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BHAGAVAD GIT A AS DUTY
AND VIRTUE ETHICS
Some Reflections
Bina Gupta
ABSTRACT
The paper examines the ethical conception of the most well-known and
much discussed Hindu text, the Bhagavad Gltd, in the context of the
Western distinction between duty ethics and virtue ethics. Most of the
materials published on the Gltd make much of its conception of duty; how-
ever, there is no systematic investigation of the notion of virtue in the Gltd.
The paper begins with a discussion of the fundamental characteristics of
virtue ethics, before undertaking a discussion of the conceptions of duty
and virtue in the Gltd. The paper clearly demonstrates that (1) both duty
and virtue coexist in the Gltd, and (2) the Gltd accords virtue an important
place.
key WORDS: Hindu ethics, Hindu duty ethics, Hindu virtue ethics, the
Bhagavad Gltd
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374 Journal of Religious Ethics
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Bhagavad Gita as Duty and Virtue Ethics 375
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376 Journal of Religious Ethics
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Bhagavad Gita as Duty and Virtue Ethics 377
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378 Journal of Religious Ethics
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Bhagavad Gita as Duty and Virtue Ethics 379
The virtues find their point and purpose not only in sustaining those re-
lationships necessary if the variety of goods internal to practices are to
be achieved and not only in sustaining the form of an individual life in
which that individual may seek out his or her good as the good of his or
her whole life, but also in sustaining those traditions which provide both
practices and individual lives with their necessary and historical context
[Maclntyre 1984,223].
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380 Journal of Religious Ethics
1 This translation from the Bhagavad Gita and others later in the paper are my own
from the original Sanskrit. I used the 1987 edition published by Gita Press Gorakhpur,
which contains not only the original Sanskrit verses but also the translation of certain
Sanskrit terms into Hindi as well as a running Hindi commentary.
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Bhagavad Gita as Duty and Virtue Ethics 381
balance of his society. So doing his dharma, fighting in the war, is the
only right thing for Arjuna to do. One's dharma must be performed in a
spirit of nonattachment to the results of one's actions; the agent should
do his dharma for the sake of dharma, not for consequences.
The notion of dharma or duty as the right course of action is repeated
throughout the text. It is determined by one's stage in life as well as by
one's position in society. It is important to remember here that the Glta's
conception of duty is very different from what we find in either Kant
or Mill. In the Western context, irrespective of whether one is speak-
ing from a Kantian or Utilitarian framework, the goal is to determine
a single moral principle by which one can derive all second-order moral
principles. That is, a single moral principle in duty ethics is supposed to
work as the criterion by which one can decide what one ought to do in
all situations. For Kant, this principle is the universalizability of max-
ims of action without contradiction; for Mill, it is the principle of utility.
Duty ethics hopes to identify a principle from which all our duties can
be derived, so that all of our duties are finally applications of this single
principle. Thus, whereas in the Western context norms for human behav-
ior are derived from reason and are to be met by individuals, dharma, in
the Hindu tradition, is comprised of rules that have been handed down
over generations and are needed for social cohesion. There never has been
any absolutely valid set of dharmas; at most, the dharmas have consti-
tuted a series of markers. However, the decision has had to be made as
to how to apply these rules in practice. Dharma has never imposed a
sort of discipline that exacts an obedience, which determines every sig-
nificant decision that one makes. There has been considerable latitude
on this count, and the question of how to reconcile the different dharmi
rules has arisen frequently. The rules of dharma are not derivable from
a single principle, or even from a single set of principles; these rule
are learned from scriptures, the only source of true knowledge in the
traditional epistemology, and are ultimately individual (and hence, i
an important sense, manifestly many). Two justifications are tradition-
ally provided for this - first, that sabda (word) is an infallible source of
knowledge, and second, that self-realization is the highest goal of huma
pursuit.
