6/15/2016 RiggsvPalmer

[*506]

PhiloRiggs,asGuardianadlitemetal.,Appellants,
v
ElmerE.Palmeretal.,Respondents.

CourtofAppealsofNewYork
SubmittedJune21,1889
DecidedOctober8,1889

115NY506
CITETITLEAS:RiggsvPalmer

[*508]OPINIONOFTHECOURT

EARL,J.

Onthe13thdayofAugust1880,FrancisB.Palmermadehislastwillandtestament,in
whichhegavesmalllegaciestohistwodaughters,Mrs.RiggsandMrs.Preston,theplaintiffs
inthisaction,andtheremainderofhisestatetohisgrandson,thedefendant,ElmerE.Palmer,
subjecttothesupportofSusanPalmer,hismother,withagiftovertothetwodaughters,
subjecttothesupportofMrs.Palmer,incaseElmershouldsurvivehimanddieunderage,
unmarriedandwithoutanyissue.Thetestatoratthedateofhiswillownedafarmand
considerablepersonalproperty.Hewasawidower,andthereafter,inMarch1882,hewas
marriedtoMrs.Bresee,withwhombeforehismarriageheenteredintoanantenuptial
contractinwhichitwasagreedthat,inlieuofdowerandallotherclaimsuponhisestatein
caseshesurvivedhim,sheshouldhavehersupportuponhisfarmduringherlife,andsuch
supportwasexpresslychargeduponthefarm.Atthedateofthewill,and,subsequently,to
thedeathofthetestator,Elmerlivedwithhimasamemberofhisfamily,andathisdeathwas
sixteenyearsold.Heknewoftheprovisionsmadeinhisfavorinthewill,and,thathemight
preventhis[*509]grandfatherfromrevokingsuchprovisions,whichhehadmanifestedsome
intentiontodo,andtoobtainthespeedyenjoymentandimmediatepossessionofhisproperty,
hewillfullymurderedhimbypoisoninghim.Henowclaimstheproperty,andthesole
questionforourdeterminationis,canhehaveit?Thedefendantssaythatthetestatorisdead
thathiswillwasmadeindueformandhasbeenadmittedtoprobate,andthat,therefore,it
musthaveeffectaccordingtotheletterofthelaw.

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Itisquitetruethatstatutesregulatingthemaking,proofandeffectofwills,andthe
devolutionofproperty,ifliterallyconstrued,andiftheirforceandeffectcaninnowayand
undernocircumstancesbecontrolledormodified,givethispropertytothemurderer.

Thepurposeofthosestatuteswastoenabletestatorstodisposeoftheirestatestothe
objectsoftheirbountyatdeath,andtocarryintoeffecttheirfinalwisheslegallyexpressed
andinconsideringandgivingeffecttothemthispurposemustbekeptinview.Itwasthe
intentionofthelawmakersthatthedoneesinawillshouldhavethepropertygiventothem.
Butitnevercouldhavebeentheirintentionthatadoneewhomurderedthetestatortomake
thewilloperativeshouldhaveanybenefitunderit.Ifsuchacasehadbeenpresenttotheir
minds,andithadbeensupposednecessarytomakesomeprovisionoflawtomeetit,it
cannotbedoubtedthattheywouldhaveprovidedforit.Itisafamiliarcanonofconstruction
thatathingwhichiswithintheintentionofthemakersofastatuteisasmuchwithinthe
statuteasifitwerewithintheletterandathingwhichiswithintheletterofthestatuteisnot
withinthestatute,unlessitbewithintheintentionofthemakers.Thewritersoflawsdonot
alwaysexpresstheirintentionperfectly,buteitherexceeditorfallshortofit,sothatjudges
aretocollectitfromprobableorrationalconjecturesonly,andthisiscalledrational
interpretationandRutherforth,inhisInstitutes(p.407),says:"Whenwemakeuseofrational
interpretation,sometimeswerestrainthemeaningofthewritersoastotakeinless,and
sometimes[*510]weextendorenlargehismeaningsoastotakeinmorethanhiswords
express."

