Climate change and Venezuela

1. Climate change in Venezuela

1.1. Concerns about and challenges of climate change
Venezuela is highly dependent on fossil fuel production12 and its high density of vulnerable
rainforest habitats are threatened by climate change. Venezuela is in the upper-middle section
of a ranking of the least vulnerable countries to climate change, ranking 43rd3. According to its
Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC)4, Venezuela has many areas liable to floods,
drought, desertification and fragile mountainous ecosystems, as well as a vulnerable economy,
which have led to severe emergencies and natural disasters affecting housing, food production5,
electricity generation, biodiversity and its coastal zones6.
Between 1990 and 2012, Venezuelas total GHG emissions increased by 35.15% 7 and are
comparable to Polands89, ranking in the top 50 most important emitters of GHG10. The primary
emissions sectors are the energy sector, LULUCF, agriculture and industrial processes11.
Although over 70% of internal energy consumption relies on oil and gas combustion in
thermoelectric plants, hydroelectric power is the main provider of electricity12. This suggests
that mitigation and adaptation in the energy sector and adaptation in agriculture are important
to achieve climate goals internally.
Venezuelas economy is intimately related to climate change concerns as it relies on fossil fuel
exports. Between 1990 and 2012, natural resources rents represented 28% of Venezuelas
GDP13, accounting for over 50% of GNI and 80% of exports in 200314 and with the largest
proven oil reserve on the planet15. This represents a long-term vulnerability16 as evidenced by
the link between decreasing oil prices and Venezuelas GDP.17 Therefore, Venezuela requires
23$ billion to upgrade its oil industry and to upgrade its hydroelectric power generation
capability to prevent power interruptions caused by droughts18.
Offsetting Venezuelas emissions is the Amazonian rainforest, which covers approximately
50% of its territory and is a carbon sink. However, forest clearing for agriculture and pasture
activities, deforestation19, and unsustainable forest degradation have affected large areas of
forest. In addition to this, the forests habitats are particularly vulnerable to climate change20.
1.2. Domestic policy and participation in international climate governance
Internationally, Venezuela ratified the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) 1994 and the Kyoto Protocol in 200521 (UNFCCC, 2014). Venezuela has
submitted a NDC (see section 1.3.) but has not ratified the Paris Agreement22. Nationally, its
rhetoric is very pro-environment, with provisions on ecological balance, the environment as
heritage of humanity, environmental education, environmental rights and protection,
intergenerational responsibility, preservation of biological and genetic diversity, and
prevention of hazardous waste crossing its borders, in the Constitution23. However, its policy
field is fragmented, with no flagship policy on climate change, but rather relying on existing
environmental legislation and ministerial programmes relating to energy24 (see International
Energy Agency25 for details on related legislation). In terms of REDD+ and LULUCF,
Venezuela limits the agricultural sector to 58% of its territory26, has combated desertification27
and implemented a forestry management plan28.

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1.3. Intended Nationally Determined Contribution under the Paris Agreement
Venezuela has submitted its INDC on December 15th 201529. Venezuela pledges to cut GHG
emissions by 20% by 203030, if developed countries fulfil their financial commitments on
climate finance, technology transfer and capacity building31. The NDC It targets emissions of
CO2 from burning fossil fuels and cement manufacturing, and mentions future mitigation and
adaptation activities planned for the following sectors: industry, electricity, building,
transportation, agriculture, water, forestry, and waste etc.32 Venezuela aims to reduce emissions
from the oil industry by improving exploration and production techniques, to create or upgrade
200 recycling factories, to upgrade its transport infrastructure, to promote agro-ecological
systems, to financially support research for green technologies, to establish a national system
for waste re-use, to commission studies for the development of energy sources from marine
and tidal power for the coastline region, to design a climate change mitigation plan, to promote
technological adaptation of the energy and agricultural sectors, to calculate costs of loss and
damage from extreme weather conditions and others.33
2. Venezuela and UNFCCC negotiations1
Venezuela supports an international system to address climate change based on equity and on
eco-socialism to replace predatory capitalism343536, which has damaged the planet, through
its market mechanisms373839. Historically responsible are rich states, which now avoid their
duty to the environment, especially the United States40, and try to pass it onto the developing
world41 through green colonialism 42. Not only are the Northern imperialist to blame for
climate change, but they are also responsible for global inequality4344. Therefore, Venezuela
supports the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities
(CBDR+RC) of developed states4546 and argues that developed countries are denying
developing countries the same process that led them to modernization and wealth47.
Despite the fact that Venezuela positions itself as a defender of environmentalism and of the
climate regime. However, commentators argue that its stance is often schizophrenic48 or a
paradox49 because it mixes environmental concerns and oil ambitions. The arguments
Venezuelan officials have used in this situation have been to emphasize its low percentage of
global emissions (0.5%)50, its reliance on hydropower for electricity production, its policies on
climate change5152 and its large carbon sink53.
2.1. Key demands in UNFCCC negotiations
Venezuelas ambitions are that developed countries bear the brunt of climate spending in the
developing world54, especially when mitigating the increase in global temperature from 3.5C
to 1.5C55. Not only this, but climate finance should respect national sovereignty over natural
resources, include technological means, cover loss and damage due to extreme weather
phenomena and provide insurance for sensitive sectors, as part of the industrialized worlds
ecological debt56. Following the Kyoto Protocol, it supports an International Court to hold
developed nations accountable for not owning up to their commitments57 and binding
agreements58. It champions stabilization of GHG emissions instead of decarbonisation59,
sustainable development60, climate justice, human rights, intergenerational equity, the right to

1
Supported by content analysis of Venezuela Analysis website articles
(https://venezuelanalysis.com/tag/climate-change) between 14 December 2009 and 26 April 2016.

