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I hereby certify that Paul Labedz has passed the Final
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Martha Finnemore, Associate Professor o f Political Science and
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Maurice Alden East, Professor o f International Affairs and Political
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S t u d e n t S e r v ic e s C e n t e r
P h il l ip s H a l l 107 W a s h i n g t o n , D C 20052 12021 994-6210 Fa x 12021994-6213
CHANGING BELIEFS AND CHANGING POLICIES
Explaining Transitions in U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Central America
During the Reagan and Bush Years
By
Paul A. Labedz
B.A. June 1989, The State University o f New York at Buffalo

M.Phil. May 1997, The George Washington University
A Dissertation Submitted to
The Faculty of
Columbian College of Arts and Sciences

Of The George Washington University in partial satisfaction
Of the requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
August 31, 2001
Dissertation directed by
Cynthia McClintock
Professor o f Political Science and International Affairs
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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For my parents, Anthony and Mary Labedz, my wife and partner, Missy, and
my daughter, Nadia
ii
ABSTRACT
Changing Beliefs and Changing Policies: Explaining Transitions

in U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Central America in the
Reagan and Bush Years
Paul A. Labedz
This study argues that a presidents foreign policy beliefs represent a critical
independent variable that must be considered together with system-level and
domestic-level variables in order to understand the causes behind changes in U.S.
foreign policy. The relationship between presidential beliefs and changes in U.S.
foreign policy was investigated through an examination o f a specific foreign policy
activity: namely, shifts in U.S. intervention in El Salvador and Nicaragua during the
Reagan and Bush presidencies.
A modified version o f the operational code construct was used to develop the
belief systems of President Reagan and President Bush. This analytical model
consisted of the presidents national self-image, images o f allies and adversaries, as
well as beliefs concerning international politics, the flow o f history, and the nature of
change. To assess the impact o f a presidents beliefs on foreign policy behavior, I
utilized Alexander Georges congruence method to show why certain policy options
were selected rather than others.
The central hypothesis o f this dissertation linking presidential foreign policy
beliefs and changes in U.S. foreign policy behavior was examined through two case
studies: U.S. policy toward El Salvador from 1980-1992 and U.S. policy toward
Nicaragua from 1980-1990. The empirical evidence from the case studies served to
confirm the hypothesis, albeit with reservations. The fundamental difference between
iii
Reagans and Bushs policies toward El Salvador and Nicaragua turned out to be the
two presidents different beliefs concerning the usefulness o f diplomatic negotiations
in securing U.S. interests in the region, with Reagan being generally averse to their
use and Bush being generally open to them.
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION I
Case Selection 5
Methodology 6
Data 12
Limitations and Possible Solutions: 15
Generalization 15
Validity 18
Data Limitations 20
CHAPTER 1: EXPLANATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY TOWARD CENTRAL 27

AMERICA
System-level Explanations 29
Domestic-level Explanations 37
Individual-level Explanations 44
CHAPTER 2: FOREIGN POLICY, U.S. INTERVENTION, 50

AND PRESIDENTIAL BELIEF SYSTEMS
Dependent Variable: U.S. Intervention 50
Independent Variable: Foreign Policy B elief System 55
Rules o f Evidence 69
CHAPTER 3: THE REAGAN BELIEF SYSTEM 75

National Self-Image 75
Image of Allies 84
Image o f Adversaries 91
The Fundamental Nature o f International Politics 105
The Flow of History 113
The Nature of Change 118
CHAPTER 4: THE BUSH BELIEF SYSTEM 127

National Self-Image 128
Image of Allies 137
Image o f Adversaries 145
The Fundamental Nature o f International Politics 154
The Flow of History 162
The Nature o f Change 167
CHAPTER 5: U.S. POLICY TOWARD CENTRAL AMERICA IN THE 1980s 182
Ronald Reagan's Approach to Central America: A B rief Overview 182
The crisis in El Salvador 183
The Reagan Response 186
The Congruence Method and Reagans policy choices 188
for El Salvador
Reagan Confronts the Sandinistas in Nicaragua 212
Why wasn't a military option selected in El Salvador 234
or Nicaragua?
Bush Takes Command 238
The Bush Agenda for El Salvador 240
The Continuing Saga o f Nicaragua 253
What about Panama? 271
CONCLUSION 280
The System-Level Explanation 281
Domestic-Level Explanations 285
BIBIOGRAPHY 292
vi
LIST OF TABLES AND DIAGRAMS
TABLE 1: DEGREES OF INTERVENTION 52
DIAGRAM 1: REAGANS POLICY CHOICES FOR EL SALVADOR, 190

1981-1989
DIAGRAM 2: REAGANS POLICY CHOICES FOR NICARAGUA, 216

1981-1989
DIAGRAM 3: BUSHS POLICY CHOICES FOR EL SALVADOR, 242

1989-1992
DIAGRAM 4: BUSHS POLICY CHOICES FOR NICARAGUA, 255

1989-1992
vii
1
Introduction
What contributes to change in a state's foreign policy behavior? This dissertation
argues that a president's foreign policy belief system is a crucial variable that helps to
explain shifts in a state's foreign policy. In the broadest sense, a foreign policy belief
system is the individual's prism through which information emanating from the
international environment is filtered. It represents a hierarchical organization of political
attitudes and ideas that provide the individual with a road map for understanding and
acting within his/her political environment. Foreign policy behavior refers to the outward
directed behavior o f a state aimed at influencing other states within the international
system. The purpose o f this dissertation will be to assess whether different presidential
belief systems influence the direction of a state's foreign policy behavior. And,
specifically whether the different set of foreign policy beliefs held by Ronald Reagan and
George Bush contributed to changes in U.S. foreign policy toward El Salvador and
Nicaragua in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Unfortunately, the predominant explanatory models in the study o f international
relations tend to de-emphasize the impact o f beliefs on foreign policy behavior. In
general, system-level explanations, such as those offered by neo-realist and dependency
scholars tend to be overly deterministic, focusing far too much attention on balance of
power considerations and economic interests, respectively, in explaining changes in
foreign policy. Moreover, these approaches have difficulty making specific predictions
about state actions. In addition, neither school acknowledges that the way a state may
2
define its national security or economic interests can be influenced by the beliefs held
by its political leaders. Domestic-level explanations, on the other hand, while placing
greater emphasis on a number of alternative independent variables, such as the role of
divided government and the impact o f bureaucratic infighting, and who tend to be quite
strong in explaining how a new policy emerges, have difficulty explaining why different
presidents respond to these internal constraints in different manners. Proponents o f the
image-based political-psychology school have developed a persuasive argument linking
elite perceptions o f other states in the international arena to certain policy choices;
however, this approach is weakened by its neglect o f a leader's national self-image,
beliefs concerning the flow of history, and their beliefs about the nature o f change.1 It is
my contention that the existing literature needs to be complemented by a new approach
that establishes a correlation between presidential foreign policy belief systems and
changes in a state's foreign policy behavior. I will show that foreign policy belief
systems play a part- albeit, not the only part- in contributing to change in a state's foreign
policy. Other influences such as shifts in the international distribution of power along
with domestic-level variables are also o f vital concern. In sum, what this dissertation
seeks to do, then, is to demonstrate the importance o f presidential foreign policy beliefs
in contributing to changes in a state's foreign policy behavior, while also keeping in mind
structural and domestic-level determinants.
The relationship between political belief systems and changes in a state's foreign
policy behavior will be investigated through an examination o f a specific foreign policy
1 National self-image refers to a presidents idealized image o f the state. This concept will be
explained in greater detail in chapter 2
3
activity: namely, shifts in U.S. policy toward El Salvador and Nicaragua during the
Reagan and Bush years. After nearly ten years of staunch opposition to the revolutionary
movement in El Salvador and the Sandinista government in Nicaragua during the 1980s,
the transition from President Reagan to President Bush represented a major turning point
in U.S. foreign policy toward these nation-states. Shortly after taking office, President
Bush scaled back covert and overt military support for right-wing forces operating in the
region and began pushing for a negotiated peace settlement to outstanding disputes-
practices deemed anathema by the Reagan administration. As will be pointed out in
subsequent chapters, it was their positions on the usefulness o f negotiations as a viable
means of securing U.S. interests in El Salvador and Nicaragua that most clearly
differentiated Ronald Reagan and George Bush.
Considering that the two presidents came from the same political party, reached
the pinnacle o f their political careers during the Cold War, shared a similarly divided
government, and held a few top-level foreign policy advisors in common, a number o f
intriguing questions come to mind: (1) Why was there not a continuation o f a similar
foreign policy toward El Salvador and Nicaragua after the presidential transition? (2)
How much can the change in policy be attributed to different foreign policy beliefs of
President Reagan and President Bush? (3) Was the change in policy merely a reflection
o f the diminishing tensions in East-West relations? (4) Or, was the battle between the
President and Congress for control o f the foreign policy agenda the key explanatory
variable? (5) Does one needs to look at multi-level factors to explain these shifts in
policy?
4
In the broadest sense, this dissertation tests whether:
Changes in U.S. foreign policy are correlated with different foreign policy belief systems
among U.S. presidents?
More specifically, it tests whether:
Shifts in U.S. interventionist behavior toward El Salvador and Nicaragua in the 1980s are
directly correlated with the different foreign policy belief systems o f Ronald Reagan and
George Bush?
Given the efforts by scholars to discern a post Cold-War foreign policy pattern for
the United States, it becomes imperative for students o f U.S.-Latin American relations to
understand which factors have led to changes in U.S. foreign policy in the past,
particularly relating to intervention in the internal affairs of other states. A qualitative
research design will be used to investigate the relationship between foreign policy beliefs
and foreign policy behavior. The qualitative design will include a content analysis of the
public addresses, personal memoirs, internal correspondences, autobiographies, and
biographies o f the two presidents as well as their leading foreign policy advisors in order
to infer the two presidents foreign policy belief systems. The data sources were selected
in a non-random fashion and reflected the central research concern: namely, Reagans
and Bushs general foreign policy beliefs and in particular their beliefs concerning the
actors and events taking place in El Salvador and Nicaragua.
5
Case Selection
In order to isolate the impact o f belief systems on foreign policy behavior (types
or degrees of intervention), it is necessary to select cases on the basis o f what Przeworski
and Teune call the "most similar systems" design.2 Even though their description on this
technique centers on cross-country comparisons, the same logic can be applied to
examining different presidents within the U.S. political system. The objective in this type
o f research design is to select two or more cases that share a num ber o f characteristics in
common with respect to a particular empirical phenomenon that the investigator is
seeking to explain. These shared characteristics or variables are then considered
'controlled.' Those variables that remain are then used to compare the different outcomes
on the selected dependent variable.
With respect to the U.S. policy toward El Salvador and Nicaragua in the 1980s,
both Reagan and Bush came from the same political party and experienced a similarly
divided government vis-a-vis the executive and legislative branches. Moreover, both
presidents received advice from many o f the same foreign policy advisors. Consequently,
one can at least in part control for the independent effects of partisanship and
bureaucratic influence on changing foreign policy behavior. One purpose o f this
dissertation, therefore, will be to demonstrate the impact of presidential belief systems on
changes in U.S. policy toward El Salvador and Nicaragua.
2 Adam Prezeworski and Henry Teune, The Logic o f Comparative Social Inquiry (New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1970). pp. 34-39.
An even more important reason for examining this set o f cases is that the events
taking place in El Salvador and Nicaragua were, with the possible exception o f U.S.-
Soviet relations, the single most important issue-area for U.S. foreign policy throughout
the 1980s. President Reagan gave more public addresses concerning U.S. policy toward
Central America than for any other region in the world. By 1986 Reagan suggested:
Since the beginning o f my first administration there has been no foreign policy issue
more directly affecting United States national interests than the conflict in Central
America, for this conflict challenges not only our strategic position but the very
principles upon which the nation is founded.3 William LeoGrande writes that not since
the Vietnam conflict "had Americans been so bitterly divided over a foreign policy issue
as they were over Central America" and that "Central America became a symbol and test
case for demonstrating Reagan's new hard line against international communism." It was
indeed the last major battle o f the Cold War.4
Methodology
The general methodology for this dissertation is a structured, focused comparison
that uses a disciplined-configurative mode o f analysis. As mentioned above, the cases to
be analyzed were selected carefully to control for the effects o f other potential
explanatory variables. This provides the study with its structure and focus. With respect
3 Assistance for Nicraguan Democratic Resistance, 25 February 1986, National Security Archive, Nicaragua Collection, Document
# NI02677.
4 William LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America. 1977-1992 (Chapel Hill, NC; University o f North
Carolina Press, 1998) pp. ix-xi.
7
to disciplined & configurative, Harry Eckstein notes that the chain o f inquiry in
disciplined-configurative studies, "runs from comparatively tested theory to case
interpretation, and thence, perhaps via ad hoc additions, newly discovered puzzles, and
systematized prudence, to new candidate-theories."5 Stephen Van Evera describes this
type o f study as a theory testing, literature assessing, historical-explanatory dissertation.6
This dissertation attempts to point up the need to combine first level variables
(belief systems) with second and third level variables (domestic politics and international
structure, respectively) in order to offer a fuller explanation o f the causes behind changes
in a state's foreign policy. Admittedly, some might argue that an analysis making the case
that it takes a lot o f variables to explain a given empirical phenomenon is not very
intellectually satisfying. However, a useful dissertation need not always create, or, for
that matter, even test specific hypotheses or theories. An equally important goal for
advancing social science is to apply existing hypotheses and/or theories to see how well
they fit in different sets o f circumstances. Van Evera, in particular, makes the case that
political scientists should not shy away from historical- explanatory and historical-
evaluative dissertations. He is indeed quite correct to suggest: if theories are never
applied, then what are they for? Theories have value only if the are eventually put to
work to explain, assess, prescribe.7 Simply put, this dissertation is going to test the
5 A discussion o f the Structured, Focused Comparison method can be found in Alexander L. George, "Case Studies and Theory
Development: The Method o f Structured, Focused Comparison," Paul G. Lauren, ed.. Diplomacy: N ew Approaches in History.
Theory, and Policy (London: Free Press, 1979). The quotation is taken from Harry Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Political
Science," Regarding Politics (Berkeley, CA; University o f California Press, 1992) pp. 139-140.
6 For a very useful discussion o f the principal functions o f a doctoral dissertation in political science consult, Stephen Van Evera,
Guide to Methods fo r Students o f Political Science (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997) pp. 89-95.
7 Ibid. p. 93.
8
validity o f one type o f belief system theory, namely that associated with Doug Blums
refinement o f the operational code (see chapter 2).
In particular, this dissertation will focus on the different methods o f intervention
chosen by Reagan and Bush to respond to the left-wing government in Nicaragua and the
revolutionary movement in El Salvador. Some o f the questions that this study seeks to
answer include, but are not limited to: how does one account for the end o f U.S. support
for the covert war in Nicaragua? What explanations can be given for the Bush
administration's pressure on the Cristiani government to negotiate with the FMLN after
nearly ten years o f opposition to the leftist movement? Did the end o f the Cold War mark
the end of U.S. opposition to indigenous rebel movements in Central America? How
much weight should be given to internal political forces in the United States, for example,
public opinion, personnel changes in the executive branch, congressional and
bureaucratic opposition to the involvement in Central America with respect to changes in
policy? How much weight did the end of the Cold W ar play in all these changes?
Linking beliefs and behavior will require combining what Alexander George calls
the process-tracing and the congruence method.8 In process-tracing, the analyst
attempts to uncover the intervening steps between a set o f beliefs and a given behavior
within the overall context o f the policy-making environment. George notes: "this
technique seeks to establish the ways in which the actors beliefs influenced his
receptivity to and assessment o f incoming information about the situation, his definition
of the situation, his identification and evaluation o f options, as well as, finally, his choice
8 Alexander L. George, "The Causal Nexus between Cognitive Beliefs and Decision-Making Behavior: The Operational Code Belief
System," in Lawrence Falkowski, ed.. Psychological Models in International Politics (Boulder: CO; W estview Press, 1979) pp. 94-
124.
9
o f a course of action."9 Applying the process-tracing method in this dissertation will
require uncovering the core and intermediate beliefs (see chapter 2) held by Reagan and
Bush and then to see if indeed these were in any way used in assessing new information,
defining the situation, and ultimately helping them to identify and evaluate options.10
To make the leap from the existence o f certain beliefs to their influence on
subsequent behavior requires coupling the process-tracing method with the
congruence method.11The basis for the congruence method is to check for consistency
between beliefs and selected courses of action. Once again, George provides us with
needed insight into the technique:
The determination o f consistency is made deductively. From the actor's beliefs,
the investigator deduces what implications they have for decision. If the
characteristics of the decision are consistent with the actor's beliefs, there is at
least a presumption that the beliefs may have played a causal role in this particular
instance o f decision-making.12
The means of ensuring that a given set of beliefs are in part responsible for a given
action, however, requires that the analyst demonstrate that these beliefs could have either
been consistent or inconsistent with other available courses o f action. It must be shown
9 Ibid. p. 113
10 The specific content o f the belief system model that I use for this study is described in detail in Chapter 2.
11 The benefits o f combining Georges process-tracing method and congruence method are well illustrated in Yuen Foong Khong,
Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions o f1 965 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1992)
12 Ibid., p. 106.
10
that the option that was actually selected followed logically from the beliefs that are
held by the decision- maker. Put somewhat differently, the analyst must engage in
counter-factual thought experiments to show that the beliefs held would in most cases
apply to the course o f action taken, and not the hypothetical situations. If one can show
that the decision-makers beliefs were consistent with the chosen option, then the strength
o f beliefs as a potential independent variable increases.
A key question that needs to be answered at this point, however, is: how are
beliefs measured? In other words, how does one know a belief when they see one?
Unfortunately, there is no simple answer to this question. An individuals beliefs can
never be observed and measured directly. That does not mean, however, that beliefs and
attitudes cannot be inferred from observable indicators. Richard Herrmann suggests that
two types o f evidence exist that scholars can use to gauge the beliefs o f leaders,
specifically: 1) the behavioral predispositions o f the individual, and 2) the
communications, both written and oral, o f the individual.13 Because the dependent
variable for this study is foreign policy behavior, it would be tautological to use the first
type of indicator to measure beliefs, namely behavior causing behavior. Consequently,
primary emphasis in this study will be given to assessing the communications of Reagan
and Bush to discern their foreign policy beliefs.
Drawing inferences from both the written and oral communications of the two
presidents will require the use o f a content analysis o f their public and private statements.
13 Richard K. Herrmann, Perceptions and Behavior in Soviet Foreign Policy (Pittsburgh, PA: University o f Pittsburgh, 1985). p. 22.
For alternative means o f measuring perception consult. Ole R. Holsti. "The Operation Code Approach: Problems and Some
Solutions," Christer Jonsson, ed.. Cognitive Dynamics and International Politics. (London: Frances Pinter, 1982) pp. 75-91.
Alexander George. "The Causal Nexus Between Cognitive Beliefs and Decision-Making B ehavior the Operational Code, pp. 95-
124.
11
In this study, I have chosen to use a qualitative content analysis o f the communications
made by two presidents and their closest foreign advisors rather than a quantitative
content analysis for two important reasons.14 First, examining documents for statements
that are linked to previously established hypotheses minimizes the danger of coding
irrelevant content in a communicated statement. Prior to conducting a quantitative
content analysis, the investigator must develop a coding scheme and decide which units
in the communication are to be recorded. The danger involved, o f course, is that the
coding scheme may overlook some of the nuances in a statement and fail to record
important communications that do not happen to fall within the analysts pre-designed
coding scheme.
Second, changes that take place in a speakers strategy are not often captured by
quantitative content analyses. The order, context, and sequence of a communication
matter tremendously. Unfortunately, in many quantitative content analyses, each
communicated unit that falls within a pre-established category is counted as if it is o f
equal significance, regardless o f where the utterance falls within the communication. By
contrast, in the qualitative content analysis used below, careful consideration is made to
determine who said what, how, to whom, and under what circumstances, and with what
affect.15
The overall goal o f this project, then, is to discern, through an examination o f the
two presidents communicated statements, what belief systems these men held and to see
14 For a very good discussion o f the benefits o f using a qualitative content analysis o f documents, consult Alexander George,
Propaganda Analysis (Evanston, IL: Row and Peterson, 1959)
15 Alexander George in Propaganda Analysis (Evanston, IL: Row & Peterson, 1959) makes a persuasive case for the use o f a
qualitative content analysis o f public documents.
12
if their beliefs shaped the type o f intervention that was used in responding to events
taking place in El Salvador and Nicaragua.
Data
The data that is used in this study are the foreign policy speeches and press
conferences o f Ronald Reagan and George Bush as well as their private reflections
concerning U.S. foreign policy found in their personal memoirs, autobiographies and
internal administration correspondences.
In addition, I conducted a qualitative content analysis o f the foreign policy
statements of the two presidents leading foreign policy advisors. This information was
obtained in their respective autobiographies. The importance o f examining these data
sources is to assess whether the president and his key advisors possessed a different set of
foreign policy beliefs. The expectation is that the president will consult with advisors
who have beliefs similar to his own. I f the presidents most important foreign policy
advisors have beliefs that are different from the presidents and if subsequent U.S. policy
reflects the beliefs o f the advisor(s), then this adds strength to a point being made by
those who claim that bureaucratic politics is the key factor in explaining change in U.S.
foreign policy.
Presidential speeches and press conferences were obtained from The Public
Papers o f Presidents o f the United States, a U.S. Government Printing Office publication
containing the public communications o f President Reagan and President Bush. To
13
supplement these public statements, specifically as it related to the two presidents
beliefs concerning U.S. policy toward El Salvador and Nicaragua, I analyzed a range of
internal policy documents, including presidential directives, memos, meeting notes,
briefing papers, and White House communications, found within the National Security
Archive. The reason for utilizing these internal documents was to check to see if what
these presidents said in public corresponded to what they said in private. I f there is a
close match, then the statements made by the president in his public addresses were more
likely to reflect his true beliefs.
Sixty speeches were analyzed from the Public Papers for President Reagan:
twenty-six (26) for his first administration and thirty-four (34) for his second
administration.16These public statements were selected from a list o f speeches that the
Reagan Presidential Library classified as Ronald Reagans major speeches. When
combined with the presidents speeches found in the National Security Archive, they
represent all o f Reagans speeches on Central America. An additional ten pre-
presidential speeches given by Reagan were examined from a collection compiled by
Alfred Balitzer.17
One o f the main purposes o f this project was to uncover the presidents general
foreign policy proclivities. Therefore, a systematic review was made o f all o f President
Reagan speeches that were made on U.S. foreign policy and Central America.
16 The reason for the variation in the number o f speeches analyzed in the first versus second Reagan administration is that during the
second term, the president gave more speeches on Central America. Many o f these were nationally televised addresses whereby the
president attempted to convince the American public to put pressure o f their members o f Congress to pass appropriation bills to fund
the government o f El Salvador o f the Contras forces in Nicaragua.
17 Alfred Ballizer, ed., A Timefo r Choosing: The Speeches o f Ronald Reagan. 1961-1982 (Chicago: Regnery Gateway, 1983)
14
The sample of public speeches and press conferences that were used for George
Bush included all statements that were indexed in the Public Papers under the
classifications: foreign policy or Central America. In total, one-hundred-and-
eighteen (118) speeches and press conferences were analyzed for traces o f the presidents
foreign policy beliefs.18 As was the case with the Reagan documents, the basis for using
this method was to examine public statements that were reasonably broad in scope and
addressed a number o f issues that the president was likely to consider o f key importance
in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy.
In addition to examining these primary documents, I checked to see if there was a
match between what the two presidents stated in their public addresses and what they
stated in their memoirs, autobiographies and in their internal administration
correspondences. From the National Security Archive, I analyzed over 120 records for
the Reagan administration that were classified as having been authored by the president.
For President Bush, I analyzed over 30 documents that were classified as having been
authored by the president. These internal records for both presidents were taken from the
National Security Archives collections on El Salvador, Nicaragua, and the Iran-Contra
Affair.
Apart from these primary sources, I reviewed a significant part o f the secondary
literature, especially scholarly studies and assessments by leading journalists who
examined the two presidents responses to the events occurring in El Salvador and
Nicaragua. Again, the purpose was to verify whether their interpretations differed from
that which I culled from the public and private communications.
18 The specific way that these documents, along with the President Reagans speeches, were coded will be discussed in Chapter 2.
15
Limitations and Possible Solutions: Generalization, Validity, and Data
An analysis o f this nature, focusing primarily on the belief system o f two
American presidents and its attendant effects on U.S. foreign policy toward Central
America, is bound to run into a number o f problems. The first and perhaps most
worrisome is the extent to which the findings can be generalized. In other words, what
can a study examining the different responses o f Ronald Reagan and George Bush to the
revolutionary crises in Central America in the 1980s tell one about the overall pattern of
U.S. foreign policy in Latin America and beyond? The answer is: quite a bit.
By using what Lijphart calls a "deviant" case, one can measure the importance of
belief systems in contributing to shifts in different types o f U.S. foreign policy where one
normally would expect continuity.19 As noted above, Reagan and Bush came from the
same political party, shared many key policy advisors, and experienced a similar Cold
War environment for m ost o f their political careers, all o f which partially adumbrated a
continuation of policy. The fact o f the matter is, however, that the two presidents did not
continue the same line o f policy. President Reagan pursued an interventionist course in
Central America based on a highly ideological or black-white view o f the world and of
U.S. allies & adversaries in the region, where the use of, or at the very least, the threat to
use military force, was considered the most effective policy available. President Bush, by
19 Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," American Political Science Review, Vol. 65 (September
1971)
16
contrast, took a more nuanced and fine-tuned approach to foreign affairs and was
willing to consider the use o f a much broader set o f interventionist tools, especially the
pursuit of negotiations to settle regional disputes. Why? A possible explanation, among
others, is that the two presidents possessed different beliefs concerning how the United
States should respond to change. These beliefs, in turn, influenced the different
approaches taken by Reagan and Bush in responding to the revolutionary events
occurring in El Salvador and Nicaragua.
This dissertation can also be beneficial to the study o f U.S. foreign policy in two
additional ways. First, even if one assumes that the central hypothesis is confirmed with
reservations, the study can still help shed light on the dynamics behind change in U.S.
foreign policy by showing which factors were indeed the most crucial and why in causing
a specific transition in policy. This links the study quite nicely to the notion of paradigm
testing, or the practice o f normal science that Thomas Kuhn introduced to the scientific
world.20
Once again, however, a potential criticism can be made to this supposed
contribution. One may point out that simply suggesting that it takes a lot o f different
variables to explain a given empirical phenomena is not doing very much to contribute to
our general understanding o f the operation of international affairs and/or the conduct o f
U.S. foreign policy. I fervently disagree. In order for any hypothesis to attain the coveted
status of a theory, then it must be tested- time and time again- to see in what
circumstances it may or may not apply. Simply claiming that other potential explanations
are more parsimonious or rigorous, and are therefore more acceptable, misses the entire
20 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure ofScientific Revolutions (Chicago, IL: The University o f Chicago Press, 1970) pp. 52-66.
17
point of the advancement o f scientific knowledge. One needs to test different
hypotheses consistently against one another to uncover when and under what
circumstances they can either be confirmed or falsified. By the end o f this dissertation
(see especially the conclusion), I show where system-level and domestic-level
explanations are useful in explaining change in U.S. foreign policy toward Central
America in the 1980s and where they need to be supplemented with a belief-system
approach.
Furthermore, if the empirical evidence in this particular study confirms the central
hypothesis linking beliefs to behavior, this study will open up a new line o f research on
U.S. foreign policy. Other cases can be used to test the strength o f this relationship, just
as I am doing with Blum s belief system model (see chapter 2). To make the point
differently, the study adds an important independent variable that needs to be considered
when studying the causes o f change in U.S. foreign policy. Outstanding analyses o f U.S.
foreign policy toward Central America in the 1980s done by such scholars as William
LeoGrande, Thomas Carothers, and Cynthia Amson have already focused on the system-
level and domestic-level factors that contributed to change in U.S. foreign policy under
President Bush.21 What is needed now is a detailed analysis o f the role that different
presidential foreign policy beliefs have played in contributing to change in U.S. policy.
Utilizing a similar or modified model, other scholars can then begin to look at the
21 William LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America. 1977-1992 (Chapel Hill: University o f North
Carolina Press, 1998) nio m as Carothers, In the Name o f Democracy: U.S. Policy Toward Central America in the Reagan Years
(Berkeley, CA: University o f California Press, 1991) Cynthia Amson, Crossroads: Congress, the President, and Central America.
1976-1993 (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993)
18
influence o f presidential beliefs on U.S. policy toward different regions o f the world
and the influence it has had throughout different time periods o f American diplomacy.
Validity
On a more methodological note, one may argue that the influence o f presidential
beliefs on foreign policy behavior represents either a spurious relationship or may simply
be an unnecessary condition for explaining shifts in policy.22 In response to the first
criticism, one simply needs to note that a wide body o f theoretical literature (adopted
from the field o f social psychology) has developed that has shown that variations in the
conduct o f a group's behavior are partially a function o f an individual's or group's belief
system.23 Thus, the model proposed below is based upon many o f the accepted findings
in the field o f political decision-making, which contends that due to limitations on
information processing by human-beings and because o f the possibility o f inadequate
information, decision-makers often fall back on their already established beliefs to help
them reach decisions.24
22 Alexander George points to the need to combat these two criticisms in "The Causal Nexus between Cognitive Beliefs and
Decision-Making B ehavior The "Operational Code" B elief System, op. cit. pp. 104-113.
23 For good examples o f the importance o f belief systems, attitudes, and values in contributing to changes in human behavior see:
Milton Rokeach, ed.. The Open and Closed Mind (New York: Basic Books, 1960); Rokeach, ed. Understanding Human Values, (New
York: Free Press, 1979). Rokeach, 77ie Nature o f Human Values (New York: The Free Press, 1973). Rokeach, Beliefs, Attitudes, and
Values (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1975). Susan Fiske and Shelly Taylor, Social Cognition (New York: New York,
McGraw Hill,1991) 2nd edition.
24 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976) Robert
Jervis, Richard N ed Lebow, Janice Gross Stein, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985)
19
With respect to the second criticism, viz., that other independent variables can
explain these same transformations in U.S. foreign policy in a more parsimonious
maimer, one needs to realize that the theoretical literature on U.S.-Central America
affairs contains a number o f critical limitations (See Chapter 1). System-level
explanations, which claim that change in a state's foreign policy behavior are a reflection
o f shifts in the distribution o f power or challenges to economic hegemony is limited to
the extent that it fails to predict the extent o f actions a state will take once a shift in the
correlation o f forces has occurred. Simply stated, different leaders can respond to shifts in
the distribution o f power or the correlation of economic forces in different ways. Nor, do
system-level explanations acknowledge that a leader's beliefs may in fact be responsible,
at least in part, for defining a state's interests.
Domestic-level models, by contrast, are superb at addressing the processes by
which foreign policy decisions are ultimately made, but tend to leave out the importance
o f the presidential worldview in determining whether the president will cooperate with
Congress in shaping the course o f U.S. foreign policy or which particular bureaucratic
faction has the president's ear. Lastly, writers in the political-psychological school,
although paying closer attention to the importance o f the individual in the decision
making process, have a propensity to focus their attention on the impact o f images of
others and images o f international politics in the foreign policy-making process. They
pay much less attention to national self-images and views concerning the flow o f history
and, most importantly, the nature o f change, which are all incorporated in the belief
system model that I use below (See chapter 2).
20
To argue: Well weve got parsimony, as many writers in the above
theoretical camps do, and quite frequently, is not a very satisfying counter-argumer.t
when one is trying to understand why change occurs in a states foreign policy. I hold this
belief, despite the ever-present complaint that social science research is geared toward the
advancement o f the most rigorous explanation possible. Throughout this study, and
especially in the conclusion, it is shown where some o f the aforementioned explanations
fit and where they do not. Only by combining these approaches in a multi-level analysis
can one capture the true essence o f the shifting nature o f U.S. foreign policy toward El
Salvador and Nicaragua in the 1980s and early 1990s.
Data Limitations
Another possible limitation o f this dissertation relates to its data. A study that
relies heavily on a content analysis o f mostly public documents can run into a number o f
validity problems. The gist of the dilemma is this: do public officials really mean what
they say when they say it? Ole Holsti observes that public statements by government
officials can and often do reveal the speaker's true beliefs, attitudes, and opinions, but
* 9 5
may also be meant as political devices to sway given audiences toward a particular end."
In other words, how does one know that they are measuring what they claim to be
measuring? In this case, how does one actually know they are measuring a presidents
beliefs? Using mainly public documents exacerbates this dilemma. How does one know
25 Holsti, Ole. Foreign Policy Decision Makers Viewed Psychologically," in James N. Rosenau. ed., In Search o f Global Patterns.
(New York: The Free Press, 1976) pp. 120-144.
21
whether the two presidents public addresses truly reflect their beliefs? Public
statements can and have been used as political devices. This problem, although seemingly
large, can be handled if one can show that what the president announces in public
*y(\
corresponds with what is revealed in private. If the presidents public declarations
match what is found in his private memoirs and/or possibly in his internal administration
correspondences, then one can be reasonably certain that these statements represent the
presidents true beliefs.
The main problem o f relying primarily on public speeches and press conferences
revolve around two different models o f communication- the instrumental and
representational-which the analyst much take into consideration when examining public
documents. In the instrumental model, one must read between the lines to get at the true
meaning of the statement given the particular circumstances and context surrounding the
utterance. In the representational model the communicated statement is taken at face
value. Ithiel De Sola Pool teaches us, however, that every act o f communication contains
both instrumental and representational components. And, unfortunately, there is no easy
way to distinguish between representational and instrumental communications. The best
one can do is to focus on whom the president is addressing in his statements, under what
circumstances, and then try to infer the intended purpose o f the statement.
26 See, for example, the work o f G.M. Bonham and G.J. N'ozica, "A Cognitive Model o f Foreign Policy Decision Making,"
Simulations and Games, Vol. 7 (June 1976) pp. 123-152 and J.D. Gilbert, "John Foster Dulles's Perceptions o f the People's Republic
o f China: An Assessment o f Accuracy," Paper presented at the Annual Meeting o f Southwestern Political Science Association, San
Antonio, Texas 1975.
27 Ithiel De Sola Pool, Trends in Content Analysis. (Urbana, 111: University oflllinois Press, 1959).
28 This technique is addressed in Alexander George, Propaganda Analysis (Evanston, IL: Row and Peterson, 1959); Deborah Larson,
"Problems o f Content Analysis in Foreign Policy Research: Notes from the Study o f the Origins o f the Cold War Belief Systems,"
22
Does this mean then that the analysis of these public documents is done mostly
in an impressionistic and ad hoc fashion? Perhaps. However, is this a crippling blow to
the value of the overall project? I would argue no. Many years ago, Hedley Bull, in
criticizing the behavioral approach to international relations and making a case in support
o f a classical approach to international relations theory, commented that systematic
procedures are no substitute for human wisdom and intuition.29 Keith Shimko, more
recently, made the point even more forcefully: When push comes to final shove, there is
almost always some persuasive reason for systematic bias in the evidence that casts doubt
on its validity... Ultimately, there is no substitute for informed judgment based on ones
knowledge o f the material, the individuals, and the circumstances surrounding the
statements.30 Simply because an analysis is not relying upon quantifiable indicators to
test a given hypothesis, does not mean that it lacks the values o f rigor, consistency, and
coherence.
One may also argue that a qualitative content analysis o f public speeches should
be coupled with interviews o f the foreign policy principals under consideration. Although
this method might help shed light on whether the public statements accurately reflected a
presidents beliefs, this method leads to other, perhaps even more serious, validity
problems. For instance, one can never know with certainty whether the interviewee is
recalling events in such as way as to put a positive spin on his/her role in the decision
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 32 (1988) p. 249. Larson, Anatomy o f Mistrust: U.S.-Soviet Relations During the Cold War
(Ithaca:NY: Cornell University Press, 1997) p. 38.
29 Hedley Bull, International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach, World Politics, Vol. 18 (April 1966) p. 366.
30 Keith Shimko, Images and Arm s Control: Perceptions o f the Soviet Union in the Reagan Administration (Ann Arbor, MI:
Univerisity of Michigan Press, 1994) pp. 53-54.
23
making process. Likewise, it is often difficult for interviewees to reconstruct either
their past motives or prior beliefs concerning the questions being investigated.31
Another potential problem with relying on the speeches o f U.S. presidents
concerns the authorship of these statements. If one is drawing inferences about the beliefs
o f these two presidents based primarily on their public communications, and if others
wrote these statements, then it is quite possible that the analyst will be measuring the
beliefs o f the speechwriter(s) rather than the beliefs o f the president. Often, this is a major
problem in studies that use public documents as the main source o f data. However, in this
case, it is not an insurmountable problem. The sixty speeches that were analyzed during
the Reagan presidency, and the others from the pre-presidential period, were those
considered some o f his most important public addresses. And, although it is true that
Reagan did not actually write most o f his speeches while president, as a number of
scholars have suggested, he was actively involved in the editing and rewriting o f his
*>*>
speeches. As Brian Dille notes: Reagan always edited the final draft. Mandelbaum
and Talbott agree, pointing out that the president cared deeply about speeches: he
worked at fine-tuning his speeches with an enthusiasm that he rarely devoted to other
duties.34 It seems reasonable then to conclude that Reagan would not have agreed to
give a speech that was not in line with his own beliefs. Moreover, it also seems
3 1 These points were raised by Ted Hopf in Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory and American Foreign Policy in the Third World,
1965-1990 (Ann Arbor, MI: University o f Michigan Press, 1994) p. 27.
32 For a very good analyses o f the presidential speechwriting process, consult: Carol Gelderman, All the Presidents' Words: The
Bully Pulpit and the Creation o f the Virtual Presidency (New York: Walker and Company, 1997)
33 Brian Dille, The Prepared and Sponteanous Remarks o f Presidents Reagan and Bush: A Validity Comparison for At-A Distance
Measurements, Political Psychology, Vol. 2 1, No. 3 (September 2000) p. 574.
34 Michael Mandelbaum and Strobe Talbott, Reagan and the Russians (New York: Vintage, 1984) p. 129.
24
reasonable to assume that these speeches would, therefore, reflect Reagans beliefs,
and not those of his speechwriters.
For the Bush years, a m ajor portion o f the public documents that were examined
took the form of press conferences that the president gave throughout his four years in
office. One can consider these responses seLf-authored in a sense and thus free from the
impression management bias that might creep into a speech that had gone through the
bureaucratic sanitizing process. Margaret Hermann contends that the best way to avoid
the problems of ghost writing in measuring a leaders beliefs is to have most o f your
sample consist of spontaneous remarks given at interviews.35 The logic here is that in the
context o f a press conference and/or interview, a leader will not have the time to plan a
response, so there is then a greater likelihood that the comments they make will reflect
their true beliefs.
As for the speeches that were examined during the Bush years, the vast majority
were those that the president mentions in his memoirs as being amongst his most
important. Speeches o f this type should be those that the president would play a more
active role in crafting, or at the very least, editing, and, therefore, should also reflect his
beliefs.
In the end, there is no denying the fact that measuring beliefs accurately is a very
difficult task. Will one ever truly know a belief when they see one? Probably not. With
the exception of the president actually telling an examiner what his beliefs are, one can
never be absolutely certain that the inferences one is making from his public or private
35 Margaret G. Hermann, Personality and foreign policy decision making: A study of 53 heads o f government, D .A. Sylvan and S.
Chan, eds.. Foreign Policy Decision Making: Perception. Cognition, and Artificial Intelligence (New York: Praeger, 1984)
25
statements are actual indicators o f a presidents true beliefs. The best one can hope to
accomplish, then, is to take reasonable steps to ensure the validity o f ones data and base
ones inferences on his/her accumulated wisdom and intuition.
The organization o f this dissertation is as follows: Chapter 1 provides a review o f
the international relations literature as it relates to explaining changes in a state's foreign
policy. It is argued that neither system nor domestic-level explanations can account fully
for the changes that take place in a state's foreign policy behavior. In addition, it is shown
why some traditional political psychological models need to be complemented with an
approach that focuses on more than simply the images o f the international arena and
adversaries.
Chapter 2 defines the dependent and independent variables that are used
throughout this study. The first section describes the continuous or ordinal nature o f the
dependent variable: U.S. intervention. Then, the theoretical background to this study's
independent variable: foreign policy belief system is discussed. It is demonstrated how
the model that is being used, builds upon the work of Nathan Leites and Alexander
George. Some o f the applications of George's work are examined as well as some o f the
criticisms that have been made concerning his analytical model. The final section
develops the belief system model that will be used in this dissertation.
Chapters 3 and 4 attempt to lay out Ronald Reagans and George Bush's foreign
policy belief systems. Both chapters discuss each president's six core and intermediate
beliefs that ultimately shaped their approach to foreign policy decision-making.
26
Chapter 5 examines the actual policies that were adopted by Reagan and Bush
in responding to the revolutionary events taking place in El Salvador and Nicaragua. I use
George's congruence method to analyze how Reagans and Bush's foreign policy beliefs
contributed to their eventual choice o f policy.
The final chapter indicates where the various theoretical camps fell short and
where they did an adequate job o f explaining the changes in U.S. foreign policy toward
Central America in the 1980s. The conclusion points to the fact that a full understanding
o f the dynamics behind change in U.S. foreign policy requires an analysis of the
interaction of all three levels o f analysis.
27
Chapter 1: Explanations for U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Central America
Historically, the ebb and flow o f U.S. foreign policy toward Central America has
been marked by periods o f intense activity followed by periods of relative neglect, only
again to be followed by periods of American activism. Often, these periods o f U.S.
activity are characterized by direct or indirect military, political, or economic
interventions on the part o f the United States into the internal affairs o f various states
within the region. What explanations can be offered for this shifting pattern o f behavior?
The purpose o f this chapter is to offer a critique o f the main theoretical approaches that
have been used to explain change in U.S foreign policy toward Central America. I will
demonstrate where each o f the approaches expectations fall short and illustrate why a
focus on presidential beliefs represents a necessary independent variable.
Explanations for U.S. interventionist behavior toward the developing world in
general and Central America in particular tend to fall within one of three broad analytical
camps. The first camp, which includes neo-realist and dependency scholars, favors a
structural approach to international relations.36 The core o f the structural interpretation is
36 Hans Morganthau's, Politics Among Nations (New York: Kopf, 1955) and Kenneth N. Waltz's, Theory o f International Politic
(Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979) are considered the founding works in realism and neo-realism, respectively. A selective
sample o f applications o f some o f the ideas contained within these texts as applied to U.S.-Latin American relations can be found in
Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, Dictatorships and Double Standards: Rationalism and Reason in Politics. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982)
pp. 23-90. Edward Luttwak, "The Nature o f the Crisis," and James Michel, "Defending Democracy, both o f which can be tound in
Cirincone, ed., Central America and the Western Alliance (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1985). Morris Rotherberg, "The Soviets
and Central America," in Robert Leiken, ed.. Central America: The Anatomy o f the Conflict. (New York: Pergamon, 1984). Among
the most important works within the dependency school are: Theotonio dos Santos, "The Structure o f Dependence," American
Economic Review Vol. 60 (May 10970) pp. 231-236; Ronald Chilcote and Joel Edelstein, ed., Latin America: The Struggle With
Dependency and Beyond (New York: Shenkman, 1974); Raymond Duvall, "Dependence and Dependencia Theory, International
Organization. Vol. 32 (May 1978) pp. 51-78; and, Julio Cotier and Richard Fagen, eds. Latin America and the United States: The
Changing Political Realities (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1974).
28
that the operation o f the international political and/or economic system constrains the
behavior o f nation-states, albeit in different ways for neo-realists and dependentistas.
The second analytical camp locates the causes o f interventionist activity as
internal to a nation-state. Adherents to this approach favor focusing on domestic political
concerns, bureaucratic infighting, and the prevailing national political culture as key
-J*T
determinants in explaining shifting foreign policy patterns. The third analytical camp
considers neither system-level variables nor domestic-level variables as the crucial
factors causing changes in U.S. interventionist behavior. The focus is on the perceptions
and images that the U.S. foreign policy elite possess o f their Latin American
counterparts, and how these images influence subsequent decisions.38 Each theoretical
camp has its own particular strengths and at times can be quite persuasive; yet each o f
them, as will be demonstrated below, are limited by a number o f significant problems.
37 Specific works focusing on state-level explanations for changing foreign policy behavior include: I.M. Destler et. al. "Breakdown:
the Impact o f Domestic Politics on American Foreign Policy," in C.W. Kegley and W ittkopf, eds., The Domestic Sources o f American
Foreign Policy (New York: St. Martins Press, 1988); Thomas Carothers, In the Name o f Democracy: U.S. Policy Toward Latin
America in the Reagan Years (Berkeley, CA: University o f California, 1991); James M . Lindsey, Congress an d the Politics o f U.S.
Foreign Policy (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1994); Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics:
A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications," in G. John Ikenberry, ed., American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays (New York:
Harper Collins, 1989) pp. 378-408; Darin H. Van Tassell, "Operational Code Evolution: How Central America Came to be "Our
Backyard" in U.S. Culture," in Valerie M. Hudson, ed., Culture and Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO; Westview, 1997) pp. 231-261.
38 Some o f the best work in this area can be found in, Martha Cottam, Foreign Policy Decision Making: The Influence o f Cognition
(Boulder, CO: Westview, 1986); Martha Cottam, Images and Intervention: U.S. Policies in Latin America (Pittsburgh, PA: University
o f Pittsburgh, 1994); Lars Schoultz, Beneath the United States: A History o f U.S. Policy Toward Latin America (Cambridge, Mass:
Harvard University Press, 1998); Martha Cottam and E. Thomas Rowe. "Intervention Decisions: The Interaction o f Situational and
Psychological Factors," Paper presented at the 1987 Annual Meeting o f the American Political Science Foundation, Chicago; Richard
Cottam, Foreign Policy Motivation (Pittsburgh, PA: University o f Pittsburgh Press, 1977).
29
System-level Explanations
At the heart of system-level explanations for shifts in foreign policy is the
expressed need to look beyond individual nation-states to discover the sources of inter
state relations. Both neo-realists and dependency scholars agree that ones theoretical
focus should begin at the system-level in order to explain the actions taken by individual
units within the system. The crux o f the argument is that the actions o f states are
fundamentally constrained by the operation of the system itself. For the neo-realist, the
defining feature o f the international system is its anarchical structure; for the dependency
scholar, it is the capitalist ordering o f states within an international economy. The basic
similarities between these two theoretical approaches end here, however.
Kenneth Waltz, considered by most international relations scholars to be the
founder o f neo-realism, argues that the nature of international relations can best be
conceptualized as a continual balancing o f power between the most powerful states
within the international system.39 Because the structure o f the international arena is
anarchic, states are constantly forced to look after their own security. As the logic goes:
in any self-help system, units have to worry about their survival, and "this worry
conditions their behavior."40 Thus states tend to express greater concern with relative
strength than with absolute advantage, lest others overrun them in the future. Writes
Waltz: "In anarchy security is the highest end."41 Balancing against a stronger state(s)
39 Kenneth Waltz, A Theory o f International Politics, is considered the foundational text for structural realists.
40 Kenneth Waltz, "Anarchic Orders and Balances o f Power," in G. John Ikenberry, ed., American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays
(New York: Harper Collins, 1989) p. 87.
41 Ibid., p. 105.
30
becomes a natural occurrence, whether or not this is the desired end for a particular
state. In addition, powerful states within the international system seek stability, and, thus,
their goal becomes maintaining a balance o f power in order to secure the status quo.
As applied to the context o f U.S.-Central American relations, neo-realists focus
on the competition between the United States and outside actors for influence in the
region. Peter Smith and William LeoGrande interpret the history o f U.S. activism in
Central America as an outgrowth o f such outside threats.42 Smith writes: "the
fundamental determinants o f U.S.-Latin American relations have been the role and
activity o f extra-hemispheric actors, not the United States or Latin America itself.43 He
views U.S. activism in Latin America from 1790s-1930s as an effort to keep European
powers out of the hemisphere, while the period from the late 1940s-1980s witnessed U.S.
efforts to check the Soviet Union. LeoGrande, by contrast, suggests that only when crisis
situations erupt in Central America, usually defined as events caused by and with the
support o f outside actors, will the United States become interested in dealing with the
region's problems.44
In the 1980s, the outside threat to Central America, at least from the vantage point
o f the United States, was the Soviet Union. By the early 1980s, the United States was
desperately trying to reestablish a global balance o f power in the aftermath o f its defeat in
Vietnam, as well as the negative international political consequences that followed from
42 Peter H. Smith, The Talons o f the Eagle: Dynamics ofU.S.-Latin American Relations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996)
William M. LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America. 1977-1992 (Chapel Hill, NC: University o f North
Carolina Press, 1998)
43 Ibid.
44 LeoGrande's argument in Our Own Backyard is analytically quite similar to the argument made by Robert A. Pastor in Whirlpool:
U.S. Foreign Policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992)
31
Soviet adventurism in the Horn o f Africa and Afghanistan, the oil crises o f the 1970s,
and the overthrow o f the Shah in Iran. All these events, it was believed, presaged a
fundamental challenge to America's predominant power position.
When the Sandinista rebels overthrew the Somoza regime and took over the reins
o f government in Nicaragua in July 1979 and further piqued Washington by requesting
economic and military assistance from the Soviets, the Reagan administration decided
that it was time to take action to prevent a further erosion of American power. In
addition, Ronald Reagan believed that soon after the Sandinistas took power, they began
lending covert military support to neighboring guerrilla forces operating in El Salvador. It
was perceived that U.S. credibility was at stake, and echoes o f the domino theory once
again began to resurface.45 It was argued that allies faith in U.S. commitments in critical
areas such as Europe and Asia would decrease if the United States did not respond to
threatening events taking place in its own backyard.
From a neo-realist perspective, the subsequent forms o f U.S. intervention in
Nicaragua and El Salvador- ranging from condemnatory speeches to outright support for
the opposition- was a logical progression o f policy in an effort to balance Soviet gains in
the area. Simply stated, when it appeared that the Soviets were involved in Central
America, the United States took action.
With respect to changes in U.S. policy toward Central America after the Reagan
to Bush transition, neo-realists would expect that when tensions between the two
superpowers waned in the latter half o f the 1980s, as a result o f a number o f important
45 For an outstanding analysis o f the renewed use o f the domino theory in the context o f theCentral America crisis in the 1980s
consult Jerome Slater, "Dominoes in Central America: Will They Fall? Does It Matter? International Securtity, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Fall
1987) pp. 105-134.
32
arms control agreements, U.S. interest and, ultimately, intervention in Central
America, would also naturally decline. Thus, when Bush took over the presidency in
1989 and Moscow began to withdraw from Eastern Europe in order to focus on its own
internal problems, the neo-realist would hold that the impetus for U.S. intervention in
Central America would be gone. In the absence o f an adversarial power challenging U.S.
hegemony in the region or threatening the overall global balance o f power, U.S. concerns
for Central American affairs should have rapidly diminished. President Bush and his
advisors should have placed Central American affairs on the back burner o f U.S. foreign
policy concerns and went on to deal with issues that they believed were more important
to U.S. national security. William LeoGrande states as much: The history of U.S.-Latin
American relations was ever thus: until a country erupted in crisis, someplace else was
always more important. As the wars that swept Central America in the 1980s subsided,
Washingtons attention drifted aw ay...46This expectation, although seemingly
persuasive at first glance, does have some substantial problems. (A critique of the neo
realist approach will be given after discussing dependency theory.)
Dependency scholars take a different cut at explaining the impact o f systemic
forces on nation-state behavior. Writers such as Theotonio dos Santos and Andre Gunder
Frank believe that it is not anarchy and power distributions that are the catalysts behind
inter-state relations: rather, it is the particular global division o f labor that conditions state
behavior in the international arena.47 These theorists argue that what is crucial in
determining a state's foreign policy behavior is its position within the global division o f
46 LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, p. 584.

