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Next week, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will be in Vietnam to attend the
ASEAN Post‐Ministerial Confernce and the annual meeting of the ASEAN Regional
Forum. She will also celebrate the 15th anniversary of US‐Vietnam diplo9matic
relations.
Before her arrival, there were many signs to indicate that the US is really committed
to the Southeast Asia: the U.S.‐led Angkor Sentinel exercises in Cambodia, the first
visit of a major Laotian official (Vice Prime Minister Thongloun Sisoulith) in
Washington, the participation of Malaysia and Singapore in the RIMPAC war games...
Concerning Vietnam, there were also many ‘goodwill’ gestures as the speech of the
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates at the Shangri‐La Dialogue, the decision to help
Vietnam on the Agent Orange issue...
Q1. How do you assess the current U.S. policy towards Southeast Asia? Is the United
States really committed to the region? And what are the U.S. aims?
ANSWER: The Obama Administration is firmly committed to making up lost ground in
Southeast Asia. Last year the Administration signed the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation and at a press conference after the signing Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton stated that ‘we [the United States] are fully engaged with our ASEAN
partners on the wide range of challenges confronting us’. This was reflected in the
Revised Priorities for Cooperation under the ASEAN‐U.S. Enhanced Partnership that
was adopted at this time. Secretary Clinton also advanced the Lower Mekong
Initiative. In November 2009, President Barrack Obama attended the 1st ASEAN‐
United States Leaders’ Meeting in Singapore. These three developments not only
mark a major step forward in U.S.‐ASEAN relations but also demonstrate that the
U.S. is willing to contest areas where China has operated relatively unchallenged.
Q2. Some have said that the USA would like to strengthen their position in Southeast
Asia, and especially in Vietnam to ‘contain’ the influence of China. What is your
opinion?
ANSWER: The Quadrennial Defense Review signaled out three countries – Indonesia,
Malaysia and Vietnam – as potential U.S. security partners. All signs indicate that the
U.S. will be able to advance these relationships because of concerns in all three
countries about Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea. The U.S. is acting to
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balance power in the region. A key indication will be whether Secretary Clinton will
announce that the United States is seeking membership in the East Asian Summit. If
the U.S. joins (along with Russia), this new body will eclipse the Chinese‐influenced
ASEAN Plus Three (China, Japan, South Korea).
Q3. Recently, China has reportedly told the US that the South China Sea has become
the ‘core interests’ of Beijing. What does China mean and what would be the
consequences of that ‘new diplomacy’ for Vietnam and other countries which have
claims on the Paracels and the Spratlys ?
ANSWER: China’s core interests involve Taiwan and Tibet. These are areas where a
challenge to Chinese sovereignty will be met by sanctions including the threat and
use of force. Elevating the South China Sea to a core interest raises the stakes. It is
China’s reaction to the USNS Impeccable incident and other U.S. intrusions into
China’s Exclusive Economic Zones not only in the South China Sea but also the East
Sea.
China’s assertion of a core interest over the South China Sea will have little
implication for the Paracels because China already occupies them and has superior
military force to defend its sovereignty claims.
China’s assertion of a core interest is a provocative act as far as the Spratly islands
are concerned. China has already acted in a muscular fashion in 2009 and this year in
enforcing its unilateral fishing ban. This means Vietnam and the Philippines can
expect their fisherman to be dealt with roughly by Chinese fishery administration
vessels. China can be assertive because the United States has said it will not take
sides in sovereignty disputes. The U.S.. in other words, won’t intervene in bilateral
disputes. But the U.S. will oppose China’s ambit claims to the South China Sea and
resist Chinese efforts to curtail freedom of navigation.
Q4. Do you think that Vietnam, as ASEAN Chair this year, will succeed in putting the
South China Sea issue on the agenda of the grouping and forming an united front of
ASEAN against the threats from China?
ANSWER: Vietnam has served as ASEAN chair for half a year and has not been
successful in forging consensus on ASEAN policy towards China. In 2002, when
ASEAN and China agreed on the Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China
Sea (DOC), ASEAN asserted that it was the first step in a Code of Conduct. Eight years
later the best Vietnam could do was to get ASEAN to agree that the DOC should be
implemented. There was no word on the more contentious Code of Conduct. China
has repeatedly stated it will not deal with the South China Sea on a multilateral basis
and it has challenged ASEAN ‘to get its act together’. ASEAN is in disarray. The best
Vietnam can hope for in the final six months of its chairmanship is that the issue is
raised in discussions with China and raised by the United States and other external
powers in the ASEAN Regional Forum meeting and later at the first ASEAN Defence
Ministers Plus Meeting with eight defence ministers who are dialogue partners.
ASEAN members are very concerned about Chinese assertiveness in the South China
Sea but they will not confront China. They prefer the United States and other
external powers to do the heavy lifting for them.