A moral rule in the Hindu context is not a categorical imperative,
that is, it is not an unconditional command - and the Gita, too, sup-
ports this view. If one is, like Arjuna, a warrior by caste, then he should
fight in battle if the cause is righteous. Similarly, if one were a priest
by caste, then he should refrain from fighting (an action associated with
another man's duty) and perform the duties prescribed for his own caste.
However, these dharmas are not universally obligatory for everyone, not
even for members of the same community, but oblige only under certain
circumstances. Some dharmas, for example, are conditioned by the goals
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382 Journal of Religious Ethics
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Bhagavad Gita as Duty and Virtue Ethics 383
In Hinduism, the distinction between the devas and the asuras goes
back to the Rg Veda. The Rdmdyana and the Mahabhdrata tell us of the
struggle between the good and the bad. In Chdndogya Upanisad 1.2.1,
both the devas and the asuras are born of Prajapti. In Chapter 16 of
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384 Journal of Religious Ethics
The demoniac do not know the way of action (duty) nor the way of renunci-
ation (right attitude), neither purity nor right conduct, nor truth is found
in them [The Bhagavad Gita 16:7].
The bad is finally reduced to three primary vices: desire (ka^ma), anger
(krodha), and greed (lobha), which constitute the threefold gate to hell [The
Bhagavad Gita 16:21].
In addition to this general account of virtue and vice, the Gita also
talks about the qualities or natural born dispositions specific to one's
place in society:
Heroism, vigor, firmness, skill, not fleeing even in a battle, charity and
leadership, are the natural born dispositions of a warrior [The Bhagavad
Gita 18:43].
The virtues noted above occur repeatedly in the Gita. For the sake of
understanding, I will next attempt to systematize these virtues and de-
termine whether or not they can be ranked in some coherent and infor-
mative fashion. Given below is an initial inventory of the verses in which
specific virtues occur in the text of the Gita:
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Bhagavad Gita as Duty and Virtue Ethics 385
The above list leaves no doubt whatsoever in the mind of the reader
that the Gita is replete with virtues. In fact there are many more
virtues in the Gita than in the Yogasutras of Patanjali (2:35-39) or
Vatsyayan's bhdsya on the Nydyasutras (1.1.2), two figures and texts fre-
quently quoted from the dstika (Vedic) systems of Indian philosophy in
the context of virtue discussions. Patanjali lists five virtues: non-violence
(ahimsd), truthfulness (satya), abstention from theft (asteya), chastity or
2 In this work, I have translated "dana" as "charity." Although the meaning of the word
"charity" goes beyond "ddna," the word "charity" is derived from the Latin "caritatem"
which, in one of its many senses, means "alms-giving," "act of charity done to the poor," and
the like. This directly coincides with the meaning of ddna as charity (Fowler et al. 1955,
294).
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386 Journal of Religious Ethics
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Bhagavad Gita as Duty and Virtue Ethics 387
I do not mean to suggest that all the virtues listed above fall neatly into
one category or the other. Virtues are often mixed up with one another.
Some sort of categorization, however, will enable us to come to grips
with the place and significance of the virtues in the Gita. In review-
ing the groupings suggested, wre see that there are more self-regarding
virtues than other-regarding virtues, and more virtues of the mind than
those of the body, or of speech. The reason for this will become obvious
shortly.
In terms of ranking the virtues of the Gita, it seems that "samatvam"
is the all-embracing master or the executive virtue. The root meaning of
"samah" is "the same." Samatvam in the Gita means inner poise, bal-
anced indifference, equality, sameness, and equanimity. It is used to sig-
nify mastery over one's self, the conquering of anger, pride, ambition, and
the like. The importance of samatvam of mind is emphasized early on in
the Gita and reiterated often throughout the text.
