The meaning of , namely, being-there as unconcealed, i.e.

,
being-meant in itself, is in no way drawn from and explicated on the
basis of judgment and thus does not originally reside in it or refer to it.
[being-true] does not mean possessing the truth but
rather taking the beings meant in each case and as such into true
safekeeping as unveiled.
[sense perception], i.e., perceiving in the how of the
sensory, is not alsocalled true merely because the concept of truth
has been transferred from to it. Rather, in accord with its own
intentional character, it in itself primordially brings to givenness its
intentional toward-which in the original. It means bringing an object
to givenness as unveiled.Hence,
[sense perception of the proper objects of each of the
individual senses is always true] (De an. 3, 427b12). We can see that
with respect to the phenomenal situation intended here, the
expressions truth and true do not really tell us anything. In
contrast, falsehood (, ) can be found only where there
is synthesis: [falsehood always involves a
synthesis] (ibid., 6, 430b). Falsehood presupposes as the condition of
its possibility a different intentional structure of meaning something as
an object, an approach to beings from the point of view of another
kind of being-meant. When a being is intended in itself not in a plain
and simple manner but rather as this or that, i.e., in its character of
being as something, perceiving takes place in the how of a taking-
together and taking-with. When, as sense perception, perceiving
actualizes itself in the mode of addressing and discussing its object
as this or that (i.e., in ), it can happen that in the course of this
the object winds up giving itself out as something that it is not. And
this tendency toward meaning the object in its as is utterly
foundational for the possibility of : ,
, , [while the
perception that white is there before one cannot be false, the
perception that what is white is this or that may be false] (ibid., 3,
428b20);
[it also is possible to think falsely, and thought is found only
where there is discourse as well as sense perception] (ibid., 427b13).
That is, only what is perceived in the mode of being-addressed with
respect to an as can give itself to such addressing as deceptively
like. In accord with its meaning, the being-true of the of
addressing is constituted only circuitously througha reference to
. itself needs to be understood in terms of its own basic
intentional characteristic, namely, that it is [assertion], i.e.,
an addressing and discussing which means its object in such a way
that what it says is said on the basis of this object and is drawn
from()it. (SUP 131)

The meaning of althes, namely, being-there as unconcealed, i.e.,

being-meant in itself, is in no way drawn from and explicated on the
basis of judgment and thus does not originally reside in it or refer to it.
Altheuein [being-true] does not mean possessing the truth but
rather taking the beings meant in each case and as such into true
safekeeping as unveiled.
Aisthsis [sense perception], i.e., perceiving in the how of the
sensory, is not alsocalled true merely because the concept of truth
has been transferred from lgos to it. Rather, in accord with its own
intentional character, it in itself primordially brings to givenness its
intentional toward-which in the original. It means bringing an object
to givenness as unveiled. Hence, h men gar aesthesis tn idion aei
althes [sense perception of the proper objects of each of the
individual senses is always true] (De an. 3, 427b12). We can see that
with respect to the phenomenal situation intended here, the
expressions truth and true do not really tell us anything. In
contrast, falsehood (pseudos, pseudes) can be found only where
there is synthesis: to gar pseudo en synthesei aei [falsehood always
involves a synthesis] (ibid., 6, 430b). Falsehood presupposes as the
condition of its possibility a different intentional structure of meaning
something as an object, an approach to beings from the point of view
of another kind of being-meant. When a being is intended in itself not
in a plain and simple manner but rather as this or that, i.e., in its
character of being as something, perceiving takes place in the how
of a taking-together and taking-with. When, as sense perception,
perceiving actualizes itself in the mode of addressing and discussing its
object as this or that (i.e., in legein), it can happen that in the course
of this the object winds up giving itself out as something that it is not.
And this tendency toward meaning the object in its as is utterly
foundational for the possibility of pseudos: hoti men gar leukn, ou
pseudetai, ei de touto to leukon e allo ti, pseudetai [while the
perception that white is there before one cannot be false, the
perception that what is white is this or that may be false] (ibid., 3,
428b20); dianoeisthai dendechetai kai pseuds kai oudeni uparchei ho
m kai lgos [it also is possible to think falsely, and thought is found
only where there is discourse as well as sense perception] (ibid.,
427b13). That is, only what is perceived in the mode of being-
addressed with respect to an as can give itself to such addressing
as deceptively like. In accord with its meaning, the being-true of
the lgos of addressing is constituted only circuitously through a
reference to pseudos. Lgos itself needs to be understood in terms of
its own basic intentional characteristic, namely, that it is apphansis
[assertion], i.e., an addressing and discussing which means its object in
such a way that what it says is said on the basis of this object and is
drawn from (ap) it. (SUP 131)