47 dos Santos, op. cit. and Andre G under Frank, "The Development o f Underdevelopment," in Peter F. Klaren and Thomas J. Bosser,
eds., Promise o f Development: Theories o f Change in Latin America. (Boulder,CO: Westview Press, 1986). pp. 111-123.
33
labor. States located at the periphery o f the system are at a decided disadvantage to
those in the core, by virtue o f their limited technological capacity and material resource
base. It is the basic assumption o f the dependencia school that the core states use their
advantages in order to keep the periphery in a perpetual state o f dependency.
Dependentista accounts approach the question o f U.S. intervention in Central
America from a different angle than the neo-realists. At the heart o f the dependency
argument is the idea that the conduct o f U.S.-Latin American affairs is essentially an
outgrowth of the United States' desire to maintain its economic hegemony over the
Western Hemisphere in particular and the world system in general.48 Dependency
theorists contend that the United States has played a malign role historically in Latin
America by fostering a system o f economic dependence, which has led to and
perpetuated large-scale poverty and injustice in the region. Because o f the internal
contradictions within the capitalist system, the United States must maintain an unequal
economic relationship with its southern neighbors, which serve as a source o f raw
materials, markets, and low cost labor. Any challenge to its hegemonic position will be
met by all means necessary, including the use of military force. In short, the United States
is considered an imperialist power whose interests in the region are driven by economic
considerations.
From the vantage point o f dependency theorists, U.S. intervention in Central
America during the 1980s was a direct outgrowth of the desire on the part of policy-
48 The most useful sources for this line o f argument include: Theotonio dos Santos, "The Structure o f Dependence," American
Economic Review, Vol. 60 (May 1970) pp. 231-236; Ronald Chilcote and Joel Edelstein, eds., Latin America: The Struggle With
Dependency and Beyond (New York: Shenkman, 1974); Raymond Duvall, "Dependence and Dependencia Theory," International
Organization , Vol. 32 (M ay 1978) pp. 51-78; Julio C otier and Richard Fagen, eds., Latin America and the United States: The
Changing Political Realities (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1974)
34
makers in Washington to try to prevent economic trends from emerging that might
threaten U.S. economic interests over the long haul. Dependentistas do not argue that the
mere loss o f the Nicaraguan and El Salvadoran economies to the Eastern Socialist Bloc
would cause irreparable harm to the U.S. economy; rather, their loss might set the stage
for subsequent defections that would indeed prove to be detrimental to U.S. economic
interests. Thus, the Reagan administration needed either (1) to demonstrate to others the
consequences o f joining the communist economic bloc (e.g., through its covert war in
Nicaragua) or (2) to provide economic and military assistance to those on the verge of
falling to leftist forces (e.g. Washington's aid to El Salvador and surrounding states in
Central America).
Like the neo-realist argument, the expectation regarding a shift in interventionist
behavior from the Reagan to Bush administrations could be explained as a reaction to the
implosion o f the Soviet Union. As the 1980s drew to a close and as state-led economic
systems proved untenable, Washington no longer needed to fear the loss o f individual
economies to an alternative- for the alternative economic system ceased to exist. If
individual countries choose to opt out o f the worldwide capitalist system they would
willy-nilly be committing economic suicide. The changes in interventionist policies from
Reagan to Bush was, therefore, simply the latter president's desire to let market forces do
the work that covert military actions and costly economic and military assistance
programs could not.
Leaving aside the veracity of many o f the empirical claims being made by neo
realist and dependency scholars, the basic problem with both system-level accounts lies
in their deterministic conclusions. For the neo-realist, the United States (and all powerful
35
states) must balance against any challenge to the status quo in an effort to maintain the
stability o f the international order. The system is portrayed as having a life o f its own.
Choices made by individual state leaders to alter their position within the international
arena are brushed aside as being irrelevant in comparison to the changes in system
structure. For Waltz, the rules o f the game are determined by the anarchic structure o f the
system, not by the individual units within it. Yet as history clearly demonstrates, the
statesmanship o f men such as Bismarck, Wilson, Chamberlain, Hitler, Stalin, and
Kissinger have fundamentally altered the position o f their states within the international
system, thus altering the balance o f power by human volition and not through system
dynamics. In addition, as Deborah Larson has demonstrated masterfully in her study o f
the origins o f the United States containment policy, different U.S. policy makers can
interpret the same external circumstances differently. Larson points out that post-World
War II U.S. policy makers, such as W. Averill Harriman, Harry Truman, James Byrnes,
and Dean Acheson interpreted information about Soviet actions in different manners
based on their preexisting beliefs about the USSR. Their preexisting beliefs, or lack
thereof, consequently influenced how they interpreted new information and ultimately
influenced their choice o f policy for dealing with the Soviets, despite the fact that all
these U.S. officials experienced the same external environment.49 Larsons basic point is
that studying a leaders beliefs is helpful in understanding how these leaders interpret,
analyze, and utilize information about the actions o f others in the international system.
For the dependentistas, the United States will respond to all perceived threats to
its economic hegemony in the W estern Hemisphere (as well as elsewhere). But how
49 Deborah Larson, Origins o f Containment: A Psychological Explanation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985)
36
exactly will the United States act? Neither system-level explanation can tell us how
leaders will act when confronted either by a shift in the balance o f power or a challenge
to economic hegemony. Both do a good job at explaining the general tendencies o f state
interaction, but neither can yield specific predictions about state actions. Admittedly, the
end o f the Cold War was o f vital importance in leading to different foreign policy
behaviors by President Reagan and President Bush. Thus, both explanations are quite
correct in arguing that one could expect the United States to act in response to these
revolutionary changes. But, neither approach can yield specific predictions concerning
the potential type of action that a state leader will select. However, if an analyst has an
understanding of a leaders beliefs concerning how to respond to change, one can then
reasonably predict what types o f actions might be selected and which types of actions are
likely to be ignored.
The fundamental difficulty with both schools is that the role o f a leader(s) beliefs
is either ignored or considered irrelevant. Neo-realists like Kenneth Waltz and
dependentistas like Morris Morley have a tendency to place individual leadership
qualities, beliefs, and other level-one type variables in a residual category. Structural
scholars o f this type fail to note that how states respond to threats to power or economic
interests is often influenced by their leaders particular worldview.50 Or, even more
importantly, how states actually define what their interests are is often determined in part
by an individual leaders beliefs. Belief system theory is designed to examine this
50 Waltz, op. cit. Morris Morley, Washington. Somoza. and the Sandinistas: State and Regime in U.S. Policy Toward Nicaragua.
1969-1981 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994). and, Morley, ed., Crisis and Confrontation: Ronald Reagan's Foreign
Policy (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littefield, 1988)
37
residual category and discover exactly what was a particular presidents basic ideology
or worldview and see how this impacted his subsequent foreign policy decisions.51
Domestic-level Explanations
An alternative approach to explaining shifts in U.S. interventionist behavior
toward Central America, specifically during the Reagan and Bush era, can be found in
studies focusing on factors internal to the United States. These studies tend to emphasize
three phenomena: first, the battle over control o f U.S. foreign policy by the President and
the United States Congress; second, the internal struggle within the executive branch by
different bureaucratic actors for control of the foreign policy agenda; and, third, the
impact o f different tendencies within the U.S. political culture that shape foreign policy
behavior.
One of the most popular domestic-level explanations for the shifting pattern o f
U.S. interventionist behavior in Central America is one that correlates the degrees of U.S.
intervention in El Salvador and Nicaragua in the 1980s with the level o f agreement
between Congress and the presidency over the desired ends o f policy.52 In a sense, the
argument is tautological: when there was a high degree of congruence between Congress
and the President, support for Reagan's initiatives were forthcoming. In these
circumstances Congress agreed to fund the Contras and provide massive amounts of
5 1 Note that throughout this study the concepts belief system, worldview and ideology will all be used synonymously.
52 Robert A. Pastor, "The United States and Central America: Interlocking Dramas," in Peter B. Evan, Harold K. Jacobson, and
Robert D. Putnum eds., Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, (Berkeley, CA: University o f
California Press, 1993) pp. 303-329
38
military and economic assistance to the government o f El Salvador. Conversely, when
Reagan's choice o f strategy diverged from those originally agreed upon by Congress,
legislative support waned. Congress cut back on military assistance programs,
temporarily suspended all military funding to the Contras, and lent its support to Latin
American sponsored peace initiatives.
Cynthia Am son suggests that over the course o f two administrations, the major
differences between the president and Congress was not over core values and the desired
ends o f policy per se. Most U.S. leaders tended to agree that maintaining stability,
promoting democracy, limiting Soviet gains in Central America, and keeping the
revolutionary left from power were indeed very good ideas that should be promoted.
Rather, the disagreements between the two branches o f government centered on the
particular policies that would be used to secure these desired ends as well as on the
potential consequences for failing to meet these ends. President Reagan believed in the
need to confront the revolutionaries in El Salvador and the government in Nicaragua
through military means. Congress, on the other hand, believed emphasizing a military
victory to the crises would downgrade the social causes behind the regional turmoil. And,
although, at times, Congress did in fact agree to fund Reagans quasi-war effort, this
support was relatively ephemeral, especially as it related to Reagans covert war in
Nicaragua.53
The expectation concerning changes during the presidential transition was that
President-elect Bush, faced with a legislative branch adamantly opposed to expanding the
53 Cynthia Amson, Crossroads: Congress, the President.and Central America. 1976-1993 (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State
University, 1993) See especially Chapter I.
39
war effort in Nicaragua and El Salvador, would be all but forced into ending his
predecessor's interventionist policies. Unwilling to risk political capital with Congress,
President Bush would put Central American affairs on the back burner and turn his
attention elsewhere. Amson suggests that when Bush came into office, he had very few
options o f continuing the war in Nicaragua because o f congressional opposition. As for
El Salvador, she continues, the administrations options were limited when
congressional impatience with the war and repudiation o f prominent cases o f political
murder led to sharp curtailments o f military aid.54As a result of this legislative
opposition coupled with the dramatic international transformations that were occurring in
the late 1980s and due to the presidents desire to focus on larger foreign policy issues,
President Bush abandoned his predecessors quest for a military solution to the regional
crises and became actively involved in trying to pave the way for a negotiated solution.
The key problem with this interpretation is that it assumes that the president will
tend to passively give in to the demands o f Congress and will shift his policy ends
according to the whims of the legislative branch. Yet as the actions of President Reagan
clearly demonstrated, presidents do not readily give in to Congress, especially in the area
o f foreign affairs. LeoGrande was indeed correct when he suggested that Reagan believed
that "foreign policy was the president's job, and he would brook no interference...From
Reagans first weeks in office, he treated Congress as an adversary to be subdued."35 Even
in the face o f a Congress unwilling to appropriate new funding for the Contras and right-
wing governments in Central America, the president could and did use of variety o f legal
54 Ibid, p. 229.
55 William M. LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, pp. 586-588.
40
and illegal means to get around Congressional obstinacy. This criticism is not meant to
suggest that President Bush would also use these same tactics with Congress, only that he
could. To assume that his hands were completely tied is highly problematic.
To argue, as LeoGrande, Amson and others have, that the shift in policy from
Reagan to Bush was a result o f the executives problems with Congress, the end o f the
Cold War, and Bushs desire to focus on larger problems in other parts o f the world,
especially in Eastern Europe, overlooks the importance that different presidential foreign
policy beliefs may have played in contributing to the change in U.S. policy. Thus, the
approach taken in this dissertation will add to the literature on U.S.-Central American
affairs by taking an approach that centers on the beliefs of the two presidents, rather than
simply on system or domestic-level explanatory variables. In short, the three levels of
explanation need to be combined to in order to offer a complete picture regarding why
U.S. policy changed in the aftermath of the presidential transition.
A different domestic-level explanation for changes in U.S. foreign policy in
Central America throughout the 1980s looks not at the battle between the president and
Congress, but rather at the battles that took place within the executive branch for control
o f the foreign policy agenda. Thomas Carothers' work on the foreign policy of the
Reagan years is an outstanding example of this approach.56 For Carothers, the central
battle over the direction o f U.S. foreign policy in the Reagan era was between two groups
o f advisors to the president. At one extreme were conservative ideologues, who in certain
respects held the views championed by neo-realists. These advisors perceived the crisis in
Central America as a mini-version of the larger international struggle with the Soviets. It
56 Carothers, op. cit.
41
was these advisors who tended to push for coercive policies toward the leftist
movements in Central America. At the other end were moderates who cautioned against
military activity and lobbied for negotiated settlements that they believed would help
promote the development o f democracy in the Western Hemisphere. These advisors
interpreted the crisis as stemming from internal/regional political problems and not
necessarily as occurring because o f Soviet interference. It is Carothers contention that
the early years o f the Reagan administration were dominated by the ideologues whose
policy initiatives were present in the hard-line approach taken toward Nicaragua, El
Salvador, and Guatemala, whereas the latter Reagan years were characterized by a more
moderate position stressing the development of democracy in the region and a movement
away from the use o f military force or threat o f military force to solve differences, with
the possible exception o f Nicaragua.
Continuing with this line o f argument, Carothers concludes that when George
Bush entered the White House in 1989 key members of the bureaucracy and his most
important foreign policy advisors were predominantly moderates and his subsequent
policies reflected their ascendancy within his administration. Simply stated, President
Bush's foreign policies toward Central America were a reflection o f the ideas
predominant within the wing o f bureaucracy that at that given time held the President's
ear.
A few critical comments are in order with respect to this approach. To argue that
infighting within the bureaucracy itself shapes the final outcome o f foreign policy
decisions, although generally true, tends to overlook a number o f important points. The
strength o f the standard bureaucratic politics model (that is, the argument that where you
42
stand depends on where you sit) is that it provides a detailed explanation o f the
political processes involved in trying to reach particular foreign policy decisions. In
other words, these arguments can provide answers to the how question. Yet, the
bureaucratic politics model has difficulty explaining the why question. W hy did Reagan
tend to side with the ideologues throughout his eight years in office when it came to
Nicaragua and shift in his support for the hard-line versus the moderate position over
U.S. policy toward El Salvador, for instance? Standard bureaucratic politics explanations
fail to note what Stephen Krasner argued over twenty-five years ago: namely, that when
it comes to key foreign policy decisions, the president is indeed king.57 Ultimately, it is
the president who chooses which group o f advisors to support; the positions taken by
these advisors can only be implemented if the president approves. Reagan appointed and
tended to listen to advisors who shared his beliefs. The same held true for George Bush.
Additionally, the bureaucratic model ignores the fact that the very battles that are
taking place within the executive branch for control o f the president's ear may not be
based necessarily on different institutional interests, but rather may develop as a result of
divergent diagnoses and prescriptions, which derive in part from different beliefs o f these
officials.58 In the end, Robert Art was indeed correct when he stated that it is "not to
bureaucratic politics but to presidents and mind-sets that one must look, "if we are to
understand why decisions are made the way they are." 59
57 Stepher D. Krasner, "Are Bureaucracies Important? (Or Allison Wonderland), in G. John Ikenberry, cd., American Foreign
Policy: Theoretical Essays (New York: Harper Collins, 1989) pp. 425-426.
58 This critique o f the bureaucratic model was made by Ole Holsti in "The Operational Code as an Approach to the Analysis o f Belief
Systems: Final Report to the National Science Foundation," Grant Number SOC75-15368 (Duke University, 1977)
59 Robert J. Art, "Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique," in G. John Ikenberry, ed., American Foreign
Policy (New York: Harper, 1989) p.432.
43
Darin Van Tassell offers a fascinating domestic-level explanation for U.S.
intervention in Central America that considers U.S. culture as the critical independent
variable. Culture, for Van Tassell, refers to "the body of customary beliefs, social forms,
and material traits constituting a distinct complex o f tradition of a social group."60 It is
Van Tasseil's argument that the underlying cause o f U.S. interventions in Central
America since the beginning o f the Republic has been a set o f beliefs inherent in
American culture that considers the United States as exceptional or superior to that of
Central America. When combined with the fact that U.S. foreign policy-makers have
defined these neighboring countries as part o f our sphere o f influence and when external
actors challenge our perceived interests in the region, this predominant cultural mentality
kicks in and compels the United States to intervene.
The cases that Van Tassel uses to test his hypothesis are from the 19th century,
which include the No-Transfer Policy o f 1811, the Monroe Doctrine, the annexation of
Mexico, and the Roosevelt Corollary. However, the same logic can be applied to the
1980s. The cultural hypothesis would suggest that both Ronald Reagan and George Bush
would interpret U.S. -Central American relations from the vantage point o f U.S.
exceptionalism and that if an extra-hemispheric power was trying to make in-roads into
the region, both presidents would logically respond in a similar manner in order to meet
the challenge. Thus, when it appeared that the Soviets were trying to establish a foothold
in the region via Nicaragua and through the rebellion in El Salvador in the late 1970s,
60 Darin H. Van Tasseil, "Operational Code Evolution: How Central America Came to Be "Our Backyard" in Valeriie Hudson, ed..
Culture and Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997) p. 234.
44
Ronald Reagan perforce would take action. Likewise, when the external threat receded,
U.S. activity in Central America under Bush would recede as well.
The difficulty with accepting this line of argument is that it implies that all
presidents would be equally affected by the predominant culture of U.S. exceptionalism.
It leaves very little room for variation amongst different presidents. Similar to the system-
level arguments above and those o f a divided government and bureaucratic politics
persuasion, the cultural explanation has a tendency to treat the individual as a mere
reflection o f his environment. Yes, international and domestic political environments are
vitally important in shaping foreign policy decisions. But differences can be found in how
presidents respond to these system-level and national-level constraints. In addition, what
needs to be examined is how these variables affect the predominant belief systems o f the
president and his closest foreign policy advisors and how, in turn, beliefs affect the
domestic and international environments. What is needed is an examination o f the
interaction o f these three different levels of explanation.
Individual-level Explanations
Dissatisfaction with the traditional explanations for U.S. interventionist behavior
has led a number o f scholars to turn to the field o f political psychology. Drawing on the
work o f Robert Jervis61, scholars such as Richard Cottam, Martha Cottam, and E.
61 Two o f Jervis's works are particularly relevant in this respect. The Logic o fIm a g es (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1970); and Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976)
45
Thomas Rowe have begun to look at the impact o f images on U.S. foreign policy
fS)
towards Latin America.
Like Jervis, both Cottam and Rowe argue that U.S. policies abroad are in part the
result o f the particular images that decision-makers possess with respect to individual
countries or regions o f the world. In one o f her early studies, Cottam develops four ideal
images: the enemy, neutral, dependent, and ally, which she believes policy-makers use
when responding to actions taken by other states.63 The function o f these images, writes
Cottam, is to help decision- makers filter incoming information from the environment.
These images, in turn, allow policy makers to categorize states, which assists them in
organizing the political world. Thus, political leaders respond differently to actions taken
by other states based on which particular images they hold of these states. More recently,
Cottam has used this model to explain U.S. military interventions in Latin America
during the Cold War and post-Cold War period. Her general thesis is that U.S. military
intervention is likely to occur under two circumstances: (1) when the U.S. foreign policy
leadership possesses an enemy image o f a third power (e.g. the Soviet Union) trying to
make in-roads into Latin America coupled with a dependent image o f Latin American
states or (2) when the U.S. foreign policy leadership possesses a dependent image of a
Latin American state who they perceive as challenging basic U.S. interests in the region.
62 For examples see: Martha Cottam, Foreign Policy Decision Making: The Influence o f Cognition. (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1986);
Martha Cottam, Images and Intervention: U.S. Policies in Latin America (Pittsburgh, PA: University o f Pittsburgh, 1994); Martha
Cottam and E. Thomas Rowe. "Intervention Decisions: The Interaction o f Situational and Psychological Factors," Paper presented at
the 1987 Annual Meeting o f the American Political Science Foundation, Chicago; Richard Cottam. Foreign Policy Motivation
(Pittsburgh, PA: University o f Pittsburgh Press, 1977),
63 Martha L. Cottam, Foreign Policy Decision Making.
46
For Cottam, throughout the 1980s, Reagan possessed an enemy image of the
Soviet Union, who he believed was trying to increase its political influence throughout
Central America. Coupled with the enemy image o f the Soviets was a dependent image
o f Central American states who the U.S. felt would fall under Soviet domination if they
did not act to prevent this from happening. Thus, writes Cottam, the situation was ripe for
U.S. interventionist policies during the Reagan years to reverse communist gains in
Nicaragua and Grenada and shore up friendly right wing governments throughout the
region.
However, when the baton passed from President Reagan to President Bush and
when the Soviet threat began to fade, intervention was still a possibility because the
dependent image o f Latin American states remained. Bush, Cottam contends, still
perceived Central American states as typified by corrupt and self-interested political
elites whose material resource base was negligible and whose culture tended to be
inferior to that o f the United States. Hence, one can explain why the United States took
military action in a country like Panama where a corrupt leader was challenging the will
power o f the United States.
Lars Schoultz, in his historical overview o f U.S. policy toward Latin America,
would fervently agree with Cottam's interpretation o f the dependent image held by
Reagan and Bush toward Central America.64In fact, Schoultz contends that the entire
history o f U.S.-Latin American relations stems from U.S. leaders rather stereotypical
image o f Latin American states. Schoultz is willing to admit, however, that U.S. policy
has also been based on perceptions of U.S. national interests, including those related to
64 Lars Schoultz, Beneath the United States: A History o f U.S. Policy Toward Latin America.
47
national security, domestic political considerations, and economic development. But,
these three interest-based explanations, he contends, do not tell the full story. Underlying
these three interests, he writes, "is a pervasive belief that Latin Americans constitute an
inferior branch o f the human species."65 Not mincing words, he goes on to state: "There,
in the minds of U.S. officials, we find the explanation o f U.S. policy in a process that
blends self-interest with what the Victorian British called their White Man's Burden and
the French their mission civilisatrice, a process by which a superior people help a weak
civilization overcome the pernicious effects of its sad defect."66
In a much broader image-based analysis, Richard K. Herrmann and Michael P.
Fischerkeller attempt to move beyond the enemy image & dependent image in
international affairs to include four additional images o f external actors.67 These
include: the ally, degenerate, imperialist, and colony. In their model, Herrmann and
Fischerkeller link these ideal-typical images to various strategies pursued by individual
states in their relationship with others. The authors conclude that interactions between
states who hold particular image(s) o f the other lead to a fairly well specified set o f
strategic outcomes. O f particular relevance to this study is their finding that intervention
is likely to occur when two separate actors possess a colony and imperialist image o f the
other, respectively.
65 Ibid., p. xv.
66 Ibid. p. xvi.
67 Richard K. Hermann and Michael P. Fischerkeller, "Beyond the Enemy Image and Spiral Model: Cognitive-Strategic Research
After the Cold War," International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer 1995) pp. 415-450.
48
The major difficulty with these image-based studies is that they focus almost
exclusively on the impact o f images o f "others" in shaping foreign policy decisions.68
Images o f the enemy and o f allies comprise only two parts o f a given president's
worldview, however. What needs to be added is an examination of a political leader's
national self-image, his/her beliefs about the nature o f international politics, his/her
beliefs concerning the flow o f history, and his/her conception o f the nature o f change. In
other words, there is a need to combine the way leaders look at others w ith the way they
look at the functions of their own state- all within the confines o f the international
political system.
The central puzzle that mainstream image analyses have had difficulty answering
is why, given that U.S. images o f Latin America nations have remained mostly the same,
have policies toward the region fluctuated over tim e?69 Also, why have U.S. presidents
responded to some events and not others that have in the past been defined as threats to
U.S. interests? A possible answer, among others, is that different U.S. presidents have
possessed different beliefs about their country as state actors and beliefs about others,
which has, in turn, resulted in shifting foreign policy behavior. It is the purpose o f this
dissertation to augment studies that focus solely on changes in the international structure
o f power and on the internal domestic political arena with one that examines how
68 In her examination o f the relationship between images and interventionist behavior, Cottam does mention the importance of self-
image in U.S. Latin American relations, but her conceptualization is not well specified. For example, she considers self-image from
the perspective o f whether or not the collective group image is positive rather than negative and whether o r not the group perceives
itself as having the ability to control events.
69 An example o f this continuity thesis is Cottam's argument that throughout the twentieth century the U.S. foreign policy elite has
perceived most o f South and Central America as dependent states. By dependent image, Cottam means states that are perceived as
weak, childlike, inept, and led by a small and often corrupt elite. See Martha Cottam, Images and Intervention, p. 25
49
changes in presidential level belief systems contributed to shifts in U.S. interventionist
behavior toward El Salvador and Nicaragua in the 1980s.
50
Chapter 2: Foreign Policy. U.S. Intervention, and Presidential B elief Systems
This chapter introduces the variables that will be used in this study. The first
section discusses the general and specific dependent variables that are the central focus
for this dissertation: namely, foreign policy behavior and shifts in U.S. intervention. The
second section deals with the independent variable: presidential foreign policy belief
systems. In the context o f introducing the independent variable, the theoretical
background to belief system analysis is examined followed by a discussion of the
operational code construct that was developed originally by Nathan Leites and later
systematized by Alexander George. A discussion is offered o f both some o f the
applications of George's theoretical construct and some o f the criticisms that have been
made concerning operational code analysis. The last section develops the analytical
model that will be used in the context o f discovering the foreign policy beliefs of
President Reagan and President Bush. The concluding section discusses the rules of
evidence that were used to construct the Reagan and Bush belief systems.
Dependent Variable: U.S. Intervention
In the broadest sense, the dependent variable for this study is "foreign policy
behavior." Although the exact meaning of this concept is a much debated topic in the
foreign policy literature, there is a consensus that foreign policy behavior refers to the
outward directed behavior o f states aimed at influencing other states within the
51
international system.70 In this study, an examination o f the broader concept o f foreign
policy will not be attempted. Rather, an analysis o f a very specific type o f foreign policy
behavior: namely, forms or degrees of U.S. intervention will be made.
The concept "intervention" refers to the action(s) that a state takes to interject
itself into another states domestic conflict situation. As Joseph Nye suggests, there are a
variety of means available to leaders of powerful states that can be used to influence the
internal or external behavior o f other states. Intervention, it should be noted, does not
necessarily have to involve military activity or the external movement o f troops across
borders. Consequently, one can operationally define "intervention" to include both
military and non-military variants. Both types o f intervention share a common feature,
however: they have the effect o f influencing directly the amount o f choice available to
local actors who are involved in a domestic conflict situation.71 For purposes of this
dissertation, therefore, U.S. intervention will be conceptualized as a continuous
dependent variable.
Table 1 here
70 Charles Hermann defines foreign policy behavior in a clear and succinct fashion in his study o f policy classifications. For
Hermann, "Foreign policy behavior consists o f those discrete official actions o f the authoritative decision-makers o f the nation's
government, or their agents, which are intended by the decision-makers to influence the behavior o f international actors external to
their polity." Charles F. Hermann, "Policy Classifications: A Key to the Comparative Study o f Foreign Policy," in James N. Rosenau,
ed.. The Analysis o f International Behavior (New York: The Free Press, 1972) p. 72.
71 Joseph S. Nye Jr., Understanding International Conflict: An Introduction to Theory and History (New York: Harper Collins, 1993)
pp. 132-138.
TABLE 1: DEGREES OF INTERVENTION72
Low Coercion
(High Local Choice)
Speeches
Broadcasts
Economic Aid
Military Advisors
Support Opposition
Blockade
Limited Military Action
Military Invasion
High Coercion
(Low Local Choice)
72 Joseph S. Nye Jr., Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History (New York: Harper Collins,
1993)
53
Generally, one can classify interventions in two ways: first, are interventions
that are nonmilitary in nature; second, are interventions that involve indirect or direct
military activity.73 In terms o f the intervention scale presented in Table 1, activities such
as speeches, broadcasts, and the provision of economic aid can be classified as
nonmilitary variants o f intervention. Often speeches and broadcasts made by state leaders
are aimed at fomenting internal discord in another state or to lend support to a politically
weakened regime. Similarly, the provision o f economic assistance, or its denial, is usually
directed at helping to prop up an allied government that is threatened by internal upheaval
or to punish an adversarial state. All these activities, it should be noted, match up quite
well with our definition o f intervention: all are actions of one state, which are directed at
influencing the internal or external political behavior of other actors involved in a
domestic conflict. Military interventions, unlike non-military intervention, will involve
either indirect military action, such as the mobilization of troops, the provision o f arms
and/or the deployment o f military advisors, or the direct application o f force, as in the
establishment of a blockade or the direct dispatch o f military troops into a combat
situation.
In the context o f the current study, Ronald Reagan utilized nearly all o f the tools
o f intervention that are contained in Table 1, with the exception, o f course, of an outright
military invasion. And, even though a military invasion was not used in dealing with the
crises taking place in El Salvador and Nicaragua, one must remember that Reagan did
73 Marc David Turetsky, in his quantitative analysis o f the causes behind U.S. interventions abroad in the post-WWII period, suggests
that there are three types o f intervention: those that involve a choice not to intervention, those that involve nonmilitary intervention,
and those that are military in nature. Because, both Reagan and Bush did order some level o f intervention, I have categorized
intervention as being either nonmilitary o r military in scope. See Turetsky, "Domestic and International Determinants in U.S.
Intervention in Internal Conflicts Abroad, 1946-1994," Political Chronicle, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Spring 2000) pp. 50-51
54
authorize an invasion o f Grenada in October 1983. Responding to the revolutionary
events in El Salvador, Reagan supported the government through the use o f speeches,
broadcasts, and the provision o f tremendous amounts of economic and military
assistance, including sending additional U.S. military advisors to train the Salvadoran
army and engage in joint military exercises. In Nicaragua, Reagan went even further. In
addition to the means used in El Salvador, the president authorized the creation and
training o f a paramilitary force by the Central Intelligence Agency, whose purpose was
first to interdict arms flowing from Nicaragua to the rebels in El Salvador and later to
overthrow the Nicaraguan government. Moreover, President Reagan cut off U.S.
economic assistance to the Sandinista government shortly after taking office, and by 1985
had imposed full-scale economic sanctions against the Nicaraguan government.
George Bush, by contrast, intervened in El Salvador and Nicaragua in a much
more limited fashion. Unlike Reagan, Bush believed in the utility o f diplomacy to settle
these disputes, especially multilateral negotiations that involved a variety of Central
American states. Admittedly, President Bush did rely initially on a good many o f the
tools o f intervention that his predecessor had used, including speeches, broadcasts, and
the provision of economic and military aid, and did in fact agree to an outright military
invasion of Panama, but the overall goal o f seeking a military solution to the crises in El
Salvador and Nicaragua (emphasis added,) was absent. In its place, was a concerted
effort by the United States to support the peace process by using the aforementioned tools
o f intervention as diplomatic carrots and sticks. The new goal was to win the peace, not
the war.
55
Independent Variable: Foreign Policy B elief System
The key explanatory variable for this study is political belief system, specifically
foreign policy belief system. The concept belief system is taken from the work o f Philip
Converse who defines it as a "configuration o f ideas and attitudes in which the elements
are bound together by some form o f constraint or functional interdependence."74 The
critical component o f this definition is the functional interdependence of beliefs, which,
simply stated, refers to a hierarchical ordering o f beliefs according to the centrality of
certain beliefs to the existence of the belief system as a whole. Put somewhat differently,
belief systems are organized into different levels, whereby certain beliefs are considered
subordinate to others based on the fact that changes in a particular belief(s) on a given
level, which is considered foundational to the belief system, will lead directly to changes
throughout the entire system. On the other hand, changes in beliefs at a lower level will
not perforce cause changes in the overall system. It is assumed that foundational beliefs
are resistant to change, thus lending a great deal of stability to the overall belief system.75
A belief system, writes Milton Rokeach, can be organized into three regions: a
core region, an intermediate region, and a peripheral region.76 These three regions are
hierarchically connected and each level contains beliefs that are also horizontally
74Philip Converse, "The Nature o f Belief Systems in Mass Publics, " in David E. Apter, ed., Ideology and Discontent (New York:
Free Press, 1964); See also Paul Dawson, "The Formation and Structure o f Political Belief Systems," Political Behavior, Vol. 1 (1979)
Quote taken from Converse, p. 207.
75 Roger W. Cobb, "The Belief System Perspective: A n Assessment o f a Framework," Journal ofP olitics, Vol. 35 (February 1973)
pp. 121-153.
76 Milton Rokeach, The Open an d Closed Mind (New York: Basic Books, 1960) pp. 35-50; Beliefs, Attitudes, and Values: A Theory
o f Organization and Change (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1968)
56
intertwined. The central region consists of beliefs known as primitive beliefs, which
are acquired early on in life and deal with an individual's conceptualization o f the
physical and social world.77 Rokeach suggests that these beliefs are pre-ideological and
in many respects are comparable to the unexamined axioms o f a mathematical system. 78
Intermediate beliefs, by contrast, are ideologically based and are beliefs a person holds
about the nature o f authority. These beliefs are adopted from religious and political
authorities that an individual depends on to help him/her form a picture o f the world in
which he/she operates. Peripheral beliefs are those that are derived from intermediate
beliefs and, as Rokeach suggests, serve to fill in the details o f an individual's world-map.
Katzenstein provides a fine set o f examples of peripheral beliefs: "a belief in abortion
may be derived from religion; or a belief about public policy might come from party
affiliation."79 It is the integration o f all three levels o f beliefs that comprises a belief
system.
Alexander George was responsible for the first rigorous application o f these ideas
in the area of foreign policy decision-making. In 1969, George helped further develop the
"operational code" (op-code) for the analysis of political leaders and foreign policy
decision-making.80 In his study, George attempted to systematize an earlier examination
o f Soviet behavior by Nathan Leites who argued that there existed within the Bolshevik
77 Examples o f primitive beliefs regarding physical reality would include beliefs about color, space, and time, while primitive beliefs
regarding social reality would include beliefs as to whether or not authority figures or people in general should be trusted. Likewise,
beliefs about the self would deal with an individual's orientation in physical space, his/her beliefs about autonomy and independence,
and self-worth.
78 Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind, pp. 40-41
79 Lawrence C. Katzenstein made this observation, "Change, Myth, and the Reunification o f China, in Valerie M. Hudson, ed..
Culture and Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997) p. 52.
80 Alexander L. George, "The Operational Code: A Neglected Approach to the Study o f Political Leaders and Decision-Making,"
International Studies Quarterly. Vol. 13 (1969) pp. 190-222.
57
leadership cadre certain psychological and sociological tendencies that one could
discern from their speeches in order to understand both Soviet behavior in general and
Of
foreign policy strategy and tactics in particular. Leites referred to these psychological
tendencies as the Soviet leaderships operational code. George culled from Leites work
what he believed to be the philosophical/core beliefs of the Soviet Politburo as well as its
instrumental beliefs, which were derived from the philosophical/core beliefs.
In doing so, George created a set o f questions whose answers he believed guided
a leaders approach to foreign policy decision-making. The philosophical beliefs that
George mentioned included the basic assumptions from which everything else in the
belief system derived. They included the following questions:
1) What is the essential nature o f political life? Is the political universe
essentially one o f harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of
one's political opponents?
2) What are the prospects for the eventual realization o f one's fundamental
political values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic, or must one be
pessimistic on this score; and in what respects one and/or the other?
3) Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?
4) How much "control" or "mastery" can one have over historical developments?
What is one's role in "moving" and "shaping" history in the desired direction?
81 Nathan Leites, A Study o f Bolshevism (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1953) and The Operational Code o fth e Politburo (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1951)
58
5) What is the role o f "chance" in human affairs and in historical
development?82
Like Rokeach, George believed that beliefs within this level are interrelated. Also like
Rokeach, George contends that there is a lower level o f beliefs (instrumental beliefs)
derived from a higher level of beliefs (philosophical beliefs). Instrumental beliefs, unlike
core beliefs, dealt with "ends-means relationships in the context o f political action" and
included answers to the following questions:
1) What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?
2) How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?
3) How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?
4) What is the best "timing" o f action to advance one's interest?
5) What is the utility and role o f different means for advancing one's interests?
George's basic assumption in using a belief system model to study foreign policy
decision-making is that at any given time there exists a predominant belief system (also
called an ideology or worldview) shared by most-albeit not all-members o f the foreign
policy elite that acts as a perceptual screen, which in turn sets the terms o f the policy
debate and places limits on what policies are ultimately selected. The existence o f elite
disagreement is not ruled out, however. George argued that because o f the tendency of
82 Alexander L. George, "The Operational Code: A Neglected Approach to the Study o f Political Leaders and Decision-Making,"
pp. 190-222.
83 Ibid. 194.
59
the chief executive and his closest advisors to share certain fundamental beliefs, ceteris
paribus, policy by-and-large tends to mirror the prevailing worldview. In addition, like
the good belief system theorist that he was, George argued that the general op-code of the
foreign policy elite could change. I f an alteration occurred within the level o f
philosophical beliefs, the functional interdependence o f beliefs throughout the system
would then require changes in the lower level o f beliefs as well.
George's formulation o f the operational code led to a number o f additional studies
that tested the relationship between beliefs and foreign policy behavior on a variety of
foreign policy leaders, including John Foster Dulles, Dean Acheson, Henry Kissinger,
Frank Church, among others.84 These studies have all tended to confirm George's basic
hypothesis that beliefs can at least indirectly influence foreign policy decision-making.
This does not mean, however, that the operational code approach to decision-making has
not been criticized. In general, there are two fundamental problems with this theoretical
construct. The first relates to the questions George uses for gauging a leader's
philosophical beliefs. In his analysis, George never clearly specifies why he has included
the beliefs that he has at the philosophical level. As Gunnar Sjoblom observes, all five of
George's philosophical beliefs are problematic in one way or another.85 Philosophical
84 Ole Holsti, "The Operational Code" Approach to the Study o f Political Leaders: John Foster Dulles' Philosophical and Instrumental
Beliefs," Canadian Journal o f Political Science, Vol. 3 (1970) pp. 123-157; D.S. McLennan, The Operational Code Approach to the
study o f Political Leaders: Dean Achesons philosophical and instrumental beliefs, Canadian Journal o f Political Science, Vol. 4,
(1971) pp. 52-75. Ole Holsti, The "Operational Code as an Approach to the Analysis o f Belief Systems: Final Report to the National
Science Foundation. Grant No. SOC75-15368. (1977): Stephen G. Walker, "The Interface Between Beliefs and Behavior: Henry
Kissingers Operational Code and the Vietnam War.Journal o f Conflict Resolution, Vol. 21 (1977) pp. 129-167; Loch Anderson,
"Operational Codes and the Prediction o f Leadership Behavior: Senator Frank Church at Midcareer," in Margarer Hermann, ed., A
Psychological Examination o f Political Leaders (New York: Free Press, 1977) pp. 82-119.
85 Gunnar Sjob!om"The Operational Code Approach: Problems and Some Solutions," in Christer Jonnsson, ed.. Cognitive Dynamics
and International Politics (London: Frances Pinter, 1982) pp. 75-90.
60
belief # 1 (PI) is troubling because it includes the possibility o f interpreting the nature
o f politics as harmonious; and, most scholars would tend to agree that an integral part o f
any definition of politics is that it involves some form o f conflict. P 1 is also limited in
that it includes only beliefs about an opponent. What about beliefs regarding a leader's
own nation, or beliefs about allies or neutrals?
The second philosophical belief (P2) is problematic because it fails to include any
indication o f a leader's goals, which is crucial to discerning the prospects for success or
the degree o f optimism/pessimism that a leader possesses. Finally, philosophical beliefs
3-5, concerning predictability, degree o f control, and the role o f chance, Sjoblom
believes, "are so clearly related that they can hardly be answered separately." 86 Thus, in
constructing an analytical model, one needs to clarify why he/she is selecting certain
types of beliefs and not others.
The second problem with George's op-code, which is crucially important for this
study, is that it assumes that the belief system, once established, will apply in equal
measure to all members o f the foreign policy elite. Political leaders in a given era, it is
argued, have their beliefs shaped by similar cultural, historical, and ideological forces.
Unfortunately, by assuming that the op-code provides a prism for the key decision
makers, the result, writes James Goldgeier, is that the model "predicts consistent behavior
37 .
from leader to leader and ignores the idiosyncrasies o f individuals." It is my intention
to demonstrate that within the context of American foreign policy during two Republican
86 Ibid., p. 62.
87 James M. Goldgeier, Leadership Style and Soviet Foreign Policy: Stain, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Gorbachev (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1994) p. 15.
61
administrations in the 1980s, the beliefs, or op-code, o f Ronald Reagan and George
Bush were indeed quite different.
Ole Holsti and Stephen Walker are perhaps the two political scientists who have
done the most to refine the Leites/George operational code. Holsti, in his major work on
the op-code, contended that a foreign policy leader's belief system is centered on two sets
o f master beliefs: those concerning the fundamental nature of the political universe (e.g.
whether leaders perceive the political universe as harmonious or conflictual), and those
relating to the fundamental sources of conflict (e.g., whether leaders perceive conflict as
stemming from human nature, the attributes o f nations, or the international system).
Holsti believed that the intersection of these two sets of beliefs formed six distinct belief
systems, which foreign policy analysts could use to classify nearly all foreign policy
leaders. By assuming a degree o f cognitive consistency, Holsti also argued that these
beliefs could potentially impact foreign policy behavior by influencing how a leader
interpreted information emanating from the international arena. What Holsti added to the
Leites/George model, besides the six-fold typology, was a demonstration of the
importance of situational variables in the relationship between beliefs and behavior. He
posited that in situations where information was overly complex, scarce, or ambiguous,
decision-makers would rely on their beliefs to select from a possible range of foreign
policy responses. Thus, Holsti believed one could at least indirectly link a leader's beliefs
with foreign policy decisions. Additionally, Holsti, in this study, attempted to develop a
* 88
coding method for arriving at a leader's op-code beliefs.
88 Holsti, "The Operational Code as an Approach to the Analysis o f B elief Systems"
62
Like the earlier criticisms o f the Georgian philosophical and instrumental
questions, Stephen W alker discovered that Holsti's typology, too, contained a number of
OQ
ambiguities and overlapping beliefs. Because of these problems, Walker revised
Holsti's original typology to contain four, rather than six belief systems, all o f which
included both philosophical and instrumental beliefs. Walker later teamed up with
Lawrence Falkowski to test whether this new typology could be used to establish a
relationship between crisis bargaining and the op-code beliefs o f U.S. Presidents and their
secretaries o f state.90
In their analysis o f Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson (and their
respective secretaries o f state) Walker and Falkowski discovered, however, that by
placing these leaders within the context o f either Holsti's or Walker's belief system
typology, they could not accurately predict the various bargaining moves that were
adopted by these administrations. Instead, the authors learned that these leaders possessed
different beliefs from different belief systems. In addition, they noted that the bargaining
positions taken by these U.S. officials reflected not only their foreign policy beliefs, but
were also related to their personal motivations for power, affiliation, and achievement
within the political sphere.91 Walker in his most recent research on the op-code has
89 Stephen G. Walker, "The Motivational Foundation o f Political Belief Systems, A Re-Analysis o f the Operational Code
Construct. International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 27 (1983) pp. 179-202.
90 Stephen Walker and Lawrence Falkowski, "The Operational Codes of U.S. Presidents and Secretaries ofState," Political
Psychology, V o l. 5, (1984) pp. 33-51.
91 Ibid.
63
attempted to develop systematic measures for linking together the cognitive and
motivational influences on a leaders foreign policy behavior.92
Douglas Blum, in his study o f continuity and change in the post-World War II
Soviet foreign policy belief system, has also made an important contribution in trying to
tackle some o f the problems associated with George's original operational code and its
subsequent adaptations.93 Blum's analytical framework, like George's, primarily consists
o f two-levels o f beliefs: a core level and an intermediate level.94 At the core level can be
found the basic assumptions and values o f an individual "from which everything else in
the belief system ultimately derives.95 The intermediate level, by contrast, contains
conceptual generalizations, which are heavily value laden and are derived from the core
beliefs. Blum cogently describes these beliefs: "The defining property of intermediate
beliefs is that they express wishful thinking: they either express a desire to remake the
world, a hope that certain outcomes will occur, or a wishful representation of the nature
o f things."96 Intermediate beliefs are those that can be derived collectively from an
individuals core beliefs. These two levels are in many respects comparable to the second
and third tiers o f Rokeach's pioneering study on belief systems mentioned earlier, and
will provide a useful heuristic for studying differences in the foundational and
derivational beliefs o f Ronald Reagan and George Bush.
92 Stephen Walker, Mark Schafer, and Michael Young, "Systematic Procedures for Operational Code Analysis: Measuring and
Modeling Jimmy Carters Operational Code," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 42 (1998) pp. 175-190.
93 Douglas Blum, "The Soviet Foreign Policy Belief System: Beliefs, Politics, and Foreign Policy Outcomes," International Studies
Quarterly. Vol. 37 (1993) pp. 373-394.
94 Blum, both his doctoral dissertation and in his International Studies Quarterly article, does mention a third level o f beliefs, which
he calls peripheral beliefs that consist o f detailed and tactical information about the outside world.
95 Ibid. p. 375.
96 Douglas Blum, "The Soviet foreign policy belief system: Sources of continuity and change in ideology and policy," Doctoral
Dissertation, (Columbia University, 1991) p. 87.
64
Beliefs at the core level include those relating to:
1) National Image: A leader's ideal image o f the state
2) Images o f Allies: Beliefs concerning the characteristics o f "friendly" states
3) Image o f Adversaries: Beliefs concerning the characteristics o f "enemies"
4) The nature of international politics: Premise regarding harmony or conflict
within the international arena and views as to whether conflicts are permanent
o f resolvable.
5) The flow of history: Views pertaining to the control or mastery one has over
historical developments.
6) The nature of change: Conceptions o f how change occurs and whether the
future should be one emphasizing the status quo or change.
In essence, what Blum has done is add on to George's original conceptualization of
philosophical beliefs in order to solve the problems brought out by his critics. Thus, one
finds Blum adding an important set o f beliefs regarding national self-image and the
image o f allies along with beliefs concerning the nature o f change. He also divides
George's original P 1 into two categories: one concerning the nature o f international
politics and the other, the images o f adversaries. Additionally, Blum has effectively
combined P2-P5, which relate to the prospects for success, predictability, degree of
control, and the role of change, into a single construct dealing with beliefs pertaining to
the flow o f history.
65
Yet why are these beliefs considered core beliefs? Why not choose another set
o f categories. Are these beliefs only relevant to a study o f Soviet foreign policy? The
answer, in part, is that the focus o f inquiry will determine which set o f beliefs an analyst
must use to link beliefs and behavior. And, regardless o f the type o f political leadership
one is examining, there will be some commonalities in how leaders respond to
international events. The major concern for this study is trying to understand why change
occurs in U.S. foreign policy. Therefore, because U.S. foreign policy, as is the case in
each states foreign policy, is intimately associated with the operation o f international
politics and because international politics is by definition interactive, the categories o f
beliefs that are chosen will mirror these concerns. Thus, the six core beliefs deal with
how state leaders view their own state (Cl), along with how they perceive others, both
allies (C2) and adversaries (C3) in the context o f interaction.97The very concept of
foreign policy implies interaction; therefore, it becomes necessary to examine a leader's
views o f the nature o f international politics (C4) and how much he/she believes they can
control these interactions (C5).98 In addition, it is assumed that international politics is
not static, but instead characterized by some degree o f change. Leaders will either seek to
97 Studies that have acknowledged the general importance o f examining self-image in relation to images o f others include: William A
Camson and Andre Modigliani, Untangling the Cold War: A Strategy f o r Testing Rival Theories (Boston: Little & Brown and Co.,
1971); Richard Ned Lebow, White Britain and Black Ireland: The Influence o f Stereotypes on Colonial Policy (Philadelphia, PA:
Institute for the Study o f Human Issues, 1976); Daniel Frei, Perceived Images: U.S. and Soviet Assumptions and Perceptions in
Disarmament (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheid, 1986); Richard N ed Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature o f International
Crises (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University, 1981) esp. Chapter 6. John G. Stoessinger, Nations in Darkness. China.
Russia, and America (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990) 5th edition. N . Kaplowitz, National Self-Images, Perceptions o f Enemies, and
Conflict Strategies, Political Psychology, Vol. 11 (1990) pp. 39-82.
98 As mentioned above. Ole Holsti in his detailed study "The Operational Code as an Approach to the Analysis o f Belief System,"
suggests that a leader's beliefs concerning the nature o f international politics and beliefs concerning the sources o f conflict represent
"m aster beliefs;" "that is, beliefs that are likely to constrain, if not dominate, other elements o f the actor's belief system." p. 156.
66
promote change or to maintain the status quo. Thus, it will be valuable to understand
how leaders perceive change and how it should be handled (C6).
As mentioned above, the intermediate-level beliefs that will be examined are
derived collectively from the core beliefs. These are beliefs that help to make the abstract
core beliefs more concrete or specific. Writes Blum: "Intermediate beliefs function to
provide normative direction as well as additional analytical concepts."99 Alexander
George suggests that these are beliefs that have to do with questions o f correct strategy
and tactics. 100They are classified as intermediate simply because they stem in some
sense from the central, core beliefs.
Beliefs o f this type include:
1) The relevance o f self-image or role for the outside world.
2) The internal political structure and dynamic of adversaries and allies.
3) The requirements for self-preservation and beliefs about war and peace.
4) The relation o f current trends to larger historical patterns.
5) The nature of specific political mechanisms, or modes, o f change.101
In the end, one of the key benefits of using this analytical model is that it returns belief
system studies, at least in the context o f studying foreign policy behavior, back to the
99 Douglas Blum, "The Soviet Foreign Policy Belief System: Beliefs, Politics, and Foreign Policy Outcomes," p.376.
100 Alexander George, The Causal Nexus between Cognitive Beliefs and Decision-Making B ehavior The Operational Code
Belief System, Lawrence S. Falkowski, ed.. Psychological Models in International Politics,(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979) p.
100 .
101 Ibid. 3 7 6 .1 have omitted one o f Blum's original intermediate beliefs, which related to the malleability o fth e political environment
because it is virtually indistinguishable from the core belief regarding the flow o f history.
Reproduced with permission o fth e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
67
original conceptualization o f Rokeach who argued that a belief system represents the
total universe of a person's beliefs about the physical world, the social world, and the
self.102
Blum argues that the dynamic by which belief systems can be used to explain
changes in nation-state's foreign policy behavior is the result o f three interacting factors:
1) the policy cycle; 2) the structure and stability o f belief systems, and; 3) emergence of
new leaders.103
The policy cycle refers to the process whereby decisions made by a foreign policy
leadership- that are deemed either successful or not- feedback into these leaders' original
belief system. Decisions or outcomes that are considered successful serve to reinforce
existing belief structures, while those that do not, often pose a challenge to existing
beliefs.104
Even though an individual leader(s) may interpret information arising from the
policy environment as contradicting his/her beliefs, the tendency is to try to force this
information into the pre-existing belief framework. As Jervis, Nisbett, and Ross have all
noted, belief systems have an incredibly stable structure.105 Changes that do take place,
occur either over a long period o f time or take place at levels outside the core. There are
102 Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind.

