MIJARES, KATHLYNE JOY S.

2B
2010-018733

FELIPE YSMAEL, JR. & CO. vs. DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

(G.R. No. 79538. October 18, 1990) 190 SCRA 673

Decisions and orders of administrative agencies have upon their finality, the force
and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res
judicata. These decisions and orders are as conclusive upon the rights of the affected
parties as though the same had been rendered by a court of general jurisdiction. The
rule of res judicata thus forbids the reopening of a matter once determined by
competent authority acting within their exclusive jurisdiction.

Courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of
government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities under the special
technical knowledge and training of such agencies.

The Court will not hesitate to step in and wield its authority when invoked if an
appropriate case is brought showing a clear grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
DENR officials and related bureaus with respect to the implementation of the public
policy concerning the conservation of natural resources.

CONGRESSMAN ENRIQUE T. GARCIA vs. BOARD OF INVESTMENTS

(G.R. No. 92024. November 9, 1990) 191 SCRA 288

It is true that the judicial power embodied in Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
speaks of the duty of Courts of justice to determine whether or not there has been grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government. By no means, however, does it vest in the Courts
the power to enter the realm of policy considerations under the guise of the commission
of grave abuse of discretion.

But this is exactly what the majority Decision has resulted in. It has made a
sweeping policy determination and has unwittingly transformed itself into what might be
termed a "government by the Judiciary," something never intended by the framers of the
Constitution when they provided for separation of powers among the three co-equal
branches of government and excluded the Judiciary from policy-making.

This Court, in the exercise of its judicial power, may review and annul executive
as well as legislative actions when they clash with the Constitution or with existing laws,
or when any branch or instrumentality of the Government has acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction (Sec. 1, Art. VIII, 1987
Constitution) but the Court may not do more than that. It may not make the decisions
that the executive should have made nor pass the laws that the legislature should have
passed. Not even the much publicized "petroscam" involving the financial arrangements
(not the issue in this case) for the LPC project would justify the intervention of this court
in a matter that pertains to the exclusive domain of the executive department. The court
does not have a panacea for all the ills that afflict our country nor a solution for every
problem that besets it.

Did the BOI gravely abuse its discretion in approving the LPC's amended
application for registration of its petrochemical project to warrant the intervention of this
Court? Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction (Abad Santos vs. Prov. of Tarlac, 67 Phil.
480; Alafriz vs. Nable, 70 Phil. 278).

The decision of the BOI to allow the transfer of the LPC petrochemical project to
Batangas and shift feedstock from naphtha only to naphtha and/or LPG, may appear to
the petitioner to be extremely unwise and inadvisable, but the Court may not, for that
reason annul the BOI's action or prohibit it from acting on a matter that lies within its
particular sphere of competence, for the Court is not a judge of the wisdom and
soundness of the actions of the two other co-equal branches of the Government, but
only of their legality and constitutionality.

RAFAEL A. LO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

(G.R. No. 128667. December 17, 1999) 321 SCRA 190

The findings of fact made therein must be respected as long as they are
supported by substantial evidence, even if not overwhelming or preponderant; that it is
not for the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of
the witnesses, or otherwise substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative
agency on the sufficiency of the evidence; that the administrative decision in matters,
within the executive jurisdiction, can only be set aside on proof of grave abuse of
discretion, fraud, or error of law.

PANCHO YAP YOUNG vs. ROBERTO M. MOMBLAN

(A.M. No. P-89-367. January 9, 1992) 205 SCRA 33

It should be recalled that a purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or
tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the
mandate of legal authority, without regard to the exercise of his own judgment, upon the
propriety or impropriety of the act done (Lamb vs. Phipps, 22 Phil. 456). Discretion, on
the other hand, is a faculty conferred upon a court or official by which he may decide the
question either way and still be right (Asuncion vs. De Yriarte, 28 Phil. 67).
 METRO CONSTRUCTION, INC vs. CHATHAM PROPERTIES, INC.
(G.R. No. 141897. September 24, 2001) 365 SCRA 697

Circular No. 1-91 covers the CIAC. In the first place, it is a quasi-judicial agency.
A quasi-judicial agency or body has been defined as an organ of government other than
a court and other than a legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through
either adjudication or rule-making. The very definition of an administrative agency
includes its being vested with quasi-judicial powers. The ever increasing variety of
powers and functions given to administrative agencies recognizes the need for the
active intervention of administrative agencies in matters calling for technical knowledge
and speed in countless controversies which cannot possibly be handled by regular
courts. The CIACs primary function is that of a quasi-judicial agency, which is to
adjudicate claims and/or determine rights in accordance with procedures set forth in
E.O. No. 1008.

Section 1 of Circular No. 1-91 emphasizes the obvious inclusion of the CIAC
even if it is not named in the enumeration of quasi-judicial agencies. The introductory
words [a]mong these agencies are preceding the enumeration of specific quasi-judicial
agencies only highlight the fact that the list is not exclusive or conclusive. Further, the
overture stresses and acknowledges the existence of other quasi-judicial agencies not
included in the enumeration but should be deemed included. In addition, the CIAC is
obviously excluded in the catalogue of cases not covered by the Circular and mentioned
in Section 2 thereof for the reason that at the time the Circular took effect, E.O. No.
1008 allows appeals to the Supreme Court on questions of law.

