Leningrad: Surviving the Siege

Ramsey Hardin

Research Seminar in Russian, East European, and Eurasian History

 Hardin 2

Leningrad: Surviving the Siege

The Russian people are patient and hardy. They survived 300 years of the Tartar yoke, 300

years of Romanov oppression, all of the Five Year Plans, and the difficulties of the present war.

--V. A. Inostrantsev, engineer, Lenriprogaza plant, 19441

Introduction

World War II has no more tragic story than that of the siege of Leningrad, a tragedy that

might have been avoided but for the hubris of Adolf Hitler and the incompetence of Joseph

Stalin. Though the two formed a short-lived non-aggression pact in August, 1939, Stalin

admitted that he expected to be forced into war with Germany. Hitlers attack on the Soviet

Union across the poorly defended Polish border in 1941 should not have been surprising, yet

there was little military planning for Leningrads defense in spite of its pivotal position as both a

focus of Socialism and Russian national identity as well as a military-industrial center. Stalin

failed to establish cooperation between military commanders and Communist Party officials or to

stockpile of food resources and medical supplies. Rather than immediately aiding Leningrad or

creating evacuation routes, the Soviet leaders diverted reinforcements to Moscow and sent

untrained and unarmed soldiers into battle. Party officials, under Stalins orders, arrested and

executed those who were suspected of opposition to his regime. As a result, through three brutal

winters of unending cold and minimal rations, the citys citizens slowly died of starvation and

disease. After the war, strict censorship of the details of Leningrads suffering during the Siege

served the propaganda efforts rather than accurate historical documentation. Leningrads citizens

became heroic symbols of a national triumph over Nazism rather than victims of wartime

1
V. A. Inostrantsev in The Siege of Leningrad: 900 Days of Terror. David M. Glantz,

(London: Brown Partworks Limited, 2001), 192.

 Hardin 3

disaster. The recent opening of government archives, the publication of siege diaries, and

interviews with survivors and Red Army veterans has created a more realistic portrayal of the

human triumphs and failures of the siege survivors.

Taken By Surprise

When German Chancellor Adolf Hitler launched the invasion of the Soviet Union with

Operation Barbarossa, he selected the city of Peter and Lenin as a priority objective. Built by

Peter the Great at the mouth of the Neva River on forty-two delta islands and named St.

Petersburg, the citys vital geographic location provided access to the Baltic Sea. It was not only

the northwest gateway to Russia, but it was also a symbol of the Russian Revolution. In 1895, V.

I. Lenin founded the Union for the Struggle of the Working Class in St. Petersburg and

introduced Marxist Socialism to citys workers movements. The city was a focal point of

revolution including the Kronshtadt Mutiny on November 8, 1904, and Bloody Sunday, January

9, 1905. In 1924, the citys workers renamed it Leningrad to honor their leader. In the 1930s,

Stalin used the city to consolidate his power as he arranged the assassination of Communist Party

Secretary Sergei M. Kirov, and followed with purges of those who might oppose his rule. In

selecting Leningrad as a target for destruction, Hitler sent an intimidating message to every

Russian about his plans for the Soviet Union. He described the Slavs an inferior race and ordered

that the city be starved into submission. Leningrads economy was highly mobilized and

militarized. Hitler intended to neutralize its importance as a center for the Soviet Baltic Fleet

and destroy its many factories. In March, 1941, he defined his goals:

Communism presents an enormous danger for the future. A communist has

never been and never will be our comrade. It is a struggle for annihilation. Soviet
 Hardin 4

officials represent a grave danger because they have clearly proven through their

previous subversive and seditious work that they reject all European culture,

civilization, constitution, and order. They are therefore to be eliminated."2

Despite the warning signs at the start of Operation Barbarossa, the Soviet Union was

unprepared for the German invasion. Because of the emphasis on expanded military production

in Leningrad, goods and services for the civilian population had been sacrificed. According to