Suchaconstructionoughttobeputuponastatuteaswillbestanswertheintention
whichthemakershadinview,forquihaeretinlitera,haeretincortice.InBacon's
Abridgment(StatutesI,5)Puffendorf(book5,chapter12),Rutherforth(pp.422,427),and
inSmith'sCommentaries(814),manycasesarementionedwhereitwasheldthatmatters
embracedinthegeneralwordsofstatutes,nevertheless,werenotwithinthestatutes,because
itcouldnothavebeentheintentionofthelawmakersthattheyshouldbeincluded.They
weretakenoutofthestatutesbyanequitableconstruction,anditissaidinBacon:"Byan
equitableconstruction,acasenotwithintheletterofthestatuteissometimesholdentobe
withinthemeaning,becauseitiswithinthemischiefforwhicharemedyisprovided.The
reasonforsuchconstructionisthatthelawmakerscouldnotsetdowneverycaseinexpress
terms.Inordertoformarightjudgmentwhetheracasebewithintheequityofastatute,itisa
goodwaytosupposethelawmakerpresent,andthatyouhaveaskedhimthisquestion,did
youintendtocomprehendthiscase?Thenyoumustgiveyourselfsuchanswerasyou

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imaginehe,beinganuprightandreasonableman,wouldhavegiven.Ifthisbethathedid
meantocomprehendit,youmaysafelyholdthecasetobewithintheequityofthestatutefor
whileyoudonomorethanhewouldhavedone,youdonotactcontrarytothestatute,butin
conformitythereto."Insomecasestheletterofalegislativeactisrestrainedbyanequitable
constructioninothersitisenlargedinotherstheconstructioniscontrarytotheletter.The
equitableconstructionwhichrestrainstheletterofastatuteisdefinedbyAristotle,as
frequentlyquoted,inthismanner:Aequitasestcorrectiolegisgeneraliterlataequaparti
deficit.Ifthelawmakerscould,astothiscase,beconsulted,wouldtheysaythatthey
intendedbytheirgenerallanguagethatthepropertyofatestatororofanancestorshouldpass
toonewhohadtakenhislifefortheexpresspurposeofgettinghisproperty?In1
Blackstone's[*511]Commentaries(91)thelearnedauthor,speakingoftheconstructionof
statutes,says:"Ifthereariseoutofthemanyabsurdconsequencesmanifestlycontradictoryto
commonreason,theyare,withregardtothosecollateralconsequences,void.***When
somecollateralmatterarisesoutofthegeneralwords,andhappentobeunreasonable,then
thejudgesareindecencytoconcludethattheconsequencewasnotforeseenbythe
parliament,and,therefore,theyareatlibertytoexpoundthestatutebyequityandonlyquoad
hocdisregardit"andhegivesasanillustration,ifanactofparliamentgivesamanpowerto
tryallcausesthatarisewithinhismanorofDale,yet,ifacauseshouldariseinwhichhe
himselfisparty,theactisconstruednottoextendtothatbecauseitisunreasonablethatany
manshoulddeterminehisownquarrel.

TherewasastatuteinBolognathatwhoeverdrewbloodinthestreetsshouldbeseverely
punished,andyetitwasheldnottoapplytothecaseofabarberwhoopenedaveininthe
street.ItiscommandedintheDecaloguethatnoworkshallbedoneupontheSabbath,and
yet,givingthecommandarationalinterpretationfoundeduponitsdesign,theInfallibleJudge
heldthatitdidnotprohibitworksofnecessity,charityorbenevolenceonthatday.

Whatcouldbemoreunreasonablethantosupposethatitwasthelegislativeintentionin
thegenerallawspassedfortheorderly,peaceableandjustdevolutionofproperty,thatthey
shouldhaveoperationinfavorofonewhomurderedhisancestorthathemightspeedilycome
intothepossessionofhisestate?Suchanintentionisinconceivable.Weneednot,therefore,
bemuchtroubledbythegenerallanguagecontainedinthelaws.