103 Douglas Blum, op. cit., pp. 376-377.
104 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (1976), discusses the tendency o f individuals to process
incoming information in such a way as to make it fit into pre-existing beliefs. He refers to this process as cognitive consistency. He
warns that when individuals do not spontaneously perceive evidence as conforming to their views, they often explicitly interpret it as
compatible with their beliefs (pp. 117-128) Jervis interpretation is based on largely on the pioneering work o f Leon Festinger. See, A
Theory o f Cognitive Dissonance (Evanston, IL: Row & Peterson, 1957) For a criticism o f Festingers work and an alternative
explanation consult Daryl J. Bern, Beliefs. Attitudes, and Human Affairs (Belmont, CA: Brooks/Carle Publishing Co, 1970)
105 Robert Jervis, Ibid. Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross. Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings o f Social
Judgement.^Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1980).
68
times, however, when continuous contradictory information emanating from the
foreign policy environment (both domestic and international) over an extended period o f
time leads to changes in the intermediate level o f beliefs. As these challenges continue to
mount, there is the possibility o f a transformation o f core beliefs. It is at this juncture,
when core beliefs are fundamentally challenged and then altered, that one often witnesses
drastic changes in foreign policy behavior.
The emergence o f new leaders is the third factor that contributes to changes in a
foreign policy leadership's belief system and, by extension, in its foreign policy behavior.
New leaders often come into office with a different set o f beliefs from their predecessors.
Valerie Bunce tested empirically the importance o f the transition o f chief executives in
her study of leadership change in the United States and Soviet Union in the post-war
period. She demonstrates persuasively that indeed, "Succession is not simply a
circulation of elites; it is a reorientation o f the policy environment."106 New
administrations that possess new belief systems influence which policy options are
considered and which players will hold the most importance political cards, both
domestically and in foreign affairs. It is important to note, however, that the emergence
o f new leaders alone does not automatically lead to changes in the prevailing belief
system. As Blum points out, changes in beliefs also stem from contradictory information
arising out of the policy cycle and incremental change in the structure of the belief
system.107
106 Valerie Bunce, Do New Leaders Matter? Executive Succession and Public Policy Under Capitalism and Socialism (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981) p. 17.
107 Oougas Blum, op. cit. p. 376.
69
It is on this point that Blums model can be criticized. Blum, like George before
him, assumes that there will exist a predominant belief system that will be shared by most
foreign policy decision-makers because of their shared historical past. Admittedly, Blum
does support the view that leaders can emerge on the domestic scene who will challenge
the prevailing belief system and who can change the course o f foreign policy. But he
cautions that this will take place over a relatively long period of time and as a result of
negative feedback emanating from the domestic and international environment. It is my
contention that changed leadership alone may be a major factor in contributing to shifts in
a state's foreign policy.
The next two chapters will utilize the above model to construct the belief system
o f President Reagan and President Bush. These beliefs, in turn, will then be linked in
chapter 5 to an examination o f the decisions that these two leaders made in response to
the revolutionary activity that took place in El Salvador and Nicaragua throughout the
1980s.
Rules o f Evidence
Prior to discussing the Reagan and Bush belief systems, however, it is necessary
to explain the methods that were used to sift through the public and private documents.
This explanation ensures that the study possesses a degree of reliability, despite the
absence o f any test for inter-coder reliability. In laying out these decision rules, other
70
researchers, using the same data, will be able to assess whether the conclusions that are
reached concerning the impact o f beliefs on changes in policy are indeed accurate.
As mentioned above, a refinement o f Doug Blums 2-level belief system model
served as the benchmark for analysis. In many respects, this dissertation represents a test
to see how well this new & improved operational code can explain changes in U.S.
foreign policy behavior (emphasis added), unlike Blums original concern with changes
in Soviet foreign policy. For each o f the belief system categories that were presented
above, a series of questions were asked to guide the analyst in selecting statements that
could be used to infer presidential beliefs. In other words, the documents were read to see
if they contained statements that could be classified as falling under core beliefs 1-6, or
under intermediate beliefs 1-5. I f they did, they were coded accordingly. If the document
did not contain any statements that could be classified under any o f the aforementioned
categories, they were not coded.
Coding documents in this way leads to an important methodological question:
Is this construction o f the two presidents beliefs systems impressionistic, ad hoc, and
subjective? Perhaps. Does the study then lack reliability? No. By providing the reader
with the specific questions that were used, analysts can, in subsequent studies, determine
the reliability of the conclusions by using the same set of questions on the same data
sources, or, conversely, use these questions to analyze their own selected data sets.
The questions that were used to code a presidents core beliefs included:
C -l: National Self Image
What is the presidents ideal image o f the United States?
a.) Does the president characterize the United States as representing
certain values, such as democracy, freedom, individual rights?
b.) Does the president characterize the United States as possessing a
special moral role, duty, or destiny in world affairs?
C-2: Images o f Allies
How are U.S. allies in Central America described?
a.) Are U.S. allies in Central America cast in positive terms?
b.) Are U.S. allies described as dependent on the U.S. for their survival
against communist insurgencies?
C-3: Images of Adversaries
How are the United States international and regional adversaries described?
a.) Are U.S. adversaries, both international and regional, described as
threatening to the national security interests o f the United States?
b.) Are U.S. adversaries, both international and regional, described as
unitary actors?
c.) Are U.S. adversaries, both international and regional, described as
trustworthy?
d.) What do U.S. leaders state are the motivations behind an adversary
international behavior?
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C-4: The Fundamental Nature of International Politics
How is the international arena characterized?
a.) How do leaders suggest power is distributed in the international
system?
b.) Is interaction within the international arena characterized as zero-sum
or non zero-sum?
c.) Is the international arena characterized as stable and predictable or
unstable and unpredictable?
d.) Are conflicts described as permanent or resolvable?
C-5: Flow of History
Are historical developments described as resulting from individual actions or
stemming from some immutable laws of history?
C-6: The Nature o f Change
a.) Do changes take place internationally in a predictable and stable fashion?
b.) Or, is change described as occurring in an unpredictable and unexpected
fashion?
How should one deal with changes that are taking place internationally?
c.) Should the United States seek actively to guide change?
d.) Should the United States respond to changes in a cautious and incremental
fashion?
Intermediate beliefs, as noted above, are those that are derived collectively from
core beliefs. Like Georges instrumental beliefs, they provide a decision maker with
73
possible prescriptions for appropriate responses to given situations. In effect,
intermediate beliefs represent the choice propensities o f an individual decision maker. Or,
to put it somewhat differently, intermediate beliefs tend to deal with questions o f correct
strategy and tactics. The questions that were used to analyze the public and private
statements o f President Reagan and President Bush in order to infer their intermediate
beliefs include:
1-1: What is the appropriate role for the United States in the world?
Is the United States characterized as exceptional, as a shining example for
the rest of the world? Or, simply as primus inter paresl
1-2: How are the internal political structures o f allies and adversaries
characterized? Open? Closed?
What are the foreign policy objectives/intentions of allies and adversaries?
What is the likelihood that allies and adversaries would resort to the use of
military force to achieve its objectives?
1-3: What are the necessary requirements for maintaining peace internationally
and regionally?
What are the most effective means for preserving peace and avoiding war?
1-4: Are current international trends a part o f some larger historical patterns?
Are democracies, free markets, and demands for freedom the trends of the
future?
1-5: What tools should the United States use to deal with the changes taking
place internationally?
74
Taken together, these are the sets o f questions that were used as rules o f
evidence to construct the belief systems o f Ronald Reagan and George Bush from
the public and private record. Answers to these questions thus provided needed
insight concerning the two presidents core and intermediate beliefs.
75
Chapter 3: The Reagan Foreign Policy Belief System
When Ronald Regan entered the White House in 1981, he was one of Americas
least experienced presidents in foreign affairs, but one who nonetheless possessed a set of
deeply held beliefs about the role that America should play in the world and the nature of
Americas allies and adversaries. Upon entering office, Reagan believed that the United
States operated in a very dangerous international environment, but one that could,
through forceful and decisive actions on the part o f the United States, change for the
better. And by better, Reagan meant simply a world free from the threat of Soviet
tyranny. This chapter will provide a glimpse into the Reagan foreign policy belief system
by applying the analytical model that was developed in the previous chapter. I will focus
on Reagans national self-image, his images o f allies and adversaries, his view
concerning the nature o f international politics, the flow of history, and the nature of
change, along with the presidents related intermediate beliefs.
National Self-Image
If one had to select a single event that catapulted Ronald Reagan into America's
national political conscience and revealed his fundamental beliefs concerning domestic
and foreign affairs, it would be what students o f the Reagan years now simply refer to as
"The Speech." On 27 October 1964, serving in his position as co-chairman of the
California Citizens for Goldwater, Reagan, in a nationally televised address, delivered "A
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Time for Choosing," a speech principally meant to drum up support for Barry
Goldwater's faltering presidential campaign, but whose impact was far greater.
In this speech, which Geoffrey Kemp calls "one o f the most powerful bits o f
oratory in American history," Reagan rails against the entire spectrum o f liberal domestic
1fW
and foreign aid initiatives. For Reagan, government spending over the past two
decades on programs such as the Tennessee Valley Authority, Social Security, youth aid
plans, and funding for the federal bureaucracy were mere examples where "Government
had laid its hands on health, housing, farming, industry, commerce, education, and, to an
ever-increasing degree interferes with the people's right to know."109 As Lou Cannon
writes, "The basic idea behind "The Speech" was that the federal government was too
big, too bothersome, and too anti-business."110
With respect to foreign policy, Reagan argued that the post World W ar II foreign
aid programs, which were meant to assist "developing" countries, often either resulted in
giving millions o f dollars to countries who did not need the money in the first place, or
ended up providing resources to countries who did not share our fundamental beliefs. The
net result of most o f these programs, Reagan asserted, was that they ended up "financing
socialism all over the world."111
"A Time for Choosing" did much more than simply criticize the wastefulness of
many o f Lyndon Johnson's post-New Deal initiatives, however. Far more importantly, the
108 Deborah Hart Strober and Gerald S. Strober, Reagan: The Man and His Presidency, The Oral History o f an Era (New York:
Houghton Mifflin, 1998) p. 569.
109 Ronald Reagan, "A Time for Choosing," in Alfred Balitzer, ed., A Time fo r Choosing: The Speeches o f Ronald Reagan. 1961-
7982 (Chicago: Regnery Gateway, 1983) p. 43.
110 Lou Cannon, President Reagan: The Role o f a Lifetime (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991) p. 90
111 Balitzer op. cit. p. 307.
77
speech provided Ronald Reagan with the opportunity to project his ideal image of
America to viewers watching the speech on their television screens at home. After
attacking Johnson's political and social programs, Reagan closes his speech with perhaps
one of the most memorable statements o f his political career, telling his audience: "You
and I have a rendezvous with destiny. We can preserve for our children this last best hope
o f man on earth or we can sentence them to take the first step into a thousand years of
darkness."112
Just prior to making this statement, however, Reagan provides us with a glimpse
o f his ideal image o f the United States. Reagan draws an analogy between the efforts on
the part o f his party to fend off the ever-growing American government with the battles
that were fought between Moses followers and the Egyptians and the American
revolutionaries heroic stand against the British at Concord. As Paul Erikson suggests, for
Reagan, the United States as "the last best hope o f man on earth," takes on an almost
religious connotation. Reagan truly believed that the American people were as divinely
inspired as were the Biblical children o f Israel. Time and time again, one can find this
theme recurring in Reagan's depiction o f the United States.
In his successful bid for the presidency in 1980, one o f the major themes of the
Reagan campaign was to emphasize the idea that the people o f the United States were a
"divinely inspired" lot. Reflecting back on the development o f his strategy for the 1980
campaign, Reagan claims that Jimmy Carter's notion that the American people suffered
from a sense o f national malaise was foolhardy. Quite the opposite was the case. Reagan
112 Ibid 312.
78
"saw no national malaise," he found nothing wrong with the American people."113
Instead, he believes that the only thing Americans needed to do was: "...Recapture our
dreams, our pride in ourselves and our country, and regain that unique sense of destiny
and optimism that had always made America different from any other country in the
world." 114
Once Reagan was ensconced in the office o f the presidency, assertions concerning
America's uniqueness certainly did not fade away. During the course o f a November
1982 nationwide address on arms reduction and nuclear deterrence, Reagan closes his
speech by telling his audience: "I've always believed that this land was set aside in an
uncommon way, that a divine plan placed this great continent between the oceans to be
found by a people from every comer of the Earth who had a special love o f faith,
freedom, and peace.115 In a very similar vein, Reagan, in accepting the Republican party's
re-nomination as their chosen candidate for the 1984 presidential election, plays once
again on this divine theme:
Four years ago we raised a banner o f bold colors-no pale pastels. We proclaimed
a dream o f America as "a shining city on a h ill..." The glistening hope of that
113 Ronald Reagan, An American Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990) p. 219.
114 Ibid.
115 "Address to the Nation on Strategic Arms Reduction and Nuclear Deterrence," 22 November 1982, Public Papers o f the
Presidents: Ronald Reagan, 1981-1989 (Washington: Federal Register Division, National Archive and Records Service, General
Services Administration) p. 1510.
79
lamp is still ours. Every promise, every opportunity is still golden in this
land...In this springtime o f hope, some light seems eternal; America's is.116
These expressions o f America's divine greatness continued throughout Reagan's
second term in office. In his 1987 remarks commemorating the crewmembers o f the
U.S.S. Stark who had been killed while escorting oil tankers in the Persian Gulf, the
president emphasized that the United States has been called upon by history to play a
very special role in the world. "In our great hour, we must answer.. .the call o f history.
It's a summons that, as a nation or people, we did not seek, but it is a call we cannot shirk
or refuse- a call to wage war against war, to stand for freedom until freedom can stand
alone, to live for liberty is the blessing and birthright of every man, woman, and child on
this Earth.117 Likewise, in his farewell address to the nation in January 1989, the
outgoing president did perhaps his best job at pointing out his ideal image o f the United
States, his "shining city upon a hill." The president's words speak for themselves:
I've spoken o f the shining city all my political life, but I don't know if I ever
communicated what I saw when I said it. But in my mind it was a tall, proud city
built on rocks stronger than the oceans, windswept, God-blessed, and teeming
with people of all kinds living in harmony; a city with free ports that hummed
with commerce and creativity. And if there had to be city walls, the walls had
116 "Remarks Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the Republican National Convention in Dallas, Texas, 23 August 1984,
Public Papers o f the Presidents: Ronald Reagan, 1981-1989, p. 1181.
117 "Remarks at a Memorial Service for Crewmembers o f the U.S.S. Stark in Jacksonville, Florida," 22 May 1987, Public Papers o f
the Presidents: Ronald Reagan. 1981-1989, p. 555.
80
doors and the doors would be open to anyone with the w ill and the heart to get
there.118
It goes without saying that Reagan's America is indeed a country blessed and guided by
God.
Apart from an image o f the United States as divinely inspired, Reagan also
perceived America to be an inherently peaceful country. On repeated occasions, the
president would hark back to the days just following World W ar II when the United
States possessed a monopoly o f nuclear weapons, and would tell his audiences that
instead of using America's unrivaled economic and military power for conquest or
domination, the United States, through the Marshall Plan in Europe and MacArthur's
guidance in Japan, helped to rebuild the economies of our former enemies. Reagan was
often flummoxed over the fact that other countries could possibly distrust the United
States. As the president states in his memoirs: "Americans were a moral people who
starting at the birth of our nation has always used our power only as a force of good in the
world."119
In his public addresses, the president echoed the same theme. At a gathering o f
the United Nations General Assembly in June 1982, Reagan announced: "America has no
territorial ambitions. We occupy no countries, and we have built no walls to lock our
people in. Our commitment to self-determination, freedom, and peace is the very soul o f
118 "Farewell Address to the Nation," 11 January 1989, Public Papers o f the Presidents: Ronald Reagan, 1981-1989, p. 1722.
119 Reagan, An American Life. pp. 296, 588.
81
America. That commitment today is as strong as it ever w as."120 Or, as Reagan told the
a U.S. audience in his nationally televised address on the upcoming Soviet-United States
summit meeting in Geneva:
Four times in my lifetime, our soldiers have been sent overseas to fight in foreign
lands.. .Not once were those young men sent abroad in the cause o f conquest. Not
once did they come home claiming a single square inch o f some other country as
a trophy o f w ar... We love freedom not only because it's practical and beneficial
but because it is morally right and just.121
To view the United States as a country bent on military expansion or intervention simply
did not register with Ronald Reagan. As Reagan himself stated, "America is the most
19^
peaceful, least warlike nation in modem history."
Coupled with a core belief o f a divinely inspired and peaceful country, a related
intermediate belief123 was that the United States, because o f its God-given attributes,
should actively set an example for all freedom loving countries to follow. Because the
120 "Remarks in New York City Before the United Nations General Assembly Special Session Devoted to Disarmament," 17 June
1982. Public Papers o fth e Presidents o f the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1981-1989, p. 785. The sentiment that the United States is
bent on peace, not aggression is used in many o f the president's speeches throughout his two terms in office. Often times the wording
changes only slightly, but the meaning is nearly identical. See, for example, the 22 November 1982 "Address to the Nation on
Strategic Arms Reduction and Nuclear Deterrence" and the president's 1983 "State o f the Union."
121 "Address to the Nation on the Upcoming Soviet-United States Summit Meeting in Geneva," 14 November 1985, Public Papers o f
122 This statement was made in the president's remarks in accepting the 1984 presidential nomination at the Republican National
Convention in Dallas, Texas. This quotation can be found in Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States: Ronald Reagan.
1981-1989, p. 1177.
123 For an explanation concerning how to identify intermediate versus core beliefs from presidential statements, consult chapter 2.
82
United States was considered to be the "city upon the hill," Reagan believed it was a
duty and moral imperative of the United States to help lead the way toward the
establishment o f peace and democracy in the world. From Europe to Latin America to the
Middle East to Asia, Reagan believed that these countries often looked to the United
States to help find solutions to their problems.124 Even as a private citizen Reagan
stressed this theme. In a speech before the World Affairs Council in 1972, Reagan
asserts: "We did not seek the role o f leadership that has been thrust upon us. But whether
we like it or not, the events o f our time demand America's participation. 125 Hedrick
Smith suggests that President Reagan believed that the United States "did not seek
leadership o f the free world, but there is no one else who can provide it, and without our
leadership there will be no peace in the world."
As president, Reagan often emphasized this theme. In an address to the
International Longshoremans Association in 1983, Reagan, quoting former Republican
President Benjamin Harrison, was quite clear on what he perceived to be the United
States role abroad:
124 Reagan clearly expresses this sentiment in his memoirs in reference to the importance o f U.S. leadership in helping to bring peace
to the Middle East. See Reagan, An American Life. p. 418.
125 "The Obligations o f Liberty," Speech to the W orld Affairs Council, 12 October 1972, in Alfred Balitzer, ed., A Time For
Choosing: The Speeches o f Ronald Reagan 1961-1982, p. 102.
126 Quoted in Hedrick Smith's, "Reagan's World," in Hedrick Smith eLal. Reagan, the Man. the President. (N ew York: Macmillan
Publishing Co. Inc., 1980) p. 102.
83
In America, a glorious fire has been lighted upon the alter o f liberty... Keep it
binning... and let the sparks that continually go up from it fall on other alters, and
light up in distant lands the fire o f freedom.127
By September, Reagan was announcing to a gathering o f United Nations delegates in
New York that the United States was "a champion o f freedom and self-determination for
all people,"128 Two years later, in a radio address to the nation on Tax reform and
Nicaragua, President Reagan made perhaps his most powerful statement to date: Those
who struggle for freedom look to America. If we fail them in this hour o f need, we fail
ourselves as the last, best hope o f liberty.129 By the time o f the 1985 State of the Union,
the president was proudly proclaiming to a joint session of Congress: "We have resumed
our historic role as a leader o f the free world."130 In March 1985, meeting with a group o f
Central American leaders, the president told his guests: And so it is that the United
States has a noble commitment to Central America. W ere committed by geography, by
treaty, and by moral obligation to stand with you, our American neighbors, in defense o f
liberty. 131
Jane Mayer and Doyle McManus comment on the propensity for Reagan to see
the United States in a leadership position, observing that the president perceived "no half
127 Saving Freedom in Central America, 18 July 1983, National Security Archive, Nicaragua Collection, Document # NI01768.
128 "Address Before the 38th Session o f the United Nations General Assembly in New York, New York," 26 September 1983, Public
Papers o f the Presidents: Ronald Reagan. 1981-1989. p. 1352.
129 Tax Reform/Nicaragua, 14 December 1985, National Security Archive, Nicaragua Collection, Document ft NI02637.
130 "Address Before a Joint Session o f the Congress on the State o f the Union," 6 February 1985, Public Papers ofth e Presidents:
Ronald Reagan, 1981-1989, p. 134.
131 Meeting with Central American Leaders, 25 March 1985, National Security Archive, Nicaragua Collection, Document ft
NI02412.
84
solutions, no limits to American power." President Reagan clearly rejected the
premise that America's power in the world was shrinking and argued "that a revitalized
America could still make the world bend to its desires."132
It was Ronald Reagan's firm belief that the United States was a country that was
indeed a cut above the rest, a nation blessed by God, destined to protect countries that had
established democracies and free markets from the vile encroachments o f Soviet-led
communism. These beliefs, as we shall see in chapter 5, had profound consequences for
the course of U.S. involvement in Central America throughout the 1980s.
Image o f Allies
Needless to say, President Reagan possessed a very flattering self-image o f the
United States. In many respects, the same can be said of Reagan's perceptions o f U.S.
allies in Central America. By the end o f the 1980s, the governments o f El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras were viewed as prototypes of newly emerging democracies in the
region, while the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance (or Contras) were perceived as
analogous to the original American and French revolutionaries. Yet a caveat is in order.
Although Reagan did champion the cause o f the newly emerging "democracies" in El
Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and certainly depicted the Contras in rather glowing
terms, he also believed that U.S. military and economic assistance was necessary in order
to prevent the first three countries from falling to communist-led insurrections and the
Contras from being overrun by the Marxist-Leninist government o f Nicaragua. Reagan,
132 Jane Mayer and Doyle McManus, Landslide: The Unmaking o f the President. 1984-1988 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1988) p. 51.
85
in describing the situation in El Salvador in 1983 to the National Association o f
Manufacturers, emphasized: "Only Salvadorans can fight this war, just as only
Salvadorans can decide El Salvador's fixture. W hat we can do is help to give them the
skills and supplies they need to do the job themselves."133
As for the events taking place in Nicaragua, the president stated in 1985: As
Americans who believe in freedom we cannot turn our backs on people who desire
nothing more than the freedom we take for granted. By providing this humanitarian
assistance, we are telling the people o f Nicaragua that we will not abandon them in their
struggle for freedom. 134
In many respects, as Martha Cottam suggests, Reagan held the typical
"dependent image" o f Central American states for U.S. presidents: they possessed a weak
and unorganized military, a small and self-interested political elite, limited economic
resource base, and an inferior and rather simplistic culture.135 Due in part to this image of
Central American countries, Reagans support for regionally sponsored diplomatic
initiatives would be limited at best.
In spite o f this rather stereotypical image, President Reagan repeatedly
emphasized to administration officials and to the American public that democracy was
beginning to take hold in Central America for the very first time. In a 1982 memorandum
133 "Remarks on Central America and El Salvador at the Annual Meeting o f the National Association o f Manufacturers," 10 March
1983, Public Papers o f the Presidents; Ronald Reagan. 1981-1989, p. 374.
134 Statement on the Establishment o f the Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office, 30 August 1985, National Security Archive,
Iran-Contras Collection, Document # ICO 1488.
135 Martha Cottam, Images a n d Intervention, pp. 117-130. See also Lars Schoultz, Beneath the United States: A History o f U.S.
Policy Toward Latin America (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1998) for an in-depth analysis o f how a dependent image
on the part o f U.S. policy-makers has guided U.S. foreign relations with Latin America since the founding o f the United States.
86
to Secretary of State George Schultz, the president wrote that the Government o f El
Salvador:
.. .is making a concerted and significant effort to comply with internationally
recognized human rights....is achieving substantial control over all elements o f its
own armed forces.. .is making continued progress in implementing essential
economic and political reforms...is committed to the holding free elections at an
early date... has made good faith efforts to investigate the murders o f six United
States citizens in El Salvador in December 1980 and January 1981 and bring to
trial those responsible.136
As a result of this presidential determination, Reagan agreed to provide continued
economic and military assistance for the government o f El Salvador.
Publicly, the president said much o f the same. In an address before a joint session
o f Congress in April 1983, Reagan told his audience: "democracy is beginning to take
root in El Salvador, which, until a short time ago, knew only dictatorship. The new
government is now delivering on its promises o f democracy, reforms, and free
elections."137 The following month, in a fact sheet released by the White House Office of
the Press Secretary, the president was willing to claim that democratic institutions in El
136 Determination to Authorize Continued Assistance for El Salvador, 28 January 1982, National Security Archive, El Salvador
Collection, Document # ES02497.
137 "Address Before a Joint Session o f Congress on Central America," 27 April 1983, Public Papers ofthe Presidents: Ronald
Reagan. 1981-1989, p. 601.
87
Salvador were flourishing, and that the land reform program has benefited about
550,000 peasants, nearly a quarter o f the rural population.138
For the president, the Salvadoran government was one that was "making every
effort to guarantee democracy, free labor unions, freedom o f religion, and a free press,"
17 0
despite the fact that it was under constant attack from leftist revolutionaries. In July
1983, Reagan commented: El Salvador is moving in the right direction. Its elected
government is committed to further improvement. They need and deserve our help. 140
Reagan later reiterated these sentiments in a 1984 speech before the General Assembly of
the United Nations, referring to the government o f El Salvador as one "dedicated to
democracy, reform, economic progress, and regional peace."141
The following year, the trend continued with Reagan placing the Salvadoran
government o f Jose Napolean Duarte in the democratic camp. At a presidential news
conference, the president commented: El Salvador, after several elections, is a
government that is striving for democracy, that was chosen by the people. And the people
trying to overthrow it, the guerrillas in El Salvador, are trying to overthrow a government
that the majority o f the people elected. 142
Despite Reagan's optimism concerning the prospects for democracy in Central
America, there was one glaring exception for the president- the Sandinista government in
138 Address by the President on Central America, 9 M ay 1984, National Security Archive, Nicaragua Collection, Document #
NI02091.
139 Ibid. p. 603.
140 Saving Freedom in Central America, 18 July 1983, National Security Archive, Nicaragua Collection, Document # NIO1768.
141"Address to the 39th Session o f the United Nations General Assembly in New York," 24 September 1984, Public Papers o f the
Presidents: Ronald Reagan. 1981-1989. p. 1358.
142 Presidents Comments on the Propriety o f Covert Operations, 12 February 1985, National Security Archive, Nicaragua
Collection, Document # NI02365.
88
Nicaragua. And to help bring democracy to Nicaragua, Reagan believed the United
States needed to lend its support to the Contra forces. The president believed that the
Contras were heroically waging a battle inside Nicaragua to overthrow the Sandinista
regime. By July 1983, the president was expressing the point that the Contras were
fighting to preserve the true meaning o f the 1979 revolution: the guerrilla bands were
fighting in Nicaragua to restore the true revolution and keep the promises made to the
OAS. 143 Time and time again, Reagan would refer to the contras as the region's
"freedom fighters struggling to bring democracy to their country and eliminate this
Communist menace at its source."144 At no point did the president better express this
sentiment than in a radio address he delivered to the nation in February 1985:
The true heroes o f the Nicaraguan struggle-non Communist, democracy-loving
revolutionaries-saw their revolution betrayed and took up arms against the
betrayer. These men and women are today the democratic resistance fighters some
call the contras. We should call them freedom fighters...Sandinista propaganda
denounces them as mercenaries and former National Guardsmen o f the Somoza
dictatorship; but this is a lie. The freedom fighters are led by those who oppose
Somoza, and their soldiers are peasants, farmers, shopkeepers, and students-the
people of Nicaragua. These brave men and woman deserve our help. They do not
ask for troops, but only for our technical and financial support and supplies. We
can not turn on them in their moment o f need; to do so would be to betray our
143 Saving Freedom in Central America, 18 July 1983, National Security Archive, Nicaragua Collection, Document # NI01768.
144 "Address to the Nation on the Situation in Nicaragua," March 16, 1986, Public Papers o f the Presidents: Ronald Reagan, 1981-
1989, p. 352.
89
centuries-old dedication to supporting those who struggle for freedom. This is
not only legal, its totally consistent with our history.145
Robert Bud McFarlane, Reagan's third national security advisor, summarizes
Reagans beliefs concerning the Contras: "The contras were one o f President Reagan's
personal causes. In his eyes, the anti-Sandinista rebels were modern-day minutemen,
heroic revolutionaries, patriots whose struggle on behalf o f liberty and democracy
deserved America's wholehearted and unflagging support."146
In Ronald Reagan's black-and-white view o f the region, clearly it was the
Sandinistas who were perceived as the bad guys and the Contras who were perceived as
the good guys. The Sandinistas represented repression and regional instability, while the
Contras, it was believed, wanted only to bring peace and democracy to Nicaragua. In
March 1985, the president, in a nation-wide radio broadcast, told American listeners that
the Contras had sent a peace proposal to the Nicaraguan government, which called for a
cease-fire and church-mediated negotiation geared toward establishing to groundwork for
a free and honest elections. The Sandinista response, announced Reagan: came back
quick, loud, and clear: Forget it. 147 By August 1985, the president publicly declared that
that the Contras have not demanded the overthrow of the Sandinista Government; they
want only the right o f free people to compete for power in free elections. 148
145 Central America, 16 February 1985, National Security Archive, Nicaragua Collection, Document # NI02369.
146 Robert C. McFarlane with Zofia Smardz, Special Trust. (New York: Cadell & Davies, 1994) p. 67.
147 Central America, 30 March 1985, National Security Archive, Nicaragua Collection, Document # NI02418.
148 Establishment o f Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office, 30 August 1985, National Security Archive, Nicaragua
Collection, Document # NI02546.
90
In June o f the following year, President Reagan continued to describe the
Contras as champions o f peace and democracy, arguing that they "seek a political
solution. They are willing to lay down their arms and negotiate to restore the original
goals of the revolution, a democracy in which the people o f Nicaragua choose their own
government."149 Reagan took the position that the United States should support the
Contras because their cause was nearly identical to our cause: to bring peace and "true
democracy" to Central America. The president said as much in preparation for the public
announcement celebrating the victory o f Contra aid legislation in the U.S. Congress:
As we approach the celebration o f our own Independence Day, we can be proud
that we as a people have embraced the freedom fighters of Nicaragua. Today,
their cause is our cause. With our help, the people o f Nicaragua will win their
struggle to bring democracy to their land, remove the threat to Mexico and our
southern borders and restore again the prospects for peaceand the chance for a
better future to our hemisphere. The cause is freedom, the cause is just, the
cause will triumph.1S0
149 "Address to the Nation on United States Assistance for the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance," 24 June 1986, Public Papers o f
150 Statements: Victory o f Contra Aid Legislation; Defeat ofC ontra Aid Legislation," 25 June 19S6, National Security Archive,
Iran-Contra Collection, Document # 1C03056.
91
Image o f Adversaries
If President Reagan perceived his allies in Central America (i.e., the center-to
right-wing governments in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala and the counter
revolutionary forces in Nicaragua) in a very favorable light, then just the opposite was the
case for U.S. adversaries in the region. In the context o f the 1980s, the adversaries for
the Ronald Reagan in Central America were: the Soviet Union, Cuba, and the Sandinista
regime in Nicaragua, all o f which were considered at times equivalent to evil incarnate by
the president.
Ronald Reagan's devil image o f the Soviet Union can be traced back to his early
days in Hollywood when he was the president o f the Screen Actors Guild and tried to
prevent what he claims to have been a Soviet-led conspiracy to take over the American
film industry. Images o f the Soviet Union secretly trying to undercut America's most
cherished institutions would color Reagan's perceptions o f the Soviets for virtually the
remainder o f his life. In his autobiography, Reagan, reflecting on the role o f the
communists in the Hollywood labor strikes o f 1947-49 writes: "they were the cause o f the
labor strife, they used minor jurisdictional disputes as excuses for their schemes. Their
aim was to gain economic control o f the motion picture industry in order to finance their
activities and subvert the screen for their propaganda."151 Likewise, in March 1961, while
on the speaking circuit for General Electric, Reagan harps on the same theme to a
gathering o f the Phoenix Chamber o f Commerce: "the Communist Party has ordered once
151 Ronald Reagan with Richard G. Hubler, Where's the Rest o f Me: The Autobiography o f Ronald Reagan. (New York: Karz-Segil
Publishers, 1981) p. 159.
92
again the infiltration of the picture business as well as the theatre and television. They
are crawling out from under the rocks, and memories being as short as they are, there are
plenty o f well-meaning but misguided people willing to give them a h an d ..."152
As a private citizen in the 1970s, Reagan continued to perceive the Soviet Union
as one o f the main, if not the main, causes behind most o f the international conflicts then
taking place throughout the world. In an address given to the Foreign Policy Association
in 1977, Reagan stated: "the Soviet Union, whenever possible, has moved outward,
turning non-westem peoples against the West and against the United States in particular,
and taking advantage o f those conflicts it did not have a hand in starting... This Soviet
policy o f seeking to alienate non-westem peoples from the West and to mobilize them
against the West whenever possible, to many observers seems to have been a thoroughly
consistent one since the end o f World War II, and is certainly consistent with Lenin's goal
o f ultimate worldwide communist victory."153
This negative image o f the Soviets did not change for Reagan during his first
fours years in office. In fact, as the Cold War heated up during the early 1980s, the
negative image o f the Soviets intensified as well. On 8 March 1983 in Orlando, Florida,
Ronald Reagan delivered one o f the most controversial speeches of his presidency.
Speaking before the annual gathering o f the National Association of Evangelicals,
Reagan, reflecting on the current Soviet leadership announced to his audience: "as good
Marxist-Leninists, the Soviet leaders have openly and publicly declared that the only
morality they recognize is that which will further their cause, which is world revolution,"
152 Quoted in Anne Edwards, Early Reagan; The Rise to Power. (New York: William R. Morrow & Company, 1987) p. 475.
153 Ronald Reagan, "United States Foreign Policy and World Realities," in Alfred Balitzer, op. ciL pp. 208-209.
93
and that the world should be aware "that while they preach the supremacy o f the state,
declare its omnipotence over individual man, and predict its eventual domination o f all
peoples on the Earth, they are the focus o f evil in the modem world."154 Not since the
days o f John Foster Dulles and the Eisenhower presidency, had a leading American
statesman referred to the Soviets in such provocative terms.
After Mikhail Gorbachev was selected as General Secretary o f the Communist
Party o f the Soviet Union in March 1985 and shortly thereafter began to restructure
Soviet society and allow for greater political openness, and after progress had been made
in U.S.-Soviet arms reductions agreements, President Reagan's negative perceptions o f
the Soviet Union slowly began to change. Following a series of summit meetings with
Gorbachev in Geneva, Reykjavik, Washington, and Moscow, which ultimately helped
paved the way for progress being made in the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START), and which in 1987 resulted in the signing of the first successful arms
reductions treaty in history- the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty- Reagan
began to temper his views concerning the nature o f the Soviet regime. In comments made
in a television interview, Reagan had the following to say about the Soviet leadership:
"We now have a leader who is apparently willing to say that he is prepared to live with
other philosophies in other countries." 155 Additionally, when asked by reporters in 1988
whether he still considered the Soviet Union an "evil empire, Reagan commented that the
"evil empire" belonged to "another time, another era" and that Gorbachev was " a serious
154 "Remarks at the Annual Convention o f the National Association o f Evangelicals in Orlando, Florida," 8 March 1983, Public
Papers o f the Presidents: Ronald Reagan. 1981-1989. pp. 362-363.
155 The New York Times, May 29, 1988.
94
man committed to serious change."156 Mikhail Gorbachev accomplished what no other
Soviet leader had been able to do for over 30 years- he helped to change Ronald Reagan's
image of the Soviet Union.
Although images o f the Soviet Union underwent a relatively drastic
transformation during the eight years o f the Reagan presidency, the image o f Cuba, at
least as it pertained to the revolutionary activity then taking place in Central America,
remained relatively constant. Simply put, Cuba was perceived as a proxy o f the Soviet
Union, a state that sought to foment revolution in the region to the disadvantage o f the
United States. In his autobiography, Reagan, reflecting on the turmoil engulfing Central
America just prior to taking office writes: "there was more evidence that Fidel Castro, the
proxy of Moscow, was shipping more arms and Communist "advisors" into Central
America and that Nicaragua was becoming a base camp for Communizing all o f Central
America."157 Moreover, in a speech that Reagan delivered in 1977 to the Foreign Policy
Association, he commented on what he saw as the Soviet-Cuban connection in the Third
World: "the Soviets.. .have hit upon a winning formula: use Cuban troops as proxy
1 SR
mercenaries to stir up things."
Reagan's first Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, examining the role o f the
Cuban-Soviet nexus in Central America in the early 1980s, and what the United States
should do about it, was even more blunt:
156 Quoted in John G. Stoessinger. Nations in Darkness: China. Russia, and America (New York: McGraw Hill, 1990 5th edition) p.
249.
157 Ronald Reagan, An American Life. p. 299.
158 Ronald Reagan, "United States Foreign Policy and W orld Realities, in Alfied Balitzer, ed., op. cit. p. 213.
95
There could not be the slightest doubt that Cuba was at once the source of
supply and the catechist o f the Salvadoran insurgency. Cuba, in turn, could not act
on the scale o f the rebellion in El Salvador without the approval and the material
support of the USSR. I believed that our policy should carry the consequences of
this relationship directly to Moscow and Havana, and through the application o f a
full range of economic, political, and security measures, convince them to put an
end to Havana's bloody activities in the hemisphere and elsewhere in the world.159
Similarly, in a confidential cable sent to the United States Embassy in El Salvador in
1981, Haig wrote: The Soviet Union and its allies quite deliberately chose to impose by
force o f arms a regime to their own taste which would greatly increase the suffering of
the Salvadoran people. 160
As the 1980s wore on, President Reagan continued to link support for the rebels
in El Salvador and the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua with Cuba and the Soviet Union.
In an address to the nation on U.S. policy in Central America in 1984, Reagan announced
to the American public: "The Sandinistas, who rule Nicaragua, are Communists whose
relationship and ties to Fidel Castro o f Cuba go back a quarter of a century," and that it is
the partnership between the Soviet Union, Cuba, and the Sandinistas that is responsible
159 Alexander Haig, Caveat: Realism. Reagan, and Foreign Policy. (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1984) p. 122.
160 "Letter to Bishop Rivera y Damas, 22 May 1981, National Security Archive, El Salvador Collection, Document# ES01747.
96
for "supporting aggression and terrorism against El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica,
and Guatemala."161
Even in his final year in office and despite the United States' improved
relationship with the Soviet Union, the president still maintained that problems in Central
America stemmed largely from the Soviet-Cuban-Nicaraguan connection. In a publicly
televised address, the president told a U.S audience: "Cubans are now in Nicaragua
constructing military facilities, flying combat missions, and helping run the secret
police", while the Soviet Union and Soviet-bloc countries have to keep the Nicaraguan
economy afloat by pumping into the country 4 billion dollars in military and economic
aid."162
If the negative image o f Cuba did not change over the course o f the two Reagan
administrations, the same can also be said for the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua.
Throughout his eight years in office, President Reagan had only harsh words to say about
the ruling regime in Managua. In his major foreign policy addresses concerning Central
America, Reagan would often retell the story about how after Anastasio Somoza was
overthrown by a popular revolution in 1979, the Sandinistas began a systematic campaign
to oust from the ruling circles any individuals who were not adherents to Marxism-
Leninism. By 1981, Reagan was trumpeting :
161 "Address to the Nation on United States Policy in Central America," 9 May 1984, The Public Papers o fth e Presidents o f the
United States: Ronald Reagan, 1981-1989, pp. 660-662.
162 "Address to the Nation on Aid to the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance," 2 February 1988, Public Papers o f the Presidents:
Ronald Reagan, 1981-1989, p. 164.
97
The government o f Nicaragua has imposed a new dictatorship. It has refused to
hold the elections it promised. It has seized control o f most media and subjects all
media to heavy censorship. It denied the bishops and priests o f the Roman
Catholic Church the right to say Mass on radio during Holy Week. It insulted and
mocked the Pope. It has driven the Miskito Indians from their homelands, burning
their villages, destroying their crops, and forcing them into involuntary internment
camps far from home. It has moved against the private sector and free labor
unions. It condoned mob action against Nicaragua's independent human rights
commission and drove the director o f that commission into exile. 163
In 1984, the president added to the list of repressive measures being used by the
Sandinista regime, arguing that after the overthrow o f Somoza, trade unions and civic
groups were outlawed and the promise o f holding genuine elections in the country was a
sham. Not mincing words, Reagan referred to Sandinista rule as "a Communist reign of
terror."164 By early 1985, the president was proclaiming that the Sandinista government
represented:
A Marxist-Leninist clique that broke the hearts o f the freedom-loving people of
their country by imposing a brutal dictatorship soon after taking control in
1979.. .The Sandinistas are not lovers of freedom, but power; not builders o f a
163 "Address Before a Joint Session o f the Congress on Central America," 27 April 1983. Public Papers o fth e Presidents: Ronald
Reagan. 1981-1989, p. 603.
164 "Address to the Nation on United States Policy in Central America," 9 May 1984, Public Papers o f the Presidents: Ronald
Reagan. 1981-1989, p. 661.
98
peaceful nation, but creators o f a fortress Nicaragua that intends to export
communism beyond its borders.165
Five years in office did little to temper this negative image. Speaking from the
Oval Office in 1986, Reagan told American viewers: "The Sandinistas have revoked the
civil liberties o f the Nicaraguan people, depriving them o f any legal right to speak, to
publish, to assemble, or to worship freely. Independent newspapers have been shut
down. There is no longer any independent labor movement in Nicaraguan nor any right to
strike...and like Communist governments everywhere, the Sandinistas have launched
assaults against ethnic and religious groups... and have even involved themselves in the
international drug trade."166
Likewise, in 1988, after some progress had been made toward establishing
democracies in Central America, Reagan still referred to the Sandinistas as "a threat that
could reverse the democratic tide and plunge the region into a cycle o f chaos and
subversion."167In a nationally televised address to the nation in February, the president
commented:
Even today, with the spotlight o f world opinion focused on the peace process, the
Sandinistas openly boast that they are arming and training Salvadoran guerrillas.
We know that the Sandinistas, who talk o f a revolution without borders reaching
Mexico, have already infiltrated guerrillas into neighboring countries. W hat will
165 "Central America, 16 February 1985, National Security Archive, Nicaragua Collection, Document # NI02369.
166 "Address to the Nation on the Situation in Nicaragua, " 16 March 1986, Ibid., pp. 354-355.
167 "Address to the Nation o f Aid to the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance," 2 February 1988, Public Papers o f the Presidents:
Ronald Reagan. 1981-1989, p. 163.
99
be our response as the ranks o f guerrillas in El Salvador, Guatemala, even
Honduras and unarmed Costa Rica, begin to swell and those fragile democracies
are ripped apart from the strain?168
Thus, despite some improvement in the relationship between Washington and
Moscow, and an accompanying reassessment and change in Reagan's image of the
Soviets, the president's negative image o f the governments o f Cuba and Nicaragua
remained largely in tact.
An accompanying intermediate belief held by President Reagan was his negative
perception of the internal political structure and dynamics of the Soviet Union, Cuba, and
Nicaragua. There is no mistaking the fact that Reagan believed that each o f these three
governments was internally repressive and that they represented everything that the
United States government did not. From the presidents vantage point, instead o f political
and economic systems based on empowering individuals, where the government took a
"hands-off' approach that allowed for market forces to drive the economy and free
elections and a basic respect for civil rights and liberties as the predominant themes in the
domestic political realm, you had three governments that pursued command economies
coupled with a high degree o f internal repression and the denial o f democratic rights and
freedoms.
Reagan believed that along with internal repression, communist regimes would
engage in aggressive external behavior by supporting revolutionary activity in the
developing world. In his memoirs, Reagan gives the reader a glimpse o f how he
168 Ibid. p. 164.
100
perceived the revolutionary nature o f Communist governments around the world,
suggesting: "every communist leader since Lenin was committed to the overthrow o f
democracy and the free enterprise system."169
By the mid-1970s, Reagan held that the Soviet Union, with the help o f Castro's
Cuba, was actively pursuing a foreign policy that encouraged and supported wars of
national liberation in the developing world. Reagan, in thinking about the connection
between the Soviet Union, Cuba, and other communist regimes, tended to lump these
countries together, adhering to the belief that internally these regimes were quite
repressive, while externally they shared a common goal: the overthrow o f the capitalist
world order through country-by-country revolutionary activities.
What this meant within the context o f the revolutionary activity occurring in
Central America, was that Reagan perceived the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Nicaragua as
advocating and supporting leftist revolutionary movements in the region, even if this
might not have been the case in reality. And although at times Reagan may have received
information that ran counter to this belief, Richard Darman suggests that the president
tended to remember only the evidence that reinforced his ideological predilections. 170
Speaking at the 1982 commencement ceremonies at his alma mater, Eureka
College, the president pointed out: "Central America has become a dangerous point o f
tension in East-West relations," and that "the Soviet Union cannot escape responsibility
for the violence and suffering in the region caused by accelerated transfer o f advanced