Richard Bidlack, this made stockpiling food and other resources difficult even though the city

was experienced in preparing for and waging war.3 Joining with Finnish troops, German forces

encircled Leningrad beginning on September 8, 1941. The siege lasted for 872 days. Shelling,

air attacks, disease, and starvation took the lives of 1.6 to 2 million civilians blockaded within

the city according to Russian authorities. Bidlack believes that the death toll was much higher,

but that Stalin deliberately revised the numbers to hide the mismanagement of the crisis.4 Of the

citys population of 3,300,000, approximately 300,000 survived. All of the survivors received the

Medal in the Defense of Leningrad for their service. According to William Lubbeck, a soldier

with German Army Group North, once German forces encircled Leningrad and destroyed its
2
Hitler, Adolf, Der Fhrer an das deutsche Volk 22. Juni 1941, in Philipp Bouhler, trans. and

ed. Der grodeutsche Freiheitskampf. Reden Adolf Hitlers, vol. 3 (Munich: Franz Eher, 1942),

53, accessed October 15, 2014, http://research.calvin.edu/german-propagandaarchive/hitler4.htm.

3
Richard Bidlack, Workers at War: Factory Workers and Labor Policy in the Siege of

Leningrad, in The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies

(Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Center for Russian and East European Studies, 1991), 4.
4
Ibid. Foreword, in Cynthia Simmons, and Nina Perlina. Writing the Siege of

Leningrad: Women's Diaries, Memoirs, and Documentary Prose (Pittsburgh:

University of Pittsburgh Press, 2002), ix.

 Hardin 5

main supply of food in early bombing campaigns, the German military command expected the

city to fall within a matter of months: "Hitler ordered us not to enter the city to avoid losses in

street battles, where tanks were unable to take part. Our German troops, in fact, quite

comfortably and easily, expected that the coming famine and cold would force the city to

surrender.5 Other German officers, such as Dr. Werner Koeppen, Reich minister for the

occupied territories of the east, wrote of the damage to Leningrad only two weeks into the siege:

Already it is impossible to get bread, sugar, or meat in the city. Leningrad is to be shut inshot

to piecesand starved out.6 The capture of Leningrad satisfied three strategic goals in the

German Operation Barbarossa and Army Group North:

Occupy the former capital of Russia and symbolic capital of the Russian Revolution.

Neutralize its military importance as a main base of the Soviet Baltic Fleet.

Destroy its industrial strength, including numerous arms factories.

The shelling and terror inflicted by the Germans began suddenly for the people of

Leningrad. Michael Jones interviewed Russian signals operator Mikhail Neishtadt who was

dismayed as he read a telegram from the Soviet Unions Defense Minister Marshal Timoshenko:

I could not believe the words. Our supreme commander could not comprehend what was

happening. The telegram read, Prepare our troops for warbut do not engage. Under no

circumstances must our troops retaliate. 7 Another Russian soldier and siege survivor, Daniil

5
William Lubbeck, and David Hurt. At Leningrad's Gates: The Story of a Soldier with Army

Group North. (Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword Military, 2007), 45.
6
Werner Koeppen, Letter, September 22, 1941, accessed October 25, 2014,

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=6860.
7
Mikhail Neishtadt, Interview, quoted in Michael Jones, Leningrad: State of Siege.
 Hardin 6

Granin, was also shaken by the events: The blockade was sudden and unexpected, as much as

the war itself was unexpected for the country. There were no reserves of fuel, no food... Then one

after another catastrophic event started to occur, power supplies were stopped, there was no

water, no sewerage system operating, no central heating in place.8 The first indication of

impending doom was an August 21, 1941 report in the main newspaper that German armies

might try to take Leningrad. By August 29, the last railroad line out of Leningrad had been

destroyed. Ironically, according to Simmons, while millions of skilled workers, women, and

children were left trapped inside the siege ring, thousands of former criminals, army deserters,

White Army officers, kulaks, and illegal immigrants were sent to various locations east of the

Urals.9

Vyacheslav Molotov, Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union who had initially signed a

non-aggression pact with Hitler in 1939, announced the attack on the radio, calling on the

Russian people for support. Diarist Elena Skriabina remembered his speech as halting and

breathless.10 Only as he spoke did she realize the looming oppression ahead as he compared

Hitler to Napoleon:

(New York: Basic Books,2008), 10.