Besides,alllawsaswellasallcontractsmaybecontrolledintheiroperationandeffect
bygeneral,fundamentalmaximsofthecommonlaw.Nooneshallbepermittedtoprofitby

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hisownfraud,ortotakeadvantageofhisownwrong,ortofoundanyclaimuponhisown
iniquity,ortoacquirepropertybyhisowncrime.Thesemaximsaredictatedbypublicpolicy,
havetheirfoundationinuniversallawadministered[*512]inallcivilizedcountries,andhave
nowherebeensupersededbystatutes.Theywereappliedinthedecisionofthecaseofthe
NewYorkMutualLifeInsuranceCompanyv.Armstrong(117U.S.591).Thereitwasheld
thatthepersonwhoprocuredapolicyuponthelifeofanother,payableathisdeath,andthen
murderedtheassuredtomakethepolicypayable,couldnotrecoverthereon.Mr.Justice
FIELD,writingtheopinion,said:"IndependentlyofanyproofofthemotivesofHunterin
obtainingthepolicy,andevenassumingthattheywerejustandproper,heforfeitedallrights
underitwhen,tosecureitsimmediatepayment,hemurderedtheassured.Itwouldbea
reproachtothejurisprudenceofthecountryifonecouldrecoverinsurancemoneypayableon
thedeathofapartywhoselifehehadfeloniouslytaken.Aswellmightherecoverinsurance
moneyuponabuildingthathehadwillfullyfired."

Thesemaxims,withoutanystatutegivingthemforceoroperation,frequentlycontrolthe
effectandnullifythelanguageofwills.Awillprocuredbyfraudanddeception,likeany
otherinstrument,maybedecreedvoidandsetaside,andsoaparticularportionofawillmay
beexcludedfromprobateorheldinoperativeifinducedbythefraudorundueinfluenceof
thepersoninwhosefavoritis.(Allenv.M'Pherson,1H.L.Cas.191Harrison'sAppeal,48
Conn.202.)Soawillmaycontainprovisionswhichareimmoral,irreligiousoragainstpublic
policy,andtheywillbeheldvoid.

Heretherewasnocertaintythatthismurdererwouldsurvivethetestator,orthatthe
testatorwouldnotchangehiswill,andtherewasnocertaintythathewouldgetthisproperty
ifnaturewasallowedtotakeitscourse.He,therefore,murderedthetestatorexpresslytovest
himselfwithanestate.Undersuchcircumstances,whatlaw,humanordivine,willallowhim
totaketheestateandenjoythefruitsofhiscrime?Thewillspokeandbecameoperativeat
thedeathofthetestator.Hecausedthatdeath,andthusbyhiscrimemadeitspeakandhave
operation.Shallitspeakandoperateinhisfavor?Ifhehadmetthetestatorandtakenhis
propertyby[*513]force,hewouldhavehadnotitletoit.Shallheacquiretitlebymurdering
him?Ifhehadgonetothetestator'shouseandbyforcecompelledhim,orbyfraudorundue
influencehadinducedhimtowillhimhisproperty,thelawwouldnotallowhimtoholdit.
Butcanhegiveeffectandoperationtoawillbymurder,andyettaketheproperty?Toanswer
thesequestionsintheaffirmative,itseemstome,wouldbeareproachtothejurisprudenceof
ourstate,andanoffenseagainstpublicpolicy.

