PAPER PHILOSOPHICAL ANTROPOLOGY: PHL 610

Professor: Dr. Randall Colton

Thesis:
The present work will start from the following main thesis:
THESIS: "The human soul is an expression of the essential
structure of matter and form and is immortal"
In other words, the main thesis is composed of two theses:
First main thesis: "The human soul is an expression of the
essential structure of matter and form"
Second main thesis: "The human soul is immortal"
Finally, this second thesis decomposes again into two
secondary theses:
First secondary thesis: "Corruption supposes the matter"
Second secondary thesis: "The human soul can not be
annihilate"

Introduction
The present paper is an attempt to summarize the previous
lessons about psychology, as well as to establish the bases
that allow us to approach the thesis and reach the conclusion;
This implies that we must precisely define its essence, within
the context of sciences that share its object. In fact,
philosophical psychology is related to biology and to positive
(experimental) psychology. With biology, since it has as
purpose the living being and the object of philosophical
psychology is also the living being, as it is unified and vivified
by a principle called "soul"; with positive or experimental
psychology, since both psychologies fully share the material
object, which is the "psykh" (), although, in the case of
positive psychology, this concept is reduced exclusively to the
human case, while on the philosophical psychology , the
concept of soul is broader, which depends on the fact that this
philosophical discipline derives and forms part of the
hilemrfica theory, which underlies cosmology and, within it,
the question of mobility. At this point appears, for the first
time, the connection between the hilmorphism and the human
soul. Indeed, today it may seem strange to any person or
even to any scholar, the affirmation of this consequence, that
is to say on the one hand the fact of the presence of a soul in
the whole range of living beings and on the other the
affirmation of an immortal soul as a substantial form of the
human being and also the claim that both facts are based on
the same theory that allows explaining the existence of a
stone.
When deepening the Thomist metaphysics, we find the
need for the existence of a set of structures that, at the same
time, allow to account for a series of events such as the
limitation in time and space, mobility and activity, which would
be inexplicable without the postulation of these structures and
principles. Now, what is most remarkable is the extension of
the theory, for we should not think that this explanation is
limited to the range of beings that go from the atoms to the
men, but we can not forget that this theoretical statement
allows us to explain and understand the existence of the
angels and God. Without the hilemorphic theory it would be
impossible to comprehend the world of pure forms, nor the
identification of essence and existence in God.
 Finally, in relation to this point, it is important that the theory
of the essential structure of matter and form is part of a
broader conceptualization, which is the structure of act and
potency, which includes the structure of essence and
existence, as well as other structures such as that of
substance and accidents and even within this the structuring
of substance, as matter and accidents as forms close to the
existence of the being.
The living being constitutes a type of moving entity and, as
mobility is solved by the hilemrfica theory, which establishes
the principles of matter and form as the basis of mobility in
general, then for the case of living entity both principles
continue to operate, but with the exception that in this case
the form adopts the name of "soul". Hence, in the
philosophical psychology of the Thomist school, the soul does
not belong exclusively to the human, but also extends to the
vegetable and animal kingdom. This is the reason why the
object of study called "soul" is broader in philosophical
psychology than in experimental psychology. Having clarified
the relative position of our science, proceed to enter into
matter.

