EN BANC members and other elective provincial positions of the Province
[G.R. No. 133064. September 16, 1999] of Isabela, and any such qualified voter can be a candidate for
JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALFREDO S. DIRIGE, MANUEL H. AFIADO,
MARIANO V. BABARAN and ANDRES R.
CABUYADAO, petitioners, vs. HON. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, In
his capacity as Executive Secretary; HON. EPIMACO
VELASCO, in his capacity as Secretary of Local Government,
HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of
Budget, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS HON. BENJAMIN G. DY, in his capacity as
Governor of Isabela, THE HONORABLE SANGGUNIANG
PANLALAWIGAN OF ISABELA, ATTY. BALTAZAR PICIO, in his
capacity as Provincial Administrator, and MR. ANTONIO
CHUA, in his capacity as Provincial Treasurer, respondents,
GIORGIDI B. AGGABAO, intervenor.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for a writ of prohibition with prayer for preliminary
injunction assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8528
converting the city of Santiago, Isabela from an independent component
city to a component city.
On May 5, 1994, Republic Act No. 7720 which converted the
municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an independent component city was
signed into law. On July 4, 1994, the people of Santiago ratified R.A. No.
7720 in a plebiscite.1
On February 14, 1998, Republic Act No. 8528 was enacted. It
amended R.A. No. 7720. Among others, it changed the status of Santiago
from an independent component city to a component city, viz:
AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED
7720 AN ACT CONVERTING THE MUNICIPALITY OF SANTIAGO INTO AN
INDEPENDENT COMPONENT CITY TO BE KNOWN AS THE CITY OF
SANTIAGO.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7720 is hereby
amended by deleting the words an independent thereon so that
said Section will read as follows:
SEC. 2. The City of Santiago. The Municipality of Santiago
shall be converted into a component city to be known as the City
of Santiago, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall
comprise of the present territory of the Municipality of Santiago,
Isabela. The territorial jurisdiction of the City shall be within the
present metes and bounds of the Municipality of Santiago.
Sec. 2. Section 51 of Republic Act No. 7720 is hereby amended
deleting the entire section and in its stead substitute the following:
SEC. 51. Election of Provincial Governor, Vice-Governor,
Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members, and any Elective Provincial
Position for the Province of Isabela.- The voters of the City of
Santiago shall be qualified to vote in the elections of the
Provincial Governor, Vice-Governor, Sangguniang Panlalawigan
such provincial positions and any elective provincial office.
Sec. 3. Repealing Clause.- All existing laws or parts thereof
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.
Sec. 4. Effectivity.- This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8528. 2 They alleged
as ground the lack of provision in R.A. No. 8528 submitting the law for
ratification by the people of Santiago City in a proper plebiscite. Petitioner
Miranda was the mayor of Santiago at the time of the filing of the petition
at bar. Petitioner Afiado is the President of the Liga ng mga Barangay ng
Santiago City. Petitioners Dirige, Cabuyadao and Babaran are residents of
Santiago City.
In their Comment, respondent provincial officials of Isabela defended
the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8528. They assailed the standing of
petitioners to file the petition at bar. They also contend that the petition
raises a political question over which this Court lacks jurisdiction.
Another Comment was filed by the Solicitor General for the
respondent public officials. The Solicitor General also contends that
petitioners are not real parties in interest. More importantly, it is contended
that R.A. No. 8528 merely reclassified Santiago City from an independent
component city to a component city. It allegedly did not involve any
creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries
of local government units, hence, a plebiscite of the people of Santiago is
unnecessary.
A third Comment similar in tone was submitted by intervenor Giorgidi
B. Aggabao,3 a member of the provincial board of Isabela. 4 He contended
that both the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991 do not
require a plebiscite to approve a law that merely allowed qualified voters of
a city to vote in provincial elections. The rules implementing the Local
Government Code cannot require a plebiscite. He also urged that
petitioners lacked locus standi.
Petitioners filed a Reply to meet the arguments of the respondents
and the intervenor. They defended their standing. They also stressed the
changes that would visit the city of Santiago as a result of its
reclassification.
We find merit in the petition.
First. The challenge to the locus standi of petitioners cannot
succeed. It is now an ancient rule that the constitutionality of law can be
challenged by one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its
enforcement.5 Petitioner Miranda was the mayor of Santiago City when he
filed the present petition in his own right as mayor and not on behalf of the
city, hence, he did not need the consent of the city council of Santiago
City. It is also indubitable that the change of status of the city of Santiago
from independent component city to a mere component city will affect his
powers as mayor, as will be shown hereafter. The injury that he would
sustain from the enforcement of R.A. No. 8528 is direct and immediate and
not a mere generalized grievance shared with the people of Santiago
City. Similarly, the standing of the other petitioners rests on a firm
foundation. They are residents and voters in the city of Santiago. They
have the right to be heard in the conversion of their city thru a plebiscite to
be conducted by the COMELEC. The denial of this right in R.A. No. 8528
gives them proper standing to strike the law as unconstitutional.
Second. The plea that this court back off from assuming jurisdiction
over the petition at bar on the ground that it involves a political question
has to be brushed aside. This plea has long lost its appeal especially in
light of Section 1 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which defines
judicial power as including the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the government. To be sure, the cut
between a political and justiciable issue has been made by this Court in
many cases and need no longer mystify us. In Taada v. Cuenco,6 we held:
xxx
The term political question connotes what it means in ordinary
parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions which
under the Constitution are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
particular measure.
In Casibang v. Aquino,7 we defined a justiciable issue as follows:
A purely justiciable issue implies a given right, legally demandable
and enforceable, an act or omission violative of such right, and a remedy
granted and sanctioned by law, for said breach of right.
Clearly, the petition at bar presents a justiciable issue. Petitioners claim
that under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution they have a right
to approve or disapprove R.A. No. 8528 in a plebiscite before it can be
enforced. It ought to be self-evident that whether or not petitioners have
the said right is a legal not a political question. For whether or not laws
passed by Congress comply with the requirements of the Constitution pose
questions that this Court alone can decide. The proposition that this Court
is the ultimate arbiter of the meaning and nuances of the Constitution
need not be the subject of a prolix explanation.
Third. The threshold issue is whether R.A. No. 8528 is
unconstitutional for its failure to provide that the conversion of the city of
Santiago from an independent component city to a component city should
be submitted to its people in a proper plebiscite. We hold that the
Constitution requires a plebiscite. Section 10, Article X of the 1987
Constitution provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, or
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and
subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected.
This constitutional requirement is reiterated in Section 10, Chapter 2
of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160), thus:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and
subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected.
The power to create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially alter
boundaries of local government units belongs to Congress.8 This power
is part of the larger power to enact laws which the Constitution vested in
Congress.9 The exercise of the power must be in accord with the mandate
of the Constitution. In the case at bar, the issue is whether the
downgrading of Santiago City from an independent component city to a
mere component city requires the approval of the people of Santiago City
in a plebiscite. The resolution of the issue depends on whether or not the
downgrading falls within the meaning of creation, division, merger,
abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of municipalities per
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. A close analysis of the said
constitutional provision will reveal that the creation, division, merger,
abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units
involve a common denominator - - - material change in the political and
economic rights of the local government units directly affected as well as
the people therein. It is precisely for this reason that the Constitution
requires the approval of the people in the political units directly affected. It
is not difficult to appreciate the rationale of this constitutional
requirement. The 1987 Constitution, more than any of our previous
Constitutions, gave more reality to the sovereignty of our people for it was
borne out of the people power in the 1986 EDSA revolution. Its Section 10,
Article X addressed the undesirable practice in the past whereby local
government units were created, abolished, merged or divided on the basis
of the vagaries of politics and not of the welfare of the people. Thus, the
consent of the people of the local government unit directly affected was
required to serve as a checking mechanism to any exercise of legislative
power creating, dividing, abolishing, merging or altering the boundaries of
local government units. It is one instance where the people in their
sovereign capacity decide on a matter that affects them - - - direct
democracy of the people as opposed to democracy thru peoples
representatives. This plebiscite requirement is also in accord with the
philosophy of the Constitution granting more autonomy to local
government units.
The changes that will result from the downgrading of the city of
Santiago from an independent component city to a component city are
many and cannot be characterized as insubstantial. For one, the
independence of the city as a political unit will be diminished. The city
mayor will be placed under the administrative supervision of the provincial
governor. The resolutions and ordinances of the city council of Santiago will
have to be reviewed by the Provincial Board of Isabela. Taxes that will be
collected by the city will now have to be shared with the
province. Petitioners pointed out these far reaching changes on the life of
the people of the city of Santiago, viz:10
Although RESPONDENTS would like to make it appear that R.A. No.
8528 had merely re-classified Santiago City from an independent
component city into a component city, the effect when challenged (sic) the
Act were operational would be, actually, that of conversion. Consequently,
there would be substantial changes in the political culture and
administrative responsibilities of Santiago City, and the Province of
Isabela. Santiago City from an independent component city will revert to
the Province of Isabela, geographically, politically and
administratively. Thus, the territorial land area of Santiago City will be
added to the land area comprising the province of Isabela. This will be to
the benefit or advantage of the Provincial Government of Isabela on
account of the subsequent increase of its share from the internal revenue
allotment (IRA) from the National Government (Section 285, R.A. No. 7160
or the Local Government Code of 1991). The IRA is based on land area and
population of local government units, provinces included.
The nature or kinds, and magnitude of the taxes collected by the City
Government, and which taxes shall accrue solely to the City Government,
will be redefined (Section 151, R.A. No. 7160), and may be shared with the
province such as taxes on sand, gravel and other quarry resources (Section
138, R.A. No. 7160), professional taxes (Section 139, R.A. No. 7160), or
amusement taxes (Section 140, R.A. No. 7160). The Provincial Government
will allocate operating funds for the City. Inarguably, there would be a (sic)
diminished funds for the local operations of the City Government because
of reduced shares of the IRA in accordance with the schedule set forth by
Section 285 of the R.A. No. 7160. The City Governments share in the
proceeds in the development and utilization of national wealth shall be
diluted since certain portions shall accrue to the Provincial Government
(Section 292, R.A. No.7160).
The registered voters of Santiago City will vote for and can be voted
as provincial officials (Section 451 and 452 [c], R.A. No. 7160).
The City Mayor will now be under the administrative supervision of the
Provincial Governor who is tasked by law to ensure that every component
city and municipality within the territorial jurisdiction of the province acts
within the scope of its prescribed powers and functions (Section 29 and
465 (b) (2) (i), R.A. No. 7160), and to review (Section 30, R.A. No. 7160) all
executive orders submitted by the former (Section 455 (b) (1) (xii), R.A. No.
7160) and (R)eportorial requirements with respect to the local governance
and state of affairs of the city (Section 455 (b) (1) (xx), R.A. No.
7160). Elective city officials will also be effectively under the control of the
Provincial Governor (Section 63, R.A. No. 7160). Such will be the great
change in the state of the political autonomy of what is now Santiago City
where by virtue of R.A. No. 7720, it is the Office of the President which has
supervisory authority over it as an independent component city (Section
25, R.A. No. 7160; Section 4 (ARTICLE X), 1987 Constitution).
The resolutions and ordinances adopted and approved by the
Sangguniang Panlungsod will be subject to the review of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan (Sections 56, 468 (a) (1) (i), 468 (a) (2) (vii), and 469 (c) (4),
R.A. No. 7160). Likewise, the decisions in administrative cases by the
former could be appealed and acted upon by the latter (Section 67, R.A.
No. 7160).
It is markworthy that when R.A. No. 7720 upgraded the status of Santiago
City from a municipality to an independent component city, it required the
approval of its people thru a plebiscite called for the purpose. There is
neither rhyme nor reason why this plebiscite should not be called to
determine the will of the people of Santiago City when R.A. No.
8528 downgrades the status of their city. Indeed, there is more reason to
consult the people when a law substantially diminishes their right. Rule II,
Article 6, paragraph (f) (1) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
the Local Government Code is in accord with the Constitution when it
provides that:
(f) Plebiscite - (1) no creation, conversion, division, merger, abolition,
or substantial alteration of boundaries of LGUS shall take effect unless
approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the
purpose in the LGU or LGUs affected. The plebiscite shall be conducted by
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) within one hundred twenty (120)
days from the effectivity of the law or ordinance prescribing such action,
unless said law or ordinance fixes another date.
x x x.
The rules cover all conversions, whether upward or downward in
character, so long as they result in a material change in the local
government unit directly affected, especially a change in the political and
economic rights of its people.
A word on the dissenting opinions of our esteemed brethren. Mr.
Justice Buena justifies R.A. No. 8528 on the ground that Congress has the
power to amend the charter of Santiago City. This power of amendment,
however, is limited by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Quite
clearly, when an amendment of a law involves the creation, merger,
division, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local
government units, a plebiscite in the political units directly affected is
mandatory. He also contends that the amendment merely caused
a transition in the status of Santiago as a city.Allegedly, it is a transition
because no new city was created nor was a former city dissolved by R.A.
No. 8528. As discussed above, the spirit of Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution calls for the people of the local government unit directly
affected to vote in a plebiscite whenever there is a material change in their
rights and responsibilities. They may call the downgrading of Santiago to a
component city as a mere transition but they cannot blink away from the
fact that the transition will radically change its physical and political
configuration as well as the rights and responsibilities of its people.
On the other hand, our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Mendoza,
posits the theory that "only if the classification involves changes in
income, population, and land area of the local government unit is there a
need for such changes to be approved by the people x x x."
With due respect, such an interpretation runs against the letter and
spirit of section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution which, to repeat,
states: "No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in
accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code and
subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected." It is clear that the Constitution
imposes two conditions - - - first, the creation, division, merger, abolition
or substantial alteration of boundary of a local government unit must meet
the criteria fixed by the Local Government Code on income, population and
land area and second, the law must be approved by the people "by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected."
In accord with the Constitution, sections 7, 8, and 9 of the Local
Government Code fixed the said criteria and they involve requirements on
income, population and land area. These requirements, however, are
imposed to help assure the economic viability of the local
government unit concerned. They were not imposed to determine
the necessity for a plebiscite of the people. Indeed, the Local
Government Code does not state that there will be no more plebiscite after
its requirements on income, population and land area have been
satisfied. On the contrary, section 10, Chapter 2 of the Code provides: "No
creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries
of local government units shall take effect unless approved by a
majority of the votes casts in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the
political unit or units directly affected. Said plebiscite shall be conducted by
the COMELEC within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the
effectivity of the law or ordinance effecting such action, unless said law or
ordinance fixes another date."11 Senator Aquilino Pimentel, the
principal author of the Local Government Code of 1991, opines
that the plebiscite is absolute and mandatory.12
It cannot be overstressed that the said two requirements of the
Constitution have different purposes. The criteria fixed by the Local
Government Code on income, population and land area are designed to
achieve an economic purpose. They are to be based on verified
indicators, hence, section 7, Chapter 2 of the Local Government Code
requires that these "indicators shall be attested by the Department of
Finance, the National Statistics Office, and the Lands Management Bureau
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources." In contrast, the
people's plebiscite is required to achieve a political purpose --- to use the
people's voice as a check against the pernicious political practice of
gerrymandering. There is no better check against this excess committed
by the political representatives of the people themselves than the exercise
of direct people power. As well-observed by one commentator, as the
creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries
are "xxx basic to local government, it is also imperative that these acts
be done not only by Congress but also be approved by the inhabitants of
the locality concerned. xxx By giving the inhabitants a hand in their
approval, the provision will also eliminate the old practice of
gerrymandering and minimize legislative action designed for the benefit of
a few politicians. Hence, it promotes the autonomy of local government
units."13
The records show that the downgrading of Santiago City was opposed
by certain segments of its people. In the debates in Congress, it was noted
that at the time R.A. No. 8528 was proposed, Santiago City has been
converted to an independent component city barely two and a half (2 1/2)
years ago and the conversion was approved by a majority of 14,000
votes. Some legislators expressed surprise for the sudden move to
downgrade the status of Santiago City as there had been no significant
change in its socio-economic-political status. The only reason given for the
downgrading is to enable the people of the city to aspire for the leadership
of the province. To say the least, the alleged reason is unconvincing for it is
the essence of an independent component city that its people can no
longer participate or be voted for in the election of officials of the
province. The people of Santiago City were aware that they gave up that
privilege when they voted to be independent from the province of
Isabela. There was an attempt on the part of the Committee on Local
Government to submit the downgrading of Santiago City to its people via a
plebiscite. The amendment to this effect was about to be voted upon when
a recess was called. After the recess, the chairman of the Committee
anounced the withdrawal of the amendment "after a very enlightening
conversation with the elders of the Body." We quote the debates, viz:14
"BILL ON SECOND READING
H.B. No. 8729 - City of Santiago
"Senator Tatad. Mr. President, I move that we consider House Bill No.
8729 as reported out under Committee Report No. 971.
"The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] there being none, the
motion is approved.
"Consideration of House Bill No. 8729 is now in order. With the
permission of the Body, the Secretary will read only the title of the bill
without prejudice to inserting in the Record the whole text thereof.
"The Acting Secretary [Atty. Raval]. House Bill No. 8729, entitled
AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF R.A. NO. 7720
ENTITLED "AN ACT CONVERTING THE MUNICIPALITY OF SANTIAGO
INTO AN INDEPENDENT COMPONENT CITY TO BE KNOWN AS THE
CITY OF SANTIAGO
_______________________________________________________
The following is the full text of H.B. No. 8729
Insert
_______________________________________________________
"Senator Tatad. Mr. President, for the sponsorship, I ask that the
distinguished Chairman of the Committee on Local Government be
recognized.
"The President. Senator Sotto is recognized.
SPONSORSHIP SPEECH OF SENATOR SOTTO
"Mr. President. House Bill No. 8729, which was introduced in the House
by Congressman Antonio M. Abaya as its principal author, is a
simple measure which merely seeks to convert the City of Santiago
into a component city of the Province of Isabela.
"The City of Santiago is geographically located within, and is physically
an integral part of the Province of Isabela. As an independent
component city, however, it is completely detached and separate
from the said province as a local political unit. To use the language
of the Explanatory Note of the proposed bill, the City of Santiago is
an island in the provincial milieu.
"The residents of the city no longer participate in the elections, nor are
they qualified to run for any elective positions in the Province of
Isabela.
"The Province of Isabela, on the other hand, is no longer vested with the
power and authority of general supervision over the city and its
officials, which power and authority are now exercised by the Office
of the President, which is very far away from Santiago City.
Being geographically located within the Province of Isabela, the City of
Santiago is affected, one way or the other, by the happenings in
the said province, and is benefited by its progress and
development. Hence, the proposed bill to convert the City of
Santiago into a component city of Isabela.
"Mr. President, it is my pleasure, therefore, to present for consideration
of this august Body Committee Report No. 971 of the Committee
on Local Government , recommending approval, with our proposed
committee amendment, of House Bill No. 8729.
"Thank you, Mr. President.
"The President. The Majority Leader is recognized.
"Senator Tatad. Mr. President, I moved (sic) that we close the period of
interpellations.
"The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none,
the period of interpellations is closed.
"Senator Tatad. I move that we now consider the committee
amendments.
"Senator Roco. Mr. President.
"The President. What is the pleasure of Senator Roco?
"Senator Roco. Mr. President, may I ask for a reconsideration of the
ruling on the motion to close the period of interpellations just to be
able to ask a few questions?
"Senator Tatad. May I move for a reconsideration of my motion, Mr.
President.
"The President. Is there any objection to the reconsideration of the
closing of the period of interpellations? [Silence] There being none,
the motion is approved.
"Senator Roco is recognized.
"Senator Roco. Will the distinguished gentleman yield for some
questions?
"Senator Sotto. Willingly, Mr. President.
"Senator Roco. Mr. President, together with the Chairman of the
Committee on Local Government, we were with the
sponsors when we approved this bill to make Santiago a
City. That was about two and a half years ago. At that time,
I remember it was the cry of the city that it be
independent. Now we are deleting that word independent.
"Mr. President, only because I was a co-author and a co-sponsor,
for the Record, I want some explanation on what happened
between then and now that has made us decide that the
City of Santiago should cease to be independent and
should now become a component city.
"Senator Sotto. Mr. President, the officials of the province said during
the public hearing that they are no longer vested with the power
and authority of general supervision over the city. The power and
authority is now being exercised by the Office of the President and
it is quite far from the City of Santiago.
"In the public hearing, we also gathered that there is a clamor from
some sectors that they want to participate in the provincial
elections.
"Senator Roco. Mr. President, I did not mean to delay this. I did want it
on record, however. I think there was a majority of 14,000 who
approved the charter, and maybe we owe it to those who voted for
that charter some degree of respect. But if there has been a
change of political will, there has been a change of political will,
then so be it.
"Thank you, Mr. President.
"Senator Sotto. Mr. President, to be very frank about it, that was a
very important point raised by Senator Roco, and I will have to
place it on the Record of the Senate that the reason why we are
proposing a committee amendment is that, originally, there was an
objection on the part of the local officials and those who oppose it
by incorporating a plebiscite in this bill. That was the
solution. Because there were some sectors in the City of Santiago
who were opposing the reclassification or reconversion of the city
into a component city.
"Senator Roco. All I wanted to say, Mr. President -- because the two of
us had special pictures (sic) in the city -- is that I thought it should
be put on record that we have supported originally the proposal to
make it an independent city. But now if it is their request, then, on
the manifestation of the Chairman, let it be so.
"Thank you.
"Senator Drilon. Mr. President.
"Senator Drilon. Will the gentleman yield for a few questions, Mr.
President?
"Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
"Senator Drilon. Mr. President, further to the interpellation of
our good friend, the Senator from Bicol, on the matter of
the opinion of the citizens of Santiago City, there is a
resolution passed by the Sanggunian on January 30, 1997
opposing the conversion of Santiago from an independent
city.
"This opposition was placed on records during the committee
hearings. And that is the reason why, as mentioned by the
good sponsor, one of the amendments is that a plebiscite
be conducted before the law takes effect.
"The question I would like to raise-- and I would like to recall
the statement of our Minority Leader -- is that, at this time
we should not be passing it for a particular politician.
"In this particular case, it is obvious that this bill is being
passed in order that the additional territory be added to
the election of the provincial officials of the province of
Isabela.
"Now, is this for the benefit of any particular politician, Mr. President.
"Senator Sotto. If it is, I am not aware of it, Mr. President.
"Senator Alvarez. Mr. President.
"The President. With the permission of the two gentlemen on the
Floor, Senator Alvarez is recognized.
"Senator Alvarez. As a born inbred citizen of this city, Mr. President,
may I share some information.
"Mr. President, if we open up the election of the city to the provincial
leadership, it will not be to the benefit of the provincial leadership,
because the provincial leadership will then campaign in a bigger
territory.
"As a matter of fact, the ones who will benefit from this are the citizens
of Santiago who will now be enfranchised in the provincial electoral
process, and whose children will have the opportunity to grow into
provincial leadership. This is one of the prime reasons why this
amendment is being put forward.
"While it is true that there may have been a resolution by the city
council, those who signed the resolution were not the whole of the
council. This bill was sponsored by the congressman of that district
who represents a constituency, the voice of the district.
"I think, Mr. President, in considering which interest is paramount,
whose voice must be heard, and if we have to fathom the interest
of the people, the law which has been crafted here in accordance
with the rules should be given account, as we do give account to
many of the legislations coming from the House on local issues.
"Senator Drilon. Mr. President, the reason why I am raising this
question is that, as Senator Roco said, just two-and-a-half
years ago we passed a bill which indeed disenfranchized--if
we want to use that phrase-- the citizens of the City of
Santiago in the matter of the provincial election. Two-and-
a-half years after, we are changing the rule.
"In the original charter, the citizens of the City of Santiago
participated in a plebiscite in order to approve the
conversion of the city into an independent city. I believe
that the only way to resolve this issue raised by Senator
Roco is again to subject this issue to another plebiscite as
part of the provision of this proposed bill and as will be
proposed by the Committee Chairman as an amendment.
"Thank you very much, Mr. President.
"Senator Alvarez. Mr. President, the Constitution does not require that
the change from an independent to a component city be subjected
to a plebiscite.
Sections 10, 11, 12 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides as
follows:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be
created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially
altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the
local government code and subject to approval by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected.
This change from an independent city into a component city is none of
those enumerated. So the proposal coming from the House is in
adherence to this constitutional mandate which does not require a
plebiscite.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President, the key word here is conversion. The
word conversion appears in that provision wherein we must call a
plebiscite. During the public hearing, the representative of
Congressman Abaya was insisting that this is not a conversion; this
is merely a reclassification. But it is clear in the bill.
