G.R. No.

189669 February 16, 2015

PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION and PETRON CORPORATION, Petitioners,

vs.

ROMARS INTERNATIONAL GASES CORPORATION, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This deals with the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court praying that the Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA), dated March 13, 2009, and the Resolution2 dated September 14, 2009, denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration thereof, be reversed and set aside.

The antecedent facts are:

Petitioners received information that respondent was selling, offering for sale, or distributing liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) by
illegally refilling the steel cylinders manufactured byand bearing the duly registered trademark and device of respondent
Petron. Petron then obtained the services of a paralegal investigation team who sent their people to investigate. The
investigators went to respondent's premises located in San Juan, Baao, Camarines Sur, bringing along four empty cylinders of
Shellane, Gasul, Total and Superkalan and asked that the same be refilled. Respondent's employees then refilled said empty
cylinders at respondent's refilling station. The refilled cylinders were brought to the Marketing Coordinator of Petron Gasul
who verified that respondent was not authorized to distribute and/or sell, or otherwise deal with Petron LPG products, and/or
use or imitate any Petron trademarks. Petitioners then requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to investigate said
activities of respondent for the purpose of apprehending and prosecuting establishments conducting illegal refilling,
distribution and/or sale of LPG products using the same containers of Petron and Shell, which acts constitute a violation of
Section 168,3 in relation to Section 1704 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code
of the Philippines, and/or Section 25 of R.A. No. 623, otherwise known as An Act To Regulate the Use of Duly Stamped or
Marked Bottles, Boxes, Casks, Kegs, Barrels and Other Similar Containers.

The NBI proceeded with their investigation and reportedly found commercial quantities of Petron Gasul and Shellane
cylinders stockpiled at respondent's warehouse. They also witnessed trucks coming from respondent's refilling facility loaded
with Gasul, Shellane and Marsflame cylinders, which then deposit said cylinders in different places, one of them a store called
"Edrich Enterprises" located at 272 National Highway, San Nicolas, Iriga City. The investigators then bought Shellane and
Gasul cylinders from Edrich Enterprises, for which they were issued an official receipt.

Thus, the NBI, in behalf of Petron and Shell, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Naga City (RTC-Naga), two separate
Applications for Search Warrant for Violation of Section 155.1,6 in relation to Section 1707 of R.A. No. 8293 against
respondent and/or its occupants. On October 23, 2002, the RTC-Naga City issued an Order granting said Applications and
Search Warrant Nos. 2002-27 and 2002-28 were issued. On the same day, the NBI served the warrants at the respondent's
premises in an orderly and peaceful manner, and articles or items described in the warrants were seized.

On November 4, 2002, respondent filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant Nos. 2002-27 and 2002-28, where the only
grounds cited were: (a) there was no probable cause; (b) there had been a lapse of four weeks from the date of the test-buy to
the date of the search and seizure operations; (c) most of the cylinders seized were not owned by respondent but by a third
person; and (d) Edrich Enterprises is an authorized outlet of Gasul and Marsflame. In an Order dated February 21, 2003, the
RTC-Naga denied the Motion to Quash.
However, on March 27,2003, respondent's new counsel filed an Appearance with Motion for Reconsideration. It was only in
said motion where respondent raised for the first time, the issue of the impropriety of filing the Application for Search Warrant
at the RTC-Naga City when the alleged crime was committed in a place within the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC-Iriga City.
Respondent pointed out that the application filed with the RTC-Naga failed to state any compelling reason to justify the filing
of the same in a court which does not have territorial jurisdiction over the place of the commission of the crime, as required by
Section 2 (b), Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Petitioner opposed the Motion for Reconsideration,
arguing that it was already too late for respondent to raise the issue regarding the venue of the filing of the application for
search warrant, as this would be in violation of the Omnibus Motion Rule.

In an Order dated July 28, 2003,the RTC-Naga issued an Order granting respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, thereby
quashing Search Warrant Nos. 2002-27 and 2002-28.

Petitioner then appealed to the CA, but the appellate court, in its Decision dated March 13,2009, affirmed the RTC Order
quashing the search warrants. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision was denied per Resolution dated
September 14, 2009.

Elevating the matter to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari, petitioner presents herein the following issues:

A.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT VENUE IN AN APPLICATION FOR SEARCH
WARRANT IS JURISDICTIONAL. THIS IS BECAUSE A SEARCH WARRANT CASE IS NOT A CRIMINAL CASE.

B.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO QUASHIS NOT
SUBJECT TO THE OMNIBUS MOTION RULE AND THATTHE ISSUE OF LACK OF JURISDICTION MAY NOT BE
WAIVED AND MAY EVEN BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.8

Petitioner's arguments deserve closer examination.

Section 2, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides thus:

SEC. 2. Court where applications for search warrant shall be filed. - An application for search warrant shall be filed with the
following:

(a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.

(b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where the crime was committed if the
place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.
However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the court where the criminal
action is pending. (Emphasis supplied)

The above provision is clear enough. Under paragraph (b) thereof, the application for search warrant in this case should have
stated compelling reasons why the same was being filed with the RTC-Naga instead of the RTC-Iriga City, considering that it
is the latter court that has territorial jurisdiction over the place where the alleged crime was committed and also the place
where the search warrant was enforced. The wordings of the provision is of a mandatory nature, requiring a statement of
compelling reasons if the application is filed in a court which does not have territorial jurisdiction over the place of
commission of the crime. Since Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the right of persons to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures, and search warrants constitute a limitation on this right, then Section 2, Rule 126 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be construed strictly against state authorities who would be enforcing the search
warrants. On this point, then, petitioner's application for a search warrant was indeed insufficient for failing to comply with the
requirement to state therein the compelling reasons why they had to file the application in a court that did not have territorial
jurisdiction over the place where the alleged crime was committed.

Notwithstanding said failure to state the compelling reasons in the application, the more pressing question that would
determine the outcome of the case is, did the RTC-Naga act properly in taking into consideration the issue of said defect in
resolving respondent's motion for reconsideration where the issue was raised for the very first time? The record bears out that,
indeed, respondent failed to include said issue at the first instance in its motion to quash. Does the omnibus motion rule cover
a motion to quash search warrants?

The omnibus motion rule embodied in Section 8, Rule 15, in relation to Section 1, Rule 9, demands that all available
objections be included in a party's motion, otherwise, said objections shall be deemed waived; and, the only grounds the court
could take cognizance of, even if not pleaded in said motion are: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) existence
of another action pending between the same parties for the same cause; and (c) bar by prior judgment or by statute of
limitations.9 It should be stressed here that the Court has ruled in a number of cases that the omnibus motion rule is applicable
to motions to quash search warrants.10 Furthermore, the Court distinctly stated in Abuan v. People,11 that "the motion to
quash the search warrant which the accused may file shall be governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that
objections not available, existent or known during the proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing
of the motion to suppress x x x."12

In accordance with the omnibus motion rule, therefore, the trial court could only take cognizance of an issue that was not
raised in the motion to quash if, (1) said issue was not available or existent when they filed the motion to quash the search
warrant; or (2) the issue was one involving jurisdiction over the subject matter. Obviously, the issue of the defect in the
application was available and existent at the time of filing of the motion to quash. What remains to be answered then is, if the
newly raised issue of the defect in the application is an issue of jurisdiction.

In resolving whether the issue raised for the first time in respondent's motion for reconsideration was an issue of jurisdiction,
the CA rationcinated, thus:

It is jurisprudentially settled that the concept of venue of actions in criminal cases, unlike in civil cases, is jurisdictional. The
place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. It
is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense should have been committed
or any one of its essential ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial
jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly
committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed
outside of that limited territory.13

Unfortunately, the foregoing reasoning of the CA, is inceptionally flawed, because as pronounced by the Court in Malaloan v.
Court of Appeals,14 and reiterated in the more recent Worldwide Web Corporation v. People of the Philippines,15 to wit:
x x x as we held in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals, an application for a search warrant is a "special criminal process," rather
than a criminal action:

The basic flaw in this reasoning is in erroneously equating the application for and the obtention of a search warrant with the
institution and prosecution of a criminal action in a trial court. It would thus categorize what is only a special criminal process,
the power to issue which is inherent in all courts, as equivalent to a criminal action, jurisdiction over which is reposed in
specific courts of indicated competence. It ignores the fact that the requisites, procedure and purpose for the issuance of a
search warrant are completely different from those for the institution of a criminal action.

For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes process.1wphi1 A search warrant is
defined in our jurisdiction as an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines signed by a judge and
directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property and bring it before the court. A search warrant is
in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and
made necessary because of a public necessity.

In American jurisdictions, from which we have taken our jural concept and provisions on search warrants, such warrant is
definitively considered merely as a process, generally issued by a court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a
criminal action to be entertained by a court pursuant to its original jurisdiction. x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly then, an application for a search warrant is not a criminal action. x x x16 (Emphasis supplied)

The foregoing explanation shows why the CA arrived at the wrong conclusion. It gravely erred in equating the proceedings for
applications for search warrants with criminal actions themselves. As elucidated by the Court, proceedings for said
applications are not criminal in nature and, thus, the rule that venue is jurisdictional does not apply thereto. Evidently, the issue
of whether the application should have been filed in RTC-Iriga City or RTC-Naga, is not one involving jurisdiction because,
as stated in the afore-quoted case, the power to issue a special criminal process is inherent in all courts.

Inferring from the foregoing, the Court deems it improper for the RTC-Naga to have even taken into consideration an issue
which respondent failed to raise in its motion to quash, as it did not involve a question of jurisdiction over the subject matter. It
is quite clear that the RTC-Naga had jurisdiction to issue criminal processes such as a search warrant.

Moreover, the Court must again emphasize its previous admonition in Spouses Anunciacion v. Bocanegra,17 that:

We likewise cannot approve the trial court's act of entertaining supplemental motions x x x which raise grounds that are
already deemed waived. To do so would encourage lawyers and litigants to file piecemeal objections to a complaint in order to
delay or frustrate the prosecution of the plaintiffs cause of action.18

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated March 13, 2009, and the Resolution
dated September 14, 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 80643 are REVERSED. The Order dated February 21, 2003 issued by the
Regional Trial Court of Naga, Camarines Sur, Branch 24, denying respondent's motion to quash, is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 192466

Appellee,

Present: VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson,

- versus - PERALTA, ABAD, VILLARAMA, JR.,* and MENDOZA, JJ. ALEJO TAROY y TARNATE, Appellant.

Promulgated: September 7, 2011

x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

Apart from the question of credibility of testimonies in a prosecution for rape, this case resolves the question of proof of the
territorial jurisdiction of the trial court.

The Facts and the Case

The public prosecutor charged Alejo Taroy y Tarnate (Taroy) with two counts of rape in Criminal Cases 02-CR-4671 and
02-CR-4672 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet.[1]

DES[2] was the eldest daughter of MILA[3] by her first marriage. MILA married Taroy in 1997 upon the death of her first
husband.[4] The couple lived with MILAs children in Pucsusan Barangay, Itogon, Benguet, at the boundary of Baguio City.[5]

DES testified that she was alone in the house on August 10, 1997 doing some cleaning since her mother was at work and her
two siblings were outside playing. When Taroy entered the house, he locked the door, closed the windows, removed his
clothes, and ordered DES to remove hers. When she resisted, Taroy poked a knife at her head and forced her to submit to his
bestial desires. Taroy warned her afterwards not to tell anyone about it, lest MILA and her siblings would suffer some harm.
DES was 10 years old then.[6]

DES testified that Taroy sexually abused her again in September 1998. This time, he entered her room, locked the door, closed
the windows, undressed himself, and ordered her to do the same. When she refused, Taroy pointed a knife at her. This
compelled her to yield to him.

Four years later or on November 1, 2002, when DES was 15, she told her aunt and MILA about what had happened between
Taroy and her. They accompanied DES to the National Bureau of Investigation to complain.

MILA and a certain Alumno testified that they later accompanied DES to the hospital for examination. MILA corroborated
DES testimony regarding how she revealed to her and an aunt the details of the rape incidents. The doctor who examined DES
testified that the latter had two narrow notches in her hymen at three oclock and five oclock positions. She explained that these
notches or V-shaped or sharp indentions over the hymenal edges suggested a history of previous blunt force or trauma possibly
caused by the insertion of an erect male penis.