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Underthecivillawevolvedfromthegeneralprinciplesofnaturallawandjusticeby
manygenerationsofjurisconsults,philosophersandstatesmen,onecannottakepropertyby
inheritanceorwillfromanancestororbenefactorwhomhehasmurdered.(Domat,part2,
book1,tit.1,3CodeNapoleon,727Mackeldy'sRomanLaw,530,550.)IntheCivil
CodeofLowerCanadatheprovisionsonthesubjectintheCodeNapoleonhavebeen
substantiallycopied.But,sofarasIcanfind,innocountrywherethecommonlawprevails
hasitbeendeemedimportanttoenactalawtoprovideforsuchacase.Ourrevisersandlaw
makerswerefamiliarwiththecivillaw,andtheydidnotdeemitimportanttoincorporateinto
ourstatutesitsprovisionsuponthissubject.Thisisnotacasusomissus.Itwasevidently
supposedthatthemaximsofthecommonlawweresufficienttoregulatesuchacaseandthat
aspecificenactmentforthatpurposewasnotneeded.

ForthesamereasonsthedefendantPalmercannottakeanyofthispropertyasheir.Just
beforethemurderhewasnotanheir,anditwasnotcertainthatheeverwouldbe.Hemight
havediedbeforehisgrandfather,ormighthavebeendisinheritedbyhim.Hemadehimselfan
heirbythemurder,andheseekstotakepropertyasthefruitofhiscrime.Whathasbefore
beensaidastohimaslegateeappliestohimwithequalforceasanheir.Hecannotvest
himselfwithtitlebycrime.

MyviewofthiscasedoesnotinflictuponElmerany[*514]greaterorotherpunishment
forhiscrimethanthelawspecifies.Ittakesfromhimnoproperty,butsimplyholdsthathe
shallnotacquirepropertybyhiscrime,andthusberewardedforitscommission.

OurattentioniscalledtoOwensv.Owens(100N.C.240),asacasequitelikethis.
Thereawifehadbeenconvictedofbeinganaccessorybeforethefacttothemurderofher
husband,anditwasheldthatshewas,nevertheless,entitledtodower.Iamunwillingto
assenttothedoctrineofthatcase.Thestatutesprovidedowerforawifewhohasthe
misfortunetosurviveherhusbandandthuslosehissupportandprotection.Itisclearbeyond
theirpurposetomakeprovisionforawifewhobyherowncrimemakesherselfawidowand
willfullyandintentionallydeprivesherselfofthesupportandprotectionofherhusband.As
shemighthavediedbeforehim,andthusneverhavebeenhiswidow,shecannotbyhercrime
vestherselfwithanestate.Theprinciplewhichliesatthebottomofthemaxim,volentinon
fitinjuria,shouldbeappliedtosuchacase,andawidowshouldnot,forthepurposeof
acquiring,assuch,propertyrights,bepermittedtoallegeawidowhoodwhichshehas
wickedlyandintentionallycreated.

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Thefactsfoundentitledtheplaintiffstotherelieftheyseek.Theerroroftherefereewas
inhisconclusionoflaw.Insteadofgrantinganewtrial,therefore,Ithinktheproperjudgment
uponthefactsfoundshouldbeorderedhere.Thefactshavebeenpassedupontwicewiththe
sameresult,firstuponthetrialofPalmerformurder,andthenbytherefereeinthisaction.
Weare,therefore,ofopinionthattheendsofjusticedonotrequirethattheyshouldagain
comeinquestion.

ThejudgmentoftheGeneralTermandthatentereduponthereportoftherefereeshould,
therefore,bereversedandjudgmentshouldbeenteredasfollows:ThatElmerE.Palmerand
theadministratorbeenjoinedfromusinganyofthepersonaltyorrealestateleftbythe
testatorforElmer'sbenefitthatthedeviseandbequestinthewilltoElmerbedeclared
[*515]ineffectivetopassthetitletohimthatbyreasonofthecrimeofmurdercommitted
uponthegrandfatherheisdeprivedofanyinterestintheestateleftbyhimthattheplaintiffs
arethetrueownersoftherealandpersonalestateleftbythetestator,subjecttothechargein
favorofElmer'smotherandthewidowofthetestator,undertheantenuptialagreement,and
thattheplaintiffshavecostsinallthecourtsagainstElmer.