Samatvam first occurs in the fifteenth verse of the second chapter,
wherein Krsna tells Arjuna that a learned person remains the same in
pleasure and pain (samadukkhasukham); he is not affected by changing
emotions. This idea is further developed in the fifth chapter, wherein
"evenness" or "sameness" is articulated as both equanimity of thought
and of action. It is said:
A learned person sees with an equal eye a priest, a cow, an elephant, a dog,
or an outcaste. In this world, everything is overcome by those who master
sameness. The infinite spirit is without any flaws and is the same in all
human beings; these persons (of even minded attitude) are established in
the Infinite spirit.
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388 Journal of Religious Ethics
Krsna argues that acting in this non-attached manner will enable Arjuna
to discipline his buddhi (intellect), which dictates one's attitude toward
the results of actions (The Bhagavad Gltd 2:39).
He points out that Arjuna's decision of giving up his duty and not
fighting is the result of the sort of detachment that stems from the nar-
row perspective of filial devotion, diffidence, and fear of losing. Krsna's
answer in these two verses goes beyond Arjuna's initial question about
duty to the nature of the excellence that Arjuna should cultivate in order
to live rightly, or as Aristotle would put it, "to live harmoniously." Krsna
says:
One whose intellect is exercised has renounced both good and evil. There-
fore, strive for yoga; Yoga is excellence in action [The Bhagavad Gltd 2:50].
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Bhagavad Gita as Duty and Virtue Ethics 389
(The Bhagavad Gita 2:49), and "buddhi yukto" that is, yoked or exer-
cised through the intellect (The Bhagavad Gita 2:50-51), and the like,
in order to do his duty skillfully - and this skill has been articulated as
samatvam.
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390 Journal of Religious Ethics
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Bhagavad Gita as Duty and Virtue Ethics 391
this control with the buddhi, Aristotle with reason. Such control is not
possible in the absence of repeated performance - "habit" in Aristotle and
"practice" in Maclntyre. The Gltd recognizes the necessity of "abhyasa
yoga" that is, the discipline of practice (The Bhagavad Gltd 12:9), or,
as Samkara puts it, "the yoga of constant striving." Krsna reminds
Arjuna that the human mind is restless and that it can be steered in
the right direction by constant practice and non-attachment (abhydsena
tu kaunteya vairdgyen ca grhyate [The Bhagavad Gltd 6:35]). At an-
other point, Arjuna is asked to engage in the practice of yoga (abhyasa
yogayuktena), so that his thoughts and emotions do not stray (The Bha-
gavad Gltd 8:8). Krsna also affirms that practice consists in repeatedly
fixing the mind on a single object by withdrawing it from everything
else, and this concentration and control in the Gltd has been called "the
discipline of practice" (The Bhagavad Gltd 12:9).
Thus, there is in the Gltd, as in Aristotle and Maclntyre, value placed
on repeated performance according to certain rules. Is repeated perfor-
mance the key to becoming virtuous? One does not become virtuous by
following a rule but by doing virtuous deeds. Virtue is excellence in char-
acter, which one can acquire by repeated performance of some action. Let
us take the virtue of charity, for example. Aristotle argues that one can-
not become charitable without doing charitable deeds; when one keeps
on doing the charitable actions, these actions become his second nature.
Practice is the key. Although the Gltd does not directly deal with the
question as to how one becomes virtuous, it does recognize certain hin-
drances, obstacles, and vices that may present themselves and the need
for repeated practice, control, and strenuous effort on the part of the
individual. Repeated practice results in a kind of joy that is quite differ-
ent from the pleasure that accompanies the satisfaction of some single,
isolated desire.