8
Daniil Aleksandrovich Granin, First-hand Accounts of the Ordeal (Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword

Military, 2006), 76.

9
Cynthia Simmons, and Nina Perlina. Writing the Siege of Leningrad: Women's

Diaries,

Memoirs, and Documentary Prose (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2002),

xxix.
10
Elena Skribiana, Siege and Survival: The Odyssey of a Leningrader, trans.

Norman Luxemburg (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1971), 35.

 Hardin 7

This is not the first time that our people have had to deal with an attack of

an arrogant foe. At the time of Napoleon's invasion of Russia our people's reply

was war for the fatherland, and Napoleon suffered defeat and met his doom. It will

be the same with Hitler, who in his arrogance has proclaimed a new crusade

against our country. The Red Army and our whole people will again wage

victorious war for the fatherland, for our country, for honor, for liberty. 11

Zhukovs Orders

Stalin saw Leningrad as a hopeless situation, according to Marshal Georgy Zhukov,

confessing to his military commanders, Leningrad may be lost.12 Stalin ordered him to save

Leningrad by any means. If the city fell, 11% of the national economy, the wealth of the

Hermitage Museum, and the palaces of the Russian tsars would be in enemy hands. German

forces could unite with the motivated Finnish forces, drive through Northern Russia and attack

Moscow, which might well win the war for Germany. However, Glantz maintains that Stalins

interference in the organization of the citys defense as the Germans approached hindered the

ground troops.13 He also argues that Stalin saw plots everywhere, especially when his generals

retreated.

11
Vyacheslav Molotov, The Nazi Invasion of Russia." The History Place - Great

Speeches Collection, accessed October 3, 2014,

http://www.historyplace.com/speeches/molotov.htm.
12
Georgy K Zhukov, The Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov. (London: Jonathan Cape, LTD,

1971), 56.
13
Glantz, 37.
 Hardin 8

On September 10, 1941, Zhukov became commander of the Leningrad front and had

three key tasks. Since 460,000 refugees from the Nazi-occupied provinces had flooded

Leningrad and its suburbs, shortages of food and munitions were critical. Zhukov had to stop the

offensive before it entered Leningrad proper, protect the fleeing civilians, and reorganize the

joint command and civilian resistance to prepare for a lengthy siege. According to Glantz, his

actions were immediate and decisive.14 He executed inadequate officers, strengthened the siege

perimeter, and organized a special armed regiment to shoot anyone who retreated from the

perimeter. Next, he ordered the laying of dense minefields and the deployment of artillery

batteries in all critical directions. He also redeployed fifty thousand sailors from the Baltic Fleet

for additional infantry and reinforcements. He addressed Leningrads citizens in a letter to the

Leningrad Pravda, calling on their memories of prior wartime experience: "The moment has

come to put your Bolshevik qualities to work, to get ready to defend Leningrad without wasting

words. We have to see that nobody is just an onlooker, and carry out in the least possible time the

same kind of mobilization of the workers that was done in 1918 and 1919. The enemy is at the

gate. It is a question of life and death."15 Ironically, the next day, Stalin ordered reinforcement

troops diverted from Leningrad to the defense of Moscow.

Zhukovs strategies, though successful, produced unintended results. He launched

attacks and counterattacks to harass and exhaust the German and Finnish forces on the siege

14
Ibid., 45.
15
Georgy Zhukov, August 21, 1941 letter to Leningrad Pravda, quoted in Geoffrey Roberts,

Stalins General: The Life of Marshal Zhukov. (New York: Random House, 2012),

193.
 Hardin 9

perimeter to the north and south. These counteroffensives stopped the enemy forces after they

had penetrated the defense lines near the seaport of Leningrad. Throughout Zhukovs Leningrad

command, Stalin diverted his troops and his attention. He insisted Zhukov frequently return to

Moscow to oversee other operations and direct Moscow defense efforts. Geoffrey Roberts

characterizes the relationship between Stalin and Zhukov as cooperative rather than friendly.

