Social Conrtrrrctionr of Self 25

16, Kart Marx, "Germany Ideology," in fickcr, ed,, The Marx-Engels Reader,
pp. 114ff.
17. Marx, "The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 184.4," in Tucker, ed,,
The Marx-EngeEs Reader, pp, 73-74.
ItS. As a parallet. to the term femkkt f prefer to use masc~lin&trather than male,
Moreover, nz~sculinistandfemkkt need ncst be identical with male and female sexudl
zderztity, A, minority of women, especially those who have achieved solne success in
terms of standards applicable to tlie contexts of a male-ctominatcd world, have incor-
porated into their own lives characteristics of the mascuiinist self. And a minority of
men, especiatty those who have reacted strongly against specific contexts of their
male-dominated patterns of sociatizatiun, have incorporated into their own lives
characteristics of d-tefeminist setf.
19. Certain kinds of "liberal fexninism" have accepted characteristics of he mod-
ern post-Cartesian, post-Entightenment self. The problem, then, has to d o not so
much wirli modern concepts of setf as with sexual, economic, political, cultural, and
other obstacles that have prevented many women from developing themsetves as sep-
arate, autonomous individuals. We may ~ L S C I note that certain kinds of "radical Eerni-
nism" have rejected such characteristics of the autonosnous, separate, rational, ego-
oriented individual as those at the t'oundation of a male-dominated and -justified
systein of aggressiveness and violence, seifishness and tack of caring-a system tliat
represses much that is human, vaiues abstract rationality, devalues the boriji, and fos-
ters nonrelational alienation and o p p r a i v e hierarchical refations of domination and
control. (Of course, this observation is not unique to radical feminism; socialist and
other feminists have come to a similar conclusion,>
20. See Sirnone de Beauvoir's analysis of the constitution of the self in terms of
self-other retations in lier Introduction to The Second Sex, trans, and cd, H. M,
Parstrtey (Mew Ycjrk: Random HouselVintage Books, 1974), pp. xv-xtaxv.
21. There is consideratlte tension and ambiguity in de Beauvoir's writings be-
tween the concept of an autonomous, separate, individual self and that of a more so-
cial self, as welt as between the liberal reformist and more radical restructztring sufu-
tions that she proposes. For example, on a general stmcturaf Itevet, she often presents
tlie model of "the self" o r "tlie subject" as "male," and seems to propose that
women can refuse to be "the other" by adopting the model of the autonomous,
transcending, mate self, But as many feminists have maintained, this strategy might,
at hest, result in the reformist "solution" of dividing the "sexist pie" more equitably*
such that women, too, acquire the opportunity to hnction as oppressing, exploiting,
alienated selves.
22. Carol Gilligan, h d: Dqrerent Voice: r"sychological "Theory and WomenW e -
velopnzenr (Cambridge, Mass,: Harvard University Press, 1982). Sce afso Carol
Gifligan, "Canccpts o l the Scif and of Morality," "&?ward Ed~.lcal;iantz;l Rewiew 47
(Novern ber 1"377"):48 1-5 17 .
23. Such constructions have given rise t o heated debate among feminists and
other scht-~lars,For example, in an observation equally applicable to de Beauvoir's
"self" equals "ma1e" and "other" equals "fe~nale,"commentators have questioned
Gifiigan? lumping together of females and males under female and male moralities
and concepts of self without taking into consideration racial, class, and ottrer vari-
ables. Some have submictcd tliat African-American, Native American, Chincse, and