with this Court shall become functus oficio. No pronouncement as to costs.
40. People v. Hernandez

In the case of Enrile v. Salazar, the petitioners were charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder
allegedly committed in connection with the failed coup d'etat that took place in late 1989. Arrested and detained without bail,
they went to the Supreme Court and inter alia invoked People v. Hernandez?4 which held that the crime of rebellion could not
be complexed with murder. Simple rebellion is punished only with prision mayor and a P20,000.00 fine and is therefore
bailable. The Court, after giving the petitioners provisional liberty pending resolution of the case, finally ruled that "based on
the doctrine enunciated in the Hernandez Case, the questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the
spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only; hence said petitioners are entitled
Case digest
1. What happened:
About March 15, 1945, Amado Hernandez and other appellants were accused of conspiring, confederating and cooperating
with each other, as well as with the thirty-one(31) defendants charged in the criminal cases of the Court of First Instance of
Manila. They were accused of being members of PKP Community Party of the Philippines which was actively engaged in an
armed rebellion against the government of the Philippines. With the party of HUKBALAHAP (Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa mga
Hapon), they committed the crime of rebellion causing murder, pillage, looting plunder, etc., enumerated in 13 attacks on
government forces or civilians by HUKS.
2. Crime Committed:
Rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies
3. Contention of the State:
The government, headed by the Solicitor General, argued that the gravity of the crime committed required the denial of bail.
Moreover, the complex crime charged by the government against Hernandez has been successfully imposed with other
arrested communist leaders and was sentenced to life imprisonment.
4. Contention of the Accused:
An appeal prosecuted by the defendants regarding the judgment rendered by the CFI in Manila that rebellion cannot be a
complex crime with murder, arson or robbery.
5. Ruling:
The court ruled that murder, arson, and robbery are mere ingredient of the crime of rebellion as means necessary for the
perpetration of the offense. Such common offense is absorbed or inherent of the crime of rebellion. Inasmuch as the acts
specified in Article 135 constitutes, one single crime it follows that said acts offer no occasion for the application of Article 48
which requires therefore the commission of at least two crimes.***
HERNANDEZ DOCTRINE
: Rebellion cannot be complexed with common crimes such as killings, destruction of property, etc., committed on the
occasion and in furtherance thereof. The thinking is not anymore correct more so that there is no legal basis for such rule now.
Rebellion constitutes ONLY ONE CRIME. ***
41. People v Cortez

In People v. Cortez, the Supreme Court directed that where the accused is convicted of a capital offense or of an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua, his bail shall be canceled and shall be placed in confinement pending the resolution of his
appeal.
42. De La Camara vs. Enage

In the strange case of De la Camara v. Enage, the accused was required by the lower court to post bail in the amount of
PI,195,200.00 to secure his temporary liberty pending his trial for multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder. This was a
clear illustration of giving with one hand and taking with the other, for the defendant did not have the funds for the excessive
bail required. No wonder he escaped.
Case Digest
FACTS:
- Ricardo De la Camara, the Municipal Mayor of Magsaysay, Misamis Oriental, was arrested and detained for his alleged
participation in the killing of 14 and wounding of 12 other laborers.
- De la Camara was charged with multiple frustrated murder and multiple murder.
- He filed an application for bail, which was granted by respondent Judge Manuel Enage for failure of the prosecution to prove
that De la Camara would flee even if he had the opportunity.
- However, the amount of bail was set at P1.2M which the petitioner now contests for being excessive.
- But the instant case became moot and academic with De la Camara escaping from the provincial jail.
- Before conviction, every person is bailable except when charged with capital offenses when the evidence of guilt is strong.
- This right stems from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to loss of freedom
until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
- When the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is excessive.
- Sole function of money bail is to assure the accuseds presence at trial.
- Main takeaway: summary of guidelines on fixing of bail from Justice Sanchezs opinion in Villaseor v. Abano:
1. Ability of the accused to give bail
2. Nature of the offense
3. Penalty for the offense charged
4. Character and reputation of the accused
5. Health of the accused
6. Character and strength of the evidence
7. Probability of the accused appearing in a trial
8. Forfeiture of other bonds
9. Whether the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested
10. If the accused is under bond for appearance at trial in other cases.
- SC held that petitioners subsequent escape cannot be condoned.
That is why he is not entitled to the relief prayed for.
43. Yap v Court of Appeals

In Yap v. Court of Appeals, the respondent court fixed bail for the appellant in the sum of P5,500,000, equivalent to his civil
liability to the complainant as found by the trial court. Applying the rule against excessive bail, the Supreme Court reduced the
amount to P200,000.00, saying that "bail is not intended as a punishment nor as insatisfaction of civil liability which should
necessarily await the judgment of the appellate court."
Case Digest
Facts:
Petitioner Francisco Yap was convicted of the crime of estafa for misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5,500,000.00. After
the records of the case were transmitted to the Court of Appeals, he filed a motion to fix bail pending appeal. The CA granted
the motion and allowed Yap to post bail in the amount of P5,500,000 on condition that he will secure a certification/guaranty
from the Mayor of the place of his residence that he is a resident of the area and that he will remain to be so until final
judgment is rendered or in case he transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the court and private complainant. He
sought the reduction of the bail but it was denied. Hence, he appealed to the SC. He contended that the CA, by setting bail at a
prohibitory amount, effectively denied him his right to bail. He also contests the condition imposed by the CA that he secure a
certification/guaranty, claiming that the same violates his liberty of abode and travel.
Issue:
1. Whether the proposed bail of P5,500,000.00 was violative of petitioner's right against excessive bail.
2. Whether the condition imposed by the CA violative of the liberty of abode and right to travel.
Held:
1. The setting of the amount at P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable, excessive, and constitutes an effective denial of petitioners
right to bail. The purpose for bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the
court. The amount should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when required but no higher than is reasonably
calculated to fulfill this purpose. To fix bail at an amount equivalent to the civil liability of which petitioner is charged (in this
case, P5,500,000.00) is to permit the impression that the amount paid as bail is an exaction of the civil liability that accused is
charged of; this we cannot allow because bail is not intended as a punishment, nor as a satisfaction of civil liability which
should necessarily await the judgment of the appellate court.
2. The right to change abode and travel within the Philippines, being invoked by petitioner, are not absolute rights. Section 6,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution states:
The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful
order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or
public health, as may be provided by law.
The order of the Court of Appeals releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as contemplated by the above
provision. The condition imposed by the Court of Appeals is simply consistent with the nature and function of a bail bond,
which is to ensure that petitioner will make himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence. Besides, a
closer look at the questioned condition will show that petitioner is not prevented from changing abode; he is merely required
to inform the court in case he does so. (Yap vs Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141529, June 6, 2001)
44. People v Malilay

The Supreme Court declared in People v. Malilay: The concern shown by this Court for the constitutional mandate as to the
presumption of innocence to be fully adhered to, requiring that there be evidence sufficient to remove every vestige of
reasonable doubt, was evident as early as United States v. Reyes, decided in 1903.Absolute certainty, as pointedout in the
leadingcase ofUnitedStatesv. Lasada, promulgated in 1910, is not demanded by the law to convict of any criminal charge but
moral certainty is required, and this certainty is required as to every proposition of proof requisite to constitute the offense. It
is incumbent on the prosecution then, as was so well stressed in People v.Dramayo, to demonstrate that culpability lies.
(Defendants are) not even called up on to offer evidence on their behalf. Their freedom is forfeit only if the requisite quantum
of proof necessary for conviction be in existence.
45. People v Sunga

In People v. Sunga, a prosecution for rape, the Supreme Court held that although the defense of the appellant was weak, he
nevertheless could not be convicted because of the constitutional presumption of innocence. The evidence of the prosecution
was weaker.
46. Dumalo v COMELEC

In the Dumlao Case, the challenged statute disqualified from running for local elective office "any person who has committed
any act of disloyalty to the State provided that the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or
military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact.
Case Digest
FACTS: Sec. 4 BP Blg. 52 disqualifies retired elective officials who has received retirement benefits and is already 65 years
old to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired. Petitioner said it is concocted and designed against him
to prevent him from running again.
HELD: No violation of equal protection. It is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and
real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from the others. Here, persons over 65 are classified
differently from younger employees to promote emergence of younger blood. Persons similarly situated are similarly treated.
It does not forbid all legal classification, what is prohibited is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. That
constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all
those belonging to the same class.
47. People v Tempongko

In People v. Tempongko, the Supreme Court declared in absolving the accused: The theory of the prosecution has too many
loose ends that it has failed to tie up to the satisfaction of this Court.The guilt of the appellant has not been established beyond
doubt and so cannot be affirmed in this appeal.The defense is weak, to be sure, but for all the persuasive arguments of the
Solicitor General and the private prosecutor, this Court remains unconvinced that the appellant raped the complainant.The
appellant may have been lying, and there is evidence of this, but we are not prepared to accept, to the point of moral certainty,
that the complainant was telling the truth. The ambiguous evidence of the prosecution cannot justify our condemning the
appellant to prison for the rest of his life where there are whispers of doubt that he is guilty.
48. People v Mirantes

TheSupremeCourt in People v. Mirantes, said through Justice Regalado: The presumption of regularity in the performance of
official functions cannot by itself affect the constitutional presumption of innocence enjoyed by an accused, particularly when
the prosecution's evidence is weak.The evidence of the prosecution must be strong enough to pierce the shield of this
presumptive innocence and to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Where the evidence of the
prosecution is insufficient to overcome this presumption, necessarily, the judgment of conviction of the trial court must be set
aside. The onus probandi on the prosecution is not discharged by casting doubts upon the innocence of an accused, but by
eliminating all reasonable doubts as to his guilt.
49. Joseph v Villaluz

In Joseph v.Villaluz, "after the prosecution has adduced evidence, the constitutional presumption of innocence must yield to
what has been so amply and persuasively demonstrated."
50. People v Regulacion

In People v. Regulacion, that it was incumbent on the accused, who had admitted the killing, to establish his case of self-
defense instead of relying merely on the weakness of the prosecution.
51. People v Arciaga

On the right to be silent, the Supreme Court said in People v. Arciaga that "no inference of guilt may be drawn against an
accused for his failure to make a statement of any sort. The neglect or refusal of the accused shall not in any manner prejudice
or be used against him."
52. People v Solis, 128 SCRA 217

But in the later case of People v. Solis it declared: "While accused have a right to be silent, they run the risk of an inference
from the nonproduction of evidence."
53. People v Resano

Failure or refusal of the accused to testify may prejudice him if the prosecution has already established a prima facie case
against him, according to People v. Resano.
54. People v Lumague

In People v. Lumague, the Supreme Court set aside the conviction of three co-accused after finding that they were denied due
process because they had not been given a chance to testify and to present additional evidence on their behalf. The trial court
was directed to receive such additional evidence and to allow the defendants to present sur-rebuttal evidence in case the
prosecution should present rebuttal evidence.
55. People v Holgado

