Wechsler Et Al-2016-Middle East Policy 1

Symposium: The ISIS Threat to U.S.
National Security
The ISIS Threat to U.S. National Security:

Policy Choices
William F. Wechsler, Mark N. Katz,
Charles Lister, Audrey Kurth Cronin
The following is a transcript of the eighty-third in a series of Capitol Hill

conferences convened by the Middle East Policy Council. The meeting was
held at the Rayburn House Office Building in Washington, DC, on January
21, 2016, with Patrick Theros, former U.S. ambassador to Qatar and an
MEPC board member, as moderator and Thomas R. Mattair as discussant.
The video can be accessed at www.mepc.org.
WILLIAM F. WECHSLER, Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress; Former

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Special Operations and Combating Terrorism, U.S.
Department of Defense
I want to briefly go through my assessment of where we are in the fight against the Islamic
State, how we got here, where were going, and the lessons we should take from our experience
thus far. Until last year, I was deputy assistant secretary of defense for special operations and
combatting terrorism, where I worked on these issues on a daily basis and saw the evolution of our
policies and our approach towards the Islamic State throughout that period.
If you look at the benchmark the president laid out for us to degrade and ultimately destroy
the Islamic State we have clearly not met that goal. To paraphrase Winston Churchill, were not
even at the beginning of the end. I think its questionable whether were at the end of the begin-
ning. We are at a very early stage in this effort, unfortunately.
Why, fundamentally, are we here? As former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said just
recently, first and foremost because of the decisions made by the local actors, because of whats
happened in Syria, and because of the leadership of the Assad regime and its decision to make war
on its own people, and because of decisions in Iraq by the former leadership there and its decision
to stoke sectarian tensions and dismiss legitimate Sunni grievances and desires.
But thats not the only reason were here. We havent met our goals, because virtually every
single player, every nation that is either in the Middle East or has significant interests in the Middle
East, does not have as its top priority the destruction of the Islamic State including the United
States. If we had it as our top priority, we would have already passed a specific authorization for the
use of military force. If this was truly our top priority, many of our policies would be changed.
But you can look around the region and see that, for many of the countries, the fight against
Bashar al-Assad has been a higher priority than the fight against the Islamic State. For many of the
people in the region, the support of the Shia has been more of a priority than the fight against the
Islamic State. For others, the proxy battle between Iran and Saudi Arabia is more important than
the fight against the Islamic State.
2016, The Authors Middle East Policy 2016, Middle East Policy Council
Symposium.indd 1 2/29/2016 11:43:18 AM

Middle East Policy, Vol. XXIII, No. 1, Spring 2016
Every country has priorities that exceed the priority they place upon the fight against the
Islamic State. When you pull all that together, you end up with the space a vacuum for the
Islamic State to accomplish what it has accomplished. The challenge posed by the Islamic State is
unchallenged only in the abstract; it is definitely de-prioritized in reality and has been for years by
many of the actors.
How important is this threat? I argue that it is very significant, and it should be much more
highly prioritized than it has been. Im pleased to see that some of the steps that the Obama admin-
istration has taken more recently have moved in that direction. Let me explain why.
First of all, even if you cannot see vital U.S. interests in stability in the Middle East, even if
your views are contrary to those held by every president and every administration starting with
Franklin Roosevelt, and even if you hold the position that the only reason we should care about
any terrorist group anywhere is because of its potential as an external threat to the U.S. homeland
then you nevertheless should still care about the Islamic State and see it as a threat. By the
way, this should have been your view even before the attacks inspired by the Islamic State in San
Bernardino.
I want to make an important distinction here. It is wrong to say that all terrorist groups around
the world threaten the United States homeland directly. It is wrong to say that all Muslim-oriented
terrorist groups threaten it, or even all Sunni terrorist groups. But the Salafi jihadist terrorist
groups al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, and others with their ideology will inevitably, once
they get territory that provides them a sanctuary from which they can act with impunity, they will
always eventually turn to external attacks.
This is a policy debate that has gone through multiple administrations in the United States: the
Clinton administration, the Bush administration, the Obama administration. Every single time, the
people who argued otherwise were proved to be wrong. And there are reasons why. It has to do
with internal ideological incentives and incentives to validate their claim to leadership in front of a
global audience. It has to do with what they see as their religious requirements to take the fight to
the nonbelievers and with what they see as the future that is laid out for them in prophecy.
It also has to do with jockeying for power, for leadership, in the minds of those they want to
impress and attract. There is nothing more impressive than an external attack against those forces
that many people feel have been keeping them down for decades and decades. Carrying out such
an attack raises your stature. We saw this in Afghanistan and Pakistan, we saw it in Yemen, and of
course now in Syria and Iraq. We will soon see it in Libya.
But it shouldnt just be the external attacks that drive our interest in this. Beyond all of our
other interests, which have been there for decades in this part of the world, we have a wider inter-
est. At this point, there are no really good potential outcomes for this part of the world. Were only
choosing between options that all lead to differing degrees of bad outcomes for the foreseeable
future. But I would argue that the worst of all outcomes for U.S. interests is that the master narra-
tive that defines what happens in this region is a regionally comprehensive sectarian war between
Sunnis and Shia.
About five years ago, the likelihood of that was extremely low. The likelihood is not ex-
tremely low anymore. Its not necessarily above 50 percent, but it is a material probability. It is
something that we need to be very much concerned about. There are people in significant positions
in major Sunni states who not only use this language but actually see this as a likely or a positive
outcome. There are people in major Shia communities and in Iran who see it in the same way.
And most critically, this is the only scenario in which the Islamic State fully succeeds at its goals.
This has been its strategy from the beginning. If we allow it to happen, we give the Islamic State
its best opportunity to succeed in its vision of a reconstructed caliphate that governs a significant
proportion of the Sunni world.

Symposium: The ISIS Threat to U.S. National Security
I dont think were there now. What we can see now is more appropriately explained as a
classic competition for regional power and influence between two states, Saudi Arabia and Iran,
including proxy wars in multiple locations. Looking at it through that lens, rather than through a
sectarian one, seems to me to more accurately explain the majority of what we see happening in
the region right now. But every month that goes by, we slip a little closer to the nightmare scenar-
io, and we really are in the Middle East version of the Thirty Years War. When those types of wars
begin, you dont know where they end.
The real danger of all of this is that its fundamentally unpredictable. A hundred years ago,
people in a room perhaps very much like this one on Capitol Hill might have been talking about
what the likely outcome was going to be of what we now call World War I. Absolutely nobody at
the time was predicting a Communist takeover of Russia. History becomes deeply unpredictable
when wars go on at that scale and scope and duration.
Last fall, the organization for which I work, the Center for American Progress, put out a report
on what the state of the fight against the Islamic State was and what we could be doing about it.
I am very pleased to see that, since then, the administration has adopted a lot of the points that
we made. It has expanded the air campaign, in terms of size but also, more important, in terms of
scope, and what kinds of targets were going after.
The expansion from high-value targets and massed personnel to strategically important targets
including the infrastructure of the organization is an incredibly important decision that was made.
The recent public announcement that a large store of cash was destroyed, and the recent piece in
the news today that the Islamic State is telling its fighters that their salaries are going to go down
by half because of such events this all has a strong impact. Thats the kind of thing we were
talking about in our report.
Weve also expanded the number of special operations personnel on the ground both in Iraq
and in Syria, which is incredibly important. Its also important to note that there was a prominent
public announcement about sending 50 U.S. special operations personnel into Syria. But all this an-
nouncement said was that were going to send the same kinds of personnel we already have, work-
ing with the same partner were already working with. The only new fact in the announcement was
that they were going to be doing this work across an imaginary line on a map, drawn by colonial
powers decades ago, a line that no actor on the ground or operating in the region recognizes as hav-
ing any de facto legitimacy except for the United States. So, in effect, we stopped being the only
actor in the region that held self-imposed constraints on its policy to reflect this imaginary line.
The administrations changes in policy also expanded the global battlefield against the Islamic
State. Again, recently the newspapers reported that our forces in Afghanistan now have the author-
ity to target the Islamic State there as well. And, of course, theres been a very strong effort on
the diplomatic front led by Secretary of State Kerry to try to address the underlying causes of the
Syrian civil war and to focus other nations attention and operations against the Islamic State.
And theres been a new focus on challenging the underlying narrative of the Islamic State. This is
absolutely critical and something that, not only the United States, but all the players who should be
focusing their efforts against the Islamic State, need to do a much better job on.
Back in the 90s, when I was working on the National Security Council staff on U.S. policy
to combat the threat from al-Qaeda, we concluded that al-Qaedas center of gravity at the time
the core element that allows an organization to accomplish its strategic goals was its money.
The epicenter of the money problem at the time was in Saudi Arabia. Eventually, after they were
attacked by al-Qaeda, the Saudi government recognized this and over the years has addressed the
problem quite successfully. Since this change in policy, Saudi Arabia has been one of our great
allies in going after al-Qaedas money supply and a great intelligence partner of the United States
as well.

