Professional Documents
Culture Documents
J. B. Conacher
Professor Emeritus
University of Toronto
Palgrave Macmillan
ISBN 978-1-349-19001-0 ISBN 978-1-349-18999-1 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-18999-1
J. B. Conacher, 1987
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1987
All rights reserved. For information, write:
Scholarly & Reference Division,
St. Martin's Press, Inc., 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010
v
List of Illustrations
1 NOW FOR IT! 7
A Set-to Between 'Pam, the Downing Street Pet', and
'The Russian Spider'.
[Punch, 17 February 1855]
vii
Preface
In my Aberdeen Coalition, 1852-1855 I dealt at some length with
the Eastern Question, Crimean War diplomacy and the failure of
wartime military administration as well as with the politics of the
Coalition and its domestic achievements and setbacks. The book had
to come to an end with the fall of the Aberdeen administration and
consequently had to leave the diplomatic and military problems that
it examined unresolved. The present book, long postponed because
of other commitments, seeks to resolve those problems of war and
peace and, as originally conceived, to study the continuing relation-
ship between Peelites and Liberals during the latter part of the
Crimean War when Palmerston became Prime Minister, but the
result was a book too long to be financially viable in these days of
high publishing costs. Consequently I have had virtually to eliminate
the second theme and to make other quite drastic cuts elsewhere,
especially in sections dealing with the Anglo-American recruitment
crisis and the controversial Kars campaign.
My approach, as in the Aberdeen Coalition, remains a narrative
one. History so written can be regarded as a branch of literature and
the historian can tell a story for its own sake if the events he deals
with are worth recording. At the same time, while presenting his
research in the form of a narrative, there is no reason why he cannot
perform his analytic function, explaining as far as the evidence allows
him, why as well as how the events of which he writes happened
and with what consequences. His point of view should emerge from
his selection and presentation of the evidence and from the gloss
that he will put on it from time to time as he chooses. I tell the story
as it seems to make sense to me, but do not wish to over-emphasise
what seems to me to be obvious, and am quite satisfied if the reader
comes to different conclusions from the evidence that I have put
before him. In my view, virtually all historical events are the result
of a multiplicity of causes and while the historian is free to make it
clear that he considers some more important than others and perhaps
one the most important he is unwise to be categorical or doctrinaire
for the evidence is rarely if ever all in.
The narrative approach, as I suggested, has its disadvantages as
well as its advantages, as for instance the necessity it imposes in this
book of plodding through the long negotiations leading up to the
ix
X Preface
1
2 Britain and the Crimea, 1855-56
but after initial victories everything had gone wrong and Sebastopol
had not been captured before winter had set in. The fact was, as
Sidney Herbert had once said, the British Army was no more than
a collection of regiments, and it was sadly lacking in effective senior
officers capable of leading and administering larger formations. The
loss of crucial supplies in November as the result of a devastating
hurricane and the lack of a passable road connecting the inadequate
port of Balaclava with the plateau outside Sebastopol where the
besieging armies were now stranded led to chaos in the winter
months and a heavy death toll from disease and inadequate diet.
The consequent outcry in the press, represented for the first time
on the field of battle by reporters, and especially the devastating
despatches of W. H. Russell in The Times, resulted in a great uproar
among the public and in the House of Commons. The Government
had been defeated by a vote of 305 to 148 on a motion of the
maverick Radical, John Roebuck, demanding the appointment of a
Committee of Inquiry. Eighty-five of the Government's usual
supporters joined the Opposition on this vote .1
It is impossible to be absolutely precise on party standings in the
House of Commons in early 1855 since contemporaries themselves
differed in their estimates, but the following figures corrected for by-
elections to the end of February should give a reasonably accurate
picture;
'he was seventy-five years old, and crippled with gout, and could not
possibly undertake such a task' with any hope of success. He advised
Victoria first to call Russell 'and hear from himself what he could
do'. This the Queen did that same afternoon, 2 February.?
While he admitted that 'the country cried out for Lord Palmerston
at the War Office', Lord John told the Queen that he did not think
'the Whigs' would join a Palmerston administration and that he
would have preferred a government led by Lansdowne or Lord
Clarendon (1800-70) with Palmerston leading the Commons and he
himself sitting on 'the Fourth Bench'. He placed great importance
on the participation of the Peelites, especially Gladstone. When
asked whether he thought he could form a government, after some
reflection he said he thought he could, but that it would be 'difficult
without the Peelites and next to impossible without Palmerston'. It
was agreed that he would discuss the matter further with Palmerston
and Lansdowne and that the latter would return to the palace with
the results of their deliberations. Lansdowne did so at nine-thirty
that evening and reported that Russell and Palmerston 'both seemed
to wish to form a government', but he agreed with Prince Albert
that, in view of Derby's failure, the Queen should take the consti-
tutional course of going first to Lord John Russell who shared the
responsibility for Aberdeen's resignation. According to the Queen,
Lansdowne 'fully believed Lord John would fail, and the trial, the
disapppointment and mortification he would feel at being refused by
his friends ... would be a wholesome and necessary lesson .... 's
When the Queen formally invited Russell to attempt the formation
of a government he immediately accepted, evidently not realising
how great an antipathy he had created among his former colleagues,
Whig as well as Peelite, by his desertion of them in their hour of
peril. It was only three years since 'Pam' had turned 'Johnny' out of
office on the Militia Bill vote in revenge for his dismissal from the
Foreign Office a few weeks earlier, but Palmerston was the first
person to whom Russell now turned. They had, after all, been
colleagues again under Aberdeen and had somewhat similar views
on the Eastern Question and the war. Palmerston appeared to be
remarkably magnanimous and agreed to lead the Commons with
Russell going to the Lords, but he was not taking much risk for he
must have known Russell could not succeed. The Peelites, Glad-
stone, Sidney Herbert, Sir James Graham and the young Duke of
Argyll (1823-1900) all refused to join, Graham who had known
Russell the longest 'taxing him roundly for his vexatious conduct'
6 Britain and the Crimea, 1855-56
Immediately after hearing from Lord John, the Queen asked Palmer-
stan whether he could undertake to form a Government which would
command the confidence of Parliament. When he replied in the
the Whigs are angry that the Peelites have joined me, and have
occupied places which the Whigs hoped to have themselves; but
if the Peelites had not joined me, we should have had an equally
numerous band of discontented, only with this difference that they
would have consisted of more able men. Aberdeen and Newcastle
behaved in the most friendly and honourable manner possible in
persuading their friends to remain in the Government, but I see
that the Peelite section still continues to make itself a little separate
section. 20
Hostility towards the Peelites was voiced from both sides of the
House on 6 February as petulant questions were asked for reasons
about a further adjournment without any ministerial announcement.
G. F. Muntz, a Radical, said that the people believed they 'were
waiting for two or three aristocratic families to adjust their differ-
ences', and asked whether there were not men enough to govern the
country 'without entering the charmed circle of these aristocratic
relationships'. R. Malins, an independent Conservative, joined the
protest against the long delay and said the House should get on with
the appointment of a Committee of Inquiry as proposed by the
Roebuck motion. Roebuck explained that he was waiting to know
what members of the House would be in office before proposing
names for his Committee. As for Palmerston's alleged difficulties in
forming a Government, Roebuck argued that it was the country
which had chosen Palmerston and so he should tell those who were
making the difficulties to stand aside while he formed an adminis-
tration, 'regardless of party considerations, and regardless of
personal considerations', made up of individuals who already had
the confidence of the country or who would attain it through him
(men, perhaps, like Roebuck and Muntz).2 1
By next day, of course, the crisis was over and ironically the
spokesman for the Government on a routine vote on account for
Ordnance expenditure was Gladstone, the Chancellor of the Exch-
equer, who had been singled out for vilification in the attacks of the
previous day. The new Prime Minister and other Ministers taking
new offices (Sidney Herbert and Sir George Grey) were not present
since the law required their re-election. Consequently, it fell to Lord
Granville as President of the Council to announce the formation of
the new ministry in the House of Lords. He took the opportunity of
Lord Aberdeen's presence to pay tribute to the late Prime Minister
as 'one of the most generous minded, liberal, just and courageous
12 Britain and the Crimea, 1855-56
down' Roebuck's Committee, but that they would not do this unless
they saw some movement on the part of the administration. 'But
your staff must be changed', he insisted. A week later he admitted
that the Committee could not be stopped, but promised that he
would resign rather than allow it to deal with the Army and its
discipline _33
The official announcements about steps taken suggested that the
new Government was not resting on its oars, but the House and
the press did not appear to be appeased. According to Greville,
Palmerston's 'entreaty to postpone the committee was greeted with
a sort of scorn and manifestation of hostility and distrust'. Of the
ten members who expressed an opinion in the short debate that
followed only two supported Palmerston's proposal to drop the
Committee and of the seven who asked for a continuation of the
Committee four were Liberals. Writing to the Queen that night,
Palmerston reported that it was generally believed that the appoint-
ment of the committee would be carried by a 'very great majority'
and that consequently the best way of meeting it was to move some
instruction 'limiting the range of its enquiry'. 34
The Cabinet discussed the matter on 16 February. Wood and Grey
were inclined to go ahead with the committee since it had been
affirmed by such a large majority before the restructured cabinet
resumed office, providing it was appointed by the committee of
selection and instructed to confine its investigations in the first
instance 'to the conduct of the Government Departments'. Graham
doubted whether such an instruction would be effectual, while Glad-
stone said he could accept a committee so limited, but not otherwise.
He thought it was 'impossible to agree to any inquiry by committee
into the state of the Army in the Crimea while the expedition [was]
in progress' and argued vehemently 'upon the breach of duty which
it would involve' on their part 'towards those holding responsible
commands'. According to Gladstone 'Panmure said that if the
Committee were granted he would not answer for it that the army
would not be in a state of mutiny within a month' and asserted that
he 'would say this in his place in the House of Lords'. Molesworth
believed the House would insist on a committee without limitation
but supported its being named by the committee of selection. Gran-
ville proposed dissolution but did not press it on getting no suppport.
Argyll and Herbert were strongly opposed to the committee, while
Canning, Clarendon, Cranworth and Lansdowne were silent,
presumably because they were all peers. The long discussion ended
The Palmerston Coalition, February 1855 17
and with the most perfect sympathy'. Gladstone spoke later in the
evening at unnecessary length, covering much of the same ground
as his two colleagues. In response to a Conservative spokesman he
denied that it would be either prudent or constitutional to 'instruct
a Select Committee to investigate the state of the army pending a
great military operation'. Therefore he concluded, they found it their
duty 'to resist and protest against this measure ... with great pain
and with wounded feelings . . . but with a fixed and immoveable
determination', which public interests and their own consciences
required. He made no promises of continued support for the Govern-
ment as had his two friends, but he did bring himself to express a
warm regard for Palmerston. 42
Palmerston responded briefly, saying that he would not criticise
his departed friends and was sorry to lose them. He said that he
had thought the committee would have been dropped following the
change of government, but that he would not have accepted office
if it had meant that he had to insist on the House rescinding its vote.
' ... I think it would be a greater evil', he said, 'if this country should
present to the world the lamentable spectacle that, in consequence
of personal differences, and in consequence of the fragmentary
division of parties, we should for one month or six weeks be unable
to find any set of public men who could present themselves to the
country as a government, and undertake the conduct of the public
affairs of the nation. ' 43
Disraeli concentrated his attack on Palmerston rather than on the
Peelites, asking whether he still had a government and how he
could reconcile his opposition to the committee last Friday with his
acceptance of it today, but he also took issue with Gladstone's denial
of precedents. 44
Of the other contributions made to the debate the most memorable
was Bright's famous 'angel of death' speech, in which he said that
he did not condemn Graham and his friends since they were acting
from a sense of what was right and wrong, but that he regretted
their resignation, because he was concerned that Palmerston's
Government should survive to secure peace, an objective on which
Palmerston reassured him. 45
Of the nine remaining speakers, five were critical of the committee.
These included two Conservatives, Lord Seymour and General Peel,
who reluctantly accepted nomination to it, Robert Lowe, a leader
writer of The Times, soon to accept office, and G. E. H. Vernon, a
22 Britain and the Crimea, 1855-56
Peelite, who said that party 'might now be called defunct', and who
promised to support the government. 46
The House then proceeded to the appointment of the committee
although several members attempted unsuccessfully to postpone the
matter, or to impose some limitation on the committee's role. The
Prime Minister indicated that he was satisfied that the members who
had been nominated could be trusted to avoid the dangerous topics
mentioned during the debate and he did not propose any limitation.
Roebuck said that the nominations had been made in consultation
with the Prime Minister, that the committee's task was a difficult
one, but that the House could have confidence in its good judgement.
When a member suggested the addition of a Mr Miles because he
was connected with Lord Raglan by marriage, Roebuck observed
that 'this was the first time he ever heard that a member of the jury
ought to be a relation of the prisoner in the dock', a phrase not
calculated to inspire confidence in his good judgement.47
The history of the ministerial crisis of 1855 is not very creditable
to the Peelite triumvirate who first resisted joining the Palmerston
administration, then accepted office and finally withdrew less than
three weeks later. Their original hesitation was to be explained by
their over-sensitive regard for their excluded colleagues, Aberdeen
and Newcastle, combined with a certain distrust of Palmerston as
Prime Minister, but neither of these reasons really justified their
initial refusal to help meet the emergency. Was loyalty to friends to
be placed before duty to the state in time of war, especially when
the friends themselves urged them to join? They may have had good
reason for reservations about Palmerston, but he was the only person
who had proved himself capable of forming a government, he was
doing his best to maintain the coalition, which had worked well for
the previous two years, and he had made important commitments in
the field of foreign policy. Personal relations between Whig and
Peelite ministers had been better than the relations in some one-
party cabinets. Graham, Gladstone and Herbert should not have
hesitated so long before accepting office and should have been more
determined to play their part once they had done so. It was generally
agreed that they were three of the ablest ministers in the Cabinet,
both as administrators and as parliamentary debaters. They were
bound to carry weight in the Cabinet, especially since they had
colleagues who shared their views regarding the desirability of a
reasonable peace settlement.
Their hesitation in accepting office was regrettable in that it
The Palmerston Coalition, February 1855 23
for it, and were apparently not anxious to remain in office, but in
this situation the more patriotic decision would have been to have
swallowed their pride and to have accepted the majority decision of
their colleagues. Their great objective was a peace settlement and
this might have been achieved sooner had they remained. Long
afterwards, Gladstone was less certain that they had been right and
he admitted that they were severely and generally condemned.
29
30 Britain and the Crimea, 1855-56
because Austria, the reluctant ally whom they were hoping to bring
into the war, had unexpectedly persuaded the Emperor Nicholas I
to accept the Four Points as a basis of negotiation. Nicholas had
died suddenly in early March, and his son, Alexander II, although
less rigid and himself anxious for peace, was not prepared to make
it on terms he considered dishonourable for Russia.
The crucial issue was the Third Point regarding the revision of the
Treaty of 1841. In negotiating their alliance with Austria in
December Britain and France had agreed to an elaboration of this
Point to the effect that the Treaty of 1841 should be revised to end
Russian preponderance in the Black Sea, with precise arrangements
to be left pending the events of war. 2 Britain and France had,
however, at the same time secretly agreed between themselves that
Sebastopol and possibly other Russian fortresses on the Black Sea
must be destroyed and Russia limited to four warships in those
waters. 3 When Russia had agreed to the Vienna negotiations (to the
surprise of Britain and France) neither she nor Austria was aware
of this secret qualification on the part of the Western Allies, which
did not contradict the published definition of the Third Point but
carried it further than the Russians were likely to go. Consequently
the British Government entered the Vienna Conference in the spring
of 1855 with little expectation that it would reach a successful
conclusion.
it was finally closed on 4 June. Lord John got along well with Buol,
the pro-Western Austrian Foreign Minister, and Bourqueney, the
able French Minister in Vienna, with whom he fully discussed the
course of action they should take when the Conference opened on
15 March. Once in Vienna it was clear that he was genuinely anxious
to achieve a settlement if it was at all possible. Russell was relieved
to find there was no evidence, as had been feared, of prior agreement
between Buol and Gortchakov and good progress was made on the
first two points respecting the Principalities and freedom of navi-
gation on the Danube. He was chagrined, however, when Clarendon
objected to a proposed five-power guarantee as likely to lead to
eventual Austro-Russi:m dominance of the Principalities. In a blunt
despatch the Foreign Secretary told Russell that there were no
grounds 'for consenting to make peace on terms that would neither
be honourable for the Allies nor safe for Europe,' and Palmerston
added his bit in a private letter, claiming that it would be impossible
for himself or for Clarendon to stand up in Parliament and justify a
treaty with the stipulations Russell was proposing. He realised that
there was a danger Russell would be unwilling to return empty-
handed and told Clarendon they 'must keep him up to the mark'. 9
Palmerston and Clarendon remained highly sceptical of success
and suspicious of Buol. Clarendon, whose moods seemed to oscillate
between aggressive defiance and gloomy pessimism, refused to be
impressed by Russell's reports of progress, but had to admit to
Palmerston that there was 'something ridiculous in insisting on the
demolition of Sebastopol which we cannot take and the limitation
of a naval force we cannot get at'. Palmerston was more robust. He
thought that the negotiations were premature because they must
first capture Sebastopol. When Russell wrote (in terms worthy of
Aberdeen) to say he did not think they could 'do more than urge
the diminution of the Russian fleet' and that he could not 'bear the
thought of carrying on the war till [their] armies had won a great
victory,' Palmerston commented: 'Nobody ought to wish to continue
the war for the mere sake of obtaining some brilliant success but we
must unfortunately continue the war until we can obtain that future
security for which we began the contest.' Palmerston had only agreed
to the negotiations because he wanted to keep the Austrian alliance,
but solutions that might seem reasonable to Russell would be quite
unacceptable to him. Clarendon, although less confident, was content
to accept Palmerston's lead, believing that was the course that public
opinion favoured.to
The Vienna Conference of 1855 33
in the Black Sea to its present size, which, as we have seen, Gort-
chakov had also referred to St Petersburg. Russell said that in that
case it was time for Austria to implement the Treaty of 2 December,
that is, to enter the war. Buol demurred and instead proposed that
Austria should offer a guarantee in the Balkans and that Turkey
should be permitted to call in her allies if the Russian fleet in the
Black Sea reached a certain number. Russell therefore asked Clar-
endon whether they could settle for anything less than limitation. 'I
should not mind any clamour in England if I could think such a
peace as Buol suggests creditable or safe', he wrote. 'But I cannot
think it would be either.' He was becoming weary of the Conference
and in the same letter asked for a replacement if the discussions
went on to the Fourth Point.19
Meanwhile the French Foreign Minister, Drouyn de Lhuys, had
been discussing a new approach with Clarendon and after a visit to
London on 30 March to get the final approval of the British Govern-
ment he proceeded to Vienna to lead the French delegation himself,
with the result that Austria, Britain and France were now all
represented at the Conference by senior cabinet ministers, scarcely
the occasion for window-dressing. The essence of Drouyn's new
proposal was the neutralisation of the Black Sea except for police
boats, with the limitation of the Russian and Turkish navies on the
Black Sea to four sail of the line and four frigates each as a less
desirable alternative.2o
Russell was furious at Clarendon's failure to keep him in the
picture - he had first heard of the new project from the French
ambassador on 26 March - and at a letter written by Palmerston on
28 March, disparaging what progress had been made. Russell replied
to the Prime Minister saying that he had only joined his Cabinet to
help out in a crisis, but now that things had settled down he thought
that Palmerston should look for a new Colonial Secretary since he
was anxious to get out. Palmerston knew that a Russell letter of
resignation did not have to be taken too seriously and dismissed it
in his next letter in his most breezy manner. 'As to giving away the
seals,' he wrote, 'that would be giving away the apple of our eye.'
Russell had already sent off a brief to Clarendon claiming that he
was too angry to write, but allowing himself a sharp closing sally.
'Perhaps for the sake of the public service', he wrote, 'you will
think it advisable not to lower your Special Envoy too much in the
estimation of foreign courts.'21
When Lord John finally received Clarendon's despatch regarding
The Vienna Conference of 1855 37
If the Cabinet did not want to accept this proposal, Russell asked
that he might be heard in person before a final decision was made.
In a private letter Russell reiterated his request that no final decision
should be made before he reached England on 29 April and added:
'It is with great hesitation I say the 3d system ought to be accepted',
but he tied it to an Austrian readiness to go to war. Palmerston liked
none of this and on reading the despatches commented to Clarendon:
'I am very glad that John Russell is coming away. The truth is as
Drummond said of him in 1851 he is a man who seldom sees the
consequences of his own acts. '28
The Conference met again on 19 April and, with some reservation
on the part of Gortchakov, agreed to a statement regarding the
territorial independence and integrity of Turkey and her membership
in the European system. Reminding Russia that all treaties placed
some curtailment on national sovereignty, Drouyn then proceeded
to make the limitation proposal (allowing Russia and Turkey each a
maximum of four ships of the line and four frigates). After much
discussion the meeting adjourned to 21 April when Gortchakov
declined to accept the proposals, saying that they were derogatory
to the sovereign rights of the Russian Emperor, 'contrary to the
European equilibrium, and dangerous to the independence of the
Ottoman Empire'. Instead he suggested that the Black Sea should
be open to all fleets. The British, French and Turkish delegates,
however, protested that they were not authorised to discuss such
proposals. According to Russell a spirit of recrimination character-
ised both meetings, as Gortchakov, elated by news of Allied setbacks
in the Crimea, attempted to arouse Turkish suspicions of Britain and
France. 29
Austria was now prepared to put forward her alternative plan
(see above) which Russell immediately forwarded to London with a
request for instructions, repeating his hope that the Austrian
proposal would not be rejected without his being present; although
recognising the urgency he did not actually ask for a delay.3o
On receiving news of the latest Austrian proposal or 'ultimatum',
as it was called, from Drouyn, the French Emperor was disposed to
refuse it and to break off relations, but he first asked the British
Government what they meant to do. Clarendon told the French
40 Britain and the Crimea, 1855-56
II DEATH OF A CONFERENCE
The Cabinet has lasted till 7 [he wrote] ... - the project as
amended by the Emperor has been considered and discussed in
all its different bearings . . . but the affair is so grave and the
consequences at home and abroad so momentous of giving up
what we have been contending ... that it is impossible to come
to a hasty decision -we will consider it again and again and I hope
the Emperor won't be annoyed at the delay ....
. . . I must tell you in confidence that the Cabinet is divided and
Lord John would probably leave it on the question- the neutrality
of Austria would leave Russia at liberty to bring all her forces
against us and lastly that the greatest evil of all we have Generals
in the Crimea not worth their salt. In short it is the most tremen-
dous fix that ever a government was placed in, but as yet I cannot
bring myself to swallow even the amended form. 38
had decided to abandon the last proposal and to return to the first
project of limitation, a decision he presumed would be in accord
with the wishes of the British Cabinet. At the following Cabinet
discussion some members regretted abandoning altogether a scheme
that, if amended, might have led to peace, for which, Clarendon
admitted, there was 'a growing desire' in the country, but he claimed
there was at last 'no difference of opinion about declining the
proposal of Austria'. Nevertheless, he wanted it clearly understood
that the earlier French plan had not been rejected by the Cabinet;
'the state of public opinion is such here now,' he wrote, 'that we
must be able to shew that we have not absolutely closed the door to
peace. ' 43 Clarendon was sensitive to the winds of public opinion from
whatever direction they blew.
Lord Cowley, who, to the chagrin of Hubner, the Austrian
ambassador, had extraordinary influence with LouisNapoleon, was
largely responsible for the dramatic change in the Emperor's views.
All along he had been highly critical of the conciliatory line that
Russell and Drouyn had adopted in Vienna and had expressed his
views strongly in a private letter to Clarendon who, he was confident,
agreed with him. 'I cannot understand Lord John', he wrote on
1 May, 'nor can I conceive a more dishonorable peace than that
which he proposes.' When he met Drouyn following the latter's
return from Vienna he strongly disagreed with the French Foreign
Minister's arguments in favour of the proposed settlement and wrote
again to Clarendon urging that the British Government should tell
the Emperor 'that our honour as well as our interests prevent our
going further'. He was shocked by Clarendon's letter of 2 May
regarding the Cabinet's indecision and again wrote privately
protesting the idea of their accepting such terms. 'It is allowing
Russia to limit us in place of our limiting Russia,' he wrote. 'If Lord
John can find a majority in the Cabinet to back his views, for God's
sake resign yourself.' He claimed that the Emperor had been
deceived by Drouyn 'who makes him believe that Austria has prom-
ised to go to war - immediately - but Drouyn's real opinion is that
Russia will accept the ultimatum'. Indeed, in a subsequent despatch
Cowley alleged that Drouyn's deliberate intention had been to
sacrifice the British alliance. 44
On 3 May Cowley was given the opportunity to intervene when
the Emperor summoned him to the Tuileries to seek his views.
Cowley gave Clarendon three separate accounts of this fateful inter-
view and its sequel, first in a private letter, then in a brief despatch
The Vienna Conference of 1855 45
relating the bald facts of the case and finally in a confidential despatch
explaining his own role. He told the Emperor that he could only
express his own appreciation of the situation since he had not yet
received instructions from his Government, but admitted that he did
not see how the French modification made the Austrian plan any
more acceptable. He found that the Emperor was under the
impression that Russia was to be required to consent to a limitation
of her fleet to the number . . . 'actually afloat' and assured the
bewildered man that this was not the case and that the arrangement
was merely one to be made with Austria. On hearing this the
Emperor said that he would consult Drouyn, but not trusting the
French Foreign Minister Cowley 'boldly' asked that he might be
present at the interview. The Emperor agreed and when they met
again that afternoon Cowley was glad to see that Marshal Vaillant,
the French War Minister, had also been invited, but in the meantime
Drouyn had again convinced his master on the matter of limitation.
