David Grondin

hegemony
Mistaking
for empire
the Bush doctrine,and the Democraticempire
Neoconservatives,

Howevertemptingit might be to regardAmericanforeignpolicyas repre-

senting eitherthe rationaldecisionsof a single individualor the coherent
outputof a policyelite,the realityis different,andmuchmorecomplex. For
we must not only considerindividualsas occupiersof bureaucraticoffices;
we need also to understandhow theirpolicyadvocaciesget shapedby their
particularvaluesandideas. In this regard,it is simplyimpossibleto ignore
the influenceexercisedby "neoconservativism" upon the administrationof
PresidentGeorgeW. Bush. And while the reassertionof Americanpower
in the aftermathof the attacksof n September2001 certainlytook some
observersby surprise,therewas a deeplyembeddedideologicalfoundation
that servedto supportif not animatethat reassertion - a foundationthat
has been a noticeableaspectof Americanpoliticalculturesince at least the
1980s.
Thus we would well to examinethe influenceof the president'sneo-
conservativeadvisersduring an era that some style as one of American
"neo-imperialism."1 For sure, it would be presumptuousfor anyone to

David Grondinis currentlya PhD candidatein politicalscienceat the Universityof Quebec

at Montrealand a visitingscholarin politicalscienceat the Universityof Pennsylvania.
1 For an in-depth analysis of the neoconservative representations of American power through the
discursive articulation of a new em pi re/" return to imperialism" thesis, see David Crondin, "line
lecture critique du discours noconservateur du nouvel impe'rialisme: La lutte globale contre le

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I David Grondin |

claim that the neoconservatives have constituted an unalloyed and undif-

ferentiated source of policy inspiration in the current administration;but by
the same token, it would be idle to pretend that they have been without
influence. And what is it they profess? Neoconservatives can be said to
propound the following: a tenaciously guarded patriotism, military
supremacy against all challengers, and an expansionist and interventionist
foreign policy that is expected to be conducive to the flourishing of a dem-
ocratic world order. In a word, they believe in "nation-building."And given
the outsized part currentlybeing played by nation-builders in American for-
eign policy, it is fair to suggest that even those policy advisers who prefer to
eschew the label neoconservative are themselves proffering guidance that
falls easily within the movement's ideational field of gravity.

A SCHOOL
OF THOUGHTS,
NOTA THOUGHT
The neoconservatism that began to take shape during the 1960s did so in
reaction to the Vietnam War. As such, it represented a cultural backlash
against many of the "countercultural"upheavals of those years. Indeed, not
a few observers of American society were even prepared to decree the neo-
conservative "movement"victorious in what got dubbed the country's "cul-
ture wars." But in reality,there was no such neoconservative movement, if
by the latter term is suggested a group of individuals rallying behind a sin-
gle objective. Rather, there were neoconservative currents of opinion.
Perhaps even better, we might cite Irving Kristol, the "godfather"of neo-
conservatism, to the effect that what the label really connoted was at most a
persuasion or a sensibility- hardly a movement. Or,to borrow from anoth-
er neoconservative luminary, Norman Podhoretz, we might regard it as a
"tendency,"because no one really wanted to see the arrivalon the scene of
anything remotely approaching a neoconservative "centralcommittee," pre-
pared to lay down the party line to adherents.2
This point having been taken, we can nonetheless trace some general
(and it goes without saying, reductionist) characteristics of American neo-
conservatism:

terrorisme comme Pax Americana," l-tudes internationales 36 (2005): 469-500.

2 Irwin Stelzer, "Neoconservatives and their critics: An introduction," in The Neocon Reader,
Stelzer, ed. (New York: Grove Press, 2004), 4.