Today the growing threat is from the Islamic State, and its center of gravity is its ideologi-
cal and religious narrative. Its ideology makes it deeply attractive to a small percentage but large
number of people across the globe. The narrative is the core driver of the flow of foreign fighters
into Syria and Iraq. The narrative is advanced as long as their target audience sees them as win-
ning in the fight against its enemies. The narrative was laid out openly and quite clearly when
Baghdadi spoke from the pulpit and declared the caliphate. And its a narrative that resonates most
often with those who have been taught from childhood by teachers espousing the Wahhabi brand
of Sunni Islam long espoused by Saudi Arabia. So its much more difficult to imagine Saudi Ara-
bia turning against the Islamic States center of gravity in the same way that it previously turned
against al-Qaedas center of gravity.
Whats the likely outcome, given all of this? Even if we are able to avoid a comprehensive,
region-wide sectarian war, the likely forecast for our efforts to combat the threat from the Islamic
State is for a long slog. This is going to be years, perhaps decades, of work. We should not in any
way expect this to be over soon. Thats just not how these wars tend to work. An Israeli analyst
said to me years ago, just as the Arab Spring had begun, What were seeing is finally, at long last,
the end of World War I in this region. I think that theres a lot of truth to that. It portends the long
effort in front of us to really understand and deal with all the tremors that will come out of this
earthquake.
Lets talk very briefly about just the lessons we should learn from this. First, regarding the
methods by which we fight the Islamic State, al-Qaeda and similar types of terrorist adversaries,
the administration is fundamentally correct to focus on indirect rather than direct action as its pri-
mary line of military operations. Direct action is vitally important; air campaigns, targeted strikes
against high-value individuals, and precision raids must be done. You have to be able to finish
off important personnel and nodes of networks, unilaterally and as part of a wider campaign. But
direct action, in my experience, is almost never the decisive line of operation in a counterterrorism
campaign.
Much more likely to be decisive is indirect action, working by, with and through others
people on the ground, who live in this area. If they take on the fight, then we have a far greater
possibility of winning over a long period of time and eventually achieving our counterterrorism
goals. If we are doing the fighting, were much less likely to do so. And by the way, weve had
tremendous success, even within the last 20 years, in achieving our counterterrorism goals through
this approach. Colombia is a huge success with this approach. The Philippines are a huge success
with this approach. Somalia has even been a qualified success thus far, despite all its problems. If
you look back to the predictions made in 2006 about what we were going to see out of al-Shabaab,
virtually none of them came true. Thats because of very good work by the African Union, sup-
ported by the United States, to fight that counterterrorism campaign, complemented by a relatively
small number of U.S. direct actions.
If indirect action is the preferred line of operations, what are the implications for U.S. policy?
First, indirect action requires a timeframe that is much longer than we are used to dealing with
in the United States. Again, these are generational efforts. Secondly, when youre thinking about
indirect action, it is critical to go in earlier and lighter than it is to go in later and bigger. You have
to start very early, and you have to go in very, very small. Any decision that you make to avoid
those kinds of early decisions ends up increasing the likelihood of the worst possible scenario,
where you have to go in big and late. Unfortunately, thats in many respects what were doing now
in Iraq and in Syria.
If youre doing indirect action, you need to understand the human terrain youre working with.
Thats a military term; people in the State Department just call it understanding the country un-
derstanding diplomacy, understanding the tribes, understanding not just the government but all the

different actors. This is a painful lesson that we learned in Iraq and Afghanistan. We are woefully
short on that kind of expertise in the United States, but its required if were going to work through
indirect action.
It means that, when we build our partners, we should focus on small elite units rather than
building in scale. There are not many examples in fact, I cant think of any where the United
States itself has independently built a foreign army successfully in scale. Weve tried it a num-
ber of times and spent a lot of money doing it, but we can only help build a foreign military in
scale when the host country itself is already committed to building in scale. We can spend a lot of
money to help another military that is already built, and is of modest capability, to get better. But
going from virtually nothing to a very large and capable modern army is extremely hard to do
and near-impossible for a foreign army to do for them.
We have, however, had a lot of success in building small elite units that can work with us
directly on counterterrorism operations. Some of these are military, some are law enforcement,
some are intelligence. That, we can do well, and thats where we need to focus our efforts. When
I say building them, Im talking about the full spectrum of equipping, training, advising, assisting
and accompanying them.
Quite often we have done this the wrong way, by starting with the easiest but lowest value-
added element, merely equipping, and incrementally working up to the most advanced one,
accompanying in current operations. In general, just throwing equipment out the door is a gi-
ant waste of U.S. taxpayers resources. But it becomes very useful if it is combined with the full
spectrum of support that we can give. Instead of starting with the lowest value-added element and
working our way up, we should start with the full spectrum of support and work down if abso-
lutely necessary, given host country requirements. Thats how you build elite foreign forces into
capable counterterrorism efforts. But that requires policy shifts.
Once weve built those elite units, the question is, what kind of support do we provide to them?
In general, we should be approaching this the same way we would approach questions about what
kind of support we are providing our own forces in the field. We would never put forces in the field
without providing them with command and control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, re-
connaissance, lift and logistics support, CASEVAC and MEDEVAC and even fire support when
necessary. Quite often, we are reluctant to provide any of these kinds of support.
This is all in the context, by the way, of what some people refer to as our combat forces not
being involved. None of this involves the U.S. military going on target and taking people down.
This is all indirect action in which we are supporting others. But there are different gradations, and
they are critically important.
The last thing I want to focus on is that working through indirect action requires the United
States to expand the object of our policy beyond the narrow focus of the interests of the United
States to the interests of our partners. If were going to be working by, with and through our part-
ners, it has to actually be a partnership. It cant be the United States telling someone else what to
do. It has to be a joint decision about what it is were going to do together. Sometimes that can be
very difficult.
My favorite example is in Colombia back in the 90s. On Capitol Hill, you heard all the time:
the only thing were interested in there is counternarcotics. The old joke in Colombia was this:
Theyre walking through the jungle, someone fires on them, and they run behind a tree and get
out their bullhorn and ask: Excuse me, can you please tell me if you are a terrorist, a narco or an
insurgent? I have three different clips paid for with three different lines of authority from the U.S.
Congress, and I have to know which one I put in my gun before I can return fire.
It was a joke, but it had some truth to it back then; we were focused on only one stovepipe
for what we could do. It was only with Plan Colombia, when we adopted a holistic plan for all

the problems narcotics, terrorism and insurgency that we got the framework for where we
are today, with negotiations that hopefully will result in the end of the longest terrorist war in the
western hemisphere. Its that kind of policy leap, to look at things holistically, that is absolutely
required when were doing indirect action.
MARK N. KATZ, Professor of Government and Politics, George Mason University;

Author, Leaving without Losing: The War on Terror after Iraq and Afghanistan
I am going to talk about the Russia factor in all of this, the ISIS threat to U.S. national secu-
rity, and our policy choices. I agree strongly with the previous speaker about everyones opposing
ISIS, but its not being anyones top priority. I think that also holds true for Russia. Ironically,
almost a century ago we had a similar situation in 1917, 18, 19, when virtually everyone opposed
the Bolsheviks in Russia. Unfortunately, with some 22-odd Russian opposition groups, and numer-
ous external powers involved in the Russian civil war, no one seemed to focus on the Bolsheviks.
It was not the top priority. We all know what happened after that: one by one, the Bolsheviks were
able to get rid of all of their enemies. I very much fear that we may be in a similar situation now; I
certainly hope not.
In Vladimir Putins speech to the UN General Assembly this past September, he called for all
those opposed to ISIS to work together to defeat it in Syria. He identified the Assad regime as a key
partner in this struggle and called upon other governments to work with it and Russia against the
common threat. Many have pointed out since then that Moscow seems more interested in protecting
the Assad regime than in defeating ISIS in Syria. Reports that most Russian attacks in Syria have
been against non-ISIS opposition forces, and not ISIS itself, have bolstered this perception. Mos-
cow, of course, claims that virtually all the Assad regimes opponents are terrorists and dismisses
any criticism of its actions.
Putin is clearly pursuing policies that compete with those of America and the West, in Syria
as well as elsewhere. There does seem, though, to be a genuine effort on Putins part to persuade
Washington that Russia and the West actually do have common aims in Syria. Putin himself has
been somewhat critical of Assad on occasion. He argues, though, that the Assad regimes ruling
Syria is better for everyone than if ISIS or other jihadists come to rule it instead. This being the
case, Russia and the West should work together to ensure that a less-bad option prevails in Syria.
Where Moscow and Washington differ, of course, is on whether there is still a less-bad option than
the Assad regime.
Moscow insists that there is not, as there is no realistic alternative to the Assad regime other
than the terrorists. Further, despite their public differences, Moscow may have persuaded itself, at
least on occasion, that the Obama administration tacitly supports Russias backing of Assad. Id
just like to mention three instances. First, since the very beginning of the uprising in Syria in 2011,
the Obama administration has exhibited an unwillingness to get very strongly involved there, and
has cited the lack of UN Security Council approval for such intervention as one of the reasons.
The Russian experience with the United States is that, if and when the United States decides
to intervene anywhere, it doesnt wait for UN Security Council approval. It just goes ahead and
intervenes. Thus, if the United States has not acted in Syria, its because Washington doesnt want
to and is hiding behind the Security Council.
A second instance that may have helped persuade the Russians was the Obama administra-
tions acceptance of Putins proposal for resolving the chemical weapons crisis in 2013. After
President Obama had threatened military retaliation if Assad crossed the red line of using chemical
weapons against his own people but then called for congressional approval, Putin announced his
plan: the United States and Russia should work together to take away Syrias chemical weapons