We are amending a bill that converts, and we are converting it
into a component city. That is how the members of the
committee felt. That is why we have proposed an
amendment to this, and this is to incorporate a plebiscite in
as much as there is no provision on incorporating a
plebiscite. Because we would like not only to give the other
people of Santiago a chance or be enfranchised as far as
the leadership of the province is concerned, but also we
will give a chance to those who are opposing it. To them,
this is the best compromise. Let the people decide, instead
of the political leaders of Isabela deciding for them.
"Senator Tatad. Mr. President.
"The President. The Majority Leader is recognized.
"Senator Tatad. At this point, Mr. President, I think we can move to
close the period of interpellations.
"The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none,
the motion is approved.
"Senator Tatad. I move that we now consider the committee
amendments, Mr. President.
"The President. Is there any objection? Silence] There being none, the
motion is approved.
"Senator Sotto. On page 2, after line 13, insert a new Section 3, as
follows:
"SEC. 3. SECTION 49 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7720 IS HEREBY AMENDED
BY DELETING THE ENTIRE SECTION AND IN ITS STEAD SUBSTITUTE THE
FOLLOWING:
"SEC. 49. PLEBISCITE. - THE CONVERSION OF THE CITY OF SANTIAGO
INTO A COMPONENT CITY OF THE PROVINCE OF ISABELA SHALL TAKE
EFFECT UPON THE RATIFICATION OF THIS ACT BY A MAJORITY OF THE
PEOPLE OF SAID CITY IN A PLEBISCITE WHICH SHALL BE HELD FOR THE
PURPOSE WITHIN SIXTY (60) DAYS FROM THE APPROVAL OF THIS ACT. THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS SHALL CONDUCT AND SUPERVISE SUCH
PLEBISCITE.
"The President. Is there any objection?
"Senator Enrile. Mr. President.
"The President. Senator Enrile is recognized.
"Senator Enrile. I object to this committee amendment, Mr. President.
"SUSPENSION OF SESSION
"Senator Tatad. May I ask for a one-minute suspension of the session.
"The President. The session is suspended for a few minutes if there is
no objection. [There was none]
"It was 7:54 p.m.
"RESUMPTION OF SESSION
"At 7:57 p.m., the session was resumed.
"The President. The session is resumed.
"Senator Sotto is recognized.
"Senator Sotto. Mr. President, after a very enlightening conversation
with the elders of the Body, I withdraw my amendment.
"The President. The amendment is withdrawn.
"Senator Maceda. Mr. President.
"The President. Senator Maceda is recognized.
"Senator Maceda. We wish to thank the sponsor for the withdrawal of
the amendment.
"Mr. President, with due respect to the Senator from Isabela -- I
am no great fan of the Senator from Isabela -- but it so
happens that this is a local bill affecting not only his
province but his own city where he is a resident and
registered voter.
"So, unless the issue is really a matter of life and death and of national
importance, senatorial courtesy demands that we, as much as
possible, accommodate the request of the Senator from Isabela as
we have done on matters affecting the district of other senators. I
need not remind them.
"Thank you anyway, Mr. President.
"Senator Alvarez. Mr. President.
"The President. Senator Alvarez is recognized.
"Senator Alvarez. Mr. President, may I express my deepest
appreciation for the statement of the gentleman from Ilocos and
Laguna. Whatever he may have said, the feeling is not mutual. At
least for now, I have suddenly become his great fan for the
evening.
"May I put on record, Mr. President, that I campaigned against the
cityhood of Santiago not because I do not want it to be a city but
because it had disenfranchised the young men of my city from
aspiring for the leadership of the province. The town is the gem of
the province. How could we extricate the town from the province?
"But I would like to thank the gentleman, Mr. President, and also the
Chairman of the Committee.
"Senator Tatad. Mr. President.
"The President. The Majority Leader is recognized.
"Senator Tatad. There being no committee amendments, I move that
the period of committee amendments be closed.
"The President. Shall we amend the title of this bill by removing the
word independent preceding component city?
"Senator Sotto. No, Mr. President. We are merely citing the title. The
main title of this House Bill No. 8729 is An Act Amending Certain
Sections of Republic Act 7720. The title is the title of Republic Act
7720. So, I do not think that we should amend that anymore.
"The President. What is the pending motion? Will the gentleman
kindly state the motion?
"Senator Tatad. I move that we close the period of committee
amendments.
"The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none,
the motion is approved.
"Senator Tatad. Unless there are any individual amendments, I move
that we close the period of individual amendments.
"The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none,
the period of individual amendments is closed.
"APPROVAL OF H.B. NO. 8729 ON SECOND READING
"Senator Tatad. Mr. President, I move that we vote on Second Reading
on House Bill No. 8729.
"The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, we
shall now vote on Second Reading on House Bill No. 8729.
"As many as are in favor of the bill, say aye.
"Several Members. Aye
As many as are against the bill, say nay. [Silence]
"House Bill No. 8729 is approved on Second Reading."
The debates cannot but raise some quizzical eyebrows on the real purpose
for the downgrading of the city of Santiago. There is all the reason to listen
to the voice of the people of the city via a plebiscite.
In the case of Tan, et al. vs. COMELEC,15 BP 885 was enacted
partitioning the province of Negros Occidental without consulting its people
in a plebiscite. In his concurring opinion striking down the law as
unconstitutional, Chief Justice Teehankee cited the illicit political
purpose behind its enactment, viz:
"The scenario, as petitioners urgently asserted, was to have the
creation of the new Province a fait accompli by the time elections are held
on February 7, 1986. The transparent purpose is unmistakably so that the
new Governor and other officials shall by then have been installed in office,
ready to function for purposes of the election for President and Vice-
President. Thus, the petitioners reported after the event: With indecent
haste, the plebiscite was held; Negros del Norte was set up and proclaimed
by President Marcos as in existence; a new set of government officials
headed by Governor Armando Gustilo was appointed; and, by the time the
elections were held on February 7, 1986, the political machinery was in
place to deliver the solid North to ex-President Marcos. The rest is
history. What happened in Negros del Norte during the elections - the
unashamed use of naked power and resources - contributed in no small
way to arousing peoples power and steel the ordinary citizen to perform
deeds of courage and patriotism that makes one proud to be a Filipino
today.
"The challenged Act is manifestly void and
unconstitutional. Consequently, all the implementing acts complained of,
viz. the plebiscite, the proclamation of a new province of Negros del Norte
and the appointment of its officials are equally void. The limited holding of
the plebiscite only in the areas of the proposed new province (as provided
by Section 4 of the Act) to the exclusion of the voters of the remaining
areas of the integral province of Negros Occidental (namely, the three
cities of Bacolod, Bago and La Carlota and the Municipalities of Las
Castellana, Isabela, Moises Padilla, Pontevedra, Hinigaran, Himamaylan,
Kabankalan, Murcia, Valladolid, San Enrique, Ilog, Cauayan, Hinoba-an and
Sipalay and Candoni), grossly contravenes and disregards the mandate of
Article XI, section 3 of the then prevailing 1973 Constitution that no
province may be created or divided or its boundary substantially altered
without the approval of a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or
units affected. It is plain that all the cities and municipalities of the
province of Negros Occidental, not merely those of the proposed new
province, comprise the units affected. It follows that the voters of the
whole and entire province of Negros Occidental have to participate and
give their approval in the plebiscite, because the whole province is affected
by its proposed division and substantial alteration of its boundary. To limit
the plebiscite to only the voters of the areas to be partitioned and seceded
from the province is as absurd and illogical as allowing only the
secessionists to vote for the secession that they demanded against the
wishes of the majority and to nullify the basic principle of majority rule.
Mr. Justice Mendoza and Mr. Justice Buena also cite two instances
when allegedly independent component cities were downgraded
into component cities without need of a plebiscite. They cite the City
of Oroquieta, Misamis Occidental, 16 and the City of San Carlos,
Pangasinan17 whose charters were amended to allow their people to vote
and be voted upon in the election of officials of the province to which their
city belongs without submitting the amendment to a plebiscite. With due
respect, the cities of Oroquieta and San Carlos are not similarly
situated as the city of Santiago. The said two cities then were not
independent component cities unlike the city of Santiago. The two
cities were chartered but were not independent component cities
for both were not highly urbanized cities which alone were
considered independent cities at that time. Thus, when the case of
San Carlos City was under consideration by the Senate, Senator Pimentel
explained:18
"x x x Senator Pimentel. The bill under consideration, Mr. President,
merely empowers the voters of San Carlos to vote in the elections of
provincial officials. There is no intention whatsoever to downgrade
the status of the City of San Carlos and there is no showing
whatsoever that the enactment of this bill will, in any way, diminish the
powers and prerogatives already enjoyed by the City of San Carlos. In
fact, the City of San Carlos as of now, is a component city. It is not a
highly urbanized city. Therefore, this bill merely, as we said earlier, grants
the voters of the city, the power to vote in provincial elections, without in
any way changing the character of its being a component city. It is
for this reason that I vote in favor of this bill.
It was Senator Pimentel who also sponsored the bill 19 allowing qualified
voters of the city of Oroquieta to vote in provincial elections of the province
of Misamis Occidental. In his sponsorship speech, he explained that the
right to vote being given to the people of Oroquieta City was consistent
with its status as a component city.20 Indeed, during the debates, former
Senator Neptali Gonzales pointed out the need to remedy the anomalous
situation then obtaining xxx where voters of one component city can
vote in the provincial election while the voters of another component city
cannot vote simply because their charters so provide. 21 Thus, Congress
amended other charters of component cities prohibiting their
people from voting in provincial elections.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted. Republic Act No. 8528 is
declared unconstitutional and the writ of prohibition is hereby issued
commanding the respondents to desist from implementing said law.
SO ORDERED.
FACTS:
1994, RA No. 7720 effected the conversion of the municipality of Santiago,
Isabela, into an independent component city. July 4th, RA No. 7720 was
approved by the people of Santiago in a plebiscite. 1998, RA No. 8528 was
enacted and it amended RA No. 7720 that practically downgraded the City
of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 for the lack of
provision to submit the law for the approval of the people of Santiago in a
proper plebiscite.
Respondents defended the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 saying that the
said act merely reclassified the City of Santiago from an independent
component city into a component city. It allegedly did not involve any
creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of
boundaries of local government units, therefore, a plebiscite of the people
of Santiago is unnecessary. They also questioned the standing of
petitioners to file the petition and argued that the petition raises a political
question over which the Court lacks jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition at bar.
RULING:
Yes. RA No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional. That Supreme Court has the
jurisdiction over said petition because it involves not a political question
but a justiciable issue, and of which only the court could decide whether or
not a law passed by the Congress is unconstitutional.
That when an amendment of the law involves creation, merger, division,
abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units,
a plebiscite in the political units directly affected is mandatory.
Petitioners are directly affected in the imple-mentation of RA No. 8528.
Miranda was the mayor of Santiago City, Afiado was the President of the
Sangguniang Liga, together with 3 other petitioners were all residents and
voters in the City of Santiago. It is their right to be heard in the conversion
of their city through a plebiscite to be conducted by the COMELEC. Thus,
denial of their right in RA No. 8528 gives them proper standing to strike
down the law as unconstitutional.
Sec. 1 of Art. VIII of the Constitution states that: the judicial power shall be
vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instru-mentality of the Government.
[G.R. No. 147465.April 10, 2002]
MMDA vs. JANCOM ENV'L. CORP., et al.
THIRD DIVISION
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court
dated APR 10 2002.
G.R. No. 147465(Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, petitioner, vs.
Jancom Environmental Corporation and Jancom International Development
Projects Pty. Limited of Australia, respondents.)
Before us is a motion for reconsideration of our decision dated January 30,
2002 affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeals, which in turn affirmed
that of the regional trial court, declaring that there is a valid and perfected
waste management contract between the Republic of the Philippines and
JANCOM Environmental Corporation, and dismissing the petition filed by
petitioner Metropolitan Manila Development Authority for lack of
merit.Petitioner has likewise filed a motion that the case at bar be heard
and resolved by the Court en banc.
In its motion for reconsideration, petitioner reiterates its arguments that
(1) resort to a petition for certiorari was proper; (2) that the waste
management contract never got through the negotiation stage; (3) that the
signature of the President is necessary for the perfection of the contract in
question; and (4) that the contract could be unilaterally cancelled by the
Government since incineration is prohibited by the Clean Air Act.
A cursory look at petitioner's arguments readily discloses that the same
are a mere rehash of the issues and arguments raised in the original
petition.The first procedural issue raised, which parenthetically, was
resolved by us in our January 30, 2002 decision, is whether or not it was
proper for petitioner to resort to a petition for certiorari, instead of
appealing the decision of the trial court.
In justifying its resort to certiorari, petitioner claims that a garbage crisis
was imminent due to the trial court's decision to prohibit and enjoin MMDA
from conducting a bidding for the establishment and operation of a new
sanitary landfill.Petitioner contends that this prohibition - and the specter
of garbage lying open in the streets - impelled it to file a petition
for certiorari rather than a regular appeal.As we stated in our decision,
"[t]he existence and availability of the right of appeal proscribes a resort
to certiorari, because one of the requirements for availment of the latter
remedy is precisely that 'there should be no appeal' (Mercado vs. CA, 162
SCRA 75 [1988])." The special civil action for certiorari is available only
when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law (Sec. 1, Rule 65, id.).Well-settled is the rule that the
special civil action for certiorari may not be invoked as a substitute for the
remedy of appeal (BF Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 288 SCRA 267
[1998]).
Petitioner claims, however, that while appeal was available, the same was
an inadequate remedy under the circumstances, stating that "the
availability of appeal is not sufficient to preclude a petition
for certiorari where appeal is not an adequate, equally beneficial, speedy
and efficient remedy.For it is the inadequacy and not the mere absence of
other legal remedies which determines the propriety of certiorari."This
argument was previously confuted by the Court of Appeals in the following
disquisition, which we quote with approval:
[T]he RTC decision is not immediately executory.Only judgments in actions
for injunction, receivership, accounting and support and such other
judgments as are now or may hereafter be declared to be immediately
executory shall be enforced after their rendition and shall not be stayed by
an appeal therefrom, unless otherwise ordered by the trial court (Sec. 4,
Rule 39, id.)
Since the RTC decision is not immediately executory, appeal would have
stayed its execution.Consequently, the adverse effects of said decision will
not visit upon petitioners during the appeal.In other words, appeal is a
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
But no appeal was taken within the reglementary period, the RTC decision
had become final and executory.
(CA Decision, p. 9.)
Thus, it cannot be gainsaid that petitioner's failure to appeal the decision
of the trial court is a fatal defect which, standing by itself, already fully
justifies the dismissal of its petition.
Petitioner also moves to have the instant case referred to the Court en
banc on the ground that novel questions of law have been raised which
merit review by the Court en banc.The motion is not meritorious.
Firstly, Circular No. 2-89 governing referral of cases to the Court en
banc states that "[t]he Court en banc is not an Appellate Court to which
decisions or resolutions of a Division may be appealed."A decision of a
Division of the Court is a decision of the Supreme Court.That much is
clear.Secondly, the question as to whether or not a perfected contract
exists between the parties can hardly be characterized as novel.Thirdly,
when this case was passed on to Mr. Justice Antonio T. Carpio upon the
retirement of Mme. Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes to whom the case had
been initially assigned, the Division thought it wise to refer the
case en consulta to the Court en banc, suggesting or inquiring if the
Court en banc should take over and whether the case should be re-raffled
courtwide due to the inhibition of Justice Carpio.The Court en banc,
however, declined to take over the case and returned it to the Third
Division with instructions that it be re-raffled among the other members of
the Division.Fourthly, Circular 2-89 further pertinently provides that "[n]o
motion for reconsideration of the action of the Court en banc declining to
take cognizance of a referral by a Division, shall be entertained."Verily, to
refer the instant case to the Court en banc anew would be equivalent to
allowing a motion for reconsideration of the previous denial of the
referral.This notwithstanding, the Third Division acting on petitioner's
motion for referral of the motion for reconsideration to the Court en banc,
once again consulted the Court en banc, inquiring if the banc desired to
take over the resolution of petitioner's motion for reconsideration.The
Court en banc declined, and again instructed the Third Division to
accordingly act on the motion for reconsideration.Withal, the Court en
banc has denied petitioner's motion that its motion for reconsideration be
resolved by the Court en banc.
Incidentally, it ahs been claimed that the Third Division violated SC
Administrative Circular No. 1294-A when it did not re-raffle the case to the
two other divisions of the Court, given the circumstance that Mr. Justice
Carpio, a member of the Division, was formerly counsel of Vivendi,
JANCOM's partner, and was Chief Presidential Legal counsel when the
contract was finalized.
The claim is without basis.Circular 12-94-A provides:
2.Whenever a Member of a Division was counsel or member of a
law firmwhich was counsel in a case before the Division... or a former
official of a government agency or private entity which is a party to a
case before the Division, said member shall inhibit himself from the case,
and the same shall be raffled among members of the two other Divisions of
the Court.
A painstaking scrutiny of the record would show that Mr. Justice Carpio and
his former law firm have never been counsel for any party in the case,
whether in the Third Division, the Court of Appeals, or the regional trial
court where the case originated.Moreover, Mr. Justice Carpio resigned as
Chief Presidential Legal counsel on February 15, 1996, while the bidding
for the waste management project was held almost a year later,
on February 12, 1997.The contract itself was signed only on December 19,
1997.Clearly, Circular 12-94-A finds no application in the case at bar.
Having disposed of the procedural issues, we again consider the
substantive issues raised by petitioner, not only to put petitioner's mind to
rest, but to expose the speciousness of its arguments.
Petitioner claims that the waste management contract never got through
the negotiation stage since the notice sent by then MMDA Chairman
Prospero Oreta informing JANCOM that it was the winning bidder
specifically provided that the same was "subject to negotiation and mutual
approval of the terms and conditions of the contract of award."The
argument is misleading since it deceivingly overlooks the fact that after
said letter was sent, a contract was prepared and signed by JANCOM and
the Philippine Government.The signing and execution of the contract by
the parties clearly show that, as between the parties, there was a
concurrence of offer and acceptance with respect to the material details of
the contract, thereby giving rise to the perfection of the contract.The
execution and signing of the contract are not disputed by the parties.
Next, petitioner reiterates its claim that the signature of the President is
necessary for the validity of the contract.It points out that Memorandum
Order No. 202 (Memorandum Order Creating an Executive Committee to
Oversee the BOT Implementation of Solid Waste Management Projects for
Waste Disposal Sites in Carmona and San Mateo) only gives the Executive
Committee recommendatory authority, not the authority to approve or
disapprove a waste management contract.Petitioner argues that the
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources signed the contract in his
capacity as member of the Executive Committee and that, therefore, the
same is not valid since the Executive Committee has no power to approve
or disapprove the contract.Again, the argument is specious as it glosses
over the fact - stated in the contract itself - that the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources signed, not as a member of the
Executive Committee, but in representation of the Presidential Task Force
on Solid Waste of which he was the Chairman (Contract, p. 1).Nor can it be
gainsaid that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, of
which the Secretary is the head, is the primary government agency
responsible for the conservation, management, development, and proper
use of the country's environment and natural resources (Whereas clause,
Memorandum Circular No 88 - Circular Reconstituting the Presidential Task
force on Waste Management).
As to the contention that the contract is worth billions of pesos, thereby
requiring Presidential approval for validity, this is a mere rehash of the
issues already answered in our January 30, 2002 decision.Again, we quote
the Court of Appeals:
As regards the President's approval of infrastructure projects required
under Section 59 of Executive Order No. 292, said section does not apply
to the BOT contract in question.Sec. 59 should be correlated with Sec. 58
of Exec. Order No. 292.Said sections read:
SECTION 58.Ceiling for Infrastructure Contracts.-The following shall be the
ceilings for all civil works, construction and other contracts for
infrastructure projects, including supply contracts for said projects,
awarded through public bidding or through negotiation, which may be
approved by the Secretaries of Public Works and Highways, Transportation
and Communications, Local Government with respect to Rural road
improvement Project and governing boards of government-owned or
controlled corporations:
xxx xxx xxx
Save as provided for above, the approval ceilings assigned to the
departments/agencies involved in national infrastructure and construction
projects shall remain at the levels provided in existing laws, rules and
regulations.
Contrary to petitioner's claim that all infrastructure contracts require the
President's approval (Petition, p. 16), Sec. 59 provides that such approval is
required only in infrastructure contracts involving amounts exceeding the
ceilings set in Sec. 58.Significantly, the infrastructure contracts treated in
Sec. 58 pertain only to those which may be approved by the Secretaries of
Public Works and Highways, Transportation and communications, Local
Government (with respect to Rural Road Improvement Project) and the
governing boards of certain government-owned or controlled
corporations.Consequently, the BOT contract in question, which was
approved by the DENR Secretary and the EXCOM Chairman and Co-
Chairman, is not covered by Exec. Order No. 292.
(Rollo, p. 51-52.)
Petitioner also claims that even if the Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources had the authority to enter into the contract, the
approval of the National Economic and Development Authority must first
be secured for the contract to be valid, citing the second paragraph of
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6957 (the Build-Operate-Transfer Law), as
amended by Republic Act No. 7718.Said Section provides:
x x x
The list of all such national projects must be part of the development
programs of the agencies concerned.The list of projects costing up to
Three hundred million pesos (P300,000,000) shall be submitted to the ICC
of the NEDA for its approval and to the NEDA Board for projects costing
more than Three hundred million pesos (P300,000,000).The list of projects
submitted to the ICC of the NEDA Board shall be acted upon within thirty
(30) working days.
x x x
Petitioner's argument is not in point.A perusal of Republic Act No. 6957, as
amended, readily shows that the required approval of NEDA refers to
the list of priority projects which must be included in the development
program of the agencies concerned.In other words, under Section 4, what
NEDA must approve is the proposal by an agency that a certain project be
considered for financing, construction, operation, or maintenance by the
private sector, not the contract itself.This conclusion is bolstered by
Section 5 of the same law which provides that after NEDA approval, the
head of the agency concerned shall then publish a notice inviting
prospective bidders to bid for the project so approved.
Lastly, petitioner argues that the incineration technology provided in the
contract is prohibited by law, citing the Clean Air Act in support thereof.This
matter was hardly treated by the two courts below, rendering it almost a
non-issue.The Court of Appeals, in its 20-page decision, devoted two short
paragraphs comprising all of three sentences to this matter (Rollo, p.
54).The regional trial court, for its part, said that the issues "which should
be addressed are the following: (1) Is there a perfected contract between
the parties? and (2) Does certiorari and/or prohibition lie in the case at
bar?" (Rollo, p. 157).We need but repeat now that, as pointed out by the
appellate court, Section 20, which provides:
SECTION 20.Ban on Incineration.- Incinertion, hereby defined aas the
burning of municipal, bio-chemical and hazardous wastes, which process
emits poisonous and toxic fumes, is hereby prohibited: xxx."
does not absolutely prohibit incineration as a mode of waste disposal;
rather, only those burning processes which emit poisonous and toxic fumes
are banned.
The rule that a statute should be given effect as a whole requires that the
statute be so construed as to make no part or provision thereof a
surplusage.Each and every part of the statute should be given its due
effect and meaning in relationto the rest.It is well settled that, whenever
possible, a legal provision must not beso construed as to be a useless
surplusage and, accordingly, meaningless in the sense of adding nothing to
the law or having no effect whatsoever therein(Uytengsu vs. Republic, 95
Phil 890 [1954]).To consider Section 20 of the Clean Air Act as prohibiting
all forms of incineration would render the phrase "which process emits
poisonous and toxic fumes" a useless surplusage, which could not have
been the intention of legislature, seeing that our learned legislators even
took pains to define, in Section 5, Article II of the Clean Air Act what
poisonous andtoxic fumes are, viz:
Section 5. Definitions.- As used in this Act:
t) "Poisonous and toxic fumes" means any emissions and fumes which are
beyond internationally-accepted standards, including but not limited to
World Health Organization (WHO) guideline values;
It may not, thus, be argued that the Clean Air Act prohibits all forms of
incineration as to make the contract in question violative of the Clean Air
Act.This is not to say, of course, that the contract involved does not in fact
run afoul with the Clean Air Act.That issue may still be raised by the proper
party in a proper action.