For the defense, Taroy denied raping DES on the occasions mentioned. He averred that the testimony was a fabrication made
upon the prodding of her aunt who disliked him.

The RTC found Taroy guilty of two counts of rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. It also
ordered him to pay DES for each count: P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages.[7] The RTC found the testimony of DES credible and worthy of belief.

Taroy challenged the Benguet RTCs jurisdiction over the crimes charged, he having testified that their residence when the
alleged offenses took place was in Pucsusan Barangay, Baguio City. The RTC held, however, that Taroys testimony that their
residence was in Baguio City did not strip the court of its jurisdiction since he waived the jurisdictional requirement.

On January 19, 2010 the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC.[8] The CA gave weight to the RTCs
assessment of DES credibility and found no evil motive in her. The CA also held that the prosecution has sufficiently
established the jurisdiction of the RTC through the testimony of MILA, DES, and Alumno. Taroy seeks his acquittal from this
Court.

The Issues Presented

The issues presented to the Court are:

1. Whether or not the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet, has jurisdiction to hear and decide the cases of rape against Taroy; and

2. Whether or not the prosecution has proved his guilt in the two cases beyond reasonable doubt.

The Courts Rulings

One. Venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases. It can neither be waived nor subjected to stipulation. The right venue must exist
as a matter of law.[9] Thus, for territorial jurisdiction to attach, the criminal action must be instituted and tried in the proper
court of the municipality, city, or province where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients took
place.[10]

The Informations[11] filed with the RTC of La Trinidad state that the crimes were committed in the victim and the offenders
house in City Limit, Tuding, Municipality of Itogon, Province of Benguet. This allegation conferred territorial jurisdiction
over the subject offenses on the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet. The testimonies of MILA and DES as well as the affidavit of
arrest[12] point to this fact. Clearly, Taroys uncorroborated assertion that the subject offenses took place in Baguio City is not
entitled to belief. Besides, he admitted during the pre-trial in the case that it was the RTC of La Trinidad that had jurisdiction
to hear the case.[13] Taken altogether, that RTCs jurisdiction to hear the case is beyond dispute.

Two. What is necessary for the prosecution to ensure conviction is not absolute certainty but only moral certainty that the
accused is guilty of the crime charged.[14] Here, the prosecution has sufficiently proved the guilt of Taroy beyond reasonable
doubt. DES testimony is worthy of belief, she having no ill-motive to fabricate what she said against her stepfather.
More, contrary to the claims of Taroy, there is nothing in the testimony of DES that would elicit suspicion as to the veracity of
her story. For one thing, the fact that she did not shout for help or resist the sexual advances of Taroy does not disprove the
fact that he raped her. Women who experience traumatic and terrifying experiences such as rape do not react in a uniform
pattern of hysteria and breakdown.

Lastly, there is nothing unusual for DES to remain in the family dwelling despite the incidents that had happened to her. She
was just a child. Where else would she go except stay with her mother who happened to be married to the man who abused
her?

While we do affirm the guilt of Taroy for the crime of rape, we modify the award of exemplary damages in accordance with
People v. Araojo.[15] The prosecution has sufficiently established the relationship of Taroy to the victim, as well as the
minority of DES necessitating the increase of the award of exemplary damages from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00.

WHEREFORE, this Court DISMISSES the appeal and AFFIRMS the Court of Appeals decision in CA-G.R. CR-HC 03510
dated January 19, 2010 with the MODIFICATION that the award of exemplary damages be increased from P25,000.00 to
P30,000.00.
G.R. No. 182601 November 10, 2014

JOEY M. PESTILOS, DWIGHT MACAPANAS, MIGUEL GACES, JERRY FERNANDEZ and RONALD MUNOZ,
Petitioners,

vs.

MORENO GENEROSO and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court challenging the decision1 dated January
21, 2008 and the resolution2 dated April 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 91541.

The appealed decision affirmed the Order dated March 16, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 96, Quezon City,
denying Joey M. Pestilos, Dwight Macapanas, Miguel Gaces, Jerry Fernandez, and Ronald Munoz's (petitioners) Urgent
Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation, as well as their subsequent motion for reconsideration.

The Antecedent Facts

The records of the case reveal that on February 20, 2005, at around 3: 15 in the morning, an altercation ensued between the
petitioners and Atty. Moreno Generoso (Atty. Generoso) at Kasiyahan Street, Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon City where the
petitioners and Atty. Generoso reside.3

Atty. Generoso called the Central Police District, Station 6 (Batas an Hills Police Station) to report the incident.4 Acting on
this report, Desk Officer SPOl Primitivo Monsalve (SPOJ Monsalve) dispatched SP02 Dominador Javier (SP02 Javier) to go
to the scene of the crime and to render assistance.5 SP02 Javier, together with augmentation personnel from the Airforce, A2C
Alano Sayson and Airman Ruel Galvez, arrived at the scene of the crime less than one hour after the alleged altercation6 and
they saw Atty. Generoso badly beaten.7

Atty. Generoso then pointed to the petitioners as those who mauled him. This prompted the police officers to "invite" the
petitioners to go to Batasan Hills Police Station for investigation.8 The petitioners went with the police officers to Batasan
Hills Police Station.9 At the inquest proceeding, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City found that the petitioners stabbed Atty.
Generoso with a bladed weapon. Atty. Generoso fortunately survived the attack.10

In an Information dated February 22, 2005, the petitioners were indicted for attempted murder allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 20th h day of February, 2005, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, qualified with evident premeditation, treachery and
taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of
the crime of Murder directly by overt acts, by then and there stabbing one Atty. MORENO GENEROSO y FRANCO, with a
bladed weapon, but said accused were not able to perform all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of Murder
by reason of some cause/s or accident other than their own spontaneous desistance, that is, said complainant was able to parry
the attack, to his damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.11

On March 7, 2005, the petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation12 on the ground that they had
not been lawfully arrested. They alleged that no valid warrantless arrest took place since the police officers had no personal
knowledge that they were the perpetrators of the crime. They also claimed that they were just "invited" to the police station.
Thus, the inquest proceeding was improper, and a regular procedure for preliminary investigation should have been performed
pursuant to Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.13

On March 16, 2005, the RTC issued its order denying the petitioners' Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation.14
The court likewise denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.15

The petitioners challenged the lower court's ruling before the CA on a Rule 65 petition for certiorari. They attributed grave
abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, on the R TC for the denial of their motion for preliminary
investigation.16

The Assailed CA Decision

On January 21, 2008, the CA issued its decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit.17 The CA ruled that the word
"invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest executed by SP02 Javier carried the meaning of a command. The arresting officer clearly
meant to arrest the petitioners to answer for the mauling of Atty. Generoso. The CA also recognized that the arrest was
pursuant to a valid warrantless arrest so that an inquest proceeding was called for as a consequence. Thus, the R TC did not
commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying the Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation.

The CA saw no merit in the petitioners' argument that the order denying the Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary
Investigation is void for failure to clearly state the facts and the law upon which it was based, pursuant to Rule 16, Section 3 of
the Revised Rules of Court. The CA found that the RTC had sufficiently explained the grounds for the denial of the motion.

The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion in its Resolution of April 17, 2008;18 hence, the
present petition.

The Issues

The petitioners cited the following assignment of errors:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE VALIDLY ARRESTED WITHOUT A WARRANT.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE LAWFULLY ARRESTED WHEN THEY WERE MERELY INVITED
TO THE POLICE PRECINCT.
III.

WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER DENYING THE MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS VOID FOR
FAILURE TO STATE THE FACTS AND THE LAW UPON WHICH IT WAS BASED.

The petitioners primarily argue that they were not lawfully arrested. No arrest warrant was ever issued; they went to the police
station only as a response to the arresting officers' invitation. They even cited the Affidavit of Arrest, which actually used the
word "invited. "

The petitioners also claim that no valid warrantless arrest took place under the terms of Rule 112, Section 7 of the Revised
Rules of Court. The incident happened two (2) hours before the police officers actually arrived at the crime scene. The police
officers could not have undertaken a valid warrantless arrest as they had no personal knowledge that the petitioners were the
authors of the crime.

The petitioners additionally argue that the R TC' s Order denying the Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation is
void because it was not properly issued.

The Court's Ruling

We find the petition unmeritorious and thus uphold the RTC Order. The criminal proceedings against the petitioners should
now proceed.

It is unfortunate that the kind of motion that the petitioners filed has to reach this Court for its resolution. The thought is very
tempting that the motion was employed simply to delay the proceedings and that the use of Rule 65 petition has been abused.

But accepting things as they are, this delay can be more than compensated by fully examining in this case the legalities
surrounding warrantless warrants and establishing the proper interpretation of the Rules for the guidance of the bench and the
bar. These Rules have evolved over time, and the present case presents to us the opportunity to re-trace their origins,
development and the current applicable interpretation.

I. Brief history on warrantless arrests

The organic laws of the Philippines, specifically, the Philippine Bill of 1902,19 and the 1935,20 197321 and 198722
Constitutions all protect the right of the people to be secure in their persons against unreasonable searches and seizures. Arrest
falls under the term "seizure. "23

This constitutional mandate is identical with the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The Fourth
Amendment traces its origins to the writings of Sir Edward Coke24 and The Great Charter of the Liberties of England (Magna
Carta Libertatum), sealed under oath by King John on the bank of the River Thames near Windsor, England on June 15,
1215.25 The Magna Carta Libertatum limited the King of England's powers and required the Crown to proclaim certain
liberties26 under the feudal vassals' threat of civil war.27 The declarations in Chapter 29 of the Magna Carta Libertatum later
became the foundational component of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.28 It provides:
No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised29 of his Freehold, or Liberties, or free Customs, or be outlawed, or
exiled, or any otherwise destroyed; nor will we not pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by lawful Judgment of his Peers, or
by the Law of the Land, We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either Justice or Right.30 [Emphasis
supplied]

In United States v. Snyder,31 the United States Supreme Court held that this constitutional provision does not prohibit arrests,
searches and seizures without judicial warrant, but only those that are unreasonable.32 With regard to an arrest, it is considered
a seizure, which must also satisfy the test of reasonableness.33

In our jurisdiction, early rulings of the Court have acknowledged the validity of warrantless arrests. The Court based these
rulings on the common law of America and England that, according to the Court, were not different from the Spanish laws.34
These court rulings likewise justified warrantless arrests based on the provisions of separate laws then existing in the
Philippines.35

In 1905, the Court held in The United States v. Wilson36 that Section 3737 of Act No. 183, or the Charter of Manila, defined
the arresting officer's power to arrest without a warrant, at least insofar as the City of Manila was concerned.

In The United States v. Vallejo, et al.,38 the Court held that in the absence of any provisions under statutes or local ordinances,
a police officer who held similar functions as those of the officers established under the common law of England and America,
also had the power to arrest without a warrant in the Philippines.

The Court also ruled in The United States v. Santos39 that the rules on warrantless arrest were based on common sense and
reason.40 It further held that warrantless arrest found support under the then Administrative Code41 which directed municipal
policemen to exercise vigilance in the prevention of public offenses.

In The United States v. Fortaleza,42 the Court applied Rules 27, 28, 29 and 3043 of the Provisional Law for the Application of
the Penal Code which were provisions taken from the Spanish Law.

These rules were subsequently established and incorporated in our Rules of Court and jurisprudence. Presently, the
requirements of a warrantless arrest are now summarized in Rule 113, Section 5 which states that: Section 5. Arrest without
warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.

In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forth with delivered to the
nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) above has been denominated as one "in
flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest.44

For purposes of this case, we shall focus on Section 5(b) the provision applicable in the present case. This provision has
undergone changes through the years not just in its phraseology but also in its interpretation in our jurisprudence.

We shall first trace the evolution of Section 5(b) and examine the applicable American and Philippine jurisprudence to fully
understand its roots and its appropriate present application.

II. Evolution of Section 5(b), Rule 113

A. Prior to the 1940 Rules of Court

Prior to 1940, the Court based its rulings not just on American and English common law principle on warrantless arrests but
also on laws then existing in the Philippines. In Fortaleza,45 the Court cited Rule 28 of the Provisional Law for the
Application of the Penal Code which provided that:

Judicial and administrative authorities have power to detain, or to cause to be detained, persons whom there is reasonable
ground to believe guilty of some offense. It will be the duty of the authorities, as well as of their agents, to arrest:

First. Such persons as may be arrested under the provisions of rule 27.