thus leaving Assad with the ability to attack his people with conventional weapons. Essentially,
the fact that the United States went along with this was seen by the Russians as another indication
that Washington was willing to work with the Assad regime, that it was the lesser of two evils.
Third, there was recently an article in the London Review of Books by Seymour Hersh sug-
gesting that some of the Joint Defense Staff at the Pentagon actually accept Moscows argument
that Assad is less bad than ISIS and so sent intelligence, including via Russia, to help the Assad
regime. Hersh claimed that this was unauthorized, but if it actually happened, Putin would not be-
lieve for a moment that it was unauthorized. He would believe that it was fully sanctioned by the
White House. Im not saying that it did happen, but if it did, it explains a lot about how the Rus-
sians might view what actual American attitudes are as opposed to what their stated attitudes
are.
The real question is, if in fact the Obama administration actually seems to be showing signs
of seeing the Assad regime as the lesser of two evils, why does it still call for Assad to step down?
Moscow is confused about this. There may be different explanations. One possibility, you may
be shocked to hear, is that American foreign policy may be incoherent. Thats actually a possibil-
ity; I dont know. Another, from the Russian point of view, is that Washington thinks it can topple
Assad, defeat or contain ISIS, and install a pro-Western government in Syria. Instead of cooperat-
ing with Russia, it can just have it all in Syria eventually.
Another possibility, from the Russian point of view, is that Washington understands that Assad
is the least-bad option, but it wants Moscow to bear all the human, material and reputational costs
of supporting him, while Washington avoids them but reaps the benefits of Russian actions. Yes,
Russians do actually think this way.
Obviously Russia and America, as well as some of Americas other allies, actually do have a
common interest in opposing ISIS. But Moscow and Washington have genuine differences about
how to combat it. Putin is truly convinced that the Assad regime, if not Assad himself, is needed
to combat ISIS; he believes there is nobody else in Syria that can do this effectively. The Obama
administration seems convinced it is the brutality of the Assad regime that has helped give rise to
ISIS. So long as this remains the case, and so long as each side believes its approach is superior,
and that the logic of the situation will eventually force the other side to see things its way, Russian-
American cooperation in combatting ISIS in Syria is unlikely to proceed very far.
I want to say a few things also about Russian motives for acting in Syria. I suggested that
there may be some degree of incoherence in American policy towards Syria. But theres a degree
of incoherence in Russian policy as well; the Russians are, in fact, pursuing multiple aims and
have multiple motives. For Putin in particular, Syria is actually a domestic Russian political issue.
It has real importance for Vladimir Putin, who has staked a lot on support for an ally. Its better for
Putin to be seen supporting Assad to the bitter end than knuckling under to America, withdrawing
support for Assad, and seeing him fall.
I think Putin sees the Arab Spring and the downfall of a number of authoritarian leaders as
setting a bad precedent. In fact, early on in the Arab Spring, Russian statements were asserting
that it was really a plot aimed at Russia at changing its regime, at least in the Muslim regions
of Russia. It was a continuation of the color revolutions, which had absolutely no local causes but
were engineered by the United States, at least as far as Vladimir Putin is concerned.
This also has an impact, curiously enough, on Putins relations with the authoritarian rulers of
Central Asia. If they doubt Putins support as shown by what he may or may not do in Syria
unlike Assad, they have another choice. They can turn to China for support. So I think Putin sees
supporting Assad as very important in terms of Russias position in Central Asia, something they
Russians definitely mean to keep. And, by the way, whatever they say about each other, Russia and
China are in a competitive relationship.

Its also important to understand that, in terms of the Russian view of the Middle East as a
whole, Putin has tended to look at Saudi Arabia in the same way that the United States has tended
to look at Iran, at least in the past. That is, as being the source of a lot of problems. The Russian
view of Saudi Arabia is that it is not a conservative monarchy, but an Islamic revolutionary re-
gime. Even back in the 90s, you can find Russian official statements blaming jihadists supported
by Saudi Arabia for the conflict in Chechnya. And after 9/11, Putin ceaselessly talked about how
15 of the 19 bombers were from Saudi Arabia. The kingdom is what they consider to be the source
of evil.
There was a little thaw in Saudi-Russian relations from about 2003 to 2011, but then the Arab
Spring came along. Saudi Arabia was involved in opposing both Gadhafi in Libya and Assad in
Syria, so this older view of Saudi Arabia came back at the same time that Moscow is trying to
sell weapons and do business with Saudi Arabia. From our point of view, this is mind-boggling.
When we dont like a country, like Iran, we simply stop doing business with it. When the Russians
dont like someone, though, they usually continue to try doing business.
Part of Moscows aim is to persuade the United States of the true nature of Saudi Arabia,
while at the same time trying to work with Riyadh as well. We saw this last year with the new
monarch in Saudi Arabia, and especially his son, Prince Mohammad Bin Salman. When Prince
Mohammad went to meet with Putin in June, by all accounts they really did hit it off. The prince
promised $10 billion worth of investment, Saudi arms purchases, et cetera. They were also going
to work together in Syria at the same time that Putin was working with the commander of
the Iranian Quds Force, apparently, about the upcoming Russian intervention in Syria. When the
prince met with Putin again this past October, obviously, the mood was a bit different. According
to one very informed account, the prince was complaining: Why are you working with the Iranians
against us in Syria? Putins response was, if you really want to contain the Iranians, youve got to
work with Moscow. Thats whats going to do it.
What theyre also doing, then, is trying to work with Iran in Syria and with Assad, while at the
same time engaging the major Sunni powers as well. The intervention that Russia launched this
past fall was very dramatic. One thing we can be certain of is that, while they have succeeded in
keeping the Assad regime alive and possibly even regaining a certain amount of territory, Rus-
sian air intervention alone is not going to enable the Assad regime to defeat its various opponents.
Thats something they cant do. Putin has indicated that he doesnt want to send ground forces,
although Russian officials occasionally talk about volunteers going. But even if they do this, its
clear theyre not going to win militarily.
Moscow has launched a diplomatic campaign aimed at resolving the Syrian conflict. But,
since the Russians are supporting the Assad regime very strongly, its not clear just how serious
this diplomatic effort actually is. Despite the drama of what Putin did and his seeming success, as
in Ukraine which seemed quite successful at first over time, it doesnt seem all that success-
ful. I think were seeing the same thing in Syria.
There has been one needless cost that they have suffered, and that is the deterioration of
Russian relations with Turkey. To me, this was really amazing; good relations with Turkey had
been one of Putins great successes. They had been doing $30 billion of business a year recently. I
think one year it was even $40 billion. Putin was encouraging Erdogan in his anti-Western stance;
they seemed to be standing together against the West. But if Putin had really valued maintaining
good relations with Turkey, he wouldnt have been flying his aircraft so near that border but of
course he did. Whether or not it was a good idea for Turkey to shoot down the Russian aircraft,
you can argue.
Putin didnt have to play it up the way he did; he could have played down the incident. But
he decided that Turkey was the new enemy, and now hes cut off much of the bilateral trade and

pushed Turkey back toward the West. Is this what he really wanted to do? Is this part of a great
master plan? I dont think so.
What does Russias involvement mean for the United States? Obviously, it does limit what
Washington can do. Certainly, Putin is focused on the Libyan example; the Security Council reso-
lution in 2011, authorizing a no-fly zone, led to intervention. Hes determined that this is not going
to take place in Syria. But, as Putin knows, it doesnt matter if you dont have a Security Council
resolution; the United States somestimes intervenes without one.
I think Putin very definitely wants to have a say, to have a role in Syria, to be part of the out-
come. The problem, however, is that we dont live in the Cold War anymore, when Soviet-Ameri-
can competition overlaid everything else. Every other conflict in the world had a Soviet-American
dimension, and the United States and the USSR were strong enough to restrain their allies to some
degree.
I think even if we have a Russian-American agreement on Syria, its not clear that we will
actually have a settlement to the Syrian conflict. The main external actors seem to be Iran, on one
side, and Saudi Arabia and certain other Gulf states as well as Turkey, on the other. The real task is
to find some kind of reconciliation between the Sunni and the Shia powers. Otherwise we will be
headed for the 30 Years War that someone referred to or maybe even a Hundred Years War.
I think the Russia factor obviously complicates American decision making, but the Obama
administrations policy has frustrated the Putin administration. On any given day, Moscow is
prepared to think of the Obama administration as weak and not knowing what it is doing. On the
other hand, at least twice a week they seem to think that hes an incredibly Machiavellian guy who
has tricked Moscow, and that the Russians are the ones who are paying the costs in Syria and not
the United States.
Putin is obviously a very difficult guy, with highly nationalist, highly combative policies. On
the other hand, he also has a pragmatic dimension. He was vehemently opposed to U.S.-led inter-
vention in Iraq but now has very good relations with the Baghdad government. Putin continues to
excoriate us for what happened in Libya, but he has amazingly good relations with the internation-
ally recognized Libyan government, as well as with some of the other forces in Libya. Theyre
restoring their contacts.
In terms of the Arab Spring, Putin opposed it. When Mohamed Morsi was president of Egypt,
though, Putin had very good relations with him. They met, they did business together, Russia pro-
vided assistance. So theres this odd pragmatic strain to Russian policy. When they have to, they
compromise. They accept the situation. Theyre not necessarily a permanent enemy that we can
never deal with.
CHARLES LISTER, Resident Fellow, Middle East Institute; Former Visiting

