University of Santo Tomas

Faculty of Civil Law

Criminal Law
Questions Asked
More Than Once
(QuAMTO 2016)

*QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as

suggested by UPLC and other distinct luminaries in the academe,
and updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the 2016
Bar Exams.

*Bar questions are arranged per topic and were selected based on
their occurrence on past bar examinations from 1990 to 2015.
 ACADEMICS COMMITTEE
KATRINA GRACE C. ONGOCO MANAGING EDITOR

REUBEN BERNARD M. SORIANO

ERINN MARIEL C. PEREZ EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
MA. NINNA ROEM A. BONSOL

REUBEN BERNARD M. SORIANO

JUAN PAOLO MAURINO R. OLLERO LAYOUT AND DESIGN
JOHN REE E. DOCTOR

QUAMTO COMMITTEE MEMBERS

CALOS LEANDRO L. ARRIERO

ELISE MARIE B. BERTOS
GABRIELA LOUISE O.J. CANDELARIA
WARREN RODANTE D. GUZMAN
MARY GRACE D. LUNA
LEAN JEFF M. MAGSOMBOL
JUAN PAOLO MAURINO R. OLLERO
ANN CAIRA C. SURIO
MARY JANE D. VILARAY

ATTY. AL CONRAD B. ESPALDON

ADVISER
 QUAMTO FOR CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)

BOOK 1 the height of their arguments, A left and took a bolo

(ARTICLES 1-99, RPC; EXCLUDE THE PROVISIONS ON from his house, after which he returned to the party
CIVIL LIABILITY) and threatened to stab everybody. B got scared and
ran towards the seashore, with A chasing him, B ran
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES up a steep incline along the shore and was cornered
on top of a cliff. Out of fear, B jumped from the cliff
Q: What are the different schools of thought or into the sea, A returned to the scene of their
theories in Criminal Law and describe each briefly. confrontation and seeing that nobody was there,
To what theory does our Revised Penal Code belong? went home to sleep. The next day, Bs wife reported
(1996) to the police station that her husband had not yet
come home. A search was conducted by the
Q: Distinguish motive from intent. (2004, 1999, residents of the barangay but after almost two days,
1996) May crime be committed without criminal B or his body could not be located and his
intent? (1996) disappearance continued for the next few days.
Based on the testimony of C and other guests, who
A: Motive is the moving power that impels a person to had seen A and B on top of the cliff, A was arrested
act for a definite result. It is not considered as an and charged with Murder. In his defense, he claimed
element of the crime. It is essential only only when the that since B's body has not been found, there was no
identity of the offender is in doubt. On the otherhand, evidence of "corpus delicti' and therefore, he should
intent is the purpose for using a particular means to be acquitted. Is the defense of A tenable or not? State
achieve a desired result. It is an ingredient of dolo or the reason(s) for your answer. (2001)
malice, thus it is an element of deliberate felonies.
A: The defense of A is not tenable. "Corpus delicti" does
A crime may be committed without criminal intent in not refer to the body of the purported victim which had
the following instances: not been found. Even without the body of the purported
1. If such is a culpable felony; victim being found, the offender can be convicted when
2. In crimes which are mala prohibita in nature. the facts and circumstances of a crime, the body of the
crime or "corpus delicti" is established. In other words,
Q: When is motive relevant to prove a case? (When is the non-recovery of the body of the victim is not a bar to
it not necessary to be established? Explain. (2006, the prosecution of A for Murder, but the fact of death
1999) and identity of the victim must be established beyond
reasonable doubt.
A: Motive is relevant to a case when:
1. The identity of the offender is in doubt; DEFINITION OF CRIMINAL LAW
2. When the act committed gives rise to variant crimes
and there is a need to determine which crime should Mala in Se and Mala Prohibita
be properly imputed to the offender;
3. When the evidence is merely circumstantial; Q: Distinguish between crimes mala in se and crimes
4. When there are no eyewitnesses to the crime and mala prohibita. May an act be malum in se and be, at
where suspicion is likely to fall upon a number of the same time, malum prohibitum? (2005, 2003,
persons; 2001, 1999, 1997)
5. In ascertaining the truth between two antagonistic
theories or versions of the killing; and A:
6. When the act is alleged to be committed in defense BASIS MALA IN SE MALA PROHIBITA
of a stranger because it must not be induced by
revenge, resentment or other evil motive. Sufficient that the
There must be a
prohibited act was
Motive is not necessary to be established in the criminal intent
done
following instances: As to Wrong merely
1. When there is a witness positively identifying the Wrong from its
their because prohibited by
accused; very nature
concepts statute
2. In commission of crimes which are mala prohibita in Criminal intent Criminal intent is not
nature; and governs necessary
3. In crimes committed through reckless imprudence. Punished under Violations of special
the RPC laws
Q: Define "corpus delicti" What are the elements of Good faith or
"corpus delicti"? (2000) Good faith, lack
lack of criminal intent
of criminal
are not valid defenses;
A: Corpus delicti literally means the body or substance of intent or
it is enough that the
the crime or the fact that a crime has been committed, negligence are
prohibition was
but does not include the identity of the person who As to valid defenses
voluntarily violated
committed it. legal Criminal Criminal liability is
The elements of corpus delicti are: implicati liability is generally incurred
1. The existence of a certain act or result forming the incurred even only when the crime is
on
basis of the criminal charge; and when the crime consummated
2. The existence of a criminal agency as the cause of is attempted or
the act or result. frustrated
Penalty is The penalty of the
Q: At a birthday party in Bogo, Cebu, A got computed on offender is the same
intoxicated and started quarrelling with B and C. At
1

the basis of as they are all deemed

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS TEAM BAROPS

FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016
 QuAMTO for CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
whether he is a principals
principal
offender, or
merely an
accomplice or
accessory
Such circumstances
Mitigating and
are not appreciated
aggravating
unless the special law
circumstances
has adopted the
are appreciated
scheme or scale of
in imposing the
penalties under the
penalties
RPC
Yes, an act may be malum in se and malum prohibitum
at the same time. In People v. Sunico, et al, (CA 50 OG
5880) it was held that the omission or failure of election
inspectors and poll clerks to include a voter's name in
the registry list of voters is wrong perse because it
disenfranchises a voter of his right to vote. In this regard
it is considered as malum in se. Since it is punished
under a speciallaw (Sec. 101 and 103, Revised Election
Code), it is considered malum prohibitum.
Q: Mr. Carlos Gabisi, a customs guard, and Mr. Rico
Yto, a private individual, went to the office of Mr.
Diether Ocuarto, a customs broker, and represented
themselves as agents of Moonglow Commercial
Trading, an Importer of children's clothes and toys.
Mr. Gabisi and Mr. Yto engaged Mr. Ocuarto to
prepare and file with the Bureau of Customs the
necessary Import Entry and Internal Revenue
Declaration covering Moonglows shipment. Mr.
Gabisi and Mr. Yto submitted to Mr. Ocuarto a
packing list, a commercial invoice, a bill of lading
and a Sworn Import Duty Declaration which
declared the shipment as children's toys, the taxes
and duties of which were computed at
P60,000.00. Mr. Ocuarto filed the aforementioned
documents with the Manila International Container
Port. However, before the shipment was released, a
spot check was conducted by Customs Senior
Agent James Bandido, who discovered that the
contents of the van (shipment) were not children's
toys as declared in the shipping documents but
1,000 units of video cassette recorders with taxes
and duties computed at P600,000.00. A hold order
and warrant of seizure and detention were then
issued by the District Collector of Customs. Further
investigation showed that Moonglow is non-existent.
Consequently, Mr. Gabisi and Mr. Yto were charged
with and convicted for violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. 3019 which makes it unlawful among others, for
public officers to cause any undue Injury to any
party, including the Government, in the discharge
of official functions through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
In their motion for reconsideration, the accused
alleged that the decision was erroneous because the
crime was not consummated but was only at an
attempted stage and that in fact the Government did
not suffer any undue injury. (2000)
a. Is the contention of both accused correct?
Explain.
A: Yes, the contention of the accused that the crime was
not consummated is correct. R.A. 3019 is a special law
punishing acts mala prohibita. As a rule, attempted
violation of a special law is not punished because
*QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as suggested by UPLC and other distinct
luminaries in the academe, and updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the 2016 Bar Exams.
criminal liability is incurred only when the crime is
consummated. Actual injury is required.
b. Assuming that the attempted or frustrated stage
of the violation charged is not punishable, may
the accused be nevertheless convicted for an
offense punished by the Revised Penal Code
under the facts of the case? Explain.
A: Yes, both are liable for attempted estafa thru
falsification of commercial documents, a complex crime.
They tried to defraud the Government with the use of
false commercial and public documents. Damage is not
necessary.
Construction of Penal Laws
Q: What is the fundamental principle in applying and
interpreting criminal laws, including the
Indeterminate Sentence Law? (2012)
A: The fundamental principle in interpreting and
applying penal laws is the principle of pro reo. The
phrase in dubio pro reo means when in doubt, for the
accused. (Intestate Estate of Gonzales v. People, G.R. No.
181409, February 11, 2010). In dubio pro reo, is in
consonance with the constitutional guarantee that the
accused ought to be presumed innocent until and unless
his guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt (People
v. Temporada, G.R. No. 173473, December 17, 2008).
Q: What is the Doctrine of Pro Reo? How does it
relate to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code?
(2010)
A: The Doctrine of Pro Reo provides that whenever a
penal law is to be construed or applied and the law
admits of two interpretations, one lenient to the
offender and one strict to the offender, that
interpretation which is lenient or favorable to the
offender will be adopted.
Following this doctrine, crimes under Art. 48 of the RPC
are complexed and punished with a single penalty (that
prescribed for the most serious crime and to be imposed
in its maximum period). The rationale being, that the
accused who commits two crimes with a single criminal
impulse demonstrates lesser perversity than when the
crimes are committed by different acts and several
criminal resolutions (People v. Comadre, G.R. No. 153559,
June 8, 2004). However, Art. 48 shall be applied only
when it would bring about the imposition of a penalty
lesser than the penalties imposable for all the
component crimes if prosecuted separately.
SCOPE OF APPLICATION AND CHARACTERISTICS OF
PHILIPPINE CRIMINAL LAW
Generality
Q; Ando, an Indonesian national who just visited the
Philippines, purchased a ticket for a passenger
vessel bound for Hong Kong. While on board the
vessel, he saw his mortal enemy Iason, also an
Indonesian national, seated at the back portion of
the cabin and who was busy reading a newspaper.
Ando stealthily approached Iason and when he was
near him, Ando stabbed and killed Iason. The vessel
is registered in Malaysia. The killing happened just a
few moments after the vessel left the port of Manila.
2
 QUAMTO FOR CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
Operatives from the PNP Maritime Command
arrested Ando. Presented for the killing of Iason,
Ando contended that he did not incur criminal
liability because both he and the victim were
Indonesians. He likewise argued that he could not be
prosecuted in Manila because the vessel is a
Malaysian-registered ship. Discuss the merits of
Ando's contentions. (2015)
A: Both contentions of Ando lack merit. The argument of
Ando that he did not incur criminal liability because
both he and the victim were Indonesians is not tenable.
Under the generality principle, penal laws shall be
obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in the Philippine
territory (Article 14 of the Civil Code). The foreign
characteristic of an offender and offended party does
not exclude him from operation of penal laws (People v.
Galacgac, C.A., 54 O.G. 1027). Under the Revised Penal
Code, except as provided in treaties and laws of
preferential application, penal laws of the Philippines
shall have force and effect within its territory. Here,
since the killing took place within the Philippine
territory, our penal laws applies and Ando may be held
criminally responsible despite his being and Indonesian
citizen.
Likewise, the contention of Ando that he could not be
prosecuted in Manila because the vessel is a Malaysian-
registered ship is without merit. Under the English Rule,
which our jurisdiction recognizes and follows, crimes
committed aboard a vessel within the territorial waters
of a country are triable in the courts of such country
except when crimes merely affect things within the
vessel or when they only refer to the internal
management thereof. Here, since the crime was
committed within the Philippine waters and neither
exception applies, Ando may be prosecuted in Manila.
ADDITIONAL ANSWER:
Under Section 27 of the Convention of the Law of The
Sea, the criminal jurisdiction of the coastal State should
not be exercised on board a foreign ship passing through
the territorial sea to arrest any person or to conduct any
investigation in connection with any crime committed
on board the ship during its passage except if the crime
is of a kind to disturb the peace of the country or the
good order of the territorial sea. The vessel is still within
the territorial waters of the Philippines when the crime
was committed since the killing happened a few
moments after the vessel left the port of Manila. Murder
committed by Ando disturbs the peace of the
Philippines; hence, he could be prosecuted in Manila.
Territoriality
Q: Pierce is a French diplomat stationed in the
Philippines. While on EDSA and driving with an
expired license, he hit a pedestrian who was
crossing illegally. The pedestrian died. Pierce was
charged with reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide. In his defense, he claimed diplomatic
immunity. Is Pierce correct? (2014)
A: Yes, Pierce is correct. Pierce, being a French diplomat
stationed in the Philippines, would be exempt from the
general application of our criminal laws, as provided for
under laws or treaties of preferential application, more
particularly under R.A. 75.
Q: After drinking one (1) case of San Miguel beer and
taking two plates of "pulutan", Binoy, a Filipino
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
seaman, stabbed to death Sio My, a Singaporean
seaman, aboard M/V "Princess of the Pacific", an
overseas vessel which was sailing in the South China
Sea. The vessel, although Panamanian registered, is
owned by Lucio Sy, a rich Filipino businessman.
When M/V "Princess of the Pacific" reached a
Philippine Port at Cebu City, the Captain of the
vessel turned over the assailant Binoy to the
Philippine authorities. An information for homicide
was filed against Binoy in the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City. He moved to quash the information for
lack of jurisdiction. If you were the Judge, will you
grant the motion? Why? (2000)
A: Yes, the Motion to Quash the Information should be
granted. The Philippine court has no jurisdiction over
the crime committed since it was committed on the high
seas or outside of Philippine territory and on board a
vessel not registered or licensed in the Philippines (US v.
Fowler, 1 Phil 614). It is the registration of the vessel in
accordance with the laws of the Philippines, not the
citizenship of her owner, which makes it a Philippine
ship. The country of registry, not ownership, determines
its nationality. The vessel being registered in Panama,
the laws of Panama govern while it is in the high seas.
Q: Hubert and Eunice were married in the
Philippines. Hubert took graduate studies in New
York and met his former girlfriend Eula. They
renewed their friendship and finally decided to get
married. The first wife, Eunice, heard about the
marriage and secures a copy of the marriage
contract in New York. Eunice filed a case of Bigamy
against Hubert in the Philippines. (2008, 1994)
a. Will the case prosper?
A: No, because the Philippine courts have no jurisdiction
over a crime committed outside of the Philippine
territory. Under the principle of territoriality, penal
laws, specifically the RPC, are enforceable only within
the bounds of our territory (Art. 2, RPC).
b. If Eunice gave her consent to the second
marriage, what will your answer be? Explain.
A: The answer will be the same. The consent of Eunice
would not confer jurisdiction on Philippine courts.
Moreover, bigamy is a public crime and not subject to
agreement between the victim and the accused.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON THE POWER OF
CONGRESS TO ENACT PENAL LAWS
Equal protection; Due process; Non-imposition of cruel
and unusual punishment or excessive fines; Bill of
Attainder; Ex Post Facto Law
Q: What are the constitutional provisions limiting
the power of Congress to enact penal laws? (2012)
A: The constitutional provisions limiting the power of
Congress to enact penal laws are the following:
1. The law must not be an ex post facto law or it should
not be given a retroactive effect.
2. The law must not be a bill of attainder, meaning it
cannot provide punishment without judicial
process.
3. The law must not impose cruel, unusual or
degrading punishment.
3
TEAM BAROPS
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016
 QuAMTO for CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
4. No person shall be held to answer for a criminal
offense without due process of law.
Q: Distinguish between ex post facto law and bill of
attainder. (2015)
A: Ex post facto law is any law which makes an innocent
act a crime after the act was committed. It is a Latin
phrase which means from something done afterwards.
It could also be a law which aggravates a crime, or
makes it greater than when it was committed, or which
changes the punishment and inflicts a greater penalty
than the law governing the crime when committed. A bill
of attainder is a law which inflicts punishment on a
named individual or a group of individuals without
judicial trial.
Ex post facto law pertains to the act while a bill of
attainder pertains to a named individual or to members
of a group.
Q: Congress passed a law reviving the Anti-
Subversion Law, making it a criminal offense again
for a person to join the Communist Party of the
Philippines. Reporma, a former high-ranking
member of the Communist Party, was charged under
the new law for his membership in the Communist
Party when he was a student in the 80s. He now
challenges the charge against him. What objections
may he raise? (2014)
A: Reporma may raise the limitations imposed by the
1987 Constitution on the power of Congress to enact
retroactive penal laws which are prejudicial to the
accused. Under the Bill of Rights of the Constitution such
is classified as an ex post facto law. It should be noted
that when Congress decriminalized the crime of
subversion, under R.A. 7637, it obliterated the felony
and its effects upon Reporma. Consequently charging
him now under the new law for his previous
membership in the Communist Party would be
constitutionality impermissible.
FELONIES
Q: How are felonies committed? Explain each.
(2015)
A: Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit
(dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa). There is deceit
when the act is performed with deliberate intent; and
there is fault when the wrongful act results from
imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill
(Article 3 of Revised Penal Code).
Aberratio Ictus; Error in Personae; Praeter Intentionem
(Article 4, par. 1)
Q: Explain and illustrate aberratio ictus. (2015,
1993) What do you understand by aberration ictus,
error in personae, and praeter intentionem? Do they
alter the criminal liability of an accused? Explain.
(1999, 1994, 1989)
A: Aberatio ictus, error in personae and praeter
intentionem are the three ways by which a person may
commit a felony although the wrongful act done is
different from that which he intended.
*QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as suggested by UPLC and other distinct
luminaries in the academe, and updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the 2016 Bar Exams.
In aberratio ictus, there is a mistake in blow whereby an
offender intending to cause an injury to one person
actually inflicts it on another because of lack of
precision. Illustration: A, intending to kill B, fires his gun
at the latter but because of poor aim or lack of precision,
he hits C instead, who suffers serious physical injury.
In error in personae, there is a mistake in the identity of
the victim. The offender intends the injury on one
person but the harm fell on another. The intended victim
was not at the scene of the crime. Illustration: A
intending to kill B, his enemy, lay in ambush for the
latter to pass along a dark alley. Because of the darkness,
A fired his gun at a person passing by, thinking him to be
B. It turned out that the person shot was C, A's father.
In praeter intentionem, the injurious result is greater
than that intended by the offender. Here, there is a
notable disparity between the means employed or the
act of the offender and the felony which resulted.
Illustration: A, without intent to kill, struck the victim on
the back, causing the victim to fall down and hit his head
on the pavement.
Yes, the presence of these circumstances will alter the
criminal liability of the accused. Thus:
1. In aberratio ictus, two offenses are actually
committed by the offender, that which he intended
to commit and that which he actually committed.
But if these two offenses are both either grave or
less grave, since they are produced by one single act,
a complex crime will result upon which the penalty
for the most serious crime shall be imposed in its
maximum period;
2. In the case of error in personae, the offender shall be
guilty of the crime actually committed byhim, but
the penalty to be imposed shall either be the penalty
for the crime actually committed or that for the
crime intended to be committed whichever is lower,
but the same will be imposed in its maximum
period;
3. In praeter intentionem, the offender, will incur
criminal liability for the felony actually committed
by him, but he will be entitled to the mitigating
circumstance of not having intended to commit so
grave a wrong as that which he committed under
Art. 13 [3] of the Revised Penal Code.
Q: Maryjane had two suitors - Felipe and Cesar. She
did not openly show her preference but on two
occasions, accepted Cesar's invitation to concerts by
Regine and Pops. Felipe was a working student and
could only ask Mary to see a movie which was
declined. Felipe felt insulted and made plans to get
even with Cesar by scaring him off somehow. One
day, he entered Cesar's room in their boarding
house and placed a rubber snake which appeared to
be real in Cesar's backpack. Because Cesar had a
weak heart, he suffered a heart attack upon opening
his backpack and seeing the snake. Cesar died
without regaining consciousness. The police
investigation resulted in pinpointing Felipe as the
culprit and he was charged with Homicide for
Cesar's death. In his defense, Felipe claimed that he
did not know about Cesar's weak heart and that he
only intended to play a practical joke on Cesar. Is
Felipe liable for the death of Cesar or will his
defense prosper? Why? (2005, 2001)
4
 QUAMTO FOR CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
A: Yes, Felipe is liable for the death of Cesar but he shall
be given the benefit of the mitigating circumstance that
he did not intend to commit so grave a wrong as that
which was committed (Art. 4[1] in relation to Art. 13[3],
RPC). When Felipe intruded into Cesars room without
the latter's consent and took liberty with the latter's
backpack where he placed the rubber snake, Felipe was
already committing a felony. And any act done by him
while committing a felony is no less wrongful,
considering that they were part of "plans to get even
with Cesar". Felipe's claim that he intended only "to play
a practical joke on Cesar" does not persuade,
considering that they are not friends but in fact rivals in
courting Maryjane.
Q: The conduct of wife A aroused the ire of her
husband B. Incensed with anger almost beyond his
control, B could not help but inflict physical injuries
on A. Moments after B started hitting A with his fists,
A suddenly complained of severe chest pains. B,
realizing that A was indeed in serious trouble,
immediately brought her to the hospital. Despite
efforts to alleviate A's pains, she died of heart attack.
It turned out that she had been suffering from a
lingering heart ailment. What crime, if any, could B
be held guilty of? (2003)
A: B could be held liable for parricide because his act of
hitting his wife with fist blows and therewith inflicting
physical injuries on her is felonious. A person
committing a felonious act incurs criminal liability
although the wrongful consequence is different from
what he intended (Art. 4 [1], RPC). Although A died of
heart attack, the said attack was generated by B's
felonious act of hitting her with his fists. Such felonious
act was the immediate cause of the heart attack, having
materially contributed to and hastened A's death. Even
though B may have acted without intent to kill his wife,
lack of such intent is of no moment when the victim dies.
However, B may be given the mitigating circumstance of
having acted without intention to commit so grave a
wrong as that committed (Art. 13[3], RPC).
Q: At the height of an altercation, Pedrito shot Paulo
but missed, hitting Tiburcio instead, resulting in the
death of the latter. Pedrito, invoking the doctrine of
aberratio ictus, claims exemption from criminal
liability. If you were the judge, how would you
decide the case? (1996)
A: If I were the Judge, I will convict Pedrito and find him
guilty of the complex crime of Homicide with Attempted
Homicide. The single act of firing at Paulo resulted in the
commission of two felonies, one grave (homicide) and
the other less grave (attempted homicide) thus falling
squarely under Art. 48, RPC; hence, the penalty would be
for the more serious crime (homicide) in its maximum
period (17 years 4 months and 1 day to 20 years).
Aberratio ictus (mistake in the blow) could not be used
as a defense as it is not an exempting circumstance.
Pedrito is liable under the principle of Art. 4, RPC, which
makes a person criminally liable for all the natural and
logical consequences of his felonious act.
Proximate Cause
Q: On his way home from office, ZZ rode in a jeepney.
Subsequently, XX boarded the same jeepney. Upon
reaching a secluded spot in QC, XX pulled out a
grenade from his bag and announced a hold-up. He
told ZZ to surrender his watch, wallet and cellphone.
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
Fearing for his life, ZZ jumped out of the vehicle. But
as he fell, his head hit the pavement, causing his
instant death. Is XX liable for ZZ's death? Explain
briefly. (2004, 2001, 1996)
A: Yes, XX is liable for ZZ's death because his acts of
pulling out a grenade and announcing a hold-up, coupled
with a demand for the watch, wallet and cellphone of ZZ
is felonious, and such felonious act was the proximate
cause of ZZ's jumping out of the jeepney, resulting in the
latter's death. Stated otherwise, the death of ZZ was the
direct, natural and logical consequence of XX's felonious
act which created an immediate sense of danger in the
mind of ZZ who tried to avoid such danger by jumping
out of the jeepney (People v. Arpa, G.R. No. L-26789 April
25, 1969).
Q: While the crew of a steamer prepared to raise
anchor at the Pasig River, A, evidently impatient
with the progress of work, began to use abusive
language against the men. B, one of the members of
the crew, remonstrated saying that they could work
best if they were not insulted. A took B's attitude as a
display of insubordination and, rising in a rage,
moved towards B wielding a big knife and
threatening to stab B. At the instant when A was only
a few feet from B, the latter, apparently believing
himself to be in great and immediate peril, threw
himself into the water, disappeared beneath the
surface, and drowned. May A be held criminally
liable for the death of B? (1997)
A: Yes. A can be held criminally liable for the death of B.
Art. 4 of the RPC provide in part that criminal liability
shall be incurred by any person committing a felony
although the wrongful act did be different from that
which he intended. The facts involved in this case are
parallel to the case of U.S. v. Valdez, (G.R. No. L-16486,
March 22, 1921) whereby the victim who was
threatened by the accused with a knife, jumped into the
river and drowned. In the foregoing case, the Supreme
Court held that if a person against whom a criminal
assault is directed who believes himself to be in danger
of death or bodily harm and impelled by the instinct of
self-preservation, jumps into the water and drowened,
his assailant is responsible for homicide in case death
results by drowning.
Q: Vicente hacked Anacleto with a bolo but the latter
was able to parry it with his hand, causing upon him
a two-inch wound on his right palm. Vicente was not
able to hack Anacleto further because three
policemen arrived and threatened to shoot Vicente
if he did not drop his bolo. Vicente was accordingly
charged by the police at the prosecutor's office for
attempted homicide. Twenty-five days later, while
the preliminary investigation was in progress,
Anacleto was rushed to the hospital because of
symptoms of tetanus infection on the two-inch
wound inflicted by Vicente. Anacleto died the
following day. Can Vicente be eventually charged
with homicide for the death of Anacleto? Explain.
(1996)
A: Yes, Vicente may be charged of homicide for the death
of Anacleto, unless the tetanus infection which
developed twenty five days later was brought about by
an efficient supervening cause. Vicente's felonious act of
causing a two-inch wound on Anacleto's right palm may
still be regarded as the proximate cause of the latter's
death because without such wound, no tetanus infection
5
TEAM BAROPS
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016
 QuAMTO for CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
could develop from the victim's right palm, and without
such tetanus infection the victim would not have died
with it.
Q: Bhey eloped with Scott. Whereupon, Bhey's
father, Robin, and brother, Rustom, went to Scotts
house. Upon reaching the house, Rustom inquired
from Scott about his sister's whereabouts, while
Robin shouted and threatened to kill Scott. The
latter then went downstairs but Rustom held his
(Scott's) waist. Meanwhile Olive, the elder sister of
Scott, carrying her two-month old child, approached
Rustom and Scott to pacify them. Olive attempted to
remove Rustom's hand from Scott's waist but
Rustom pulled Olive's hand causing her to fall over
her baby. The baby then died moments later. Is
Rustom criminally liable for the death of the child?
(1994)
A: Yes, Rustom is criminally liable for the death of the
child because his felonious act was the proximate cause
of such death. It was Rustom's act of pulling Olive's hand
which caused the latter to fall on her baby. Had it not
been for said act of Rustom, which is undoubtedly
felonious (at least slight coercion) there was no cause
for Olive to fall over her baby. In short, Rustom's
felonious act is the cause of the evil caused. Any person
performing a felonious act is criminally liable for the
direct, natural and logical consequence thereof although
different from what he intended.
IMPOSSIBLE CRIME
Q: What is an impossible crime? (2015, 2000, 1993)
Is an impossible crime really a crime? (2000)
A: An impossible crime is an act which would be an
offense against persons or property, were it not for the
inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on
account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual
means (Art, 4 (2), RPC).
An impossible crime is really not a crime, nevertheless it
gives rise to criminal liability. Objectively, no felony is
being committed but the accused is punished for his
criminal perversity.
Q: Can there be an impossible crime of adultery?
(2015)
A: There is no impossible crime of adultery since this is a
crime against chastity, and not against person or
property as required by Art. 4(2) of the RPC.
Q: Carla, 4 years old, was kidnapped by Enrique, the
tricycle driver paid by her parents to bring and fetch
her to and from school. Enrique wrote a ransom
note demanding P500,000.00 from Carla's parents
in exchange for Carla's freedom. Enrique sent the
ransom note by mail. However, before the ransom
note was received by Carla's parents, Enrique's
hideout was discovered by the police.
Carla was rescued while Enrique was arrested and
incarcerated. Considering that the ransom note was
not received by Carla's parents, the investigating
prosecutor merely filed a case of "Impossible Crime
to Commit Kidnapping" against Enrique. Is the
prosecutor correct? If he is not correct, can he
instead file a case of grave coercion? (2014, 2000)
*QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as suggested by UPLC and other distinct
luminaries in the academe, and updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the 2016 Bar Exams.
A: The crime committed by Enrique is kidnapping for
ransom. Even before the ransom note was received, the
crime of kidnapping with serious illegal detention had
already been committed. The act cannot be considered
an impossible crime because there was no inherent
improbability of its accomplishment or the employment
of inadequate or ineffectual means. The delivery of the
ransom note after the rescue of the victim did not
extinguish the offense, which had already been
consummated when Enrique deprived Carla of her
liberty. The sending of the ransom note would have had
the effect only of increasing the penalty to death under
the last paragraph of Art. 267 (People v. Tan, G.R. No.
95322,March 1, 1993). Furthermore, kidnapping is a
crime against liberty while in impossible crime it is
important that the accused committed an act that would
have been a crime against person or property.
The prosecutor cannot file a case of grave coercion
instead, since as discussed above the crime committed
by Enrique is kidnapping for ransom.
Q: A, B, C and D, all armed with armalites, proceeded
to the house of X. Y, a neighbor of X, who happened
to be passing by, pointed to the four culprits the
room that X occupied. The four culprits peppered
the room with bullets. Unsatisfied, A even threw a
hand grenade that totally destroyed X's room.
However, unknown to the four culprits, X was not
inside the room and nobody was hit or injured
during the Incident. Are A, B, C and D liable for any
crime? Explain. (2000)
A: Yes. A, B, C and D are liable for destructive arson
because of the destruction of the room of X with the use
of an explosive, the hand grenade. Liability for an
impossible crime is to be imposed only if the act
committed would not constitute any other crime under
the RPC. Although the facts involved are parallel to the
case of Intod v. CA, (G.R. No. 103119, October 21, 1992),
where it was ruled that the liability of the offender was
for an impossible crime, no hand grenade was used in
said case, which constitutes a more serious crime
though different from what was intended.
Q: Puti deserted Pula, his roommate, because Pula
was courting Ganda, whom Puti fancied. One day,
Puti decided to teach Pula a lesson and went to a
veterinarian (Vet) to ask for poison on the pretext
that he was going to kill a sick pet, when actually
Puti was intending to poison Pula. The Vet instantly
gave Puti a non-toxic solution which when mixed
with Pulas food, did not kill Pula. (2014, 2009, 2004,
1998)
a. What crime, if any, did Puti commit?
A: Puti committed an impossible crime of murder. Puti
with intent to kill Pula unknowingly employed
ineffectual means to accomplish the intended felony,
that is, using a non-toxic solution.
b. Would your answer be the same if, as a result of
the mixture, Pula got an upset stomach and had
to be hospitalized for 10 days?
A: No. If as a result of the mixture administered by Puti,
Pula suffered an upset stomach and had to be
hospitatlized for 10 days, Puti shall be liable for less
serious physical injuries. The rule is, in impossible
6
 QUAMTO FOR CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
crime, the act performed should not constitute a
violation of another provision of the RPC.
Q: JP, Aries and Randal planned to kill Elsa, a
resident of Barangay Pula, Laurel, Batangas. They
asked the assistance of Ella, who is familiar with the
place. On April 3, 1992, at about 10:00 in the
evening, JP, Aries and Randal, all armed with
automatic weapons, went to Barangay Pula. Ella,
being the guide, directed her companions to the
room in the house of Elsa. Whereupon, JP, Aries
and Randal fired their guns at her room.
Fortunately, Elsa was not around as she attended a
prayer meeting that evening in another barangay in
Laurel. JP, et al, were charged and convicted of
attempted murder by the Regional Trial Court at
Tanauan, Batangas.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, all the accused
ascribed to the trial court the sole error of finding
them guilty of attempted murder. If you were the
ponente, how will you decide the appeal? (1994)
A: If I were the ponente, I will set aside the judgment
convicting the accused of attempted murder and instead
find them guilty of impossible crime under Art. 4 par. 2,
RPC, in relation to Art. 59, RPC. Liability for impossible
crime arises not only when the impossibility is legal, but
likewise when it is factual or physical impossibility, as in
the case at bar. Elsas absence from the house is a
physical impossibility which renders the crime intended
inherently incapable of accomplishment. To convict the
accused of attempted murder would make Art. 4, par. 2
practically useless as all circumstances which prevented
the consummation of the offense will be treated as an
incident independent of the actor's will which is an
element of attempted or frustrated felony (Intod v. CA,
G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992).
STAGES OF EXECUTION
Q: Taking into account the nature and elements
of the felonies of coup d etat and rape, may one be
criminally liable for frustrated coup d etat or
frustrated rape? Explain. (2005)
A: One cannot be criminally liable for frustrated coup d
etat or frustrated rape.
In coup d etat, the mere attack directed against the duly
constituted authorities of the Republic of the
Philippines, or any military camp or installation,
communication networks, public utilities or other
facilities needed for the exercise and continued
possession of power would consummate the crime. The
objective may not be to overthrow the government but
only to destabilize or paralyze the government through
the seizure of facilities and utilities essential to the
continued possession and exercise of governmental
powers.
The crime of rape could only be either attempted or
consummated. If the accused who placed himself on top
of a woman, raising her skirt and unbuttoning his pants,
whereby the endeavour to have sex is very apparent, is
guilty of Attempted rape. On the other hand, entry on
the labia or lips of the female organ by the penis,
even without rupture of the hymen or laceration of
the vagina, consummates the crime of rape. Moreso, the
Court has long abandoned its stray decision in People
v. Erina, 50 Phil 998 where the accused was found guilty
of frustrated rape.
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
Q: In the jewelry section of a big department store,
Julia snatched a couple of bracelets and put these in
her purse. At the store's exit, however, she was
arrested by the guard after being radioed by the
store personnel who caught the act in the store's
moving camera. Is the crime consummated,
frustrated, or attempted? (1998)
A: The crime is consummated theft because the taking of
the bracelets was complete after Julia succeeded in
putting them in her purse. Julia acquired complete
control of the bracelets after putting them in her purse;
hence, the taking with intent to gain is complete and
thus the crime is consummated.
CONSPIRACY AND PROPOSAL
Q: Define conspiracy. (2012)
A: Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to
an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it.
4Q: Distinguish by way of illustration conspiracy as a
felony from conspiracy as a manner of incurring
liability in relation to the crimes of rebellion and
murder. (2012)
Conspiracy to commit rebellion if A and B conspired
to overthrow the government, conspiracy is punishable.
Conspiracy to commit rebellion is a felony. Rebellion if
they committed rebellion, they are equally liable for the
crime of rebellion. However, they will not be additionally
charged with conspiracy to commit rebellion. Since they
committed what they conspired, conspiracy will not be
considered as an independent felony but as a manner of
incurring criminal responsibility.
Conspiracy to commit homicide, not punishable if A
and B conspire to kill X, conspiracy is not punishable.
The law provides no penalty for conspiracy to be
commit homicide. Homicide if pursuant to conspiracy
to commit homicide, A embraced X and then B
stabbed and killed X, the conspirators are equally
liable for homicide. Conspirators are equally liable for
homicide. Conspiracy in this case will be considered as a
manner of incurring liability.
Q: Ricky was reviewing for the bar exam when the
commander of a vigilante group came to him and
showed him a list of five policemen to be liquidated
by them for graft and corruption. He was further
asked if any of them is innocent. After going over the
list, Ricky pointed to two of the policemen as honest.
Later, the vigilante group liquidated the three other
policemen in the list. The commander of the
vigilante group reported the liquidation to Ricky. Is
Ricky criminally liable? Explain. (2008)
A: No, Ricky is not criminally liable because he has not
done any overt act that the law punishes as a crime. He
did not conspire with the vigilante group. Although his
act of pointing out two policemen as honest men may
imply his acquiescence to the vigilantes conclusion that
the others were corrupt and deserve to be killed, mere
acquiescence to a crime, absent any criminal
participation, does not make one a co-conspirator.
7
TEAM BAROPS
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016
 QuAMTO for CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
Q: A and B, both store janitors, planned to kill their
employer C at midnight and take the money kept in
the cash register. A and B together drew the sketch
of the store, where they knew C would be sleeping,
and planned the sequence of their attack. Shortly
before midnight, A and B were ready to carry out the
plan. When A was about to lift C's mosquito net to
thrust his dagger, a police car with sirens blaring
passed by. Scared, B ran out of the store and fled,
while A went on to stab C to death, put the money in
the bag, and ran outside to look for B. The latter was
nowhere in sight. Unknown to him, B had already
left the place. What was the participation and
corresponding criminal liability of each, if any?
Reasons. (2003)
A: Both A and B are liable for the composite crime of
robbery with homicide. There was an expressed
conspiracy between them to kill C and take the latter's
money. The planned killing and taking of the money
appears to be intimately related as component crimes,
hence a special complex crime of robbery with homicide.
The conspiracy being expressed, not just implied, A and
B are bound as co-conspirators after they have planned
and agreed on the sequence of their attack even before
they committed the crime. Therefore, the principle in
law that when there is a conspiracy, the act of one is the
act of all, already governs them. In fact, A and B were
already in the store to carry out their criminal plan.
That B ran out of the store and fled upon hearing the
sirens of the police car, is not spontaneous desistance
but flight to evade apprehension. It would be different if
B then tried to stop A from continuing with the
commission of the crime; he did not. So the act of A in
pursuing the commission of the crime which both he and
B designed, planned, and commenced to commit, would
also be the act of B because of their expressed
conspiracy.
Q: What is the doctrine of implied conspiracy and
give its legal effects. (2003, 1998)
A: An implied conspiracy is one which is inferred or
deduced from the mode and manner in which the
offense is committed. It can be inferred when the
persons who committed the crime acted in concert
simultaneously, indicative of meeting of the minds
towards common goal or objective.
The legal effects of an implied conspiracy are the
following:
1. Only those who participated by criminal acts in the
commission of the crime will be considered as co-
conspirators; and
2. Mere acquiescence to or approval of the commission
of the crime or mere presence at the scene without
any act of criminal participation, shall not render
one criminally liable as co-conspirator (Bahilidad v.
People, G. R. No 185195, 2010)
Q: Juan and Arturo devised a plan to murder Joel. In
a narrow alley near Joel's house, Juan will hide
behind the big lamppost and shoot Joel when the
latter passes through on his way to work. Arturo will
come from the other end of the alley and
simultaneously shoot Joel from behind. On the
appointed day, Arturo was apprehended by the
authorities before reaching the alley. When Juan
shot Joel as planned, he was unaware that Arturo
*QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as suggested by UPLC and other distinct
luminaries in the academe, and updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the 2016 Bar Exams.
was arrested earlier. Discuss the criminal liability of
Arturo, if any. (1998)
A: Arturo, being one of the two who devised the plan to
murder Joel, thereby becomes a co-principal by direct
conspiracy. What is needed only is an overt act and both
will incur criminal liability. Arturo's liability as a
conspirator arose from his participation in jointly
devising the criminal plan with Juan, to kill Jose and it
was pursuant to that conspiracy that Juan killed Joel.
The conspiracy here is actual,and express not by
inference only. The overt act was done pursuant to that
conspiracy whereof Arturo is co-conspirator. There
being a conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Arturo,
therefore, should be liable as a co-conspirator but the
penalty on him may be that of an accomplice only
because he was not able to actually participate in the
shooting of Joel, having been apprehended before
reaching the place where the crime was committed.
Q: A had a grudge against F. Deciding to kill F, A and
his friends, B, C, and D, armed themselves with
knives and proceeded to the house of F, taking a
taxicab for the purpose. About 20 meters from their
destination, the group alighted and after instructing
E, the driver, to wait, travelled on foot to the house
of F. B positioned himself at a distance as the group's
lookout. C and D stood guard outside the house.
Before A could enter the house, D left the scene
without the knowledge of the others. A stealthily
entered the house and stabbed F. F ran to the street
but was blocked by C, forcing him to flee towards
another direction. Immediately after A had stabbed
F, A also stabbed G who was visiting F. Thereafter, A
exiled from the house and, together with B and C,
returned to the waiting taxicab and motored away. G
died. F survived. Who are liable for the death of G
and the physical injuries of F? (1997)
A: A alone should be held liable for the death of G. The
object of the conspiracy of A, B, C, and D was to kill F
only. Since B, C, and D did not know of the stabbing of G
by A, they cannot be held criminally therefor. E, the
driver, cannot be also held liable for the death of G since
the former was completely unaware of said killing. For
the physical injuries of F, A, B and C should be held liable
therefore. Even if it was only A who actually stabbed
and caused physical injuries to G, B and C are
nonetheless liable for conspiring with A and for
contributing positive acts which led to the realization of
a common criminal intent. B positioned himself as a
lookout, while C blocked Fs escape. D, however,
although part of the conspiracy, cannot be held liable
because he left the scene before A could enter the house
where the stabbing occurred. Although he was earlier
part of the conspiracy, he did not personally participate
in the execution of the crime by acts which directly
tended toward the same end (People v. Tamayo, 44 Phil.
38). In the same breath, E, the driver, cannot be also held
liable for the infliction of physical injuries upon F
because there is no showing that he had knowledge of
the plan to kill F.
Q: At about 9:30 in the evening, while Dino and Raffy
were walking along Padre Faura Street, Manila.
Johnny hit them with a rock injuring Dino at the
back. Raffy approached Dino, but suddenly, Bobby,
Steve, Danny and Nonoy surrounded the duo. Then
Bobby stabbed Dino. Steve, Danny, Nonoy and
Johnny kept on hitting Dino and Raffy with rocks. As
8
 QUAMTO FOR CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)

a result, Dino died, Bobby, Steve, Danny, Nonoy and conspiracy and treachery? Explain.
Johnny were charged with homicide. (1994)
A: If they have to be criminally liable at all, each will be
a. Is there conspiracy in this case? responsible for their individual acts as there appears to
be no conspiracy because the acts of the three were
A: Yes, there is conspiracy among the offenders, as spontaneous and a reflex response to Yabangs shooting
manifested by their concerted actions against the of Sergio. There was no concerted act that will lead to a
victims, demonstrating a common felonious purpose of common purpose. Treachery cannot likewise be
assaulting the victims. The existence of the conspiracy appreciated as there was no conscious adoption of
can be inferred or deduced from the manner the means, methods or form to facilitate the commission of
offenders acted in commonly attacking Dino and Raffy the felony.
with rocks, thereby demonstrating a unity of criminal
design to inflict harm on their victims. d. Is Yabang criminally liable for the death of
Sergio? (1992)
b. Can the court appreciate the aggravating
circumstances of nighttime and band? A: Yabang is liable for Homicide for the killing of Sergio
as the attack was frontal. The fact that Sergio is a
A: No, nighttime cannot be appreciated as an suspected killer does not justify Yabangs act of killing
aggravating circumstance because there is no indication him (People v. Oanis, G.R. No. L-47722, 1943).
that the offenders deliberately sought the cover of
darkness to facilitate the commission of the crime or ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
that they took advantage of nighttime. Besides, judicial Yabang is liable for Murder because of the qualifying
notice can be taken of the fact that Padre Faura Street is circumstance of abuse of superior strength, in terms of
well-lighted. However, band should be considered as the the weapon being used.
crime was committed by more than three armed
malefactors; in a recent Supreme Court decision, stones MULTIPLE OFFENDERS
or rocks are considered deadly weapons.
Recidivism; Habituality (Reiteracion); Quasi- Recidivism;
Q: As a result of a misunderstanding during a Habitual Delinquency
meeting, Joe was mauled by Nestor, Jolan, Reden and
Arthur. He ran towards his house but the four Q: Who is a habitual delinquent? Distinguish
chased and caught him. Thereafter, they tied Joes habitual delinquency from recidivism as to the
hands at his back and attacked him. Nestor used a crimes committed, the period of time the crimes are
knife; Jolan, a shovel; Arthur, his fists; and Reden, a committed, the number of crimes committed and
piece of wood. After killing Joe, Reden ordered the their effects in relation to the penalty to be imposed
digging of a grave to bury Joes lifeless body. on a convict. (2012)
Thereafter, the four (4) left together. Convicted for
the killing of Joe, Arthur now claims that his A: A person shall be deemed to be habitual delinquent, if
conviction is erroneous as it was not he who within a period of ten years from the date of his release
inflicted the fatal blow. Would you sustain his claim? or last conviction of the crimes of serious or less serious
Why? What was the crime committed by the four as- physical injuries, robo, hurto estafa or falsification, he is
sailants? Discuss with reasons. (1993) found guilty of any of said crimes a third time or oftener
(Art. 62, RPC).
A: No. Arthurs claim is without merit. The offenders
acted in conspiracy in killing the victim and hence, liable The following are the differences between recidivism
collectively. The act of one is the act of all. The existence and habitual delinquency:
of a conspiracy among the offenders can be clearly
deduced or inferred from the manner they committed RECIDIVISM HABITUAL
the killing, demonstrating a common criminal purpose DELINQUENCY
and intent. There being a conspiracy, the individual acts First crime and First, second and
of each participant is not considered because their the aggravated third crimes
liability is collective. second crime must be a
are embraced habitual
The crime committed is murder, qualified by treachery in the same delinquency
because the offenders, taking advantage of their superi- Nature of Title of the crime, that is,
ority in number, rendered the victim defenseless and crime RPC. serious or less
without any chance to retaliate, by tying his hands at his serious physical
back before attacking him. injuries, theft,
robbery, estafa
Q: As Sergio, Yoyong, Zoilo and Warlilo engaged in a or falsification of
drinking spree at Heartthrob Disco, Special Police document.
Officer 3 (SPO 3) Manolo Yabang suddenly Accused was The accused was
approached them, aimed his revolver at Sergio convicted of convicted of first
whom he recognized as a wanted killer and fatally the first crime habitual
shot the latter. Whereupon, Yoyong, Zoilo and by final delinquency
Warlito ganged up on Yabang. Warlito, using his own Time element judgment at crime; within ten
pistol, shot and wounded Yabang. (1992) the time of the years after
trial of the conviction or
c. What are the criminal liabilities of Yoyong, Zoilo second crime. release, he was
and Warlito for the injury to Yabang? Was there found guilty or
9

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS TEAM BAROPS

FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016
 QuAMTO for CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
habitual- Q: Juan de Castro already had three (3) previous
delinquency convictions by final judgment for theft when he was
crime for the found guilty of Robbery with Homicide. In the last
second time; case, the trial Judge considered against the accused
within 10 years both recidivism and habitual delinquency. The
after conviction accused appealed and contended that in his last
or release, he conviction, the trial court cannot consider against
was found guilty him a finding of recidivism and, again, of habitual
of habitual- delinquency. Is the appeal meritorious? Explain.
delinquency (2001)
crime for the
third time or A: No, the appeal is not meritorious. Recidivism and
oftener. habitual delinquency are correctly considered in this
At least two At least three case because the basis of recidivism is different from
Number of that of habitual delinquency. Juan is a recidivist
crimes crimes
crimes because he had been previously convicted by final
committed committed
Ordinary Extraordinary or judgment for theft and again found guilty for Robbery
aggravating special with Homicide, which are both crimes against property,
circumstance aggravating embraced under the same Title (Title Ten, Book Two)
the presence of circumstance, of the Revised Penal Code. The implication is that he
any of which the presence of is specializing in the commission of crimes against
will trigger the which will property, hence, aggravating in the conviction for
application of trigger the Robbery with Homicide. Habitual delinquency, which
Nature of the the penalty for imposition of brings about an additional penalty when an offender is
aggravating the second additional convicted a third time or more for specified crimes, is
circumstance crime penalty for the correctly considered.
committed in third or
its maximum subsequent Q: Distinguish between recidivism and quasi
period unless crime. recidivism. (1998)
it is off-set by a
mitigating This is not RECIDIVISM QUASI-RECIDIVISM
circumstance subject of the off- It is enough that a final Felony was committed
set rule. judgment has been after having been
rendered in the first convicted by final
Q: During trial for theft in 2014, the prosecution offense judgment of an offense,
managed to show that accused AA has also been before beginning to serve
convicted by final judgment for robbery in 2003, but sentence or while serving
she eluded capture. A subsequent verification the same
showed that AA had several convictions, to wit: Requires that the First and subsequent
1. In 1998, she was convicted of estafa; offenses be included in conviction may or may
2. In 2002, she was convicted of theft; the same Title of the not be embraced by the
3. In 2004, she was convicted of frustrated Code same title of the RPC
homicide; It increases the penalty Shall be punished by the
to its maximum period maximum period of the
The judge trying the theft case in 2014 is about to penalty prescribed by law
convict AA. What circumstances affecting the for the new felony
liability or penalty may the judge appreciate against Felonies under RPC First crime for which the
AA? (2014) only offender is serving
sentence need not be a
A: The judge may appreciate the aggravating crime under the RPC but
circumstance of recidivism. A recidivist is one who, at the second crime must be
the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been one under the RPC
previously convicted by final judgment of another crime A generic aggravating Special aggravating
embraced in the same title of the RPC. Robbery, theft, circumstance circumstance which may
estafa are crimes against property embraced in Title Ten be offset by special
of the RPC. The judge may also appreciate the privileged mitigating
aggravating circumstance of habituality or reiteracion, circumstances not by
because there have been two or more crimes committed ordinary mitigating
for which she has been published, regardless of the circumstances
degree of penalty.