Second. A person charged with a crime for which the code provides a penalty greater than that of confinamiento.

Third. A person charged with a crime for which the code provides a penalty less than that of confinamiento, if his antecedents
or the circumstances of the case would warrant the presumption that he would fail to appear when summoned by the judicial
authorities.

The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not apply, however, to a defendant who gives sufficient bond, to the
satisfaction of the authority or agent who may arrest him, and who it may reasonably be presumed will appear whenever
summoned by the judge or court competent to try him.

Fourth. A person coining under the provisions of the preceding paragraph may be arrested, although no formal complaint has
been filed against him, provided the following circumstances are present:

First. That the authority or agent had reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful act, amounting to a crime had been
committed.

Second. That the authority or agent had sufficient reason to believe that the person arrested participated in the commission of
such unlawful act or crime." [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
In the same decision, the Court likewise cited Section 3 7 of the Charter of Manila, which provided that certain officials,
including police officers may, within the territory defined in the law, pursue and arrest without warrant, any person found in
suspicious places or under suspicious circumstances, reasonably tending to show that such person has committed, or is about
to commit any crime or breach of the peace.

In Santos,46 the Court cited Miles v. Weston,47 which ruled that a peace officer may arrest persons walking in the street at
night when there is reasonable ground to suspect the commission of a crime, although there is no proof of a felony having been
committed.

The Court ruled in Santos that the arresting officer must justify that there was a probable cause for an arrest without a warrant.
The Court defined probable cause as a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves as to warrant a reasonable man in believing that the accused is guilty. Besides reasonable ground of suspicion,
action in good faith is another requirement. Once these conditions are complied with, the peace officer is not liable even if the
arrested person turned out to be innocent.

Based on these discussions, it appears clear that prior to the 1940 Rules of Court, it was not necessary for the arresting officer
to first have knowledge that a crime was actually committed. What was necessary was the presence of reasonably sufficient
grounds to believe the existence of an act having the characteristics of a crime; and that the same grounds exist to believe that
the person sought to be detained participated in it. In addition, it was also established under the old court rulings that the
phrase "reasonable suspicion" was tantamount to probable cause without which, the warrantless arrest would be invalid and
the arresting officer may be held liable for its breach.48

In The US. v. Hachaw,49 the Court invalidated the warrantless arrest of a Chinaman because the arresting person did not state
in what way the Chinaman was acting suspiciously or the particular act or circumstance which aroused the arresting person's
curiosity.

It appears, therefore, that prior to the establishment in our Rules of Court of the rules on warrantless arrests, the gauge for a
valid warrantless arrest was the arresting officer's reasonable suspicion (probable cause) that a crime was committed and the
person sought to be arrested has participated in its commission. This principle left so much discretion and leeway on the part
of the arresting officer. However, the 1940 Rules of Court has limited this discretion.

B. The 1940 Rules of Court

(Restricting the arresting

officer's determination of

probable cause)

Rules 27 and 28 of the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code were substantially incorporated in Section 6,
Rule 109 of the 1940 Rules of Court as follows:50

SEC. 6. Arrest without warrant - When lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an offense in his presence;

(b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has
committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]

These provisions were adopted in toto in Section 6, Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court. Notably, the 1940 and 1964 Rules
have deviated from the old rulings of the Court. Prior to the 1940 Rules, the actual commission of the offense was not
necessary in determining the validity of the warrantless arrest. Too, the arresting officer's determination of probable cause (or
reasonable suspicion) applied both as to whether a crime has been committed and whether the person to be arrested has
committed it.

However, under the 1940 and the 1964 Rules of Court, the Rules required that there should be actual commission of an offense,
thus, removing the element of the arresting officer's "reasonable suspicion of the commission of an offense." Additionally, the
determination of probable cause, or reasonable suspicion, was limited only to the determination of whether the person to be
arrested has committed the offense. In other words, the 1940 and 1964 Rules of Court restricted the arresting officer's
discretion in warrantless arrests under Section 6(b), Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court.

C. The more restrictive 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure

Section 6, Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court again underwent substantial changes and was re-worded and re-numbered
when it became Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when. lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered
to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. [Emphasis and
underscoring supplied]

As amended, Section 5(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Court retained the restrictions introduced under the 1964 Rules of
Court. More importantly, however, it added a qualification that the commission of the offense should not only have been
"committed" but should have been "just committed." This limited the arresting officer's time frame for conducting an
investigation for purposes of gathering information indicating that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime.

D. The Present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure

Section 5(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure was further amended with the incorporation of the word
"probable cause" as the basis of the arresting officer's determination on whether the person to be arrested has committed the
crime.
Hence, as presently worded, Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that:

When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.

From the current phraseology of the rules on warrantless arrest, it appears that for purposes of Section S(b ), the following are
the notable changes: first, the contemplated offense was qualified by the word "just," connoting immediacy; and second, the
warrantless arrest of a person sought to be arrested should be based on probable cause to be determined by the arresting officer
based on his personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.

It is clear that the present rules have "objectified" the previously subjective determination of the arresting officer as to the (1)
commission of the crime; and (2) whether the person sought to be arrested committed the crime. According to Feria, these
changes were adopted to minimize arrests based on mere suspicion or hearsay.51

As presently worded, the elements under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are: first, an
offense has just been committed; and second, the arresting officer has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge
of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.

For purposes of this case, we shall discuss these elements separately below, starting with the element of probable cause,
followed by the elements that the offense has just been committed, and the arresting officer's personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed the crime.

i) First Element of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure: Probable cause

The existence of "probable cause" is now the "objectifier" or the determinant on how the arresting officer shall proceed on the
facts and circumstances, within his personal knowledge, for purposes of determining whether the person to be arrested has
committed the crime.

i.a) U.S. jurisprudence on probable cause in warrantless arrests

In Payton v. New York,52 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution does not
prohibit arrests without a warrant although such arrests must be reasonable. According to State v. Quinn,53 the warrantless
arrest of a person who was discovered in the act of violating the law is not a violation of due process.

The U.S. Supreme Court, however indicated in Henry v. United States54 that the Fourth Amendment limited the
circumstances under which warrantless arrests may be made. The necessary inquiry is not whether there was a warrant or
whether there was time to get one, but whether at the time of the arrest probable cause existed. The term probable cause is
synonymous to "reasonable cause" and "reasonable grounds."55

In determining the existence of probable cause, the arresting officer should make a thorough investigation and exercise
reasonable judgment. The standards for evaluating the factual basis supporting a probable cause assessment are not less
stringent in warrantless arrest situation than in a case where a warrant is sought from a judicial officer. The probable cause
determination of a warrantless arrest is based on information that the arresting officer possesses at the time of the arrest and
not on the information acquired later.56
In evaluating probable cause, probability and not certainty is the determinant of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.
Probable cause involves probabilities similar to the factual and practical questions of everyday life upon which reasonable and
prudent persons act. It is a pragmatic question to be determined in each case in light of the particular circumstances and the
particular offense involved.57

In determining probable cause, the arresting officer may rely on all the information in his possession, his fair inferences
therefrom, including his observations. Mere suspicion does not meet the requirements of showing probable cause to arrest
without warrant especially if it is a mere general suspicion. Probable cause may rest on reasonably trustworthy information as
well as personal knowledge. Thus, the arresting officer may rely on information supplied by a witness or a victim of a crime;
and under the circumstances, the arresting officer need not verify such information.58

In our jurisdiction, the Court has likewise defined probable cause in the context of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure.

In Abelita Ill v. Doria et al.,59 the Court held that personal knowledge of facts must be based on probable cause, which means
an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual
belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based
on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the
person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion, therefore, must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the
part of the peace officers making the arrest.

i.b) Probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, distinguished from probable
cause in preliminary investigations and the judicial proceeding for the issuance of a warrant of arrest

The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable
cause to believe that the accused is guilty of the crime and should be held for triat.60 In Buchanan v. Viuda de Esteban,61 we
defined probable cause as the existence of facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on
the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.

In this particular proceeding, the finding of the existence of probable cause as to the guilt of the respondent was based on the
submitted documents of the complainant, the respondent and his witnesses.62

On the other hand, probable cause in judicial proceedings for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is defined as the existence of
such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been
committed by the person sought to be arrested.

Hence, before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge must be satisfied that based on the evidence submitted, there is sufficient
proof that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested is probably guilty thereof. At this stage of the criminal
proceeding, the judge is not yet tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary investigation. It is
sufficient that he personally evaluates the evidence in determining probable cause63 to issue a warrant of arrest.

In contrast, the arresting officer's determination of probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure is based on his personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person sought to be arrested has
committed the crime. These facts or circumstances pertain to actual facts or raw evidence, i.e., supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion
therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making.the arrest.
The probable cause to justify warrantless arrest ordinarily signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the
offense with which he is charged,64 or an actual belief or reasonable ground of suspicion, based on actual facts.65

It is clear therefore that the standard for determining "probable cause" is invariable for the officer arresting without a warrant,
the public prosecutor, and the judge issuing a warrant of arrest. It is the existence of such facts and circumstances that would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested or held for trial, as the case may be.

However, while the arresting officer, the public prosecutor and the judge all determine "probable cause," within the spheres of
their respective functions, its existence is influenced heavily by the available facts and circumstance within their possession. In
short, although these officers use the same standard of a reasonable man, they possess dissimilar quantity of facts or
circumstances, as set by the rules, upon which they must determine probable cause.

Thus, under the present rules and jurisprudence, the arresting officer should base his determination of probable cause on his
personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime; the public
prosecutor and the judge must base their determination on the evidence submitted by the parties.

In other words, the arresting officer operates on the basis of more limited facts, evidence or available information that he must
personally gather within a limited time frame.

Hence, in Santos,66 the Court acknowledged the inherent limitations of determining probable cause in warrantless arrests due
to the urgency of its determination in these instances. The Court held that one should not expect too much of an ordinary
policeman. He is not presumed to exercise the subtle reasoning of a judicial officer. Oftentimes, he has no opportunity to make
proper investigation but must act in haste on his own belief to prevent the escape of the criminal.67

ii) Second and Third Elements of Section 5(b), Rule 113:

The crime has just been committed/personal

knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person

to be arrested has committed it

We deem it necessary to combine the discussions of these two elements as our jurisprudence shows that these were usually
taken together in the Court's determination of the validity of the warrantless arrests that were made pursuant to Section 5(b),
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

In Posadas v. Ombudsman,68 the killing of Dennis Venturina happened on December 8, 1994. It was only on December 11,
1994 that Chancellor Posadas requested the NBI's assistance. On the basis of the supposed identification of two (2) witnesses,
the NBI attempted to arrest Francis Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag three (3) days after the commission of the crime.
With this set of facts, it cannot be said that the officers have personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the persons
sought to be arrested committed the crime. Hence, the Court invalidated the warrantless arrest.

Similarly, in People v. Burgos,69 one Cesar Masamlok personally and voluntarily surrendered to the authorities, stating that
Ruben Burgos forcibly recruited him to become a member of the NPA, with a threat of physical harm. Upon receipt of this
information, a joint team of PC-INP units was dispatched to arrest Burgos who was then plowing the field. Indeed, the arrest
was invalid considering that the only information that the police officers had in effecting the arrest was the information from a
third person. It cannot be also said in this case that there was certainty as regards the commission of a crime.
In People v. del Rosario,70 the Court held that the requirement that an offense has just been committed means that there must
be a large measure of immediacy between the time the offense was committed and the time of the arrest. If there was an
appreciable lapse of time between the arrest and the commission of the crime, a warrant of arrest must be secured.

The Court held that the arrest of del Rosario did not comply with these requirements because he was arrested only a day after
the commission of the crime and not immediately thereafter. Additionally, the arresting officers were not present and were not
actual eyewitnesses to the crime. Hence, they had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had
committed the offense. They became aware of del Rosario's identity as the driver of the getaway tricycle only during the
custodial investigation.

In People v. Cendana,71 the accused was arrested one (1) day after the killing of the victim and only on the basis of
information obtained from unnamed sources. The unlawful arrest was held invalid.