Fellow, Brookings Doha Center; Former Analyst and Head, IHS Janes Terrorism &
Insurgency Centre
I very much agree with what our first two speakers have already said today. I will focus on
Syria and give a bit more of a live assessment of how things stand, and look back on lessons
learned from whats taken place over the last few years. Im going to aim to be somewhat provoca-
tive. This is such an important subject that I dont think one should hold back when assessing the
situation and what to do in the future.
In Syria and Iraq, ISIS is probably feeling under more pressure than it has since the dramatic
events in the summer of 2014. That is not to say they are losing, necessarily, but they are certainly
more stretched than they have been in quite some time. Having said that, the progress towards this
point has been painfully slow. It has also provided the organization with the opportunity to expand

and acquire the kind of strategic depth and other options that it has done since the summer of 2014
elsewhere around the world. Now were looking at places like Libya and Egypt and Afghanistan
as potential new hot points for ISIS, even if it starts to genuinely lose out in places like Syria and
Iraq.
Im very glad the first speaker talked about the idea of indirect action, working with allies on
the ground, focusing on human terrain. But that lesson hasnt been well enough implemented in
the Syrian case. There are many options on the table, but for one reason or another, many of them
have been ignored. Very often, the easiest options, but not necessarily the best, have been chosen,
and there have been fairly negative consequences to some of those decisions.
The first element of this indirect-action approach in Syria and the best known has been the
partnership with the Kurds, namely their Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its armed wings, the
YPG and the womens YPJ. American partnership with the PYD on the ground in Syria, fight-
ing against ISIS, has been successful. The PYD has demonstrated a fairly remarkable amount of
professionalism. Certainly they have taken back ground from ISIS. But I think those results should
be placed within the context of the fact that the Kurds have received a fairly substantial amount of
support from the United States, including close air support.
The argument could be made that many other opposition forces in Syria could be just as
capable, if not more so, of taking back territory from ISIS if they had that kind of support from the
U.S. military. I have given the example before that in the very first weeks of 2014, the mainstream
opposition in northern Syria took back four-and-a-half provinces from ISIS in six weeks. The
Kurds, with U.S. air support, have taken back roughly two-thirds of a combined province and over
two provinces in more than a year. So we are looking at progress, but I think its been painfully
slow. We could be doing a lot better with more partners.
The PYD is a complicated movement. It is affiliated with the militant Kurdistan Workers
Party (PKK). Many of its senior commanders dont have public faces they dont have Twitter
accounts, they dont conduct media interviews but they identify themselves not as the PYD, but
as the PKK. The PYD and its armed wings have begun introducing a new educational curriculum
in northeastern Syria that abides by the PKKs socialist kind of ideology, which many Arab tribes
are extremely unhappy with. Kurdish is now being taught to children in many parts of the north-
east, and Arab tribesmen living there are being encouraged to allow their children to learn Kurdish.
All of this is ruffling feathers under the surface and taking us in a very bad direction, although
it may take some time to show. This speaks to the fact that the broader conventional opposition in
Syria is deeply hostile to the PYD. The fact that the U.S. government has partnered so closely with
it has generated, rightly or wrongly, a perception that Western policy is disconnected from the re-
alities on the ground. And perhaps Western policy is not supportive of the idea of a unitary Syrian
state in the future, due to allegations of what the PYD may or may not want for their own future in
Syria because of their links to the PKK.
The PYD also has serious geographical limitations, and they realize it. They have openly said
they cannot go beyond a certain point in the fight against ISIS; theyll be stepping into Arab terri-
tory, and thats not going to get them anywhere. So the U.S. partnership and the use of the PYD as
its principal partner in fighting against ISIS in Syria is approaching its limit right now.
In that sense, the establishment of what has been called the Syrian Democratic Forces es-
sentially a broad coalition heavily dominated still by the PYD but which has incorporated Syrian
Christians and some other local tribal forces predominately represented by northeastern Sunni
tribes is a move in the right direction, but its not nearly enough to convince the broader oppo-
sition that the PYD is a legitimate actor within the Syrian context. However, its also not necessar-
ily enough, at least in my assessment, to actually take those additional steps into Arab territory and
take back territory from ISIS.
10

In terms of fighting ISIS, when were talking about centers of gravity, there are two: their
momentum and their financing. To counter ISIS, were not only looking to blow up cash or target
oil fields. Thats not going to degrade or destroy ISIS.
The best way of attacking their financing is to take back the territory. Another obsession in the
media over the last 18 months has been that oil is the dominant source of ISISs income. But most
serious studies of this subject have come to the conclusion that the control of territory taxation
as well as extortion from people and businesses and a variety of other economic sectors is the
primary source of income for ISIS. The only way of defeating them is to take back territory. For
that very reason, indirect action and working with a broader scope of local allies is really the only
way forward. And I dont think were there yet.
Moving beyond the PYD, probably the next-best example of an attempt at indirect action
in Syria is the train-and-equip program. I think most people will admit this was a fairly dismal
failure; there have even been acting and existing administration officials who have recently come
out and basically admitted it themselves. The train-and-equip mission essentially aimed to partner
with local forces in Syria who the U.S. military hoped would essentially drop their fight against
the regime in favor of fighting against ISIS, with American support.
The reason for the failure is that the very objective is totally disconnected from realities on
the ground. As a result, recruitment for the train-and-equip program was miniscule. And many of
the people recruited either werent socially rooted into the dynamics on the ground, or were not
the kinds of reliable personalities that the broader opposition were willing to trust when they were
redeployed into Syria. I think its very well-known what happened when the first two batches of
train-and-equip-troops went in.
This was an unfortunate example of minimalist or overly risk-averse thinking about how to
team up with local forces on the ground, and who to team up with. Of course, theres been a vari-
ety of, unfortunately, amusing and ironic stories about how the first batch, for example, was sent
back into Syria during the first week of Ramadan. The commander of this first batch immediately
put in a request for a bunch of his fighters to be sent back to their families for two weeks of leave.
And it was granted.
So as soon as they went into the country, they all went home. Many of them traveled almost
100 miles inside Syria into deeply hostile territory, sometimes into regime-held areas, to go and be
with their families for two weeks. Then, by the time they went up north, all of the enemies of U.S.
policy, namely al-Qaeda, had figured everything out. They knew where the bases were and who
the local connections were, and as soon as they teamed up two weeks later, they were attacked. So
theres a real shortcoming in strategic thinking. Despite the fact that we recognize this as the right
way forward, we havent gone about it in the right way.
The third-best example here is what I call the CIAs vet and equip program, which has been
going on for a long time. It started very small and has since become larger over the last two-and-a-
half years, led by the CIA, often working with regional countries, which is an inherent advantage.
It does help root you in the political dynamics and establish a better relationship of trust with other
opposition forces. This effort has established support relationships with at least 40 separate armed
groups in northern and southern Syria. Only two of them have been attacked and defeated by hos-
tile al-Qaeda forces. But 38-plus continue to fight to this day, often in areas dominated by hostile
al-Qaeda forces. They have retained a heavy footprint within local dynamics. Of course, this is
fighting against the regime and not ISIS, but it has shown, I think, that it is possible to establish re-
lationships with local allies, to support them with regional allies, and buttress them into a position
of influence within their local area that the train-and-equip program never even got close to.
Its also a nationally focused program. It hasnt focused just on the north or just on the south
or just on Damascus. It is nationwide. For obvious reasons, not a great deal of information is re-
11

leased from the source, but this program deserves more praise than it has necessarily received. Of
course, one big criticism of this program has been that some of these forces have at times cooper-
ated with al-Qaedas affiliate in Syria, Jabhat al-Nusra. Its very easy for us, thousands of miles
away, to say, therefore youre a terrorist. But, speaking as someone whos spent a lot of time
with these groups and has gotten to know their realities, I can say theyre fighting for their lives
every single minute of the day. They still have family in Syria who are being bombed, who are be-
ing attacked, who are being shelled by the regime, who are being attacked by Hezbollah, and who
are now facing Russian airstrikes.
Unfortunately, one actor out of dozens, if not hundreds, on the ground, is an al-Qaeda affiliate.
My personal experience in knowing these groups is that their cooperation with them has absolutely
no connection to their ideological leanings at all. Its simply a reflection of their desperation. I
think whats to be lauded is that the CIA program hasnt seen this as a reason to cut off certain
organizations. The establishment of personal relationships between vetters and the guys on the
ground has meant that the trust is genuine, that because they cooperate with someone we dont
like, it doesnt mean they are one and the same.
I think ISIS is feeling the pressure, but there is a very long way to go. In Syria, ISIS has
demonstrated very recently the capacity to launch large-scale offensives. Theyve captured a
huge amount of weaponry in eastern Deir ez-Zor province on the Iraqi border, which will almost
certainly keep them fighting for a long time to come. Theyve previously captured huge weapons
stores from the Iraqi government, from opposition forces in Syria or from the Syrian regime and
then several weeks later launched a major offensive somewhere else. Its fairly likely that well
see, in the weeks to come in northern Aleppo, a real choke point for the opposition. It also hap-
pens to be a very complex battle theater right now, with Russian airstrikes, regime airstrikes, the
occasional American airstrikes, opposition forces, Kurds, ISIS, et cetera. And I expect ISIS to look
to exploit that.
Where to go from here? I spoke about attacking ISIS financing by taking back territory. That
involves a far broader teaming up with local allies on the ground and a much less risk-averse
assessment of who they are. One of two ways forward now is to blunt their momentum. This
is very much linked to the fight against ISIS financing, neutralizing their capacity to fight on
multiple fronts at once, which has been their biggest strength over the last two years or so. This
means bringing the fight to ISIS on multiple fronts. It doesnt mean focusing all your resources on
Ramadi and then thinking about Mosul and Raqqa and elsewhere later. It means fighting on all of
those fronts.
ISIS has demonstrated an ability to redeploy forces rapidly from front to front in order to de-
fend or attack. Its only been able to exploit that capability because we have an Iraq-first strategy.
Later we started to develop somewhat of a Syria strategy, but theyre not in sync. There hasnt
been an anti-ISIS fight on multiple fronts coordinated in the way that I would suggest that we need
to develop now.
On a broader point, our allies dont have to look exactly like us or talk like us. I hate to say it,
but I hear from Syrians all the time: You went to such-and-such a group because they wear Oak-
ley sunglasses or they wear baseball caps. You went to them because they talk about democracy,
democracy, democracy. But guess what? They dont actually mean it. There are many people in
Syria who, I know for a fact, could be excellent American allies but dont speak or look like us.
This is not always based on religion; very often its cultural or traditional.
I will briefly talk about the effects of the Russian intervention, which have been fairly trans-
formative. In four months of Russian airstrikes in Syria, at least a quarter of a million people
have been displaced from their homes. IDP camps in northern Syria are overflowing this winter.
If we think the refugee flows into Europe were bad in 2015, wait until we see what happens in
12