Q: Amado, convicted of rape but granted an absolute

pardon by the President, and one year thereafter,
convicted of homicide, is a recidivist. (2009) CONTINUING CRIMES

A: True, rape is now a crime against persons and like the Q: What is delito continuado? (2009) Differentiate
crime of homicide, is embraced in the same Title of the delito continuado from a continuing offense. (2009,
RPC under which Amado had been previously convicted 1994)
by final judgment.
10

*QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as suggested by UPLC and other distinct
luminaries in the academe, and updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the 2016 Bar Exams.
 QUAMTO FOR CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
A: Delito continuado refers to a crime constituted by
several overt acts committed by the offender in one
place, at about the same time, and all such overt acts
violate one and the same provision of penal law, thus
demonstrating that all such acts are the product of a
single indivisible criminal resolution. Hence, all said acts
are considered as one crime only. (People vs, Ledesma,
G.R. No. L-41522, September 29, 1976). On the other
hand, a continuing offense is one whose essential
elements took place in more than one municipality or
city, so much so that the criminal prosecution may be
instituted and the case tried in the competent court of
any one of such municipality or city.
The term continued crime" or delito continuado
mandates that only one information should be filed
against the offender although a series of felonious acts
were performed; the term continuing crime" is more
pertinently used with reference to the venue where the
criminal action may be instituted.
Q: Angelo devised a Ponzi Scheme in which 500
persons were deceived into investing their money
upon a promise of a capital return of 25%, computed
monthly, and guaranteed by post-dated checks.
During the first two months following the
investment, the investors received their profits, but
thereafter, Angelo vanished. Angelo was charged
with 500 counts of estafa and 2,000 counts of
violation of Batas Pambansa (BP) 22. In his motion
to quash, Angelo contends that he committed a
continued crime, or delito continuado, hence, he
committed only one count of estafa and one count of
violation of BP 22. What is delito continuado? Is
Angelos contention tenable? Explain. (2009)
A: No, his contention is not tenable. He committed as
many counts of estafa against the 500 victims and 2000
counts violation of B.P. 22, since each swindling is
achieved through distinct fraudulent machinations
contrived at different times or dates, and in different
amounts. Moreover, his drawing separate checks
payable to each payee is a separate criminal resolution,
as they must be of different amounts and of different
dates. He acted with separate fraudulent intent against
each swindling victim and had distinct criminal intent in
drawing and issuing each check. It cannot be maintained
that his acts are the product of one criminal resolution
only.
COMPLEX CRIMES AND
SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIMES
Q: Distinguish clearly but briefly: Between ordinary
complex crime, special complex crime, continuous
crime as concepts in the Penal Code. What are the
penalties thereof. (2005, 2004, 2003, 1999)
A: As to concept:
An ordinary complex crime is made up of two or more
crimes being punished in distinct provisions of the
Revised Penal Code but alleged in one Information
either because they were brought about by a single
felonious act or because one offense is a necessary
means for committing the other offense or offenses.
They are alleged in one Information so that only one
penalty shall be imposed. A special complex crime, on
the other hand, is made up of two or more crimes which
are considered only as components of a single
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
indivisible offense being punished in one provision of
the Revised Penal Code.
As to penalties:
In ordinary complex crime, the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed in its maximum period.
In special complex crime, only one penalty is specifically
prescribed for all the component crimes which are
regarded as one indivisible offense. The component
crimes are not regarded as distinct crimes and so the
penalty for the most serious crime is not the penalty to
be imposed nor in its maximum period. It is the penalty
specifically provided for the special complex crime that
shall be applied according to the rules on imposition of
the penalty.
Q: Distinguish clearly but briefly between compound
and complex crime as concepts in the Penal Code.
(2004)
A: Compound crimes result when the offender
committed only a single felonious act from which two or
more crimes resulted. This is provided for in modified
form in the first part of Article 48, Revised Penal Code,
limiting the resulting crimes to only grave and/or less
grave felonies. Hence, light felonies are excluded even
though resulting from the same single act.
On the other hand, complex crimes result when the
offender has to commit an offense as a necessary means
for committing another offense. Only one information
shall be filed and if proven, the penalty for the more
serious crime shall be imposed
Q: Jason Ivler was involved in a vehicular collision
resulting to the injuries of Evangeline Ponce and the
death of her husband. He was charged of two
offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Slight Physical Injuries; and (2) Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to
Property. Can Ivler be convicted with the two
offenses? (2013)
A: No. Reckless imprudence is a single crime, its
consequences on persons and property are material
only to determine the penalty. Reckless imprudence
under Art. 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not
merely a means of committing other crimes such that
conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars
subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense,
regardless of its various resulting acts (Ivler vs. San
Pedro, G.R. No. 172716, November 17, 2010).
Q: Can there be a complex crime of coup d etat with
rebellion? Can there be a complex crime of coup d
etat with sedition? (2003)
A: There can be a complex crime of coup dtat with
rebellion if there was conspiracy between the
offender/offenders committing the rebellion. By
conspiracy, the crime of one would be the crime of the
other and vice versa. This is possible because the
offender in coup dtat may be any person or persons
belonging to the military or the national police or a
public officer, whereas rebellion does not so require.
Moreover, the crime of coup dtat may be committed
singly, whereas rebellion requires a public uprising and
taking up arms to overthrow the duly constituted
government. Since the two crimes are essentially
different and punished with distinct penalties, there is
no legal impediment to the application of Art. 48 of the
11
RPC.
TEAM BAROPS
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016
 QuAMTO for CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
Coup d'tat can be complexed with sedition because the
two crimes are essentially different and distinctly
punished under the Revised Penal Code. Sedition may
not be directed against the government or be non-
political in objective, whereas coup d'tat is always
political in objective as it is directed against the
government and led by persons or public officer holding
public office belonging to the military or national police.
Art. 48 of the Code may apply under the conditions
therein provided.
Q: A, actuated by malice and with the use of a
fully automatic M-14 sub-machine gun, shot a
group of persons who were seated in a cockpit with
one burst of successive, continuous, automatic fire.
Four (4) persons were killed thereby, each having
hit by different bullets coming from the sub-machine
gun of A. Four (4) cases of murder were filed against
A. The trial court ruled that there was only one
crime committed by A for the reason that, since A
performed only one act, he having pressed the
trigger of his gun only once, the crime
committed was murder. Consequently, the trial
judge sentenced A to just one penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Was the decision of the trial judge
correct? Explain. (1999)
A: The decision of the trial judge is not correct. When the
offender made use of an automatic firearm, the acts
committed are determined by the number of bullets
discharged inasmuch as the firearm being automatic, the
offender need only press the trigger once and it would
fire continually. For each death caused by a distinct and
separate bullet, the accused incurs distinct criminal
liability. Hence, it is not the act of pressing the trigger
which should be considered as producing the several
felonies, but the number of bullets which actually
produced them.
CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINAL LIABILITY
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES
Q: Distinguish clearly but briefly: Between justifying
and exempting circumstances in criminal law.
(2004, 1998)
A: Justifying circumstance affects the act, not the actor;
while exempting circumstance affects the actor, not the
act. In justifying circumstance, no criminal and,
generally, no civil liability is incurred; while in
exempting circumstance, civil liability is generally
incurred although there is no criminal liability
Self-Defense (Defense of Person, Rights, Property and
Honor)
Q: BB and CC, both armed with knives, attacked FT.
The victim's son, ST, upon seeing the attack, drew
his gun but was prevented from shooting the
attackers by AA, who grappled with him for
possession of the gun. FT died from knife wounds.
AA, BB and CC were charged with murder. In his
defense, AA invoked the justifying circumstance of
avoidance of greater evil or injury, contending that
by preventing ST from shooting BB and CC, he
merely avoided a greater evil. Will AA's defense
prosper? Reason briefly. (2004)
*QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as suggested by UPLC and other distinct
luminaries in the academe, and updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the 2016 Bar Exams.
A: No, AA's defense will not prosper. The act of the
victim's son, ST, appears to be a legitimate defense
of relatives; hence, justified as a defense of his father
against the unlawful aggression by BB and CC. STs
act to defend his father's life and to stop BB and CC
achieve their criminal objective cannot be regarded as
an evil inasmuch as it is, in the eyes of the law, a lawful
act. What AA did was a lawful defense, not greater evil.
Likewise, AAs defense will not prosper because in this
case there was a conspiracy among the three of them,
hence, the act of one is the act of all.
Q: Pat. Negre saw Filemon, an inmate, escaping from
jail and ordered the latter to surrender. Instead of
doing so, Filemon attacked Pat. Negre with a bamboo
spear. Filemon missed in his first attempt to hit Pat.
Negre, and before he could strike again, Pat. Negre
shot and killed him. (1993)
a. Can Pat. Negre claim self defense? Explain.
A: Yes, self-defense can be claimed as there is an
imminent and great peril on the life of Negre.
b. Suppose Pat Negre missed in his shot, and
Filemon ran away without parting with his
weapon. Pat Negre pursued Filemon but the
latter was running so fast that Pat Negre fired
warning shots into the air shouting for Filemon
to stop. In as much as Filemon continued
running Pat. Negre fired at him hitting and
killing him. Is the plea of self-defense
sustainable? Why would you then hold Pat.
Negre criminally liable? Discuss.
A: No, self-defense is no longer sustainable as there is no
more peril on his life.
Q: While Carlos was approaching his car, he saw it
being driven away by Paolo, a thief. Carlos tried to
stop Paolo by shouting at him, but Paolo ignored
him. To prevent his car from being carnapped,
Carlos drew his gun, aimed at the rear wheel of the
car and fired. The shot blew the tire which caused
the car to veer out of control and collide with an
oncoming tricycle, killing the tricycle driver. (2008)
a. What is the criminal liability of Carlos, if any?
Explain.
A: Carlos did not incur criminal liability because his act
of firing at the rear wheel of the car to stop the vehicle
and prevent Paolo from taking away his (Carlos) car is
neither done with dolo nor culpa. The act does not
constitute a crime; it is a reasonable exercise of his right
to prevent or repel an actual unlawful physical invasion
or usurpation of his property pursuant to Art. 429 of the
Civil Code.
b. What is the criminal liability of Paolo, if any?
Explain.
A: Paolo is criminally liable for (1) carnapping under
R.A. No. 6539 for driving away the motor vehicle of
Carlos against the latters will and obviously with intent
to gain and (2) for homicide for the death of the tricycle
driver which resulted from the criminal act deliberately
being committed by Paolo (which is the carnapping).
The homicide was the result of praetor intentionem and
12
 QUAMTO FOR CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
not a component of the crime of carnapping or a result
of reckless impurdence or of simple negligence.
Q: The accused lived with his family in a
neighborhood that often was the scene of frequent
robberies. At one time, past midnight, the accused
went downstairs with a loaded gun to investigate
what he thought were footsteps of an uninvited
guest. After seeing what appeared to him an armed
stranger looking around and out to rob the house, he
fired his gun seriously injuring the man. When the
lights were turned on, the unfortunate victim turned
out to be a brother-in-law on his way to the kitchen
to get some light snacks. The accused was indicted
for serious physical injuries. Should the accused,
given the circumstances, be convicted or acquitted?
Why? (2003, 1996)
A: The accused should be convicted because, even
assuming the facts to be true in his belief, his act of
shooting a burglar when there is no unlawful
aggression on his person is not justified. Defense of
property or property right does not justify the act of
firing a gun at a burglar unless the life and limb of the
accused is already in imminent and immediate danger.
Although the accused acted out of a misapprehension of
the facts, he is not absolved from criminal liability.
A: Osang, a married woman in her early twenties,
was sleeping on a banig on the floor of their nipa hut
beside the seashore when she was awakened by the
act of a man mounting her. Thinking that it was her
husband, Gardo, who had returned from fishing in
the sea, Osang continued her sleep but allowed the
man, who was actually their neighbor, Julio, to have
sexual intercourse with her. After Julio satisfied
himself, he said Salamat Osang" as he turned to
leave. Only then did Osang realize that the man was
not her husband. Enraged, Osang grabbed a balisong
from the wall and stabbed Julio to death. When tried
for homicide, Osang claimed defense of honor.
Should the claim be sustained? Why? (2000, 1998)
A: No, Osang's claim of defense of honor should not be
sustained because the aggression on her honor had
ceased when she stabbed the aggressor. In defense of
rights under Art. 11(1) of the RPC, it is required inter
alia that there be (1) unlawful aggression, and (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent
or repel it. The unlawful aggression must be continuing
when the aggressor was injured or disabled by the
person making a defense. Otherwise, the attack made is
a retaliation and not a defense. Hence, Osang's act of
stabbing Julio to death after the sexual intercourse was
finished, is not defense of honor but an immediate
vindication of a grave offense committed against her,
which is only mitigating.
Defense of Relatives
Q: When A arrived home, he found B raping his
daughter. Upon seeing A, B ran away. A took his gun
and shot B, killing him. Charged with homicide, A
claimed he acted in defense of his daughter's honor.
Is A correct? If not, can A claim the benefit of any
mitigating circumstance or circumstances? (2002,
2000, 1998)
A: No, A cannot validly invoke defense of his daughter's
honor in having killed B since the rape was already
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
consummated; moreover, B already ran away, hence,
there was no aggression to defend against and no
defense to speak of. Defense of honor as included in self-
defense, must have been done to prevent or repel an
unlawful aggression. There is no defense to speak of
where the unlawful aggression no longer exists. A may,
however, invoke the benefit of the mitigating
circumstance of having acted in immediate vindication
of a grave offense to a descendant, his daughter, under
par. 5, Art. 13 of the RPC.
Defense of Stranger
Q: A chanced upon three men who were attacking B
with fist blows. C, one of the men, was about to stab
B with a knife. Not knowing that B was actually the
aggressor because he had earlier challenged the
three men to a fight, A shot C as the latter was about
to stab B. May A invoke the defense of a stranger as a
justifying circumstance in his favor? Why? (2002)
A: Yes. A may invoke the justifying circumstance of
defense of stranger since he was not involved in the fight
and he shot C when the latter was about to stab B. There
being no indication that A was induced by revenge,
resentment or any other evil motive in shooting C, his
act is justified under par. 3, Art. 11 of the RPC.
Fulfillment of Duty
Q: Lucresia, a store owner, was robbed of her
bracelet in her home. The following day, at about 5
oclock in the afternoon, a neighbor, 22-year old Jun-
Jun, who had an unsavory reputation, came to her
store to buy bottles of beer. Lucresia noticed her
bracelet wound around the right arm of Jun-Jun. As
soon as the latter left, Lucresia went to a nearby
police station and sought the help of a policeman on
duty, Pat. Willie Reyes. He went with Lucresia to the
house of Jun-Jun to confront the latter. Pat. Reyes
introduced himself as a policeman and tried to get
hold of Jun-Jun who resisted and ran away. Pat.
Reyes chased him and fired two warning shots in the
air. Jun-Jun continued to run and when he was about
7 meters away, Pat. Reyes shot him in the right leg.
Jun-Jun was hit and he fell down but he crawled
towards a fence, intending to pass through an
opening underneath. When Pat. Reyes was about 5
meters away, he fired another shot at Jun-Jun hitting
him at the right lower hip. Pat. Reyes brought Jun-
Jun to the hospital, but because of profuse bleeding,
he eventually died. Pat. Reyes was subsequently
charged with homicide. During the trial, Pat. Reyes
raised the defense, by way of exoneration, that he
acted in the fulfilment of a duty. Is the defense
tenable? Explain. (2000)
A: No, the defense of Pat. Reyes is not tenable. The
defense of having acted in the fulfillment of a duty
requires as a condition, inter alia, that the injury or
offense committed be the unavoidable or necessary
consequence of the due performance of the duty. It is not
enough that the accused acted in fulfilment of a duty.
After Jun-Jun was shot in the right leg and was already
crawling, there was no need for Pat. Reyes to shoot him
further. Clearly, Pat. Reyes acted beyond the call of duty
which brought about the cause of death of the victim.
Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act
13
of 2004 (R.A. No. 9262); Battered Woman Syndrome
TEAM BAROPS
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016
 QuAMTO for CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
Q: Define "Battered Woman Syndrome." What are
the three phases of the "Battered Woman
Syndrome"? Would the defense prosper despite the
absence of any of the elements for justifying
circumstances of self-defense under the Revised
Penal Code? Explain. (2010)
A: Battered Woman Syndrome refers to a scientifically
define pattern of psychological and behavioural
symptoms found in woman living in battering
relationships as a result of cumulative abuse (Sec. 3[d],
R.A. 9262).
The three (3) phases of the BWS are: (1) tension-
building phase; (2) acute battering incident; and (3)
tranquil, loving, or non-violent phase (People v. Genosa,
G.R. No. 135981, January 15, 2004).
Yes, the defense will prosper. Sec. 26 of R.A. 9262
provides that victim-survivors who are found by the
courts to be suffering from battered woman syndrome
do not incur any criminal and civil liability
notwithstanding the absence of any of the elements of
justifying circumstances of self-defense under the RPC.
Q: Dion and Talia were spouses. Dion always came
home drunk since he lost his job a couple of months
ago. Talia had gotten used to the verbal abuse from
Dion. One night, in addition to the usual verbal
abuse, Dion beat up Talia. The next morning, Dion
saw the injury that he had inflicted upon Talia and
promised her that he would stop drinking and never
beat her again. However, Dion did not make good on
his promise. Just after one week, he started drinking
again. Talia once more endured the usual verbal
abuse. Afraid that he might beat her up again, Talia
stabbed Dion with a kitchen knife while he was
passed out from imbibing too much alcohol. Talia
was charged with the crime of parricide. (2015)
a. May Talia invoke the defense of Battered
Woman Syndrome to free herself from criminal
liability? Explain.
A: No, a single act of battery or physical harm committed
by Dion against Talia resulting to the physical and
psychological or emotional distress on her part is not
sufficient to avail of the benefit of the justifying
circumstance of Battered Woman Syndrome. The
defense of Battered Woman Syndrome can be invoked if
the woman with marital relationship with the victim is
subjected to cumulative abuse or battery involving the
infliction of physical harm resulting to the physical and
psychological or emotional distress. Cumulative means
resulting from successive addition. In sum, there must
be at least two battering episodes between the accused
and her intimate partner and such final episode
produced in the battered persons mind an actual fear of
an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest
belief that she needed to use force in order to save her
life (People v. Genosa, G.R. No. 135981, January 15, 2004).
b. Will your answer be the same, assuming that
Talia killed Dion after being beaten up after a
second time? Explain.
A: Yes, Talia can invoke the defense of Battered Woman
Syndrome to free herself from criminal liability for
killing her husband since she suffered physical and
*QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as suggested by UPLC and other distinct
luminaries in the academe, and updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the 2016 Bar Exams.
emotional distress arising from cumulative abuse or
battery. Under Section 26 of RA 9262, victim survivors
of Battered Woman Syndrome do not incur any criminal
or civil liability despite the absence of the requisites of
self-defense.
Q: Ms. A had been married to Mr. B for 10 years.
Since their marriage, Mr. B had been jobless and a
drunkard, preferring to stay with his "barkadas"
until the wee hours of the morning. Ms. A was the
breadwinner and attended to the needs of their
three (3) growing children. Many times, when Mr. B
was drunk, he would beat Ms. A and their three (3)
children, and shout invectives against them. In fact,
in one of the beating incidents, Ms. A suffered a deep
stab wound on her tummy that required a prolonged
stay in the hospital. Due to the beatings and verbal
abuses committed against her, she consulted a
psychologist several times, as she was slowly
beginning to lose her mind. One night, when Mr. B
arrived dead drunk, he suddenly stabbed Ms. A
several times while shouting invectives against her.
Defending herself from the attack, Ms. A grappled
for the possession of a knife and she succeeded. She
then stabbed Mr. B several times which caused his
instantaneous death. Medico-Legal Report showed
that the husband suffered three (3) stab wounds.
Can Ms. A validly put up a defense? Explain. (2014,
2010)
A: Yes, Ms. A can put up the defense of battered woman
syndrome. It appears that she is suffering from physical
and psychological or emotional distress resulting from
cumulative abuse by her husband. Under Sec. 3 of R.A.
9262, victim survivors who are found by courts to be
suffering from battered woman syndrome do not incur
any criminal and civil liability notwithstanding the
absence of any of the elements for justifying
circumstances of self defense under the RPC.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Ms. A may validly put up the justifying circumstance of
self-defense, all requisites thereof being present,
namely:
1. Unlawful aggression which is a condition sine qua
non. Here, Mr. B arrived that night dead drunk and
he suddenly stabbed Ms. A several times while
shouting invectives. This is unlawful aggression that
is sudden and imminent and places Ms. As life in
peril.
2. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it. The sudden and imminent armed
attack by Mr. B gave no other option to Ms. A but to
attempt to disarm Mr. B of his knife and to use the
same to protect and save herself.
3. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself. The circumstances
obtaining is very clear on this regard, Mr. B arrived
one night dead drunk, he suddenly stabbed Ms. A
several times while shouting invectives. There is
absolutely no circumstances mentioned in the
problem to indicate provocation on the part of the
person defending herself.
EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
Insanity
Q: While his wife was on a 2-year scholarship
abroad, Romeo was having an affair with his maid
14
Dulcinea. Realizing that the affair was going
 QUAMTO FOR CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
nowhere, Dulcinea told Romeo that she was going
back to the province to marry her childhood
sweetheart. Clouded by anger and jealousy, Romeo
strangled Dulcinea to death while she was sleeping
in the maids quarters.
The following day, Romeo was found catatonic
inside the maids quarters. He was brought to the
National Center for Mental Health (NCMH) where he
was diagnosed to be mentally unstable. Charged
with murder, Romeo pleaded insanity as a defense.
(2010)
a. Will Romeos defense prosper? Explain.
A: No, Romeos defense of insanity will not prosper.
Insanity as a defense to the commission of a crime must
have existed and proven to have been existing at the
precise moment when the crime was being committed.
The facts of the case indicate that Romeo committed the
crime with discernment and was only diagnosed to be
mentally unstable after the crime was committed.
b. What is the effect of the diagnosis of the NCMH
on the case?
A: The effect of the diagnosis made by NCMH is possibly
a suspension of the proceeding against Romeo and his
commitment to appropriate institution for treatment
until he could already understand the proceedings.
Minority
Q: While they were standing in line awaiting
their vaccination at the school clinic, Pomping
repeatedly pulled the ponytail of Katreena, his 11
years, 2 months and 13 days old classmate in Grade
5 at the Sampaloc Elementary School. Irritated,
Katreena turned around and swung at Pomping with
a ball pen. The top of the ball pen hit the right eye
of Pomping which bled profusely. Realizing what
she had caused, Katreena immediately helped
Pomping. When investigated, she freely admitted
to the school principal that she was responsible
for the injury to Pomping's eye. After the incident,
she executed a statement admitting her culpability.
Due to the injury, Pomping lost his right eye. (2000,
1998)
a. Is Katreena criminally liable? Why?
A: No, Katreena is not criminally liable due to her
minority. She is exempted from criminal liability for
being a minor less than fifteen (15) years old although
over nine (9) years of age. Nonetheless is she civilly
liable.
b. Discuss the attendant circumstances and effects
thereof.
A: The attendant circumstances which may be
considered are:
1. Minority of the accused as an exempting
circumstance under Art. 12(3) of RPC, where she
shall be exempt from criminal liability, unless it was
proved that she acted with discernment. She is
however civilly liable;
2. If found criminally liable, the minority of the
accused is a privileged mitigating circumstance. A
discretionary penalty lower by at least two (2)
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
degrees than that prescribed for the crime
committed shall be imposed in accordance with Art.
68(1) of RPC. The sentence however, should
automatically be suspended in accordance with Sec.
5(a) of R.A. No. 8369 (Family Courts Act of 1997);
3. Likewise if found criminally liable, the ordinary
mitigating circumstance of not intending to commit
so grave a wrong as that committed under Art.
13(3) of the RPC may apply;
4. The ordinary mitigating circumstance of sufficient
provocation on the part of the offended party
immediately preceded the act.
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Q: What is a privileged mitigating circumstance?
Distinguish a privileged mitigating circumstance
from an ordinary mitigating circumstance as to
reduction of penalty and offsetting against
aggravating circumstance/s. (2012)
A: Privileged mitigating circumstances are those that
mitigate the criminal liability of the accused by
graduating the imposable penalty for the crime being
modified to one or two degrees lower. These
circumstances cannot be offset by aggravating
circumstance. The circumstance of incomplete
justification or exemption (when majority of the
conditions are present), and the circumstance of
minority (if the child above 15 years of age acted with
discernment) are privileged mitigating circumstance.
The distinctions between ordinary and privileged
mitigating circumstances are as follows:
a. Under the rules for application of divisible penalties
(RPC, Art. 64), the presence of a mitigating
circumstance, if not off-set by aggravating
circumstance, has the effect of applying the divisible
penalty in its minimum period. Under the rules on
graduation of penalty (RPC, Art. 68, 69), the
presence of privileged mitigating circumstance has
the effect of reducing the penalty one to two degrees
lower;
b. Ordinary mitigating circumstances can be off-set by
aggravating circumstances. Privileged mitigating
circumstances are not subject to the off-set rule.
Surrender and Confession of Guilt
Q: When is surrender by an accused considered
voluntary, and constitutive of the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender? (1999)
A: A surrender by an offender is considered voluntary
when it is spontaneous, indicative of an intent to submit
unconditionally to the authorities.
To be mitigating, the surrender must be:
a. spontaneous, i.e., indicative of acknowledgment of
guilt and not for convenience nor conditional;
b. made before the government incurs expenses, time
and effort in tracking down the offender's
whereabouts; and
c. made to a person in authority or the letter's agents.
Q: In order that the plea of guilty may be mitigating,
what requisites must be complied with? (1999)
A: For plea of guilty to be mitigating, the requisites are:
1. That the accused spontaneously pleaded guilty to
15
the crime charged;
TEAM BAROPS
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016
 QuAMTO for CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
2. That such plea was made before the court
competent to try the case and render judgment; and
3. That such plea was made prior to the presentation
of evidence for the prosecution.
Q: An accused charged with the crime of homicide
pleaded "not guilty" during the preliminary
investigation before the Municipal Court. Upon the
elevation of the case to the Regional Trial Court, the
court of competent jurisdiction, he pleaded guilty
freely and voluntarily upon arraignment. Can his
plea of guilty before the RTC be considered
spontaneous and thus entitle him to the
mitigating circumstance of spontaneous plea of
guilty under Art. 13(7), RPC? (1999)
A: Yes, his plea of guilty before the Regional Trial Court
can be considered spontaneous, for which he is entitled
to the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty. His plea
of not guilty before the Municipal Court is immaterial as
it was made during preliminary investigation only and
before a court not competent to render judgment.
Q: After killing the victim, the accused absconded.
He succeeded in eluding the police until he surfaced
and surrendered to the authorities about two years
later. Charged with murder, he pleaded not guilty
but, after the prosecution had presented two
witnesses implicating him to the crime, he changed
his plea to that of guilty. Should the mitigating
circumstances of voluntary surrender and plea of
guilty be considered in favor of the accused? (1997)
A: Voluntary surrender may not be appreciated in favor
of the accused. Two years is too long a time to consider
the surrender as spontaneous (People v. Ablao, G.R. No.
69184, March 26, 1990). For sure the government
had already incurred considerable efforts and
expenses in looking for the accused. Plea of guilty can no
longer be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance
because the prosecution had already started with the
presentation of its evidence (Art. 13[7], RPC).
Q: Hilario, upon seeing his son engaged in a scuffle
with Rene, stabbed and killed the latter. After the
stabbing, he brought his son home. The Chief of
Police of the town, accompanied by several
policemen, went to Hilario's house, Hilario, upon
seeing the approaching policemen, went with them
to the Police Station to be investigated in connection
with the killing. When eventually charged with
and convicted of homicide, Hilario, on appeal,
faulted the trial court for not appreciating in his
favor the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender. Is he entitled to such a mitigating
circumstance? Explain. (1996)
A: Yes, Hilario is entitled to the mitigating circumstance
of voluntary surrender. The crux of the issue is whether
the fact that Hilario went home after the incident, but
came down and met the police officers and went with
them is considered "voluntary surrender." The
voluntariness of surrender is tested if the same is
spontaneous showing the intent of the accused to
submit himself unconditionally to the authorities. This
must be either (a) because he acknowledges his guilt, or
(b) because he wishes to save them the trouble and
expenses necessarily incurred in his search and capture
(Reyes' Commentaries, p. 303). Thus, the act of the
accused in hiding after commission of the crime, but
*QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as suggested by UPLC and other distinct
luminaries in the academe, and updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the 2016 Bar Exams.
voluntarily went with the policemen who had gone to
his hiding place to investigate, was held to be
mitigating circumstance (People v. Dayrit, cited in Reyes'
Commentaries, p. 299).
Q: Upon learning that the police wanted him for the
killing of Polistico. Jeprox decided to visit the police
station to make inquiries. On his way, he met a
policeman who immediately served upon him the
warrant for his arrest. During the trial, in the course
of the presentation of the prosecutions evidence,
Jeprox withdrew his plea of not guilty and entered a
plea of guilty. Can he invoke the mitigating
circumstances of voluntary surrender and plea of
guilty? Explain. (1992)
A: Jeprox is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance
of voluntary surrender as his going to the police station
was only for the purpose of verification of the news that
he is wanted by the authorities. In order to be
mitigating, surrender must be spontaneous and that he
acknowledges his guilt. He can neither invoked plea of
guilty as a mitigating circumstance in this case. Art.
13(7) of the Revised Penal Code explicitlty provides that
confession of guilt must be done before the prosecution
had started to present evidence.
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Q: Name the four (4) kinds of aggravating
circumstances and state their effect on the penalty
of crimes and nature thereof. Distinguish generic
aggravating circumstance from qualifying
aggravating circumstance. (1999)
A: The four (4) kinds of aggravating circumstances are:
1. Generic aggravating or those that can generally
apply to all crimes, and can be offset by mitigating
circumstances, but if not offset, would affect only
the maximum of the penalty prescribed by law;
2. Specific aggravating or those that apply only to
particular crimes and cannot be offset by mitigating
circumstances;
3. Qualifying circumstances or those that change the
nature of the crime to a graver one, or brings about
a penalty next higher in degree, and cannot be offset
by mitigating circumstances;
4. Inherent aggravating or those that essentially
accompany the commission of the crime and do not
affect the penalty whatsoever.
The distinctions between generic aggravating
circumstances and qualifying aggravating circumstances
are as follows:
Generic aggravating circumstances:
a. affects the nature of the crime or brings about a
penalty higher in degree than that ordinarily
prescribed;
b. can be offset by ordinary mitigating circumstances;
c. need not be alleged in the Information as long as
proven during the trial;
d. the same shall be considered in imposing the
sentence.
Qualifying circumstances:
a. affects the nature of the crime or brings about a
penalty higher in degree than that ordinarily
prescribed;
b. cannot be offset by mitigating circumstances;
c. must be alleged in the Information and proven
16
during trial.
 QUAMTO FOR CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
Generic
Q: Wenceslao and Loretta were staying in the same
boarding house, occupying different rooms. One late
evening, when everyone in the house was asleep,
Wenceslao entered Lorettas room with the use of a
picklock. Then, with force and violence, Wenceslao
ravished Loretta. After he had satisfied his lust,
Wenceslao stabbed Loretta to death and, before
leaving the room, took her jewelry. Discuss the
applicability of the relevant aggravating
circumstances of dwelling, nocturnity and the use of
the picklock to enter the room of the victim. (2009)
A:
1. Dwelling is an aggravating circumstance because
the crimes were committed in Lorettas room which
in law is considered as her dwelling. It is well settled
that dwelling includes a room in a boarding house
being occupied by the offended party where she
enjoys privacy, peace of mind and sanctity of an
abode.
2. Nocturnity or nighttime is also aggravating because
although it was not purposely or especially sought
for by Wenceslao, nighttime was obviously taken
advantaged of by him in committing the other
crimes. Under the objective test, noctunity is
aggravating when taken advantage of by the
offender during the commission of the crime thus
facilitating the same.
3. The use of a picklock to enter the room of the victim
is not an aggravating circumstance under Art. 14 of
the Code but punished as a crime by itself where the
offender has no lawful cause for possessing it. The
use of picklocks is equivalent to force upon things in
robbery with force upon things.
Q: Rico, a member of the Alpha Rho fraternity, was
killed by Pocholo, a member of the rival group,
Sigma Phi Omega. Pocholo was prosecuted for
homicide before the Regional Trial Court in Binan,
Laguna. During the trial, the prosecution was able to
prove that the killing was committed by means of
poison in consideration of a promise or reward and
with cruelty. If you were the Judge, with what crime
will you convict Pocholo? Explain. (2000)
A: Pocholo should be convicted of the crime of homicide
only because the aggravating circumstances which
should qualify the crime to murder were not alleged in
the Information. The circumstances of using poison, in
consideration of a promise or reward, and cruelty which
attended the killing of Rico could only be appreciated as
generic aggravating circumstances since none of them
have been alleged in the information to qualify the
killing to murder. A qualifying circumstance must be
alleged in the Information and proven beyond
reasonable doubt during the trial to be appreciated as
such.
Q: The accused and the victim occupied adjacent
apartments, each being a separate dwelling unit of
one big house. The accused suspected his wife of
having an illicit relation with the victim. One
afternoon, he saw the victim and his wife together
on board a vehicle. In the evening of that day, the
accused went to bed early and tried to sleep, but
being so annoyed over the suspected relation
between his wife and the victim, he could not sleep.
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
Later in the night, he resolved to kill victim. He rose
from bed and took hold of a knife. He entered the
apartment of the victim through an unlocked
window. Inside, he saw the victim soundly asleep. He
thereupon stabbed the victim, inflicting several
wounds, which caused his death within a few hours.
Would you say that the killing was attended by
the qualifying or aggravating circumstances of
evident premeditation, treachery, nighttime and
unlawful entry? (1997)
A:
1. Evident premeditation cannot be considered against
the accused because he resolved to kill the victim
"later in the night" and there was no sufficient lapse
of time between the determination and execution, to
allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of
his will.
2. Treachery may be present because the accused
stabbed the victim while the latter was sound
asleep. Accordingly, he employed means and
methods which directly and specially insured the
execution of the act without risk himself arising
from the defense which the victim might have made.
3. Nighttime cannot be appreciated because there is no
showing that the accused deliberately sought or
availed of nighttime to insure the success of his act.
The Intention to commit the crime was conceived
shortly before its commission. Moreover, nighttime
is absorbed in treachery.
4. Unlawful Entry may be appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance, inasmuch as the accused
entered the room of the victim through the window,
which is not the proper place for entrance into the
house.
Q: Jose, Domingo, Manolo, and Fernando, armed
with bolos, at about one o'clock in the morning,
robbed a house at a desolate place where Danilo, his
wife, and three daughters were living. While the four
were in the process of ransacking Danilo's house,
Fernando, noticing that one of Danilo's daughters
was trying to get away, ran after her and finally
caught up with her in a thicket somewhat distant
from the house. Fernando, before bringing back the
daughter to the house, raped her first. Thereafter,
the four carted away the belongings of Danilo and
his family.
a. What aggravating circumstances may be
appreciated against the four? Explain. (1996)
A: The aggravating circumstances which may be
considered in the premises are:
1. Band because all the four offenders are armed;
2. Nocturnity because evidently the offenders took
advantage of night time;
3. Dwelling; and
4. Uninhabited Place because the house where the
crimes were committed was "at a desolate place"
and obviously the offenders took advantage of this
circumstance in committing the crime.
b. What crime did Jose, Domingo, Manolo and
Fernando commit? Explain.
A: Jose, Domingo, and Manolo committed Robbery,
while Fernando committed complex crime of Robbery
with Rape, Conspiracy can be inferred from the manner
17
the offenders committed the robbery but the rape was
TEAM BAROPS
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016
 QuAMTO for CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
committed by Fernando at a place "distant from the
house" where the robbery was committed, not in the
presence of the other conspirators. Hence, Fernando
alone should answer for the rape, rendering him liable
for the special complex crime.
c. Suppose, after the robbery, the four took turns
in raping the three daughters of Danilo inside
the latter's house, but before they left, they
killed the whole family to prevent identification,
what crime did the four commit? Explain.
A: The crime would be Robbery with Homicide because
the killings were by reason (to prevent identification)
and on the occasion of the robbery.
Q: Ben, a widower, driven by bestial desire, poked a
gun on his daughter Zeny, forcibly undressed her
and tied her legs to the bed. He also burned her face
with a lighted cigarette. Like a madman, he laughed
while raping her. What aggravating circumstances
are present in this case? (1994)
A: The aggaravating circumstances in this case are:
1. Cruelty, for burning the victim's face with a lighted
cigarette, thereby deliberately augmenting the
victim's suffering by acts clearly unnecessary to the
rape, while the offender delighted and enjoyed
seeing the victim suffer in pain (People v. Lucas, G.R.
No. 80102, January 22, 1990);
2. Relationship, because the offended party is a
descendant (daughter) of the offender and
considering that the crime is one against chastity.
Q: B, who is blind in one eye, conspired with M, a
sixteen year old boy, with C, who had been
previously convicted of Serious Physical Injuries,
and with R, whose sister was raped by X a day
before, to kill the latter. B, C and R were armed with
.38 caliber revolvers, while M carried no weapon
and acted only as a look out. They proceeded to the
house of X riding in a motorized tricycle. Thereupon,
C, on instruction of B to give X no chance, shot X who
was then sleeping. Indicted for Homicide, as the
information alleges no qualifying circumstance.
Specify the mitigating and aggravating
circumstances present, and explain in whose favor,
and against whom, must they be considered. (1993)
A:
1. Mitigating circumstances:
a. B is entitled to the mitigating circumstance
under Art. 13(8);
b. M is entitled to the privileged mitigating
circumstances of minority under Art. 68 of the
RPC;
c. Vindication of a grave offense in favor of R
because his sister was raped by X a day before
the shooting, and even if there was an interval
of one (1) day between the rape and the killing.
2. Aggravating circumstances:
a. The aggravating circumstance of recidivism Art.
14(9) should be considered against C if alleged
in the Information (People v. Peter Cadevida, G.R.
No. L-94528, March 1. 1993).
b. The aggravating circumstance of motor vehicle
under Art. 14(20) of the Code, all the accused
having used a motorized tricycle;
c. Treachery should be aggravating against all of
the accused including M who acted as a lookout
*QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as suggested by UPLC and other distinct
luminaries in the academe, and updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the 2016 Bar Exams.
because all of them were present when X was
shot (Art. 62(4), RPC). X was sleeping when shot
to death.
Q: In an information for Murder against A. B, and C,
the prosecution alleges Treachery as the qualifying
circumstance and the following generic aggravating
circumstances: (1) nocturnity, (2) abuse of superior
strength, and (3) employing means to weaken the
defense. At the trial, the prosecution, without
objection from the de oficio counsel for the accused,
proved evident premeditation. It likewise success-
fully proved the qualifying and the generic
aggravating circumstances alleged in the
information.
For the purpose of determining the appropriate
penalty to be imposed upon the accused, may the
court take into account evident premeditation and
the other generic aggravating circumstances?
(1991)
A: Yes, as far as evident premeditation is concerned, but
only as a generic aggravating circumstance. Since
treachery absorbs nocturnity, abuse of superior
strength and employing means to weaken the defense,
they can no longer be considered as additional
circumstances.
Qualifying
Q: When would qualifying circumstances be deemed,
if at all, elements of a crime? (2003)
A: A qualifying circumstance would be deemed an
element of a crime when:
1. It changes the nature of the crime, bringing about a
more serious crime and a heavier penalty;
2. It is essential to the crime involved, otherwise some
other crime is committed; and
3. It is specifically alleged in the Information and
proven during the trial.
ALTERNATIVE CIRCUMSTANCES
Q: A was invited to a drinking spree by friends. After
having had a drink too many, A and B had a heated
argument, during which A stabbed B. As a result, B
suffered serious physical injuries. May the
intoxication of A be considered aggravating or
mitigating? (2002)
A: The intoxication of A may be prima facie considered
mitigating since it was merely incidental to the
commission of the crime. It may not be considered
aggravating as there is no clear indication from the facts
of the case that it was habitual or intentional on the part
of A. Aggravating circumstances are not to be presumed;
they should be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
ABSOLUTORY CAUSE
Instigation
Q: Distinguish Entrapment from Instigation. (2003,
1995)
A: As to intent:
In Entrapment, the criminal design originates from and
18
is already in the mind of the lawbreaker even before
 QUAMTO FOR CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
entrapment while in Instigation, the idea and design to
bring about the commission of the crime originated and
developed in the mind of the law enforcers;
As to the means and ways:
In Entrapment, the law enforcers resorts to ways and
means for the purpose of capturing the lawbreaker in
flagrante delicto while in Instigation, the law enforcers
induce, lure, or incite a person who is not minded to
commit a crime and would not otherwise commit it, into
committing the crime;
As to criminal liability:
Entrapment is no bar to prosecution and conviction of
the lawbreaker while Instigation absolves the accused
from criminal liability (People v. Dante Marcos, 1990).
Q: The Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA)
had intelligence reports about the drug pushing
activities of Rado, but could not arresthim for lack of
concrete evidence. SP03 Relio, a PDEA team leader,
approached Emilo and requested him to act as
poseur-buyer of shabu and transact with Rado.
Emilo refused, saying that he had completely been
rehabilitated and did not want to have anything to
do with drugs anymore. But he was prevailed upon
to help when SP03 Relio explained that only he
could help capture Rado because he used to be his
customer. SP03 Relio then gave Emilo the marked
money to be used in buying shabu from Rado. The
operation proceeded. After Emilo handed the
marked money to Rado in exchange for the sachets
of shabu weighing 50 grams, and upon receiving the
pre-arranged signal from Ernilo, SP03 Relio and his
team members barged in and arrested Rado and
Ernilo, who were both charged with violation of R.A.
9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of2002. (2015)
a. What defense, if any, may Ernilo invoke to free
himself from criminal liability? Explain.
A: Ernilo may invoke Section 33, Art. II of RA 9165 or
the Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002. He may have
violated Section 11 of RA 9165 for possession of shabu
but he is immune from prosecution and punishment
because of his role as the poseur-buyer in the
entrapment operation. There was virtually instigation.
He is exempted from prosecution or punishment
because the information obtained from him by the PDEA
agents, who had no direct and concrete evidence of
Rados drug-pushing activities, led to the whereabouts,
identity and arrest of Rado. So long as the information
and testimony given are pleaded and proven, Ernilo
cannot be prosecuted for violation of RA 9165.
b. May Rado adopt as his own Emilo's defense?
Explain.
A: No. First, an entrapment operation is a valid means of
arresting violators of RA 9165. It is an effective way of
apprehending law offenders in the act of committing a
crime. In a buy-bust operation, the idea to commit a
crime originates from the offender, without anybody
inducing or prodding him to commit the offense. Second,
the immunity does not extend to violators of Section 5 of
RA 9165 or the sale of shabu (sec. 33, RA 9165). Lastly,
he was the offender of the crime and apparently the
most guilty of the offense.
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
Q: Suspecting that Juan was a drug pusher, SPO2
Mercado, leader of the Narcom team, gave Juan a
Pl00-bill and asked him to buy some marijuana
cigarettes. Desirous of pleasing SPO2 Mercado, Juan
went inside the shopping mall while the officer
waited at the corner of the mall. After fifteen
minutes, Juan returned with ten sticks of marijuana
cigarettes which he gave to SPO2 Mercado who
thereupon placed Juan under arrest and charged
him with violation of The Dangerous Drugs Law by
selling marijuana cigarettes. Is Juan guilty of any
offense punishable under The Dangerous Drugs
Act? Discuss fully. (1995)
A: Juan cannot be charged of any offense punishable
under The Dangerous Drugs Act. Although Juan is a
suspected drug pusher, he cannot be charged on the
basis of a mere suspicion. By providing the money with
which to buy marijuana cigarettes, SPO2 Mercado
practically induced and prodded Juan to commit the
offense of illegal possession of marijuana. Set against the
facts, instigation is a valid defense available to Juan.
Article 332: Persons exempt from criminal liability for
theft, swindling and malicious mischief
Q: The wife of AAA predeceased his mother-in-law.
AAA was accused of defrauding his mother-in-law
under a criminal information for estafa, but the
actual recital of facts of the offense charged therein,
if proven, would constitute not only the crime of
estafa, but also falsification of public document as a
necessary means for committing estafa. AAA invokes
the absolutory cause of relationship by affinity.
Which statement is most accurate? (2012)
A: There are two views on whether the extinguishment
of the marriage by death of the spouse dissolves the
relationship by affinity for purpose of absolutory clause.
The first holds that the relationship by affinity
terminates with the dissolution of the marriage, while
the second maintains that relationship continues even
after the death of the deceased spouse. The principle of
pro reo calls for the adoption of the continuing affinity
view because it is more favorable to the accused.
However, the absolutory cause applies to theft,
swindling and malicious mischief. It does not apply to
theft through falsification or estafa through falsification
(Intestate estate of Gonzales v. People, G.R. No. 181409,
February 11, 2010).
Q: Dennis leased his apartment to Myla for P10,000
a month. Myla failed to pay the rent for 3 months.
Gabriel, the son of Dennis, prepared a demand letter
falsely alleging that his father had authorized him to
collect the unpaid rentals. Myla paid the unpaid
rentals to Gabriel who kept the payment. (2008)
a) Did Gabriel commit a crime? Explain.
A: Yes, Gabriel committed a crime; it was either the
crime of falsification of a private document (if damage or
at least intent to cause damage could be proved) or the
crime of swindling only. It could not be both falsification
and swindling or a complex crime of estafa through
falsification since the document falsified was a private
document. The two crimes cannot go together.
b) Can Gabriel invoke his relationship with Dennis
19
to avoid criminal liability? Explain.
TEAM BAROPS
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016
 QuAMTO for CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
A: If Gabriel would be made criminally liable for
falsification of a private document, he cannot invoke his
relationship with Dennis, his father, to avoid criminal
liability because Art. 332 of the RPC provides exemption
from criminal liability in crimes against property only
for theft, swindling or malicious mischief but not for
falsification of document.
If he would be made criminally liable for swindling, he
can invoke his relationship with Dennis because this
crime cannot be complexed with falsification of a private
document. The charged could, therefore, stand alone.
The exemption in Art. 332 will obtain.
Article 20: Accessories exempt from criminal liability by
reason of relationship
Q: DCB, the daughter of MCB, stole the earrings of
XYZ, a stranger. MCB pawned the earrings with TBI
Pawnshop as a pledge for P500 loan. During the
trial, MCB raised the defense that being the mother
of DCB, she cannot be held liable as an accessory.
Will MCB's defense prosper? Reason briefly. (2004)
A: No, MCB's defense will not prosper because the
exemption from criminal liability of an accessory by
virtue of relationship with the principal does not cover
accessories who themselves profited from or assisted
the offender to profit by the effects or proceeds of the
crime. This non-exemption of an accessory, though
related to the principal of the crime, is expressly
provided in Art. 20 of the RPC.
PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE/
DEGREE OF PARTICIPATION
Principal
Q: Nel learned that Elgar, the owner of the biggest
house in the place, would be out of town for three
days with no one left to watch the house. He called
his friends Ben, Ardo and Gorio and they planned to
take the valuables in the house while Elgar was
away. Nel and Ben would go inside the house, Ardo
would serve as the lookout, while Gorio would stay
in the getaway car. When Elgar left, they carried out
their plan to the letter. Nel and Ben went inside the
house through the backdoor which was left
unlocked. None of the rooms and drawers inside
were locked. They took the money, jewelry and
other valuables therefrom and immediately left
using the getaway car. After driving for about one
kilometer, Nel realized he left his bag and wallet
with IDs in the house and so he instructed Gorio to
drive back to the house. Nel just went in thinking
that the house was still empty. But to his surprise,
Nel found Fermin seated on a bench with Nel's bag
and wallet beside him and appeared to be texting
using his smart phone. Nel took a golf club near him
and hit Fermin with it. Fermin shouted for help, but
Nel kept hitting him until he stopped making noise.
The noise alerted the neighbor who called the
police. Nel, Ben, Ardo and Gorio were caught. Fermin
died. What is the criminal liability of Nel, Ben, Ardo
and Gorio? Explain. (2015)
A: Nel, Ben, Ardo and Gorio are criminally liable as
principals for the crime of Theft. They conspired to take
Elgars personal properties without his knowledge, with
*QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as suggested by UPLC and other distinct
luminaries in the academe, and updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the 2016 Bar Exams.
intent to gain, and without violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things (Art. 308,
RPC) Nel and Ben entered the house through an
unlocked backdoor and took the valuables from the
rooms and drawers that wer likewise left unlocked. Nel
and Ben are liable as principals by direct participation
while Ardo and Gorio are principals by indispensable
cooperation because they have concurred in the criminal
resolution and cooperated by performing another act as
lookout and driver of a getaway car, respectively, which
were indispensable for the commission of the crime
(Art. 17, RPC).
Nel, however, is also liable for the separate crime of
Homicide for the death of Fermin. The killing of Fermin
was a separate act and was not a necessary means for
committing Theft (Art. 48, RPC) because the latter crime
was already consummated. Nel killed Fermin for a
different reason perhaps because of his anger that
Fermin was in possession of his bag and wallet and
appeared to be using his smart phone to contact the
police.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
All the offenders are liable for the crime of Robbery with
Homicide. They are in conspiracy mwith each other, and
after unlawfully taking the property of Elgar, killing
occurred. In People v. Disimban (G.R. No. L-1746, January
31, 1951), the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction for
Robbery with Homicide although the robbery victim was
different from the homicide victim. In People v. Sandoval,
the Supreme court ruled that those who took part as
principals in the Robbery will also be held guilty as
principals of Robbery with Homicide although they did
not actually take part in the Homicide.
Q: Mr. Red was drinking with his buddies, Mr. White
and Mr. Blue when he saw Mr. Green with his former
girlfriend, Ms. Yellow. Already drunk, Mr. Red
declared in a loud voice that if he could not have Ms.
Yellow, no one can. He then proceeded to the mens
room but told Mr. White and Mr. Blue to take care of
Mr. Green. Mr. Blue and Mr. White asked Mr. Red
what he meant but Mr. Red simply said, "You already
know what I want," and then left. Mr. Blue and Mr.
White proceeded to kill Mr. Green and hurt Ms.
Yellow. (2014)
a. What, if any, are the respective liabilities of Mr.
Red, Mr. White and Mr. Blue for the death of Mr.
Green?
A: Mr. Blue and Mr. White are liable for the death of Mr.
Green as principals by direct participation. They were
the ones who participated in the criminal resolution and
who carried out their plan and personally took part in
its execution by acts which directly tended to the same
end. Mr. Red cannot be held criminally liable as principal
by inducement because his statement that Mr. Blue and
Mr. White are to take care of Mr. Green was not made
directly with the intention of procuring the commission
of the crime. There is no showing that the words uttered
by him may be considered as so efficacious and powerful
so as to amount to physical or moral coercion (People v.
Assad, G.R. No. L-33673, February 24, 1931). Neither is
there evidence to show that Mr. Red has an ascendancy
or influence over Mr. White and Mr. Blue (People v.
Abarri, F.R. No. 90815, March 1, 1995).
20
 QUAMTO FOR CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)

b. What, if any, are the respective liabilities of Mr.
Red, Mr. White and Mr. Blue for the injuries of
Ms. Yellow?
A: Mr. Blue and Mr. White are liable as principals by
direct participation for the crime of physical injuries for
hurting Ms. Yellow to the extent of the injuries inflicted.
Having no participation in the attack upon Ms. Yellow,
Mr. Red would have no criminal liability therefor.
Q: A asked B to kill C because of a grave injustice
done to A by C. A promised B a reward. B was willing
to kill C, not so much because of the reward
promised to him but because he also had his own
long-standing grudge against C, who had wronged
him in the past. If C is killed by B, would A be liable
as a principal by inducement? (2002, 1994)
A: No. A would not be liable as a principal by
inducement because the reward he promised B is not
the sole impelling reason which made B to kill C. To
bring about criminal liability of a co-principal, the
inducement made by the inducer must be the sole
consideration which caused the person induced to
commit the crime and without which the crime would
not have been committed. The facts of the case indicate
that B, the killer supposedly induced by A, had his own
reason to kill C out of a long standing grudge.
and still he concurred in that criminal design by
providing the firearm.
Q: Tata owns a three-storey building located at No. 3
Herran Street. Paco, Manila. She wanted to construct
a new building but had no money to finance the
construction. So, she insured the building for
P3,000,000.00. She then urged Yoboy and Yongsi, for
monetary consideration, to bum her building so she
could collect the insurance proceeds. Yoboy and
Yongsi burned the said building resulting to its total
loss. What is their respective criminal liablity?
(1994)
A: Tata is a principal by inducement because she directly
induced Yoboy and Yongsi for a price or monetary
consideration, to commit arson which the latter would
not have committed were it not for such reason. Yoboy
and Yongsi are principals by direct participation (Art.
17(21),(3), RPC).
Accomplice
Q: Who is an accomplice? (2012)
A: Accomplices are those persons who, not being the
principal, cooperate in the execution of the offense by
previous or simultaneous acts (Art. 18, RPC).