The right of the accused to counsel in criminal proceedings has never been considered subject to waiver.79 This is because,
according to Chief Justice Moran in People v. Holgado:
In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to
be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated
man may have no skill in the science of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted
not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen more easily to
persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that
it has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to
apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it
is essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to
procure an attorney of his own.
Case Digest
Facts: Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the court of First Instance of Romblon with slight illegal detention because
according to the information, being a private person, he did "feloniously and without justifiable motive, kidnap and detain one
Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for about eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal
liberty. He pleaded guilty (without a counsel) and said that he was just instructed by Mr. Ocampo, which no evidence was
presented to indict the latter.
Issue: Whether or Not there was any irregularity in the proceedings in the trial court.
Held: Yes. Rule 112, section 3 of ROC that : If the defendant appears without attorney, he must be informed by the court that
it is his right to have attorney being arraigned., and must be asked if he desires the aid of attorney, the Court must assign
attorney de oficio to defend him. A reasonable time must be allowed for procuring attorney. This was violated. Moreso the
guarantees of our Constitution that "no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law", and
that all accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel." In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless
the accused be given the opportunity to be heard by counsel.
The trial court failed to inquire as to the true import of the qualified plea of accused. The record does not show whether the
supposed instructions of Mr. Ocampo was real and whether it had reference to the commission of the offense or to the making
of the plea guilty. No investigation was opened by the court on this matter in the presence of the accused and there is now no
way of determining whether the supposed instruction is a good defense or may vitiate the voluntariness of the confession.
Apparently the court became satisfied with the fiscal's information that he had investigated Mr. Ocampo and found that the
same had nothing to do with this case. Such attitude of the court was wrong for the simple reason that a mere statement of the
fiscal was not sufficient to overcome a qualified plea of the accused. But above all, the court should have seen to it that the
accused be assisted by counsel especially because of the qualified plea given by him and the seriousness of the offense found
to be capital by the court.
56. People v Magsi

Thus, in People v. Magsi, Justice Makasiar chided the trial court for its pro forma appointment of a counsel de oficio who did
not exert his best efforts for the protection of his non-paying client and its own failure to explain to the defendant the meaning
of the accusation against him and the consequences of his plea of guilty. The judgment in this case was set aside and the case
remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings.
Case Digest
Facts: Soon after appellant was apprehended on August 20, 1970, his arraignment was scheduled before the Criminal Circuit
Court of San Fernando, La Union. The case was actually set and rescheduled for six (6) times, first of which was on August 1,
1970. On that date, despite appointment by the court of Atty. Mario Rivera as de officio counsel for the accused, hearing was
re-set to September 8, 1970 on motion of Atty. Rivera, who was prompted to ask for it because of accused desire to be
represented by a de parte counsel. Prior to the next hearing, Atty. Rivera moved to withdraw as de officio counsel and it was
favorably acted on by the court on September 7, 1970. At the second hearing on September 8, 1970, for failure of the de
officio and de parte counsels to appear, despite a second call of the case, the hearing was re-set for the next day and the court
appointed Atty. Dominador Cariaso de officio counsel for the accused. On the third hearing date, neither the de parte nor the
de officio counsel was in Court, so Atty. Rivera was reappointed that day as de officio counsel for arraignment purposes only.
The accused del Rosario entered a plea of guilty but qualified it with the allegation that he committed the crime out of fear of
his co-accused Eloy Magsi and the other coaccused. Appellant was found guilty of murder and made to suffer the death
penalty.
Issue: Whether or not there was a violation of the rights of the accused.
Held: YES. The desire to speed up the disposition of cases should not be effected at the sacrifice of the basic rights of the
accused. Citing People vs. Domingo (55 SCRA 243-244): the trial courts should exercise solicitous care before sentencing the
accused on a plea of guilty especially in capital offenses by first insuring that the accused fully understands the gravity of the
offense, the severity of the consequences attached thereto as well as the meaning and significance of his plea of guilty; and
that the prudent and proper thing to do in capital cases is to take testimony, to assure the court that the accused has not
misunderstood the nature and effect of his plea of guilty. Mere pro-forma appointment of de officio counsel, who fails to
genuinely protect the interests of the accused, resetting of hearing by the court for alleged reception of evidence when in fact
none was conducted, perfunctory queries addressed to the accused whether he understands the charges and the gravity of the
penalty, are not sufficient compliance.
57. People v Malunsing

In People v. Malunsing, a defendant in a murder case manifested at the start of the trial that he had lost confidence in his
former counsel and wanted to retain counsel de parte. Nevertheless, the court appointed the same lawyer as his counsel de
oficio. Asked by the court if he wanted to confer with his client, counsel declined, saying "I think I know the case," and the
case then proceeded to trial, during which no evidence was adduced in behalf of the defendant, unlike his co-accused who
were actively represented by their lawyers. On appeal of his conviction, the Supreme Court remanded the case for new trial in
view of the violation of the constitutional rights of the accused.
Case Digest
Manuel Villegas together with Malunsing et al were charged for murder. At the opening of the trial, Manuel Villegas was
appointed a counsel de oficio, Atty. Geronimo Pajarito. Villegas however intimated to Geronimo and the trial court that he has
his own lawyer. However, the court proceeded without giving Villegas the opportunity to present his own lawyer. The court
then asked Atty. Pajarito if he wants to confer with his client but Pajarito replied I think I know the case. Thereafter, trial
began where the prosecution presented evidence against Villegas. No evidence was presented in behalf of Villegas and he was
not even called to the witness stand to prove his innocence. Consequently, Villegas was convicted of the crime charged.
Now, Atty. Pablito Pielago [presumably Villegas true lawyer and supposed lawyer from the onset?] questioned the conviction
as he presented the above irregularities. He said that Villegas is an unlettered man and he does not know the intricacies of
court proceedings hence Pajarito should have been vigilant in representing him in court. Pielago now wants the reversal of the
conviction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conviction should be reversed.
HELD: Yes, for there is a gross violation of Villegas constitutional rights. The Supreme Court noted that it is not enough that
a counsel de oficio was appointed, especially so as here, where the accused had indicated that he wanted a lawyer of his
choice, a decision prompted moreover by the fact that he had lost confidence in the member of the bar thus designated. Nor is
it to manifest respect for this right if the counsel de oficio thus named, instead of conferring with the accused, would just
blithely inform the judge that he was already fully prepared for his exacting responsibility. It was unintended, of course, but
the result could not rightly be distinguished from pure travesty. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction but considering
the gravity of the offense charged, it ordered a new trial.
58. Soriano v Sandiganbayan

Thus, in Soriano v. Sandiganbayan, a prosecutor entrapped by the NBI was charged with and convicted of violating Section
3(b) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Supreme Court agreed with him that the said law was inapplicable but
rejected his submission that he could also not be convicted of bribery under the Revised Penal Code because this would
violate his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. "Wrong," said Justice
Abad Santos. "A reading of the information . . . clearly makes out a case of bribery.''
Case Digest
Facts: Tan was accused of qualified theft. The petitioner, who was an Asst. Fiscal, was assigned to investigate. In the course
of the investigation, petitioner demanded Php.4000 from Tan as price for dismissing the case. Tan reported it to the NBI
which set up an entrapment. Tan was given a Php.2000, marked bill, and he had supplied the other half. The entrapment
succeeded and an information was filed with the Sandiganbayan. After trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding
the petitioner guilty as a principal in violating the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A.3019). A motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan, hence this instant petition.
Issue: Whether or Not the investigation conducted by the petitioner can be regarded as contract or transaction within the
purview of .RA.3019.
Held: R.A. 3019 Sec.3. Corrupt practices of public officers - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing laws, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be
unlawful: xxx b. Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share percentage or benefit, for himself or for
other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the Govt. and any other party wherein the public officer
in his official capacity has to intervene under the law.
The petitioner stated that the facts make out a case of direct bribery under Art.210 of the RPC and not a violation of R.A.
3019 sec.3 (b). The offense of direct bribery is not the offense charged and is not included in the offense charged which is
violation of R.A.3019 sec.3 (b).
The respondent claimed that, transaction as used hereof, is not limited to commercial or business transaction, but includes all
kinds of transaction whether commercial, civil, or administrative in nature.
The court agrees with the petitioner. It is obvious that the investigation conducted by the petitioner was neither a contract nor
transaction. A transaction like a contract is one which involves some consideration as in credit transactions. And this element
is absent in the investigation conducted by the petitioner.
Judgment modified. Petitioner is guilty of direct bribery under Art.210 of the RPC.
59. People v Ramirez, 69 SCRA 144

In People v. Ramirez, it was held that a person charged with rape, of which he was later absolved, could not be convicted of
qualified seduction, which was not included in the information.
60. People v Quintal

A charge for the latter crime should be filed in which all the elements thereof, including the virginity of the victim, should be
alleged, according to the later case of People v. Quintal.
61. People v. Abino

It was held that convicting the appellant of rape by intimidation under an information charging him with raping his daughter
while she was asleep and unconscious would violate his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.
62. People v. Montes

The charge of rape was not conclusively proved in this case, but the trial court nevertheless sentenced the accused to life
imprisonment plus civil damages for having indirectly caused the death of the complainant who had taken her life two days
after the alleged incident. The SC observed that the judgment may indicate that the accused was convicted of homicide. If
this is so, the lower court is in grave error for he was never charged with said offense; he was accused of and tried for rape.
63. People v Ortega
In this case, it was held t h a t a person charged at his arraignment with homicide by drowning could not be convicted of
homicide by stabbing, which was not the crime alleged in the information.
The defendant is also denied the right to be informed of the charge against him, and to due process as well, where the statute
itself is couched in such indefinite language that it is not possible for men of ordinary intelli gence to determine therefrom
what acts or omissions are punished and, hence, should be avoided. This is the void- for-vagueness rule. Thus, a law
imposing penalties upon a person for being a "gangster" is constitutionally flawed if it does not define the word with such
reasonable specificity as to sufficiently inform the ordinary individual of its meaning and thus enable him to avoid violation
of its provision."
Case Digest
Facts
Appellants Ortega, Jr. and Garcia were charged with murder. The Information alleged that the accused-appellants, conspiring
together and mutually helping one another, without any justifiable cause, with treachery and evident premeditation and with
abuse of superior strength and with deliberate intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and stab repeatedly with a pointed weapon on the different parts of the body of the victim thereby inflicting serious
physical injuries which directly caused his death. Appellants Ortega and Garcia pleaded not guilty to the charge. RTC,
however, found both accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue
Whether or not Appellant Garcia was adequately informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Held
No. The Information accused Appellant Garcia (and Appellant Ortega) of attack[ing], assault[ing], and stab[bing] repeatedly
with a pointed weapon on the different parts of the body one ANDRE MAR MASANGKAY y ABLOLA. The prosecutions
evidence itself shows that Garcia had nothing to do with the stabbing which was solely perpetrated by Appellant Ortega. His
responsibility relates only to the attempted concealment of the crime and the resulting drowning of Victim Masangkay. The
hornbook doctrine in our jurisdiction is that an accused cannot be convicted of an offense, unless it is clearly charged in the
complaint or information. Constitutionally, he has a right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him. To convict him of an offense other than that charged in the complaint or information would be a violation of this
constitutional right.
64. Gallego v. Sandiganbayan