2016. Syrians werent willing to get on boats without lifejackets last winter. This winter, boats are
leaving every few hours. Thats a sign of how people are thinking about the conflict now. If they
are that desperate, the flows as spring starts could potentially be quite huge. Ill praise our second
speaker for giving such a balanced view of Russia; perhaps mine will seem less balanced. But I
think Russia has learned from its ally in Damascus that the most effective way of fighting against
the opposition is to blockade, besiege and starve opposition areas. Theyve done this very effec-
tively over the last four months.
Although the Assad regime hasnt made huge gains, the gains it has made in the last four
months have transformed the conflict. The chances of success for the political process in Geneva
look remarkably slim now because of those gains and how the conflict has been transformed. The
opposition is really feeling the pressure on the ground, and that has had direct effects on their
interest in engaging in a political process. Six months ago, their interest was clear; they were very
willing to talk. But this kind of kneel-or-starve strategy, which Russia and Assad and Hezbol-
lah and many other militia forces on the ground have implemented, has been brutally effective in
slowly taking back territory. Assad has repeatedly used the term cleanse in terms of shaping his
military strategy on the ground. He is literally looking to cleanse his population and separate the
good from the bad. And this kneel-or-starve policy, as I say, has been the hallmark of how to do
that.
Its been very well-documented, so I wont list examples, that Russia is using cluster muni-
tions in Syria. It has certainly targeted aid convoys from Turkey on at least a weekly basis over the
last two months. It has allegedly targeted mosques, schools, hospitals and IDP camps over the last
four months. Whether or not those allegations are true, perception in Syria is much more important
than truth. The perception is that Russia is no longer a party we can negotiate with. This is provid-
ing another knock-on effect on current political efforts.
More broadly, the opposition forces now are being asked to sign on to the political talks. Their
argument is, we will have no role in any talks until humanitarian provisions are put in place. They
mean at least the free flow of aid, the cessation of what they call indiscriminate bombardment,
perhaps the release of some detainees, and the ending of the sieges. Theres no sign that thats any-
where near close. The United Nations said yesterday that theyre now going to refocus on trying to
push humanitarian confidence-building measures as a way of ensuring that the first round of talks
in Geneva take place. But I think were a very long way away from seeing the regime let alone
Russia or Hezbollah agree to such humanitarian provisions.
The final point Ill make is this: please dont forget al-Qaeda, though ISIS is everyones obses-
sion at the moment. In my study of Jabhat al-Nusra, one thing I have learned is that they are going
to be in Syria for the long haul. They have used the last four-and-a-half to five years to deeply
root themselves in society and in revolutionary dynamics. The result is that most of the opposi-
tion simply cant entertain the idea of turning against al-Qaeda. Yes, theyre powerful, but many
opposition people will say that they havent often demonstrated anything counter to the revolution.
So, Syrians say, until they do, why should we attack them? If theyre fighting alongside us against
the regime, why should we? This is a real danger for Syria, but also for the international commu-
nity, because theyre operating more quietly. Theyre not carrying out spectacular attacks. Theyre
not releasing statements declaring war against America. But theyre al-Qaeda, and they are deeply
rooted in Syrian dynamics.
However, things are slowly changing. The leader of Jabhat al-Nusra recently did a video
interview with several Syrian opposition journalists in which, in subtle ways, he undermined the
respect and the history of the Free Syrian Army. Although it isnt a single organization but an um-
brella, the power of the idea of the Free Syrian Army is such that his disrespect sparked something
in peoples minds in Syria that hasnt been around throughout the conflict. People have started
13

subtly, albeit not in public, to question the long-term motives of their ally of convenience. Perhaps
thats something the United States and its allies can look to exploit in the months to come.
AUDREY KURTH CRONIN, Distinguished Service Professor and Director,

International Security Program at George Mason University; Author, How
Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns;
Author, ISIS Is Not a Terrorist Group, Foreign Affairs (March to April 2015).
Id like to shift the conversation to a broader discussion of American policy and how we look
at the challenges of ISIS and al-Qaeda. I agree with many of the points made thus far, but I also
think that U.S. policy makers are fundamentally behind in putting together an effective framework
for ISIS. Instead, were trying to adapt structures that have been in place for 10 or 15 years now
to fight al-Qaeda. What follows discusses the al-Qaeda movement, as well as ISIS, and identifies
crucial distinctions in U.S. policy with respect to each.
The United States and its allies are using tools and frameworks that were custom-made for the
wrong enemy. They were built for al-Qaeda, and now were trying to adjust them to address ISIS.
Unfortunately, classic counterterrorism is not sufficient. ISIS is not al-Qaeda. Its not even an out-
growth or a part of al-Qaeda. Its a successor to al-Qaeda. This is not the next phase in the global
al-Qaeda movement; its the post-al-Qaeda jihadist threat. Yes, the groups were once formally
aligned, and al-Qaeda remains dangerous; it is not defeated. Its affiliates in Yemen and North Af-
rica are particularly concerning. But the outlines of the next phase of this struggle are coming into
focus, and the United States is failing to adjust.
There are fundamental differences between al-Qaeda and ISIS their origins, characteristics,
strategies, approaches, vulnerabilities and aims. Al-Qaeda and its associates are terrorist organiza-
tions. Theyre small in number, in the dozens or the hundreds. They attack civilians. Generally
speaking, they do not hold territory. And they dont directly confront military forces. ISIS uses
ruthless terrorist tactics and has very similar rhetoric, but it has evolved to become much more
than a terrorist organization. ISIS is a conventional army of some 30,000 fighters that holds terri-
tory, has extensive military capabilities, controls lines of communication, commands infrastruc-
ture, is independently funded, and engages in sophisticated military operations.
Al-Qaeda came into being in the aftermath of the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Its
formative experience was the 10-year war against Soviet occupation, when thousands of religious
mujahedeen, including Osama bin Laden, converged upon the country and attacked Soviet troops.
ISIS came into being because of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, then blossomed in U.S.-run prisons,
grew through the Syrian civil war, and exploded after the 2013 killings of Sunni Iraqi protesters by
the Shia-dominated Maliki government in Baghdad. ISIS is a direct descendant of the group that in
2004 became known as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), but now it also includes Iraqi Sunni tribes, former
anti-U.S. insurgents, and secular Baathist military officers who want to regain the power and secu-
rity they had during the Saddam Hussein regime.
If the United States uses the same strategy and frameworks to counter ISIS that we have used
to counter the al-Qaeda movement, we will fail. Lets go quickly through the background and cur-
rent differences between al-Qaeda and ISIS. Theyre partly rooted in their histories.
The closest historical parallel to ISIS, I think, is not the al-Qaeda movement, but the armed Is-
lamic group, the Groupe Islamique Arm (GIA) in Algeria. To refresh your memories, in 1991 the
Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was about to win popular democratic elections, when the Algerian
Army executed a bloodless coup and dissolved the FIS by official decree. With FIS members in
jail, radicals formed the GIA, an extreme and violent faction.
What followed was unconstrained carnage, with massacres, terrorism and atrocities on all
14

sides. The GIAs numbers grew, including criminals who were released from jail and Salafist
fighters who had returned from Afghanistan. They made appalling violence their trademark. Their
purpose was to intimidate opponents, eliminate moderate elements, and force ordinary people to
support them. GIA leader Zouabri put it this way: In war there is no neutrality. Except for those
who are with us, all of the others are renegades. The GIA engaged in a very deliberate policy of
polarization, removing any moderate middle that could stabilize and govern within Algeria.
Their hyperviolent, pseudo-religious nihilism soon evolved beyond terrorism to full-scale civil
war. Members of the GIA massacred whole villages, hacked old people and newborns to death,
and slaughtered women and children as if they were animals. They later beheaded more than 70
journalists, stating, Those who fight us with the pen shall die by the sword. They killed Jews,
Christians and moderate Muslims. Over the course of the decade, their communiques became
increasingly perverse and bloodcurdling: Blood and corpses create glory, and death creates life,
read one of them. The violence peaked in 1997, but it did not end until the early 2000s. At least
100,000 Algerians died, though the numbers are highly contested. We dont know exactly, because
all the journalists were dead. Many more simply disappeared.
Al-Qaeda leaders over the course of the movement have decried the Algerian experience,
describing it as exactly what they want to avoid. Over and over in strategy documents, statements
and letters, leaders such as al-Suri and al-Maqdisi urged avoidance of that approach. To quote al-
Libbi, They destroyed themselves with their own hands, with their lack of reason, delusions, their
ignoring of people, their alienation of them through oppression, deviance and severity, coupled
with a lack of kindness, sympathy and friendliness. Their enemy did not defeat them. Rather, they
defeated themselves, were consumed and fell.
Al-Qaeda leader Zawahiri has specifically pointed to the lessons of what he calls the Algerian
events, most famously in his 2005 letter to Zarqawi about AQIs violence in Iraq. After Zarqawi
beheaded the U.S. hostages Nicholas Berg and Owen Armstrong, Zawahiri wrote to Zarqawi
saying:
Among the things which the feelings of the Muslim populace who love and support you
will never find palatable are the scenes of slaughtering the hostages. You shouldnt be
deceived by the praise of some of the zealous young men and their description of you as
the sheik of the slaughterers and so forth. They do not express the general view of the
admirer and the supporter of the resistance in Iraq.
Now Im not implying here that Zawahiri is a great guy, some kind of humanist: he was in
favor of killing the hostages quietly with a shot to the head instead of publicly beheading them. He
strongly believed that the gory image Zarqawi was projecting through shocking videos and other
media would alienate the broader Muslim ummah against what al-Qaeda was trying to accomplish,
which was widespread mobilization behind the al-Qaeda movement.
By contrast, ISIS is consciously mimicking the excesses of the GIA all over social media. And
theyre extraordinarily good at it. ISIS grew rapidly because of the Syrian civil war, but even more
so the failure of democratic governance in Iraq. Baathist military officers, Sunni troops, tribes
and factions in Iraq were all promised representation after the United States withdrew. Instead,
they got exclusion and repression. Like the GIA, ISIS has now embarked on a strategy of ruthless
polarization, especially polarization along sectarian lines. And its working. Having gained power
in Syria, ISIS easily conquered Iraqi cities and towns, because Sunnis welcomed them and even
led their military operations. And in this case, unlike in Algeria, theres no brutal army crackdown
in response, for good or ill.
What does all this mean for the United States and our frameworks, policies and ways of think-
15