In Rolito Go v. CA,72 the arrest of the accused six ( 6) days after the commission of the crime was held invalid because the
crime had not just been committed. Moreover, the "arresting" officers had no "personal knowledge" of facts indicating that the
accused was the gunman who had shot the victim. The information upon which the police acted came from statements made
by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting; one stated that the accused was the gunman; another was able to take down the
alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned out to be registered in the name of the accused's wife. That information did
not constitute "personal knowledge."

In People v. Tonog, Jr.,73 the warrantless arrest which was done on the same day was held valid. In this case, the arresting
officer had knowledge of facts which he personally gathered in the course of his investigation, indicating that the accused was
one of the perpetrators.

In People v. Gerente,74 the policemen arrested Gerente only about three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions had killed
the victim. The Court held that the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of the victim and of facts indicating
that Gerente and two others had killed him. The warrantless arrest was held valid.

In People v. Alvario,75 the warrantless arrest came immediately after the arresting officers received information from the
victim of the crime. The Court held that the personal knowledge of the arresting officers was derived from the information
supplied by the victim herself who pointed to Alvario as the man who raped her at the time of his arrest. The Court upheld the
warrantless arrest. In People v. Jayson,76 there was a shooting incident. The policemen who were summoned to the scene of
the crime found the victim. The informants pointed to the accused as the assailant only moments after the shooting. The Court
held that the arresting officers acted on the basis of personal knowledge of the death of the victim and of facts indicating that
the accused was the assailant. Thus, the warrantless arrest was held valid.

In People v. Acol,77 a group held up the passengers in a jeepney and the policemen immediately responded to the report of the
crime. One of the victims saw four persons walking towards Fort Bonifacio, one of whom was wearing his jacket. The victim
pointed them to the policemen. When the group saw the policemen coming, they ran in different directions. The Court held
that the arrest was valid.

In Cadua v. CA,78 there was an initial report to the police concerning a robbery. A radio dispatch was then given to the
arresting officers, who proceeded to Alden Street to verify the authenticity of the radio message. When they reached the place,
they met with the complainants who initiated the report about the robbery. Upon the officers' invitation, the victims joined
them in conducting a search of the nearby area where the accused was spotted in the vicinity. Based on the reported statements
of the complainants, he was identified as a logical suspect in the offense just committed. Hence, the arrest was held valid.
In Doria,79 the Court held that Section S(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure does not require the arresting
officers to personally witness the commission of the offense.

In this case, P/Supt. Doria alleged that his office received a telephone call from a relative of Rosa Sia about a shooting incident.
He dispatched a team headed by SP03 Ramirez to investigate the incident. SP03 Ramirez later reported that a certain William
Sia was wounded while Judge Abelita III, who was implicated in the incident, and his wife just left the place of the incident.
P/Supt. Doria looked for Abelita III and when he found him, he informed him of the incident report. P/Supt. Doria requested
Abelita III to go with him to the police headquarters as he had been reported to be involved in the incident. Abelita III agreed
but suddenly sped up his vehicle and proceeded to his residence where P/Supt. Doria caught him up as he was about to run
towards his house.

The police officers saw a gun in the front seat of the vehicle beside the driver's seat as Abelita III opened the door. They also
saw a shotgun at the back of the driver's seat. The police officers confiscated the firearms and arrested Abelita III. The Court
held that the petitioner's act of trying to get away, coupled with the incident report which they investigated, were enough to
raise a reasonable suspicion on the part of the police authorities as to the existence of probable cause. Based on these
discussions, it appears that the Court's appreciation of the elements that "the offense has just been committed" and ''personal
knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested committed it" depended on the particular circumstances of
the case. However, we note that the element of ''personal knowledge of facts or circumstances" under Section S(b ), Rule 113
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires clarification.

The phrase covers facts or, in the alternative, circumstances. According to the Black's Law Dictionary,80 "circumstances are
attendant or accompanying facts, events or conditions. " Circumstances may pertain to events or actions within the actual
perception, personal evaluation or observation of the police officer at the scene of the crime. Thus, even though the police
officer has not seen someone actually fleeing, he could still make a warrantless arrest if, based on his personal evaluation of
the circumstances at the scene of the crime, he could determine the existence of probable cause that the person sought to be
arrested has committed the crime. However, the determination of probable cause and the gathering of facts or circumstances
should be made immediately after the commission of the crime in order to comply with the element of immediacy.

In other words, the clincher in the element of ''personal knowledge of facts or circumstances" is the required element of
immediacy within which these facts or circumstances should be gathered. This required time element acts as a safeguard to
ensure that the police officers have gathered the facts or perceived the circumstances within a very limited time frame. This
guarantees that the police officers would have no time to base their probable cause finding on facts or circumstances obtained
after an exhaustive investigation.

The reason for the element of the immediacy is this - as the time gap from the commission of the crime to the arrest widens,
the pieces of information gathered are prone to become contaminated and subjected to external factors, interpretations and
hearsay. On the other hand, with the element of immediacy imposed under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the police officer's determination of probable cause would necessarily be limited to raw or
uncontaminated facts or circumstances, gathered as they were within a very limited period of time. The same provision adds
another safeguard with the requirement of probable cause as the standard for evaluating these facts of circumstances before the
police officer could effect a valid warrantless arrest.

In light of the discussion above on the developments of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and
our jurisprudence on the matter, we hold that the following must be present for a valid warrantless arrest: 1) the crime should
have been just committed; and 2) the arresting officer's exercise of discretion is limited by the standard of probable cause to be
determined from the facts and circumstances within his personal knowledge. The requirement of the existence of probable
cause objectifies the reasonableness of the warrantless arrest for purposes of compliance with the Constitutional mandate
against unreasonable arrests.

Hence, for purposes of resolving the issue on the validity of the warrantless arrest of the present petitioners, the question to be
resolved is whether the requirements for a valid warrantless arrest under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure were complied with, namely: 1) has the crime just been committed when they were arrested? 2) did the
arresting officer have personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the petitioners committed the crime? and 3) based on
these facts and circumstances that the arresting officer possessed at the time of the petitioners' arrest, would a reasonably
discreet and prudent person believe that the attempted murder of Atty. Generoso was committed by the petitioners? We rule in
the affirmative.

III. Application of Section S(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules

of Criminal Procedure in the present case: there was a

valid warrantless arrest

We deem it necessary to review the records of the CA because it has misapprehended the facts in its decision.81 From a
review of the records, we conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge of facts or circumstances upon which they
had properly determined probable cause in effecting a warrantless arrest against the petitioners. We note, however, that the
determination of the facts in the present case is purely limited to the resolution of the issue on the validity of the warrantless
arrests of the petitioners.

Based on the police blotter82 entry taken at 4:15 a.m. on February 20, 2005, the date that the alleged crime was committed, the
petitioners were brought in for investigation at the Batasan Hills Police Station. The police blotter stated that the alleged crime
was committed at 3:15 a.m. on February 20, 2005, along Kasiyahan St., Brgy. Holy Spirit, Quezon City.

The time of the entry of the complaint in the police blotter at 4:15 a.m., with Atty. Generoso and the petitioners already inside
the police station, would connote that the arrest took place less than one hour from the time of the occurrence of the crime.
Hence, the CA finding that the arrest took place two (2) hours after the commission of the crime is unfounded.

The arresting officers' personal observation of Atty. Generoso's bruises when they arrived at the scene of the crime is
corroborated by the petitioners' admissions that Atty: Generoso indeed suffered blows from petitioner Macapanas and his
brother Joseph Macapanas,83 although they asserted that they did it in self-defense against Atty. Generoso.

Atty. Generoso's bruises were also corroborated by the Medico-Legal Certificate84 that was issued by East Avenue Medical
Center on the same date of the alleged mauling. The medical check-up of Atty. Generoso that was made about 8:10 a.m. on the
date of the incident, showed the following findings: "Contusion Hematoma, Left Frontal Area; Abrasion, T6 area, right
midclavicular line periorbital hematoma, left eye; Abrasion, distal 3rd posterolateral aspect of right forearm; Abrasion, 4th and
fifth digit, right hand; Abrasion on area of ih rib (L ant. Chest wall), tenderness on L peripheral area, no visible abrasion. In
addition, the attending physician, Dr. Eva P. Javier, diagnosed Atty. Generoso of contusion hematoma, periorbital L., and
traumatic conjunctivitis, o.s.

To summarize, the arresting officers went to the scene of the crime upon the complaint of Atty. Generoso of his alleged
mauling; the police officers responded to the scene of the crime less than one (1) hour after the alleged mauling; the alleged
crime transpired in a community where Atty. Generoso and the petitioners reside; Atty. Generoso positively identified the
petitioners as those responsible for his mauling and, notably, the petitioners85 and Atty. Generoso86 lived almost in the same
neighborhood; more importantly, when the petitioners were confronted by the arresting officers, they did not deny their
participation in the incident with Atty. Generoso, although they narrated a different version of what transpired.87

With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and which they have personally observed less than one
hour from the time that they have arrived at the scene of the crime until the time of the arrest of the petitioners, we deem it
reasonable to conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge of facts or circumstances justifying the petitioners'
warrantless arrests. These circumstances were well within the police officers' observation, perception and evaluation at the
time of the arrest. These circumstances qualify as the police officers' personal observation, which are within their personal
knowledge, prompting them to make the warrantless arrests.
Similar to the factual antecedents in Jayson,88 the police officers in the present case saw Atty. Generoso in his sorry bloodied
state. As the victim, he positively identified the petitioners as the persons who mauled him; however, instead of fleeing like
what happened in Jayson, the petitioners agreed to go with the police officers.

This is also similar to what happened in People v. Tonog, Jr.89 where Tonog did not flee but voluntarily went with the police
officers. More than this, the petitioners in the present case even admitted to have been involved in the incident with Atty.
Generoso, although they had another version of what transpired.

In determining the reasonableness of the warrantless arrests, it is incumbent upon the courts to consider if the police officers
have complied with the requirements set under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, specifically,
the requirement of immediacy; the police officer's personal knowledge of facts or circumstances; and lastly, the propriety of
the determination of probable cause that the person sought to be arrested committed the crime.

The records show that soon after the report of the incident occurred, SPOl Monsalve immediately dispatched the arresting
officer, SP02 Javier, to render personal assistance to the victim.90 This fact alone negates the petitioners' argument that the
police officers did not have personal knowledge that a crime had been committed - the police immediately responded and had
personal knowledge that a crime had been committed.1wphi1

To reiterate, personal knowledge of a crime just committed under the terms of the above-cited provision, does not require
actual presence at the scene while a crime was being committed; it is enough that evidence of the recent commission of the
crime is patent (as in this case) and the police officer has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances, that the person to be arrested has recently committed the crime.

Considering the circumstances of the stabbing, particularly the locality where it took place, its occasion, the personal
circumstances of the parties, and the immediate on-the-spot investigation that took place, the immediate and warrantless
arrests of the perpetrators were proper. Consequently, the inquest proceeding that the City Prosecutor conducted was
appropriate under the circumstances.

IV. The term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest is construed to

mean as an authoritative command

After the resolution of the validity of the warrantless arrest, the discussion of the petitioners' second issue is largely academic.
Arrest is defined as the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an
offense. An arrest is made by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the person
making the arrest.91 Thus, application of actual force, manual touching of the body, physical restraint or a formal declaration
of arrest is not required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other and the intent
of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary.92

Notwithstanding the term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest,93 SP02 Javier could not but have the intention of arresting the
petitioners following Atty. Generoso' s account. SP02 Javier did not need to apply violent physical restraint when a simple
directive to the petitioners to follow him to the police station would produce a similar effect. In other words, the application of
actual force would only be an alternative if the petitioners had exhibited resistance.