Prescinding from the issues at hand, several motions for leave to
intervene, with the corresponding petitions-in-intervention, were filed in
this case.These motions for intervention were not granted by the
Court.Moreover, the issues raised by these would-be petitions-in-
intervention - such as the claim that the contract was not a publicly bidded
contract but a negotiated one, that the signatories therein committed
violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices act, that the decision
contravenes public policy to promote the constitutional rights to health and
healthful ecology - were not raised during the trial.The rule is well-settled
that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not adequately brought
to the attention of the trial court need not be, and ordinarily will not be
considered by a reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal because this would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play,
justice, and due process (PAL vs. NLRC, 259 SCRA 459 [1996]).
We, therefore, hold that petitioner has failed to bring out any matter which
could justify a reversal.It bears emphasizing, however, that the Court, in
deciding the instant case, is not making any pronouncement as to whether
or not the contract in question is advantageous or disadvantageous to the
government.The only question before the Court is whether or not there is a
valid and perfected contract between the parties.As to the necessity,
expediency, and wisdom of the contract, these are outside the realm of
judicial adjudication.These considerations are primarily and exclusively a
matter for the President to decide.While the Court recognizes that the
garbage problem is a matter of grave public concern, it can only declare
that the contract in question is a valid and perfected one between the
parties, but the same is still ineffective or unimplementable until and
unless it is approved by the President, the contract itself providing that
such approval by the President is necessary for its effectivity.
ACCORDINGLY, petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED
and this denial is FINAL.
SO ORDERED.
MMDA v. Jancom
Date: Jan 30, 2002
Petitioner: MMDA
Respondent: Jancom
Ponente: Melo, J.
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure
Facts of the case: After bidding for a waste management project with the
MMDA, Jancom won a contract for the MMDAs San Mateo waste
management project. A BOT contract for the waste to energy project was
signed on Dec 19, 1997, between Jancom and the Philippine Government,
represented by the Presidential Task Force on Solid Waste Management
through DENR Secretary Victor Ramos, CORD-NCR chair Dionisio dela
Serna, and MMDA chair Prospero Oreta.
The contract, however, was never signed by President Ramos as it was too
close to the end of his term. He endorsed it to President Estrada, but
Estrada refused to sign it, for two reasons: the passage of RA 8749, or the
Clean Air Act of 1999 and the clamor of San Mateo residents for the closure
of the dumpsite.
When the MMDA published another call for proposals for solid waste
management projects for Metro Manila, Jancom filed a petition with the
Pasig RTC asking the court to declare as void the resolution of the Greater
Metropolitan Manila Solid Waste Management Committee disregarding the
BOT contract with Jancom, and the call for bids for a new waste
management contract.
On May 29, 2000, the lower court decided in favor of Jancom. Instead of
appealing, the MMDA filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari
and a TRO. When the CA dismissed the petition, the MMDA went to the
Supreme Court, arguing that the contract with Jancom was not binding
because it was not signed by the President, the conditions precedent to the
contract were not complied with, and there was no valid notice of award.
The Supreme Court ruled that MMDA should have filed a motion for appeal
instead of for certiorari, because a certiorari would only apply in cases
where there was grave abuse of jurisdiction, something which the petition
did not allege. Correction may be obtained only by an appeal from the final
decision. Since the decision was not appeal, the Court said it has become
final and gone beyond the reach of any court to modify in any substantive
aspect.
Though saying it was unnecessary to discuss the substantive issues, the
court took it up just the same, if only to put the petitioners mind to rest.
The contract with Jancom is valid: citing Article 1305, 1315 and 1319 of the
Civil Code.
In asserting that there was no valid and binding contract, MMDA can only
allege that there was no valid notice of award; the contract does not bear
the signature of the President; the conditions precedent specified in the
contract were not complied with.
But the Court said that the lack of notice was the governments fault;
though the President did not sign, his alter-ego did; and anyway his
signature was only necessary for the effectivity of the contract, not its
perfection; and that the two-month period within which Jancom should
comply with the conditions had not yet started to run because the contract
had not yet taken effect, precisely because of the absence of the
Presidents signature.
HELD: The Court of Appeals did not err when it declared the existence of a
valid and perfected contract between the Republic of the Philippines and
Jancom. The MMDA cannot revoke or renounce the same without the
consent of the other. Although the contract is a perfected one, it is still
ineffective or unimplementable until and unless it is approved by the
President.
Voting: vitug, panganiban, Sandoval Gutierrez concur.
Carpio j: No part, I was former counsel to a foreign partner of Jancom
Environmental Corporation.
Section 11, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution says: The Supreme Court
en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order
their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took
part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
Does this mean that all administrative decisions and penalties may be
rendered only by the Supreme Court en banc?
On February 7, 1989, the Court promulgated Circular No. 2-89 which says:
A decision or resolution of a Division of the Court, when concurred in by a
majority of its members who actually took part in the deliberations on the
issues in a case and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence
of at least three such Members, is a decision or resolution of the Supreme
Court (Sec 4 (3), Article VIII, 1987 Constitution.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 133954. August 3, 2000]
VICTORIANO B. TIROL, JR. petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT,
Region VIII, represented by its DIRECTOR, Leyte Government
Center, Candahug, Palo, Leyte, respondent.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770,
otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, in relation to Rule 45 of
the Revised Rules of Court, petitioner seeks the reversal of the
Resolution[1] of 20 March 1997 and the Order[2] of 5 March 1998 of the
Office of the Ombudsman which, respectively, found petitioner and his co-
respondents in OMB-Visayas-Crim-94-0836 criminally culpable for violation
of Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019,[3] as amended, and denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration of the said Resolution.
Petitioner is the incumbent Regional Director of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), Region V. Prior to such assignment
he was the DECS Regional Director of Region VIII. In the latter capacity, he
and some officials of the Lalawigan National High School, Lalawigan,
Borongan, Eastern Samar, were charged with the violation of Section 3(g)
of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, for entering into a contract alleged
to be manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government. The
charge originated from a complaint filed by the schools Teachers and
Employees Union alleging overpricing of various school equipment for the
Lalawigan National High School. Specifically, petitioners participation
consisted in approving the Requisition and Issue Voucher (RIV) and the
check in connection with the transaction.
On the strength of the complaint, Region VIII of respondent Commission on
Audit (COA) audited the operations and accounts of the Lalawigan National
High School. The audit covered the period from 1 January 1990 to 30 April
1993.
Per the audit report,[4] COA found that there was malversation of public
funds. It cited the purchase of certain supplies and equipment which was
done through a negotiated contract and not through a competitive public
bidding, contrary to COA Circular No. 85-55A. The circular requires public
bidding in the purchase of supplies, materials and equipment in excess
of P50,000, unless the law or agency charter provides otherwise. In the
questioned purchase the agency failed to ascertain the reasonableness of
the contract prices, resulting in an overprice of P35,100 in comparison with
COAs actual canvass of prices, thus:
Per Voucher Per Canvass
Quantity Description Unit Price Total Unit Price Total
Amount Amount
2 Singer Sewing
P7,850 P15,700 P4,450 P8,900
machine
4 16" Hitachi / 3,800 15,200 1,200 4,800
 Union Coiling Fan In an Information[8] filed with the Sandiganbayan and docketed as SB
Criminal Case No. 23785,[9] petitioner and two other co-respondents were
3 Molodione 3,675 11,025 1,850 5,550 charged with the aforementioned offense allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of October, 1992, at Tacloban City,
2 Xylophone 1,750 3,500 560 1,120 Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-
named accused, all public officers, having been appointed and qualified as
2 Makita Electric such public positions above-mentioned, in such capacity and committing
Planer Model No. the offense in relation to office, conniving and confederating together and
8,837.50 17,675 8,500 17,200
19008 3 in. 82 mutually helping with each other, with deliberate intent, did then and there
mm willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter into a transaction or contract for
and in behalf of Lalawigan National High School, Lalawigan, Borongan,
1 Makita Electric Eastern Samar, for the purchase of the following:
Circular Saw
16,900 16,900 7,330 7,330
Model No. 5601
2 pcs. Singer Sewing Machine P 15,700.0
N 160 mm

TOTAL P80,000 P44,900 4 pcs. 16" Hitachi Union Ceiling Fan 15,200.00
In its letter to the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, the COA
[5]

recommended the filing of both criminal and administrative cases against 3 pcs. Meodione 11,025.00
the persons liable therefor, including petitioner for his approval of the RIV
for the assailed purchase and signing of the check in payment therefor.
This complaint was docketed as OMB-Visayas-Crim-94-0836. 2 pcs. Xylophone 3,500.00
In his counter-affidavit,[6] petitioner alleged that the aforesaid documents
were previously reviewed by his subordinates. He approved them only
upon the certification and representation of the said subordinates that 2 pcs. Makita Elect. Planor Model No. 19008 3 17,675.00
everything was in order. Accordingly, his approval was purely a ministerial in. 82 mm
act.
In her Resolution of 20 March 1997,[7]Virginia Palanca Santiago, Graft
Investigation Officer III of the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas, rejected 1 pc. Makita Elect. Circular Saw Model No. 5601 16,900.00
petitioners defense because had he carefully scrutinized the documents he N 160 mm
would have discovered that the purchases were made without competitive
public bidding and the magnitude of the amount involved would prevent a TOTAL P 80,000.0
reasonable mind from accepting the claim that petitioner was merely
careless or negligent in the performance of his functions.
Santiago gave credence to COAs detailed report which clearly showed an
overpriced value of the supplies and materials purchased, to the great in the total amount of P80,000.00, Philippine Currency, with Fairchild
disadvantage of the government. Had the proper bidding procedure been Marketing and Construction, based at Tacloban City, without following the
observed, no such damage would have occurred. Moreover, petitioners co- procedures of competitive public bidding as required by law, which
respondents did not dispute the charge of overpricing. Their main defense transaction was manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
was that the purchase was emergency in nature. The Office of the government, particularly the Lalawigan National High School, as the value
Ombudsman-Visayas, however, ruled that emergency purchases could only of above-mentioned items were overpriced in the total amount
refer to those which were urgent such that failure to make them would of P35,100.00, Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the
endanger the lives of the students. It held that the doubtful purchase did government.[10]
not qualify as an emergency purchase. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[11] of the Resolution of the
Accordingly, Santiago recommended that petitioner and his co-respondents Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas. He insisted that his act of approving the
be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, for RIV arose from the need of the requesting school, and matters pertaining
entering into a contract or transaction manifestly and grossly to the price and mode of purchase were not yet considered at that stage. It
disadvantageous to the Government. was only after the approval of the RIV that these matters were deliberated
The Resolution was recommended for approval by Deputy Ombudsman for upon, not by him, but by the officials of the requesting school. As to the
the Visayas, Arturo C. Mojica. Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved check, he asserted that the supporting documents had been acted upon
the Resolution on 21 June 1997. and approved by his subordinates and the concerned school officials, and
since there was no indication of any patent irregularity, he signed the
check. Finally, petitioner assailed the finding of conspiracy since there was
no direct proof therefor other than a mere allegation imputing the same.
In the Order of 5 March 1998,[12] the Office of the Special Prosecutor
recommended that petitioners Motion for Reconsideration be dismissed for
lack of merit. The Ombudsman approved the recommendation on 22 May
1998.
Petitioner then filed the instant petition. In the meantime, the proceeding
before the Sandiganbayan continued. Upon arraignment on 24 August
1998, petitioners co-accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. On
2 September 1998, petitioner filed a motion to reset the scheduled hearing
on 17 and 18 September citing the pendency of the instant petition. The
Sandiganbayan denied petitioners motion as well as his subsequent motion
for reconsideration. Consequently, he filed a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court claiming that the Sandiganbayan gravely
abused its discretion in denying his motions. That action, entitled Tirol v.
Sandiganbayan and docketed as G.R. No. 135913, was decided on 4
November 1999 adversely against petitioner.
In the instant petition, petitioner seeks the reversal of the assailed
Resolution and Order of the Office of the Ombudsman, which, according to
him, erred in concluding that he was culpably liable for alleged overpricing
of the questioned purchase of supplies and materials. He argues that the
acts directly resulting in the overprice were committed by the following
officials: (1) co-respondent Conchita C. Devora, Principal 1, who approved
the transaction, countersigned the checks and requisitioned the items; (2)
co-respondent Maria A. Alvero, Bookkeeper, who affixed her signature in
the voucher; and (3) Salome G. Germana, Designated Storekeeper, who
signed Box No. 4 of the voucher. His participation was limited to signing
the RIV and the check as a matter of routine. Moreover, the RIV did not
involve the determination of the price of the supplies and materials to be
purchased, and his signing the check was done in compliance with the
DECS policy which limited the signing authority of the principal, Conchita
C. Devora, to checks not exceeding P50,000. In such case the signing
authority was vested in him as the DECS Regional Director.
In maintaining his innocence, petitioner asserts that the presumption of
regularity in the performance of public functions by public officers should
apply in his favor. He had no ground to doubt the preparation, processing
and verification of his subordinates prior to his act of approving the RIV
and signing the check. His position required the signing of voluminous
documents and it would be unreasonably cumbersome if he were to
scrutinize every document that required his signature.
In support of his arguments, petitioner cites the cases of Arias v.
Sandiganbayan[13] and Magsuci v. Sandiganbayan,[14] where this Court held
that heads of office may rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates
and on the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies or
enter into negotiations. He likewise disputes the allegation of conspiracy
for the acts imputed against him were functions discharged in the
performance of his official duty. He did not overstep or exceed said
functions. For conspiracy to exist, it is essential that there must be a
conscious design to commit an offense.
In the Comment for the public respondent, the Office of the Solicitor
General contends that conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence; it
may be established by circumstantial evidence. It avers that what prevails
in the instant case is a conspiracy of silence and inaction. Petitioner should
have been vigilant in protecting the interest of the government. The
magnitude of the amount involved should have cautioned him to verify the
truthfulness of the documents presented for his signature. Petitioner
ignored this telling warning and in so doing he was guilty of negligence. His
reliance on his subordinates is no excuse, otherwise his position would be a
mere rubber stamp for the said subordinates.
As a final argument, the Office of the Solicitor General asseverates that it is
beyond the ambit of this Courts authority to review the power of the
Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before it. The
Ombudsman is constitutionally mandated to investigate and prosecute
matters falling within his jurisdiction.
In his Reply petitioner states that the nature of the petition does not
involve a review of the factual finding of the Office of the Ombudsman but
rather its conclusion based on undisputed facts. The issue is a question of
law and may, therefore, be reviewed by this Court.
A meticulous review and re-evaluation of the pleadings in this case, as well
as G.R. No. 135913 leads this Court to a conclusion unfavorable to
petitioner.
Petitioner is indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019, which
provides:
Section 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers. In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following
shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:
xxx
(g) Entering into a contract or transaction manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government.
There is no dispute that the Office of the Ombudsman included him as a
respondent because of his participation in signing the RIV and issuing a
check pertaining to the questioned purchase. Whether, on the one hand,
the said acts were done in good faith as to exonerate him from any liability,
and on the other, whether there was conspiracy among petitioner and his
co-respondents, involve questions of fact. These are matters of evidence to
be weighed and appreciated by the Sandiganbayan, which has original
exclusive jurisdiction over the case.[15]
Only questions of law may be appealed to us by way of certiorari. This
Court is not ordinarily a trier of facts, its jurisdiction being limited to errors
of law. There is a question of law in any given case when the doubt or
difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts. A
question of fact arises when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth
or falsehood of alleged facts.[16]
From the pleadings it is clear to this Court that, contrary to the
representations of petitioner, what he wants us to do is review the
evidence and determine whether in fact he acted in good faith and that no
conspiracy existed among the accused.
The rulings in Arias v. Sandiganbayan[17] and Magsuci v.
Sandiganbayan[18] are inapplicable to petitioner. It must be emphasized
that the petitioners therein were indicted and submitted themselves to trial
before the Sandiganbayan, which convicted them of the offenses charged.
In short the Sandiganbayan had, in due course, received the evidence of
the parties and weighed its probative value. Unsatisfied with the findings of
fact and conclusion of law of the Sandiganbayan, petitioners therein
appealed to this Court.
In Arias this Court set aside the judgment against the petitioner because
there was no evidence that the Government suffered undue injury. As
stated by the Solicitor General which recommended Arias acquittal, (a) the
"P80.00 per square meter acquisition cost is just, fair and reasonable," and
(b) "the prosecution likewise has not shown any positive and convincing
evidence of conspiracy between the petitioners and their co-accused."
In Magsuci, the reversal by this Court of the judgment of conviction was
based on a finding that Magsuci acted in good faith and that "there has
been no intimation at all that he had foreknowledge of any irregularity
committed by either or both Engr. Enriquez and Acla."
In both Arias and Magsuci, there was paucity of evidence on conspiracy.
In this case, there is only the claim of petitioner that he had acted in good
faith and that there was no conspiracy. The Ombudsman believes
otherwise. It is settled that this Court ordinarily does not interfere with the
discretion of the Ombudsman to determine whether there exists
reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that
the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the
corresponding information with the appropriate courts.[19] This rule is based
not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers
granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon
practicality as well. Otherwise the functions of the courts will be grievously
hampered by immeasurable petitions assailing the dismissal of
investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the of the
Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in as much the same
way that the courts would be extremely swamped if they would be
compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or
prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court
or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant. [20]
Petitioner has not convinced this Court that his case falls within any of the
exemptions, enumerated in Brocka v. Enrile,[21] to the rule that criminal
prosecution may not be restrained either through a preliminary or final
injunction or a writ of prohibition.
There is yet another basic reason for dismissing the instant petition. This is
an appeal under Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 in relation to
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. We have declared Section 27
to be unconstitutional in Fabian v. Desierto [22] for increasing the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in the Constitution without its
advice and consent. Moreover, even if said provision had not been declared
unconstitutional, it still does not grant a right of appeal to parties
aggrieved by orders and decisions of the Ombudsman in criminal
cases[23] as in fact said Section mentions only appeals from "all
administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman."
Even if we were to brush aside technicality which action we would
ordinarily reserve for cases having transcendental importance to the
public[24] and considered the instant petition one for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, it would still suffer from a failure to denominate
the proper party. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 has for its object
the review of an action of a tribunal, board or officer exercising quasi-
judicial functions made without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In the
instant petition, the tribunal whose action is sought to be reviewed is the
Office of the Ombudsman yet, petitioner impleaded the Commission on
Audit as respondent, and not the Office of the Ombudsman.
Additionally, the totality of petitioners and his counsels acts, including that
in the other case he filed with us in G.R. No. 135913, [25] manifests a
scheme to frustrate the ends of justice by using court procedures to delay
the resolution of a pending case. It is with much regret that we must
reiterate to petitioners counsel our command laid down some thirty years
ago that a lawyer, as an officer of the court, should never induce a court to
act contrary to the dictates of justice and equity nor should he befuddle
the issues. These and similar maneuvers are not only unethical, they also
almost always betray the weakness of the clients cause. [26]
The actions filed by petitioner before this Court, specifically G.R. No.
135913 and the instant petition, were in fact a modified form of forum
shopping. Perhaps realizing that this instant petition could be dismissed in
light of Fabian, which was promulgated on 16 September 1998, petitioner
instituted GR. No. 135913 on 3 November 1998. The two petitions could
have created havoc to the judicial system had petitioner succeeded with
his ploy. Petitioners counsel is hereby warned that a repetition of his
dilatory tactics or some other similar scheme to thwart justice will be dealt
with more severely.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in this case is hereby DENIED and
the Resolution of 20 March 1997 and Order of 5 March 1998 of the Office of
the Ombudsman in OMB-Visayas-Crim-94-0836 are AFFIRMED.
Double costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
cial principles: Appellate jurisdiction of the courtTIROL VS COAGR NO.
133954Aug 3, 2000Facts: In this petition for review on certiorari under
Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770,otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of
1989, in relation to Rule 45 of theRevised Rules of Court, petitioner seeks
the reversal of the Resolution of 20 March1997 and the Order of 5 March
1998 of the Office of the Ombudsman which,respectively, found petitioner
and his co-respondents in OMB-Visayas-Crim-94-0836criminally culpable
for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, anddenied
petitioners motion for reconsideration of the said Resolution.Issue: Whether
or not the issue is a question of law and may therefore be reviewed bythe
Supreme Court.Held: From the pleadings, it is clear that the question raised
by the petitioner arequestions of fact rather than of law. What petitioner
wants to happen is for the SC toreview the evidence and determine
whether in fact he acted in good faith and that noconspiracy existed
among the accused.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 135385 December 6, 2000
ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES,
SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and
COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES, respondents.
HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI
ASCARRAGA, EDTAMI MANSAYANGAN, BASILIO WANDAG, EVELYN
DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS, ALFREMO CARPIANO, LIBERATO A. GABIN,
MATERNIDAD M. COLAS, NARCISA M. DALUPINES, BAI KIRAM-
CONNIE SATURNO, BAE MLOMO-BEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATU
BALITUNGTUNG-ANTONIO D. LUMANDONG, DATU MANTUMUKAW
TEOFISTO SABASALES, DATU EDUAARDO BANDA, DATU JOEL UNAD,
DATU RAMON BAYAAN, TIMUAY JOSE ANOY, TIMUAY MACARIO D.
SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B. ENDING, DATU SAHAMPONG
MALANAW VI, DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON, BAI NANAPNAY-LIZA
SAWAY, BAY INAY DAYA-MELINDA S. REYMUNDO, BAI TINANGHAGA
HELINITA T. PANGAN, DATU MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L. SAWAY, DATU
MAUDAYAW-CRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY MAKAY, LOURDES D. AMOS,
GILBERT P. HOGGANG, TERESA GASPAR, MANUEL S. ONALAN, MIA
GRACE L. GIRON, ROSEMARIE G. PE, BENITO CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE
CARANTES, LYNETTE CARANTES-VIVAL, LANGLEY SEGUNDO, SATUR
S. BUGNAY, CARLING DOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO
ABUGAN, VIRGILIO CAYETANO, CONCHITA G. DESCAGA, LEVY
ESTEVES, ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO C. AGUILAR, MAURO
VALONES, PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI, PERFECTO B.
GUINOSAO, WALTER N. TIMOL, MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR
DALUNHAY, RICO O. SULATAN, RAFFY MALINDA, ALFREDO
ABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB, MIRLANDO H. MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE
SATURNO, ROMEO A. LINDAHAY, ROEL S. MANSANG-CAGAN,
PAQUITO S. LIESES, FILIPE G. SAWAY, HERMINIA S. SAWAY, JULIUS
S. SAWAY, LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY UGYUB, SALVADOR TIONGSON,
VENANCIO APANG, MADION MALID, SUKIM MALID, NENENG MALID,
MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO DIANO, JOSEPHINE M. ALBESO,
MORENO MALID, MARIO MANGCAL, FELAY DIAMILING, SALOME P.
SARZA, FELIPE P. BAGON, SAMMY SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D. EMBA,
NORMA MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR., JERSON P. GERADA,
RENATO T. BAGON, JR., SARING MASALONG, SOLEDAD M.
GERARDA, ELIZABETH L. MENDI, MORANTE S. TIWAN, DANILO M.
MALUDAO, MINORS MARICEL MALID, represented by her father
CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M. LADRA, represented by her
father MONICO D. LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID, represented by her
father TONY MALID, ARIEL M. EVANGELISTA, represented by her
mother LINAY BALBUENA, EDWARD M. EMUY, SR., SUSAN BOLANIO,
OND, PULA BATO B'LAAN TRIBAL FARMER'S ASSOCIATION, INTER-
PEOPLE'S EXCHANGE, INC. and GREEN FORUM-WESTERN
VISAYAS,intervenors.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR
THE CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES, INC., intervenor.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition
and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of
certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known
as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules).
In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to
comment.1 In compliance, respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of
the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government
agency created under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on
October 13, 1998 their Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the
constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the petition be dismissed for lack
of merit.
On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed through the Solicitor
General a consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is of the view that
the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership
over natural resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be
granted in part.
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan
Flavier, one of the authors of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member
of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, and the leaders and members of
112 groups of indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for
Leave to Intervene. They join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of
IPRA and praying for the dismissal of the petition.
On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed
a Motion to Intervene and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts
that IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens patriae and that the
State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those
who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this reason
it prays that the petition be dismissed.
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous
People and the Haribon Foundation for the Conservation of Natural
Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to Intervene with attached
Comment-in-Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that
IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and pray that the petition for
prohibition and mandamus be dismissed.
The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations
were granted.
Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and
intervenors filed their respective memoranda in which they reiterate the
arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings and during the hearing.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the
IPRA and its Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to an
unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public
domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation
of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution:
"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral
domains, and Section 3(b) which, in turn, defines ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral
domains including inalienable public lands, bodies of water, mineral and
other resources found within ancestral domains are private but community
property of the indigenous peoples;
"(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the
composition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the
indigenous peoples over the ancestral domains;
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the
indigenous peoples over the ancestral lands;
"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples
in the harvesting, extraction, development or exploration of minerals and
other natural resources within the areas claimed to be their ancestral
domains, and the right to enter into agreements with nonindigenous
peoples for the development and utilization of natural resources therein for
a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years;
and
"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to
maintain, develop, protect and conserve the ancestral domains and
portions thereof which are found to be necessary for critical watersheds,
mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover
or reforestation."2
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing
definition of "ancestral domains" and "ancestral lands" which might even
include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate
the rights of private landowners.3
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the
powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law applicable
to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral
lands on the ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of
the Constitution.4
These provisions are:
"(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and
recognition of ancestral domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole
authority to delineate ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a
particular area is an ancestral domain and upon notification to the
following officials, namely, the Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources, Secretary of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary of
Justice and Commissioner of the National Development Corporation, the
jurisdiction of said officials over said area terminates;
"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices
of indigenous peoples shall be applied first with respect to property rights,
claims of ownership, hereditary succession and settlement of land
disputes, and that any doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof
shall be resolved in favor of the indigenous peoples;
"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be
used to resolve disputes involving indigenous peoples; and
"(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and
disputes involving rights of the indigenous peoples."5
Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the
NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that "the
administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is
characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of
policy and program coordination." They contend that said Rule infringes
upon the Presidents power of control over executive departments under
Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.6
Petitioners pray for the following:
"(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and
66 and other related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and
invalid;
"(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and
Commissioners of the NCIP to cease and desist from implementing the
assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its Implementing Rules;
"(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources to cease and desist
from implementing Department of Environment and Natural Resources
Circular No. 2, series of 1998;
"(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget
and Management to cease and desist from disbursing public funds for the
implementation of the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371; and
"(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources to comply with his duty of carrying out
the States constitutional mandate to control and supervise the
exploration, development, utilization and conservation of Philippine natural
resources."7
After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as
follows:
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion,
which the Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago
join, sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371.
Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged
provisions of the law with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends
should be interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural
resources and should be read in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss
the petition solely on the ground that it does not raise a justiciable
controversy and petitioners do not have standing to question the
constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice
Panganiban filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)
(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections
58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await the filing of
specific cases by those whose rights may have been violated by the IPRA.
Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections
3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo,
Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate opinions of
Justices Panganiban and Vitug.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was
not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after
redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to
Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is
DISMISSED.
Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions
of Justices Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, and Panganiban.
SO ORDERED.
GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and
mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of
certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules
and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA
and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of
the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals
and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine
embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?
HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining
the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership
over the natural resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over
the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and
the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in
their ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of
the land on which the resources are found, the right to the small scale
utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large
scale development and exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the
lands of the public domain. They are private lands and belong to the
ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private land title that existed
irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the right of
ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a
limited form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the
same.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 123547. May 21, 2001]
REV. FR. DANTE MARTINEZ, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, HONORABLE JUDGE JOHNSON BALLUTAY, PRESIDING
JUDGE, BRANCH 25, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CABANATUAN CITY,
HONORABLE JUDGE ADRIANO TUAZON, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE,
BRANCH 28, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CABANATUAN CITY,
SPOUSES REYNALDO VENERACION and SUSAN VENERACION,
SPOUSES MAXIMO HIPOLITO and MANUELA DE LA PAZ and
GODOFREDO DE LA PAZ, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision, dated September
7, 1995, and resolution, dated January 31, 1996, of the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed the decisions of the Regional Trial Court, Branches 25 [1] and
28,[2] Cabanatuan City, finding private respondents spouses Reynaldo and
Susan Veneracion owners of the land in dispute, subject to petitioners
rights as a builder in good faith.
The facts are as follows:
Sometime in February 1981, private respondents Godofredo De la Paz and
his sister Manuela De la Paz, married to Maximo Hipolito, entered into an
oral contract with petitioner Rev. Fr. Dante Martinez, then Assistant parish
priest of Cabanatuan City, for the sale of Lot No. 1337-A-3 at the Villa Fe
Subdivision in Cabanatuan City for the sum of P15,000.00. The lot is
located along Maharlika Road near the Municipal Hall of Cabanatuan
City. At the time of the sale, the lot was still registered in the name of
Claudia De la Paz, mother of private respondents, although the latter had
already sold it to private respondent Manuela de la Paz by virtue of a Deed
of Absolute Sale dated May 26, 1976 (Exh. N/Exh. 2-Veneracion). [3] Private
respondent Manuela subsequently registered the sale in her name on
October 22, 1981 and was issued TCT No. T-40496 (Exh. 9). [4] When the
land was offered for sale to petitioner, private respondents De la Paz were
accompanied by their mother, since petitioner dealt with the De la Pazes
as a family and not individually. He was assured by them that the lot
belonged to Manuela De la Paz. It was agreed that petitioner would give a
downpayment of P3,000.00 to private respondents De la Paz and that the
balance would be payable by installment. After giving the P3,000.00
downpayment, petitioner started the construction of a house on the lot
after securing a building permit from the City Engineers Office on April 23,
1981, with the written consent of the then registered owner, Claudia de la
Paz (Exh. B/Exh, 1).[5] Petitioner likewise began paying the real estate taxes
on said property (Exh. D, D-1, D-2).[6] Construction on the house was
completed on October 6, 1981 (Exh. V).[7] Since then, petitioner and his
family have maintained their residence there.[8]
On January 31, 1983, petitioner completed payment of the lot for which
private respondents De la Paz executed two documents. The first
document (Exh. A) read:
1-31-83
Ang halaga ng Lupa sa Villa Fe Subdivision na ipinagbili kay Fr. Dante
Martinez ay P15,000.00 na pinangangako namin na ibibigay ang Deed of
Sale sa ika-25 ng Febrero 1983.
[SGD.] METRING HIPOLITO
[SGD.] JOSE GODOFREDO DE LA PAZ[9]
The second writing (Exh. O) read:
Cabanatuan City
March 19, 1986
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that Freddie dela Paz has agreed to sign tomorrow (March
20) the affidavit of sale of lot located at Villa Fe Subdivision sold to Fr.
Dante Martinez.
[Sgd.] Freddie dela Paz
FREDDIE DELA PAZ[10]
However, private respondents De la Paz never delivered the Deed of Sale
they promised to petitioner.
In the meantime, in a Deed of Absolute Sale with Right to Repurchase
dated October 28, 1981 (Exh. 10), [11] private respondents De la Paz sold
three lots with right to repurchase the same within one year to private
respondents spouses Reynaldo and Susan Veneracion for the sum
of P150,000.00. One of the lots sold was the lot previously sold to
petitioner.[12]
Reynaldo Veneracion had been a resident of Cabanatuan City since
birth. He used to pass along Maharlika Highway in going to the Municipal
Hall or in going to and from Manila. Two of the lots subject of the sale were
located along Maharlika Highway, one of which was the lot sold earlier by
the De la Pazes to petitioner. The third lot (hereinafter referred to as the
Melencio lot) was occupied by private respondents De la Paz. Private
respondents Veneracion never took actual possession of any of these lots
during the period of redemption, but all titles to the lots were given to him.
[13]
Before the expiration of the one year period, private respondent Godofredo
De la Paz informed private respondent Reynaldo Veneracion that he was
selling the three lots to another person for P200,000.00. Indeed, private
respondent Veneracion received a call from a Mr. Tecson verifying if he had
the titles to the properties, as private respondents De la Paz were offering
to sell the two lots along Maharlika Highway to him (Mr. Tecson)
for P180,000.00 The offer included the lot purchased by petitioner in
February, 1981. Private respondent Veneracion offered to purchase the
same two lots from the De la Pazes for the same amount. The offer was
accepted by private respondents De la Paz. Accordingly, on June 2, 1983, a
Deed of Absolute Sale was executed over the two lots (Exh. I/Exh. 5-
Veneracion).[14] Sometime in January, 1984, private respondent Reynaldo
Veneracion asked a certain Renato Reyes, petitioners neighbor, who the
owner of the building erected on the subject lot was. Reyes told him that it
was Feliza Martinez, petitioners mother, who was in possession of the
property. Reynaldo Veneracion told private respondent Godofredo about
the matter and was assured that Godofredo would talk to Feliza. Based on
that assurance, private respondents Veneracion registered the lots with the
Register of Deeds of Cabanatuan on March 5, 1984. The lot in dispute was
registered under TCT No. T-44612 (Exh. L/Exh. 4-Veneracion). [15]
Petitioner discovered that the lot he was occupying with his family had
been sold to the spouses Veneracion after receiving a letter (Exh. P/Exh. 6-
Veneracion) from private respondent Reynaldo Veneracion on March 19,
1986, claiming ownership of the land and demanding that they vacate the
property and remove their improvements thereon.[16] Petitioner, in turn,
demanded through counsel the execution of the deed of sale from private
respondents De la Paz and informed Reynaldo Veneracion that he was the
owner of the property as he had previously purchased the same from
private respondents De la Paz.[17]
The matter was then referred to the Katarungang Pambarangay of San
Juan, Cabanatuan City for conciliation, but the parties failed to reach an
agreement (Exh. M/Exh. 13).[18] As a consequence, on May 12, 1986,
private respondent Reynaldo Veneracion brought an action for ejectment in
the Municipal Trial Court, Branch III, Cabanatuan City against petitioner and
his mother (Exh. 14).[19]
On the other hand, on June 10, 1986, petitioner caused a notice of lis
pendens to be recorded on TCT No. T-44612 with the Register of Deeds of
Cabanatuan City (Exh. U).[20]
During the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed to have the case
decided under the Rules on Summary Procedure and defined the issues as
follows:
1. Whether or not defendant (now petitioner) may be judicially ejected.
2. Whether or not the main issue in this case is ownership.
3. Whether or not damages may be awarded. [21]
On January 29, 1987, the trial court rendered its decision, pertinent
portions of which are quoted as follows:
With the foregoing findings of the Court, defendants [petitioner Rev. Fr.
Dante Martinez and his mother] are the rightful possessors and in good
faith and in concept of owner, thus cannot be ejected from the land in
question. Since the main issue is ownership, the better remedy of the
plaintiff [herein private respondents Veneracion] is Accion Publiciana in the
Regional Trial Court, having jurisdiction to adjudicate on ownership.
Defendants counterclaim will not be acted upon it being more
than P20,000.00 is beyond this Courts power to adjudge.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, dismissing plaintiffs complaint
and ordering plaintiff to pay Attorneys fee of P5,000.00 and cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.[22]
On March 3, 1987, private respondents Veneracion filed a notice of appeal
with the Regional Trial Court, but failed to pay the docket fee. On June 6,
1989, or over two years after the filing of the notice of appeal, petitioner
filed a Motion for Execution of the Judgment, alleging finality of judgment
for failure of private respondents Veneracion to perfect their appeal and
failure to prosecute the appeal for an unreasonable length of time.
Upon objection of private respondents Veneracion, the trial court denied on
June 28, 1989 the motion for execution and ordered the records of the case
to be forwarded to the appropriate Regional Trial Court. On July 11, 1989,
petitioner appealed from this order. The appeal of private respondents
Veneracion from the decision of the MTC and the appeal of petitioner from
the order denying petitioners motion for execution were forwarded to the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Cabanatuan City. The cases were
thereafter consolidated under Civil Case No. 670-AF.
On February 20, 1991, the Regional Trial Court rendered its decision finding
private respondents Veneracion as the true owners of the lot in dispute by
virtue of their prior registration with the Register of Deeds, subject to
petitioners rights as builder in good faith, and ordering petitioner and his
privies to vacate the lot after receipt of the cost of the construction of the
house, as well as to pay the sum of P5,000.00 as attorneys fees and the
costs of the suit. It, however, failed to rule on petitioners appeal of the
Municipal Trial Courts order denying their Motion for Execution of
Judgment.
Meanwhile, on May 30, 1986, while the ejectment case was pending before
the Municipal Trial Court, petitioner Martinez filed a complaint for
annulment of sale with damages against the Veneracions and De la Pazes
with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Cabanatuan City. On March 5,
1990, the trial court rendered its decision finding private respondents
Veneracion owners of the land in dispute, subject to the rights of petitioner
as a builder in good faith, and ordering private respondents De la Paz to
pay petitioner the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages and P10,000.00 as
attorneys fees, and for private respondents to pay the costs of the suit.
On March 20, 1991, petitioner then filed a petition for review with the Court
of Appeals of the RTCs decision in Civil Case No. 670-AF (for
ejectment). Likewise, on April 2, 1991, petitioner appealed the trial courts
decision in Civil Case No. 44-[AF]-8642-R (for annulment of sale and
damages) to the Court of Appeals. The cases were designated as CA G.R.
SP. No. 24477 and CA G.R. CV No. 27791, respectively, and were
subsequently consolidated. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts
decisions, without ruling on petitioners appeal from the Municipal Trial
Courts order denying his Motion for Execution of Judgment. It declared the
Veneracions to be owners of the lot in dispute as they were the first
registrants in good faith, in accordance with Art. 1544 of the Civil
Code. Petitioner Martinez failed to overcome the presumption of good faith
for the following reasons:
1. when private respondent Veneracion discovered the construction on the
lot, he immediately informed private respondent Godofredo about it and
relied on the latters assurance that he will take care of the matter.
2. the sale between petitioner Martinez and private respondents De la Paz
was not notarized, as required by Arts. 1357 and 1358 of the Civil Code,
thus it cannot be said that the private respondents Veneracion had
knowledge of the first sale.[23]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in a resolution
dated January 31, 1996.[24] Hence this petition for review. Petitioner raises
the following assignment of errors:
I THE PUBLIC RESPONDENTS HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT JUDGES JOHNSON BALLUTAY AND ADRIANO
TUAZON ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS REYNALDO
VENERACION AND WIFE ARE BUYERS AND REGISTRANTS IN GOOD FAITH IN
RESOLVING THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION OF THE LAND IN
DISPUTE.
II THAT PUBLIC RESPONDENTS ERRED IN NOT RESOLVING AND DECIDING
THE APPLICABILITY OF THE DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN THE
CASES OF SALVORO VS. TANEGA, ET AL., G.R. NO. L 32988 AND IN
ARCENAS VS. DEL ROSARIO, 67 PHIL 238, BY TOTALLY IGNORING THE SAID
DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN THE ASSAILED DECISIONS OF
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENTS.
III THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT GIVING DUE
COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR REVIEW IN CA G.R. SP. NO. 24477.
IV THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN DENYING PETITIONERS
PETITION FOR REVIEW AFORECITED INEVITABLY SANCTIONED AND/OR
WOULD ALLOW A VIOLATION OF LAW AND DEPARTURE FROM THE USUAL
COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS BY PUBLIC RESPONDENT HONORABLE
JUDGE ADRIANO TUAZON WHEN THE LATTER RENDERED A DECISION IN
CIVIL CASE NO. 670-AF [ANNEX D] REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT JUDGE SENDON DELIZO IN CIVIL CASE NO. 9523
[ANNEX C] AND IN NOT RESOLVING IN THE SAME CASE THE APPEAL
INTERPOSED BY DEFENDANTS ON THE ORDER OF THE SAME COURT
DENYING THE MOTION FOR EXECUTION.
V THAT THE RESOLUTION [ANNEX B] (OF THE COURT OF APPEALS)
DENYING PETITIONERS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION [ANNEX I]
WITHOUT STATING CLEARLY THE FACTS AND THE LAW ON WHICH SAID
RESOLUTION WAS BASED, (IS ERRONEOUS).
These assignment of errors raise the following issues:
1. Whether or not private respondents Veneracion are buyers in good faith
of the lot in dispute as to make them the absolute owners thereof in
accordance with Art. 1544 of the Civil Code on double sale of immovable
property.
2. Whether or not payment of the appellate docket fee within the period to
appeal is not necessary for the perfection of the appeal after a notice of
appeal has been filed within such period.
3. Whether or not the resolution of the Court of Appeals denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration is contrary to the constitutional
requirement that a denial of a motion for reconsideration must state the
legal reasons on which it is based.
First. It is apparent from the first and second assignment of errors that
petitioner is assailing the findings of fact and the appreciation of the
evidence made by the trial courts and later affirmed by the respondent
court. While, as a general rule, only questions of law may be raised in a
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, review may
nevertheless be granted under certain exceptions, namely: (a) when the
conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or
conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd,
or impossible; (c) where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of
fact are conflicting; (f) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings,
went beyond the issue of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee; (g) when the findings of the
Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (h) when the
findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (i) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as
in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents; (j) when the finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is
premised on the supposed absence of evidence but is contradicted by the
evidence on record; and (k) when the Court of Appeals manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. [25]
In this case, the Court of Appeals based its ruling that private respondents
Veneracion are the owners of the disputed lot on their reliance on private
respondent Godofredo De la Pazs assurance that he would take care of the
matter concerning petitioners occupancy of the disputed lot as constituting
good faith. This case, however, involves double sale and, on this matter,
Art. 1544 of the Civil Code provides that where immovable property is the
subject of a double sale, ownership shall be transferred (1) to the person
acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it to the Registry of Property;
(2) in default thereof, to the person who in good faith was first in
possession; and (3) in default thereof, to the person who presents the
oldest title.[26] The requirement of the law, where title to the property is
recorded in the Register of Deeds, is two-fold: acquisition in good faith and
recording in good faith. To be entitled to priority, the second purchaser
must not only prove prior recording of his title but that he acted in good
faith, i.e., without knowledge or notice of a prior sale to another. The
presence of good faith should be ascertained from the circumstances
surrounding the purchase of the land.[27]
1. With regard to the first sale to private respondents Veneracion, private
respondent Reynaldo Veneracion testified that on October 10, 1981, 18
days before the execution of the first Deed of Sale with Right to
Repurchase, he inspected the premises and found it vacant. [28] However,
this is belied by the testimony of Engr. Felix D. Minor, then building
inspector of the Department of Public Works and Highways, that he
conducted on October 6, 1981 an ocular inspection of the lot in dispute in
the performance of his duties as a building inspector to monitor the
progress of the construction of the building subject of the building permit
issued in favor of petitioner on April 23, 1981, and that he found it 100 %
completed (Exh. V).[29] In the absence of contrary evidence, he is to be
presumed to have regularly performed his official duty. [30] Thus, as early as
October, 1981, private respondents Veneracion already knew that there
was construction being made on the property they purchased.
2. The Court of Appeals failed to determine the nature of the first contract
of sale between the private respondents by considering their
contemporaneous and subsequent acts.[31] More specifically, it overlooked
the fact that the first contract of sale between the private respondents
shows that it is in fact an equitable mortgage.
The requisites for considering a contract of sale with a right of repurchase
as an equitable mortgage are (1) that the parties entered into a contract
denominated as a contract of sale and (2) that their intention was to
secure an existing debt by way of mortgage.[32] A contract of sale with right
to repurchase gives rise to the presumption that it is an equitable
mortgage in any of the following cases: (1) when the price of a sale with a
right to repurchase is unusually inadequate; (2) when the vendor remains
in possession as lessee or otherwise; (3) when, upon or after the expiration
of the right to repurchase, another instrument extending the period of
redemption or granting a new period is executed; (4) when the purchaser
retains for himself a part of the purchase price; (5) when the vendor binds
himself to pay the taxes on the thing sold; (6) in any other case where it
may be fairly inferred that the real intention of the parties is that the
transaction shall secure the payment of a debt or the performance of any
other obligation.[33] In case of doubt, a contract purporting to be a sale with
right to repurchase shall be construed as an equitable mortgage. [34]
In this case, the following circumstances indicate that the private
respondents intended the transaction to be an equitable mortgage and not
a contract of sale: (1) Private respondents Veneracion never took actual
possession of the three lots; (2) Private respondents De la Paz remained in
possession of the Melencio lot which was co-owned by them and where
they resided; (3) During the period between the first sale and the second
sale to private respondents Veneracion, they never made any effort to take
possession of the properties; and (4) when the period of redemption had
expired and private respondents Veneracion were informed by the De la
Pazes that they are offering the lots for sale to another person
for P200,000.00, they never objected. To the contrary, they offered to
purchase the two lots for P180,000.00 when they found that a certain Mr.
Tecson was prepared to purchase it for the same amount. Thus, it is clear
from these circumstances that both private respondents never intended
the first sale to be a contract of sale, but merely that of mortgage to
secure a debt of P150,000.00.
With regard to the second sale, which is the true contract of sale between
the parties, it should be noted that this Court in several cases, [35] has ruled
that a purchaser who is aware of facts which should put a reasonable man
upon his guard cannot turn a blind eye and later claim that he acted in
good faith. Private respondent Reynaldo himself admitted during the pre-
trial conference in the MTC in Civil Case No. 9523 (for ejectment) that
petitioner was already in possession of the property in dispute at the time
the second Deed of Sale was executed on June 1, 1983 and registered on
March 4, 1984. He, therefore, knew that there were already occupants on
the property as early as 1981. The fact that there are persons, other than
the vendors, in actual possession of the disputed lot should have put
private respondents on inquiry as to the nature of petitioners right over the
property. But he never talked to petitioner to verify the nature of his right.
He merely relied on the assurance of private respondent Godofredo De la
Paz, who was not even the owner of the lot in question, that he would take
care of the matter. This does not meet the standard of good faith.
3. The appellate courts reliance on Arts. 1357 and 1358 of the Civil Code to
determine private respondents Veneracions lack of knowledge of
petitioners ownership of the disputed lot is erroneous.
Art. 1357[36] and Art. 1358,[37] in relation to Art. 1403(2)[38] of the Civil Code,
requires that the sale of real property must be in writing for it to be
enforceable. It need not be notarized. If the sale has not been put in
writing, either of the contracting parties can compel the other to observe
such requirement.[39] This is what petitioner did when he repeatedly
demanded that a Deed of Absolute Sale be executed in his favor by private
respondents De la Paz. There is nothing in the above provisions which
require that a contract of sale of realty must be executed in a public
document. In any event, it has been shown that private respondents
Veneracion had knowledge of facts which would put them on inquiry as to
the nature of petitioners occupancy of the disputed lot.
Second. Petitioner contends that the MTC in Civil Case No. 9523 (for
ejectment) erred in denying petitioners Motion for Execution of the
Judgment, which the latter filed on June 6, 1989, two years after private
respondents Veneracion filed a notice of appeal with the MTC on March 3,
1987 without paying the appellate docket fee. He avers that the trial courts
denial of his motion is contrary to this Courts ruling in the cases
of Republic v. Director of Lands,[40] and Aranas v. Endona[41] in which it was
held that where the appellate docket fee is not paid in full within the
reglementary period, the decision of the MTC becomes final and
unappealable as the payment of docket fee is not only a mandatory but
also a jurisdictional requirement.
Petitioners contention has no merit. The case of Republic v. Director of
Lands deals with the requirement for appeals from the Courts of First
Instance, the Social Security Commission, and the Court of Agrarian
Relations to the Court of Appeals. The case of Aranas v. Endona, on the
other hand, was decided under the 1964 Rules of Court and prior to the
enactment of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981 (B.P. Blg. 129) and
the issuance of its Interim Rules and Guidelines by this Court on January
11, 1983. Hence, these cases are not applicable to the matter at issue.
On the other hand, in Santos v. Court of Appeals,[42] it was held that
although an appeal fee is required to be paid in case of an appeal taken
from the municipal trial court to the regional trial court, it is not a
prerequisite for the perfection of an appeal under 20 [43] and 23[44] of the
Interim Rules and Guidelines issued by this Court on January 11, 1983
implementing the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981 (B.P. Blg.
129). Under these sections, there are only two requirements for the
perfection of an appeal, to wit: (a) the filing of a notice of appeal within the
reglementary period; and (b) the expiration of the last day to appeal by
any party. Even in the procedure for appeal to the regional trial courts,
[45]
nothing is mentioned about the payment of appellate docket fees.
Indeed, this Court has ruled that, in appealed cases, the failure to pay the
appellate docket fee does not automatically result in the dismissal of the
appeal, the dismissal being discretionary on the part of the appellate court.
[46]
Thus, private respondents Veneracions failure to pay the appellate
docket fee is not fatal to their appeal.
Third. Petitioner contends that the resolution of the Court of Appeals
denying his motion for reconsideration was rendered in violation of the
Constitution because it does not state the legal basis thereof.