ing about these two threats? How should we respond? With counterterrorism? Its very tempting.
Using counterterrorism tools weve had considerable success with respect to al-Qaeda. Weve
poured enormous energy and resources into counterterrorism bureaucracies, authorities and fund-
ing lines. It is natural. Bureaucracies take a long time to turn around.
Some of it does make sense. Continuing robust police and intelligence operations and coop-
eration is vital to minimizing the ability of ISIS to inspire or carry out operations abroad. Thats
classic counterterrorism. Unfortunately, beyond that, it doesnt fully fit. Just because ISIS has ji-
hadist rhetoric and engaged in terrorist attacks in Paris and San Bernardino, that does not mean its
the same as al-Qaeda or even an affiliate. Many techniques that were custom made for al-Qaeda
cannot simply be redirected to fight this particular threat. Here are four examples:
First, leadership decapitation through drone strikes. Some 75 percent of the leaders of the
core al-Qaeda group have been killed by raids and armed drones. The technology is well-suited to
going after targets hiding in rural areas. There has been some success in using drones to take out
leadership within Pakistan and Yemen, for example, especially when there was imminent danger
of attack. But thats a tactical success. The broad public backlash to the drone strikes used against
al-Qaeda was considered tolerable because of immediate tactical gains, even as it built widespread
opposition and fueled anger more generally over the longer term.
What about ISIS? Fighters tend to cluster in urban areas, where they are surrounded by build-
ings and civilian populations. ISIS governs a functioning pseudo-state with a complex admin-
istrative structure. At the top is the emirate, which consists of Baghdadi and two deputies, both
of whom formerly served as generals in the Saddam-era Iraqi Army. Below them is a civilian
bureaucracy supervised by about a dozen administrators. Although its hardly the model govern-
ment that ISIS tries to project in its propaganda videos, this pseudo-state would carry on without
Baghdadi or his closest lieutenants. Killing the leaders will not defeat it and would be difficult in
the local terrain.
Second, disrupting terrorist financing. Cutting off al-Qaedas funding has been one of coun-
terterrorisms most impressive success stories. I credit you for that, Will [Wechsler]. I credit all
those who worked hard at it. Nothing Im saying is meant as criticism of the gains weve made
in that arena. A global network for countering terrorist financing emerged after September 11,
2001, backed by the UN, the EU and hundreds of cooperating governments. The result has been a
serious squeeze. By 2005, al-Qaeda was asking its affiliates for financial help. By 2011, the U.S.
Treasury Department claimed that al-Qaeda was struggling to secure steady financing to plan and
execute terrorist attacks.
As for ISIS, I agree here with Charles that fighting their financing is a different kind of chal-
lenge. Theyre much more oriented toward the territory that they control. They dont rely on
outside funding to the same extent. ISIS systematically took over key oil assets in eastern Syria
beginning in 2012 and then seized oil-operating parts of Iraq two years later. They steal jewelry,
cars, machinery, livestock; they charge tolls, sell antiquities and ransom hostages. They even earn
revenue from growing cotton and wheat in the breadbasket of Syria, which is Raqqa. Their wide-
ranging extortion racket is lucrative and successful. It targets local businesses within the territory
they control, including cellphone-service providers, water-delivery companies, electric utilities
the list goes on and on. Classic terrorist-financing tools cannot defeat armies holding territory.
Third, our deradicalization programs. With al-Qaeda, radicalization occurred through reli-
gious arguments and an intellectual message of a kind of twisted altruism. The core group cast
the establishment of a caliphate as a long-term, almost utopian, goal. Educating and mobilizing
ordinary Muslims came first. Al-Qaeda is mainly groups of men fighting in remote places. Publicly
the model has a severe aesthetic; sex is promised after martyrdom. Even for the angriest young
Muslim man, this might be a bit of a hard sell.
16

Lets look at ISIS. I would argue that the process theyre engaging in is not radicalization, at
least not in the same sense; its more recruitment through power, agency and identity. Its a very
different message, addressed to men and sometimes women, in alarming numbers indeed,
sometimes the message is even aimed at children. Its about immediate gratification. The caliphate
is now. ISIS operates in urban settings and offers recruits instant opportunities to fight and die. It
posts exhilarating podcasts by individual fighters on the front lines. ISIS is far more effective at
using social media than core al-Qaeda well ahead even of al-Qaedas more media-savvy affili-
ates, like al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).
The group also procures sexual partners for its male recruits. Some young women volunteer
after meeting a jihadist hottie online. Others follow their husbands or are trafficked there and
enslaved. ISIS is extremely adept at getting this message out and targeting it very effectively, even
to specific individuals they want to recruit. Teenagers are attracted to the Islamic State before they
understand what it is and not only Muslim teenagers. Theirs is a short-term demonstration of
power; no vision is needed. ISIS promotes conquest in every dimension, and that includes the
sexual. Its about immediate agency. Its about being successful.
Fourth, identifying a groups targeting errors, publicizing them so as to undermine their ap-
peal and facilitate a backlash. This is a classic counterterrorism approach, and its been effective
historically. It put al-Qaeda on the defensive. Zawahiri has been keenly sensitive to the backlash
engendered whenever al-Qaeda kills the very people it is trying to attract, members of the Mus-
lim ummah. Attacks in Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Spain, Jordan and the UK all resulted in
Muslim casualties that outraged members of Islamic communities everywhere. The group began
to steadily lose popular support starting in about 2007. In Muslim-majority countries, the shift
was dramatic, according to Gallup and Pew polls rigorously collected annual measurements of
public opinion about al-Qaeda and its terrorist attacks.
It is not the same with respect to ISIS. Like the Algerian GIA, this group is killing or exploit-
ing Western journalists, for example, so that they can control the message, publicly beheading
them to intimidate and show their power. They seem impervious to the risk of a backlash, because
their core message is all about power and revenge, not legitimacy in the sense that Westerners
think of it. Their brutality is designed to intimidate foes and suppress dissent. Revulsion among
Muslims might eventually undermine ISIS and I firmly hope that is the case but, for the time
being, our focus on their savagery only helps them augment the image of their strength. This, in
turn, inspires angry or alienated young people throughout the world to carry out attacks in places
like the United States, Europe and elsewhere. We help perpetuate that image for them.
How about a second possible framework, counterinsurgency? Beginning in 2006, the United
States called al-Qaeda a global insurgency. The group hijacked local agendas and persuaded local
groups to turn nationalist campaigns into al-Qaeda-associated affiliates. There was exploitable
tension between local nationalist aims and al-Qaeda and its broader global movement. Some see
ISIS as the latest outgrowth in that worldwide struggle. And it is true that many local groups are
exploiting or taking advantage of the ISIS megaphone, associating what they are doing with the
Islamic State, even when there is no logistical trail, and its not exactly what the nature or source
of the inspiration was.
Regarding Iraq, since ISISs dramatic 2014 territorial advances, theres been a lot of talk in the
United States about resurrecting the 2006 surge. Many Americans still think of Iraq as if we were
in occupation there. Many of those now aligned with ISIS are Sunni insurgent groups who attacked
coalition troops during the occupation and then became part of the Sunni awakening. Some argue
that the U.S. military should return in larger numbers to draw them to our side, as we did during the
surge. But there are vast differences between the situation today and the one we faced in 2006. The
logic of counterinsurgency does not suit the struggle against ISIS. For one thing, of course, were
17

no longer in occupation. At the height of the surge, the United States had 165,000 troops in Iraq, up
against a smaller force than ISIS, alongside a Syrian state that was actually intact.
Washington can send in more troops, but it cannot lend legitimacy to a government that it does
not control. ISIS is being led by highly trained, capable and advanced Iraqi Baathists, who know
American techniques and habits because we trained them and, to some extent, with American
equipment that was left in the country, also armed them. Now, they have M1A1 tanks, armed
Humvees, MRAPs, 155 millimeter Howitzers and so on. I think its ironic that we were reluctant
to arm the Syrian moderates because we feared that weapons would fall into the wrong hands.
The former Iraqi Baathist military is running this campaign. Local commanders are given mis-
sion orders. Theyre very sophisticated in their military tactics and objectives and, to some degree,
theyre backed by a functioning pseudo-state. Fault lines may again appear between the groups
secular former Iraqi army officers, Sunni tribal leaders, and Sunni resistance fighters, on the one
hand, and its veteran jihadists, on the other. But if they do, it will more likely result from missteps
by ISIS than our policies.
The so-called hearts-and-minds approach that we focused on for so long in the global war on
terrorism will not work here. It would be misguided. ISIS is not interested in local populations
support, and right now they dont need it. Even as the indigenous population tries to flee ISIS-
controlled territory, the group continues to attract outside recruits. They want to kill, conquer and
control in that order of priority. ISIS doesnt want to be popular, they want to be powerful.
That leads us to the third possibility: conventional war. Some in Washington and on the cam-
paign trail are urging us to send in more troops with the goal of completely destroying ISIS now.
That makes for good soundbites. But strategy is about matching ends and means. Theres a sharp
contrast between the rhetorical statements of presidential candidates and what it would actually
take to defeat a conventional army.
Surely we should know better than to believe in instant, cost-free solutions, given our experi-
ence. Our goal in the wars of the past 15 years, at a cost of $1.6 trillion and the commitment of hun-
dreds of thousands of U.S. troops and the loss of almost 7,000 American lives, has been to defeat the
threat of violent extremism and transform the Middle East. Have we succeeded? More to the point,
such a deployment would play directly into the pseudo-religious ISIS narrative and its end-of-days
argument about confronting the crusaders in Dabiq and heading toward the apocalypse. A massing of
U.S. or Western troops would give ISIS exactly the sort of propaganda victory that could draw more
recruits to their cause, particularly if those forces were seen as allied with the Shiites.
Where does this leave us? The sobering fact is that the United States and its allies have no
good strategic military options in their fight against ISIS. Neither counterterrorism nor counterin-
surgency nor conventional warfare is likely to afford a clear-cut, immediate victory against ISIS.
For the time being, at least, despite the bad press the word containment gets because it sounds
passive, I still firmly believe the best and most realistic policy that matches ends and means and
is most likely to succeed over the long term is offensive containment. It combines a limited use
of force including airstrikes, cutting off supplies and so forth with a major diplomatic and
economic effort to weaken ISIS, gradually take back territory, and align the interests of the many
countries threatened by the group.
ISIS is not merely an American problem. The wars in Iraq and Syria involve not only regional
players but also major global powers. Weve heard a lot about the incentives, policies and think-
ing of the Russians, but we also need to think about Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states.
They must develop a common economic, military and diplomatic approach to a solution in Syria
(as hard as that will be), to ensure that the ISIS pseudo-state is treated as a global pariah. Offensive
containment is a strategy for victory. This approach has resulted in gradually removing about 25
percent of ISISs territory thus far. But its not easy, its not quick, its not instant gratification. And
18

there are risks.