By contrast, it was held in Gallego v. Sandigan bayan that the use of the words "unwarranted," "mani fest partiality,"
"evident bad faith," and "gross inexcusable negligence," which all have definite connotations, did not make the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act invalid for vagueness.
65. Estrada v. Sandiganbayan

The petitioner invoked the void-for-vagueness rule in questioning the Plunder Law which he claimed denied him the right to
be in formed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him because of its ambiguity in failing to define with pre cision
certain words and phrase in many of its provisions. In an extended opinion, the Supreme Court rejected his challenge and
declared inter alia through Justice Bel- losillo.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently
definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. It must be stressed,
how ever, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheldnot
absolute pre cision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity is
permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely
because it might have been more explicit in its wordings, or detailed in its provision. Especially where, because of the nature
of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details as in all other statutes.
Case Digest
Bellosillo J.
Facts
Petitioner calls for the Court to subject RA 7080(An Act defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder) to the crucible of
constitutionality for reasons that the act:
is vague
dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions
abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes punishable under the Revised Penal Code
Issue
Is the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being vague?
Held/Ratio
No. Petitioner has miserably failed to show that the Plunder Law is unconstitutional due to its vagueness.
As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct
would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. The amended information itself closely tracks the
language of law, indicating w/ reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense w/c the petitioner is alleged to have
committed.
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his defense.
Petitioner however bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms combination and
series in the key phrase a combination or series of overt or criminal acts. These omissions, according to the petitioner,
render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence violative of his fundamental right to due process.
A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used herein, or because of the employment of
terms without defining them.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence most
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in
two (2) respects it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what
conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary
flexing of the Government muscle.
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible chilling effect
upon protected speech. The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed
by the possibility that the protected speech of other may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of
possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. But in criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free
speech.
66. People v. Crisologo

In People v. Crisologo, a deaf-mute was accused of robbery with homicide, but arraignment was deferred for six years
because there was no sign language expert to assist him. Finally waiving the reading of the information, he was tried, still
without the assistance of a sign language expert, and was eventually convicted. The Supreme Court reversed, declaring
through Justice Teodoro Padilla:
The absence of a qualified interpreter in sign language and of any other means, whether in writing or otherwise, to inform the
accused of the charges against him denied the accused his fundamental right to due process of law. The accuracy and fairness
of the factual process by which the guilt or innocence of the accused was determined was not safeguarded. The accused could
not be said to have enjoyed the right to be heard by himself and counsel, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him in the proceedings where his life and liberty were at stake.
Case Digest
Facts
Accused-appellant Crisologo alias Amang, a deaf-mute, was charged of robbery with homicide. He was allegedly informed
of the charge against him through sign language by Special Policeman Munoz a childhood acquaintance. Mr. Munoz
subsequently entered a plea of guilty on behalf of the accused. Upon objection of counsel, however, this plea was disregarded
and arraignment was rescheduled until the Court could avail of the services of an expert in the sign language from the school
of the deaf and dumb. Apparently no sign language expert or representative ever arrived, the accused through a counsel de
oficio waived the reading of the information and pleaded not guilty. Trial proceeded without any evidence being presented on
his part. Finally, without the services of an expert in sign language ever being utilized at any stage of the proceedings, the
accused was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide.
Issue
Whether or not the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation was violated.
Held
Yes. The absence of an interpreter in sign language who could have conveyed to the accused, a deaf-mute, the full facts of the
offense with which he was charged and who could also have communicated the accuseds own version of the circumstances
which led to his implication in the crime, deprived the accused of a full and fair trial and a reasonable opportunity to defend
himself. Not even the accuseds final plea of not guilty can excuse these inherently unjust circumstances.
The absence of a qualified interpreter in sign language and of any other means, whether in writing or otherwise, to inform the
accused of the charges against him denied the accused his fundamental right to due process of law. The accuracy and fairness
of the factual process by which the guilt or innocence of the accused was determined was not safeguarded. The accused could
not be said to have enjoyed the right to be heard by himself and counsel, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him in the proceedings where his life and liberty were at stake.
67. People v. Parazo

A similar ruling was made in People v. Parazo, where a deaf-mute and mental retardate could not ade quately defend himself
at the trial for lack of a qualified sign language expert or any other means to communicate to him the crime he was alleged to
have committed. His conviction was reversed and the case remanded to the lower court for re-trial.
Case Digest
Facts
(As to how the complaint got to RTC, there is no info in the case. The facts just presented evidence to show that Parazo
deserves a re trial because he was sentenced to death without an interpreter even though he is deaf and mentally retarded)
RTC decision: Parazo (28 years old) is guilty of rape (sentenced to death) and homicide
May 29, 1997-Motion for Reconsideration under consideration, bringing to the attention of the Court facts and
circumstances, such as the absence of a sign language expert, which if true would warrant the setting aside of his judgment of
conviction.
February 10, 1998- the Court resolved to grant appellant's Urgent Omnibus Motion: (1) to hold in abeyance consideration of
his motion for reconsideration pending his medical examination; (2) to allow a supplemental motion for reconsideration after
his medical examination; and (3) to submit him (appellant) for examination by a physician of the Supreme Court.
The results of medical examinations conducted on appellant also indicate that appellant is really a deaf-mute, a mental
retardate, whose mental age is only seven (7) years and nine (9) months, and with low IQ of 60 only.
Parazos mother testified that he was born deaf and mute and she has no money for medical lintervention. Barangay captain
that Parazo was known as pipi since childhood. His school teacher says he was never active in class and he never finished
grade I. DSWD says that he was a beneficiary of their projects relative to "Persons with Disability." During his early
childhood, he was an active participant of the project. As he grew older however, he did not anymore bother to visit their
office.
Issue
Whether he deserves a re trial for he was sentenced to death without the aid of a language expert although he is deaf and
mentally retarded.
Held
Yes he deserves re trial. Based on the collateral information's (sic) gathered from persons who have known the patient since
childhood, together with the results of the diagnostic test at UP-PGH and evidenced by the psychological report, it is now
established that Marlon Parazo is suffering from (1) Profound Hearing Loss, left ear; (2) Severe Hearing Loss, right ear; (3)
Mental Retardation, Mild.
Criteria for Mental Retardation as follows:

1. Significantly sub-average intellectual functioning: an IQ. of approximately 70 or below on an individually administered
IQ. test.
2. Concurrent deficits or impairments in present adaptive functioning (i.e., the person's effectiveness in meeting the standards
expected for his or her age by his or her cultural group) in at least two of the following skill areas: communication, self-care,
home-living, social/interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-direction, functional academic skills, work, leisure,
health and safety).
3. Onset before age of 18.
Records on hand show that appellant was tried below without the benefit of a sign language expert. He deserves a re-
arraignment and re-trial, to the end that only upon proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt may he be consigned to the lethal
injection chamber.
68. Ignacio v Villaluz

In Ignacio v. Villaluz, the respondent judge had previously convicted the petitioner of arson, holding that the motive for the
crime was to conceal the acts of malversation committed by the accused. When he was subsequently prosecuted for
malversation before the same judge, the petitioner moved for the latter's disqualification on the ground that he could not be
expected to be objective and impartial in the trial of this case. The judge denied the motion, and the petitioner went on
certiorari to the Supreme Court, where he was sustained. "It is difficult to understand the reluctance of respondent judge to
inhibit himself," observed Justice Teehankee. "In a case where he was named respondent, Mateo v. Villaluz, decided in 1973,
this Court laid down the principle: It is now beyond dispute that due process cannot be satisfied in the absence of that degree
of objectivity on the part of a judge sufficient to reassure litigants of his being fair and just.'"
69. Mateo v Villaluz

"In a case where he was named respondent, Mateo v. Villaluz, decided in 1973, this Court laid down the principle: It is now
beyond dispute that due process cannot be satisfied in the absence of that degree of objectivity on the part of a judge
sufficient to reassure litigants of his being fair and just.'"
70. People v Opida

In People v. Opida," the conviction was reversed after the Court found that the trial judge was biased and had obviously
prejudged the accused because of their appear ance and criminal record. The decision stressed:
The scales of justice must hang equal and, in fact, should even be tipped in favor of the accused because of the constitutional
presumption of innocence. Needless to stress, this right is available to every accused, whatever his present circumstance and
no matter how dark and repellent his past. Despite their sinister connotations in our society, tattoos are at best dubious
adornments only and surely not under our laws indicia of criminality. Of bad taste perhaps, but not of crime.
In any event, convictions are based not on the mere appearance of the accused but on his actual commission of crime, to be
ascertained with the pure objectivity of the true judge who must uphold the law for all without favor or malice and always
with justice.
71. Conde v Rivera

In the old case of Conde v. Rivera, the Supreme Court dismissed all charges against an accused who was required to "dance
attendance on courts" and subjected to a number of unjustified postponements that resulted in unconscionable delay of her
trial. Justice Malcolm declared:
Aurelia Conde, formerly a municipal midwife in Lucena, Tayabas, has been forced to respond to no less than five
informations for various crimes and misdemeanors, has appeared with her witnesses and counsel at hearings no less than on
eight different occasions only to see the case postponed, has twice been required to come to the Supreme Court for protection,
and now, after the passage of more than one year from the time when the first information was filed, seems as far away from a
definite resolution of her troubles as she was when originally charged.
Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantee that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to
have a speedy trial. Aurelia Conde, like all other accused persons, has a right to a speedy trial in order that if innocent she may
go free, and she has been deprived of that right in defiance of law. Dismissed from her humble position, and compelled to
dance attendance on courts while investigations and trials are arbitrarily postponed without her consent, is palpably and openly
unjust to her and a detriment to the public. By the use of reasonable diligence, the prosecution could have settled upon the
appropriate information, could have attended to the formal preliminary examination, and could have prepared the case for a
trial free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays.
Once before, as intimated, the petitioner had to come to us for redress of her grievances. We thought then we had pointed out
the way for the parties. But it seems not. Once again therefore and finally, we hope, we propose to do all in our power to assist
this poor woman to obtain justice. On the one hand has been the petitioner, of humble station, without resources, but
fortunately assisted by a persistent lawyer, while on the other hand has been the Government of the Philippine Islands which
should be the last to set an example of delay and oppression in the administration of justice. The Court is thus under a moral
and legal obligation to see that these proceedings come to an end and that the accused is discharged from the custody of the
law.
We lay down the legal proposition that, where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures postponements of the trial of
a defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than a year, the accused is
entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by
habeas corpus to obtain his freedom.
Case Digest
Facts: Aurelia Conde, formerly a municipal midwife in Lucena, Tayabas, has been forced to respond to no less the five
information for various crimes and misdemeanors, has appeared with her witnesses and counsel athearings no less than on
eight different occasions only to see the cause postponed, has twice been required to come to the Supreme Court for
protection, and now, after the passage of more than one year from the time when the first information was filed, seems as far
away from a definite resolution of her troubles as she was when originally charged.
Issue: Whether or Not petitioner has been denied her right to a speedyand impartial trial.
Held: Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantee that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the
right to have a speedytrial. Aurelia Conde, like all other accused persons, has a right to a speedytrial in order that if innocent
she may go free, and she has been deprived of that right in defiance of law. We lay down the legal proposition that, where a
prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a
reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than a year, the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in
mandamus to compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his
freedom.
72. Flores v People, 61 SCRA 331