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 I Mistaking hegemony for empire |

Itsadherentsfavoura strongexecutivepower,meaningthattheynotonly
desirea powerfulgovernment,state,andpresident,buttheyalsobelieve
militaryforcecanandshouldserveto backstopa robustforeignpolicy.
The rhetoricof neoconservatismmay be populist,but the strategyto
be followedis verymuch corporatist,meaningthatwhile neoconserv-
atives do express interest in small business and workers,they also
insist the large corporationsand the country'srichest individuals
shouldbenefitfromtaxrelief,so as to stimulatethe economy(andin
this respectwe can say thatthey sharethe preferenceof "neoliberals"
for market-based approachesto growth).
Neoconservatives encouragereligiosityand respecttraditionalfamily
values, with the allocationof roles (economicas well as personal)
made along genderlines; it followsthatthey havelittle love for intel-
lectualandeconomicelites (heldto be too liberalandmaterialistic),as
well as for artists(judgedto be too decadent).3

At the outset, we need to demystifyAmericanneoconservatism

and its postulatedinfluence on the Bush administration. Sympathetic
observerssuch as MaxBootarecorrectto underscorethatin the upperech-
elons of the administration,neoconservativesare distinguishedby their
absence.4 That said, it is hardlya coincidencethat referenceis so often
made to neoconservativesas being "neo-Reaganites." A threaddoes con-
nect the Reaganand GeorgeH. W. Bush administrationswith the current
administration, in thatquitea few membersof the latteralsoworkedforthe
former. It was duringthe Reaganera thatthe alliancewas struckbetween
socioeconomicconservatives,concernedas theywereabouttoo much state
involvementin the marketandalwayson guardagainstanyformsof social-
ism, and right-wingpopulists,known for their patrioticfervourand their
religious(oftenfundamentalist)convictions. Moreover,the so-called"neo-
Reaganites" flockedto the president'sside becausein him theysawthe man
who broughtvictoryover internationalcommunism in general,and the
Soviet Union in particular,accomplishingthis through a mix of strong
defencespending,a sense of moralclarityin foreignpolicy,and a refusalto

3 Anne Norton, Leo Strauss and the Politics of American Empire (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 2004), 176-80.

4 Max Boot, "The myth about neoconservatism," in Neocon Reader, 45.

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I David Grondin |

subordinate the exercise of American strength to domestic political

pressures.5
Thus we should not subscribe to the view that deep ideological cleav-
ages separate the neoconservatives from such key figures in the current
administration as Condoleezza Rice, Dick Cheney, and Donald Rumsfeld-
even the president himself. For while it may be the case that none of these
latter figures style themselves neoconservatives, it is no less apparent that
they have drawn upon various elements of neoconservative thinking.
Indeed, Cheney and Rumsfeld were even among the original promoters of
the neoconservative "Project for a new American century" back in mid-
1997- a project that brought together, inter alios, RichardArmitage, John
Bolton, and Robert Zoellick, to say nothing of that self-proclaimed neocon-
servative, Richard Perle, who directed a Pentagon advisory group (the
Defense Policy Board) between 2001 and 2003, until stepping down on
conflict-of-interest grounds.
It is true that some analysts will take pains to distinguish between
"ultra-nationalists"who are closer to realist geopolitical thinkers, and neo-
conservative empire-builders. This may be so, but it is also true that the for-
mer tend to surround themselves with the latter,from whom they presum-
ably seek and obtain guidance. Rumsfeld had Paul Wolfowitz at his elbow,
as well as Douglas Feith, during the first term of George W. Bush. As for
Cheney, until recently he was able to take solace in the nearness of I. Lewis
libby, the latter having been a close colleague of Wolfowitz. And when she
was national security advisor to the president, Rice relied upon the judge-
ment of her assistant, Stephen Hadley,who now occupies her former post.
So even though the secretary of state regards herself as being not only a
realist but someone who is skeptical of nation-building, she was also
exposed to daily doses of neoconservative policy advice, including and espe-
cially on such matters as regime change in Iraq and the democratization of
the greater Middle East.
I say all this because it is important not to overlook or minimize the
influence neoconservatives have wielded in the corridors of power in
Washington since 2001. Sometimes it makes good sense to "round up
the usual suspects," and in the matter of trying to gauge influence in the

5 William Kristol and Robert Kagan, "Toward a neo-Reaganite foreign policy," Foreign Affairs 75
(July-August 1996): 19.

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 I Mistaking hegemony for empire |

policy process, we can do much worse than to resort to this familiar

investigatory practice.