170 Richard Darman, Who's In Control? Polar Politics and the Sesible Center (fle w York: Simon & Schuster, 1996) pp. 39-40.
101
military equipment to Cuba."171 Similarly, Reagan, in his memoirs, reminisces about
the first few weeks o f his administration and the trouble brewing in Central America,
stating: "Although El Salvador was the immediate target, the evidence showed that the
Soviets and Fidel Castro were targeting all of Central America for a communist takeover.
El Salvador and Nicaragua were only a down payment. Honduras, Guatemala, and Costa
Rica were next, and then would come Mexico."172 At a meeting with Central American
leaders in 1985, Reagan was quite clear in expressing his belief regarding Soviet
involvement in the Central America:
The Soviet Union has its own plan for Central America, a region which Soviet
Foreign Minister Gromyko described as boiling like a cauldron... The Soviet
plan is designed to crush democracy in Costa Rica, Honduras, El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Panama. Its a plan to turn Central America into a Soviet
beachhead of aggression that could spread terror and instability north and south,
disrupt our vital sea lanes, cripple our ability to carry out our commitments to our
European allies, and send in a human tidal wave across all our borders.173
As for the goal o f the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, Reagan was pretty clear
concerning their intentions as well. Speaking to joint session o f Congress in April 1983,
the president claimed that the revolutionary movement that was taking place in El
171 "Address at Commencement Exercises at Eureka College in Illinois," 9 May 1982 The Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the
United States: Ronald Reagan, 1981-1989, p. 583.
172 Ronald Reagan, An American Life, p. 239.
173 Meeting with Central American Leaders, 25 March 1985, National Security Archive, Nicaragua Collection, Document
SMI02412.
102
Salvador was one where the guerrilla attacks are directed from headquarters in
Managua, the capital o f Nicaragua...The goal o f the professional guerilla movements in
Central America is as simple as it is sinister- to destabilize the entire region from the
Panama Canal to Mexico. 174 In one o f his first major National Security Decision
Directives on Central America (NSDD-100), the president claimed that the Marxist-
Leninist regime in Nicaragua was committed to the export o f violence and
totalitarianism and posed a significant risk to the stability o f Central America. 175 In
1984, he told the American public: "we...m ust understand and come to grips with the fact
that the Sandinistas are not content to brutalize their own land. They seek to export their
terror to every other country in the region."176 Two years later, the president told
American listeners:
The Sandinista revolutionary reach extends well beyond their immediate
neighbors. In South America and the Caribbean, the Nicaraguans have provided
support in the form o f military training, safe haven, communications, false
documents, safe transit, and sometimes, weapons to radicals from the following
countries: Colombia, Ecuador, Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, and the
Dominican Republic. Even that is not all, for there is an old Communist slogan
174 Central America: Defending O ur Vital Interests, 27 April 1983, National Security Archive, Nicaragua Collection, Document#
NI01683.
175 National Security Decision Directive on Enhanced U.S. Military Activity and Assistance in the Central American Region
(NSDD-100), 28 July 1983, National Security Archive, Nicaragua Collection, Document # NIO1781.
176 "Address to the Nation on United States Policy in Central America," 9 May 1984, The Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the
United States: Ronald Reagan. 1981-1989. p. 651.
103
that the Sandinistas have made clear they honor: The road to victory goes
through Mexico 177
Later that year, Reagan in a report to Congress regarding his decision to continue the
application o f economic sanctions against Nicaragua argued that throughout 1986: the
Sandinistas continued to support guerrilla groups in neighboring Central American
countries and to expand their already huge arsenal o f Soviet weapons...The Sandinistas
also continued their policy of internal repression, leading to large outflows o f refugees,
I 7R
thousands o f whom seek shelter in the United States.
Some of Reagan's closest foreign policy advisors shared these views. In a
confidential cable sent from the Department o f State to the U.S. Embassy in Canada,
Reagans first Secretary o f State, Alexander Haig, wrote: by April 1981 irrefutable
evidence had become available that the government of Nicaragua assisted in the
transshipment o f weapons from Cuba to insurgents in El Salvador.179 George Shultz,
Haigs replacement at the State Department, in a secret memorandum to the president,
suggested that the United States needed not only to preserve the government o f El
Salvador, but also to protect other Central American countries from the Nicaraguan
virus. 180 In his memoirs, Schultz reflected on the internal and external character o f the
177 "Address to the Nation on the Situation in Nicaragua, 16 May 1986, Public Papers o f the Presidents: Ronald Reagan. 1981-
1989, p. 353.
178 Letter to the Speaker o f the House o f Representatives and the President o f the Senate: Continuation o f Nicaraguan Emergency;
Report on Economic Sanctions against Nicaragua, 10 November 1986, National Security Archive, Nicaragua Collection, Document #
NI02923.
179 U.S. Aid to Nicaragua, 7 January 1982, National Security Archive, Nicaragua Collection, Document # NI01422.
180 Managing O ur Central American Strategy, 25 May 1983, National Security Archive, Iran-Contra Collection, D ocum ent#
IC00106.
104
Sandinista government, commenting that after the overthrow o f the Somoza regime in
1979, the old dictatorship had taken on a new form: "that o f a command economy, a self-
appointed elitist vanguard, and guerrilla warfare. Nicaragua had become its base, all of
Central America its target."181
In the White House, Constantine Menges, Reagan's national security advisor for
Latin America, comments on the Soviet-Cuban-Nicaraguan connection as well: "the
Soviet bloc and Cuba provide thousands of military and secret police operatives,
hundreds o f millions o f dollars in weapons, and full support in the aggression by armed
subversion against their neighbors, which the Sandinistas initiated in 1979 and have
continued ever since."182 Reagans second National Security Advisor, William Clark,
also held this belief. In an interview with U.S. News and World Report, Clark stated that
one objective o f the administration was to convince Congress and the American people
that what was occurring in Nicaragua was that they have a Marxist government,
supported by the Soviet Union and Cuba, which is creating a military threat to the region,
18 7
destabilizing the area through subversion.
In February 1988, the president, in his last major address to the nation concerning
the events taking place in Central America, reiterated his belief that behind nearly all the
discord in Central America was Nicaragua, claiming that Nicaragua "is being
transformed into a beachhead for aggression against the United States. It is the first step
181 George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary o f State (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1993). p. 287.
182 Constantine Menges, Inside the National Security Council: The True Story o f the Making and Unmaking o f Reagan's Foreign
Policy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988) p. 96.
183 Reagans Foreign Policy: His No. 1 Aide Speaks Out, U.S. News and World Report, Vol. 94, No. 18,9 May 1983. p. 35.
105
in a strategy to dominate the entire region of Central America and threaten Mexico
and the Panama Canal."184
Overall, as Edwin Meese argues, President Reagan and some o f his closest
advisors perceptions concerning Nicaragua's role in fomenting revolution in the region
were colored not only by the belief that the Sandinistas were closely allied with the
Soviets and Cuba, but also by the belief that Nicaragua would serve as a base for
i oer
exporting revolution in the hemisphere.
The Fundamental Nature o f International Politics
Given that the Reagan worldview was one that contained a highly favorable set o f
beliefs concerning the United States and its allies, and a negative sets o f beliefs
concerning U.S. adversaries, it is no surprise then that the image the president possessed
o f the nature o f international politics was one that placed the competition between the
United States and the Soviet Union at the center o f the international universe. The
international arena was perceived as a place that was filled with danger emanating largely
from an expansionist Soviet Union. And, it was believed that the United States needed to
accept this fact and base its foreign policy on what Reagan called a firm sense of realism.
Charles Kegley and Eugene Wittkopf in their analysis o f the Reagan
administration's worldview comment on these beliefs, stressing the point that the
184 "Address to the Nation on Aid to the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance," 2 February 1988, The Public Papers o f the Presidents
o f the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1981-1989. p. 163.
185 Edwin Meese III, With Reagan: The Inside Story (Washington, D.C.: 1992) p. 223.
106
president and his advisors proceeded from the basic assumption that communism
comprised the principal danger in the world, and that the United States needed to use its
power to combat the spread o f the red menace. Margaret Hermann, in her personality
study o f Reagan, tends to agree with Kegley and Wittkopf. Hermann notes that one o f
Reagans fundamental political orientations centers on the perception that international
relations is essentially conflict prone, with the United States locked into a power struggle
with the U.S.S.R, and that many o f the Soviet Union's interests were in direct competition
1R7
with U.S. interests around the world.
Reagan, in his public addresses, makes a number of important references to the
highly competitive and often conflict-ridden nature of international politics. He also
comments on what he believed the United States needed to do to operate safely in this
environment. Discussing the chaotic situation in Poland in late 1981, Reagan
commented: "the world is full o f peril, as well as promise. Too many o f its people, even
now, live in the shadow o f want and tyranny."188 And in January 1984, the president
pointed out that the United States, operating in the international community with an
expansionist adversary, must be guided by a firm sense of realism. Realism, for Reagan,
meant: "that we must start with a clear-eyed understanding o f the world we live in; we
186 Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf, "The Reagan Administration's World View," Orbis (Spring 1982)
187 Margaret G. Hermann, "Assessing Personality at a Distance: A Profile o f Ronald Reagan," Mershon Center Quarterly Report.
Vol. 7,No. 6, (Spring 1983) p. 6.
188 "Address to the Nation About Christmas and the Situation in Poland," 23 December 1981 The Public Papers o f the Presidents o f
the United Stales: Ronald Reagan. 1981-1989. p. 1186.
107
must recognize that we are in a long-term competition with a government that does
not share our notions o f individual liberties at home and peaceful change abroad.. . 1,189
Christopher Layne perhaps brings home the point most clearly concerning
Reagan's perception o f world politics, arguing that Reagans image o f the nature o f
international politics was analogous to a Manichaean struggle, with democratic countries,
led by the United States facing off against Communist countries, led by the Soviet
Union.190 And in this bi-polar, zero-sum, game between what Reagan believed was
analogous to the struggle between the forces o f good versus the forces o f evil, the United
States needed to focus on the perceived threats to its security. For Reagan, Central
America was so vitally important simply because he saw this as an area where the Soviets
were directly threatening U.S. security and ideals, and this threat was taking place in
what the president likened to our own backyard. As the president stated in February
1986: Since the beginning o f my 1st administration there has been no foreign policy
issue more directly affecting United States national interests than the conflict in Central
America, for this conflict challenges not only our strategic position but the very
principles upon which this nation is founded. 191
Although Ronald Reagan did in fact believe that the nature o f international
politics was one o f potential conflict and danger, he also believed that international peace
could be maintained. One of Reagan's most important intermediate beliefs was that peace
189 "Address to the Nation and Other Countries on United States-Soviet Relations," 16 January 1984, Public Papers o f the
Presidents: Ronald Reagan, / 981-1989, pp. 42-43.
190 Christopher Layne, "Requiem for the Reagan Doctrine," in David Boaz, ed.. Assessing the Reagan Years. (Washington. D.C.:
Cato Institute, 1988) pp. 104-5.
191 Assistance for Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance, 25 February 1986, National Security Archive, Nicaragua Collection,
Document # NI02677.
108
could be secured only if the United States was willing to build up and improve its
military forces to the point where the U.S. could sustain parity, or even attain a position
o f military strength in comparison to the Soviet Union. In other words, Reagan believed
that the potential for maintaining international peace was directly co-related with how
strong the United States was militarily in the world.
As early as 1972, while still a private citizen, Reagan told the World Affairs
Council: "It is America's industrial and economic strength, translated into military
potential, that represents the single greatest guarantee o f peace for the w orld."192 At his
first inaugural, the president returns to this theme, warning potential adversaries that the
United States: "will maintain sufficient strength to prevail if need be, knowing that if we
do so we have the best chance o f never having to use that strength."193 By 1984, the
president, in an interview with the New York Times, mentioned: there is less tension
today and less threat and danger with the rebuilding we have done that makes us more
secure than was earlier when our defenses were so lax that there was a window o f
vulnerability. 194
The presidents key advisors that he relied on most for advice in foreign affairs
tended to agree with his assessments concerning the requirements for maintaining
international peace. Secretary o f Defense, Casper Weinberger, for example, fashioned a
defense build-up from 1981-1988 that was based on the very premise of returning the
United States to a predominant military position in the world. Military spending for the
first five years o f the Reagan presidency would amount to $1.5 trillion, an increase of
192 Ronald Reagan, "The Obligations o f Liberty, 12 October 1972. Alfred Balitzer, ed., op. cit. p. 102.
193 "Inaugural Address," 20 January 1981, The Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1981-1989, p. 3.
194 Alew York Times, An Interview With President Reagan on Campaign Questions, 28 March 1984.
109
over $400 billion from the Carter projections for this same time period.195 The United
States military build-up during this five-year span served to increase the nations nuclear
arsenal as well as to retool Americas naval fleet, which would thereafter be centered on
13-15 aircraft-carrier battle groups and included nearly 600 naval vessels.196 In his
memoirs, Weinberger poignantly comments o f the relationship between military strength
and the prospects for peace:
We must understand how critically important it is, if we want to keep our
democracy, our peace, and our freedom, that we be willing to make sacrifices-
sacrifices often difficult, expensive, and unpopular. Wise and resolute investment
in our military strength is not only quite consistent with all the blessings of
democracy; it is the only course that will let us keep our democracy, our peace
and our freedom.197
Beyond rebuilding America's military strength, Reagan also believed that peace
could be secured through progress being made in three additional areas. The first was
eliminating the threat and use o f force in solving international disputes. In a number of
public speeches, the president suggested that the United States and Soviet Union needed
195 Walter LaFeber, The American Age: U.S. Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad: 1750 to the present (New York: Norton, 1994)
pp. 707-708.
196 Ibid.
197 Casper Weinberger, Fighting For Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon. (New York: Warner Books, 1990) p. 431.
110
to consider seriously ending their involvement in a variety o f regional conflicts
because o f the potential for a direct U.S.-USSR confrontation arising out o f these
crises.198
The second avenue for maintaining peace was making progress in arms
reductions. The notion o f arms reductions in general, and with the Soviet Union in
particular-especially as they related to nuclear armaments-became a key facet o f the
Reagan foreign policy agenda. After his successful re-election, Reagan in his first formal
meeting, which happened to be with his arms control negotiating team, stated that: "I
have no more important goal than reducing and ultimately eliminating nuclear
weapons."199 Moreover, in a 1985 address to a special session o f the European
Parliament, the president suggested: "We cannot and should not seek to build our peace
and freedom perpetually upon the basis o f expanding nuclear arsenals." Rather, the
president noted, that in order to reduce tensions and solve problems in U.S.-Soviet
relations and ultimately preserve international peace, the United States and the Soviets
needed to be "prepared to conclude fair, equitable, verifiable agreements for arms
reductions...along with insisting upon compliance with past agreements."200
In addition to preserving international peace through limitations on U.S. and
Soviet involvement in regional disputes and through progress being made in arms
reduction agreements, the president was also a firm believer in the necessity of
198 See for example, "Address at Commencement Exercises at Eureka College," 9 May 1982, "Address to the Nation and Other
Countries on United States-Soviet Relations," 16 January 1984, " "Address to the 39th Session o f the United Nations General
Assembly in New York, New York," 24 September 1984, The Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States: Ronald Reagan.
1981-1989.
199 Quoted in Jane Mayer and Doyle McManus, Landslide: The Unmaking o f the President, 1984-1988, p. 48.
200 "Address to a Special Session o f the European Parliament," 8 May 1985, The Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States:
Ronald Reagan. 1981-1989, pp. 585-586.
Ill
establishing a better relationship with the USSR through the use o f increased
dialogue. One o f things that Ronald Reagan most liked to tell others about the possibility
o f success in arms control negotiations, including his Soviet counterparts, was that the
United States and Soviet Union did not distrust each other because they were armed, but
rather were armed because they distrusted each other. Therefore, despite the fact that the
president still considered the Soviet Union "an evil empire" well into the Gorbachev
years, the president did believe that the best way to improve U.S.-Soviet relations and to
increase the chances for maintaining international peace was to hold a continuous series
o f discussions with the Soviet leadership, premised, of course, on the notion that the U.S
was in a position o f military strength. As Reagan reveals in his memoirs, [I] "didn't
disagree with Weinberger that the Russians were an evil force in the world and
untrustworthy, but I didn't think that meant we should not talk to them."201
The rationale behind increased negotiations with the Soviets was, as the president
told the United Nations, that "history demonstrates beyond controversy that just as the
arms competition has its root in political suspicions and anxieties, so it can be channeled
in more stabilizing directions and eventually be eliminated i f those political suspicions
and anxieties are addressed as well."202 In the end, the goal was to lessen some of these
suspicions and anxieties through a process o f dialogue, which was ultimately meant to
allow both parties to get to know one another a little bit better and thus decrease the
chances that they would one day come into direct conflict.