GRAY,J.(dissenting).

Thisappealpresentsanextraordinarystateoffacts,andthecase,inrespectofthem,I
believe,iswithoutprecedentinthisstate.

Therespondent,aladofsixteenyearsofage,beingawareoftheprovisionsinhis
grandfather'swill,whichconstitutedhimtheresiduarylegateeofthetestator'sestate,caused
hisdeathbypoisonin1882.Forthiscrimehewastriedandwasconvictedofmurderinthe
seconddegree,andatthetimeofthecommencementofthisactionhewasservingouthis
sentenceinthestatereformatory.Thisactionwasbroughtbytwoofthechildrenofthe
testatorforthepurposeofhavingthoseprovisionsofthewillintherespondent'sfavor
canceledandannulled.

Theappellants'argumentforareversalofthejudgment,whichdismissedtheir
complaint,isthattherespondentunlawfullypreventedarevocationoftheexistingwill,ora
newwillfrombeingmade,byhiscrime,andthatheterminatedtheenjoymentbythetestator
ofhispropertyandeffectedhisownsuccessiontoitbythesamecrime.Theysaythatto
permittherespondenttotakethepropertywilledtohimwouldbetopermithimtotake
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advantageofhisownwrong.

Tosustaintheirpositiontheappellants'counselhassubmittedanableandelaborate
brief,and,ifIbelievedthatthedecisionofthequestioncouldbeaffectedbyconsiderationsof
anequitablenature,Ishouldnothesitatetoassenttoviewswhichcommendthemselvestothe
conscience.Butthematterdoesnotliewithinthedomainofconscience.Weareboundbythe
rigidrulesoflaw,whichhavebeenestablishedbythelegislature,andwithinthelimitsof
whichthedetermination[*516]ofthisquestionisconfined.Thequestionwearedealingwith
is,whetheratestamentarydispositioncanbealtered,orawillrevoked,afterthetestator's
death,throughanappealtothecourts,whenthelegislaturehas,byitsenactments,prescribed
exactlywhenandhowwillsmaybemade,alteredandrevoked,and,apparently,asitseemsto
me,whentheyhavebeenfullycompliedwith,hasleftnoroomfortheexerciseofan
equitablejurisdictionbycourtsoversuchmatters.Modernjurisprudence,inrecognizingthe
rightoftheindividual,undermoreorlessrestrictions,todisposeofhispropertyafterhis
death,subjectsittolegislativecontrol,bothastoextentandastomodeofexercise.Complete
freedomoftestamentarydispositionofone'spropertyhasnotbeenandisnottheuniversal
ruleasweseefromtheprovisionsoftheNapoleonicCode,fromthosesystemsof
jurisprudenceinothercountrieswhicharemodeledupontheRomanlaw,andfromthe
statutesofmanyofourstates.Tothestatutoryrestraints,whichareimposeduponthe
dispositionofone'spropertybywill,areaddedstrictandsystematicstatutoryrulesforthe
execution,alterationandrevocationofthewillwhichmustbe,atleast,substantially,ifnot
exactly,followedtoinsurevalidityandperformance.Thereasonfortheestablishmentofsuch
rules,wemaynaturallyassume,consistsinthepurposetocreatethosesafeguardsaboutthese
graveandimportantacts,whichexperiencehasdemonstratedtobethewisestandsurest.That
freedom,whichispermittedtobeexercisedinthetestamentarydispositionofone'sestateby
thelawsofthestate,issubjecttoitsbeingexercisedinconformitywiththeregulationsofthe
statutes.Thecapacityandthepoweroftheindividualtodisposeofhispropertyafterdeath,
andthemodebywhichthatpowercanbeexercised,aremattersofwhichthelegislaturehas
assumedtheentirecontrol,andhasundertakentoregulatewithcomprehensiveparticularity.