THE BUSH DOCTRINE AND THE NEOCONSERVATIVES

It would be going too far to claim that the Bush administration had blindly
swallowed the entirety of the neoconservative agenda (which if it did would
lead it to attempt regime change in North Korea and Iran); still, there can
be no denying that the president has embraced at least rhetoricallythe neo-
conservative goal of deposing insalubrious regimes and replacing them
with democratic governments. More than two years ago, Bush spoke of a
"globaldemocratic revolution,"with reference to the vision of transforming
the Middle East, starting with Iraq.6 Eighteen months later, on 12 April
2005, addressing the troops at Fort Hood, Texas, the president reaffirmed
that the invasion of Iraq and the subsequent holding of elections in the
country confirmed the start of that worldwide democratic revolution: "As
the Iraq democracy succeeds, that success is sending a message from
Beirut to Tehranthat freedom can be the future of every nation. The estab-
lishment of a free Iraq at the heart of the Middle East will be a crushing
defeat to the forces of tyrannyand terror,and a watershed event in the global
democraticrevolution." Moreover,he traced a direct line between the fall of
the Berlinwall and the tumbling of the statue of Saddam Hussein in Baghdad
in April 2003, hailing both as "greatmoments in the history of liberty."7
Ever since 11 September 2001, the Bush administration has adopted
the neoconservative rhetoric about America's being engaged in a war pit-
ting civilization and liberty against the "forces of evil" and barbarism.8
There can be no question that the September 2002 "Nationalsecurity strat-
egy of the United States of America," announcing a Bush doctrine predi-
cated upon military prevention, regime change, and enhanced defence
spending, has been heavily influenced by neoconservative writings. Among

6 Said the president: "Iraqi democracy will succeed - and that success will send forth the news,
from Damascus to Teheran - that freedom can be the future of every nation. The establishment
of a free Iraq at the heart of the Middle East will be a watershed event in the global democratic
revolution." Remarks made at the 20th anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy,
US Chamber of Commerce, Washington, 6 November 2003.

7 George W. Bush, "President discusses war on terror," White House, 12 April 2005.

8 See Norton, Leo Strauss and the Politics of American Empire, 176.

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I David Grondin |

these havebeen workspublishedunderthe aegis of the "Projectfor a new

Americancentury,"includingRebuildingAmerica'sDefenses (by Donald
Kagan,GarySchmitt,and ThomasDonnelly),and PresentDangers:Crisis
and Opportunityin AmericanForeign and Defense Policy (by William
Kristoland RobertKagan).
The first of these works demonstratesa strong and direct line of
descent from the controversial"Defenseplanningguidance"producedby
PaulWolfowitzand I. Lewislibby backin 1992 when they servedin the
administrationof the currentpresident'sfather. Thatdocument,initially
made public via a leak to the press, provoked a heated debate in
Washington,resultingin its being revisedby the then secretaryof defense
(andcurrentvice president),DickCheney. It advocatedthatAmericaseek
activelyto remainat the top of the internationalpeckingorder,and that it
availitself of its statusas sole superpowerto shapea worldordercongenial
to its valuesand interests. In the originaldraftof this document,the idea
of preventivewar against states developingweaponsof mass destruction
was adumbrated.Giventhis intellectuallineage,you couldalmostsaythat
the interveningClintonyearscounted,doctrinallyat least,for nothing.
The secondof these works,by WilliamKristoland RobertKagan,con-
stitutesthe most explicitarticulationof a neoconservative foreignpolicyof
Straussianinspiration. Here it is arguedthat America'sglobal strategy
must workforregimechangewhen requiredforthe promotionof the coun-
try'sinterestsandthe provisionof globalstability.Preferringunilateralism
andmilitaryinterventionto the multilateralapproachof the Clintonadmin-
istration,Kaganand Kristolenvisionedregimechangeas a means of ush-
ering in the globaldemocraticrevolution,and urgedthatAmericatakeon
the defence of the interestsof allies even should the latternot feel them-
selvesthreatened:"TheUnited Stateswouldinsteadconceiveof itself as at
once a Europeanpower,an Asian power,a MiddleEasternpowerand, of
course,a WesternHemisphericpower.It wouldactas if threatsto the inter-
ests of our allies constitutedthreatsto us."9