In some respects, ISISs incentives to project force abroad increase as it loses territory and is
desperate to shift global perceptions away from its losses. As horrible as it is to think about, terror-
ism is a weak tactic. Asymmetrical enemies often resort to it when they are losing a conventional
war. In the short term, there is no one-to-one correlation between loss of territory and a reduction
in terrorist attacks abroad. For this reason, our response must also include the robust police and
intelligence cooperation I mentioned at the outset, continued efforts to counter violent extremism,
and above all more aid for displaced persons and refugees who are even more terrified by ISIS
than we are.
I have been shocked over the last several years at how the United States and its Western allies
failed to stem the tide of this humanitarian crisis long ago, when we could have provided more
funding and support for displaced persons in places like Jordan, Lebanon and other parts of the
region. That would have been a smart, forward-looking, strategic step more powerful than any use
of military force, not to mention also the right thing to do.
Again, some of these tools do overlap with counterterrorism; but they should be tailored for an
enemy that is not al-Qaeda and is more akin to a dangerous state actor. Over the long run, allow-
ing ISIS to maintain a sanctuary in Iraq and Syria entails even greater risks of more serious and
sophisticated violence directed against us and our allies.
In sum, the United States and its allies must move beyond outmoded forms of counterterror-
ism and counterinsurgency, while also resisting pressure to cross the threshold into full-fledged
war. For the foreseeable future, offensive containment is the best U.S. policy available.
DR. MATTAIR: A question from the floor: Why did the current administration choose to not get
involved earlier in Syria? And I would add: Why is ISIS not our number-one priority in the region
right now?
MR. WECHSLER: When the administration was first looking at the Syrian, Iraq and Islamic
State problems, there was an overestimation of the likelihood of Assads fall. The administration
thought he would fall rapidly, at an early stage in the Arab Spring. Unfortunately, that was a fairly
widespread assessment at the time. It has been proven wrong. I think there was an underestima-
tion of the risks of a full withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq and the resulting limitations of U.S.
influence there.
I think the record is pretty clear that there was, in the intelligence community and others
various members have been very open about this an underestimation of the strength of the
Islamic State early on, when it went under different names. There were different approaches to the
estimation of risk. You had, at a certain point in the process years ago, Secretary Hillary Clinton
leading an effort with the director of the CIA, supported by the secretary of defense, to do a more
robust training and equipping program for the Syrian elements. That request was denied.
Then theres another factor that doesnt get much attention but should: legal authorities. It
hasnt been discussed here, but its vitally important. The United States does not possess stand-
ing legal authority to overthrow another countrys government for good reason, I might add. It
does possess standing legal authority to offer help, should a country request it. The domestic legal
authority is then supported by international law as well. So if you want to understand why theres
a difference between the Iraqi and the Syrian contexts, or why to some degree we ended up with
a policy that doesnt make sense with local realities in Syria, where we were asking people to
not fight the Assad regime but only to fight the Islamic State, one place to look is the law, which
says that we can come to Iraqs assistance and fight against the Islamic State there. But Syrias
not asking us to come to their assistance. We dont have standing legal authority to overthrow the
19

Assad regime. This doesnt mean that there arent other ways that different administrations have
addressed these problems, but legal authorities are critically important when making policy in the
current administration.
AMB. THEROS: Id like to suggest another thought. We know deep down, but havent really
articulated it properly, that ISIS to many people is a manifestation of a larger issue, the shifting of
tectonic plates in the region. ISIS is only one part of a problem. Turkey sees ISIS in one context;
we see it in another; Saudi Arabia sees it in another. This is very much like 1848, when Europe
turned upside down. The revolutions were crushed, but, as one German friend of mine said, the
1848 revolution ended in 1946. This may be why I believe that ISIS is not the priority.
MR. LISTER: Why were we not involved earlier? For one thing, there was certainly an expecta-
tion that the opposition was going to be more successful more quickly than turned out to be the
case. On the other hand, there was a fairly long period of time, from the start of the protests in
February/March 2011 until the summer of 2012 before the opposition showed any potential to win
the revolution. Thats a whole year when some kind of policy could have been developed. But I
guess Libya would also be an explanation. There was one intervention already underway. If you
want to make the legal argument, you could probably say there are ways around it; we did inter-
vene in Libya without the express permission or invitation of the government there.
MR. WECHSLER: But fully in accordance with international law. All Im saying is that, if
youre trying to understand current U.S. policy, a full appreciation of domestic and international
law is critical to understanding why some decisions are made and why others are not.
MR. LISTER: I agree with you. I also think what is often not talked about is that in the very first
stages of the militarization of the revolution, U.S. intelligence had already spotted the arrival of al-
Qaeda in Iraq commanders into Syria. Certainly in Washington, that was a key source of concern,
whether or not it was spoken about publicly, regarding the potential path ahead in Syria.
Id like to make one more point. I heard a recent comment from former Defense Secretary
Chuck Hagel, who said, Weve got it all wrong. Assad was never our enemy, and we should never
have shaped Syria around that frame. I think thats just patently false. You dont have to frame
yourself within the Syrian revolutionary years to say whether or not Assad is our enemy.
Going back to the Iraq occupation, the Assad regime and Syrian military intelligence were
directly involved for periods of time in busing foreign fighters every day from the Damascus and
Aleppo airports to the Iraqi border. I dont think anyones ever done a study of it, but the number
of American soldiers killed by foreign fighters moved by Assad into Iraq is probably quite high.
The Assad regime has been an avowed enemy of the United States and its allies for a very
long time, albeit covertly. And throughout the Syrian revolution, the Assad regime has played an
equally significant role in facilitating the growth of groups like ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra, through
the release of Islamist prisoners who went on to establish a variety of extremist groups in Syria.
Many of these figures dont have a very public face, but theyre in the top ranks of ISIS, Jabhat
al-Nusra and a variety of other jihadist organizations in Syria.
The Assad regime purposely released those people with the explicit knowledge that they
would go on to establish these kinds of groups. Its up to us in the West to recognize that kind of
behavior, and the implications that its had, and then to make judgements afterwards.
DR. MATTAIR: When we chose this topic, it was not long after the attacks in Paris. Can the
panel assess the risk of such an attack taking place here in the United States? Can any of you
20

speak to the topic of conventional armed attacks against ISIS by the United States? There are some
pretty good scholars in Washington who advocate that and say we could do it with a relatively
small number of forces, lets say 8,000 to 12,000. Why are they wrong?
DR. CRONIN: I think its inevitable that there will be additional terrorist attacks in the United
States. I dont think that theyll be of the scale of the Paris attacks; the contexts are quite different.
But, especially because the United States is inadvertently helping to increase ISISs media profile,
its more successful in reaching out to people who are frustrated and want to sign onto their narra-
tive. I am also extremely concerned about the degree to which we are enhancing their core strategy
of polarization by making unbelievably irresponsible statements in the context of our presidential
election.
MR. WECHSLER: We would have already had far more such attacks if not for the continuous
work of the FBI and the police departments. Its not like the terrorists arent trying. The reason
there hasnt been a greater number of attacks and weve unfortunately had some already is
because of the good work of literally thousands and thousands of people across the United States
every single day. In part, the American public is at risk of missing this reality because the law-
enforcement personnel have been so successful. But the threat of these kinds of attacks is real.
MR. LISTER: I absolutely agree with whats been said already. I think attacks of some form are
probably inevitable. The only thing I would add is, dont forget about al-Qaeda. They are still per-
fectly capable of carrying out a spectacular attack in America of the sort that we fear ISIS might
carry out in another way. We mustnt get too focused on one organization when theres one weve
been fighting for a very long time that still wants to carry out another 9/11 or a small bombing in
Times Square or somewhere else.
DR. KATZ: Its clear that such an attack cant be ruled out. The real question is, what would be
the impact of such an attack? One possibility is that well decide weve had enough and were not
going to be involved anymore. I dont think thats going to be the American reaction. Certainly,
with regard to the terrorist attacks, the French government seems to see itself as being at war. The
other possibility is that we lash out, we overreact, we intervene somewhere, as we did after 9/11. Is
that what the terrorists actually want? We have to make sure that we keep our head. We should not
play into doing what the terrorists want, whether its too much or too little.
MR. WECHSLER: It would be a significant mistake for us to put tens of thousands of troops on
the ground inside Iraq and Syria to fight this ourselves. We had problems doing it before, and we
didnt solve all the issues. Even without those tens of thousands of ground forces, there will still
be a need for U.S. military direct action, though. As I said in my comments, direct action in these
types of campaigns is almost never decisive. That doesnt mean it shouldnt be a component of our
strategy; it just cant be the core of our strategy.
Theres going to be a role for U.S. airpower. Theres going to be a role for discreet, targeted,
direct actions when required, for hostage rescues and for raids on certain facilities. And theres go-
ing to be a significant role for U.S. forces to be training and equipping and advising and assisting
and accompanying missions inside Iraq and Syria. Those are very dangerous missions.
This requires significant numbers of people, but it is very different from a scenario where we
are occupying a country, where we are the ones taking on the fight in the first place. A direct-action
campaign takes a long period of time, but it can be successful. Again, I point to Colombia and the
Philippines and, to a degree even now, Somalia.
21