Under Circular No. 1-91, appeals from the arbitral awards of the CIAC may be
brought to the Court of Appeals, and not to the Supreme Court alone. The grounds for
the appeal are likewise broadened to include appeals on questions of facts and appeals
involving mixed questions of fact and law.

MAXIMINO FUENTES vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS

(G.R. No. 109849. February 26, 1997) 268 SCRA 703

Prevailing jurisprudence uniformly holds that findings of facts of the trial court
particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals are binding upon the Court.

The jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals is
limited to the review and revision of errors of law allegedly committed by the appellate
court, as its findings of fact are deemed conclusive. As such this Court is not duty-bound
to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings
below. This rule, however, is not without exceptions." The findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals, which are as a general rule deemed conclusive, may admit of review by this
Court:

(1) when the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contradictory;
(2) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures;
(3) when the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is
manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;
(4) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;
(5) when the appellate court, in making its findings, goes beyond the issues of the case,
and such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(6) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on a misapprehension of
facts;
(7) when the Court of Appeals fails to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, will justify a different conclusion;
(8) when the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;
(9) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the specific evidence on
which they are based; and
(10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of
evidence but such findings are contradicted by the evidence on record.

ANTONIO G. PACHECO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 124863. June 19, 2000

Petitioners failed to prove that they have a clear legal right. They have failed to
point to any specific provision in Executive Order No. 18 vesting in the Sugar
Regulatory Administration the power to regulate sugar importation. That is not a power
expressly or impliedly vested in the SRA by law.

The court may not compel the Sugar Regulatory Administration to issue rules and
regulations governing the importation of sugar in the absence of "a standard for the
control and regulation of sugar importation" vested in it under the law. In other words, it
is not the ministerial duty of the SRA specifically enjoined by law to issue rules and
regulations governing sugar importation. Mandamus lies to compel the performance of a
clear legal duty or a ministerial duty imposed by law upon the defendant or respondent
to perform the act required that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from
office, trust or station. A clear legal right is one that is founded or granted by law. Unless
the right to relief is clear, mandamus will not issue. If there is any discretion as to the
taking or non-taking of the action sought, there is no clear legal duty.
 SALVADOR APRUEBA vs. HON. RODOLFO GANZON
(No. L-20867. September 3, 1966) 18 SCRA 8

Mandamus will not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion by a

public officer where the law imposes on him the right or duty to exercise judgment in
reference to any matter in which he is required to act.

The privilege of operating a market stall under license is always subject to the
police power of the city government and may be refused or granted for reasons of public
policy and sound public administration. Such privilege is not absolute but revocable
under an implied lease contract subject to the general welfare clause.

EVELYN ABEJA vs. JUDGE FEDERICO TAADA

(G.R. No. 112283. August 30, 1994) 236 SCRA 60

The COMELEC Rules of Procedure are controlling in election protests heard by a

regional trial court. In view of the fact that the subject election contest was filed on May
26, 1992, Section 2, Rule 17 and Section 11, Rule 35 of the aforementioned Comelec
rules are applicable. Rule 17 treats of Hearings whereas Rule 35 treats of Election
Contests Before Courts of General Jurisdiction.

No law or rule authorizes a procedure in which the revision of the ballots in the
counter-protested precincts should be revised only if it is shown after the revision of the
ballots in the protested precincts that protestant leads the protestee by at least one (1)
vote.

Nowhere in the COMELEC Rules is it indicated that presentation of evidence by

the protestee may continue after the court has ruled on the evidence of the protestant
and determine the number of votes obtained by the latter.

Public office is personal to the incumbent and is not a property which passes to
his heirs.

DOLORES A. PAREDES vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

(G.R. No. 88177 December 4, 1990; G.R. No. 89530 December 4, 1990) 192 SCRA 84

A qualification standard must exist to guide the appointing authority not only in
extending an appointment, but also in settling contested appointments. Without a duly
approved Qualification Standard it would be extremely difficult if not impossible for the
appointing authority to determine the qualification and fitness of the applicant for the
particular position. Without an approved Qualification Standard the appointing authority
would have no basis or guide in extending a promotional or original appointment in
filling up vacant positions in its department or agency.

Appeal in judicial proceedings is a statutory right that must be exercised only in

the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. This doctrine is also
applicable in quasijudicial proceedings so that one must first ascertain the law
applicable to determine whether or not the party can appeal the order or decision.

Appeal to the Civil Service Commission in an administrative case is extended to

the party adversely affected by the decision, that is, the person or the respondent
employee who has been meted out the penalty of suspension for more than thirty days;
or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary demotion in rank or salary or transfer,
removal or dismissal from office. In an administrative case, the complainant is a mere
witness. Even if she is the Head of the Administrative Services Department of the HSRC
as a complainant she is merely a witness for the government in an administrative case.
No private interest is involved in an administrative case as the offense is committed
against the government.