NEOCONSERVATIVE IDEALISM
There is nothing surprising in the neoconservatives'position being
characterizedas latter-dayAmerican"imperialism"
inspiredby visions of

9 Robert Kagan and William Kristol, "The present clanger," National Interest, no. 59 (spring
2000): 64.

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 I Mistaking hegemony for empire |

a worldwide pax Americana. This is exactly how its advocates imagined it;
they were quick to trace a link between their preferredpolicy and that devel-
oped, a century earlier,by Theodore Roosevelt, in whose foreign policy they
glimpsed just the right blend of pragmatism and progressive imperialism
suited for a 21st century democratic, and imperial, republic.
Rooseveltimplored Americansto look beyond the immediate needs of
their dailylives and embraceas a nation a higher purpose in the world.
He aspiredto greatnessfor America,and he believedthat a nation could
only be greatif it acceptedits responsibilitiesto advancecivilizationand
improve the world's condition.... Roosevelt was no Utopian;he had
contempt for those who believed the internationalenvironment could
be so transformedas to rid the worldof war,put an end to international
conflict, and, indeed, put an end to the nation itself. Rooseveltwas an
idealistof a differentsort. He did not attemptto wish awaythe realities
of power, but insisted that the defenders of civilization must exercise
their power against civilization'sopponents. "Warlikeinterventionby
the civilized powers," he insisted, "would contribute directly to the
peace of the world."10
Now, it is always thought wise to take recourse in useful historical
analogies if one seeks to promote a particularagenda, and in this case noth-
ing could be as attractivefor those hoping to demonstrate the credentials of
an approach linking empire with democratic values as Theodore
Roosevelt's policy of "progressive imperialism." Kagan and Kristol have
not missed the point, and it is precisely upon the first Roosevelt's civiliza-
tional- and civilizing- rhetoric that they base their own advocacy. In place
of the Clinton administration's (neo)liberal diplomacy they adjudged to be
too motivated by crass economic interests, as well as overly inclined toward
multilateralism,they would substitute a politics of greatness and patriotism.
Needless to say, after the attacks of 11 September, such a politics would
be bound to find resonance in a nation whose patriotic fibre had suddenly
stiffened. "Honor and greatness," wrote Kagan and Kristol, "used to be
understood as worthy goals of American foreign policy. In insisting that the
national interest extended beyond material security and prosperity, and in
summoning Americans to seek honor as a nation, Roosevelt echoed the

10 Ibid., 68-69.

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I David Grondin |

viewsof the AmericanFounders....Butit has been a long time since anyof

theirleadersaskedthem to care,or made an appealto the elevatedpatriot-
ism thatjoins interestand justice,andthathas characterized the American
republicfromits beginning.""
Thus,for neoconservatives, thereis littleto fearfromthe nationalsecu-
ritypractices of the Bush administration: afterall,theyarebeingcarriedout
in the interestsof the Americanpeople,andin the bargaintheysupportthe
country'scivilizingmission to the rest of the world. Irrespectiveof the
objectivenatureof the threatfacingit, whatreallymattersis thatAmerica's
leadershipis at one and the same time good for Americaand good for the
world. This catchphraseis so firmlyimplantedin neoconservative rhetoric
as to havebecomethe effectivesloganfor the "Projectfor a new American
century."In theirunderstandingof the meaningof "virtuousempire,"neo-
conservativeshave transcendeda more traditionalpolicy that assumes
Americacan serveas a modelfor the world,andinsteadhaveembracedthe
ideathatthe worldactuallyneeds to be remadein America'simage.12Thus
it is only a small leap in logic to interpretthe terroristattackson America
as an attackupon the world- or at least, upon what the world should
become.13In their insistencethat Americanvaluesand Americandemoc-
racy symbolizewhat the world is after,the neoconservativesshow them-
selves to be almost as much the ideologicaldescendantsof Woodrow
Wilson than of the latter's great adversary,Roosevelt - save that they
expressa preferencefor the Republican's pragmatismandhis emphasison
the virtuesof "speak[ing] softlyand carrying]a big stick."
Contraryto whatsome feverishminds imagine,thereis nothing"con-
spiratorial" in the neoconservativeagenda,nor is much hiddenfromview.
Pureand simple,the neoconservative projectanticipatesand desiresglobal
hegemonyon the partof the US. Whyhide it? Andwhatotherpolicyaim
can possiblybe suggestedby the "Projectfor a new Americancentury"?By
couching it in a rhetoricpromotinga civilizationalconflict against bar-
barism,good againstevil, and securityagainstterrorism,the globalwaron
terror (or, GWOT)has served neoconservativehawks within the Bush