To be sure, after a crime had just been committed and the attending policemen have acquired personal knowledge of the
incidents of the crime, including the alleged perpetrators, the arrest of the petitioners as the perpetrators pointed to by the
victim, was not a mere random act but was in connection with a particular offense. Furthermore, SP02 Javier had informed the
petitioners, at the time of their arrest, of the charges against them before taking them to Batasan Hills Police Station for
investigation.94

V. The Order denying the motion for preliminary

investigation is valid

In their last ditch attempt at avoidance, the petitioners attack the R TC Order denying the petitioners' urgent motion for regular
preliminary investigation for allegedly having been issued in violation of Article VIII, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution95
and Rule 16, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.96

The RTC, in its Order dismissing the motion, clearly states that the Court is not persuaded by the evidentiary nature of the
allegations in the said motion of the accused. Aside from lack of clear and convincing proof, the Court, in the exercise of its
sound discretion on the matter, is legally bound to pursue and hereby gives preference to the speedy disposition of the case."

We do not see any taint of impropriety or grave abuse of discretion in this Order. The RTC, in resolving the motion, is not
required to state all the facts found in the record of the case. Detailed evidentiary matters, as the RTC decreed, is best reserved
for the full-blown trial of the case, not in the preliminary incidents leading up to the trial.

Additionally, no less than the Constitution itself provides that it is the decision that should state clearly and distinctly the facts
and the law on which it is based. In resolving a motion, the court is only required to state clearly and distinctly the reasons
therefor. A contrary system would only prolong the proceedings, which was precisely what happened to this case. Hence, we
uphold the validity of the RTC's order as it correctly stated the reason for its denial of the petitioners' Urgent Motion for
Regular Preliminary Investigation. WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition, and hereby AFFIRM
the decision dated January 21, 2008 and the resolution dated April 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91541.
The City Prosecutor of Quezon City is hereby ORDERED to proceed with the criminal proceedings against the petitioners. SO
ORDERED.
A.M. No. MTJ-07-1666 September 5, 2012
(Formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 05-1761-MTJ)

GERLIE M. UY and MA. CONSOLACION T. BASCUG, Complainants,

vs.
JUDGE ERWIN B. JAVELLANA, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, LA CASTELLANA, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL,
Respondent.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This administrative case arose from a verified complaint1 for "gross ignorance of the law and procedures, gross incompetence,
neglect of duty, conduct improper and unbecoming of a judge, grave misconduct and others," filed by Public Attorneys Gerlie 2
M. Uy (Uy) and Ma. Consolacion T. Bascug (Bascug) of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO), La Carlotta District, against
Presiding Judge Erwin 3 B. Javellana (Javellana) of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), La Castellana, Negros Occidental.

Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug alleged the following in their complaint:

First, Judge Javellana was grossly ignorant of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug cited
several occasions as examples: (a) In Crim. Case No. 04-097, entitled People v. Cornelio, for Malicious Mischief, Judge
Javellana issued a warrant of arrest after the filing of said case despite Section 16 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure;
(b) In Crim. Case No. 04-075, entitled People v. Celeste, et al., for Trespass to Dwelling, Judge Javellana did not grant the
motion to dismiss for non-compliance with the Lupon requirement under Sections 18 and 19(a) of the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure, insisting that said motion was a prohibited pleading; (c) Also in People v. Celeste, et al., Judge Javellana
refused to dismiss outright the complaint even when the same was patently without basis or merit, as the affidavits of therein
complainant and her witnesses were all hearsay evidence; and (d) In Crim. Case No. 02-056, entitled People v. Lopez, et al.,
for Malicious Mischief, Judge Javellana did not apply the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure and, instead, conducted a
preliminary examination and preliminary investigation in accordance with the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, then set
the case for arraignment and pre-trial, despite confirming that therein complainant and her witnesses had no personal
knowledge of the material facts alleged in their affidavits, which should have been a ground for dismissal of said case.Second,
Judge Javellana gave the impression that he was a co-agent in a surety company with a certain Leilani "Lani" Manunag
(Manunag). Judge Javellana had conveyed to the public on several occasions that Manunag was in a special position to
influence him in granting provisional liberty to the accused.4 In different cases, Judge Javellana (a) instructed the wife of an
accused to file the Motion to Reduce Bond prepared by the PAO with Manunag, leading the wife to believe that Manunag was
a court personnel, hence, said Motion was never filed with the MTC and, instead of the cash bond the accused intended to post,
the accused was released on a surety bond issued by Manunags company for which the accused still had to pay premium; 5 (b)
reduced the bail from P 40,000.00 to P 30,000.00, consistent with the reduced bail amount Manunag instructed the
representative of the accused to seek, not to P 10,000.00 as prayed for by the PAO in the Motion for Reduction of Bail or to P
20,000.00 as recommended by the Chief of Police;6 (c) did not warn Manunag against getting involved in court processes as
she was engaged in surety insurance and did not even question a counter-affidavit of an accused prepared by "Lani;"7 (d)
instructed the relatives of the accused to go to Manunag who knew how to "process" an affidavit of desistance, and when said
relatives did approach Manunag, the latter charged them fees; 8 (e) did not set the Motion to Reduce Bail for hearing but
granted the same because it was filed by "the intimate friend of judge who is an agent of surety" and took cognizance of the
amount of premium for the surety bond in determining the amount of bail; 9 (f) denied the Motion to Extend Time to File
Counter-Affidavit for violation of the three-day notice rule, but granted the Motion to Reduce Bail facilitated by Manunag
even when it was filed in violation of the same rule;10 and (g) issued warrants of arrest under questionable circumstances, more
particularly described in the immediately succeeding paragraph, in which cases, the bail bonds of the accused were facilitated
by Manunag.

Third, Judge Javellana violated Section 6(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and issued warrants of
arrest without propounding searching questions to the complainants and their witnesses to determine the necessity of placing
the accused under immediate custody. As a result, Judge Javellana issued warrants of arrest even when the accused had
already voluntarily surrendered or when a warrantless arrest had been effected.

Fourth, Judge Javellana failed to observe the constitutional rights of the accused as stated in Section 12(1), Article III of the
Constitution. Judge Javellana set Crim. Case No. 03-097, entitled People v. Bautista,11 for preliminary investigation even when
the accused had no counsel, and proceeded with said investigation without informing the accused of his rights to remain silent
and to have a counsel.
Fifth, Judge Javellana was habitually tardy. The subpoena in Civil Case No. 05-001, entitled Villanueva v. Regalado, 12 only
stated that the hearing would be "in the morning," without indicating the time. Judge Javellana failed to arrive for the pre-trial
of the case set in the morning of April 14, 2005. Judge Javellana was still a no-show when the pre-trial was reset in the
morning of April 15, 2005 and May 3, 2005. Finally, anticipating Judge Javellanas tardiness, the pre-trial was rescheduled at
1:30 in the afternoon of another date.

Sixth, Judge Javellana whimsically or inconsistently implemented laws and rules depending on stature of the parties, persons
accompanying the parties, lawyers of the parties, and his personal relations with the parties/lawyers. Judge Javellana, in
several cases,13 denied or refused to receive Motions for Extension of Time to File Counter-Affidavits signed only by the
accused, yet in other cases,14 granted such motions. In another case, 15 Judge Javellana denied the Motion to Extend Time to
File Counter-Affidavit for violation of the three-day notice rule, but granted the Motion to Reduce Bail, which was in violation
of the same rule. Judge Javellanas inconsistent and irregular ruling could be due to the fact that the former motion was filed
by Public Attorney Bascug, with whom Judge Javellana had an axe to grind, while the latter motion was facilitated by
Manunag.

Seventh, Judge Javellana also adopted the mantra that the "litigants are made for the courts" instead of "courts for the
litigants." In Crim. Case No. 03-104, entitled People v. Fermin, the accused, assisted by Public Attorney Uy, pleaded guilty to
the crime of attempted homicide. The accused filed a Petition/Application for Probation, prepared by the PAO but signed only
by the accused. Judge Javellana refused to accept said Petition/Application and required the father of the accused to return the
Petition/Application all the way from the MTC in La Castellana to the PAO in La Carlota, despite the great distance between
these two cities. The PAO already adopted the practice of preparing the motions for extension of time to file counter-affidavit,
motions for release of minor, or applications for probation, but letting the accused themselves or their parents (in case the
accused were minors) sign the motions/applications, thus, enabling the PAO to serve as many clients as possible despite the
lack of lawyers. Such practice is not prohibited considering that under Rule 138, Section 34 of the Rules of Court, a party may
conduct his litigation in a municipal court "in person, with an aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for the purpose or
with aid of an attorney."16

Eighth, Judge Javellana did not observe the proper procedure in airing his complaints against public attorneys. Judge Javellana
rebuked the public attorneys in the Orders he issued. In one such Order, 17 Judge Javellana misleadingly stated that Public
Attorney Uy "has already expressed her desire not to attend todays hearing," when Public Attorney Uy actually waived her
personal appearance at said hearing as she had to attend the hearing of a criminal case at the MTC of Pontevedra. In another
Order,18 Judge Javellana reported, prior to confirmation, that the PAO lawyer refused to prepare the motion for extension of
time to file counter-affidavit, thus, prompting the accused to hire a special counsel. Additionally, Judge Javellana improperly
filed his complaints against the public attorneys appearing before his court with the Department of Justice or the District
Public Attorney (DPA) of Bacolod City, instead of the appropriate authorities, namely, the DPA of La Carlota City or the PAO
Regional Director. Moreover, Judge Javellana had required Public Attorney Bascug to explain why she allowed the accused in
Crim. Case No. 03-090, entitled People v. Earnshaw, to sign the Motion for Extension of Time to File Counter-Affidavits,
even when she was the one who prepared said Motion. Judge Javellana did not verify first whether it was indeed Public
Attorney Bascug who prepared the Motion in question, thus, violating her right to due process. Also, Judge Javellana was
already encroaching upon the domain of the PAO. It is the concern of the PAO and not the court "as to how the Public
Attorneys Office will be managed, specifically, what policies to use in the acceptance of cases brought to its Office, how one
could avail of its legal services, at what point in time one is considered a client of said Office x x x ."19

Lastly, to support their complaint, Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug attached a hand-written note20 relating the observations of
an anonymous member of Judge Javellanas staff, viz:

Page One

1. Honorable Judge reports to duty at past 11:00 A.M. and hurriedly conducts preliminary investigations or preliminary
examinations after making party litigants wait from 8:00 A.M. until 11:00 A.M. There had been occasions when litigants
became impatient for waiting for several hours for the Judges arrival and would leave the court. Judge then would forego the
examination.

2. Judge spends more time conversing in cafeterias than stay in the court. Litigants who are in a hurry to go home would bring
the affidavits to the cafeteria for Judges signature.

3. Most of the time, in Court, in front of litigants as audience and even while solemnizing civil marriage Judge would keep
repeating these remarks:
I am a criminal lawyer.

I did not come from the DAR or the COMELEC.

I am an intelligent Judge.

I am the counsel of the famous Gargar-Lumangyao and Spider

Hunter cases and I have caused the execution of Col. Torres.

I am not under the Mayor or the Chief of Police.

and other remarks as if he is the only intelligent, credible and qualified judge in the whole world.

4. Judge tolerates the negligence of duty of his court utility worker. Said utility worker never reports to open or close the court;
he never cleans the courtroom; most of the time he stays in his Karaoke bar which is some few meters away from the MTC of
La Castellana. As a matter of fact the MTC of La Castellana is the dirtiest of all the courtrooms in the whole province.

Page Two

5. Motion for Extension of Time to File Counter Affidavit in CC 03-090-Pp. vs. Efraim Earnshaw made by Atty. Bascug was
denied by Judge on the ground that it was the accused who signed the Motion and Atty. Bascug was ordered to explain. Other
motions had been denied for not meeting the 3-day rule but others were granted.

6. Motion to Reduce Bail received by court on January 7, 2004 was not set for hearing but was ordered granted because it was
filed by the intimate friend of the judge who is an agent of Surety. This did not meet the 3-day rule CC 03-108 Pp. vs. Lowell
Panaguiton for "Homicide."

Page Three

1. Criminal Case No. 03-102- Julius Villanueva "Frustrated Homicide" Urgent Motion to Stay Transfer to Provincial Jail -
Filed 1/21/2004 was not heard but order was issued January 21, 2004 also.

2. Criminal Case No. 03-090- Efraim Earnshaw "Less Serious Physical Injuries" January 26, 2004 - Scheduled for arraignment
but upon order of Judge on affidavit of Desistance of Melanie Pabon and Motion to Dismiss was filed and case dismissed.