Cowley and Vaillant, however, had the better of the argument and
Drouyn, who, according to Cowley, lost his temper, had to admit
that the proposal placed no direct limitation on Russia. Cowley asked
'whether having solemnly declared that their intention was to cause
the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea to cease, they were
prepared to re-establish that preponderance,' while Marshal Vaillant
stated 'that the Army would not be satisfied with a peace on those
terms'. Cowley's question was a misleading one and it is doubtful
whether Vaillant spoke for Canrobert, commanding the French army
in the Crimea, but the Emperor was persuaded by them. He said he
'despaired of finding terms that would suit the honor of the
belligerent powers' and at the same time be acceptable to Russia
and consequently concluded that they should abide by the terms
originally proposed by the Allies at the Conference. After the
meeting Drouyn de Lhuys resigned, but Cowley protested that there
had been no intrigue. Nevertheless Clarendon warned him that he
should 'never mention to a human being' that he had been consulted
by the Emperor. 45
Walewski replaced Drouyn, and Persigny, a lightweight Bonapar-
tist, replaced Walewski as ambassador in London. Clarendon was
unenthusiastic about both appointments, telling Cowley that while
Walewski (an illegitimate son of Napoleon Bonaparte) was loyal to
the alliance his intellect was 'not of an order to fit him for the
management of the foreign affairs of France at a moment of great
46 Britain and the Crimea, 1855-56
crisis. ' 46 Before long he would have cause even to doubt the new
Foreign Minister's good intentions towards Britain.
When he heard of Drouyn's resignation Russell felt that he should
do likewise. 'It is painful to leave a second Cabinet, and will injure
my reputation, perhaps irretrievably,' he wrote to Clarendon. 'But
I see no other course.' A little later he qualified his position, saying
that his own resignation was a matter of honour if he was responsible
for Drouyn's resignation, but if Drouyn was only resigning as a result
of a personal quarrel that was another matter. In that event he was
ready to reconsider, realising that since Louis Napoleon had now
changed his mind Britain could no longer accept the Austrian
proposals. 'The state of domestic affairs makes it necessary that we
should do everything possible to keep together,' he concluded.47
Thus unfortunately in the end the combined appeals of Clarendon
and Palmerston persuaded Russell to withdraw his resignation. He
had in fact been misled by Clarendon who had failed to tell him of
the intervention of the British ambassador in Paris that had resulted
in Napoleon's abandonment of Drouyn. Thus remaining in office put
Russell in a very anomalous position when subsequently he had to
defend in Parliament a policy he had opposed in the Cabinet. The
year 1855 was a bad one for Lord John.
The Vienna Conference was not formally ended until early June,
but with the resignation of Drouyn and the surrender of Russell it
no longer had any chance of success. On 26 April, just after Russell's
departure, the Allied ambassadors had declared the Russian proposal
for opening the Straits to all fleets as unacceptable. As an alternative
Gortchakov then proposed that the Straits should remain closed, but
that the Porte should reserve the right of inviting the fleets of any
foreign powers to enter 'whenever she should consider her security
menaced'. The Allies also found this alternative unacceptable, but
Buol thought that it was an improvement over the previous Russian
proposal and that it admitted discussion. 48
Buol did not provide a text of the Austrian proposals in writing
until mid-May by which time he had extended them to include the
principle of limitation of the Russian fleet to the number of ships
afloat at the end of the war. If Russia rejected them, as he antici-
pated, then he would formally bring the conferences to a close, but
he did not consider that Austria would be required to take up arms
since the Allies had rejected the previous proposals in which Austria
had indicated the terms under which she would do so. The British
Government decided not to accept these revised proposals, since
The Vienna Conference of 1855 47
Austria was not prepared to make them a casus belli and since, if
Russia refused them, as seemed likely, acceptance now would
weaken the allied position in future negotiations. Palmerston and
Clarendon, however, were anxious to avoid a rupture with Austria,
'for as long as her ultimate course remains at all doubtful,' Palmer-
ston observed, 'she makes a valuable diversion in our favor. ' 49 Clar-
endon feared that Russell and several other ministers might have
qualms about breaking off relations altogether and this was certainly
true of Argyll, who was so despondent that at one point he told his
wife he had almost made up his mind 'to cut the cable'.5 The peace
party in the Cabinet was weak, but it existed and would have been
much stronger if the Peelite ministers had not resigned so quickly.
Despite his earlier apprehension that there was a growing public
demand for peace, Clarendon now declared that the war feeling in
London was on the rise, fanned by rumours of the negotiation of a
'bad peace', by suspicions of Austria, and by the news that the peace
party was 'waxing stronger every day at Paris'. When Walewski
proposed reopening the Conference to invite the Russians to recon-
sider the matter of limitation, the British Cabinet, called to decide
on what Clarendon termed 'these miserable French and Austrian
projects', was 'quite determined not to submit to the humiliation of
begging Russia to reconsider the decision she announced in the
Conference'. Nevertheless they recognised that they could not
separate themselves from France and strenuous efforts were made,
by Clarendon writing directly to Walewski, and the Queen and
Palmerston to Louis Napoleon, putting forward the British
position. 51
Persigny, the new French ambassador, who, in Clarendon's view,
although a great talker had more imagination than his predecessor,
assured the Foreign Secretary that nothing could 'disturb the
alliance'. He admitted that the French Government as well as public
opinion had 'been enervated by a fear of the Emperor's journey to
the Crimea' and consequently converted to the idea of 'paix a tout
prix' as the lesser evil. Nevertheless, he asserted that he and others
had 'always intended to recommence the war in 6 months sur le
Rhine ou autre part, and that the Emperor although he
recommended to [Britain] the last proposals made by Austria hoped
[the British] would refuse them.' 'Well may Cowley say,' Clarendon
sanctimoniously observed to Russell, 'that in politics Frenchmen
cannot distinguish between right and wrong. ' 52
In the end, at 'great sacrifice', according to Walewski, and in order
48 Britain and the Crimea, 1855-56
Government into the hands of the war party. Consequently they all
agreed to try to persuade Gibson to withdraw his motion if the
Government could assure them that the negotiations were not closed.
When Milner Gibson's motion came before the House on 21 May
Palmerston, in answer to a question from Herbert of which he had
been given notice, asserted that if any proposal was made 'which
was considered likely to lead to a satisfactory result the [Vienna]
conference would be ready to be reassembled'. (It was a misleading
answer, if technically accurate.) Gladstone then declared that this
put a new light on the situation and urged Gibson to withdraw his
motion which, after a brief debate, Gibson and his seconder reluc-
tantly agreed to do. Disraeli made the most of the occasion,
denouncing Herbert and Gladstone for their temerity and Palmerston
for his pusillanimity and asking the Prime Minister why he placed
the papers on the table if he did not want them discussed. Palmerston
replied that he had provided Parliament with the papers it was
entitled to see, but that he disapproved of the motion because he
'thought it would be shutting the door on future negotiations' (not
an entirely honest explanation) and because it infringed on the func-
tions of the executive. Russell said the Allied representatives were
all agreed that there was no basis of accommodation in the Russian
proposals, but that he expected that the Austrian government would
make further proposals which would either be rejected or lead to
further negotiations. Again this was a misleading statement since the
Cabinet had already decided to reject Buol's proposals. 'The Tories
were furious at the idea of postponement', Palmerston wrote to
Clarendon after the debate, 'because they evidently expected that the
discussion would enable them to establish some shade of difference
between different members of the Government.' He complimented
Russell for speaking 'shortly and discreetly'. 'We studiously
abstained', he dryly observed, 'from any mention or allusion to
recent communications with Austria. '56
In the Lords on 26 May Lord Grey insisted on going on with
his motion, deploring the failure of the negotiations and referring
favourably to the Russian proposal. He made a long and contentious
speech which sounded more friendly to the Russians than to the
Allies and consequently antagonised his hearers on both sides of the
House. The Dukes of Argyll and Newcastle, the Bishop of Oxford
and Lords Clarendon, Derby, Granville and Malmesbury all spoke
against his motion and Lord Lyttelton, Mrs Gladstone's brother-in-
law, alone gave him support ,57
50 Britain and the Crimea, 1855-56
Excluding the Speaker and allowing for six vacant seats, he put the
total strength of the Conservatives in the House of Commons at
292 with the Liberals at 359, including the Peelites and the Irish
Independents. He explained that he did not count members as
Conservative 'who do not receive notes from Joliffe, and who would
not support a Conservative Government, though they may not always
go with a Conservative opposition'. 68
The division had actually been on the motion to delete the objec-
tionable words in the original motion, but when the second question
was put to insert Baring's additional clause which would have
completed the transformation of the original motion from one of
lack of confidence to one of approbation Lowe proposed his amend-
ment to shouts of 'Adjourn' and 'Divide'. Palmerston said he had
no objection to the first part of Lowe's amendment, which blamed
Russia for the failure of the negotiations, because it was a matter of
fact, but opposed the concluding words which would be an inter-
ference with the prerogatives of the Crown. After some argument
as to the continuation of the debate, the House adjourned at 3.15
am to Monday, 4 June.69
On the very day the Vienna Conference ended, the parliamentary
debate was resumed, nominally on Lowe's proposed amendment
placing the blame for the breakdown of peace negotiations on
Russia's 'refusal to restrict the strength of her navy in the Black
Sea'. The advanced war party supported the amendment with
enthusiasm, but Palmerston, as we have seen, opposed it on the
The Vienna Conference of 1855 55
57
58 Britain and the Crimea, 1855-56
state of peace for the security of Turkey, and through Turkey for
the security of Europe. '6
Roebuck predictably agreed with Cobden regarding Russell's
conduct and with Palmerston on the validity of the war. He recog-
nised the need for some compromise within a Cabinet, but not such
a compromise as Russell had made, which was 'inconsistent with all
those principles of political honesty which ought to govern the
conduct of public men'. He went on to rebuke Russell for staying
so long in Aberdeen's Cabinet, allowing an army 'to dwindle into
nothing' when he knew that the conduct of the war was 'in hands
unfitted for the task' .7 It appeared poor Lord John was in the wrong
whatever he did.
Disraeli did not let the opportunity pass. In a speech that
Broughton described as 'coarse and violent' and that Le Marchant
said none of his supporters cheered, he mocked Russell for remaining
in the Cabinet as the Minister of Peace, but recommending 'the
vigorous prosecution of the war in his place in the House'. He
thought the reasons given by Lord John for 'this extraordinary
course' seemed 'no less singular than his conduct' and solemnly
opined that 'the question of peace and war' could not be an 'open
question'. Given the Government's acceptance of the Four Points,
he queried their repudiation of their Plenipotentiary. Sir George
Grey, the only other spokesman for the Government, briefly endeav-
oured to rebut Disraeli's interpretation of what had happened at
Vienna. 8
Russell's speech came as a shock to some of his colleagues as Sir
Charles Wood explained to his cousin Lord Grey with little thought
for Cabinet confidentiality. On 9 July he wrote:
the Cabinet had rejected the propositions on 30 April, the day after
his return, but explained that 'there were circumstances which arose
in the course of these discussions which made it appear to my mind
impossible to urge the acceptance of these propositions upon the
Government ... circumstances quite independent of the merits of
the propositions themselves, and did not in the least alter my opinion
of the merits of those propositions.' He also said that when he left
Vienna he understood that the propositions would be enforced by
an Austrian ultimatum to St Petersburg and that if a treaty were
concluded Austria would enter an alliance to 'prevent and to resist
any future aggression on the part of Russia against Turkey'. The
Cabinet had concurred, 'some for one reason, some for another', in
Clarendon's despatch of 8 May (which had thrown cold water on the
Austrian proposals and called on her to fulfil her engagements under
the treaty of 2 December). Westmorland's despatch, he explained,
indicated that Austria had no intention of making a Russian rejection
of its ultimatum a casus belli and therefore Her Majesty's Govern-
ment then saw no point to going on, when it was nearly certain
Russia would reject the proposals which were less favourable to the
Allies than those proposed by Drouyn de Lhuys and himself. It
would, however, have been improper, he argued, to have made any
premature announcement, in view of the fact that uncertainty as to
Austria's intentions was tying down a large part of the Russian Army.
He again reiterated his reasons for not resigning in May although he
had offered to do so. A few days ago he had repeated his offer of
resignation which Palmerston was still unwilling to accept, but when
he had found he could not remain with advantage to the Government
he had insisted on going and Palmerston had concurred. Russell said
he was highly appreciative of the way he had been treated by his
Cabinet colleagues, but added that there were other 'friends' who
... when they once perceive
The least rub in your fortunes, fall away
Like water from ye, never found again
But when they mean to sink ye.
These he regarded with contempt but remained impervious to slander
and calumny.ls
Lord Broughton, who listened to the speech in the peers' gallery,
was not impressed. He recorded that Russell spoke 'less audibly than
usual' and that 'he was occasionally cheered- somewhat faintly'.
Perceptively he noted that Russell made no explanation of his change
Parliamentary Politics, Summer 1855 63
of mind in the first days of May. Indeed the speech was misleading
from its omissions, but Lord John had great powers of self-deception.
Lord Grey, writing in response to Wood's account, was more severe.
Johnny's conduct [he wrote] has indeed been strange and would
indeed be unaccountable did we not know how he had acted
before ... I am thoroughly convinced on looking at his whole
political career with the light thrown upon it by recent events that
from the first vanity and selfishness have been the only guides of
his conduct.16
The judgement is a harsh one (reflecting as much on Grey as on
Russell) and undoubtedly is exaggerated, but it is not without some
truth. Yet there must have been something about Russell that made
other people, more generous than Grey and with more cause for
hostility, to forgive him, or at least to put up with him in the way
people put up with a spoilt child.
Bulwer-Lytton said that under the altered circumstances he would
make his statement as temperate as possible and then went on to
make one of the most scathing attacks ever delivered by one front
bench politician against another. Lord John, he said, did not seem
to comprehend how his position was viewed by others. Here was a
man who shortly before had broken up a government by his sudden
and solitary desertion 'accompanied by a denunciation of two of his
colleagues so startling, that it was without parallel in the records of
the House'. But he had the good excuse that the question involved
the fate of armies which made it impossible for him to conceal his
sentiments. Then a few months later he brought back from Vienna
'propositions for peace which he did conscientiously recommend as
likely to end the war', yet he turned around and abused the office
he took from the Sovereign 'and the confidence that the people
placed in his honesty and truth', by going with his colleagues in
urging a continuation of the war, excusing himself by saying that he
might have damaged the Government otherwise. The speaker went
on to broaden the attack to include Palmerston who, he declared,
shared the blame and who had failed to keep his promise to adhere
to Lord Aberdeen's foreign policy. He attributed the delay in the
answering of Westmorland's despatch of 19 May to differences in
the Cabinet, suggesting that Russell did not stand alone and that
Clarendon did not represent all the Ministers. He said he would like
to hear the opinion of other ministers, especially of the Chancellor
of the Exchequer (Lewis) and the First Lord of the Admiralty
64 Britain and the Crimea, 1855-56
that Lord John could not have resigned on his return from Vienna
because he would have been accused of wishing to trip up Palmerston
in order to 'get his place'.zl
Following Russell's departure, Wood wrote a letter to Palmerston
urging him to strengthen the Cabinet along Whig lines, pointing out
that neither Molesworth nor Lewis were ready speakers, while he
himself had too heavy a departmental load to take on other subjects
with the result that Palmerston had to rely too heavily on George
Grey whose health was poor. He continued:
This is a weak corps. There is the opposite side and on our own
there is the war party and the peace party, the Pee lites and perhaps
Lord John. We really want all the speaking power that we can
raise or enlist. The readiest speaker in this way is Labouchere ....
It is right that I should say to you that I am not very comfortable
at the exclusion of so many of our old friends. Now that Lord
John has gone his place might well be taken by one of them ....
We have had a large infusion of new blood which is alright but
we have not added much weight to the Government. It is imposs-
ible that a Government can go on long losing one after another
of its good men and not adding some weight in the House of
Commons and we have been going through this for much too
long. 22
Peel, namely that the enquiry was not and could not have been
complete, the same reason for which they had opposed the appoint-
ment of the Committee. On a motion for adjournment Palmerston
said that he had hoped to conclude the debate in one evening, but
on pressure from Bright and Disraeli, who blamed the adjournment
on the failure of the Ministers to speak earlier, he agreed to it. 40
When the debate was resumed two days later the Attorney
General (Cockburn) made a spirited defence of his chief, Lord
Palmerston. Lord John Russell said that every member of the Aber-
deen administration, including the Home Secretary, was responsible
for the expedition and its conduct as long as he remained in office.
He pointed out that the motion of Roebuck (a Radical), would
disqualify them all from office and turn over the Government to the
party which had opposed Catholic Emancipation, the Reform Act
and the repeal of the Corn Laws. He also noted various inconsisten-
cies and contradictions in Roebuck's speech as did so many other
speakers and in particular the impossibility of judging the sufficiency
of the force and the wisdom of Raglan's actions without considering
the role of the French Government and the French army. He vigor-
ously defended the decision to invade the Crimea in view of the
general situation. The risks of war had to be taken and an early
victory might easily have been achieved. He made it clear that his
criticism was not of the deficiencies of individuals but of the weak-
nesses of the military organisation. 'It was not that the Duke of
Newcastle was deficient in the conscientious discharge of his duties,
or that he was not a most laborious Minister', he said; 'on the
contrary I believe that he was both conscientious and laborious and
... a man of sound judgement. But it appeared to me that he did
not have sufficient authority .... ' Nevertheless despite the defects
in organisation great activity was shown in despatching all that was
required to the Crimea. A 'fine army' had been sent out at the
beginning of the war which was initially successful in battle and it
was not fair to condemn Lord Aberdeen's administration because of
'the various accidents and the various fortunes which befall warlike
expeditions'. As for the lack of Cabinet meetings he argued that no
important decisions were required from mid August to early October
when the first full reports of operations were beginning to come in. 41
John Bright said that he had not voted for the Committee because
he thought that Roebuck's original motion was something of a
conspiracy against Aberdeen and his Peelite colleagues. But now
there was a Report before the House that could not be ignored. He
Parliamentary Politics, Summer 1855 73
Gladstone had given a silent vote on the Roebuck Report, but since
their resignation from office he had been by far the most vocal of
the four former Peelite ministers in the Commons and had spoken
as often as the other three combined. 48 In addition to the great issues
of peace and war he took his usual independent line on related issues
that interested him such as the repayment provisions for a new war
loan, new proposals for administrative reform and the Government's
proposals for a Turkish loan.49
The mismanagement and inefficient conduct of the war effort inevi-
tably produced a demand for administrative reform on the part
of business-minded middle classes who blamed it on aristocratic
inefficiency. In 1855 this was reflected outside of Parliament in the
activity of the recently founded Administrative Reform Association
and in the Commons by radicals such as Layard, independent
Liberals such as Lowe, and independent Conservatives such as
Bulwer-Lytton. 50 As the promoter of Civil Service reform when he
was a minister Gladstone was prepared to support reasonable
demands for administrative reform, while not necessarily agreeing
with all the charges of the reformers.
On 15 June Layard invited the House of Commons to support a
motion attributing the sorry state of the country which threatened
national discredit and great disasters to 'the manner in which merit
and efficiency have been sacrificed, in public appointments, to party
and family influence, and to a blind adherence to routine'. While
many members must have sympathised with the sense of frustration
that led to the making of this motion, few would have been prepared
to go so far and in such a negative direction. Consequently an
amendment was proposed by Sir Bulwer-Lytton, from the Oppo-
sition front bench, which substituted for Layard's harsh language a
resolution urging upon the ministers a careful revision of establish-
76 Britain and the Crimea, 1855-56
towards the end of January they had been forced to resign office.
Within another few weeks three of the Peelites who had accepted
Cabinet offices in Palmerston's ministry and six who had accepted
other offices had again resigned. Their position was an anomalous
one since they had resigned on the appointment of the Roebuck
committee which had been supported by the Opposition. It is true
that they were suspicious of Palmerston's intentions with regard to
the war, but they still sat on the Government side of the House, and
received the Government whip. They had no connection with the
official Opposition and more often than not supported the Govern-
ment in the division lobbies, most of them fairly faithfully. As the
session developed it was clear that with respect to the question of
peace their position was similar to that of the Manchester School on
the left wing of the Liberal party, a position that was partly shared
by some independent members of the Conservative Opposition.
Gladstone saw no objection to working with Milner Gibson and his
friends but Herbert abhorred it. The Peelites were no longer a
cohesive group. Indeed seven still held government appointments,
two in the Cabinet, and for all intents and purposes those Peelites
had now identified themselves as orthodox party members; even
most of those who held aloof from the Government may now be
regarded as independent Liberals. Liberal governments were well
used to having to put up with a dissident or independent tail.
t
A c K s
L E
B A
Kuu..
GEO~'-c.' "
8.&lOUm
lS' E 40"
79
80 Britain and the Crimea, 1855-56
long in the dark as to the true nature of the situation and conse-
quently helpless to defend either him or themselves against the many
charges hurled against them from all directions. In the final section
of his despatch Raglan reiterated his indignation at the aspersions
that had been heaped on his hard working staff:
without any attempt having been made first to ascertain from an
officer, like [himself], responsible for their conduct, that they had
in any way exposed themselves to such grave charges, and without
letting them know who their accusers [were] .... The precept
'Audi alteram partem,' so well understood in England, [he
observed] has on this occasion been wholly lost sight of.
He did not deny that there was much that was wanting, but he
blamed it on the organisation of the British Army, which was 'framed
for stationary service in the Colonies, or for home duty', but which
was 'undoubtedly defective for operations in the field'. He continued:
The troops under my command were sent from England without
those means which are essentially necessary for the maintenance
of efficiency in the field. This has been the case with all former
armies: and it did not occur to me to suppose that Her Majesty's
Government would be willing to form establishments upon a large
scale, which could not at once be got up in the midst of the active
operations of a campaign.
Raglan was a humane and cultivated English gentleman and
everyone who came in contact with him seemed to have liked and
respected him, but these lines written ten months after he had been
given command of the expeditionary force suggest that he lacked
the capacity to rise to challenges and overcome them, which is the
characteristic of great generals such as Wellington or Marlborough.
In a further despatch,I2 replying to Panmure's of 12 February,
Raglan again recounted all the trials that he and his army had had
to face and made it clear that he had undertaken the Crimean venture
with misgiving and only because he thought he had no alternative
but to carry out the Government's wishes. He again defended all
that he had done and expressed his full confidence in Generals Airey
and Estcourt. To lose Airey, in particular, he felt would be a serious
loss and he would have great difficulty in replacing him. He
concluded on a note of injured pride:
Having now replied to the several points in your despatch, I must
86 Britain and the Crimea, 1855-56
'directed quite as much against the past as the present'. The debate,
which took place on 12 May, turned out to be a fiasco, and the
motion was easily defeated by a vote of 181 to 71 with the help of
Government proxies. Malmesbury noted that Ellenborough's speech
was 'below the expectation and fell flat'. Indeed, according to
Broughton, 'before he had hardly begun' he 'sat down abruptly' to
the astonishment of his hearers, but Panmure was also brief and
missed his opportunity .1s
On 1 June in a long and friendly letter to Raglan about other
matters, Panmure seemed to close the subject in one casual sentence.
'You shall hear no more from me as to your staff,' he wrote; 'I have
told my colleagues that I acquiesce in your reason for not submitting
to a change, and that I will press it no further.' Within two weeks
of receiving the letter, however, Raglan was dead and Palmerston,
spurred on by the cries of the administrative reformers, again began
to demand the replacement of Filder whom he denounced as
'narrow-minded, prejudiced, opposed to every new resource and
improved practice, wedded to routine, and refusing every improved
arrangement'. It was a terrific indictment of an old man who obvi-
ously should not have been appointed in the first place. 'We are not
justified', Palmerston told Panmure, 'in sacrificing the interests of
the Army and endangering the success of our operations out of
delicacy for the feelings of individuals.' With Raglan no longer there
to protect him, Filder, whose health was already failing, was finally
recalled in July and replaced, not by Tulloch, but by Colonel
Pakenham with whom Simpson subsequently expressed himself as
well pleased. 19
It is hard to say where the blame lay for the Crimean fiasco. I
have argued elsewhere that it lay in large part in the system, 20 but
in some areas certain individuals were not up to the job. This was
unhappily true of Raglan himself, for all his good qualities. In a
sense, he was too decent a gentleman to be a really effective military
commander. He had no experience in commanding troops in the
field and by far the greater part of his military career had been
behind a desk in Whitehall. Indeed, he had served as Wellington's
secretary from 1810 to the old Duke's death in 1852, despite the loss
of his right arm at Waterloo. Everybody who was anybody knew
him and liked him; that plus his seniority made him the inevitable
man. Despite the joke that he used to call the enemy 'the French',
harking back to his early career under Wellington, he got along well
with the French generals because he was a civilised man and could
90 Britain and the Crimea, 1855-56
was inspecting troops to discuss the proposal with him and to use all
his diplomatic tact to persuade the French Emperor that it would be
unwise for him to go himself to the Crimea. On arriving he
discovered that the French army officers were even more anxious
that the command should not be taken over by a civilian. Clarendon
pointed out that it would take time to convey all the additional
troops the Emperor proposed to take and to make all the necessary
arrangements. He also argued that the campaign would take four
months and that it would be unwise for Napoleon to be that long
away from Paris, a point with which the Emperor fully agreed. He
also urged that the move would be most unpopular in England for
it would appear to reduce the status of the British force and to
threaten the Alliance, which was the last thing that Napoleon
wanted. Clarendon's biographer gives a graphic account of the
conversation:
'I think', said Clarendon, 'your Majesty should not move until
everything is ready, when you may give the dernier coup de main'.
'C'est le mot!', exclaimed the Emperor, 'le dernier coup de
main.' 24
In the end the Emperor did not even do that but he kept his advisors
and his allies on tenterhooks for another two months before he
abandoned the idea.