202 "Address to the 39th Session o f the United Nations General Assembly," 24 September 1984. The Public Papers ofthe Presidents
o f the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1981-1989.
112
Interestingly enough, however, the desire on the part o f President Reagan for
dialogue with the Soviets did not extend to dialogue with the Sandinistas. Thus, Reagan
was willing to put aside some o f his apprehensions concerning the Soviets, for example,
his belief that they were untrustworthy, in an effort to advance the prospects for peace
between the superpowers and to avoid the possibility o f a nuclear conflict. The
Sandinistas, by contrast, did not receive the same consideration by the president. At a
National Security Planning Group (NSPG) meeting in 1984, Reagan summarized his
position concerning negotiating bi-laterally with the Nicaraguan government: If we are
just talking about negotiations with Nicaragua, that is so far-fetched to imagine that a
communist government like that would make any reasonable deal with us, but if it is to
get Congress to support the anti-Sandinistas, then that can be helpful.
Reagans plan for peace in Central America was laid out in National Security
Decision Directive-100. The directive stated that because o f the increasing threat posed
by the Sandinista government to the stability o f the region, the United States needed
pursue four avenues to support democratic states in the region, and those on the path to
democracy. The means to accomplish this end was to provide security assistance to
friendly governments in the region, to provide security assistance to the Contras to offset
Soviet and Cuban involvement in Nicaragua, to engage in a public relations campaign to
win support for democratic forces in the region, and to expand military exercises in the
region in an effort to deter Nicaraguan expansionism.204 Reagans objective, it appears,
203 National Security Planning Group Meeting, 25 June 1984, National Security Archive, Iran-Contra Collection, Document #
IC00463.
204 Enhanced U.S. Military Activity and Assistance for the Central American Region, National Security Decision Directive, 28 July
1983, National Security Archive, Iran-Contra Collection, Document # IC 00165.
113
was to promote democratic development through the provision o f economic and
military assistance coupled with strong-arm diplomacy.
In sum, President Reagan's core beliefs concerning the fundamental nature o f
international politics were ones that placed the U.S.-Soviet rivalry at the epicenter o f the
international system. The world was perceived as bi-polar and the relationship between
the United States and Soviet Union was clearly viewed in zero-sum terms. These core
beliefs were coupled with a set o f intermediate beliefs that acknowledged that even
though the U.S.-Soviet relationship was inherently conflictual, international peace could
be maintained if the United States could reestablish approximate parity with the Soviet
Union and negotiate with them on the basis o f equal or even greater military strength.
The Flow o f History
Another set of important political beliefs possessed by the president were those
relating to the control or mastery one had over historical developments. For Reagan,
some larger historical forces did not control an individuals fate, or, for that matter, did
these forces control the destiny o f their nations; rather, the president believed that
individual ideas and actions clearly were the pivotal factors determining historical
progress. Coupled with this belief was what Lou Cannon called an unquenchable
optimism. Cannon writes that the president "truly believed that life's problems would turn
out well, as they nearly always did for him."205 This view o f history and his optimistic
205 Lou Cannon, President Reagan: The Role o f a Lifetime, p. 179.
114
outlook on life would convince Reagan that the correct ideas and decisions by his
administration and our allies could positively change the course o f world affairs.
Reagan would emphasize this theme to various audiences during his tenure in the
White House. At his first Inaugural Address, he told Americans: "We're not as some
would have us believe, doomed to an inevitable decline. I do not believe in a fate that will
fall on us no matter what we do. I do believe in a fate that will fall on us if we do
nothing."206 To members o f the British Parliament in 1982, Reagan added: "the ultimate
determinant in the struggle that's now going on in the world will not be bombs and
rockets, but a test o f wills and ideas, a trial o f spiritual resolve...Let us be shy no longer.
Let us go to our strength. Let us offer hope. Let us tell the world that a new age is not
only possible but probable."207
Four years in public office did little to change this perspective. In his 1985 State
o f the Union, Reagan told a joint session o f Congress: "There are not constraints on the
human mind, no walls around the human spirit, no barriers to our progress except those
we ourselves erect. " A year later, Reagan once again announced to Congress: "history is
no captive of some inevitable force. History is made by men and women o f vision and
courage."208 Yet perhaps his most poignant statement reflecting his beliefs concerning the
flow o f history occurred in 1987, when Reagan announced to the General Assembly of
the United Nations: "All over the world today, the yearnings o f the human heart are
redirecting the course o f international affairs, putting the lie to the myth o f materialism
206 "Inaugural Address, 20 January 1981, The Public Papers o fth e Presidents o f the United States: Ronald Reagan. 1981-1989. p. 2.
207 "Address to Members o f the British Parliament," Public Papers o f the Presidents: Ronald Reagan. 1981-1989, p. 747.
"Address Before a Joint Session o f the Congress on the State o f the Union," 6 February 1985, and "Address Before a Joint Session o f
the Congress on the State o f the Union, 4 February 1986, The Public Papers o fth e Presidents o f the United States: Ronald Reagan.
1981-1989, p. 130 & p. 126.
115
and historical determinism. We have only to open our eyes to see the simple
aspirations o f ordinary people writ large on the record o f our times."209
Nowhere in this statement, or in the others mentioned above, can one find Reagan
speaking o f the immutable laws o f history. Instead, what one finds is a firm belief that
there in nothing inevitable at all about the laws o f history. Human actions, for Ronald
Reagan, make the difference.
Combined with a belief in the power of free will over historical materialism,
Reagan also possessed an intermediate belief concerning the relationship o f current
trends to larger historical patterns. The president held the belief that it was not political
democracies and market-based economies that were on the losing side o f history, but
rather Marxist-Leninist governments and state-led economies that were doomed to
failure. In 1982, the president emphasized to the British Parliament that the march of
freedom and democracy has advanced to such an extent that it "will leave Marxism-
Leninism on the ash-heap o f history as it has left other tyrannies, which stifle the freedom
and muzzle the self-expression o f the people."210 A year later, Reagan told American
troops stationed in South Korea: "Communism is not the wave o f the future and it never
t
was- freedom is. And it's good to see people beginning to wake up to the fact." The
trend would continue the following year. To the National Association o f Evangelicals,
209 Address to the 42nd Session o f the United Nations General Assembly," 21 September 1987. The Public Papers o f the Presidents
o f the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1981-1989, p. 1058.
210 "Address to Members o f the British Parliament," Public Papers o f the Presidents: Ronald Reagan. 1981-1989, p. 747.
211 "Remarks to American Troops at Camp Liberty Bell, Republic o f Korea," 13 November 1983, Public Papers o f the Presidents:
Ronald Reagan. 1981-1989, p. 1594.
116
President Reagan emphasized: "communism is another sad, bizarre chapter in human
history whose last pages are even now being written."
Why did Reagan believe that Marxist-Leninist regimes were on their last legs?
Because Ronald Reagan believed inherently that governments that placed the state's
interests above the individual's were bound to be stagnant and unproductive. Reagan, in
his memoirs suggests as much: "Only when people are free to worship, create, and build,
only when they are given a personal stake in deciding their destiny and benefiting from
their own risks, only then do societies become dynamic, prosperous, progressive, and
free."213 By removing government interference from individual lives, Reagan believed
that you release the energies o f the human spirit. And, one o f the m ost important
aspirations o f the human spirit is the longing for freedom.
President Reagan would proclaim these ideas to an American audience at his
second inaugural:
Human freedom is on the march, and nowhere more so than in our own
hemisphere. Freedom is one o f the deepest and noblest aspirations o f the human
spirit. People, worldwide, hunger for the right of self-determination for those
inalienable rights that make for human dignity and progress.214
212 "Remarks at the Annual Convention o f the National Association o f Evangelicals in Orlando, Florida, 8 March 1983, Public
Papers o f the Presidents: Ronald Reagan, 1981-1989, p. 364,
214 "Inaugural Address," 21 January 1985, The Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1981-1989, pp.
57-58.
117
The following month, Reagan would proclaim: One o f the most inspiring
developments o f recent years is the move against communism and toward freedom that is
sweeping the world. In the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, we see dissidents; in
Poland, the Solidarity movement. We see freedom fighters in Afghanistan, Ethiopia,
Cambodia, and Angola.215 In the context o f Central America, Reagan remained equally
optimistic. To a gathering o f private sector supporters of his Central American policy, the
president noted: The fixture of Central America is not with communism; the future o f
Central America is with democracy and all those fighting for freedom. 216
It was because o f beliefs such as these, that Reagan would be able to speak from
the heart when he told German citizens gathering at the Brandenburg Gate in West
Berlin: "that there stands before the entire world one great and inescapable conclusion:
Freedom leads to prosperity. Freedom replaces ancient hatreds among the nations with
comity and peace. Freedom is the victor."217 For Reagan, it was only logical that
Marxism-Leninism would fall further and further behind the Westernized democracies in
the race for the future.
215 Central America, 16 February 1985, National Security Archive, Nicaragua Collection, Document # NI02369.
216 Aid to the Contras, 21 March 1986, National Security Archive, Nicaragua Collection, Document # NI02727.
217 "Remarks on East-West Relations at the Brandenburg Gate in W est Berlin," 12 June 1987, Public Papers o f the Presidents:
Ronald Reagan. 1981-1989, p. 635.
118
Nature o f Change
Ronald Reagan believed that democracies and free-markets would ultimately
prevail over Marxist-Leninist political and economic systems. However, this did not
mean that the president believed that victory was necessarily assured. Decisive actions,
on the part o f the United States, were required to emerge victorious. In the context of
directing U.S. foreign policy, the Reagan presidency would be one that pursued an
activist course rather than simply seeking to secure the status quo.
When Ronald Reagan became president in 1981, he immediately rejected the
cautious foreign policy o f the Carter years and replaced it with one that promoted the
extension of the United States' global/missionary role. Quoting Thomas Paine, President
Reagan in 1984 stated: We have it in our power to begin the world over again. 2l8In
some ways, Reagan's foreign policy would represent a return to the "rollback" strategy
announced during the Eisenhower presidency. Kegley and W ittkopf suggest that U.S.
foreign policy under Reagan would be one that accepted the notion that "U.S.
219
management o f global affairs is to be pursued actively and accepted willingly."
Otherwise put, confrontation, rather than cooperation would be the choice o f strategy for
the U.S. as it related to its adversaries, especially the Soviet Union and their allies in
Central America. Robert Schulzinger sums up the new approach quite well:
218 Quoted in Thomas G . Paterson, J. Garry Clifford, and Kenneth J. Hagan, American Foreign Policy: A H isto ry /1900 to the present
(Lexington,MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1991) 3rd edition, p. 647.
219 Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf, "The Reagan Administration's W orld View," p. 226.
119
Ronald Reagan and his principal foreign policy advisors came to power in
1981 with a clear idea o f reversing the course o f the last fifteen years o f United
States foreign policy. They looked back to the decades immediately after the
Second World War when the United States was the unquestioned leader of an
anti-Soviet alignment. The new administration expected to confront the Soviets
assertively. It looked forward to battling Third World Communists from
Nicaragua to Afghanistan. It pledged to elevate the fight against terrorism over
the Carter administrations concentration on human rights. It promised to erase
the dishonorable stain o f Irans seizure o f the United States embassy and its
captivity of fifty-three American hostages for 444 days.220
Edwin Meese, one of Reagan's closest advisors, comments on Reagan's strategy
for confronting the Soviets. Meese suggests that Reagan firmly rejected the traditional
method o f dealing with Moscow in the 1960s and 1970s, namely through accommodation
and an attempt to improve bi-lateral relations through "building bridges" via arms control
agreements, economic credits, technology transfers, and so on. In contrast, Reagan
believed that accommodating the Soviets would only ease the economic and technical
pressure on their domestic system. The logic was as follows: if the Soviets confronted a
United States that was militarily and technologically on the wane, then the political
leadership in Moscow could delay facing up to the problems they were experiencing
domestically and continue to pursue their expansionist foreign policy. Therefore, instead
o f accommodating the Soviets, Reagan felt it was necessary to revamp America's military
220 Robert D. Schultzinger, U.S. Diplomacy Since 1900 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) 4th edition, p. 333.
120
strength and to push forward with our technological developments in addition to
reestablishing a firm willingness to protect Western security interests. The rationale
behind the strategy was simple: force the Soviets to "either stand down from their
continuing confrontation with the West, or face increasingly devastating pressures on the
home front." 221
Regarding the changes taking place in Central America, Reagan likewise
advocated an activist approach. Reflecting on the potential for a successful application of
his policy for promoting democracy and freedom in Central America, the president
stated:
We must not allow totalitarian communism to win by default. But we cannot
succeed unless the Congress approves the necessary resources...the United States
must work so that the fledgling democracies of this hemisphere will have a better
future and so that our own future can be more secure.
At a briefing o f foreign policy specialists at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, the president asserted: Today democracy in Latin America
constitutes a life-giving tide. It can still flood its powerful, cleansing way into
Nicaraguathe Communist wall against it is high, but not yet too highif only the
House takes action.. .What it comes down to in the end is the matter o f witness of
choosing whether to believe those whom we know to be providing us with accurate
221 Edwin Meese III, With Reagan; The Inside Story, p. 163-167.
222 Saving Democracy in Central America, 18 July 1983, National Security Archive, Nicaragua Collection, Document # NI01768.
121
reports about Nicaragua or to listen instead to the small whispering voices within our
own minds that say there is no trouble there, not because that is the truth, but because we
do not care to be inconvenienced by the need to risk action.223
The question that remained, and one that relates to an intermediate belief held by
Reagan, was how to confront the Soviets and their allies in order to push forward with
change in the international arena. In other words, what would be the specific
mechanisms, or modes, o f change that the president would use? The answer, in short, was
that an all-out effort was needed to bring the "evil empire" to its knees, one incorporating
military, economic, and political tools.
President Reagan's National Security Decision Directive 32, signed in May 1982,
provides a good summary o f the tactics that would be used. Reagans general foreign
policy strategy would be based on five pillars: military modernization; expanded military
spending, economic pressure on the USSR and its allies, political persuasion and
propaganda at home and abroad, and covert operations intended to split satellite
governments away from Moscow.224
Militarily, the confrontation with Moscow would take two forms: first, the U.S.
would rebuild its military forces to the point where it could negotiate with the Soviets
from a position o f strength. Second, the United States would increase its military
assistance, both covertly and overtly, to anti-Communist resistance forces fighting around
the world. President Reagan was clear regarding his intentions in his 1986 State o f the
Union:
223 Dropby CSIS Briefing, 10 July 1986, National Security Archive, Iran-Contra Collection, Document # IC02983.
224 Christopher Simpson, ed., National Security Directives o f the Reagan and Bush Administrations: The Declassified History o f U.S.
Political and Military Policy, 1981-1991. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995) p. 62.
122
To those imprisoned in regimes held captive, to those beaten for daring to fight
for freedom and democracy- for their right to worship, to speak, to live, and to
prosper in the family o f free nations- we say to you tonight: You are not alone,
freedom fighters, America will support with moral and material assistance your
right not just to fight and die for freedom but to fight and win freedom- to win
225
freedom in Afghanistan, in Angola, in Cambodia, and in Nicaragua.
Reagan's military assistance program was linked with a number o f the economic
and political tools. The United States would once again be willing to provide vast
amounts o f economic aid to governments around the world, so long as they shared the
United States' main objective o f reining in the Soviet Union. Following the advice of his
first ambassador to the United Nations, Jeane Kirkpatrick, U.S. assistance to foreign
countries would no longer be based on how well these countries protected human rights-
as it had been under Carter- but rather how closely these countries helped pursue U.S.
foreign policy objectives. Constantine Menges, Reagan's National Security Council
advisor for Latin American affairs, summarized the Reagan policy for providing
assistance abroad, as one that encouraged democracy without coercing traditional allies
o f the United States.226 The results o f this approach in Central America were very high
levels o f economic and military assistance to the governments o f El Salvador, Honduras,
and Guatemala, along with the termination o f U.S. assistance to Nicaragua and,
225 "Address Before a Joint Session o f Congress on the State o f the Union," 4 February 1986, Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the
United States: Ronald Reagan, 1981-1989, p. 129.
226 Constantine Menges, Inside the National Security Council, p. 382.
123
ultimately, the adoption o f full-scale economic sanctions against the Sandinista
government.
On the home front, President Reagan believed in the necessity o f initiating a
public relations campaign to educate the general American public and particularly the
United States Congress on the correctness o f his policy toward Central America. In
January 1983, President Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive-77 (NSDD-
77), establishing an official executive branch organization for public diplomacy in
support o f national security objectives. The goal ofNSDD-77 was straightforward: to
strengthen the organization, planning, and coordination of the various aspects o f public
diplomacy relative to national security. Later that same year, the president signed
NSDD-100, ordering his secretary o f state and secretary of defense to prepare a
coordinated legislative, diplomatic, and public strategies that supported Reagans
foreign policy goals in Central America. The implementation o f this initiative, directed
the president, should be timed to take into account public affairs/legislative factors.228
Coupled with a belief in the contingent nature of U.S. assistance to allies and the
adoption o f a full-scale public diplomacy effort, was an additional intermediate belief that
reflected Reagan's general aversion to negotiations and established treaties, especially
with the Soviets, but even more so with the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. The simple
fact o f the matter was that Ronald Reagan did not believe that Marxist-Leninist
governments could be trusted to abide by the provisions of an established agreement. If
227 National Security Decision Directive (NSDD-77), Management o f Public Diplomacy Relative to National Security, 14 January
1983, National Security Archive, Iran-Contra Collection, Document # IC00068.
228 National Security Decision Directive on Enhanced U.S. Military Activity and Assistance in the Central American Region (NSDD-
100), 28 July 1983,National Security Archive, Nicaragua Collection, Document# NI01781.
124
one held the belief that communist rulers would do nearly anything to promote their
goals/objectives, then it made little sense to negotiate with them, primarily because any
established agreement would have been signed to serve only a temporary purpose. Once
the established agreement no longer met their needs, Reagan believed, the communist
leaders would disavow their original promises and pursue a new objective. One o f
Reagan's favorite sayings concerning negotiations, and a mantra he lived by, was that
trust was important in any set o f negotiations, but verification was even more important.
During his second term, Ronald Reagan did indeed begin to "trust" the Soviets,
insofar as the agreements that were ultimately reached (e.g. INF Treaty, START
negotiations), he believed, were fully verifiable. But his opposition to negotiating with
the Sandinistas remained relatively constant. Although the president would often
emphasize that the United States sought a diplomatic solution to the crisis in Central
America, he nevertheless insisted that any agreement was contingent on bringing what he
called "true democracy" to the region. As late as February 1988, the president held on to
the belief that the Sandinistas could not be trusted. In a nationally televised speech,
Reagan addressed the topic o f the Sandinistas trustworthiness, specifically as it related to
a recently signed Central American peace accord: "It's important to remember that we
already have a negotiated settlement with the Sandinistas: the settlement of 1979 that
helped bring them to power, in which they promised in writing, democracy, human
rights, and a non-aligned foreign policy. O f course, they haven't kept a single one o f
those promises, and we now know that they never intended to."229
229 "Address to the Nation on Aid to the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance, 2 February 1988, The Public Papers o f the Presidents
o f the United States: Ronald Reagan. 1981-1989, p. 165.
125
One important consequence o f Reagan possessing this belief, writes Robert
Pastor, was that any suggestions by members of the Reagan foreign policy team
advocating the use o f bi-lateral negotiations with the Sandinistas would be perceived as a
sign of weakness or naivete by the administration.230 In a sense, then, a diplomatic
solution to the Nicaraguan civil war was a remote possibility at best with Ronald Reagan
as president. The end result was that President Reagan continued to press for Contra aid
until he left office in 1989, despite the damage this caused not only in Nicaragua, but also
in the broader context o f U.S.-Latin American relations.
Over the eight-year period o f the Reagan presidency, over 40,000 Nicaraguans
had lost their lives in that nations bloodiest civil war. Perhaps as important as these
figures, writes Walter LaFeber, was the fact that U.S. officials fixation on Nicaragua
gave them little time to deal with other dangers in the area.231 By 1989, Honduras had
been turned into a staging area for U.S. troops and their Contra allies. The result: growing
anti-American sentiment in the country. Additionally, beginning as early as 1983, a
severe debt crisis would surface throughout Latin America, affecting both the debtor
countries o f Central and South America and U.S. and international lenders alike. These
problems... and more would have to be handled by Ronald Reagans successor.
230 Robert A. Pastor, "The Centrality o f Central America," in Larry Berman, e<. Looking Back on the Reagan Presidency.
(Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990) p. 40.
231 Walter LaFeber, The American Age, p. 723.
126
:je s|e sfe afe 3(e 5(e afc s(s s(e s|e
One o f the best ways to capture the essence o f Ronald Reagan's foreign policy
belief system is to think about it in terms o f what Betty White calls the president's "black
and white" thinking, or what others have referred to simply as his "us versus them"
mentality. Clearly, on the "white" side were the United States and its allies, and in the
context o f Central America this meant the right-wing governments of El Salvador,
Honduras, and Guatemala, along with the Contras o f Nicaragua who the president saw as
patriots valiantly waging a battle against the evil forces o f Marxism-Leninism, led
ultimately by the Soviet Union, but served in Central America by the proxy forces of
Cuba and the Sandinistas. This battle took place not in the context o f a harmonious
international environment, but rather in one marked by competition and the distinct
possibility o f conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union and their left-wing
allies. Despite this conflict-ridden environment, however, Ronald Reagan truly believed
that the forces o f history were on the side o f the United States. However, he also believed
that in order to achieve the victory of "us over them," the United States needed to take
vigorous actions to promote favorable change in the direction of democracies and free
markets and away from more state-led traditions.
127
Chapter 4: The Bush Foreign Policy Belief System
The transition from Ronald Reagan to George Bush brought to the American
presidency a very different type o f leader who possessed both similar and yet at times
quite different foreign policy beliefs. Like his predecessor, George Bush viewed the
United States as a very special and blessed country, a country that was meant to lead.
Also like Reagan, Bush cast a very suspicious eye on the United States main
international adversary, the Soviet Union, and a more regionally based adversary, the
Sandinista government o f Nicaragua. Moreover, Bush, again like Reagan, believed that
the flow of history would be determined by human actions and that freedom would
ultimately prevail over tyranny. Where the two men differed fundamentally, however,
was in their beliefs regarding how change should be handled and the proper tools that the
United States should use to respond to international and regional change. In the context
o f the U.S. response to the crises within El Salvador and Nicaragua, the most important
difference between Reagans and Bushs policies was Reagans aversion toward
negotiations and Bushs openness toward them. This chapter will serve to provide flesh to
the Bush foreign policy belief system by examining his core and intermediate beliefs
concerning his national self-image, his images o f allies and adversaries, his views
regarding international politics, the flow o f history, and the nature o f change.
128
National Self-Image
Ronald Reagan perceived the United States as "the shining city on the hill," a
peaceful country marked by God to be an inspiration for all others. By contrast, George
Herbert Walker Bush's America was that of a land that was meant to help others. Instilled
in him since his early childhood in Connecticut, and later in his private schooling at
Greenwich Day School, Andover Academy, and finally Yale University was what the
French call noblesse oblige, a deep moral sense o f obligation to serve others because of
the benefits o f high birth and powerful social position. Eastern establishment shibboleths
such as "It's more blessed to give than to receive" and "Public service is the purpose for
entering politics" were part and parcel o f the person and personality o f George Bush.
Fitzhugh Green, an early Bush biographer and friend o f the Bush family, admits that
these were indeed the ideas followed by the future president, although at times denied for
political reasons. They had, in a sense, become a part o f his social persona.232
Bushs elder brother, Prescott, comments on how the entire Bush family was
influenced by the model set by their father, Prescott Bush Sr., who was a firm believer in
the notion that public service was a noble calling: Dad always impressed on his children
and instilled in us the concept that we had certain obligations because o f the privileges
we enjoyed.233 George Bushs call to service was never more evident than in his
decision to join the U.S. Navy in 1941, immediately following his graduation from
Andover, despite strong opposition from both his father and his teachers. Bush was
232 Fitzhugh Green, George Bush: An Intimate Portrait (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1989) p. 78. Nicholas King, George Bush: A
Biography (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1980) also addresses George Bush's belief in noblesse oblige, p. 18.
233 Nicholas King, George Bush. p. 18.
129
determined to go to war in order to help his country; he was determined to serve.
Herbert Parmet notes that this decision reflected a pattern o f Bushs early life:
volunteering to serve, in defiance o f all the elders who had any possible influence...234
After the war, Bushs ardent desire to serve once again appeared. In a letter to a close
personal friend in January 1949, Bush revealed his desire to enter the public arena: I
have in the back of my mind a desire to be in politics, or at least the desire to do
something o f service to this country.235
A sense of obligation, honor, kindliness, and generosity would, however, become
much more than simply a lodestar o f principles upon which George Bush would approach
his own public service career; these same ideas would become intimately linked with
Bush's self-image of his country. The United States, Bush believed, because o f its
advantaged position at the apex o f the international political pyramid should help others.
Otherwise put, the United States represented, above all, a generous nation in support of
certain ideals. However, as will be pointed out below, this generosity was not unlimited.
The United States, under the stewardship of George Bush, would be very cautious in
selecting those areas/issues in which we decided to bestow our generosity upon.
Nonetheless, in his Inaugural address, Bush claims that the United States "has
meaning beyond what we see, and that our strength is a force of good." Less than a
month later, in his first major address to a joint session of Congress, the president
reiterates these themes: "We're a people whose energy and drive have fueled our rise to
234 Herbert S. Parmet, George Bush: The Life o f a Lone Star Yankee (New York: Scribner, 1997) p. 46.
235 George Bush, A ll the Best: My Life in Letters and Other Writings (New York: Scribner, 1999) p. 67.
236 Inaugural Address," 20 January 1989, Public Papers o f the Presidents o fth e United States: George Bush. 1989-1993
(Washington: Federal Register Division, National Archives and Records Service, General Services Administration)
130
greatness. And we're a forward looking nation-generous, yes, but ambitious, not for
ourselves, but for the world." Two years later, in another address to Congress, this time
declaring the end of the most dramatic foreign policy event o f the Bush administration:
the conflict in the Persian Gulf, Bush once again returns to the idea o f America's
goodness and generosity: "Americans are a caring people. We are a good people, a
generous people. Let us always be caring and good and generous in all we do."238 Yet for
all they were worth, the ideas o f the United States' goodness and generosity, for Bush,
were simply one part o f a much broader set o f ideals that we, as a country, represented.
Two ideals, in particular, form an integral part of George Bush's self-image o f the
United States: freedom and democracy, both o f which were in a sense linked together.
These were ideals that Bush shared with Ronald Reagan. According to President Bush,
the United States represents more than simply a nation o f individuals sharing a common
heritage. The United States stands for certain principles, certain ideas, among these are
freedoms for individuals and nations as embodied in the concepts o f self-determination
and democracy.239 In his autobiography, written just prior to becoming the 41st president
o f the United States, Bush sees America "as a beacon of hope throughout the world, and
o f freedom, justice, and opportunity for all its citizens."240 He expands upon this theme
after taking office. In both his 1990 and 1991 State of the Union addresses, Bush is quite
237 "Address on Administration Goals Before a Joint Session o f Congress, " 9 February 1989, Public Papers o fth e Presidents o f the
United States: George Bush, 1989-1993.
238 "Address Before a Joint Session o f the Congress on the Cessation o f the Persian G u lf Conflict," 6 March 1991, Public Papers of
the Presidents o f the United States: George Bush, 1989-1993.
239 George Bush mentions these principles as the guiding benchmarks for his administration in a set o f remarks he made at the
Associated Press Luncheon in Chicago, Illinois on 24 April 1989, Public Papers o f the Presidents o fth e United States: George Bush,
1989-1993.
240 George Bush with Victor Gold, Looking Forward: An Autobiography (New York: Bantam Books, 1998) p. 202.
131
lucid regarding exactly what he means when he suggests that the United States
represents an ideal. In January 1990, Bush passionately argues that:
America, not just the nation but an idea, alive in the minds o f people everywhere.
As this new world takes shape at the center o f the widening circle o f freedom
today, tomorrow, and into the next century. Our nation is the enduring dream of
every immigrant who ever set foot on these shores, and the millions still
struggling to be free. This nation, this idea called Ajnerica, was and always will
be a new worldour new world.241
The following year, in explaining to Congress and the American people why the United
States was involved militarily in the Persian Gulf, the president had the following to say:
Halfway around the world, we are engaged in a great struggle in the skies and on
the sea and sands. We know why we're there: We are Americans, part o f
something larger than ourselves. For two centuries, we've done the hard work of
freedom. And tonight, we lead the world in facing down the threat to decency and
humanity. 242
241 "Address Before a Joint Session o f the Congress on the State o f the Union,1' 31 January 1990, Public Papers o f the Presidents o f
the United States: George Bush, 1989-1993.
242 Address Before a Joint Session o f the Congress on the State o f the Union, 12 January 1991, Public Papers o f the Presidents o f
132
The United States, in other words, represented a type o f universalism,
"something larger than ourselves;" a universalism that could serve other nations by virtue
o f our example; an example o f a stable political and economic system based on
democracy, free enterprise economics, and the rule o f law.
Reflecting back on the changes that had taken place internationally under his
watch, President Bush told a gathering of dignitaries and students at Texas A&M
University: "the end of the Cold War, you see, has placed in our hands a unique
opportunity to see the principles for which America has stood for over two centuries,
democracy, free enterprise and the rule of law, spread more widely than ever before in
human history."243
This self-image o f United States is linked closely with an intermediate-level belief
that Bush possessed concerning the role that the United States should play for the rest o f
the world and ties in quite nicely with Bush's vision o f America as a land that was meant
to assist others. In his Inaugural address, Bush trumpets: "America is never wholly
herself unless she is engaged in high moral principle. We as a people have such a purpose
today. It is to make kinder the face o f the Nation and gentler the face o f the world."244
Ronald Reagan would nod in approval concerning Bush's image o f the role that the
United States should play in areas o f concern to this country: America should and must
lead.
243 Remarks at Texas A&M Univeristy in College Station, 15 December 1992, Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United
States: George Bush, 1989-1993. The idea that George Bush supported the notion o f America as a universal idea is also mentioned in
Hebert S. Parmet, George Bush: The Life o f a Lone Star Yankee, pp. 380-381.
244 Inaugural Address," 20 January 1989, Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States: George Bush, J989-1993.
133
Among the beliefs most clearly articulated by George Bush was this notion
that the United States was looked upon by others to lead. To lead not only the Western
alliance in a rapidly changing international environment, but also to lead the developing
world to the proverbial promise-land o f democratic institutions, free markets, and
societies governed by the rule of law. For Bush, world leadership was simply part of
America's internal nature. Marlin Fitzwater, Bush's press secretary, succinctly makes this
point: "President Bush always saw America in the lead, deciding its own interests, then
persuading others to jo in or follow."245 Political scientist Richard Melanson, refers to
Bush's perception o f the proper role for the United States within the international
community as a "velvet hegemony," "an imperialism with a human face." The core idea
in this set of beliefs was that the United States would act as the provider o f order for the
international community.246
As early as February 1989, Bush was proclaiming to Congress: "Never before has
our leadership been so crucial, because while America has its eyes on the future, the
world has its eyes on America."247 In an interview with foreign journalists later that same
year, when queried if he feared losing the U.S. leadership in NATO, Bush quipped: "No,
not a bit. If you'll excuse some chauvinistic pride...that is one worry I do not have. And
we will be involved, whether it's in the Pacific or whether it's in Europe. It's just our
245 Marlin Fitzwater, Call the Briefing: Reagan and Bush, Sam and Helen: A Decade with Presidents and the Press (Holbrook, Mass:
Adams, 1995). P. 245.
246 Richard Melanson, "George Bush's Search for a Post-Cold War Strategy," in Kenneth W. Thompson, ed.. The Bush Presidency:
Ten Intimate Perspectives, Part II. (Lantham, MD: University Press o f America, 1998) p. 159.
247 "Address on Administration Goals Before a Joint Session o f Congress," 9 February 1989, Public Papers o f the Presidents ofthe
134
nature.248" Bush was even more forthright in his foreign policy memoirs, writing: "I
always have believed that the United States bears a disproportionate responsibility for
peace in Europe and an obligation to lead NATO." 249
U.S. leadership o f NATO was a belief shared by both the president and his closest
foreign policy advisors. One o f Bush's closest foreign policy advisors, Brent Scowcroft,
reflects on the dangers evident in past episodes o f U.S. isolation from Europe this
century, noting poignantly: "the lesson we drew from this bloody history was that the
United States had to continue to play a significant role in European security, whatever
developed with respect to the Soviet Union. The vehicle for that role m ust be NATO.250
Colin Powell, Chairman o f the Joint Chiefs o f Staff during the Bush
administration, on the other hand, had the following to say about the need for U.S.
leadership in Europe after the tumultuous period o f 1989-1992: "however different the
world, the United States remains its leader. We are still the foundation on which Western
security rests, and we are increasingly looked to as the foundation upon which the newly
freed nations of Eastern Europe want their security to rest. America is trusted and
j
respected as no other nation on earth.
In the developing world, the role for the United States, as perceived by Bush,
centered not so much on maintaining security per se, but rather in advancing the cause of
democracy and free markets. And, yet, the cause was considered as worthy as securing
the peace in Europe. The president believed firmly in the necessity of taking a very active
248 "Interview with Foreign Journalists," 21 November 1989, Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States: George Bush.
1989-1993.
249 George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Vintage, 1998) p. 60.
250 Ibid. pp. 230-231.
251 Colin L. Powell with Joseph E. Persico, An American Journey (New York: Ballantine, 1995) p. 588.
135
role in pushing forward this agenda. Within his first State o f the Union, Bush told his
audience that the rapid changes taking place at the international level required that the
United States "ensure democracy's advance, to take the lead in forging peace and
freedom's best hope: a great and growing commonwealth o f free nations."252
As these goals related to Central America, Bush believed that the United States
must help in advancing the cause of democratization. While Vice-President, Bush
stressed the need for the United States to assist the Contras in their struggle against the
Sandinistas:
Freedom can flourish in Nicaragua, just as it is flourishing throughout the rest o f
the continent, but it needs our help. We must act now, before it is too late...Let us
extend a helping hand to the Nicaraguan people, just as others helped our
forefathers in their time o f need. Lets give freedom a chance in Nicaragua.253
While president, Bush noted at a news conference in March 1990: "We must take
the lead in helping our neighbors, and we cannot look to others to make sacrifices if we
ourselves cannot work in partnership in our own hemisphere. And I also add there are
those who argue that Panama and Nicaragua are not as vital as Eastern Europe. They're
wrong. This is our hemisphere.. .The world is changing drastically, and we must meet the
252 "Address Before a Joint Session o f the Congress on the State o f the Union," 31 January 1990, Public Papers ofthe Presidents o f
253 Excerpts from Remarks by Vice-President George Bush, 28 February 1985, National Security Archives, Iran-Contra Collection,
Document # IC00893.
136
challenges in every region with equal commitment and equal dedication." 254 A day
later, the president reemphasized the necessity o f U.S. leadership in promoting
democracy in Central America, telling reporters: "Panama and Nicaragua stand at a
historic moment: on the threshold of democracy. In both nations the people have spoken
in favor o f freedom, but the difficult work o f democracy remains.. .But it cannot happen
if we in the United States fail to add our strength and support to the forces of
democracy."255
In the aftermath o f the seismic changes that took place internationally during his
presidency, Bush continued to believe in the necessity o f U.S. leadership. Leadership, in
particular, that was directed at maintaining a peaceful, prosperous, and democratic world
order. In one of his final foreign policy addresses, President Bush, in speaking to a
graduating class of cadets from the United States Military Academy at West Point,
articulates what he perceived as the proper role for the United States in the post-cold war
world: "in the wake o f the cold war, in a world where we are the only remaining
superpower, it is the role o f the United States to marshal its moral and material resources
to promote a democratic peace. It is our responsibility, it is our opportunity to lead. There
is no one else."256
Bush was willing to admit, however, that U.S. leadership was not unlimited. The
U.S. would lead in those areas that it defined as vital to its national interests. It would
254 "The President's News Conference," 22 March 1990, Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States: George Bush, 1989-
1993.
255 "The President's News Conference," 23 March 1990, Public Papers o fth e Presidents o fth e United States: George Bush. 1989-
1993.
256 "Remarks at the United States Military Academy in West Point, New York," 5 January 1993, Public Papers o f the Presidents o f
the United Stales: George Bush, 1989-1993.
137
lend its support to those areas that he deemed most important to the U.S. national
interest. In his personal diary, Bush reflects on his decision not to intervene actively in
the brewing Yugoslavian crisis: "The concept that we have to work out every problem,
everywhere in the world, is crazy.. .1 don't want to look isolationist; I don't want to turn
my back on the desires of many ethnic Americans that come from that part o f the world;
but I don't think that we can be looked to for solving every problem every place in the
w orld..."257
Overall, then, George Bush's self-image o f the United States was one that coupled
a belief that America stood for "goodness" and "generosity" with a sense o f responsibility
to serve the international community by promoting American ideas o f freedom and
democracy. As was the case with Ronald Reagan, these ideas, which Bush firmly
believed were part and parcel o f the American creed, would become universally accepted
only through vigorous U.S. leadership.
Image o f Allies
One o f the great ironies of George Bush's image o f allies and adversaries was that
in a relatively short period of time, former allies would became new enemies o f the
United States and former enemies would become allies. By the time President Bush left
office in 1993, two stalwart U.S. allies during the Cold War, Manuel Noriega o f Panama
and Saddam Hussein of Iraq, would experience directly the military wrath o f the United
States, while former arch-enemies o f America, including the governments o f the Soviet
257 George Bush, All the Best: M y Life in Letters and O ther Writing? (New York: Scribner, 1999) pp. 527-528.
138
Union and Nicaragua, would work with the United States in an effort to secure
international peace and spread the benefits o f democracy.
Despite these rather dramatic transformations in U.S. relations with some o f its
former allies, Bush's image o f Americas allies in Central America remained quite similar
to that o f President Reagan. In particular, the U.S. relationship with the government o f El
Salvador would remain very strong. Early on in his administration, Bush argued that the
1984-1989 Christian Democratic government o f Jose Napoleon Duarte was in many
respects a model for new democracies in the region. Bush's position toward the Duarte
government was clearly expressed in a set o f written responses to a Chinese news agency
in February 1989. When questioned if the U.S. intended to take an active role in helping
to promote peace by working with the governments in the region, Bush answered: "The
United States continues to seek a just solution to conflicts in Central America, based on
democracy, respect for human rights, and security. In El Salvador, the popularly elected
government of President Duarte has worked, with our support, to institutionalize
democracy, despite an organized military assault by Communist forces. There has been
considerable success in curbing human rights abuses from the far right and within the
military. We will continue to support the Government of El Salvador in its efforts."258
After the March 1989 Salvadoran presidential elections, President Bush remained
willing to support the newly elected ARENA candidate, Alfredo Cristiani. At a White
House luncheon, Bush told the journalists in attendance that he truly believed that the
elections were certifiably free and that Cristiani would indeed make every effort to
258 "Written Responses to Questions Submitted by Xinhua News Agency o f China," 16 February 1989, Public Papers o f the
Presidents o f the United States: George Bush. 1989-1993.
139
continue strengthening the democratic institutions in El Salvador.259 Bush noted,
however, that Cristiani faced big problems with those Marxist-backed guerrillas coming
at him. And that his administration was going to support that, just as w ere going to
support the Central American Presidents as they now, hopefully, push Ortega (President
o f Nicaragua) to do what Ortega should have done long before now.
By May, Bush was even more forthright in conveying his image o f the
government o f El Salvador at a speech he gave to the Council of the Americas, calling
the March elections, another ringing affirmation o f that nation's commitment to
democracy. The president went on to say:
We expect ARENA (National Republican Alliance) to exercise its political power
responsibly. And I have conveyed to President-elect Cristiani our commitment to
human rights in El Salvador. I honestly feel that he shares my concern, and he
deserves our support.
Five months later, in October 1989, Bush referred to the recent elections as free and
certifiably fair, noting that they were an important major step towards the peace that
259 "Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session at a White House Luncheon for Joumalists,"31 March 1989, Public Papers o f the
Presidents o f the United States: George Bush, 1989-1993.
260 Ibid.
261 "Remarks to the Council o f the Americas," 2 May 1989, Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States: George Bush, 1989-
1993.
140
the people o f El Salvador want.262 Prior to an official meeting with Cristiani in
February 1990, Bush gave to the press a glowing endorsement of the new Salvadoran
president:
Id like to say that I know this man. I know o f his commitment to democracy. I
will support him now. I will support him in the future. And the success o f
democracy in El Salvador is a very important thing to us, to this country. And Ive
been very impressed with the courage he has shown in going after those who have
broken the law in his country. And thats been a shining example to all o f us.263
In July o f 1991, Bush, in a set o f remarks after a meeting with Cristiani stated:
Mr. President, time and again you and the people o f El Salvador have proved your
doubters wrong. Political rights have flourished despite hardship and despite war.
And your people enjoy freedom of speech like never before. Exiles who once
feared for their lives have returned, come back home to campaign for office and
build parties. You have begun to lay libertys cornerstone, the rule o f law. And
youve strengthened the judicial system. Youve expanded civilian authority over
262 T h e Presidents News Conference in San Jose, Costa Rica, 28 October 1989, Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United
States: George Bush. 1989-1993.
263 Remarks Prior to Meeting with President Alfredo Cristiani Buckard o f El Salvador, 1 February 1990, Public Papers o f the
141
the police and military and youve committed yourself to dramatic reductions
in armed forces. And youve strengthened protections for human rights.264
Thomas Carothers summarizes the president's position toward the new government of El
Salvador, stating that Bush believed that Cristiani and the ARENA political party "had
transformed itself into a genuinely democratic party and that Cristiani was a sincere
moderate who has real authority as party leader."265
As for the counter-revolutionaries o f Nicaragua, Bush also possessed a favorable
image of this American ally, albeit not in the glowing terms o f President Reagan. In a
speech delivered to the Austin Council o f Foreign Affairs while still vice-president, Bush
defended the Contras as the true guardians o f the 1979 Nicaraguan revolution:
Amazingly, we still hear the libel repeated that the Nicaraguan freedom fighters
are made up largely o f ex-followers o f Somoza. In fact, ex-members o f Somozas
national guard account for only at tiny handful o f the 15,000 armed resistance
fighters. The entire political leadership o f the freedom fightersAlfonso Robelo,
Aldolfo Colero o f the FDN and Eden Pastora were prominent political
opponents o f Som oza.. .These true patriots only took up arms again when it
264 Remarks Following Discussions with President Alfredo Cristiani Buckard o f El Salvador and an Exchange with Reporters, 12
July 1991, Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States: George Bush, / 989-1993.
265 Thomas Carothers, In the Name o f Democracy: U.S. Policy Toward Latin America in the Reagan Years (Berkeley, CA:
University ofCalifomia Press, 1991) p. 37.
142
became clear to them that the hard-line Communists had seized power and
were, as Eden Pastora says, selling their country to the Soviet bloc.-
In a letter to the bishop o f his church in 1986, the vice-president claimed that the Contras
were not warmongers in any sense o f the word. Rather, their goal was to bring democracy
to Nicaragua:
.. .The Freedom Fighters have always made it clear that they will lay down their
arms when genuine democracy is permitted again in Nicaragua, as the Sandinistas
promised nearly six years ago. The United States Government has supported the
struggle o f the Freedom Fighters as we support efforts to establish democracy
elsewhere...Someday I would like to discuss this with you. I am totally convinced
that the moral ground is on our side.. .1 hate to differ with you on this key
question but my view is not simply official it is profoundly personal, stemming
largely from what my Episcopal faith has taught me.
Because Bush admired the Contras in many of the same ways that Reagan did, he
was unwilling to abandon the Contras when he became president. In February 1989,
when asked if he would be willing to no longer provide aid to the Contras if the Soviets
would work with the United States to defuse the crises in Central America, the president
Document # IC00893.
267 George Bush, A ll the Best, p. 348.
143
responded: I wouldnt make a deal on that with the Soviets, nor would that come
up.268 Later that month, Bush was even more direct, telling reporters that the United
States will not leave the resistance standing alone, leave them twisting out there without
fulfillment o f the commitment to democracy on the part o f the Sandinistas.269 The
following month, he again told reporters: We cannot, and I will not, leave the Contras
out there with no humanitarian aid at a ll...270
Yet, President Bush did realize that trying to provide military or even economic
assistance to the Contras at the same levels as was given during the Reagan years was
politically impossible. There is no mistaking the fact that Bushs policy options for
dealing with the Sandinista government were limited by domestic political forces. At a
White House luncheon in late March 1989, Bush admitted: there was no way, not a
snowballs chance in hell, of getting a dime for lethal aidmilitary aid from Congress.
And I think anybody thats familiar with Congress would acknowledge that.271
The Contras, for President Bush, were viewed in many respects as a tool to be
used to advance the cause of democracy in Nicaragua by putting pressure on the
Sandinistas. Bush expresses this viewpoint quite lucidly at a news conference in August
1989. After being asked if the United States would support the demobilization o f the
Contra forces prior to the scheduled Nicaraguan presidential elections in February 1990,
268 The Presidents News Conference, 6 February 1989, Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States: George Bush, 1989-
1993.
269 Remarks if Afghanistan and a Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters," 16 February 1989, Ibid.
270 T he Presidents News Conference, 7 March 1989, Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United Stales: George Bush, 1989-
1993.
271 Remarks and a Question -an d - Answer Session at a White House Luncheon for Journalists, 31 March 1989, Public Papers o f
144
Bush replied: I don't want to see the mandatory demobilization o f those Contras
before the elections. I've felt and I am absolutely correct that the pressure from the
Contras has been the thing that's led Ortega (President o f Nicaragua) to start moving a
little bit on free, fair elections."272 Thus, President Bush believed that Contras could be
used as a deterrent threat to convince the Sandinista to move further in the direction o f
democratization as defined by the United States.
Even though Bush did admit that getting additional military assistance from
Capitol Hill for the Contras was going to be extremely difficult, the president refused to
rule out the possibility in the future. In late October 1989, after Nicaraguan President
Daniel Ortega announced at the Pan-American Conference that he was considering
unilaterally ending the cease-fire with the Contras, Bush was asked if lethal aid to the
Contras would once again be considered. The president was quick to respond that he
would reevaluate the situation in a minute o f a cease-fire is broken.
Thus, Bush's image o f allies in Central America remained similar to those held by
President Reagan- strong verbal and financial support for the democratically elected
government of El Salvador and continued backing o f the counter-revolutionaries in
Nicaragua. The key areas o f distinction between the two presidents, however, lie in the
fact that Reagan was willing to continue to support the Contras at almost any cost,
whereas Bush most certainly was not.
272 "The President's News Conference," 23 August 1989, Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States: George Bush. 1989-
1993.
273 The Presidents News Conference," 31 October 1989, Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States: George Bush. 1989-
1993.
145
Image o f Adversaries
The transition from Reagan to Bush did not automatically result in a carrying over
o f the same set o f images concerning the United States' main international adversary, the
Soviet Union; or, for that matter, its main regional adversary in Central America, the
Sandinistas. One attribute o f George Bushs personality was that he is a very cautious
man, and the beliefs he held regarding the Soviet Union and the Sandinistas would also
be marked by a heavy degree of caution.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, U.S.-Soviet relations in the closing days of
the Reagan presidency were clearly improving, as evidenced in the series o f top-level
summits between the two heads o f state, including a final meeting at Governors Island,
New York just weeks before Ronald Reagan left office. When George Bush entered the
White House, the flowery rhetoric o f a new era o f detente was replaced with a much
more cautious/skeptical view of the Soviets. Michael Duffy and Dan Goodgame, in their
analysis of the Bush presidency, in fact, claim that Bush feared that Reagan might have
been "going soft" on the Soviets during his final years in office. By m id-1988, they write,
Bush was warning the World Affairs Council in Northern California: "the Cold War is
not over" and that the United States should be prepared for an extended period o f
competition with the Soviets.274 At the president's Inaugural, one can clearly see this new
approach when the president states: "we will continue the new closeness with the Soviet
274 Michael Duffy and Dan Goodgame, Marching in Place: The Status Quo Presidency o f George Bush (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1992) pp. 178-179.
146
Union, consistent with both our security and with progress (emphasis added).275
This skepticism was even more pronounced in the president's first address to a joint
session o f Congress the following month: "the fundamental facts remain that the Soviets
retain a very powerful military machine in the service o f objectives which are still too
often in conflict with ours." Yet, perhaps the clearest indicator o f Bush's new
assessment o f the Soviets came in May 1989 when he proclaimed:
The Soviet Union has promised a more cooperative relationship before, only to
reverse course and return to militarism. Soviet foreign policy has been almost
seasonal: warm before cold, thaw before freeze. We seek a friendship that knows
no season o f suspicion, no chill o f distrust... the national security o f America and
our allies is not predicated on hope. It must be based on deeds, and we look for
777
enduring, ingrained economic and political change.
The reason behind this cautionary image of the Soviets was the fear by Bush and
his closest foreign policy advisors that the Soviets, under Gorbachev, might be engaged
in another propaganda war with the United States. In other words, Bush wanted to ensure
that Soviet actions regarding its promises of perestrokia and glasnost were more than just
promises. Brent Scowcroft, Bush's national security advisor, originally questioned the
motivations behind the Soviet reform program. In his memoirs he writes:
275 Inaugural Address," 20 January 1989, Public Papers o fth e Presidents o f the United States: George Bush, 1989-1993 "
276 "Address on Administration Goals Before a Joint Session o f Congress, 9 February 1989, Public Papers o f the Presidents ofthe
277 "Remarks at the Texas A&M University Commencement in College Station," 12 May 1989, Inaugural Address, 20 January
1989, Public Papers o f the Presidents o fth e United States: George Bush, 1989-1993.
147
He believed that Gorbachev's goal was to restore dynamism to a socialist
political and economic system and revitalize the Soviet Union domestically and
internationally to compete with the West. To me, especially before 1990, this
made Gorbachev potentially more dangerous than his predecessors. 278
Thus, the early goal of President Bush, as far as the Soviet Union was concerned, was to
ensure that Gorbachev's acts spoke louder than his words. One policy consequence o f
this skepticism, writes David Mervin, was that Bush ordered a "painstaking five month
long review" in order to reassess the United States approach toward the USSR, which
ultimately delayed the U.S. in taking the lead in improving East-West relations and laid
Bush open to criticism by both the far right o f his own political party and the democratic
/-'i
opposition in Congress. 279
This prudent approach towards the Soviets did not mean, however, that as the
Bush presidency wore on, that his image o f the USSR did not change; in fact, it did,
albeit slowly. Only after it became evident that Gorbachev was indeed serious in pushing
forward his reform agenda, both with words and deeds, at home and in Eastern Europe,
and after he had effectively ended Soviet support for regional clients engaged in
revolutionary activity in the developing world, the president's extreme caution gave way
to a caution o f a much lesser degree. By July 1991, Bush could confidently tell an
audience o f Soviet citizens: "In every respect o f our relationsmilitary, political,
278 George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed, p. 13.