Q: Despite the massive advertising campaign in Q: Distinguish an accomplice from a conspirator as

media against firecrackers and gun-firing during the to their knowledge of the criminal design of the
New Year's celebrations, Jonas and Jaja bought ten principal, their participation, the penalty to be
boxes of super lolo and pla-pla in Bocaue, Bulacan. imposed in relation to the penalty for the principal,
Before midnight of December 31, 1999, Jonas and and the requisites/elements to be established by the
Jaja started their celebration by having a drinking prosecution in order to hold them criminally
spree at Jona's place by exploding their high- responsible for their respective roles in the
powered firecrackers in their neighborhood. In the commission of the crime. (2012, 2007)
course of their conversation, Jonas confided to Jaja
that he has been keeping a long-time grudge against A: The differences between an accomplice and
his neighbor Jepoy in view of the latter's refusal to conspirator are as follows:
lend him some money. While under the influence
of liquor, Jonas started throwing lighted super lolos ACCOMPLICE CONSPIRATOR
inside Jepoy's fence to irritate him and the same
exploded inside the latter's yard. Upon knowing that They know and They know of and
the throwing of the super lolo was deliberate, Jepoy agree with the join in the criminal
became furious and sternly warned Jonas to stop his criminal design. design. They know
malicious act or he would get what he wanted. A They come to know the criminal
Knowledge of
heated argument between Jonas and Jepoy ensued it after the intention because
the criminal
but Jaja tried to calm down his friend. At midnight, principals have they themselves
design of the
Jonas convinced Jaja to lend him his .45 calibre reached the have decided upon
principal
pistol so that he could use it to knock down Jepoy decision and only such course of
and to end his arrogance. Jonas thought that after then do they agree action.
all, explosions were everywhere and nobody would to cooperate in its
know who shot Jepoy. After Jaja lent his firearm to execution.
Jonas, the latter again started started throwing Accomplices are Conspirators are
lighted super lolos and pla-plas at Jepoy's yard in mere instruments the authors of the
order to provoke him so that he would come out of who perform acts crime.
Participation
his house. When Jepoy came out, Jonas immediately not essential to the
shot him with Jaja's .45 caliber gun but missed his commission of the
target. Instead, the bullet hit Jepoy's five year old crime.
son who was following behind him, killing the boy One degree lower Same as principal
instantaneously. If you were the Judge, how would than that of the NOTE: Conspiracy
you decide the case? Explain. (2000) principal. alone is not
punishable except
Penalty
A: I would convict Jonas as principal by direct in cases where the
participation and Jaja as co-principal by indispensable law specifically
cooperation for the complex crime of murder with prescribes a
homicide. Jaja should be held liable as co-principal and penalty.
not only as an accomplice because he knew of Jonas' (1) community of (1) that two or
21

Requisites
criminal design even before he lent his firearm to Jonas criminal design; more persons come