In the case of Flores v. People, the accused were charged with robbery in 1951, appealed their conviction in 1955 to the Court
of Appeals, which did not act until 1958, when it remanded the case to the lower court for a re hearing, and in 1959 set aside
the decision so a trial could be held to receive additional evidence for the defendants. Nothing was done for about a year
despite six or seven scheduled hearings which were not held because of the absence of the offended party. Instead of rendering
a new decision, the lower court returned the records of the Court of Appeals, and five more years elapsed without anything
being done. The accused moved to dismiss the case in 1965 and when their second motion for reconsideration was denied by
the Court of Appeals in 1966, or a decade and a half since they were impleaded, went to the Supreme Court. They were finally
discharged in 1974 on the strength of their constitutional right to a speedy trial. Interestingly, the Supreme Court itself took
eight years to decide.
Case Digest
Flores vs. People

FACTS:
Petitioners, Francisco Flores and Francisco Angel, were accused for robbery. Information was filed in December 1951. They
were found guilty of the crime charged in November 1955. Notice of appeal was file in December 1955. It was until
February 1958 that action was taken by CAa resolution remanding the records of the case to the lower court for a rehearing
of the testimony of a certain witness deemed material for the disposition of the case. Such resolution was amended dated
August 1959 which granted the petitioners to set aside the decision so that evidence for the defense on new facts may be
received and a new decision in lieu of the old one may be rendered. The case was returned to the lower court but nothing was
done for about a year because the offended party failed to appear despite the 6/7 dates set for such hearing. Furthermore,
when the offended party took the witness stand, his testimony was characterized as a mere fiasco as he could no longer
remember the details of the alleged crime and even failed to identify the 2 accused.
The trial court instead of rendering a decision sent back the records to the appellate tribunal. 5 more years elapsed without
anything being done, petitioners sought dismissal of the case against them due to inordinate delay in the disposition (from
December 1955- May 1965). CA was unresponsive notwithstanding the vigorous plea of the petitioners, its last order being a
denial of a second MR dated January 1966. CAs defense is that the case was not properly captioned as People of the
Philippines and without Court of Appeals being made a party to the petition.
ISSUE: WON constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated.
HELD: YES. Petition for certiorari was granted. Orders denying Motion to dismiss as Motion to Reconsideration are set
aside and nullified. Criminal Case against petitioners was dismissed.
Constitutional right to a speedy trial means one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. An accused is entitled
to a trial at the earliest opportunity. He cannot be oppressed by delaying the commencement of the trial for an unreasonable
length of time. The Constitution does not say that such right may be availed only where the prosecution of a crime is
commenced and undertaken by the fiscal. It does not exclude from its operation cases commenced by private
individuals. Where a person is prosecuted criminally, he is entitled to a speedy trial, irrespective of the nature of the offense
or the manner in which it is authorized to be commenced.
Technicalities should give way to the realities of the situation. There should not be too much significance attached to the
procedural defect (refer to CAs defense). CA failed to accord respect to this particular constitutional right amounting at the
very least to a grave abuse of discretion.
73. Cojuangco v Sandiganbayan

In Cojuangco v. Sandiganbayan, the Supreme Court held that the respondent court's delay of more than one year in resolving
the petitioner's motion to dismiss the charges against him violated the right to a speedy trial, considering that all pertinent
pleadings required by the Sandiganbayan had already been submitted.
Case Digest
Facts: This petition for prohibition seeks to dismiss Criminal Case entitled People of the Philippines vs. Eduardo M.
Cojuangco, Jr., et al., now pending before respondent Sandiganbayan and to prohibit said court from further proceeding with
the case. Petitioner invokes his constitutional right to due process, a speedy trial, and a speedy determination of his cases
before all judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative bodies. Further, he prays for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction enjoining respondent Sandiganbayan from further enforcing and/or implementing
its order dated February 20, 1995 which bans petitioner from leaving the country except upon prior approval by said court.
Issue: When a person is criminally charged, is his right to travel absolutely curtailed?
Held: No. The travel ban should be lifted, considering all the circumstances now prevailing. The rule laid down by this Court
is that a person facing a criminal indictment and provisionally released on bail does not have an unrestricted right to travel, the
reason being that a persons right to travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed by the very necessity of safeguarding the
system of justice. But, significantly, the Office of the Solicitor General in its Manifestation dated November 20, 1998
indicated that it is not interposing any objection to petitioners prayer that he be allowed to travel abroad based on the
following considerations: (1) that it is well within the power of this Court to suspend its own rules, including the second
paragraph, Section 23, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court; (2) that it has been shown in the past that the petitioner has always
returned to the Philippines after the expiration of the period of his allowed travel; and (3) that petitioner, now Chairman of the
Board of San Miguel Corporation, may be constrained to leave the country for business purposes, more often than he had done
in the past.
74. Padilla v Apas

In Padilla v. Apas, it was held that "since the prosecution, by repeated motions for postponement, caused the delay of the
proceedings from the time the information was filed on February 28,1996, from which time the test of the violation of the right
to a speedy trial is to be counted, the dismissal of the case, on motion of the accused, amounts to an acquittal." The dismissal
of the case by the trial court on March 22, 2000 was affirmed by the Supreme Court.
75. Amberti v Court of Appeals

It should be remembered, however, that in Amberti v. Court of Appeals, Justice Teehankee gave the following significant
reminder:
The Court has consistently maintained that although a speedy determination of an action implies a speedy trial, speed is not
the chief objective of a trial. Careful and deliberate consideration for the administration of justice, a genuine respect for the
rights of all parties and the requirements of procedural due process and an adherence to the Court's standing admonition that
the discretion granted judges in the granting or denial of motions for postponement and the setting aside or denial of orders
previously issued 'should always be predicated on the consideration that more than the mere convenience of the courts or of
the parties in the case, the ends of justice and fairness would be served thereby' are more important than a race to end the
trial.
76. Martin v Ver

Moreover, as held in Martin v. Ver, the right to a speedy trial, which begins from the filing of the information, cannot be
quantified into a specified number of days or months but must be examined in the light of surrounding circumstances such as,
in that case, the unavailability of witnesses.
77. Aquino v Military Commission No. 2

Although the trial is an indispensable and, indeed, the most important part of the proceedings against the accused, it has been
held that the right to be present thereat is a personal right and therefore may be validly waived. This was the rule announced in
Aquino v. Military Commission No. 2, where the petitioner was sustained in his refusal to be present at his own trial, which he
claimed was a mere mockery because his conviction had already been pre-ordained. As the Supreme Court put it:
Considering the aforecited provisions of the Constitution, that 'after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the
absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified,' and the absence of any
law specifically requiring his presence at all stages of his trial, there appears, therefore, no logical reason why petitioner,
although he is charged with a capital offense, should be precluded from waiving his right to be present in the proceedings for
the perpetuation of testimony, since this right, like the others aforestated, was con ferred upon him for his protection and
benefit. It is also important to note that under Section 7 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court (Deposition of witness for
the prosecution) the 'Failure or refusal on the part of the defendant to attend the examination or the taking of the deposition
after notice hereinbefore provided, shall be considered a waiver ...' Similarly, Presidential Decree No. 328 expressly provides
that'. . . the failure or refusal to attend the examination or the taking of the deposition shall be considered a waiver.'
78. People v Presiding Judge, 125 SCRA 269

Nonetheless, the basic rule was made subject to the qualification that the presence of the accused may be required if it is
necessary for purposes of identification, that is, where the prosecution intends to introduce witnesses who will identify him.
This doctrine was affirmed in the cases of People v. Presiding Judge and People v. Macaraeg.
79. People v Macaraeg, 141 SCRA 37