279 David Mervin, George Bush and the Guardianship Presidency (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998) p. 170.
148
economicwe see positive signs o f a new partnership. But for all the progress we've
made, let's face it, obstacles do remain. Our ability to overcome them will be a test o f the
9on
strength o f this new relationship I'm talking about"
Although Bush's image of the Soviet Union may have been subtly transformed
from 1989-1991, his image o f the Sandinista government during his first fourteen months
in the office remained relatively constant. As was the case for Ronald Reagan, Bush
believed that the Sandinistas controlled Nicaragua society with an iron fist and that they
could not be trusted, even though they had agreed in 1987 to abide by the Central
American peace accords, which, among other things, stipulated that the Nicaraguan
government hold fair and free presidential elections in early 1990.
In February 1989, responding to a reporter's request to comment on the
Sandinistas recent agreement with other Central American leaders to move ahead with
plans for the following year's national presidential elections, Bush noted, "To the degree
that rhetoric goes forward and is enacted, that's good. But there's 90 days now in which to
finalize agreements. And what's troubling to me is that claims like this have been made at
one time, only to see those claims repudiated.. .promises made. Promises broken. And so,
n o 1
I think we have to be wary o f supporting any positive commitments to democracy."
Likewise, in a written response to foreign journalists, the president referred to the
Sandinistas as a regime that "seeks to consolidate their totalitarian control and regional
280 "Remarks at the Moscow State Institute for International Relations," 30 July 1991, Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United
States: George Bush, 1989-1993.
281 "Remarks on Afghanistan and a Question-and-Answer Session With Reporters," 16 February 1989, Public Papers o f the
149
hegemony."282 In other words, for George Bush, the Sandinistas were not only
anathema to all the United States stood for as a country by virtue o f their totalitarian
ideology, but were untrustworthy to boot. The policy consequence of this set o f beliefs
was that it would inhibit greatly the potential for mutually beneficial interactions between
the United States and the Sandinista government in the future. It would not, however,
preclude the possibility o f having the United States support regionally generated peace
initiatives, which would be the key to bringing a peaceful democratic transition in
Nicaragua.
Associated with these core-level beliefs concerning U.S. adversaries in the
context of U.S.-Central American relations are a number o f intermediate-level beliefs
regarding the internal political structure and external dynamics o f these same adversaries.
Despite the efforts o f Gorbachev to reform the internal political structure o f the Soviet
Union, Bush and his advisors still questioned how much political change had actually
taken place. The prevailing view, at least early on within the administration, was that the
Soviet Union still had a very long way to go before it could be considered in any
sense"democratic." In fact, Bush and Scowcroft both agreed that Gorbachev was using
elections merely to consolidate his hold on the Soviet government apparatus and to put
pressure on recalcitrant members of the Communist Party who were opposing his agenda
o f reforms.283 They believed it to be chimerical that power in any sense rested with the
Soviet people.
282 Written Responses to Questions Submitted by Xinhua News Agency o f China," 16 February 1989, Public Papers o f the
283 George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed, p. 140-141.
150
Beliefs concerning the internal political structure o f the Sandinistas were even
less flattering. As was the case for Ronald Reagan, the Sandinista government
represented for George Bush a repressive government unwilling to give its citizens their
God-given rights of political expression and self-determination. In February 1989, Bush
told a foreign news agency that in Nicaragua: "the press and church remain harassed",
"political opponents are jailed" and the government insists on maintaining "the largest
army in Central America."284 By October 1989, Bush had resorted to referring to the
Sandinista government as a "military clique," led by a "little man who is out o f whack
with the rest o f the hemisphere."285 At one point, in response to a journalist's question as
to what he thought of Daniel Ortega's (the President o f Nicaragua) decision to wear Army
fatigues to a meeting o f U.S. and Latin American countries to discuss the peace process
in Central America, Bush replied that Ortega looked like an "unwanted animal at a
garden party."286 Clearly, the image President Bush possessed of the internal political
structure and leaders o f Nicaragua was not very favorable.
A larger concern on the part o f President Bush was how the Soviet Union and
Nicaragua's internal political structure contributed to certain types of external behavior.
The logic behind the hypothesis held by Bush, and Reagan before him, was quite simple:
the less democratic a state was internally, the greater the chances that it could engage in
aggressive external behavior. One o f the leading reasons for Bushs continued suspicion
Presidents o f the United Slates: George Bush. 1989-1993.
285 Interview with Latin American Journalists, 25 October 1989, Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States: George
Bush. 1989-1993.
286 "The President's News Conference in San Jose, Costa Rica," 28 October 1989, Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United
151
o f the Soviets was their unwillingness to end support for third world revolutionary
governments and insurgent movements, especially in Central America. In the context o f
this particular region, the belief held by Bush was that the Soviets, often times by proxy
through Cuba, were actively supporting the Nicaraguan government, which in turn was
fomenting revolutionary activity in the region, especially in neighboring El Salvador.
Both George Bush and Brent Scowcroft claim that it was this issue- the Soviets
continued support for revolutionary activity in Central America- that remained the
biggest thom in U.S.-Soviet relations throughout the early Bush administration.287
While president, Bush commented on the Soviet-Cuban-Sandinista connection in
March 1989 and the problem this posed for the status of U.S.-Soviet relations: "The
Soviet Union has an obligation and an opportunity to demonstrate its "new thinking." In
other regional conflicts, it's adopted a welcome new approach, but in Central America,
what we've seen to date is "old thinking."288 By May 1989, the president was calling on
the Soviets:
To end Soviet-bloc support for the Nicaraguan assault on regional democracy.
The United States ended military aid to the Nicaraguan resistance 2 year ago.
And, yet, since that time, the Soviets continue to funnel about a billion worth o f
military assistance a year to the Sandinista regime, about the same rate as before
we stopped our military aid to the contras...The Soviet Union must understand
2S7 George Bush and Brent Scowcroft. A World Transformed, p. 134.

288 "The President's News Conference," 24 March 1989, Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States: George Bush. 1989-
1993.
152
that we hold it accountable for the consequences o f this intervention and for
the progress towards peace in the region and democracy in Nicaragua.
In a similar vein, Bush perceived that the Sandinista government was exporting
revolution. As early as 1985, in a speech delivered to the Austin Council on Foreign
Affairs, then vice-president Bush claimed that the government of Nicaragua was run by a
small cadre o f Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries bent on "the creation o f little Cubas
throughout the region."290 Quoting directly from a series o f statements made by high-
level Sandinista officials, Bush attempted to illustrate the danger posed by the Sandinista
regime to regional stability:
Tomas Borge, Nicaraguan Minister of the Interior, has stated from the beginning,
This revolution goes beyond our borders. Our revolution was always
internationalist...O r Nicaraguas Miguel D Escoto, who described how the
Sandinistas view Central America: You {the U.S.} may look at us as five
countries, six with Panama, but we regard ourselves as six different states o f a
single nation, in the process o f reunification. ...Nicaraguas ambassador to Costa
Rica spelled it out more clearly. He said that the Costa Ricans, should they call on
289 "Remarks to the Council o f Americas, 2 May 1989, Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States: George Bush, 1989-
1993.
Document # IC00893.
153
the OAS to help them in the event o f an invasion, would not have time to
convoke an OAS meeting, because by that time they would have been
occupied.291
In a statement made the following month, Bush again linked together the dangers
associated with a regime characterized by the U.S. as internally repressive and externally
ambitious: As long as the Sandinistas impose totalitarian rule and ally themselves with
the c o m m unist/terrorist nations, as long as the Nicaraguan military buildup far exceeds
that countrys defensive needs, there will be instability.292 Finally, in a letter to the
bishop of his diocese in 1986, Bush claims that the Sandinistas: have refused to "stop
exporting subversion to their neighbors; they have refused to "reduce their bloated
military apparatus;" they have refused to "sever their military ties to Cuba and the Soviet
bloc;" they have refused "to honor their promises to the Organization o f American states
to establish a democratic, pluralistic political system;" and they have refused to "begin a
293
genuine dialogue covering the entire political system in Nicaragua."
As president, Bushs beliefs remained relatively unaltered. In announcing the
Bipartisan Accord on Central America, an executive/legislative agreement to continue
providing the Contras with humanitarian assistance up until the scheduled presidential
elections in Nicaragua, President Bush summarized the position he would take toward the
government of Nicaragua: "the burden of proof is on the Sandinista government to do
something it has steadfastly refused to do from 1979-1989: to keep its promises to the
291 Ibid.
292 Statement: Comayagua, Honduras, 16 March 1985, National Security Archives, Iran-Contra Collection, Document # IC00949.
293 George Bush, All the Best: M y Life in Letters and Other Writings. (New York: Scribner, 1999) p. 348.
154
Nicaraguan people to perm it real democracy, keep its promises not to support
subversion in Central America, and keep its obligation to thus hemisphere not to permit
the establishment o f Soviet-bloc bases in Central America."294 For the next 11 months,
President Bush would remain skeptical of Sandinista intentions until it became evident
that they would indeed accept their electoral defeat in the February 1990 presidential
elections.
The Fundamental Nature o f International Politics
The overall image that George Bush possessed o f the nature of international
politics was that this was an arena characterized by uncertainty, unpredictability, and,
oftentimes, instability. Like most men of his generation, the guiding framework o f
international politics in the post-World War II era was the East-West competition
between the Soviet Union and United States, respectively. Upon taking over the
presidency in 1989, this bipolar competition was still the predominant theme in
international politics and did indeed shape many o f Bush's beliefs concerning
international politics, as it had all of the earlier post-war presidents. Yet within a span of
three short years, the Cold War would effectively be over and democratization and free
market economics would break through the former iron curtain. These tremendous
294 "Statement on the Bipartisan Accord on Central America," 24 March 1989, Public Papers o f the Presidents o fth e United States:
George Bush, 1989-1993.
155
changes would make a president who already possessed a cautious personality even
more careful in responding to the vast transformations that were taking place
internationally.
Two themes in particular emerge from Bush's public and private statements
concerning the nature of international politics: the danger o f a world system in flux
coupled with a profound hope for the establishment o f a new world order. James A.
Baker EH, Bush's Secretary of State, captures the beliefs he shared with the president
regarding the international arena, calling it "a world laden with hope and opportunity, as
well as peril and uncertainty, for American diplomacy." 296 Very early on in his
administration, Bush, in responding to a foreign news agency's question concerning his
general assessment on the current world situation said: "the one constant in today's world
is change.. .our world still is a tumultuous and dangerous place."297 By M ay 1989, the
president told the graduating class o f Boston University that in the world today: "nations
are undergoing changes so radical that the international system you know in the future
will be as different from today's world as is from the time o f Woodrow W ilson."298 Bush
could not have realized how true this statement would turn out to be. At the end o f 1989,
Eastern Europe had been transformed from an integral part of the Soviet empire to a
295 Both George Bush and Brent Scowcroft in the introduction to their memoirs acknowledge these points.- A World Transformed, pp.
xi-xiv.
295 James A. Baker III with Thomas M. DeFrank, The Politics o f Diplomacy: Revolution. War. and Peace. 1989-1992 (New York:
G.P. Putnams Sons, 1995) p. 2.
298 "Remarks at the Boston University Commencement Ceremony in Massachusetts," 21 May 1989, Public Papers o f the Presidents
o f the United States: George Bush 1989-1993.
156
series o f newly emerging democracies and the Soviet Union itself had begun to turn
inward to deal with its own problems.
With the collapse o f the old order based primarily on East-West competition came
the challenges of the new world order. At a speech on 2 August 1990, President Bush
admits that despite the vast changes in the strategic landscape over the past year-and-a-
half, a whole new set o f challenges emerged: "Even in a world where democracy and
freedom have made great gains, threats remain. Terrorism, hostage-taking, renegade
regimes and unpredictable rulers, new sources o f instability-all require a strong and
engaged America. 299 And, at his 1990 State o f the Union, Bush admits: "we must
recognize an unfortunate fact: In many regions o f the world tonight, the reality is conflict,
not peace."300
Moreover, skepticism regarding Soviet intentions remained. In fact, despite the
tremendous changes taking place throughout Europe in 1989 and 1990, which did require
Soviet acquiescence, Brent Scowcroft was very reluctant to claim that the Cold War was
over. Writes Scrowcroft: "There was much left to resolve with the Soviets before I would
be comfortable saying they were no longer adversaries, but a giant forward step had been
taken.301 Continued Soviet involvement in Central America worried both Scowcroft and
Bush. Both the president and his national security advisor noted that the biggest thorn in
299 "Remarks at the Aspen Institute in Aspen, Colorado," 2 August 1990, Public Papers o fth e Presidents o f the United States:
George Bush. 1989-1993.
300 "Address Before a Joint Session o f the Congress on the State o f the Union," 3 1 January 1990, Public Papers o f the Presidents o f
the United States: George Bush. 1989-1993.
301 George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed, p. 181.
157
US-Soviet relations remained Central America, where the Soviets still supported their
client Nicaragua and, through it and Cuba, the guerrillas in El Salvador.302
It would be in response to these new and old challenges that Bush believed a new
world order could be forged. What would this new world order entail? For Bush, the new
world order would be an era "freer from the threat o f terror, stronger in the pursuit o f
justice, and more secure in the quest for peace." It would be an international environment
where "the rule o f law supplants the rule o f the jungle. A world in which nations
recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice. A world where the strong
respect the rights o f the weak."303 The president put it somewhat differently in his 1991
State of the Union: "a new world order, where diverse nations are drawn together in
common cause to achieve the universal aspirations o f mankindpeace and security,
freedom, and the rule o f law."304 Yet, how could these goals be achieved? The answer
could be found in a set o f important intermediate beliefs held by President Bush
regarding the requirements for peace.
George Bush, like Ronald Reagan, firmly believed that the most effective way to
maintain international peace was to have military strength at home and a relatively active
United States engaged abroad. Bush says as much in early 1989, stating: "balance has
been restored in the international system by a Western policy o f strength and realism. "j05
In other words, peace would come through internal military and economic strength and
302 Ibid. 134.