The British were becoming increasingly restive with Canrobert's
indecision and lack of leadership. An old friend of Panmure's,
Admiral H. Stewart, second in command of the British fleet in the
Black Sea, wrote to him saying that he thought Canrobert was too
cautious, that he considered 'matters in a fix' and that perhaps it
would be best if Louis Napoleon did come. The Allies he feared
were 'nearly at a standstill and every day', he wrote, 'appears to add
to the boldness of the Russians. ' 25
Towards the end of March Lord Raglan wrote a long and revealing
letter to Lord John Russell in Vienna, marked 'private and confide-
ntial' .26 He said he did not think Louis Napoleon would come; 'and
if he do', he added, 'I shall consider it a great misfortune and as
adding vastly to the difficulties'. He thought the French talked boldly
only to promote the peace negotiations, whereas in fact they were
very cautious and used more men than the British for similar oper-
ations. 'It is this display of caution that makes me feel confident that
the French do not consider that they have the ball at their feet, or
that they are in a position to strike a blow which would be decisive,'
94 Britain and the Crimea, 1855-56
he concluded. He did not think that they were likely to win a victory
that would justify the Emperor taking the risk of being 'personally
a party to it'. He went on:
The fact is the Russians are most formidable enemies and having
possession of an arsenal of which the resources are boundless
they have immeasurable advantages over assailants who are many
thousand miles from their base and are composed of more than
one body and commanded by more than one chief; and they have
profited greatly by the experience they have acquired since the
Allies appeared in the Crimea. They have become admirable
marksmen and are very clever in the choice of places whence to
annoy those in our trenches who show themselves even for an
instant.
Raglan overestimated the strength of the Russians in the Crimea and
asserted that there was no chance of driving them out as long as
Sebastopol was in their hands, thus indicating his disagreement with
Napoleon's proposed operation. 'It remains to be seen whether it
can be assaulted with a fair chance of success,' he added. The
bombardment was to begin the following week, 'but', he wrote, 'the
French have not yet stated definitely what the immediate object of
the renewed attack is desired to be, and the "Mamelon" is a bone
of contention that will not be easily acquired'. 'Amidst all these
varying circumstances', he continued, 'I feel that I am guilty of no
imprudence in saying that the question of peace should not be made
to depend upon what may be effected here.' He went on to criticise
the decision, so lightly taken, to invade the Crimea and to speculate
that had they not done so Austria might have declared war on Russia
the previous autumn. 'As it is', he concluded, 'I do not despair of
your success.'
The peace party would have found strong confirmation of their
views had they been able to read this letter, for obviously Raglan
wrote to support Russell's attempt to negotiate a peace settlement,
which Palmerston and his henchman, Clarendon, did not want at
that time. Clarendon's attitude is a puzzling one, for he was becoming
increasingly pessimistic about the military prospects and about the
attitude of their French allies. On 3 April he wrote to Russell about
the fears of the French generals and about their attempt to lay the
blame on the British generals to whom impracticable co-operation
had been proposed, 'for the purpose', he feared, 'of being refused'.
He expected that in another month sickness would increase in the
The Crimean Campaign to the Death of Raglan 95
England will ever court the place of honor and the post of danger;
but her strength and resources, and the lives of her gallant sons,
are not to be wasted or sacrificed, merely as a forlorn hope, to an
army of more than treble her number, and which boasts itself to
be our superior also in skill and organization.
The refusal to renew the attack on the advanced works before
the Malakoff Tower, exhibits on General Canrobert's part a
disinclination to expose his troops; while his proposal that we
should attack the Redan, shows a reckless demand upon ours,
which creates a suspicion of his motives, and fills me with doubt,
as to his judgement, and at times shakes my confidence in his good
faith. 29
96 Britain and the Crimea, 1855-56
times. Two days later a French and Turkish force had carried out a
reconnaissance in force to the north-east of Balaclava, crossing the
Tchernaya river by the Trakatir Bridge and pushing the Russians
out of the village of Tchorgoun. 42
Louis Napoleon was much displeased with Pelissier for permitting
the Kertch expedition when he had explicitly instructed him to
concentrate his forces with a view to cutting Sebastopol off from the
rest of the Crimea by attacking the Russians outside the town in
whatever way the generals might decide. Pelissier excused himself
by saying that the Kertch operation was necessary to humour the
English. He continued to ignore the Emperor's directive, however,
because he was convinced that it was essential to pursue the direct
siege of Sebastopol by continuous pressure on the enemy's defences
and eventually breaking through at some point into the city on the
south side of the harbour. 43
With this in view the Allies started another heavy bombardment
on 6 June which did great damage, but as always it was quite extra-
ordinary how much Todleben and his brave workforce succeeded in
repairing under cover of darkness. On the evening of 7 June the
French army after heavy fighting succeeded in taking important
points in front of the Malakoff Battery, in particular the Mamelon,
which changed hands several times in the course of the night, while
the British, with less difficulty, occupied the Quarries to the south
of the Redan. The British were elated by this series of successes,
Kertch, Taganrog, Anapa and now the Quarries ('You spoil us by
giving us a victory almost daily,' Panmure wrote to Raglan on 11
June), but Louis Napoleon was unimpressed because the heavy
casualties suffered by the French seemed to be frittering away the
army he wanted used in another direction. 'He is displeased with
Pelissier's despatches which throw cold water on the imperial plan
of campaign', Clarendon told Russell. 44
The British Ministers tended to agree with Napoleon that the field
of operations should be opened up to the north-east of Sebastopol,
but were less inclined to interfere with the generals. Nor did they
consider the expedition into the Sea of Azov an unnecessary diver-
sion. Indeed they were concerned that the Emperor was doing
'exactly what he said he would not do by commanding the army and
fleet from Paris'. Regarding the Emperor's instructions to Pelissier,
Clarendon wrote to Cowley: 'We think that he and Raglan should
be directed to concert measures together for an immediate forward
movement from whatever base in whatever direction they may think
102 Britain and the Crimea, 1855-56
best for driving the Russians from the north of the harbour.' Two
days later he protested the Emperor's veto of an attack on Anapa.
'It is manifest that the order should only be a caution and not a
prohibition', he wrote; 'pray get this observed to the Emperor. ' 45
Panmure explained the situation to Raglan:
I see by your secret letter of this morning that you and Pelissier
both prefer the pressure of the siege to the exterior movement for
investment. All our information goes to the conviction that the
Russians are weaker than we are, and if we stormed the Inkerman
heights and gained and occupied the M'Kenzie Ridge, we should
compel the enemy to withdraw a great part of his garrison, and
either meet us on the field or retreat to the head of the Crimea.
However, it is easy to wage war on paper, and I rely on your local
information as being by far the best for action. Now it is not so
in Paris, and you may shape your course on the information I give
you, but you must betray me to no one. The Emperor has made
up his mind that Sebastopol cannot be taken by any process of
siege tending to regular approach and final assault. 46
Palmerston blamed the depression in Paris on the activity of financial
speculators and Russian intrigue. 'The Queen is vexed about the
Emperor being so low about our Crimean prospects', Clarendon told
Cowley, but he reported that Panmure agreed with the Emperor
that 'it would be most imprudent to attempt an assault until the
whole of Sebastopol was invested' and he thought Raglan agreed.
On 8 June Panmure sent Raglan a despatch repeating telegraphed
instructions of the 4th, ordering him to concert measures with
Pelissier and Orner to attack the enemy, either across the Tchernaya
or by cutting his lines of communication with Sebastopol, giving
full consideration to the advantages of using Eupatoria as a base.
Nevertheless the 'fullest latitude was left to the generals as to the
means to be employed' .47
The operation of 6-10 June although costly was only a prelude to
an all out attack on the two major Russian fortifications of the
Malakoff and the Redan which began with a very heavy bombard-
ment on 17 June. Unhappily on the following evening everything
went wrong with the ensuing attacks on both these strong points,
which the Russians repulsed. There were very heavy losses all
around, some 4,000 to the Russians, 3,500 to the French and 1,500
to the British. The French Emperor was further enraged by this
continued disregard of his directives and was only persuaded at the
The Crimean Campaign to the Death of Raglan 103
day rooms and separate married quarters might not be made avail-
able in army barracks. Panmure agreed to the desirability of day
rooms to avoid the necessity of soldiers having to cook their food in
their sleeping quarters and also agreed to the undesirability of women
being in the common barrack rooms and seeing all that went on
there, but his preference was to prohibit privates from marrying for
the first ten or twelve years and only providing married quarters for
non-commissioned officers. He went on to talk about the necessity
of making the army attractive since, although they were receiving a
thousand recruits a week, they needed more. He had been advised
against a larger bounty and consequently he indicated that he
intended to double the soldier's pay when they were facing an enemy,
that is as soon as they landed in the Crimea. Panmure made his
announcement in this casual way without any consultation with his
colleagues and Palmerston was furious when he heard of it. 'I
certainly think Panmure's conduct the greatest outrage against
official duty in the history of the country,' Palmerston told the
Queen, 'and taking into consideration the way in which it was done
the magnitude of the matter and the vast public interest concerned
it was an act of absolute insanity.' The Queen and her husband were
as astonished as he was. The result was that he sent Panmure a very
stiff letter that led the War Secretary to tender his resignation.
Clarendon feared this would damage the Government and appealed
to Lansdowne to intervene as the only person who could persuade
Palmerston to withdraw his angry letter at which Panmure took such
umbrage. By the time he heard from Lansdowne, Palmerston had
cooled down and, using Wood as an intermediary, he agreed to
withdraw the letter which had given such offence, saying that he had
'written it in great haste on reading the newspaper' and that they
would consider the matter in Cabinet. 'Like you I wish to avoid a
change', Palmerston wrote to Lansdowne, 'and besides Panmure has
many good qualities for his office, and we have all much personal
regard for him.' As a result Panmure returned the offensive letter
and withdrew his resignation, but warned Palmerston that it would
'depend on the result of the Cabinet deliberations as to the plan
itself' whether or not he would retain his position. Panmure got his
way and an extra field allowance of sixpence a day was approved.s 2
In the meantime, however, the outlook in the Crimea remained
gloomy and the Government was faced with the difficult task of
deciding on a replacement for Raglan.
5 The Conclusion of the
Crimean Campaign and
the War on other Fronts
I SIMPSON AS RAGLAN'S SUCCESSOR
105
106 Britain and the Crimea, 1855-56
The more I see, and reflect upon, the condition of things here,
my Lord [he wrote], the more I am struck with the conviction that
these four armies never can carry on any joint and united oper-
ations in their present condition. We want one great man to direct
the whole.
My second reflection is my own position! for surely I am an
108 Britain and the Crimea, 1855-56
will give you credit, and on your retirement a still further mark of
the Queen's favour may be conferred; but I strongly recommend
you not to hesitate in the matter. Either buckle up your reins
vigorously for the work, or at once claim the consideration which
your long and honourable services entitle you to receive. I have
written you plainly as a friend, and you will, I know, accept what
I write as such.9
This was not the language that a Chatham or a Churchill would have
used to a discredited general!
By the time Simpson received Panmure's letter of 20 July,
however, he was in no mood to retire. 'I am glad that at length all
doubts are ended as to my being confirmed in the command', he
wrote in reply, 'because I have now only one fixed object before
me - that of carrying it on to the best of my ability, and I cannot be
otherwise but proud and gratified with the high position I hold, and
with the confidence reposed in me. But I am equally sensible and
deeply impressed at the difficulties surrounding me.' Ten days later
in reply to a letter of 31 July he thanked Panmure for his 'kind and
frank manner' of writing but defended himself against the charge of
despondency, saying 'however sanguine a Commander may be of
the success of any operation, it is incumbent upon him to take every
precaution for the safety of the army in case of failure'. 'If Sebastopol
beats us,' he added, 'depend upon it, my Lord, everything here must
be well weighed and considered beforehand!' 10
Panmure was not neglectful of the needs of his army in the Crimea.
He and Palmerston were constantly harping on the importance of
good sanitation; and, as we have seen, soldiers' pay was increased
sixpence a day. He was particularly concerned with the organisation
and despatch of the Army Work Corps to relieve the army of chores
that were still too heavy a burden in view of the arduous duty in
the trenches. Simpson was unenthusiastic for fear of disciplinary
problems, although he promised to give the Corps 'a good start',
when it finally arrived in mid-August. By early autumn, however,
he was complaining bitterly that they were the worst lot of men to
have come to the Crimea and caused trouble among the soldiers
because of their higher pay.n
On 28 July Panmure sent Simpson a despatch on the necessity of
looking forward to the possibility of the Army having to spend a
second winter in the Crimea and the need 'to make every provision
for its comfort and protection'. He went into details regarding the
110 Britain and the Crimea, 1855-56
The situation was a difficult. one for the proud British who would
have liked to act independently of the French, 'although', as Palmer-
ston pointed out to Clarendon, 'we must not forget that the combined
action is a wholesome restraint on the French as well as a shackle
upon us'. He would have liked an operation based on Eupatoria but
concluded that it was difficult to change plans at that point and that
they would have to await the result of the operations against the
Malakoff and the Redan.1 7
As the summer wore on Clarendon was becoming increasingly
pessimistic about the lack of progress in the Crimea and unimpressed
by Panmure's administration of the War Department. On 8 August
he wrote to Palmerston saying that the letters of the Admirals, Lyons
and Stewart, confirmed the gloomy apprehensions that he had long
entertained; 'there appears to be no energy, no directing mind,
nothing like united action and above all no plan except to wait for
the winter and for that no preparation seems to be making', he
wrote. Yet it was difficult to suggest remedies, especially regarding
112 Britain and the Crimea, 1855-56
earthworks makes repair so rapid that the damage of the day is often
made good during the succeeding night'. He expected that they
would eventually fight their way in to the South Side of Sebastopol
harbour, but was concerned 'on account of the probability of divided
councils and command', which had already been responsible for their
lack of success; 'I really believe', he concluded, 'that one indifferent
commander is better than two good ones', a saying he attributed to
the first Napoleon.21
A week later Simpson wrote more optimistically: 'It may be
imagined that our siege operations are languid; but all is going on
favourably, and if the French can succeed in taking the Malakoff,
everything will assume a new shape.' He added the comment that
The Times arrived in Sebastopol before it did in the Allied camp;
'so what with the electric wires and the Times, our enemy has many
advantages over us.' In reply to a query from Panmure he reported
that they were 'by no means idle as regards the destruction of the
buildings in the town', but he was nervous about the supply of shells
running short. In despatches of 15 and 17 July Simpson informed
Panmure that on the advice of General Niel he was abandoning the
direct assault on the Redan, presumably because of the terrain.
Panmure concurred in the decision since 'other modes of approach'
were to be followed, but he criticised the lack of sufficient instruction
to officers in the last attack on the Redan. 'I must impress on you',
he wrote, 'the necessity of entrusting with a knowledge of your plan
of attack the senior officers employed in it. ' 22
The military situation in the Crimea was a strange one. The Allies
had originally landed on the west coast immediately south of Eupa-
toria, a coast town which they held until the end of the war, but on
25 and 26 September they had advanced south to Balaclava and the
Upland to the east and south of Sebastopol, crossing the Tchernaya
River by the Trakatir Bridge below Mackenzie's Farm. By a singular
coincidence the Russian Commander-in-Chief, Prince Menshikov, in
order to keep open his line of communication with the interior, had
led the greater part of his army out of Sebastopol the previous night
to take up positions to the north-east on the Belbeck river, cutting
right across the path taken by the British army the following morning.
Indeed the British force had blundered into and captured part of his
baggage train. Neither the Russian nor Allied Command was aware
of what the other was doing.23
The result was that for the rest of the war the Allied armies
besieging Sebastopol from the Upland were cut off from the interior,
114 Britain and the Crimea, 1855-56
damaged room, but one which still gave no access to the rest of the
house. It was only an empty hall that had been broken into. The
Russians had made an orderly evacuation from what had become an
untenable position, but they withdrew to a natural line of defence.
The long roadstead of Sebastopol separated them from the besieging
Allied armies, while to the east the high ground across the Tchernaya
River, which emptied into the eastern end of the roadstead, afforded
them strong defensive positions which they had occupied for the
previous twelve months. The situation was similar to that of the
previous year following the Allied victory on the Alma. Critics
quickly asserted that the Allied armies should have pressed onwards
immediately for the final kill while the enemy was off balance, just
as the year before it was argued Sebastopol lay open if the victors
had only followed through from their initial victory.
Newcastle, who watched the battle, hastened to send Clarendon
his congratulations and to give him an eye witness account, observing
that only now were the conditions fulfilled for an honourable peace
on better terms than those considered by the ill-fated Russell mission
of which he had never approved. The assault on the Redan, he
claimed, was quite unnecessary. Despite 'the pluck and valour' of
the officers, the men would not 'have it'. 'They have been so demora-
lized by this horrid trench work that they [illegible] to gabions as
foxes do to holes.' But he did not blame them for they were raw
boys sent in where experienced men should have been used. He
went on to give a dramatic account of 'the destruction by fire of a
town entirely built of stone', one of the most beautiful cities he had
ever seen. A few days later he wrote again to criticise the failure of
the Generals to follow up the victory. 'Here we are', he wrote,
'stupefied with unexpected and in one sense undeserved success -
paralyzed with victory - so astonished and stunned by our triumph
that we are motionless - apparently incapable of council as we are
of action. ' 37
Palmerston and his colleagues were also much put out by the failure
of the generals to exploit their advantage. 'There has been a lull
after the victory', Clarendon wrote to Lansdowne, 'and I fear we
118 Britain and the Crimea, 1855-56
shall pay dearly for it. A considerable time might have been required
for reorganizing the armies after such a slaughter, but 15 days of
inactivity are unaccountable and inexcusable.' He presumed the
Russians were now fortifying their positions and would not evacuate
the Crimea 'whereas if the success had been followed up with any
vigour the Russians who were in utter confusion . . . might have
been driven anywhere'. Palmerston's exasperation was reflected in
returning to Wood a letter from Admiral Lyons: 'I'll fire an angry
telegraph at old Simpson today,' he wrote. 'Blow me if I don't-
Lyons letter is enough to provoke a saint. '38
Pelissier and Simpson took a very different view of their situation.
For almost a year their armies had been holding exposed positions
under the fire of enemy guns. The final attack that had led to the
Russian withdrawal had been a costly one, and not without its own
serious reverses. Casualties on both sides had been three times what
they were at the Alma. Pelissier regarded the enemy positions
beyond the Tchernaya as too strong to attack. He had won the prize
that his Emperor wanted and French honour was now satisfied.
Simpson was not the man to disagree. Indeed, in a later response to
Panmure's complaints he bluntly asserted, 'We continue to be, as
we have been ever since I came to the Crimea, a besieged army. . . . '
Indeed, a month after the fall of Sebastopol Simpson informed
Panmure that General Jones advised against the erection of batteries
to fire at the Russians on the North Side as the French were doing
since he was of the opinion that 'the casualties from a superior fire
would more than counterbalance any good result' f39
The bad reports of the British Army's failure to capture the Redan
and Simpson's failure to keep the Government fully informed and
to take any aggressive action after the evacuation of Sebastopol led
the Government to consider replacing him. As early as 10 September
Panmure was suggesting that Simpson should organise a forward
movement from Eupatoria to take the Russians in the rear or to
occupy Kaffa and other places along the coast, and on 15 September
he expressed the hope that Simpson and Pelissier were taking advan-
tage of the presumed demoralisation of the Russians and were giving
the enemy no rest 'till his overthrow or expulsion from the Crimea'
was completed. 'In order to keep this object properly in view', he
wrote, 'you must not suffer your mind to rest upon any expectation
of peace; your duty as a general is to keep your army in the best
condition for offence, and to turn your attention to all means within
your power for so doing.' This was softened by a private letter in
The Conclusion of the Crimean Campaign 119
October in order to allow time to sound out opinion about him and
his role in the Redan fiasco, which Panmure finally concluded was
not his responsibility. In the end it was decided to appoint
Codrington and Panmure wrote to the three Generals who were
being passed over, asking for their understanding and co-operation.
'It appeared to us that on the whole Sir William Codrington is
the best for the chief command', Palmerston informed the Queen.
'Though perhaps not a man of genius he is a good officer is a
gentleman and intelligent in his manners [sic], speaks French well
and being of a conciliatory disposition though not wanting in firmness
he is the most likely to get on well with the French Commander in
Chief.... ' Simpson, who favoured Brown, the most senior candi-
date, said the three other divisional commanders would want to
resign, but they all accepted the decision. It was made easier for
Campbell, since it was decided at the suggestion of Prince Albert to
break the army up into two corps, one of which he was invited
to command. The other corps fell to Sir William Eyre, its acting
commander pending the arrival of General Markham who died
shortly after he had been appointed. Thus in both this case and that
of the army command Panmure put what he considered merit before
seniority without the threatened resignations. 45
The Queen was most indignant at an article in The Times, criti-
cising the army command which observed that England had not had
a good general in fifty years and did not appear capable of producing
more than one in a century. She even suggested that all persons
connected with The Times should be excluded from 'higher society',
but Palmerston pointed out the difficulties. Clarendon explained that
while Delane was away (visiting the Crimea) the paper was in the
hands of '3 or 4 ignorant men' who were 'completely indifferent' to
the consequences of what they printed and that while Walter, the
proprietor, might have seen the impropriety of the offending leader,
'the policy of the paper [was] never to admit it was in the wrong'! 46
Meanwhile the ministers remained in the dark as to what was
happening in the Crimea. 'The only news that Simpson has vouch-
safed was received last night', Clarendon informed Russell on
18 September, 'viz that they could not commence operations until
they knew what the enemy intended to do!' In mid-October he
undoubtedly reflected ministerial exasperation with the army
command when he wrote to Palmerston:
army from the Crimea, leaving only some 50,000 troops to hold the
western Chersonese peninsula as un gage or bargaining counter. The
Emperor was prepared to accept this advice because of difficulties
that faced him at home. 'H.M. has been thoroughly frightened',
Cowley wrote to Clarendon, 'by the Minister of Finance who tells
him that he has only money to carry on the war until the spring,
that a new loan would not take, and that the people would resist the
imposition of fresh taxes.' There were also reports of great distress
in the south of France, where the war and conscription had become
most unpopular. Clarendon thought this might explain the Emperor's
desire to bring the army back, 'as well as to enable him to talk big
to Germany'. 52
Napoleon first warned Cowley on 17 October that Pelissier's views
might make it necessary 'to retire upon the lines of Kamiesch [the
French base port in the Crimea] after completely destroying Seva-
stopol, and either reembark the Army to return home, or make an
attack elsewhere- holding, however, Kamiesch, Kertch, Eupatoria,
and he hopes Kinbourn, and waging a defensive war in the Crimea
until peace [was] made.' Three days later Marshal Vaillant sent
Panmure the concrete French proposals for reducing the Allied army
in the Crimea to 70,000 (30,000 French, 20,000 Turks, 15,000 English
and 5,000 Sardinians). He indicated that the Emperor regarded this
as a matter of urgency, but insisted that they must act in concert.s3
On 22 October Cowley reported further arguments made by the
Emperor:
Pelissier evidently could not forget the fate of the French Army the
first Napoleon led into Russia.
Clarendon wasted no time in letting Cowley know that the Govern-
ment was 'dead against the Emperor's notion of withdrawing the
Army from the Crimea', which, he said, would be regarded as a
retreat. Moreover, he added in a further letter, it would be very
inconvenient, for where would the troops go? When Marshal Vail-
lant's formal proposals were put before the Cabinet they were
considered 'most anxiously'. They had no desire to force their views
on the Emperor, Clarendon told Cowley,but they could not justify
in Parliament the withdrawal of half the British Army; 'we should
be utterly disgraced', he wrote, 'and the two parties into which the
country is now divided would join in impeaching us, the war party
for having abandoned the field of battle - the peace party for having
given an advantage to Russia which would encourage her to prolong
the war.' It was generally recognised, he argued, that 'the military
prestige of Russia had received a tremendous shock' and that conse-
quently it would be madness to abandon the Crimea for the decision
would be compared to that of the Russians to withdraw from Seba-
stopol. Cowley, of course, reported these views to the French
Government and Clarendon told him that Persigny had sent a strong
despatch to Paris putting the British view that the Allied armies
should remain 'in the strongest terms'. The Foreign Secretary argued
that positive orders should be given to the generals 'to drive the
Russians out of the Crimea before the season closes - if that is
impossible to harass them in every way during the winter'. 56
In the first week in November Lord Lansdowne visited Paris and
had two long conversations with the Emperor. He told Louis Napo-
leon that it was his 'deliberate conviction that no government in
England could stand any withdrawal of forces from the Crimea' at
that time, a statement which the Emperor made him 'repeat more
than once'. Lansdowne told Cowley he did not think the Emperor
was obstinately bent on withdrawal, but that he felt he must have
something to show for keeping his troops in the Crimea. Cowley
126 Britain and the Crimea, 1855-56
win those laurels in two years, is in fact, to lose them.' As for the
army, 'having suffered in 1854 from being too lean, it may suffer in
1856 from being too fat. Then it was starved, now it runs some
danger of being coddled.' It allowed that the men were in 'splendid
condition', but claimed they were in need of 'example and oppor-
tunity', which it would be hard to obtain 'under Generals to whom
everything [was] impossible'. 'A military system that was not robust
enough to bear the trials of a siege', it concluded, 'is not likely to
regain credit in a campaign in the open field.'
Ironically, while The Times correspondent was praising conditions
in the camp, its leader writer decrying the failure of aristocratic
leadership and the Prime Minister taking consolation in increased
numbers, the new Commander-in-Chief in the Crimea was frankly
writing to Panmure about continuing problems that faced the Army,
especially concerning the Land Transport Corps, which needed
drastic reorganisation, and which according to Colonel Wetheral,
the officer in command, was 'in a deplorable state from overwork
and insufficient establishments'. 'By Sir Wm Codrington's account,
it is clear that the army is even now totally unfit to move, which is
a very serious question', Queen Victoria had commented to Panmure
about some earlier proposals received from Codrington regarding the
Land Transport Corps. Returning Codrington's letters, Clarendon
observed: 'they are melancholy as exhibiting a state of things the
result of all the wisdom of England of boundless expense and of two
years experience, an army ill-lodged, over-paid and unable to move!