Throughout his adult life, Zhukov had venerated Stalin, even in the years after his first disgrace.

He was in awe of Stalin, who was the dominant figure in their relationship, yet the

imbalance in their personal relationship did not preclude the two men from forming a creative

and productive partnership that was to lead the Red Army to the brink of complete catastrophe

before leading it to the greatest victory in military history. 16 According to Salisbury, Stalin

maintained veto power over battle plans and staff, elevating his favorite officers and eliminating

any that he perceived as a threat.17 In spite of Stalins interference, Zhukovs unceasing efforts

stopped the German offensive in its tracks. Unfortunately, the fierce battle was transformed into

a deadly siege.

The Daily Struggle: Survival for the Leningrad Citizen

Though the Soviet command had several months to assist Leningrads citizens, the lack

of preparation caused misery. Lisa Kirschenbaum states that Leningraders endured sufferings

which defy the imagination.18 V. M Kovalchuk, A. I. Rupasov, and A. N. Christokov believe

16
Geoffrey Roberts, Stalins General: The Life of Georgy Zhukov (New York:

Random House, 2012), 156.

17
Harrison E. Salisbury, The 900 Days: The Siege of Leningrad (New York: Harper &

Row, 1969) 93.

18
Lisa Kirschenbaum, The Legacy of the Siege of Leningrad, 1941-1995: Myth,

Memories, and Monuments. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 88.
 Hardin 10

that citizens survived through mutual assistance, creative lawbreaking, self-distraction, and

fatalism.19 Bitter temperatures of forty below and frozen pipes forced people to use small stoves

called burzhuiki which frequently caused rapidly spreading fires. With the citys electricity

destroyed by German shelling, the streets were dark both day and night during the dreary winter

months. Snowdrifts filled the streets, covering the bodies of the dead. Major Lozak, a staff

officer in the Red Army, recalled,

"In those days there was something in a man's face which told you that he

would die within the next twenty-four hours. I remember how I'd walk every day

from my house to the center of the city. Many a time I saw a man suddenly

collapse on the snow. There was nothing I could do. One just walked on. And, on

the way back, I would see a vague human form covered with snow on the spot

where, in the morning, I had seen a man fall down.20

The quest for bread and any other food was a major part of the daily routine. Children

were at greater risk of starvation and developmental problems during this time. Anastasia

Pershkina, who was eleven years old during the siege, remembered drawing pictures of food and

moaning from hunger during the night. She frequently stood on bread lines:

People wrapped themselves in pieces of cloth. All you could see were the

tips of noses sharp from hunger. In the deep silence people stood and patiently

waited for their priceless pieces of bread. They baked the bread in enormous
19
V. M. Kovalchuk, A. I. Rupasov, and A. N. Christokov. Leningrad During the Great Patriotic

War: Means of Adaptation. Russian Studies in History. 52 (Fall, 2013)

(2): 7. DOI 10. 2753/RSH1061-1983520201.

20
Major Lozak quoted in Harrison E. Salisbury, The 900 Days: The Siege of Leningrad.

(New York: Harper & Row,1969), 91.