3. Deonaldo Lopez Case - Motion for Extension of Time to File Counter Affidavit dated 10-3-02 was signed by accused
namely Deonaldo Lopez, Jojo Balansag, Junnel Jorge, and Bernie Bello - granted by judge.21

Based on the foregoing, Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug prayed that Judge Javellana be removed from the MTC of La
Castellana.

In his Comment22 on the complaint against him, Judge Javellana discounted the allegations of Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug
as "baseless, untruthful, intrigues, malicious and a harassment tending to intimidate him," and countered as follows:

First, Judge Javellana asserted that he was not grossly ignorant of the rules of procedure and explained his
actions in particular cases: (a) In People v. Cornelio, Judge Javellana issued a warrant of arrest for the two
accused charged with Malicious Mischief in the exercise of his judicial discretion, and the necessity of
holding the accused in detention became evident when it was revealed during trial that the same accused
were wanted for Attempted Homicide in Crim. Case No. 04-096; (b) In People v. Celeste, et al., Judge
Javellana insisted that referral of the dispute (involving an alleged Trespass to Dwelling) to the Lupong
Tagapamayapa was not a jurisdictional requirement and the Motion to Dismiss on said ground was a
prohibited pleading under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure; (c) Still in People v. Celeste, et al.,
Judge Javellana refused to dismiss outright the complaint as prayed for by Public Attorney Uy as the Judge
had to accord due process to the complainant in said case; and (d) In People v. Lopez, et al. another case for
Malicious Mischief, Judge Javellana reiterated that a motion to dismiss is a prohibited pleading under the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure and added that he could not dismiss the case outright since the
prosecution has not yet fully presented its evidence.
Second, Judge Javellana denied acting as the co-agent of Manunag. Manunag was an Authorized Surety
Bond Agent of Commonwealth Insurance and Surety Bond Company, a bonding company duly accredited
by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). The relationship between Judge Javellana and Manunag
was "purely on official business." That Manunag influenced Judge Javellana in fixing the amount of bail in
several cases was a malicious and deliberate lie, based on mere speculation and suspicion. Judge Javellana
had consistently granted the reduction of the amount of bail to only 75%, and not as low as 25%, of the
amount stated in Department Circular No. 89 dated August 29, 2000 of the Department of Justice (DOJ).
Judge Javellana even chided Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug that as officers of the court, said public
attorneys were duty bound not to demand outrageous reduction of bail. In addition, Judge Javellana could
not warn Manunag to stay away from "the processes (sic) premises in the Court" because "everybody are
allowed to attend Court proceedings unless otherwise the attendance of the public is prohibited."23 Judge
Javellana likewise stated that he could not interfere with the processing of surety insurance and bond for
such was a private matter between the insurance and bonding company and its authorized agents. Referring
to case records, Judge Javellana pointed out that he only granted the motions to reduce bail that complied
with the three-day notice rule.

Third, Judge Javellana claimed to have conducted preliminary examination, asking the complainants and
their witnesses searching questions, before issuing warrants of arrest. According to Judge Javellana, he
would sign the official form of the warrant of arrest right after the preliminary examination. In some cases,
Judge Javellana was not aware that the accused had already voluntarily surrendered or was already taken
into custody by virtue of a warrantless arrest because police officers did not timely inform the court of such
fact.

Fourth, Judge Javellana did not violate the constitutional rights of the accused in People v. Bautista. Judge
Javellana argued that while a judge can ask clarificatory questions during the preliminary investigation, a
preliminary investigation is mandatory only when the law imposes the penalty of imprisonment of at least
four years, two months, and one day. Judge Javellana further averred that he always advised litigants to
secure the services of a counsel or that of a public attorney from the PAO. However, even when the public
attorney failed or refused to appear before the court, Judge Javellana still proceeded with his clarificatory
questions since there was yet no full blown trial for which the accused already needed the services of a
competent lawyer.

Fifth, Judge Javellana explained his failure to arrive for the pre-trial in Villanueva v. Regalado scheduled on
April 14, 2005. Judge Javellana averred that he had been suffering from diabetes, as evinced by his medical
records from the Supreme Court Health and Welfare Plan, and on said date, his blood sugar rose to 300,
which caused him to be lethargic, weak, and drowsy.

Sixth, Judge Javellana repudiated the allegation that he applied the law and ruled whimsically and
inconsistently. Judge Javellana asserted that he "applied the law and the rules according to what he believes
is fair, just and equitable in the exercise of his judicial discretion."24 Judge Javellana never favored Manunag
and in all criminal cases involving homicide, he had granted the reduction of bail to P 30,000.00 (75% of the
recommended bail of P 40,000.00).

Seventh, Judge Javellana admitted not accepting petitions, applications, and motions prepared by the PAO
but signed only by the accused, asseverating that public attorneys should affix their signatures and state their
Roll of Attorneys number in every pleading they file in court. Judge Javellana asked that "if all courts admits
(sic) any pleading filed by any litigant then what will happen to the practice of law?" 25

Eighth, Judge Javellana emphasized that government lawyers, such as Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug, are
paid with peoples money, so they should be sincere and dedicated to their work and, whenever possible, go
the extra mile to serve poor litigants. Thus, Judge Javellana reported Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug to
higher PAO officials to guide said public attorneys and not to interfere with the performance of their
functions.

And ninth, Judge Javellana identified the member of his staff who wrote the note containing more
allegations against him as Mr. Ray D. Pineda (Pineda), Process Server. Judge Javellana described Pineda as
"very abnormal, eccentric and queer in his relationship with his fellow staff as shown by his quarrelsome
attitude and fond of inciting litigants to criticize the Clerk of Court and other personnel and most of all his
loyalty to the Official of the Municipality rather than to this Court x x x." 26 Judge Javellana clarified that he
often mentioned the Gargar-Lumangyao Kidnapping with Double Murder Case and the Spider Hunters
 Multiple Murder and Multiple Frustrated Murder Case not to boast but to relay the impression that he meant
business as Presiding Judge. These cases were dubbed as the "Case of the Century" by then Executive Judge
Bernardo Ponferrada of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City (who later became Deputy Court
Administrator) because the same involved big time personalities. Judge Javellana mentioned the said cases
even when solemnizing marriages because he would then be reading the Holy Scriptures and he had to
highlight that he survived the trials and threats to his life because of the Holy Bible. Judge Javellana also did
not have a Court Aide who owned a Karaoke Bar whose negligence the judge was tolerating. Pineda was just
"jealous" because he was not designated by Judge Javellana as Acting Docket Clerk in lieu of Mr. Vee
Caballero who was already on terminal leave prior to retirement. Judge Javellana further narrated that he had
reprimanded Pineda several times, even in open court. In one of these instances, it was because Pineda
submitted a falsified information sheet to the Supreme Court Personnel Division, stating therein that he had
never been charged with a criminal offense, when in truth, he was previously charged with "Physical Injury."
Judge Javellana advised Pineda to rectify the latters records by executing an affidavit to be submitted to the
Supreme Court Personnel Division, but Pineda did not heed the same.

In the end, Judge Javellana stressed that the charges against him were baseless and malicious; and the acts being complained
of involved judicial discretion and, thus, judicial in nature and not the proper subject of an administrative complaint. Judge
Javellana hinted about a conspiracy between the Municipal Mayor, on one hand, and Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug, on the
other. The Municipal Mayor was purportedly angry at Judge Javellana because the latter caused the arrest of and heard the
cases against the formers supporters and employees; while Public Attorney Bascug was suffering from a "Losing Litigants
Syndrome" and "Prosecution Complex," and was influencing Public Attorney Uy, a neophyte lawyer.

Consequently, Judge Javellana sought the dismissal of the instant complaint against him.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), in its report27 dated January 2, 2006, found Judge Javellana liable for gross
ignorance of the law or procedure when he did not apply the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure in cases appropriately
covered by said Rule; and (2) gross misconduct when he got involved in business relations with Manunag, implemented the
law inconsistently, and mentioned his accomplishments for publicity. The OCA thus recommended that:

1. The instant administrative complaint be REDOCKETED as a regular administrative matter; and

2. Judge Edwin B. Javellana, MTC, La Castellana, Negros Occidental be SUSPENDED from office without salary and other
benefits for three (3) months with a STERN WARNING that repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt
with more severely.28

In a Resolution 29 dated February 5, 2007, the Court re-docketed the complaint as a regular administrative matter and required
parties to manifest their willingness to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings filed.

On separate dates,30 the parties manifested their willingness to submit the case for resolution based on the pleadings already
filed.

We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OCA, except for the penalty imposed.

Gross Ignorance of the Law

The Revised Rule of Summary Procedure shall govern the following criminal cases:

SECTION 1. Scope. This Rule shall govern the summary procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial
Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases falling within their
jurisdiction.

xxxx

B. Criminal Cases:

(1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;

(2) Violations of the rental law;

(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances;

(4) Violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (Bouncing Checks Law).

(5) All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged is imprisonment not exceeding six
months, or a fine not exceeding one thousand pesos (P 1,000.00), or both, irrespective of other imposable penalties, accessory
or otherwise, or of the civil liability arising therefrom: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property
through criminal negligence, this Rule shall govern where the imposable fine does not exceed ten thousand pesos (P
10,000.00). (Emphasis supplied.)

The cases People v. Cornelio31 and People v. Lopez, et al.32 pending before Judge Javellana were both for malicious mischief.

The crime of malicious mischief is committed by any person who deliberately causes damage to the property of another
through means not constituting arson.33 There are special cases of malicious mischief which are specifically covered by Article
328 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:

ART. 328. Special cases of malicious mischief. Any person who shall cause damage to obstruct the performance of public
functions, or using any poisonous or corrosive substance; or spreading any infection or contagion among cattle; or who causes
damage to the property of the National Museum or National Library, or to any archive or registry, waterworks, road,
promenade, or any other thing used in common by the public, shall be punished:

1. By prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the damage caused exceeds 1,000 pesos;

2. By arresto mayor, if such value does not exceed the above- mentioned amount but is over 200 pesos; and

3. By arresto menor, if such value does not exceed 200 pesos. (Emphasis ours.)

All other cases of malicious mischief shall be governed by Article 329 of the same Code, which reads:

ART. 329. Other mischiefs. The mischiefs not included in the next preceding article shall be punished:

1. By arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods, if the value of the damage caused exceeds 1,000 pesos;

2. By arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value is over 200 pesos but does not exceed 1,000 pesos; and

3. By arresto menor or fine of not less than the value of the damage caused and not more than 200 pesos, if the amount
involved does not exceed 200 pesos or cannot be estimated. (Emphasis ours.)

Without any showing that the accused in People v. Cornelio and People v. Lopez, et al. were charged with the special cases of
malicious mischief particularly described in Article 328 of the Revised Penal Code, then Article 329 of the same Code should
be applied. If the amounts of the alleged damage to property in People v. Cornelio and People v. Lopez, et al., P 6,000.0034 and
P 3,000.00,35 respectively, are proven, the appropriate penalty for the accused would be arresto mayor in its medium and
maximum periods which under Article 329(a) of the Revised Penal Code, would be imprisonment for two (2) months and one
(1) day to six (6) months. Clearly, these two cases should be governed by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.

Judge Javellanas issuance of a Warrant of Arrest for the accused in People v. Cornelio is in violation of Section 16 of the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, categorically stating that "the court shall not order the arrest of the accused except for
failure to appear whenever required." Judge Javellana never claimed that the accused failed to appear at any hearing. His
justification that the accused was wanted for the crime of attempted homicide, being tried in another case, Crim. Case No.
04-096, is totally unacceptable and further indicative of his ignorance of law. People v. Cornelio, pending before Judge
Javellanas court as Crim. Case No. 04-097, is for malicious mischief, and is distinct and separate from Crim. Case No. 04-096,
which is for attempted homicide, although both cases involved the same accused. Proceedings in one case, such as the issuance
of a warrant of arrest, should not be extended or made applicable to the other.

In People v. Lopez, et al., Judge Javellana conducted a preliminary investigation even when it was not required or justified. 36
The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure does not provide for a preliminary investigation prior to the filing of a criminal case
under said Rule. A criminal case within the scope of the Rule shall be commenced in the following manner:

SEC. 11. How commenced. The filing of criminal cases falling within the scope of this Rule shall be either by complaint or
by information; Provided, however, That in Metropolitan Manila and in Chartered Cities, such cases shall be commenced only
by information, except when the offense cannot be prosecuted de oficio.