(Same above)
80. People v Dichoso

In People v. Dichoso, the hearings for the presentation of the evidence for the accused were reset no less than eleven times on
motion of the defense. On the twelfth scheduled hearing, the defense counsel manifested that if his client did not again appear
he would submit the case without presenting any evidence. The accused did not show up and counsel did as promised. The
accused was convicted and through new counsel questioned the sentence on the ground that she had been deprived of her right
to be heard. The Supreme Court ruled that she had by her repeated failure to attend the hearings waived her right to the trial,
adding that "speedy justice is as much a prerogative of an Accused as of Complainant."
81. People v. Avancea 32 OG 713
CRUZ CITATION
When in the course of his trial the defendant escaped or otherwise failed or refused to appear, the same was
suspended because of the requirement that he be present at certain stages thereof.
DIGEST
The old case of People v. Avancea (32 OG 713) required his presence at certain stages of the trial, which as a result,
had to be discontinued as long as the defendant had not reappeared or remained at large.
As his right to be present at these stages was then held not waivable even by his escape, such escape thus operated to
the fugitive's advantage, and in mockery of the authorities, insofar as the trial could not proceed as long as he had not been
recaptured.
The doctrine laid down in that case has been modified by Section 19, which now allows trial in absentia.
Now, the prisoner cannot by simply escaping thwart his continued prosecution and possibly eventual conviction
provided only that: a) he has been arraigned; b) he has been duly notified of the trial; and c) his failure to appear is unjustified.
Thus, the right to be present at one's trial may now be waived except only at that stage where the prosecution intends to
present witnesses who will identify the accused.
Under Section 19, the defendant's escape will be considered a waiver of this right and the inability of the court to
notify him of the subsequent hearings will not prevent it from continuing with his trial. He will be deemed to have received
due notice. The same fact of his escape will make his failure to appear unjustified because he has, by escaping, placed himself
beyond the pale, and protection, of the law.
(Wala akong makitang legit na digest. T_T nakacite lang siya sa case ni People v. Salas)
82. People v. Salas 143 SCRA 163
CRUZ CITATION
The purpose of this rule is to speed up the disposition of criminal cases, trial of which could in the past be
indefinitely deferred, and many times completely abandoned, because of the defendant's escape
DIGEST
Facts: Mario Abong was originally charged with homicide in the Court of First Instance of Cebu but before he could be
arraigned the case was reinvestigated on motion of the prosecution. As a result of the reinvestigation, an amended information
was filed, with no bail recommended, to which he pleaded not guilty. Trial commenced, but while it was in progress, the
prisoner, taking advantage of the first information for homicide, succeeded in deceiving the city court of Cebu into granting
him bail and ordering his release; and so he escaped. The judge, learning later of the trickery, cancelled the illegal bail bond
and ordered Abong's rearrest. Abong, however, was gone. Nonetheless (Bernardo Salas), the prosecution moved that the
hearing continue in accordance with the constitutional provision authorizing trial in absentia under certain
circumstances. the judge denied the motion, however, and suspended all proceedings until the return of the
accused. The order of the trial court is before the Supreme Court on certiorari and mandamus.
Issue: Whether Abong may be tried in absentia, in light of his escape.
Held: Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution provides that "In all criminal prosecution, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to
have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after
arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his
failure to appear is unjustified." The purpose of this rule is to speed up the disposition of criminal cases, trial of which could in
the past be indefinitely deferred, and many times completely abandoned, because of the defendant's escape. The old case of
People v. Avancea (32 OG 713) required his presence at certain stages of the trial which as a result, had to be discontinued as
long as the defendant had not reappeared or remained at large. As his right to be present at these stages was then held not
waivable even by his escape, such escape thus operated to the fugitive's advantage, and in mockery of the authorities, insofar
as the trial could not proceed as long as he had not been recaptured. The doctrine laid down in that case has been modified by
Section 19, which now allows trial in absentia, Now, the prisoner cannot by simply escaping thwart his continued prosecution
and possibly eventual conviction provided only that: a) he has been arraigned; b) he has been duly notified of the trial; and c)
his failure to appear is unjustified. Thus, the right to be present at one's trial may now be waived except only at that stage
where the prosecution intends to present witnesses who will identify the accused. Under Section 19, the defendant's escape
will be considered a waiver of this right and the inability of the court to notify him of the subsequent hearings will not prevent
it from continuing with his trial. He will be deemed to have received due notice. The same fact of his escape will make his
failure to appear unjustified because he has, by escaping, placed himself beyond the pale, and protection, of the law.
83. Borja v. Mendoza
CRUZ CITATION
After arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly
notified and his failure to appear is unjustified
The indispensable requisite for trial in absentia is that it should come 'after arraignment.' The express mention in the
present Constitution of the need for such a step emphasizes its importance in the procedural scheme to accord an accused
due process
DIGEST
Facts: Manuel Borja was accused of slight physical injuries before the City Court of Cebu. No arraignment was made.
Notwithstanding this, Judge Romulo R. Senining proceeded with the trial in absentia and thereafter, in a decision promulgated
on 18 August 1976, found Borja guilty of such offense and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment for a period of 20 days of
arresto menor. Thereafter, an appeal was duly elevated to the Court of First Instance of Cebu presided by Judge Rafael T.
Mendoza. Without any notice to Borja and without requiring him to submit his memorandum, a decision on the appealed case
was rendered on 16 November 1976 affirming the judgment of the City Court. Borja filed the petition for certiorari with the
Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether Borja should be arraigned first before the trial can commence.
Held: The plea to nullify the proceedings in the criminal case finds support in the procedural due process mandate of the
Constitution. It requires that the accused be arraigned so that he may be informed as to why he was indicted and what penal
offense he has to face, to be convicted only on a showing that his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt with full opportunity
to disprove the evidence against him. Moreover, the sentence to be imposed in such a case is to be in accordance with a valid
law. Due process is where the accused is "heard in a court of competent jurisdiction, and proceeded against under the orderly
processes of law, and only punished after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him, with an opportunity to be heard, and a
judgment awarded with the authority of a constitutional law." An arraignment thus becomes indispensable as the means "for
bringing the accused into court and notifying him of the cause he is required to meet." Upon the accused being arraigned,
"there is a duty laid by the Code [now the Rules of Court] upon the court to inform [him] of certain rights and to extend to
him, on his demand, certain others. This duty is an affirmative one which the court, on its own motion, must perform, unless
waived." No such duty, however, is laid on the court with regard to the rights of the accused, which he may be entitled to
exercise during the trial. Those are rights, which he must assert himself and the benefits of which he himself must demand. In
other words, in the arraignment the court must act of its own volition, as arraignment is an indispensable requirement in any
criminal prosecution." Procedural due process demands no less. Nor is it only the due process guarantee that calls for the
accused being duly arraigned. As noted, it is at that stage where in the mode and manner required by the Rules, an accused, for
the first time, is granted the opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him. It is imperative that he is thus made
fully aware of possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him. At the very least
then, he must be fully informed of why the prosecuting arm of the state is mobilized against him. An arraignment serves that
purpose. It is true, the complaint or information may not be worded with sufficient clarity. He would be in a much worse
position though if he does not even have such an opportunity to plead to the charge. With his counsel by his side, he is thus in
a position to enter his plea with full knowledge of the consequences. He is not even required to do so immediately. He may
move to quash. What is thus evident is that an arraignment assures that he be fully acquainted with the nature of the crime
imputed to him and the circumstances under which it is allegedly committed. It is thus a vital aspect of the constitutional rights
guaranteed him. It is not useless formality, much less an idle ceremony.
84. People v. Prieto
CRUZ CITATION
Deferred confiscation of the bail bond of the accused, who had already gone abroad and could not attend his trial, as
being premature until judgment of conviction shall have been rendered.
The present Constitution certainly has not made a correct concept of a bail as given to allow the release of a person in
the custody of the law on condition that he would appear before any court whenever so required. Upon failure to do so, the
warrant of arrest previously issued can be a sufficient justification for his confinement.
DIGEST
Facts: On 7 February 1977, Judge Hermenegildo A. Prieto, Sr., of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, issued an order
issuing "a warrant of arrest for the apprehension of accused Dario Gamayon for his continuous failure to appear in Court
everytime the case is called for trial." The order continued: "His bail bond is declared forfeited," and likewise gave the
bondsmen thirty days "from notice thereof within which to produce the body of accused Dario Gamayon and show cause why
judgment should not be rendered against them for the amount of their undertaking." On 5 April 197, in resolving a motion for
reconsideration, however, the judge reversed. Hence, the petition for certiorari.
Issue: Whether the provision allowing the continuation of a trial after arraignment notwithstanding rhw absence of the
accused affected the traditional concept of bail.
Held: The last sentence of Section 19 of the Constitution allows the continuation of a trial after arraignment, notwithstanding
the absence of an accused, provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified. However, it must be
considered that the constitutional right to bail would be rendered nugatory if, by the mere fact that the trial could proceed in
the absence of the accused, the undertaking in a bail bond and the Rules of Court provision could be ignored. Clearly, the
innovation introduced by the present Constitution goes no further than to enable a judge to continue with the trial even if the
accused is not present under the conditions therein specified. It does not give him the right to jump bail. Where it is undisputed
that the accused had gone abroad, the usual procedure provided by the Rules of Court to determine the liability of his
bondsmen should be followed. There is no justification in law, therefore, for such valid and correct order being reconsidered,
just because of the innovation in the Constitution as to the trial being held in the absence of an accused. The present
Constitution certainly has not made a dent on the traditional and correct concept of a bail as given to allow the release of a
person in the custody of the law on condition that he would appear before any court whenever so required, Upon failure to do
so, the warrant of arrest previously issued can be a sufficient justification for his confinement. All that is assured on accused
who posts bail, therefore, is that prior to his conviction, he need not be deprived of his liberty. The mere fact that the trial
could not continue in his absence certainly affords no justification for his jumping bail nor for his bondsmen to escape from
the legal effects of their undertaking.
85. Manotoc v. CA 142 SCRA 149
CRUZ CITATION
Justice Fernan - "A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines, as this is a
necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond... Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the
Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts."
DIGEST
Facts: Petitioner was charged with estafa. He posted bail. Petitioner filed before each of the trial courts a motion entitled,
"motion for permission to leave the country," stating as ground therefor his desire to go to the United States, "relative to his
business transactionsand opportunities." The prosecution opposed said motion and after due hearing, both trial judges denied
the same. Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the then Court of Appeals seeking to annul the
orders dated March 9 and 26, 1982, of Judges Camilon and Pronove, respectively, as well as the communication-request of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, denying his leave to travel abroad. He likewise prayed for the issuance of the
appropriate writ commanding the Immigration Commissioner and the Chief of the Aviation Security Command (AVSECOM)
to clear him for departure. The Court of Appeals denied the petition. Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as a
matter of right, neither the courts which granted him bail nor the Securities and Exchange Commission which has no
jurisdiction over his liberty could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel.
Issue: Whether a court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines
A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of
the nature and function of a bail bond. Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and given
for the release of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his appearance may
be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at
all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. Indeed, if the accused
were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts
86. US v. Javier 37 Phil 449

CRUZ CITATION
The right to confrontation "intends to secure the accused in the right to be tried, so far as facts provable by
witnesses are concerned, by only such witnesses as meet him face to face at the trial, who give their testimony in his presence,
and give to the accused an opportunity of cross-examination. It was intended to prevent conviction of the accused upon
deposition or ex parte affidavits, and particularly to preserve the right of the accused to test the recollection of the witness in
the exercise of the right of cross-examination."
DIGEST
Facts: Doroteo Natividad on the afternoon of 22 October 1915, fastened his carabao valued at P150 in his corral situated in
the barrio of Trapiche, municipality of Tananuan, Province of Batangas. On the following morning when he went to look after
the animal, he found the gate to the corral open and that the carabao had disappeared. He reported the matter to the
Constabulary, and a patrol of the Constabulary under the leadership of sergeant Presa (+) on November 20, encountered
Lazaro Javier, Apolinario Mendoza, and Placido de
Chavez leading a carabao. When the ladrones saw the Constabulary, they scattered in all directions. On the following day, the
Constabulary found the carabao tied in front of the house of one Pedro Monterola in the barrio of Santa Clara, municipality of
San Pablo. The carabao was identified by Doroteo Natividad as the one, which had been taken from his corral on the night of
22 October 1915, and by the Constabulary as the one seen in the possession of Javier. Javier was charged for stealing the
carabao before the justice of the peace of the municipality of Santo Tomas, Province of Batangas. During trial, the sworn
statement of sergeant Presca, now deceased, was presented in court by the prosecution. Presca's signature in the statement was
identified.
Javier alleged that the lower court erred in admitting said sworn statement as evidence.
Issue: Whether the sworn statement, which was executed by a person now deceased, is inadmissible inasmuch as the accused
is not given the opportunity to cross-examine the author thereof.
Held: The Philippine Bill of Rights provides "That in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to meet the
witnesses face to face," and the provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure, section 15 (5), states taht "In all criminal
prosecutions the defendant shall be entitled: to be confronted at the trial by and to cross-examine the witnesses against him."
With reference to the clause of the Bill of Rights, it "intends to secure the accused in the right to be tried, so far as facts
provable by witnesses are concerned, by only such witnesses as meet him face to face at the trial, who give their testimony in
his presence, and give to the accused an opportunity of cross-examination. It was intended to prevent the conviction of the
accused upon depositions or ex parte affidavits, and particularly to preserve the right of the accused to test the recollection of
the witness in the exercise of the right of cross-examination." In other words, confrontation is essential because cross-
examination is essential. A second reason for the prohibition is that a tribunal may have before it the deportment and
appearance of the witness while testifying. The sworn statement of Presa was not made by question and answer under
circumstances, which gave the defense an opportunity to cross-examine the witness. The proviso of the Code of Criminal
Procedure as to confrontation is therefore inapplicable. Presa's statement again is not the testimony of a witness deceased,
given in a former action between the same relating to the same matter. Consequently, the exception provided by section 298,
No. 8, of the Code of Civil Procedure and relied upon by the prosecution in the lower court is also inapplicable. Nor is the
statement of Presca a dying declaration or a deposition in a former trial or shown to be a part of the preliminary examination.
Under these circumstances, the sworn statement was improperly received in evidence in the lower court. Still, although the
Court could find this to be reversible error and, ordinarily, should remand the case for a new trial. The Court however is
convinced that this would gain the accused nothing except delay for the testimony of the owner of the carabao and of the two
Constabulary soldiers, rebutted by no reasonable evidence on behalf of the accused, is deemed sufficient to prove guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.
87. People v. Ramos 122 SCRA 312