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS TEAM BAROPS

FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016
 QuAMTO for CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
that is, knowing the to an agreement;
criminal design of (2) that the
the principal by agreement
direct participation, concerned the
he concurs with the commission of a
latter in his crime; and (3) that
purpose; (2) the the execution of the
performance of the felony was decided
previous or upon.
simultaneous acts
that are not
indispensible to the
commission of the
crime
Q: Ponciano borrowed Rubens gun, saying that he
would use it to kill Freddie. Because Ruben also
resented Freddie, he readily lent his gun, but told
Ponciano: "O, pagkabaril mo kay Freddie, isauli mo
kaagad, ha." Later, Ponciano killed Freddie, but used
a knife because he did not want Freddies neighbors
to hear the gunshot. (2009)
a. What, if any, is the liability of Ruben? Explain.
A: Rubens liability is that of an accomplice only because
he merely cooperated in Pocianos determination to kill
Freddie. Such cooperation is not indispensable to the
killing, as in fact the killing was carried out without the
use of Rubens gun. Neither may Ruben be regarded as a
co-conspirator since he was not a participant in the
decision-making of Ponciano to kill Freddie; he merely
cooperated in carrying out the criminal plan which was
already in place (Art. 18, RPC).
b. Would your answer be the same if, instead of
Freddie, it was Manuel, a relative of Ruben, who
was killed by Ponciano using Rubens gun?
Explain.
A: No. The answer would not be the same because
Ruben lent his gun purposely for the killing of Freddie
only, not for any other killing. Poncianos using Rubens
gun in killing a person other than Freddie is beyond
Rubens criminal intent and willing involvement. Only
Ponciano will answer for the crime against Manuel.
Accessories
Q: Modesto and Abelardo are brothers. Sometime in
August 1998 while Abelardo was in his office,
Modesto, together with two other men in police
uniform, came with two heavy bags. Modesto asked
Abelardo to keep the two bags in his vault until he
comes back to get them. When Abelardo later
examined the two bags, he saw bundles of money
that, in his rough count, could not be less than P5
Million. He kept the money inside the vault and soon
he heard the news that a gang that included Modesto
had been engaged in bank robberies. Abelardo,
unsure of what to do under the circumstances, kept
quiet about the two bags in his vault. Soon after, the
police captured, and secured a confession from,
Modesto who admitted that their loot had been
deposited with Abelardo. What is Abelardo's
liability? (2013)
A: Abelardo is not criminally liable. To be criminally
liable as an accessory under Art. 19, such person must
have knowledge of the commission of the crime. The
*QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as suggested by UPLC and other distinct
luminaries in the academe, and updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the 2016 Bar Exams.
term knowledge under the law is not synonymous
with suspicion. Mere suspicion that the crime has been
committed is not sufficient. Even if he can be considered
as an accessory under Art. 19(2) of RPC, Abelardo is not
liable, being the brother of Modesto under Art. 20, RPC.
Q: Immediately after murdering Bob, Jake went to
his mother to seek refuge. His mother told him to
hide in the maids quarters until she finds a better
place for him to hide. After two days, Jake
transferred to his aunts house. A week later, Jake
was apprehended by the police. Can Jakes mother
and aunt be made criminally liable as accessories to
the crime of murder? Explain. (2010, 1998)
A: Obviously, Jakes mother was aware of her sons
having committed a felony, such that her act of
harbouring and concealing him renders her liable as an
accessory. But being an ascendant of Jake, she is exempt
from criminal liability by express provision of Art. 20 of
the RPC. On the other hand, the criminal liability of
Jakes aunt depends on her knowledge of his
commission of the felony, her act of harbouring and
concealing Jake would render her criminally liable as
accessory to the crime of murder; otherwise, without
knowledge of Jakes commission of the felony, she would
not be liable.
Decree Penalizing Obstruction of Apprehension and
Prosecution of Criminal Offenders
(P.D. 1829)
Q: Manolo revealed to his friend Domeng his desire
to kill Cece. He likewise confided to Domeng his
desire to borrow his revolver. Domeng lent it.
Manolo shot Cece in Manila with Domeng's revolver.
As his gun was used in the killing, Domeng asked
Mayor Tan to help him escape. The mayor gave
Domeng P5,000.00 and told him to proceed to
Mindanao to hide. Domeng went to Mindanao. The
mayor was later charged as an accessory to Cece's
murder. (2008)
a. Can he be held liable for the charge? Explain.
A: Giving Domeng the benefit of a milder criminal
responsibility of an accomplice, not of a co-principal by
indispensable cooperation of Manolo, Mayor Tan could
not be liable as an accessory to Ceces murder. To incur
criminal liability of an accessory for helping or assisting
in the escape of an offender, he must be a principal of
the crime committed. Unless Domeng would be
considered as a co-principal by indispensable
cooperation in the commission of the murder, the
Mayor, by assisting him to escape, would be an
accessory to the felony.
b. Can he be held liable for any other offense?
Explain fully.
A: Although the Mayor may not be held liable as an
accessory to the killing of Cece, he may be held liable for
obstruction of justice under P.D. No. 1829 for assisting
Domeng, who was involved in the commission of a
crime, to escape from Manila to Mindanao. Unlike in Art.
19 of the RPC, P.D. No. 1829 made no qualification as to
the offender whether he be principal, accomplice or
accessory in the crime in whose favour the obstructing
acts were committed.
22
 QUAMTO FOR CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
PENALTIES
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Q: Imagine that you are a Judge trying a case, and
based on the evidence presented and the applicable
law, you have decided on the guilt of two (2)
accused. Indicate the five (5) steps you would follow
to determine the exact penalty to be imposed.
Stated differently, what are the factors you must
consider to arrive at the correct penalty? (1991)
A:
1. Determine the crime committed;
2. Stage of execution and degree of participation;
3. Determine the penalty;
4. Consider the modifying circumstances;
5. Determine whether Indeterminate Sentence Law is
applicable or not.
Q: What are the penalties that may be served
simultaneously? (2007)
A: The penalties that may be served simultaneously are
imprisonment/ destierro and:
1. Perpetual absolute disqualification;
2. Perpetual special disqualification;
3. Temporary absolute disqualification;
4. Temporary special disqualification;
5. Suspension from public office, the right to vote and
be voted for, and the right to follow a profession or
calling;
6. Fine; and any principal penalty with its accessory
penalties.
Q: After trial, Judge Juan Laya of the Manila RTC
found Benjamin Garcia guilty of Murder, the victim
having sustained several bullet wounds in his body
so that he died despite medical assistance given in
the Ospital ng Manila. Because the weapon used by
Benjamin was unlicensed and the qualifying
circumstance of treachery was found to be present.
Judge Laya rendered his decision convicting
Benjamin and sentencing him to "reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment". Are "reclusion perpetua" and
life imprisonment the same and can be imposed
interchangeably as in the foregoing sentence? Or
are they totally different? State your reasons.
(2005, 2001, 1994)
A: The penalty of reclusion perpetua and the penalty of
life imprisonment are totally different from each other
and therefore, should not be used interchangeably.
Reclusion perpetua is a penalty prescribed by the RPC,
with a fixed duration of imprisonment from 20 years
and 1 day to 40 years, and carries it with accessory
penalties. Life imprisonment, on the other hand, is a
penalty prescribed by special laws, with no fixed
duration of imprisonment and without any accessory
penalty.
Q: Under Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 7959, reclusion
perpetua shall be from 20 years and 1 day to 40
years. Does this mean that reclusion perpetua is
now a divisible penalty? Explain. (2005)
A: No, because the Supreme Court has repeatedly called
the attention of the Bench and the Bar to the fact that the
penalties of reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
are not synonymous and should be applied correctly and
as may be specified by the applicable law. Reclusion
perpetua has a specific duration of 20 years and 1 day to
40 years (Art. 27) and accessory penalties (Art. 41),
while life imprisonment has no definite term or
accessory penalties. Also, life imprisonment is imposable
on crimes punished by special laws, and not on felonies
in the Code.
Q: When is there preventive imprisonment? When is
the accused credited with the full time of his
preventive imprisonment, and when is he credited
with 4/5 thereof? (1994)
Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the
Philippines (R. A. 9364)
Q: The death penalty cannot be inflicted under
which of the following circumstances:
1. When the guilty person is at least 18 years of age
at the time of the commission of the crime.
2. When the guilty person is more than 70 years of
age.
3. When, upon appeal to or automatic review by
the Supreme Court, the required majority for the
imposition of the death penalty is not obtained.
4. When the person is convicted of a capital crime
but before execution becomes insane.
5. When the accused is a woman while she is
pregnant or within one year after delivery.
Explain your answer or choice briefly. (2004)
A: Understanding the word "inflicted" to mean the
imposition of the death penalty, not its execution, the
circumstance in which the death penalty cannot be
inflicted is no. 2: "when the guilty person is more than
70 years of age" (Art. 47, RPC). Instead, the penalty shall
be commuted to reclusion perpetua, with the accessory
penalties provided in Art. 40, RPC.
In circumstance no. 1 when the guilty person is at least
18 years of age at the time of the commission of the
crime, the death penalty can be imposed since the
offender is already of legal age when he committed the
crime. Circumstance no. 3 no longer operates,
considering the decision of the Supreme Court in People
v. Efren Mateo, G.R. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, providing an
intermediate review for such cases where the penalty
imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment before they are elevated to the Supreme
Court. In circumstances nos. 4 & 5, the death penalty can
be imposed if prescribed by the law violated although its
execution shall be suspended when the convict becomes
insane before it could be executed and while he is
insane. Likewise, the death penalty can be imposed upon
a woman but its execution shall be suspended during
her pregnancy and for one year after her delivery.
Q: Under Article 47 of RA. 7659, the death penalty
shall be imposed in all cases in which it must be
imposed under existing laws. What are the
exceptions to the imposition of the death penalty?
(1998)
A: The death penalty shall not be imposed although
prescribed under existing laws:
1. When the accused is less than 18 years of age at the
time of the commission of the offense;
2. When the accused is more than 70 years of age
23
already;
TEAM BAROPS
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016
 QuAMTO for CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
3. When upon appeal or automatic review of the case
by the Supreme Court, the required majority vote
for the imposition of the death penalty is not
obtained.
Q: When was the constitutional proscription against
the imposition of the death penalty lifted? When is
the execution of the death penalty suspended under
the Revised Penal Code? When is the death penalty
commuted under the same Code? (1995)
A:
a. The constitutional proscription against the im-
position of the death penalty was lifted with the
enactment of R.A. 7659, otherwise known as the
Heinous Crimes Law, which took effect fifteen (15)
days after publication on December 16,1993, that is
on December 31, 1993 (People v. Martin Simon, G.R.
No. 93028 July 29, 1994).
b. Death penalty shall not be executed (a) upon a
woman within three years after date of the
sentence, (b) while she is pregnant, (c) upon a
person over 70 years old (Art. 83, RPC), or (4) upon
a convict who becomes insane after final sentence
(Art. 79, RPC).
c. When the convict reaches the age of 70 years the
death sentence is commuted to reclusion perpetua
(Art. 83, RPC).
APPLICATION
Indeterminate Sentence Law
(R. A. 4103, as amended)
Q: What is the fundamental principle in applying and
interpreting criminal laws, including the
Indeterminate Sentence Law? How is the
Indeterminate Sentence Law applied in imposing a
sentence? (2012)
A: The fundamental principle in interpreting and
applying penal laws is the principle of pro reo. The
phrase in dubio pro reo means when in doubt, for the
accused. (Intestate Estate of Gonzales v. People, G.R. No.
181409, February 11, 2010). In dubio pro reo, is in
consonance with the constitutional guarantee that the
accused ought to be presumed innocent until and unless
his guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt (People
v. Temporada, G.R. No. 173473, December 17, 2008). If
crime is punishable under the RPC, the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the
maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of
the attending circumstance, could be properly imposed
under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum of
which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower
to that prescribed by the Code for the offense. If the
offense is punishable under a special law, the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the
maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum
fixed by said law, and the minimum shall not be less
than the minimum term prescribed in the same (R.A.
4103, Sec. 1).
When penalty is imposed by RPC
Q: How are the maximum and the minimum terms of
the indeterminate sentence for offenses punishable
under the Revised Penal Code determined? Under
the law, what is the purpose for fixing the maximum
*QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as suggested by UPLC and other distinct
luminaries in the academe, and updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the 2016 Bar Exams.
and the minimum terms of the indeterminate
sentence? (2002)
A: For crimes punished under the Revised Penal Code,
the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence shall
be the penalty properly imposable under the same Code
after considering the attending mitigating and/or
aggravating circumstances according to Art. 64 of said
Code. The minimum term of the same sentence shall be
fixed within the range of the penalty next lower in
degree to that prescribed for the crime under the said
Code.
The maximum and the minimum terms of the
indeterminate sentence must be fixed because they are
the basis for the following:
1. Whenever a prisoner has served the minimum
penalty imposed upon him, he is fit for release on
parole upon terms and conditions prescribed by the
Board;
2. When the paroled prisoner violates any of the
conditions of his parole during the period of
surveillance, he may be rearrested to serve the
remaining unexpired portion of the maximum
sentence;
3. Even if a prisoner has already served the minimum
but he is not fitted for release on the parole, he shall
continue to serve until the end of the maximum
term.
Q: Bruno was charged with homicide for killing the
75-year old owner of his rooming house. The
prosecution proved that Bruno stabbed the owner
causing his death; and that the killing happened at
10 in the evening in the house where the victim and
Bruno lived. Bruno, on the other hand, successfully
proved that he voluntarily surrendered to the
authorities; that he pleaded guilty to the crime
charged; that it was the victim who first attacked
and did so without any provocation on his (Bruno's)
part, but he prevailed because he managed to draw
his knife with which he stabbed the victim. The
penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal.
Assuming a judgment of conviction and after
considering the attendant circumstances, what
penalty should the judge impose? (2013)
A: Bruno should be sentenced to an indeterminate
sentence penalty of arresto mayor in any of its period to
prision correccional in its medium period as maximum.
Bruno was entitled to two privileged mitigating
circumstances of incomplete self-defense and the
presence of at least two ordinary mitigating
circumstances (voluntary surrender and plea of guilt)
without any aggravating circumstance under Art. 69 and
64(5) of the RPC respectively, which lowers the
prescribed penalty for homicide which is reclusion
temporal to prision correccional.
Q: X was convicted of a complex crime of direct
assault with homicide aggravated by the
commission of the crime in a place where public
authorities are engaged in the discharge of their
duties. The penalty for direct assault is prision
correccional in its medium and maximum period.
What is the correct indeterminate penalty? (2012)
A: 10 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years &
4 months of reclusion temporal as maximum.
24
 QUAMTO FOR CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
Q: An agonizing and protracted trial having come to
a close, the judge found A guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of homicide and imposed on him a straight
penalty of SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
mayor. The public prosecutor objected to the
sentence on the ground that the proper penalty
should have been TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1)
DAY of reclusion temporal. The defense counsel
chimed in, contending that application of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law should lead to the
imposition of a straight penalty of SIX (6) MONTHS
and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional only. Who
of the three is on the right track? Explain. (2010)
A: None of the contentions is correct because the
Indeterminate Sentence Law (R.A. 4103) has not been
followed. The imposition of penalty for the crime of
homicide, which is penalized by imprisonment
exceeding one (1) year and is divisible, is covered by the
Indeterminate Sentence Law. The said law requires that
the sentence in this case should reflect a minimum term
for purposes of parole, and a maximum term fixing the
limit of the imprisonment. Imposing a straight penalty is
incorrect.
Q: In a conviction for homicide, the trial court
appreciated two (2) mitigating circumstances and
one (1) aggravating circumstance. Homicide under
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code is punishable
by reclusion temporal, an imprisonment term of
twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20)
years.
a. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
determine the appropriate penalty to be
imposed. Explain. (2009)
A: Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum
of the sentence shall be anywhere within the range of 6
years and 1 day to 12 years imprisonment while the
maximum of the sentence shall be anywhere within the
range of Reclusion Temporal minimum i.e., not lower
than 12 years and 1 day to not more than 14 yrs. and 8
months.
b. Will your answer be the same if it is a conviction
for illegal possession of drugs under R.A. 9165
(Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002), the prescribed
penalty of which is also imprisonment for a term
of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty
(20) years? Why or why not?
A: No. My answer will not be the same because
violations of R.A. 9165 are mala prohibita in which
mitigating and aggravating circumstances are not
appreciated. Although in People v. Simon (G.R. No. 93028,
July 29, 1994), it was held that Art. 64 can be applied if
the special law adopted the nomenclature of penalties
provided under the RPC, such pronouncement cannot be
applied in the instant case because the penalties for
illegal possession of drugs under R.A. 9165 do not follow
the technical nomenclature of penalties in the RPC and
thus, cannot be divided into periods. Hence, the
existence of mitigating and aggravating circumstances
cannot be appreciated.
Q: Macky, a security guard, arrived home late one
night after rendering overtime. He was shocked to
see Joy, his wife, and Ken, his best friend in the act of
having sexual intercourse. Macky pulled out his
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
service gun and shot and killed Ken. The court found
that Ken died under exceptional circumstances and
exonerated Macky of murder but sentenced him to
destierro, conformably with Article 247 of the
Revised Penal Code. The court also ordered Macky
to pay indemnity to the heirs of the victim in the
amount of P50,000. While serving his sentence,
Macky entered the prohibited area and had a pot
session with Ivy (Joys sister). Is Macky entitled to an
indeterminate sentence in case he is found guilty of
the use of prohibited substances? Explain your
answer. (2007)
A: No, Macky is not entitled to the benefit of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law (R.A. 4103, as amended)
for having evaded the sentence which banished or
placed him on destierrro. Sec. 2 of the said law expressly
provides that the law shall not apply to those who shall
have "evaded sentence".
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
No, because the penalty for use of any dangerous drug
by a first offender is not imprisonment but
rehabilitation in a government center for a minimum
period of six (6) months (Sec. 15, R.A. 9165). The
Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply when the
penalty is imprisonment not exceeding one year.
Q: Homer was convicted of homicide. The trial court
appreciated the following modifying circumstances:
the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, and the
mitigating circumstances of passion and
obfuscation, no intent to commit so grave a wrong,
illiteracy and voluntary surrender. The imposable
penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal the range
of which is twelve (12) years and one (1) day to
twenty (20) years. Taking into account the attendant
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
determine the proper penalty to be imposed on the
accused. (1997)
A: It appears that there is one aggravating circumstance
(nocturnity), and four mitigating circumstances (passion
and obfuscation, no intent to commit so grave a wrong
as that committed and voluntary surrender). Par. 4, Art.
64 should be applied. Hence there will be off-setting of
modifying circumstances, which will now result in the
excess of three mitigating circumstances. This will
therefore justify in reducing the penalty to the minimum
period. The existence of an aggravating circumstance,
albeit there are four aggravating, will not justify the
lowering of the penalty to the next lower degree under
par. 5 of said Article, as this is applicable only if there is
no aggravating circumstance present. Since the crime
committed is Homicide and the penalty therefor is
reclusion temporal, the MAXIMUM sentence under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law should be the minimum of
the penalty, which is 12 years and 1 day to 14 years and
8 months. The MINIMUM penalty will thus be the
penalty next lower in degree, which is prision mayor in
its full extent (6 years and 1 day to 12 years). Ergo, the
proper penalty would be 6 years and 1 day, as minimum,
to 12 years and 1 day, as maximum. I believe that
because of the remaining mitigating circumstances after
the off-setting it would be very logical to impose the
minimum of the MINIMUM sentence under the ISL and
the minimum of the MAXIMUM sentence.
25
TEAM BAROPS
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016
 QuAMTO for CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
Q: Assume in the preceding problem that there were
two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating
circumstance. Impose the proper prison penalty.
A: There being two (2) mitigating circumstances without
any aggravating circumstance, the proper prison penalty
is arresto mayor (in any of its periods, ie. ranging from
one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months) as
MINIMUM to prision correccional in its maximum
period four (4) years, two (2) months, and one (1) day to
six (6) years as MAXIMUM. Under Art. 64, par. 5 of the
Revised Penal Code, when a penalty contains three
periods, each one of which forms a period in accordance
with Art. 76 and 77 of the same Code, and there are two
or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating
circumstances, the penalty next lower in degree should
be imposed. For purposes of the ISL, the penalty next
lower in degree should be determined without
regard as to whether the basic penalty provided by
the RPC should be applied in its maximum or
minimum period as circumstances modifying liability
may require. The penalty next lower in degree to
prision correccional. Therefore, as previously stated, the
minimum should be within the range of arresto mayor
and the maximum is within the range of prision
correctional in its maximum period.
Q: A and B pleaded guilty to the crime of parricide.
The court found three mitigating circumstances,
namely, plea of guilty, lack of instruction and lack of
intent to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed. The prescribed penalty for parricide is
reclusion perpetua to death. Impose the proper
principal penalty. (1997)
A: The proper penalty is reclusion perpetua. Even if
there are two or more mitigating circumstances, a court
cannot lower the penalty by one degree (Art. 63[3], RPC;
People v. Formigones, G.R. No. L-3246, November 29,
1950). In U.S. v. Relador 60 Phil. 593, where the crime
committed was parricide with the two (2) mitigating
circumstances of illiteracy and lack of intention to
commit so grave a wrong, and with no aggravating
circumstance, the Supreme Court held that the
proper, penalty to be imposed is reclusion perpetua.
When penalty is imposed by Special Penal Law
Q: Harold was convicted of a crime defined and
penalized by a special penal law where the
imposable penalty is from 6 months, as minimum, to
3 years, as maximum. State with reasons whether
the court may correctly impose the following
penalties: (2005)
a. a straight penalty of 10 months;
A: Yes, because the penalty is less than one year, a
straight penalty may be imposed (People v. Arellano, G.R.
No. 46501, October 5, 1939).
b. 6 months, as minimum, to 11 months, as
maximum;
A: No, because Indeterminate Sentence Law does not
apply when the penalty imposed is less than one year
(R.A. 4103, Sec. 2).
c. a straight penalty of 2 years.
*QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as suggested by UPLC and other distinct
luminaries in the academe, and updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the 2016 Bar Exams.
A: No, because the Indeterminate Sentence Law will
apply when the minimum of the penalty exceeds one
year.
Q: A was convicted of illegal possession of grease
guns and two Thompson sub-machine guns
punishable under the old law (R.A. No. 4) with
imprisonment of from five (5) to ten (10) years. The
trial court sentenced the accused to suffer
imprisonment of five (5) years and one (1) day. Is
the penalty thus imposed correct? Explain. (1999)
A: The penalty imposed, being only a straight penalty, is
not correct because it does not comply with the
Indeterminate Sentence Law which applies to this case.
Said law requires that if the offense is punished by any
law other than the RPC, the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum
term of which shall not exceed the maximum penalty
fixed by the law and the minimum shall not be less than
the minimum penalty prescribed by the same.
Q: Itos was convicted of an offense penalized by a
special law. The penalty prescribed is not less than
six years but not more than twelve years. No
modifying circumstance attended the commission of
the crime. If you were the judge, will you apply the
Indeterminate Sentence Law? If so, how will you
apply it? (1999, 1994)
A: If I were the judge, I will apply the provisions of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, as the last sentence of
Section 1 Act 4103, specifically provides the application
thereof for violations of special laws. Under the same
provision, the minimum must not be less than the
minimum provided therein (six years and one day) and
the maximum shall not be more than the maximum
provided therein, i.e. twelve years.
Three- fold Rule
Q: Roman and Wendy are neighbors. On Valentine's
Day, without prior notice, Roman visited Wendy at
her condo to invite her to dinner, but Wendy turned
him down and abruptly left, leaving her condo door
unlocked. Roman attempted to follow, but appeared
to have second thoughts; he simply went back to
Wendy's condo, let himself in, and waited for her
return. On Wendy's arrival later that evening,
Roman grabbed her from behind and, with a knife in
hand, forced her to undress. Wendy had no choice
but to comply. Roman then tied Wendy's hands to
her bed and sexually assaulted her five (5) times
that night. Roman was charged with, and was
convicted of, five (5) counts of rape, but the judge
did not impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua for
each count. Instead, the judge sentenced Roman to
40 years of imprisonment on the basis of the three-
fold rule. Was the judge correct? (2013)
A: No, the three-fold rule is applicable only in
connection with the service of the sentence not in the
imposition of the proper penalties. The court must
impose all penalties for all the crimes for which the
accused have been found guilty. Thus, the court should
not make a computation in it decision and sentence the
accused to not more than the three-fold of the most
severe of the penalties imposable. The computation
under the three-fold rule is for the prison authorities to
26
make.
 QUAMTO FOR CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
Subsidiary Imprisonment
Q: E and M are convicted of a penal law that imposes
a penalty of fine or imprisonment or both fine and
imprisonment. The judge sentenced them to pay the
fine, jointly and severally, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. Is the penalty
proper? Explain. (2005)
A: The penalty is not proper. The two accused must
separately pay the fine, which is their penalty. Solidary
liability applies only to civil liabilities.
Q: May the judge impose an alternative penalty of
fine or imprisonment? Explain.
A: No. A fine, whether imposed as a single or as an
alternative penalty, should not and cannot be reduced or
converted into a prison term. There is no rule for
transmutation of the amount of a fine into a term of
imprisonment (People v. Dacuycuy, G.R. No. L-45127, May
5, 1989).
EXECUTION AND SERVICE
Probation Law
(P.D. 968, as amended by R.A. 10707)
Q: Matt was found guilty of drug trafficking while his
younger brother Jeff was found guilty of possession
of equipment, instrument, apparatus and other
paraphernalia for dangerous drugs under Section 12
of Republic Act No. 9165. Matt filed a petition for
probation. Jeff appealed his conviction during the
pendency of which he also filed a petition for
probation. The brothers counsel argued that they
being first time offenders, their petitions for
probation should be granted. How would you
resolve the brothers petitions for probation?
Explain. (2010)
A: The brothers petition for probation should both be
denied. Matts petition for probation shall be denied
because he was convicted for drug-trafficking. Section
24 of RA 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drug Act of
2002) expressly provides, Any person convicted for
drug trafficking or pushing under this Act, regardless of
the penalty imposed by the court, cannot avail of the
privilege granted by the Probation Law or Presidential
Decree No. 968, as amended. On the other hand, Jeffs
application for probation cannot also be entertained or
granted because he has already appealed his conviction
by the trial court (P.D. 968, as amended, Sec. 4).
Q: Maganda was charged with violation of the
Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. 22) punishable by
imprisonment of not less than 30 days but not more
than 1 year or a fine of not less than but not more
than double the amount of the check, which fine
shall not exceed P200,000.00, or both. The court
convicted her of the crime and sentenced her to
pay a fine of P50,000.00 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay
the private complainant the amount of the check.
Maganda was unable to pay the fine but filed a
petition for probation. The court granted the
petition subject to the condition, among others, that
she should not change her residence without the
courts prior approval. (2005)
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
a. What is the proper period of probation?
A: The period of probation shall not be less than the
total number of days of subsidiary imprisonment or
more than twice the said number of days as computed at
the rate established under the Revised Penal Code,
which is one (1) day imprisonment for every P8.00 fine
but not to exceed six (6) months. (P.D. 968, Sec. 14[b]
(establishing a Probation System) in correlation with
Art. 39, RPC)
b. Supposing before the Order of Discharge was
issued by the court but after the lapse of the
period of probation, Maganda transferred
residence without prior approval of the court.
May the court revoke the Order of Probation and
order her to serve the subsidiary imprisonment?
Explain.
A: Yes. The Court may revoke her probation. Probation
is not coterminous with its period. There must first be
issued by the court an order of final discharge based on
the report and recommendation of the probation officer.
Only then can the case of the probationer be terminated.
Q: PX was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment
of thirty days and a fine of one hundred pesos.
Previously, PX was convicted of another crime for
which the penalty imposed on him was thirty days
only. Is PX entitled to probation? Explain briefly.
(2004)
A: Yes, PX may apply for probation. His previous
conviction for another crime with a penalty of thirty
days imprisonment or not exceeding one (1) month does
not disqualify him from applying for probation; the
penalty for his present conviction does not disqualify
him either from applying for probation, since the
imprisonment does not exceed six (6) years (P.D. 968,
Sec. 9).
Q: Juan was convicted of the Regional Trial Court of a
crime and sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for a minimum of eight years. He
appealed both his conviction and the penalty
imposed upon him to the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court ultimately sustained Juan's
conviction but reduced his sentence to a maximum
of four years and eight months imprisonment. Could
Juan forthwith file an application for probation?
Explain. (2003, 2002, 2001, 1995, 1992)
A: No, Juan can no longer avail of the probation because
he appealed from the judgment of conviction of the trial
court. Sec. 4 of the Probation Law mandates that no
application for probation shall be entertained or granted
if the accused has perfected an appeal from the
judgment of conviction.
Q: A was charged with homicide. After trial, he was
found guilty and sentenced to six (6) years and one
(1) day in prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve
(12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. Prior to his conviction, he had been found
guilty of vagrancy and imprisoned for ten (10) days
of arresto manor and fined fifty pesos (P50.00). Is he
eligible for probation? Why? (2002)
27
TEAM BAROPS
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016
 QuAMTO for CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
A: No, he is not entitled to the benefits of the Probation
Law (P.D. 968, as amended) does not extend to those
sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of
more than six years (Sec. 9[a]). It is of no moment that in
his previous conviction A was given a penalty of only ten
(10) days of arresto mayor and a fine of P50.00.
REPEATED DOCTRINE
Q: May a probationer appeal from the decision
revoking the grant of probation or modifying the
terms and conditions thereof? (2002)
A: No. Under Section 4 of the Probation Law, as
amended, an order granting or denying probation is not
appealable.
Q: The accused was found guilty of grave oral
defamation in sixteen (16) information which were
tried jointly and was sentenced in one decision to
suffer in each case a prison term of one (1) year and
one (1) day to one (1) year and eight (8) months of
prision correccional. Within the period to appeal, he
filed an application for probation under the
Probation Law of 1976, as amended. Could he
possibly qualify for probation? (1997)
A: Yes. In Francisco v. CA, (G.R. No. 108747, April 6, 1995)
the Supreme Court held that in case of one decision
imposing multiple prison terms, the totality of the
prison terms should not be taken into account for the
purposes of determining the eligibility of the accused
for the probation. The law uses the word "maximum
term", and not total term. It is enough that each of the
prison terms does not exceed six years. The number of
offenses is immaterial for as long as the penalties
imposed, when taken individually and separately, are
within the probationable period.
Q: On February 3, 1986, Roberto was convicted of
arson through reckless imprudence and sentenced
to pay a fine of P15,000.00, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency by the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City. On February 10, 1986, he
appealed to the Court of Appeals. Several months
later, he filed a motion to withdraw the appeal on
the ground that he is applying for probation. On
May 7, 1987, the Court of Appeals granted the
motion and considered the appeal withdrawn. On
June 10, 1987, the records of the case were
remanded to the trial court. Roberto filed a "Motion
for Probation" praying that execution of his
sentence be suspended, and that a probation officer
be ordered to conduct an Investigation and to
submit a report on his probation. The judge denied
the motion on the ground that pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 1990, which took effect on
July 16, 1986, no application for probation shall be
entertained or granted if the defendant has
perfected an appeal from the judgment of
conviction. Is the denial of Roberto's motion
correct? (1994)
A: Yes. Eventhough Roberto was qualified for probation
at the time of his conviction, he is, nevertheless not
qualified at the time he filed the application, thus he is
no longer entitled to probation. The qualification for
probation must be determined as of the time the
application is filed in Court.
*QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as suggested by UPLC and other distinct
luminaries in the academe, and updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the 2016 Bar Exams.
Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (R.A. No.
9344); also refer to Child and Youth Welfare Code
(P.D. 603, as amended)
Q: Michael was 17 years old when he was charged
for violation of Sec. 5 of R.A. 9165 (illegal sale of
prohibited drug). By the time he was convicted and
sentenced, he was already 21 years old. The court
sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years
and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, and a fine of P500,000. Michael applied
for probation but his application was denied
because the probation law does not apply to drug
offenders under R.A. 9165. Michael then sought the
suspension of his sentence under R.A. 9344 or the
Juvenile Justice and Youth Welfare Code. Can
Michael avail of the suspension of his sentence
provided under this law? (2013)
A: The benefits of a suspended sentence can no longer
apply to Michael. The suspension of sentence lasts only
until the law reaches the maximum age and thus, could
no longer be considered a child for purposes of applying
R.A. 9344. However, he shall be entitled to the right of
restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration in
accordance with the law to give him the chance to live a
normal life and become a productive member of the
community. Accordingly, Michael may be confined in an
agricultural camp and other training facility in
accordance with Sec. 51 of R.A. 9344 (People v. Jacinto,
G.R. No. 182239, March 16, 2011).
Q: Joe was 17 years old when he committed
homicide in 2005. The crime is punishable
by reclusion temporal. After two years in hiding, he
was arrested and appropriately charged in May
2007. Since Republic Act 9344 (Juvenile Justice and
Welfare Act of 2006) was already in effect, Joe
moved to avail of the process of intervention or
diversion. (2009, 2003)
a. What is intervention or diversion? Is Joe entitled
to intervention or diversion? Explain.
A: Intervention refers to a series of activities which are
designed to address issues that caused the child to
commit an offense. It may take the form of an
individualized treatment program which may include
counselling, skills training, education, and other
activities that will enhance his/her psychological,
emotional and psycho-social well-being. This is available
to a child 15 years old or less at the time of the
commission of the crime or although over 15 but below
18 years old at the time of commission of the crime, the
child acted without discernment. Diversion refers to
an alternative, child-appropriate process of determining
the responsibility and treatment of a child conflict with
the law on the basis of his/her social, cultural, economic,
psychological or educational background without
resorting to formal court proceedings. This process
governs when the child is over 15 years old but below
18 at the time of the commission of the crime and he
acted with discernment.
Yes. Joe is entitled to diversion. Being only 17 years old
at the time he committed the crime of homicide, he is
treated as a child in conflict with the law under R.A.
28
9344.
 QUAMTO FOR CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
b. Suppose Joes motion for intervention or
diversion was denied, and he was convicted two
(2) years later when Joe was already 21 years
old, should the judge apply the suspension of
sentence? Explain.
A: No. The Judge should not suspend sentence anymore
because Joe was already 21 years old and no longer a
minor at the time of promulgation of the sentence.
For purposes of suspension of sentence, the offender's
age at the time of promulgation of the sentence is the
one considered, not his age when he committed the
crime. Suspension of sentence is availing under R.A.
9344 only until a child reaches the maximum age of
twenty-one (21) years.
c. Suppose Joe was convicted of attempted murder
with a special aggravating circumstance and was
denied suspension of sentence, would he be
eligible for probation under Presidential Decree
(PD) 968, considering that the death penalty is
imposable for the consummated felony? Explain.
A: Yes. He would be eligible for probation because the
penalty imposable on Joe will not exceed 6 years
imprisonment. Even if it would be considered that the
crime committed was punishable by death, the penalty
as far as Joe is concerned can only be reclusion perpetua
because R.A. 9344 forbids the imposition of the capital
punishment upon offenders thereunder. The murder
being attempted only, the prescribed penalty is two
degrees lower than reclusion perpetua; hence, prision
mayor. Because Joe was 17 years old when he
committed the crime, the penalty of prision mayor
should be lowered further by one degree because his
minority is a privileged mitigating circumstance; hence,
prision correctional or imprisonment within the range of
six months and 1 day to 6 years is imposable.
Q: There are at least 7 instances or situations in
criminal cases wherein the accused, either as an
adult or as a minor, can apply for and/or be granted
a suspended sentence. Enumerate at least 5 of them.
(2006)
A: Instances when sentence may be suspended are:
1. where the accused became insane before sentence
could be promulgated (Art. 79, RPC);
2. where the offender, upon conviction by the trial
court, filed an application for probation which has
been granted (Baclayon v. Mutia, G.R. No. L-59298
April 30, 1984);
3. where the offender needs to be confined in a
rehabilitation center because of drug-dependency
although convicted of the crime charged;
4. where the offender is a youthful offender under Art.
192, PD 603, otherwise referred to as the Child and
Youth Welfare Code; and where the, crime was
committed when the offender is under 18 years of
age and he is found guilty thereof in accordance
with Rep. Act 9344, otherwise known as the
"Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006", but the
trial court subjects him to appropriate disposition
measures prescribed by the Supreme Court in the
Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law;
5. the death sentence shall be suspended upon a
woman while she is pregnant or within one year
after delivery. (Art. 83, Revised Penal Code);
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
6. Suspension of Sentence of a first-time minor
offender under Section 66 of RA 9165
(Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002);
7. When the sentence is death, its execution may be
suspended or postponed by the Supreme Court,
through the issuance of a RO upon the ground of
supervening events (Echegaray v. Secretary of
Justice, G.R. No. 132601, January 19, 1999).
REPEATED DOCTRINE
Q: A was 2 months below 18 years of age when
he committed the crime. He was charged with the
crime 3 months later. He was 23 when he was finally
convicted and sentenced. Instead of preparing to
serve a jail term, he sought a suspension of the
sentence on the ground that he was a juvenile
offender. Should he be entitled to a suspension of
sentence? Reasons. (2003)
A: No, A is not entitled to a suspension of the sentence
because he is no longer a minor at the time of
promulgation of the sentence. For purposes of
suspension of sentence, the offender's age at the time of
promulgation of the sentence is the one considered, not
his age when he committed the crime. So although A was
below 18 years old when he committed the crime, but he
was already 23 years old when sentenced, he is no
longer eligible for suspension of the sentence.
Q: Can juvenile offenders, who are recidivists,
validly ask for suspension of sentence? Explain.
(2003)
A: Yes, so long as the offender is still a minor at the time
of the promulgation of the sentence. The law
establishing Family Courts, Rep. Act 8369, provides to
this effect: that if the minor is found guilty, the court
should promulgate the sentence and ascertain any civil
liability which the accused may have incurred. However,
the sentence shall be suspended without the need of
application pursuant to PD 603, otherwise known as the
Child and Youth Welfare Code (RA 8369, Sec. 5a). It is
under PD 603 that an application for suspension of the
sentence is required and thereunder it is one of the
conditions for suspension of sentence that the offender
be a first time convict: this has been displaced by RA
8369.
MODIFICATION AND EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL
LIABILITY
Extinction by Death
Q: The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Tiburcio
guilty of frustrated homicide and sentenced him to
an indeterminate penalty of four years and one day
of prision correccional as minimum, to eight years
ofprision mayor as maximum, and ordered him to
pay actual damages in the amount of 1125,000.00.
Tiburcio appealed to the Court of Appeals which
sustained his conviction as well as the penalty
imposed by the court a quo. After sixty days, the
Court of Appeals issued an Entry of Judgment and
remanded the records of the case to the RTC. Three
days thereafter, Tiburcio died of heart attack. Atty.
Abdul, Tiburcio's counsel, filed before the RTC a
Manifestation with Motion to Dismiss, informing the
court that Tiburcio died already, and claiming that
his criminal liability had been extinguished by his
29
demise. (2015)
TEAM BAROPS
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016
 QuAMTO for CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
a. Should the RTC grant the Motion to Dismiss the
case? Explain.
A: The RTC may not grant the motion to dismiss because
the Court of Appeals, having issued an Entry of
Judgment, the decision has become final and executory.
However, the pecuniary penalty, such as the civil
liability arising from the crime consisting of actual
damages of P25,000 survives the death of Tiburcio.
b. Assuming that Tiburcio's death occurred before
the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, will
you give a different answer?
A: Yes. The RTC decision must be set aside and the case
against Tiburcio must consequently be dismissed. The
demise of Tiburcio which occurred before the Court of
Appeals rendered its decision causes his criminal
liability, as well as his civil liability ex delicto, to be
totally extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a
defendant to stand as the accused, the civil action is
instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto
is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on criminal
case.
PRESCRIPTION OF CRIME
Q: A killed his wife and buried her in their backyard.
He immediately went into hiding in the mountains.
Three years later, the bones of As wife were
discovered by X, the gardener. Since X had a
standing warrant of arrest, he hid the bones in an
old clay jar and kept quiet about it. After two years,
Z, the caretaker, found the bones and reported the
matter to the police. After 15 years of hiding, A left
the country but returned three years later to take
care of his ailing sibling. Six years thereafter, he was
charged with parricide but raised the defense of
prescription. (2010, 2009, 2004, 2000).
a. Under the Revised Penal Code, when does the
period of prescription of a crime commence to
run?
A: Generally, the period of prescription of a crime
commences to run for the date it was committed; but if
the crime was committed clandestinely, the period of
prescription of the crimes under the RPC commence to
run from the day on which the crime was discovered
(the discovery rule) by the offended party, the
authorities or their agents (Art. 91, RPC).
b. When is it interrupted?
A: The running of the prescriptive period of the crime is
interrupted when any kind of investigative proceedings
is instituted against the guilty person which may
ultimately lead to his prosecution (Panaguiton, Jr. v.
DOJ, G.R. No. 167571, November 25, 2008).
c. Is As defense tenable? Explain.
A: No, the defense of prescription of the crime is not
tenable. The crime committed is parricide which
prescribes in twenty (20) years (Art. 90, RPC). It was
only when the caretaker, Z, found the victims bones and
reported the matter to the police that the crime is
deemed legally discovered by the authorities or their
agents and thus the prescriptive period of the crime
*QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as suggested by UPLC and other distinct
luminaries in the academe, and updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the 2016 Bar Exams.
commenced to run. When A left the country and
returned only after three (3) years, the running of the
prescriptive period of the crime is interrupted and
suspended because prescription shall not run when the
offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago (Art.
91, RPC). Since A had been in hiding for 15 years after
the commission of the crime and the prescriptive period
starting running only after 5 years from such
commission when the crime was discovered, only 10
years lapsed and 3 years thereof should be deducted
when the prescriptive period was interrupted and
suspended. Hence, the 3 years when A was out of the
Philippines should be deducted from the 10 years after
the prescription starts running. Adding the 7 years of
prescription and the 6 years that lapsed before the case
was filed, only a total of thirteen (13) years of the
prescriptive period had lapsed. Hence, the crime has not
yet prescribed.
Q: On June 1, 1988, a complaint for concubinage
committed in February 1987 was filed against
Roberto in the Municipal Trial Court of Tanza, Cavite
for purposes of preliminary investigation. For
various reasons, it was only on July 3, 1998 when the
Judge of said court decided the case by dismissing it
for lack of jurisdiction since the crime was
committed in Manila. The case was subsequently
filed with the City Fiscal of Manila but it was
dismissed on the ground that the crime had already
prescribed. The law provides that the crime of
concubinage prescribes in ten (10) years. Was the
dismissal by the fiscal correct? Explain. (2001)
A: No, the Fiscal's dismissal of the case on alleged
prescription is not correct. The filing of the complaint
with the Municipal Trial Court, although only for
preliminary investigation, interrupted and suspended
the period of prescription in as much as the jurisdiction
of a court in a criminal case is determined by the
allegations in the complaint or information, not by the
result of proof (People v. Galano, G.R. No. L-42925,
January 31, 1977).
Q: A was charged in an Information with the crime of
grave oral defamation but after trial, the court found
him guilty only of the offense of simple slander. He
filed a motion for reconsideration contending that,
under the law, the crime of simple slander would
have prescribed in two months from commission,
and since the information against him was filed
more than four months after the alleged commission
of the crime, the same had already prescribed. The
Solicitor General opposed the motion on two
grounds: first, in determining the prescriptive
period, the nature of the offense charged in the
Information should be considered, not the crime
proved; second, assuming that the offense had
already prescribed, the defense was waived by the
failure of A to raise it in a motion to quash. Resolve
the motion for reconsideration. (1997)
A: The motion for reconsideration should be granted.
a. The accused cannot be convicted of the offense of
simple slander although it is necessarily included in
the offense of grave slander charged in the
information, because, the lesser offense had already
prescribed at the time the information was filed;
otherwise prosecutors can easily circumvent the
rule of prescription in light offenses by the
30
 QUAMTO FOR CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
simple expediment of filing a graver offense which
includes such light offense.
b. b. While the general rule is the failure of an accused
to file a motion to quash before he pleads to the
complaint or information, shall be deemed a waiver
of the grounds of a motion to quash, the exceptions
to this are: (1) no offense was charged in the
complaint or information; (2) lack of Jurisdiction;
(3) extinction of the offense or penalty; and (4)
double jeopardy. Since the ground invoked by the
accused in his motion for reconsideration is
extinction of the offense, then it can be raised even
after plea. In fact, it may even be invoked on appeal
(People v. Balagtas, G.R. No. 46413, October 6, 1939)
Q: Joe and Marcy were married in Batanes in 1955.
After two years, Joe left Marcy and settled in
Mindanao where he later met and married Linda on
12 June 1960. The second marriage was registered
in the civil registry of Davao City three days after its
celebration. On 10 October 1975 Marcy who
remained in Batanes discovered the marriage of
Joe to Linda. On 1 March 1976 Marcy filed a
complaint for bigamy against Joe. The crime of
bigamy prescribed in fifteen years computed from
the day the crime is discovered by the offended
party, the authorities or their agents. Joe raised the
defense of prescription of the crime, more than
fifteen years having elapsed from the celebration of
the bigamous marriage up to the filing of Marcy's
complaint. He contended that the registration of
his second marriage in the civil registry of Davao
City was constructive notice to the whole world of
the celebration thereof thus binding upon Marcy.
Has the crime of bigamy charged against Joe already
prescribed? Discuss fully. (1995)
A: No. The prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy is
computed from the time the crime was discovered by
the offended party, the authorities or their agents. The
principle of constructive notice which ordinarily applies
to land or property disputes should not be applied to the
crime of bigamy, as marriage is not property. Thus,
when Marcy filed a complaint for bigamy on 7 March
1976, it was well within the reglamentary period as it
was barely a few months from the time of discovery on
10 October 1975 (Sermonia v. CA, G.R. No. 109454, June
14, 1994).
Q: B imitated the signature of A, registered owner of
a lot, in special power of attorney naming him (B) as
the attorney- in-fact of A. On February 13, 1964, B
mortgaged the lot to a bank using the special power
of attorney to obtain a loan of P8,500.00. On the
same day, both the special power of attorney and the
mortgage contract were duly registered in the
Registry of Deeds. Because of Bs failure to pay, the
bank foreclosed the mortgage and the lot was sold to
X in whose name a new title was issued. In March
1974, A discovered that the property was already
registered in the name of X because of an ejectment
case filed against him by X. (1993)
a. If you were the lawyer of A, with what crime or
crimes would you charge B? Explain.
A: The crime committed is estafa thru falsification of
public document.
b. If you were the counsel of B. what would be your
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
defense? Discuss.
A: My defense will be prescription because the crime
was committed in 1964 and almost twenty nine years
had already elapsed since then. Even if we take
Falsification and Estafa individually, they have already
prescribed. It is to be noted that when it comes to
discovery, the fact that the crime was discovered in
1964 will be of no moment because the offended party is
considered to have constructive notice on the forgery
after the Deed of Sale where his signature had been
falsified was registered in the office of the Register of
Deeds (Cabral v. Puno, G.R. No. L-41692, April 30, 1976).
PRESCRIPTION OF PENALTIES
Q: Taylor was convicted of a violation of the Election
Code, and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of
one year as minimum, to three years as maximum.
The decision of the trial court was affirmed on
appeal and became final and executory. Taylor
failed to appear when summoned for execution of
judgment, prompting the judge to issue an order for
his arrest. Taylor was able to use the backdoor and
left for the United States. Fifteen years later, Taylor
returned to the Philippines and filed a Motion to
Quash the warrant of arrest against him, on the
ground that the penalty imposed against him had
already prescribed. (2015)
a. If you were the judge, would you grant Taylor's
Motion to Quash? Explain.
A: If I were the judge, I will deny the motion to quash.
Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code provides when the
prescription of penalties shall commence to run. Under
said provision, it shall commence to run from the date
the felon evades the service of his sentence. Pursuant to
Article 157 of the same Code, evasion of service of
sentence can be committed only by those who have been
convicted by final judgment by escaping during the term
of his sentence. Taylor never served a single minute of
his sentence, and thus, prescription never started to run
in his favor. Clearly, one who has not been committed to
prison cannot be said to have escaped therefrom ( Del
Castillo v. Torrecampo, G.R. No. 139033, December 18,
2002).
b. Assuming that instead of the United States,
Taylor was able to go to another country with
which the Philippines had no extradition treaty,
will your answer be the same? Explain.
A: Even if Taylor was able to go to another country
which the Philippines had no extradition treaty, I will
deny the motion to quash. Going to a foreign country
with which this Government has no extradition treaty to
interrupt the running of prescription is not applicable
nor even material because the period of prescription is
not applicable nor even material because the period of
prescription had not commenced to run in the first
place; hence, there is nothing to interrupt.
PARDON BY THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE
Q: Senator Adamos was convicted of plunder. About
one year after beginning to serve his sentence, the
President of the Philippines granted him absolute
pardon. The signed pardon states: "In view hereof,
31
and in pursuance of the authority vested upon me by
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 QuAMTO for CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
the Constitution, I hereby grant absolute pardon
unto Adamos, who was convicted of plunder in
Criminal Case No. XV32 and upon whom the penalty
of reclusion perpetua was imposed." He now comes
to you for advice. He wants to know if he could run
for senator in the next election. (2015)
b. What advice will you give Adamos? Explain.
If I were the counsel of Senator Adamos, I will give him
the advice that he cannot run in the Senatorial race since
the terms of the pardon has not expressly restored his
right to hold public office or remitted the accessory
penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification. Under
Article 36 of the Revised Penal Code, a pardon shall not
work the restoration of the right to hold public office
unless such right be expressly restored by terms of the
pardon. Under Article 41, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua shall carry with it perpetual absolute
disqualification which the offender shall suffer even
though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the
same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon
(Risos-Vidal v. Lim, G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015).
d. Assuming that what Adamos committed was
heading a rebellion for which he was imposed
the same penalty of reclusion perpetua, and what
he received was amnesty from the government,
will your answer be the same? Explain.
If Senator Adamos was convicted of rebellion and he
received amnesty, I will give him the advice that he can
run in the Senatorial race. Under Article 89 of the
Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is totally
extinguished by amnesty, which completely extinguishes
the penalty and all its effects. Thus, the amnesty
extinguishes not only the principal penalty of reclusion
perpetua but also its effects such as the accessory
penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification. Amnesty
looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the
offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense
with which he is charged, so that the person released by
amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he
had committed no offense (Barrioquinto v. Fernandez,
G.R. No. L-1278, January 21, 1949).
Q: TRY was sentenced to death by final judgment.
But subsequently he was granted pardon by the
President. The pardon was silent on the perpetual
disqualification of TRY to hold any public office.
After his pardon, TRY ran for office as Mayor of APP,
his hometown. His opponent sought to disqualify
him. TRY contended he is not disqualified because
he was already pardoned by the President
unconditionally. Is TRY'S contention correct?
Reason briefly. (2004)
A: No, TRY's contention is not correct. Art. 40 of the RPC
expressly provides that when the death penalty is not
executed by reason of commutation or pardon, the
accessory penalties of perpetual absolute
disqualification and civil interdiction during thirty (30)
years from the date of the sentence shall remain as
effects thereof, unless such accessory penalties have
been expressly remitted in the pardon. This is because
pardon only excuses the convict from serving the
sentence but does not relieve him of the effects of the
conviction unless expressly remitted in the pardon.
*QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as suggested by UPLC and other distinct
luminaries in the academe, and updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the 2016 Bar Exams.
Q: Linda was convicted by the Sandiganbayan of
estafa, through falsification of public document. She
was sentenced accordingly and ordered to pay,
among others, P5,000.00 representing the balance
of the amount defrauded. The case reached the
Supreme Court which affirmed the judgment of
conviction. During the pendency of Linda's motion
for reconsideration in the said Court, the President
extended to her an absolute pardon which she
accepted. By reason of such pardon, she wrote the
Department of Finance requesting that she be
restored to her former post as assistant treasurer,
which is still vacant. The Department ruled that
Linda may be reinstated to her former position
without the necessity of a new appointment and
directed the City Treasurer to see to it that the sum
of P5,000.00 be satisfied. Claiming that she should
not be made to pay P5,000.00, Linda appealed to the
Office of the President. The Office of the President
dismissed the appeal and held that acquittal, not
absolute pardon. Is the only ground for
reinstatement to one's former position and that the
absolute pardon does not exempt the culprit from
payment of civil liability. Is Linda entitled to
reinstatement? (1994)
A: No, Linda is not entitled to reinstatement to her
former position inasmuch as her right thereto had been
relinquished or forfeited by reason of her conviction.
The absolute pardon merely extinguished her criminal
liability, removed her disqualification, and restored her
eligibility for appointment to that office. She has to re-
apply for such position and under the usual procedure
required for a new appointment. Moreover, the pardon
does not extinguish the civil liability arising from the
crime (Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr., February 9, 1989 (G.R.
No. 78239); see Art. 36, RPC).
AMNESTY
Q: Enumerate the differences between pardon and
amnesty. (2006)
A: The following are the differences between pardon
and amnesty:
In pardon:
The convict is excused from serving the sentence but the
effects of conviction remain unless expressly remitted
by the pardon; hence, for pardon to be valid there must
be a sentence already final and executory at the time the
same is granted. Moreover, the grant is in favor of
individual convicted offenders, not to a class of
convicted offenders; and the crimes subject of the grant
may be common crimes or political crimes. Finally, the
grant is a private act of the Chief Executive which does
not require the concurrence of any other public officer
or office.
In amnesty:
The criminal complexion of the act constituting the
crime is erased, as though such act was innocent when
committed; hence, the effects of the conviction are
obliterated. Amnesty is granted is in favor of a class of
convicted offenders, not to individual convicted
offenders; and the crimes involved are generally
political offenses, not common crimes. Amnesty is a
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 QUAMTO FOR CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
public act that requires the conformity or concurrence
of the Philippine Senate.
Q: Under Presidential Proclamation No. 724,
amending Presidential Proclamation No. 347,
certain crimes are covered by the grant of amnesty.
Name at least 5 of these crimes. (2006)
A: (1) Illegal assembly; (2) Alarms and scandal; (3)
Illegal association; (4) Disloyalty by public officers/
employees; and (5) Illegal possession of firearms.
Q: Antero Makabayan was convicted of the crime of
Rebellion. While serving sentence, he escaped from
jail. Captured, he was charged with, and convicted of
Evasion of Service of Sentence. Thereafter, the
President of the Philippines issued an amnesty
proclamation for the offense of Rebellion. Antero
applied for and was granted the benefit of the
amnesty proclamation. Antero then filed a petition
for habeas corpus, praying for his immediate release
from confinement. He claims that the amnesty
extends to the offense of evasion of Service of
Sentence. As judge, will you grant the petition?
Discuss fully. (2009)
A: Yes, I will grant the petition because the sentence that
was evaded proceeded from the crime of Rebellion
which has been obliterated by the grant of amnesty to
the offender (Art. 89[3], RPC). Since the amnesty erased
the criminal complexion of the act committed by the
offender as a crime of rebellion and rendered such act as
though innocent, the sentence lost its legal basis. The
purported evasion thereof therefore cannot subsist
(People v. Patriarca, G.R. No. 135457, September 29,
2000). Amnesty obliterates, not only the basis of
conviction, but also all the legal effects thereof.
Q: Can former DSWD Secretary Dinky Soliman apply
for amnesty? How about columnist Randy David?
(You are supposed to know the crimes or offenses
ascribed to them as published in almost all
newspapers for the past several months.) (2006)
A: Both Dinky Soliman and Randy David may apply for
amnesty because the crime respectively imputed to
them are crimes against public order which are among
the crimes covered by amnesty.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Proclamation 1160, which amended Proclamation 724,
applies only to offenses committed prior to 1999. Thus,
their applications shall be ineffectual and useless.
Q: General Lim and General Querubin of the Scout
Rangers and Philippine Marines, respectively, were
changed with conduct unbecoming an officer and a
gentleman under the Articles of War. Can they apply
for amnesty? (2006)
A: Yes. General Lim and General Querubin of the Scout
Rangers and Philippine Marines can apply for amnesty.
Violation of conduct unbecoming an officer and a
gentleman under Article 96 of the Articles of War is
explicitly enumerated in Section 1 of Presidential
Proclamation No. 724 as one of the crimes that are
covered by the grant of amnesty.
BOOK II
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
(ARTICLES 114-365, RPC) AND SPECIFICALLY
INCLUDED SPECIAL LAWS
CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY
(Arts. 114-123)
Piracy in General and Mutiny on the High Seas (Art.
122) and Qualified Piracy (Art. 123)
Q: The inter-island vessel M/V Viva Lines I, while
cruising off Batanes, was forced to seek shelter at
the harbor of Kaoshiung, Taiwan because of a strong
typhoon. While anchored in said harbor, Max, Baldo
and Bogart arrived in a speedboat, fired a bazooka
at the bow of the vessel, boarded it and divested the
passengers of their money and jewelry. A passenger
of M/V Viva Lines I, Dodong advantage of the
confusion to settle an old grudge with another
passenger, and killed him. After their apprehension,
all four were charged with qualified piracy before a
Philippine court. (2008)
a. Was the charge of qualified piracy against the
three person (Max, Badong and Bogart) who
boarded the inter-island vessel correct? Explain.
A: The charge is correct. Qualified Piracy was committed
when the offenders seized the vessels by firing on or
boarding the same. In the problem, they even went
further by divesting the passengers of their money and
jewelry. The vessel was anchored in the harbour of
Kaoshioung, Taiwan and it is submitted that the crime
was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of
another country. The Supreme Court has ruled that the
high seas contemplated under Art. 122 of the RPC
include the three-mile limit of any state (People v. Lol-lo,
G.R. No. 17958, February 27, 1922). Moreover, piracy is
an offense that can be tried anywhere because it is a
crime against the Law of Nations.
b. Was Dodong correctly charged before the
Philippine court for qualified piracy? Explain.
A: No, Dodong was not correctly charged with qualified
piracy because committing piracy was never in his mind
nor did he have any involvement in the piracy
committed. He merely took advantage of the situation in
killing the passenger. He should be charged with murder
since there was evident premeditation and intent to kill.
Q: While the S.S. Nagoya Maru was negotiating the
sea route from Hongkong towards Manila, and while
still 300 miles from Aparri, Cagayan, its engines
malfunctioned. The Captain ordered the ship to stop
for emergency repairs lasting for almost 15 hours.
Due to exhaustion, the officers and crew fell asleep.
While the ship was anchored, a motorboat manned
by renegade Ybanags from Claveria, Cagayan, passed
by and took advantage of the situation. They cut the
ship's engines and took away several heavy crates of
electrical equipment and loaded them in their
motorboat. Then they left hurriedly towards Aparri.
At daybreak, the crew found that a robbery took
place. They radioed the Aparri Port Authorities
resulting in the apprehension of the culprits. (2006)
A: Piracy in the high seas was committed by the
renegade Ybanags. The culprits, who are neither
members of the complement nor passengers of the ship,
33
seized part of the equipment of the vessel while it was
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 QuAMTO for CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
three hundred miles away from Aparri, Cagayan (Art.
122, RPC).
Q: Supposing that while the robbery was taking
place, the culprits stabbed a member of the crew
while sleeping. What crime was committed? Explain.
A: The crime committed is qualified piracy, because it
was accompanied by physical injuries/homicide. The
culprits stabbed a member of the crew while sleeping
(Art. 123, RPC).
Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery (P.D. 532)
Q: A postal van containing mail matters, including
checks and treasury warrants, was hijacked along a
national highway by ten (10) men, two (2) of whom
were armed. They used force, violence and
intimidation against three (3) postal employees who
were occupants of the van, resulting in the unlawful
taking and transportation of the entire van and its
contents. (2012)
a. If you were the public prosecutor, would you
charge the ten (10) men who hijacked the postal
van with violation of Presidential Decree No.
532, otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and
Anti -Highway Robbery Law of 1974? Explain
your answer.
A: No, I would not charge the 10 men with the crime of
highway robbery. The mere fact that the offense charged
was committed on a highway would not be the
determinant for the application of P.D. 532. If a motor
vehicle, either stationary or moving on a highway, is
forcibly taken at gun point by the accused who
happened to take a fancy thereto, the location of the
vehicle at the time of the unlawful taking would not
necessarily put the offense within the ambit of P.D. 532.
In this case, the crime committed is violation of the Anti-
Carnapping Act of 1972 (People v. Puno, G.R. No. 97471,
February 17, 1993). Moreover, there is no showing that
the 10 men were a band of outlaws organized for the
purpose of depredation upon the persons and
properties of innocent and defenseless inhabitants who
travel from one place to another. What was shown is one
isolated hijacking of a postal van. It was not stated in the
facts given that the 10 men previously attempted similar
robberies by them to establish indiscriminate
commission thereof (Filoteo Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
No. 79543, October 16, 1993).
b. If you were the defense counsel, what are the
elements of the crime of highway robbery that
the prosecution should prove to sustain a
conviction?
A: Under Section 2 of P.D. 532, highway robbery is
defined as the seizure of any person for ransom,
extortion or other unlawful purposes, or the taking away
of the property of another by means of violence against
or intimidation of person or force upon things or other
unlawful means, committed by any person on any
Philippine highway. Hence, the elements of highway
robbery are:
1. intent to gain;
2. unlawful taking of the property of another;
3. violence against or intimidation of any person;
4. committed on a Philippine highway
5. indiscrimate victim;
*QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as suggested by UPLC and other distinct
luminaries in the academe, and updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the 2016 Bar Exams.
To obtain a conviction for highway robbery, the
prosecution must prove that the accused were
organized for the purpose of committing robbery
indiscriminately. If the purpose is only particular
robbery, the crime is only robbery, or robbery in band if
there are at least four armed participants. (See People v.
Mendoza, G.R. No. 104461, February 23, 1996)
Q: Police Sgt. Diego Chan, being a member of the
Theft and Robbery Division of the Western Police
District and assigned to the South Harbor, Manila,
was privy to and more or less familiar with the
schedules, routes and hours of the movements of
container vans, as well as the mobile police
patrols, from the pier area to the different export
processing zones outside Metro Manila. From time
to time, he gave valuable and detailed information
on these matters to a group interested in those
shipments in said container vans. On several
instances, using the said information as their basis,
the gang hijacked and pilfered the contents of the
vans. Prior to their sale to "fences" in Banawe,
Quezon City and Bangkal, Makati City, the gang
Informs Sgt, Chan who then inspects the pilfered
goods, makes his choice of the valuable items and
disposes of them through his own sources or
"fences". When the highjackers were traced on one
occasion and arrested, upon custodial investigation,
they implicated Sgt. Chan and the fiscal charged
them all, including Sgt. Chan as co-principals. Sgt.
Chan, in his defense, claimed that he should not be
charged as a principal but only as an accessory after
the fact under P.D. 532, otherwise known as the
Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Act of 1972.
Is the contention of Sgt. Chan valid and tenable?
Explain. (2001)
A: No, the contention of Sgt. Chan is not valid or tenable
because by express provision of P.D. 532, Section 4, a
person who knowingly and in any manner, aids or
protects highway robbers/brigands, such as giving them
information about the movement of police officers or
acquires or receives property taken by brigands, or who
directly or indirectly abets the commission of highway
robbery/brigandage, shall be considered as accomplice
of the principal offenders and punished in accordance
with the rules in the RPC.
CRIMES AGAINST THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF THE
STATE (Articles 124-133)
Arbitrary Detention (Article 124)
Q: What are the 3 ways of committing arbitrary
detention? Explain each. What are the legal grounds
for detention? (2006)
A: The three (3) ways of committing arbitrary detention
are:
a. by detaining or locking up a person without any
legal cause or ground therefore purposely to
restrain his liberty (RPC, Art. 124);
b. by delaying delivery to the proper judicial authority
of a person lawfully arrested without a warrant
(RPC, Art. 125); and
c. by delaying release of a prisoner whose release has
been ordered by competent authority (RPC, Art.
126).
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 QUAMTO FOR CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
In all the above-stated ways, the principal offender
should be a public officer acting under color of his
authority.
The legal grounds for detention are;
a. commission of a crime;
b. violent insanity or other ailment requiring
compulsory confinement in an institution
established for such purpose.
Q: After due hearing on a petition for a writ of
amparo founded on the acts of enforced
disappearance and extralegal killing of the son of
the complainant allegedly done by the respondent
military officers, the court granted the petition. May
the military officers be criminally charged in court
with enforced disappearance and extralegal killing?
Explain fully. (2008)
A: No. "Enforced disappearance and extralegal killing" is
not per se a criminal offense although it is wrongful. The
grant of a writ of amparo only provides a relief; it does
not establish a basis for a crime. Unless the writ was
issued because of specific overt acts shown to have been
committed by the respondent military officers and such
acts are crimes under penal laws, no criminal charge
may be routinely filed just because the petition for the
writ was granted.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Yes, the respondent military officers may be criminally
charged in court since enforced disappearance
constitutes arbitrary detention under Art. 124 or
Unlawful Arrest under Art. 269 of the RPC. Extralegal
killing can also be considered murder and/or homicide
under Art. 248/249, RPC.
Q: Major Menor, while patrolling Bago-Bago
community in a police car with SP03 Caloy Itliong
blew his whistle to stop a Nissan Sentra car which
wrongly entered a one-way street. After demanding
from Linda Lo Hua, the driver, her drivers license,
Menor asked her to follow them to the police
precinct. Upon arriving there, he gave instructions
to Itliong to guard Lo Hua in one of the rooms and
not to let her out of sight until he returns; then got
the car key from Lo Hua. In the meantime, the latter
was not allowed to make any phone calls but was
given food and access to a bathroom.
When Menor showed up after two days, he brought
Lo Hua to a private house and told her that he would
only release her and return the car if she made
arrangements for the delivery of P500,000.00 in a
doctors bag at a certain place within the next
twenty-four hours. When Menor went to the
designated spot to pick up the bag of money, he
suddenly found himself surrounded by several
armed civilians who introduced themselves as NBI
agents. What criminal offense has Menor
committed? Explain. (1992)
A: Menor is liable under Art. 124, RPC (Arbitrary
Detention) he being a public officer who detained, a
person without legal grounds. Violation of a traffic
ordinance by entering a one-way street is not a valid
reason to arrest and detain the driver. Such only merits
the issuance of a traffic violation ticket. Hence, when Lo
Hua was ordered to follow the police officers to the
precinct (confiscating her license to compel her to do
so), and confining her in a room for two days and
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
prohibiting her to make phone calls, is a clear case of
deprivation of personal liberty. Giving her food and
access to the bathroom will not extinguish or mitigate
the criminal liability.
Menor is further liable for robbery, because money or
personal properly was taken, with intent to gain, and
with intimidation. The peculiar situation of Lo Hua
practically forced her to submit to the monetary
demands of the major.
CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER
(Articles 134-160)
Rebellion (Article 134)
Q: Distinguish clearly but briefly between
rebellion and coup d'etat, based on their
constitutive elements as criminal offenses. (2004,
1991)
A:
1. As to overt acts:
In rebellion, there is public uprising and taking up arms
against the Government. In coup d'etat public uprising is
not necessary. The essence of the crime is a swift attack,
accompanied by violence, intimidation, threat, strategy
or stealth, directed against duly constituted authorities
of the Government, or any military camp or installation,
communication networks, public utilities or facilities
needed for the exercise and continued possession of
government power;
2. As to purpose:
In rebellion, the purpose is to remove from the
allegiance of the Philippines, the whole or any part or
the Philippines or any military or naval camps, deprive
the Chief Executive or Congress from performing their
functions. In coup d'etat the objective is to seize or
diminish state powers.
3. As to participation:
Rebellion can be carried out by any person. Coup d'etat
is committed by any person belonging to the military or
police or holding public office, with or without civilian
participation.
Q: On May 5, 1992, at about 6:00 a.m., while
Governor Alegre of Laguna was on board his car
traveling along the National Highway of Laguna,
Joselito and Vicente shot him on the head resulting
in his instant death. At that time, Joselito and
Vicente were members of the liquidation squad of
the New People's Army and they killed the governor
upon orders of their senior officer, Commander
Tiago. According to Joselito and Vicente, they were
ordered to kill Governor Alegre because of his
corrupt practices. If you were the prosecutor, what
crime will you charge Joselito and Vicente? (1998)
A: If I were the prosecutor, I would charge Joselito and
Vicente with the crime of rebellion, considering that the
killers were members of the liquidation squad of the
New People's Army and the killing was upon orders of
their commander; hence, politically-motivated. This was
the ruling in People v. Avila, G.R. No. 84612 March 11,
35
1992) involving identical facts which is a movement
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 QuAMTO for CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
taken judicial notice of as engaged in rebellion against
the Government.
Q: VC, JG, GG, and JG conspired to overthrow the
Philippine Government. VG was recognized as the
titular head of the conspiracy. Several meetings
were held and the plan was finalized. JJ, bothered by
his conscience, confessed to Father Abraham that he,
VG, JG and GG have conspired to overthrow the
government. Father Abraham did not report this
information to the proper authorities. Did Father
Abraham commit a crime? If so, what crime was
committed? What is his criminal liability? (1994)
A: No, Father Abraham did not commit a crime because
the conspiracy involved is one to commit rebellion, not a
conspiracy to commit treason which makes a person
criminally liable under Art 116, RPC. And even assuming
that it will fall as misprision of treason, Father Abraham
is exempted from criminal liability under Art. 12, par. 7,
as his failure to report can be considered as due to
"insuperable cause", as this involves the sanctity and
inviolability of a confession. Conspiracy to commit
rebellion results in criminal liability to the co-
conspirators, but not to a person who learned of such
and did not report to the proper authorities (US v.
Vergara, 3 Phil. 432; People vs. Atienza, 56 Phil. 353).
Coup detat (Article 134-A)
Q: If a group of persons belonging to the armed
forces makes a swift attack, accompanied by
violence, intimidation and threat against a vital
military installation for the purpose of seizing
power and taking over such installation, what crime
or crimes are they guilty of? (2002, 1998)
A: The perpetrators, being persons belonging to the
Armed Forces, would be guilty of the crime of coup
d'etat, under Art. 134-A of the RPC, as amended, because
their attack was against vital military installations which
are essential to the continued possession and exercise of
governmental powers, and their purpose is to seize
power by taking over such installations.
Q: If the attack is quelled but the leader is unknown,
who shall be deemed the leader thereof?
A: The leader being unknown, any person who in
fact directed the others, spoke for them, signed receipts
and other documents issued in their name, or
performed similar acts, on behalf of the group shall be
deemed the leader of said coup d'etat (Art 135, RPC).
Q: Supposing a public school teacher participated in
a coup d'etat using an unlicensed firearm. What
crime or crimes did he commit? (1998)
A: The public school teacher committed only coup d'etat
for his participation therein. His use of an unlicensed
firearm is absorbed in the coup d'etat under the new
firearms law (R.A. 8294).
Direct Assault (Article 148)
Q: Who are deemed to be persons in authority and
agents of persons in authority? (2000)
*QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as suggested by UPLC and other distinct
luminaries in the academe, and updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the 2016 Bar Exams.
A: Persons in authority are persons directly vested with
jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of
some court or government corporation, board, or
commission. Barrio captains and barangay chairmen are
also deemed persons in authority (Article 152, RPC).
Agents of persons in authority are persons who by direct
provision of law or by election or by appointment by
competent authority, are charged with maintenance of
public order, the protection and security of life and
property, such as barrio councilman, barrio policeman,
barangay leader and any person who comes to the aid of
persons in authority (Art. 152, RPC).
In applying the provisions of Articles 148 and 151 of the
Rev Penal Code, teachers, professors and persons
charged with the supervision of public or duly
recognized private schools, colleges and universities,
and lawyers in the actual performance of their
professional duties or on the occasion on such
performance, shall be deemed persons in authority. (P.D.
No. 299, and Batas Pambansa Big. 873).
Q: Dancio, a member of a drug syndicate, was a
detention prisoner in the provincial jail of X
Province. Brusco, another member of the syndicate,
regularly visited Dancio. Edri, the guard in charge
who had been receiving gifts from Brusco everytime
he visited Dancio, became friendly with him and
became relaxed in the inspection of his belongings
during his jail visits. In one of Brusco's visits, he was
able to smuggle in a pistol which Dancio used to
disarm the guards and destroy the padlock of the
main gate of the jail, enabling Dancio to escape.
What crime(s) did Dancio, Brusco and Edri commit?
Explain. (2015)
A: Dancio committed the crime of direct assault under
Article 148 for disarming the guards with the use of
pistol while they are engaged in the performance of
their duties. Using a pistol to disarm the guards
manifests criminal intention to defy the law and its
representative at all hazard. [Note: Illegal possession of
firearms may also be considered]
Edri committed infidelity in the custody of prisoner or
evasion through negligence under Article 224. As the
guard in charge, Edri was negligent in relaxing the
inspection of the Bruscos belongings during jail visits
allowing him to smuggle a pistol to Dencio, which he
subsequently used to escape. By accepting gifts from
Brusco, who was part of the syndicate to which Dancio
belonged, he is also guilty of indirect bribery under
Article 211.
Brusco committed delivery of prisoner from jail under
Article 156, qualified by his bribery of Edri. Helping a
person confined in jail to escape constitutes this crime.
Helping means furnishing the prisoner with the
material means or tools which greatly facilitate his
escape; hence, providing a pistol which helped Dencio to
escape is delivery of prisoner from jail.
Q: Miss Reyes, a lady professor, caught Mariano, one
of her students, cheating during an examination.
Aside from calling Mariano's attention, she
confiscated his examination booklet and sent him
out of the room, causing Mariano extreme
embarrassment.
36
 QUAMTO FOR CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
In class the following day, Mariano approached Miss
Reyes and without any warning, slapped her on the
face. Mariano would have inflicted grave injuries on
Miss Reyes had not Dencio, another student,
intervened. Mariano then turned his ire on Dencio
and punched him repeatedly, causing him injuries.
What crime or crimes, if any, did Mariano commit?
(2013, 2002, 1993)
A: Mariano is liable for two counts of direct assault.
First, when he slapped Miss Reyes, who is a person in
authority expressly mentioned in Art. 152 of the RPC,
who was in the performance of her duties on the day of
the commission of the assault. Second, when he
repeatedly punched Dencio, who became an agent of the
person in authority when he came to the aid of a person
in authority, Miss Reyes (Celig v. People, G.R. No. 173150,
July 28, 2010).
Q: Rigoberto gate-crashed the 71st birthday party of
Judge Lorenzo. Armed with a piece of wood
commonly known as dos por dos, Rigoberto hit
Judge Lorenzo on the back, causing the latters
hospitalization for 30 days. Upon investigation, it
appeared that Rigoberto had a grudge against Judge
Lorenzo who, two years earlier, had cited Rigoberto
in contempt and ordered his imprisonment for three
(3) days. (2009)
a. Is Rigoberto guilty of Direct Assault? Why or why
not?
A: No, Rigorberto is not guilty of Direct Assault because
Judge Lorenzo has ceased to be a judge when he was
attacked. He has retired (71 years old) from his position
as a person in authority when he was attacked. Hence,
the attack on him cannot be regarded as against a
person in authority anymore.
b. Would your answer be the same if the reason for
the attack was that when Judge Lorenzo was still
a practicing lawyer ten years ago, he prosecuted
Rigoberto and succeeded in sending him to jail
for one year? Explain your answer.
A: Yes. Rigorberto is guilty of Direct Assault because the
employment of violence was by reason of an actual
performance of a duty by the offended party acting as a
practicing lawyer. Lawyers are considered persons in
authority by virtue of B.P. 873, which states that lawyers
in the actual performance of their professional duties or
on the occasion of such performance shall be deemed
persons in authority. But the crime having been
committed 10 years ago, may have already prescribed
because it is punishable by a correctional penalty.
Q: A, a teacher at Mapa High School, having gotten
mad at X, one of his pupils, because of the latter's
throwing paper clips at his classmates, twisted his
right ear. X went out of the classroom crying and
proceeded home located at the back of the school.
He reported to his parents Y and Z what A had done
to him. Y and Z immediately proceeded to the school
building and because they were running and talking
in loud voices, they were seen by the barangay
chairman, B, who followed them as he suspected
that an untoward incident might happen. Upon
seeing A inside the classroom, X pointed him out to
his father, Y, who administered a fist blow on A,
causing him to fall down. When Y was about to kick
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
A, B rushed towards Y and pinned both of the latter's
arms. Seeing his father being held by B, X went near
and punched B on the face, which caused him to lose
his grip on Y. Throughout this incident, Z
shouted words of encouragement at Y, her
husband, and also threatened to slap A. Some
security guards of the school arrived, intervened
and surrounded X, Y and Z so that they could be
investigated in the principal's office. Before leaving,
Z passed near A and threw a small flower pot at him
but it was deflected by B. (2001)
a. What, if any, are the respective criminal liability
of X, Y, and Z?
A: X is liable for Direct Assault only, assuming the
physical injuries inflicted on B, the Barangay Chairman,
to be only slight and hence, would be absorbed in the
direct assault. A Barangay Chairman is a person in
authority and in this case, was performing his duty of
maintaining peace and order when attacked.
Y is liable for the complex crimes of Direct Assault with
Less Serious Physical Injuries for the fist blow on A, the
teacher, which caused the latter to fall down. For
purposes of the crimes in Arts. 148 and 151 of the RPC, a
teacher is considered a person in authority, and having
been attacked by Y by reason of his performance of
official duty, direct assault is committed with the
resulting less serious physical injuries completed.
Z, the mother of X and wife of Y may only be liable as an
accomplice to the complex crimes of direct assault with
less serious physical injuries committed by Y. Her
participation should not be considered as that of a co-
principal, since her reactions were only incited by her
relationship to X and Y. as the mother of X and the wife
of Y.
b. Would your answer be the same if B were a
barangay tanod only?
A: If B were a Barangay Tanod only, the act of X of laying
hand on him, being an agent of a person in authority
only, would constitute the crime of Resistance and
Disobedience under Art. 151, since X, a high school
pupil, could not be considered as having acted out of
contempt for authority but more of helping his father get
free from the grip of B. Laying hand on an agent of a
person in authority is not ipso facto direct assault, while
it would always be direct assault if done to a person in
authority in defiance to the latter is exercise of
authority.
Q: Because of the approaching town fiesta in San
Miguel, Bulacan, a dance was held in Barangay
Camias. A, the Barangay Captain, was invited to
deliver a speech to start the dance. While A was
delivering his speech, B, one of the guests, went to
the middle of the dance floor making obscene dance
movements, brandishing a knife and challenging
everyone present to a fight. A approached B and
admonished him to keep quiet and not to disturb the
dance and peace of the occasion. B, instead of
heeding the advice of A, stabbed the latter at his
back twice when A turned his back to proceed to the
microphone to continue his speech. A fell to the
ground and died. At the time of the incident A was
not armed. What crime was committed? Explain.
37
(2000, 1995)
TEAM BAROPS
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016
 QuAMTO for CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
A: The complex crime of direct assault with murder was
committed. A, as a Barangay Captain, is a person in