n Ibid., 69.

12 For a critique of the assumption of an empire of virtue, see Claes C. Ryn, America the
Virtuous: The Crisis of Democracy and the Quest for Empire (New Brunswick, Nj: Transaction,
2003), 8-9.

13 John Edwards, "After the fall," Discourse & Society 15 (2004): 157.

I 234 I International Journal | Winter 2005-2006 |

 I Mistaking hegemony for empire |

administrationas a useful vehicle for advancingthe projectof a new,

American,centuryin everysense of the word.

WILL TO POWER, WILL TO EMPIRE

Followingthe collapseof communism,Americanstrategistswere at loose
ends in grapplingwiththe developmentof a coherentsecuritypolicy.While
few, even in those yearsof confusion,reallydoubtedthat Americaconsti-
tutedthe coreof a globalsystemthatwas characterized byits hegemony,the
shockof Septembern concentratedminds. So somethingwas addedto the
regnantassumption:neoconservativeanalystscould now trumpeta new-
foundpoliticalwill intendedto translatethe visionof globaldominanceinto
reality.Withthe obviousevidenceof Americanvulnerability, it becameeasy
to legitimizea courseof actionthat,absentthe terroristattackson the coun-
try,wouldhavesmackedof old-fashionedimperialism.The clearestexpres-
sion of this new will to powerwas to be foundin the nationalstrategydoc-
umentunveiledin September2002, and especiallyin the passagesrelating
to preventivewar.
For neoconservativesin the administration,September 11 quickly
becamethe pretextto constructa differentsecurityorder. Ratherthancon-
tinue withwhattheytookto be the Clinton administration's relativepoliti-
cal disengagementfrom a world expected,henceforth,primarilyto serve
Americaneconomic interests,neoconservativesurged that the time had
come to capitalizeon the ColdWar'sending- indeed,history'sending!-
and shape a geopoliticalorderin which the US would be and remainthe
sole superpower.The experimentwith liberalinternationalismand multi-
lateralismwas over,and in its placewouldarisea new unilateralism.14
September11,to repeat,did not so much causeneoconservative views
on worldorderto changeas it providedthe contextfor implementingwhat
had alreadybeen conceived. Thus the post-September11 order quickly
found itself transformedinto a heavilymilitarizedone. MichaelMann
-
explains:"Whereasin the recentpast Americanpowerwas hegemonic
-
routinely accepted and often considered legitimate abroad now it is
imposedat the barrelof a gun. This undermineshegemonyand the claim
to be a benevolentempire."15