DR. MATTAIR: All of you spoke about the importance of working with partners in combating
ISIS. How would you assess how well those partnerships are working now? Im speaking about
Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Some of them are saying that its difficult for them to throw
themselves into this when they are not sure that we have enough skin in the game. We are not as
involved as they would like us to be, particularly in countering Russia and Iran and Assad. How
are the areas of cooperation developing with those countries? And what are we saying to them to
alleviate their concerns about our intentions?
DR. KATZ: I think we need to do more, obviously. Tom, you and I were in Riyadh in September
2014 for a Saudi Foreign Ministry conference in which it was made clear to us that there was a lot
of concern about the pursuit of the Iranian nuclear accord. I personally think it was a good thing to
have done. On the other hand, I think an effort should have been made to reassure our traditional
allies in the region that we were going to continue to work with them, and not simply give Iran a
free pass.
And they certainly have reason to worry about Iran. Look at Iranian activity in Iraq and Syria.
And they believe that Iran is active in Yemen and Bahrain, and that more needed to be done by the
United States to counter Tehran. Then, when they dont see us doing anything, they start to act on
their own. That was part of the problem in Syria. Not seeing American leadership, some of our al-
lies decided they had better do what they needed to do. I think its fairly understandable.
Theres going to have to be a greater American diplomatic effort. Managing alliances is dif-
ficult. Its in some ways more complicated than dealing with adversaries. You dont have to worry
about hurting the feelings of your opponents. But you do have to be concerned about your friends.
I think thats something we have to pay attention to.
MR. LISTER: I agree. More needs to be done. Theres a lot of suspicion and paranoia in the
region that the United States is diverting its traditional alliances in the Middle East onto another
track. And whether you believe that or not, perception is very often more important than fact. The
perception is certainly that the United States is almost unilaterally pursuing rapprochement with
Iran and ignoring its traditional allies in the region. This has had major implications with regard
to the ability to develop a genuinely unified and synchronized strategy against ISIS, but its also
had a knock-on impact on the ability to develop a genuinely durable political track on Syria. While
you do have all of the key states sitting around the table agreeing in principle to certain ideas, the
established belief in the region is that there is very little actual agreement around that table. That is
particularly the case between Iran and, for example, the Gulf states and Turkey, but also between
the Gulf states and Turkey and the United States. And I dont see any movement being made to
rectify that situation.
DR. MATTAIR: Charles, you know the cast of characters on the ground very well. Who are the
partners on the ground inside Syria that we could be working with to change the situation and
increase prospects for a diplomatic resolution that would lead to Assads departure and allow
everyone to concentrate on ISIS?
MR. LISTER: I would build on what the CIA appears to have done with regional partners in the
country roughly 40 groups on the ground. Those relationships are solid, but the scale of support
provided to them is still kind of minimal. I would argue for expanding them. Those 40 groups
would be worth building on, but there is a variety of other movements in key strategic areas of the
country where, for example, jihadists do not have a stranglehold over the broader dynamics. Prob-
ably one of the most important examples in that respect is Aleppo. If ISIS launches a major offen-
22

sive in this thin strip of northern Aleppo, between the regime and Kurdish territory in the west and
ISIS territory in the east, thats of massive significance to the entire conflict in Syria. Turkey will
probably not allow it to happen.
In any case, there are a number of groups. Fastaqm Kama Umrat, for example, is a very well-
known Aleppo-rooted movement that is inherently moderate. Its been in Aleppo since the very
beginning of the fighting in Aleppo city. It has extraordinarily minimal contact with the Western
world because it has operated within alliances with other organizations that the West hasnt neces-
sarily liked.
This movement has a highly capable political leadership who have begun to reach out to some
European states in the last few months, and with some success, but there doesnt seem to be a lot
of reciprocity on the U.S. side. These people are fighting on the front line against ISIS, sitting
there in the trenches, fighting every single day. They have been defending towns that, if they fell,
everything will fall.
They have, through other groups supported by the United States, got the phone numbers of
various people. And they have attempted at times to call in airstrikes. They said, listen, we are
absolutely on the precipice of losing everything, and theyve made phone calls. When theyre
answered, they just say, sorry, we cant do anything, and put the phone down. Most of the time,
theyre not answered. Theres an amazing desire within many of these groups to have a working
relationship with the United States.
I think thats underappreciated. Its easy to sit here and see loads of men with beards and say,
well, they cant possibly be potential partners of ours. But theyre all desperate to work with the
West in pursuit of what they see as a just fight. Part of that does mean fighting Assad. The argu-
ment that we shouldnt be fighting Assad but we should be fighting ISIS is slightly confused. As
far as Im concerned, removing Assad, preferably politically, will actually open the gates to a
much more effective counter-ISIS strategy.
With Assad in place, were never going to defeat ISIS in Syria. He is their best recruitment
mechanism within the Syrian population. He has facilitated their growth, their expansion, and their
continued existence within his territory. Hes still buying their oil. In fact, his key middleman was
just recently sanctioned by the United Nations for doing exactly that. Its critical that we recognize
the interdependent relationship there. With regard to defeating ISIS, there has to be some way,
preferably politically, to remove Assad and his regime from power.
DR. CRONIN: I hope Im not stepping out of line, but I wanted to ask a question that follows on
from this conversation and is related to the one you just asked. That is, it seems to me that in the
Syrian context we have a number of tactical objectives, and they relate to getting rid of Assad or
getting rid of ISIS. What I dont understand is, what is the realistic future governance of that state,
assuming we were to achieve those objectives?
DR. MATTAIR: There are those who think state collapse would be the result of getting rid of
Assad and his clique, and some who think there are opposition forces willing to work together and
build a new Syria. Charles may want to comment on that, because hes written about it. Can you
just say something about Jaysh al-Islam and Ahrar ash-Sham and why those conservative, Islamist,
armed opposition movements are different from ISIS and the Nusra Front, and where they fit into
the struggle against Assad and the creation of a new Syria?
MR. LISTER: In terms of state collapse or the hope for some kind of solution and future govern-
ment, its thin. But if you are a diplomat, someone who works on Track II, or an analyst or an aca-
demic, you have to hold out some hope; you cant just give up. I feel that I have to retain some kind
23

of optimism. There are 150,000 opposition fighters right in Syria, who are all armed to the teeth and
have made it clear that if Assad is not eventually removed from power, and if there isnt some hope
of their having a role in building a future Syria, they will fight on for the rest of their lives.
We all know, from other conflicts around the world, that the longer you fight, you generally
move up the extremist ladder and become something quite different. Thats the danger, and they
see it, too. We can only try to push the political track. The opposition sees the regime as inherently
evil, the devil incarnate. Likewise, the regime sees the entire opposition in exactly the same way.
But what Ive seen in Track II work is that those boundaries can be broken down, those misunder-
standings can be defeated, by putting people in the same room together. I know its extraordinarily
resource-intensive and it takes a long time. But even government efforts at doing something like
this could be remarkably powerful in terms of encouraging the idea of Syrias remaining united.
Jaysh al-Islam and Ahrar ash-Sham are fascinating movements. More than ISIS and al-Qaeda,
theyre the kinds of groups Ive studied the most since the start of the conflict. Theyre the two
most powerful opposition groups in Syria, and they are absolutely nothing like al-Qaeda or the
Islamic State. They do not have international objectives. They are explicitly focused only on
Syria. In some individual cases within a group like Ahrar ash-Sham, they have people who retain a
transnational vision of what it means it be a Muslim or a Salafi. But they do not retain military or
revolutionary objectives beyond Syrias boundaries.
When you put them in a room with a variety of other opposition groups, although they may
be recognized as having slightly different ideological leanings, they are inherently part of the
revolution. Im not advocating by any means that the West should be working directly with these
kinds of groups, but we must recognize that they are part of the revolution. Saudi Arabia for a
very long time took a hard line against groups like this, especially Ahrar ash-Sham, but Riyadh
has now come around and persuaded the Western world that groups like Ahrar ash-Sham should,
if possible, have a role in the political process. Theyre too big to ignore, and they are part of the
revolution.
I think Ahrar ash-Sham may be becoming more hardline. They had a period of about a year
of internal debate, deciding whether or not a reformist faction was going to start leading the group
down a new path. But that movement seems to have lost out. Jaysh al-Islam has now emerged as
the key pivot for the armed opposition. Their chief political official, Mohammed Alloush, was just
named yesterday as the chief negotiator on the entire opposition team that will hopefully be going
to Geneva. Thats a big promotion if you look at the rest of the people on that negotiating team. So
these groups cannot be ignored.
24

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Symposium: The ISIS Threat to U.S.

The ISIS Threat to U.S. National Security:

The following is a transcript of the eighty-third in a series of Capitol Hill

WILLIAM F. WECHSLER, Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress; Former

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MARK N. KATZ, Professor of Government and Politics, George Mason University;

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CHARLES LISTER, Resident Fellow, Middle East Institute; Former Visiting

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AUDREY KURTH CRONIN, Distinguished Service Professor and Director,

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there are risks.

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