303 "Address Before a Joint Session o f the Congress on the Persian G u lf Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit," 11 September 1990,
Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United Stales: George Bush. 1989-1993.
304 "Address Before a Joint Session o f the Congress on the State o f the Union," 29 January 1991, Public Papers o f the Presidents o f
305 Written Responses to Questions Submitted by Xinhua News Agency o f China," 16 February 1989, Public Papers o f the
158
an activist United States. The president drove home this point in his final State o f the
Union: "strength in the pursuit o f peace is no vice; isolationism in the pursuit o f security
is no virtue."306 The United States, Bush believed, should reject any notion o f an
isolationist foreign policy. Unlike Ronald Reagan, however, George Bush, in the conduct
o f his foreign policy would eschew ideology in favor o f a "cold, hard decision making
guided by the perceived national interest."307 As Bert Rockman put it, George Bush
would approach foreign policy-making, especially coalition building, from the standpoint
o f shared threats rather than shared values a la Reagan.308 Bushs foreign policy would be
guided by focusing on threats to U.S. interests and collaborating with other states to meet
desired ends rather than emphasizing the internal political ideology o f potential allies or
adversaries.
One o f the earliest manifestations o f this Realpolitik approach was the need to
integrate the Soviets into the international system, rather than to contain them. On 12
May 1989, in perhaps one the most important foreign policy speeches o f the Bush
administration, the president laid out the new U.S. approach toward the Soviets:
We are approaching the conclusion o f an historic postwar struggle between two
visions: one o f tyranny and conflict and one o f democracy and freedom. The
review o f U.S -Soviet relations that my administration has just completed outlines
306 "Address Before a Joint Session o f the Congress on the State o f the Union," 28 January 1992, Public Papers o fth e Presidents o f
307 Daniel P. Franklin and Robert Shepard, "Is Prudence a Policy? George Bush and the World," in Ryan J. Barilleaux and Mary E.
Stuckey, eds.. Leadership and the Bush Presidency: Prudence or Drift in an Era o f Change? (Westport, CN: Praeger Publishers,
1992) p. 172
308 Bert A. Rockman, "The Leadership Style o f George Bush, " in Colin Campbell and Bert A. Rockman, eds., The Bush Presidency:
First Appraisals (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1991) p. 16.
159
a new path toward resolving this struggle...In sum, the United States now has
as its goal much more than simply containing Soviet expansionism. We seek the
integration o f the Soviet Union into the community o f nations... As we seek
peace, we must also remain strong. The purpose o f our military might is not to
pressure a weak Soviet economy or to seek military superiority. It is to deter war.
It is to defend ourselves and our allies and to do something more: to convince the
Soviet Union that there can be no reward in pursuing expansionism, to convince
the Soviet Union that reward lies in the pursuit o f peace.309
The message of the speech is clear: the United States and its Western allies must work
more closely with the Soviets in the years ahead to ensure international peace and
stability.
One way to integrate the Soviets even more closely with the West, and to promote
the cause o f peace at the same time, was to continue to make progress in arms limitations.
But, there was an even more important message implied in the speech: the United States
must remain an active member o f the international community in order for this goal to be
met.
What this required in practice was that the United States, despite a receding threat
from the Soviet Union, would need to maintain its alliance commitments to ensure
international stability and peace. In his remarks to the graduating class at Boston
University in May 1989, Bush announces his administration's new policy toward Europe:
309 "Remarks at the Texas A&M University Commencement Ceremony in College Station," 12 May 1989, Public Papers o f the
160
While an ideological earthquake is shaking asunder the very Communist
foundation, the West is being tested by complacency. We must never forget that
twice in this century American blood has been shed over the conflicts that began
in Europe. And we share the fervent desire o f Europeans to relegate war forever
to the province o f distant memory. But that is why the Atlantic Alliance is so
central to our foreign policy. And that's why America remains committed to the
alliance and the strategy which has preserved freedom in Europe. We must never
forget that to keep the peace in Europe is to keep the peace for America.310
A logical extension o f the continued U.S. commitment to its previous alliance partners in
Europe would be that America would also begin to shore up its other alliances around the
world, particularly in Central America. Although no official "alliance" existed, outside o f
the U.S. commitment to the Organization o f American States (OAS), Bush over time
came to see the necessity o f working with our traditional allies in the region to come to a
peaceful settlement to the continuing crisis.
Aside from a need to incorporate the Soviets into the international community and
the need to maintain alliance commitments, Bush possessed an additional intermediate
belief concerning the prerequisites for peace that suggested that unwarranted aggression
o f one nation-state against another nation-state would not be tolerated. It goes without
saying that the most dramatic foreign policy event o f the Bush administration was the
310 "Remarks at the Boston University Commencement Ceremony in Massachusetts, 21 May 1989, Public Papers o f the Presidents
o f the United States: George Bush, 1989-1993.
161
crisis that developed in the Persian G ulf in the summer o f 1990. After Iraqi President
Saddam Hussein ordered his Revolutionary Guard to occupy Kuwait, George Bush
immediately took action by convincing leaders throughout the international community,
including, most importantly, Saudi Arabia that an international response was necessary.
The United States would take the first active step in response to these events by
requesting from the Saudi government permission to send U.S. forces into the kingdom,
(which the president ultimately did receive) in an effort to deter Saddam from sending his
troops southward. The rationale for Bush's early actions was based on a set o f beliefs that
he announced to the nation on 8 August 1990 when he stated: "if history teaches us
anything, it is that we m ust resist aggression or it will destroy our freedoms.
Appeasement does not work."311 And appease Saddam, George Bush certainly did not.
By March 1991, the crisis ended and the Iraqi Army was forced out o f Kuwait.
The United States had sent nearly 550,000 troops into battle with the resulting death toll
3p
o f over 150 Americans and at a cost o f over 7 billion for this country alone.
Taken together, then, George Bush's beliefs concerning the nature o f international
politics was typified by the idea that the vast changes taking place at the international
level from 1988-1992 made the international arena one o f great uncertainty, but also great
possibility. In order for some semblance o f stability and peace to emerge from these
transformations, Bush believed that the United States needed to actively integrate its
311 "Address to the Nation Announcing the Deployment o f United States Armed Forces to Saudi Arabia," Public Papers o f the
312 These figures were taken from W alter LaFeber*s, The American Age: U.S. Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad: 1750 to the
Present (New York: Norton, 1994) 2nd edition, p. 765.
162
former rival, the Soviet Union, into the community o f Western nations, while
maintaining its former alliance commitments and checking cases o f international
aggression.
The Flow o f History
The general dichotomy that is often drawn when assessing a leader's beliefs
concerning historical developments is whether or not they believe that individual free will
supercedes notions of historical determinism. George Bush, like Ronald Reagan,
fervently believed that individual citizens in general and political leaders in particular
have and should continue to shape historical events. With respect to the changes that
were taking place around the world in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the overarching
belief on the part of President Bush was that the United States should assist in managing
the change from totalitarian political and economic systems to political and economic
systems characterized by democracy and free markets. But, the key idea would be to
assist the countries in transition, and, not to have the United States dominating the
process.313
Reflecting back on some o f the changes that had taken place around the world
under his stewardship, Bush, at the 1992 Republican National Convention, told the
cheering throng of party supporters that the United States won the Cold War, not because
o f some inevitable historical forces, but because o f tough choices made by American
313 There were o f course exceptions to this tendency, namely U.S. military intervention in Panama in 1989 and the use of force in the
G ulf crisis in 1990-1991. The Panama anomaly will be discussed at the end o f chapter 5.
163
leaders. In his address, Bush triumphantly declared: "The demise o f communism
wasn't a sure thing. It took strong leadership o f Presidents from both parties, including
Republicans like Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan. Without their vision and the support
o f the American people, the Soviet Union would be a strong superpower today, and we'd
be facing a nuclear threat tonight."314
Secretary o f State James Baker echoes the president's views in his memoirs,
claiming that the Bush administration was in large part responsible for harnessing,
shaping, and managing those "seismic geopolitical changes in the strategic interests of
our country."315 Yet, as Brent Scowcroft cautions, U.S. policies were not necessarily the
leading cause behind these changes, but rather were ones that provided solid
encouragement to countries in transition and allowed the United States to react in
effective ways to changing circumstances.316
The true cause behind the vast changes taking place around the world at this time,
Bush and Scowcroft would argue-as Reagan did before them- was the yearning o f
individual citizens for freedom. And, when given a choice, they believed people would
choose freedom over tyranny. The president emphasizes this point in February, 1989: "It
is my strongly held conviction that when people are given the chance they will inevitably
choose a free press, freedom o f worship, and certifiably free elections."317 Perhaps the
best example o f this belief came later in a speech the president delivered to the citizens of
314 "Remarks Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the Republican National Convention in Houston," 20 August 1992, Public
Papers o f the Presidents o f the United Stales: George Bush. 1989-1993.
3 15 James A. Baker III with Thomas M. DeFrank, The Politics o f Diplomacy: Revolution. War, and Peace. 1989-1992. p . xiv.
316 George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed, pp. 180-181.
317 "Address on Administration Goals Before a Joint Session o f Congress," 9 February 1989, Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the
United States: George Bush. 1989-1993
164
Mainz, Germany. Bush likened the spirit o f freedom to a flower, which during the
Cold War was frozen and could not grow. When the Cold W ar began to thaw, however,
the flower blossomed and the passion for freedom spread throughout the world like
pollen in the wind.318 Simply put, Bush believed that as more and more people became
aware o f the benefits o f freedom, they would demand that their free will be unhampered
by the state.319
It is quite obvious that George Bush believed that man had a significant degree o f
control over historical developments. But he also held a number o f intermediate-level
beliefs that related current trends to larger historical patterns. First and foremost among
these was the belief that once the tide o f democracy has begun to flow, it is virtually
unstoppable. This theme is evident in the president's Inaugural Address:
I come before you and assume the presidency at a moment rich with
prom ise...For a new breeze is blowing, and a world refreshed by freedom seems
reborn. For in man's heart, if not in fact, the day o f the dictator is over. The
totalitarian era is passing, its old ideas blown away like leaves from an ancient
lifeless tree. A new breeze is blowing, and a nation refreshed by freedom stands
ready to push on.
318 "Remarks to the Citizens o f Mainz, Federal Republic o f Germany, 31 May 1989, Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United
States: George Bush, 1989-1993
319 This idea can be found in President Bushs "Remarks and a Question and Answer Session with Members o f the American Society
o f Newspaper Editors," 6 April 1990, Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States: George Bush, 1989-1993.
320 "Inaugural Address," 20 January 1989, Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States: George Bush, 1989-1993
165
In the context o f democratization in Central America, Bush, in October 1989,
reiterates this theme, perhaps in an even more forthright manner: "The world has watched
in wonder as brave men and women have taken to the streets to proclaim their rights, to
proclaim a faith in democracy. Some governments respond with reform, some with
repression, but there is no longer any doubt which side history is on. The day o f the
despot, the day o f the dictatorover, finished."321
Bush did acknowledge, however, that there was a holdout in the region: Cuba. But
even with respect to this country, Bush remained optimistic. At a ceremony
commemorating Cuban Independence Day, he noted: "the thirst for democracy is
unquenchable. Ajid totalitarian systems everywhere are feeling new pressures from the
people...And so dont tell me that Cubans don't want freedom and democracy; they do.
And I challenge Fidel Castro to let the will of the people prevail."322
Concomitant with the trend toward worldwide democracy was the demise o f
Soviet-led communism. In a personal letter to Prince Saruddin Khan, Bush comments
that the Soviet system is clearly on the wane and that "it's democracy that's on the
march."323 Likewise, in October 1989, Bush told a group o f Latin American journalists:
"Marx's star is fading, not just in this hemisphere but look at Eastern Europe, look around
the whole w orld...and human rights are rising up, and pluralism is coming on."324 Yet
321 "The President's News Conference in San Jose, Costa Rica, 28 October 1989, Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United
322 "Remarks on the Observance o f Cuban Independence Day, 22 May 1989, Public Papers o f the Presidents o fth e United States:
George Bush, 1989-1993
323 George Bush, A ll the Best, George Bush: M y Life in Letters and other Writings, p. 416
324 "Interview with Latin American Journalists," 25 October 1989, Public Papers o fth e Presidents o f the United Stales: George
Bush. 1989-1993.
166
Bush saved his most memorable comments regarding the fail o f communism for a
speech he would deliver at the United States Coast Guard Academy in New London,
Connecticut:
We live in a time when we are witnessing the end o f an idea: the final chapter of
the C ommunist experiment. Communism is now recognized, even by many within
the Communist world itself, as a failed system, one that promised economic
prosperity but failed to deliver the goods, a system that built a wall between the
people and their personal aspirations. But the eclipse o f Communism is only one
half of the story o f our time. The other is the ascendancy o f the democratic idea.
Never before, has an idea o f freedom so captured the imaginations of men and
women the world over, and never before has the hope o f freedom beckoned so
m any... Everywhere those voices are speaking the language o f democracy and
freedom. And we hear them, and the world hears them. And America will do all it
can do to encourage them.
In addition to the onward march of democracy and the collapse of Marxism, Bush
also believed that a trend toward interdependence between nation-states was emerging.
This belief would become manifest throughout his time in office as seen in his
willingness to work with others nation-states in handling a whole host of military,
325 "Remarks at the United States Coast Guard Academy Commencement Ceremony in New London, Connecticut, 24 May 1989,
Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States: George Bush, 1989-1993
167
political, economic, and diplomatic challenges. Bush comments on the necessity of
interdependence in a meeting o f the Small Business Legislative Council: "More than
ever, the world is interconnected, interdependent, changing rapidly...More than any point
in our human history, societies and economies rely upon one another."327
Thus, one can discern from Bush's public and private statements-as was the case
with Ronald Reagan-that he believed that individuals could indeed play a key role in
guiding historical forces. And, it was the quest for freedom and, ultimately, the actions
taken on the part o f formerly repressed individuals that best explain the vast changes that
took place in the international arena in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The trends that
would emerge during this time frame would be those o f burgeoning democratization,
weakened communism, and increased interdependence.
The Nature o f Change
A persuasive argument can be made that the most significant difference between
the respective worldviews o f Ronald Reagan and George Bush were their set o f beliefs
concerning the nature o f change and the means to be used to either lead or respond to
change. Ronald Reagan was the swashbuckling Republican, the anti-government radical,
who came to Washington in a quest to stir things up at home and to lead the United States
326 George Bush's handling o f the Persian G ulf crisis, the Two-Plus-Four solution to German reunification, the utilization ofG -7
summits to help manage European economic integration, and a willing to work with Central American governments to resolve its
regional crisis are all good examples o f the president's propensity to work collectively with others to solve military, political,
economic, and diplomatic problems.
327 "Remarks to Members o f the Small Business Legislative Council, " I March 1989, Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United
States: George Bush, 1989-1993
168
back to its rightful place atop the international pyramid. Reagan sought to create
change, not respond to it. By way o f contrast, writes political scientist Nelson Polsby,
President Bush was an American Tory. Tories, in the British political tradition, are
politicians who are deeply conservative and cautious by nature, who "care about society
and government that is handed to them" and, whose principal desire is "to keep the boat
afloat." 328 A Tory's instinct is to maintain order, to defend the status quo, and, above all
else, to avoid making mistakes. Bush possessed a personality that could be characterized
as cautious and held a set o f beliefs regarding how to deal with change that could be
classified as being quite cautious as well. In taking over for Ronald Reagan, George Bush
was determined to keep the legacy o f his predecessor alive, but he was unwilling to set
off on an entirely new course o f action on his own.
When it comes to responding to dramatic change, writes David Mervin, the Tory
tends to be averse to radical solutions, while at the same time fearing the potential
instability and unpredictability o f the change itself.329 George Bush was the embodiment
of the American Tory. He believed that change occurred in a very unpredictable fashion.
To a gathering o f news reporters in October 1989, Bush noted that the transformations
then taking place in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and elsewhere around the globe
were indeed quite dynamic and that he wanted to handle them "properly." Properly, for
Bush, meant cautiously.
The president was willing to admit the following February that he was certainly
not "smart enough to predict for fact-certain" the changes that had taken place over the
328 Quoted in Duffy and Goodgame, Marching in Place: The Status Quo Presidency o f George Busk, p.64
329 David Mervin, George Bush and the Guardianship Presidency, pp. 158-159.
169
past year.330 James Baker felt similarly, pointing out that the United States was
entering into a period o f "revolutionary change" and that no one could possibly foresee
how dramatic these changes would be.331
In large part because o f these uncertainties, the president and his advisors began
to declare that the enemy no longer was the Soviet Union, but rather "the enemy was
unpredictability;" the enemy was instability." Duffy and Goodgame suggest that
Bushs biggest fear was a breakdown in the stability that had kept the peace during four
decades of the Cold War. In a very nice juxtaposition o f the differences between the way
Bush responded to changes then taking place in Eastern Europe and the way Ronald
Reagan would have, the authors write: Bushs soberness was particularly striking in
contrast with what everyone, not least his aides, knew would have been the response of
his predecessor. Ronald Reagan would have tapped into the national and global mood o f
uplift....But George Bush, the foreign policy pro, concentrated prudently on what could
go wrong.333
On perhaps the most symbolic day on post-war era, 9 November 1989, when
border restrictions were relaxed between east and west Berlin, Bushs conservatism again
came to the surface. In response to a reporters question about how the United States was
planning to respond to these momentous events, the president stated:
330 "Joint News Conference Following Discussions With Chancellor Helmut Kohl o f the Federal Republic o f Germany, 25 February
1990, Public Papers o fth e Presidents o f the United Slates: George Bush. 1989-1993.
331 James A. Baker III with Thomas De Frank, The Politics o f Diplomacy, p. 30
332 "Joint News Conference Following Discussions With Chancellor Helmut Kohl o f the Federal Republic o f Germany, 25 February
1990, Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States: George Bush. 1989-1993.
333 Michael Duffy and Dan Goodgame, M arching in Place, p. 187.
170
We are handling it in a way where we are not trying to give anybody a hard
time. W ere saluting those who can move forward with democracy. We are
encouraging the concept o f a Europe whole and free. And so, we ju st welcome it.
But I dont like to go into a lot o f hypotheses about too much change or too rapid
change or what Ill do, what our whole team here would do, if something went
wrong.334
In a follow up question, when asked why he did not seem elated at these incredible turn
o f events, Bush responded: I am not an emotional kind o f guy. The president did,
however, acknowledge:
Im very pleased. And Ive been very pleased with a lot o f other developments.
And, as Ive told you, I think the United States part o f this, which is not related to
this development today particularly, is being handled in a proper fashion. And
well have some thatll suggest more flamboyant courses o f actions for this
country, and were, I think, handling this properly with allies, staying in close
touch with this dynamic change try to help as development takes place, try to
enhance reform, both political and economic. And so, the fact that Im not
bubbling overmaybe its getting toward evening, because I feel pretty good
about it.335
334 "Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters on the Relaxation o f East German Border Controls, 9 November
1989, Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United Slates: George Bush, /989-1993.
335 Ibid.
171
Dramatic change was most certainly in the air. Yet the question that remained
was how the president would deal with these changes. Unlike Reagan, President Bush
would not lead the way in promoting change, but instead, he would respond
conservatively to the changes that were then taking place, as he most clearly did when the
Berlin wall was finally tom down.
George Bush possessed a fairly diverse set of beliefs regarding what was required
to manage, or respond to change. O f course, the predominant international transformation
then taking place was the shift to democracy and free market economies in Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union. Bush would approach these changes incrementally and
with utter caution. His motto for responding to these changes was announced in February
1990 at a luncheon hosted by the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco: "I think we can
avoid doing dumb things."336 This response to a reporter's query on how he planned to
help Gorbachev deal with the transformations occurring in Eastern Europe and at home,
although seemingly a facetious comment at first glance, fits quite well within the
framework of "Tory" beliefs, whose adherents champion the motto: "do no harm."
By the end o f the month, Bush was telling reporters that the United States and
Soviet Union should not remove their forces from Europe, repeating an earlier statement
that the enemy is instability and unpredictability as this rapid change continues to unfold
inside the Soviet Union and inside Eastern Europe.337 In March, at yet another news
336 "Remarks and a Question and A nswer Session at a Luncheon Hosted by the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco, California, 7
February 1990. Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States: George Bush, 1989-1993.
337 Joint News Conference Following Discussions with Chancellor Helmut Kohl o f the Federal Republic o f Germany, 25 February
1990, Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States: George Bush, 1989-1993.
172
conference, the president stated: You know, I get askedthe question is, who is the
M O
enemy? And I answer: uncertainty, unpredictability.
In practice, Bush believed that he could assist Gorbachev at home by verbally
supporting the General Secretarys reforms o f perestroika and glasnost, while promising
economic and technological assistance in the future if political and economic reforms
continued apace in the Soviet Union. His administrations plan for dealing with changes
in the Soviet empire, writes Bush, was to keep up pressure for positive incremental
change, while at the same time refraining from inflammatory rhetoric o f the W ests Cold
W ar victory that might set back the cause o f freedom throughout the Soviet Union rather
than move it forward.339 It is hard to imagine Ronald Reagan making these statements if
the Soviet Union has collapsed under his watch.
As for responding to change in Eastern Europe, Bush was more specific as to
what was necessary to maintain stability. For this region, he would use increased
economic ties with the United States to recognize the reforms already under way, but also
to encourage greater reforms in the future. Brent Scowcroft suggests that George Bush
believed that the most effective way to respond to the changes occurring in the Soviet
sphere o f influence was to focus on Eastern Europe, which reflected the presidents view
that the most likely course of events in the Soviet bloc would be a gradual loosening of
bonds with Moscow and an increasing tolerance for deviation from Leninist-Stalinist
dogmatism.340
338 The Presidents News Conference Following Discussions with Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu o f Japan in Palm Springs,
California, 3 March 1990, Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States: George Bush. 1989-1993.
339 George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed, pp. 180, 207.
340 Ibid. p. 48.
173
In his remarks to the citizens o f Hamtramck, Michigan on 17 April 1989, the
president announced his new policy toward Eastern Europe. The president said he would
be willing to grant Eastern European countries access to our "General System o f
Preferences," which would allow selective tariff relief to beneficiary countries.
Additionally, Bush would request that the U.S. Congress authorize the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation to operate in this region, thereby encouraging U.S. firms to
cooperate with private investors in Eastern Europe.341 The logic behind these ideas was
that the greater the economic ties between the United States and Eastern Europe, the
more likely America would be able to control the pace o f reform, thereby helping to
prevent instability in the region and the potential o f a Soviet backlash.
Responding to the changes taking place in Central America would require yet
another set o f tools. In this region, Bush would pursue his goal o f advancing hemispheric
democratization by combining U.S. support for regional diplomatic initiatives, offering
economic/humanitarian assistance to the counter-revolutionaries in Nicaragua and allied
governments in the region, and continuing the former administration's economic pressure
on the Sandinista government. It was with respect to how he would handle the changes
taking place in El Salvador and Nicaragua that George Bush would differ most
dramatically from Ronald Reagan, especially their different perspectives on the viability
o f negotiations in bringing an end to these crises.
This overall response package chosen by President Bush was indicative o f his
rather conservative beliefs concerning how to respond to change. It also dovetailed nicely
341 "Remarks to the Citizens in Hamtramck, Michigan," 17 April 1989, Public Papers o f the Presidents o fth e United States: George
Bush, 1989-1993. Although the speech at Hamtramck dealt primarily with U.S.-Poiish relations, the same economic linkages would be
used with other Eastern European countries as they moved down the road o f reform.
174
with his national-self image o f the United States. Unlike Reagan, Bush would
ultimately be willing to have other regional actors take the lead in finding a solution to
the regional crisis, namely, through the Contadora peace process. However, the United
States would still remain an active participant, albeit not as active as during the Reagan
years. In essence, the United States would lend a helping hand to peace by staying on the
sidelines o f the Contadora negotiations, while putting pressure on various actors who
were trying to scuttle a potential peace accord. Once the regional actors had brokered
an agreement, the United States would then respond. Thus, one finds Bush believing in
the necessity of helping others establish peace, which fits well within his national self-
image, but not having the United States as involved militarily or economically as had
been the case during the Reagan presidency, which fits nicely within his set of beliefs
regarding how to respond to change.
When Ronald Reagan left office, so toe did the calls for an active military
solution to the crisis in Central America, especially in Nicaragua. This was the most
fundamental difference in the foreign policy approach taken by the two presidents.
George Bush realized that the probability o f having Congress continue to support the
Contras with military assistance was very low. And, even if the president could squeeze
some military aid out o f the Congress for the Contras, the political capital that he would
need to expend, he believed, would be far too great. As mentioned previously, Bush
acknowledged: there was no way, not a snowballs chance in hell, o f getting a dime for
342 Consult chapter 5 for a detailed discussion o f the Bush response to the Contadora peace process.
175
lethal aid-m ilitary aidfrom Congress, in order to assist the Contra program. 343 So,
instead o f pursuing U.S. interests militarily, Bush would promote peace and democracy
for the entire region by supporting the peace accord signed by all the Central American
Presidents in 1987, which not surprisingly was also supported by a majority in the U.S.
Congress. In short, Bush, unlike Reagan, was willing to work with both the United States
Congress and Central American leaders to find a solution to the crises in El Salvador and
Nicaragua.
Prior to the formal announcement o f the Bipartisan Accord on Central America,
Bush told a gathering o f news reporters that the United States shares with the people of
Central America the goals of democracy, security, and peace, and that in order to meet
the challenge o f realizing these goals, we must work together with Latin American
democratic leaders, as well as our European friends.344 At the official announcement of
the bipartisan agreement, Bush noted: "The United States supports the peace and
democratization process and the goals o f the Central American Presidents embodied in
the Esquipulus Accord."345 Esquipulas II, as it became known, called for, among other
things, that all insurgent forces reintegrate voluntarily and peacefully into their
homelands under safe and democratic conditions.
Unlike President Reagan, Bush and his advisors did in fact believe that a regional
peace agreement, generated by Central American leaders, might be a key to solving the
343 Remarks and a Question-and-Answer at a White House Luncheon for Journalists, 31 March 1989, Public Papers o f the
344 The Presidents News Conference, 24 March 1989, Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States: George Bush, 1989-
1993.
345 "Bipartisan Accord on Central America," 24 March 1989, Public Papers o fth e Presidents o f the United States: George Bush,
1989-1993.
176
regional crisis, especially in Nicaragua and El Salvador. This idea o f allowing others
to decide their own political fate with minimal interference from the United States fits
quite nicely with Bushs cautious approach to change and distinguishes his foreign
approach from Ronald Reagans.
The need to respond to change with caution represented not only a key foreign
policy belief, but was also an important feature o f President Bushs personality. In
response to a foreign news agencys question asking whether the United States would
actively make use of its influence in Central America to help promote a peaceful
resolution to the crises, the president responded: In Central America, the United States
government continues to support the Esquipulas II agreement in all o f its provisions,
which include provision for democratic freedom o f press; labor rights; freedom for
opposition groups to organize, hold meeting, demonstrations, etc. We believe that all
commitments including those of democracy, must be complied with if there is to be
lasting peace in the region.346
Secretary of State Baker agreed with the president. In testimony before Congress,
Baker stated that a new approach in Central America, especially toward the crisis in El
Salvador was needed: We believe this is the year to end the war through a negotiated
settlement which guarantees safe political space for all Salvadorans.347 Terry Lynn Karl
suggests that dropping the prior administrations demands for defeating the FMLN
militarily represented a decisive reversal of U.S. policy.348
Written Responses to Questions Submitted by Xinhua New Agency o f China, 16 February 1989, Public Papers o f the Presidents o f
347 Quoted in Terry Lynn Karl, El Salvadors Negotiated Revolution, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 2, p. 150.
348 Ibid.
Ill
At a meeting with Alfredo Cristiani in July 1991, it was Bush who told the
Salvadoran President: Mr. President, difficult steps lie ahead. But the world understands
your commitment to peace, and democracy. The United States and the international
community fully support your efforts for peace, and , will support sound peace accords in
yo ur brave land (emphasis added).349
In a fundamental departure from the Reagan foreign policy toward Nicaragua,
President Bush, in National Security Directive-8, stressed that the first point o f strategy
for dealing with the Sandinista government and the Contra resistance was to seek an
active diplomatic solution to the conflict (emphasis added). Bush, in signing NSD-8,
argued that the first priority o f the United States is to engage in active diplomacy on a
sustained basis for a democratic opening in Nicaragua. We should move toward direct
involvement in negotiations among the five Central American countries. Bilateral
relations with Nicaragua are not excluded, but should be held in reserve.. .and undertaken
only at my direction and in consultation with the Central American democracies and the
internal opposition.350 Clearly, Bushs willingness to pursue a diplomatic end to the
crisis was a remarkable change from the Reagan emphasis on making the Sandinista
government cry uncle and his predecessors much greater willingness to utilize
paramilitary options to overthrow the Nicaraguan government.
President Bush, being a cautious American Tory, however, wanted to hedge his
bets. So, rather than relying on the peace accords alone, he would also ask Congress to
349 Remarks Following Discussions with Alfredo Cristiani Buckard o f El Salvador and an Exchange with Reporters, 12 July 1991,
Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States: George Bush. 1989-1993.
350 National Security Directive 8, U.S. Policy Toward Nicaragua and the Nicaraguan Resistance, 1 May 1989. Copy provided by
the George Bush Presidential Library.
178
continue supporting the Contras through a provision o f humanitarian assistance,
which dovetailed in many respects with the presidents national self-image o f the U.S. to
help others. By signing the Bipartisan Accord on Central America, Congressional leaders,
from both houses and from both sides o f the aisle, promised to provide humanitarian
assistance to the Contras up until the presidential elections in Nicaragua, which were
scheduled to take place on 26 February 1990. The reasoning behind this request was that
it would act as support for the Contras and a disincentive to the Sandinistas so that they
would abide by the terms o f the regional peace accord. B y keeping the Contras funded,
the Sandinista government could rest assured that if they did not follow through with
their promises to allow the counter revolutionaries to peacefully reintegrate into
Nicaraguan society and to hold fair and free elections the following year, then increased
levels o f military aid to the Contras would begin once again.
In addition to providing for continued humanitarian assistance to the Contras,
President Bush would also put economic pressure on the Sandinistas by continuing the
former administration's decision to use economic sanctions against Nicaragua. In his
mandatory notifications to Congress for a continuation o f Ronald Reagans 1985
executive order, the president justifies his decision on the grounds that the government of
Nicaragua still poses "an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and
foreign policy o f the United States."351 As stated above, the president did not fully trust
the Sandinista government to stand by its international promises, so funding the Contras
and continuing economic sanctions would act as leverage on the Nicaraguan government.
351 "Notice o f the Continuation o f the National Emergency With Respect to Nicaragua," 21 April 1989, Public Papers o f the
179
Quite interestingly, but not surprisingly, after the Sandinistas lost the presidential
elections in February 1990, President Bush ordered an end to the economic sanctions,
reintroduced aid packages to the Nicaraguan government in Congress, and reestablished
the country's sugar quota with the United States.352
In sum, George Bush's set o f beliefs concerning the nature o f change were ones
that perceived change as occurring in an unexpected and unpredictable fashion, and that
responding to it should be done in a cautious and prudent manner, so as to minimize the
potential for greater instability. As applied to the enormous transformations that took
place around the world from 1989-1992, Bush believed the tools that would be needed to
respond prudently to these changes would be to support verbally the global reform efforts
toward democracies and free markets, while continuing to utilize diplomatic and
economic carrots and sticks to push the reform process along. And in the context o f the
crises in El Salvador and Nicaragua, negotiations would be key to finally bringing these
conflicts to an end. This willingness to use diplomatic tools in Central America rather
than paramilitary options will provide the key area o f difference when the policies of
Ronald Reagan and George Bush are compared in Chapter 5.
Overall, what can one glean about the Bush foreign policy belief system from the
public and private statements o f the president? One particular idea that emerges is that
352 "White House Fact Sheet on Economic Assistance for Nicaragua, 13 March 1990, Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United
180
George Bush believed that the United States represented something quite special for
the international system o f nation-states. As was the case with Ronald Reagan, the United
States, above all, represented an ideal, the ideal o f freedom. And it was the duty o f the
United States to spread this ideal to others in the international community so that they,
too, could enjoy the blessings o f liberty, political democracy, and free market economies.
This generosity, this service mentality, this sense o f noblesse oblige would be applied to
long-time allies of the United States and former adversaries who were experiencing a
period of transformation. Yet, George Bush also realized that the international
community was oftentimes characterized by a great deal o f uncertainty and instability.
Change can occur in unexpected ways, as it did from 1988-1992. Therefore, Bush
believed that the United States should respond to events not boldly, as Reagan might
have, but conservatively, with a firm sense o f realism in mind. Bush, very much unlike
Reagan, believed that negotiated solutions in El Salvador and Nicaragua could in fact
secure U.S. interests in Central America. Overall, Bush felt that some immutable forces
did not determine history; rather, history is shaped by the decisions o f leaders and
citizens. And, he saw it as his duty as President o f the United States to respond carefully
to the ever-changing contours o f international affairs. His goal was clear: to guide our
country and, in part, selected regions of the world, safely through this tumultuous period
in global history.
181
**********
The impact o f this set o f beliefs, along with those o f President Reagan, will be
examined in the next chapter to see how they shaped the development o f change in U.S.
foreign policy toward El Salvador and Nicaragua in the 1980s and early 1990s.
182
Chapter 5: U.S. Foreign Policy toward Central America in the 1980s
In this chapter I will attempt to establish the connection between presidential
foreign policy beliefs and subsequent foreign policy behavior. Specifically, I will assess
whether the different foreign policy beliefs held by Ronald Reagan and George Bush
contributed to different degrees o f U.S. intervention in the internal political affairs o f El
Salvador and Nicaragua throughout the 1980s (and early 1990s). In an effort to make the
leap from beliefs to behavior, I will use the congruence method to illustrate how beliefs
influenced the subsequent policy choices that were made by the two presidents.
Ronald Reagan's Approach to Central America: A B rief Overview
Ronald Reagan perceived the revolutionary events taking place in Central
America in the early 1980s as nothing more or less than a Soviet-led effort to assist leftist
guerrillas in unseating a number o f U.S. allies in the region. The Soviet goal was to
establish a powerful strategic foothold in Americas backyard. It was believed that
Moscow was attempting to use the Marxist-Leninist governments of Cuba and Nicaragua
to help it accomplish its ultimate objective of a fully communist Central America. In
short, for Reagan, the struggles taking place in Central America in the late 1970s and
early 1980s represented in microcosm the larger international struggle between the Soviet
Union and the United States.
183
The approach that Reagan would take toward Central America was in many
respects a direct response to the perceived failures of President Carters overall strategy
toward the Soviets. The president, along with many members o f his foreign policy team,
believed that Carter's efforts to make U.S. military and economic assistance to allies in
Central America contingent on their human rights record was a misguided policy.353
Harold Molineu suggests: "upon the administration's inception in 1981, the Reagan
policymakers were determined to reshape and correct a foreign policy gone awry, a
policy insufficiently attuned to the overall strategic struggle with the USSR."354
The crisis in E l Salvador
As in any new incoming presidential administration, the international events that a
president must respond to are usually not o f his own choosing and certainly not o f his
own making. This was indeed the case for Ronald Reagan when he entered office in
January 1981 and was faced with a very precarious situation in El Salvador.
353 Committee o f Sante Fe, "A New Inter-American Policy for the Eighties, reprinted in Bruce D. Larkin, ed.. Vital Interests: The
Soviet issue in U.S. Central American Policy," (Boulder,CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988) pp. 11-48. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick,
Dictatorships and Double Standards: Rationalism and Reason in Politics (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982) pp. 23-90. Jeffrey B.
Gayner, "The Department o f State," in Charles L. Heatherly, ed.. Mandate fo r Leadership: Policy Management in a Conservative
Administration (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 1980) pp. 503-598. Richard Nixon, The Real War (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1980)
354 Harold Molineu, U.S. Policy Toward Latin America: From Regionalism to Globalism (Boulder, CO; Westview, 1990) 2nd
edition, p. 191.
184
For nearly the entire decade o f the 1970s, El Salvador had experienced
various levels of political turmoil. Around the time o f the fraudulent 1972 presidential
elections, popular armed elements began to emerge, followed shortly thereafter by the
formation o f popular opposition groups.355From 1975-1979, thousands o f people from a
vast array o f social sectors waged a campaign o f civil disobedience and mass protest
campaigns against the government's unwillingness to establish political and economic
reforms. In response, the military cracked down on its opponents. General Carlos
Romero, El Salvadors top political/military leader, initiated a period o f repression that
resulted in enormous international and domestic criticism.356
As a result of this criticism and with U.S. support, a group o f reform-minded
military officials ousted General Romero and set up a civilian-military revolutionary
junta on 15 October 1979, promising to initiate significant economic and political
reforms. These promised reforms came slowly, if at all.357 Over a period o f 14 months,
three juntas had fallen and a forth was established on 4 December 1980 with Jose
Napoleon Duarte as President.
During the interregnum between the first and forth civilian-military juntas, with
land and social reform at a standstill and internal repression reaching frightening levels,
355 Cynthia McClintock, Revolutionary Movements in Latin America: El Salvador's FMLN and Peru's Shining Path, (Washington,
DC: United States Institute o f Peace Press, 1998) deals quite nicely with the emergence o f the armed resistance in El Salvador. See
especially, pp. 48-63.
356 Marvin E. Gettleman, et.a!., El Salvador: Central America in the New Cold War (New York: The Grove Press, 1986) pp. 54-55.
357 In all fairness, on 6 March 1980 a 2nd civilian-military junta did announce a land reform program under the direction o f the U.S.
Department o f State and the American Institute for Labor Development. The land reforms included three phases: the first was
confiscation o f all properties over 500 hectares; the second, involved seizure o f all land between 150-500 hectares; the third, was a
land-to-tiller program, allowing share-croppers to become owners o f the land they worked on. The first phase was enacted, while the
second was not and the third faced significant opposition to its implementation. See Cynthia Amson, El Salvador: A Revolution
Confronts the United States, pp. 50-51.
185
the popular organizations and the armed resistance began to unify in opposition to the
government. On 18 April 1980 the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR), a broad
coalition of disenchanted political parties, trade unions, church people, professional,
students, and small-businesses was created representing the opposition to the government
from the popular sector.358 The objective of the FDR, writes McClintock: "was to unite
left and center-left groups, both political parties and social organizations."359 In October
1980, the Farabundo Marti Front for National Liberation (FMLN) was established,
bringing together the five groups of the armed left. The following month, the FDR joined
forces with the FMLN, thus creating an official political-military opposition to the
Salvadoran government, the FDR-FMLN.
Jimmy Carters response to both the government and non-government sponsored
terrorism and the unification o f the militant left was to charter a center course between
both camps and to begin to push for the establishment of a less repressive government
that could stave off a large scale left-wing insurrection. Carter planned to use U.S.
economic and military assistance as leverage to push and prod the government in the
direction of reform. As a result, in April 1980, the United States approved $5.7 million in
military aid for El Salvador. By September, $20 million in economic assistance was on its
way to San Salvador.360
Following the brutal rape and murder o f four U.S. churchwomen on 3 December
1980, however, Carter decided to suspend U.S. economic and military aid to the
Salvadoran government. The suspension was short-lived, however. On December 16th
358 Cynthia Amson, El Salvador, pp. 54-57.

359 McClintock, op. cit. p. 52.
360 Gettleson, op. cit. p. 57.
186
and 18th, the president once again opened the monetary pipeline by lending the
Salvadoran government an additional $66.5 million in emergency lethal aid, bringing the
total U.S. assistance for 1980 to $150 million.361
Luckily for the government, the money was being sent just in time. In late
December, the FMLN began a series o f attacks on government installations in the
northern province o f Chalatenango. On 11 January 1980, ten days before the inauguration
o f Ronald Reagan, the FMLN launched its general offensive throughout El Salvador. The
goals o f the rebels included: setting o ff a general insurrection throughout the country;
hoping the Army would split, with its moderate elements joining the FMLN; and, to
present the incoming Reagan administration with a fa il accompli o f another successful
revolutionary movement in Central America. The rebels failed to accomplish any o f these
objectives in their offensive, but would continue to fight. In response, Carter, just prior to
leaving office, supplied the Salvadoran government with an additional set o f grants worth
"if.*)
$10 million and sent six U.S. military advisors to help train the Salvadoran army.
The Reagan Response
When Ronald Reagan became president he was determined to shore up U.S. allies
in Central America who were facing left-wing insurrections and to draw the line against
Soviet encroachments in the Western Hemisphere. Just prior to taking office, the
president-elect told the Wall Street Journal: "the Soviet Union underlies all the unrest
361 Ibid.
362 Ibid. pp. 57-58.
187
that is going o n ...If they weren't engaged in this game o f dominoes, there wouldn't be
any hot spots in the world."363 This statement by the president was a clear reflection o f
his set o f beliefs concerning the Soviet Union, the United States major international
adversary. As applied to the crisis in El Salvador, what this mindset entailed, writes
Thomas Carothers, was that "El Salvador was not a civil war in a small, remote country,
but a geo-strategic crisis o f m ajor proportions. It was the hottest flash point o f the
perceived Soviet-Cuban campaign to spread communism throughout Central
America."364 Reagan's first Secretary o f State, A1 Haig, sums up the administration's
viewpoint:
El Salvador was not merely a local problem. It was also a regional problem that
threatened the stability o f all Central America, including the Panama Canal and
Mexico and Guatemala with their vast oil reserves. And it was a global issue
because it represented the interjection o f the war of national liberation into the
Western Hemisphere.365
It was quite apparent to most observers that President Reagan was not going to take a
wait-and-see approach to the crisis. But the exact measures that he would use to respond
to the events taking place in El Salvador had not yet been determined.
363 Quoted in William M. LeoGrande, O ur Own Backyard: The United States in Central America. 1977-1992 (Chapel Hill, NC: The
University o f North Carolina Press, 1998) p. 53.
364 Thomas Carothers, In the Name o f Democracy: U.S. Policy Toward Latin America in the Reagan Years (Berkeley, CA:
University o f California Press, 1991) p. 15.
365 Alexander Haig, Caveat: Realism. Reagan, and Foreign Policy (New York: MacMillan Publishing, 1984) p. 118.
188
During the first month o f his presidency, the president would have to decide
on a course o f action for U.S. policy toward El Salvador. The decisions that he would
make would lay the groundwork for nearly all of the subsequent foreign policy decisions
concerning El Salvador during his eight years in office.
The Congruence Method and R eagans policy choices fo r E l Salvador
Following the requirements o f congruence method,366one must posit all plausible
courses o f action that could have been used in reaching a foreign policy decision(s) and
then show how a decision-makers beliefs would logically lead to certain choices of
actions rather than others.367 In his most frequently cited work, Analogies at War, Yuen
Foong Khong uses the congruence method to show how U.S. foreign policy decision
makers relied in part on the historical analogies of Korea and Dien Bien Phu to make
><ro
decisions concerning whether and how to intervene militarily in Vietnam. Khong, in
his analysis, discovered that the analogies that were used by U.S. policy makers tended to
bound and limit the choice options these decision makers considered viable, and thus
influenced their selection of the course o f action that the United States would take in
Vietnam during the early years o f the Johnson administration. Below, the same logic will
be applied in linking the beliefs held by President Reagan and President Bush and the
366 See introduction for discussion o f the congruence method.

367 Throughout this chapter, for each of the policy approaches adopted by Reagan and Bush in responding to events in El Salvador
and Nicaragua, I will posit four possible options that the president could have chosen, ranging from those requiring little or no action
to those involving the outright use o f military force. T he options that I have selected are linked to the dependent variable scale that
was discussed in Chapter 2.
368 Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions o f 1965 (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1992)
189
options they would consider using in response to the events taking place in El
Salvador and Nicaragua.
Diagram 1 provides a summary of the main options that President Reagan could
choose from to deal with the crisis in El Salvador.
(Diagram 1 here)
190
DIAGRAM 1: REAGANS POLICY CHOICES FOR EL SALVADOR, 1981-
1989
(NOT CHOSEN)
Consistent with-> Option 4
Military invasion
(CHOSEN)
Also consistent with-} Option 3
Low intensity
conflict
(U.S. advisors,
military exercises,
economic & military
aid, PR campaign)
Ronald Reagans
Foreign Policy Belief System
(NOT CHOSEN)
Not consistent with-} Option 2
ContingentMilitary
and Economic Aid;
Promotion o f the use
o f peace negotiations
(NOT CHOSEN)
Not consistent with-}- Option 1
Do nothing
191
From the starting point o f a presidential foreign policy belief system that
emphasized an active global role for America in promoting and guiding positive change,
coupled with a belief in a dangerous international environment whereby the United States
needed to counter the expansionist forces o f the Soviet Union and its proxies (See
Chapter 3), four possible options were available to the president to handle the
revolutionary activity taking place in El Salvador.
The first was to refrain from any interventionist activity whatsoever. I f chosen,
this option would require that the president take a wait-and-see approach to the crisis and
then deal with whichever faction ultimately emerged victorious. The second was to
continue the Carter policy o f using economic and military assistance as a carrot and/or
stick in order to put pressure on the Salvadoran government to implement governmental
and economic reforms.369 The third was to use low-intensity conflict. W ith this option,
the United States would develop a strategy o f limited use o f force against the leftist
insurgents via the Salvadoran Government/Army.
It should be noted that the low intensity conflict option involved a broad range o f
possible courses o f action, including economic and military assistance, the sending of
U.S. military advisors, the use o f regional military exercises, and a widespread public
relations campaign to win over public opinion370 As Michael Klare and Peter Kombluh
suggest, low intensity conflict involves not only military assistance, but also
369 For an outstanding analysis o f Carters policy toward Central America consult William M. LeoGrande, O ur Own Backyard,
Chapters 2 & 3.
370 For a detailed description o f "low intensity conflict" see Michael T. Klare, "The New Strategic Doctrine," The Nation, December
28, 1985. As this tactic applied to El Salvador see Terry Lynn Karl, "El Salvador's Negotiated Revolution," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71,
No. 2 (Spring 1992) pp. 147-164.
192
nontraditional forms o f coercion- economic, diplomatic, psychological, and
paramilitary.371
The presidents fourth option would be to send in the Marines to defeat the rebel
forces in an effort to secure a government in power that would be closely allied with
Washington. It is my argument that Ronald Reagan's foreign policy beliefs would lead
him to select either option 3 (low intensity conflict) or option 4 (direct use of force),
while not considering option 1 (do-nothing) at all, and giving only partial consideration to
option 2 (Carters contingent aid policy).
As will be demonstrated below, option 3, low intensity conflict, emerged as the
policy o f choice for President Reagan. This policy option, as applied to the crisis in El
Salvador, consisted of various military and non-military actions below the threshold o f
full-scale war, including: little-to no-strings economic and military aid; the transfer of
arms; the provision of military advisors; economic and psychological operations aimed at
minimizing the peasant support for the rebel opposition; and, a public relations campaign
geared toward winning greater domestic and international support for the presidents
foreign policy agenda.372
Beginning in late January 1981, all four options that are listed in Diagram 1 were
discussed in a series of National Security Council (NSC) meetings.373 A t a January 23rd
session, which was devoted entirely to El Salvador, option 1, the do-nothing approach,
was eliminated. The question on policy-makers minds was not whether the United States
371 Michael T. Klare and Peter Kombluh, The New Interventionism: Low-Intensity Warfare in the 1980s and Beyond, in Klare and
Kombluh, eds., Low-fntensity Warfare: Counterinsurgency, Proinsurgency, and Antiterrorism in the Eighties (New York: Pantheon
Books, 1988) p. 8.
372 Michael T. Klare, The New U.S. Strategic Doctrine, The Nation (December 28, 1985/January 4, 1986).
373 Alexander Haig, Caveat, p. 128-130.
193
should respond, but rather in what way it should respond, and how quickly. Questions
were also raised as to whether additional U.S. military advisors should be sent to assist
the Salvadoran army and what specific roles these advisors should play.374 And even
though none o f these queries were answered definitively at the January meeting, it was
decided that U.S. economic and military assistance, the amount o f which would be
determined at a later date, would be given to the Salvadoran government, and that U.S.
military advisors stationed in El Salvador would remain.
This decision, it should be noted, was the first in a series o f decisions that mark
the initial stages of the adoption o f the low intensity conflict strategy for responding to
the events in El Salvador. And although it appears that the decision simply to grant
economic and military assistance was in reality the selection of option 2, the assistance
that would be given was not contingent on improvements being made in the Salvadoran
governments human rights record, thus differentiating it from a replay o f the earlier
Carter policy (option 2).
At the January 23rd meeting, the president's advisors divided into two camps. One
camp, which included Vice-President Bush, Secretary o f Defense Casper Weinberger,
Director o f Central Intelligence William Casey, and National Security Advisor Richard
Allen, advised the president that El Salvador should be treated as a local problem and that
military and economic assistance should be given in an incremental fashion to the
Salvadoran government. This aid, these advisors believed, should be combined with
covert measures to interdict the flow o f arms into El Salvador from neighboring
Nicaragua. The second camp represented the position of Secretary o f State Alexander
374 Ibid., p. 128.
194
Haig, who agreed with the first camp that assistance should be given to the
Salvadoran government, but that the United States should also put a heavy dose o f
military, political, and economic pressure on Cuba. Haig was quite clear in his belief that
Cuba, backed by the Soviets, was the source of nearly all the mischief in Central
America.375 Both camps, did, however, agree that some action was indeed necessary.
In February, the State Department announced that the United States was no longer
demanding that the military and economic assistance given to the Salvadoran government
be contingent on its human rights record, nor was the United States insisting that the
Salvadoran government proceed with its investigations o f the murders o f U.S. citizens.
Both o f these decisions were the clear signals that option 2 was no longer being seriously
considered by the administration.
Prior to even taking office, Reagan provided the public with a glimpse o f how he
perceived the issue o f concern for human rights should affect U.S. foreign policy. In a
personal interview with TIME magazines Laurence Barrett, Reagan stated that the
United States was not planning on basing its decisions to provide economic and military
assistance on a countrys human rights record.377 In response to a question that asked how
strongly the U.S. should push nations like those in Central America on human rights, the
president-elect stated:
We should not carry our campaign for human rights to some small country we can
pressure to the point where the government that, lets say, partially violates
375 Ibid. p. 129.

376 William L. LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, p. 85.
377 An Interview with Ronald Reagan, TIME, 5 January 1981.
195
human rights in our eyes is succeeded by a government that denies all human
rights.. .What I believe is that we do our utmost to bring about [improvement in
human rights] in those countries that are aligned with us, but not at the expense of
helping an overthrow by a [faction] that is totalitarian.378
In late February, the NSC formally approved its initial policy toward El Salvador.
The president would supply $25 million in emergency military aid. Moreover, twenty-six
additional military advisors would be sent to El Salvador, bringing the total number of
U.S. advisors in the country to fifty-four.379
The NSC decision, not surprisingly, followed in the wake of the State
Department's release o f the "White Paper" on 23 February 1981. The paper titled:
"Communist Interference in El Salvador," argued that the U.S. government had definitive
proof showing that the Salvadoran rebels had received military assistance from
Nicaragua, Cuba, the Soviet Union and a host o f Eastem-Bloc countries. More
importantly, the report provided the needed rationale for the presidents decision to begin
pumping in huge amounts o f military and economic assistance to the Salvadoran
government.380
The policy consequence o f the initial NSC decision, along with the State
Departments announcement, was another signal that option 2, a continuation o f Carter's
policy o f using U.S. aid to promote economic and political reforms, was also not going to
378 Ibid.
379 William LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, pp. 85-89.
380 Report by the Department ofState, February 23, 1981. Document 670. American Foreign Policy: Current Documents 1981.
Department o fS tate Publications 9384.
196
be accepted, at least not for the time being. Instead, President Reagan saw the need to
adopt a policy of low intensity conflict. The goal was to help the Salvadorans win the war
on the battlefield rather than to push for negotiations between the rebels and the
Salvadoran government. Reagan expressed his preference for a military solution in
January 1981:
Concerning El Salvador, I think that there is one thing you have to say about the
situation there: it is almost a kind o f civil war. When that is happening, and if
reforms are needed- and admittedly reforms are needed- you do not try to fight a
civil war and institute reforms at the same time. Get rid o f the war. Then go
JQ 1
forw ard with the reforms (Emphasis added).
The way Ronald Reagan planned to get rid o f the war was to provide the government
o f El Salvador with enough military and economic assistance and training by U.S.
advisors to defeat the Marxist-Leninist rebels on the field of battle.
Februarys NSC decision was followed shortly thereafter by a 9 March 1981
"Presidential Finding" to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which in turn would
report to the intelligence committees in Congress. In his finding, Reagan authorized the
CIA to spend nearly $20 million to fund anti-Sandinista forces operating in Nicaragua382
381 An interview with Ronald Reagan, Time, January 5, 1981.