14 Charles Krauthammer, "The unipolar moment revisited," National Interest, no. 70 (winter
2002-03), 14.

15 Michael Mann, Incoherent Empire (London: Verso, 2003), 252.

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I David Grondin |

Ever since September 11, it has become commonplace, perhaps even

obligatory, to discuss American foreign policy in the context of empire.
During the Cold War,those who used this construct to discuss the country's
foreign policy were sometimes held to be blaspheming America's policies
if not its very meaning, and they were usually limited to a ginger group of
economic determinists of the so-called "new left," lumped together under
the rubric of "radicalrevisionism." As for more mainstream policy ana-
lysts, while they may have been permitted, even expected, to dwell upon the
"evilempire" (the Soviet Union), it simply would not do for them to sing the
praises of an empire of good. Empire is no longer such a dirty word in
Washington: numerous policy analysts, liberal and realist alike, invoke the
e-word as a descriptive term for contemporary reality, even though in so
doing they hardly share the same approach to the term of the anti-capital-
ist, and fundamentally economic, critique of empire. Thus we find Andrew
Bacevich speaking of an informal empire, Michael Ignatieff of an "empire
lite," Niall Fergusson of a colossal empire, Chalmers Johnson of a military
empire, and Walter Russell Mead of a liberal empire.16
In fact, there need be nothing fundamentally provocativeabout the e-
word as a descriptiveof contemporaryAmericanpower,as MichaelCox notes.
I concede that there are both theoretical weaknesses and dangerous
policy implications that flow from the notion of an American Empire.
Yet rejectionof the term is not enough: we have to engage with it in a
creative fashion, as others have alreadytried to do. And, as the new
conservatives have pointed out, the concept does have its uses as a
comparativetool of analysis,one that has not been fully exploitedin the
past, partlyfor methodologicalreasons- the term afterall is open to dif-
ferent meanings- but largelybecause it has for so long been associated
with a radicalcritiqueof US foreign policy. This has been particularly
unfortunateand has made it virtuallyimpossiblefor othercommentators
to employ the concept at all.17

16 Bacevich, American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2002); Ignatieff, Empire Lite: Nation-Building in Bosnia, Kosovo and
Afghanistan (Toronto: Penguin Canada, 2003); Fergusson, Colossus: The Price of America's
Empire (New York: Penguin, 2004); Johnson, The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and
the End of the Republic (New York: Henry Holt, 2004); Mead, Special Providence: American
Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2002).

17 Michael Cox, "Empire by denial? Debating US power," Security Dialogue 35 (summer 2004): 230.

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 I Mistaking hegemony for empire |

Thuswhile empireas a descriptivemayhaveemergedfromthe closet,

does it necessarilyaddanythingto our understandingof US foreignpolicy
in the periodsince Septembern? And what, if anything,does it tell us
about the role of neoconservativepolicy intellectuals? To answer these
questions,let us go directlyto the source,and see how neoconservatives
themselvesconstruemattersimperial.

THE NEOCONSERVATIVE EMPIRE

Given its growing acceptanceas a useful descriptivein the American
debate,we can takeit for grantedthat"empire" has managedto shed much
of the negativebaggagethathas traditionally accompaniedit (e.g.,in refer-
ences to the "fairof the Romanempire). This may be the case for policy
analystsand otherintellectuals,but it is hardlytrue thatpoliqmakers are
lining up to get themselvesdepictedas imperialists. Naturallyenough,
Bushadministrationofficialsdisplayan aversionto the notionthattheyare
susceptibleto imperialtemptations.Totheirchagrin,however,these same
officialsfind thatneoconservatives not saddledwith the responsibilitiesof
officeare onlytoo happyto styletheirsan imperialproject.18
Billedas the directlegatee of policies and practicesfirst popularized
duringthe Reaganyears,the Bush administrationhas in fact stuck fairly
closely to ideologicalpaths espoused by such neo-Reaganiteanalystsas
WilliamKristoland RobertKagan. Undertheir aegis, numerousneocon-
servativesand other republicanswere able to vent their spleen against
Clinton-eramultilateralists,and plump for the overthrowof regimes that
woulddefyAmerica'shegemonicrule. Not onlythis, but Kristoland Kagan
laid down clearmarkersfor a liberalAmericanempirethat would enable
the US to forge,regardlessof the obstacles,a worldordercongenialto the
country'svaluesandinterests.19Andwhile some will tell you thattodaythe
influenceof neoconservativesin Washingtonhas greatlydiminished,there
can be no gainsayingthatduringthe first GeorgeW. Bushadministration,
strong neoconservativewinds blew through the corridorsof power in
Washington.

18 Garry Dorrien, Imperial Designs: Neoconservatism and the New Pax Americana (New York:

Routledge, 2004).

19 Norman Podhoretz, "Pour une diplomatic ne*o-reaganienne," Politique internationale, no. 89

(autumn 2000): 113-41.