Development
The characteristic of the mobility of the living being is that it
is an automotive, that is to say the movement of living beings
is characterized by coming from beings that move
themselves. A living being is distinguished from an inert being
in which the inert is totally dependent on external conditions
and alien to oneself to move, whereas in the living being this
external condition is relativized by an internal condition. Now,
for this kind of movement to take place, it is necessary that
the metaphysical expression that defines movement in
general can be fulfilled in a particular way: "act of a being in
potency insofar as it is in potency". (Physics, IV, 10-14). This
implies that in the living being there must be, intrinsically, one
or several parts in act and one or several in potency at the
same time, which implies that these beings must be structured
in the line of the internal organization; In short they must be
"organisms". This does not exactly coincide with the
hilemrfica structure of other moving entities, because in this
case, within a same being, there is act and potency in
different internal parts at the same time, instead in the inert
moving entity, these parts are not internal, since it is not
present the fact that some parts move to others but, as has
been said, in the inert movement is stimulated completely
from the outside by an extrinsic efficient cause.
Notwithstanding this consideration there exists in every
existing being an inner tension, provoked by the simultaneous
interaction of various structures of act and potency, as is the
case of essence and existence and constituting the essence,
the structure of matter and form, Where the inert beings tend
to the realization of the form that actualizes to the matter.
From this point of view even the inanimate beings possess
inwardly a cause of their movement and essential activity; this
is how the updating principle of the compound.
Now, as is to be expected, this system of structures that
allow us to constitute the being, also affect man in his
metaphysical constitution and therefore there is community
between man and all other beings that make up reality as a
whole. Notwithstanding this common condition, diversity is
evident, and within this, the peculiar position of man as a
being not only composed, but also in a dual condition, not in
the Platonic sense, but in the sense that this peculiar being
moves between the realm of animated gross matter and the
world of the spiritual, ie a world in which both the objects of
knowledge and the way of cognitively accessing them does
not depend on matter intrinsically. Hence the study of
metaphysical structures requires, in the case of man, certain
special considerations, in order to understand their behavior in
the different spheres of activity, but if we bear in mind the
general conception of the structured entity and the fact that
man is part of the universal body of beings, we see that the
first part of our thesis begins to settle naturally: "The human
soul is an expression of the essential structure of matter and
form." In living beings, what is called "form" in the inanimate
world, is called "soul" and can be "vegetative," "sensitive," or
"rational." The rational soul is the substantial form
corresponding to the human being.
All of the above allows us to base the next step of this
analysis, that is, to demonstrate the thesis that the soul is an
expression of the structure of matter and form, to finally end
up demonstrating the second part of the thesis, that is, that
the human soul is immortal.
The soul is the substantial form of the compound that we
call the body and therefore is found complete in each and
every one of its parts. This distinguishes the soul from other
forms which may also be in the whole body, but which by
being accidental are not all complete in each of its parts. For
example, the geometric shape of my body is and affects my
whole body, but not everything in each of its parts, because if
so outside we would have, for example a finger of the hand
with the complete shape of my body, which would imply a
coupling and not one unit, but two. This is why St. Thomas,
referring to the human soul, can affirm that "the soul is in the
eye by sight and in the ear by the auditory faculty".
 What happens to the brain ?, ie Is the brain the organ of
thought and will? Which correspond to the higher faculties of
the human soul. In order to answer this question and
concentrate only on thought, to make analysis simpler, it is
necessary to distinguish the different moments of the
intellection, starting from the base of which the human soul is
a soul incorporated, that is to say that its action is performs,
through an organic body. This also happens with the irrational
animals, but the difference is in that these two superior
faculties are exclusive of the human being and also they are
spiritual, the latter means that for the case of intelligence,
some of its objects do not depend on matter and since in
knowledge the intellect is identified with its object and since
the object does not depend on matter, then the intellect that
identifies with him neither. Thus for example, the metaphysical
object called act - potency, which comes into play in the
definition of the movement given above: "act of a being in
potency insofar as it is in potency", is applicable to any
change. So much, an material change, such as the
combustion of a wood transformed into ash, as immaterial, as
is the case of the immaterial movement from one thought to
another during the rational process. This implies that the act -
potency object, which is realized in both cases, sometimes
depends on matter (as in the wood) and sometimes does not
depend (as in the case of thought), because if it were
absolutely dependent on matter, It could never be realized in
immaterial objects, but according to the above, sometimes it
depends and sometimes it does not depend, that is to say it
does not depend absolutely, but only in relative way.
Therefore, even when the brain participates directly in the
cognitive process, this does not imply that such knowledge
depends on matter intrinsically
 The second part of the main thesis confronts us with the
need to demonstrate immortality which will of the human soul,
be done by analyzing separately, the two ways of ending it,
that is:
1. That the soul can be corrupted.
2. That the soul can be annihilated.
With respect to the first argument, can the human soul be
corrupted? This question leads us to establish the first
secondary thesis, as part of the second main thesis:
"Corruption supposes matter." This thesis leads us to a
question: What is corruption? It is important to answer this
question clearly, as it will allow us to make a very necessary
prior distinction for our purpose of demonstrating the second
major thesis; The distinction between corruption and
annihilation. Both concepts will be analyzed by contrast and
therefore simultaneously.
Corruption is a type of change and therefore does not imply
creation or annihilation. These last two terms refer to the
absolute being and nothingness absolute or more simply to
being and nothingness, but the term corruption refers to a
relative being and non-being; If it were not so, it would not be
enough to speak of creation or annihilation, as it would be the
same as talking about corruption, but the truth is that it is not
the same thing.
Now what is corruption? Let us first see the so-called "per
se" corruption, that is to say that corruption that affects the
compounds of first matter and substantial form. Such is the
case of the human soul that enters in composition with what
we call the human body, although in fact we should speak Of
the matter.
 As already said, corruption is a process of change and
substantial change is a well-defined fact since Aristotle. In an
substantial change, we will always find a substrate common to
the terms "trminus a quo" and "terminus ad quem". This is
the matter, that is to say in the substantial change the
presence of matter is indispensable, for being the principle
that unifies the change. If it were not so, there would be no
true change, but would correspond to a creation of
nothingness and an annihilation of being to nothingness,
which would be inexplicable, because how would we explain
that whenever certain conditions are generated, always
appears the same of the nothing, ie the same thing appears in
the same thing? So for example in a chemical reaction. A true
substantial change requires, to be logical, the persistence,
through change, of a common factor, that is to say matter and
therefore substantial change only affects the compounds of
first matter and substantial form. But the fact is that the human
soul is only form and not a compound and therefore the
human soul can not be object of a change "per se".
However, there is still a possibility of corruption different
from the previous one and that is the so-called "per accidens"
change, in which forms can be corrupted together with the
compound. This happens when the forms in question depend
intrinsically on matter, so that when the compound
disappears, so do the compromised forms. But the case of the
human soul is that as the human soul is a form does not
depend intrinsically on matter, because otherwise it would not
be possible for the soul to have immaterial powers.
The second argument leads us to the question of whether
the soul can be annihilated. We have already shown that the
soul has the power to be immortal by being immaterial. But
this power really comes from what has been put into it by the
creator of the soul, that is to say by God, which would have to
be demonstrated, but that by being too distant doctrinally we
can only consider it as a hypothesis. Thus, assuming that the
soul is a direct creation of God and considering its power to
be immortal, it would not be understood that God, despite
having created it and having created it with the power to be
eternally, would finally end up annihilating it. With all this is
demonstrated, the second consequence of the second
secondary thesis is that "the human soul can not be
annihilated"