It is enough to break the heart of everybody both out there and at
home.' He took comfort, however, that Codrington was 'fully alive
to the realities', which was more than he was ever able to say of the
General's predecessors.6J
It may be presumed that the optimistic Palmerston anticipated
that Codrington would have straightened out the Land Transport
difficulties by the spring, but their existence may eventually have
helped the Government to decide on the acceptance of peace terms
that they earlier considered insufficient. The less sanguine Clarendon
may well have been influenced by these considerations at the peace
conference just as Russell had clearly been upset by Raglan's gloomy
advice the preceding year.
On his return to England in December, Newcastle proposed a
British expedition to the Christian provinces at the eastern end of
the Black Sea, an area over which Turkey had surrendered its claims
to Russia earlier in the century, but which the Russians had never
The Conclusion of the Crimean Campaign 129
fully subdued. At the same time he warned that England should 'not
commit these poor people by making their country the theatre of
war and then leave them to the vengeance of Russia by taking no
account of them in the terms of peace'. Palmerston had made a
similar proposal to Lansdowne a few days earlier combined with a
French landing either in the Ukraine or in the Baltic against Finland
or St Petersburg. On 3 January 1856 the Cabinet drew up instructions
for its representatives at the Council of War which met in Paris the
following week, favouring the Black Sea plan, but Argyll warned
that it might seem to have 'an Anglo-Indian aspect' and lead to
divisions. 62
The Council of War considered a variety of plans involving the
eastern end of the Black Sea (in which the French showed little
interest) and the Baltic, but the main consideration was given to
driving the Russians out of the Crimea. Subsequently the Emperor
vetoed the British idea of simultaneous campaigns, arguing that all
the Allied forces were needed to complete the Crimean operation.
It was finally agreed that one Allied army, mainly French, led by
Pelissier, would attack the Russian lines of communication from
Eupatoria, while a second army, mainly British, led by Codrington
would hold the line of the Tcheernaya river ready to advance as
opportunity arose. The British Government demanded an early
campaign in order to allow time for a follow-up operation on the
Asian front and for this reason insisted that if an armistice was signed
before then it should have a deadline of 31 March.63
As the peace conference approached, these plans must have
seemed more and more unreal, but some steps to implement them
were taken and may have had some influence on the Russians during
the negotiations. Panmure was one of the last to accept the likelihood
of peace. 'I am neither warlike nor peaceable', he told Granville,
'but I say that if we cannot have an honourable peace, we must have
a bloody war. '64 In December he had told Codrington to ignore all
rumours of peace unless he wrote to the contrary, but on 21 January
he had to admit that in the midst of the current peace negotiations
'one can scarcely bring one's mind to settle definitely upon future
arrangements for war'. 'With the exception of John Bull', he
moaned, 'everybody leans to peace.' Nevertheless, a few days later
in a letter going into details about the anticipated operations he told
the General that peace was still 'but a rumour' and that he was not
to relax any of his preparations for a 'keen and vigorous campaign'.
Palmerston was delighted with his War Minister's attitude and wrote
130 Britain and the Crimea, 1855-56
The war with Russia was not confined to the Crimea. In 1855 a
second and larger Allied fleet under the command of Admiral Sir
Richard S. Dundas66 again blockaded the Russians in the Baltic. It
consisted of over eighty British ships, nineteen of them steamships
of the line, and some sixteen French vessels. They penetrated the
Gulf of Finland to the environs of Cronstadt, the main Russian naval
base, less than 30 miles west of St Petersburg, but it proved too
strongly defended to attack. Sveaborg and Fredericksham on the
north coast of the Gulf were bombarded and a fort near Lovisa was
captured by a landing party and blown up. The main achievement
of the fleet in the Baltic, however, was the maintenance of the
blockade on the Russian ports, the destruction of some 80,000 tons
of Russian shipping and the tying down of a large Russian army
along the Baltic ~oastline. A foray was even made by a few British
ships into the remote White Sea, which was to become an all too
familiar battleground for the Royal Navy in the Second World War. 67
The Conclusion of the Crimean Campaign 131
Nevertheless, Palmerston was not satisfied with what had been done
and in a letter to Wood caustically observed that this Admiral
Dundas was 'little better suited for the Baltic than his namesake was
for the Black Sea'. He suggested that Admiral Lyons, the other
Dundas's successor, should be transferred to the Baltic since the
Admiral's job in the Black Sea was now confined to supervising
transports. Before the year was finished the Royal Navy was planning
a third Baltic campaign for 1856, which, according to Clarendon,
much impressed the French who anticipated that it would 'double
up Russia'. 68
There were also some desultory naval operations in the north
Pacific in 1855 as there had been in 1854. The Anglo-French squad-
rons in this remote area had little to show for their efforts, but they
forced the Russians to evacuate Petropaulovsk on the Kamchatka
peninsula and bottled up the Russian ships in the area in the mouth
of the Amur River. 69 Even on the far eastern shores of their vast
empire the Russians found themselves on the defensive in the face
of the guns of the ubiquitous Royal Navy. None of these naval
operations in 1855 had any very significant results, but they were a
reminder of British sea power when ships of the Royal Navy could
penetrate Russian waters from the environs of St Petersburg in the
west to those of Vladivostok in the far east and sail unchallenged on
the inland waters of the Black Sea.
Closely connected with operations in the Baltic were prolonged
negotiations for a defensive treaty with Sweden concluded in
November 1855. By this treaty Britain and France guaranteed
Sweden against Russian aggression. There was also a secret annex
providing for Sweden's entry into the war, but the final peace nego-
tiations were begun before this could happen.7
The second land front was in Asia Minor where the Russians had
pressed the Turks in previous wars.7 1 They had occupied eastern
Armenia and the Black Sea coastline north of Batoum in 1828, but
had agreed to withdraw from Erzeroum, the provincial capital, and
the ancient frontier fortress of Kars, by the Treaty of Adrianople in
1829. In 1854, a Russian army based on Georgia again took the
offensive in Armenia and on 4 August defeated the badly led Turkish
army which withdrew to Kars. In the late summer the British Govern-
ment, concerned about the consequences of this offensive, sent out
a British officer, Colonel William Fenwick Williams (1800-83), who
arrived in the area in September. He was shocked by the poor state
of the Turkish troops and by the lack of defence preparations, but
132 Britain and the Crimea, 1855-56
force proceeded inland slowly and won one victory over the retiring
Russians, but in face of the onset of winter weather early in
November they were forced to withdraw when they were only a few
miles short of Kutais. By this time some Turkish troops had arrived
in Erzeroum but their commander refused to advance to the relief
of Kars without additional reinforcements. It was then too late for
the inhabitants of Kars were now dying of starvation and on
28 November Williams was forced to surrender.
Nobody came out of the fall of Kars very well except for the brave
Turkish garrison and its European officers. The British blamed the
French for their dilatoriness in agreeing to a relief expedition, and
the Turks for their failure to keep the Kars garrison properly supplied
and reinforced, the Turks blamed the British for their delay in
advancing a promised war loan with which grain supplies could be
bought for Kars. Karl Marx was one of the severest critics of British
policy in England with a scathing series of articles in the Chartist
People's Paper, later published as a pamphlet, which was based on
a slanted study of the recently published Blue Book. Admiral Slade,
the British commander of the Turkish fleet later argued with some
force that the Kars garrison should have been withdrawn before it
was surrounded, but ironically the Russian success made it easier for
the Czar to agree to peace negotiations and as we shall see the place
was eventually returned to Turkey. n
The war was over by the time the Government Blue Book was
published. A private member, J. Whiteside, an Irish Conservative,
provoked a three-night debate with a motion condemning the
Government's failure to take the necessary steps to forestall the fall
of Kars, but he spoiled his case by an overlong speech and the use
of extreme language in attacking Lord Stratford. The Opposition
was somewhat divided and the Government easily survived with a
majority of 127. The fall of Kars has received little attention from
modern historians of the Crimean War, but its fate was a matter of
some consequence in the peace negotiations.73
136
The Drift to Peace 137
Disraeli then wrote saying that he did not think 'that controversy
between them was desirable or could be agreeable', but politely
claimed that Derby's letter had failed to convince him that his
reported remarks were unfounded. Consequently he maintained that
'silence and inertness' were their wisest course. Disraeli was not
easily put down and two weeks later Derby received another letter
in Disraeli's hand marked 'Secret and most confidential', but signed
'You know who'! It brought news, which later proved to be auth-
entic, of an Austrian peace proposal recommended by France. The
letter also contained an additional tit-bit that Palmerston was plan-
ning to blow up Cronstadt with newly invented 'submarine ships'.
The Derby-Disraeli alliance was a strange one.z
Meanwhile Palmerston was faced with the necessity of finding two
new members for his Cabinet to replace Molesworth, who died in
October, and Canning, who went out to India in November as
Governor General. He was greatly in need of debating talent in the
Commons and, ignoring party considerations, to everyone's surprise,
offered the Colonial Office to Derby's son, Lord Stanley, who, but
for filial loyalty, might have been a Liberal. When Stanley declined
after consulting his father, Palmerston approached Sidney Herbert,
who, he told the Queen, was 'the most promising man of his standing
in the Commons' and who, as a good speaker, would greatly streng-
then the ranks on the Treasury bench. After some friendly
discussion, however, Herbert also declined because of their different
views about peace. In the end Henry Labouchere (1798-1869), an
old Whig politician who had served in the Melbourne and Russell
Cabinets, was appointed Colonial Secretary and, after some other
cabinet shuffles, M. T. Baines (1799-1860, elder brother of the better
known Edward Baines, editor of the Leeds Mercury), was appointed
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. The Queen gave her qualified
assent to both appointments which she did not consider 'as strong
an arrangement' as she thought had been intended. Clarendon and
Greville both expressed similar opinions. Palmerston's difficulties
in cabinet making throughout his first ministry indicated its basic
weakness. 3
In November there was some talk of a dissolution. Indeed, Delane,
editor of The Times, approached Clarendon, 'very humbly for such
a potentate', the latter told Palmerston, to urge such a course on
the grounds that all the leaders of the peace party would be defeated
in an election. Clarendon was not convinced and told Delane that
his advocating it in The Times would be the best way of preventing
138 Britain and the Crimea, 1855-56
p,.
p,.
p,. ~
~
p,. ~
p,.
p,.
~
p,. ~
p,. ~
p,.
~
~
~
~
140 Britain and the Crimea, 1855-56
season's. We should make hay while the sun shines but not forget
to prepare for a less genial season. The Emperor will, I think, be
true to us, at least as long as it is in his interest to be so and that
will be for some time but if anything were to happen to him we
should find Frenchmen of today just the same as they always have
been and ready to add more chapters to the voluminous works
entitled Rivalites de Ia France et de 1' Angleterre .... 6
and Berlin cooperating', he wrote, 'we shall find all our steadiness
and skill required to avoid being drawn into a peace which would
disappoint the just expectations of the country'. s His suspicions were
exaggerated, but not without foundation, and in fact serious peace
talks were closer than he anticipated.
The long drawn out and involved negotiations that eventually led
to the peace settlement of 1856 have been examined in some detail
by many historians, 9 but we may look more closely at the attitude
of the British Government and its representatives and the develop-
ment of British policy in the last six months of the war. In the
autumn of 1855 France, initially unknown to its ally, was beginning
to open up exploratory peace feelers through a number of interme-
diaries, the Prince of Coburg, Baron Seebach, the Saxon Minister
in Paris who was son-in-law of Nesselrode, Count Beust and von der
Pfordten, prime ministers of Saxony and Bavaria. A direct contact
was also entered upon between the Due de Morny, the Emperor's
half-brother, and Prince A.M. Gortchakov, the Russian ambassador
in Vienna, but these were suspended in favour of more concrete
proposals made by Count Buol. The Russians were not yet ready to
sue for peace, but were ready to listen, and in November Beust
informed Nesselrode that Napoleon III would not demand humili-
ating terms, providing Russia accepted the neutralisation of the Black
Sea. 10 Throughout the ensuing months France strove determinedly
to drive the Alliance down the road to peace, while Britain, following
reluctantly, seized every opportunity to apply the brakes and forestall
all precipitous decisions.
France's German soundings may have helped to break the ice, but
the important initiative was taken by Austria. The Austrian Emperor
was much impressed by the Allied success at Sebastopol and was
now ready to listen to the advice of his pro-Western Foreign Minister
rather than to the pro-Russian 'military prophets' who, according to
Elliot, the British charge d'affaires in Vienna, surrounded him. Late
in September Buol suggested to Bourqueney, the French minister
(Westmorland, the rather ineffective British minister, had left
Vienna and his successor had not yet been appointed), that Austria
should present to Russia conditions of peace approved by the Allies
based upon a strengthened Four Points. Bourqueney returned to
Paris at the beginning of October with these proposals, Bourqueney
gave a full account of Buol's views to Cowley who discussed them
with him and the Emperor on 14 October. It was proposed to
neutralise the Black Sea, to force Russia to withdraw from the banks
142 Britain and the Crimea, 1855-56
Russians had already agreed to the Austrian terms and that that was
why Buol was so opposed to making any changes. He was particularly
indignant at Walewski's attitude, at his giving the Austrians an
immediate acceptance, thus putting the onus on London to make
any changes and undermining the Alliance in the eyes of the
Austrians, and at the peremptory way in which an immediate answer
was demanded. 'The whole thing has been concocted without us at
Vienna', he wrote to Cowley, 'our name has been used without our
permission and then our assent is demanded in 4 and 20 hours .... '
He took his time, however, in sending a formal despatch to Paris,
setting out in detail the Government's position which had already
been conveyed through Persigny and Cowley.27
In his despatch Clarendon assured the French Government that
the British Government agreed that Austria had taken 'an important
step towards the Western Powers', that the opinion of the French
Emperor carried great weight with them and that they had no wish
to extend the war. Nevertheless, he declared, they were determined
to avoid any negotiations which did 'not afford a fair prospect of
being carried to a successful conclusion'. He then restated in detail
the modifications already specified, but out of deference to the
Emperor withdrew the stipulation regarding the Sea of Azov. He
maintained that they sought no material changes, but that they
reserved the right to propose amendments. In concluding his long
despatch Clarendon asserted that it did not become the dignity of
England and France to make proposals and that their position was
not to be impaired, that is to say that the proposals were Austria's,
although made in consultation with them. Therefore he trusted that
the French Government would agree to their modifications which
were intended to make the proposals 'more clear and effective'.zs
Meanwhile, immediately after the crucial Cabinet meeting Palmer-
ston had taken the unusual step of writing independently and much
less diplomatically to the French ambassador. Lecturing poor
Persigny on the responsibility of the executive in a parliamentary
regime and the need for official papers before taking such an
important step, he pointed out that as yet they had nothing of that
sort. He went on:
all Europe against us, and France having made peace without us,
and the certainty that the States would declare war against us the
moment we were without allies and it will be most difficult, perhaps
impossible to avoid being hustled into a peace we
disapprove. . . .31
and to explain that those which had been made were 'solely for the
purpose of giving more complete effect to the intentions of those
who drew up the ultimatum'. Clarendon made it very clear that it
would be quite unacceptable to leave the neutralisation of the Black
Sea to a separate treaty between Russia and Turkey. He continued:
If Buol resists our modification, which is indispensible in order to
fulfil the objects of the war, and for the future peace of Europe
. . . and yet insists upon imposing on Russia the sacrifice and
humiliation of ceding the half of Bessarabia and the mouths of the
Danube which will be, I have no hesitation in saying, for the
nearly exclusive advantage of Austria a non Belligerent, it will be
impossible to believe that the proposal has been made to us in
good faith, or that the negotiations will be conducted in any other
spirit by Austria than that of sparing the pride of Russia at the
expense of England and France, who have made such vast sacr-
ifices to save Europe from a danger greater and more imminent
than any by which she has yet been threatened.
Clarendon's harsh tone in this prolix sentence was probably affected
by the existence of a number of diplomatic differences between
Britain and Austria, in particular the recent Austrian arrest and
imprisonment of a former Austrian officer, Colonel Tiirr, now
serving with the British in the Principalities. Two days later, on
29 November, Elliot informed Clarendon that Buol (who had been
apprised of the British views by Walewski) was ready to agree to
some of their proposed modifications, but refused to court a Russian
rejection by specifying the number of coast guard vessels in the main
treaty rather than in a separate Russo-Turkish Convention. This was
a view that led Clarendon to observe to Cowley that Austria was
'cramming her ultimatum down our throats rather than that of
Russia'.37
On 28 November Cowley reported that the Emperor was very
pleased with the Queen's letter and that Walewski had sent Persigny
a reply to Clarendon's despatch recognising the English alterations
as improvements and promising to recommend their adoption to
Buol. In fact, however, on some points Walewski was not prepared
to go the whole way and two days later Cowley reported a conver-
sation that was 'anything but satisfactory or agreeable'. He still
objected to including the number of coast guard vessels in the main
treaty and to any mention of consuls, and raised difficulties over the
organisation of the Principalities. How could he, Walewski asked,
The Drift to Peace 155
'do otherwise than pronounce that excellent which was his own
work!!! for the fact was', Cowley continued, 'the redaction was
concocted by himself and Bourqueney'. Cowley was indignant that
Walewski should have sent a draft to Vienna without consulting
France's Ally and complained that he now found that he was dealing
with a French rather than an Austrian proposition. Walewski said
'the trouble was the two Governments were no longer united in
their policy, and that everyone knew this', which, Cowley said, was
Walewski's fault. Walewski also warned that unless the Emperor
changed his mind a large part of the French Army would be brought
away from the Crimea and that then either negotiations would lead
to an armistice or the war would be continued under altered circum-
stances; 'and', he added, 'France must be in a position to speak with
authority to Europe'. All this was expressed in civil language, but
with some warmth on both sides. 'I must add', Cowley continued,
'that his [Walewski's] manner was most disagreeable and he seemed
to take pleasure in saying what he knew must be anything but satis-
factory for me to hear.' He thought there was very little that could be
done about Walewski and that the only hope lay with the Emperor. 38
'What an avowal of duplicity was his admission that the Ultimatum
was drawn up by him and sent to Vienna, and then presented by
him to us as the work of Buol!' Palmerston exploded when he read
Cowley's account of his conversation with Walewski. He proposed
to Clarendon that they should stick to their guns on the assumption
that the French Government would not leave them in the lurch. 39
On 29 November Clarendon sent another despatch to Cowley
raising further difficulties about the Austrian Ultimatum. Queen
Victoria had quite understandably expressed great doubts about the
draft of the despatch that had been sent to her for she feared that
it did not correspond entirely to what she had said in her letter to
the Emperor, sent with the concurrence of Palmerston and Clar-
endon. She said it was all very well to make improvements in the
Ultimatum
but that if the responsibility of defeating it fell upon this country,
her position will become a most dangerous one! For there is no
disguising the fact that, if the French Nation is determined not to
support the war any longer in its present condition all attempts to
constrain it to do so must recoil upon us. 40
In a letter to Cowley the day after he had sent this despatch Clar-
endon was a little more conciliatory, saying that 'to meet the wishes
156 Britain and the Crimea, 1855-56
that sea'. When asked whether France would be ready to sign preli-
minaries of peace on this basis, Walewski replied that they must
first consult the English Government. The Emperor attached little
importance to the overture, but was anxious that the Austrian Ulti-
matum should be sent without further delay. Consequently Walewski
urged that the British Government should withdraw their alterations.
which Cowley told him was 'quite contrary to the engagement'. A
similar proposal from Russia was made by Gortchakov to the
Austrian Government a few days earlier, which of course made Buol
all the more anxious to get his own Ultimatum off to St Petersburg.
The British Government wasted no time in declining the Seebach
overture as 'insufficient'. Walewski gave the Saxon minister a nega-
tive reply. 45
On 11 December Clarendon complained to Persigny of Walewski's
'persevering attempts to make us do what we don't think safe or
right and which we feel sure must be productive of serious misunder-
standings hereafter'. Persigny, of course, was delighted to pass on
these comments to his detested Foreign Minister, telling Walewski
that he had 'turned a trifle into a grave affair' and that he was 'looked
upon by the entire Cabinet as being in collusion with Buol', all of
which made Walewski furious. 46 Clarendon was also annoyed by the
Queen's 'continued absence particularly at Osborne' which, he told
Cowley, was 'most inconvenient just now, as she chooses to be
consulted about everything'. Presumably he had just received a letter
she had written him that day expressing her 'anxiety that no punctili-
ousness about . . . similar wordings of clauses should let the Cabinet
overlook the position' in which they should put themselves, 'if
France, tired of refinements, were to agree upon her terms with
Russia'. There was much common sense in what the Queen said,
but it was too much for Palmerston, who protested to Clarendon:
The Queen does not seem to understand what she writes about.
There is no chicane in the case, and we are not standing out about
refinements of words we are objecting to things and things of
great importance ... and we should hear plenty about them in
Parliament if we allowed ourselves to be drawn into the trap laid
for us. 47
Clarendon's life had also been complicated by a state visit of
the King of Sardinia, accompanied by Cavour, that had unpleasant
consequences. Queen Victoria, in a letter to King Leopold, described
the Sardinian King as 'startling in the extreme in appearance . . .
The Drift to Peace 159
with a very strange, short, rough manner', but at the same time 'so
frank, open, just, straightforward, liberal and tolerant, with much
sound good sense'. She had reason to change her mind about some
of these good qualities before very long, for the King went on to
Paris, where he was most indiscreet in relating conversations with
Prince Albert and Palmerston to the Emperor. Prince Albert was
said to have warned him against an Austrian-French alliance against
England, while Palmerston was reported to have claimed that the
French Emperor 'was in the hands of a parcel of adventurers, that
he would not stand up against them and that yielding to their exig-
encies he was ready to conclude an ignominious peace, that England
did not care a fig for the French, that the Emperor might withdraw
his army from the Crimea if he liked, take it where he liked, but if
the Sardinians would remain firm they and the British troops were
strong enough to carry on the war alone and bring it to an honourable
termination.' Cowley said the Emperor was 'much upset' and he had
never seen him 'more hurt or annoyed'. He did his best to placate
poor Louis Napoleon, stressing the royal couple's affection for him
and Palmerston's admiration. Later Cavour called on Cowley, saying
the King had exaggerated Palmerston's language 'because he had
been set up against him by the Queen and Prince and that Palmerston
had treated H.M. very cavalierly'. Walewski promised to calm the
flames but Cowley feared he would blow the coals whenever it suited
him. The Emperor was most indignant at the charge that he was
pro-Austrian, saying that he had a natural antipathy to Austrian
policy, but the incident may have helped lead to his coming rappro-
chement with Russia. 48
Seymour, who had duly arrived in Vienna on 6 December (with
a bad cold), reported that he had been warmly welcomed by Buol
and that the Austrian Cabinet was waiting for instructions from
London 'with great anxiety'. Count Esterhazy's carriage was packed,
ready to set off on the long journey to St Petersburg; letters had
been prepared for the Kings of Prussia and Bavaria calling on them
to urge the Russian Emperor to accept the terms of the Austrian
Ultimatum; Gortchakov was to be informed of what was happening
two days after Esterhazy's departure, but given no details until the
Austrian ambassador had arrived in the Russian capital. In the 'prob-
able event' of the Ultimatum being rejected Esterhazy and his
mission were to leave St Petersburg immediately. 'In the more
improbable event' of the Ultimatum being considered, Esterhazy
was to warn the Russian Chancellor after ten days that only nine
160 Britain and the Crimea, 1855-56
Buol was anxious that nothing be made public for nine or ten
days. Clarendon agreed that Her Majesty's Government would make
nothing known, but said he could not be responsible for the papers;
a few days earlier he had instructed Seymour to tell Buol that revel-
ations had already been made on the Bourse with a resultant rise in
the funds. On the 17th the Morning Post carried an account of the
peace terms as set out in the Austrian Ultimatum, which Greville
supposed had been leaked by Palmerston in an endeavour to under-
mine the whole thing by a premature announcement. Clarendon
gave a different account to Queen Victoria, telling her that within
48 hours of the news first reaching Paris the French funds had risen
two per cent and that the Rothschilds both in Paris and in London
were well informed of the situation. He claimed that the Morning
Post, which he said was the organ of the French Government, had
made no secret about it as was evident from their issues of 18 and
19 December and that some of its news appeared to come from
Vienna. He was satisfied that the Cabinet agreement on confide-
ntiality was observed, but thought there might be an advantage in
the truth being known rather than false rumours for he believed the
terms were 'thought good and such as would lead to an honourable
peace' .52
On 18 December Clarendon wrote privately to Seymour, congratu-
lating him on his good work in helping to get the Ultimatum into
shape. Nevertheless he did not expect an early peace and he thought
they might 'look forward to a tremendous campaign in the Baltic
next year'. Seymour himself anticipated that the Ultimatum would
lead to a rupture in Austro-Russian relations rather than an early
peace, and expressed surprise at the peace atmosphere reported in
Paris. Indeed, when he had presented his credentials, the Emperor
had told him he could not believe the Ultimatum would be accepted.
As for Austria's reliability Seymour thought she was militarily well-
prepared, if only her finances were better. In fact on the eve of
the despatch of the Ultimatum the finance minister, unaware of its
contents, had announced cuts in the military budget. A circular had
subsequently been sent around to all Austrian embassies saying that
the military reductions had been exaggerated and would be brought
back within a few weeks. Seymour had no doubts about Buol's
'firmness and honesty' and believed all would be well provided he
was not overborne, but he had to admit that there was still much
prejudice against England and leaning towards Russia in Vienna. 53
162 Britain and the Crimea, 1855-56
ever, took a very different view, claiming that they were bound
just as much by the Memorandum as by the Ultimatum. Cowley
reported that they had a long and 'very disagreeable' conversation,
and promised Clarendon that he would write to the Emperor 'to put
him on his guard against his insidious minister'! In a later conver-
sation with the Emperor, Cowley alluded to all the intrigues under
way attempting to compel the Emperor to make peace. This led the
Emperor to show him a letter that Drouyn had addressed to him in
October 1853, arguing against an English alliance and attempting 'to
show that England had but little respect for France, when her own
interests [were] concerned'. 'Make use of England as long as it suits
you', Drouyn had advised, 'form your continental alliances without
reference to her, and shake her off whenever she stands in your
way'. The Emperor replied that 'the basis of his policy was a straight-
forward understanding with England' .58 What an extraordinary
relationship this was between the French Emperor and the British
ambassador to whom he lamented the failings of his own ministers
(but almost two centuries earlier there had been an English King
who sometimes preferred French advice).