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1 David Grondin |

In those early years, officials and other influential figures such as

Wolfowitz,libby, Perle,and David Frum (the Canadianspeech writerin 2001-
02 credited with having produced the "axisof evil"image) could hardly be
accused of hiding their "agenda."Reflectingarguments disseminated by neo-
conservative policy intellectuals, these officials proclaimed the need for
America to projectits influence via a benign liberal empire that would, inter
alia, result in the spread of democracyworldwide- and not just lead to the
opening of globalmarketsto Americancompanies, held by some to have been
a policy aim of a Clinton administrationthat lacked a more ennobling view of
America'srole in the world. Hence there was a greatdeal of willingness, on the
neoconservatives'part,to associatetheir projectwith images of a "newRome."
To be sure, the neoconservatives understood the necessity of opening
up markets. After all, a free market had to go hand in hand with political
and cultural freedom. But they never mistook a means for the end, in the
sense that they did not hold capitalism per se to represent the embodiment
of civilized values. Something greater beckoned, a yearning that could not
be satisfied by bourgeois comforts but rather required the kind of grandeur
that had been Rome's, sustained by a warrior ethos and a willingness to
wage moral crusades.20 Empire being good, an American empire had to be
best. As Irving Kristol saw the matter,

What's the point of being the greatest, most powerful nation in the
world and not having an imperialrole? It's unheardof in human histo-
ry. The most powerfulnation alwayshad an imperialrole.... I think it
would be naturalfor the United States ... to play a far more dominant
role in worldaffairs. Not what we'redoing now but to command and to
give ordersas to what is to be done. Peopleneed that. There are many
parts of the world- Africa in particular- where an authority to use
troops can make a very good difference,a healthydifference.21

For those who argued thusly, September 11 became an opportunity to

reverse the policies of what they took to be a crassly mercantile Clinton
administration. The call to arms had sounded.

20 Corey Robin, "Remembrance of empires past: 9/n and the end of the Cold War," in Cold War
Triumphalism: The Misuse of History after the Fall of Communism, Ellen Schrecker, ed. (New
York: New Press, 2004), 276.

21 Quoted in ibid.

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 I Mistakinghegemony for empire |

WHEN EMPIRE THREATENS HEGEMONY

The Bushadministrationwas not slow to seize upon the momentumgen-
erated by the aftermathof the attacks of New Yorkand Washington:
Americawould augment its militarysupremacyin hopes of getting the
world'seconomic and politicalbalance "right"(that is, skewed more in
America'sfavour).22In doing so, frequentrecoursewas had to the Roman
analogy. Neoconservatives close to or inside the administrationmade no
secretof theirbeliefthatthe country'smilitarysuperioritywas an essential
guaranteeof globalstability,anda necessaryconditionof the worldwidepax
Americana.23
There was something paradoxical,though, in the Roman analogy:
America'smilitarypower was not intended to conquerterritoryfor the
empire,defeatpeerchallengers,or physicallydominatetraderoutes,as had
been the case with Rome's. Neitherdid the enthusiastsof empirecounte-
nancethe likelihoodof the imperialthrustgeneratingan opposingreaction,
whathas been termed"blowback."24 Ironically,the verycentrepieceof the
neoconservative strategy, militarybuild-upintendedto renderfecklessany
a
peer challengeto America'sstatus as sole superpower,generatedits own
"asymmetrical'' reactionin the formof terroriststrikesat Americanterrito-
ry and militaryassets outsidethe US. Youdid not haveto be a studentof
Gramscito appreciatewhatwas going on: farfrom guaranteeingthe coun-
try's security,the Bush doctrinebegan to loom as a source of insecurity
becauseof the backlashit was triggering.Genuineandeffectivehegemony
requiresthe nuancedapplicationof variousleversof influence,andmust be
accompaniedby a professedwillingnessto compromiseas well as a credi-
ble desireto forgea consensus. As such,hegemonyitselfis calledinto ques-
tionthroughexcessiveandovertrelianceon bruteforce,whetherthatbe mil-
itaryor economicin nature. Thereis but a thin line separatinghegemony
fromempire,andthe formereasilycanbecomeimperilledbythe latter,with

22 Alex Callinicos, The New Mandarins of American Power: The Bush Administration's Plans for
the World (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), 126. Also see David Harvey, The New Imperialism
(London: Oxford University Press, 2003).