CRUZ CITATION
The Supreme Court rejected an affidavit implicating the accused as a drug pusher as mere hearsay, because the
affiant had not been presented in court and so could not be cross-examined by the defense.
DIGEST
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila is REVERSED, and
appellant is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged in the information. No costs.
1. Remedial Law; Evidence; Constitutional Law; Due Process; Hearsay Evidence; Admissibility of affidavit; Affidavit
of a person pointing to accused as the seller of marijuana leaves, not admissible, for being hearsay as affiant was not presented
in court; Nature of affidavit.-
The lower court erred in admitting as evidence the written sworn affidavit of Malcon Olevere. It can be gleaned from the
records that Malcon Olevere executed the written sworn statement declaring that appellant Ramos sold to him the marijuana
leaves for P10.00. This piece of evidence is a mere scrap of paper because Malcon Olevere was not produced in court for
cross-examination. An affidavit being taken ex-parte is often incomplete and inaccurate. Such kind of evidence is considered
hearsay. The constitutional right to meet the witnesses face to face in order not to deprive persons of their lives and properties
without due process of law is well-protected in our jurisprudence.
2. Remedial Law; Evidence; Constitutional Law; Due Process; Hearsay Evidence; Non admissibility of sworn affidavit,
grounds for.-
For the court to admit the sworn statement of Malcon Olevere without giving the adverse party the right to cross-examine him
would easily facilitate the fabrication of evidence and the perpetration of fraud. The inadmissibility of this sort of evidence is
based, not only on the lack of opportunity on the part of the adverse party to cross-examine the affiant, but also on the
commonly known fact that, generally, an affidavit is not prepared by the affiant himself but by another who uses his own
language in writing the affiants statements which may either be omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them.
3. Remedial Law; Evidence; Proof that marijuana leaves was recovered from a person does not necessarily prove that the
accused had been selling marijuana leaves, including the recovered marijuana from the person; Case at bar.-
It is not disputed that the marijuana leaves recovered and tested by witness Vequilia came from Malcon Olevere and not from
appellant. It would be absurd and manifestly unjust to conclude that appellant had been selling marijuana stuff just because
what were recovered from Olevere were real marijuana. Proof of one does not necessarily prove another. Nowhere can it be
found on the record that appellant was caught in possession or in the act of selling the prohibited marijuana leaves.
4. Remedial Law; Evidence; Witnesses; Credibility; Hearsay; Oral testimony of prosecution witnesses not being based on
personal knowledge are considered hearsay.- The oral testimonies given by the witnesses for the prosecution prove nothing
material and culpable against the accused. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, not anyone of the three witnesses
presented testified on the basis of their personal knowledge that the appellant sold the marijuana leaves to Malcon Olevere.
Under Rule 130, Sec. 30 of the Revised Rules of Court, a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his own
knowledge, that is, a witness, therefore, may not testify as to what he merely learned from others, either because he was told or
having read or heard the same. Such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he
has learned. Since Malcon Olevere was not presented as a witness, the testimonies offered by the witnesses for the prosecution
are regarded as hearsay, insofar as they impute to the appellant the commission of the offense charged.
5. Remedial Law; Evidence; Witnesses; Acquittal; Eight to silence and to counsel; Extrajudicial Admissions; Apprisal of
accused of his constitutional rights to silence and to counsel at custodial investigation, not sufficient, as said rights must be
fully explained, especially where accused not adequately educated; Verbal admissions of accused at custodial investigation,
not admissible; Reason.-
The lower court, in convicting appellant of the crime charged, partly relied on the verbal admission made by appellant himself
before Lt. Mediavillo and Sgt. Linga during the custodial investigation. Although the records prove that the appellant has been
duly apprised of his constitutional rights to silence and to counsel, We are not fully convinced that this apprisal was
sufficiently manifested and intelligently understood and accepted by the appellant. This is fatal to the admissibility of
appellants verbal admission. We have repeatedly emphasized that care should be taken in accepting extrajudicial admissions,
especially when taken during custodial investigation. x x x Appellant has only finished Grade VI, which means that he is not
adequately educated to understand fairly and fully the significance of his constitutional rights to silence and to counsel. As
mandated, it is not enough that the police investigator merely informs him of his constitutional rights to silence and to counsel,
and then taking his statements down, the interrogating officer must have patience in explaining these rights to him. The
records do not reveal that these requirements have been fully complied with, nor was there any showing that appellant has
been represented by counsel during custodial investigation. In consonance with Section 20 of the Bill of Rights which states
that any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence. We hold that the verbal
admissions of appellant during custodial investigation may not be taken in evidence against him.
88. Combate v. San Jose 135 SCRA 693

CRUZ CITATION
The testimony of the accused is subject to cross-examination by defense counsel. Depositions and ex parte
affidavits are inadmissible unless the persons making them are presented in court for examination on their statements by
the judge and the accused. Evidence of this nature is hearsay and excluded by the Rules of Court.
89. People v. Liwanag 73 SCRA 473
CRUZ CITATION
The accused objected to the inclusion in the evidence for the prosecution of testimony adduced against him during
the preliminary investigation.
As it appeared, however, that the witnesses were subjected to cross-examination then, and later also at the trial, the Supreme
Court held that there was no violation of the right of confrontation.
90. Talino v. Sandiganbayan
CRUZ CITATION
Where several co-accused are given a separate trial, the evidence given against them at the other trial where they
had no opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses is not admissible against them.
91. Tampar vs. Usman

Cruz(2007 Citation)
Case Digest
FACTS:Records of the case show that petitioners filed a complaint against respondents for annulment of sale in extrajudicial
settlement of estate. Petitioners deny that they entered into an agreement with respondents and claimed that their signatures in
such were forged. The court required the parties to submit statements of at least two witnesses to prove their claims and
challenged respondents to take an oath (yamin/vamin?) declaring that there is no truth to claim of forgery.By virtue of the
yamin/vamin?/oath, judgement was rendered in favour of respondents.
ISSUE: WON the Shariah court committed a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint of petitioners by virtue of
the yamin/vamin?/oath taken by the respondent?
HELD: Dismissal of case is upheld because petitioners failed to adduce evidence to support the complaint, but not because of
the yamin/vamin?/oath taken by the respondent. The supreme court said that a committeeto review the rules regarding the
yamin/vamin?/oath and to make necessary amendments.
92. People vs. Bardaje
Cruz(2007 Citation)
Case Digest
FACTS: The accused, Adelino Bardaje was convicted of Forcible Abduction with Rape and sentenced to death. Thus, the case
is brought to the SC for automatic review. The complainant Marcelina Cuizon claimed that she was dragged by the accused
together with five other persons from the house of a certain Fernandez by means of force and intimidation and at nighttime.
Also, she narrated that Bardaje slapped her rendering her unconscious and when she regained consciousness in a hut, Bardaje
was holding her hands and removing her panties. Despite her struggle, Bardaje succeeded in having sexual intercoursewith her
while his companions kept guard.
ISSUE:
NO.
HELD:
Cuizons charge that she was forcibly abducted and afterwards raped was highly dubious and inherently improbable.
According to the medical findings, no evidence of external injuries was found around the vulva or any part of the body.
Considering that complainant was allegedly dragged, slapped into unconsciousness, wrestled with and criminally
abused. Physical evidence is of the highest order and speaks more eloquently than all witnesses put together.The medical
findings of old healed lacerations in the hymen which according to the testimony of the examining physician would have
occurred two weeks or even one month before, if said lacerations had been caused by sexual intercourse. This expert opinion
bolstersthe defense that Bardaje and Cuizon had previous amorous relations at the same time that itcasts serious doubts on the
charge of intercourse by force and intimidation.It is impossible that complainant could have been raped by the accused inside
a smallroom occupied by a woman and two children and in a small hut where the owner, his wife andseven children are all
present. It is improbable that she could have been sexually abused with so many within hearing and seeing distance.Under the
abovementioned circumstances, the Five Others who stood guard outside while Adelino allegedly took advantage of her.
Would have taken turns in abusing her if rapeindeed happen. The fact that they did not do so, implies a special relationship
between Marcelino and Adelino.This is a case where a young girl could not admit to her parents that she had eloped and
voluntarily submitted to sexual intercourse. She was left with no choice but to charge Bardaje with rape or incur the ire of her
parents and social disrepute from a small community.
93. Fajardo vs. Garcia

Cruz(2007 Citation)
ITO TALAGANG WALANG LUMALABAS :///////
94. Louisiana vs. Resweber
Cruz(2007 Citation)
Case Digest
FACTS:
Petitioner was convicted in a state court of murder and sentenced to be electrocuted. A warrant for his execution was duly
issued. He was prepared for electrocution, placed in the electric chair and subjected to a shock which was intended to cause
his death, but which failed to do so, presumably because of some mechanical difficulty. He was removed from the chair and
returned to prison; but another warrant for his execution at a later date was issued.
HELD
1. Assuming, but not deciding, that violations of the principles of the double jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment and
the cruel and unusual punishment provision of the Eighth Amendment would violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment --
(a) The proposed execution would not violate the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment. P. 462.
(b) It would not violate the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment. P. 463.[p460]
2. The proposed execution would not violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. P. 465.
3. The record of the original trial, showing the warrant of arrest, the indictment, the appointment of counsel, and the minute
entries of trial, selection of jury, verdict, and sentence, contains nothing on which this Court could conclude that the
constitutional rights of petitioner were infringed at the trial. P. 465.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana denied petitioner's applications for writs of certiorari, mandamus, prohibition and habeas
corpus to prevent a second attempt to execute him for murder. This Court granted certiorari.
95. Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice

Cruz(2007 Citation)
January 19, 1999 (G.R. No. 132601)
Case Digest
FACTS:
On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on that same day. The
public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that the action of the SC not only violated the
rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on the power of the executive to grant reprieve.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on the execution of
Echegaray despite the fact that the finality of judgment has already been rendered; that by granting the TRO, the Honorable
Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive function. - NO
HELD:
Respondents cited sec 19, art VII. The provision is simply the source of power of the President to grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. The provision, however, cannot
be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality.
The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for
the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life.
For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an accused after his final
conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three branches of our government.
96. People vs. Tongko
Cruz(2007 Citation)
Case Digest
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
97. People vs. Dionisio, 22 SCRA 1299
Cruz(2007 Citation)
Case Digest
FACTS:
On or about the 19th day of August, 1962, in Manila City, Rosauro Dionisio, a person who is not duly authorized in any
capacity by the Games and Amusement Board to conduct a horse race, did then and there willfully and unlawfully offer,
arrange and collect bets for the Special Daily Double Race being then conducted at the Sta. Ana Racing Club at Makati and
for that purpose has in possession the cash amount of P8.50, one Nueva Era Racing Program, dated August 19, 1962, one list
of bets, one ballpen and one booklet of Daily Double receipt. He was thereby charged in violation of Republic Act No. 3063.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the penalty applied to his offense infringes the Constitutional provision that Excessive fines shall not be
imposed nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted. (Art III Sec. 1 clause 19, of the Constitution of the Phils)
HELD:
Referring to penalties that are inhumane and barbarous, or shocking to the conscience and fines or imprisonment are definitely
not in this category. Nor does mere severity constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
The Social Scourge of Gambling must be stamped out. The laws against gambling must be enforced to the limit. (Peo v.
Gorostiza, 77 Phil 88)
98. People vs. Estoista
Cruz(2007 Citation)
Wala ako mahanap nito na matino, ito lang lumalabas http://www.batasnatin.com/law-library/political-and-public-

international-law/constitutional-law/1716-right-against-cruel-and-inhuman-punishment.html
Case Digest
illegal possession of firearms Republic Act. No. 4 is constitutional. It does not go against the constitutional prohibition on
cruel and unusual punishment having due regard to the prevalent conditions which the law proposes to curb.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
99. Generics Act Case

Cruz(2007 Citation)
Case Digest
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
100. People vs. De la Cruz, 92 Phil 906
Cruz(2007 Citation)
Case Digest
FACTS:
In the morning of October 14, 1950, Eduardo Bernardo, Jr. went to the De La Cruz's store in Sampaloc, Manila, and
purchased from him a six-ounce tin of "Carnation" milk for thirty centavos.
As the purchase had been made for Ruperto Austria, who was not in good terms with Pablo de la Cruz the matter
reached the City Fiscal's office and resulted in this criminal prosecution, because Executive Order No. 331 (issued by
authority of Republic Act No. 509) fixed 20 centavos as the maximum price for that kind of commodity.
Republic Act No. 509 provides in part as follows:
SEC. 12. Imprisonment for a period of not less two months nor more than twelve years or a fine of not less than two
thousand pesos nor more than ten thousand pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who sells any article, goods, or
commodity in excess of the maximum selling price fixed by the president; . . . .
In addition to the penalties prescribed above, the persons, corporations, partnerships, or associations found guilty of
any violation of this Act or of any rule or regulations issued by the president pursuant to this Act shall be barred from the
wholesome and retail business for a period of five years for a first offense, and shall be permanently barred for the second or
succeeding offenses.
Having retailed a can of milk at ten centavos more than the ceiling price, Pablo de la Cruz was sentenced, after trial,
in the court of first instance of Manila, to imprisonment for five years, and to pay a fine of five thousand pesos plus costs. He
was also barred from engaging in wholesale and retail business for five years.
Issues:
1) WON the trial judge erred in imposing a punishment wholly disproportionate to the offence
2) WON the trial judge erred in not invalidating RA No. 509 in so far as it prescribed excessive penalties.
3) Is imprisonment for two months or fine of two thousand pesos too excessive for a merchant who sells goods at prices beyond
the ceilings established in the Executive Order? - NO. because in overstepping the price barriers Dela Cruz might derive, in
some instances, profits amounting to thousands of pesos
The prison term must be so disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of all reasonable
men as to what is right and proper under the circumstances (lb.). authorities are not lacking to the effect that the fundamental
prohibition likewise restricts the judge's power and authority
The second theory would contrast the penalty imposed by the court with the gravity of the particular crime or misdemeanor,
and if notable disparity results, it would apply the constitutional brake, even if the statute would, under other circumstances,
be not extreme or oppressive.
4) Is five years and five thousand pesos, cruel and unusual for a violation that merely netted a ten-centavo profit to the accused?
-- NO.
In our opinion the damage caused to the State is not measured exclusively by the gains obtained by the accused, inasmuch as
one violation would mean others, and the consequential breakdown of the beneficial system of price controls.
HELD:
We may decrease the penalty, exercising that discretion vested in the courts by the same statutory enactment. Wherefore,
101. People v. Ching Kuan
CRUZ CITATION: It may seem paradoxical, but the truth is that the codal provision in question, in authorizing the
imposition
reducing theofimprisonment
unequal fines,toaims precisely
six months andatthe
equality
fine tobefore the law.pesos,
two thousand Since we
a fine is imposed
hereby as penalty
affirm the appealedand not as in
decision payment
all
for a specific
other respects.loss or injury, and since its lightness or severity depends upon the culprit's wealth or means, it is only just and
The constitution
proper directs
that the latter be that "Excessive
taken finesinshall
into account fixingnotthe
be amount.
imposed,To norancruel and unusual
indigent laborer, punishment
for instance,inflicted." The a day or
earning P1.50
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is generally aimed at the form or character of the punishment
about P36 a month, a fine of P10 would undoubtedly be more severe than a fine of P100 to an officeholder or property rather than itsowner
severity in respect of duration or amount, and apply to punishment which never existed in America
with a monthly income of P600. Obviously, to impose the same amount of a fine for the same offense upon two persons of which public sentimentthus
has regarded as cruel or obsolete (15 Am. Jur., p. 172), for instance those inflicted at the whipping post, or in the pillory,
differently circumstanced would be to mete out to them a penalty of unequal severity and, hence, unjustly discriminatory.
burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling, and the like (15 Am. Jur., supra, Note 35 L.R.A. p. 561). Fine
and imprisonment would not thus be within the prohibition.
However, there are respectable authorities holding that the inhibition applies as well to punishments that although not cruel
and unusualJ.:
OZAETA, in nature, may be so severe as to fall within the fundamental restriction. (15 Am. Jur., p. 178)
For the purposes of this decision, we may assume, without actually holding, that too long a prison term might clash with the
Philippine was
Appellant Constitution.
accused ofBut that brings
a violation of up again86
section twoofopposing theories,
the Revised we areoftold
Ordinances thethe prohibition
City of Manilaapplies
in that to
onlegislation
or about theonly,
8th
and not to the courts' decision imposing penalties within the limits of the statute (15 Am. Jur., "Criminal Law" sec. 526). The
of May, 1941, he constructed a 297-square-meter building of strong materials in the district of Tondo without the proper
section would violate the Constitution, if the penalty is excessive under any and all circumstances, the minimum being entirely
permit from the city
out of proportion engineer.
to the kind ofHe pleaded
offenses guilty in the municipal court and was there sentenced to pay a fine of P150 and the
prescribed
costs. He appealed to the Court of First Instance, where he again pleaded guilty and was sentenced to pay a fine of P175, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and the costs. Claiming that the fine imposed on him was excessive, appellant
has further appealed to this Court.
The penalty prescribed by section 1137 of the Revised Ordinances for the violation committed by the accused is a fine of not
more than 200 or imprisonment for not more than six months, or both, in the discretion of the court. In other words the
maximum penalty that the court could have imposed was imprisonment for six months and a fine of P200.
(1) Appellant urges us to take into consideration his plea of guilty as a mitigating circumstance and to reverse our decisions
in People vs. Durano, G.R. No. 45114, and People vs. Roque, G.R. No. 47561, in which we held that the rules of the Revised
Penal Code for the application of penalties when mitigating and aggravating circumstances concur do not apply to a case
where the accused is found guilty of the violation of a special law and not of a crime penalized by said Code. (2) He also
contends that the trial court erred in taking into consideration his financial ability to pay the fine and that article 66 of the
Revised Penal Code is unconstitutional.
1. As to the first contention, we find it unnecessary to reexamine or disturbed the decisions cited, because, the penalty imposed
being only a fine, the rules established in articles 63 and 64 of the Revised Penal Code concerning the presence of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances could not in any event be applied herein. If at all, it would be article 66 of the same Code that
should be applied. Said article reads as follows:
Art. 66. Imposition of fines. In imposing fines the courts may fix any amount within the limits established by law;
in fixing the amount in each case attention shall be given, not only to the mitigating and aggravating circumstances,
but more particularly to the wealth or means of the culprit.
2. So we proceed to pass upon appellant's second contention. The trial court said:
The accused in this case is well-to-do and could afford to pay a fine. According to the attorney of the accused
himself, he has a good business, and for that reason he was able to construct a big building. In view thereof, the Court
believes that the penalty imposed by the Municipal Court is reasonable.
After quoting from article 66, counsel for the appellant says:
As a consequence of this provision, when a fine has to be imposed, a poor person will be required to pay less than
one who is well-to-do, notwithstanding the fact that both commit the same degree of violation of the law. In such
case, the above provision creates a discrimination between the rich and the poor, in the sense of favoring the poor but
not the rich, and thus causing unequal application of the law. Consequently, the above provision is unconstitutional
and void as being a law which denies to all persons the equal protection of the laws. . . .
It may seem paradoxical, but the truth is that the codal provision in question, in authorizing the imposition of unequal fines,
aims precisely at equality before the law. Since a fine is imposed as penalty and not as payment for a specific loss or injury,
and since its lightness or severity depends upon the culprit's wealth or means, it is only just and proper that the latter be taken
into account in fixing the amount. To an indigent laborer, for instance, earning P1.50 a day or about P36 a month, a fine of P10
would undoubtedly be more severe than a fine of P100 to an officeholder or property owner with a monthly income of P600.
111. People v. Tac-An 182
Cruz(2007 Citation)
And in People v. Tac-An, it was held:
It is elementary that the constitutional right against double jeopardy protects one against a second or later prosecution for
the same offense, and that when the subsequent information charges another and different offense, although arising from
the same act or set of acts, there is no prohibited double jeopardy. In the case at bar, it appears to us quite clear that the
offense charged in Criminal Case No. 4007 is that of unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm penalized under a
special statute, while the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 4012 was that of murder punished under the Revised Penal
Code. It would appear self-evident that these two (2) offenses in themselves are quite different one from the other, such
that in principle, the subsequent filing of Criminal Case No. 4012 is not to be regarded as having placed appellant in a
prohibited second jeopardy.
112. Perez v. Court of Appeals 168 SCRA 236