This contention is likewise without merit.
Art. VIII, Sec. 14 of the Constitution provides that No petition for review or
motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due
course or denied without stating the basis therefor. This requirement was
fully complied with when the Court of Appeals, in denying reconsideration
of its decision, stated in its resolution that it found no reason to change its
ruling because petitioner had not raised anything new. [47] Thus, its
resolution denying petitioners motion for reconsideration states:
For resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration of Our Decision filed by the
petitioners.
Evidently, the motion poses nothing new. The points and arguments raised
by the movants have been considered and passed upon in the Decision
sought to be reconsidered. Thus, We find no reason to disturb the same.
WHEREFORE, the motion is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.[48]
Attorneys fees should be awarded as petitioner was compelled to litigate to
protect his interest due to private respondents act or omission. [49]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and a new
one is RENDERED:
(1) declaring as null and void the deed of sale executed by private
respondents Godofredo and Manuela De la Paz in favor of private
respondents spouses Reynaldo and Susan Veneracion;
(2) ordering private respondents Godofredo and Manuela De la Paz to
execute a deed of absolute sale in favor of petitioner Rev. Fr. Dante
Martinez;
(3) ordering private respondents Godofredo and Manuela De la Paz to
reimburse private respondents spouses Veneracion the amount the latter
may have paid to the former;
(4) ordering the Register of Deeds of Cabanatuan City to cancel TCT No. T-
44612 and issue a new one in the name of petitioner Rev. Fr. Dante
Martinez; and
(5) ordering private respondents to pay petitioner jointly and severally the
sum of P20,000.00 as attorneys fees and to pay the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.
Macalinao, Romielyn P.
Subject: Constitutional Law 1
Topic: Requirement as to Decision
Title: FR. MARTINEZ vs CA
Reference: G.R. No. 123547 May 21, 2001
FACTS
Petitioner Rev. Fr. Dante Martinez, then Assistant parish priest of
Cabanatuan City, entered into an oral contract with private respondents
Godofredo De la Paz and his sister Manuela De la Paz regarding the sale of
Lot No. 1337-A-3 at the Villa Fe Subdivision in Cabanatuan City for the sum
of P15,000.00. The aforesaid lot is located along Maharlika Road near the
Municipal Hall of Cabanatuan City.
At the time of the sale, the lot was still registered in the name of Claudia
De la Paz, mother of private respondents, although the same had already
sold it to private respondent Manuela de la Paz by virtue of a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated May 26, 1976. Private respondent Manuela
subsequently registered the sale in her name on October 22, 1981.
When the land was offered for sale to petitioner, private respondents De la
Paz were accompanied by their mother, since petitioner dealt with the De
la Pazs as a family and not individually. He was assured by them that the
lot belonged to Manuela De la Paz. It was agreed that petitioner would give
a downpayment of P3,000.00 to private respondents De la Paz and that the
balance would be payable by installment. After giving the P3,000.00
downpayment, petitioner started the construction of a house on the lot
after securing a building permit from the City Engineers Office on April 23,
1981, with the written consent of the then registered owner, Claudia de la
Paz. Consequently, petitioner also began paying the real estate taxes on
said property.
On October 6, 1981, the construction of the petitioners house was
completed and on January 31, 1983, petitioner completed the payment for
the lot.
However, private respondents De la Paz never delivered the Deed of Sale
they promised to petitioner. On October 28, 1981, in a Deed of Absolute
Sale with Right to Repurchase, private respondents De la Paz sold three
lots with right to repurchase the same within one year to private
respondents spouses Reynaldo and Susan Veneracion for the sum of
P150,000.00.
Petitioner discovered that the lot he was occupying with his family had
been sold to the spouses Veneracion after receiving a letter from private
respondent Reynaldo Veneracion on March 19, 1986, claiming ownership of
the land and demanding that they vacate the property and remove their
improvements thereon. Petitioner, in turn, demanded through counsel the
execution of the deed of sale from private respondents De la Paz and
informed Reynaldo Veneracion that he was the owner of the property as he
had previously purchased the same from private respondents De la Paz.
The matter was then referred to the Katarungang Pambarangay of San
Juan, Cabanatuan City for conciliation, but the parties failed to reach an
agreement. On May 12, 1986, private respondent Reynaldo Veneracion
brought an action for ejectment in the Municipal Trial Court, Branch III,
Cabanatuan City against petitioner and his mother. The MTC rendered a
decision in favor of the petitioner, thus prompting private respondent
Veneracion to elevate the matter to the Regional Trial Court where it ruled
in favor of the latter by virtue of their prior registration to the Register of
Deeds.
Petitioner filed a petition for review for the ejectment case before the Court
of Appeals where it ruled in favor of private respondent Veneracion.
Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration but was subsequently
denied. Hence, this case.
ISSUES
Whether or not the denial of petitioners motion for reconsideration before
the Court of Appeals violated the Constitution for not stating the legal
basis?
RULINGS
No, such act is not a violation.
Article VIII, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution provides that No petition
for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be
refused due course or denied without stating the basis therefor. The
Supreme Court ruled that this requirement has been complied with by the
Court of Appeals by declaring in its resolution that it found no reason to
change its ruling because petitioner had not raised anything new to
provide further basis for the reconsideration.
The CAs resolution states: For resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration
of Our Decision filed by the petitioners. Evidently, the motion poses
nothing new. The points and arguments raised by the movants have been
considered and passed upon in the Decision sought to be reconsidered.
Thus, We find no reason to disturb the same.
EN BANC
[B. M. No. 1036. June 10, 2003]
DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, complainant, vs. EDWIN L.
RANA, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite
moral integrity for membership in the legal profession. Possession of moral
integrity is of greater importance than possession of legal learning. The
practice of law is a privilege bestowed only on the morally fit. A bar
candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice law even if he passes the
bar examinations.
The Facts
Respondent Edwin L. Rana (respondent) was among those who passed the
2000 Bar Examinations.
On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of
successful bar examinees as members of the Philippine Bar, complainant
Donna Marie Aguirre (complainant) filed against respondent a Petition for
Denial of Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with
unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave
misrepresentation.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar
during the scheduled oath-taking on 22 May 2001 at the Philippine
International Convention Center. However, the Court ruled that respondent
could not sign the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge
against him. Thus, respondent took the lawyers oath on the scheduled date
but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.
Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and
grave misconduct. Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a
lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections
before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (MBEC) of Mandaon,
Masbate. Complainant further alleges that respondent filed with the MBEC
a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in
the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In
this pleading, respondent represented himself as counsel for and in behalf
of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan, and signed the pleading as
counsel for George Bunan (Bunan).
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a
municipal government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law to
act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant
accuses respondent of acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate
George Bunan (Bunan) without the latter engaging respondents
services. Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy
to prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.
On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to take
the lawyers oath but disallowed him from signing the Roll of Attorneys until
he is cleared of the charges against him. In the same resolution, the Court
required respondent to comment on the complaint against him.
In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his specific
assistance to represent him before the MBEC. Respondent claims that he
decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who
knows the law. Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that
objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing. He explains,
however, that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or represented
himself as an attorney in the pleading.
On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent
claims that he submitted his resignation on 11 May 2001 which was
allegedly accepted on the same date. He submitted a copy of the
Certification of Receipt of Revocable Resignation dated 28 May 2001
signed by Vice-Mayor Napoleon Relox. Respondent further claims that the
complaint is politically motivated considering that complainant is the
daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing candidate for mayor of Mandaon,
Masbate. Respondent prays that the complaint be dismissed for lack of
merit and that he be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondents Comment
and refuted the claim of respondent that his appearance before the MBEC
was only to extend specific assistance to Bunan. Complainant alleges that
on 19 May 2001 Emily Estipona-Hao (Estipona-Hao) filed a petition for
proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor. Respondent signed as
counsel for Estipona-Hao in this petition. When respondent appeared as
counsel before the MBEC, complainant questioned his appearance on two
grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath as a lawyer; and (2) he was
an employee of the government.
Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondents Comment) reiterating
his claim that the instant administrative case is motivated mainly by
political vendetta.
On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and recommendation.
OBCs Report and Recommendation
The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as
counsel for Bunan in the May 2001 elections. The minutes of the MBEC
proceedings show that respondent actively participated in the
proceedings. The OBC likewise found that respondent appeared in the
MBEC proceedings even before he took the lawyers oath on 22 May 2001.
The OBC believes that respondents misconduct casts a serious doubt on
his moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. The OBC also believes that
respondents unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his admission
to the practice of law. The OBC therefore recommends that respondent be
denied admission to the Philippine Bar.
On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law
which respondent allegedly violated when he appeared as counsel for
Bunan while he was a government employee. Respondent resigned as
secretary and his resignation was accepted. Likewise, respondent was
authorized by Bunan to represent him before the MBEC.
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve
admission to the Philippine Bar.
Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the records
show that respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001,
before respondent took the lawyers oath. In the pleading entitled Formal
Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for
the Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001, respondent signed
as counsel for George Bunan. In the first paragraph of the same
pleading respondent stated that he was the (U)ndersigned Counsel for,
and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T.
BUNAN. Bunan himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he had
authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to represent him before the
MBEC and similar bodies.
On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also retained
respondent as her counsel. On the same date, 14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao
informed the MBEC that Atty. Edwin L. Rana has been authorized by
REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal counsel of the party and the candidate of
the said party. Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he
was entering his appearance as counsel for Mayoralty Candidate
Emily Estipona-Hao and for the REFORMA LM-PPC. On 19 May 2001,
respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in the petition filed before
the MBEC praying for the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning
candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.
All these happened even before respondent took the lawyers oath. Clearly,
respondent engaged in the practice of law without being a member of the
Philippine Bar.
In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,[1] the Court elucidated that:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in
court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident
to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition,
conveyancing. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for
them in matters connected with the law,incorporation services, assessment
and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial
body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the
trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p.
262, 263). (Italics supplied) x x x
In Cayetano v. Monsod,[2] the Court held that practice of law means any
activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice
of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the
legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service
which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.
Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in
the proceedings before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without
license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of unauthorized
practice of law. Respondent called himself counsel knowing fully well that
he was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out as counsel
knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown
moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar. [3]
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a
privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special
qualifications duly ascertained and certified.The exercise of this privilege
presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational
attainment, and even public trust[4] since a lawyer is an officer of the
court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by
passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be
withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the
person seeking admission had practiced law without a license. [5]
The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran,
Jr. v. Abad,[6] a candidate passed the bar examinations but had not taken
his oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys. He was held in contempt of court
for practicing law even before his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e)
of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the unauthorized
practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court. [7]
True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the
lawyers oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally
makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar
examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to
become an attorney-at-law.[8] Respondent should know that two essential
requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his
lawyers oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll
of Attorneys.[9]
On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law does
not allow respondent to act as counsel for a private client in any court or
administrative body since respondent is the secretary of the Sangguniang
Bayan.
Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang
Bayan prior to the acts complained of as constituting unauthorized practice
of law. In his letter dated 11 May 2001 addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice-
mayor and presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent stated
that he was resigning effective upon your acceptance. [10] Vice-Mayor Relox
accepted respondents resignation effective 11 May 2001. [11] Thus, the
evidence does not support the charge that respondent acted as counsel for
a client while serving as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows
that Bunan indeed authorized respondent to represent him as his counsel
before the MBEC and similar bodies. While there was no misrepresentation,
respondent nonetheless had no authority to practice law.
WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the
Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.
AGUIRRE vs. RANA
B. M. No. 1036 June 10, 2003
FACTS: Respondent Edwin L. Rana was among those who passed the 2000
Bar Examinations. Respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as
counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal
Board of Election Canvassers of Mandaon, Masbate and filed with the MBEC
a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in
the Canvassing of Votes in some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In
this pleading, respondent represented himself as "counsel for and in behalf
of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan," and signed the pleading as
counsel for George Bunan. Furthermore, respondent also signed as counsel
for Emily Estipona-Hao on 19 May 2001 in the petition filed before the
MBEC praying for the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning
candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. On 21 May 2001, one day
before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees as
members of the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre filed
against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar. On 22 May
2001, respondent was allowed to take the lawyers oath but was disallowed
from signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges against
him.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent shall be denied Admission to the Bar.
RULING: Respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he
appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed various pleadings,
without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of
unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called himself "counsel" knowing
fully well that he was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out as
"counsel" knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has
shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar.
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a
privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special
qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege
presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational
attainment, and even public trust since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A
bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing
the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be
withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the
person seeking admission had practiced law without a license. True,
respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyers
oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes
one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar
examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to
become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know that two essential
requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his
lawyers oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll
of Attorneys.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 491 October 6, 1989
IN THE MATTER OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE 1989 ELECTIONS OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.
PER CURIAM:
In the election of the national officers of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (hereafter "IBP") held on June 3, 1989 at the Philippine
International Convention Center (or PICC), the following were elected by
the House of Delegates (composed of 120 chapter presidents or their
alternates) and proclaimed as officers:
NAME POSITION
 IBP By-Laws which prohibit such activities. The Supreme Court en banc,
Atty. Violeta Drilon President
exercising its power of supervision over the Integrated Bar, resolved to
suspend the oath-taking of the IBP officers-elect and to inquire into the
Atty. Bella Tiro Executive Vice-President veracity of the reports.
It should be stated at the outset that the election process itself (i.e. the
voting and the canvassing of votes on June 3, 1989) which was conducted
Atty. Salvador Lao Chairman, House of Delegates by the "IBP Comelec," headed by Justice Reynato Puno of the Court of
Appeals, was unanimously adjudged by the participants and observers to
be above board. For Justice Puno took it upon himself to device safeguards
Atty. Renato F. Ronquillo Secretary, House of Delegates to prevent tampering with, and marking of, the ballots.
What the Court viewed with considerable concern was the reported
electioneering and extravagance that characterized the campaign
Atty. Teodoro Quicoy Treasurer, House of Delegates
conducted by the three candidates for president of the IBP.
I. MEDIA ACCOUNT OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN.
Atty. Oscar Badelles Sergeant at Arms, House of Delegates Emil Jurado, in his column "IBP Group Questions Drilon Election" (Manila
Standard, Sunday, June 17, 1989), Luis Mauricio, in two successive
columns: "The Invertebrated Bar" (Malaya, June 10, 1989) and "The
Atty. Justiniano Cortes Governor & Vice-President for Northern Luzon Disintegrating Bar" (Malaya, June 20, 1989), and Teodoro Locsin Jr. in an
article, entitled "Pam-Pam" (The Philippines Free Press, July 8,1989), and
the editorial, entitled 'Wrong Forum" of the Daily Globe (June 8, 1989),
Atty. Ciriaco Atienza Governor & Vice-President for Central Luzon were unanimously critical of the "vote-buying and pressure tactics"
allegedly employed in the campaign by the three principal candidates:
Attys. Violeta C. Drilon, Nereo Paculdo and Ramon Nisce who reportedly
Atty. Mario Jalandoni Governor & Vice-President for Metro Manila "poured heart, soul, money and influence to win over the 120 IBP
delegates."
Atty. Jose Aguilar Grapilon Governor & Vice-President for Southern Luzon Mr. Jurado mentioned the resentment of Atty. Drilon's rivals who felt at a
disadvantage because Atty. Drilon allegedly used PNB helicopters to visit
far-flung IBP chapters on the pretext of distributing Bigay Puso donations,
Atty. Teodoro Almine Governor & Vice-President for Bicolandia and she had the added advantage of having regional directors and labor
arbiters of the Department of Labor and Employment (who had been
granted leaves of absence by her husband, the Labor Secretary)
Atty. Porfirio Siyangco Governor & Vice-President for Eastern Visayas campaigning for her. Jurado's informants alleged that there was rampant
vote-buying by some members of the U.P. Sigma Rho Fraternity (Secretary
Drilon's fraternity), as well as by some lawyers of ACCRA (Angara,
Atty. Ricardo Teruel Governor & Vice-President for Western Visayas Concepcion, Cruz, Regala and Abello Law Office) where Mrs. Drilon is
employed, and that government positions were promised to others by the
Atty. Gladys Tiongco Governor & Vice-President for Eastern Mindanao office of the Labor Secretary.
Mr. Mauricio in his column wrote about the same matters and, in addition,
mentioned "talk of personnel of the Department of Labor, especially
Atty. Simeon Datumanong Governor & Vice-President for Western Mindanao conciliators and employers, notably Chinese Filipinos, giving aid and
comfort to her (Atty. Drilon's) candidacy," the billeting of out-of-town
delegates in plush hotels where they were reportedly "wined and dined
The newly-elected officers were set to take the their oath of office on July
continuously, womened and subjected to endless haggling over the price
4,1989, before the Supreme Court en banc. However,disturbed by the
of their votes x x x" which allegedly "ranged from Pl5,000 to P20,000, and,
widespread reports received by some members of the Court from lawyers
on the day of the election, some twelve to twenty votes which were
who had witnessed or participated in the proceedings and the adverse
believed crucial, appreciated to P50,000."
comments published in the columns of some newspapers about the
In his second column, Mr. Mauricio mentioned "how a top official of the
intensive electioneering and overspending by the candidates, led by the
judiciary allegedly involved himself in IBP politics on election day by
main protagonists for the office of president of the association, namely,
closeting himself with campaigners as they plotted their election strategy
Attorneys Nereo Paculdo, Ramon Nisce, and Violeta C. Drilon, the alleged
in a room of the PICC (the Philippine International Convention Center where
use of government planes, and the officious intervention of certain public
the convention/election were held) during a recess x x x."
officials to influence the voting, all of which were done in violation of the
Mr. Locsin in his column and editorial substantially re-echoed Mauricio's
reports with some embellishments.
II. THE COURT'S DECISION TO INVESTIGATE.
Responding to the critical reports, the Court, in its en banc resolution dated
June 15, 1989, directed the outgoing and incoming members of the IBP
Board of Governors, the principal officers and Chairman of the House of
Delegates to appear before it on Tuesday, June 20, 1989, at 2:00 o'clock
p.m., and there to inform the Court on the veracity of the aforementioned
reports and to recommend, for the consideration of the Court, appropriate
approaches to the problem of confirming and strengthening adherence to
the fundamental principles of the IBP.
In that resolution the Court "call[ed] to mind that a basic postulate of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), heavily stressed at the time of its
organization and commencement of existence, is that the IBP shall be non-
political in character and that there shall be no lobbying nor campaigning
in the choice of members of the Board of Governors and of the House of
Delegates, and of the IBP officers, national, or regional, or chapter. The
fundamental assumption was that officers, delegates and governors would
be chosen on the basis of professional merit and willingness and ability to
serve."
The resolution went on to say that the "Court is deeply disturbed to note
that in connection with the election of members of the Board of Governors
and of the House of Delegates, there is a widespread belief, based on
reports carried by media and transmitted as well by word of mouth, that
there was extensive and intensive campaigning by candidates for IBP
positions as well as expenditure of considerable sums of money by
candidates, including vote-buying, direct or indirect."
The venerable retired Supreme Court Justice and IBP President Emeritus,
Jose B.L. Reyes, attended the dialogue, upon invitation of the Court, to give
counsel and advice. The meeting between the Court en banc on the one
hand, and the outgoing and in coming IBP officers on the other, was an
informal one. Thereafter, the Court resolved to conduct a formal inquiry to
determine whether the prohibited acts and activities enumerated in the IBP
By-Laws were committed before and during the 1989 elections of IBP's
national officers.
The Court en banc formed a committee and designated Senior Associate
Justice Andres R. Narvasa, as Chairman, and Associate Justices Teodoro R.
Padilla, Emilio A. Gancayco, Abraham F. Sarmiento, and Carolina C. Grio-
Aquino, as members, to conduct the inquiry. The Clerk of Court, Atty. Daniel
Martinez, acted as the committee's Recording Secretary.
A total of forty-nine (49) witnesses appeared and testified in response to
subpoenas issued by the Court to shed light on the conduct of the
elections. The managers of three five-star hotels the Philippine Plaza, the
Hyatt, and the Holiday Inn where the three protagonists (Drilon, Nisce and
Paculdo) allegedly set up their respective headquarters and where they
billeted their supporters were summoned. The officer of the Philippine
National Bank and the Air Transport Office were called to enlighten the
Court on the charge that an IBP presidential candidate and the members of
her slate used PNB planes to ferry them to distant places in their campaign
to win the votes of delegates. The Philippine Airlines officials were called to
testify on the charge that some candidates gave free air fares to delegates
to the convention. Officials of the Labor Department were also called to
enable the Court to ascertain the truth of the reports that labor officials
openly campaigned or worked for the election of Atty. Drilon.
The newspaper columnists, Messrs. Luis Mauricio, Jesus Bigornia and Emil
Jurado were subpoenaed to determine the nature of their sources of
information relative to the IBP elections. Their stories were based, they
said, on letters, phone calls and personal interviews with persons who
claimed to have knowledge of the facts, but whom they, invoking the Press
Freedom Law, refused to identify.
The Committee has since submitted its Report after receiving, and
analyzing and assessing evidence given by such persons as were
perceived to have direct and personal knowledge of the relevant facts; and
the Court, after deliberating thereon, has Resolved to accept and adopt the
same.
III. PROHIBITED ACTS AND PRACTICES UNDER IBP BY-LAWS.
Article I, Section 4 of the IBP By-Laws emphasizes the "strictly non-
political" character of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, thus:
"SEC. 4. Non-political Bar. The Integrated Bar is strictly non-political, and
every activity tending to impair this basic feature is strictly prohibited and
shall be penalized accordingly. No lawyer holding an elective, judicial,
quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any political
subdivision or instrumentality thereof shall be eligible for election or
appointment to any position in the Integrated Bar or any Chapter thereof. A
Delegate, Governor, officer or employee of the Integrated Bar, or an officer
or employee of any Chapter thereof shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his position as of the moment he files his certificate of candidacy for
any elective public office or accepts appointment to any judicial, quasi-
judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision
or instrumentality thereof. "'
Section 14 of the same By-Laws enumerates the prohibited acts relative to
IBP elections:
SEC. 14. Prohibited acts and practices relative to elections. The following
acts and practices relative to election are prohibited, whether committed
by a candidate for any elective office in the Integrated Bar or by any other
member, directly or indirectly, in any form or manner, by himself or
through another person:
(a) Distribution, except on election day, of election campaign material;
(b) Distribution, on election day, of election campaign material other than
a statement of the biodata of a candidate on not more than one page of a
legal-size sheet of paper; or causing distribution of such statement to be
done by persons other than those authorized by the officer presiding at the
elections;
(c) Campaigning for or against any candidate, while holding an elective,
judicial, quasi-judicial or prosecutory office in the Government or any
political subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof;
(d) Formation of tickets, single slates, or combinations of candidates, as
well as the advertisement thereof;
(e) For the purpose of inducing or influencing a member to withhold his
vote, or to vote for or against a candidate, (1) payment of the dues or
other indebtedness of any member; (2) giving of food, drink,
entertainment, transportation or any article of value, or any similar
consideration to any person; or (3) making a promise or causing an
expenditure to be made, offered or promised to any person."
Section 12(d) of the By-Laws prescribes sanctions for violations of the
above rules:
(d) Any violation of the rules governing elections or commission of any of
the prohibited acts and practices defined in Section 14 prohibited Acts and
Practices relative to elections) of the by-laws of the Integrated Bar shall be
a ground for the disqualification of a candidate or his removal from office if
elected, without prejudice to the imposition of sanctions upon any erring
member pursuant to the By-laws of the Integrated Bar.
At the formal investigation which was conducted by the investigating
committee, the following violations were established:
(1) Prohibited campaigning and solicitation of votes by the candidates for
president, executive vice-president, the officers of candidate the House of
Delegates and Board of Governors.
The three candidates for IBP President Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo began
travelling around the country to solicit the votes of delegates as early as
April 1989. Upon the invitation of IBP President, Leon Garcia, Jr. (t.s.n., July
13,1989, p. 4), they attended the Bench and Bar dialogues held in
Cotabato in April 1989 (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, p. 123), in Tagaytay City,
Pampanga, and in Baguio City (during the conference of chapter presidents
of Northern Luzon (t.s.n., July 3,1989, p. 113; t.s.n., July 10, p. 41; t.s.n.,
July 13, p. 47) where they announced their candidacies and met the
chapter presidents.
Atty. Nisce admitted that he went around the country seeking the help of
IBP chapter officers, soliciting their votes, and securing their written
endorsements. He personally hand-carried nomination forms and
requested the chapter presidents and delegates to fill up and sign the
forms to formalize their commitment to his nomination for IBP President.