For all his worldly wisdom Cowley was much moved by the
Emperor's declaration as was his correspondent, who replied in the
same emotional vein, expressing the hope that their 'unswerving
course' would continue 'to exercise a wholesome influence' upon the
Emperor and 'keep him from yielding to the sinister counsels of the
dishonest men by whom alone he [was] surrounded'; 'one cannot
help pitying a man', Clarendon added, 'who loves what is true and
honourable who is doomed to consort with liars and rogues'! 59
Meanwhile on 11 January word was received in Vienna of Russia's
acceptance of the Ultimatum with certain reservations. She rejected
the Fifth Point, proposed to return Kars and the occupied portions
of Asia Minor for the Russian territories held by the Allies, rather
than surrendering part of Bessarabia, and asked for a broadening of
the role of the coast guard vessels referred to in the Third Point.
These revisions, Seymour noted, were more objectionable to Austria
and Britain than to France. In any event the French Emperor wasted
no time in writing a private letter to Queen Victoria, which he gave
to Cowley for transmission in order to avoid his own officials! Even
Cowley had to admit to him that the Russian reply accorded more
than he had expected. Indeed the ambassador suggested to Clar-
endon that if Austria was agreeable they might exchange the Russian
territory they occupied for Kars and a reduced piece of Bessarabia
The Drift to Peace 167
along the Danube, and that in this way an honourable peace might
be secured. 60
In his letter Napoleon III urged Queen Victoria to accept the
Russian revisions. He claimed that French public opinion would say
to him: 'Vous aviez obtenu tout cela non sans d'immenses sacrifices
et cependant vous allez les continuer, comprettre les finances de Ia
France, repandre ses tresors et son sang et pourquoi: pour obtenir
quelques Iandes de Ia Bessarabie!f/'61
Queen Victoria made a restrained but firm reply, pointing out that
they did not yet know the exact terms of the Russian response and
that they should not lose the chance of getting better conditions by
showing a willingness to accede at this moment. It would be better
to wait until Russian relations with Austria were ruptured. The
Queen told Clarendon that her own feelings 'cannot be for peace
now'. 'The honour and glory of her dear Army, is as near her heart
as almost anything', she wrote, 'and she cannot bear the thought
that "the failure on the Redan" should be our last fait d'armes, and
it would cost her more than words can express to conclude a peace
with this as the end.' But more reasonably she added: 'However,
what is best and wisest must be done. '62
Clarendon forwarded the Queen's 'spirited opinion about peace'
to Palmerston with his own sober comment:
If I should feel the least secure that we should be more successful
this year than the last I should be even more averse to peace [than]
she is but I have no such feeling for I think that our military
administration is not such as can render our army efficient and
moveable. 63
Fortunately Buol and his Emperor remained firm and refused to
consider the proposed Russian modifications. Buol even refused
Gortchakov's request for a twenty-four hour extension of the Ulti-
matum. The situation was complicated by Seebach informing the
French Government that if they negotiated directly, independent of
the Austrian Ultimatum, the Russian plenipotentiaries would be
empowered to consider a boundary rectification and the particular
conditions, but the British Cabinet refused to give any answer to
Seebach until Russia~s final reply to Austria had been received.64
Upset by Russia's attempt to suppress the Fifth Point and
suspecting she had never been informed of the British reservations,
Clarendon instructed Seymour by telegraph on 15 January to inform
Buol regarding the contents of his Despatch no. 16 of 8 January.
168 Britain and the Crimea, 1855-56
that they had not another summer to destroy Cronstadt and expel
the Russians from the countries south of the Caucasus, but agreed
with her that it would 'not be right to continue the war for the mere
purpose of prospective victories' .1o
In fact Britain's predicament arising from her insistence on the
acceptance of her special conditions was only accentuated by the
news of Russia's acceptance of the Ultimatum. Palmerston insisted
that they must adhere to the decisions they had taken from the
beginning, claiming that they had accepted Austria's refusal to put
these conditions in their Ultimatum, but had required that she should
make them known to Russia. 'France must give way for we are quite
in the right', he added optimistically, but if they failed to do so, he
asserted: 'we shall not be afraid of appealing to this country and the
world to decide between us and the French'! If they gave way about
this, he told Clarendon, they would be 'dragged down about [the]
armistice and all the conditions of peace' .7 1 In the end, as usual,
despite Palmerston's bluster, they had to compromise. Clarendon's
tone for the next week or more was shrill and self-righteous as he
strove to maintain the demands and avoid unpalatable surrender,
but he was not unaware of the difficulties of their position.
The state of feeling in France renders a continuation of the war
impossible (he admitted to Queen Victoria], but the manner in
which that feeling is exhibited at Paris will make honorable
conditions of peace extremely difficult. Lord Cowley describes the
people as mad, kissing each other on the restoration of peace and
treating Hubner as a sort of saviour.72
Clarendon's petulance was no doubt fed by the knowledge that for
all his protestations to the contrary, it would be impossible for Britain
to go on fighting without France. This view was forcefully presented
by Prince Albert in a long memorandum written for the Cabinet in
which he pointed out the danger of pushing France into abandoning
the Alliance, leaving the British army prisoners in the Crimea and
Britain's shores undefended against a hostile Europe with the Royal
Navy tied up in the Black Sea and the Baltic. Considering the benefits
they had won and the part played by France he continued: 'we have
no moral right, if we had physical power to enforce a single handed
independent determination as to the final settlement'. 73
Yet for a week after the Russian acceptance, the Cabinet under
Palmerston's resolute lead refused to budge, and although Clarendon
admitted that they were 'now standing almost alone', he continued
The Drift to Peace 171
thought, was that the coast should not be fortified and that it should
be opened to commerce.77
France was now a weak reed, for as Cowley warned, with the
Russian acceptance of the Ultimatum the Emperor could not if he
wished continue the war. On 18 January, however, Persigny
informed Clarendon that in deference to the wishes of their ally the
French Government would make known the particular conditions to
Russia through the good offices of Seebach. Palmerston and Clar-
endon were anxious to make these conditions sine quibus non to
peace and to so inform Russia before preliminaries were signed, but
Walewski remained hesitant, although he did offer to make the
Aland Island condition sine qua non, if the preliminaries were signed
first.7 8
Things remained at an impasse until 25 January when Cowley
reported that the Emperor was willing to have Walewski inform
Seebach officially, what the Russians already knew privately, namely
the terms of the special conditions on which the British insisted and
further that the French Government was willing to enter a binding
agreement with the British Government not to make peace until the
special conditions were obtained, provided that this stipulation was
kept secret and that the British Government agreed to sign the
preliminaries of peace as drawn up by the Austrian Government
without delay. 79 These preliminaries still presented a difficulty to the
British Government, but at this point Russia inadvertently offered a
solution by proposing they should all simply initial a protocol at
Vienna, indicating that Russia accepted the conditions laid down in
the Ultimatum and providing for the appointment of Plenipotent-
iaries to meet in Paris within three weeks to sign peace preliminaries
and an armistice and begin negotiations. Palmerston welcomed this
proposal and told Queen Victoria that the arguments in Prince
Albert's memorandum would justify them before Parliament for
going ahead in view of France's attitude; on the same day Clarendon
informed the Queen that everything had been settled.so
Walewski continued to make some reservations, but he eventually
transmitted the special conditions in writing to Seebach and by 29
January they had been despatched to St Petersburg. Although they
were already known, the Russian Plenipotentiaries could not now
pretend that they were unaware of them when they arrived in Paris.
The Protocol, which Clarendon described as inconsequential, was
duly signed in Vienna on 1 February and from this time onward,
174 Britain and the Crimea, 1855-56
176
The Conclusion of Peace, 1856 177
lead given by the Thunderer, but the strictures on Russell and the
Peelite trio were manifestly unfair. It was certainly open to question
whether the great Joss of life, not to mention high cost, direct and
indirect, was justified by the rather more stringent terms that had
been obtained. When Aberdeen and his friends first learnt of the
terms in December they were critical and sceptical that they would
lead anywhere. In particular they criticised the proposal for neutralis-
ation, which Aberdeen dismissed as 'simply absurd', while he
regarded the cession of Bessarabian territory as an unnecessary
humiliation. Initially he anticipated the rejection of the Austrian
Ultimatum to be 'inevitable', but when the Russian acceptance was
announced he thought it wise not to object to the terms, although
he still regarded them as clumsy and impracticable and bound to be
evaded or to bring a peace that would not last. 3
The new session of Parliament opened on 31 January, shortly
before the protocol was signed at Vienna. The Queen's Speech
announced that 'while determined to omit no effort which could give
vigour to the operations of the war', she deemed it her duty 'not to
decline any overtures which might reasonably afford a prospect of a
safe and honourable peace'. Consequently, the Speech continued,
as a result of the efforts of Austria, negotiations for a peace treaty
were shortly to be opened in Paris. 4
In the House of Commons the address was approved with no
dissent and with only a brief debate. Disraeli's was the voice of
moderation. He welcomed the prospect of an early peace but
condemned those who insisted on continuing the war. Palmerston in
an even briefer speech welcomed the spirit of Disraeli's remarks and
quite agreed that it would be wrong to continue the war if they were
now able to accomplish the objects for which it was fought.S
The only sour note came from Roebuck who announced that he
had no confidence in 'the noble Lord' (Palmerston) and did not think
the people of the country had either. Denouncing Russia's long
record of aggression, he contended that they had gone to war 'to
prevent Russia from acquiring such a preponderance in Europe as
would enable her to override both France and England'. This he
argued had not been achieved, for although they had 'an army of
lions', it had been 'led by jackasses'. Instead they were 'suing for
peace', because 'our great Ally- our "big brother" as he was called-
chooses to lead the way'. 6
In the Lords Derby made a speech that was three times as long
as Disraeli's in the Commons and much less accommodating. While
178 Britain and the Crimea, 1855-56
he did not intend to give comfort to the enemy by voting .against the
Queen's Speech, as it was called, he thought it a pretty sad affair.
Indeed, he tore the whole Speech apart, paragraph by paragraph,
with emphasis on the omissions. He noted the lack of any mention
of Turkey or Sardinia and the failure to say anything about the
deterioration of relations with Persia and more seriously with the
United States over the Foreign Enlistment issue. He was especially
vehement on the lack of any reference to Kars, to the valour of its
defenders and of any explanation for its loss. While he welcomed
the prospects of peace, providing the objects of the war were fully
secured, he asked why Austria was approaching Russia on behalf of
the Allies instead of the opposite. It would have been difficult to have
made a more scathing attack on the Address and yet he concluded his
long speech by reiterating his intention of not offering it the 'slightest
opposition'. 7 The irony of the situation was that many of the views
expressed were those of the Prime Minister who was forced by
circumstances to accept situations that were uncongenial to him. As
we have seen, Palmerston and Clarendon had constantly attempted,
unsuccessfully, to secure assistance for the Turkish garrison of Kars
and they were both unhappy about the way in which they were
forced to go along with the Austro-French peace initiative.
Lord Clarendon replied more briefly in a conciliatory speech,
which Hansard reported as being 'very imperfectly heard'. He
explained that nothing was said about differences with the United
States since discussions were still in progress and publication of the
correspondence, on which any debate would have to be based, would
be premature, but he proceeded to give a stout defence of the British
position. As for Kars, he fully agreed with Derby's elogium of its
defenders, promised the early publication of all the relevant papers
on which the House could make judgement and hotly denied that
there was any difference between England and France on the
grounds that England had a selfish interest in this front. Derby's
raising of this question had been impolitic for how could Britain
separate her obvious interest and concern at the continued expansion
of the Russian Empire into this part of Asia from the more immediate
concern for the protection of Turkey from Russian aggression? Actu-
ally there was no doubt that the British Government was more
concerned about the Asian front than the French, despite Claren-
don's disclaimers, but that did not warrant Derby's severe strictures
made, it would seem, merely to embarrass the Government. Clar-
endon also vigorously defended the role of Austria and concluded
The Conclusion of Peace, 1856 179
with warm praise for 'the judgement, firmness and moderation, the
honourable and straightforward conduct' of the French Emperor,
who 'desired peace', but who 'would make no peace that was incon-
sistent with the honour and dignity of France' .8
The Government had got off lightly as Palmerston recognised
when in his jaunty way he wrote to Clarendon: 'Roebuck and Derby
might be put into a bag together, and the survivor let out to be trod
upon .... But a few war to the knife speeches, (appropriate as
somebody said for the member from Sheffield) will do no harm. '9
There was a relative lull in diplomatic activity between the signing
of the Protocols in Vienna on 1 February and the opening of the
Congress in Paris on the 25th. The Austrian, British and French
ambassadors conferred with the Porte in Constantinople in this
period in an effort to get their position settled with the Turkish
Government on Points One and Four. The Fourth Point was finally
disposed of when the Turkish Grand Council approved with a few
amendments some twenty-one proposals made by the ambassadors,
which on paper comprised a sweeping programme of legal and
administrative reforms providing equality of treatment for non-
Musselman subjects of the Sultan. These were promulgated by him
on 18 February as the Hatti-Humayun of Abdul Medjid. There was
also much discussion of the future organisation of the Principalities
envisaged in the First Point, but no decisions were reached.1
Cowley, who was to support Clarendon as the second British
delegate, was anxious that the British and French Governments
should hold preliminary discussions prior to the opening of the
Congress to ensure a clear understanding between them. Walewski,
however, stalled to the last moment in preparing a memorandum for
that purpose, since in Cowley's view his object was to enter the
Conference with as few engagements towards England as possible,
and no memorandum had arrived before he left Paris on 9 February
for a short visit to England where he was able to confer with Clar-
endon. During the first week in February Cowley had two audiences
with Louis Napoleon, who was as friendly as ever, and ascertained
the Emperor's views on most of the matters that were likely to come
up at the Peace Conference, or Congress as the French preferred to
call it, some of which he told Clarendon were 'odd enough', but on
the whole he thought the Emperor would be amenable to reason,
'except on Bessarabia'. Alluding to an inquiry from Cavour as to
what he thought might be done in the conferences for Italy, the
Emperor indicated that he was disposed to make an effort on two
180 Britain and the Crimea, 1855-56
STAYING PROCEEDINGS.
Jlr. 81i. " TELL RUSSIA, IP HE DOESN'T SETTLE AT ON<"E. I SHALL GO ON WITH THo ACTION."
Clarendon, 'he was made to see his mistake'. Clarendon warned the
Emperor against the efforts that would be made by flattery to divide
the Allies and alluded to the bad impression created by peace at any
price talk in Paris. Louis Napoleon strongly condemned such talk,
which he attributed to 'the notorious levity and love of change of
the French nation', and agreed to the importance of prior agreement
before the Conference opened. On being pressed by Clarendon he
said he would have no hesitation or difficulty in renewing the war if
Russia failed to live up to her engagements. Clarendon again warned
Napoleon against flattery and advised him how to parry this request.
'Every time I see him', the Foreign Secretary wrote to Palmerston,
'I am better satisfied with his frank and straightforward conduct',
but events were to prove him over-sanguine.1 5
Although Louis Napoleon attached great importance to the
English Alliance and rejoiced in his friendship with Queen Victoria,
he was much more prepared to be friendly with the Russians than
was Clarendon and the Russians knew this.
On the 18th Clarendon had what he called a satisfactory conver-
sation with Brunnow, who was 'full of professions of esteem and
respect' for Palmerston (!)and who made no disguise of the fact that
Russia 'had been beaten and must take the consequences'. Clar-
endon told Palmerston that when Brunnow asked what England
wanted under Point 5, he replied that England was determined not
to make peace unless she secured the objects of the war. He told
Brunnow that the English people:
did not regard the prospects of Peace with much favour; they had
made vast preparations and were cheerfully submitting to great
sacrifices in order to prosecute the war with vigour . . . and it was
not unnatural therefore that the people of England should desire
one more campaign, nevertheless [illegible] their sound sense and
sober judgement would be satisfied with a peace upon conditions
to which Russia had agreed ....
Clarendon formed the impression that Brunnow thought the terms
were moderate and that peace would be made.16
The next day he was more pessimistic, telling Palmerston he feared
Brunnow was stiffening because of the shameful peace atmosphere
on the Bourse and in the salons of Paris. He said that he was anxious
to have the prime minister's comments for he felt that he was walking
upon ground that was mined and that he had 'nobody to depend
upon except the Emperor and Marshal Vaillant'. Clarendon did not
The Conclusion of Peace, 1856 183
east of the Black Sea. Clarendon and Cowley objected to the omis-
sions and told Walewski they expected his support which he prom-
ised. At the meeting the conditions under Article 5 were considered.
It was agreed to settle the demand regarding the Aland Islands by
a separate convention between Russia, Britain and France, since they
were of no concern to Austria, Sardinia and Turkey. The Russians
expressed the hope that their compliance on this condition would
be taken into account when other matters were considered. The
conference then considered the territories east of the Black Sea. As
a result of British pressure before the meeting Walewski spoke of
the necessity of placing an effectual barrier between Russia and
Turkey, but in fact the Russians had already been informed that the
British would not be supported by France in this area. Thus when
Clarendon went further, proposing that the territory east of the
Kuban river should be declared independent (that is, the entire area
from the Kuban to the Turkish frontier), Orlov protested strongly
against any suggestion of such a vast cession of territory not
mentioned in the Ultimatum nor subsequently. He also refused to
make any promises about abolishing any fortifications on the Circas-
sian coast, since they might be needed as protection against brigands.
Brunnow pointed out that these territories had been ceded by Turkey
to Russia under the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829. This was admitted
by Ali who told Cowley, when the latter took him aside, that the
real difficulty lay in border infractions. Cowley then suggested setting
up a mixed commission to revise the frontier to which Orlov agreed.
When Walewski asked for the restitution of Kars, Orlov repeated
his claim for compensation. Clarendon rejected this on the ground
that the war had been fought to defend the integrity of Turkey;
'restitution of territory held by the enemy', Clarendon argued, 'is
invariably made at the conclusion of peace.' (The adjective 'defeated'
should be understood before the word 'enemy' to make this state-
ment meaningful.) 'We restore I said', Clarendon reported, 'Eupa-
toria, Kinburn, Kamiesch, Sebastopol, Balaclava and Kertch, but at
the same time we give her what is far more valuable than all these
places -we give her peace .... ' He went on to spell out the advan-
tages for Russian commerce in the Black Sea and the Baltic that
would accrue from the end of the blockade; the cession of a strip of
land in Bessarabia; already agreed to, was a small price to pay.
Orlov then withdrew his demand regarding Bessarabia and agreed to
return Kars if other matters were dealt with satisfactorily. Clarendon
refused to proceed under 'menace', saying they 'would continue the
188 Britain and the Crimea, 1855-56
pressed for their union and Turkey consented he did not see any
objection. 41
On the evening of 9 March Clarendon again discussed the Bessara-
bian frontier with the Emperor, who he still thought was too
considerate of Russian sensibilities. He agreed, however, to a change
in the proposed line to avoid bisecting a Bulgarian colony providing
it was made to reach the Pruth well above its junction with the
Danube. Excusing his moderation the Emperor dwelt on his financial
difficulties and blamed his generals for failing to make it possible for
them to conclude 'a glorious peace and crush Russia'! Again,
however, on the same night the Emperor saw Orlov and continued
to promise his support (according to Charles-Roux, in return for
Russian support on unification of the Principalities). In fact, as
Baumgart suggests, on this point France basically sided with the
Russians against Britain and Austria. 42
At the conference the next day the Russians agreed to refer to
St Petersburg the new proposal for a line that kept them 20 miles
east of the Danube and the Pruth up to a point 120 miles north of
the junction of the two rivers but 'passing round' Bolgrad, the centre
of the Bulgarian colony. Russian requests for guarantees for Russian
subjects left west of the frontier and for the dismantling of Turkish
fortifications were refused. It was agreed to appoint a committee,
Buol, Bourqueney and Ali, to draft articles for the reorganisation
of the Principalities. Walewski proposed that if general principles
were agreed to, the details could be worked out later without holding
up the conclusion of the peace treaty. At this point it was agreed on
Walewski's proposal to invite Prussia to attend a meeting to amend
the 1841 Convention. The Russians concluded what had been a
fruitful session by responding to an earlier request of Clarendon's
giving assurances regarding the care of Allied war graves in the
Crimea. In his private letter Clarendon wrote: 'We have made great
progress today and peace may almost be looked upon as a fait
accompli. ' 43
The news was well received by Palmerston who seems to have
drawn in his horns. He congratulated Clarendon on the progress that
they had made and expressed the view that the peace would be well
received by the country, although he regretted their failure to get
any concessions on the eastern shores of the Black Sea. 'But if
the French will not back us up in asking these things', he added
philosophically, 'it is of course hopeless for us to expect to obtain
194 Britain and the Crimea, 1855-56
We shall not perhaps get all we desire [he wrote], and I shall, of
course, get plenty of abuse, but I hope that it will be a peace that
we need not be ashamed of, and if we can shake hands heartily
with the Russians, so much the better.
It is lucky that we have Orloff to deal with, for he has behaved
in a straightforward and gentlemanlike manner. - Brunnow has
been like a low attorney and we should have finished nothing with
him: - his intentions were, I dare say, good, but he has a slavish
fear of saying a word or doing a thing that might displease St.
Petersburg. Orloff treats him like his footman.
Treaty, saying he did not think that Russia was at present contem-
plating renewed aggression against Turkey. He reported Orlov as
admitting they had been beaten and were signing a treaty 'such as
never was signed by Russia before'. He claimed he was simply trying
to soften the hard conditions being pressed on his master. Clarendon
denied the severity of the terms and promised there would be no
harshness or discourtesy in the 'redaction'. A few days later Clar-
endon reported that everything was in a state of discreditable
confusion owing to the manner in which W alewski had failed to keep
his engagements, not from bad faith, but because he had 'no prin-
ciple, no convictions and no feeling of personal and national dignity'.
The trouble, Clarendon declared, was that Walewski was 'very weak'
and wanted 'to please everybody'; ' ... we found the Russians in
one room, the Prussians in another and we were shown into a third
and Walewski was running from one to another', he continued,
'till I said we could not any longer take part in such a Vaudeville
travestie'. 52
In the course of a long conversation with the Emperor on 18
March Clarendon broached the Italian question and on the following
day they were joined by Walewski and Cavour, but the discussion
was on the whole inconclusive and according to Clarendon, Cavour
was not pleased. The Emperor, however, instructed Walewski to see
Buol about the withdrawal of Austrian and French troops from the
Papal Legations, and to sweeten the proposal he added the with-
drawal of Allied troops from Greece. Palmerston was delighted that
Clarendon had raised the matter and wasted no time in sending him
a despatch approving his course. 'The military occupation of an
independent state by foreign troops is a condition of things which is
so repugnant to all right principle that it can only be justified by
some strong and urgent and temporary necessity', he declared and
now that peace was 'about to be restored', he argued, 'all these
occupations might by general consent be made to cease'. Clarendon
was more sceptical for he did not see how troops could be removed
from Italy and Greece 'before some better order of things is
established'. 53
In another audience with the Emperor a few days later Clarendon
communicated the substance of this despatch from Palmerston on
the subject and expressed the hope that the Emperor would not
leave the important matter of Italy solely in the hands of Walewski,
'but that he would himself communicate to Count Buol his determi-
nation to withdraw the French troops from Rome and to require
The Conclusion of Peace, 1856 199
that the Austrian troops should quit the Legations'. The Emperor
seemed to assent, but made no promises, agreeing that 'a strong
declaration of opinion on the subject of Italy should be expressed
and recorded by the Congress before its final separation'. 54
The Emperor's tone in these conversations remained friendly, 'but
the impression left on my mind was not satisfactory', Clarendon
reported to Palmerston. 'The Emperor wants peace to be signed and
he has ceased to care much for the conditions upon which peace is
to be made .... ' The Austrian Alliance no longer interested him.