2
develop, and gender equality among others6162. Transparent proceedings has been central in
Venezuelas rhetoric after the 2009 Copenhagen COP.

3. Negotiation group affiliations

Since 2009, the landscape of group affiliations has changed. The Bolivarian Alliance of the
People of our America (ALBA) has joined the Like-Minded Developing Countries group
(LMDC) alongside other OPEC countries.63
3.1. Main demands of relevant groups
G77/China. At Marrakech, The G77/China will focus on balancing adaptation, especially for
countries most vulnerable to climate change and for the agricultural sector, and mitigation. In
addition to this, it stresses that the international consultation and analysis process should
determine developing countries capacity-building needs, that more attention needs to be paid
to the Adaptation Fund, namely its resources, access, approval, innovative features and
coherence with other funds, and that more financial resources need to support technology
development and transfer in developing countries. Also, the limited human resources of small
delegations should be considered when scheduling meetings.64
LMDC. This group demands international equity and historical responsibility of industrialized
countries even though they accept that all countries must contribute.65 It supports the principle
of CBDR/RC, opposes uniformity, demands the implementation of international agreements,
supports negotiations under the Convention, the equity principle, and believes that developed
countries should be more ambitious in their emission reduction target and in their technology
transfer, capacity-building and funding towards developing countries.66 At COP22 it will focus
on the facilitative dialogue to enhance pre-2020 action (1/CP.21, paragraph 115) and on
expanding the role of the two high-level champions (1/CP.21, paragraph 121). Firstly, it
stresses the importance of assessing, tracking and reporting on implementing climate finance,
especially the needs of developing countries in terms of finance, technology and capacity-
building, and the need to develop a concrete road map to achieve the goal of providing USD
100 billion by 2020. Secondly, expanding the role of the two high-level champions to include
items addressed by the facilitative dialogues, namely regular reporting on progress at each
high-level event.67 Particularly on the issues of global stocktake (GST) and climate finance
(CF), it stresses the differentiation between developed and developing countries. Firstly,
developed countries should have greater transparency, especially transparency of support, and
should fully cover reporting costs of developing countries. Also, they should adhere to
mandatory reviews with much stricter standards whereas this should be voluntary for
developing countries. Developing countries should have their sovereignty respected and access
to capacity-building, environmentally sound technologies and collaborative research.68
Secondly, transparency should view Parties as main actors. GST inputs are the overall effects
of NDCs, the state of adaptation efforts and other support, the latest IPCC reports and those of
subsidiary bodies, with focus on adaptation, finance, technology and capacity-building.
Positive accounts should be preferred.69

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ALBA2. It has been hailed as strong, potent and noisy and it has joined LMDC in a strategic
move to keep holding developed countries accountable for GHG emissions under the Kyoto
protocol while protecting the national interests of its fossil fuel-reliant members.70 Its position
highlights its members ideological orientation: rational use of resources, preventing wasteful
consumption, sustainable development social and economic justice, fair multilateral
negotiations and the promotion of socioeconomic reform through mutually advantageous
agreements, sometimes mediated by the ALBA Bank, rather than free-market mechanisms, like
cap-and-trade of emission, the carbon market and the Clean Development Mechanism, in the
case of Bolivia and Venezuela.71 It has no official group statement about the climate regime
prior to Marrakech seeing as it seems to have merged its identity with LMDC.
3.2. Groups role in UNFCCC negotiations
The G77/China represents the interests of the developing countries and is very influential. At
COP21, it deadlocked the negotiation over the issue of finance and won its ambition of $100
billion climate finance from developed countries72. However, it is a fragmented group, as
evidenced by the High-Ambition Coalition in which many G77/China members collaborated
with developed countries.7374 As a sub-set of the G77/China, LMDC has been vocal on issues
of climate finance, an ambiguous long-term goal and on the continued stark differentiation
between the developed and the developing, where it obtained significant victories
differentiation and mitigation.75 Moreover, ALBA scored a victory in the Green Climate Fund,
which it championed76, and in the inclusion of non-market articles in Paris Agreement.
Although it has been argued that ALBAs, and implicitly Venezuelas, influence is overstated,
it remains a leading actor in these groups.

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5
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41
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42
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46
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48
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49
Pashley, 2015, op. cit.
50
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52
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53
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54
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55
UNFCCC, 2015b, op. cit.
56
UNFCCC, 2015, op. cit.
57
Suggett, 2013, op. cit.
58
Salerno, 2010, op. cit.
59
UNFCCC, 2015b, op. cit.
60
Embassy of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 2015, op. cit.
61
UNFCCC, 2015b, op. cit.
62
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6
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67
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76
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