The complaint or information shall be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and of his witnesses in such number
of copies as there are accused plus two (2) copies for the courts files. If this requirement is not complied with within five (5)
days from date of filing, the case may be dismissed.

SEC. 12. Duty of Court.

(a) If commenced by complaint. On the basis of the complaint and the affidavits and other evidence accompanying the same,
the court may dismiss the case outright for being patently without basis or merit and order the release of the accused if in
custody.

(b) If commenced by information. When the case is commenced by information, or is not dismissed pursuant to the next
preceding paragraph, the court shall issue an order which, together with copies of the affidavits and other evidence submitted
by the prosecution, shall require the accused to submit his counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses as well as any
evidence in his behalf, serving copies thereof on the complainant or prosecutor not later than ten (10) days from receipt of said
order. The prosecution may file reply affidavits within ten (10) days after receipt of the counter-affidavits of the defense.

SEC. 13. Arraignment and trial. Should the court, upon a consideration of the complaint or information and the affidavits
submitted by both parties, find no cause or ground to hold the accused for trial, it shall order the dismissal of the case;
otherwise, the court shall set the case for arraignment and trial.

If the accused is in custody for the crime charged, he shall be immediately arraigned and if he enters a plea of guilty, he shall
forthwith be sentenced.

Section 1, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure only requires that a preliminary investigation be conducted
before the filing of a complaint or information for an offense where the penalty prescribed by law is at least four (4) years, two
(2) months and one (1) day without regard to the fine. As has been previously established herein, the maximum penalty
imposable for malicious mischief in People v. Lopez, et al. is just six (6) months.

Judge Javellana did not provide any reason as to why he needed to conduct a preliminary investigation in People v. Lopez, et
al. We stress that the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure was precisely adopted to promote a more expeditious and
inexpensive determination of cases, and to enforce the constitutional rights of litigants to the speedy disposition of cases. 37

Judge Javellana cannot be allowed to arbitrarily conduct proceedings beyond those specifically laid down by the Revised Rule
on Summary Procedure, thereby lengthening or delaying the resolution of the case, and defeating the express purpose of said
Rule.

We further agree with the OCA that Judge Javellana committed a blatant error in denying the Motion to Dismiss filed by the
accused in People v. Celeste, et al. and in insisting that said Motion was a prohibited pleading, even though the case was never
previously referred to the Lupong

Tagapamayapa as required by Sections 18 and 19(a) of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.

The pertinent provisions of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure read:

Sec. 18. Referral to Lupon. Cases requiring referral to the Lupon for conciliation under the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 1508 where there is no showing of compliance with such requirement, shall be dismissed without prejudice, and
may be revived only after such requirement shall have been complied with. This provision shall not apply to criminal cases
where the accused was arrested without a warrant.

Sec. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. The following pleadings, motions, or petitions shall not be allowed in the cases
covered by this Rule:
(a) Motion to dismiss the complaint or to quash the complaint or information except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter, or failure to comply with the preceding section. (Emphases ours.)

We see no ambiguity in the aforequoted provisions. A case which has not been previously referred to the Lupong
Tagapamayapa shall be dismissed without prejudice. A motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to comply with the Lupon
requirement is an exception to the pleadings prohibited by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Given the express
provisions of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, we find irrelevant Judge Javellanas argument that referral to the
Lupon is not a jurisdictional requirement. The following facts are undisputed: People v. Celeste, et al. was not referred to the
Lupon, and the accused filed a Motion to Dismiss based on this ground. Judge Javellana should have allowed and granted the
Motion to Dismiss (albeit without prejudice) filed by the accused in People v. Celeste, et al.

The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure has been in effect since November 15, 1991. It finds application in a substantial
number of civil and criminal cases pending before Judge Javellanas court. Judge Javellana cannot claim to be unfamiliar with
the same.

Every judge is required to observe the law. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it;
and anything less than that would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. In short, when the law is so elementary, not to
be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. 38

In Agunday v. Judge Tresvalles,39 we called the attention of Judge Tresvalles to Section 2 of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure which states that a "patently erroneous determination to avoid the application of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure is a ground for disciplinary action." We went on further to interpret said provision as follows:

Although the said provision states that "patently erroneous determination to avoid the application of the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure is a ground for disciplinary action," the provision cannot be read as applicable only where the failure to
apply the rule is deliberate or malicious. Otherwise, the policy of the law to provide for the expeditious and summary
disposition of cases covered by it could easily be frustrated. Hence, requiring judges to make the determination of the
applicability of the rule on summary procedure upon the filing of the case is the only guaranty that the policy of the law will be
fully realized. x x x.40 (Emphasis ours.)

Resultantly, Judge Javellana cannot invoke good faith or lack of deliberate or malicious intent as a defense. His repeated
failure to apply the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure in cases so obviously covered by the same is detrimental to the
expedient and efficient administration of justice, for which we hold him administratively liable.

As for Judge Javellanas refusal to dismiss People v. Lopez, et al. and People v. Celeste, et al., however, we exonerate him of
the administrative charges for the same. Judge Javellana is correct that the appreciation of evidence is already within his
judicial discretion.41 Any alleged error he might have committed in this regard is the proper subject of an appeal but not an
administrative complaint. We remind Judge Javellana though to adhere closely to the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure in
hearing and resolving said cases.

II
Gross Misconduct

Judges are enjoined by the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary42 to act and behave, in and out of court,
in a manner befitting their office, to wit:

Canon 2
INTEGRITY

Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of judges.

SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a
reasonable observer.

SECTION 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must
not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.

xxxx
 Canon 3
IMPARTIALITY

Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to the decision itself but also to the
process by which the decision is made.

SECTION 1. Judges shall perform their judicial duties without favor, bias or prejudice.

SECTION 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the confidence of
the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary.

xxxx

Canon 4
PROPRIETY

Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge.

SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.

SECTION 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a
way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.

xxxx

SECTION 8. Judges shall not use or lend the prestige of the judicial office to advance their private interests, or those of a
member of their family or of anyone else, nor shall they convey or permit others to convey the impression that anyone is in a
special position improperly to influence them in the performance of judicial duties.

xxxx

SECTION 14. Judges shall not knowingly permit court staff or others subject to their influence, direction or authority, to ask
for, or accept, any gift, bequest, loan favor in relation to anything done or to be done or omitted to be done in connection with
their duties or functions.

xxxx

Canon 5
EQUALITY

Ensuring equality of treatment to all before the courts is essential to the due performance of the judicial office.

xxxx

SECTION 2. Judges shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or by conduct, manifest bias or prejudice
towards any person or group on irrelevant grounds.

xxxx

SECTION 2. Judges shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct, manifest bias or prejudice towards
any person or group on irrelevant grounds.

SECTION 3. Judges shall carry out judicial duties with appropriate consideration for all persons, such as the parties, witnesses,
lawyers, court staff and judicial colleagues, without differentiation on any irrelevant ground, immaterial to the proper
performance of such duties.

xxxx
 Canon 6
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE

Competence and diligence are prerequisites to the due performance of judicial office.

xxxx

SECTION 5. Judges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with
reasonable promptness.

SECTION 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and
courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall
require similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others subject to their influence, direction or control.

Judge Javellana had violated the aforequoted canons/standards in several instances.

Judge Javellana did not admit having a business relationship with Manunag, contrary to the finding of the OCA. What Judge
Javellana stated in his Comment was that his relationship with Manunag was "purely on official business," since Manunag was
a duly authorized agent of a credited bonding company. Nonetheless, Judge Javellana, by referring the accused who appeared
before his court directly to Manunag for processing of the bail bond of said accused, gave the impression that he favored
Manunag and Manunags bonding company, as well as the reasonable suspicion that he benefitted financially from such
referrals. Judge Javellana should remember that he must not only avoid impropriety, but the "appearance of impropriety" as
well.

Moreover, Judge Javellana was conspicuously inconsistent in Granting43 or denying44 motions for extension of time to file
pleadings which were signed only by the accused. Judge Javellana reasoned in his Comment that the PAO lawyers who
prepared the motions should have signed the same as counsels for the accused, but this only explained Judge Javellanas denial
of said motions.

It did not address why, in other cases, Judge Javellana had granted similar motions signed only by the accused. Without any
satisfactory basis for the difference in his ruling on these motions, Judge Javellana had acted arbitrarily to the prejudice of the
PAO lawyers.

Judge Javellana himself admitted that he often mentioned his previous accomplishments as counsel in big and controversial
cases, claiming that he only did so to impress upon the parties that he meant business and that he relied greatly upon God to
survive the trials and threats to his life. We are not persuaded.

The previous Code of Judicial Conduct specifically warned the judges against seeking publicity for personal vainglory. 45
Vainglory, in its ordinary meaning, refers to an individuals excessive or ostentatious pride especially in ones own
achievements.46 Even no longer explicitly stated in the New Code of Judicial Conduct, judges are still proscribed from
engaging in self-promotion and indulging their vanity and pride by Canons 1 (on Integrity) and 2 (on Propriety) of the New
Code.

We have previously strongly reminded judges in that:

Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct says in no uncertain terms that "a judge should not seek publicity for
personal vainglory." A parallel proscription, this time for lawyers in general, is found in Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility: "a lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified,
self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services." This means that lawyers and judges
alike, being limited by the exacting standards of their profession, cannot debase the same by acting as if ordinary merchants
hawking their wares. As succinctly put by a leading authority in legal and judicial ethics, "(i)f lawyers are prohibited from x x
x using or permitting the use of any undignified or self-laudatory statement regarding their qualifications or legal services
(Rule 3.01, Code of Professional Responsibility), with more reasons should judges be prohibited from seeking publicity for
vanity or self-glorification. Judges are not actors or actresses or politicians, who thrive by publicity. 47

Judge Javellanas actuations as described above run counter to the mandate that judges behave at all times in such a manner as
to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. 48 We cannot stress enough that "judges are the
visible representations of law and justice. They ought to be embodiments of competence, integrity and independence. In
particular, municipal judges are frontline officers in the administration of justice. It is therefore essential that they live up to
the high standards demanded by the Code of Judicial Conduct."49

For his violations of the New Code of Professional Conduct, Judge Javellana committed gross misconduct. We have defined
gross misconduct as a "transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or
gross negligence by the public officer."50

There is no sufficient evidence to hold Judge Javellana administratively liable for the other charges against him contained in
the complaint. Yet, we call Judge Javellanas attention to several matters pointed out by the OCA, that if left unchecked, may
again result in another administrative complaint against the judge: (1) notices of hearing issued by Judge Javellanas court
must state the specific time, date, and place51; (2) in case Judge Javellana is unable to attend a hearing for any reason, he must
inform his Clerk of Court as soon as possible so that the latter can already cancel the hearing and spare the parties, counsels,
and witnesses from waiting52; and (3) he must take care in ascertaining the facts and according due process to the parties
concerned before levying charges of incompetence or indifference against the PAO lawyers appearing before his court. 53

III
Penalty

Gross ignorance of the law54 and gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct55 are classified as
serious charges under Rule 140, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Court, and penalized under Rule 140, Section 11(a) of the
same Rules by:

1) Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from
reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however,
that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;

2) Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or

3) A fine of more than P 20,000.00 but not exceeding P 40,000.00

The OCA recommended that Judge Javellana be suspended without salary and benefits for three months.1vvph!1 Given the
gravity and number of violations committed by Judge Javellana, we deem it appropriate to impose suspension without salary
and benefits for a period of three months and one day.

WHEREFORE, Judge Erwin B. Javellana is found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct. He is
SUSPENDED from office without salary and other benefits for a period of three (3) months and one (1) day with a STERN
WARNING that the repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this
Decision be attached to his records with this Court.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7594, February 09, 2016

ADELPHA E. MALABED, Complainant, v. ATTY. MELJOHN B. DE LA PEA, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is an administrative complaint filed by Adelpha E. Malabed (complainant) against Atty. Meljohn B. De la
Pea (respondent) for dishonesty and grave misconduct.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Facts

In her Complaint1 dated 7 August 2007, complainant charged respondent with dishonesty for "deliberately and repeatedly
making falsehood" that "misled the Court." First, complainant claimed that the Certificate to File Action in the complaint filed
by respondent refers to a different complaint, that is the complaint filed by complainant's brother against Fortunato Jadulco. In
effect, there was no Certificate to File Action, which is required for the filing of a civil action, in the complaint filed by
respondent on behalf of his client Fortunato Jadulco.