The Gltd makes a distinction among three kinds of happiness. It is not
possible to provide a complete justification of the translation of"sukkha"
as "happiness." Suffice is to note that I take sukkha to be the oppo-
site of dukkha, that is, pain and suffering. The Gltd uses both "sukkha"
and "dukkha" numerous times to signify everyday experience of plea-
sure and pain (1:32-33; 5:3, 6; 16:14; 17:9; and 18:8). Arjuna is asked
to "hold equal" (samekrtvd) each of the opposites, for example, victory-
defeat, pleasure-pain, and the like; and non-attachment transcends both
"sukkha" and "dukkha, indeed all opposites. These three kinds of happi-
ness are contingent upon the three inborn dispositions that predominate
in a person:
That happiness which a person comes to rejoice after long practice ends
his suffering; that happiness which springs from understanding of the self
is of the nature of goodness; that happiness which arises from the contact
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392 Journal of Religious Ethics
of the senses and the object is passionate; and that happiness which leads
the self astray arises from sloth and inertia is of the nature of darkness
[The Bhagavad Gltd 18:36-39].
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Bhagavad Gita as Duty and Virtue Ethics 393
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394 Journal of Religious Ethics
nature: the bad, that is, those desires and passions that moral agents
should try to overcome, and the principle of goodness, which constantly
struggles to free itself from the influence of the other. For Aristotle, in
contrast, the pursuit of goodness or the cultivation of virtues is neither
against nature nor is it something that is brought about by nature. That
is, human nature simpliciter is indifferent to virtue. It is neither pro
virtue nor against virtue; by nature, according to Aristotle, one is nei-
ther virtuous nor vicious. The cultivation of a life of virtue is understood
more on the analogy of a musician practicing to be a good violinist than
as trying to do one's duty (e.g., Kant's imperfect duty to cultivate one's
talents). Aristotle takes a naturalistic view of human nature, viewing
it as the raw material that one can mold according to the principle of
the golden mean. In the Glta, the gunas are potentialities; they contain
both good and bad. Individual beings develop these potentialities in var-
ied ways and one must diligently overcome the bad by cultivating the
good. One who practices detachment and evenness of mind will succeed
in this respect - which explains why cultivation of virtues and the "right
attitude" play such an important role in Hindu ethics.
In Hindu ethics, irrespective of whether one is looking at its begin-
nings, or at its later formulations, the subjective has consistently been
emphasized, although objective morality as exhibited in some external
code of acts, which must be performed to ensure the well-being of society
as a whole, is also recognized. It is important to underscore one important
point here: in Hindu ethics the term "dharma" is used for both "duty"
and "virtue." The concept of "dharma" like the German "Recht" covers
a large spectrum of different but connected meanings. It encompasses
within its fold a theory of ethical rules, a theory of virtue, a social ethics,
and an account of the Kantian notion of duty for duty's sake, leading to
the goal of moksa. There are two components of dharma, the subjective
and the objective. The subjective dharma is concerned with inner purifi-
cation, purification of the mind, inner discipline; the objective dharma is
concerned with duties, including universal or common duties and those
duties that depend on a person's particular position in society and stage of
life. One cultivates virtues in order to conquer one's passions and desires.
Virtues are character traits that find expression in habitual actions; they
are good for the individual and in turn are conducive to the well-being of
society as a whole. Virtues subdue the impious and manifest the pious.
This explains why there are more self-regarding virtues in the Glta than
other-regarding virtues, and more virtues of the mind than virtues of the
body or speech. The idea is that cultivation of virtues will translate into
the right kinds of actions, such that actions are the expression of a stable
durable character.
The above discussion leaves room for the following question among
others, for which I am indebted to an anonymous reader of this
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Bhagavad Gita as Duty and Virtue Ethics 395
REFERENCES
Anscombe, G. E. M.
1997 "Modern Moral Philosophy." In Virtue Ethics, edited by Roger Crisp
and Michael Slote, 26-44. New York: Oxford University Press.
Aristotle
1906 Nichomachean Ethics. Translated by James E. C. Welldon. New
York: Macmillan.
Fowler, Mrs. William Little, Henry Watson Fowler, and Jessie Coulson
1955 Oxford Universal Dictionary. London: Oxford University Press.
Maclntyre, Alasdair
1984 After Virtue. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press.
Morris, William
1978 American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language. Boston:
Houghton Mifflin.
Runes, D. D.
1968 Dictionary of Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press.
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