 Hardin 11

ovens. The crusts fell over and fell off in crumbs. The workers treated me to the

crusts. I dont remember how many crusts I ate. The smell of that bread has

remained with me forever.21

The quest for food brought out the best and worst in Leningraders. Initially,

affluent residents bought whatever they could as long as retail stores were operational,

especially canned foods that would last a long time. The steady withdrawals of funds sent

the banks into a crisis, so the government began rationing and limited savings withdrawals

to 200 rubles per month.22 The implementation of strict regulations did not prevent some

Leningraders from taking advantage of their fellow citizens. Food salesmen exchanged

loaves of bread for expensive clothing or family heirlooms. Reid reports that those in

charge of food inventories stole for families or sale on the black market while Army

paymasters lost track of large sums of money.23 People with a food related job became

sought-after friends who accepted bribes, offers of assistance, or sexual favors. Glantz

points out that food warehouses were looted regularly, so the sale of food at flea markets

became illegal. Only a shortage of police officers prevented frequent arrests.24 The
21
Anastasiya Pershkina, The Siege of Leningrad: A Life of Hunger,

http://sputniknews.com/voiceofrussia/2013_01_19/The-siege-of-Leningrad-A-life-of-hunger/

(accessed October 3, 2014).

22
Richard Bidlack and Nikita Lomagin. The Leningrad Blockade, 1941-1944: A New

Documentary History from the Soviet Archives (New Haven: Yale University Press,

2012), 73.
23
Anna Reid. Leningrad: The Epic Siege of World War II, 1941-1944. (New York:

Walker and Company, 2011),193.

24
Glantz, 187.
 Hardin 12

shortage of police also increased more serious criminal behavior. Some of the most

common crimes were ration card theft and forgery, murder for ration cards and other

possessions, and concealment of bodies so that ration cards could continue to be used.

There were also cases of animals killed and used for food as well as cannibalism,

especially during the depths of winter famine.25

Though some people immediately began to hoard food, others went into denial,

arguing that the city had enough supplies and that the war would end quickly. Gradually,

however, many residents became convinced that no amount of effort would help them

survive. The constant sirens, falling bombs, and pervasive danger created a sense of

fatalism. They had to spend a lot of time in bomb shelters, and many lost their jobs as

businesses closed down. With no engrossing job and constant malnutrition, they became

fatigued and depressed.

The city had been under siege for four months before Leningrads political leaders

focused on the emergency needs of the people. Bidlack notes that the authorities began to

manufacture power generators, open public baths, laundries, heating stations, and health

clinics. These measures did not help the majority of people, however, since food

shipments did not increase.26

The most effective means of helping people survive was evacuation. By the end of

January, the ice on Lake Lagoda would allow heavy transport trucks. City officials arranged the

departure of more than 500,000 non-working adults and children over the Road of Life. Others

left on their own, pulling sleds or traveling in horse-drawn wagons. Food was also brought into

the city across the ice and more than one million people were able to escape. Young women
25
V. M. Kovalchuk, 16.
26
Bidlack, Leningrad Blockade, 168.
 Hardin 13

drove food trucks without adequate sleep or food. To stay awake, they tied pots and pans to the

truck bumpers for extra noise.27 It was a perilous trip. Granin reports that one young boy had a

harrowing experience during evacuation: I got on a train with my brother at the Finland railway

station to take us to Lake Ladoga. And when we got off the train, there were crowds all sitting

down, all covered with ice, ice pools everywhere. No trucks came to take us across Lake Ladoga;

there was a shortage of them. Under the ice in a puddle, in a hole, in a crater there was a frozen

woman with a baby in her hands.28

Several factors gave siege victims a reason to remain hopeful. Teamwork on collective

projects gave Leningraders a meaningful way to pass the time between jobs or to avoid

depression when any hope was remote. James Clapperton conducted interviews with blockade

survivors who expressed nostalgia for the feelings of closeness that arose from shared suffering.29

They dug trenches around the city, cleaned the city to prevent epidemics, defused incendiary

bombs, and helped the weak and the sick.

Cultural activities also gave citizens a more optimistic outlook. During the siege, Dmitri

Shostakovich not only worked guarding city rooftops and extinguishing fires, but he also

composed Seventh Symphony dedicated to the heroism of his city. The Leningrad premiere, on

August 9, 1942, was performed by starving musicians and broadcast over loudspeakers at the

front to defy the Nazis and hearten Russian troops. Abroad, it provided moral redemption for
27
Simmons, 80.
28
Daniil Aleksandrovich Granin, First-hand Accounts of the Ordeal, (Barnsley,

UK: Pen & Sword Military, 2006), 142.