Second, complainant alleged that respondent did not furnish her counsel with a copy of the free patent covered by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 1730, but respondent forwarded a copy to the Court of Appeals. Complainant claimed that she
could not properly defend herself without a copy of the title. She further claimed that the title presented by respondent was
fabricated. To support such claim, complainant presented Certifications from the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and the Registry of Deeds in Naval, Biliran, allegedly confirming that there is no file in their offices of
OCT No. 1730.

Complainant also alleged that respondent was guilty of conflict of interest when he represented the occupants of the lot owned
by complainant's family, who previously donated a parcel of land to the Roman Catholic Church, which deed of donation
respondent notarized.

Complainant further accused respondent of conniving with Regional Trial Court (RTC), Naval, Biliran, Branch 16 Judge
Enrique C. Asis, who was his former client in an administrative case, to rule in his clients' favor. Complainant narrated the
outcomes in the "cases of Estrellers which were filed in the [Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC)] and reversed by the RTC,
in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction to favor respondent x x x and his client[s] x x x."

Complainant charged respondent with grave misconduct when he defied the accessory penalty of his dismissal as a judge.
Respondent worked as Associate Dean and Professor of the Naval Institute of Technology (NIT) - University of Eastern
Philippines College of Law, which is a government institution, and received salaries therefor, in violation of the accessory
penalty of dismissal which is his perpetual disqualification from reemployment in any government office.

In his Comment2 dated 16 December 2007, respondent basically denied the charges against him. Respondent alleged that "the
[Certificate to File Action] he used when he filed Civil Case No. [B-] 1118 for quieting of title before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 16, Naval, Biliran was the certification of Lupon Chairman, the late Rodulfo Catigbe, issued on May 9,
2001."3chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Respondent also claimed that the free patent title was attached to the folio of the records in Civil Case No. B-1118 and he
furnished a copy of the same to complainant's counsel. Assuming opposing counsel was not furnished, respondent wondered
why he raised this matter only upon filing of the instant complaint.

Respondent argued that notarization of the deed of donation had no relation to the case filed against the occupants of the lot.
Respondent likewise stressed that the matter regarding Judge Asis's rulings favorable to his clients should be addressed to
Judge Asis himself.

As regards the charge of grave misconduct for defying the accessory penalty of dismissal from the service, respondent
admitted that he accepted the positions of Associate Dean and Professor of the NIT - University of Eastern Philippines College
of Law, which is a government institution. However, respondent countered that he was no longer connected with the NIT
College of Law; and thus, this issue had become moot. Respondent further claimed that his designation as Assistant Dean was
only temporary, and he had not received any salary except honorarium. Respondent stated that he even furnished the Office of
the Bar Confidant (OBC) and the MCLE Office a copy of his designation as Associate Dean, and since there were no
objections, he proceeded to perform the functions appurtenant thereto. He likewise submitted an affidavit from Edgardo Garcia,
complainant in the administrative case against him, who interposed no objection to his petition for judicial clemency filed
before this Court.

Complainant filed a Reply-Affidavit4 on 22 January 2008. Respondent filed a Rejoinder to Reply5 on 20 February 2008.
Complainant filed a Sur-rejoinder to the Rejoinder to Reply6 on 20 February 2008. All these submissions basically reiterated
the respective arguments of the parties and denied each other's allegations.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Ruling of the IBP

In his Report and Recommendation,7 Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commissioner Norberto B. Ruiz noted the foul
language used by respondent in his pleadings submitted before the IBP. Respondent described complainant's counsel as
"silahis" and accused complainant of "cohabiting with a married man x x x before the wife of that married man died."
According to the IBP Commissioner, such offensive language "[is a] clear manifestation[] of respondent's gross misconduct
that seriously affect his standing and character as an officer of the court."

With respect to the charges of dishonesty and grave misconduct, the IBP Commissioner found that respondent is guilty of the
same "as evidenced by the numerous documents attached by complainant in all the pleadings she has submitted." Respondent
committed acts of dishonesty and grave misconduct (1) for using a Certificate to File Action which was used in a complaint
filed by complainant's brother Conrado Estreller against Fortunato Jadulco, who is respondent's client; (2) for not furnishing
complainant's counsel with a copy of the free patent covered by OCT No. 1730 which was attached to the Comment
respondent filed with the Court of Appeals; and (3) for accepting the positions of Associate Dean and Professor of the NIT -
University of Eastern Philippines College of Law and receiving salaries therefor, in violation of the accessory penalty of
prohibition on reemployment in any government office as a result of his dismissal as a judge.

The IBP Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one
year.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On 28 October 2011, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution adopting the IBP Commissioner's recommendation. The
Resolution reads:
 RESOLUTION NO. XX-2011-137

Adm. Case No. 7594

Adelpha E. Malabed vs. Atty. Meljohn De La Pea

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex
"A" and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and finding
Respondent guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct, Atty. Meljohn B. De La Pea is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one (1) year.9chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Issue

The sole issue in this case is whether respondent is guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Ruling of the Court

Respondent is guilty of gross misconduct.

Using foul language in pleadings

In his Comment, respondent called complainant's counsel "silahis by nature and complexion"10 and accused complainant of
"cohabiting with a married man x x x before the wife of that married man died."11 In his Rejoinder, respondent maintained
that such language is not foul, but a "dissertation of truth designed to debunk complainant's and her counsel's credibility in
filing the administrative case."12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

We are not convinced. Aside from such language being inappropriate, it is irrelevant to the resolution of this case. While
respondent is entitled and very much expected to defend himself with vigor, he must refrain from using improper language in
his pleadings. In Saberon v. Larong,13 we stated:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

x x x [W]hile a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of
offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful,
convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.

On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance
no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is
charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyers language even in his pleadings must be dignified.

For using improper language in his pleadings, respondent violated Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise
improper.
Non-submission of certificate to file action

The submission of the certificate to file action, which evidences the non-conciliation between the parties in the barangay, is a
pre-condition for the filing of a complaint in court.14 Complainant claims that there is no such certificate in the complaint
filed by respondent on behalf of Fortunato Jadulco, et al. Instead, what respondent submitted was the certificate to file action
in the complaint filed by complainant's brother, Conrado Estreller, against Fortunato Jadulco.15chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Respondent counters that what he used "when he filed Civil Case No. [B-] 1118 for Quieting of Title, etc. x x x was the
certification x x x issued on May 9, 2001, x x x."

Based on the records, the complaint for quieting of title in Civil Case No. B-1118 was filed with the RTC on 18 October 2000.
The Certificate of Endorsement, which respondent claimed was the certificate to file action he used in Civil Case No. B-1118,
was issued on 9 May 2001, or after the filing of the complaint on 18 October 2000. It is apparent that the Certificate of
Endorsement did not exist yet when the complaint in Civil Case No. B-1118 was filed. In other words, there is no truth to
respondent's allegation that the subject matter of Civil Case No. B-1118 was brought before the Lupon Tagapamayapa and that
a certificate to file action was issued prior to the filing of the complaint. Clearly, respondent misrepresented that he filed a
certificate to file action when there was none, which act violated Canon 10, Rule 10.01, and Rule 10.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood; nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow
the Court to be misled by any artifice.

Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, x x x.

Failure to furnish opposing counsel with copy of title

With regard to respondent's alleged act of not furnishing complainant's counsel with a copy of the free patent title, we find that
it does not constitute dishonesty.

Admittedly, the Court of Appeals was furnished a copy of OCT No. 1730, which means that a copy of the title exists. There is
no showing that respondent deliberately did not furnish complainant's counsel with a copy of the title. The remedy of
complainant should have been to file with the Court of Appeals a motion to furnish complainant or counsel with a copy of the
title so she and her counsel could examine the same.

Moreover, whether OCT No. 1730 is fabricated, as complainant alleges, is a question of fact demanding an examination of the
parties' respective evidence. Obviously, this matter falls outside the scope of this administrative case, absent any clear and
convincing proof that respondent himself orchestrated such fabrication. The DENR and Registry of Deeds certifications do not
prove that respondent manufactured OCT No. 1730. Such documents merely confirm that OCT No. 1730 does not exist in
their official records.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Conflict of interest
Complainant accuses respondent of conflict of interest when the latter allegedly notarized a deed of donation of a parcel of
land executed by complainant's family in favor of the Roman Catholic Church. Eventually, respondent allegedly sought to
litigate as counsel for the opposing parties who are occupants in the lot owned by complainant's family.

Suffice to state that notarization is different from representation. A notary public simply performs the notarial acts authorized
by the Rules on Notarial Practice, namely, acknowledgments, oaths and affirmations, jurats, signature witnessings, and copy
certifications. Legal representation, on the other hand, refers to the act of assisting a party as counsel in a court action.

As regards complainant's serious accusations against respondent of conniving with Judge Asis and conspiring with the latter to
render judgments favorable to respondent's clients, such are bare allegations, without any proof. Complainant simply narrated
the outcomes of the proceedings in Civil Case Nos. 1017, 860 and 973, which were filed by the Estrellers in the MCTC and
reversed by the RTC. Complainant conveniently failed to present any concrete evidence proving her grave accusation of
conspiracy between respondent and Judge Asis. Moreover, charges of bias and partiality on the part of the presiding judge
should be filed against the judge, and not against the counsel allegedly favored by the judge.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Violation of prohibition on reemployment in government office

In our 9 February 1994 Resolution,16 we dismissed respondent as Acting Judge of Municipal Trial Court of Naval, Leyte and
Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Caibiran-Culaba, Leyte for partiality, with prejudice to reappointment
to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations.

There is no dispute that respondent knows full well the consequences of his dismissal as a judge, one of which is the accessory
penalty of perpetual disqualification from reemployment in any government office, including government-owned or controlled
corporations. Despite being disqualified, respondent accepted the positions of Associate Dean and Professor of NIT-College of
Law, a government institution, and received compensation therefor.

Respondent alleges that his designation was only temporary, and "no fixed salary was attached to his designation except for
honorarium." Respondent also claims that he furnished a copy of his designation to the OBC and MCLE office as a "gesture of
x x x respect, courtesy and approval from the Supreme Court." He further avers that complainant in the administrative case
against him (as a judge) posed no objection to his petition for clemency.

Respondent's contentions are untenable. The prohibition on reemployment does not distinguish between permanent and
temporary appointments. Hence, that his designation was only temporary does not absolve him from liability. Further,
furnishing a copy of his designation to the OBC and MCLE office does not in any way extinguish his permanent
disqualification from reemployment in a government office. Neither does the fact that complainant in his previous
administrative case did not object to his petition for clemency.

In view of his disqualification from reemployment in any government office, respondent should have declined from accepting
the designation and desisted from performing the functions of such positions.17 Clearly, respondent knowingly defied the
prohibition on reemployment in a public office imposed upon him by the Court.

In Santeco v. Avance,18 where respondent lawyer "willfully disobeyed this Court when she continued her law practice despite
the five-year suspension order," the Court held that failure to comply with Court directives constitutes gross misconduct,
insubordination or disrespect which merits a lawyer's suspension or even disbarment.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Gross Misconduct
In sum, respondent committed gross misconduct for (1) misrepresenting that he submitted a certificate to file action issued by
the Lupon Tagapamayapa when in fact there was none prior to the institution of the civil action of his client, Fortunato Jadulco,
in Civil Case No. B-1118; (2) using improper language in his pleadings; and (3) defying willfully the Court's prohibition on
reemployment in any government office as accessory penalty of his dismissal as a judge. Gross misconduct is defined as
"improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of
duty, willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not a mere error in judgment."19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, gross misconduct is a ground for disbarment or suspension from the
practice of law.

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct
in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order
of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.

In view of respondent's repeated gross misconduct, we increase the IBP's recommended penalty to suspension from the
practice of law for two (2) years.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Meljohn B. De la Pea GUILTY of gross misconduct and accordingly SUSPEND
him from the practice of law for two (2) years with a WARNING that the commission of the same or similar act or acts shall
be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and all courts in
the Philippines for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.