The Emperor spoke with detestation of Austrian policy [Clarendon
continued] and in slighting tones of the Emperor of Austria - but
on the other hand there is an evident tendency on the part of the
Emperor towards Russia - a dislike to offend and a great desire
to be agreeable to the Emperor of Russia - the comparisons
constantly made between England and France to the disparage-
ment of the former by the organs and agents of Russia through
Europe and by those who have daily access to the Emperor have
not, I think, been without effect upon His Majesty, altho' at the
same time I have no reason to believe that his feelings towards
England have undergone any change or that His Majesty has
ceased to consider that his own interests are closely bound up with
the Anglo-French Alliance.ss
At this stage the Cabinet began to take an active interest in the
drafting of the final text of the Treaty, and indicated their desire to
see a complete draft before the Treaty was signed, especially of the
articles regarding the Principalities. On 22 March Palmerston wrote
that the Cabinet had been going over Clarendon's reports, which
seemed to them to be 'generally speaking ... very good', but he
promised they would have a few verbal alterations to suggest, some
of which might be important; 'we are all unanimous', he wrote, 'that
a Treaty of such great importance, and upon the conclusion of which
questions of peace and war in Europe may hereafter depend ought
not to be signed in a hurry nor until we are quite satisfied with the
wording of every article'. The result was a long despatch of fifteen
pages on 24 March returning nineteen articles with suggested alter-
ations in wording and queries on various matters. In a letter on the
same day Palmerston suggested a colony in European Turkey for
the Polish volunteers, saying 'We cannot turn these men wholly
adrift without doing something for them and they would probably
be useful settlers for the Sultan'. He warned that the Morning Adver-
200 Britain and the Crimea, 1855-56
tiser was beginning to carp against the Peace, but he thought reason-
able men would be satisfied, although there would be 'nothing to
spare in it' .56
Palmerston continued to send daily comments on various details,
even after withdrawing to Broadlands for a few days and on the 27th
indicated that he thought the Cabinet would accept the changes in
Clarendon's latest communications; he again urged proper treatment
for the Poles, gave Clarendon a free hand in the prolongation of the
armistice, but professed a preference for Monday to Sunday for the
signing of the treaty (perhaps on the advice of his wife's evangelical
son-in-law, Lord Shaftesbury). 'Your Aland Island Treaty will do
quite well', he added laconically. Clarendon, however, showed little
sympathy with the Poles; 'as the war did not become general and
there [was] to be no recasting of the map of Europe', he told Palmer-
ston, it was useless to put forward demands on their partY
The substance of the fourth point, it will be remembered, had
been settled at the Constantinople Conference when the Sultan met
the demands of the Allied ambassadors with the proclamation of the
hatti-sherif recognising the rights and immunities of non-Moslem
subjects of the Porte. It was proposed to take formal note of this by
an article in the Treaty, but Ali insisted on the use of a weaker
phrase indicating that the contracting powers 'recognized the value'
of the firman. The Russians, who regarded this clause as a vindication
of their original demands on Turkey in 1853, unsuccessfully tried to
get an additional sentence emphasising their point of view. In fact,
of course, the Russians no longer enjoyed the special privileges
claimed in former treaties.ss
The last week of March was taken up with discussing and
approving of the final wording of the various clauses of the Treaty
and on 26 March the representatives of Britain, France and Russia
met and agreed to the terms of a Convention 'stipulating that no
fortification should be erected on the Aland Islands, nor any naval
or military establishments placed on those Islands by Russia'. Clar-
endon transmitted copies of the various clauses as they were
approved and on the 28th was able to tell Palmerston that the greater
part of modifications he had suggested in a despatch of the 24th had
been 'wholly or partially accepted'. At the seventeenth meeting on
28 March the remaining clauses were discussed and approved. The
British Plenipotentiaries asked that the treaty should not be signed
on Sunday, but yielded to the universal wish both inside and outside
the Congress to avoid any unnecessary delay. To have persisted,
The Conclusion of Peace, 1856 201
Now that the haggling was over Palmerston was magnaminous. 'I
wish you joy with all my heart', he wrote to Clarendon that same
day, 'on the conclusion of the great work on which you have been
engaged. It will I am sure give general satisfaction in this country
and I trust it will for many years to come secure the peace of Europe
against a resurgence of the dangers which have been the cause of
the war.' 'I have not read anything in a long while', Clarendon
responded, 'that has given me as much pleasure as your opinion of
the Treaty and your expectation of the results to which it may lead.'
Once the matter was settled both Palmerston and Clarendon quickly
abandoned the high ground they once occupied. Writing to the
Queen immediately after signing the peace treaty Clarendon asserted
that, while another campaign must have brought glory to Her
Majesty's arms, the price would have been too high, quite apart
from 'the cost and the horrors of war', for the continuation of the
war, he thought, might have led to a coalition of Europe against
England, joined by the United States, the consequences of which, he
added with some understatement, 'might have been most serious'.63
The Treaty, based on the Five Points of the Austrian Ultimatum,
consisted of a Preamble and thirty-four articles, with three annexes. 64
The Conclusion of Peace, 1856 203
Nine articles dealt with such matters as the end of hostilities, ratific-
ation, the return of occupied territories and prisoners of war, the
evacuation of troops, amnesty for nationals who served the enemy
and the resumption of normal commerce. Two new and significant
articles (VII and VIII) provided for the admission of Turkey 'to
participate in the advantages of the public law and system (concert)
of Europe, and for the mediation of any differences that might arise
between the Porte and the other Contracting Powers'. Had these
204 Britain and the Crimea, 1855-56
are told, was inaudible. If there was hissing at Temple Bar it was
more likely caused by the fact that the procession arrived an hour
and a half late, by the inaudibility of the herald or by the closing of
the City Gates in traditional fashion in the faces of the crowd from
the West End. In a leader The Times described the whole ceremony
as 'meagre, motley, slovenly and too late', but nevertheless
pronounced it as a 'successful' appeal to the good nature of the
populace. 'We do all our forms in a slovenly way', it pontificated,
'and the slovenliness of the ceremony made it the more authentic.
By this time people have well nigh forgotten sores that were rankling
even two short months ago .... They have reason to be satisfied
with the terms which our diplomatists have battled for and won. '65
The previous day in a leader, examining the terms of the Treaty,
now published for the first time, they were satisfied that it could not
be said, as was so often the case in the past, that what had been
gained in the war was lost in the negotiation. It continued:
The Treaty is at least commensurate with our military successes.
What more we might have extorted from Russia . . . had we more
signally vanquished her in the field, it is vain to conjecture. As it
is we have inspired one another with mutual respect, and that
respect is reflected in the Treaty before us. To use a hackneyed
phrase 'the objects of the war' have been 'achieved'; and we are
really at a loss to discover what has been omitted that we had a
right to require. 66
Clarendon could not have asked for more from the great Thunderer
whose malign influence in the past had often been a cause of grave
concern for him.
8 Finale
I THE RESUMPTION OF THE CONGRESS, THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TREATY AND THE
RESOLUTION OF THE AMERICAN ENLISTMENT
CRISIS
Five more meetings of the Congress were held after the signing of
the peace treaty, for Louis Napoleon had always wanted it to be
more than just a peace conference. The atmosphere was, however,
more relaxed and much of the time was taken up with festivities.
The Emperor gave a grand banquet of 140 'couverts' on the evening
of 12 April, which Clarendon described 'as the finest thing of the
kind I ever assisted at', but he was less pleased with his conversation
with the Emperor whom he sat next to. He found Louis Napoleon
too afraid of hurting the Pope, too anxious for a European Congress
and inclined to think that in a year or two the French people would
tire of the arts of peace and want something more striking for their
amusement. This affair was followed on the 14th by an even more
lavish dinner and fete at the Hotel de Ville which lasted for seven
hours. 'There is no sovereign in Europe who could give such a fete
as the Prefet de Ia Seine for he had the best singers and all the best
dancers of Paris in a locale far more magnificent and commodious
than the Tuileries', Clarendon wrote to Palmerston. 'Certainly the
Plenipotentiaries will carry away with them notions of the boundless
wealth and luxury of France. ' 1
Details regarding the implementation of the Peace Treaty were
cleared up during the first week of April. The armistice was extended
to the sea, the blockade was lifted and restrictions to trade between
the former belligerents were removed, all with great celerity for this
was the first international peace settlement since the invention of the
telegraph. Arrangements were also discussed for the early evacuation
of troops and the meeting of the Bessarabian boundary commission,
and instructions were prepared for the Commissioners to be sent to
the Principalities.z
The Congress then turned its attention to broader issues the more
important of which Clarendon had already discusssed with the
Emperor. 'The signature of peace has put that august body in high
good humour and I would say it would agree to anything that would
207
208 Britain and the Crimea, 1855-56
Circassia but from the Caspian to the east where the Russians had
good lines of communication. Turkey had ceded the territories
between Batoum and Anapa in 1829, although she had not had
control over all of them. Orner had now occupied one of these
provinces, but Palmerston admitted that as a Moslem he was the
right man in the wrong place. 15 (The Circassian tribes to the west
were Moslem.) As for the hatti-sherif he claimed it was impossible
to overrate its importance, although admitting that it would not be
uniformly administered. The Allies could not make the demands
that the Russians had made, but he claimed the Sultan was willing
to give the Allies 'that sort of moral right' which he thought would
give sufficient security. He went on to say it was not unnatural for
people to be disappointed that it had been impossible to make use
of the formidable military and naval power they had built up, but
he added 'when a war ceases to be just I hold it to be a crime', a
sentiment with which Gladstone could easily agree. Perhaps the most
remarkable part of Palmerston's speech was its conclusion. Prompted
by Clarendon, 16 he rejected the widespread opinion (which surely
he so recently held) that Russia would continue her 'long cherished
projects of aggression'. He professed the belief that the new Czar
was a man of peace, 'not inspired by ambition of conquest', other
than 'conquests over indolence, undeveloped natural resources, and
all those difficulties which prevent the progressive improvement of
a nation'. He was optimistic in whatever direction he looked and
trusted that the late war had settled the divisions in every part of
Europe, although he was sure that in time of necessity the nation
would always be ready to do its duty.
I trust that period may be long deferred [he concluded], and that
the youngest man who sits in this House may not live to see the
time when it will be necessary for responsible Ministers of the
Crown to call upon the people of this country to support their
Sovereign in the prosecution of any war.
Aberdeen could not have asked for more, providing he could bring
himself to believe these peaceful professions of his old rival. Indeed,
the speech contrasted sharply with the views Palmerston had
expressed privately, prior to the conclusion of the treaty, but, except
for some of his colleagues, the House had not heard the more
ebullient expressions of them. As we have seen, Palmerston often
exaggerated to make his point or to let off steam, but he was basically
a realist, temperamentally an optimist and, in point of fact, a Prime
Finale 217
strength in 1856. The new recruits in the British Army had not shown
up well in the fight for the Redan, although admittedly the operation
was ill-conceived. The qualities of the new Commander-in-Chief
were uncertain and yet no other General officer had been thought
fit for the appointment. The only British General who had really
distinguished himself, Fenwick Williams, was a prisoner-of-war in
Russia. According to Colonel Wetheral, as we have seen, the
Crimean Army was 'immoveable' because of the failure of the Land
Transport Corps and yet there was talk of sending it into the wilds
of Georgia in the spring. Britain might have been able to carry on
the war alone by means of a naval blockade, but there is no evidence
that she had or was likely to have the military capacity to make it a
reasonable project. Prince Albert made this clear in his memor-
andum for the Cabinet of 28 January. In talking of such a possibility
earlier, British spokesmen were guilty either of bluffing or of self-
deceit, probably a combination of the two. By March they were
more realistic and also less afraid of public opposition to the peace
they were concluding.
The relationship between Palmerston and Clarendon is a matter
of some dispute. Temperley would seem to exaggerate the role of
Palmerston and underestimate that of Clarendon, although some of
his strictures on the Foreign Secretary are not without foundation. 24
(Clarendon still awaits a good modern biographer.) Herbert Bell is
more judicious, but as a biographer he naturally lays more emphasis
on Palmerston's role, and he did not have access to Clarendon's
letters in the Palmerston papers, nor did he make use of Clarendon's
despatches. Palmerston was clearly the more forceful and the more
aggressive of the two, but he always showed respect for the Foreign
Secretary's opinions and the two men treated each other as equals,
although Clarendon realised that as Prime Minister Palmerston had
the last word. Palmerston often put pressure on Clarendon, but he
always remained flexible and ready to adjust as the situation
required. The fact is that the two men worked well together and
were in general agreement on the broad outlines of policy. Clarendon
was no rubber stamp and British diplomacy in the Crimean war
would have been less effective without his steady hand at the helm.
He was a cautious man and if he thought a clear departure from
previous policy was necessary, he would normally ask for directions,
but in other circumstances, especially towards the end of the peace
negotiations, he made his own decisions which were accepted by
Palmerston and his colleagues. Clarendon's great forte was his
224 Britain and the Crimea, 1855-56
III CONCLUSION
tives and ten of them were still shown to be members of the Carlton
Club. 25
Lord Granville in writing to the Duke of Newcastle several months
after the formation of Palmerston's ministry emphasised his own
affinity with the Peelites and his strong desire for a Peelite Liberal
'amalgamation'. 26 He admitted that Whig prejudices were the main
obstacle and had nothing but praise for the conduct of the Peelite
ministers towards their Whig colleagues during the Coalition, but he
felt that he had to express his regret that the Peelites were also guilty
of indiscretions, such as insisting on so many places in the Coalition
administration and in remaining as members of the Carlton Club. It
should be noted, however, that, with the exception of Russell, the
Whig prejudice to which Granville referred was mainly or altogether
outside the Cabinet. Had it not been for the misfortune of the
Crimean War the Coalition might have survived and the fusion of
the parties that both Granville and Newcastle desired have been
achieved. As it was, Newcastle stood apart from his Peelite
colleagues and four years were to pass before they all came together
again.
On foreign policy issues the four ex-ministers in the Commons
often took an independent line in debate and occasionally in the
division lobbies, especially Gladstone, but they were no more inde-
pendent than many Radical members of the Liberal party. It is more
difficult to generalise about the back-bench Peelites, most of whom
were now probably regarded as Liberals. Examination of the division
lists 27 is of limited value, partly because there were not very many
significant divisions during the period under consideration and partly
because a vote with the Opposition did not necessarily signify any
movement towards the Derbyites, nor a vote with the Government
full acceptance of the Palmerston administration. Moreover, many
of the divisions against the Government were inspired by Radicals,
who on some motions got Conservative support and who were often
more hostile to the Government than any of the Peelites (with the
exception of Gladstone) for there was no class barrier in the case of
the latter. An examination of eight major divisions up to 1 May
1856 indicates that 35 members once identified as Peelites generally
continued to give the Government support, as no more than two
gave as many as four adverse votes and nineteen gave none. Glad-
stone, who was the strongest Peelite critic of the Government did
support it in ten out of eighteen divisions during the period from
1 March 1855 to 1 May 1856. Indeed, his hostility to Palmerston was
226 Britain and the Crimea, 1855-56
party in the country would have been less disposed to accept peace
from Aberdeen than they were in fact from Palmerston. The Palmer-
ston Government probably wrested a little more from Russia in the
peace settlement than Aberdeen's might have done, but it is doubtful
that this would have made any great difference in the long run.
Whether Aberdeen would have succeeded in persuading Clarendon
to be more cautious on the enlistment issue is hard to say.
Although Palmerston was what today we would call a 'hawk' in
both foreign and military affairs, much more than Aberdeen, he was
not a militarist. Commenting on a letter of Prince Albert who took
a continental view of military matters, he made some interesting
remarks to Clarendon about 'the feeling of this country about the
military condition'.
He [the Prince] should recollect [Palmerston wrote] that in coun-
tries where there is no Parliament or a Parliament recently estab-
lished the military principle predominates and men are prouder of
being officers than of being gentlemen. Whereas in countries like
this where Parliamentary Government has taken deep root the
civil principle predominates and men are more proud of being
gentlemen than being officers.
In continental countries, he pointed out, the army was the first line
of defence, 'while in this country whose island position makes the
army but the second line of defence we do not regard the army in
the same degree as a permanent institution of prime necessity on a
large scale' .29
Palmerston lacked Aberdeen's moral qualities as a prime minister
and for this reason in some ways commanded less respect, but in
others he had an advantage. Not only was his heart more in the war,
but he sat in the House of Commons and he belonged to the much
larger Liberal component of the coalition, even if he was still, after
twenty-five years, regarded as a newcomer by some Whigs. For these
reasons he was probably a more acceptable leader to the majority
of the Liberal party, but not necessarily to all of them; Russell still
had some following and of course the Manchester School or Radical
peace party had no use for Palmerston.
Lord Aberdeen had been a great favourite with Queen Victoria
whereas Lord Palmerston when Foreign Secretary in the Russell
administration had much antagonised her. Nevertheless as Prime
Minister, after initial awkwardness, he got along better with the
Queen than might have been expected. He sent her pithy, sometimes
228 Britain and the Crimea, 1855-56
230
Notes and References 231
156-8), Gladstone memo., 31.1.55; Herbert Papers, copy of letter to
Derby, 31.1.55.
5 LQV, III, 106-7, memo. by Prince Albert, 1.2.55; Hansard's Parliamen-
tary Debates, 3rd series (hereinafter Hansard), 136, 1238-60; L. Stra-
chey and R. Fulford (eds), The Greville Memoirs, VII, 108-9.
6 BL, B.P. 12(12), (Aberdeen) Correspondence &c 1855-60 (hereinafter
Ab. Cor. 1855-60), 12; LQV, III, 108-9, memo. by Prince Albert,
2.2.55.
7 BL Add. MS 44747, 87-94 (Autobiographical Memoranda 1845-66,
159-61), Gladstone memo. 2.2.55, partly reproduced in John Morley,
Gladstone, I, 528-9, with important omissions; BL Add. MS 44791,
111-13, part of an autobiographical memo.; LQV, III, 109-10, memo.
by the Queen, 2.2.55.
8 LQV, III, 111-13, memo. 2.2.55, drafted by the Prince and signed by
the Queen, and 114-16, Victoria to Russell, 2.2.55; and 119-21, memo.
by Prince Albert, 3.2.55; Brian Connell, Regina v. Palmerston, 157-8,
Queen's Journal, 2.2.55.
9 LQV, III, 114-18, memo. by Prince Albert and the Queen, 3.2.55; BL
Add. MS 44745, 97-106, Gladstone memo., 3.2.55; PRO 30/22/12A,
149-56, Argyll, Lansdowne and Cranworth, 3.2.55; Connell, Regina v.
Palmerston, 158-61.
10 Hickleton Papers, A4/57, Clarendon, 3 and 4.2.55; Maxwell, Clar-
endon, II, 59-60; LQV, III, 121-2; PRO 30/22/12A, 157-8, Palmerston,
2.3.55; G. P. Gooch, Later Correspondence of Lord John Russell, II,
182-3.
11 LQV, III, 122-5, the Queen and Palmerston, 4 and 5.2.55; memo. by
the Queen, 6.2.55. Palmerston had not yet heard from Graham who
was ill.
12 MS Clar dep c31, 15-16, 5.2.55.
13 See BL Add. MSS 44237, 251-6, 44745, 43-60 and 108-17, 44163,
168-9, and 44262, 175-84; Lord Stanmore (Sir Arthur Gordon), Sidney
Herbert, I, 251-62 and The Earl of Aberdeen, 289-90, John Martineau,
Duke of Newcastle, 254-6. John Morley, Gladstone, I, makes use of
many of the Gladstone memoranda covering the crisis and most are
published in John Brooke and Mary Sorensen, W. E. Gladstone, III,
Autobiographical Memoranda, 1845-56.
14 Ab. Cor. 1855-60, 31-2 and 40, letters from Palmerston, Granville and
Clarendon, 7, 8 and 12.2.55 with Aberdeen's replies. For the office
of Secretary at War and its abolition, see John Sweetman, War and
Administration (Edinburgh: 1984) 70-6. This book appeared after my
own was completed.
15 Broadlands MS GC/CL/585-6, 4 and 5.2.55; Lansdowne Papers,
Palmerston, 7.2.55; MS Clar dep c31, 18, 5.3.55; Autobiographical
Memoranda, 1845-1866,277, Appendix 6, Palmerston Diary. Frederick
Peel, the former Prime Minister's son, was appointed Under Secretary
for War and thus became a not very effective spokesman for the War
Office in the Commons.
16 Broadlands MS GC/PA/99, n.d.
232 Notes and References
17 Sir George Douglas and Sir George D. Ramsay (eds), The Panmure
Papers, I, 51.
18 Ibid., 8-9 and 45 (for the quotation).
19 Broadlands MS GC/GR/1830, 7.2.55.
20 Ashley, Palmerston, II, 307.
21 Hansard, 136, 1296-1308.
22 Ibid., 1329-32.
23 Ibid., 1332-57; Malmesbury, Memoirs, II, 7.
24 Hansard, 136, 1365-8.
25 See my Aberdeen Coalition, 440-3.
26 Broadlands MS GC/CL/487-8, 8 and 9.2.55; Hickleton Papers A57,
Clarendon, 9.2.55; MS Clar dep c31, 5.2.55.
27 MS Clar dep c31, 21-2, 10.2.55 (Maxwell, Clarendon, II, 63, in part).
28 MS Clar dep c29, 268-9, 9.2.55. Seep. 36.
29 MS Clar dep c30, 20, 9.2.55. I can no longer find the letter about the
feeling at Brooks's in the Russell Papers where I originally read it before
they were bound. There are numerous other letters of congratulations in
PRO 30/22/12A and /12B.
30 Hansard, 136, 1421-31; Greville Memoirs, VII, 114; Argyll, Autobi-
ography, I, 536.
31 Broadlands MS CAB/A81, Palmerston memo. of results of Cabinet
deliberations Saturday 10.2.55; G. Douglas and G. D. Ramsay (eds),
Panmure Papers, I, 56-7; Hansard, 136, 1402-13 and 1421-31; Connell,
Regina v. Palmerston, 166; BL Add. MS 44791, 115.
32 Hansard, 136, 1431-8.
33 Panmure Papers, I, 58-9 and 70.
34 Greville Memoirs, VII, 117; Hansard, 136, 1431-66; LQV, III, 134-5.
35 BL Add. MS 44745, 77-8, memo. 18.2.55 (Autobiographical Memor-
anda 1845-1866, 178-9).
36 Hansard, 136, 1514-30.
37 Ibid., 1534-41, 1580 and 1592; Ab. Cor. 1855--60, 44-5, 19.2.55.
38 Greville Memoirs, VII, 115.
39 BL Add. MS 44745, 121-32, memos 20 and 21.2.55 (Autobiographical
Memoranda, 180-4); LQV, III, 136-8, memo. of Prince Albert,
21.2.55.
40 BL Add. MS 44745, 132-40 (Autobiographical Memoranda, 184-7);
Stanmore, Herbert, I, 264, LQV, III, 138-9, Palmerston, 21.2.55;
Broadlands MS GC/CA/377, 22.2.55; RA A24/5, Palmerston, 22.2.55
and /6, 23.2.55; Parker, Graham, II, 267; Hansard, 136, end pages,
List of the Ministry, 22.2.55.
41 MS Clar dep c30, 27-8, 22.2.55; Ab. Cor. 1855--60, 49-50, 22.2.55;
Greville Memoirs, VII, 117-18. See also Stanmore, Herbert, I, 267-8
and Parker, Graham, II, 272-3 for letters of Wood and Clarendon and
MS Clar dep c30, 86, 22.2.55 for Graham's reply to Clarendon.
42 BL Add. MS 44112, 13 and 14, 22 and 23.2.55; Hansard, 136, 1743-55,
1762-72 and 1820-46.
43 Hansard, 136, 1846-51.
44 Ibid., 1851-9.
45 Ibid., 1755-62.
Notes and References 233
46 Ibid., 1774-1820.
47 Ibid., 1864-8. The nominees were J. Roebuck, H. Drummond, Sir John
Pakington, Colonel J. Lindsay, A. H. Layard, E. Ellice, Lord Seymour,
Sir George Lewis and General Peel. Two others, E. Ball and T. W.
Bramston were added on nomination from the floor. In all, there were
six Conservatives, two of them independent who had given support to
the Coalition Government, and five Liberals, two of them critical of
the Government. Ball, a Conservative, was later replaced by Captain
Gladstone, a Liberal Conservative. (Ibid., 137, 1686-1700.)
48 BL Add. MS 44791, 115 (in an autobiographical memo. written in the
1890s entitled 'Second Stage of Parliamentary Life 1853-65');
49 Bell, Palmerston, II, 115.
50 PRO 30/22/12B, 103-7 and 115-16; Gooch, Later Correspondence, II,
192-3; Walpole, Russell, II, 250-1; BL Add. MS 44745, 147-8, memo.
28.2.55.
51 Walpole, Russell, 251-2.
52 MS Clar dep c30, 218-19, 22.2.55, Maxwell, Clarendon, II, 71; PRO
30/22/12B, 163-6, Clarendon 26.2.66. See also Autobiographical
Memoranda 1845-1866, 189, 192-3 and 194-5.
53 RA A24/ 17, 18, 20, 26, 30, 35, 36, 38 and 42, 8, 10, 15, 18, 26, 28
and 31.3.55; Broadlands MS GC/EL2, 10.3.55 and GR/1832, 28.3.55;
Hodder, Shaftesbury, II, 490-4, 503-4 and 506-11. See also Geoffrey
Finlayson, The Seventh Earl of Shaftesbury, 373-5.
54 Broadlands MS GC/W0/28 29.2.55; PRO 30/22/12B, 163-6, 26.2.55.
55 Greville Memoirs, VII, 119.
56 MS Clar dep c30, 231-2, 28.2.55.
57 For all these appointments see RA A24/5-42, 22.2 to 31.3.55; Broad-
lands MS GC/RU/485 and 486, 28.2 and 26.3.55; PRO 30/22/12B,
125-8, 134-5, 167-8 and 177-8, 23-26.2.55; PRO 30/22/12C, 128-31
and 159-60, 10 and 13.3.55; PRO 30/22/12D, 65-6, 28.3.55 and 111-12
and 129-30, 3 and 4.4.55; Hickleton Papers, A4/63, 28, 8.3.55; Greville
Memoirs, VII, 121-2; Connell, Regina v. Palmerston, 171.
58 BL Add. MS 44745, 158 and 159, Gladstone memo. 28 and n.d.2.55
(Autobiographical Memoranda 1845-1866, 192).
59 PRO 30/22/12C, 128-31, 10.3.55; Greville Memoirs, VII, 120 and 124.
4 MS Clar dep c30, 208-11, Russell, 17 and 18 Feb. 1855; PRO 30/22/
12B, 41-2, 17.2.55, PP 1854-5, LV, cmd. 1964, EP, XVI, 265-9.
5 Henderson, Crimean War Diplomacy, 39-41.
6 Broadlands MS GC/CL/590, 18.2.55; see also PRO 30/22/12C, 204-11,
20.3.55.
7 See pp. 97-8.
8 Broadlands MS, GC/RU/483, 1-3, 22.2.55; Gooch, Later Correspon-
dence, II, 193-4, who omits the passage dealing with Poland. See also
Schroeder, Crimean War, 150-2 and passim. About this time Louis
Napoleon was also attempting to negotiate a military convention with
the Austrian Emperor (PRO 30/22/12C, 169-70, Cowley, 15.3.55 and
229-36, copy of a letter from the French to the Austrian Emperor).
Clarendon was uncertain whether to consider this 'a reality or a dodge'.
For further details see Schroeder, 260.
9 MS Clar dep c30, 264-71, 15, 16 and 18.3.55; PP 1854-5, cmd. 1924,
EP XIII, 4-21; cf. Henderson, Crimean War Diplomacy, 41-5; FO 7/
461, nos. 21 (tel) and 26, 27 and 28/3/55; PRO 30/22/12D, 61-6,
28.3.55; MS Clar dep c31, 69-70, 23.3.55.
10 PRO 30/22/12C, 41-8; Broadlands MS GC/CL/597 and 598, 11 and
13.3.55; MS Clar dep c30, 268-70, 18.3.55 and dep c31, 49-52 and
69-70, 11 and 23.3.55.