29
James Clapperton, "The Siege of Leningrad as Sacred Narrative: Conversations with

Survivors, Oral History-London. 35 (Spring, 2007) (1): 49-60. Stable URL:

http://www.jstor.org.proxy.lib.ohiostate.edu/stable/40179922
 Hardin 14

Stalin and the Soviet regime. According to Moynahan, Shostakovich described his music as not

merely a cry against the Nazis but also against Stalinism: A requiem for a noble city beset by

the twin monsters of the century.30

Finally, Leningraders knew that surrender was not an option for them. Hitler had

announced that he intended to erase the city from the face of the earth. He had promised to leave

the populace to die in the event of a German victory. In fact, Hitler was so convinced that his

military machine would easily defeat the Russians that he had invitations printed for a

celebration at the Astoria Hotel in Leningrad for the evening of August 9, 1942. Shostakovich

chose this night for the premiere of his symphony to counter Nazi arrogance.

The Siege Broken: A Society Altered

In January 1943, Red Army soldiers broke through the German line, rupturing the

blockade and creating a more efficient supply route along the shores of Lake Ladoga. Early in

1944, Soviet forces approached Leningrad, forcing the Germans to retreat southward from the

city on January 27. The siege was over. A giant Soviet offensive to sweep the USSR clean of its

invaders began in May. The aftermath of the siege presented many questions. What was most

instrumental in creating this tragedy--Nazi aggression or Soviet blunders? Certainly Hitlers

arrogant belief in Nazi dominance was the igniting factor, but Stalin willfully refused to prepare

for an invasion, despite countless warnings. Thousands of young conscripts in the People's Levy,

were thrown into the front-line with no training. Party officials failed to store food, protect the

city, or evacuate Leningrad until too late. Their negligence caused millions of deaths, radically
30
Brian Moynahan, Leningrad: Siege and Symphony, (New York: Atlantic

Monthly Press, 2013), 10.

 Hardin 15

changed the city and its population, and altered historic traditions in Russian society. The role of

women during the siege was critical since they were responsible for the survival of their families.

The Changing Role of Women during the Siege

Siege survivor Nadezhda Mandelshtam was typical of many women who remained in

Leningrad, left alone to preserve some level of normalcy in the midst of chaos. She was most

afraid when she learned that the Badaevsky food warehouses had been burned. A system of food

rationing was launched to stretch the citys meager supplies. People who did not work received

125 grams of bread, and children received 150 grams. With her husband and other male relatives

called to the front to fight, her main worry was finding enough food for her family. At the

market, she tried to exchange her possessions for food products to save her children from

starvation. Death surrounded her constantly: The Germans bombed Leningrad daily, at the

same time every morning and evening. Many people died of hunger. Walking in the yard with

the children, I saw the janitors go into the apartments and then bring down the dead into the yard

to pile them in stacks on the ground. Later, a truck would come to take them away to the

Piskarevskoe cemetery.31 Her family survived by walking to nearby villages to dig for potatoes

or frozen cabbage leaves for soup. She also joined with relatives to share food and collect

drinking water.

Elena Kochinas Blockade Diary, showed how the role of women extended beyond the

home at a cost of familial relationships. Though she was a member of a scientific institute and

had a young daughter, she teamed with other women to assemble anti-tank ditches for the citys

defense and to work in peat bogs to provide fuel for warmth and cooking. Women also replaced
31
Nadezhda Mandelshtam. Hope Against Hope; a Memoir. (New York: Atheneum, 1970),

72.
 Hardin 16

men in the munitions factories. Her husband, a designer, was exempted from the draft to work in

the city. He was ill suited to the adaptations necessary for survival, becoming increasingly

depressed and irrational, sneaking extra food from the family supply, and stealing from a food

warehouse. As his mental condition rapidly deteriorated, Elena assumed all the organizational

functions that allowed the family to survive the siege. She ate pine needles, grass, and anxiously

guarded a small plot of carrots and turnips for human invaders.