Cruz(2007 Citation)
In the case of Perez v. Court of Appeals a person previously acquitted of consented abduction was subsequently charged
with qualified seduction arising from the same act on which the earlier prosecution was based. In holding that there was no
double jeopardy, the Supreme
Court declared:
A plea of double jeopardy cannot be accorded merit where two indictments are perfectly distinct in point of law, however
closely they may appear to be connected in fact. Protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same
offense or iden tical offense. Where two different laws (or articles of the same code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to
one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the same technical offense.
Where two different laws (orarticles of the same code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to
a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some important act
which is not an essential element of the other. There are similar elements between consented abduction and qualified
seduction, namely: (1) that the offended party is a virgin, and, (2) that she must be over twelve (12) and under eight een
(18) years of age. However two elements differentiate the two crimes. Consented abduction, in addition to the two
common elements, requires that: (1) the taking away of the offended party must be with her consent, after solicitation or
cajolery from the of fender; and, (2) the taking away of the offended party must be with lewd designs. On the other hand,
an information for qualified se duction also requires that: (1) the crime be committed by abuse of authority, confidence or
relationship, and, (2) the offender has sexual intercourse with the woman.
Case Digest
FACTS:
Petitioner herein was initially charged with consented abduction in the CFI of Pampanga. The accused pleased not guilty,
but the trial on the merits ensued and a judgment of conviction was rendered against Perez.
On appeal, the CA reversed and acquitted Perez of the crime of Consented Abduction.
Subsequent to petitioners acquittal, complainant Yolanda Mendoza filed another criminal complaint against Perez, but this
time is for Qualified Seduction.
Petitioner filed a motion to quash involving double jeopardy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not subsequent filing of case in the form of qualified seduction after acquittal to consented seduction
constitutes double jeopardy.
HELD:
No. In the case at bar, the issue posed by the petitioner relates to the identity of the two offenses of Consented Abduction
and Qualified Seduction.
It is true that the two offenses for which the petitioner was charged arose from the same facts. This. however does not
preclude the filing of another information against him if from those facts. two distinct elements, arose.
A single act may be an offense against two statutes and if each statutes requires proof of an additional fact, which the other
does not, and acquittal or conviction under either statute does not exempt the defendant from prosecution and conviction
under the other.
The plea of double jeopardy cannot therefore be accorded merit, as the two indictments are perfectly distinct in point of
law however closely they may appear to be connected in fact.
The similar elements between Consented Abduction and Qualified Seduction.

1. That the offended part is a virgin
2. That she must be over twelve and under 18 years of age.
Consented Abduction requires that:

1. The taking away of the offended party must be with her consent, after solicitation or cajolery from the offender.
2. The taking away of the offended party must be with lewd designs.
Qualified Seduction requires that:

1. The crime ben committed by abuse of authority, confidence or relationship.
2. The offender has sexual intercourse with the woman.
113. Yap v. Lutero

Cruz(2007 Citation)
Analyzing the double jeopardy provision in the Bill of Rights, Chief Justice Concepcion said in the case of Yap v. Lutero:
Our Bill of Rights deals with two (2) kinds of double jeopardy. The first sentence of clause 20, Section 1, Article III of the
Constitution, ordains that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The second sentence of
said clause provides that if an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction, or acquittal under either shall constitute a
bar to another prosecution for the same act. Thus, the first sentence prohibits double jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense, whereas the second contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the same act. Under thfirst sentence, one may
betwice put in jeopardy of punishment of the same act, provided that he is charged with different offenses, or the offense
charged in one case is not included in, or does not include, the crime charged in the other case. The second sentence applies,
even if the offenses charged are notthe same, owing to the fact that one constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the other' a
violation of a statute. If the two charges are based on one and the same act, conviction or acquittal under either the law or the
ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other. Incidentally, such conviction or acquittal is not indispensable to sustain the
plea of double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. So long as jeopardy has attached under one of the information
charging
said offense, the defense may be availed of in the other case involving the same offense, even if there has been neither
conviction nor acquittal in either case.
114. People v. Relova

Case Citation
In People v. Relova a person was charged under a city ordinance with having installed a device in his ice plant that lowered
his electric meter readings to the prejudice of the city government. The information was, how ever, dismissed on theground of
prescription, having been filed more than two months after discovery ofthe offense. Later, the same defendant was charged
anew, this time before the court of first instance, for theft of electric current under the Revised Penal Code. On motion of the
ac cused, the respondent judge dismissed the case because of double jeopardy, and the prosecution appealed. Through Justice
Feliciano, the Supreme Court sustained the dismissal, applying the above-mentioned Yap Case and stating in part as follows:
The basic difficulty with the petitioner's position is that it must be examined, not under the terms of the first sentence ofArticle
IV (2) of the 1973Constitution, but rather under the secondsentence of the same section. The first sentence of Article IV
(22) sets forth the general rule: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not available where the sec ond
prosecution is for an offense that is different from the of fense charged in the first or prior prosecution, although both the first
and second offenses may be based upon the same act or set of acts. The second sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an
exception to the general proposition: the constitutional pro tection against double jeopardy is available although the prior
offense charged under an ordinance be different from the of fense charges subsequently under a national statute such as the
Revised Penal Code, provided, that both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts. This was made clear sometime ago
in Yap v. Lutero. Put a little differently, where the offenses charged are pe nalized either by different sections of the same
statute or by dif ferent statutes, the important inquiry relates to the identity of offenses charged: the constitutional protection
against double jeopardy is available only where an identity is shown to exist be tween the earlier and the subsequent offenses
charged. In con trast, where one offense is charged under a municipal ordinance while the other is penalized by a statute, the
critical inquiry is to the identity ofthe acts which the accused is said to have commit ted and which are alleged to have given
rise to the two offenses: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available so long as the acts which constitute
or have given rise to the first offense under a municipal ordinance are the same acts which constitute or have given rise to the
offense charged under a statute. The question may be raised why one rule should exist where two offenses under two different
sections of the same statute or under different statutes are charged, and another rule for the situation where one offense is
charged under a municipal ordinance and another offense under a national statute. If the second sentence of the double
jeopardy provision had not been written into the Constitution, conviction or acquittal under a municipal ordinance would
never constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act under a national statute. An offense penalized by municipal
ordinance is, by definition, different from an offense under a statute. The two offenses would never consti tute the same
offense having been promulgated by different rule-making authoritiesthough one be subordinate to the otherand the plea
of double jeopardy would never lie. The dis cussions during the 1934-1935 Constitutional Convention show that the second
sentence was inserted precisely for the purpose of extending the constitutional protection against double jeop ardy to a
situation whichwould not otherwise be covered by the first sentence.
CASE DIGEST
FACTS:
espondent herein is the judge who rendered the decision dismissing the petition of the prosecutor to charge Manuel Opulencia in violation of
unicipal ordinance S1 of 1974 for illegal installation of electric wire do reduce electric consumption for his factory - Opulencia Ice Plant.
n information however was filed after almost 9 months. The responded herein then moved to quash the charges for grounds of prescription,
at since the violation is classified as light felony, only two months is given for prescription.
The lower court granted the motion to quash. The prosecutor then, after the motion was granted, filed another charge against
the respondent company owner, on ground of theft. That according to the prosecutor, illegal installation which is punishable
under the municipal ordinance and theft of electricity punishable under the RPC are different.
ISSEUE:
Whether the dismessal fo the first case can be properly pleaded by the accused in the motion to quash.
HELD:
The constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not available where the second prosecution is for an offense that is
different from the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution, although both the first and second offenses ma be based
upon the same act or set of facts.
But the protection against double jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be different from
the offense charged subsequently udner a national statude, provided that both offenses spring from the same act or set of facts.
The first sentence prohibits double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, whereas the second contemplates double
jeopardy of punishment for the same act. Under the first sentence, one may be twice put to jeopardy provided that he is
charged with different offenses, or the offense charges is not included or does not icnlude, the crime charged it he other case.
The second sentence applies even if the offenses charged are not the same, owing to the fact that one constitutes a violation of
an ordinance and the other a violation of the statues. If two charges are based on one and the same act, conviction or acquittal
under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution under other.
In the case at bar, the Supreme held that the theft of electric current contended by the prosecutor is indeed part of the offense
charged under the municipal ordinance of Batangas, which is the illegal or unauthorized installation of electrical wiring
because immediate physical effect of the installation is the inward flow of electric current into Opulencias ice plant.
The petition is dismissed.

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1. Sales v.

As Justice Ynares-Santiago put it in Sales v.Sandiganbayan:

58 N.M. 385, 271 P.2d 827, affirmed.

10. US v. Tan Teng

11. Villaflor v. Summers

13. Beltran v Samson

Scope of the Privilege of the Right Against Self Incrimination

14. Chavez v Court of Appeals

When is the right against self-incrimination available

Petitioner was convicted.

15. Miranda v Arizona

2. Vignera v. New York:

3. Westover v. United States:

16. Gideon v Wainwright

17. Escobedo v Illinois

18. People v Buscato

19. People v Bagasala

20. People v Ramos, 122 SCRA 312

21. People v Galit

22. Morales v. Enrile

Same as with People v. Galit

The petitions are without merit and hereby dismissed.

23. People v. Pecardal

24. People v. Capitin

25. People v. Barros

27. People v. Macam

28. People v. Lamsing

29. People v. Salvatierra

30. De la Torre v. Court of Appeals

31. People v. Compil

32. People v. Lucero

The three accused denied complicity in the crime charged.

Issue: Whether or Not the lower court erred in convicting accused-appellant.

Held: Appellant's conviction cannot be based on his extrajudicial confession.

Whereof, Decision convicting appellant Alejandro Lucero y Cortel is hereby reversed.

33. People v. Suarez

34. People v. Bonola

35. People v. Andan

36. People v. Serzo

37. Guazon v. De Villa

38. Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile

39. Enrile v. Salazar

40. People v. Hernandez

41. People v Cortez

42. De La Camara vs. Enage

43. Yap v Court of Appeals

44. People v Malilay

45. People v Sunga

46. Dumalo v COMELEC

47. People v Tempongko

48. People v Mirantes

49. Joseph v Villaluz

50. People v Regulacion

51. People v Arciaga

52. People v Solis, 128 SCRA 217

53. People v Resano

54. People v Lumague

55. People v Holgado

56. People v Magsi

57. People v Malunsing

58. Soriano v Sandiganbayan

59. People v Ramirez, 69 SCRA 144

60. People v Quintal