11 Winfried Baumgart (ed.), Akten zur Geschichte des Krimkriegs, ser. I,
vol. II (hereafter Akten, II), 809-10, no. 396, 15.3.55 and 823-3, no.
412, 28.3.55. See also p. 253 n.55. Buol was chagrined at the British
Government's failure to appreciate what a great assistance Austria's
occupation of the Principalities was to the Allies in their Crimean
campaign (see ibid., 852-4, no. 424, 10.4.55).
12 MS Clar dep c30, 266-80, 18 and 20.3.55; PRO 30/22/12B, 207-30,
n. d., 'Memorandum on modes of carrying into effect the 3rd Point',
and various drafts in English and French, 221-87; 12C further memor-
anda, dated 8 and 9.3.55; cf. Schroeder, Crimean War, 257-9. For the
Russian point of view see J. S. Curtiss, Russia's Crimean War, 388-9.
For Raglan's view on the war situation as expressed to Russell see
pp. 93-4.
13 FO 7/463, no. 38, 26.3.55; MS Clar dep c30, 266-7, 274-80 and 291-4,
18, 20 and 26.3.55; MS Clar dep c31, 79-82, 25.3.55; Broadlands MS
GC/CL/610, 30.3.55.
14 Broadlands MS GC/CL/607, 24.3.55; cf. Henderson, Crimean War
Diplomacy, 45.
15 PRO 30/22/12C, 284-92, partly reproduced in Gooch, Later Correspon-
dence, II, 199-200; PRO 30/22/12D, 1-2, Lansdowne 27.3.55 (Gooch,
Later Correspondence, II, 199); Lansdowne Papers, Russell, 1.4.66.
16 PR0/30/22/12D, 28.3.55.
17 FO 7/463, no. 38 and 39, 26.3.55 and no. 47, 30.3.55, Protocols nos.
Vand VI, 23 and 26.3.55 (PP 1854-5, LV, cmd. 1924, EP XIII, 39-43).
Russell's despatch is much more informative than the Protocol. There
were apparently six Russian warships still afloat at Sebastopol and
two nearing completion in the shipyards at Nikolaev (Curtiss, Russia's
Crimean War, 396).
Notes and References 235
British, half French) and permitting the Sultan to open the Straits when
in danger of aggression.
30 FO 7/464, no. 92, 21.4.55.
31 MS Clar dep c31, 143-4, 23.4.55, Clarendon to Palmerston with Palmer-
ston's marginal reply. Cf. PRO 30/22/120, 203, Clarendon to Russell,
22.4.55.
32 FO 7/464, no. 95, 22.4.55. Cf. Buol to Hiibner and Colloredo, 23.4.55
(Akten, II, 877-9, no. 440), expressing satisfaction at the attitude of
Russell and Drouyn.
33 MS Clar dep c30, 330-55, two letters dated 23.4.55 and two enclosures,
one Drouyn's draft of proposed terms to be offered Russia, the other
a draft of a proposed treaty of guarantee (both in French). Cf. FO 7/
464, no. 100, 23.4.55. The independence and integrity of Turkey was
to be guaranteed, the Straits were to remain closed but, in the event
of Russia increasing her Black Sea fleet, Britain and France were each
to be permitted to bring into the Black Sea half as many ships as the
Russians, and should the Sultan be threatened he reserved the right to
open the Straits to his allies. By a secret clause Austria was to undertake
to recognise an increase of the Russian fleet to the size of its pre-war
strength as an occasion for invoking the treaty. These provisions went
further than Buol's earlier proposals. Cf. Schroeder, Crimean War,
270-84.
34 Broadlands MS GC/RU/488, 23.4.55.
35 Ibid., GC/CL/620, 26.4.55; MS Clar dep c31, 152, 26.4.55, printed in
Maxwell, Clarendon, II, 81; LQV, III, 152-3; Henderson, Crimean War
Diplomacy, 54.
36 Broadlands MS, GC/CL/627, Clarendon, 30.4.55. Russell was probably
influenced by a pessimistic letter he had received from Raglan while in
Vienna. See pp. 93-4.
37 FO 519/171, 376-9, 30.4.55. Clarendon carried on an almost daily
private correspondence with Cowley, with whom he was most intimate.
38 Ibid., 382-5, 2.5.55. Drouyn's modification involved changing the limi-
tation on the Russian fleet from 'the status quo afloat' to 'any excessive
development of Russia's fleet' (Schroeder, Crimean War, 275).
39 Ab. Cor. 1855-60, 64, Clarendon, 2.5.55; MS Clar dep c30, 40, 3.5.55;
Henderson, Crimean War Diplomacy, 59. Clarendon often showed
Aberdeen Russell's despatches. Muriel Chamberlain, Lord Aberdeen
(London: 1983), 518, questions the propriety of this proceeding.
40 MS Clar dep c30, 364-8, 4.5.55 and c31, 168-71.
41 Fitzmaurice, Granville, I, 106-8.
42 FO 519/171, 396-403, 4.5.55.
43 Ibid., 422-8, 5.5.55.
44 MS Clar dep c33, 227-69, Cowley, 1, 2 and 3.5.55.
45 Ibid., 260-9 and 280-93, 3 and 7.5.55; FO 27/1067, nos. 514 and 515
(confidential), both 7.5.55; FO 519/171, 439, 9.5.55. Cf. Henderson,
Crimean War Diplomacy, 59-63, Schroeder, Crimean War, 276-8, and
F. A. Simpson, Louis Napoleon and the Recovery of France, 305-7.
For Hubner's views see Akten, II, 845-7 and 910-13, nos. 443-4 and
452-3, 30.4 and 9.5.55.
Notes and References 237
46 FO 519/171, 434-7, 7.5.55. Lacking a private code to communicate
with Walewski, the Emperor had asked Cowley to send the invitation
to Walewski in English cypher through the Foreign Office! (MS Clar
dep c33, 276 and 280-93,5 and 7.5.55; F. A. Wellesley and A. Sencourt,
Conversations with Napoleon Ill, 82, quoting the Emperor to Cowley,
5.5.55.)
47 MS Clar dep c30, 369-74 and 377-8, 6 and 7.5.55.
48 PP 1854-5, LV, cmd. 1959, EP XV, 14, no. 13.
49 Ibid., 14-18, nos. 15 and 17; MS Clar dep c31, 195-200 and 214-18,
15, 20 and 23.5.55; Broadlands MS GC/CL/632, 634-6, 19 and
22-4.5.55; PRO 30/22/12E, 7-10, 19 and 23.5.55; Connell, Regina v.
Palmerston, 175-6.
50 PRO 30/22/12E, 13-14, 23.5.55; Argyll MS, 1855, 22.5.55, copy made
by lOth Duke of Argyll.
51 FO 519/171, 506-10, 23.5.55, 526-9, 26.5.55 and 530-5, 28.5.55; FO
519/4, 460-2, no. 603, 23.5.55. Cowley's despatches and letters
expressed his contempt for the French Government and their constant
chopping and changing. Walewski was now on a pro-peace, pro-
Austrian tack, but the Emperor assured Cowley that he would on no
account accept the current Austrian proposals. He suggested, however,
that they might play Buol's game and appear to go along with him, but
Cowley assured him that no British Government could defend such a
course before Parliament. 'H.M. Government must decide this question
with regard to their own honor and interests alone', the ambassador
told Clarendon. He even suggested 'that they must take the honor and
interests of France into their own safe keeping for there are no men to
do it here'! (FO 519/4, no. 584, 453-5, 20.5.55.)
52 PRO 30/22/12E, 27-30, Clarendon, 30.5.55. Cf. Palmerston, 27 May
in Maxwell, Clarendon, I, 82.
53 FO 519/4, 470-3, no. 621, 27.5.55; PP 1854-5, LV, cmd. 1939, EP
XIV, Protocol 14, 4.6.55 and XV, no. 16, 29.5.55. The key article of
the Austrian proposals was no. 2, which stipulated that the Russian and
Turkish plenipotentiaries should propose 'by common agreement the
equal amount of the effective naval forces which the two sea-bordering
powers [would] keep in the Black Sea and which [was not to] exceed
the actual number of the Russian ships afloat in the sea'. The other
articles covered the guarantee of Turkish territorial integrity, the closing
of the Straits except for two frigates each allowed England and France,
and the right of the Sultan to call in the fleets of his allies, if, 'which
God forbid' (the text ran), he should be threatened.
54 Cf. Schroeder, Crimean War, 278-84, who concludes his account of the
Vienna Conference with an interesting rationalisation of Austrian
policy. According to Professor Curtiss, Austria was now able to demob-
ilise some 62,000 reserves, but persuaded Russia not to invade the
Principalities nor to repudiate her concessions on Points One and Two
(Russia's Crimean War, 401).
55 Hansard, 137, 1628-9, 1790-1 and 1951-3; 138, 105-13 and 559. In the
House of Lords on 3 May Derby condemned the Allied proposals as
being too conciliatory (ibid., 138, 18-24).
238 Notes and References
21 Ibid., 299.
22 Ibid., 310 (21.7.55) and 339 (7.8.55); W06/74, 49-51, Panmure,
13.8.55. When he asked Simpson why he did not destroy the buildings
in the town, Panmure had callously added, 'Raglan spared them on
some principle of mercy that I don't comprehend.' (Panmure Papers,
I, 311, 23.7.55.)
23 See Hamley, War in the Crimea, 75-9; Seaton, Crimean War, 112-17.
24 Hamley (War in the Crimea, 129), citing Todleben, puts the total
Russian force 'in and around Sebastopol' at 110,000 and 115,000, against
an Allied total of 65,000 in November 1854; A. W. Kinglake, The
Invasion of the Crimea, III (NY, 1875), 43-4, puts the Russians at
120,000 'on the Sebastopol theatre of war' (including battalions of
seamen) and the Allies at 65,000 (including seamen and marines) plus
some 11,000 Turkish troops. In May 1855 the Allied force totalled
224,000, according to Gooch (The New Bonapartist Generals, 206).
Seaton (Crimean War, 189) places the Russian strength at 84,000 in
June 1855 including 9,000 in eastern Crimea. Three additional Russian
divisions were sent to the Crimea in the summer of 1855 (Seaton,
Crimean War, 195; Curtiss, Russia's Crimean War, 440).
25 See Curtiss, Russia's Crimean War, 401 and 439.
26 See Seaton, Crimean War, 186-7. Admiral Slade ranks the achieve-
ments of Satler, the Russian Commissary General, with those of
Todleben (Turkey and the Crimean War, 391).
27 MS Clar dep c42, 73-86, 30.8.55. For Newcastle's sojourn in the Black
Sea theatre of war, see further F. Darrell Munsell, The Unfortunate
Duke: Henry Pelham, Fifth Duke of Newcastle. 18II-1864 (Columbia,
Missouri: 1985) 219-25, which appeared after the present book was
completed.
28 MS Clar dep c42, 61-110, 15 and 28.7, 30.8, 11, 15 and 22.9, 3 and
15.11.55 and several more from Clumber in December, 114-28.
29 MS Clar dep c29, 202-4 and 218-21, Panmure, 13.9 and 4.10, and c31,
375--6, 502-3 and 554--6, Palmerston, 2.8, 20.9 and 6.10.55, and c30,
497-8, Granville, 16.9.55; Broadlands MS GC/CU705, 4.10.55.
30 Hamley, War in the Crimea, 262-3 and 276.
31 Ibid., 267 and 271-2; Seaton, Crimean War, 196-7; Curtiss, Russia's
Crimean War, 448-9. Hamley puts the Russian losses in Sebastopol and
vicinity from March to August at 81,000.
The extremely elaborate system of trenches and tunnels constructed
on both sides (sometimes the one under the other) is well illustrated in
the very detailed maps and plans included in the official history of the
Royal Engineers in the Crimea: Captain H. C. Elphinstone and Major
General Sir Harry D. Jones, Journal of the Operations conducted by
the Corps of Royal Engineers, Parts I and II (1859), 2 vols., with a
separate box of plans. For a graphic description of the construction of
the siege works see Bentley, Russell's Despatches, 178.
32 Leo Tolstoi, Sebastopol, introduction by Philip Rahv (Ann Arbor paper-
backs). There is also a brief preliminary story entitled 'Sebastopol in
December, 1854'.
33 Seaton, Crimean War, 195-206; Hamley, War in the Crimea, 271;
246 Notes and References
indicated that the step had been taken. (MS Clar dep c134, 506-9,
20.12.55; RA G42/1 and /21, 19 and 20.12.55.)
53 MS Clar dep c134, 474-9, 18.12.55; FO 7/460, no. 20, 24 and 25, 12
and 17.12.55; MS Clar dep c27, 350 and 364-8, 10 and 12.55.
54 FO 7/480, no. 19, 9.1.56; MS Clar dep c46, 17-24, Seymour's covering
letter, 7-9.1.56.
55 MS Clar dep c31, 784-7, 30.12.55; dep c49, 13-14 and 18,7 and 9.1.56.
In the third letter Palmerston pointed out that a preliminary treaty
was not really necessary, especially when operations were ipso facto
suspended by winter. Colloredo confirmed Palmerston's account in a
despatch to Buol (Akten, III, 213-40) and later reported a similar
conversation with Clarendon who refused to accept the claim that the
additional points were a matter of negotiation (ibid., 213-17). Buol was
taken aback by this news and told Hubner that the language of the
English ministry was 'neither loyal nor logical'. (ibid., 222-4, nos. 107,
to Colloredo, and 108, to Hubner, 9.1.56).
56 MS Clar dep c135, 1-12 (to Seymour), 1.1.56. Cf. Schroeder, Crimean
War, 334 ff, whose indictment of Clarendon is, I think, over-severe.
57 MS Clar c46, 17-22, 7.1.56 and 22-5, 9.1.56; FO 7/474, no. 16, 8.1.56;
MS Clar dep c135, 51-5, 8.1.56; FO 7/480, no. 19, 9.1.56.
58 RA G42/92 and 98, Cowley (copies), 8 and 9.1.56. The words quoted
are Cowley's. Cf. Palmerston's cynical views quoted above
(pp. 138-40). The Emperor was, however, easily swayed in his opinions
for a week later the Austrian Minister claimed that he was much
impressed by the argument that the English demands were contrary to
the Memorandum of 14 November. Hubner admitted, nevertheless,
that Louis Napoleon was very loath to embroil himself with England.
(Akten, III, no. 35, to Buol, 17.1.56).
59 FO 519/173, 37-40, 11.1.56.
60 FO 7/480, tel 11.1.56 and nos. 29 and 31, 12.1.56; MS Clar dep c51,
102-22, 13.1.56.
61 LQV, III, 205-7; MS Clar dep c51, 102-22, 13.1.56.
62 LQV, III, 207-9, 15.1.56.
63 Broadlands MS GC/CL/782, 15.1.56.
64 FO 7/480, no. 30, Seymour, 12.1.56; RA G42/142, Cowley (copy),
15.1.56 and G43/8, Clarendon to Cowley (copy), 16.1.56.
65 FO 7/474, nos. 22 and 23. 14 and 15.1.56; MS Clar dep c135, 78-83,
to Seymour, 15.1.56.
66 FO 7/480, Seymour tel, 15.1.56, and nos. 39, 44 and 48, 16.1.56. For
Clarendon's reply see FO 7/474, no. 34, copy of tel, 18.1.56.
A week later, prompted by Palmerston, Clarendon sent Seymour a
rebuke in an official despatch. (SeeMS Clar dep c49, 64, Palmerston,
25.1.56; FO 7/474, no. 52, 25.1.56; MS Clar dep c135, 169-73, 29.1.56.)
Seymour subsequently offered his resignation, which Clarendon brushed
aside. 'The fault is mine', Seymour wrote. 'I never before conversed by
telegraph, and in trying to be terse I became coarse. I must look more
closely to my Telegrams, thank you for the bran new word'. (MS Clar
dep c46, 26-31, 13.2.56.)
67 RA G43/4, Cowley (copy), 15.1.56; FO 27/1108, no. 66, 12.1.56.
254 Notes and References
Discussing the bad relations between Cowley and Walewski at this time
Greville commented: 'The fact is that Cowley is a gentleman and a man
of honour and veracity, but he is sensitive, touchy and ill tempered;
the other is an adventurer, a needy speculator, without honor,
conscience, or truth, and utterly unfit both as to his character and his
capacity for such an office as he holds.' (Greville Memoirs, VII, 191.)
68 FO 7/480, no. 49, 16.1.56; de Ia Gorce, Histoire du Second Empire, I,
454; Curtiss, Russia's Crimean War, 500; Broadlands MS, GC/CL/773,
26.12.55. F. A. Simpson (Louis Napoleon and the Recovery of France,
1848-56, 346-7) suggests that the Allied failure to take Sebastopol in
1854 was as fatal to Russia as Russia's withdrawal in 1812 had been to
Napoleon. See Schroeder, Crimean War, 331-2, for the attitude of the
German states.
69 Charles-Roux, Alexandre 11, Gortchakoff, et Napoleon Ill, 78.
70 MS Clar dep c49, 30, 17.1.56; LQV, III, 209-11.
71 MS Clar dep c49, 46-9, 23.1.56. The private letters Palmerston and
Clarendon wrote expressing their real beliefs seem to refute Professor
Schroeder's charges of duplicity, although they were both undoubtedly
capable of self-deception.
72 RA G43/32, Clarendon to Queen Victoria, 19.1.56.
73 Ibid., /70, 25.1.56.
74 RA G43/57 and 59, Clarendon, 24.1.56, enclosing a letter from Palmer-
ston, 23.1.56; FO 27/1108, no. 99, Clarendon to Cowley, 18.1.56 (also
FO 519/173, 57-62, 18.1.56 and 75-8, 23.1.56); MS Clar dep c135,
127-9, to Seymour, 22.1.56; FO 7/474, no. 47, Clarendon to Seymour,
24.1.56; FO 7/480, tel 21.1.56, and nos. 53 and 63, 22 and 23.1.56.
75 FO 519/5, 400/5, no. 96, 19.1.56; MS Clar dep c51, 176-85, Cowley
to Seymour (copy), 20.1.56; FO 519/173, 63-70, Clarendon, 21.1.56,
opposing the Bessarabian-Kars proposal; MS Clar dep c49, 34-9,
21.1.56. Clarendon telegraphed Seymour to ignore Cowley's suggestion
(FO 7/474, no. 36, 22.1.56).
76 Add. MS 48579, 101-2, 24.1.56; FO 7/480, nos. 60 and 63, Seymour,
23.1.56; MS Clar dep c135, 169-73, 29.1.56 and FO 7/474, no. 54,
25.1.56, in which Clarendon drew a distinction between the Memor-
andum and the Ultimatum, pointing out that the conditions in the
Ultimatum were 'a minimum and not a maximum'.
77 RA G43/24, 18.1.56. Cf. FO 519/173, 57-62, 18.1.56.
78 FO 519/5,400-5, no. 96, 19.1.56; FO 519/173,55-62, 18.1.56; RA G43/
20 and 39, Clarendon, 18 and 21.1.56; FO 27/1108, no. 125, 23.1.56,
Clarendon summarising Walewski's despatch. See also Akten, III,
266-70, no. 145, re a conversation between Hubner and Louis Napo-
leon, 17.1.56.
79 MS Clar dep c51, 222-37, 25.1.56; FO 519/5, 424-8, no. 140, 25.1.56.
On 16 January Colloredo informed Buol that Persigny had told him
that both the British and French Governments understood that Austria
had informed Russia unofficially about the additional conditions, a point
Buol acknowledged to Colloredo on the 18th, but on the 14th Buol had
instructed V. Esterhazy in St Petersburg to make it understood that the
Notes and References 255
5th point implied no obligation and accorded the same latitude to all
belligerent powers (Akten, III, 243, 249, 263, nos. 126, 131 and 141).
80 FO 7/480, no. 65, 24.1.56; FO 519/173, 85-8, 25.1.56; RA G43173 and
80, 26.1.56; FO 519/5, no. 160, 29.1.56; FO 27/1109, no. 145, 26.1.56.
The Austrian Government had anticipated that the acceptance of the
Memorandum of 14 November by all the belligerents would be the basis
of the preliminaries of peace (Akten, III, 263, no. 141).
81 FO 519/5, 433-4 and 445, nos. 151 and 166, 27 and 29.1.56; FO 7/474,
no. 62, 30.1.56, authorising Seymour to sign the protocol; FO 7/481,
no. 91, 1.2.56, announcing the signature; FO 519/173, 85-8, 25.1.56,
in which Clarendon refers to the signing of an 'insignificant protocol'
in Vienna.
82 FO 519/5, 423, no. 137, 25.1.56, Cowley re Russian proposal; Maxwell,
Clarendon, II, 114; Fitzmaurice, Granville, I, 144; Greville Memoirs,
VII, 201; Broadlands MS GC/CL, 784 and 785, 19.1.56, Clarendon
opposing Seymour as a negotiator and reporting the Queen's acceptance
of his offer to go.
83 Greville Memoirs, VII, 180, 193, 195-6. Indeed, on 3 February (197)
Greville observed: 'The "Times" has become completely changed, it is
full of moderation. . . .'
Edouard Gourdon, a contemporary French chronicler, expressing a
rather official French point of view, remarks that the attitude of the
English Government inspired lively disquiet among the friends of peace,
that several newspapers wanted a third campaign and that the Cabinet
was thought to be disposed to follow this impulse, but that the sequel
showed that the press did not represent the whole nation. (Histoire du
Congres de Paris, 248-50.)
64 The text is printed in PP 1856, LXI, cmd. 2072, and in Annual Register
1856, 310-20.
65 The Times, 31.3 and 29 and 30.4.56; Cavour e l'Inghilterra, 404; Bell,
Palmerston, II, 149; MS Clar dep c49, 229-30 and 233-5, 31.3 and
2.4.56.
66 The Times, 29.4.56.
8. FINALE
Private Collections
Argyll (8th duke), Inverary Castle, Scotland (correspondence with the
duchess).
Broughton (Hobhouse) Papers, BL Add. MSS 43759, 47230 and 56567.
Clarendon Papers (MS Clar), Bodleian Library, Oxford.
Cobden Papers, BL Add. MS 43384.
Derby Papers, Liverpool Record Office.
Disraeli Papers (Hughenden Papers), microfilm, Disraeli Project, Queen's
University, Kingston, Ontario.
Gladstone Papers, BL Add. MSS 44086-44835; Hawarden Archives, St
Deniols, Clwyd, North Wales.
Graham Papers, Netherby Manor, Longtown, Cumberland; microfilm
copies, University Library, Cambridge and Newberry Library, Chicago.
Grey (3rd Earl) Papers, University of Durham Library (microfilm of letters
from Sir Charles Wood).
Hickleton Papers (Sir Charles Wood, 1st Viscount Halifax), microfilm,
Brotherton Library, University of Leeds.
Herbert Papers, Wilton Archives, Wiltshire.
Lansdowne Papers, Bowood House, Caine, Wiltshire.
Newcastle Papers (fifth duke), University of Nottingham Library.
Palmerston Papers, Broadlands MSS, University of Southampton BL Add.
MS 48759.
Russell Papers, PR0/30/22/12 and 13, Kew.
Papers of Queen Victoria and Prince Albert, Windsor Castle, RA A24-25
and G39-43.
Crown Copyright Records, Public Record Office, Kew
FO 7/450, 460, 461, 463, 464, 474, 480, and 481 (Austria);
FO 27/1052, 1059, 1060, 1077-80, 1108-9, 1121, and 1167-9 (France);
FO 519/4, 5 and 171-3 (Cowley Papers);
WO 6/70 and 74; WO 33/1.
263
264 Bibliography
Tulloch, Col. [A. M.) The Crimean Commission and the Chelsea Board,
(London, 1857).
Aberdeen
Chamberlain, Muriel E., Lord Aberdeen: A Political Biography (London,
1983).
Gordon, Sir Arthur (later Lord Stanmore}, The Earl of Aberdeen (New
York, 1893}.
Iremonger, Lucille, Lord Aberdeen (London, 1978}.
Albert, Prince Consort
Martin, Theodore, Life of his royal highness the Prince Consort, vol.
III (London, 1877).
Jagow, Kurt (ed.), Letters of the Prince Consort 1831-1861, trans.
E. T. S. Dugdale (London, 1938).
Argyll
Argyll, Dowager Duchess of (ed.), George Douglas, eighth duke of
Argyll, autobiography and memoirs, 2 vols (London, 1906).
Calthorpe
[S. J. G. Calthorpe] Letters from Headquarters or the Realities of
War in the Crimea, by an Officer of the Staff, vol. II, 3rd edn
(London, 1858).
Clarendon
Maxwell, Sir Herbert, The Life and Letters of George William Frederick,
fourth earl of Clarendon, K.G., G.C.B., vol. II (London, 1913).
Cowley
Wellesley, F. A. (ed.}, The Paris Embassy during the Second Empire, Selec-
tions from the Papers of . .. 1st earl Cowley (London, ~929).
Disraeli
Monypenny, W. F. and Buckle, G. E., The Life of Benjamin Disraeli, Earl
of Beaconsfield, rev. edn, vol. 1, 1804-1859 (London and New York,
1929}.
Gladstone
Morley, John, The Life of William Ewart Gladstone, vol. I (London and
Toronto, 1903).
Brooke, John and Sorensen, Mary, (eds}, The Prime Minister's Papers: W.
E. Gladstone, vol. III, Autobiographical Memoranda 1845-1866 (London,
1978).
Matthew, H. C. G. (ed.), The Gladstone Diaries, vol. V.1855-1860 (Oxford,
1978).
[W. E. Gladstone] 'The Declining Efficiency of Parliament', Quarterly
Review, XCIX (1856) 521-70.
Shannon, R. T., Gladstone (London, 1982).
266 Bibliography
Graham
Parker, C. S., Life and Letters of Sir James Graham, second baronet of
Netherby, P.C., G.C.B., 1792-1861, vol. II (London, 1907).