23 Colin Cray, The Sheriff: America's Defense of the New World Order (Lexington: University
Press of Kentucky, 2004), 55.

24 Chalmers Johnson, The Costs and Consequences of American Empire, new and rev. ed. (New
York: Henry Holt, 2004).

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I David Grondin |

its stress upon militarism,arrogance,and aboveall, the growingthreatto

employforce.
GeorgeW.Bush'sAmericalookedto be sacrificingthe benefitsof hege-
monyfor the seductionof empire,forgettingin the processthat,"[ajfter all,
it is influence,not power,that is ultimatelymost valuable."25 To be pre-
served,hegemonymust be anchoredin a "societal" context.26This means
thata hegemonmust ensurethatit can get othersto followits leadpriorto
undertakingaction,and the first step towardachievingthis assuranceis to
show a decent respectfor globalrules and practices. In otherwords,the
hegemon carrieseven more of a responsibilityfor upholdingglobalstan-
dardsthando lesser powers,for if it wantsto shapean ordermost congen-
ial to its interests,it can only do this by bringingalongthe othersthrough
persuasionand negotiation.
Hence the ultimateparadoxof Americanhegemony (or the so-called
"neoconservative democraticempire"):unilateralactionon the hegemorfs
partundercutsits leadershipby weakeningglobalstabilityand triggeringa
counter-hegemonic reaction.27This is why unilateralism- or even the per-
ception of it- can be and is the principal obstacleto continued American
hegemony.Andin undercuttingthe prospectsof hegemon/ s continuation,
the neoconservativesend up being their own worst enemy,the ultimate
revisionists.

CONCLUSION: A PAX AMERICANA?

One consequenceof the genuine catastrophethat was Septembern has
been an unprecedentedreestablishmentof Americanmilitaryhegemony,
under the guise of the GWOT.28FareedZakariawas certainlyprescient
when he wrote, in the aftermath of the attacks on New York and
Washington,that "[t]hewaron terrorismwill strengthengovernmenteven
more than the ColdWardid, since this is a warthatwill be foughtboth at

25 Stephen C. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, "American primacy in perspective," Foreign

Affairs 81 (July/August 2002): 32.

26 Christian Reus-Smit, American Power and World Order (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), 52.

27 Bruce Cronin, "The paradox of hegemony: America's ambiguous relationship with the United
Nations," European Journal of International Relations 7 (2001): 105-11.

28 Slavoj Zizek, Welcome to the Desert of the Real! Five Essays on September 77 and Related
Dates (London: Verso, 2002), 144-45.

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 I Mistaking hegemony for empire |

home and abroad.The fundamentalshift thatis likelyto takeplaceis that

counterterrorism will move from the realm of law enforcementto that of
nationalsecurity."29
Butless prescientwas JohnIkenberry's observationthatwiththe "end"
of the majorcombatsin Iraqin 2003, the neoconservative momenthadalso
ended.30Morean expressionof wish than of reality,Ikenberry'sclaim not
onlyoverlooksthe ongoingculturalwarsin whichneoconservatives contin-
ue to participate,but it also misstatesIraq'spositionin the neoconservative
program;Iraqwas and is a partof that agenda,but not the entireagenda.
No one can say whetherneoconservativism will outlivethe Bush adminis-
tration. If it does, it will have much to do with the mannerin which the
GWOTcontinuesto unfold,and in particularwhetherthe prosecutionof
the war againstthe terroristsso militarizesAmericanforeignpolicyas to
put paidto anyprospectof erectingthe "benignempire"of neoconservative
longing.

29 Fareed Zakaria, "The return of history: What September 11 hath wrought," in How Did This
Happen? Terrorism and the New War, James Hoge and Gideon Rose, eds. (New York: Public
Affairs Press, 2001), 313.

30 G. John Ikenberry, "The end of the neo-conservative moment," Survival 46 (spring 2004): 8.

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