Theappellants'argumentisnothelpedbyreferencetothoserulesofthecivillaw,orto
thoselawsofothergovernments,bywhichtheheirorlegateeisexcludedfrombenefitunder
thetestament,ifhehasbeenconvictedofkilling,or[*517]attemptingtokill,thetestator.In
theabsenceofsuchlegislationhere,thecourtsarenotempoweredtoinstitutesuchasystem
ofremedialjustice.ThedeprivationoftheheirofhistestamentarysuccessionbytheRoman

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law,whenguiltyofsuchacrime,plainly,wasintendedtobeinthenatureofapunishment
imposeduponhim.Thesuccession,insuchacaseofguilt,escheatedtotheexchequer.(See
Domat'sCivilLaw,pt.2,book1,tit.1,3.)

Iconcedethatrulesoflaw,whichannultestamentaryprovisionmadeforthebenefitof
thosewhohavebecomeunworthyofthem,maybebasedonprinciplesofequityandof
naturaljustice.Itisquitereasonabletosupposethatatestatorwouldrevokeoralterhiswill,
wherehismindhasbeensoangeredandchangedastomakehimunwillingtohavehiswill
executedasitstood.Buttheseprinciplesonlysuggestsufficientreasonsfortheenactmentof
lawstomeetsuchcases.

Thestatutesofthisstatehaveprescribedvariouswaysinwhichawillmaybealteredor
revokedbuttheveryprovision,definingthemodesofalterationandrevocation,impliesa
prohibitionofalterationorrevocationinanyotherway.Thewordsofthesectionofthe
statuteare:"Nowillinwriting,exceptinthecaseshereinaftermentioned,noranypart
thereof,shallberevokedoralteredotherwise,"etc.Where,therefore,noneofthecases
mentionedaremetbythefacts,andtherevocationisnotinthewaydescribedinthesection,
thewillofthetestatorisunalterable.Ithinkthatavalidwillmustcontinueasawillalways,
unlessrevokedinthemannerprovidedbythestatutes.Mereintentiontorevokeawilldoes
nothavetheeffectofrevocation.Theintentiontorevokeisnecessarytoconstitutethe
effectiverevocationofawillbutitmustbedemonstratedbyoneoftheactscontemplatedby
thestatute.AsWOODWORTH,J.,saidinDanv.Brown(4Cow.490):"Revocationisanact
ofthemind,whichmustbedemonstratedbysomeoutwardandvisiblesignofrevocation."
Thesamelearnedjudgesaidinthatcase:"Theruleisthatifthetestatorletsthewill[*518]
standuntilhedies,itishiswillifhedoesnotsufferittodoso,itisnothiswill."(Goodright
v.Glasier,4Burr.2512,2514Pembertonv.Pemberton,13Ves.290.)

Thefindingoffactofthereferee,that,presumably,thetestatorwouldhavealteredhis
will,hadheknownofhisgrandson'smurderousintent,cannotaffectthequestion.Wemay
concedeittothefullestextentbutstillthecardinalobjectionisundisposedof,thatthe
makingandtherevocationofawillarepurelymattersofstatutoryregulation,bywhichthe
courtisboundinthedeterminationofquestionsrelatingtotheseacts.Twocasesinthisstate
andinKentucky,atanearlyday,seemtometobemuchinpoint.Gainsv.Gains(2Marshall,
190),wasdecidedbytheKentuckyCourtofAppealsin1820.Itwasthereurgedthatthe
testatorintendedtohavedestroyedhiswill,andthathewasforciblypreventedfromdoingso