authority and was acting in an official capacity when he
tried to maintain peace and order during the public
dance in the Barangay, by admonishing B to keep quiet
and not to disturb the dance and peace of the occasion.
When B, instead of heeding A's advice, attacked the
latter, B acted in contempt and lawless defiance of
authority constituting the crime of direct assault,
which characterized the stabbing of A. And since A was
stabbed at the back when he was not in a position to
neither defend him nor retaliate, there was treachery in
the stabbing. Hence, the death caused by such stabbing
was murder and having been committed with direct
assault, a complex crime of direct assault with
murder was committed by B.
REPEATED DOCTRINE
Q: Pablo, disobeying a judicial order, was punished
by an RTC Judge of Manila for contempt. He waited
for the judge to go out into the street. Upon seeing
the judge, Pablo hurriedly approached him, and
without saying a word struck him with his fist
causing a slight contusion on the face of the Judge.
Rex came to the rescue of the Judge but because he
was taller and bigger than Pablo, the latter used a
knife in attacking Rex. Pablo limited his assault to
the arms of Rex Inflicting lesions graves which
incapacitated Rex from labor for forty five (45) days.
If you were the prosecutor called to institute a
criminal action against Pablo, with what crime or
crimes would you charge him? Explain. (1993)
A: The crime of direct assault upon a person in authority
with respect to the slight contusion on the face of the
Judge. Direct assault with serious physical injuries with
respect to the assault on Rex.
Delivery of Prisoner from Jail (Article 156)
Q: To secure a release of his brother Willy, a
detention prisoner, and his cousin Vincent, who is
serving sentence for homicide, Chito asked the RTC
Branch Clerk of Court to issue an Order which would
allow the two prisoners to be brought out of jail. At
first, the Clerk refused, but when Chita gave her
P50,000.00, she consented.
She then prepared an Order requiring the
appearance in court of Willy and Vincent, ostensibly
as witnesses in a pending case. She forged the
judge's signature, and delivered the Order to the jail
warden who, in turn, allowed Willy and Vincent to
go out of jail in the company of an armed escort,
Edwin. Chito also gave Edwin P50,000.00 to leave
the two inmates unguarded for three minutes and
provide them with an opportunity to escape. Thus,
Willy and Vincent were able to escape. What crime
or crimes, if any, had been committed by Chito,
Willy, Vincent, the Branch Clerk of court, Edwin, and
the jail warden? Explain your answer. (2009, 2014)
A: The crimes committed in this case are as follows:
1. Chito committed the crimes of:
a. Delivery of Prisoners from Jail (Art. 156, RPC)
for working out the escape of prisoners Willy
and Vincent;
b. Two counts of Corruption of Public Officials
(Art. 212, RPC); and
*QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as suggested by UPLC and other distinct
luminaries in the academe, and updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the 2016 Bar Exams.
c. Falsification of Public Documents, as a principal
by inducement (Art. 172[1], RPC);
2. Willy committed the crime of Delivery of Prisoners
from Jail (Art. 156, RPC) as a principal by
indispensable cooperation if he was aware of the
criminal plan of Chito to have them escape from
prison and he did escape pursuant to such criminal
plan; otherwise he would not be liable for said crime
if he escaped pursuant to human instinct only;
3. Vincent, being a prisoner serving sentence by final
judgment, committed the crime of Evasion of
Service of Sentence (Art. 157, RPC) for escaping
during the term of his imprisonment;
4. The Branch Clerk of Court committed the crimes of:
a. Direct Bribery (Art. 210, RPC) for accepting the
P50,000.00 in consideration of the order she
issued to enable the prisoners to get out of jail;
b. Falsification of Public Document for forging the
judge's signature on said Order (Art. 171, RPC);
c. Delivery of Prisoners from Jail (Art. 156, RPC), as
a co-principal of Chito by indispensable
cooperation for making the false order and
forging the judge's signature thereon, to enable
the prisoners to get out of jail;
d. Evasion of Service of Sentence (Art. 157, RPC);
as a co-principal of Vincent by indispensable
cooperation for making the false Order that
enabled Vincent to evade service of his
sentence;
5. Edwin, the jail guard who escorted the prisoners in
getting out of jail, committed the crimes of
a. Infidelity in the Custody of Prisoners,
specifically conniving with or consenting to
Evasion for leaving unguarded the prisoners
escorted by him and provide them an
opportunity to escape (Art. 223, RPC);
b. Direct Bribery for receiving the P50,000.00 as
consideration for leaving the prisoners
unguarded and allowing them the opportunity
to escape (Art. 210, RPC);
6. The jail warden did not commit nor incur a crime
there being no showing that he was aware of what
his subordinates had done nor of any negligence on
his part that would amount to infidelity in the
custody of prisoners.
Q: A, a detention prisoner, was taken to a hospital
for emergency medical treatment. His followers, all
of whom were armed, went to the hospital to take
him away or help him escape. The prison guards,
seeing that they were outnumbered and that
resistance would endanger the lives of other
patients, deckled to allow the prisoner to be taken
by his followers. What crime, if any, was committed
by A's followers? Why? (2002)
A: A's followers shall be liable as principals in the crime
of delivery of prisoner from jail. The felony is committed
not only by removing from any jail or penal
establishment any person confined therein but also by
helping in the escape of such person outside of said
establishments by means of violence, intimidation,
bribery, or any other means.
Evasion of Service of Sentence (Article 157)
Q: Manny killed his wife under exceptional
circumstances and was sentenced by the Regional
38
Trial Court of Dagupan City to suffer the penalty of
 QUAMTO FOR CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
destierro during which he was not to enter the city.
While serving sentence, Manny went to Dagupan
City to visit his mother. Later, he was arrested in
Manila. (1998)
a. Did Manny commit any crime?
A: Yes. Manny committed the crime of evasion of service
of sentence when he went to Dagupan City, which he
was prohibited from entering under his sentence of
destierro. A sentence imposing the penalty of destierro
is evaded when the convict enters any of the
place/places he is prohibited from entering under the
sentence or come within the prohibited radius. Although
destierro does not involve imprisonment, it is
nonetheless a deprivation of liberty (People v. Abilong,
G.R. No. L-1960, November 26, 1948).
b. If so, where should he be prosecuted?
A: Manny may be prosecuted in Dagupan City or in
Manila where he was arrested. This is so because
evasion of service of sentence is a continuing offense, as
the convict is a fugitive from justice in such case
(Parulan v. Dir. of Prisons, G.R. No. L-28519, February 17,
1968).
Decree Codifying the Laws on Illegal/Unlawful
Possession, Manufacture, Dealing in, Acquisition or
Disposition of Firearms, Ammunition or Explosives
(P.D. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294), as further
amended by the Comprehensive Firearms and
Ammunition Regulation Act (R.A. No. 10591)
Q: A has long been wanted by the police authorities
for various crimes committed by him. Acting on an
information by a tipster, the police proceeded to
an apartment where A was often seen. The tipster
also warned the policemen that A was always armed.
At the given address, a lady who introduced herself
as the elder sister of A, opened the door and let the
policemen in inside, the team found A sleeping on
the floor. Immediately beside him was a clutch bag
which, when opened, contained a .38 caliber paltik
revolver and a hand grenade. After verification, the
authorities discovered that A was not a licensed
holder of the .38 caliber paltik revolver. As for the
hand grenade, it was established that only military
personnel are authorized to carry hand grenades.
Subsequently, A was charged with the crime of
Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition.
During trial, A maintained that the bag containing
the unlicensed firearm and hand grenade belonged
to A, his friend, and that he was not in actual
possession thereof at the time he was arrested. Are
the allegations meritorious? Explain. (2000)
A: A's allegations are not meritorious. Ownership is not
an essential element of the crime of illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition. What the law requires is
merely possession, which includes not only actual
physical possession but also constructive possession
where the firearm and explosive are subject to one's
control and management (People v. De Grecia, 233 SCRA
716; U.S. v. Juan, 23 Phil. 105: People v. Soyang, G.R. Nos.
L-13983-85. December 31, 1960).
CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST
(Article 161-187)
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
Q: How are "forging" and "falsification" committed?
(1999)
A: Forging or forgery is committed by giving to a
treasury or bank note or any instrument payable to
bearer or to order the appearance of a true and genuine
document; or by erasing, substituting, counterfeiting, or
altering by any means the figures, letters, words or signs
contained therein.
Falsification, on the other hand, is committed by:
1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting,
signature or rubric;
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated
in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so
participate;
3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an
act or proceeding statements other than those in
fact made by them;
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
5. Altering true dates;
6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine
document which changes its meaning;
7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document
purporting to be a copy of an original document
when no such original exists, or including in such
copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that
of the genuine original; or
8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the
issuance thereof in a protocol, registry, or official
book.
Illegal Possession and Use of False Treasury or Bank
Notes and Other Instruments of Credit (Article 168)
Q: Is mere possession of false money bills
punishable under Article 168 of the Revised Penal
Code? (1999)
A: No. Possession of false treasury or bank note alone
without an intent to use it, is not punishable. But the
circumstances of such possession may indicate intent to
utter, sufficient to consummate the crime of illegal
possession of false notes.
Q: The accused was caught in possession of 100
counterfeit P20 bills. He could not explain how and
why he possessed the said bills. Neither could he
explain what he intended to do with the fake bills.
Can he be held criminally liable for such possession?
Decide. (1999)
A: Yes. Knowledge that the note is counterfeit and intent
to use it may be shown by the conduct of the accused. So,
possession of 100 false bills reveal: (a) knowledge that
the bills are fake; and (b) intent to utter the same.
Falsification by Public Officer, Employee or Notary
or Ecclesiastical Minister (Article 171)
Q: Erwin and Bea approached Mayor Abral and
requested him to solemnize their marriage. Mayor
Abral agreed. Erwin and Bea went to Mayor Abral's
office on the day of the ceremony, but Mayor Abral
was not there. When Erwin and Bea inquired where
Mayor Abral was, his chief of staff Donato informed
them that the Mayor was campaigning for the
coming elections. Donato told them that the Mayor
authorized him to solemnize the marriage and that
39
Mayor Abral would just sign the documents when he
TEAM BAROPS
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016
 QuAMTO for CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
arrived. Donato thereafter solemnized the marriage
and later turned over the documents to Mayor Abral
for his signature. In the marriage contract, it was
stated that the marriage was solemnized by Mayor
Abral. What crime(s) did Mayor Abral and Donato
commit? Explain. (2015)
A: Mayor Abral is liable for falsification of public
document by a public officer under Article 171. Making
an untruthful statement by stating in a marriage
contract, a public document, that the marriage was
solemnized by him, is an act of falsification. The crime of
illegal marriage is not committed because element that
the offender has performed an illegal marriage
ceremony is lacking (Ronulo v. People, G.R. No. 182438,
July 2, 2014).
Donato committed the crime of usurpation of function
under Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code because he
performed the act of solemnizing marriage, which
pertained to the mayor, a person in authority, without
being lawfully entitled to do so. The crime of illegal
marriage is not committed, because the element that
the offender is authorized to solemnize marriage is
lacking (Ronulo v. People, G.R. No. 182438, July 2, 2014).
Falsification by Private Individual and Use of
Falsified Documents (Article 172)
Q: A falsified official or public document was found
in the possession of the accused. No evidence was
introduced to show that the accused was the author
of the falsification. As a matter of fact, the trial court
convicted the accused of falsification of official or
public document mainly on the proposition that "the
only person who could have made the erasures and
the superimposition mentioned is the one who
will be benefited by the alterations thus made"
and that "he alone could have the motive for making
such alterations". Was the conviction of the accused
proper although the conviction was premised
merely on the aforesaid ratiocination? Explain your
answer. (1999)
A: Yes, the conviction is proper because there is a
presumption in law that the possessor and user of a
falsified document is the one who falsified the same.
Q: Jose Dee Kiam, a Chinese citizen born in Macao,
having applied with a recruitment agency to work in
Kuwait, went to Quezon City Hall to procure a
Community Tax Certificate, formerly called
Residence Certificate. He stated therein that his
name is Leo Tiampuy, a Filipino citizen born in
Binan, Laguna. As he paid for the Community Tax
Certificate, Cecille Delicious, an employee in the
office recognized him and reported to her boss that
the information written in the Community Tax
Certificate were all lies. Shortly thereafter, an
information was filed against Dee Kiam alias
Tiampuy. What crime, if any, may he be indicted for?
Why? (1992)
A: Dee Kiam can be indicted for the felony of
Falsification of a Public Document committed by a
private individual under Art. 172 of the RPC in relation
to Art. 171 thereof. A residence certificate is a public or
official document within the context of said provisions
and jurisprudence. Since Dee Kiam made an untruthful
statement in a narration of facts (Art. 171(4), RPC), and
*QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as suggested by UPLC and other distinct
luminaries in the academe, and updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the 2016 Bar Exams.
he being a private individual, he is culpable thereunder.
Q: In a civil case for recovery of a sum of money
filed against him by A. B interposed the defense of
payment. In support thereof, he identified and
offered in evidence a receipt which appears to be
signed by A On rebuttal. A denied having been paid
by B and having signed the receipt. He presented a
handwriting expert who testified that the alleged
signature of A on the receipt is a forgery and that a
comparison thereof with the specimen signatures of
B clearly shows that B himself forged the signature
of A.
Is B liable for the crime of using a falsified docu-
ment in a judicial proceeding (last paragraph of
Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code)? (1991)
A: No, B should not be liable for the crime of using a
falsified document, under the last paragraph of Art. 172,
RPC. He would be liable for forgery of a private
document under the second mode of falsification under
Art. 172, RPC. Being the possessor and user of the
falsified document he is presumed to be the forger or
falsifier and the offense of introducing falsified
document is already absorbed in the main offense of for-
gery or falsification.
False Testimony (Article 180-183)
Q: Al Chua, a Chinese national, filed a petition under
oath for naturalization, with the Regional Trial
Court of Manila. In his petition, he stated that he is
married to Leni Chua; that he is living with her in
Sampaloc, Manila; that he is of good moral
character; and that he has conducted himself in an
irreproachable manner during his stay in the
Philippines. However, at the time of the filing of the
petition, Leni Chua was already living in Cebu, while
Al was living with Babes Toh in Manila, with whom
he has an amorous relationship. After his direct
testimony, Al Chua withdrew his petition for
naturalization. What crime or crimes, if any, did Al
Chua commit? Explain. (2005)
A: Al Chua committed perjury. His declaration under
oath for naturalization that he is of good moral character
and residing at Sampaloc, Manila are false. This
information is material to his petition for naturalization.
He committed perjury for this wilful and deliberate
assertion of falsehood which is contained in a verified
petition made for a legal purpose.
Q: A, a government employee, was administratively
charged with immorality for having an affair with B,
a co-employee in the same office who believed him
to be single. To exculpate himself, A testified that he
was single and was willing to marry B, He induced C
to testify and C did testify that B was single. The
truth, however, was that A had earlier married D,
now a neighbor of C. Is a guilty of perjury? Are A and
C guilty of subordination of perjury? (1997)
A: No. A is not guilty of perjury because the willful
falsehood asserted by him is not material to the charge
of immorality. Whether A is single or married, the
charge of immorality against him as a government
employee could proceed or prosper. In other words, A's
civil status is not a defense to the charge of
immorality, hence, not a material matter that could
40
influence the charge. There is no crime of subornation
 QUAMTO FOR CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
of perjury. The crime is now treated as plain perjury
with the one inducing another as the principal
inducement, and the latter, as principal by direct
participation (People v. Podol, 66 Phil. 365). Since in this
case A cannot be held liable for perjury, the matter that
he testified to being immaterial, he cannot therefore be
held responsible as a principal by inducement when he
induced C to testify on his status. Consequently, C is not
liable as principal by direct participation in perjury,
having testified on matters not material to an
administrative case.
Q: Sisenando purchased the share of the
stockholders of Estrella Corporation in two
installments, making him the majority stockholder
thereof and eventually, its president. Because the
stockholders who sold their stocks failed to comply
with their warranties attendant to the sale,
Sisenando withheld payment of the second
installment due on the shares and deposited the
money in escrow instead, subject to release once
said stockholders comply with their warranties. The
stockholders concerned, in turn, rescinded the sale
in question and removed Sisenando from the
Presidency of the Estrella Corp., Sisenando then filed
a verified complaint for damages against said
stockholders in his capacity as president and
principal stockholder of Estrella Corp. In retaliation,
the stockholders concerned, after petitioning the
Securities and Exchange Commission to declare the
rescission valid, further filed a criminal case for
perjury against Sisenando, claiming that the latter
perjured himself when he stated under oath in the
verification of his complaint for damages that he is
the President of the Estrella Corporation when in
fact he had already been removed as such. Under the
facts of the case, could Sisenando be held liable for
perjury? Explain. (1996)
A: No, Sisenando may not be held liable for perjury
because it cannot be reasonably maintained that he
wilfully and deliberately made an assertion of a
falsehood when he alleged in the complaint that he is the
President of the Corporation, obviously, he made the
allegation on the premise that his removal from the
presidency is not valid and that is precisely the issue
brought about by his complaint to the SEC. It is a fact
that Sisenando has been the President of the
corporation and it is from that position that the
stockholders concerned purportedly removed him,
whereupon he filed the complaint questioning his
removal. There is no wilful and deliberate assertion of a
falsehood which is a requisite of perjury.
Q: Paolo was charged with homicide before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila. Andrew, a
prosecution witness, testified that he saw Paolo
shoot Abby during their heated argument. While the
case is still pending, the City Hall of Manila burned
down and the entire records of the case were
destroyed. Later, the records were reconstituted.
Andrew was again called to the witness stand. This
time he testified that his first testimony was false
and the truth was he was abroad when the crime
took place. The judge immediately ordered the
prosecution of Andrew for giving a false testimony
favorable to the defendant in a criminal case. (1994)
a. Will the case against Andrew prosper?
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
A: Yes. For one to be criminally liable under Art. 181,
RPC, it is not necessary that the criminal case where
Andrew testified is terminated first. It is not even
required of the prosecution to prove which of the two
statements of the witness is false and to prove the
statement to be false by evidence other than the
contradictory statements.
b. Paolo was acquitted. The decision became final
on January 10, 1987. On June 18, 1994 a case of
giving false testimony was filed against Andrew.
As his lawyer, what legal step will you take?
A: As lawyer of Andrew, I will file a motion to quash the
Information on the ground of prescription. The crime of
false testimony under Art. 180 has prescribed because
Paolo, the accused in the principal case, was acquitted
on January 10, 1987 and therefore the penalty
prescribed for such crime is arresto mayor under Art.
180[4] of RPC. Crimes punishable by arresto mayor
prescribe in five (5) years (Art. 90[3], RPC). But the case
against Andrew was filed only on June 18, 1994,
whereas the principal criminal case was decided with
finality on January 10, 1987 and, thence the prescriptive
period of the crime commenced to run. From January 10,
1987 to June 18, 1994 is more than five (5) years.
Q: Explain and illustrate subornation of perjury.
(1993)
A: Subordination of perjury refers to the act of a
person procuring a false witness to testify and
thereby commit perjury. The procurer is a co-
principal by inducement.
Q: A, who was the client of B (a lawyer), signed a re-
tainer agreement for the payment of attorneys
fees. After B rendered satisfactory service, A
refused to pay the attorneys fees. B sued. In her
verified answer, A alleged that she did not owe
money to plaintiff B nor did she engage his legal
services. These statements under oath were false.
B filed a criminal complaint for perjury against A,
and an information was filed in court. If you are the
lawyer for accused A, what is your defense, if any?
(1991)
A: I will move for the dismissal of the complaint for per-
jury. The falsity of sworn statement must be required
or authorized by law (Flordeliz v. Himalalaon, G.R. No. L-
48088, July 31, 1978).
Anti-Money Laundering Act (R.A. No. 9194)
Q: Define Money Laundering. What are the three (3)
stages in money laundering? (2010)
A: Money Laundering is the process by which a person
conceals the existence of unlawfully obtained money
and makes it appear to have originated from lawful
sources. The intention behind such a transaction is to
hide the beneficial owner of said funds and allows
criminal organizations or criminals to enjoy proceeds of
such criminal activities.
The three (3) stages in money laundering are:
a. Placement/ infusion or the physical disposal of
criminal proceeds
b. Layering or the separation of the criminal proceeds
41
from their source by creating layers of financial
TEAM BAROPS
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016
 QuAMTO for CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
transactions to disguise such proceeds as legitimate
and avoid audit trail; and
c. Integration or the provision of apparent legitimacy
to the criminal proceeds.
Q: There being probable cause to believe that
certain deposits and investments in a bank are
related to an unlawful activity of smuggling by
Alessandro as defined under Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9160 as amended (Anti-Money Laundering Act), an
application for an order to allow inquiry into his
deposit was filed with the Regional Trial Court. After
hearing the application, the court granted the
application and issued a freeze order. Pass upon the
correctness of the courts order. Explain. (2010)
A: The freeze order issued by the Regional Trial Court is
not correct because jurisdiction to issue said freeze
order is now vested with the Court of Appeals under RA
9194, amending the Anti-Money Laundering Act (R.A.
9160). The Regional Trial Court is without jurisdiction to
issue a freeze order of the money involved.
Q: [True or False] For a person who transacts an
instrument representing the proceeds of a covered
unlawful activity to be liable under the Anti-Money
Laundering Act (R.A. 9160, as amended), it must be
shown that he has knowledge of the identities of the
culprits involved in the commission of the predicate
crimes. (2009)
A: False, there is nothing in the law which requires that
the accused must know the identities of the culprits
involved in the commission of the predicate crimes. To
establish liability under R.A. 9160, it is sufficient that
proceeds of an unlawful activity are transacted, making
them appear to have originated from legitimate sources.
Q: Don Gabito, a philanthropist, offered to fund
several projects of the Mayor. He opened an account
in the Mayors name and regularly deposited various
amounts ranging from P500,000.00 to P1 Million.
From this account, the Mayor withdrew and used the
money for constructing feeder roads, barangay
clinics, repairing schools and for all other municipal
projects. It was subsequently discovered that Don
Gabito was actually a jueteng operator and the
amounts he deposited were proceeds from his
jueteng operations. What crime/s were committed?
Who are criminally liable? Explain. (2005)
A: Don Gabito violated the Anti-Money Laundering Act
(Sec. 4, R.A. 9160) for knowingly transacting money or
property which involves or relates to the proceeds of an
unlawful activity such as jueteng. In addition, he may be
prosecuted for liability as a jueteng operator (R.A. 9287).
The mayor who allowed the opening of an account in his
name is likewise guilty for violation of the AMLA. He,
knowing that the money instrument or property
involves the proceeds of an unlawful activity, performs
or fails to perform any act which results in the
facilitation of money laundering.
CRIMES RELATIVE TO OPIUM AND OTHER
PROHIBITED DRUGS
The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
(R.A. No. 9165)
Punishable Acts
*QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as suggested by UPLC and other distinct
luminaries in the academe, and updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the 2016 Bar Exams.
Q: Tiburcio asked Anastacio to join their group for a
session. Thinking that it was for a mah-jong
session, Anastacio agreed. Upon reaching Tiburcios
house, Anastacio discovered that it was actually a
shabu session. At that precise time, the place was
already raided by the police, and Anastacio was
among those arrested. What crime can Anastacio be
charged with, if any? Explain your answer. (2007)
A: Anastacio may not be charged of any crime. Sec. 7 of
R.A. 9165 on the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs of
2002 punishes employees and visitors of a den, dive or
resort where dangerous drugs are used in any form. But
for a visitor of such place to commit the crime, it is a
requisite that he "is aware of the nature of the place as
such and shall knowingly visit the same." These
requisites are absent in the facts given.
Q: After receiving reliable information that Dante
Ong, a notorious drug smuggler, was arriving on PAL
Flight No. PR 181, PNP Chief Inspector Samuel
Gamboa formed a group of anti-drug agents. When
Ong arrived at the airport, the group arrested him
and seized his attache case. Upon inspection inside
the Immigration holding area, the attache case
yielded 5 plastic bags of heroin weighing 500 grams.
Chief Inspector Gamboa took the attache case and
boarded him in an unmarked car driven by PO3
Pepito Lorbes. On the way to Camp Crame and upon
nearing White Plains corner EDSA, Chief Inspector
Gamboa ordered PO3 Lorbes to stop the car. They
brought out the drugs from the case in the trunk and
got 3 plastic sacks of heroin. They then told Ong to
alight from the car. Ong left with the 2 remaining
plastic sacks of heroin. Chief Inspector Gamboa
advised him to keep silent and go home which the
latter did. Unknown to them, an NBI team of agents
had been following them and witnessed the
transaction. They arrested Chief Inspector Gamboa
and PO3 Lorbes. Meanwhile, another NBI team
followed Ong and likewise arrested him. All of them
were later charged. What are their respective
criminal liabilities? (2006)
A: Chief Inspector Gamboa and PO3 Pepito Lorbes who
conspired in taking the attache case are liable for the
following crimes defined under R.A. 9165:
a. Sec. 27 for misappropriation or failure to account
for the confiscated or seized dangerous drugs.
b. Sec. 4 in relation to Sec. 3(e) for their acts as
protector/coddler of Dante Ong who imported
drugs.
c. In addition, by allowing Ong to escape prosecution
for illegal importation or illegal transportation of
dangerous drugs, where the penalty is life
imprisonment to death, they are also liable for
qualified bribery under Art. 211-A of the RPC.
With respect to Dante Ong, he is guilty of illegal
importation of dangerous drugs under Sec. 4, R.A. 9165,
if PR 181 is an international flight. If PR 181 is a
domestic flight, he is liable for violation of Sec. 5 of R.A.
9165 for illegal transportation of dangerous drugs.
Q: Obie Juan is suspected to have in his possession
an unspecified amount of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. An entrapment operation
was conducted by police officers, resulting in his
arrest following the discovery of 100 grams of the
said dangerous drug in his possession. He was
42
subjected to a drug test and was found positive for
 QUAMTO FOR CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
the use of marijuana, another dangerous drug. He
was subsequently charged with two crimes:
Violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 for the
possession of shabu and violation of Section 15,
Article II of RA 9165 for the use of marijuana. (2005,
2004, 1998)
a. Are the charges proper? Explain.
A: The charge of possession of shabu is proper as the
mere possession of such drug is punishable, but the
charge of use of marijuana is not proper as Section 15 of
Rep. Act 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002) expressly excludes penalties for use of
dangerous drugs when the person tested is also found to
have in possession such quantity of any dangerous drug"
provided for in Section 11 of such Act. ( R.A. No. 9165,
Sec. 11 and 16).
b. So as not to be sentenced to death, Obie Juan
offers to plead guilty to a lesser offense. Can he
do so? Why?
A: No. Obie Juan cannot plead guilty to a lower offense as
it is prohibited under the law (R.A. 9165, Sec. 23). Any
person charged under any provision of this Act
regardless of the imposable penalty shall not be allowed
to avail of the provision on plea-bargaining.
Q: A and his fiancee B were walking in the plaza
when they met a group of policemen who had earlier
been tipped off that A was in possession of
prohibited drugs. Upon seeing the policemen and
sensing that they were after him, A handed a sachet
containing shabu to his fiancee B, telling her to hide
it in her handbag. The policemen saw B placing the
sachet inside her handbag. If B was unaware that A
was a drug user or pusher or that what was inside
the sachet given to her was shabu, is she nonetheless
liable under the Dangerous Drugs Act? (2002)
A: No, B will not be criminally liable because she is
unaware that A was a drug user or pusher or of the
content of the sachet handed to her by A, and therefore
the criminal intent to possess the drug in violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act is absent. There would be no basis
to impute criminal liability to her in the absence of
animus possidendi.
Q: Pat. Buensuceso, posing as a buyer, approached
Ronnie, a suspected drug pusher, and offered to buy
P300 worth of shabu. Ronnie then left, came back
five minutes later and handed Pat. Buensuceso an
aluminum foil containing the shabu. However,
before Pat. Buensuceso was able to deliver the
marked money to Ronnie, the latter spotted a
policeman at a distance, whom Ronnie knew to
be connected with the Narcotics Command of the
Police. Upon seeing the latter, Ronnie ran away but
was arrested thirty minutes later by other
policemen who pursued him. Under the
circumstances, would you consider the crime of sale
of a prohibited drug already consummated? Explain.
(2000, 1996)
A: Yes, the sale of prohibited drug is already
consummated although the marked money was not yet
delivered. When Ronnie handed the aluminum foil
containing the shabu to Pat. Buensuceso pursuant to
their agreed sale, the crime was consummated. Payment
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
of the consideration is not an element of requisite of the
crime. If ever, the marked money is only evidentiary to
strengthen the case of the prosecution.
Q: Superintendent Al Santiago, Chief of the Narcotics
Division, Western Police District, received
information that a certain Lee Lay of No. 8 Tindalo
Street, Tondo, Manila is a member of the 14K Gang
selling shabu and marijuana. SPOl Lorenzo and
SPO3 Peralta were instructed to conduct
surveillance and buy-bust operations against Lay.
Their informant contacted Lay and a meeting was
arranged at T. Pinpin Restaurant at 2:00 in the
afternoon on February 14, 1993. SPO1 Lorenzo and
SPO3 Peralta, acting as poseur-buyers, purchased
from Lay 10 sticks of marijuana and paid P500.
Later, Lay agreed to sell to them one kilo of dried
marijuana fruiting tops which he gave them at his
residence. The policemen arrested Lay and a search
was conducted. Found were 356 grams of marijuana
seeds, 932 grams of marijuana fruiting tops and 50
sticks of marijuana cigarettes. What offense or
offenses did Lay commit? (1998)
A: Lay committed the offenses of illegal selling of
dangerous drugs and illegal possession of dangerous
drugs which should be made subject of separate
information. The crime of illegal selling of dangerous
drugs is committed as regards the 10 sticks of
marijuana and as regards the one (1) kilo of dried
marijuana fruiting tops, which should be subject of two
(2) separate information because the acts were
committed at different times and in different places. The
crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs is
committed as regards the marijuana seeds, marijuana
fruiting tops and marijuana cigarettes which are not the
subject of the sale. Another information shall be filed for
this.
Custody and Disposition of Confiscated Drugs
Q: Following his arrest after a valid buy-bust
operation, Tommy was convicted of violation of
Section 5, Republic Act 9165. On appeal, Tommy
questioned the admissibility of the evidence because
the police officers who conducted the buy-bust
operation failed to observe the requisite "chain of
custody" of the evidence confiscated and/or seized
from him. What is the "chain of custody"
requirement in drug offenses? What is its rationale?
What is the effect of failure to observe the
requirement? (2009)
A: Chain of custody requirement in drug offenses
refers to the duly recorded, authorized movement and
custody of seized dangerous drugs, controlled chemicals,
plant sources of dangerous drugs, and laboratory
equipment of dangerous drugs from the time of
confiscation/seizure thereof from the offender, to its
turn-over and receipt in the forensic laboratory for
examination, to its safekeeping and eventual violation,
and for destruction (Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation
No. 1 Series of 2001.) Its rationale is to preserve the
authenticity of the corpus delicti or body of the crime by
rendering it improbable that the original item seized/
confiscated in the violation has been exchanged or
substituted with another or tampered with or
contaminated. It is a method of authenticating the
evidence as would support a finding beyond reasonable
43
doubt that the matter is what the prosecution claims to
TEAM BAROPS
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016
 QuAMTO for CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
be. Failure to observe the chain of custody
requirement renders the evidence questionable, not
trustworthy and insufficient to prove the corpus delicti
beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, Tommy would be
acquitted on reasonable doubt.
CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC MORALS
(Art. 200-202)
Q: Pia, a bold actress living on top floor of a
plush condominium in Makati City sunbathed
naked at its penthouse every Sunday morning. She
was unaware that the business executives holding
office at the adjoining tall buildings reported to
office every Sunday morning and, with the use of
powerful binoculars, kept on gazing at her while she
sunbathed. Eventually, her sunbathing became the
talk of the town. (1996)
a. What crime, if any, did Pia commit? Explain.
A: Pia did not commit a crime, the felony closest to
making Pia criminally liable is Grave Scandal, but then
such act is not to be considered as highly scandalous and
offensive against decency and good customs. In the first
place, it was not done in a public place and within public
knowledge or view. As a matter of fact it was discovered
by the executives accidentally and they have to use
binoculars to have public and full view of Pia sunbathing
in the nude.
b. What crime, if any, did the business executives
commit? Explain.
A: The business executives did not commit any crime.
Their acts could not be acts of lasciviousness (as there
was no overt lustful act), or slander, as the eventual talk
of the town, resulting from her sunbathing, is not
directly imputed to the business executives, and besides
such topic is not intended to defame or put Pia to
ridicule.
Q: Juan and Petra are officemates. Later, intimacy
developed between them. One day, Juan sent to
Petra a booklet contained in a pay envelope which
was securely sealed. The booklet is unquestionably
indecent and highly offensive to morals. Juan was
thereafter charged under par. 3 of Art. 201 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by P.D. 969, which
provides that the penalty of prision mayor or a fine
from P6.000to P12,000, or both such imprisonment
and fine shall be imposed upon those who shall sell,
give away or exhibit films, prints, engravings,
sculpture or literature which are offensive to
morals. Is Juan guilty of the crime charged? Reasons.
(1993)
A: No. Juan is not guilty of the crime charged because the
law (Art. 201, RPC) covers only the protection of public
moral and not only the moral of an individual.
CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS
(Art. 203-245)
Q: Who are public officers? (1999)
A: Public Officers are persons who, by direct provision
of the law, popular election or appointment by
competent authority, takes part in the performance of
*QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as suggested by UPLC and other distinct
luminaries in the academe, and updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the 2016 Bar Exams.
public functions in the Government of the Philippines, or
performs in said Government or in any of its branches
public duties as an employee, agent or subordinate
official, of any rank or class (Art. 203, RPC)
Bribery (Article 210 212)
Direct Bribery
Q: During a PNP buy-bust operation, Cao Shih was
arrested for selling 20 grams of methamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu) to a poseur-buyer. Cao Shih,
through an intermediary, paid Patrick, the Evidence
Custodian of the PNP Forensic Chemistry Section,
the amount of P500,000.00 in consideration for
the destruction by Patrick of the drug. Patrick
managed to destroy the drug. State with reasons
whether Patrick committed the following crimes:
(2005)
a. Direct Bribery;
A: Patrick committed the crimes of Direct Bribery and
Infidelity in the Custody of Documents. When a public
officer is called upon to perform or refrain from
performing an official act in exchange for a gift, present
or consideration given to him (Art. 210, RPC), the crime
committed is direct bribery. Secondly, he destroyed the
shabu which is an evidence in his official custody,
thus, constituting infidelity in the custody of
documents under Art. 226 of the RPC.
b. Indirect bribery;
A: Indirect bribery was not committed because he did
not receive the bribe because of his office but in
consideration of a crime in connection with his official
duty.
c. Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act);
A: Sec. 3(e), R.A. No. 8019 was not committed because
there was no actual injury to the government. When
there is no specific quantified injury, violation is not
committed (Garcia-Rueda v. Amor, G.R. No. 116938,
September 20, 2001).
d. Obstruction of Justice under PD 1829;
A: Patrick committed the crime of obstruction of justice
although the feigner penalty imposable on direct bribery
or infidelity in the custody of documents shall be
imposed. Sec. 1 of P.D. No. 1829 refers merely to the
imposition of the higher penalty and does not preclude
prosecution for obstruction of justice, even if the same
not constitute another offense.
Q: Deputy Sheriff Ben Rivas received from the RTC
Clerk of Court a Writ of Execution in the case of
Ejectment filed by Mrs. Maria Estrada vs. Luis Ablan.
The judgment being in favor of Estrada, Rivas went
to her lawyer's office where he was given the
necessary amounts constituting the sheriffs fees
and expenses for execution in the total amount of
P550.00, aside from P2,000.00 in consideration of
prompt enforcement of the writ from Estrada and
her lawyer. The writ was successfully enforced.
(2001)
44
 QUAMTO FOR CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
a. What crime, if any, did the sheriff commit?
A: The sheriff committed the crime of Direct Bribery
under Art. 210(2) of the RPC, since the P2, 000 was
received by him "in consideration" of the prompt
enforcement of the writ of execution which is an official
duty of the sheriff to do.
b. Was there any crime committed by Estrada and
her lawyer and if so, what crime?
A: On the part of the plaintiff and her lawyer as giver of
the bribe-money, the crime is Corruption of Public
Officials under Art. 212 of the RPC.
Indirect Bribery
Q: Commissioner Marian Torres of the Bureau of
internal Revenue (BIR) wrote solicitation letters
addressed to the Filipino-Chinese Chamber of
Commerce and Industry and to certain CEOs of
various multinational corporations requesting
donations of gifts for her office Christmas party. She
used the Bureau's official stationery. The response
was prompt and overwhelming so much so that
Commissioner Torres' office was overcrowded with
rice cookers, radio sets, freezers, electric stoves and
toasters. Her staff also received several envelopes
containing cash money for the employees' Christmas
luncheon. Has Commissioner Torres committed any
impropriety or irregularity? What laws or decrees
did she violate? (2006)
A: Yes, Commissioner Torres violated the following:
1. Indirect Bribery (Art. 211, RPC) for receiving gifts
offered by reason of office.
2. R.A. 6713 or Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees when he solicited
and accept gifts (Sec. 7[d]).
3. P.D. 46, making it punishable for public officials and
employees to receive, and for private persons to
give, gifts on any occasion, including Christmas.
Q: A, who is the private complainant in a murder
case pending before a Regional Trial Court judge,
gave a judge a Christmas gift, consisting of big
basket of assorted canned goods and bottles of
expensive wines, easily worth P10.000.00. The
judge accepted the gift knowing it came from A.
What crime or crimes, if any, were committed?
(1997, 1993)
A: The judge committed the crime of indirect bribery
under Art. 211 of the RPC. The gift was offered to the
judge by reason of his office. In addition, the judge will
be liable for the violation of P.D. 46 which punishes the
receiving of gifts by public officials and employees on
occasions like Christmas.
REPEATED DOCTRINE:
Q: Arevalo, a judge who heard a civil case, received
gifts from Maricel, the plaintiff therein, but rendered
judgment in favor of Julie, the defendant therein.
Who are criminally liable, and for what crime or
crimes? Explain. (1993)
A: Arevalo, the judge, is liable for indirect bribery (Art.
210, RPC) and for violation of the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standard (Sec. 7(d) R.A. 6713 and P.D. 46).
Maricel is liable for corruption of public officer (Art. 212,
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
RPC and P.D. 46).
Qualified Bribery
Q: What is the crime of qualified bribery? May a
judge be charged and prosecuted for such felony?
How about a public prosecutor? A police officer?
Explain. (2010)
A: Qualified bribery is a crime committed by a public
officer who is entrusted with law enforcement and who,
in consideration of any offer, promise, gift of offer,
refrains from arresting or prosecuting an offender who
has committed a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua
and/ or death (art. 211-A, RPC)
No, a judge may not be charged of this felony because his
official duty as a public officer is not law enforcement
but the determination of cases already filed in court. On
the other hand, a public prosecutor may be prosecuted
for this crime in respect of the bribery committed, aside
from dereliction of duty committed in violation of Art.
208 of the Revised Penal Code, should be refrain from
prosecuting an offender who has committed a crime
punishable by reclusion perpetua and / or death in
consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present.
Meanwhile, a police officer who refrains from arresting
such offender for the same consideration above stated,
may be prosecuted for this felony since he is a public
officer entrusted with law enforcement.
Malversation of Public Funds or Property
(Article 217-222)
Q: What constitutes the crime of malversation of
public funds or property? How is malversation
distinguished from estafa? (1999)
A: Malversation of public funds or property is
committed by any public officer who, by reason of the
duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or
property, shall take or misappropriate or shall consent,
or through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any
other person to take such public funds or property,
wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the
misappropriation or malversation of such funds or
property. (Art. 217, RPC)
Malversation differs from estafa in that malversation is
committed by an accountable public officer involving
public funds or property under his custody and
accountability; while estafa is committed by non-
accountable public officer or private individual involving
funds or property for which he is not accountable to the
government.
Q: A typhoon destroyed the houses of many of the
inhabitants of X Municipality. Thereafter, X
Municipality operated a shelter assistance program
whereby construction materials were provided to
the calamity victims, and the beneficiaries provided
the labor. The construction was partially done when
the beneficiaries stopped helping with the
construction for the reason that they needed to earn
income to provide food for their families. When
informed of the situation, Mayor Maawain approved
the withdrawal of ten boxes of food from X
Municipality's feeding program, which were given to
the families of the beneficiaries of the shelter
45
assistance program. The appropriations for the
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 QuAMTO for CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
funds pertaining to the shelter assistance program
and those for the feeding program were separate
items on X Municipality's annual budget. (2015)
a. What crime did Mayor Maawain commit?
Explain.
A: Mayor Maawain committed the crime of Illegal use of
public funds or property punishable under Article 220 of
the RPC. This offense is also known as Technical
Malversation. The crime has 3 elements: a.) that the
offender is an accountable public officer; b) that he
applies public funds or property under his
administration to some public use; and c) that the public
use for which such funds or property were applied is
different from the purpose for which they were
originally appropriated by law or ordinance. The funds
for the feeding program are not specifically
appropriated for the beneficiaries of the shelter
assistance program in X Municipalitys annual budget.
Mayor Maawain ought to use the boxes of food
earmarked particularly for the feeding program, which
would cater only to the malnourished among his
constituents who needed the resources for proper
nourishment.
b. May Mayor Maawain invoke the defense of good
faith and that he had no evil intent when he
approved the transfer of the boxes of food from
the feeding program to the shelter assistance
program? Explain.
A: No. Mayor Maawain cannot invoke good faith when
he approved the transfer of the boxes of food from the
feeding program to the Shelter Assistance program.
Criminal intent is not an element of technical
malversation. The law punishes the act of diverting
public property earmarked by law or ordinance for a
particular purpose to another public purpose. The
offense is mala prohibita, meaning that the prohibited
act is not inherently immoral but becomes a criminal
offense because positive law forbids its commission
based on considerations of public policy, order and
convenience. It is the commission of an act as defined by
the law, and not the character or effect thereof that
determines whether or not the provision has been
violated. Hence, malice or criminal intent is completely
irrelevant. (Ysidoro v. People, G.R. No. 192330, 14
November 2012).
Q: Roger and Jessie, Municipal Mayor and Treasurer,
respectively, of San Rafael, Leyte, caused the
disbursement of public funds allocated for their
local development programs for 2008. Records show
that the amount of P2-million was purportedly used
as financial assistance for a rice production
livelihood project. Upon investigation, however, it
was found that Roger and Jessie falsified the
disbursement vouchers and supporting documents
in order to make it appear that qualified recipients
who, in fact, are non-existent individuals, received
the money. Roger and Jessie are charged with
malversation through falsification and violation of
Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 for causing undue injury to
the government. Discuss the propriety of the
charges filed against Roger and Jessie. Explain.
(2009)
A: The charge of malversation through falsification is not
correct because the falsifications of several documents
*QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as suggested by UPLC and other distinct
luminaries in the academe, and updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the 2016 Bar Exams.
were not necessary means to obtain the money that
were malversed. The falsifications were committed to
cover up or hide the malversation and therefore, should
be separately treated from malversation. The given facts
stated that Roger and Jessie falsified disbursement
vouchers and supporting documents in order to make it
appear that qualified recipients received the money.
Art. 48, RPC on complex crimes is not applicable. They
should be charged of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
3019 for the breach of public trust and undue injury
caused to the Government. The violation is a crime
malum prohibitum.
Q: Eliseo, the deputy sheriff, conducted the
execution sale of the property of Andres to satisfy
the judgment against him in favor of ABC
Corporation, a government-owned or controlled
corporation with an original charter. However, the
representative of the corporation failed to attend
the auction sale. Gonzalo, the winning bidder,
purchased property for P100,000 which he paid to
Eliseo. Instead of remitting the amount to the Clerk
of Court as ex-officio Provincial Sheriff, Eliseo lent
the amount to Myrna, his officemate, who promised
to repay the amount within two months, with
interest thereon. However, Myrna reneged on her
promise. Despite demands of ABC Corporation,
Eliseo failed to remit the said amount. (2008)
a. State with reasons, the crime or crimes, if any,
committed by Eliseo.
A: The crime committed by Eliseo is malversation since
he is a public officer who received the amount in his
official capacity; thus he is accountable for it.
b. Would your answer to the first question be the
same if ABC Corp. were a private corporation?
Explain.
A: The crime would still be malversation even if ABC
Corporation, in whose favor the judgment was rendered,
were a private corporation. This is because the
P100,000.00 came from the sale of property levied upon
or seized upon execution ordered by the court. The
property was in custodia legis. Although not strictly
public property when Eliseo, in his official capacity,
conducted the execution sale and received it proceeds.
As long as Eliseo has not accounted for and turned over
the proceeds officially, he is not relieved of his official
accountability.
Q: In 1982, the Philippine National Bank (PNB), then
a government banking institution, hired Henry dela
Renta, a CPA, as Regional Bank Auditor. In 1992, he
resigned and was employed by the Philippine
Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC), another
government-owned and controlled corporation. In
1995, after the PNB management unearthed
many irregularities and violations of the bank's
rules and regulations, dela Renta was found to have
manipulated certain accounts involving trust
funds and time deposits of depositors. After
investigation, he was charged with malversation of
public funds before the Sandiganbayan. He filed a
motion to dismiss contending he was no longer an
employee of the PNB but of the PDIC. (2006)
a. Is dela Renta's contention tenable?
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 QUAMTO FOR CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
A: No, dela Renta's contention is not tenable for these
reasons:
1. His contention that he is no longer an employee of
PNB but of PDIC has no merit since both PNB and
PDIC are government institutions and the funds
thereof belong to the same Government who suffers
from the malversation; (Sec. 4, PD 1606, as
amended).
2. Resignation or separation from office is not a
ground for extinguishing criminal liability under
Art. 89 of the Revised Penal Code, for any crime
committed while the offender was connected with
the office; and
3. The crime of malversation was discovered only in
1995 and so, the prescriptive period of the crime
only commenced to run from then. Obviously, the
amount misappropriated exceeds P200.00 and so
the prescribed penalty is within the range of prision
mayor already. Crimes punishable by prision mayor
prescribes in 15 years. From 1995 to the present
(2006) is only around 11 years. Hence the crime can
still be prosecuted.
A: The contention of Henry dela Renta is not tenable.
Dela Renta may be prosecuted for malversation even if
he had ceased to be an employee of the PNB. At the time
of the commission of the offense, PNB was a
government owned and controlled corporation and
therefore, any crime committed by the Regional Bank
Auditor, who is a public officer, is subject to the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan (See R.A. 7975, as
amended by RA. 8249).
b. After his arraignment, the prosecution filed a
motion for his suspension pendente lite, to
which he filed an opposition claiming that he can
no longer be suspended as he is no longer an
employee of the PNB but that of the PDIC.
Explain whether he may or may not be
suspended.
A: Dela Renta may still be suspended pendente lite
despite holding a different public office, the PDIC, when
he was charged. The term "office" in Sec. 13 of R.A.
3019 applies to any office which the officer might
currently be holding and not necessarily the office or
position in relation to which he is charged.
Q: Allan, the Municipal Treasurer of the Municipality
of Gerona, was in a hurry to return to his office after
a day-long official conference. He alighted from
the government car which was officially assigned to
him, leaving the ignition key and the car unlocked,
and rushed to his office. Jules, a bystander, drove off
with the car and later sold the same to his
brother, Danny for P20,000.00, although the car
was worth P800,000.00.
a. What are the respective crimes, if any,
committed by Allan, Danny and Jules? Explain.
(2005)
A: Allan, the municipal treasurer is liable for
malversation committed through negligence or culpa.
The government car which was assigned to him is public
property under his accountability by reason of his
duties. By his act of negligence, he permitted the taking
of the car by another person, resulting in malversation,
consistent with the language of Art. 217 of RPC. Danny
violated the Anti-Fencing Law. He is in possession of an
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
item which is the subject of thievery. P.D. 1612 (Anti-
Fencing Law) under Sec. 5 provides that mere
possession of any good, article, item, object or anything
of value which has been the subject of robbery or
thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing. Jules is
guilty of carnapping. He took the motor vehicle
belonging to another without the latter's consent (R.A.
No. 6539).
b. What, if any, are their respective civil liabilities?
Explain.
A: Allan is under obligation to restitute the vehicle or
make reparation if not possible. Jules must pay the
amount he gained from the sale of the car which is
P20,000.00. Danny must make reparation
corresponding to the value of the car which is
P800,000.00.
Q: Accused Juan Santos, a deputy sheriff in a
Regional Trial Court, levied on the personal
properties of a defendant in a civil case before said
court, pursuant to a writ of execution duly issued
by the court. Among the properties levied upon and
deposited inside the "evidence room" of the Clerk
of Court for Multiple RTC Salas were a
refrigerator, a stock of cassette tapes, a dining table
set of chairs and several lampshades. Upon the
defendants paying off the judgment creditor, he
tried to claim his properties but found out that
several items were missing, such as the cassette
tapes, chairs and lampshades. After due and
diligent sleuthing by the police detectives
assigned to the case, these missing items were found
in the house of accused Santos, who reasoned out
that he only borrowed them temporarily. If you
were the fiscal/prosecutor, what would be the
nature of the information to be filed against the
accused? Why? (2001)
A: If I were the fiscal/prosecutor, I would file an
information for Malversation against Juan Santos for the
cassette tapes, chain and lampshades which he, as
deputy sheriff, levied upon and thus under his
accountability as a public officer. Said properties being
under levy, are in custodia legis and thus impressed with
the character of public property, misappropriation of
which constitutes the crime of malversation although
said properties belonged to a private individual (Art.
222, RPC). Juan Santos misappropriated such properties
when, in breach of trust, he applied them to his own
private use and benefit. His allegation that he only
borrowed such properties is a lame excuse, devoid of
merit as there is no one from whom he borrowed the
same. The fact that it was only "after due and diligent
sleuthing by the police detectives assigned to the case",
that the missing items were found in the house of
Santos, negates his pretension.
Q: Alex Reyes, together with Jose Santos, were
former warehousemen of the Rustan Department
Store. In 1986, the PCGG sequestered the assets,
fund and properties of the owners-incorporators of
the store, alleging that they constitute "Ill-gotten
wealth" of the Marcos family. Upon their application,
Reyes and Santos were appointed as fiscal agents of
the sequestered firm and they were given custody
and possession of the sequestered building and its
contents, including various vehicles used in the
47
firm's operations. After a few months, an inventory
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 QuAMTO for CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
was conducted and it was discovered that two (2)
delivery vans were missing. After demand was made
upon them, Reyes and Santos failed to give any
satisfactory explanation why the vans were missing
or to turn them over to the PCGG; hence, they were
charged with Malversation of Public Property.
During the trial, the two accused claimed that they
are not public accountable officers and, if any crime
was committed, it should only be Estafa under Art.
315, par. l(b) of the Revised Penal Code. What is the
proper offense committed? State the reason(s) for
your answer. (2001)
A: The proper offense committed was Malversation of
Public Property, not estafa, considering that Reyes and
Santos, upon their application, were constituted as
"fiscal agents" of the sequestered firm and were "given
custody and possession" of the sequestered properties,
including the delivery vans which later they could not
account for. They were thus made the depositary and
administrator of properties deposited by public
authority and hence, by the duties of their
office/position, they are accountable for such properties.
Such properties, having been sequestered by the
Government through the PCGG, are in custodia legis
and therefore impressed with the character of public
property, even though the properties belong to a private
individual (Art. 222, RPC).The failure of Reyes and
Santos to give any satisfactory explanation why the vans
were missing, is prima facie evidence that they had put
the same to their personal use.
Q: A Municipal Treasurer, accountable for public
funds or property, encashed with public funds
private checks drawn in favor of his wife. The checks
bounced, the drawer not having enough cash in the
drawee bank. The Municipal Treasurer, in encashing
private checks from public funds, violated
regulations of his office. Notwithstanding restitution
of the amount of the checks, can the Municipal
Treasurer nevertheless be criminally liable? What
crime did he commit? Explain. (1999)
A: Yes, notwithstanding the restitution of the amount of
the check, the Municipal Treasurer will be criminally
liable as restitution does not negate criminal liability
although it may be considered as a mitigating
circumstance similar or analogous to voluntary
surrender. (People v. Velasquez, GR No. L-47741, April 28,
1941). He will be criminally liable for malversation.
However, if the restitution was made immediately,
under vehement protest against an imputation of
malversation and without leaving the office, he may not
be criminally liable.
Q: Elizabeth is the municipal treasurer of Masinloc,
Zambales. On January 10, 1994, she received, as
municipal treasurer, from the Department of Public
Works and Highways, the amount of P100, 000.00
known as the fund for construction, rehabilitation,
betterment, and Improvement (CRBI) for the
concreting of Barangay Phanix Road located in
Masinloc, Zambales, a project undertaken on
proposal of the Barangay Captain. Informed that the
fund was already exhausted while the concreting of
Barangay Phanix Road remained unfinished, a
representative of the Commission on Audit
conducted a spot audit of Elizabeth who failed to
account for the Pl00,000 CRBI fund. Elizabeth, who
was charged with malversation of public funds, was
*QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as suggested by UPLC and other distinct
luminaries in the academe, and updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the 2016 Bar Exams.
acquitted by the Sandiganbayan of that charge but
was nevertheless convicted, in the same criminal
case, for illegal use of public funds. On appeal,
Elizabeth argued that her conviction was
erroneous as she applied the amount of P50,000.00
for a public purpose without violating any law or
ordinance appropriating the said amount for any
specific purpose. The absence of such law or
ordinance was, in fact, established. Is the contention
of Elizabeth legally tenable? Explain. (1996)
A: Elizabeth's contention that her conviction for illegal
use of public funds (technical malversation) was
erroneous is legally tenable because she was charged for
malversation of public funds under Art. 217 of the RPC
but was convicted for Illegal use of public funds which is
defined and punished under Art. 220. A public officer
charged with malversation may not be validly convicted
of illegal use of public funds (technical malversation)
because the latter crime is not necessarily included nor
does it necessarily include the crime of malversation.
The Sandiganbayan should have followed the procedure
provided in Sec. 11, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court and
order the filing of the proper Information (Parungao v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 96025, May 15, 1991). From the
facts, there is no showing that there is a law or
ordinance appropriating the amount to a specific public
purpose. As a matter of fact, the problem categorically
states that the absence of such law or ordinance was, in
fact, established." So, procedurally and substantially, the
Sandiganbayan's decision suffers from serious infirmity.
Q: Randy, an NBI agent, was issued by the NBI an
armalite rifle (Ml6) and a Smith and Wesson
Revolver. Cal. 38. After a year, the NBI Director made
an inspection of all the firearms issued. Randy, who
reported for work that morning, did not show up
during the inspection. He went on absence without
leave (AWOL). After two years, he surrendered to
the NBI the two firearms issued to him. He was
charged with malversation of government property
before the Sandiganbayan. Randy put up the defense
that he did not appropriate the armalite rifle and the
revolver for his own use, that the delay in
accounting for them does not constitute conversion
and that actually the firearms were stolen by his
friend, Chiting. Decide the case. (1994)
A: Randy is guilty as charged under Art. 217, RPC. He is
accountable for the firearms they issued to him in his
official capacity. The failure of Randy to submit the
firearms upon demand created the presumption that he
converted them for his own use. Even if there is no
direct evidence of misappropriation, his failure to
account for the government property is enough factual
basis for a finding of malversation. Indeed, even his
explanation that the guns were stolen is incredible for if
the firearms were actually stolen, he should have
reported the matter immediately to the authorities.
Infidelity in the Custody of Prisoners
(Article 223-230)
Q: During a town fiesta, A, the chief of police,
permitted B, a detention prisoner and his
compadre, to leave the municipal jail and entertain
visitors in his house from 10:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. B
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 QUAMTO FOR CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
returned to the municipal jail at 8:30 p.m. Was there
any crime committed by A? (1997)
A: Yes, A committed the crime of infidelity in the custody
of a prisoner since B is a detention prisoner. As Chief of
Police, A has custody over B. Even if B returned to the
municipal jail at 8:30 p.m. A, as custodian of the
prisoner, has maliciously failed to perform the duties of
his office, and when he permits said prisoner to obtain a
relaxation of his imprisonment, he consents to the
prisoner escaping the punishment of being deprived of
his liberty which can be considered real and actual
evasion of service under Art. 223 of RPC (US v. Bandino,
G.R. No. 9964. February 11, 1915).
Q: A chief of police of a municipality, believing in
good faith that a prisoner serving a ten-day sentence
in the municipal jail, would not escape, allowed said
prisoner to sleep at the latter's house because the
municipal jail was so congested and there was no
bed space available. Accordingly, the prisoner went
home to sleep every night but returned to jail early
each morning, until the ten-day sentence had been
fully served. Did the Chief of Police commit any
crime? Explain. (1996)
A: The Chief of Police is guilty of violation of Art. 223 of
RPC, consenting or conniving to evasion, the elements of
which are (a) he is a public officer, (b) he is in charge or
custody of a prisoner, detention or prisoner by final
judgment, (c) that the prisoner escaped, and (d) there
must be connivance. Relaxation of a prisoner is
considered infidelity, thus making the penalty
ineffectual, although the convict may not have (US v.
Bandino, G.R. No. 9964. February 11, 1915). It is still
violative of the provision. It also includes a case when
the guard allowed the prisoner, who is serving a six-day
sentence in the municipal jail, to sleep in his house and
eat there (People v. Revilla).
Maltreatment of Prisoners (Article 235)
Q: AA was arrested for committing a bailable offense
and detained in solitary confinement. He was able to
post bail after two (2) weeks of defection. During the
period of detention, he was not given any food. Such
deprivation caused him physically discomfort. What
crime, if any, was committed in connection with the
solitary confinement and food deprivation of AA?
Explain your answer. (2012)
A: The crime of torture and maltreatment of prisoner is
committed. Food deprivation and confinement in
solitary cell are considered as physical and
psychological torture under Sec. 4(2) of the Anti-Torture
Act of 2009 or R.A. 9745. Torture refers to an act by
which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such
purposes as obtaining from him/her or a third person
information or a confession; punishing him/her for an
act which he/she or a third person has committed or is
suspected of having committed; or intimidating or
coercing him/her or a third person; or for any reason
based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or
suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with
the consent of acquiescence of a person in authority or
agent of a person in authority (R.A. 9745, Sec. 3).
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
(R.A. No. 3019, as amended)
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
Q: Malo, a clerk of court of a trial court, promised the
accused in a drug case pending before the court, that
he would convince the judge to acquit him for a
consideration of P5 million. The accused agreed and
delivered the money, through his lawyer, to the
clerk of court. The judge, not knowing of the deal,
proceeded to rule on the evidence and convicted the
accused. (2014)
a. Malo was charged with violation of Section 3(b),
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, which prohibits a
public officer from directly or indirectly
requesting or receiving any gift, present, share
percentage or benefit wherein the public officer,
in his official capacity, has to intervene under
the law. He was later charged also with indirect
bribery under the Revised Penal Code. Malo
claims he can no longer be charged under the
Revised Penal Code for the same act under R.A.
3019. Is he correct?
A: No. One may be charged with violation of R.A. 3019 in
addition to a felony under the RPC for the same delictual
act, either concurrently or subsequent to being charged
with a felony under the RPC. This is very clear from Sec.
3 of R.A. 3019. Also, R.A. 3019 is a special law, the
elements of the crime is not the same as those punished
under the RPC.
b. Malo was charged with estafa under Article 315
because he misrepresented that he had influence,
when he actually had none. Is the charge correct?
A: Yes, estafa is committed by any person who shall ask
for money from another for the alleged purpose of
bribing a government employee when in truth the
offender intended to convert the money to his own
personal use and benefit (Art. 315(2)(c), RPC).
Q: May a public officer charged under Section 3(b) of
Republic Act No. 3019 directly or indirectly
requesting or receiving any gift, present, share,
percentage or benefit, for himself or for any other
person, in connection with any contract or
transaction between the government and any other
party, wherein the public officer in his official
capacity has to intervene under the law" also be
simultaneously or successively charged with direct
bribery under Article 210 of the Revised Penal
Code? Explain. (2010)
A: Yes, a public officer charged under Sec. 3 (b) of R.A.
3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) may also be
charged simultaneously or successively for the crime of
direct bribery under Art. 210 of the RPC, because the
two crimes are essentially different and are penalized
under distinct legal philosophies. Whereas violation of
Sec. 3(b) of R.A. 3019 is a malum prohibitum, the crime
under Art. 20 of the Code is a malum in se.
Q: Proserfina, an assistant public high school
principal, acted to facilitate the release of salary
differentials and election duty per diem of
classroom teachers with the agreement that they
would reimburse her for her expenses. Did
Proserfina commit a crime? Explain. (2010)
A: Yes, Proserfina committed violation of Sec. 3 (b) of
49
R.A. 3019 which considers as a corrupt practice, the act
TEAM BAROPS
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016
 QuAMTO for CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
of (b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any
gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or
for any other person, in connection with any contract or
transaction between the Government and any other
party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity
has to intervene under the law. Being the assistant
public high school principal, it is her duty to intervene in
the release of salary differentials and per diem of
classroom teachers under her. Her act of doing so, made
with a request for a share of benefit therefor constitutes
graft or corrupt practice under Sec. 3 (b) of Rep. Act No.
3019. Considering that the acts prohibited or punished
under this law are mala prohibita, and thus punishable
thereunder, whether done with criminal intent or not.
Q: Charina, Clerk of Court of an RTC Branch,
promised the plaintiff in a case pending before the
court that she would convince the Presiding Judge to
decide the case in plaintiffs favor. In consideration
therefor, the plaintiff gave Charina P20,000.00.
Charina was charged with violation of Section 3 (b)
of Republic Act No. 3019, prohibiting any public
officer from directly or indirectly requesting or
receiving any gift, present, percentage, or benefit in
connection with any contract or transaction x x x
wherein the public officer, in his official capacity,
has to intervene under the law. While the case was
being tried, the Ombudsman filed another
information against Charina for Indirect Bribery
under the Revised Penal Code. Charina demurred to
the second information, claiming that she can no
longer be charged under the Revised Penal Code
having been charged for the same act under R.A.
3019. Is Charina correct? Explain. (2009)
A: No, Charina is not correct. Although the charge for
violation of R.A. No. 3019 and the charge for Indirect
Bribery (Art. 211, RPC) arose from the same act, the
elements of the violation charged under R.A. No. 3019
are not the same as the felony charged for Indirect
Bribery under the RPC (Mejia v. Pamaran, G.R. No. L-
56741-42 April 15, 1988). Hence, the crime charged is
separate and distinct from each other, with different
penalties. The two charges do not constitute a ground
for a motion to dismiss or motion to quash as there is no
jeopardy against the accused.
Q: The Central Bank (Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas),
by a resolution of the monetary board, hires Theof
Sto. Tomas, a retired manager of a leading bank
as a consultant. Theof later receives a valuable gift
from a bank under investigation by the Central
Bank. May Thereof be prosecuted under Republic
Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)
for accepting such a gift? Explain. (2003)
A: No, Theof may not be prosecuted under Rep. Act
3019, but may be prosecuted for violation of P.D. 46,
under which such act of receiving a valuable gift is
punished. Although Theof is a "public officer" within
the application of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act (R.A. 3019), yet his act of receiving such gift does not
appear to be included among the punishable acts under
R.A. 3019 since he is not to intervene in his official
capacity in the investigation of the bank which gave the
gift. Penal laws must be strictly construed against the
State. In any case, Thereof is administratively liable.
Q: A month after the arraignment of Brad Kit
Commissioner of the Housing and Land Use
*QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as suggested by UPLC and other distinct
luminaries in the academe, and updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the 2016 Bar Exams.
Regulatory Board, who was charged with violation
of Section 3 (h) of Republic Act 3019 (Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act) before the Sandiganbayan,
the Office of the Special Prosecutor filed a Motion to
Suspend Accused Pendente Lite pursuant to Section
13 of the Anti-Graft Law. The Court granted the
motion and suspended accused Brad Kit for a period
of 90 days. Accused assailed the constitutional
validity of the suspension order on the ground that
it partakes of a penalty before Judgment of
conviction is reached and is thus violative of his
constitutional right to be presumed innocent. He
also claimed that this provision of the law on
suspension pendente lite applies only to elective
officials and not to appointed ones like him. Rule
with reasons. (2000)
A: The suspension order does not partake of a penalty
and is thus not violative of Brad Kit's constitutional right
to be presumed innocent. Under the law, the accused
public officers shall be suspended from office while the
criminal prosecution is pending in court (R.A. 3019, Sec.
13). Such preventive suspension is mandatory to
prevent the accused from hampering the normal
course of the investigation (Rios v. Sandiganbayan,
[G.R. No. 129913, September 26, 1997; Bunye v. Escareal,
G.R. No. 110216, September 10, 1993).
Neither is there merit in Brad Kits claim that the
provision on suspension pendente lite applies only to
elective officials and not to appointed ones like him. It
applies to all public officials indicted upon a valid
information under R.A. No. 3019, whether they be
appointive or elective officials; or permanent or
temporary employees, or pertaining to the career or
non-career service
Q: A public officer was accused before the
Sandiganbayan of a violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A.
No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Just after arraignment and even before evidence
was presented, the Sandiganbayan issued an order
for his suspension pendente lite. The accused
questioned the said Order contending that it is
violative of the constitutional provision against an
ex post facto law. (1999)
a. Will you sustain the objection of the accused?
Why?
A: No, I will not sustain the objection of the accused.
Suspension of the accused pendente lite is not violative
of the constitutional provision against ex-post facto law.
Ex-post facto law means making an innocent act a crime
before it is made punishable.
b. What pre-conditions are necessary to be met or
satisfied before preventive suspension may be
ordered?
A: The pre-conditions necessary to be met or satisfied
before a suspension may be ordered are: (1) there must
be proper notice requiring the accused to show cause at
a specific date of hearing why he should not be ordered
suspended from office pursuant to R.A. 3019, as
amended; and (2) there must be a determination of a
valid information against the accused that warrants his
suspension.
50
 QUAMTO FOR CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
Q: A is charged with the crime defined in Section
3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act in an
Information that reads: That from 01 to 30 January
1995, in the City of Pasig and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the accused, being then
employed in the Office of the District Engineer,
Department of Public Works and Highways and in
the discharge of his official administrative
functions, did then and there willfully and
unlawfully work for and facilitate the approval of B's
claim for the payment of the price of his land which
the government had expropriated, and after the
claim was approved, the accused gave B
onlyP1,000.00 of the approved claim of P5,000
and willfully and unlawfully appropriated for
himself the balance of P4,000, thus causing undue
injury to B and the Government." A has filed a
motion to quash the information, contending that it
does not charge an offense. Is he correct? (1997)
A: Yes, the contention of A is correct. The information
failed to allege that the undue injury to B and the
government was caused by the accused's manifest
partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable
negligence, which are necessary elements of the offense
charged, i.e. violation of Sect. 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. The accused is employed in the
Office of the District Engineer of the DPWH which has
nothing to do with the determination and fixing of the
price of the land expropriated, and for which
expropriated land the Government is legally obligated to
pay. There is no allegation in the information that the
land was overpriced or that the payment of the amount
was disadvantageous to the Government. It appears that
the charge was solely based on the accused having
followed up the payment for B's land which the
Government has already appropriated, and that the
accused eventually withheld for himself from the price
of the said land, the amount of P4,000 for his services.
No violation of Sec. 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Act appears. At most, the accused should be merely
charged administratively.
Anti-Plunder Act (R.A. No. 7080, as amended)
Q: City Engr. A, is the city engineer and the Chairman
of the Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) of the City
of Kawawa. In 2009, the City of Kawawa, through an
ordinance, allotted the amount of P100 million for
the construction of a road leading to the poblacion.
City Engr. A instead, diverted the construction of the
road leading to his farm. Investigation further
showed that he accepted money in the amount
of P10 million each from three (3) contending
bidders, who eventually lost in the bidding.
Audit report likewise showed that service vehicles
valued at P2 million could not be accounted for
although reports showed that these were lent to City
Engr. As authorized drivers but the same were
never returned. Further, there were funds under
City Engr. As custody amounting to P10 million
which were found to be missing and could not be
accounted for. In another project, he was
instrumentalin awarding a contract for the
construction of a city school building costing P10
million to a close relative, although the lowest bid
was P8 million. Investigation also revealed that City
Engr. A has a net worth of more than P50 million,
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
which was way beyond his legitimate income.
(2014)
a. If you are the Ombudsman, what charge or
charges will you file against City Engr. A?
A: If I am the Ombudsman, I would file a case of Plunder
under R.A. 7080 agasint City Engr. A. It is very clear from
the facts given that all the elements of plunder are
present, namely:
1. The offender is a public officer holding a public
office in the Government of the Republic of the
Phlippines;
2. The offender amassed, accumulated, or acquired ill-
gotten wealth through a combination of overt or
criminal acts of misuse, misaapropriation,
conversion or malversation of public funds,
receiving kickbacks from persons in connection
with a government contract or project by reason of
his office or position and illegally or fraudulently
conveying or disposing of assets belonging to the
national government or any of its subdivisions; and
3. The aggregate amount or total value of the ill gotten
wealth amassed, accumulated, or acquired is at least
P50M.
b. Suppose the discovered net worth of City Engr. A
is less than P50 million, will your answer still be
the same?
A: Yes, the answer will be the same since in plunder the
basis is the combination of criminal acts or series of acts,
which constitutes the accumulation of more than P50M.
The predicate crimes are already absorbed in the crime
of plunder. City Engr. As net worth being less than
P50M is not determinative of his liability, as long as the
wealth amassed/ accumulated is more than P50M.
Q: Through kickbacks, percentages or
commissions and other fraudulent
schemes/conveyances and taking advantage of his
position, Andy, a former mayor of a suburban town,
acquired assets amounting to P10 billion which is
grossly disproportionate to his lawful income. Due
to his influence and connections and despite
knowledge by the authorities of his Ill-gotten wealth,
he was charged with the crime of plunder only after
twenty (20) years from his defeat in the last
elections he participated in. (1993)
a. May Andy still be held criminally liable? Why?
A: Andy will not be criminally liable because Section 6 of
RA 7080 provides that the crime punishable under this
Act shall prescribe in twenty years and the problem
asked whether Andy can still be charged with the crime
of plunder after 20 years.
b. Can the State still recover the properties and
assets that he illegally acquired, the bulk of
which is in the name of his wife and children?
Reason out.
A: Yes, because Section 6 provides that recovery of
properties unlawfully acquired by public officers from
them or their nominees or transferees shall not be
barred by prescription, laches or estoppel.
CRIMES AGAINST PERSON (Article 246 266)
51
TEAM BAROPS
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016
 QuAMTO for CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
Parricide (Article 246)
Q: Who may be guilty of the crime of parricide?
(1999)
A: Any person who kills his father, mother, or child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, or his ascendants or
descendants, or spouse, shall be guilty of parricide. (Art.
246, RPC)
Q: After a heated argument over his philandering,
Higino punched on the head his wife Aika, who was
six and a half months pregnant. Because of the
impact, Aika lost her balance, fell on the floor with
her head hitting a hard object. Aika died and the
child was expelled prematurely. After thirty-six
hours, the child died. (2015)
a. What crime(s) did Higino commit? Explain.
A: With respect to the killing of the wife, parricide under
Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is committed
because of the qualifying circumstance of relationship.
With respect to the killing of the child, Higino is liable
for infanticide under Article 255 of the Revised Penal
Code because his child was born alive and was already
viable or capable of independent existence and the
childs age is less than three (3) days for the latter died
after thirty-six hours from expulsion. Higino shall incur
criminal liability for parricide and infanticide although
these crimes committed are different from his criminal
intention of maltreating his wife (Article 4, RPC).
Inasmuch as the single act of Higino produced two grave
felonies, it falls under Art. 48, RPC, ie. a complex crime.
b. Assuming that when the incident occurred, Aika
was only six months pregnant, and when she
died, the fetus inside her womb also died, will
your answer be different? Explain.
A: If the child died inside the womb of Aika, who was
only six months, the crime committed is complex crime
of parricide with unintentional abortion. Killing the
unborn child as a result of the violence employed against
the mother without intent to abort is unintentional
abortion. Since the child died inside the womb of the
mother, unintentional abortion is committed regardless
of viability of the victim. Because the same violence that
killed the mother also caused unintentional abortion, the
crime committed is a complex crime (People v. Pacayna,
Jr. G.R. No. 179035, April 16, 2008; People v. Robinos, G.R.
No. 138453, May 29, 2002; People v. Villanueva, G.R. No.
95851, March 01, 1995; People v. Salufrania, G.R. No. L-
50884, March 30, 1988).
Q: In 1975, Pedro, then a resident of Manila,
abandoned his wife and their son, Ricky, who was
then only three years old. Twenty years later, an
affray took place in a bar in Olongapo City between
Pedro and his companions, on one hand, and Ricky
and his friends, upon the other, without the father
and son knowing each other. Ricky stabbed and
killed Pedro in the fight, only to find out, a week
later, when his mother arrived from Manila to visit
him in jail, that the man whom he killed was his own
father. (1996)
a. What crime did Ricky commit? Explain.
*QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as suggested by UPLC and other distinct
luminaries in the academe, and updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the 2016 Bar Exams.
A: Ricky committed parricide because the person killed
was his own father, and the law punishing the crime
(Art. 246, RPC) does not require that the crime be
"knowingly" committed. Should Ricky be prosecuted and
found guilty of parricide, the penalty to be imposed is
Art. 49 of the RPC for Homicide (the crime he intended
to commit) but in its maximum period.
b. Suppose Ricky knew before the killing that
Pedro is his father, but he nevertheless killed
him out of bitterness for having abandoned him
and his mother, what crime did Ricky commit?
Explain.
A: The crime committed should be parricide if Ricky
knew before the killing that Pedro is his father, because
the moral basis for punishing the crime already exists.
His having acted out of bitterness for having been
abandoned by his father may be considered mitigating.
Q: A, a young housewife, and B, her paramour,
conspired to kill C, her husband, to whom she was
lawfully married, A and B bought pancit and mixed it
with poison. A gave the food with poison to C, but
before C could eat it. D, her illegitimate father, and E,
her legitimate son, arrived. C, D, and E shared the
food in the presence of A who merely watched them
eating. C, D, and E died because of having partaken
of the poisoned food. What crime or crimes did A
and B commit? (1997)
A: A committed the crime of multiple parricide for the
killing of C, her lawful husband, D, her illegitimate
father, and E, her legitimate son. All these killings
constitute parricide under Art. 246 of the RPC because
of her relationship with the victims. B committed the
crime of murder as a co-conspirator of A in the killing of
C because the killing was carried out by means of poison
(Art. 248[3], RPC). But for feloniously causing the death
of D and E, B committed two counts of homicide. The
plan was only to kill C.
Q: Aldrich was dismissed from his Job by his
employer. Upon reaching home, his pregnant wife,
Carmi, nagged him about money for her medicines.
Depressed by his dismissal and angered by the
nagging of his wife, Aldrich struck Carmi with his
fist. She fell to the ground. As a result, she and her
unborn baby died. What crime was committed by
Aldrich? (1994)
A: Aldrich committed the crime of parricide with
unintentional abortion. When Aldrich struck his wife,
Carmi, with his fist, he committed the crime of
maltreatment under Art. 266(3) of RPC. Since Carmi
died because of the felonious act of Aldrich, he is
criminally liable of parricide under Art. 246, RPC in
relation to Art. 4(1) of the same Code. Since the unborn
baby of Carmi died in the process, but Aldrich had no
intention to cause the abortion of his wife, Aldrich
committed unintentional abortion as defined in Art.
257, RPC. Inasmuch as the single act of Aldrich produced
two grave or less grave felonies, he falls under Art. 48,
RPC, ie. a complex crime.
Death or Physical Injuries Inflicted Under
Exceptional Circumstances (Article 247)
Q: Procopio, a call center agent assigned at a
52
graveyard shift, went home earlier than usual. He
 QUAMTO FOR CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
proceeded immediately to their bedroom to change
his clothes. To his surprise, he found his wife Bionci
in bed making love to another woman Magna.
Enraged, Procopio grabbed a knife nearby and
stabbed Bionci, who died. (2015)
a. What crime did Procopio commit, and what
circumstance attended the case? Explain.
A: The crime committed by Procopio is parricide
qualified by the circumstance of relationship. Killing a
spouse after having been surprised in the act of
committing sexual intercourse with another woman is
death under exceptional circumstance under Article 247
of the Revised Penal Code. However, in this case this is
not death under exceptional circumstance because
Bionci was having homosexual intercourse with another
woman and not sexual intercourse with a man.
Homosexual intercourse is not within the
contemplation of the term sexual intercourse in Article
247. However, the crime of parricide is attended by the
circumstance of passion arising from a lawful sentiment
as a result of having caught his wife in the act of
infidelity with another woman (People v. Belarmino, G.R.
No. L-4429, April 18, 1952, En Banc).
b. Assuming that Procopio and Bionci were
common-law spouses,will your answer be the
same? Explain.
A: No, the answer is not the same. The crime committed
is Homicide if Procopio and Bionci were common law
spouses. Parricide contemplates killing by spouse who
are legally married.
Q: A and B are husband and wife. A is employed as a
security guard at Landmark, his shift being from
11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. One night, he felt sick and
cold, hence, he decided to go home around midnight
after getting permission from his duty officer. Upon
reaching the front yard of his home, he noticed that
the light in the master bedroom was on and that the
bedroom window was open. Approaching the front
door, he was surprised to hear sighs and giggles
inside the bedroom. He opened the door very
carefully and peeped inside where he saw his wife B
having sexual intercourse with their neighbor C. A
rushed inside and grabbed C but the latter managed
to wrest himself free and jumped out of the window,
A followed suit and managed to catch C again and
after a furious struggle, managed also to strangle
him to death. A then rushed back to his bedroom
where his wife B was cowering under the bed covers.
Still enraged, A hit B with fist blows and rendered
her unconscious. The police arrived after being
summoned by their neighbors and arrested A who
was detained, inquested and charged for the death
of C and serious physical Injuries of B. (2005, 2001)
a. Is A liable for C's death? Why?
A: Yes, A is liable for C's death but under the exceptional
circumstances in Art. 247 of the RPC, where only
destierro is prescribed. Art. 247 governs since A
surprised his wife B in the act of having sexual
intercourse with C, and the killing of C was "immediately
thereafter" as the discovery, escape, pursuit and killing
of C form one continuous act. A person who commits
acts penalized under Art. 247 is still criminally liable.
However, this is merely an exempting circumstance
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
when the victim suffers any other kind of physical
injury. A will suffer the penalty of destierro.
b. Is A liable for B's injuries? Why?
A: Likewise, A is liable for the serious physical injuries
he inflicted on his wife B but under the same exceptional
circumstances in Art. 247 of the RPC, for the same
reasons.
Q: At 10:00 oclock in the evening of 10 November
1990, upon his arrival from Cebu City, Marco
surprised his wife, Rosette, and her former
boyfriend, Raul, both naked and in the act of illicit
copulation. Raul got his revolver and, upon seeing
the revolver, Marco ran toward the street, took a
pedicab and proceeded to the house of his brother,
a policeman, from whom he borrowed a revolver.
With the weapon, he returned to his residence.
Unable to find Raul and Rosette, Marco proceeded
to a disco jointly owned and operated by Raul. It
was already 11:00 oclock that evening when he
arrived at the joint. Upon seeing Raul with two (2)
male companions, A and B, drinking beer at one of
the tables, Marco fired two (2) shots at Raul, who
was hit on his forehead with one of the bullets; the
other bullet hit A, injuring him on his stomach. As a
consequence of the gunshot wound, Raul died