Final Consideration
However, from all of the above, a problem arises: How
does consciousness after death work? The approach of this
problem is necessary, because if the human soul is spiritual, it
means that it is immortal and this implies that we can try to
know, something of its future state. This difficulty does not
exist for philosophies that deny the immortality of the soul, but
in this difficult endeavor Thomism counts, in addition to his
own philosophical concepts, with the aid of revelation.
Let us first look at the philosophical perspective: the human
soul is the substantial form of the human compound and
because it is spiritual, it is independent of matter, which
implies that it is not essentially affected by the death of the
body. The soul survives after death, but this does not imply
that the human being survives, because this is composed of
matter and soul, but only survives the substantial form, but not
possessed by a body, but as owning itself. How is it possible
this? We have already said that in intellective knowledge there
is an identification between the intellect and its object, so that
if the object is metaphysical, the intellect identifies itself with
an object detached from matter; Such is the case of the
human soul, which is absolutely immaterial and can then be
object of an intellection; after death, the soul has itself by
means of an intuitive self-cognition. At the moment of death
the human being born to a unique and original vision of his
spiritual essence, being in fact this is the first time that we will
contemplate an essence of a direct and intuitive way,
producing an identification between the cognitive I and the
spiritual soul.
The self-possession of the soul by itself, through the
cognitive self, implies that the soul can not perform sensory
operations, or less the vegetative ones, but only those of a
spiritual nature, but in reality this is sufficient for the existence
of consciousness and as consequence, for the existence of
life. Notwithstanding the above and based directly on
revelation, there are still three possible states for the
subsisting soul: hell, purgatory and paradise. Each of these
destinies correspond to the possible states of the soul after
death and relate to the situation of the soul, relative to God, at
the moment of death, that is to say with the degree of
acceptance or rejection on the part of the soul towards God. If
at the moment of death the soul is in full harmony with the will
of God, destiny is paradise, which consists in the beatific
vision; If it is in an intermediate state, that is to say that there
is an acceptance, but not in fullness, destiny is purgatory,
which is a state of intermediate purification to holiness; If at
the moment of death the attitude was of total rejection of God,
destiny is a state of metaphysical longing for happiness in the
beatific vision, but without any hope of attaining it. In this case
it is not possible to leave itself to open itself to the
contemplation of the Other; Is ultimately the triumph of the
ego that makes of "gravitational center" preventing the soul
"fly" to God. The eternal tragedy in this case is that the nature
of the soul is made to contemplate the Perfect Being, but not
to itself.
Given the definitive result and given that no one knows
when the time of death will come, it is necessary to always be
alert in prayer. This situation was plotted in Matthew 25: 1-13,
through the parable of the ten virgins.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Most of this research is based on the book by ANTONIO
MILLN PUELLES, "FOUNDATIONS OF PHILOSOPHY"
Ninth Edition. At the same time, this book is based on the
following bibliography:
PLATN : 1 Alcib., 129 (and also Timeo, 70) ; ARISTTELESDe
Anima, II, 2-4 : SAN AGUSTN : De Trinit., III, c. 9 (and also De gen. ad
litter., VI, c. 10); SANTO ToMs: Sum. Theol., I, q. 15-76 (and also Cont.
Gent., II, 55); DESCARTES: Discourse of the Method, IV;
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nouv. pour expliq. la nat. des subst. (ed. Gerhardt), N; Monadologie, par.
51-90; HUME: A Treat. of Hum. Nat., IV, s. 6 ; LAMARCK : Philosophie
zoologique, I ; DARWIN: The origin of species. cap. III and "sumary" cap.
IV. H. ANDR: Der Wesensunterschied von Pflanze, Tier und Mensch; M.
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Dasein ohne Krper; VANDEL: L'homme et 1'volution; G. VANZINI:
Inmortalit dell'anima umana; L. VIALLETON: Dillusion transformaste; H.
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WAELHENS: La filosofa de Martn Heidegger (captulo IX. "The problem
of human existence as a whole: the ontological interpretation of
death")..

Manuel Muoz B.