Women not only managed the family, but also served as soldiers on the front lines.

According to Adamovich and Granin, 17,000 young women and girls from Leningrad fought in

womens units as regular soldiers.32 Soldiers received larger food rations, so the women would

pass extra food to their families. John Erickson points out that Russian women participated as

soldiers in an unprecedented way during World War II. The official stance of the Soviet

government was that any person who entered the armed forces ceased to be man or woman and

became simply soldier.33 Blockade survivors, many of whom were women, proved resilient

and resourceful.

Siege Propaganda: Heroic Myth, Truth Denied

Michael Jones believes that the entire story of Leningrads suffering will never truly be

known. In fact, Russian authorities censored the mortality rate in warfare and in the city. No

photo with more than three dead people was published in newspapers. Instead, the government

focused on the symbolic significance of the Leningrad defense and the courage of those under
32
Ales Adamovich, and Daniil Aleksandrovich Granin. Leningrad under Siege:

First-hand

Accounts of the Ordeal. Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Military, 2007, 105.
33
John Erickson, Soviet Women at War, in John Garrard, ed., World War II and the

Soviet People (New York: St. Martins Press, 1990), 58.

 Hardin 17

siege as examples of Soviet strength. Party propaganda portrayed support of the war as support

of the Communist Party. Bedlack notes that the state used the victory in the war and the

defense of Leningrad to try to legitimize its existence and its one party system.34 Recent access

to Soviet-era archives in Russia, a variety of diaries and memoirs, and periodicals printed in

blockaded areas provide greater insight into the military strategies, political blunders, and living

conditions in Leningrad during the siege. Bidlack points out that the Kremlin was well informed

on developments in the blockade zone. 35 Dispatches from Stalin reveal his lack of interest in the

fate of Leningrad citizens as he details plans for saving the army and destroying ships and

munitions factories before the Germans can reach them. The authorities were informed of mass

starvation and cannibalism more than two months before they allotted resources to the Ladoga

ice road for civilian evacuation. Though Leningrad might have been supplied by repairing

railroads, Stalin opted to commit a half million Soviet troops to encircling Nazi forces in the

Ukrainian heartland. In addition, according to Glantz, Soviet military commanders and national

officials treated the Leningrad political leaders dismissively. The Leningrad Party Organization

had additional difficulties as it lost many members to mobilization at the front and was unable to

replace them. As Soviet problems mounted, pro-German sentiment increased. Many Russians

prepared themselves for life under enemy occupation, but there were no records of major

conspiratorial plots or anti-Soviet demonstrations. Whenever Party authorities exhibited

disorganization, tried to round up suspected subversives, or confiscated letters that contained

defeatist comments, instances of looting and rioting rose significantly. Other acts of civil

disobedience were small industrial strikes for increased food. Generally, hatred of the enemy was

far greater than resentment of the failings of the Soviet system.

34
Bidlack, Leningrad Blockade, 408.
35
Ibid.,405.
 Hardin 18

Reconstructing Stories

The Siege of Leningrad was not militarily decisive. The siege did not destroy the city,

nor did the denial of an easy victory stop the Germans from continuing their invasion of Russia.

Yet, reconstructing the stories of its victims and preserving personal histories are important

challenges in accurate accounts of the siege and its victims. The statistics alone are staggering.

Six times more lives were lost in the defense of this single city than the entire United States

World War II death toll.36 Yet it is in the tiny details of diarists that one can understand the

strength of the victims of the Siege of Leningrad: a child draws bread since he has none to eat, a

woman cheerfully picks pine needles for a snack, a starving couple makes soup from wallpaper

pasteand all feel some comfort from their triumph over hunger. They survived without the

bare essentials of life, and those that were able to adapt to their harsh circumstances, to use small

victories to inspire them, are remembered best through their personal stories of courage.

36
Glantz, 180.
 Hardin 19

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