instantaneously. Due to the timely medical
attention given to him, A survived; he was, however,
hospitalized for 45 days. Marco was prosecuted for
Murder for the death of Raul and for frustrated
murder in the case of A. The informations in both
cases allege the qualifying circumstances of evident
premeditation and treachery and the generic
aggravating circumstance of nighttime. You are
Marcos lawyer. What would be your defense(s)?
A: The defense with respect to the death of Raul is
death under exceptional circumstances (Art. 247, RPC,
People v. Abarca, G.R. No. 74433 September 14, 1987).
Although the killing happened one hour after having
surprised the spouse, that would still be within the
context of immediately thereafter. With respect to the
wounding of the stranger, the defense of lawful exercise
of a right is a justifying circumstance under Art. 11(5)
could be invoked. At the time accused shot Raul, he was
not committing a felonious act and therefore could not
have been criminality liable under Art. 4, RPC.
Murder (Article 248)
Q: Define murder. What are the elements of the
crime? (1999)
A: Murder is the unlawful killing of a person which
otherwise would constitute only homicide, had it not
been attended by any of the following circumstances:
1. With treachery or taking advantage of superior
strength, or with the aid of armed men, or
employing means to weaken the defense or of
means or persons to insure or afford impunity;
2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise;
3. By means or on the occasion of inundation, fire,
poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel,
derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of an
airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or with the
use of any other means involving great waste and
ruin;
53
TEAM BAROPS
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016
 QuAMTO for CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
4. On occasion of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano,
destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public
calamity;
5. With evident premeditation;
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly
augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging
or scoffing at his person or corpse.
The elements of murder are: (1) that a person was
unlawfully killed; (2) that such a killing was attended by
any of the above-mentioned circumstances; (3) that the
killing is not parricide nor infanticide; and (4) that the
accused killed the victim.
Q: Honesto and Wilma were married but had been
living separately due to irreconcilable differences.
Honesto later met Celia and fell in love with her.
Thinking that he could marry Celia if Wilma were to
die, Honesto decided to kill Wilma. He secretly
followed Wilma for weeks to learn her daily routine.
He decided to kill her at night on her way home. On
the night he was to kill Wilma, Honesto wore dark
clothes so that he would not be easily seen. He
waited in the dark alley for Wilma to pass by. He saw
someone whom he thought looked like Wilma and
shot her with a revolver. The bullet passed through
the person's head and grazed another passerby's
arm. Some bystanders who heard the shot were able
to stop Honesto. It turned out that Wilma did not
report for work on that day, and the one who was
shot in the head was Melba, who died. The passerby
whose arm was grazed by the bullet required
medical attendance for two days. (2015)
a. What crime(s) did Honesto commit? Explain.
A: Honesto is liable for murder qualified by the
circumstance of treachery for killing Melba due to error
in personae or mistake of identity and slight physical
injuries for the wound sustained by the passerby due to
aberratio ictus or mistake of blow. Although his
intention to commit parricide, he is liable for murder
and slight physical injuries since they are the direct,
natural and logical consequence of act committed with
intent to kill his wife.
b. Will your answer be the same, assuming that the
other passerby was hit in the left eye which caused
his/her blindness? Explain.
A: If the passerby was hit in the left eye causing
blindness, the crime committed by Honesto is serious
physical injuries. Unlike slight physical injuries, serious
physical injuries can be made a component of a complex
crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. Since
a single act of shooting the victim constitutes murder
and serious physical injuries, they can be merged
together to form a complex crime. Thus, my answer
would be different since the crime would be Murder
with Serious physical injuries.
Q: Lito, a minor, was bullied by Brutus, his
classmate. Having had enough, Lito got the key to the
safe where his father kept his licensed pistol and
took the weapon. Knowing that Brutus usually hung
out at a nearby abandoned building after class, Lito
went ahead and hid while waiting for Brutus. When
Lito was convinced that Brutus was alone, he shot
Brutus, who died on the spot. Lito then hid the gun
in one of the empty containers. At the time of the
*QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as suggested by UPLC and other distinct
luminaries in the academe, and updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the 2016 Bar Exams.
shooting, Lito was fifteen years and one month old.
What is Lito's criminal liability? Explain. (2015)
A: Lito is criminally liable for murder qualified by the
circumstance of treachery, or evident premeditation, as
well as illegal possession of firearms. Minority is not an
exempting under Section 7 of RA No. 9644 since his age
is above fifteen years but below eighteen years and he
acted with discernment. Circumstance will show that he
discerned the consequences of his criminal acts as
shown from the fact he employed means to make a
surprise attack and he even hid the murder weapon in
an empty container. It was also clear that he planned the
killing. However, minority will be considered as a
privileged mitigating circumstance, which will require
the graduation of the penalty prescribed by law to one
degree lower (Article 68).
Q: Roger, the leader of a crime syndicate in Malate,
Manila, demanded the payment by Antonio, the
owner of a motel in that area, of P10,000 a month as
"protection money". With the monthly payment,
Roger assured, the syndicate would provide
protection to Antonio, his business, and his
employees. Should Antonio refuse, Roger warned,
the motel owner would either be killed or his
establishment destroyed. Antonio refused to pay the
protection money. Days later, at round 3:00 in the
morning, Mauro, a member of the criminal
syndicate, arrived at Antonio's home and hurled a
grenade into an open window of the bedroom where
Antonio, his wife and their three year-old daughter
were sleeping. All three of them were killed
instantly when the grenade exploded. State, with
reason, the crime or crimes that had been
committed as well as the aggravating circumstances,
if any, attendant thereto. (2008)
A: By demanding protection money under threat and
intimidation, the crime of grave threats is committed by
Roger, the leader of the crime syndicate. For killing the
businessman, his wife and three year old daughter, the
complex crime of multiple murder was committed by
Mauro. The killing is qualified by the use of an explosive
(hand grenade). The treachery attending the killing shall
be separately appreciated as another aggravating
circumstance aside from the use of explosive as the
qualifying circumstance.
Other aggravating circumstances which may be
appreciated are:
1. Dwelling, because the killings were committed in
the home of the victims who had not given any
provocation;
2. Nocturnity, considering that the offenders carried
out the killing at around 3:00 a.m., indicative of a
deliberate choice of nighttime for the commission of
the crime;
3. Treachery under Art. 14(16) of the RPC considering
that victims were all asleep when killed; and
The offense was committed by a person who belongs to
an organized/ syndicated crime group under the
Heinous Crimes Law (Sec. 23, R.A. 7659), amending for
this purpose Art. 62(1) of the RPC.
Q: Mang Jose, a septuagenarian, was walking with
his ten-year old grandson along Paseo de Roxas and
decided to cross at the intersection of Makati
54
Avenue but both were hit by a speeding CRV
 QUAMTO FOR CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
Honda van and were sent sprawling on the
pavement a meter apart. The driver, a Chinese
mestizo, stopped his car after hitting the two victims
but then reversed his gears and ran over Mang Jose's
prostrate body anew and third time by advancing
his car forward. The grandson suffered broken legs
only and survived but Mang Jose suffered multiple
fractures and broken ribs, causing his instant death.
The driver was arrested and charged with Murder
for the death of Mang Jose and Serious Physical
Injuries through Reckless Imprudence with respect
to the grandson. Are the charges correct? Explain.
(2001)
A: Yes, the charges are correct. For deliberately running
over Mang Jose's prostrate body after having bumped
him and his grandson, the driver indeed committed
Murder, qualified by treachery. Said driver's deliberate
intent to kill Mang Jose was demonstrated by his
running over the latter's body twice, by backing up the
van and driving it forward, whereas the victim was
helpless and not in a position to defend himself or to
retaliate.
As to the serious physical injuries sustained by Mang
Jose's 10-year old grandson, as a result of having been
hit by the speeding vehicle of said driver, the same were
the result of reckless imprudence which is punishable as
a quasi-offense in Art. 365 of the RPC. The charge of
Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Serious Physical
Injuries is correct. The penalty next higher in degree to
what ordinarily should be imposed is called for since the
driver did not lend help on the spot, which help he could
have given to the victims.
Q: Fidel and Fred harbored a long standing grudge
against Jorge who refused to marry their sister
Lorna, after the latter got pregnant by Jorge. After
weeks of surveillance, they finally cornered Jorge in
Ermita, Manila, when the latter was walking home
late at night. Fidel and Fred forcibly brought Jorge
to Zambales where they kept him hog-tied in a small
nipa house located in the middle of a rice field. Two
days later, they killed Jorge and dumped his body
into the river. What crime or crimes did Fidel and
Fred commit? Explain. (1996)
A: Fidel and Fred committed the crime of Murder under
Art. 248, RPC, the killing being qualified by evident
premeditation. This is due to the long standing grudge
entertained by the two accused occasioned by the
victim's refusal to marry their sister after impregnating
her. The intention of the accused is determinative of the
crime committed. Where the intention is to kill the
victim and the latter is forcibly taken to another place
and later killed, it is murder. There is no indication that
the offenders intended to deprive the victim of his
liberty. Whereas, if the victim is kidnapped, and taken to
another situs and killed as an afterthought, it is
kidnapping with homicide under Art. 267, RPC.
Q: On his way to buy a lotto ticket, a policeman
suddenly found himself surrounded by four men.
One of them wrestled the police officer to the ground
and disarmed him while the other three companions
who were armed with a hunting knife, an ice pick,
and a balisong, repeatedly stabbed him. The
policeman died as a result of the multiple stab
wounds inflicted by his assailants. What crime or
crimes were committed? Discuss fully. (1995)
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
A: All the assailants are liable for the crime of murder,
qualified by treachery, (which absorbed abuse of
superior strength) as the attack was sudden and
unexpected and the victim was totally defenseless.
Conspiracy is obvious from the concerted acts of the
assailants. Direct assault would not complex the crime,
as there is no showing that the assailants knew that the
victim was a policeman; even if there was knowledge,
the fact is that he was not in the performance of his
official duties, and therefore there is no direct assault.
Q: Harry, an overseas contract worker, arrived from
Saudi Arabia with considerable savings. Knowing
him to be "loaded", his friends Jason, Manuel and
Dave invited him to poker session at a rented beach
cottage. When he was losing almost all his money
which to him was his savings of a lifetime, he
discovered that he was being cheated by his friends.
Angered by the betrayal he decided to take revenge
on the three cheats. Harry ordered several bottles of
Tanduay Rhum and gave them to his companions to
drink, as they did, until they all fell asleep. When
Harry saw his companions already sound asleep he
hacked all of them to death. Then he remembered
his losses. He rifled through the pockets of his
victims and got back all the money he lost. He then
ran away but not before burning the cottage to hide
his misdeed. The following day police investigators
found among the debris the charred bodies of Jason,
Manuel, Dave and the caretaker of the resort. After
preliminary investigation, the Provincial Prosecutor
charged Harry with the complex crime of arson with
quadruple homicide and robbery. Was Harry
properly charged? Discuss fully. (1995)
A: No, Harry was not properly charged. Harry should
have been charged with three (3) separate crimes,
namely: murder, theft and arson. Harry killed Jason,
Manuel and Dave with evident premeditation, as there
was considerable lapse of time before he decided to
commit the crime and the actual commission of the
crime. In addition, Harry employed means which
weakened the defense of Jason, Manuel and Dave. Harry
gave them the liquor to drink until they were drunk and
fell asleep. This gave Harry the opportunity to carry out
his plan of murder with impunity.
The taking of the money from the victims was a mere
afterthought of the killings. Hence, Harry committed the
separate crime of theft and not the complex crime of
robbery with homicide. Although theft was committed
against dead persons, it is still legally possible as the
offended party are the estates of the victims.
In burning the cottage to hide his misdeed, Harry
became liable for another separate crime, arson. This
act of burning was not necessary for the consummation
of the two (2) previous offenses he committed. The fact
that the caretaker died from the blaze did not qualify
Harry's crime into a complex crime of arson with
homicide for there is no such crime.
Q: Two (2) Philippine National Police (PNP) officers,
X and Y, on board on motorboat with Z, a civilian as
motorman, arrested A and B who were in a banca,
for dynamite fishing. The latters banca was towed
towards the municipality. On the way, the PNP
motorboat was intercepted by a third banca whose
55
occupants, C, D. and E, tried to negotiate for the
TEAM BAROPS
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016
 QuAMTO for CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
release of A and B and their banca. The PNP officers
refused and instead shouted at C, D, and E that they
are all under arrest. Thereupon, C, D, and E
simultaneously threw dynamite sticks at the PNP
motorboats. The first explosion killed X. A and B
also reacted by throwing dynamite at the PNP
motorboat, its explosion killed Y and Z. What crime
or crimes did A, B, C, D and E commit? (1991)
A: C. D and E are liable for the complex crime of Murder,
qualified by explosion, with direct assault for the death
of X. A and B are liable for the complex crime of Murder
Qualified by explosion as to death of Y, and simple
Murder qualified by explosion for the death of Z. No
crime of direct assault can be filed insofar as the death
of Z is concerned, he being a civilian. This, of course,
assumes that there is no conspiracy among A, B, C, D
and E, otherwise all would have the same criminal
liability as the act of one becomes the act of all.
Homicide (Article 249)
Q: Explain and illustrate the stages of execution of
the crime of homicide, taking into account the
nature of the offense, the essential element of each
of the stages of execution and the manner of
committing such intentional felony as distinguished
from felony committed through reckless
imprudence. (2012)
A: Elements of the crime Homicide as an intentional
felony has three stages, attempted, frustrated and
consummated. In whatever stages homicide is
committed, intent to kill must be established for being
an indispensible element thereof. However, if the victim
died as a consequence of wounds caused by an act
committed with malice, intent to kill is conclusively
presumed and the crime committed is consummated
homicide. Because of this conclusive presumption, lack
of intent to kill is not a defense in consummated
homicide. (NOTE: In consummated homicide, the
accused may prove lack of intent to kill for purpose of
appreciating the mitigating circumstance of praeter
intentionem). But if the victim did not die as a
consequence of wounds caused by an act committed
with malice, intent to kill must be established beyond
reasonable doubt. If intent to kill is proven, the crime
committed is frustrated or attempted homicide. If intent
to kill is not proven, the crime committed is physical
injuries. Thus, lack of intent to kill is a defense in
attempted or frustrated homicide.
Nature of the crime If the offender with intent to kill
attempted to inflict or inflicted non-mortal wounds upon
the victim, he already directly commenced an overt act
to commit homicide. Hence, the crime committed is
attempted homicide if he failed to inflict moral wounds
upon the victim by reason of some cause or accident
other than his own spontaneous desistance. If the
offender with intent to kill inflicted mortal wounds upon
the victim, he already performed all acts of execution
which would produce the homicide as a consequence. If
death is not produced despite the mortal character of
the wounds due to causes independent of the will of the
offender, the crime committed is frustrated homicide. If
death is produced, the crime committed is consummated
homicide. In this situation, all the elements necessary for
execution and accomplishment of homicide are present
if the victim dies due to the wounds inflicted by the
offender with the intent to kill.
*QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as suggested by UPLC and other distinct
luminaries in the academe, and updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the 2016 Bar Exams.
Intentional felony and culpable felony Homicide
regardless of stages must be committed with malice
(general intent) and intent to kill (specific intent). Even
if there is no intent to kill and evil intent, the offender is
liable for culpable felony if the victim dies or was injured
as a result of the recklessness of the former. If there is
no intent to kill, evil intent and recklessness on the part
of the accused, he is not liable for his intentional act,
which caused the death of or injury upon the victim
because of the exempting circumstance of accident.
Q: In a free-for-all brawl that ensued after some
customers inside a night club became unruly, guns
were fired by a group, among them A and B, that
finally put the customers back to their senses.
Unfortunately, one customer died. Subsequent
investigation revealed that A's gunshot had inflicted
on the victim a slight wound that did not cause the
deceased's death nor materially contribute to it. It
was B's gunshot that inflicted a fatal wound on the
deceased. A contended that his liability should, if at
all, be limited to slight physical injury. Would you
agree? Why? (2003)
A: No, I beg to disagree with A's contention that his
liability should be limited to slight physical injury only.
He should be held liable for attempted homicide because
he inflicted said injury with the use of a firearm which is
a lethal weapon. Intent to kill is inherent in the use of a
firearm (Araneta, Jr. v. CA, G.R. No. L-43527, July 3, 1990).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Yes, I would agree to As contention that his criminal
liability should be for slight physical injury only, because
he fired his gun only to pacify the unruly customers of
the night club and therefore, without intent to kill. Bs
gunshot that inflicted a fatal wound on the deceased
may not be imputed to A because conspiracy cannot
exist when there is a free-for-all brawl or tumultuous
affray. A and B are liable only for their respective act.
Q: The accused, not intending to kill the victim,
treacherously shot the victim while the victim was
turning his back to him. He aimed at and hit the
victim only on the leg. The victim, however, died
because of loss of blood. Can the accused be liable
for homicide or murder, considering that treachery
was clearly involved but there was no attempt to
kill? Explain your answer. (1999)
A: The accused is liable for the death of the victim even
though he merely aimed and fired at the latter's leg, "not
intending to kill the victim", considering that the
gunshot was felonious and was the proximate cause of
death. An offender is liable for all the direct, natural, and
logical consequences of his felonious act although
different from what he intended. However, since specific
intent to kill is absent, the crime for said death is only
homicide and not murder (People v. Pugay and Samson,
G.R. No. L-74324, November 17, 1988).
Q: A killed: (1) a woman with whom he lived
without benefit of clergy, (2) their child who was
only two days old, (3) their daughter, and (4) their
adopted son. What crime or crimes did A commit?
(1999)
A: A committed the following crimes:
56
 QUAMTO FOR CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
1. HOMICIDE or MURDER as the case may be, for the
killing of his common-law wife who is not legally
considered a "spouse".
2. INFANTICIDE for the killing of the child as said child
is less than three (3) days old (Art. 255, RPC).
However, the penalty corresponding to parricide
shall be imposed since A is related to the child
within the degree defined in the crime of parricide.
3. PARRICIDE for the killing of their daughter, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, as long as she is not less
than three (3) days old at the time of the killing.
4. MURDER for the killing of their adopted son as the
relationship between A and the said son must be by
blood in order for parricide to arise.
Q: Tommy saw Lino and Okito engaged in a street
fight. Lino then suddenly drew his balisong and
lunged at Okito. In an effort to break up the fight,
Tommy tried to snatch the balisong from Lino but
not before the latter had inflicted a wound on Okito.
As Lino withdrew the weapon and attempted to stab
Okito a second time. Tommy tried to grab the
weapon again. In so doing, his left forearm was
slashed. As he succeeded in snatching away the
balisong with his right arm, it flew with such force,
that it hit Nereo, a passerby who was seriously
injured. Explain your answers fully. What is the
criminal liability of Lino with respect to Okito,
Tommy and Nereo? (1992)
A: As far as Okito is concerned, Lino is liable for frus-
trated homicide, assuming that the wound suffered by
Okito is such that for reasons or causes independent of
the will of Lino (such as timely medical attention) Okito
would have died. If the injury is not serious enough, the
liability is only attempted homicide. Intent to kill is
manifest because of the use of a deadly weapon. For the
injury on the arm of Tommy, Uno is liable only for
physical injuries (serious, less serious or slight,
depending on the nature of the injury). Apparently there
is no intent to kill. For Nereo, Lino should be liable for
serious physical injuries as the wounding of Nereo was
the natural and logical consequence of Linos felonious
act.
Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray (Article 251)
Q: A, B and C are members of SFC Fraternity. While
eating in a seaside restaurant, they were attacked by
X, Y and Z, members of a rival fraternity. A rumble
ensued in which the above named members of the
two fraternities assaulted each other in a confused
and tumultuous manner resulting in the death of A.
As it cannot be ascertained who actually killed A, the
members of the two fraternities who took part in the
rumble were charged for death caused in a
tumultuous affray. Will the charge prosper? Explain.
(2010)
A: No, the charge of death caused in the tumultuous
affray will not prosper. In death caused by tumultuous
affray under Art. 251 of the RPC, it is essential that the
person involved did not compose groups organized for
the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each
other reciprocally. In this case, there is no tumultuous
affray since the participants in the rumble belong to
organized fraternities. The killer of A, a member of the
SFC Fraternity could not be any other but member of the
rival fraternity. Conspiracy is therefore present among
the attackers from the rival fraternity and thus rules out
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
the idea of an affray. The liability of the attackers should
be collective for the crime of homicide or murder as the
case may be.
Q: During a town fiesta, a free-for-all fight erupted in
the public plaza. As a result of the tumultuous affray,
A sustained one fatal and three superficial stab
wounds. He died a day after. B, C, D and E were
proven to be participants in the "rumble", each
using a knife against A, but it could not be
ascertained who among them inflicted the mortal
injury. Who shall be held criminally liable for the
death of A and for what? (1997)
A: B, C, D, and E being participants in the tumultuous
affray and having been proven to have inflicted serious
physical injuries, or at least, employed violence upon A,
are criminally liable for the latter's death. And because it
cannot be ascertained who among them inflicted the
mortal injury on A, there being a free-for-all fight or
tumultuous affray. B, C, D, and E are all liable for the
crime of death caused in a tumultuous affray under Art.
251 of the RPC.
Giving Assistance to Suicide (Article 253)
Q: Francis and Joan were sweethearts, but their
parents had objected to their relationship because
they were first cousins. They forged a pact in writing
to commit suicide. The agreement was shoot each
other in the head which they did. Joan died. Due to
medical assistance, Francis survived. Is Francis
criminally liable for the death of Joan? Explain.
(2008)
A: Yes, Francis is criminally liable for Joans death. His
act of shooting her, although done pursuant to a solemn
pact, is nevertheless felonious and is the proximate
cause of Joans death (Art. 4[1], RPC). Moreover, the
mere act of giving assistance to a suicide is a crime (Art.
253, RPC).
Infanticide (Article 255)
Q: Ana has been a bar girl/GRO at a beer house for
more than 2 years. She fell in love with Oniok, the
bartender, who impregnated her. But Ana did not
inform him about her condition and instead, went
home to Cebu to conceal her shame. However, her
parents drove her away. So she returned to Manila
and stayed with Oniok in his boarding house. Upon
learning of her pregnancy, already in an advanced
state, Oniok tried to persuade her to undergo an
abortion, but she refused. Because of their constant
and bitter quarrels, she suffered birth pangs and
gave birth prematurely to a live baby girl while
Oniok was at his place of work. Upon coming home
and learning what happened, he prevailed upon Ana
to conceal her dishonor. Hence, they placed the
infant in a shoe box and threw it into a nearby creek.
However, an inquisitive neighbor saw them and with
the help of others, retrieved the infant who was
already dead from drowning. The incident was
reported to the police who arrested Ana and Oniok.
The 2 were charged with parricide under Article 246
of the Revised Penal Code. After trial, they were
convicted of the crime charged. Was the conviction
correct? (2006)
57
TEAM BAROPS
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016
 QuAMTO for CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
A: The conviction of Ana and Oniok is not correct. They
are liable for infanticide because they killed a child less
than three days of age. (Art. 255, RPC) In this case, Ana
gave birth to a live baby girl, thus the victim is already
viable and breathing on its own upon separation from
womb. Infanticide involves a killing where the victim is
already a person.
Rape (Article 266A)
Q: What other acts are considered rape under the
Anti-Rape Law of 1997, amending the Revised Penal
Code? (2002)
A: The other acts considered rape under the Anti-Rape
Law of 1997 are:
1. having carnal knowledge of a woman by a man by
means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of
authority;
2. having carnal knowledge of a demented woman by a
man even if none of the circumstances required in
rape be present; and
3. committing an act of sexual assault by inserting a
persons penis into the victims mouth or anal
orifice, or by inserting any instrument or object, into
the genital or anal orifice of another person.
Q: Charlie was charged for the qualified rape of AAA.
The Information alleged that AAA was 14 years old
at the time the crime was committed and that
Charlie was AAA's stepfather. The presentation of
AAA's birth certificate during the trial duly
established the following: (1) that AAA was indeed
14 years old at the time of the rape; and (2) that
AAA's mother is BBB and her father was the late CCC.
BBB and Charlie only became live-in partners after
CCC's death. The RTC found Charlie guilty of
qualified rape. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
convicted Charlie of simple rape. Charlie appealed
before the Supreme Court. How will you rule and
why? (2015)
A: The CA ruling is correct. The crime committed by
Charlie is simple rape. To be held liable for qualified
rape, a qualifying circumstance should be alleged in the
information and proven by evidence beyond reasonable
doubt. Although minority and step-relationship as a
qualifying circumstance are alleged in the information,
what is proven by the evidence is the qualifying
circumstance of minority and common-law relationship
with the mother of the victim. The concept of step-
relationship is different from that of common-law
relationship because in the former the mother of the
victim and the offender are legally married while in the
latter they are not. To appreciate this qualifying
circumstance of minority and common-law relationship
will offend the constitutional right of the accused to be
informed of the nature of the crime charged against him.
Q: The Anti-Rape Law of 1997 reclassified rape from
a crime against honor, a private offense, to that of a
crime against persons. Will the subsequent marriage
of the offender and the offended party extinguish
the criminal action or the penalty imposed? Explain.
(2002)
A: Yes. By express provision of Article 266-C of the
RPC, as amended, the subsequent valid marriage
between the offender and offended party shall
extinguish the criminal action or the penalty imposed,
*QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as suggested by UPLC and other distinct
luminaries in the academe, and updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the 2016 Bar Exams.
although rape has been reclassified from a crime against
chastity, to that of a crime against persons.
Q: GV was convicted of raping TC, his niece, and he
was sentenced to death. It was alleged in the
information that the victim was a minor below seven
years old, and her mother testified that she was only
six years and ten months old, which her aunt
corroborated on the witness stand. The information
also alleged that the accused was the victim's uncle,
a fact proved by the prosecution. On automatic
review before the Supreme Court, accused-appellant
contends that capital punishment could not be
imposed on him because of the inadequacy of the
charges and the insufficiency of the evidence to
prove all the elements of the heinous crime of rape
beyond reasonable doubt. Is appellant's contention
correct? Reason briefly. (2004)
A: Yes, appellant's contention is correct insofar as the
age of the victim is concerned. The age of the victim
raped has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt to
constitute the crime as qualified rape and deserving of
the death penalty. The guidelines in appreciating age as
a qualifying circumstance in rape cases have not been
met, to wit:
1. The primary evidence of the age of the victim is her
birth certificate;
2. In the absence of the birth certificate, age of the
victim maybe proven by authentic document, such
as baptismal certificate and school records;
3. If the aforesaid documents are shown to have been
lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the
testimony, if clear and credible of the victim's
mother or any member of the family, by
consanguinity or affinity, who is qualified to testify
on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age
or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to
Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall
be sufficient but only under the following
circumstances: (a) If the victim is alleged to
be below 3 years of age and what is sought to
be proved is that she is less than 7 years old; (b) If
the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and
what is sought to be proved is that she is less than
12 years old; (c) If the victim is alleged to be below
12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic
document, or the testimony of the victim's mother
or relatives concerning the victim's age under the
circumstances above-stated, complainant's sole
testimony can suffice, provided that it is expressly
and clearly admitted by the accused (People v.
Pruna, G.R. No. 138471, October 10, 2002).
Q: A, a male, takes B, another male, to a motel and
there, through threat and intimidation, succeeds in
inserting his penis into the anus of B. What, if any, is
As criminal liability? Why? (2002)
A: A shall be criminally liable for rape by committing an
act of sexual assault against B, by inserting his penis into
the anus of the latter. Even a man may be a victim of
rape by sexual assault under par. 2 of Article 266-A of
the RPC, as amended, "when the offender's penis is
inserted into his mouth or anal orifice."
Q: Flordeluna boarded a taxi on her way home to
58
Quezon City which was driven by Roger, Flordeluna
 QUAMTO FOR CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
noticed that Roger was always placing his car
freshener in front of the car aircon ventilation but
did not bother asking Roger why. Suddenly,
Flordeluna felt dizzy and became unconscious.
Instead of bringing her to Quezon City, Roger
brought Flordeluna to his house in Cavite where she
was detained for two (2) weeks. She was raped for
the entire duration of her detention. May Roger be
charged and convicted of the crime of rape with
serious illegal detention? Explain. (2000)
A: No, Roger may not be charged and convicted of the
crime of rape with serious illegal detention. Roger may
be charged and convicted of multiple rapes. Each rape is
a distinct offense and should be punished separately.
Evidently, his principal intention was to abuse
Flordeluna; the detention was only incidental to the
rape.
Q: King went to the house of Laura who was alone.
Laura offered him a drink and after consuming three
bottles of beer, King made advances to her and with
force and violence ravished her. Then King killed
Laura and took her jewelry. Doming, Kings adopted
brother, learned about the incident. He went to
Laura's house, hid her body, cleaned everything and
washed the bloodstains inside the room. Later, King
gave Jose, his legitimate brother, one piece of
jewelry belonging to Laura. Jose knew that the
jewelry was taken from Laura but nonetheless he
sold it for P2,000. What crime or crimes did King,
Doming and Jose commit? Discuss their criminal
liabilities. (1998)
A: King committed the composite crime of Rape with
homicide as a single indivisible offense, not a complex
crime. His act of taking Laura's jewelry when she is
already dead likewise constitute theft. Domings acts,
having been done with knowledge of the commission of
the crime and done to conceal the body to prevent its
discovery, makes him an accessory to the crime of rape
with homicide (Art. 19[2], RPC) but he is exempt from
criminal liability (Art. 20, RPC) being an adopted brother
of the principal. Jose incurs criminal liability either as an
accessory to the crime of theft or a fence. Although he is
a legitimate brother of King, the exemption under Art.
20 does not include the participation he did because he
profited from the effect of such theft.
Q: The complainant, an eighteen-year old mental
retardate with an intellectual capacity between the
ages of nine and twelve years, when asked during
the trial how she felt when she was raped by the
accused, replied "Masarap, it gave me much
pleasure." With the claim of the accused that the
complainant consented for a fee to the sexual
intercourse, and with the foregoing answer of the
complainant, would you convict the accused of rape
if you were the judge trying the case? Explain.
(1996)
A: Yes, I would convict the accused of rape. Since the
victim is a mental retardate with an intellectual capacity
of a child less than 12 years old, she is legally incapable
of giving a valid consent to the sexual intercourse. The
sexual intercourse is tantamount to a statutory rape
because the level of intelligence is that of a child less
than twelve years of age. Where the victim of rape is a
mental retardate, violence or intimidation is not
essential to constitute rape. As a matter of fact, R.A.
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
7659, the Heinous Crimes Law, amended Art. 335, RPC,
by adding the phrase "or is demented."
Q: Gavino boxed his wife Alma for refusing to sleep
with him. He then violently threw her on the floor
and forced her to have sexual intercourse with him.
As a result Alma suffered serious physical injuries.
Can Gavino be charged with rape? Explain. (1995)
A: Yes. A woman is no longer the chattel-antiquated
practices labeled her to be. A husband who has sexual
intercourse with his wife is not merely using a property,
he is fulfilling a marital consortium with a fellow human
being with dignity equal to that he accords himself. He
cannot be permitted to violate this dignity by coercing
her to engage in a sexual act without her full and free
consent sexual intercourse, albeit within the realm of
marriage, if not consensual, is rape. (People vs. Jumawan,
G.R. No. 187495, April 21, 2014).
NOTE: Prior to R.A. 8353 (Anti-Rape Law), a husband
cannot be guilty of rape committed upon his wife
because of the matrimonial consent which she gave
when she assumed the marriage relation. However,
under Art. 266-C of R.A. 8353, a husband may be guilty
of rape of his wife if it is the legal husband who is the
offender.
DOCTRINE NO LONGER CONTROLLING:
A: No. A husband cannot be charged with the rape of his
wife because of the matrimonial consent which she gave
when she assumed the marriage relation, and the law
will not permit her to retract in order to charge her
husband with the offense (Sate v. Haines, 11 La. Ann. 731
So. 372; 441 RA 837).
Q: Three policemen conducting routine surveillance
of a cogonal area in Antipole chanced upon Ruben, a
15-year old tricycle driver, on top of Rowena who
was known to be a child prostitute. Both were naked
from the waist down and appeared to be enjoying
the sexual activity. Ruben was arrested by the
policemen despite his protestations that Rowena
enticed him to have sex with her in advance
celebration of her twelfth birthday. The town
physician found no semen nor any bleeding on
Rowena's hymen but for a healed scar. Her hymenal
opening easily admitted two fingers showing that no
external force had been employed on her. Is Ruben
liable for any offense? Discuss fully. (1995)
A: Ruben is liable for rape, even if force or intimidation
is not present. The gravamen of the offense is the carnal
knowledge of a woman below twelve years of age
(People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. L-30912 April 30, 1980)
since the law doesn't consider the consent voluntary and
presumes that a girl below twelve years old does not
and cannot have a will of her own. In People v. Perez, CA
37 OG 1762, it was held that sexual intercourse with a
prostitute below twelve years old is rape. Similarly, the
absence of spermatozoa does not disprove the
consummation as the important consideration is not the
emission but the penetration of the female body by the
male organ.
Q: Ariel intimidated Rachel, a mental retardate, with
a bolo into having sexual intercourse with him.
Rachel's mother immediately filed a complaint,
supported by her sworn statement, before the City
59
Prosecutor's Office. After the necessary preliminary
TEAM BAROPS
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016
 QuAMTO for CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
investigation, an information was signed by the
prosecutor but did not contain the signature of
Rachel nor of her mother.
a. Citing Art. 344 of the RPC, Ariel moves for the
dismissal of the case. Resolve with reason.
(1993)
A: The case should not be dismissed. This is allowed by
law. It is enough that a complaint was filed by the
offended party or the parents in the Fiscal's Office.
b. After the prosecution had rested its case, Ariel
presented a sworn affidavit of desistance
executed by Rachel and her mother stating that
they are no longer interested in prosecuting the
case and that they have pardoned Ariel. What
effect would this affidavit of desistance have on
the criminal and civil aspects of the case?
Explain fully. (1993, 1991)
A: The case should not be dismissed. While the affidavit
of desistance executed by the victim amounts to a
pardon, the same does not extinguish criminal liability.
In the crime of rape, pardon by the offended party only
bars prosecution if given before the institution of the
criminal action. After the criminal action had been
instituted, such pardon only waives the civil liability but
not the criminal liability of the offender.
Anti-Hazing Law (R.A. No. 8049)
Q: What is hazing as defined by law? (2002)
A: Hazing, as defined by law, is an initiation rite or
practice as a prerequisite for admission into
membership In a fraternity, sorority or organization by
placing the recruit, neophyte or applicant in some
embarrassing or humiliating situations such as forcing
him to do menial, silly, foolish and similar tasks or
activities or otherwise subjecting him to physical or
psychological suffering or injury.
Q: What does the law require before initiation rites
may be performed? (2002)
A: Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 8049 (Anti-Hazing Law)
requires that before hazing or initiation rites may be
performed, notice to the school authorities or head of
organizations shall be given seven (7) days before the
conduct of such rites. The written notice shall indicate
(a) the period of the initiation activities, not exceeding
three (3) days; (b) the names of those to be subjected to
such activities, and (c) an undertaking that no physical
violence shall be employed by anybody during such
initiation rites.
Special Protection of Children Against Child
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act
(R.A. No. 7610, as amended)
Q: Eduardo Quintos, a widower for the past 10 years,
felt that his retirement at the age of 70 gave him
the opportunity to engage in his favorite pastime
voyeurism. If not using his high-powered
binoculars to peep at his neighbor's homes and
domestic activities, his second choice was to follow
sweet young girls. One day, he trailed a teenage girl
up to the LRT station at EDSA-Buendia. While
ascending the stairs, he stayed one step behind her
*QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as suggested by UPLC and other distinct
luminaries in the academe, and updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the 2016 Bar Exams.
and in a moment of bravado, placed his hand on her
left hip and gently massaged it. She screamed and
shouted for help. Eduardo was arrested and charged
with acts of lasciviousness. Is the designation of the
crime correct? (2006)
A: No. The crime should be Other Acts of Child Abuse
under Section 10(b) of R.A. 7610 of Section 3 that refers
to child abuse committed by any act, deeds or words
which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth
and dignity of a child as a human being. In relation
thereto, Section 10 provides criminal liability for other
acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation, or for other
conditions prejudicial to the child's development. The
reaction of the victim, screaming for help upon the
occurrence of the touching indicates that she perceived
her dignity was being debased or violated.
Q: Mrs. MNA was charged of child abuse. It appears
from the evidence that she failed to give
immediately the required medical attention to her
adopted child, BPO, when he was accidentally
bumped by her car, resulting in his head injuries
and impaired vision that could lead to night
blindness. The accused, according to the social
worker on the case, used to whip him when he failed
to come home on time from school. Also, to punish
him for carelessness in washing dishes, she
sometimes sent him to bed without supper. She
moved to quash the charge on the ground that there
is no evidence she maltreated her adopted child
habitually. She added that the accident was caused
by her drivers negligence. She did punish her ward
for naughtiness or carelessness, but only mildly. Is
her motion meritorious? Reason briefly. (2004)
A: No, the motion to quash is not meritorious. It is not
necessary that movants maltreatment of a child be
"habitual" to constitute child abuse. The wrongful acts
penalized as "Child Abuse" under R.A. 7610 refers to the
maltreatment of the child, "whether habitual or not":
this is expressly stated in Sec. 2(b) of the said law. Mrs.
MNA should be liable for child abuse.
CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY AND
SECURITY (Articles 267-292)
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention
(Article 267)
Q: Sexy boarded a taxi on her way home from a
party. Because she was already tipsy, she fell asleep.
Pogi, the taxi driver, decided to take advantage of
the situation and drove Sexy to a deserted place
where he raped her for a period of two (2) weeks.
What crime did Pogi commit? (2014)
A: The crime committed by Pogi is kidnapping and
Serious Illegal Detention with rape. Since Sexy was
raped for two weeks, there was a clear deprivation of
liberty, which constitutes the crime of kidnapping with
serious illegal detention. The crime is committed when
one kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner
deprives her of his liberty and the kidnapping or
detention has lasted more than three days or the victim
is a female. Since as a consequence of the detention, the
victim is raped, the crime committed is special complex
crime of kidnapping with rape, the resultant crime is
only one kidnapping with rape. This is because the
60
composite acts are regarded as a single indivisible
 QUAMTO FOR CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
offense as in fact R.A. 7659 punishes these acts with only
a single penalty (People v. Mirandilla, Jr., G.R. No. 186417,
July 27, 2011).
Q: Pretty was a campus beauty queen who, because
of her looks and charms, attracted many suitors.
Having decided that she would become a nun, Pretty
turned down all her suitors. Guapo, one of her most
persistent suitors, could not handle rejection and
one night, decided to accost Pretty as she walked
home. Together with Pogi, Guapo forced Pretty into
his car and drove her to an abandoned warehouse
where he and Pogi forced Pretty to dance for them.
Later, the two took turns in raping her.After
satisfying their lusts, Guapo and Pogi dropped her
off at her house. (2014, 2006)
a. What crime or crimes did Guapo and Pogi
commit?
A: The crimes committed by Guapo and Pogi are forcible
abduction with rape. There is no doubt at all that the
forcible abduction of Pretty as she walked home was a
necessary if not indispensible means which enabled
them to commit the successive acts of rape upon her
person. It bears noting, however, that even while the
first act of rape was being performed, the crime of
forcible abduction had already been consummated, so
that the second rape cannot legally be considered as still
connected with the abduction in other words, the
second rape would be detached from, and considered
independently of, that of forcible abduction and,
therefore, the former can no longer be complexed with
the latter (People v. Jose, G.R. No. L-28232, February 6,
1971; People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 141125, February 28,
2002). Since there is conspiracy, Guapo and Pogi are
responsible not only for the rape each personally
committed but also for the rape committed by his co-
conspirator (People v. Villa, G.R. No. L-59, June 30, 1948)
b. Pretty, after the ordeal, decided to take her own
life by hanging herself one hour after the rape.
Would Guapo and Pogi be liable for Prettys
death? Explain.
A: Guapo and Pogi cannot be held liable for the death of
Pretty due to suicide committed by reason of the rapes.
Suicide is an intervening cause that breaks the
connection between the rapes and death. The death
resulting from suicide cannot be considered as the
direct, natural and logical consequence of the rapes
committed by Guapo and Pogi. In People v. Napudo (G.R.
No. 168448, October 8, 2008), the victim committed
suicide due to rape. However, the accused was only
charged with and convicted of rape.
Q: While walking alone on her way home from a
party, Mildred was seized at gun point by Felipe and
taken on board a tricycle to a house some distance
away. Felipe was with Julio, Roldan, and Lucio, who
drove the tricycle. At the house, Felipe, Julio, and
Roldan succeeded in having sexual intercourse with
Mildred against her will and under the threat of
Felipe's gun. Lucio was not around when the sexual
assaults took place as he left after bringing his
colleagues and Mildred to their destination, but he
returned everyday to bring food and the news in
town about Mildred's disappearance. For five days,
Felipe, Julio and Roldan kept Mildred in the house
and took turns in sexually assaulting her. On the 6th
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
day, Mildred managed to escape; she proceeded
immediately to the nearest police station and
narrated her ordeal. What crime/s did Felipe, Julio,
Roldan, and Lucio commit and what was their
degree of participation? (2013)
A: Felipe, Julio, Roldan and Lucio are all liable of the
special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention with rape. It was sufficiently proved that the
four kidnapped Madrid and held her in detention for five
days and carnally abused her. Notably, however, no
matter how many rapes have been committed in the
special complex crime of kinapping with rape, the
resultant crime is only one kidnapping with rape. The
composite acts are regarded as a single indivisible
offense with only one penalty. The offense is not forcible
abduction with rape since it was obvious that the intent
is to detain the victim.
As to the degree of their participation, all of them are
principally liable because of implied conspiracy as they
acted toward a single criminal design or purpose (People
v. Miranda, Jr., G.R. No. 186417, July 27, 2011). Albeit,
Lucio was not around when the sexual assault took
place, his complicity is evident as he was the one who
drove the tricycle and returned every day to bring food
and news to his cohorts.
Q: Virgilio, armed with a gun, stopped a van along a
major thoroughfare in Manila, pointed the gun at the
driver and shouted: "Tigil! Kidnap ito!" Terrified,
the driver, Juanito, stopped the van and allowed
Virgilio to board. Inside the van were Jeremias, a 6-
year-old child, son of a multi-millionaire, and Daday,
the childs nanny. Virgilio told Juanito to drive to a
deserted place, and there, ordered the driver to
alight. Before Juanito was allowed to go, Virgilio
instructed him to tell Jeremias parents that unless
they give a ransom of P10-million within two (2)
days, Jeremias would be beheaded. Daday was told
to remain in the van and take care of Jeremias until
the ransom is paid. Virgilio then drove the van to his
safehouse. What crime or crimes, if any, did Virgilio
commit? Explain. (2009)
A: The crime committed against Jeremias, the 6 year-old
child, is Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention under
Art 267(4), RPC. The evident criminal intent of the
offender, Virgilio, is to lock up the child to demand
ransom. Whether or not the ransom was eventually
obtained will not affect the crime committed because the
demand for ransom is not an element of the crime; it
only qualifies the penalty to death but the imposition of
this penalty is now prohibited by R.A. No. 9346.
As to Daday, the nanny of the child who was told to
remain in the van and take care of the child until the
ransom is paid, the crime committed is Serious Illegal
Detention because the offended party deprived of liberty
is a female (Art. 267[4], RPC).
As to Juanito, the driver of the van who was seriously
intimidated with a gun pointed at him and directed to
stop the van and allow the gun-man to board the same,
and thereafter to drive to a deserted place, the crime
committed by Virgilio is Grave Coercion (Art. 286, RPC)
and Slight Illegal Detention (Art. 268, RPC) for holding
the driver before he was allowed to go.
61
TEAM BAROPS
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016
 QuAMTO for CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
Q: Jaime, Andy and Jimmy, laborers in the noodles
factory of Luke Tan, agreed to kill him due to his
arrogance and miserliness. One afternoon, they
seized him and loaded him in a taxi driven by Mario.
They told Mario they will only teach Luke a lesson in
Christian humility. Mario drove them to a fishpond
in Navotas where Luke was entrusted to Emil and
Louie, the fishpond caretakers, asking them to hide
Luke in their shack because he was running from the
NBI. The trio then left in Mario's car for Manila
where they called up Luke's family and threatened
them to kill Luke unless they give a ransom within
24 hours. Unknown to them, because of a leak, the
kidnapping was announced over the radio and TV.
Emil and Louie heard the broadcast and panicked,
especially when the announcer stated that there is a
shoot-to-kill order for the kidnappers. Emil and
Louie took Luke to the seashore of Dagat-dagatan
where they smashed his head with a shovel and
buried him in the sand. However, they were seen by
a barangay kagawad who arrested them and
brought them to the police station. Upon
interrogation, they confessed and pointed to Jaime,
Andy, Jimmy and Mario as those responsible for the
kidnapping. Later, the 4 were arrested and charged.
What crime or crimes did the 6 suspects commit?
(2006)
A: Jaime, Andy and Jimmy committed kidnapping with
homicide. The original intention was to demand ransom
from the family with the threat of killing. As a
consequence of the kidnapping, however, Luke was
killed. Thus, the victim was deprived of his freedom and
the subsequent killing, though committed by another
person, was a consequence of the detention. Hence, this
properly qualified the crime as the special complex
crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide. Emil and
Louie who smashed the head of the victim and buried
the latter in the sand committed murder qualified by
treachery or abuse of superior strength. They are not
liable for kidnapping because they did not conspire, nor
are they aware of the intention to detain Luke whom
they were informed was hiding from the NBI. Mario has
no liability since he was not aware of the criminal intent
and design of Jaime, Andy and Jimmy. His act of bringing
Luke to Navotas for "a lesson in Christian humility" does
not constitute a crime.
Q: Paz Masipag worked as a housemaid and yaya of
the one week old son of the spouses Martin and Pops
Kuripot. When Paz learned that her 70 year-old
mother was seriously ill, she asked Martin for a cash
advance of P1,000.00 but Martin refused. One
morning, Paz gagged the mouth of Martins son with
stockings; placed the child in a box; sealed it with
masking tape and placed the box in the attic. Later in
the afternoon, she demanded P5,000.00 as ransom
for the release of his son. Martin did not pay the
ransom. Subsequently, Paz disappeared. After a
couple of days, Martin discovered the box in the attic
with his child already dead. According to the
autopsy report, the child died of asphyxiation barely
three minutes after the box was sealed. What crime
or crimes did Paz commit? Explain. (2005)
A: Paz committed the composite crime of kidnapping
with homicide under Art. 267, RPC as amended by R.A.
No. 7659. Under the law, any person who shall detain
another or in any manner deprive him of liberty and the
victim dies as a consequence is liable for kidnapping
*QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as suggested by UPLC and other distinct
luminaries in the academe, and updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the 2016 Bar Exams.
with homicide and shall be penalized with the
maximum penalty. In this case, notwithstanding the fact
that the one-week-old child was merely kept in the attic
of his house, gagged with stockings and placed in a box
sealed with tape, the deprivation of liberty and the
intention to kill becomes apparent. Though it may
appear that the means employed by Paz was attended by
treachery (killing of an infant), nevertheless, a separate
charge of murder will not be proper in view of the
amendment. Here, the term "homicide" is used in its
generic sense and covers all forms of killing whether in
the nature of murder or otherwise. It is of no moment
that the evidence shows the death of the child took place
three minutes after the box was sealed and the demand
for the ransom took place in the afternoon. The
intention is controlling here, that is, ransom was
demanded.
Q: DAN, a private individual, kidnapped CHU, a
minor. On the second day, DAN released CHU even
before any criminal information was filed against
him. At the trial of his case, DAN raised the defense
that he did not incur any criminal liability since he
released the child before the lapse of the 3-day
period and before criminal proceedings for
kidnapping were instituted. Will DAN's defense
prosper? Reason briefly. (2004)
A: No. DAN's defense will not prosper. Voluntary release
by the offender of the offended party in kidnapping is
not absolutory. Besides, such release is irrelevant and
immaterial in this case because the victim being a minor,
the crime committed is kidnapping and serious illegal
detention under Art. 267 to which such circumstance
does not apply. The circumstance may be appreciated
only in the crime of Slight Illegal Detention in Art. 268.
Q: A and B conspiring with each other, kidnapped C
and detained him. The duo then called up C's wife
informing her that they had her husband and would
release him only if she paid a ransom in the amount
of P10,000,000 and that, if she were to fail, they
would kill him. The next day, C, who had just
recovered from an illness had a relapse. Fearing he
might die if not treated at once by a doctor, A and B
released C during the early morning of the third day
of detention. Charged with kidnapping and serious
illegal detention provided in Article 267, RPC, A and
B filed a petition for bail. They contended that since
they had voluntarily released C within three days
from commencement of the detention, without
having been paid any amount of the ransom
demanded and before the institution of criminal
proceedings against them, the crime committed was
only slight illegal detention prescribed in Article
268, RPC. After hearing, the trial court found the
evidence of guilt to be strong and therefore denied
the petition for bail. On appeal, the only issue was:
Was the crime committed kidnapping and serious
detention or slight illegal detention? Decide. (1997)
A: The crime committed by A and B is kidnapping and
serious illegal detention because they made a demand
for ransom and threatened to kill C if the latter's wife did
not pay the same. Without the demand for ransom, the
crime could have been slight illegal detention only. The
contention of A and B that they had voluntary released C
within three days from the commencement of the
detention is immaterial as they are charged with a crime
62
where the penalty prescribed is death (Asistio v. San
 QUAMTO FOR CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
Diego, G.R. No. L-21991 March 31, 1964). They were
properly denied bail because the trial court found that
the evidence of guilt in the information for kidnapping
and serious Illegal detention is strong.
Q: Edgardo induced his friend Vicente, in
consideration of money, to kidnap a girl he is
courting so that he may succeed to raping her and
eventually making her accede to marry him. Vicente
asked for more money which Edgardo failed to put
up. Angered because Edgardo did not put up the
money he required, he reported Edgardo to the
police. May Edgardo be charged with attempted
kidnapping? Explain. (1996)
A: No, Edgardo may not be charged with attempted
kidnapping inasmuch as no overt act to kidnap or
restrain the liberty of the girl had been commenced. At
most, what Edgardo has done in the premises was a
proposal to Vicente to kidnap the girl, which is only a
preparatory act and not an overt act. The attempt to
commit a felony commences with the commission of
overt act, not preparatory act. Proposal to commit
kidnapping is not a crime.
REPEATED DOCTRINE
Q: A charged B with the crime of rape. While the
case was pending in court, B, together with his
mother and brother, overpowered A while riding a
tricycle, dragged her inside a carinderia owned by
them and detained her for two (2) days. They
demanded that she sign an affidavit of desistance
and reimburse B the sum of P5,000.00 which he
paid to his lawyer in the case. She was released only
after she signed the affidavit asking for the
dismissal of the case and delivered to B P1,000.00.
She promised to deliver the balance of P4.000.00
thirty (30) days later. What crime or crimes
was/were committed by B, his mother, and
brother? (1991)
A: This is kidnapping with Ransom which is kidnapping
or illegal detention committed by a private person for
the purpose of extorting ransom. Since the victim is a
woman, it is serious.
Kidnapping of Minors (Article 270 271)
Q: A and B were legally separated. Their child C, a
minor, was placed in the custody of A the mother,
subject to monthly visitations by B, his father. On
one occasion, when B had C in his company, B
decided not to return C to his mother. Instead, B
took C with him to the United States where he
intended for them to reside permanently. What
crime, if any, did B commit? Why? (2002)
A: B committed the crime of kidnapping and failure to
return a minor under Art. 271, in relation to Art. 270, of
the RPC, as amended. Art. 271 expressly penalizes any
parent who shall take from and deliberately fail to
restore his or her minor child to the parent or guardian
to whom custody of the minor has been placed. Since the
custody of C, the minor, has been given to the mother
and B has only the right of monthly visitation, the
latter's act of taking C to the United States, to reside
there permanently, constitutes a violation of said
provisions of law.
Slavery and Servitude (Article 272 274)
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
Q: The creditor who resorts to forced labor of a child
under the pretext of reimbursing himself for the
debt incurred by the childs father commits the
crime of slavery. (2009)
A: False, the proper offense is exploitation of child labor
(Art. 273, RPC). Exploitation of child labor is committed
by a person, who under the pretext of reimbursing
himself of a debt incurred by an ascendant, guardian or
person entrusted with the custody of a minor, shall
against the minors will, retain him in his services.
Q: Aling Maria received an urgent telephone call
from Junior, her eldest son, asking for P2,000.00 to
complete his semestral tuition fees preparatory to
his final exams in Commerce. Distressed and
disturbed, she borrowed money from her compadre
Mang Juan with the assurance to pay him within 2
months. Two months lapsed but Aling Maria failed to
settle her obligation. Mang Juan told Aling Maria that
she does not have to pay the loan if she will allow
her youngest 10-year old daughter Annie to work as
a housemaid in his house for 2 months at
Pl,000.00 a month. Despite Aling Maria's objection,
Mang Juan insisted and brought Annie to his house
to work as a maid.
a. Was a crime committed by Mang Juan when
he brought Annie to his house as maid for the
purpose of repaying her mother's loan? (2006)
A: Yes. Mang Juan committed the crime of exploitation of
child labor which is committed by any persons who
under the pretext of reimbursing himself of a debt
incurred by an ascendant, guardian or person entrusted
with the custody of a minor, shall, against the latter's
will, retain him in his service (Art. 273, RPC). He can also
be liable as an employer for the employment of a minor
below 15 yrs. old, under Sec. 12, Art. 8 of R.A.7610.
b. If Aling Maria herself was made to work as a
house-maid in Mang Juan's household to pay her
loan, did he commit a crime?
A: Yes. Mang Juan committed the crime of involuntary
servitude for rendering services under compulsion and
payment of debts. This is committed by any person who,
in order to require or enforce the payment of a debt,
shall compel the debtor to work for him, against his will,
as household servant or farm labourer (Art. 274, RPC).
Trespass to Dwelling (Article 280-281)
Q: What is the difference between violation of
domicile and trespass to dwelling? (2002)
A: The differences between violation of domicile and
trespass to dwelling are:
a. The offender in violation of domicile is a public
officer acting under color of authority; in trespass to
dwelling, the offender is a private person or public
officer acting in a private capacity.
b. Violation of domicile is committed in 3 different
ways: (1) by entering the dwelling of another
against the will of the latter, (2) searching papers
and other effects inside the dwelling without the
previous consent of the owner or (3) refusing to
leave the premises which he entered surreptitiously,
63
after being required to leave the premises. Trespass
TEAM BAROPS
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016
 QuAMTO for CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
to dwelling is committed only in one way; that is, by
entering the dwelling of another against the express
or implied will of the latter.
Q: Under what situations may a private person enter
any dwelling, residence, or other establishments
without being liable for trespass to dwelling? (2006)
A: A private person may enter a dwelling, residence, or
other establishment without being liable for trespass to
dwelling in the following situations:
a. where a person so enters to avoid some serious
harm to himself; or
b. he did so to save or help an occupant thereof or
some other person from serious harm;
c. where a person so enters to render service to
humanity or to the cause of justice; and
d. where a person enters establishments which cater
to public service while still open for such patronage
(RPC, Art. 280 last par.)
e. if a public officer or person authorized is conducting
a valid arrest or valid search and seizure (Rules on
Criminal Procedure, Rule 113).
Q: At about 11:00 in the evening, Dante forced his
way inside the house of Mamerto. Jay, Mamerto's
son, saw Dante and accosted him, Dante pulled a
knife and stabbed Jay on his abdomen. Mamerto
heard the commotion and went out of his room.
Dante, who was about to escape, assaulted Mamerto.
Jay suffered Injuries which, were it not for the timely
medical attendance, would have caused his death.
Mamerto sustained Injuries that incapacitated him
for 25 days. What crime or crimes did Dante
commit? (1994)
A: Dante committed qualified trespass to dwelling,
frustrated homicide for the stabbing of Jay, and less
serious physical injuries for the assault on Mamerto. The
crime of qualified trespass to dwelling should not be
complexed with frustrated homicide because when the
trespass is committed as a means to commit a more
serious offense, trespass to dwelling is absorbed by the
greater crime, and the former constitutes an aggravating
circumstance of dwelling (People v. Abedosa, G.R. No. L-
28600, March 21, 1928).
Threats and Coercion (Article 282 289)
Q: Distinguish coercion from illegal detention.
(1999)
A: Coercion may be distinguished from illegal detention
as follows:
In coercion, the basis of criminal liability is the
employment of violence or serious intimidation
approximating violence, without authority of law, to
prevent a person from doing something not prohibited
by law or to compel him to do something against his will,
whether it be right or wrong. In illegal detention, the
basis of liability is the actual restraint or locking up of a
person, thereby depriving him of his liberty without
authority of law. If there was no intent to lock up or
detain the offended party unlawfully, the crime of illegal
detention is not committed.
Grave Coercion
Q: Forcibly brought to the police headquarters, a
person was tortured and maltreated by agents of the
*QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as suggested by UPLC and other distinct
luminaries in the academe, and updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the 2016 Bar Exams.
law in order to compel him to confess a crime
imputed to him. The agents failed, however, to draw
from him a confession which was their intention to
obtain through the employment of such means.
What crime was committed by the agents of the law?
Explain your answer. (1999)
A: In this case the suspect was forcibly brought to the
police headquarters to make him admit the crime and
was tortured or maltreated to make him confess to such
crime, but later released because the agents failed to
draw such confession, thus the crime of grave coercion
is committed because of the violence employed to
compel such confession without the offended party
being confined in jail (US v. Cusi, G.R. No. L-3699, March
18, 1908). It is noted that the offended party was merely
"brought" to the police headquarters and is thus not a
detention prisoner. Had he been validly arrested, the
crime committed would be maltreatment of prisoners.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Evidently, the person tortured and maltreated by the
agents of the law is a suspect and may have been
detained by them. If so and he had already been booked
and put in jail, the crime is maltreatment of prisoner and
the fact that the suspect was subjected to torture to
extort a confession would bring about a higher penalty
in addition to the offender's liability for the physical
injuries inflicted.
Q: Isagani lost his gold necklace bearing his initials.
He saw Roy wearing the said necklace. Isagani asked
Roy to return to him the necklace as it belongs to
him, but Roy refused. Isagani then drew his gun and
told Roy, "If you will not give back the necklace to
me, I will kill you!" Out of fear for his life and against
his will, Roy gave the necklace to Isagani, What
offense did Isagani commit? (1998)
A: Isagani committed the crime of grave coercion (Art.
286, RPC) for compelling Roy, by means of serious
threats or intimidation, to do something against the
latter's will, whether it be right or wrong. Serious
threats or intimidation approximating violence
constitute grave coercion, not grave threats. Such is the
nature of the threat in this case because it was
committed with a gun, is a deadly weapon. The crime is
not robbery because intent to gain, which is an essential
element of robbery, is absent since the necklace belongs
to Isagani.
Light Coercion
Q: A widower of ten years, septuagenarian Canuto
felt that he had license to engage in voyeurism. If not
peeping into his neighbors rooms through his
powerful single-cylinder telescope, he would trail
young, shapely damsels along the hallways of
shopping malls. While going up the escalator, he
stayed a step behind a mini-skirted one, and in a
moment of excitement, put his hand on her left hip
and massaged it. The damsel screamed and hollered
for help. Canuto was apprehended and brought up
on inquest. What charge/s, if any, may he be held
responsible for? Explain. (2010)
A: Canuto may be held liable only for the milder crime of
unjust vexation which is a form of light coercion under
Art. 287 of the RPC, instead of the crime of acts of
lasciviousness although the offender is known for his
64
voyeurism. Our RPC inclines towards milder criminal
 QUAMTO FOR CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
responsibility, consistent with the presumption of
innocence under our fundamental law and the rule of
pro reo permeating our system of applying penal laws.
Holding the hip of a person is not per se lascivious but
undoubtedly annoys, irritates, and vexed the young
offended party. The attitude to prosecute the offender
for the milder crime of unjust vexation may be proper
considering his age and civil status.
Q: Pinky was a lessee of a market stall owned by
Giovanni. When Pinky refused to pay her rental,
Giovanni nailed some wooden barricades on one of
the sides of the market stall and posted this
warning: We have closed this portion of the door.
Do not open it or else something may happen to
you. What crime/s did Giovanni commit, if any?
Explain your answer. (2007)
A: The crime committed by Giovanni is light coercion
under Art. 287 of the RPC, commonly referred to as
unjust vexation. Although what was done by Giovanni
could reasonably be assumed as retaliation to the
lessees refusal to pay rent, absent any clear violence in
the premises, such would not bring about a case of grave
coercion. The situation should be interpreted liberally in
favor of the offender. The rule of pro reo precludes any
finding for grave coercion, because it would be against
the offender. The written warning which states or else
something may happen to you is so equivocal that it
may not be interpreted as felonious. A crime is never
presumed; it is the contrary that is presumed.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The crime committed by Giovanni is grave coercion
because barricading one of the sides of the market stall
was an act of violence deliberately done. It is not only an
act of unjust vexation or light coercion but of grave
coercion.
Q: When is embracing, kissing and touching a girl's
breast considered only unjust vexation instead of
acts of lasciviousness? (1994)
A: The acts of embracing and kissing of a woman arising
either out of passion or other motive and the touching of
her breast as a mere incident of the embrace without
lewd design constitutes merely unjust vexation.
However, where the kissing, embracing and the touching
of the breast of a woman are done with lewd design, the
same constitute acts of lasciviousness.
CRIMES AGAINTS PROPERTY (Articles 293-332)
Robbery (Article 293-305)
Q: A, B, and C agreed to rob the house of Mr. D at 10
oclock in the evening, with C as the driver of the
tricycle which they would use in going to and leaving
the house of Mr. D, and A and B as the ones who
would enter the house to get the valuables of Mr. D.
As planned, C parked the tricycle in a dark place,
while A and B entered the house thru an open door.
Once inside, A entered the masters bedroom and
started getting all the valuables he could see, while B
entered another room. While inside the room, B saw
a male person and immediately B brought out his
gun but he accidentally pulled its trigger. The bullet
went through the window, hitting a neighbor that
killed him. Neighbors were then awakened by the
gunfire and policemen were alerted. Not long after,
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
policemen arrived. A and B panicked and got hold of
a young boy and shouted to the policemen who were
already outside of the house that they would harm
the boy if the policemen did not disperse. A and B
demanded that they should be allowed to use a
vehicle to bring them to a certain place and that
would be the time that they would release the young
boy. The policemen acceded. In the meantime, C was
arrested by the policemen while he was about to
flee, while A and B, after releasing the young boy,
were arrested. What crime/s did A, B, and Ccommit,
and what modifying circumstances attended the
commission of the crime/s? (2014)
A: A, B and C committed the crime of robbery with
homicide under Art. 294(1) of the RPC. It is immaterial
that the death of the person occurred by mere accident,
as long as homicide is produced by reason or on
occasion of the robbery, the crime is robbery with
homicide as it is only the result, without reference or
distinction as to the circumstances, causes, modes or
persons intervening in the commission of the crime that
has to be taken into consideration they are not liable for
the detention of the boy as illegal detention is absorbed
by the crime of robbery. The modifying circumstance of
dwelling attended the commission of the crime. The
settled rule is that dwelling is aggravating in robbery
with homicide.
Q: Christopher, John, Richard, and Luke are
fraternity brothers. To protect themselves from
rival fraternities, they all carry guns wherever they
go. One night, after attending a party, they boarded a
taxicab, held the driver at gunpoint and took the
latters earnings. (2010)
a. What crime, if any, did the four commit?
A: The crime committed is robbery by a band since there
were four (4) offenders acting in concert in committing
the robbery and all the four were armed.
b. Would your answer be the same if they killed the
driver? Explain.
A: No, the crime becomes robbery with homicide and all
the fraternity brothers are liable. The existence of a
band shall be appreciated only as generic aggravating
circumstance. Also, if the firearms used were unlicensed,
the same would only be taken as generic aggravating
circumstance as provided by R.A. 8294.
Q: While Alfredo, Braulio, Ciriaco, and Domingo
were robbing a bank, policemen arrived. A firefight
ensued between the bank robbers and the
responding policemen, and one of the policemen
was killed. (2009)
a. What crime or crimes, if any, had been
committed? Explain.
A: The crimes committed are Robbery with Homicide
(Art 294[1] RPC), a single indivisible offense, and Direct
Assault with Multiple Attempted Homicide, a complex
crime. Robbery with Homicide was committed because
one of the responding policemen was killed by reason or
on occasion of the robbery being committed. The
complex crime of Direct Assault with Multiple
Attempted Homicide was committed in respect of the
65
offenders firing guns at the responding policemen who
TEAM BAROPS
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016
 QuAMTO for CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
are agents of person in authority performing their duty
when fired at to frustrate such performance (People v.
Ladjaalam, G.R. Nos. 136149-51, September 19, 2000).
b. Suppose it was Alfredo who was killed by the
responding policemen, what charges can be filed
against Braulio, Ciriaco and Domingo? Explain.
A: The crime of which Braulio, Ciriaco and Domingo can
be charged is Robbery with Homicide (Art. 294[1], RPC)
because the killing resulted by reason or on the occasion
of the robbery. It is of no moment that the person killed
is one of the robbers. A killing by reason or on the
occasion of the robbery, whether deliberate or
accidental, will be a component of the crime of Robbery
with Homicide, a single indivisible offense, as long as it
is intimately connected to the robbery.
c. Suppose in the course of the robbery, before the
policemen arrived, Braulio shot and killed
Alfredo following a heated disagreement on who
should carry the money bags, what would be the
criminal liability of Braulio, Ciriaco and
Domingo? Explain.
A: Braulio shall be liable for Robbery with Homicide
(Art. 294[1], RPC) for killing Alfredo, since the killing was
by reason of the robbery. Ciriaco and Domingo having
conspired only in the commission of the robbery, should
incur liability only for the crime conspired uponthe
robbery, unless they were with Braulio during the killing
and could have prevented the same but they did not, in
which case they shall also be liable for Robbery with
Homicide. It is of no moment that the person killed is
one of the robbers and he was killed during the robbery.
Q: Jervis and Marlon asked their friend, Jonathan, to
help them rob a bank. Jervis and Marlon went inside
the bank, but were unable to get any money from the
vault because the same was protected by a time-
delay mechanism. They contended themselves with
the customers cellphones and a total of P5,000 in
cash. After they dashed out of the bank and rushed
into the car, Jonathan pulled the car out of the curb,
hitting a pedestrian which resulted in the latters
death. What crime or crimes did Jervis, Marlon and
Jonathan commit? Explain your answer. (2007)
A: Jervis, Marlon and Jonathan committed robbery with
homicide, because there was conspiracy among them to
commit the robbery and the death of the pedestrian was
caused on the occasion of the robbery. Even though the
death was accidental, it is enough that such death was
caused by any of the robbers felonious act and on the
occasion of the commission of the robbery (People v.
Guiapar, G.R. No. L-35465, May 31, 1984).
Q: Jose employed Mario as gardener and Henry as
cook. They learned that Jose won P500,000.00 in the
lotto, and decided to rob him. Mario positioned
himself about 30 meters away from Joses house and
acted as lookout. For his part, Henry surreptitiously
gained entry into the house and killed Jose who was
then having his dinner. Henry found the
P500,000.00 and took it. Henry then took a can of
gasoline from the garage and burned the house to
conceal the acts. Mario and Henry fled, but were
arrested around 200 meters away from the house by
alert barangay tanods. The tanods recovered the
P500,000.00. Mario and Henry were charged with
*QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as suggested by UPLC and other distinct
luminaries in the academe, and updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the 2016 Bar Exams.
and convicted of robbery with homicide, with the
aggravating circumstances of arson, dwelling, and
nighttime. Mario moved to reconsider the decision
maintaining that he was not at the scene of the crime
and was not aware that Henry killed the victim;
hence, he was guilty only of robbery, as an
accomplice. Mario also claimed that he conspired
with Henry to commit robbery but not to kill Jose.
Henry, likewise, moved to reconsider the decision,
asserting that he is liable only for attempted
robbery with homicide with no aggravating
circumstance, considering that he and Mario did not
benefit from the P500,000.00. He further alleged
that arson is a felony and not an aggravating
circumstance; dwelling is not aggravating in
attempted robbery with homicide; and nighttime is
not aggravating because the house of Jose was
lighted at the time he was killed. Resolve with
reasons the respective motions of Mario and Henry.
(2005)
A: Mario is not correct. Mario conspired and acted in
concert with Henry to commit robbery. Hence, the act of
one is the act of all and the extent of the specific
participation of each individual conspirator becomes
secondary, each being held liable for the criminal
deed(s) executed by another or others. As a conspirator,
Mario casts his lot with his fellow conspirators and
becomes liable to any third person who may get killed in
the course of implementing the criminal design. Henry is
incorrect, since he acquired possession of the money.
The crime of robbery with force and intimidation is
consummated when the robber acquires possession of
the property, even if for a short time. It is no defense
that they had no opportunity to dispose of or benefit
from the money taken. Since the crime in robbery with
force and intimidation against persons (robbery with
homicide), dwelling is aggravating. Arson, which
accompanied the crime of robbery with homicide is
absorbed (Art. 294, RPC as amended by R.A. 7659) and is
not aggravating because the RPC does not provide
that such crime is an aggravating circumstance (People
v. Regala, G.R. No. 130508, April 5, 2000). Nighttime,
likewise, is not aggravating. There is no showing that the
same was purposely sought by the offenders to facilitate
the commission of the crime or impunity.
Q: Together XA, YB and ZC planned to rob Miss OD.
They entered her house by breaking one of the
windows in her house. After taking her personal
properties and as they were about to leave, XA
decided on impulse to rape OD. As XA was molesting
her, YB and ZC stood outside the door of her
bedroom and did nothing to prevent XA from raping
OD. What crime or crimes did XA, YB and ZC commit,
and what is the criminal liability of each? Explain
briefly. (2004, 1998)
A: The crime committed by XA, YB and ZC is the
composite crime of Robbery with Rape, a single,
indivisible offense under Art. 294(1) of the RPC.
Although the conspiracy among the offenders was only
to commit robbery and only XA raped CD, the other
robbers, YB and ZC, were present and aware of the rape
being committed by their co-conspirator. Having done
nothing to stop XA from committing the rape, YB and ZC
thereby concurred in the commission of the rape by
their co-conspirator XA. The criminal liability of all, XA,
YZ and ZC, shall be the same, as principals in the
66
special complex crime of robbery with rape which is a
 QUAMTO FOR CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
single, indivisible offense where the rape accompanying
the robbery is just a component.
Q: A learned two days ago that B had received dollar
bills amounting to $10,000 from his daughter
working in the United States. With the intention of
robbing B of those dollars, A entered B's house at
midnight, armed with a knife which he used to gain
entry, and began quietly searching the drawers,
shelves, and other likely receptacles of the cash.
While doing that, B awoke, rushed out from the
bedroom, and grappled with A for the possession of
the knife which A was then holding. After stabbing B
to death, A turned over B's pillow and found the
latter's wallet underneath the pillow, which was
bulging with the dollar bills he was looking for. A
took the bills and left the house. What crime or
crimes were committed? (2003)
A: The crime committed is robbery with homicide, a
composite crime. This is so because A's primordial
criminal intent is to commit a robbery and in the course
of the robbery, the killing of B took place. Both the
robbery and the killing were consummated, thus giving
rise to the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide. The primary criminal intent being to commit a
robbery, any killing on the "occasion" of the robbery,
though not by reason thereof, is considered a
component of the crime of robbery with homicide as a
single indivisible offense.
Q: A entered the house of another without
employing force or violence upon things. He was
seen by a maid who wanted to scream but was
prevented from doing so because A threatened her
with a gun. A then took money and other valuables
and left. Is A guilty of theft or of robbery? Explain.
(2002)
A: A is liable for robbery because of the intimidation he
employed on the maid before the taking of the money
and other valuables. It is the intimidation of person
relative to the taking that qualifies the crime as robbery,
instead of simply theft. The non-employment of force
upon things is of no moment because robbery is
committed not only by employing force upon things but
also by employing violence against or intimidation of
persons.
Q: A and B are neighbors in Barangay Nuevo I, Silang,
Cavite. A is a barangay Kagawad and known to be a
bully, while B is reputed to be gay but noted for his
industry and economic savvy which allowed him
to amass wealth in leaps and bounds, including
registered and unregistered lands in several
barangays. Resenting B's riches and relying on his
political influence, A decided to harass and
intimidate B into sharing with him some of his lands,
considering that the latter was single and living
alone. One night, A broke into B's house, forced him
to bring out some titles and after picking out a title
covering 200 square meters in their barangay,
compelled B to type out a Deed of Sale conveying the
said lot to him for P1.00 and other valuable
considerations. All the while, A carried a paltik
caliber .45 in full view of B, who signed the deed out
of fear. When A later on tried to register the deed, B
summoned enough courage and had A arrested and
charged in court after preliminary investigation.
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
What charge or charges should be filed against A?
Explain. (2001)
A: The charge for Robbery under Art. 298 of the RPC
should be filed against A. Said Article provides that any
person who, with intent to defraud another, by means of
violence or intimidation, shall compel him to sign,
execute and deliver any public instrument or
document shall be held guilty of robbery. The paltik
caliber .45 firearm carried by A was obviously intended
to intimidate B and thus, used in the commission of the
robbery. If it could be established that A had no license
or permit to possess and carry such firearm, it should be
taken only as special aggravating circumstance to the
crime of robbery, not subject of a separate prosecution.
Q: A, B, C, D and B were in a beerhouse along
MacArthur Highway having a drinking spree. At
about 1 o'clock in the morning, they decided to leave
and so asked for the bill. They pooled their money
together but they were still short of P2,000.00. E
then orchestrated a plan whereby A, B, C and D
would go out, flag a taxicab and rob the taxi driver of
all his money while E would wait for them in the
beer house. A. B, C and D agreed. All armed with
balisongs, A, B, C and D hailed the first taxicab they
encountered. After robbing X, the driver, of his
earnings, which amounted to P1,000.00 only, they
needed P1 ,000.00 more to meet their bill. So, they
decided to hail another taxicab and they again
robbed driver T of his hard-earned money
amounting to P1,000. On their way back to the
beerhouse, they were apprehended by a police
team upon the complaint of X, the driver of the first
cab. They pointed to E as the mastermind. What
crime or crimes, if any, did A, B, C, D and B commit?
Explain fully. (2000)
A: A. B, C, D and E are liable for two (2) counts of
robbery under Art. 294 not for highway Robbery under
P.D. 532. The offenders are not brigands but only
committed the robbery to raise money to pay their bill
because it happened that they were short of money to
pay the same.
Q: Distinguish Highway Robbery under Presidential
Decree No. 532 from Robbery committed on a
highway. (2000)
A: Highway Robbery under Pres. Decree 532 differs
from ordinary Robbery committed on a highway in
these respects:
1. In Highway Robbery under PD 532, the robbery is
committed indiscriminately against persons who
commute in such highways, regardless of the
potentiality they offer; while in ordinary Robbery
committed on a highway, the robbery is committed
only against predetermined victims;
2. It is Highway Robbery under PD 532, when the
offender is a brigand or one who roams in public
highways and carries out his robbery in public
highways as venue, whenever the opportunity to do
so arises. It is ordinary Robbery under the Revised
Penal Code when the commission thereof in a public
highway is only incidental and the offender is not a
brigand; and
3. In Highway Robbery under PD 532, there is
frequency in the commission of the robbery in
public highways and against persons travelling
67
thereat; whereas ordinary Robbery In public
TEAM BAROPS
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016
 QuAMTO for CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
highways is only occasional against a b. Suppose it was robber D who was killed by the
predetermined victim, without frequency in public
highways.
Q: A, brother of B, with the intention of having a
night out with his friends, took the coconut shell
which is being used by B as a bank for coins from
inside their locked cabinet using their common key.
Forthwith, A broke the coconut shell outside of their
home in the presence of his friends. (2000)
a. What is the criminal liability of A, if any?
Explain.
A: A is criminally liable for Robbery with force upon
things, because the coconut shell with the coins inside,
was taken with intent to gain and broken outside of
their home (Art. 299[b][2], RPC).
b. Is A exempted from criminal liability under
Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code for being a
brother of B? Explain.
A: No, A is not exempt from criminal liability under Art.
332 because said Article applies only to theft,
swindling or malicious mischief. Here, the crime
committed is robbery.
Q: Two young men, A and B, conspired to rob a
residential house of things of value. They
succeeded in the commission of their original
plan to simply rob. A, however, was sexually
aroused when he saw the lady owner of the house
and so, raped her. The lady victim testified that B
did not in any way participate in the rape but B
watched the happening from a window and did
nothing to stop the rape. Is B as criminally liable as A
for robbery with rape? Explain. (1999, 1996)
A: Yes, B is as criminally liable as A for the composite
crime of robbery with rape under Art. 294(1). Although
the conspiracy of A and B was only to rob, B was present
when the rape was being committed which gave rise to a
composite crime, a single indivisible offense of robbery
with rape. B would not have been liable had he
endeavored to prevent the commission of the rape. But
since he did not when he could have done so, he in effect
acquiesced with the rape as a component of the robbery
and so he is also liable for robbery with rape.
REPEATED DOCTRINE
Q: A, B, C and D all armed, robbed a bank, and when
they were about to get out of the bank, policemen
came and ordered them to surrender but they fired
on the police officers who fired back and shot it out
with them.
a. Suppose a bank employee was killed and the
bullet which killed him came from the firearm of
the police officers, with what crime shall you
charge A, B. C and D?
A: A, B, C and D should be charged with the crime of
robbery with homicide because the death of the bank
employee was brought about by the acts of said
offenders on the occasion of the robbery. They shot it
out with the policeman, thereby causing such death by
reason or on the occasion of a robbery; hence, the
composite crime of robbery with homicide.
*QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as suggested by UPLC and other distinct
luminaries in the academe, and updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the 2016 Bar Exams.
policemen and the prosecutor charged A, B and
C with Robbery and Homicide. They demurred
arguing that they (A, B and C) were not the ones
who killed robber D, hence, the charge should
only be Robbery. How would you resolve their
argument? (1998)
A: The argument is valid, considering that a separate
charge for Homicide was filed. It would be different if
the charge filed was for the composite crime of robbery
with homicide which is a single, indivisible offense.
Q: After raping the complainant in her house, the
accused struck a match to smoke a cigarette before
departing from the scene. The brief light from the
match allowed him to notice a watch in her wrist. He
demanded that she hand over the watch. When she
refused, he forcibly grabbed it from her. The accused
was charged with and convicted of the special
complex crime of robbery with rape. Was the court
correct? (1997)
A: No, the court erred in convicting the accused of the
special complex crime of robbery with rape. The accused
should instead be held liable for two (2) separate crimes
of Robbery and Rape, since the primary intent or
objective of the accused was only to rape the
complainant, and his commission of the robbery was
merely an afterthought. The robbery must precede the
rape. In order to give rise to the special complex crime
for which the court convicted the accused.
REPEATED QUESTION:
Q: Jose, Domingo, Manolo, and Fernando, armed
with bolos, at about one o'clock in the morning,
robbed a house at a desolate place where Danilo, his
wife, and three daughters were living. While the four
were in the process of ransacking Danilo's house,
Fernando, noticing that one of Danilo's daughters
was trying to get away, ran after her and finally
caught up with her in a thicket somewhat distant
from the house. Fernando, before bringing back the
daughter to the house, raped her first. Thereafter,
the four carted away the belongings of Danilo and
his family.
a. What crime did Jose, Domingo, Manolo and
Fernando commit? Explain.
A: Jose, Domingo, and Manolo committed Robbery,
while Fernando committed complex crime of Robbery
with Rape, Conspiracy can be inferred from the manner
the offenders committed the robbery but the rape was
committed by Fernando at a place "distant from the
house" where the robbery was committed, not in the
presence of the other conspirators. Hence, Fernando
alone should answer for the rape, rendering him liable
for the special complex crime.
b. Suppose, after the robbery, the four took turns
in raping the three daughters of Danilo inside
the latter's house, but before they left, they
killed the whole family to prevent identification,
what crime did the four commit? Explain. (1996)
A: The crime would be Robbery with Homicide because
the killings were by reason (to prevent identification)
and on the occasion of the robbery.
68
 QUAMTO FOR CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)