He started campaigning and distributing the nomination forms in March
1989 after the chapter elections which determined the membership of the
House of Delegates composed of the 120 chapter presidents (t.s.n., June
29, 1989, pp. 82-86). He obtained forty (40) commitments. He submitted
photocopies of his nomination forms which read:
"Nomination Form
I Join in Nominating
RAMON M. NISCE
as
National President of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines
______________ _______________
Chapter Signature"
Among those who signed the nomination forms were: Onofre P. Tejada,
Candido P. Balbin, Jr., Conizado V. Posadas, Quirico L. Quirico Ernesto S.
Salun-at, Gloria C. Agunos, Oscar B. Bernardo, Feliciano F. Wycoco, Amor L.
Ibarra, Jose M. Atienza, Jose N. Contreras, Romeo T. Mendoza, Leo C.
Medialdea, Jr., Paulino G. Clarin, Julius Z. Neil, Roem J. Arbolado Democrito
M. Perez, Abelardo Fermin, Diosdado B. Villarin, Jr., Daniel C. Macaraeg,
Confesor R. Sansano Dionisio E. Bala, Jr., Emesto A. Amores, Romeo V.
Pefianco, Augurio C. Pamintuan, Atlee T. Viray, Ceferino C. Cabanas, Jose S.
Buban, Diosdado Z. Reloj, Jr., Cesar C. Viola, Oscar C. Fernandez, Ricardo B.
Teruel Rodrigo R. Flores, Sixto Marella, Jr., Arsenio C. Villalon, Renato F.
Ronquillo, Antonio G. Nalapo Romualdo A. Din Jr., Jose P. Icaonapo Jr., and
Manuel S. Person.
Atty. Nisce admitted that he reserved rooms at the Hyatt Hotel based on
the commitments he had obtained (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, pp. 82-85).
Unfortunately, despite those formal commitments, he obtained only 14
votes in the election (t.s.n., June 29, 1 989, p. 86). The reason, he said, is
that. some of those who had committed their votes to him were
"manipulated, intimidated, pressured, or remunerated" (t.s.n., June
29,1989, pp. 8695; Exhibit "M-4-Nisce," t.s.n., July 4, 1989, pp. 100-1 04).
(2) Use of PNB plane in the campaign.
The records of the Philippine National Bank (Exhibit C-1-Crudo and Exhibit
C-2-Crudo) show that Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. of the Department
of Environment & Natural Resources (DENR) borrowed a plane from the
Philippine National Bank for his Bicol CORD (Cabinet Officers for Regional
Development) Assistant, Undersecretary Antonio Tria. The plane manifest
(Exh. C-2-Crudo) listed Atty. Violeta Drilon, Arturo Tusi (Tiu), Assistant
Secretary for Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Tony Tria, Atty.
Gladys Tiongco, and Amy Wong. Except for Tony Tria, the rest of the
passengers were IBP candidates.
Atty. Drilon admitted that she "hitched" a ride on a PNB plane. She said
that she was informed by Atty. Tiu about the availability of a PNB plane
(t.s.n., July 3,1989, pp. 116-118).
Atty. Tiu, who ran for the position of IBP executive vice-president in the
Drilon ticket, testified that sometime in May 1989 he failed to obtain
booking from the Philippine Airlines for the projected trip of his group to
Bicol. He went to the DENR allegedly to follow up some papers for a client.
While at the DENR, he learned that Assistant Secretary Tria was going on
an official business in Bicol for Secretary Fulgencio Factoran and that he
would be taking a PNB plane. As Assistant Secretary Tria is his fraternity
brother, he asked if he, together with the Drilon group, could hitch a ride
on the plane to Bicol. His request was granted. Their purpose in going to
Bicol was to assess their chances in the IBP elections. The Drilon company
talked with the IBP chapter presidents in Daet, Naga, and Legaspi, and
asked for their support (t.s.n., July 10, 1989, pp. 549).
Assistant Secretary Antonio S. Tria confirmed the use of a PNB plane by
Atty. Drilon and her group. He recalled that on May 23,1989, DENR
Secretary Factoran instructed him to go to Bicol to monitor certain regional
development projects there and to survey the effect of the typhoon that hit
the region in the middle of May. On the same day, Atty. Tiu, a fraternity
brother (meaning that Tiu belongs to the Sigma Rho fraternity) went to the
DENR office and requested the Secretary (Factoran) if he (Tiu) could be
allowed to hitch a ride on the plane. Assistant Secretary Tria, together with
the Drilon group which included Attorneys Drilon, Grapilon, Amy Wong,
Gladys Tiongco, and Tiu, took off at the Domestic Airport bound for Naga,
Daet and Legaspi. In Legaspi the Drilon group had lunch with Atty. Vicente
Real, Jr., an IBP chapter president (t.s.n., July 10, 1989, pp. 54-69).
(3) Formation of tickets and single slates.
The three candidates, Paculdo, Nisce and Drilon, admitted having formed
their own slates for the election of IBP national officers on June 3, 1989.
Atty. Paculdo's slate consisted of himself for President; Bella D. Tiro, for
Executive Vice-President; and for Governors: Justiniano P. Cortez (Northern
Luzon), Oscar C. Fernandez (Central Luzon), Mario C.V. Jalandoni (Greater
Manila), Petronilo A. de la Cruz (Southern Luzon), Teodorico C. Almine, Jr.
(Bicolandia), Ricardo B. Teruel (Western Visayas), Porfirio P. Siyangco
(Eastern Visayas), Jesus S. Anonat (Western Mindanao), Guerrero A. Adaza,
Jr. (Eastern Mindanao) (Exhibit M-Nisce).
The Drilon ticket consisted of. Violeta C. Drilon for President, Arturo Tiu for
Executive Vice President, Salvador Lao for Chairman of the House of
Delegates, and, for Governors: Basil Rupisan (Northern 'Luzon), Acong
Atienza (Central Luzon), Amy Wong (Metro Manila), Jose Grapilon (Southern
Tagalog), Teodoro Almine (Bicolandia), Baldomero Estenzo (Eastern
Visayas), Joelito Barrera (Western Visayas), Gladys Tiongco (Eastern
Mindanao), Simeon Datumanong (Western Mindanao) (Exhibit M-1-Nisce).
Atty. Ramon N. Nisce's line-up listed himself and Confessor B. Sansano
Benjamin B. Bernardino, Antonio L. Nalapo Renato F. Ronquillo, Gloria C.
Agunos, Mario Valderrama, Candido P. Balbin Jr., Oscar C. Fernandez, Cesar
G. Viola, Leo C. Medialdea, Jr., Vicente P. Tordilla, Jr., Jose S. Buban, Joel A.
Llosa, Jesus T. Albacite and Oscar V. Badelles.
(4) Giving free transportation to out-of-town delegates and alternates.
Atty. Nisce admitted having bought plane tickets for some delegates to the
convention. He mentioned Oscar Badelles to whom he gave four round-trip
tickets (worth about P10,000) from Iligan City to Manila and back. Badelles
was a voting delegate. Nisce, however, failed to get a written commitment
from him because Atty. Medialdea assured him (Nisce) "sigurado na 'yan,
h'wag mo nang papirmahin." Badelles won as sergeant-at-arms, not in
Nisce's ticket, but in that of Drilon.
Badelles admitted that Nisce sent him three airplane tickets, but he
Badelles said that he did not use them, because if he did, he would be
committed to Nisce, and he Badelles did not want to be committed (t.s.n.,
July 4,1989, pp. 77-79, 95-96).
Nisce also sent a plane ticket to Atty. Atilano, who was his candidate, and
another ticket to Mrs. Linda Lim of Zamboanga. Records of the Philippine
Airlines showed that Atty. Nisce paid for the plane tickets of Vicente Real, Jr.
(Exh. D-1-Calica), Romeo Fortes (Exh. D-1-Calica), Cesar Batica (Exh. D-2-
Calica), Jose Buban of Leyte (Exh. D-2-Calica), Delsanto Resuello (Exh. D-3-
Calica), and Ceferino Cabanas (Exh. D-3-Calica).
In spite of his efforts and expense, only one of Nisce's candidates won:
Renato Ronquillo of Manila 4, as Secretary of the House of Delegates (t.s.n.
July 3, p. 161).
(5) Giving free hotel accommodations, food, drinks, entertainment to
delegates.
(a) ATTY. NEREO PACULDO
Atty. Paculdo alleged that he booked 24 regular rooms and three suites at
the Holiday Inn, which served as his headquarters. The 24 rooms were to
be occupied by his staff (mostly ladies) and the IBP delegates. The three
suites were to be occupied by himself, the officers of the Capitol Bar
Association, and Atty. Mario Jalandoni. He paid P150,000 for the hotel bills
of his delegates at the Holiday Inn, where a room cost P990 per day with
breakfast.
Those listed as guests of Atty. Paculdo at the Holiday Inn were: Emesto C.
Perez, Tolomeo Ligutan Judge Alfonso Combong, Ricardo Caliwag, Antonio
Bisnar, Benedicto Balajadia, Jesus Castro, Restituto Villanueva, Serapio
Cribe Juanita Subia, Teodorico J. Almine, Rudy Gumban, Roem Arbolado,
Ricardo Teruel, Shirley Moises, Ramon Roco, Alberto Trinidad, Teodoro
Quicoy Manito Lucero, Fred Cledera Vicente Tordilla, Julian Ocampo,
Francisco Felizmenio Marvel Clavecilla, Amador Capiral, Eufronio Maristela,
Porfirio Siyangco, William Llanes, Jr., Marciano Neri, Guerrero Adaza,
Diosdado Peralta, Luis C. Formilleza, Jr., Democrito Perez, Bruno Flores,
Dennis Rendon, Judge Ceferino Chan, Mario Jalandoni, Kenneth Siruelo
Bella Tiro, Antonio Santos, Tiburcio Edano James Tan, Cesilo A. Adaza,
Francisco Roxas, Angelita Gacutan, Jesse Pimentel, Judge Jaime Hamoy,
Jesus Anonat, Carlos Egay, Judge Carlito Eisma, Judge Jesus Carbon, Joven
Zach, and Benjamin Padon.
Noel de Guzman, Holiday Inn's credit manager, testified that Atty. Paculdo
booked 52 (not 24) rooms, including the presidential suite, which was used
as the Secretariat. The group bookings were made by Atty. Gloria Paculdo,
the wife of Nereo Paculdo (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 63-68). The total sum of
P227,114.89 was paid to Holiday Inn for the use of the rooms.
(b) ATTY. VIOLETA C. DRILON
The delegates and supporters of Atty. Drilon were billeted at the Philippine
Plaza Hotel where her campaign manager, Atty. Renato Callanta, booked
40 rooms, 5 of which were suites. According to Ms. Villanueva, Philippine
Plaza banquet and conventions manager, the contract that Atty. Callanta
signed with the Philippine Plaza was made in the name of the "IBP c/o Atty.
Callanta."
Mrs. Lourdes Juco, a sales manager of the Philippine Plaza, recalled that it
was Mr. Mariano Benedicto who first came to book rooms for the IBP
delegates. She suggested that he obtain a group (or discounted) rate. He
gave her the name of Atty. Callanta who would make the arrangements
with her. Mr. Benedicto turned out to be the Assistant Secretary of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
The total sum of P316,411.53 was paid by Atty. Callanta for the rooms,
food, and beverages consumed by the Drilon group, with an unpaid
balance of P302,197.30. Per Attorney Daniel Martinez's last telephone
conversation with Ms. Villanueva, Atty. Callanta still has an outstanding
account of P232,782.65 at Philippine Plaza.
Atty. Callanta admitted that he signed the contract for 40 rooms at the
Philippine Plaza. He made a downpayment of P123,000. His "working
sheet' showed that the following persons contributed for that down
payment:
(a) Nilo Pena (Quasha Law Office) P 25,000
(b) Antonio Carpio 20,000
(c) Toto Ferrer (Carpio Law Office) 10,000

(d) Jay Castro 10,000
(e) Danny Deen 20,000
(f) Angangco Tan (Angara Law Office) 10,000
(g) Alfonso Reyno 20,000
(h) Cosme Rossel 15,300
(t.s.n. July 4, 1 989, pp. 3-4)
Atty. Callanta explained that the above listed persons have been
contributing money every time the IBP embarks on a project. This time,
they contributed so that their partners or associates could attend the legal
aid seminar and the IBP convention too.
Atty. Drilon alleged that she did not know that Atty. Callanta had billeted
her delegates at the Philippine Plaza. She allegedly did not also know in
whose name the room she occupied was registered. But she did ask for a
room where she could rest during the convention. She admitted, however,
that she paid for her hotel room and meals to Atty. Callanta, through Atty.
Loanzon (t.s.n. July 3,1989).
The following were listed as having occupied the rooms reserved by Atty.
Callanta at the Philippine Plaza: Violeta Drilon, Victoria A. Verciles, Victoria
C. Loanzon, Leopoldo A. Consulto Ador Lao, Victoria Borra, Aimee Wong,
Callanta, Pena, Tiu, Gallardo, Acong Atienza, D. Bernardo, Amores, Silao
Caingat, Manuel Yuson, Simeon Datumanong, Manuel Pecson, Sixto
Marella, Joselito Barrera, Radon Macalalag, Oscar Badelles, Antonio
Acyatan, Ildefonso C. Puerto, Nestor Atienza, Gil Batula Array Corot,
Dimakuta Corot Romeo Fortes Irving Petilla, Teodoro Palma, Gil Palma,
Danilo Deen, Delsanto, Resuello, Araneta, Vicente Real, Sylvio Casuncad
Espina, Guerrero, Julius Neri, Linda Lim, Ben Lim, C. Batica, Luis Formilleza,
Felix Macalag Mariano Benedicto, Atilano, Araneta, Renato Callanta.
Atty. Nilo Pena admitted that the Quasha Law Office of which he is a senior
partner, gave P25,000 to Callanta for rooms at the Philippine Plaza so that
some members of his law firm could campaign for the Drilon group (t.s.n.
July 5,1989, pp. 7678) during the legal aid seminar and the IBP convention.
Most of the members of his law firm are fraternity brothers of Secretary
Drilon (meaning, members of the Sigma Rho Fraternity). He admitted being
sympathetic to the candidacy of Atty. Drilon and the members of her slate,
two of whom Jose Grapilon and Simeon Datumanong are Sigma Rhoans.
They consider Atty. Drilon as a "sigma rho sister," her husband being a
sigma rhoan.
Atty. Antonio Carpio, also a Sigma Rhoan, reserved a room for the
members of his own firm who attended the legal aid seminar and the
convention. He made the reservation through Atty. Callanta to whom he
paid P20,000 (t.s.n. July 6,1989, pp. 30-34).
Atty. Carpio assisted Atty. Drilon in her campaign during the convention, by
soliciting the votes of delegates he knew, like Atty. Albacite his former
teacher (but the latter was already committed to Nisce), and Atty. Romy
Fortes, a classmate of his in the U.P. College of Law (t. t.s.n. July 6, 1989,
pp. 22, 29, 39).
(c) ATTY. RAMON NISCE.
Atty. Nisce, through his brother-in-law, Ricardo Paras, entered into a
contract with the Hyatt Hotel for a total of 29 rooms plus one (1) seventh-
floor room. He made a downpayment of P20,000 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, p.
58) on April 20, 1989, and P37,632.45 on May 10, or a total of P57,632.45.
Ms. Cecile Flores, Ms. Milagros Ocampo, and Mr. Ramon Jacinto, the sales
department manager, credit manager, and reservation manager,
respectively of the Hyatt, testified that Atty. Nisce's bill amounted to
P216,127.74 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 57-58; Exhibits E-Flores, F-Jacinto G-
Ocampo).
As earlier mentioned, Atty. Nisce admitted that he reserved rooms for
those who committed themselves to his candidacy.
The hotel guests of Atty. Nisce were: Gloria Agunos Dennis Habanel B.
Batula, John E. Asuncion, Reynaldo Cortes, Lourdes Santos, Elmer Datuin,
Romualdo Din, Antonio Nalapo, Israel Damasco, Candido Balbin, Serrano
Balot, Ibarra, Joel Llosa, Eltanal, Ruperto, Asuncion, Q. Pilotin Reymundo P.
Guzman, Zoilo Aguinaldo, Clarin, R. Ronquillo, Dominador Carillo, Filomeno
Balinas, Ernesto Sabulan, Yusop Pangadapun, A. Viray, Icampo, Abelardo
Fermin, C. Quiaoit, Augurio Pamintuan, Daniel Macaraeg, Onofre Tejada.
(6) Campaigning by labor officials for Atty. Violeta Drilon
In violation of the prohibition against "campaigning for or against a
candidate while holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory
office in the Government' (Sec. 14[c], Art. I, IBP By-Laws), Mariano E.
Benedicto II, Assistant Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment,
testified that he took a leave of absence from his office to attend the IBP
convention. He stayed at the Philippine Plaza with the Drilon group
admittedly to give "some moral assistance" to Atty. Violeta Drilon. He did
so because he is a member of the Sigma Rho Fraternity. When asked about
the significance of Sigma Rho, Secretary Benedicto explained: "More than
the husband of Mrs. Drilon being my boss, the significance there is that the
husband is my brother in the Sigma Rho."
He cheered up Mrs., Drilon when her spirits were low. He talked to her
immediate circle which included Art Tiu, Tony Carpio, Nilo Pena, Amy Wong,
Atty. Grapilon, Victor Lazatin, and Boy Reyno. They assessed the progress
of the campaign, and measured the strengths and weaknesses of the other
groups The group had sessions as early as the later part of May.
Room 114, the suite listed in the name of Assistant Secretary Benedicto
toted up a bill of P23,110 during the 2-day IBP convention/election. A total
of 113 phone calls (amounting to Pl,356) were recorded as emanating from
his room.
Opposite Room 114, was Room 112, also a suite, listed in the names of
Mrs. Drilon, Gladys Tiongco (candidate for Governor, Eastern Mindanao)
and Amy Wong (candidate for Governor, Metro Manila). These two rooms
served as the "action center' or "war room" where campaign strategies
were discussed before and during the convention. It was in these rooms
where the supporters of the Drilon group, like Attys. Carpio, Callanta,
Benedicto, the Quasha and the ACCRA lawyers met to plot their moves.
(7) Paying the dues or other indebtedness of any number (Sec. 14[e], IBP
BY-Laws).
Atty. Teresita C. Sison, IBP Treasurer, testified that she has heard of
candidates paying the IBP dues of lawyers who promised to vote for or
support them, but she has no way of ascertaining whether it was a
candidate who paid the delinquent dues of another, because the receipts
are issued in the name of the member for whom payment is made (t.s.n.
June 28, 1989, pp. 24-28).
She has noticed, though, that there is an upsurge of payments in March,
April, May during any election year. This year, the collections increased by
P100,000 over that of last year (a non-election year from Pl,413,425 to
Pl,524,875 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, p. 25).
(8) Distribution of materials other than bio-data of not more than one page
of legal size sheet of paper (Sec. 14[a], IBP By-Laws).
On the convention floor on the day of the election, Atty. Paculdo caused to
be distributed his bio-data and copies of a leaflet entitled "My Quest," as
wen as, the lists of his slate. Attys. Drilon and Nisce similarly distributed
their tickets and bio-data.
The campaign materials of Atty. Paculdo cost from P15,000 to P20,000.
They were printed by his own printing shop.
(9) Causing distribution of such statement to be done by persons other
than those authorized by the officer presiding at the election (Sec. 14[b],
IBP By-Laws).
Atty. Paculdo employed uniformed girls to distribute his campaign
materials on the convention floor. Atty. Carpio noted that there were more
campaign materials distributed at the convention site this year than in
previous years. The election was more heated and expensive (t.s.n. July
6,1989, p. 39).
Atty. Benjamin Bernardino, the incumbent President of the IBP Rizal
Chapter, and a candidate for chairman of the House of Delegates on
Nisce's ticket, testified that campaign materials were distributed during the
convention by girls and by lawyers. He saw members of the ACCRA law
firm campaigning for Atty. Drilon (t.s.n. July 3,1989, pp. 142-145).
(10) Inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote, or to vote for
or against a candidate (Sec. 14[e], IBP BY-Laws).
Atty. Bernardino disclosed that his cousin, Atty. Romeo Capulong, urged
him to withdraw his candidacy for chairman of the House of Delegates and
to run as vice-chairman in Violy Drilon's slate, but he declined (t.s.n. July
3,1989, pp. 137, 149).
Atty. Gloria Agunos personnel director of the Hyatt Terraces Hotel in Baguio
and president of the Baguio-Benguet IBP Chapter, recalled that in the third
week of May 1989, after the Tripartite meet of the Department of Labor &
Employment at the Green Valley Country Club in Baguio City, she met Atty.
Drilon, together with two labor officers of Region 1, Attys. Filomeno Balbin
and Atty. Mansala Atty. Drilon solicited her (Atty. Agunos') vote and invited
her to stay at the Philippine Plaza where a room would be available for her.
Atty. Paculdo also tried to enlist her support during the chapter presidents'
meeting to choose their nominee for governor for the Northern Luzon
region (t.s.n. July 13,1989, pp. 43-54).
Atty. Nisce testified that a Manila Chapter 4 delegate, Marcial Magsino, who
had earlier committed his vote to Nisce changed his mind when he was
offered a judgeship (This statement, however, is admittedly hearsay).
When Nisce confronted Magsino about the alleged offer, the latter denied
that there was such an offer. Nisce's informant was Antonio G. Nalapo an
IBP candidate who also withdrew.
Another Nisce candidate, Cesar Viola, withdrew from the race and refused
to be nominated (t.s.n. June 29, 1989, p. 104). Vicente P. Tordilla who was
Nisce's candidate for Governor became Paculdo's candidate instead (t.s.n.
June 29, 1989, p. 104).
Nisce recalled that during the Bench and Bar Dialogue in Cotabato City,
Court Administrator Tiro went around saying, "I am not campaigning, but
my wife is a candidate." Nisce said that the presidents of several IBP
chapters informed him that labor officials were campaigning for Mrs. Drilon
(t.s.n. June 29,1989, pp. 109-110). He mentioned Ciony de la Cerna, who
allegedly campaigned in La Union (t.s.n. June 29,1989,p.111)
Atty. Joel A. Llosa, Nisce's supporter and candidate for governor of the
Western Visayas, expressed his disappointment over the IBP elections
because some delegates flip-flopped from one camp to another. He
testified that when he arrived at the Manila Domestic Airport he was met
by an assistant regional director of the DOLE who offered to bring him to
the Philippine Plaza, but he declined the offer. During the legal aid seminar,
Atty. Drilon invited him to transfer to the Philippine Plaza where a room had
been reserved for him. He declined the invitation (t.s.n. July 4,1989, pp.
102-106).
Atty. Llosa said that while he was still in Dumaguete City, he already knew
that the three candidates had their headquarters in separate hotels:
Paculdo, at the Holiday Inn; Drilon, at the Philippine Plaza; and Nisce, at the
Hyatt. He knew about this because a week before the elections,
representatives of Atty. Drilon went to Dumaguete City to campaign. He
mentioned Atty. Rodil Montebon of the ACCRA Law Office, accompanied by
Atty. Julve the Assistant Regional Director of the Department of Labor in
Dumaguete City. These two, he said, offered to give him two PAL tickets
and accommodations at the Philippine Plaza (t.s.n. July 4,1989, pp. 101-
104). But he declined the offer because he was already committed to Atty.
Nisce.
Atty. Llosa also revealed that before he left for Manila on May 31, 1989, a
businessman, Henry Dy, approached him to convince him to vote for Atty.
Paculdo. But Llosa told Dy that he was already committed to Nisce.
He did not receive any plane tickets from Atty. Nisce because he and his
two companions (Atty. Eltanal and Atty. Ruperto) had earlier bought their
own tickets for Manila (t.s.n. July 4, 1989, p. 101).
SUMMARY OF CAMPAIGN EXPENSES INCURRED
BY THE CANDIDATES
Atty. Paculdo admitted having spent some P250,000 during his three weeks
of campaigning. Of this amount, the Capitol Bar Association (of which he
was the chapter president) contributed about P150,000. The Capitol Bar
Association is a voluntary bar association composed of Quezon City
lawyers.
He spent about P100,000 to defray the expenses of his trips to the
provinces (Bicol provinces, Pampanga, Abra, Mountain Province and
Bulacan) (t.s.n. June 29,1989, pp. 9-14).