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bythedefendantinerrorordevisee,anditwasinsistedthatthewill,thoughnotexpressly,
wastherebyvirtuallyrevoked.Thecourtheld,astheactconcerningwillsprescribedthe
mannerinwhichawillmightberevoked,thatasnoneoftheactsevidencingrevocationwere
done,theintentioncouldnotbesubstitutedfortheact.Inthatcasethewillwassnatched
awayandforciblyretained.In1854,SurrogateBRADFORD,whoseopinionsareentitledto
thehighestconsideration,decidedthecaseofLeaycraftv.Simmons(3Bradf.35).Inthatcase
thetestator,amanofeightynineyearsofage,desiredtomakeacodiciltohiswill,inorder
toenlargetheprovisionsforhisdaughter.Hissonhavingthecustodyoftheinstrument,and
theonetobeprejudicedbythechange,refusedtoproducethewill,attestator'srequest,for
thepurposeofalteration.Thelearnedsurrogatereferstotheprovisionsofthecivillawfor
suchandothercasesofunworthyconductintheheirorlegatee,andsays,"ourstatutehas
undertakentoprescribethemodeinwhichwillscanberevoked(citingthestatutory
provision).ThisisthelawbywhichIamgovernedinpassinguponquestionstouchingthe
revocationofwills.Thewholeofthissubjectisnowregulatedbystatute,andamere
intentionto[*519]revoke,howeverwellauthenticated,orhoweverdefeated,isnot
sufficient."Andheheldthatthewillmustbeadmittedtoprobate.Imayreferalsotoacasein
thePennsylvaniacourts.Inthatstatethestatuteprescribedthemodeforrepealingoraltering
awill,andinClinganv.Mitcheltree(31Pa.StateRep.25)theSupremeCourtofthestate
held,whereawillwaskeptfromdestructionbythefraudandmisrepresentationofthe
devisee,thattodeclareitcanceledasagainstthefraudulentpartywouldbetoenlargethe
statute.

Icannotfindanysupportfortheargumentthattherespondent'ssuccessiontothe
propertyshouldbeavoidedbecauseofhiscriminalact,whenthelawsaresilent.Public
policydoesnotdemandit,forthedemandsofpublicpolicyaresatisfiedbytheproper
executionofthelawsandthepunishmentofthecrime.Therehasbeennoconvention
betweenthetestatorandhislegatee,noristhereanysuchcontractualelementinsucha
dispositionofpropertybyatestator,astoimposeorimplyconditionsinthelegatee.The
appellants'argumentpracticallyamountstothis:Thatasthelegateehasbeenguiltyofa
crime,bythecommissionofwhichheisplacedinapositiontosoonerreceivethebenefitsof
thetestamentaryprovision,hisrightstothepropertyshouldbeforfeitedandheshouldbe
divestedofhisestate.Toallowtheirargumenttoprevailwouldinvolvethediversionbythe
courtofthetestator'sestateintothehandsofpersons,whom,possiblyenough,forallwe
know,thetestatormightnothavechosenordesiredasitsrecipients.Practicallythecourtis
askedtomakeanotherwillforthetestator.Thelawsdonotwarrantthisjudicialaction,and
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merepresumptionwouldnotbestrongenoughtosustainit.

Butmorethanthis,toconcedeappellants'viewswouldinvolvetheimpositionofan
additionalpunishmentorpenaltyupontherespondent.Whatpowerorwarranthavethecourts
toaddtotherespondent'spenaltiesbydeprivinghimofproperty?Thelawhaspunishedhim
forhiscrime,andwemaynotsaythatitwasaninsufficientpunishment.Inthetrialand
punishmentoftherespondentthelawhas[*520]vindicateditselffortheoutragewhichhe
committed,andfurtherjudicialutteranceuponthesubjectofpunishmentordeprivationof
rightsisbarred.Wemaynot,inthelanguageofthecourtinPeoplev.Thornton(25Hun,
456),'enhancethepains,penaltiesandforfeituresprovidedbylawforthepunishmentof
crime.'

Thejudgmentshouldbeaffirmed,withcosts.

AllconcurwithEARL,J.,exceptGRAY,J.,whoreadsdissentingopinion,and
DANFORTH,J.,concurring.

Judgmentinaccordancewiththeprevailingopinion.

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