Granville
Fitzmaurice, Lord Edmond, Life of Granville George Leveson Gower,
second Earl Granville, K.G., 1815-1891, vol. I (London, 1905).
Greville
Strachey, Lytton, and Fulford, Roger (eds), The Greville Memoirs
1814-1860, vol. III, January 1854 to November 1860 (London, 1938).
Herbert
Stanmore, Lord, Sidney Herbert: Lord Herbert of Lea- a memoir, 2 vols
(London, 1906).
Malmesbury
Malmesbury, Earl of, Memoirs of an Ex-Minister, vol. II (London, 1884).
Napoleon m
Simpson, F. A., Louis Napoleon and the Recovery of France, 1848-56
(London, 1923).
Wellesley, F. A. and Sencourt, R., Conversations with Napoleon Ill
(London, 1934).
Newcastle
Martineau, John, The Life of Henry Pelham, fifth Duke of Newcastle,
1811-1864 (London, 1908).
Munsell, F. Darrell, The Unfortunate Duke: Henry Pelham, Fifth Duke of
Newcastle, 1811-1864 (Columbia, Missouri, 1985).
Florence Nightingale
Woodham-Smith, Cecil, Florence Nightingale, 1820-1910 (London, 1950).
Smith, F. B., Florence Nightingale, Reputation and Power (London, 1982).
Palmerston
Ashley, the Hon. Evelyn, The Life and Correspondence of Henry John
Temple, Viscount Palmerston, vol. II (London, 1879).
Bell, H. C. F., Lord Palmerston, vol. II (London, 1936).
Connell, Brian (ed.), Regina v. Palmerston: The Correspondence between
Queen Victoria and her Foreign and Prime Minister 1837-1865 (London,
1962).
Panmure
Douglas, Sir George and Ramsay, Sir George Dalhousie (eds), The Panmure
Papers, being a selection from the correspondence of Fox Maule, second
baron Panmure, afterwards eleventh earl of Dalhousie, K.T., G.C.B., 2
vols (London, 1908).
Raglan
Hibbert, Christopher, The destruction of Lord Raglan: a tragedy of the
Crimean War, 1854-5, (London, 1963) Pelican edn.
Russell
Gooch, G. P. (ed.), The Later Correspondence of Lord John Russell,
1840-1878, vol. II (London, 1925).
Walpole, Spencer, The Life of Lord John Russell, vol. II (London, 1891).
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Shaftesbury
Finlayson, Geoffrey, The seventh earl of Shaftesbury (1981).
Hodder, Edwin, The Life and Work of the Seventh Earl of Shaftesbury,
K.G., vol. II (London, 1892 edn).
Stratford de Redclitl'e
Lane-Poole, S., Life of Stratford Canning, Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe,
vol. II (London, 1887).
4. SECONDARY SOURCES
5. THESIS
Revells, Carl C., An Eye on Sevastopol: British Naval Policy and Operations
during the Russian War 1853-1856, Queen's University doctoral thesis,
Ontario, 1984.
Index
Aberdeen, 4th earl, collapse of his government, 1, 3, 76, 79, 224;
resignation, 3; presses Peelites to join Palmerston, 8-9; praised by
Granville, 11-12; favours Russell as envoy to Vienna, 14; laments
resignation of Peelites, 20; informed of Vienna proposals and approves,
42 and n.39; on Russell's 'extraordinary declaration', 60; and the
Sebastopol Committee Report, 67-9, 72; urges Newcastle to attend
debate, 67, 88-9; on peace coalition, 136; critical of proposed peace
terms, 177; welcomes Clarendon's news of peace, 194; on treaty of peace,
216-18; Palmerston compared with, 224-8; and also: 5, 6, 8, 9, 15, 22,
24,27, 31, 51,59,60, 76, 79,83,90, 127,162,221,222,224,229
Abdul Medjid, Sultan, issues Hatti Humayun on treatment of non-
Musselman subjects, 179, 200, 216, 218
administrative reform, 75-6
Adrianople, Treaty of, 131
Airey, Gen. Sir Richard, criticised by Panmure, 15; replacement
recommended, 83-4, 87; Raglan's confidence in, 85; ministers continue
to lack confidence in, 87-8; defended by Calthorpe, 242 n.15; and
Hibbert, 242 n.21; and also, 90, 247 n.62
Aland Islands, 148-9, 160, 171-2, 180, 185-7, 200, 220
Albert, Prince, attempts to persuade Gladstone, 19; attends London war
council, 98; visits Paris, 112; recommends creation of two corps, 121;
critical of Simpson, 122; army statistics, 127; quoted by King of Sardinia,
159; on danger of breaking with France, 170, 173; drafts Queen's letter,
251 n.35; continental military views, 227; his influence on Victoria, 228;
and also 3, 5, 27, 100, 138
Alexander II, Czar, 30, 140, 169, 209, 211, 216
Ali Pasha, attends Vienna Conference, 35; and Paris Peace Congress, 180,
186, 187, 193, 194
Allied forces, statistics, 90-1 and n.22, 102 and n.48, 110 and n.14, 114
and n.24, 115 and n.31, 116, 127; campaign plans, 98, 129; withdrawal of
troops proposed, 123-6
Alma, battle of, 117, 184
Aloushta, 98-9
Amery, L. S., 18
Amur river, 131
Anapa, 100
Argyll, 8th duke of, refuses to join Russell, 5; joins Palmerston ministry,
8; opposed to Roebuck committee, 16; does not resign, 19; despondent,
47; opposes Grey motion, 49; identified with peace party, 60, 175;
favours Colin Campbell, 120; and also, 23, 129
aristocracy, attacked by Layard, 17-18, 75-6; and The Times, 127-8
Armenia, 131-3
armistice, 164, 183, 197, 200, 207
Index 271
army, British, early reverses, 2; staff problems, 15, 83-8; reform measures,
80-2; problems of command, reinforcements and planning, 83-96;
operations April-June 1855, 96-104; further problems of command,
105-9; reinforcements, ill-trained, 110--11; pay increase for Crimean
soldiers, 104, 109; criticism of Army Work Corps, 109, 115; problem of
reinforcements, 110-11; formation of a sixth division, 111; continuation
of siege to fall of Sebastopol, 111-17; failure to follow up victory, 117-19;
Simpson's resignation, 119-20; appointment of Codrington, 120-1;
divided into two corps, 121; The Times criticism of, 122, 127; capture
of Kinburn, 123; proposed troop withdrawal, 123-6; in good shape in
second winter, 126-7; plan for another campaign, 227-9; evacuation of
troops, 207, 211; vote of thanks, 218-19; British military strength
exaggerated, 222-3; British view of different from Continental, 227; see
also Codrington, Crimea, Panmure, Raglan, Simpson, etc.; for foreign
armies see Austria, France, Russia, Sardinia, Turkey, etc.
artillery, discipline and patronage put under C-in-C, 81; powerful batteries
constructed, 84; failure to erect batteries to fire on North Side, 118;
troop sent to Eupatoria, 123
Asia Minor, 129, 131-3
Austria, initial peace proposals, 13, 29-30; Vienna Conference, 30-48;
proposals rejected, 46-8; possibility of further proposals, 49; Russell's
support of her proposals revealed, 57-8; uncomplimentary wording
towards deleted from despatches, 235 n.24; the Austrian ultimatum,
138-61; Russian acceptance of ultimatum and British reservations,
162-75; impressed by fall of Kinburn, 143; terms of ultimatum, 145-6
and n.19; Russian revisions refused, 166-7; Russian acceptance, 169;
impasse with Britain, 167-72; defended by Clarendon, 178-9; and the
Triple Treaty of Guarantee, 210; see also, Buol, Paris Peace Congress,
Vienna Conference, etc.
Azeglio, V. E. d', Sardinian minister, 205
Azov, Sea of, 96, 98, 100-1, 148-50, 191, 220
Bessarabia-continued
opposed to exchange, 180-3; danger of rupture over, 184-8; Palmerston
on possibility of some concession, 190-1; compromise proposed, 192-3;
and accepted, 196; extent of transfer defined, 204; boundary commission
to meet, 207; boundary disputes, 211-12
Beust, Count, 141
Black Sea, curtailment of Russian preponderance on, 13, 29-30, 33, 45,
56; number of Russian ships in, 34-7; French neutralisation proposal,
36-40 and nn.33 and 38; proposed admission of British and French
warships, 38 and 236 n.33; Austrian proposal for, 48 and n.53; Russian
refusal of Allied proposals, 48, 53; Newcastle's visit to, 76, 114-15, 117;
neutralisation of, 141, 145, 148, 153, 156, 190; Convention, 194--6, 201,
204-5; disposition of East coast of, 148, 172, 186-7, 189, 193, 195;
return of British warships to, 211; and also, 81, 129, 131, 160, 170,
215, 217, 218, 220, 252 n.51; see also Circassia.
blockade, 130, 184, 187, 207, 209
Board of General Officers, 82
Bolgrad, 193, 211
Bomarsund, 148
Bosphorus straits, 82, 127
Boulogne, 91
Bourqueney, baron, French ambassador in Vienna, 32--6, 141, 144, 147,
153, 160, 180
Bourse, the French stock exchange, 156, 161, 169, 182, 252 n.52
Bouverie, E. P., 27, 61 and n.13
Bright, John, 'angel of death' speech, 21; on Sebastopol Committee
Report, 72-3; alleged peace coalition, 136, 138; and also 48, 50, 55,
56, 60, 72, 228
Britain, agrees to discuss peace proposals, 13, 29-30; greater naval
resources, 81; treaty with Sweden, 169; impossible to continue war alone,
170; danger of split with France, 185; degree of success in peace
negotiations, 220-1; see also army, Clarendon, Crimea, Paris Peace
Congress, Palmerston, Vienna Conference
Brooks's Club, 14, 17, 20, 24, 25, 26, 60
Broughton, 1st baron, diary comments, 58, 62, 89 and passim
Brown, Gen. Sir George, 100, 103, 121
Brunnow, baron, 180-2, 184, 187, 194
Buchanan, James, 135
Bug river, 190
Bulgaria, 81
Bulgarian colony in Bessarabia, 193
Bulwer-Lytton, Sir Edward (later 1st earl), 60, 63-4, 75--6 and n.52
Buol, Count, host of Vienna Conference, 32-42 and n.11, n.27 and n.33;
provides text of Austrian proposals, 46; Cabinet agrees to reject his
proposals, 49; his circular about Russell, 57; Russell's promise of support
to, 61; peace proposals to Bourqueney, 141-2; Austrian ultimatum and
memorandum of 14 November, 145--6; British modifications, 154, 156-7,
160; anxious for secrecy, 161; fails to inform Russia of British conditions,
163-4, 168; queries British assent to memorandum, 164; misinformed
Index 273
n.63; discusses Italy, Russia, Poland and free trade, 207-9; supports
Declaration of Paris and principle of mediation, 208-9; on Belgian press,
208; and Triple Treaty of Guarantee, 210; final conversation with Orlov,
211; defends peace treaty, 217; honoured at Mansion House, 219; change
in attitude understandable, 222; exaggerates power of public opinion,
222; relationship with Palmerston, 223-4; Sebastopol never fully yielded,
255 n.5; declines promotion in peerage, 259 n.63; see also 31, 49, 58,
121, 124, 131, 168, 256 n.39, 247 n.62, 255 n.5, 259 n.63
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, 134
Cobden, Richard, 20, 50, 55, 58, 60, 76, 136, 138
Coburg, Prince of, 141
Cockburn, Sir Alexander (Attorney General), 60, 72, 73
Codrington, Gen. Sir William, considered for command, 107; named
successor to Simpson, 108; appointment of delayed, 120-1; considers
army unfit to move, 128; and also 112, 129, 223, 247 n.58
Colloredo, Count, 33, 37, 164, 168, 254 n.79
Colonial Office, 8, 24, 65, 137
Colquhon, consul, 251 n.37
Commissariat commission appointed, 81; its report, 82
Conservatives, number of, 2, 54 and n.68; upset by postponement of debate
on Vienna papers, 49; divisions among, 50, 55; differences on Sebastopol
Report, 68, 74; no return of Peelites to, 8, 224; Gladstone critical of,
226
Constantinople, conference on Points One and Four, 179, 200, 205; and
also 218
Consuls, admission of to Black Sea ports, 38, 156, 191, 221
Contemporary, The, 115
Council of War, in London, 98; in Paris, 126, 129
Counterpoise proposals, 33-4, 35, 37
Cowley, 1st earl, informed of Cabinet divisions, 42, 43, 55; persuades
Emperor to abandon Austrian proposals, 44-5; critical of Russell and
Drouyn, 44; considers French amoral, 47, 237 n.51; on French threat of
Crimean withdrawal, 123-6; influence with Emperor, 138; discusses
Buol proposals with Bourqueney and Emperor, 141; his dislike of Buol
proposals, 142, 146; warns of consequences of troop withdrawal, 143;
out of favour, 144; shown Austrian ultimatum and Buoi-Buorqueney
Memorandum, 144-6; dislike of Austrian proposals and differences
with Walewski, 149, 154-8, 168 and n.67; suggests Kars-Bessarabian
exchange, 166-7, 171; second British Plenipotentiary at Paris Peace
Congress, 179, 184; proposes a mixed commission, 187; offered
promotion in peerage, 259 n.63; defends Treaty in Lords, 218; and
also 98, 171, 181, 187, 191, 222
Crampton, J. F. T., British minister in Washington, 134-5, 212-13
Cranworth, 1st baron, 6, 16
Crimea, Crimean war, Napoleon III's plan of campaign, 38; weakness of
Allied generals, 42, 43; his desire to take command in, 31, 91-3;
Sebastopol Committee Report on, 66-75; Palmerston, Panmure and the
Crimean commissions, 79-82; problems of command, reinforcements
and planning, 83-96; telegraph to, 90; Allied armies in Crimea, 90-1;
276 Index
Crimea-continued
lack of a plan, 91; Raglan warns Russell and criticises invasion decision,
93-4; Clarendon apprehensive, 94-5; new plan of campaign, 98-100;
continuation of siege to fall of Sebastopol, 111-17; conclusion of
operations and second winter, 117-30; and also 40, 51
Cronstadt, 130, 137, 183
Crossley, F., 55
Curtiss, Professor J. S., 196 and n.49
Czartoryski, Prince Adam, 209
Elcho, Lord, 55
Elgin, 8th earl, 25
Ellenborough, 1st earl, 3, 54, 83, 88-9
Ellesmere, 1st earl, 217
Ellice, Edward, 136
Elliot, Henry, 141, 144, 153
Engineers, Royal, discipline and patronage put under C-in-C, 81; Crimean
history of, 245 n.31
England, see Britain
Index 277
Erzeroum, 131-2
Estcourt, Gen. James, Adjutant General in Crimea, replacement
recommended, 83; Raglan's confidence in, 84-5; ministers' continued
lack of confidence in, 87-8; dies of cholera, 103; defended by Calthorpe,
242 n.15
Esterhazy, Count Valentin, 159, 160, 254-5 n.79
Eugenie, Empress, 97
Eupatoria, 91, 98, 99, 102, 103, 111, 113-14, 118, 119, 123, 124, 129, 187,
244 n.17, 260-1 n.10
Evans, Gen. Sir George de Lacy, 69, 73, 74
Eyre, Lt. Gen. Sir William, 121
Georgia, 119, 131, 142, 148 and n.24, 152, 172, 215, 223
Germany, recruiting in, 110
278 Index
43-6; real views on war questioned, 57; proposes plan of campaign, 91;
instructions to French army, 97; state visit to England, 37-8, 97-8;
proposals to war council, 97-8; orders Canrobert to call up reserve for
new offensive, 98-9; urges attack from Aloushta, 99; opposes attack
on Anapa, 100; critical of Kertch expedition and of attack on Mamelon,
101; his instructions criticised by Panmure, 102; low about Crimean
prospects, 112; ready for peace negotiations, 123; threatens withdrawal
in Crimea, 124-6; British confidence in, 138, 174; raises Polish question,
50, 140; influenced by anti-war sentiment, 140, 143; wants to re-draw
map of Europe, 143; and Austrian ultimatum, 145-52, 154-7; upset by
report of Palmerston's remarks, 159; reveals Drouyn's anti-English bias,
166; no objection to special conditions, 165; urges Victoria to accept
Russian reservations, 166-7; partiality for Cowley, 168; faithful to British
alliance, 168; Seebach to inform Russia of special conditions, 173;
praised by Clarendon, 179; friendly discussion with Cowley, 179; plays
mediating role between Clarendon and Orlov, 180; conversations with
Clarendon, 181; also friendly to Russians, 182 and n.20; doubtful of
Bessarabian frontier, 185; conversations with Orlov and Clarendon,
186; favours Russia on Bessarabia, 191:--2; sees envoys separately, 192;
discusses Italian question with Clarendon, 198-9; over-anxious for
peace, 199; Congress greets him at Tuileries, 202; entertains Congress
with banquet, 207; further conversations with Clarendon, 207-8, 210;
discusses Polish question with Orlov, 209; and Triple Treaty of
Guarantee, 210; Bessarabian border settlement, 211-12; praised by
Clarendon, 217; seeks military convention with Austria, 234 n.8;
communicates with Walewski by English cypher, 237 n.46; and also 1,
141, 143, 222, 226, 237 n.51
Navy, Royal, conveyance of French troops, 81; expedition to Kertch and
Sea of Azov, 98-100; Kinburn expedition, 123; The Times on defects,
127-8; in the Baltic, White Sea and Pacific, 130-1; receives votes of
thanks, 218-19; increase in size, 219
Nesselrode, Count, 140
Neutralisation plan, 35-7, 48, 154
Newcastle, 5th duke of, in Aberdeen coalition, 1; presses Peelite colleagues
to join Palmerston, 8; praised by Panmure, 12; and Sebastopol
Committee Report, 67-9, 73--4; visits Crimea, 67, 114-17 and n.37;
despatch to Raglan, 83--4; qualifies report on Codrington, 120; proposes
expedition to Circassia, 128-9; stands apart from other Peelites, 225;
and also 9, 15, 22, 86, 88, 90, 226, 259, n.61
Newdegate, Charles, 18
Nicaragua, 212
Nicholas I, Czar, 30
Niel, Gen., 91, 113
Nightingale, Florence, 81, 82
Nikolaev, 123, 186, 190 and n.35, 217, 220, 234 n.17
Nova Scotia, 134
Odessa, 123
Orner Pasha, 91, 98, 132-3, 216
282 Index
House of Commons-continued
debate on Sebastopol Committee Report, 67-75; debates on Turkish
loan and administrative reform, 75--6; Palmerston unable to defend
Crimean situation in, 88; debate on Kars campaign, 133; debate on
Queen's Speech, 1856, 177 and n.4; to be informed in event of split
with France, 190; Triple Treaty of Guarantee tabled, 210; question re
dismissal of Crampton, 213; debate on peace treaty, 214-16;
Palmerston's leadership in, 228
House of Lords, change of ministry 11-12; Grey's motion of Vienna
Papers defeated, 48-9 and n.55; Ellenborough Resolutions defeated,
88-9; Derby criticises Queen's Speech, 177-9; debate on peace treaty,
217-18
Paskevich, Field Marshal, 114
Paton, Gen. G., 99
Paxton, Sir Joseph, 88
peace negotiations, Vienna Conference, 13-14, 29-48; parliamentary
debates on, 48-56; cause of Russell resignation, 61; attitude of Raglan
and Clarendon, 93-5; Napoleon III ready for, 123, 141; Austrian
proposals, 138--61; British reservations, 162-75; preliminaries of peace,
179-84; peace conference in Paris, 184-202; Parliamentary debate on,
214-18; historical assessment of, 219-24; see also Paris Peace Congress
and Paris, Treaty of
Peel, Frederick, 27, 231 n.15
Peel, Gen.J., 21, 70, 71-2, 233 n.47
Peel, Sir Robert (3rd bt.), 26-7
Peelites, number of, 2; Liberal hostility to, 9-11; divided on resignation,
19-20; resignations unwise, 22-4; support for Palmerston? 24; on
Baring amendment, 50, 54--6; vote on Sebastopol Report, 74; Clarendon
critical of, 76; their difficult position, 76-7; relationship with Liberals,
224--6; analysis of voting, 225; final fusion with Liberals, 229; and also
31, 47, 70, 176
Pelissier, Gen., succeeds Canrobert, 100; Emperor upset by his
independence, 101-3; makes crucial decisions, 110; fails to
communicate with Simpson, 112; bulldog tenacity of, 114; criticised by
Newcastle, 114; his plan, 115; fall of Sebastopol, 116-17; defends
failure to follow up, 118; only agrees to limited operations, 122-3;
negative views, 123-5; and also 119, 244 n.9
People's Paper, 133
Persia, 178
Persigny, comte, 45, 47, 125, 147, 149, 150-1, 158, 173, 250 n.19, 254 n.79
Petropaulovsk, 131
Pfordten, von der, 141
Phillimore, J. G., 52
Phillimore, R. J., 52, 215
Phinn, T., 66
Piedmont, see Sardinia
Poland, Polish question, 31, 57, 140, 149, 200, 209
Principalities, Danubian: protectorate proposed, 13; Russian withdrawal
from, 29; discussed at Vienna Conference, 32; Austrian proposals, 142,
Index 285
145, 154; drafting committee, 186, 193, 197, 258 n.46; union of, 192,
194 and n.46; treaty provisions for, 199, 204, 212; and also 1, 171, 215,
217, 221, 252 n.51, 256 n.23
Prussia, Russell visit to Berlin, 31; abandonment of neutrality proposed,
235 n.19; puts pressure on Russia, 169; full participation at peace congress
opposed, 180; invited to later sessions, 193, 197-8; and also 14, 124, 159
Pruth river, 188, 192, 193, 215
public opinion, British, 41-2, 43, 47, 95, 163, 174-5, 176, 189, 190, 196,
199-200, 205-6, 213, 219-20, 222, 223, 224; French, 124, 140, 147,
155, 169, 170, 190
Taganrog, 100-1
Tartar insurgents, 100
Tchernaya river, 102, 116, 117, 118, 123, 126
Tchorgoun, 101
Times, The, W. H. Russell's despatches to, 2; opposing Government, 14;
Lowe a leader writer of, 21, 27, 66; alleged connection between Delane
and Cabinet, 65; publishes letters re Crimean conditions, 87; arrives in
Sebastopol before Balaclava, 113; Queen's indignation with, 121;
reports good conditions in British winter camp, 126-7; critical of military
system, 127-8; reports a 'peace coalition', 136; British opposition to peace
known abroad, 163; mixed feelings re peace, 176-7; on signing of peace
treaty, 205-6; and also 26, 73, 169
Todleben, Maj. Gen., 101, 112, 114
Tolstoi, Leo, 115
Tories, see Conservatives
Trakatir bridge, 101, 113
Transport Board, 81
Treaties (of)
Adrianople, 1829, 131, 180, 187; December 2 1854, 30, 36, 37, 40; Paris,
1814, 180; Paris, 1856, see Paris, Treaty of; Straits, 1841, 30, 197; Triple
288 Index
Treaties-continued
Treaty of Guarantee, 1856, 146, 210, 212; Unkiar Skelessi, 1834, 180
Trebizond, 132, 211
Tulloch, Col. A.M., Commissariat Commissioner, 82, 87, 89
Turkey, treaties with Russia, 13; represented at Vienna Conference, 35;
proposed guarantee of, 38, 40 and n.33, 57, 142, 146; and Austrian
ultimatum, 145, 149, 154; separate treaty with Russia, 186, 191, 194-5;
protection of Christians, 145, 160, 179, 200, 205, 217-18; objection to
Article Four, 186; right to garrison Principalities, 204; former treaties
with Russia, 259 n.59; claims Serpents' Isle, 212; and also 30, 36, 37, 48,
58-9, 62, 128, 156, 172, 183; see also peace negotiations, treaties
Turkish army, numbers in Crimea, 91; divided between Eupatoria and
Sebastopol, 91; role in new war plan, 98; and Kertch expedition, 100;
occupation of Tchorgoun, 101; proposed attack on Simpheropol, 103;
Eupatoria garrison, 124; defence of Kars, 131-3
Turkish contingent under Gen. Vivian, 110, 132
Turkish loan, 35, 75--6, 133
Tiirr, Col., 154, and n.37
Ukraine, 129
United States, and Central America, 134, 213; and Foreign Enlistment
Crisis, 134-5, 178, 212-13
Upland, the, 113
Vaillant, Marshal, supports Cowley, 45; attends London war council, 98;
proposals for troop withdrawal, 125; and also 182
Vane, Sir Harry, 55
Varna, 81
Vernon, G. E. H., 21, 55
Victoria, Queen, summons Derby, 3-4; seeks advice of Lansdowne, 4-5;
calls Russell, 5-6; commissions Palmerston, 7-8; Palmerston reports to,
15, 16, 56 and n.75; impressed by Louis Napoleon, 37-8, 97-8, 138;
from Palmerston re Vienna proposals, 41; writes to Emperor, 47;
accepts Russell resignation, 61; from Palmerston re Sebastopol Report,
74, 240 n.31; vexed by Emperor's pessimism, 102; requests formation
of 6th division, 111; royal visit to Paris, 112; and successor to Simpson,
120-1; indignation with The Times, 121; critical of Simpson, 122;
cabinet appointments, 137; favours consideration of peace negotiations,
143-7; critical of Palmerston's letter, 151; correspondence with Napoleon
III re Austrian ultimatum, 152-3; regrets wording of Clarendon's
despatch, 157; absence at Osborne, 158; revisit of King of Sardinia,
158-9 and n.48; refuses Emperor's request, 167; 'charming letter' to
Emperor, 181; offers promotion in peerage to Clarendon and Cowley,
259 n.63; addresses presented to, 214-18; relations with Palmerston,
227-8 and n.30; her views on prosecution of the war and influence of
Albert, 228; and also 161 and n.52, 170, 172, 202, 228
victory celebrations, 219
Vienna Conference, 1855, 13-14, 29-48, 48-9, 55--6, 60
Vienna Protocol of 1 February 1856, 177, 184
Index 289
Villiers, Charles, 12
Vivian, Maj. Gen. Robert, 110, 132