Atty. Nisce's hotel bills at the Hyatt amounted to P216,127.74. This does
not include the expenses for his campaign which began several months
before the June 3rd election, and his purchases of airplane tickets for some
delegates.
The records of the Philippine Plaza Hotel, headquarters of Atty. Drilon's
camp, showed that her campaign rang up over P600,000 in hotel bills. Atty.
Callanta paid P316,411.53 for the rooms, food, and beverage consumed by
Atty. Drilon's supporters, but still left an unpaid bill of P302,197.30 at
convention's end.
FINDINGS.
From all the foregoing, it is evident that the manner in which the principal
candidates for the national positions in the Integrated Bar conducted their
campaign preparatory to the elections on June 3, 1989, violated Section 14
of the IBP By-Laws and made a travesty of the idea of a "strictly non-
political" Integrated Bar enshrined in Section 4 of the By-Laws.
The setting up of campaign headquarters by the three principal candidates
(Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo) in five-star hotels: The Philippine Plaza, the
Holiday Inn and The Hyatt the better for them to corral and entertain the
delegates billeted therein; the island hopping to solicit the votes of the
chapter presidents who comprise the 120-member House of Delegates that
elects the national officers and regional governors; the formation of tickets,
slates, or line-ups of candidates for the other elective positions aligned
with, or supporting, either Drilon, Paculdo or Nisce; the procurement of
written commitments and the distribution of nomination forms to be filled
up by the delegates; the reservation of rooms for delegates in three big
hotels, at the expense of the presidential candidates; the use of a PNB
plane by Drilon and some members of her ticket to enable them to "assess
their chances" among the chapter presidents in the Bicol provinces; the
printing and distribution of tickets and bio-data of the candidates which in
the case of Paculdo admittedly cost him some P15,000 to P20,000; the
employment of uniformed girls (by Paculdo) and lawyers (by Drilon) to
distribute their campaign materials on the convention floor on the day of
the election; the giving of assistance by the Undersecretary of Labor to
Mrs. Drilon and her group; the use of labor arbiters to meet delegates at
the airport and escort them to the Philippine Plaza Hotel; the giving of pre-
paid plane tickets and hotel accommodations to delegates (and some
families who accompanied them) in exchange for their support; the
pirating of some candidates by inducing them to "hop" or "flipflop" from
one ticket to another for some rumored consideration; all these practices
made a political circus of the proceedings and tainted the whole election
process.
The candidates and many of the participants in that election not only
violated the By-Laws of the IBP but also the ethics of the legal profession
which imposes on all lawyers, as a corollary of their obligation to obey and
uphold the constitution and the laws, the duty to "promote respect for law
and legal processes" and to abstain from 'activities aimed at defiance of
the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system" (Rule 1.02, Canon
1, Code of Professional Responsibility). Respect for law is gravely eroded
when lawyers themselves, who are supposed to be millions of the law,
engage in unlawful practices and cavalierly brush aside the very rules that
the IBP formulated for their observance.
The unseemly ardor with which the candidates pursued the presidency of
the association detracted from the dignity of the legal profession. The
spectacle of lawyers bribing or being bribed to vote one way or another,
certainly did not uphold the honor of the profession nor elevate it in the
public's esteem.
The Court notes with grave concern what appear to be the evasions,
denials and outright prevarications that tainted the statements of the
witnesses, including tome of the candidates, during the initial hearing
conducted by it before its fact-finding committee was created. The
subsequent investigation conducted by this Committee has revealed that
those parties had been less than candid with the Court and seem to have
conspired among themselves to deceive it or at least withhold vital
information from it to conceal the irregularities committed during the
campaign.
CONCLUSIONS.
It has been mentioned with no little insistence that the provision in the
1987 Constitution (See. 8, Art. VIII) providing for a Judicial and Bar Council
composed of seven (7) members among whom is "a representative of the
Integrated Bar," tasked to participate in the selection of nominees for
appointment to vacant positions in the judiciary, may be the reason why
the position of IBP president has attracted so much interest among the
lawyers. The much coveted "power" erroneously perceived to be inherent
in that office might have caused the corruption of the IBP elections. To
impress upon the participants in that electoral exercise the seriousness of
the misconduct which attended it and the stern disapproval with which it is
viewed by this Court, and to restore the non-political character of the IBP
and reduce, if not entirely eliminate, expensive electioneering for the top
positions in the organization which, as the recently concluded elections
revealed, spawned unethical practices which seriously diminished the
stature of the IBP as an association of the practitioners of a noble and
honored profession, the Court hereby ORDERS:
1. The IBP elections held on June3,1989 should be as they are hereby
annulled.
2. The provisions of the IBP By-Laws for the direct election by the House of
Delegates (approved by this Court in its resolution of July 9, 1985 in Bar
Matter No. 287) of the following national officers:
(a) the officers of the House of Delegates;
(b) the IBP president; and
(c) the executive vice-president,
be repealed, this Court being empowered to amend, modify or repeal the
By-Laws of the IBP under Section 77, Art. XI of said By-Laws.
3. The former system of having the IBP President and Executive Vice-
President elected by the Board of Governors (composed of the governors of
the nine [91 IBP regions) from among themselves (as provided in Sec. 47,
Art. VII, Original IBP By-Laws) should be restored. The right of automatic
succession by the Executive Vice-President to the presidency upon the
expiration of their two-year term (which was abolished by this Court's
resolution dated July 9,1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) should be as it is
hereby restored.
4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive Vice-President
shall automatically succeed to the office of president. The incoming board
of governors shall then elect an Executive Vice-President from among
themselves. The position of Executive Vice-President shall be rotated
among the nine (9) IBP regions. One who has served as president may not
run for election as Executive Vice-President in a succeeding election until
after the rotation of the presidency among the nine (9) regions shall have
been completed; whereupon, the rotation shall begin anew.
5. Section 47 of Article VII is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 47. National Officers. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall
have a President and Executive Vice-President to be chosen by the Board
of Governors from among nine (9) regional governors, as much as
practicable, on a rotation basis. The governors shall be ex oficio Vice-
President for their respective regions. There shall also be a Secretary and
Treasurer of the Board of Governors to be appointed by the President with
the consent of the Board.
6. Section 33(b), Art. V, IBP By-Laws, is hereby amended as follows:
(b) The President and Executive Vice President of the IBP shall be the
Chairman and Vice-Chairman, respectively, of the House of Delegates. The
Secretary, Treasurer, and Sergeant-at-Arms shall be appointed by the
President with the consent of the House of Delegates.'
7. Section 33(g) of Article V providing for the positions of Chairman, Vice-
Chairman, Secretary-Treasurer and Sergeant-at- Arms of the House of
Delegates is hereby repealed
8. Section 37, Article VI is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 37. Composition of the Board. The Integrated Bar of the
Philippines shall be governed by a Board of Governors consisting of nine
(9) Governors from the nine (9) regions as delineated in Section 3 of the
Integration Rule, on the representation basis of one (1) Governor for each
region to be elected by the members of the House of Delegates from that
region only. The position of Governor should be rotated among the different
Chapters in the region.
9. Section 39, Article V is hereby amended as follows:
Section 39. Nomination and election of the Governors at least one (1)
month before the national convention the delegates from each region shall
elect the governor for their region, the choice of which shall as much as
possible be rotated among the chapters in the region.
10. Section33(a), Article V hereby is amended by addingthe following
provision as part of the first paragraph:
No convention of the House of Delegates nor of the general membership
shall be held prior to any election in an election year.
11. Section 39, (a), (b), (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), and (7) of Article VI should
be as they are hereby deleted.
All other provisions of the By-Laws including its amendment by the
Resolution en banc of this Court of July 9, 1985 (Bar Matter No. 287) that
are inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or modified.
12. Special elections for the Board of Governors shall be held in the nine
(9) IBP regions within three (3) months, after the promulgation of the
Court's resolution in this case. Within thirty (30) days thereafter, the Board
of Governors shall meet at the IBP Central Office in Manila to elect from
among themselves the IBP national president and executive vice-president.
In these special elections, the candidates in the election of the national
officers held on June 3,1989, particularly identified in Sub-Head 3 of this
Resolution entitled "Formation of Tickets and Single Slates," as well as
those identified in this Resolution as connected with any of the
irregularities attendant upon that election, are ineligible and may not
present themselves as candidate for any position.
13. Pending such special elections, a caretaker board shall be appointed by
the Court to administer the affairs of the IBP. The Court makes clear that
the dispositions here made are without prejudice to its adoption in due
time of such further and other measures as are warranted in the premises.
SO ORDERED.
IN THE MATTER OF THE INQUIRY
INTO THE 1989 ELECTIONS OF
THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.
A. M. No. 491
October 6, 1989
FACTS: In the election of the national officers of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines held on June 3, 1989 at the Philippine International Convention
Center, the newly-elected officers were set to take their oath of office on
July 4, 1989 before the Supreme Court en banc. However, disturbed by the
widespread reports received by some members of the Court from lawyers
who had witnessed or participated in the proceedings and the adverse
comments published in the columns of some newspapers about the
intensive electioneering and overspending by the candidates, led by the
main protagonists for the office of president of the association, namely,
Attorneys Nereo Paculdo, Ramon Nisce, and Violeta C. Drilon, the alleged
use of government planes, and the officious intervention of certain public
officials to influence the voting, all of which were done in violation of the
IBP By-Laws which prohibit such activities, the Supreme Court en banc,
exercising its power of supervision over the Integrated Bar, resolved to
suspend the oath-taking of the IBP officers-elect and to inquire into the
veracity of the reports. The prohibited acts are against the IBP By-Laws
more specifically Article I, Section 4 of the IBP By-Laws emphasizes the
"strictly non-political" character of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
Sec. 14. Prohibited acts and practices relative to elections and Section
12[d] of the By-Laws prescribes sanctions for violations of the above rules:
Any violation of the rules governing elections or commission of any of the
prohibited acts and practices defined in Section 14 [Prohibited Acts and
Practices Relative to Elections) of the By-laws of the Integrated Bar shall be
a ground for the disqualification of a candidate or his removal from office if
elected, without prejudice to the imposition of sanctions upon any erring
member pursuant to the By-laws of the Integrated Bar.
ISSUE Whether or not the candidates violated the IBP By-Laws.
DECISION: The candidates and many of the participants in that election not
only violated the By-Laws of the IBP but also the ethics of the legal
profession which imposes on all lawyers, as a corollary of their obligation to
obey and uphold the constitution and the laws, the duty to "promote
respect for law and legal processes" and to abstain from 'activities aimed
at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system" (Rule
1.02, Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility). Respect for law is
gravely eroded when lawyers themselves, who are supposed to be millions
of the law, engage in unlawful practices and cavalierly brush aside the very
rules that the IBP formulated for their observance.
The unseemly ardor with which the candidates pursued the presidency of
the association detracted from the dignity of the legal profession. The
spectacle of lawyers bribing or being bribed to vote one way or another,
certainly did not uphold the honor of the profession nor elevate it in the
public's esteem.
The Court notes with grave concern what appear to be the evasions,
denials and outright prevarications that tainted the statements of the
witnesses, including tome of the candidates, during the initial hearing
conducted by it before its fact-finding committee was created. The
subsequent investigation conducted by this Committee has revealed that
those parties had been less than candid with the Court and seem to have
conspired among themselves to deceive it or at least withhold vital
information from it to conceal the irregularities committed during the
campaign.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-57883 March 12, 1982
GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA Presiding Judge, Branch II of the City
Court of Olongapo, ESTANISLAO L. CESA, JR., FIDELA Y. VARGAS,
BENJAMIN C. ESCOLANGO, JUANITO C. ATIENZA, MANUEL REYES
ROSAPAPAN, JR., VIRGILIO E. ACIERTO, and PORFIRIO AGUILLON
AGUILA, petitioners,
vs.
MANUEL ALBA, Minister of Budget, FRANCISCO TANTUICO,
Chairman, Commission on Audit, and RICARDO PUNO, Minister of
Justice, Respondents.
FERNANDO, C.J.:
This Court, pursuant to its grave responsibility of passing upon the validity
of any executive or legislative act in an appropriate cases, has to resolve
the crucial issue of the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
entitled "An act reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor
and for Other Purposes." The task of judicial review, aptly characterized as
exacting and delicate, is never more so than when a conceded legislative
power, that of judicial reorganization, 1 may possibly collide with the time-
honored principle of the independence of the judiciary 2as protected and
safeguarded by this constitutional provision: "The Members of the Supreme
Court and judges of inferior courts shall hold office during good behavior
until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to
discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court shall have the
power to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight
Members, order their dismissal." 3 For the assailed legislation mandates
that Justices and judges of inferior courts from the Court of Appeals to
municipal circuit courts, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and
the Court of Tax Appeals, unless appointed to the inferior courts
established by such Act, would be considered separated from the judiciary.
It is the termination of their incumbency that for petitioners justifies a suit
of this character, it being alleged that thereby the security of tenure
provision of the Constitution has been ignored and disregarded,
That is the fundamental issue raised in this proceeding, erroneously
entitled Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition 4 considered by
this Court as an action for prohibited petition, seeking to enjoin respondent
Minister of the Budget, respondent Chairman of the Commission on Audit,
and respondent Minister of Justice from taking any action implementing
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Petitioners 5 sought to bolster their claim by
imputing lack of good faith in its enactment and characterizing as an
undue delegation of legislative power to the President his authority to fix
the compensation and allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter
appointed and the determination of the date when the reorganization shall
be deemed completed. In the very comprehensive and scholarly Answer of
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, 6 it was pointed out that there is no
valid justification for the attack on the constitutionality of this statute, it
being a legitimate exercise of the power vested in the Batasang Pambansa
to reorganize the judiciary, the allegations of absence of good faith as well
as the attack on the independence of the judiciary being unwarranted and
devoid of any support in law. A Supplemental Answer was likewise filed on
October 8, 1981, followed by a Reply of petitioners on October 13. After the
hearing in the morning and afternoon of October 15, in which not only
petitioners and respondents were heard through counsel but also the amici
curiae, 7 and thereafter submission of the minutes of the proceeding on the
debate on Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, this petition was deemed submitted
for decision.
The importance of the crucial question raised called for intensive and
rigorous study of all the legal aspects of the case. After such exhaustive
deliberation in several sessions, the exchange of views being
supplemented by memoranda from the members of the Court, it is our
opinion and so hold that Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is not unconstitutional.
1. The argument as to the lack of standing of petitioners is easily resolved.
As far as Judge de la Llana is concerned, he certainly falls within the
principle set forth in Justice Laurel's opinion in People v. Vera. 8 Thus: "The
unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement." 9 The
other petitioners as members of the bar and officers of the court cannot be
considered as devoid of "any personal and substantial interest" on the
matter. There is relevance to this excerpt from a separate opinion
in Aquino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections: 10 "Then there is the attack on the
standing of petitioners, as vindicating at most what they consider a public
right and not protecting their rights as individuals. This is to conjure the
specter of the public right dogma as an inhibition to parties intent on
keeping public officials staying on the path of constitutionalism. As was so
well put by Jaffe: 'The protection of private rights is an essential
constituent of public interest and, conversely, without a well-ordered state
there could be no enforcement of private rights. Private and public
interests are, both in substantive and procedural sense, aspects of the
totality of the legal order.' Moreover, petitioners have convincingly shown
that in their capacity as taxpayers, their standing to sue has been amply
demonstrated. There would be a retreat from the liberal approach followed
in Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works,foreshadowed by the very decision
of People v. Vera where the doctrine was first fully discussed, if we act
differently now. I do not think we are prepared to take that step.
Respondents, however, would hark back to the American Supreme Court
doctrine in Mellon v. Frothingham with their claim that what petitioners
possess 'is an interest which is shared in common by other people and is
comparatively so minute and indeterminate as to afford any basis and
assurance that the judicial process can act on it.' That is to speak in the
language of a bygone era even in the United States. For as Chief Justice
Warren clearly pointed out in the later case of Flast v. Cohen, the barrier
thus set up if not breached has definitely been lowered." 11
2. The imputation of arbitrariness to the legislative body in the enactment
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 to demonstrate lack of good faith does
manifest violence to the facts. Petitioners should have exercised greater
care in informing themselves as to its antecedents. They had laid
themselves open to the accusation of reckless disregard for the truth, On
August 7, 1980, a Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization was
organized. 12 This Executive Order was later amended by Executive Order
No. 619-A., dated September 5 of that year. It clearly specified the task
assigned to it: "1. The Committee shall formulate plans on the
reorganization of the Judiciary which shall be submitted within seventy (70)
days from August 7, 1980 to provide the President sufficient options for the
reorganization of the entire Judiciary which shall embrace all lower courts,
including the Court of Appeals, the Courts of First Instance, the City and
Municipal Courts, and all Special Courts, but excluding the Sandigan
Bayan." 13 On October 17, 1980, a Report was submitted by such
Committee on Judicial Reorganization. It began with this paragraph: "The
Committee on Judicial Reorganization has the honor to submit the following
Report. It expresses at the outset its appreciation for the opportunity
accorded it to study ways and means for what today is a basic and urgent
need, nothing less than the restructuring of the judicial system. There are
problems, both grave and pressing, that call for remedial measures. The
felt necessities of the time, to borrow a phrase from Holmes, admit of no
delay, for if no step be taken and at the earliest opportunity, it is not too
much to say that the people's faith in the administration of justice could be
shaken. It is imperative that there be a greater efficiency in the disposition
of cases and that litigants, especially those of modest means much
more so, the poorest and the humblest can vindicate their rights in an
expeditious and inexpensive manner. The rectitude and the fairness in the
way the courts operate must be manifest to all members of the community
and particularly to those whose interests are affected by the exercise of
their functions. It is to that task that the Committee addresses itself and
hopes that the plans submitted could be a starting point for an institutional
reform in the Philippine judiciary. The experience of the Supreme Court,
which since 1973 has been empowered to supervise inferior courts, from
the Court of Appeals to the municipal courts, has proven that reliance on
improved court management as well as training of judges for more efficient
administration does not suffice. I hence, to repeat, there is need for a
major reform in the judicial so stem it is worth noting that it will be the first
of its kind since the Judiciary Act became effective on June 16, 1901." 14 I t
went to say: "I t does not admit of doubt that the last two decades of this
century are likely to be attended with problems of even greater complexity
and delicacy. New social interests are pressing for recognition in the courts.
Groups long inarticulate, primarily those economically underprivileged,
have found legal spokesmen and are asserting grievances previously
ignored. Fortunately, the judicially has not proved inattentive. Its task has
thus become even more formidable. For so much grist is added to the mills
of justice. Moreover, they are likewise to be quite novel. The need for an
innovative approach is thus apparent. The national leadership, as is well-
known, has been constantly on the search for solutions that will prove to
be both acceptable and satisfactory. Only thus may there be continued
national progress." 15 After which comes: "To be less abstract, the thrust is
on development. That has been repeatedly stressed and rightly so. All
efforts are geared to its realization. Nor, unlike in the past, was it to b
"considered as simply the movement towards economic progress and
growth measured in terms of sustained increases in per capita income and
Gross National Product (GNP). 16 For the New Society, its implication goes
further than economic advance, extending to "the sharing, or more
appropriately, the democratization of social and economic opportunities,
the substantiation of the true meaning of social justice." 17 This process of
modernization and change compels the government to extend its field of
activity and its scope of operations. The efforts towards reducing the gap
between the wealthy and the poor elements in the nation call for more
regulatory legislation. That way the social justice and protection to labor
mandates of the Constitution could be effectively implemented." 18 There is
likelihood then "that some measures deemed inimical by interests
adversely affected would be challenged in court on grounds of validity.
Even if the question does not go that far, suits may be filed concerning
their interpretation and application. ... There could be pleas for injunction
or restraining orders. Lack of success of such moves would not, even so,
result in their prompt final disposition. Thus delay in the execution of the
policies embodied in law could thus be reasonably expected. That is not
conducive to progress in development." 19 For, as mentioned in such
Report, equally of vital concern is the problem of clogged dockets, which
"as is well known, is one of the utmost gravity. Notwithstanding the most
determined efforts exerted by the Supreme Court, through the leadership
of both retired Chief Justice Querube Makalintal and the late Chief Justice
Fred Ruiz Castro, from the time supervision of the courts was vested in it
under the 1973 Constitution, the trend towards more and more cases has
continued." 20 It is understandable why. With the accelerated economic
development, the growth of population, the increasing urbanization, and
other similar factors, the judiciary is called upon much oftener to resolve
controversies. Thus confronted with what appears to be a crisis situation
that calls for a remedy, the Batasang Pambansa had no choice. It had to
act, before the ailment became even worse. Time was of the essence, and
yet it did not hesitate to be duly mindful, as it ought to be, of the extent of
its coverage before enacting Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
3. There is no denying, therefore, the need for "institutional reforms,"
characterized in the Report as "both pressing and urgent." 21 It is worth
noting, likewise, as therein pointed out, that a major reorganization of such
scope, if it were to take place, would be the most thorough after four
generations. 22 The reference was to the basic Judiciary Act generations .
enacted in June of 1901, 23 amended in a significant way, only twice
previous to the Commonwealth. There was, of course, the creation of the
Court of Appeals in 1935, originally composed "of a Presiding Judge and ten
appellate Judges, who shall be appointed by the President of the
Philippines, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments of the
National Assembly, 24 It could "sit en banc, but it may sit in two divisions,
one of six and another of five Judges, to transact business, and the two
divisions may sit at the same time." 25 Two years after the establishment of
independence of the Republic of the Philippines, the Judiciary Act of
1948 26 was passed. It continued the existing system of regular inferior
courts, namely, the Court of Appeals, Courts of First Instance, 27 the
Municipal Courts, at present the City Courts, and the Justice of the Peace
Courts, now the Municipal Circuit Courts and Municipal Courts. The
membership of the Court of Appeals has been continuously
increased. 28 Under a 1978 Presidential Decree, there would be forty-five
members, a Presiding Justice and forty-four Associate Justices, with fifteen
divisions. 29 Special courts were likewise created. The first was the Court of
Tax Appeals in 1954, 30 next came the Court of Agrarian Relations in
1955, 31 and then in the same year a Court of the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations for Manila in 1955, 32 subsequently followed by the creation of
two other such courts for Iloilo and Quezon City in 1966. 33 In 1967, Circuit
Criminal Courts were established, with the Judges having the same
qualifications, rank, compensation, and privileges as judges of Courts of
First Instance. 34
4. After the submission of such Report, Cabinet Bill No. 42, which later
became the basis of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, was introduced. After
setting forth the background as above narrated, its Explanatory Note
continues: "Pursuant to the President's instructions, this proposed
legislation has been drafted in accordance with the guidelines of that
report with particular attention to certain objectives of the reorganization,
to wit, the attainment of more efficiency in disposal of cases, a reallocation
of jurisdiction, and a revision of procedures which do not tend to the proper
meeting out of justice. In consultation with, and upon a consensus of, the
governmental and parliamentary leadership, however, it was felt that some
options set forth in the Report be not availed of. Instead of the proposal to
confine the jurisdiction of the intermediate appellate court merely to
appellate adjudication, the preference has been opted to increase rather
than diminish its jurisdiction in order to enable it to effectively assist the
Supreme Court. This preference has been translated into one of the
innovations in the proposed Bill." 35 In accordance with the parliamentary
procedure, the Bill was sponsored by the Chairman of the Committee on
Justice, Human Rights and Good Government to which it was referred.
Thereafter, Committee Report No. 225 was submitted by such Committee
to the Batasang Pambansa recommending the approval with some
amendments. In the sponsorship speech of Minister Ricardo C. Puno, there
was reference to the Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization.
Thus: "On October 17, 1980, the Presidential Committee on Judicial
Reorganization submitted its report to the President which contained the
'Proposed Guidelines for Judicial Reorganization.' Cabinet Bill No. 42 was
drafted substantially in accordance with the options presented by these
guidelines. Some options set forth in the aforesaid report were not availed
of upon consultation with and upon consensus of the government and
parliamentary leadership. Moreover, some amendments to the bill were
adopted by the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good
Government, to which The bill was referred, following the public hearings
on the bill held in December of 1980. The hearings consisted of dialogues
with the distinguished members of the bench and the bar who had
submitted written proposals, suggestions, and position papers on the bill
upon the invitation of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good
Government." 36 Stress was laid by the sponsor that the enactment of such
Cabinet Bill would, firstly, result in the attainment of more efficiency in the
disposal of cases. Secondly, the improvement in the quality of justice
dispensed by the courts is expected as a necessary consequence of the
easing of the court's dockets. Thirdly, the structural changes introduced in
the bill, together with the reallocation of jurisdiction and the revision of the
rules of procedure, are designated to suit the court system to the
exigencies of the present day Philippine society, and hopefully, of the
foreseeable future." 37 it may be observed that the volume containing the
minutes of the proceedings of the Batasang Pambansa show that 590
pages were devoted to its discussion. It is quite obvious that it took
considerable time and effort as well as exhaustive study before the act was
signed by the President on August 14, 1981. With such a background, it
becomes quite manifest how lacking in factual basis is the allegation that
its enactment is tainted by the vice of arbitrariness. What appears
undoubted and undeniable is the good faith that characterized its
enactment from its inception to the affixing of the Presidential signature.
5. Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office
within the competence of a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers
from no infirmity. The ponencia of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Cruz v. Primicias,
Jr. 38reiterated such a doctrine: "We find this point urged by respondents, to
be without merit. No removal or separation of petitioners from the service
is here involved, but the validity of the abolition of their offices. This is a
legal issue that is for the Courts to decide. It is well-known rule also that
valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the
incumbents. ... And, of course, if the abolition is void, the incumbent is
deemed never to have ceased to hold office. The preliminary question laid
at rest, we pass to the merits of the case. As well-settled as the rule that
the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of its
incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be
made in good faith." 39 The above excerpt was quoted with approval
in Bendanillo, Sr. v. Provincial Governor, 40 two earlier cases enunciating a
similar doctrine having preceded it. 41 As with the offices in the other
branches of the government, so it is with the judiciary. The test remains
whether the abolition is in good faith. As that element is conspicuously
present in the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, then the lack of
merit of this petition becomes even more apparent. The concurring opinion
of Justice Laurel in Zandueta v. De la Costa 42 cannot be any clearer. This is
a quo warranto proceeding filed by petitioner, claiming that he, and not
respondent, was entitled to he office of judge of the Fifth Branch of the
Court of First Instance of Manila. There was a Judicial Reorganization Act in
1936, 43 a year after the inauguration of the Commonwealth, amending the
Administrative Code to organize courts of original jurisdiction known as the
Courts of First Instance Prior to such statute, petitioner was the incumbent
of such branch. Thereafter, he received an ad interim appointment, this
time to the Fourth Judicial District, under the new legislation. Unfortunately
for him, the Commission on Appointments of then National Assembly
disapproved the same, with respondent being appointed in his place. He
contested the validity of the Act insofar as it resulted in his being forced to
vacate his position This Court did not rule squarely on the matter. His
petition was dismissed on the ground of estoppel. Nonetheless, the
separate concurrence of Justice Laurel in the result reached, to repeat,
reaffirms in no uncertain terms the standard of good faith to preclude any
doubt as to the abolition of an inferior court, with due recognition of the
security of tenure guarantee. Thus: " I am of the opinion that
Commonwealth Act No. 145 in so far as it reorganizes, among other judicial
districts, the Ninth Judicial District, and establishes an entirely new district
comprising Manila and the provinces of Rizal and Palawan, is valid and
constitutional. This conclusion flows from the fundamental proposition that
the legislature may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court and
therefore may reorganize them territorially or otherwise thereby
necessitating new appointments and commissions. Section 2, Article VIII of
the Constitution vests in the National Assembly the power to define,
prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, subject to
certain limitations in the case of the Supreme Court. It is admitted that
section 9 of the same article of the Constitution provides for the security of
tenure of all the judges. The principles embodied in these two sections of
the same article of the Constitution must be coordinated and harmonized.
A mere enunciation of a principle will not decide actual cases and
controversies of every sort. (Justice Holmes in Lochner vs. New York, 198
U.S., 45; 49 Law. ed; 937)" 44 justice Laurel continued: "I am not insensible
to the argument that the National Assembly may abuse its power and
move deliberately to defeat the constitutional provision guaranteeing
security of tenure to all judges, But, is this the case? One need not share
the view of Story, Miller and Tucker on the one hand, or the opinion of
Cooley, Watson and Baldwin on the other, to realize that the application of
a legal or constitutional principle is necessarily factual and circumstantial
and that fixity of principle is the rigidity of the dead and the unprogressive.
I do say, and emphatically, however, that cases may arise where the
violation of the constitutional provision regarding security of tenure is
palpable and plain, and that legislative power of reorganization may be
sought to cloak an unconstitutional and evil purpose. When a case of that
kind arises, it will be the time to make the hammer fall and heavily. But not
until then. I am satisfied that, as to the particular point here discussed, the
purpose was the fulfillment of what was considered a great public need by
the legislative department and that Commonwealth Act No. 145 was not
enacted purposely to affect adversely the tenure of judges or of any
particular judge. Under these circumstances, I am for sustaining the power
of the legislative department under the Constitution. To be sure, there was
greater necessity for reorganization consequent upon the establishment of
the new government than at the time Acts Nos. 2347 and 4007 were
approved by the defunct Philippine Legislature, and although in the case of
these two Acts there was an express provision providing for the vacation
by the judges of their offices whereas in the case of Commonwealth Act
No. 145 doubt is engendered by its silence, this doubt should be resolved
in favor of the valid exercise of the legislative power." 45
6. A few more words on the question of abolition. In the above-cited
opinion of Justice Laurel in Zandueta, reference was made to Act No.
2347 46 on the reorganization of the Courts of First Instance and to Act No.
4007 47 on the reorganization of all branches of the government, including
the courts of first instance. In both of them, the then Courts of First
Instance were replaced by new courts with the same appellation. As Justice
Laurel pointed out, there was no question as to the fact of abolition. He
was equally categorical as to Commonwealth Act No. 145, where also the
system of the courts of first instance was provided for expressly. It was
pointed out by Justice Laurel that the mere creation of an entirely new
district of the same court is valid and constitutional. such conclusion
flowing "from the fundamental proposition that the legislature may abolish
courts inferior to the Supreme Court and therefore may reorganize them
territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating new appointments and
commissions." 48 The challenged statute creates an intermediate appellate
court, 49 regional trial courts, 50 metropolitan trial courts of the national
capital region, 51 and other metropolitan trial courts, 52 municipal trial
courts in cities, 53 as well as in municipalities, 54 and municipal circuit trial
courts. 55 There is even less reason then to doubt the fact that existing
inferior courts were abolished. For the Batasang Pambansa, the
establishment of such new inferior courts was the appropriate response to
the grave and urgent problems that pressed for solution. Certainly, there
could be differences of opinion as to the appropriate remedy. The choice,
however, was for the Batasan to make, not for this Court, which deals only
with the question of power. It bears mentioning that in Brillo v. Eage56 this
Court, in an unanimous opinion penned by the late Justice Diokno,
citing Zandueta v. De la Costa, ruled: "La segunda question que el
recurrrido plantea es que la Carta de Tacloban ha abolido el puesto. Si
efectivamente ha sido abolido el cargo, entonces ha quedado extinguido el
derecho de recurente a ocuparlo y a cobrar el salario correspodiente. Mc
Culley vs. State, 46 LRA, 567. El derecho de un juez de desempenarlo
hasta los 70 aos de edad o se incapacite no priva al Congreso de su
facultad de abolir, fusionar o reorganizar juzgados no
constitucionales." 57 Nonetheless, such well-established principle was not
held applicable to the situation there obtaining, the Charter of Tacloban
City creating a city court in place of the former justice of the peace court.
Thus: "Pero en el caso de autos el Juzgado de Tacloban no ha sido abolido.
Solo se le ha cambiado el nombre con el cambio de forma del gobierno
local." 58 The present case is anything but that. Petitioners did not and
could not prove that the challenged statute was not within the bounds of
legislative authority.
7. This opinion then could very well stop at this point. The implementation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, concededly a task incumbent on the
Executive, may give rise, however, to questions affecting a judiciary that
should be kept independent. The all-embracing scope of the assailed
legislation as far as all inferior courts from the Courts of Appeals to
municipal courts are concerned, with the exception solely of the
Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals 59 gave rise, and
understandably so, to misgivings as to its effect on such cherished Ideal.
The first paragraph of the section on the transitory provision reads: "The
provisions of this Act shall be immediately carried out in accordance with
an Executive Order to be issued by the President. The Court of Appeals, the
Courts of First Instance, the Circuit Criminal Courts, the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Courts, the Courts of Agrarian Relations, the City
Courts, the Municipal Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Courts shall
continue to function as presently constituted and organized, until the
completion of the reorganization provided in this Act as declared by the
President. Upon such declaration, the said courts shall be deemed
automatically abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold the
office." 60 There is all the more reason then why this Court has no choice
but to inquire further into the allegation by petitioners that the security of
tenure provision, an assurance of a judiciary free from extraneous
influences, is thereby reduced to a barren form of words. The amended
Constitution adheres even more clearly to the long-established tradition of
a strong executive that antedated the 1935 Charter. As noted in the work
of former Vice-Governor Hayden, a noted political scientist, President Claro
M. Recto of the 1934 Convention, in his closing address, in stressing such a
concept, categorically spoke of providing "an executive power which,
subject to the fiscalization of the Assembly, and of public opinion, will not
only know how to govern, but will actually govern, with a firm and steady
hand, unembarrassed by vexatious interferences by other departments, or
by unholy alliances with this and that social group." 61 The above excerpt
was cited with approval by Justice Laurel in Planas v. Gil. 62 Moreover,
under the 1981 Amendments, it may be affirmed that once again the
principle of separation of powers, to quote from the same jurist
as ponente in Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 "obtains not through
express provision but by actual division." 64 The president, under Article VII,
shall be the head of state and chief executive of the Republic of the
Philippines." 65 Moreover, it is equally therein expressly provided that all
the powers he possessed under the 1935 Constitution are once again
vested in him unless the Batasang Pambansa provides
otherwise." 66 Article VII of the 1935 Constitution speaks categorically: "The
Executive power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines." 67 As
originally framed, the 1973 Constitution created the position of President
as the "symbolic head of state." 68 In addition, there was a provision for a
Prime Minister as the head of government exercising the executive power
with the assistance of the Cabinet 69 Clearly, a modified parliamentary
system was established. In the light of the 1981 amendments though, this
Court in Free Telephone Workers Union v. Minister of Labor 70 could state:
"The adoption of certain aspects of a parliamentary system in the
amended Constitution does not alter its essentially presidential
character." 71 The retention, however, of the position of the Prime Minister
with the Cabinet, a majority of the members of which shall come from the
regional representatives of the Batasang Pambansa and the creation of an
Executive Committee composed of the Prime Minister as Chairman and not
more than fourteen other members at least half of whom shall be members
of the Batasang Pambansa, clearly indicate the evolving nature of the
system of government that is now operative. 72 What is equally apparent is
that the strongest ties bind the executive and legislative departments. It is
likewise undeniable that the Batasang Pambansa retains its full authority to
enact whatever legislation may be necessary to carry out national policy as
usually formulated in a caucus of the majority party. It is understandable
then why in Fortun v. Labang 73 it was stressed that with the provision
transferring to the Supreme Court administrative supervision over the
Judiciary, there is a greater need "to preserve unimpaired the
independence of the judiciary, especially so at present, where to all intents
and purposes, there is a fusion between the executive and the legislative
branches." 74
8. To be more specific, petitioners contend that the abolition of the existing
inferior courts collides with the security of tenure enjoyed by incumbent
Justices and judges under Article X, Section 7 of the Constitution. There
was a similar provision in the 1935 Constitution. It did not, however, go as
far as conferring on this Tribunal the power to supervise administratively
inferior courts. 75 Moreover, this Court is em powered "to discipline judges
of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their
dismissal." 76 Thus it possesses the competence to remove judges. Under
the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such
power. 77 Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by
virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-
existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of
removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his
position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the
question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise.
Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is
one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal
and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He
ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the
assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted
principles of constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices
and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be
accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there
is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does not
render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the
case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by
either of the two departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of
deciding a case where the matter has been put in issue. Neither is there
any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created
by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom
it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried and
tested ways of judicial power, Rather what is sought to be achieved by this
liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the
exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing tulle inferior courts, the
power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is
ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any
unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernidble except to those
predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would
be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of alternatives
between one which would save and another which would invalidate a
statute, the former is to be preferred. 78 There is an obvious way to do so.
The principle that the Constitution enters into and forms part of every act
to avoid any constitutional taint must be applied Nuez v.
Sandiganbayan, 79 promulgated last January, has this relevant excerpt: "It
is true that other Sections of the Decree could have been so worded as to
avoid any constitutional objection. As of now, however, no ruling is called
for. The view is given expression in the concurring and dissenting opinion
of Justice Makasiar that in such a case to save the Decree from the direct
fate of invalidity, they must be construed in such a way as to preclude any
possible erosion on the powers vested in this Court by the Constitution.
That is a proposition too plain to be committed. It commends itself for
approval." 80 Nor would such a step be unprecedented. The Presidential
Decree constituting Municipal Courts into Municipal Circuit Courts,
specifically provides: "The Supreme Court shall carry out the provisions of
this Decree through implementing orders, on a province-to-province
basis." 81 It is true there is no such provision in this Act, but the spirit that
informs it should not be ignored in the Executive Order contemplated
under its Section 44. 82 Thus Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 could stand the
most rigorous test of constitutionality. 83
9. Nor is there anything novel in the concept that this Court is called upon
to reconcile or harmonize constitutional provisions. To be specific, the
Batasang Pambansa is expressly vested with the authority to reorganize
inferior courts and in the process to abolish existing ones. As noted in the
preceding paragraph, the termination of office of their occupants, as a
necessary consequence of such abolition, is hardly distinguishable from the
practical standpoint from removal, a power that is now vested in this
Tribunal. It is of the essence of constitutionalism to assure that neither
agency is precluded from acting within the boundaries of its conceded
competence. That is why it has long been well-settled under the
constitutional system we have adopted that this Court cannot, whenever
appropriate, avoid the task of reconciliation. As Justice Laurel put it so well
in the previously cited Angara decision, while in the main, "the Constitution
has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to
the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the
government, the overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties
between the several departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to
say just where the one leaves off and the other begins." 84 It is well to
recall another classic utterance from the same jurist, even more emphatic
in its affirmation of such a view, moreover buttressed by one of those
insights for which Holmes was so famous "The classical separation of
government powers, whether viewed in the light of the political philosophy
of Aristotle, Locke, or Motesquieu or of the postulations of Mabini, Madison,
or Jefferson, is a relative theory of government. There is more truism and
actuality in interdependence than in independence and separation of
powers, for as observed by Justice Holmes in a case of Philippine origin, we
cannot lay down 'with mathematical precision and divide the branches into
water-tight compartments' not only because 'the great ordinances of the
Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white but also
because 'even the more specific of them are found to terminate in a
penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other.'" 85 This too
from Justice Tuazon, likewise expressing with force and clarity why the
need for reconciliation or balancing is well-nigh unavodiable under the
fundamental principle of separation of powers: "The constitutional
structure is a complicated system, and overlappings of governmental
functions are recognized, unavoidable, and inherent necessities of
governmental coordination." 86 In the same way that the academe has
noted the existence in constitutional litigation of right versus right, there
are instances, and this is one of them, where, without this attempt at
harmonizing the provisions in question, there could be a case of power
against power. That we should avoid.
10. There are other objections raised but they pose no difficulty. Petitioners
would characterize as an undue delegation of legislative power to the
President the grant of authority to fix the compensation and the allowances
of the Justices and judges thereafter appointed. A more careful reading of
the challenged Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 ought to have cautioned them
against raising such an issue. The language of the statute is quite clear.
The questioned provisions reads as follows: "Intermediate Appellate
Justices, Regional Trial Judges, Metropolitan Trial Judges, municipal Trial
Judges, and Municipal Circuit Trial Judges shall receive such receive such
compensation and allowances as may be authorized by the President along
the guidelines set forth in Letter of Implementation No. 93 pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 985, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1597." 87 The existence of a standard is thus clear. The basic postulate that
underlies the doctrine of non-delegation is that it is the legislative body
which is entrusted with the competence to make laws and to alter and
repeal them, the test being the completeness of the statue in all its terms
and provisions when enacted. As pointed out in Edu v. Ericta: 88 "To avoid
the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at
the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and
lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete
abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy,
marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to
apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative
command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose
may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office
designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate
supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be either express or
implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The
standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be
implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a
whole." 89 The undeniably strong links that bind the executive and
legislative departments under the amended Constitution assure that the
framing of policies as well as their implementation can be accomplished
with unity, promptitude, and efficiency. There is accuracy, therefore, to this
observation in the Free Telephone Workers Union decision: "There is
accordingly more receptivity to laws leaving to administrative and
executive agencies the adoption of such means as may be necessary to
effectuate a valid legislative purpose. It is worth noting that a highly-
respected legal scholar, Professor Jaffe, as early as 1947, could speak of
delegation as the 'dynamo of modern government.'" 90 He warned against
a "restrictive approach" which could be "a deterrent factor to much-needed
legislation." 91 Further on this point from the same opinion" "The spectre of
the non-delegation concept need not haunt, therefore, party caucuses,
cabinet sessions or legislative chambers." 92 Another objection based on
the absence in the statue of what petitioners refer to as a "definite time
frame limitation" is equally bereft of merit. They ignore the categorical
language of this provision: "The Supreme Court shall submit to the
President, within thirty (30) days from the date of the effectivity of this act,
a staffing pattern for all courts constituted pursuant to this Act which shall
be the basis of the implementing order to be issued by the President in
accordance with the immediately succeeding section." 93 The first sentence
of the next section is even more categorical: "The provisions of this Act
shall be immediately carried out in accordance with an Executive Order to
be issued by the President." 94 Certainly petitioners cannot be heard to
argue that the President is insensible to his constitutional duty to take care
that the laws be faithfully executed. 95 In the meanwhile, the existing
inferior courts affected continue functioning as before, "until the
completion of the reorganization provided in this Act as declared by the
President. Upon such declaration, the said courts shall be deemed
automatically abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold
office." 96 There is no ambiguity. The incumbents of the courts thus
automatically abolished "shall cease to hold office." No fear need be
entertained by incumbents whose length of service, quality of
performance, and clean record justify their being named anew, 97 in legal
contemplation without any interruption in the continuity of their
service. 98 It is equally reasonable to assume that from the ranks of
lawyers, either in the government service, private practice, or law
professors will come the new appointees. In the event that in certain cases
a little more time is necessary in the appraisal of whether or not certain
incumbents deserve reappointment, it is not from their standpoint
undesirable. Rather, it would be a reaffirmation of the good faith that will
characterize its implementation by the Executive. There is pertinence to
this observation of Justice Holmes that even acceptance of the
generalization that courts ordinarily should not supply omissions in a law, a
generalization qualified as earlier shown by the principle that to save a
statute that could be done, "there is no canon against using common
sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean." 99 Where
then is the unconstitutional flaw
11. On the morning of the hearing of this petition on September 8, 1981,
petitioners sought to have the writer of this opinion and Justices Ramon C.
Aquino and Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera disqualified because the first-
named was the chairman and the other two, members of the Committee
on Judicial Reorganization. At the hearing, the motion was denied. It was
made clear then and there that not one of the three members of the Court
had any hand in the framing or in the discussion of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129. They were not consulted. They did not testify. The challenged
legislation is entirely the product of the efforts of the legislative
body. 100 Their work was limited, as set forth in the Executive Order, to
submitting alternative plan for reorganization. That is more in the nature of
scholarly studies. That the undertook. There could be no possible objection
to such activity. Ever since 1973, this Tribunal has had administrative
supervision over interior courts. It has had the opportunity to inform itself
as to the way judicial business is conducted and how it may be improved.
Even prior to the 1973 Constitution, it is the recollection of the writer of
this opinion that either the then Chairman or members of the Committee
on Justice of the then Senate of the Philippines 101consulted members of
the Court in drafting proposed legislation affecting the judiciary. It is not
inappropriate to cite this excerpt from an article in the 1975 Supreme
Court Review: "In the twentieth century the Chief Justice of the United
States has played a leading part in judicial reform. A variety of conditions
have been responsible for the development of this role, and foremost
among them has been the creation of explicit institutional structures
designed to facilitate reform." 102 Also: "Thus the Chief Justice cannot avoid
exposure to and direct involvement in judicial reform at the federal level
and, to the extent issues of judicial federalism arise, at the state level as
well." 103
12. It is a cardinal article of faith of our constitutional regime that it is the
people who are endowed with rights, to secure which a government is
instituted. Acting as it does through public officials, it has to grant them
either expressly or impliedly certain powers. Those they exercise not for
their own benefit but for the body politic. The Constitution does not speak
in the language of ambiguity: "A public office is a public trust." 104 That is
more than a moral adjuration It is a legal imperative. The law may vest in a
public official certain rights. It does so to enable them to perform his
functions and fulfill his responsibilities more efficiently. It is from that
standpoint that the security of tenure provision to assure judicial
independence is to be viewed. It is an added guarantee that justices and
judges can administer justice undeterred by any fear of reprisal or
untoward consequence. Their judgments then are even more likely to be
inspired solely by their knowledge of the law and the dictates of their
conscience, free from the corrupting influence of base or unworthy
motives. The independence of which they are assured is impressed with a
significance transcending that of a purely personal right. As thus viewed, it
is not solely for their welfare. The challenged legislation Thus subject d to
the most rigorous scrutiny by this Tribunal, lest by lack of due care and
circumspection, it allow the erosion of that Ideal so firmly embedded in the
national consciousness There is this farther thought to consider.
independence in thought and action necessarily is rooted in one's mind
and heart. As emphasized by former Chief Justice Paras in Ocampo v.
Secretary of Justice, 105 there is no surer guarantee of judicial
independence than the God-given character and fitness of those appointed
to the Bench. The judges may be guaranteed a fixed tenure of office during
good behavior, but if they are of such stuff as allows them to be
subservient to one administration after another, or to cater to the wishes of
one litigant after another, the independence of the judiciary will be nothing
more than a myth or an empty Ideal. Our judges, we are confident, can be
of the type of Lord Coke, regardless or in spite of the power of Congress
we do not say unlimited but as herein exercised to reorganize inferior
courts." 106 That is to recall one of the greatest Common Law jurists, who at
the cost of his office made clear that he would not just blindly obey the
King's order but "will do what becomes [him] as a judge." So it was pointed
out in the first leading case stressing the independence of the
judiciary, Borromeo v. Mariano, 107 The ponencia of Justice Malcolm
Identified good judges with "men who have a mastery of the principles of
law, who discharge their duties in accordance with law, who are permitted
to perform the duties of the office undeterred by outside influence, and
who are independent and self-respecting human units in a judicial system
equal and coordinate to the other two departments of
government." 108 There is no reason to assume that the failure of this suit
to annul Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 would be attended with deleterious
consequences to the administration of justice. It does not follow that the
abolition in good faith of the existing inferior courts except the
Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals and the creation of new ones
will result in a judiciary unable or unwilling to discharge with independence
its solemn duty or one recreant to the trust reposed in it. Nor should there
be any fear that less than good faith will attend the exercise be of the
appointing power vested in the Executive. It cannot be denied that an
independent and efficient judiciary is something to the credit of any
administration. Well and truly has it been said that the fundamental
principle of separation of powers assumes, and justifiably so, that the three
departments are as one in their determination to pursue the Ideals and
aspirations and to fulfilling the hopes of the sovereign people as expressed
in the Constitution. There is wisdom as well as validity to this
pronouncement of Justice Malcolm in Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay
Transportation Company, 109 a decision promulgated almost half a century
ago: "Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights,
should not sanction usurpations by any other department or the
government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to
the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic
Act." 110 To that basic postulate underlying our constitutional system, this
Court remains committed.
WHEREFORE, the unconstitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 not
having been shown, this petition is dismissed. No costs.
GR No. L-57883 March 12 1982
FACTS:
De La Llana, et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for
Prohibition, seeking to enjoin the Minister of the Budget, the Chairman of
the Commission on Audit, and the Minister of Justice from taking any action
implementing BP 129 which mandates that Justices and judges of inferior
courts from the CA to MTCs, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan
and the CTA, unless appointed to the inferior courts established by such
act, would be considered separated from the judiciary. It is the termination
of their incumbency that for petitioners justify a suit of this character, it
being alleged that thereby the security of tenure provision of the
Constitution has been ignored and disregarded.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the reorganization violate the security of tenure of justices
and judges as provided for under the Constitution.
RULING:
What is involved in this case is not the removal or separation of the judges
and justices from their services. What is important is the validity of the
abolition of their offices.
Well-settled is the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an
illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid,
the abolition must be made in good faith.
Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of valid abolition
of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the
abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office
with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense
that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of
security of tenure does not arise.