Q: Five robbers robbed, one after the other five

houses occupied by different families located inside BRIGANDAGE ROBBERY IN A
a compound enclosed by a six-feet high hollow block BAND
fence. How many robberies did the five commit? 1. There are at More than three
Explain. (1996) least four persons; armed
2. They form a malefactors take
A: The offenders committed only one robbery in the band of robbers; part in the
eyes of the law because when they entered the Elements
3. The purpose is commission of a
compound, they were impelled only by a single any of the robbery
indivisible criminal resolution to commit a robbery as following: (see
they were not aware that there were five families below)
inside said compound, considering that the same was 1. To commit Commit robbery,
enclosed by a six-feet high hollow-block fence. The robbery in high but not
series of robbery committed in the same compound at way; necessarily in a
about the same time constitutes one continued crime, 2. Kidnap or extort highway.
motivated by one criminal impulse. Purpose or get ransom;
3. Any other
REPEATED DOCTRINE purpose to be
Q: Victor, Ricky, Rod and Ronnie went to the store of achieved by means
Mang Pandoy. Victor and Ricky entered the store of force or violence
while Rod and Ronnie posted themselves at the The agreement The agreement is
door. After ordering beer Ricky complained that he among more than to commit only a
was shortchanged although Mang Pandoy three armed men particular
vehemently denied it. Suddenly Ricky whipped out a Agreement
is to commit robbery.
knife as he announced "Hold-up ito!" and stabbed robbery in the
Mang Pandoy to death. Rod boxed the stores highway.
salesgirl Lucy to prevent her from helping Mang
Pandoy. When Lucy ran out of the store to seek help Theft (Article 308 311)
from people next door she was chased by Ronnie. As
soon as Ricky had stabbed Mang Pandoy, Victor Q: Bruno, a taxi driver, had an indebtedness in the
scooped up the money from the cash box. Then sum of Pl 0,000.00 which would become due in one
Victor and Ricky dashed to the street and shouted, week. He was starting to worry because he still had
"Tumakbo na kayo!" Rod was 14 and Ronnie was 17. not raised the amount to pay for his debt. Every day,
The money and other articles looted from the store he had prayed for divine intervention. One night,
of Mang Pandoy were later found in the houses of while returning the taxi to the garage, he found a
Victor and Ricky. Discuss fully the criminal liability wallet on the back seat. Inspecting it, he learned that
of Victor, Ricky, Rod and Ronnie. (1995) it contained exactly Pl 0,000.00 cash, the amount of
his obligation, and IDs. Thinking it was divine
A: All are liable for the special complex crime of robbery intervention, and that his prayers were answered,
with homicide. The acts of Ricky in stabbing Mang he took the money and used it to pay his debt.
Pandoy to death, of Rod in boxing the salesgirl to (2015)
prevent her from helping Mang Pandoy, of Ronnie in
chasing the salesgirl to prevent her in seeking help, of a. What crime, if any, did Bruno commit? Explain.
Victor in scooping up money from the cash box, and of
Ricky and Victor in dashing to the street and announcing A: Bruno committed the crime of theft. The owner is
the escape, are all indicative of conspiracy. The rule is known to Bruno because there are IDs found in the
settled that when homicide takes place as a consequence wallet. Failure to deliver to the local authorities or to its
or on the occasion of a robbery, all those who took part owner the lost property which he found constitutes theft
in the robbery are guilty as principals of the crime of under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.
robbery with homicide, unless the accused tried to
prevent the killing. Further, the aggravating b. Assuming that instead of using the money,
circumstance of craft could be assessed against the Bruno turned over the wallet and its contents to
accused for pretending to be customers of Mang Pandoy. the nearby police station, and it was the chief of
police of that station who appropriated the
Brigandage (Article 306-307) money for his own benefit, what crime was
committed by the chief of police?
Q: Who are brigands? Distinguish brigandage from
robbery in band as to elements, purpose of the A: The chief of police is liable for theft. Although he is
offender and agreement among the offenders. not the one who found the property, he is considered as
(2012) finder in fact since the property was surrendered to him
by the actual finder. He acquired the position occupied
A: When more than three armed persons form a band of by the actual finder and assumed by voluntary
robbers for the purpose of committing robbery in the substitution the obligation to surrender the property to
highway, or kidnapping persons for the purpose of the lawful owner. Appropriating the property is of the
extortion or to obtain ransom, for any other purpose to same character of that made by one who originally
be attained by means of force and violence, they shall be found the same (People v. Avila, G.R. No. L-19786, March
deemed highway robbers or brigands (Art. 306, RPC). 31, 1923). The liability of the finder in fact is the same
liability of the finder in law. Thus, what the Chief of
The following distinctions between brigandage and Police committed is Theft.
69

robbery by band:

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS TEAM BAROPS

FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016
 QuAMTO for CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
Q: Clepto went alone to a high-end busy shop and
decided to take one of the smaller purses without
paying for it. Overcame by conscience, she decided
to leave her own purse in place of the one she took.
Her act was discovered and Clepto was charged with
theft. She claimed that there was no theft, as the
store suffered no injury or prejudice because she
had left a purse in place of the one she took.
Comment on her defense. (2014)
A: Her defense is untenable. Theft was already
consummated from the taking of personal property of
another with intent to gain without the consent of the
latter. The presence of injury or damage is not an
element of theft. Her leaving behind her own purse will
not alter the fact that she took a purse from the high-end
shop without the consent of the owner.
Q: Madam X, a bank teller, received from depositor
Madam Y a check payable to cash in the amount
of P1 million, to be deposited to the account of
Madam Y. Because the check was not a crossed
check, Madam X credited the amount to the account
of her good friend, Madam W, by accomplishing a
deposit slip. Seven (7) days after, Madam X
contacted her good friend, Madam W and told her
that the amount of P1 million was wrongfully
credited to Madam W, thus, Madam X urged Madam
W to withdraw the amount of P1 million from her
accountand to turn over the same to Madam X. As a
dutiful friend, Madam W readily acceded. She was
gifted by Madam X with an expensive Hermes bag
after the withdrawal of the amount. What crime/s, if
any, did Madam X and Madam W commit? Explain.
(2014)
A: Madam X shall be liable as principal in the crime of
qualified theft committed with grave abuse of
confidence defined and punishable under Art. 310 of the
RPC. Being a bank teller, she had only the physical
possession not juridical possession of the money
received by her. Consequently, her subsequent
misappropriation of the same shall constitute the crime
of theft, qualified with grave absue of confidence.
Madam W is not criminally liable. She had no knowledge
of the crime and withdrew the money from her account
and turned over the same to Madam X because of the
misrepresentaition of the latter that the P1M was
wrongfully deposited to her account. Her participation is
not based on conspiracy or community of design,
without which she cannot be held liable as principal by
direct particiapation, principal by indispensable
cooperation or accomplice. Receiving an expensive
Hermes bag from Madam X will not make Madam W
liable as an accessory since the latter has no actual
knowledge of the commission of the crime of theft by the
former and the bag cannot be considered as the effects
of the crime since there is no showing that the money
withdrawn was used in buying it.
Q: Is the crime of theft susceptible of commission in
the frustrated stage? Explain your answer in relation
to what produces the crime of theft in its
consummated stage and by way of illustration of the
subjective and objective phases of the felony. (2012)
A: No. Unlawful taking is deemed complete from the
moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even
if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same. Unlawful
*QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as suggested by UPLC and other distinct
luminaries in the academe, and updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the 2016 Bar Exams.
taking, which is the deprivation of ones personal
property, is the element which produces the felony in its
consummated stage. At the same time, without unlawful
taking as an act of execution, the offense could only be
attempted theft, if at all. Thus, the theft cannot have a
frustrated stage. Theft can only be attempted or
consummated (Valenzuela v. People, G.R. No. 160188,
June 21, 2007).
Q: On her way home, Eva Marie saw an injured chow
chow puppy behind a bush. Since the puppy did not
have a collar, she brought it home so she could have
it as a pet. Her son in fact begged Eva Marie to keep
the puppy. The following day, Eva Marie bought a
collar for the puppy and brought it to a veterinarian
for treatment. (2010)
a. Did Eva Marie incur criminal liability in bringing
the puppy home as a pet? Explain.
A: Yes, Eva Marie incurred criminal liability for the
crime of simple theft. The puppy is personal property
which is susceptible of taking and has pecuniary value.
Obviously, she took it with intent to own it; hence, with
intent to gain.
b. Did she incur civil liability? Explain.
A: Eva Marie may incur civil liability of the owner of the
puppy would incur a loss due to non-restitution or
return thereof to the owner. Finding any property of
value, legally regarded as lost property, would constitute
theft if the finder failed to deliver the same to the local
authorities or to its owner (Art. 308[1], RPC). Once Eva
Marie is found guilty of theft, she will incur civil liability
which consists of restitution or reparation for damage
caused and indemnification for consequential damages
(Art. 100, RPC). The general rule is that a person who is
criminally liable is also civilly liable.
Q: Paul lives with his long-time girlfriend Joan in a
condominium in Makati. For more than a year, he
has been secretly saving money in an envelope
under their bed to buy her an engagement ring. One
day, while Joan was cleaning their room, she found
the envelope, took the money, and left Paul. As
prosecutor, what crime, if any, would you charge
Joan? Explain. (2010)
A: Joan may be charged for qualified theft because she
took away personal property belonging to Paul without
the latters consent, so obviously with intent to gain, and
with grave abuse of confidence. But Joan may invoke as
a defense Art. 332 of the RPC, under which no criminal
liability but only civil liability shall result from the crime
of theft, swindling or malicious mischief committed by
spouses, among others. The reference to theft under
the Article embraces both simple theft and qualified
theft, and the reference to spouses includes common-
law or live-in relationships (People v. Constantino, 60
O.G. 3603, September 6, 1963).
Q: Lucas had been the stay-in houseboy of spouses
Nestor and Julia for five years. One night, while
Nestor and Julia were out having dinner, Lucas and
his friend Pedro gained entry into the masters'
bedroom with the use of a false key. They found
Julia's jewelry box in one of the cabinets which was
unlocked. Lucas believed that Julia's jewelry inside
70
the box. Unknown to Lucas and Pedro, the box was
 QUAMTO FOR CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
empty. Pedro took the box and left the bedroom
with Lucas. They were shock when they saw Nestor
in the sala, pointing a gun at them. Nestor ordered
them to stop and hand over the box. Pedro complied.
It turned out that Nestor had just arrived in time to
see Lucas and Pedro leaving the master's bedroom
with the box. State with reasons, the crime or
crimes, if any, Lucas and Pedro committed. (2008)
A: Lucas committed qualified theft. Pedro committed
simple theft only. There was taking of personal property,
the jewelry box, belonging to another (Julia), with intent
to gain and without the consent of the owner but
without violence, intimidation of persons or force upon
things. The use of a false key is legally considered as a
force upon things, if used to gain entry to the house or
building but not when used to enter a locked room
inside such house or building. Thus, the taking only
constitutes theft. The crime is qualified theft as to Lucas
only, although there is evident conspiracy between him
and Pedro; because the circumstance qualifying the theft
is personal only to Lucas but not to Pedro.
The theft is already consummated because the offenders
had already taken out of the cabinet Julias jewelry box,
which she intended to remain in the cabinet. The
asportation was completed when they succeeded in
taking out Julias jewelry box from the cabinet.
Q: Eman, a vagrant, found a bag containing
identification cards and a diamond ring along Roxas
Blvd. Knowing that it was not his, he went to a
nearest police station to seek help in finding the
owner of the bag. At the precint PO1 Melvin
attended to him. In the investigation Eman proposed
to PO1 Melvin, "in case you don't find the owner let's
just pawn straight to the pawnshop and pawned the
ring for P50,000.00 Eman never saw PO1 Melvin
again. (2008, 2001, 1998)
a. What is the criminal liability of Eman, If any?
Explain.
A: Eman has no criminal liability, unless he received part
of the proceeds of the pawned ring. The facts do not
state that Eman received any part of the P50,000.00
proceeds of the ring pledged. The facts state that after
turning over the bag to PO1 Melvin, Eman never saw
PO1 Melvin against. The proposal Eman made to PO1
Melvin is not a crime as to bring about criminal liability.
b. What is the criminal liability of PO1 Melvin, is
any? Explain
A: PO1 Melvin is criminally liable for theft for having
pawned the ring, which he does not own, and
appropriating the proceeds thereof without the consent
of the owner thus demonstrating intent to gain. PO1
Melvin is simply substituted to the possession Eman had
when the latter found the bag containing the ring. He
was under a legal obligation to deliver it to its owner
and his failure to do so amounts to a taking which
would constitute theft when shown to be motivated by
intent to gain (Art. 308[1] , RPC); People v. Avila, G.R. No.
L-19786 March 31, 1923).
Q: Forest Ranger Jay Velasco was patrolling the
Balara Watershed and Reservoir when he noticed a
big pile of cut logs outside the gate of the watershed.
Curious, he scouted around and after a few minutes,
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
he saw Rene and Dante coming out of the gate with
some more newly-cut logs. He apprehended and
charged them with the proper offense.
a. What is the offense? Explain. (2006)
A: The offense is Qualified Theft under Sec. 68 of P.D.
705, amending P.D. No. 330, which penalizes any person
who directly or indirectly cuts, gathers, removes, or
smuggles timber, or other forest products from any of
the public forest. The Balara Watershed is protected by
the cited laws.
b. During the preliminary investigation and up to
the trial proper, Rene and Dante contended that
if they were to be held liable, their liability
should be limited only to the newly-cut logs
found in their possession but not to those found
outside the gate. If you were the judge, what will
be your ruling?
A: The contention is untenable, the presence of the
newly cut logs outside the gate is circumstantial
evidence, which, if unrebutted, establishes that they
are the offenders who gathered the same.
Q: DD was engaged in the warehouse business.
Sometime in November 2004, he was in dire need of
money. He, thus, sold merchandise deposited in his
warehouse to VR for P500,000.00. DD was charged
with theft, as principal, while VR as accessory. The
court convicted DD of theft but acquitted VR on the
ground that he purchased the merchandise in good
faith. However, the court ordered VR to return the
merchandise to the owner thereof and ordered DD
to refund the P500,000.00 to VR. DD moved for the
reconsideration of the decision insisting that he
should be acquitted of theft because being the
depositary, he had juridical possession of the
merchandise. VR also moved for the reconsideration
of the decision insisting that since he was acquitted
of the crime charged, and that he purchased the
merchandise in good faith, he is not obligated to
return the merchandise to its owner. Rule on the
motions with reasons. (2005)
A: The motion for reconsideration of DD should be
granted. By depositing the merchandise in his
warehouse, he transferred not merely physical but
also juridical possession. The element of taking in the
crime of theft is wanting. At the most, he could be held
liable for estafa for misappropriation of the merchandise
deposited. On the other hand, the motion of VR must
also be denied. His acquittal is of no moment because
the thing, subject matter of the offense, shall be restored
to the owner even though it is found in the possession of
a third person who acquired it by lawful means (Art.
105, RPC).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The motion for reconsideration of DD should be denied.
In this case, there being no proof that title to the goods
was transferred to DD, only physical possession is
presumed transferred to and obtained by DD. (U.S. v. De
Vera, G.R. No. L-16961, September 19, 1921). The
principal distinction between the two crimes is that in
theft the thing is taken while in estafa the accused
received the property and converts it to his own use or
benefit. However, there maybe theft even if the accused
71
has possession of the property, if he was entrusted only
TEAM BAROPS
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016
 QuAMTO for CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
with the material or physical (natural) or de facto
possession of the thing, his misappropriation of the
same constitutes theft, but if he has the juridical
possession of the thing, his conversion of the same
constitutes embezzlement or estafa (Santos v. People,
G.R. No. 77429, January 29, 1990).
Q: A vehicular accident occurred on the national
highway in Bulacan. Among the first to arrive at the
scene of the accident was A, who found one of the
victims already dead and the others unconscious.
Before rescuers could come, A, taking advantage of
the helpless condition of the victims, took their
wallets and jewelry. However, the police, who
responded to the report of the accident, caught A.
What crime or crimes did A commit? Why? (2002)
A: A committed the crime of qualified theft because he
took the wallets and jewelry of the victims with evident
intent to gain and on the occasion of a vehicular
accident wherein he took advantage of the helpless
condition of the victims. But only one crime of qualified
theft was committed although there were more than one
victim divested of their valuables, because all the taking
of the valuables were made on one and the same
occasion, thus constituting a continued crime.
Q: A fire broke out in a department store, A, taking
advantage of the confusion, entered the store and
carried away goods which he later sold. What crime,
if any, did he commit? Why? (2002)
A: A committed the crime of qualified theft because he
took the goods on the occasion of and taking advantage
of the fire which broke out in the department store. The
occasion of a calamity such as fire, when the theft was
committed, qualifies the crime under Art. 310 of the
RPC, as amended.
Q: Sunshine, a beauteous "colegiala" but a shoplifter,
went to the Ever Department Store and proceeded to
the women's wear section. The saleslady was of the
impression that she brought to the fitting room
three (3) pieces of swimsuits of different colors.
When she came out of the fitting room, she returned
only two (2) pieces to the clothes rack. The saleslady
became suspicious and alerted the store detective.
Sunshine was stopped by the detective before she
could leave the store and brought to the office of the
store manager. The detective and the manager
searched her and found her wearing the third
swimsuit under her blouse and pants. Was the theft
of the swimsuit consummated, frustrated, or
attempted? Explain. (2000, 1998)
A: The theft was consummated because the taking or
transportation was complete. The transportation is
complete when the offender acquired exclusive
control of the personal property being taken; in this
case, when Sunshine wore the swimsuit under her
blouse and pants and was on her way out of the store.
With evident intent to gain, the taking constitutes theft
and being complete, it is consummated. It is not
necessary that the offender is in a position to dispose of
the property.
REPEATED DOCTRINE
Q: In the jewelry section of a big department store,
Julia snatched a couple of bracelets and put these in
her purse. At the store's exit, however, she was
*QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as suggested by UPLC and other distinct
luminaries in the academe, and updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the 2016 Bar Exams.
arrested by the guard after being radioed by the
store personnel who caught the act in the store's
moving camera. Is the crime consummated,
frustrated, or attempted? (1998)
A: The crime is consummated theft because the taking of
the bracelets was complete after Julia succeeded in
putting them in her purse. Julia acquired complete
control of the bracelets after putting them in her purse;
hence, the taking with intent to gain is complete and
thus the crime is consummated.
Q: At the height of the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo at
around midnight, Aniceto joined some neighbors in
evacuating his family, a few possessions and two
horses to higher ground. Miguel, taking advantage of
the darkness and the confusion, got one of the
horses and asked his friend Doro to accompany him
to Angeles City where he sold the same to an
acquaintance Peping. Searching for his horse,
Aniceto found it, with identifying brand intact, in the
possession of Peping who refused to surrender the
same saying that he had paid good money for it.
Whereupon, Aniceto reported the matter to the
police who promised to accompany him to the
Prosecutors office. May Miguel and Doro be charged
criminally for any offense? If you were the counsel
for both, what defense could you possibly set up for
them? (1992)
A: Miguel should be charged of Qualified Theft of Large
Cattle, a horse being classified as such under Art. 310,
RPC. Doro, on the other hand, should be charged as
accessory if he is aware that the horse was stolen as he
assisted ' the principal, Miguel, in profiting from the
crime. If I were the defense counsel, I will put up the
defense of consent of the owner; hence, there is only
civil liability.
Usurpation (Article 312)
Q: Teresita is the owner of a two-hectare land in
Bulacan which she planted rice and corn. Upon her
arrival from a three-month vacation in the United
States, she was surprised to discover that her land
had been taken over by Manuel and Teofilo who
forcibly evicted her tenant-caretaker Juliana, after
threatening to kill the latter if she would resist their
taking of the land. Thereafter, Manuel and Teofilo
plowed, cultivated and appropriated the harvest for
themselves to the exclusion of Teresita. (1996)
a) What crime or crimes did Manuel and Teofilo
commit? Explain.
A: Manuel and Teofilo committed the crime of
usurpation of real rights under Art. 312, RPC, for
employing violence against or intimidation of persons.
The threats to kill employed by them in forcibly
entering the land is the means of committing the
crime and therefore absorbed in the felony, unless the
intimidation resulted in a more serious felony.
b) Suppose Manuel and Teofilo killed Juliana when
the latter refused to surrender possession of the
land, what crime or crimes did the two commit?
Explain.
A: The crime would still be usurpation of real rights
72
under Art. 312, RPC, even if the said offenders killed the
 QUAMTO FOR CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
caretaker because the killing is a violence against
persons which is the means for committing the crime
and as such, determinative only. However, this gives
way to the proviso that the penalty provided for therein
is "in addition to the penalty incurred in the acts of
violence (murder or homicide) executed by them. The
crime is similar to a robbery where a killing is
committed by reason thereof, giving rise only to one
indivisible offense, plus the fine mentioned therein.
Anti-Fencing Law (P.D. 1612)
and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
Q: What are the elements of fencing? (2010, 1995)
A: The elements of fencing are:
1. a crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
2. accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in
the crime, buys, receives, possesses, keeps,
acquires, conceals, or disposes, or buys and
sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item
, object or anything of value, which has been
derived from the proceeds of said crime;
3. the accused knows or should have known that
said article, item, object or anything of value has
been derived from the from the proceeds of the
crime of robbery or theft; and
4. there is, on the part of the accused, intent to
gain for himself or for another.
Q: Manolo, an avid art collector, was invited to
Tonios house. There, Manolo noticed a nice painting
that exactly looked like the painting which he
reported was stolen from him some years back.
Manolo confronted Tonio about the painting, but
Tonio denied any knowledge, claiming that he
bought the painting legitimately from a friend.
Manolo later proved to Tonio that the painting was
indeed the stolen painting. (2014)
a) What crime/s, if any, may Tonio be charged
with?
A: Tonio may be charged with the crime of fencing.
Under Sec. 5 of P.D. 1612, mere possession of a stolen
article or object or anything of value which has been the
subject of robbery or thievery is prima facie evidence of
fencing. Since Tonio is in possession of a stolen property,
it is presumed that he committed the crime of fencing.
b) Manolo decided to take matters into his own
hands and, one night, broke into Tonios house
by destroying the wall and taking the painting.
What, if any, would be the liability of Manolo?
A: Manalo is liable for the crime of trespass to dwelling
qualified by use of force since he entered the house of
Tonio against the latters will. There is no robbery
because the owner of the property taken cannot commit
robbery.
Q: Roberto bought a Toyota Fortuner from Iigo for
P500,000. While driving his newly-bought car,
Roberto met a minor accident that made the
examination of his vehicle's Registration Certificate
necessary. When the policeman checked the plate,
chassis and motor numbers of the vehicle against
those reflected in the Registration Certificate, he
found the chassis and motor numbers to be different
from what the Registration Certificate stated. The
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
Deed of Sale covering the sale of the Fortuner,
signed by Iigo, also bore the same chassis and
motor numbers as Roberto's Registration
Certificate. The chassis and motor numbers on the
Fortuner were found, upon verification with the
Land Transportation Office, to correspond to a
vehicle previously reported as carnapped. Roberto
claimed that he was in good faith; Iigo sold him a
carnapped vehicle and he did not know that he was
buying a carnapped vehicle. If you were the
prosecutor, would you or would you not charge
Roberto with a crime? (2013)
A: I will charge Roberto with violation of Anti-Fencing
Law. In this case, someone carnapped the vehicle, sold it
to Roberto who did not take part in the crime. Roberto
should have known also that the car was stolen because
it was not properly documented as the deed of sale and
registration certificate did not reflect the correct
numbers of the vehicles engine and chassis. Apparently,
he made no effort to check the papers covering his
purchase. Lastly, Robertos defense of good faith is
flawed because P.D. 1612 is a special law and, therefore,
its violation is regarded as malum prohibitum, requiring
no proof of criminal intent (Dimat v. People, G.R. No.
181184, January 25, 2012).
Q: Arlene is engaged in the buy and sell of used
garments, more popularly known as "ukay-
ukay." Among the items found by the police in a raid
of her store in Baguio City were brand-new Louie
Feraud blazers. Arlene was charged with "fencing."
Will the charge prosper? Why or why not? (2010)
A: No, a charge of fencing will not prosper. Fencing is
committed when a person, with intent to gain for
himself or for another, deals in any manner with an
article of value which he knows or should be known to
him to have been derived from proceeds of theft or
robbery (Sec. 2, P.D. 1612). Thus, for a charge of fencing
to prosper, it must first be established that a theft or
robbery of the article subject of the alleged fencing has
been committeda fact which is wanting in this case. It
should be noted that the suspect is engaged in the buy
and sell of used garments, which are in the nature of
personal property. In civil law, possession of personal or
movable property carries with it a prima facie
presumption of ownership. The presumption of
fencing arises only when the article or item involved is
the subject of a robbery or thievery (Sec. 5, P.D. 1612).
Q: Flora, who was engaged in the purchase and sale
of jewelry, was prosecuted for the violation of P.D.
1612, otherwise known as the Anti-Fencing Law, for
having been found to be in possession of recently
stolen jewelry valued at P100,000.00 at her jewelry
shop at Zapote Road, Las Pinas, Metro Manila. She
testified during the trial that she merely bought the
same from one named Cecilino and even produced a
receipt covering the sale. Cecilino, in the past, used
to deliver to her jewelries for sale but is presently
nowhere to be found. Convicted by the trial court for
violation of the Anti-Fencing Law, she argued (or her
acquittal on appeal, contending that the prosecution
failed to prove that she knew or should have known
that the jewelries recovered from her was the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. (1996)
A: No, Flora's defense is not well-taken because mere
73
possession of any article of value which has been the
TEAM BAROPS
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016
 QuAMTO for CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
subject of theft or robbery shall be prima facie evidence
of fencing (P.D. 1612). The burden is upon the
accused to prove that she acquired the jewelry
legitimately. Her defense of having bought the jewelry
from someone whose whereabouts is unknown, does
not overcome the presumption of fencing against her
(Pamintuan v. People, G.R. No. 111426, July 11, 1994).
Buying personal property puts the buyer on caveat
because of the phrases that he should have known or
ought to know that it is the proceed from robbery or
theft. Besides, she should have followed the
administrative procedure under the decree that of
getting a clearance from the authorities in case the
dealer is unlicensed in order to escape liability.
Q: What is the difference between a fence and an
accessory to theft or robbery? Explain. Is there any
similarity between them? (1995)
A: A fence is punished as a principal under P.D. No. 1612
and the penalty is higher, whereas an accessory to
robbery or theft under the Revised Penal Code is
punished two degrees lower than the principal, unless
he bought or profited from the proceeds of theft or
robbery arising from robbery in Philippine highways
under P.D. No. 532 where he is punished as an
accomplice, hence the penalty is one degree lower. In
addition thereto fencing is a malum prohibitum and
therefore there is no need to prove criminal intent of the
accused; this is not so in violations of Revised Penal
Code.
Yes, there is a similarity in the sense that all the acts of
one who is an accessory to the crimes of robbery or theft
are included in the acts defined as fencing. In fact, the
accessory in the crimes of robbery or theft could be
prosecuted as such under the Revised Penal Code or as a
fence under P.D. No. 1612. (Dizon-Pamintuan vs. People,
GR 111426, July 11, 1994)
Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6539),
as amended by R.A. No. 7659
REPEATED QUESTION
Q: While Carlos was approaching his car, he saw it
being driven away by Paolo, a thief. Carlos tried to
stop Paolo by shouting at him, but Paolo ignored
him. To prevent his car from being carnapped,
Carlos drew his gun, aimed at the rear wheel of the
car and fired. The shot blew the tire which caused
the car to veer out of control and collide with an
oncoming tricycle, killing the tricycle driver. What is
the criminal liability of Paolo, if any? Explain. (2008)
A: Paolo is criminally liable for (1) carnapping under
R.A. No. 6539 for driving away the motor vehicle of
Carlos against the latters will and obviously with intent
to gain and (2) for homicide for the death of the tricycle
driver which resulted from the criminal act deliberately
being committed by Paolo (which is the carnapping).
The homicide was the result of praetor intentionem and
not a component of the crime of carnapping or a result
of reckless impurdence or of simple negligence.
Q: Samuel, a tricycle driver, plied his usual route
using a Honda motorcycle with a sidecar. One
evening, Raul rode on the sidecar, poked a knife at
Samuel and instructed him to go near the bridge.
Upon reaching the bridge, Raul alighted from the
motorcycle and suddenly stabbed Samuel several
*QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as suggested by UPLC and other distinct
luminaries in the academe, and updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the 2016 Bar Exams.
times until he was dead. Raul fled from the scene
taking the motorcycle with him. What crime or
crimes did Raul commit? (1998)
A: Raul committed the composite crime of Carnapping
with homicide under Sec. 14 of R.A. 6539, also known as
the 'Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972 as amended,
considering that the killing "in the course or "on the
occasion of a carnapping. A motorcycle is included in the
definition of a "motor vehicle" in said Act. There is no
apparent motive for the killing of the tricycle driver but
for Raul to be able to take the motorcycle. The fact that
the tricycle driver was killed brings about the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death.
Swindling (Estafa) and Other Deceits
(Article 315-318)
Q: Dora gave Elen several pieces of jewelry for sale
on commission basis. They agreed that Elen would
remit the proceeds of the sale and return the unsold
items to Dora within sixty days. The period expired
without Elen remitting the proceeds of the sale or
returning the pieces of jewelry. Dora demanded by
phone that Elen turn over the proceeds of the sale
and return the unsold pieces of jewelry. Elen
promised to do so the following day. El en still failed
to make good on her promise but instead issued
post-dated checks. Thereafter, Dora made several
more demands, the last of which was in writing, but
they were all unheeded. When the checks were
deposited in Dora's bank account, the checks were
returned unpaid for insufficient funds. Elen was
charged with estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa
Big. 22. Will the charges against Elen prosper?
Explain. (2015)
A: Art. 315 par.1(b) of the RPC punishes Estafa through
Misappropriation. To prove the foregoing crime, the
prosecution must establish the following elements: (1)
the offenders receipt of money, goods, or other personal
property in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving
the duty to deliver, or to return the same; (2)
misappropriation or conversion by the offender of the
money or property received, or denial of receipt of the
money or property; (3) the misappropriation,
conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and
(4) demand by the offended party that the offender
return the money or property received.
In the case at hand, the pieces of jewelry were received
by Elen from Dora, an act which transferred the juridical
possession of the former. To have juridical possession
means possession which gives the transferee a right
over the thing which the transferee may set up against
the owner.
Generally, demand for the return of the thing delivered
in trust is necessary before an accused is convicted of
Estafa. However, if there is an agreed period for the
return of the thing received in trust and the accused
failed to return it within the agreed period, demand is
unnecessary. Failure to return the thing within the
agreed period consummates the crime of Estafa, i.e., the
misappropriation of the thing received in trust. In this
case, Dora and Elen agreed on a period, within 60 days,
for the delivery of the proceeds of the sale and return of
the unsold items to Dora. Elens failure to return within
74
60 days is a presumption of misappropriation of the
 QUAMTO FOR CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
jewelry. Thus, there would be no more need to present
any act of misappropriation.
Q: Dela convinced Nita to work in Taiwan, promising
Nita that she would take care of the processing of the
neccessary documents. Dela collected P120,000.00
from Nita purportedly for the processing of her
papers. Upon receipt of the money, Nita was made to
accomplish certain forms and was told that she
would be deployed to Taiwan within one month.
After one month, Nita followed up on her
application. Dela made some excuses and told Nita
that the deployment would be delayed. Another
month passed and Dela made other excuses which
made Nita suspicious. Nita later discovered that Dela
was not licensed to recruit. Nita confronted Dela and
demanded the return of her money. Dela promised
to return the same in a week's time. (2015)
a. A week later, Dela was nowhere to be found.
What crime(s) did Dela commit? Explain.
A: Dela defrauded Nita by leading her to believe that she
has the capacity to send her to Taiwan for work, even
though she does not have a license or authority for the
purpose. Such misrepresentation came before Nita gave
Dela P120,000 for the processing of her papers. Clearly,
Nita would have not parted with her money were it not
for such enticement by Dela. As a consequence of Delas
false pretenses, Nita suffered damages as the promised
employment abroad never materialized and the money
she paid was never recovered. Thus, the crime of estafa
through falsification of public documents is committed.
Since Dela has no license to recruit, the crime of illegal
recruitment is also committed. (People v. Chua, G.R. No.
187052, September 13, 2012).
b. Will your answer still be the same, assuming
that the promise to deploy for employment
abroad was made by Dela to Celia, Digna and
Emma, in addition to Nita, and from whom Dela
also collected the same amount of processing
fee?
A: Yes, Dela shall be liable for both Estafa under Par.2
(a) of Art. 315 of the RPC and Illegal Recruitment, but in
large-scale. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in
large scale if committed against three or more persons
individually or as a group. Since there are at least 3
victims in this case, Cela, Digna, Emma, and Nita, Dela
shall be liable for large scale illegal recruitment under
the earlier cited provisions (People v. Tolentino, G.R. No.
208686, July 1, 2015).
Q: Mr. Benjie is the owner of a hardware store
specializing in the sale of plumbing materials. On
February 1, 2014, Mr. Ed, a friend and regular
customer of Mr. Benjie, visited the hardware store
and purchased several plumbing materials in the
total amount of P5 million. Mr. Benjie readily
accepted Mr. Eds payment of three (3) postdated
checks in the amount of P1 million Pesos each in
view of the assurance of Mr. Ed that the checks will
be honored upon presentment for payment. Mr.
Benjie, as a consequence, immediately delivered the
materials to the house of Mr. Ed. The following day,
Mr. Ed went back to Mr. Benjie to tender another
two (2) postdated checks in the amount of P1
million each to complete the payment, with the same
assurance that the checks will be honored upon
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
presentment for payment. When the checks were
presented for payment, all were dishonored for
insufficiency of funds and corresponding notices of
dishonor were sent and received by Mr. Ed. One
month after receipt of the notices of dishonor, Mr. Ed
failed to make good the checks. Thereafter, Mr.
Benjie filed before the public prosecutors office a
complaint against Mr. Ed, although no demand letter
was earlier sent to Mr. Ed.
During the preliminary investigation, Mr. Benjie
accepted several amounts from Mr. Edas partial
payments. The wife of Mr. Benjie protested and
insisted that the complaint should continue despite
the partial payments. On the other hand, Mr. Ed
counters that no demand letter was earlier sent to
him, that the obligation is merely civil in character
and that novation took place when Mr. Benjie
accepted the partial payments. Discuss the criminal
liability, if any, of Mr. Ed. (2014)
A: Mr. Ed is liable for one count of estafa under Art.
315(2)(d) for the issuance of the first three checks
because he issued them simultaneous with the
transaction in order to defraud another. However, the
two other checks are deemed to have been issued in
payment of a pre-existing obligation, hence the same act
could not have been the efficient cause of defraudation
required in estafa under the RPC. He is liable for two
counts if violation of B.P. 22 for the issuance of the five
checks which were dishonoured for insufficiency of
funds. The gravamen of B.P. 22 is the issuance of a
worthless or unfunded check. Deceit is not material to
B.P. 22.
Mr. Eds defense of partial payments constituting
novation and absence of demand letter will not
exculpate dim from the criminal liability incurred. The
partial payments made would only affect his civil
liability while his claim of absence of demand letter
negated by his receipt of notices of dishonour.
Q: William is the son-in-law of Mercedes who owns
several pieces of real property. In 1994, William's
wife, Anita, died. In 1996, William caused the
preparation of a Special Power of Attorney (SPA)
giving him the authority to sell two (2) parcels of
land registered in the name of Mercedes. The
signature of Mercedes in the SPA was forged and,
through this forged SPA and without the consent and
knowledge of Mercedes, William succeeded in
selling the two (2) parcels for Php 2,000,000. He
pocketed the proceeds of the sale. Mercedes
eventually discovered William's misdeeds and filed
a criminal complaint. William was subsequently
charged with estafa through falsification of public
document. Was the criminal charge proper? (2013)
A: The criminal charge of estafa through falsification is
correct. William forged the signature of his mother-in-
law in the Special Power of Attorney, which is a public
document, as a necessary means to sell her properties to
third parties without delivering the proceeds thereof.
Although the relationship of affinity created between
William and his mother-in-law survived the death of
either party to the marriage, the coverage of the
absolutory cause under Art. 332 (1) of the RPC cannot
be applied to him. It is strictly limited to the simple
crimes of theft, estafa and malicious mischief. It does not
75
apply where any of the crimes mentioned is complex
TEAM BAROPS
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016
 QuAMTO for CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
with another crime. This is because when estafa is
committed through falsification of a public document,
the matter acquires a very serious public dimension and
goes beyond the respective rights and liabilities of
family member among themselves. Effectively, when the
offender resorts to an act that breaches the public
interest in the integrity of public documents as a mean
to violate the property rights of a family member, he is
removed from the protective mantle of the absolutory
cause under Article 332 (Intestate Estate of Carungcong
v. People, G.R. No. 181409, February 11, 2010).
Q: The president, treasurer, and secretary of ABC
Corporation were charged with syndicated estafa
under the following Information: That on or about
the 1st week of January 2010 or subsequent thereto
in Cebu City and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together and all of
them mutually helping and aiding one another in a
syndicated manner, through a corporation
registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), with intention of carrying out the
unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise or
scheme, with intent to gain and by means of fraud
and deceit, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously defraud Virna, Lana, Deborah and
several other persons by falsely or fraudulently
pretending or representing in a transaction or series
of transactions, which they made with complainants
and the public in general, to the effect that they were
in a legitimate business of foreign exchange trading
successively or simultaneously operating under the
name and style of ABC Corporation and DEF
Management Philippines, Incorporated, induced and
succeeded in inducing complainants and several
other persons to give and deliver to said accused the
amount of at least P20,000,000.00 on the strength of
said manifestations and representations, the
accused knowing fully well that the abovenamed
corporations registered with the SEC are not
licensed nor authorized to engage in foreign
exchange trading and that such manifestations and
representations to transact in foreign exchange
were false and fraudulent, that these resulted to the
damage and prejudice of the complainants and other
persons, and that the defraudation pertains to funds
solicited from the public in general by such
corporations/associations. Will the case for
syndicated estafa prosper? Explain. (2010)
A: No, a case for syndicated estafa will not prosper
because a syndicate for such crime under P.D. 1689
must be comprised of five (5) or more persons
committing the estafa or other forms of swindling
defined in Arts. 315 and 316 of the RPC whereas the
case given involved only three (3) accused who are
alleged to have conspired in the commission of the
swindling. But because the amount defrauded exceeds
P100,000.00, the case is still under the same P.D. 1689
with a lower penalty than syndicated estafa.
Q: Fe is the manager of a rice mill in Bulacan. In
order to support a gambling debt, Fe made it appear
that the rice mill was earning less than it actually
was by writing in the talaan or ledger a figure
lower than what was collected and paid by their
customers. Fe then pocketed the difference. What
crime/s did Fe commit, if any? Explain your answer.
(2007)
*QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as suggested by UPLC and other distinct
luminaries in the academe, and updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the 2016 Bar Exams.
A: If the talaan or ledger which Fe made to show a
falsehood was a private document, the only crime that
Fe committed was estafa thru abuse of confidence or
unfaithfulness. Criminal liability for falsification of a
private document does not arise without damage or at
least proof of intent to cause damage. It cannot co-exist
with the crime of estafa which is also essentially
requires damage or at least proof of intent to cause
damage. Since the talaan was falsified to cover-up or
conceal the misappropriation of the amount involved,
whatever damage or intent to cause damage attends the
falsification, it will be the same damage or intent to
cause damage that will attend the estafa.
If such talaan or ledger was a commercial document,
damage or proof of intent to cause damage is not
necessary. The falsification alone if done with intent to
pervert the truth would bring about criminal liability for
falsification of a commercial document. Damage or
intent to cause damage, would sustain the estafa
independently of the falsification of the commercial
document. In this case, two (2) separate crimes are
committed; namely, estafa and falsification of the
commercial document. The falsification should not be
complexed with the estafa since it was not committed as
a necessary means to commit the estafa but rather
resorted to, to conceal or hide the misappropriation of
the amount she pocketed.
Q: DD purchased a television set for P50,000.00 with
the use of a counterfeit credit card. The owner of
the establishment had no inkling that the credit card
used by DD was counterfeit. What crime or crimes
did DD commit? Explain. (2005)
A: DD committed the crime of estafa under Art.
315(2)(a) of the RPC by falsely pretending to possess
credit. The elements of estafa under this penal provision
are: (1) the accused defrauded another by means of
deceit; and (2) damage or prejudice capable of
pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or
third party. The accused also violated R.A. No. 8484,
which punishes the use or possession of fake or
counterfeit credit card.
Q: A sold a washing machine to B on credit with
the understanding that B could return the appliance
within two weeks if after testing the same, B decided
not to buy it. Two weeks lapsed without B returning
the appliance. A found out that B had sold the
washing machine to a third party. Is B liable for
estafa? Why? (2002)
A: No, B is not liable for estafa because he is not just an
entrustee of the washing machine which he sold; he is
the owner thereof by virtue of the sale of the
washing machine to him. The sale being on credit, B as
buyer is only liable for the unpaid price of the washing
machine; his obligation is only a civil obligation. There is
no felonious misappropriation that could constitute
estafa.
REPEATED QUESTION
Q: Mr. Carlos Gabisi, a customs guard, and Mr. Rico
Yto, a private Individual, went to the office of Mr.
Diether Ocuarto, a customs broker, and represented
themselves as agents of Moonglow Commercial
76
Trdg., an Importer of children's clothes and toys. Mr.
 QUAMTO FOR CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
Gabisi and Mr. Yto engaged Mr. Ocuarto to prepare
and file with the Bureau of Customs the necessary
Import Entry and Internal Revenue Declaration
covering Moonglow's shipment. Mr. Gabisi and Mr.
Yto submitted to Mr. Ocuarto a packing list, a
commercial invoice, a bill of lading and a Sworn
Import Duty Declaration which declared the
shipment as children's toys, the taxes and duties of
which were computed at P60,000.00. Mr. Ocuarto
filed the aforementioned documents with the Manila
International Container Port. However, before the
shipment was released, a spot check was conducted
by Customs Senior Agent James Bandido, who
discovered that the contents of the van (shipment)
were not children's toys as declared in the shipping
documents but 1,000 units of video cassette
recorders with taxes and duties computed at
P600,000.00. A hold order and warrant of seizure
and detention were then issued by the District
Collector of Customs. Further investigation showed
that Moonglow is non-existent. Consequently, Mr,
Gabisi and Mr. Yto were charged with and convicted
for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 which
makes it unlawful among others, for public officers
to cause any undue Injury to any party, including the
Government. In the discharge of official functions
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence. In their motion for
reconsideration, the accused alleged that the
decision was erroneous because the crime was not
consummated but was only at an attempted stage,
and that in fact the Government did not suffer any
undue injury.Assuming that the attempted or
frustrated stage of the violation charged is not
punishable, may the accused be nevertheless
convicted for an offense punished by the Revised
Penal Code under the facts of the case? Explain.
(2000)
A: Yes, both are liable for attempted estafa thru
falsification of commercial documents, a complex crime.
They tried to defraud the Government with the use of
false commercial and public documents. Damage is not
necessary.
Q: Is there such a crime as estafa through
negligence? Explain. (1999)
A: There is no such crime as estafa through negligence.
In estafa, the profit or gain must be obtained by the
accused personally, through his own acts. In the case of
People v. Nepomuceno (CA, 460G 6135), it was held that
the mere negligence in allowing another to take
advantage of or benefit from the entrusted chattel
cannot constitute estafa.
Q: Aurelia introduced Rosa to Victoria, a dealer in
jewelry who does business in Timog, Quezon City.
Rosa, a resident of Cebu City, agreed to sell a
diamond ring and bracelet to Victoria on a
commission basis, on condition that, if these items
cannot be sold, they may be returned to Victoria
forthwith. Unable to sell the ring and bracelet, Rosa
delivered both items to Aurelia in Cebu City with the
understanding that Aurelia shall, in turn, return the
items to Victoria in Timog, Quezon City. Aurelia
dutifully returned the bracelet to Victoria but sold
the ring kept the cash proceeds thereof to her and
issued a check to Victoria which bounced. Victoria
sued Rosa for estafa under Article 315, R.P.C..
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
Victoria insisting that delivery to a third person of
the thing held in trust is not a defense in estafa. Is
Rosa criminally liable for estafa under the
circumstances? Explain. (1999)
A: No, Rosa cannot be held criminally liable for estafa.
Although she received the jewelry from Victoria under
an obligation to return the same or deliver the proceeds
thereof, she did not misappropriate it. In fact, she gave
them to Aurelia specifically to be returned to Victoria.
The misappropriation was done by Aurelia, and absent
the showing of any conspiracy between Aurelia and
Rosa, the latter cannot be held criminally liable for
Amelia's acts. Furthermore, as explained above, Rosa's
negligence which may have allowed Aurelia to
misappropriate the jewelry does not make her
criminally liable for estafa.
Q: Divina, is the owner of a 500-square meter
residential lot in Makati City covered by TCT No.
1998. As her son needed money for his trip abroad,
Divina mortgaged her lot to her neighbor Dino for
P1,000,000. Later Divina sold the same lot to Angel
for P2,000,000. In the Deed of Sale, she expressly
stated that the property is free from any lien or
encumbrance. What crime, if any, did Divina
commit? (1998)
A: Divina committed estafa or swindling under Art.
316(2) of the RPC because, knowing that the real
property being sold is encumbered, she still made a
misrepresentation in the Deed of Sale that the same is
free from any lien or encumbrance. There is thus a
deceit or fraud causing damage to the buyer of the lot.
Q: On March 31, 1995, Orpheus Financing Corp.
received from Maricar the sum of P500,000 as
money market placement for sixty days at fifteen
(15) per cent interest, and the President of said
Corp. issued a check covering the amount including
the interest due thereon, postdated May 30, 1995.
On the maturity date, however, Orpheus Financing
Corp. failed to deliver back Maricar's money
placement with the corresponding interest earned,
notwithstanding repeated demands upon said
Corporation to comply with its commitment. Did
the President of Orpheus Financing Corporation
incur any criminal liability for estafa for reason of
the non-payment of the money market placement?
Explain. (1996)
A: No, the President of the financing corporation does
not incur criminal liability for estafa because a money
market transaction partakes of the nature of a loan, such
that non-payment thereof would not give rise to estafa
through misappropriation or conversion. In money
market placement, there is transfer of ownership of the
money to be invested and therefore the liability for its
return is civil in nature.
Q: Julio obtained a letter of credit from a local bank
in order to import auto tires from Japan. To secure
payment of his letter of credit, Julio executed a trust
receipt in favor of the bank. Upon arrival of the tires,
Julio sold them but did not deliver the proceeds to
the bank. Julio was charged with estafa under P.D.
No. 115 which makes the violation of a trust receipt
agreement punishable as estafa under Art. 315, par.
(1), subpar. (b), of the Revised Penal Code. Julio
77
contended that P.D. No. 115 was unconstitutional
TEAM BAROPS
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016
 QuAMTO for CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
because it violated the Bill of Rights provision
against imprisonment for non-payment of debt. Rule
on the contention of Julio, Discuss fully. (1995)
A: Such contention is invalid. A trust receipt
arrangement doesn't involve merely a simple loan
transaction but includes likewise a security feature
where the creditor bank extends financial assistance to
the debtor-importer in return for the collateral or
security title as to the goods or merchandise being
security is the one sought to be protected and not the
loan which is a separate and distinct agreement.
What is being penalized under P.D. 115 is the misuse or
misappropriation of the goods or proceeds realized from
the sale of the goods, documents or instruments which
are being held in trust for the entrustee-banks. In other
words, the law punishes the dishonesty and abuse of
confidence in the handling of money or goods to the
prejudice of the other, and hence there is no violation of
the right against imprisonment for non-payment of debt
(People v. Nitafan, G.R. Nos. 81559-60, Apri 6, 1992).
Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22), plus
Administrative Circular No. 12-2000
Q: Frank borrowed P1,000,000 from his brother
Eric. To pay the loan, Frank issued a post-dated
check to be presented for payment a month after the
transaction. Two days before maturity, Frank called
Eric telling him he had insufficient funds and
requested that the deposit of the check be deferred.
Nevertheless, Eric deposited the check and it was
dishonored. When Frank failed to pay despite
demand, Eric filed a complaint against him for
violation of Batas Pambansa Big. 22 (The Bouncing
Checks Law). Was the charge brought against Frank
correct? (2013)
A: Yes, the charge brought against Frank is correct.
Violation of B.P. 22 is malum prohibitum which is
committed by mere issuance of a check. Good faith is not
a defense. As long as the check was issued on account or
for value, the purpose for which the check was issued,
the terms and conditions relating to the issuance are
irrelevant to the prosecution of the offender. For this
reason, the request of Frank to defer the deposit of the
check as it has insufficient funds will not militate against
his prosecution for B.P. 22. Despite notice, Frank can still
be charged. Moreover, if what is charged is Estafa, Frank,
being a brother of the offended party, cannot be held
criminally liable under Art. 332, RPC.
Q: A asked financial support from her showbiz
friend B who accommodated her by issuing in her
favor a postdated check in the sum of P90,000.00.
Both of them knew that the check would not be
honored because Bs account had just been closed.
The two then approached trader C whom they asked
to change the check with cash, even agreeing that
the exchange be discounted at P85,000.00 with the
assurance that the check shall be funded upon
maturity. Upon Cs presentment of the check for
payment on due date, it was dishonored because the
account had already been closed. What action/s may
C commence against A and B to hold them to account
for the loss of her P85,000.00? Explain. (2010, 1992)
A: A criminal action for violation of B.P. 22 may be filed
against B who drew the postdated check against a closed
bank account, for value paid by C, and with knowledge at
*QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as suggested by UPLC and other distinct
luminaries in the academe, and updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the 2016 Bar Exams.
the time he issued the check that the account thereof is
already closed. A cannot be held liable under B.P. 22
because he was a mere endorser of Bs check to C who
exchanged the checks with cash. B.P. 22 does not apply
to endorser of checks. Hence only a civil action may be
filed by C against A to recover to P85,000.00.
Although a simultaneous action for estafa is authorized
by law for the issuance of a worthless check, under the
given facts, the check was discounted and thus issued in
a credit transaction for a pre-existing indebtedness.
Criminal liability for estafa does not arise when a check
has been issued in payment for a pre-existing debt.
Q: A and B agreed to meet at the latter's house to
discuss B's financial problems. On his way, one of A's
car tires blew up. Before A left following the
meeting, he asked B to lend him money to buy a new
spare tire. B had temporarily exhausted his bank
deposits, leaving a zero balance. Anticipating,
however, a replenishment of his account soon, B
issued A a postdated check with which A negotiated
for a new tire. When presented, the check bounced
for lack of funds. The tire company filed a criminal
case against A and B. What would be the criminal
liability, if any, of each of the two accused? Explain.
(2003)
A: A who negotiated the unfunded check of B in buying a
new tire for his car may only be prosecuted for estafa if
he was aware at the time of such negotiation that the
check has no sufficient funds in the drawee bank;
otherwise, he is not criminally liable. B who
accommodated A with his check may nevertheless be
prosecuted under B.P. 22 for having issued the check,
knowing at the time of issuance that it has no funds in
the bank and that A will negotiate it to buy a new tire,
i.e., for value. B may not be prosecuted for estafa because
the facts indicate that he is not actuated by intent to
defraud in issuing the check which A negotiated.
Obviously, B issued the postdated check only to help A;
criminal intent or dolo is absent.
Q: A a businessman, borrowed P500,000.00 from
B, a friend. To pay the loan, A issued a postdated
check to be presented for payment 30 days after the
transaction. Two days before the maturity date of
the check, A called up B and told him not to deposit
the check on the date stated on the face thereof, as A
had not deposited in the drawee bank the amount
needed to cover the check. Nevertheless, B
deposited the check in question and the same was
dishonored of insufficiency of funds. A failed to
settle the amount with B in spite of the latter's
demands. Is A guilty of violating B.P. Blg. 22,
otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law?
Explain. (2002)
A: Yes, A Is liable for violation of B.P. 22. Although
knowledge by the drawer of insufficiency or lack of
funds at the time of the issuance of the check is an
essential element of the violation, the law presumes
prima facie such knowledge, unless within five (5)
banking days of notice of dishonor or non-payment,
the drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due
thereon or makes arrangements for payment in full by
the drawee of such checks. A mere notice by the drawer
A to the payee B before the maturity date of the check
will not defeat the presumption of knowledge created
by the law; otherwise, the purpose and spirit of B.P. 22
78
will be rendered useless.
 QUAMTO FOR CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
Q: The accused was convicted under B.P. Blg. 22 for
having issued several checks which were
dishonored by the drawee bank on their due date
because the accused closed her account after the
issuance of checks. On appeal, she argued that she
could not be convicted under B.P. Blg. 22 by reason
of the closing of her account because said law
applies solely to checks dishonored by reason of
insufficiency of funds and that at the time she issued
the checks concerned, she had adequate funds in the
bank. While she admits that she may be held liable
for estafa under Article 215 of the Revised Penal
Code, she cannot however be found guilty of having
violated B.P. Blg. 22. Is her contention correct?
Explain. (1996)
A: No, the contention of the accused is not correct. As
long as the checks issued were issued to apply on
account or for value, and was dishonored upon
presentation for payment to the drawee bank for lack of
insufficient funds on their due date, such act falls within
the ambit of B.P. 22. Said law expressly punishes any
person who may have insufficient funds in the drawee
bank when he issues the check, but fails to keep
sufficient funds to cover the full amount of the check
when presented to the drawee bank within ninety (90)
days from the date appearing thereon.
Q: What is a memorandum check? Is the "bouncing"
thereof within the purview of BP Blg. 22? (1995,
1994)
A: A memorandum check is an ordinary check with the
word Memorandum,Memo", or Mem" written across
the face, signifying that the maker or drawer engages to
pay its holder absolutely thus partaking the nature of a
promissory note. It is drawn on a bank and is a bill of
exchange within the purview of Sec. 185 of the
Negotiable Instruments Law. Yes, a person who issued a
memorandum check without sufficient funds is guilty of
violating B.P. Big. 22 as said law covers all checks
whether it is an evidence of indebtedness, or in payment
of a pre-existing obligation, or as deposit or guarantee.
(People vs. Nitafan, G.R. No. 75954,1992)
Q: Jane is a money lender. Edmund is a businessman
who has been borrowing money from Jane by
rediscounting his personal checks to pay his loans.
In March 1989, he borrowed P100,000 from Jane
and issued to her a check for the same amount. The
check was dishonored by the drawee bank for
having been drawn against a closed account. When
Edmund was notified of the dishonor of his check he
promised to raise the amount within five days. He
failed. Consequently, Jane sued Edmund for
violation of the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22).
The defense of Edmund was that he gave the check
to Jane to serve as a memorandum of his
indebtedness to her and was not supposed to be
encashed. Is the defense of Edmund valid? Discuss
fully. (1995)
A: The defense of Edmund is not valid. A memorandum
check upon presentment is generally accepted by the
bank. It does not matter whether the check is in the
nature of a memorandum as evidence of indebtedness.
What the law punishes is the mere issuance of a
bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was
issued nor the terms and conditions relating thereto.
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
The mere act of issuing a worthless check is a malum
prohibitum. The understanding that the check will not
be presented at the bank but will be redeemed by the
maker when the loan falls due is a mere private
arrangement which may not prevail to exempt it from
the penal sanction of B.P. Blg. 22.
Arson (Anti-Arson Law or P.D. 1613 and Article 320,
RPC as amended by R.A. 7659)
Q: Senio planned to burn Bal's house. One evening,
during a drinking spree at his house, Senio told his
friends what he intended to do and even showed
them the gasoline in cans that he would use for the
purpose. Carlo, a common friend of Senio and Bal,
was present at the drinking spree. He was still sober
when Senio told them his plans. Before going home,
Carlo warned Bal that Senio would burn his house
and had already bought gasoline that would be used
for the purpose. Bal reported the matter to the
police authorities. Meanwhile, Senio went to Bal' s
house and proceeded to pour gasoline around the
walls of the house and it was at that point when he
was caught by the police. What crime did Senio
commit, if any? Explain. (2015)
A: Senio is liable for attempted arson. He manifested
before his intention to burn the house of Bal to his
friends. He then performed the act of pouring gasoline
around the walls of the house to execute his criminal
design to commit arson. This is not just a preparatory
act, because it already ceased to be equivocal and
revealed a clear intention to burn the house. In sum, he
already commenced the commission of the crime of
arson directly by overt acts but he did not perform all
acts to execute his criminal design to commit arson by
setting the house on fire due to a cause other than his
spontaneous desistance, and that is, having been caught
by the police.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The crime could only be malicious mischief as the
problem does not mention that he is carrying a match or
a lighter. It was not shown that SEnio was about to light
a match or ignite a lighter to set the house on fire.
Q: CD is the stepfather of FEL. One day, CD got very
mad at FEL for failing in his college courses. In his
fury, CD got the leather suitcase of FEL and burned it
together with all its contents. What crime was
committed by CD? (2004)
A: The crime committed by CD is arson under P.D. 1613
(the new Arson Law) which punishes any person who
burns or sets fire to the property of another (Sec. 1, P.D.
1613). CD is criminally liable although he is the
stepfather of FEL whose property he burnt, because
such relationship is not exempting from criminal
liability in the crime of arson but only in crimes of theft,
swindling or estafa, and malicious mischief (Art. 332,
RPC). The provision (Art. 323, RPC) of the Code to the
effect that burning property of small value should be
punished as malicious mischief has long been
repealed by P.D. 1613; hence, there is no more legal
basis to consider burning property of small value as
malicious mischief.
Q: One early evening, there was a fight between
Eddie Gutierrez and Mario Cortez. Later that
79
evening, at about 11 o'clock, Eddie passed by the
TEAM BAROPS
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016
 QuAMTO for CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
house of Mario carrying a plastic bag containing
gasoline, threw the bag at the house of Mario who
was inside the house watching television, and then
lit it. The front wall of the house started blazing and
some neighbors yelled and shouted. Forthwith,
Mario poured water on the burning portion of the
house. Neighbors also rushed in to help put the fire
under control before any great damage could be
inflicted and before the flames have extensively
spread. Only a portion of the house was burned.
Discuss Eddie's liability. (2000)
A: Eddie is liable for destructive arson in the
consummated stage. It is destructive arson because fire
was resorted to in destroying the house of Mario which
is an inhabited house or dwelling. The arson is
consummated because the house was in fact already
burned although not totally. In arson, it is not required
that the premises be totally burned for the crime to be
consummated. It is enough that the premises suffer
destruction by burning.
Q: Tata owns a three-storey building located at No. 3
Herran Street. Paco, Manila. She wanted to construct
a new building but had no money to finance the
construction. So, she insured the building for
P3,000,000.00. She then urged Yoboy and Yongsi, for
monetary consideration, to bum her building so she
could collect the insurance proceeds. Yoboy and
Yongsi burned the said building resulting to its total
loss. What crime did Tata, Yoboy and Yongsi
commit? (1994)
A: Tata, Yoboy and Yongsi committed the crime of
destructive arson because they collectively caused the
destruction of property by means of fire under the
circumstances which exposed to danger the life or
property of others.
CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
(Articles 333-334, 336-346)
Adultery and Concubinage (Art. 333-334)
Q: Filipino citizens Hector and Wendy were married
in New York, and have been living happily in Manila
for the last three years. Hector was removing junk
from his basement when he came across an
unlabeled recordable ed. He put it in his computer's
DVD drive to check its contents. To his surprise, he
saw a video of Wendy and another man Ariel, in the
act of sexual intercourse in the master's bedroom of
his house. Angered by what he saw, he filed a
complaint for adultery against Wendy and Ariel.
During the course of the trial, and again to the
surprise of Hector, it was proved that Wendy was
born male and underwent sex reassignment later in
life. (2015)
a. May Hector's charge of adultery against Wendy
and Ariel prosper? Explain.
A: Yes, Hectors charge of Adultery will prosper.
Adultery has the following elements: (1) the woman is
married; (2) she has sexual intercourse with a man not
her husband; (3) as regards the man with whom she has
sexual intercourse, he must know her to be married.
In the case at hand, the discovery by Hector of the video
of Wendy having sexual intercourse with another man,
*QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as suggested by UPLC and other distinct
luminaries in the academe, and updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the 2016 Bar Exams.
Ariel, is sufficient to charge his wife with Adultery. The
fact that Wendy was later discovered by Hector to be
born male who simply underwent sexual re-assignment
later in life, is immaterial to the charge of Adultery
considering that the marriage between the same sex is
considered valid in the USA where they were married.
b. What is an impossible crime? Can there be an
impossible crime of adultery?
A: An impossible crime is an act which would be an
offense against persons or property, were it not for the
inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on
account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual
means. There is no impossible crime of adultery since
this is a crime against chastity, and not against person or
property.
Q: Suspecting that her husband of twenty years was
having an affair, Leilanie hired a private investigator
to spy on him. After two weeks, the private
investigator showed Leilanie a video of her husband
having sexual intercourse with another woman in a
room of a five-star hotel. Based on what she saw on
the video, Leilanie accused her husband of
concubinage. Will the case of concubinage prosper?
Explain. (2010)
A: No, a case for concubinage will not prosper because
said crime may be committed only be a husband in three
(3) ways, viz:
a. By keeping a mistress in the conjugal dwelling; or
b. By having sexual intercourse with a woman not his
wife under scandalous circumstances; or
c. By cohabiting with a woman not his wife in any
other place (Art. 334, RPC)
The facts of the case given do not constitute any of the
situations above-stated.
Q: A, a married woman, had sexual intercourse with
a man who was not her husband. The man did not
know she was married. What crime, if any, did each
of them commit? Why? (2002)
A: A, the married woman, committed the crime of
adultery under Art. 333 of the RPC, as amended, for
having sexual intercourse with a man not her husband
while her marriage is still subsisting. But the man who
had carnal knowledge of her, not knowing her to be
married, shall not be liable for adultery.
Q: A is married. He has a paramour with whom he
has sexual relations on a more or less regular basis.
They meet at least once a week in hotels, motels and
other places where they can be alone. Is A guilty of
any crime? Why? (2002)
A: A is guilty of the crime of concubinage by having
sexual intercourse under scandalous circumstances with
a woman who is not his wife. Having sexual relations on
a more or less regular basis in hotels, motels and other
places may be considered a scandalous circumstance
that offends public conscience, giving rise to criticism
and general protest such acts being imprudent and
wanton and setting a bad example.
Acts of Lasciviousness (Article 336)
Q: At the Maligaya Disco Club, Leoncio and Evelyn
80
were intimately dancing a very seductive dance
 QUAMTO FOR CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
number. While gyrating with their bodies, Leoncio
dipped his private parts in Evelyns buttocks.
Incensed, Evelyn protested, but Leoncio continued
and tightly embraced her. (2009)
a. What crime or crimes, if any, did Leoncio
commit? Explain.
A: Leoncio committed the crime of unjust vexation only
because the act was done in the course of dancing. The
act of dipping his private parts in Evelyns buttocks
during a very seductive dance, although offensive to
Evelyn, may be viewed as part of a dirty dancing. Lewd
intent cannot simply be presumed from the act of dirty
dancing. The fact that the act was perpetrated in a public
place and with an audience negates lewd designs or
lascivious intent, which is essential in the crime of acts
of lasciviousness.
b. Would your answer be the same if, even after the
music had stopped, Leoncio continued to dance
dirty, rubbing his private parts on Evelyns
buttocks? Explain.
A: The crime would then be acts of lasciviousness. That
the music for dancing had already stopped puts an end
to any pretense of dancing by Leoncio. His continued
dirty acts absent the dancing as there was no music
anymore is patently lewd and lascivious. More so,
Evelyn already protested Leoncios lewd acts in the
course of dancing. So where the dance ended, Leoncios
continued dirty acts cannot be veiled as still part of
dancing.
Q: Eduardo Quintos, a widower for the past 10 years,
felt that his retirement at the age of 70 gave him
the opportunity to engage in his favorite pastime
voyeurism. If not using his high-powered
binoculars to peep at his neighbor's homes and
domestic activities, his second choice was to follow
sweet young girls. One day, he trailed a teenage girl
up to the LRT station at EDSA-Buendia. While
ascending the stairs, he stayed one step behind her
and in a moment of bravado, placed his hand on her
left hip and gently massaged it. She screamed and
shouted for help. Eduardo was arrested and charged
with acts of lasciviousness. Is the designation of the
crime correct? (2006)
A: The designation of the crime as acts of lasciviousness
is not correct. There is no lewd design exhibited by
Eduardo when he placed his hand on the left hip of the
victim and gently massaging it. The overt act he
committed by Eduardo still falls short of the crime of
acts of lasciviousness. The nature of the act done does
not manifest sexual desire. It is more appropriate to
consider such overt act as as unjust for causing
annoyance, irritation or disturbance to the victim. The
Revised Penal Code favors a milder criminal
responsibility.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
A: The crime should be Other Acts of Child Abuse under
Section 10(b) of R.A. 7610 of Section 3 that refers to
child abuse committed by any act, deeds or words which
debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and
dignity of a child as a human being. In relation thereto,
Section 10 provides criminal liability for other acts of
child abuse, cruelty or exploitation, or for other
conditions prejudicial to the child's development. The
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
reaction of the victim, screaming for help upon the
occurrence of the touching indicates that she perceived
her dignity was being debased or violated.
CRIMES AGAINST CIVIL THE CIVIL STATUS OF
PERSONS (Articles 347-352)
Illegal Marriages (Articles 349-352)
Q: What are the elements of the crime of bigamy? If
you were the judge in a bigamy case where the
defense was able to prove that the first marriage
was null and void or a nullity, would you render a
judgment of conviction or acquittal? Explain your
answer. (2012, 1996)
A: the following are the elements of bigamy:
1. the offender has been legally married;
2. the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in
case of absence, the absent spouse vould not yet be
presumed dead according to NCC;
3. he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
4. the subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity (Mercado v. Tan, G.R. No.
137110, 2000)
If I were the judge, I will render judgment of conviction.
Proof that the first marriage is null and void is not a
defense in bigamy. As long as the previous marriage was
not lawfully dissolved or judicially declared as null and
void, contracting a new marriage constitutes bigamy
(People v. Manuel, G.R. No. 165842, November 29, 2005).
Q: Assuming the existence of the first marriage when
accused contracted the second marriage and the
subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the
second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity, would you render a judgment of
conviction or acquittal? Explain your answer. (2012)
A: I will render a judgment of conviction. A declaration
of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity is absolutely of no moment
insofar as the States penal laws are concerned. Since a
marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid
marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second
marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of
criminal liability for bigamy. Although the judicial
declaration of nullity of a marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the
celebration of marriage insofar as the vinculum between
the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that the
said marriage is not without legal effects. Among these
legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for
bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the States
penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow
individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital
contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape
the consequences of contracting multiple marriages,
while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the
promise of futurity and commitment (Tenebro v. CA, G.R.
No. 150758, February 18, 2004).
REPEATED QUESTION:
Q: Hubert and Eunice were married in the
Philippines. Hubert took graduate studies in New
York and met his former girlfriend Eula. They
renewed their friendship and finally decided to get
married. The first wife, Eunice, heard about the
marriage and secures a copy of the marriage
81
contract in New York. (2008, 1994)
TEAM BAROPS
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016
 QuAMTO for CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
a. Eunice filed a case of Bigamy against Hubert in
the Philippines. Will the case prosper? Explain.
A: No, a case for bigamy filed in the Philippines will not
prosper because the bigamous marriage appears to have
been committed in New York, U.S.A., not in the
Philippines. The governing rule of procedure as to the
place where the criminal action is to be instituted
directs that the criminal action should be instituted and
tried in the court of the municipality or territory where
the offense was committed, or where any of its essential
ingredients occurred if it were a continuing crime. In
criminal cases, the venue where the action should be
instituted is jurisdictional; if this is not complied with, it
would render the prosecution invalid or void.
b. If Eunice gave her consent to the second
marriage, what will your answer be? Explain.
A: The answer would be the same even if the wife by the
first marriage, which is subsisting, gave her consent to
the second marriage. Bigamy is a public crime and not
subject to agreement between the victim and the
accused. Moreover, the legal obstacle to the institution
of a case for bigamy in the Philippines is jurisdictional
and cannot be excused or waived by the parties affected.
Q: CBP is legally married to OEM. Without obtaining
a marriage license, CBP contracted a second
marriage to RST. Is CBP liable for bigamy? Reason
briefly. (2004)
A: Whether CBP could be held liable for bigamy or not
depends on whether the second marriage is invalid or
valid even without a marriage license. Although as a
general rule, marriages solemnized without license are
null and void ab initio, there are marriages exempted
from license requirement under Chapter 2, Title 1 of the
Family Code, such as in Art. 27 which is a marriage in
articulo mortis. If the second marriage was valid even
without a marriage license, then CBP would be liable for
bigamy. Otherwise, CBP is not liable for bigamy but for
Illegal Marriage in Art. 350 of the RPC specifically
designated as "Marriage contracted against provisions of
laws."
(DOCTRINE REPEATED IN OTHER QUESTIONS)
Q: Joselito married Ramona in July 1995, only to
learn later on that Ramona was previously married
to David, from whom Ramona had been separated
for more than ten years. Believing that his marriage
to Ramona was an absolute nullity, Joselito
contracted a subsequent marriage with Anabelle.
Can Joselito be prosecuted for bigamy? Explain.
(1996)
A: Yes, Joselito can be prosecuted for bigamy for his
subsequent marriage with Anabelle even though his
marriage with Ramona was an absolute nullity. Despite
the nullity of the first marriage, Joselito should have filed
a case of dissolution of such marriage under Art. 40
Family Code, before contracting a second marriage with
Anabelle.
Q: Issa and Bobby, who were first cousins, were
married in 1975. In 1993, Bobby was told that his
marriage to Issa was incestous under the law then in
force and therefore void ab initio. He married
Caring. Charged with bigamy, Bobby raised the
*QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as suggested by UPLC and other distinct
luminaries in the academe, and updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the 2016 Bar Exams.
defense that his first marriage is void ab initio and
therefore, there is no previous marriage to speak of.
Will you sustain Bobby's defense? (1994)
A: No. I will not sustain Bobby's defense. Bobby
remarried in 1993, or after the Family Code took effect
on August 3, 1988, and therefore his capacity to marry
in 1993 shall be governed by said Code. In Art. 40 of the
Family Code, it is mandated that the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void. In short, there is
a need of a judicial declaration of such nullity before
Bobby may validly remarry.
REPEATED QUESTION:
Q: Abe, married to Liza, contracted another
marriage with Connie in Singapore. Thereafter, Abe
and Connie returned to the Philippines and lived as
husband and wife in the hometown of Abe in
Calamba, Laguna. (1994)
a. Can Abe be prosecuted for bigamy?
A: No, Abe may not be prosecuted for bigamy since the
bigamous marriage was contracted or solemnized in
Singapore, hence such violation is not one of those
where the Revised Penal Code, under Art. 2 thereof, may
be appplied extraterritorially. The general rule on
territoriality of criminal law governs the situation.
b. If not, can he be prosecuted for any other crime?
A: Yes, Abe, together with Connie, may be prosecuted for
concubinage under Art. 334 of the RPC for having
cohabited as husband and wife. But concubinage being a
private crime requires the sworn complaint of Liza, the
offended spouse in accordance with Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
CRIMES AGAINST HONOR (Articles 353-364)
Libel (Articles 353-362)
Q: In her weekly gossip column in a tabloid, Gigi
wrote an unflattering article about Pablo, a famous
singer, and his bitter separation from his wife. The
article portrayed Pablo as an abusive husband and
caused him to lose lucrative endorsement contracts.
Pablo charged Gigi with libel. In her defense, Gigi
countered that she did not commit libel because
Pablo has attained the status of a public figure so
that even his personal life has become a legitimate
subject of public interest and comment. Is Gigi
correct? (2013)
A: No, Gigi is nor correct. Although wider latitude is
given to defamatory utterances against public figures in
relation to matters of public interest involving them,
such defamatory utterances do not automatically fall
within the ambit of constitutionally protected speech. If
the utterances are false, malicious or unrelated to a
public figures work, the same may give rise to criminal
liblity (Fermin v. People, G.R. No. 157643, March 28,
2008). Any attack upon the private character of the
public figure on matters which are not related to their
works may constitute liber under Art. 355 (Sazon v. CA,
G.R. No. 120715, March 29, 1996). Here, Gigi was
attacking the personal life of Pablo as a husband and not
82
his public life as a famous singer.
 QUAMTO FOR CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
Q: Angelina maintains a website where visitors can
give their comments on the posted pictures of the
goods she sells in her exclusive boutique. Bettina
posted a comment that the red Birkin bag shown in
Angelinas website is fake and that Angelina is
known to sell counterfeit items. Angelina wants to
file a case against Bettina. She seeks your advice.
What advice will you give her? (2010)
A: I will advise Angelina to file a criminal case of libel
against Bettina because the imputations made by
Bettina are libellous. Whether the imputation of a defect,
status or condition is real or imaginary, if it publicly
tends to discredit, dishonor or place in contempt or
ridicule a particular person who is identified, the
imputation is presumed by law to be malicious and thus
penalized as libel under Art. 355 of the RPC. Moreover, if
Bettina is engaged in similar line of trade, her statement
against the goods sold by Angelina may constitute a
violation of the law on Unfair Competition (R.A. 8291).
Q: In an interview aired on television, Cindee
uttered defamatory statements against Erika, a
successful and reputable businesswoman. What
crime or crimes did Cindee commit? Explain. (2005)
A: Cindee committed libel for uttering defamatory
remarks tending to cause dishonor or discredit to Erika.
Libel can be committed in television programs or
broadcasts, though it was not specifically mentioned in
the article since it was not yet in existence then, but it is
included as "any similar means." Defamatory
statements aired on television is similar to radio,
theatrical exhibition or cinematographic exhibition,
which are among the modes for the commission of libel
(Art. 353, 355, RPC).
Q: Distinguish clearly but briefly between oral
defamation and criminal conversation. (2004)
A: Oral defamation, known as Slander, is a malicious
imputation of any act, omission, condition or
circumstance against a person, done orally in public,
tending to cause dishonor, discredit, contempt,
embarassment or ridicule to the latter. This is a crime
against honor penalized in Art. 358 of the RPC.
Criminal conversation is used in making a polite
reference to sexual intercourse as in certain crimes, like
rape, seduction and adultery. It has no definite concept
as a crime.
Q: During a seminar workshop attended by
government employees from the Bureau of Customs
and the Bureau of Internal Revenue, A, the speaker,
in the course of his lecture, lamented the fact that a
great majority of those serving in said agencies
were utterly dishonest and corrupt. The following
morning, the whole group of employees in the two
bureaus who attended the seminar, as complainants,
filed a criminal complaint against A for uttering
what the group claimed to be defamatory
statements of the lecturer. In court, A filed a motion
to quash the information, reciting fully the above
facts, on the ground that no crime was committed. If
you were the judge, how would you resolve the
motion? (2003)
A: I would grant the motion to quash on the ground that
the facts charged do not constitute an offense, since
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
there is no definite person or persons dishonored. The
crime of libel or slander is a crime against honor such
that the person or persons dishonored must be
identifiable even by innuendoes; otherwise the crime
against honor is not committed. Moreover, A was not
making a malicious imputation, but merely stating an
opinion; he was delivering a lecture with no malice at all
during a seminar workshop. Malice being inherently
absent in the utterance, the statement is not actionable
as defamatory.
Q: A was nominated Secretary of a Department in
the Executive Branch of the government. His
nomination was thereafter submitted to the
Commission on Appointments for confirmation.
While the Commission was considering the
nomination, a group of concerned citizens caused to
be published in the newspapers a full-page
statement objecting to A's appointment They
alleged that A was a drug dependent, that he had
several mistresses, and that he was corrupt,
having accepted bribes or favors from parties
transacting business in his previous office, and
therefore he was unfit for the position to which he
had been nominated. As a result of the publication,
the nomination was not confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments. The official sued the
concerned citizens and the newspapers for libel and
damages on account of his non-confirmation.
a. How will you decide the case? (2002)
A: I will acquit the concerned citizens and the
newspapers involved, from the crime of libel, because
obviously they made the denunciation out of a moral or
social duty and thus there is absence of malice. Since A
was a candidate for a very important public position of a
Department Secretary, his moral, mental and physical
fitness for the public trust in such position becomes a
public concern as the interest of the public is at stake. It
is pursuant to such concern that the denunciation was
made; hence, bereft of malice.
b. If defamatory imputations are made not by
publication in the newspapers but by broadcast
over the radio, do they constitute libel? Why?
(2002)
A: Yes, because libel may be committed by radio
broadcast Art. 355 of the RPC punishes libel committed
by means, among others, of radio broadcast, inasmuch
as the broadcast made by radio is public and may be
defamatory.
Q: For some time, bad blood had existed between the
two families of Maria Razon and Judge Gadioma who
were neighbors. First, there was a boundary dispute
between them which was still pending in court.
Maria's mother also filed an administrative
complaint against the judge which was however
dismissed. The Razons also felt intimidated by the
position and alleged influence of their neighbor.
Fanning fire to the situation was the practice of the
Gadiomas of throwing garbage and animal
excrement into the Razon's premises. In an
explosion of anger, Maria called Judge Gadioma
"land grabber", "shameless", and "hypocrite." What
crime was committed by Maria, if any? Explain
briefly. (1998)
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TEAM BAROPS
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016
 QuAMTO for CRIMINAL LAW (1991-2015)
A: Maria committed the crime of slander or slight
defamation only because she was under the influence of
anger. When Maria called Judge Gadioma a hypocrite
and land grabber she imputed to him the commission of
crimes.

Q: Because of a pendency of a labor dispute, two (2)

belligerent labor unions had a confrontation in a
picket line during which the President and the
Secretary of one union shouted to the members and
officers of the rival union composed of men and
women, the following: Mga supot, mga walang
bayag, mga kabit ng Intsik, mga tuta, mga segunda
mano." Are the President and the Secretary of said
union liable for oral defamation/slander? Explain.
(1993)

A: No. The President and the Secretary of the Union are

not liable for oral defamation or slander because there is
no identity of the offended party. The individual
defamed or slandered was not singled out ( Uy Tioco v.
Yang Shu Wen, G. R. Nos. 9986 & 9891, December 22,
1915).

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*QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as suggested by UPLC and other distinct
luminaries in the academe, and updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the 2016 Bar Exams.