382 This presidential finding is considered the first step in the creation o f the Contra forces in Nicaragua.
197
in addition to establishing a paramilitary arms interdiction campaign to put an end to
the flow o f military weapons that was moving from Nicaragua to the Salvadoran
rebels.383
Reagan's March finding would eventually culminate in the signing o f National
Security Decision Directive-17 (NSDD-17) on 4 January 1982, which established official
U.S. national security policy toward Cuba and Central America. The provisions of
NSDD- 17 included: $350 million in U.S. assistance for the region, a counterinsurgency
and counterintelligence training program, and a public relations campaign aimed at U.S.
audiences to win greater support for the president's Central American policies.384
Occurring alongside these NSC decisions was a concerted effort on the part of the
president to obtain supplemental Congressional funding to support the Salvadoran
government for the upcoming fiscal year. In March 1981, Reagan requested that
Congress appropriate nearly $120 million in military and economic assistance. Congress,
although quite skeptical of the motivation behind Reagan's policies, agreed the following
month to authorize the request, but required that the president, every six months, certify
that the Salvadoran government was making progress both in its human rights record and
in pursuing a negotiated end to the fighting. Reagan accepted the certification

1Q C
requirements and signed the bill into law.
383 Christopher Simpson, The National Security Directives o f the Reagan and Bush Administrations: The Declassified History o f U.S
Political and Military Policy, 1981-1991 (Boulder,CO: Westview Press, 1995) p. 18.
384 Ibid. pp. 53-54. In addition to NSDD 17, President Reagan on 28 May 1982 signed NSDD 37 and 37a that called for an increased
public relations blitz to gain greater support for the administration's policy toward Cuba and Central America. Also, NSDD 39 was
signed on 25 October 1982 in order to win greater support for the interdiction campaign that was seeking to stem the flow of arms
from Nicaragua and HI Salvador. See pp. 128, p. 208.
385 LeoGrande, O ur Own Backyard, pp. 131-134.
198
Reagan, it should be noted, was willing to accept these Congressional
demands in large part because the certification requirements were such that the
administration needed only to show that progress was being made toward these ends, not
that they were being actually put into effect. In a sense, then, Congress was putting some
restrictions on what the president could do, but they were not yet tying his hands
completely. In fact, in his first certification to Congress in January 1982, Reagan was
willing to claim that progress had indeed been made in complying with internationally
recognized human rights, that the Salvadoran government was achieving substantial
control over all elements of its own armed forces, that there was continued progress in
implementing essential economic and political reforms, that the Salvadoran government
was committed to holding o f free elections at an early date, and that the government
had made good faith efforts to investigate the murders o f the six United States citizens
in El Salvador.386
Also taking place in the second half o f 1981 was an effort by moderates within
the administration, led by Assistant Secretary o f State for Inter-American affairs, Thomas
Enders, to recapture some of the power they lost initially to the hard-liners concerning
U.S. policy toward El Salvador. Enders believed that the most effective course o f action
in El Salvador was not unlimited support for the government/military, but to use U.S. aid
as leverage in order to push forward political reform, a policy nearly identical to Jimmy
Carter's (option 2).387 Enders argued that by pressuring the government to hold elections,
the rebels might lose some o f their moderate supporters who would then enter the
386 Determination to Authorize Continued Assistance for El Salvador, 28 January 1982, National Security Archives, El Salvador
Collection, Document # ES02497.
387 For the similarities between Enders approach and the Carters consult Thomas Carothers, In the Name o f Democracy, pp. 19-20.
199
political arena. The result would be not only a legitimately elected government, but
also a weakening o f the insurgents to the point where they would no longer pose a threat
to the government.
Additionally, by nesting Reagan's anticommunist crusade under the banner of
democracy and free elections, Enders believed that much of the congressional criticism
and outright opposition that the president faced would melt away. The logic was that no
member o f Congress could possibly oppose advancing the cause o f democracy in the
developing world. Reagan Chief-of-Staff, James Baker, who did not want the Central
American imbroglio to distract Ronald Reagan from his domestic policy agenda,
supported Enders in his efforts to regain some control over Central American policy.
By July, Enders had won a temporary victory. At a World Affairs Council
meeting, Enders, in the first major public announcement on Central America by the
Reagan administration, stated that the United States was seeking a political solution, not a
military one to the crisis. And, it would be elections, not a negotiated settlement that
*J Q Q
would be used to bring peace to El Salvador. Ronald Reagan would support the
election option for El Salvador in public, while continuing to provide large amounts of
economic and military assistance to the Salvadoran government.
It should be noted that Reagan realized that in order to receive Congressional
approval for increased levels o f economic and military assistance for the government of
El Salvador, he could not possibly oppose supporting elections for the country, even
though seeking a political solution may have run counter to his beliefs. What Reagan
388 LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, pp. 126-127.

389 Ibid. 127. See also Carothers, In the Name o f Democracy, pp. 19-20.
200
would not tolerate, however, was a negotiated solution that included any type of
power sharing between the government and the rebels. Nonetheless, it should also be
mentioned, that because o f the initial policy, the United States would play a key role in
promoting the 1982 Constituent Assembly elections in El Salvador and in helping to keep
right-wing political party candidate Roberto D'Aubuisson from obtaining the position of
provisional president.390
Unfortunately for Enders, the FMLN did not trust the electoral process, and his
earlier victory in shaping U.S. foreign policy for the region was ephemeral. In late 1981
and throughout 1982, the rebels went on the attack. Government outposts were sacked
and the rebels tried continuously to cripple the Salvadoran economy. By the end o f the
year, the armed resistance had destroyed over 32 bridges throughout the country.391 The
success of the FMLN in 1982 and the inability o f the Salvadoran army to control the
resistance prompted a policy review by the Reagan administration in early 1983.
Added to the situation on the ground was the fact that the Enders policy ran
counter in many ways to what Reagan and his more hard-line advisors believed was
necessary to win in Central America. The Salvadoran government was under heavy
pressure from the rebels, and as mentioned above, Reagan felt that the best course of
action was to get rid o f the war. Then proceed with reforms.392 Therefore, well in
advance of the 1983 policy review, President Reagan decided to come to the aid o f the
Salvadoran government. In February 1982, the president, using the power given to him in
390 U.S. opposition to ARENA candidate D'Aubuisson was based on the fear that if the right-wing took full control in El Salvador
and continued with its death squad activities, it was be virtually impossible to get Congress to provide for additional funding to
support the Salvadoran government.
392 An interview with Ronald Reagan, Time, January 5, 1981.
201
the Foreign Assistance Act o f 1962, decided to provide the Salvadoran government
with $55 million in emergency military assistance. In his presidential determination,
Reagan authorized the furnishing of up to $55,000,000 in defense articles from the
stocks o f the Department o f Defense, defense services of the Department o f Defense, and
military education and training, to El Salvador under the provisions o f chapters 2 and 5 o f
part II o f the Act.393 It should be noted that this provision o f emergency military
assistance was delivered without any approval from the U.S. Congress.
Quite interestingly, the declining state o f affairs in El Salvador was mirrored by
the declining influence o f the moderate faction within the Reagan administration.394 By
the Spring o f 1983, Thomas Enders had been fired, and interventionist option 2, the
replay o f Carter's reform initiatives, had been put aside once again. One reason for
scrapping option 2, o f course, was that President Reagans core beliefs did not match
Ender's preferences for a diplomatic solution. Writes one Reagan administration official:
"We talked about diplomacy, but it began as a cover story for what we were really trying
to do."395 Reagan saw the need for a military victory and ardently supported low intensity
conflict, albeit not vociferously in his public addresses because o f the need for
Congressional approval for the amounts o f economic and military assistance that he
planned on providing to the Salvadoran government.
In an effort to try to gain public and Congressional support for his national
security policies, especially as they related to Central America, the president in January
393 Determination to Authorize the Furnishing oflmm ediate Military Assistance to El Salvador, 2 February 1892, National Security
Archives, El Salvador Collection, Document # ES02535.
394 Although Ronald Reagan did support Enders idea o f elections for El Salvador, when Enders floated the idea o f possible
negotiations between the government and rebels, the hard-liners pushed for his removal, which occurred in late May 1983.
395 Quoted in LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, p. 555.
202
1983 signed National Security Decision Directive-77 (NSDD-77). The purpose of the
directive was to establish a Special Planning Group whose membership included the
Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director o f the United States Information Agency
and the Director of the Agency for International Development, whose goal it was to
strengthen the organization, planning, direction and coordination o f the various aspects o f
public diplomacy of the United States government to generate support for our national
security objectives.396
Because of the declining state of affairs in Central America in early 1983, the
president sent his Ambassador to the United Nations, Jeane Kirkpatrick on a fact-finding
mission to the region in February. Kirkpatrick reported back to the president and told him
that the situation on the ground in El Salvador looked even bleaker than was originally
anticipated. As a result, President Reagan redoubled his efforts to provide the Salvadoran
government with enough military and economic assistance to prevent a rebel victory.397
On 24 February 1983, Reagan signed NSDD-82, which included $60 million in
emergency military aid for the Salvadoran army. The directive also mandated that
additional U.S. military advisors be sent to El Salvador. Finally, Reagan agreed to help
with the establishment o f a countrywide counter-insurgency effort, including civic action
and psychological operations.398 As was the case with NSDD-77 and the earlier
presidential findings, NSDD-82 was another clear indicator that the low intensity conflict
option was the policy o f choice for the president.
396 Management o f Public Diplomacy Relative to National Security, 14 January 1983, National Security Archives, Iran-Contra
Collection, Document # IC00068.
397 Kirkpatrick's trip to Central American is reported in LeoGrande, O ur Own Backyard, p. 185-186.
398 Christopher Simpson, National Security Directives, p. 276-277
203
In his speech on El Salvador to the National Association o f Manufacturers
in March, Reagan revealed his new foreign policy for Central America. The president
announced: Im proposing that $60 million o f the moneys already appropriated for our
worldwide military assistance programs be immediately reallocated to El Salvador, and
that the focus o f this assistance will remain the same to train Salvadorans so that they
can defend themselves.399 The president also noted: only Salvadorans can fight this
war, just as only Salvadorans can decide El Salvadors future. What we can do is help to
give them the skills and supplies they need to do the job themselves. Carefully couching
his address under the mantle o f promoting democracy and human rights for the region in
order to win support in the national legislature, Reagan went on to say: I will ask
Congress for $65 million in new moneys and the reprogramming o f $103 million from
already appropriated worldwide funds, for a total o f $168 million in increased economic
assistance.400
As for the prospects of a negotiated settlement to the crisis, Reagan remained
skeptical. This was to be expected considering his core beliefs regarding how the United
States should respond to change. The president emphasized that his administration
already supported negotiations, but only negotiations that were designed to strengthen
democracy, to halt subversion, to stop the flow o f arms, to respect borders, and to remove
all the foreign military advisors the Soviets, the Cubans, the East Germans, the PLOs,
399 Remarks on Central America and El Salvador at the Annual Meeting o f the National Association o f M anufacturers, 10 March
1983, The Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States: Ronald Reagan. 1981-1989 (Washington: Federal Register Division,
National Archives and Record Services Administration)
400 Ibid.
204
as well as our own from the region. What Ronald Reagan did oppose once again,
however, were:
Negotiations that could be used as a cynical device for dividing up power behind
the peoples back. We cannot support negotiations which, instead o f expanding
democracy, try to destroy it; negotiations which would simply distribute power
among armed groups without the consent o f the people o f El Salvador.401
In the House and Senate, meanwhile, the president was facing strident opposition
from liberal Democrats regarding his requests for increased levels o f economic and
military assistance. As in 1981 and 1982, Congressional opposition stemmed in large
part from the brutal violation o f human rights by the Salvadoran Government and Army
on the Salvadoran population. Realizing that congressional opinion was not in his favor,
on 27 April 1983, Reagan, in a rare presidential maneuver, addressed both chambers of
Congress in an effort to win support for his aid package. The president stated in very
forthright terms that the crisis in El Salvador threatened U.S. national security. He framed
his argument overall in terms o f U.S. credibility, telling his audience:
If we cannot defend ourselves there, we cannot expect to prevail elsewhere. Our
credibility would collapse, our alliances would crumble, and the safety o f our
homeland would be put in jeopardy. We have a vital interest, a moral duty, and a
solemn responsibility. This is not a partisan issue. It is a question o f our meeting
401 Ibid.
205
our moral responsibility to ourselves, our friends, and our posterity. It is a
duty that falls on all of us- the President, the Congress, and the people. We must
perform it together. Who among us would wish to bear responsibility for failing to
meet our shared obligation? 402
How would the United States protect its credibility, while at same time supporting
an allied government? Reagan announced that the United States planned to pursue four
goals. The first would be to promote regional democratization: This means using our
assistance, our powers o f persuasion, and our legitimate leverage to bolster humane
democratic systems where they already exist and to help countries on their way to that
goal complete the process as quickly as human institutions can be changed. The second
goal would be to support economic development through traditional aid and increased
economic ties. The third goal will be to support the security o f the regions threatened
nations. Reagan was quite lucid in describing the need for military assistance:
No amount o f reform will bring peace so long as guerrillas believe they will win
by force. No amount of economic help will suffice if guerrilla units can destroy
roads and bridges and power stations and crops, again and again, with impunity.
But with better training and material help, our neighbors can hold off the
guerrillas and give democratic reform time to take root.403
402 "Address Before a Joint Session o f the Congress on Central America, 27 April 1983, Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the
United States: Ronald Reagan. 1981-1989.
403 Ibid. p. 606.
206
The fourth goal was to support dialogue and negotiations between both countries in
the region and within them. But, this dialogue/negotiations would have to contain certain
provisions:
The United States will support any agreement among Central American countries
for the withdrawal, under fully verifiable and reciprocal conditions, o f all foreign
military and security advisors...W e will support any verifiable, reciprocal
agreement among Central American countries on the renunciation o f support for
insurgencies on neighbors territory. And, finally, we desire to help Central
America end its costly arms race and will support any verifiable, reciprocal
agreements on the nonimportation o f offensive weapons.404
It is clear that the terms that the president laid out in order to have the United States
accept a negotiated end to the crisis were such that this option was virtually a non-option
as soon as it was announced. Verification was the key. The United States would demand
that verification criteria would be extensive, and this is something that Washington
realized that neither the Sandinistas nor Cuba nor their Soviet backers would support.
Shortly after the presidents speech, Congress agreed to approve Reagan's request,
allowing the president to offer an additional $65 million to the Salvadoran government,
and thus giving the president even less reason to pursue a diplomatic end to the civil war.
Even though Congress had agreed to fund the presidents foreign policy program
for El Salvador, the situation on the ground did not improve, thus causing a great deal of
404 Ibid.
207
consternation for the president. In a top-secret memorandum written by Reagan in
July 1983 to his Secretaries ofS tate and Defense, the Director o f the Central Intelligence,
and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs o f Staff, the president acknowledged that the
security situation in Central America was deteriorating, in large part because o f what he
believed to be inadequate funding. Moreover, Reagan saw a persistent lack o f public
understanding of our interests, objectives, the threat, and our policies for dealing with
Central American problems. As a result o f these problems, the president concluded that
it is necessary both to increase the U.S. military presence in the area and to intensify the
public relations campaign. The reason for adopting these measures, writes Reagan, was to
improve as quickly as possible our ability to deter the consolidation o f a Marxist-
Leninist state in Central America which could serve as a base for Soviet power projection
and/or destabilization o f other states in the region.405
The official policy outcome that resulted from this presidential memo was the
creation o f National Security Decision Directive100 (NSDD-100). This directive
provided for enhanced U.S. military activity and assistance for Central America,
specifically for El Salvador and the Contras in Nicaragua. As it pertained to El Salvador,
the president, in NSDD-100, noted:
The democratic states o f Central America must be assisted to the maximum
degree possible in defending themselves against externally supported subversion
or hostile neighbors. U.S. military activities in the region must be significantly
405 Central America, 12 July 1983, National Security Archive, Nicaragua Collection, D ocum ent# NIO1758.
208
increased to demonstrate our willingness to defend our Allies and to deter
further Cuban and Soviet Bloc intervention.406
Here again, one can see a reflection o f the presidents beliefs concerning the nature o f the
adversary in the region and the means to respond to a challenge to U.S. interests.
In order to shore up U.S. allies in the region, a number of measures were
approved. The first was to expand U.S. military activities and exercises in the Caribbean
Basin and along the Pacific Coast o f Central America. The second was for the Secretaries
o f State and Defense to coordinate a public diplomacy effort to boost the overall level of
support for the presidents policy toward the region. The third was for the Department of
Defense to move ahead with the already scheduled Big Pine II naval exercises and to
reassess the needs o f the Salvadoran armed forces. As the president notes: The Secretary
o f Defense will review the military training requirements o f El Salvador with a view to
determining if the number of military trainers is adequate. If more are deemed necessary,
the Department o f Defense will develop a credible and defensible rationale and
legislative strategy designed to increase the number to the appropriate level.407
Taken together, these decisions illustrate that the President was not looking for a
negotiated settlement o f the crisis, at least not in 1983. Both NSDD-82 and NSDD-100
signaled that Reagan was hoping to pursue a course o f low intensity conflict for dealing
with the insurgency in El Salvador.
100), 28 July 1983, National Security Archive, Nicaragua Collection, Document # NIO1781.
407 Ibid.
209
Events taking place in El Salvador over the next year helped the president sell
his program to a reluctant U.S. Congress. On 25 March 1984, El Salvador held its first
genuine democratic presidential elections in its nation's history, elections that were
vigorously supported by Ronald Reagan. The president realized that Liberal opponents in
Congress would watch the 1984 elections very closely. If the elections were considered
fair and free, Reagan realized that the probability o f getting increased funding from
Capitol Hill for his foreign policy agenda in Central America would also increase.
In the Salvadoran elections, Reagan initially supported National Conciliation
Party (PCN) candidate Francisco Guerrero who was seen as a moderate politically
between the left and far right.408 However, after the ballots were counted Guerrero had
placed a distant third behind Christian Democratic Party (CDN) candidate, Jose Napoleon
Duarte, and Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) candidate, Roberto D' Aubuisson.
In the run-off between Duarte and D'Aubuisson, Washington bet its chips on
Duarte, or more accurately, gave the Christian Democrat a lot o f its own chips. As
Thomas Carothers points out: "the administration provided Duarte both covert and overt
assistance. The Central Intelligence Agency reportedly gave a significant amount o f
funds, possibly between SI million and $3 million." Overtly, the U.S. embassy lobbied
intensely for Duarte in El Salvador, "making sure all major political sectors understood
that the United States government favored a Duarte victory and that a victory by the right
would jeopardize the extensive economic and military aid relationship between the two
408 LeoGrande reports that in the first round o f the presidential elections the CIA provided Guerrero with nearly a half a million
dollars to boost his campaign. Our Own Backyard, pp. 247-248.
210
countries."409 Not surprisingly, in the May run-off election, Duarte won with nearly
54% o f the popular vote.410
For the remainder o f the his presidency, Reagans policy toward El Salvador
would be centered on propping up Duarte from challenges he faced from extremists on
both the right and left. How would this be done? Very simply, by inundating the
Salvadoran government with U.S. economic and military largesse. A few examples are
sufficient to support this point. Just prior to his run-off victory, Reagan used his
emergency powers to send $32 million in military aid to the Salvadoran government.411
After the election, the foreign assistance pipeline really began to flow. Fresh o ff his
electoral victory, Duarte came to Washington and swept Congress off its feet. Both the
House and Senate approved Reagan's supplemental requests for 1984, which when added
to the original appropriation, amounted to a grand total o f nearly $200 million for 1984
alone.412This allocation o f economic and military assistance, it should be noted, came
with very few, if any, formal strings attached. The aid was just one part o f the Reagan
strategy of low intensity conflict, however.
In addition to helping convince the U.S. Congress to continue to aid the
Salvadoran government, the president, in a secret memorandum written in June 1984,
decided to move forward with the implementation o f National Security Decision
Directive-124 (NSDD-124). As it applied to El Salvador, the president requested that the
Secretary o f Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs o f Staff proceed with creating
409 Thomas Carothers, In the Name o f Democracy, p. 30

411 Gcttleman et.al.,, El Salvador, p, 60
211
contingency plans to increase once again U.S. military activities, exercises, and
intelligence gathering in Central America. The purpose o f these actions, writes Reagan,
was to demonstrate U.S. resolve and enhance the confidence o f friendly countries in the
region. The president went on to say that these actions would also serve to provide
intelligence and an active U.S. military involvement in the region which would
deter/disrupt the expected communist guerrilla offensive in El Salvador.413
The Reagan budgetary request for El Salvador in 1985, in the amount o f $128
million, passed both houses o f Congress in December 1984 as part o f a continuing
resolution. Perhaps most surprising o f all, however, was the decision by Congress not to
place certification requirements on the aid. In both his 1986 & 1987 foreign aid requests,
Reagan was practically given a blank check by Congress. The only stipulation on the
appropriated funds was that if the Duarte government were overthrown, Congress would
cut o ff the assistance. What this meant in practice was that Reagan was free to provide
military and economic assistance to the Duarte government up to the full level o f his
original requests 414 Reagan took advantage of Congress' generosity, providing the
Salvadoran government with $444 million in 1986 and $570 million in 1987.415
By 1984 and throughout the 2nd Reagan administration, support for Jose Napoleon
Duarte had become the keystone to U.S. policy in El Salvador. In fact, from 1984-1988,
the United States, writes Terry Lynn Karl, was providing the Duarte administration with
up to $1.2 million a day to fend o ff a rebel victory. 416 And, as long as Duarte continued
413 "Central America: NSPG Meeting o f June 25, 1984, National Security Archives, Iran-Contra Collection, Document # IC00462.
414 LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, pp. 275-276
415 Figures quoted in McClintock, Revolutionary Movements, p. 204.
416 Terry Lynn Karl, op. cit. p. 148.
212
to prosecute the war against the FMLN and did not foolishly agree to a power-sharing
formula with the insurgents via negotiations, Washington would continue to support
him.417
President Reagan would leave office a few months prior to President Duarte's
departure from the political scene in El Salvador. Dealing with the next Salvadoran
administration would be left to a new president who would enter the White House in
January 1989.
Reagan Confronts the Sandinistas in Nicaragua
In July 1979, the Somoza dynasty, which had ruled in Nicaragua since the 1930s,
came to a sudden and abrupt end. A leftist revolutionary movement, led by the Sandinista
National Liberation Front (FSLN), swept into power. From 1979-1981, President Carter
fluctuated in his support and/or disapproval of the FSLN. Economic aid was offered, only
to be rescinded later on; diplomatic negotiations were attempted, only to be eventually
417 After his 1984 electoral victory, Duarte did begin negotiations with the FDR-FMLN. However, the Christian Democrat was only
willing to end the fighting if the FDR-FMLN agreed to enter the political arena. The FMLN, on the other hand, continued to press for
a power-sharing formula in order for them to lay down their arms and for an end to U.S. assistance and a removal o f U.S. advisors
from the country. Both sides refused to budge and the talks were ended in 1985. F o ra good description o f both sides positions consult
LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, pp. 262-264.
213
tossed aside. Carter's approach seemed to be in a state o f confusionshould we or should
we not support the new regime?418
The confused policy of President Carter centered on four issues. The first concerned
what conditions should be attached to economic assistance offered to Nicaragua, or whether
U.S. economic assistance should be cut off altogether. The second centered on how Carter
should respond to the increased Cuban military presence in Nicaragua. The third focused on
how the president should respond to the expropriation o f private property that had taken
place, along with increasing evidence o f centralization o f the economy. The fourth issue
dealt with Carters concern regarding the increased size o f the Nicaraguan military as well
as its support for the neighboring rebellion in El Salvador. All four issues were dealt with
differently at various times, thus leading to a great deal of policy confusion over U.S-
Nicaraguan affairs during the Carter presidency 419
When Ronald Reagan entered the White House in January 1981, the president and
his foreign policy advisors focused their attention almost immediately on events taking place
in El Salvador. Yet, concerns about how to handle Nicaragua soon became equally, if not
more important. The president and his closest advisors immediately set for themselves the
task o f reconstructing U.S. policy toward Nicaragua which, Luis Maira states, was designed
to "bury the earlier Central American policy of the Democrats."420
418 The Carter response to the Sandinista takeover in Nicaragua is discussed in Anthony Lake, Somoza Falling (Boston, Mass:
Houghton Mifflin, 1989) and Robert Pastor, Condemned to Repetition: The United States and Nicaragua (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1987)
419 Stephen M. Gorman, "Nicaragua," Gurtov and Moghroori, eds.. Roots o f Failure: The United States Policy in the Third World.
(Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1984)
420 Luis Maira, "Reagan and Central America: Strategy Through a Fractured Lens," Martin Diskin, ed., Trouble In Our Backyard:
Central America and the United Slates in the Eighties (New York: Pantheon Books, 1983) p. 52.
214
Similar to Reagans beliefs concerning the FMLN in El Salvador, the revolution
in Nicaragua was seen as one part of the Soviet-Cuban led conspiracy to take over Latin
America. The logic went as follows: first, communism would come to Nicaragua, followed
shortly thereafter by El Salvador, Guatemala, Costa Rica, and Honduras. Next, the
communist plague would spread to the south, and then to the north; all o f South America
would fall, Mexico would turn "red", and the United States would be left to fight alone in a
hemisphere filled with communist countries. Internationally, U.S. commitments and its
credibility would be questioned. An exaggerated argument? Perhaps. Did Reagan and some
o f his leading advisors really describe the situation in the region in this fashion? At times
these officials did, both in their public statements and in private correspondences. For
example, as president, Reagan warned the American people that if the United States chose
to ignore the malignancy in Managua, it would likely spread and become a mortal threat
to the entire New World.421 To a joint session of Congress in April 1983, the president
suggested that should the United States stand idly by while the government of El Salvador
was overthrown, the international implications would be that our credibility would
collapse, our alliances crumble, and the safety of our homeland would be put at
jeopardy.422 Likewise, Secretary of State George Schultz in a secret memorandum to
Ronald Reagan in 1983, told the president: We have to safeguard not only El Salvador but
also the other Central American countries against the Nicaraguan vims.423
421 Quoted in Jerome Slater, Dominos in Central America: Will They Fall? Does It Matter? International Security, Vol. 12, No. 2
(Fall 1987) p. 106.
422 Central America: Defending O ur Vital Interests, 27 April 1983, National Security Archive, Nicaragua Collection, Document #
NI01683.
423 Managing Our Central American Strategy, 25 May 1983, National Security Archives, Iran-Contra Collection, Document #
IC00106.
215
If Reagan and his key advisors did in part believe in this domino logic, did they
have empirical evidence to verify their claims? At certain times, they believed they did. For
instance, in the context o f a National Security Council Planning Group Meeting on Central
America in June 1984, Director of Central Intelligence, William Casey, briefed the
president on the Cuban military build-up in Nicaragua and the potential consequences this
had on regional stability. Casey noted that the CIA believed that there were: Cuban
preparations for another military offensive in El Salvador, while at the same time the
Cubans are building up their own forces in Nicaragua. He went on to tell the president that
the CIA estimated: There are actually 7-8 thousand Cuban troops in Nicaragua... Cuba
and Nicaragua are moving quickly to complete the construction of the new 3100 meter
airport in Puenta Huetea. Two other runways at two other airports are nearing the point
where they could take jet fighter planes and also Soviet cargo planes. Further, we see that 45
Nicaraguan pilots trained in the Soviet bloc have returned to Nicaragua.424
With this mentality in mind, President Reagan laid down a framework for his policy
toward Nicaragua. As was the case in responding to the events taking place in El Salvador,
Reagan could have adopted four distinct policy options. Diagram 2 summarizes these
options.
(Diagram 2 here)
424 National Security Planning Group Meeting, 25 June 1984, National Security Archives, Iran-Contra Collection, Document #
IC00463.
216
DIAGRAM 2: REAGANS POLICY CHOICES FOR NICARAGUA, 1981-1989
(NOT CHOSEN)
Consistent with-> Option 4 Military
invasion
(CHOSEN)
Also consistent with-> Option 3 Low intensity
conflict
(Covert
operations)
Ronald Reagans
(NOT CHOSEN)
Not consistent with-> Option 2 Contingent
economic
assistance
to Sandinistas;
Promotion of
the use of
peace
negotiations;
(NOT CHOSEN)
Not consistent with-> Option 1 Do nothing
217
Option 1 represents the do-nothing approach. With this option, Reagan would reason
that it was too late to force a change in the Nicaraguan government. He would focus his
attention instead on responding to events taking place in neighboring El Salvador. Option 2
would allow the president to establish a new relationship with the Sandinistas by extending
them economic assistance. The goal would be to direct their revolution in ways that did not
threaten U.S. economic or security interests. The Sandinistas had successfully defeated the
Somoza regime and it was now time to accept this fact and to deal with them accordingly.
Option 3, by contrast, was to follow a strategy of low intensity conflict whereby the United
States would support anti-Sandinista forces economically and militarily in an effort to
overthrow the sitting Nicaraguan government, or at the very least, to prevent the Sandinista
government from supporting revolutionary movements elsewhere in the region. Reagans
conception of a low intensity conflict would also include waging a massive public
information campaign that was designed to point up the brutality and illegitimacy of the
Sandinista government. Option 4 was to send in U.S. military forces to remove the
Sandinistas from power.
The policy that Reagan would decide on in early 1981, like his policy toward El
Salvador, was to wage a low intensity conflict against the Sandinista government. In most
respects, Reagan's policy would be very different from Carter's earlier efforts to engage the
new Nicaraguan government.
Reagan's policy was based on three key tenets. First, the U.S. would seek to contain
Soviet influence in the hemisphere, especially that o f its perceived surrogates: Cuba and
Nicaragua. Second, the United States would try to rollback communist gains. The means to
accomplish this end would be to organize and support covert forces in Nicaragua. Third, all
218
means necessary, with the possible exception o f the outright use o f U.S. military troops,
would be used to accomplish the first two goals.425 The objective was to send the Soviets a
dual message: we were drawing a line in Central America and we were going to support
either the military governments in the region or newly elected democratic leaders in order to
secure it. If necessary, Washington was even willing to create its own regional forces to
accomplish these tasks 426 In short, the achievement o f these goals would become manifest
in the administration's decision to replace political bargaining with military escalation, and
substitute covert war for state diplomacy.427
With these goals in mind, Reagan and some o f his key foreign policy advisors began
a barrage o f verbal attacks on the supposed Soviet-Cuban nexus in Nicaragua and in Central
America overall. In many respects, this verbal assault would mark the beginning of the U.S.
attack on Nicaraguan sovereignty, the ultimate culmination o f which would be a covert war
designed to overthrow the Sandinista regime.
The first blow was struck in February 1981. In the aforementioned State
Department report, the U.S. government claimed that it had "definitive evidence o f the
clandestine military support given by the Soviet Union, Cuba, and their Communist allies to
Marxist-Leninist guerrillas now fighting to overthrow the established Government of El
425 Morris J. Blachman and Kenneth Sharpe, "El Salvador The Policy that Failed," in Richard Newfarmer, ed., From Gunboats to
Diplomacy: Mew U.S. Policies fo r Latin America (Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press, 1984) offer an excellent
overview o f Reagan's approach to Central America.
426 Robert A. Pastor, Whirlpool: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Latin America and the Caribbean (Princeton, N J: The Princeton
University Press, 1992) p. 68.
427 W alter LaFeber, "Introduction: The Reagan Policy in Historical Perspective," Coleman and Herring, eds., Understanding the
Central American Crisis (Wilmington, DL: SR Books, 1991) p. 1.
219
Salvador."428 State's argument went as follows: the Soviet Union and its surrogate,
Cuba, were sending military supplies through the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua to support
the rebel uprising in El Salvador. The report suggested that if the United States did not
prevent this transfer of military aid, the government o f El Salvador would be overthrown.
The United States would then be faced with a second Marxist-Leninist regime in Central
America, which would soon spread like cancer to the surrounding countries.
It was at this point that President Reagan immediately cancelled the aid package that
was given to the Nicaraguan government in the final days of the Carter administration. The
result of this cancellation for the Sandinista government was a loss o f over $25 million in
economic assistance. Four year later, Reagan would officially impose a halt on all U.S. trade
with Nicaragua, as well as to put pressure on international lending agencies and foreign
governments to halt their lending and trading with the Sandinista government429 At this
early juncture it was also decided that more drastic measures were needed than simply a
cancellation of economic assistance.
These measures included the initiation o f a covert war against the Nicaraguan
government. The ultimate goal of U.S. sponsored covert activity, o f course, was to unseat
the Sandinistas from power. As mentioned previously, in early March 1981, President
Reagan submitted his "Presidential Finding on Central America." Reagan, in his "finding"
was asking Congress to appropriate $19.5 million dollars for the CIA to expand President
Carter's earlier efforts to assist moderate opponents o f the Sandinista regime. These initial
requests passed with very little congressional opposition.
428 Report by the Department o f State, February 23, 1981. Document 670. American Foreign Policy: Current Documents 1981.
Department o f State Publications 9384.
429 LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, p. 107; and Molineu, U.S. Policy Toward Latin America, pp. 213-216.
220
With Congressional approval in hand, the CIA began making contingency plans
for clandestine operations in Nicaragua. By 23 November 1981 these plans were
incorporated into National Security Council Directive-17 (NSDD-17). NSDD-17 granted
the CIA authority to recruit a 500 man para-military squad to attack the Cuban support
structure in Nicaragua. Reagan officially signed the finding on 1 December 1981, agreeing
to support and conduct paramilitary operations against Nicaragua.430 After training ex-
Somoza National Guardsmen and other dissident Nicaraguans in Texas, California, and
Honduras, the covert war was about to begin. 431 NSDD-17 was, in a sense, the first real
indicator that the low intensity conflict option was being selected by President Reagan as
official U.S. policy toward Nicaragua.
On 14 March 1982 the Contras struck their first blow. Directed and trained by the
CIA, a group o f ex-National Guardsmen, the former praetorian guard of Anastasia Somoza,
blew up two bridges in the Nueva Segovia province, thus marking the official start of
Nicaragua's new civil war. For the next year and a half, the Contras would strike at least a
hundred times. Over the course o f the year, the original Contra force of 500 had grown to
over 4,000. Moreover, by late 1983, the resistance had nearly 10,000 troops in the field.432
The Contras were divided into two groups. The first, the Nicaraguan Democratic
Force (FDN), was based in Honduras and was led by former National Guardsman Enrique
Bermudez. The second, the Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE), operated out of
Costa Rica and was led by Eden Pastora and Alfonso Robelo, two former members of the
430 Signed Presidential Finding on Central America, 1 December 1981, National Security Archives, Iran-Contra Collection,
D ocument# IC00041.
431 Christopher Simpson, National Security Directives, pp. 18, 53-54. See also Peter Kombluh, "The Covert War," in Thomas
Walker, ed., Reagan Versus the Sandinistas: The Undeclared War on Nicaragua ( Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987) pp. 21-24.
432 Walker, "Reagan versus the Sandinistas, p. 26.
221
original Sandinista coalition that came to power in Nicaragua after the overthrow of
Somoza 43j Both groups of anti-Sandinistas, it should be stressed, were heavily dependent
on the CIA for training and support. E. Bradford Bums goes so far as to suggest: "The CIA
exercised total and absolute control over the Contras. 434
Ironically, it was Congress that exercised no control over the CIA. Early on, CIA
efforts to bring the two Contra groups together proved to be futile. Pastora refused to
cooperate with the ex-Guardsmen, who he helped to overthrow in the 1979 revolution.
Counter-revolutionaries, one might say, indeed make strange bedfellows. The basic problem
with trying to unify the Contras was that each faction represented distinct and separate
interests. The only commonality between them was their dislike of the Sandinistas and their
desire to acquire control of the Nicaraguan government.
Over time, the FDN proved to be an unorganized and untalented fighting force.
Attempts to establish "liberated zones" in northern Nicaragua failed. In December 1982, and
again in March, August, and October 1983, the FDN was driven back by the Nicaraguan
Popular Army (EPS). Despite setbacks in the field of battle, it should be mentioned that the
FDN was particularly good at one thing: terrorizing the Nicaraguan population. One FDN
leader is quoted as saying: "There is no line at all, not even a fine line, between a civilian
farm owned by the government and a Sandinista military outpost."435
By 1983, it became clear that the CIA was in part responsible for these violations in
basic human rights. In a manual written for FDN leaders, the use of terrorism and the
433 Ibid. pp. 26-27.

434 Bradford E. Bums, At War in Nicaragua: The Reagan Doctrine and the Politics o f Nostalgia. (New York: Harper & Row
Publishers, 1987) p. 65.
435 Harry E. Vanden and Thomas Walker, "The Reimposition o f U.S. Hegemony over Nicaragua," Coleman and Herring, eds.,
Understanding the Central American Crisis p. 165
222
assassination of government officials were tactics that were advocated by the CIA to be
used in certain circumstances. Because o f the increasing U.S. involvement in the war,
however, domestic support in Congress and in the American public, which was already
quite limited at best, decreased even further.
After the formal approval o f NSDD-17 and the onset o f the war in Nicaragua,
President Reagan needed desperately to maintain Congressional support to keep the Contra
war alive. In January 1983, the president signed off on three top-secret policy proposals
involving Nicaragua. The first was to have the president and Secretary of State meet with
key Congressional leaders to discuss the possibility of creating presidential commissions,
which would of course include members o f Congress, to study the necessity o f increased
economic and military assistance for the Contras. The goal was to have Congress approve
funding for the resistance and to remove restrictions on the aid in return for the creation of
these presidential commissions that were designed to study U.S. policy in Central
America.436
The second policy proposal issued by Reagan, also in January 1983, and which fit
quite nicely with his beliefs concerning regional adversaries (see chapter 3), was to have the
Secretaries of State and Defense, along with the Director of the CIA: develop a program of
appropriate military actions, exercises, and contingency measures designed to curtail and
eventually halt Cuban/Soviet Bloc assistance and presence in Nicaragua.437 Reagan
436 Central America: The Presidential Commission, January 1983, National Security Archive, Nicaragua Collection, Document #
01759.
437 Central America: U.S. Military Presence, [Excised] and Contingency Response, National Security Archive, Iran-Contra
223
directed his advisors to have the program implemented before the completion o f the
policy reviews being completed by the bipartisan presidential commissions.
The third proposal was a direct response to Congress 1982 decision to place
restrictions on the funds that were appropriated for the Contras. In his proposal, the
president called upon his Secretary o f State to develop a public diplomacy campaign to win
support in U. S. pubic opinion for his Central American policies. The objective o f the plan
was to educate the American people regarding the situation in Central America and the
danger posed by the Marxist-Leninist government of Nicaragua in their export of
revolution to democratically oriented states, as well as the danger of Soviet, Soviet Bloc,
and Cuban interference in the region.438 The president also noted that the administration
would, on a twice-a-month basis, inform the major media outlets of the presidents plan for
the region in order to most effectively get his point across to the American people. A third
part of the proposal was to have key administration officials, including himself, lobby
members o f Congress to remove the restrictions on the funds being appropriated for the
Contras in the upcoming budgeting cycle 439
In July 1983, the latter two o f these policy proposals became official U.S. policy
with the presidents signing of National Security Decision Directive-100 (NSDD-100).
NSDD-100 called for, among other things, adequate U.S. support for the democratic
resistance forces within Nicaragua in an effort to ensure that Nicaragua ceases to be a
Soviet/Cuban base and that they government adheres to the principles that it agreed to in
438 Central America: Public Aflairs/Legislative Action Plan, National Security Archive, Nicaragua Collection, Document#
NI0176I.
439 Ibid.
22 4
July 1979.440 Additionally, Reagan, in issuing NSDD-100, directed that expansive U.S.
military activities and exercises commence in the Caribbean Basin and along the Pacific
coast of Central America.
The provisions o f NSDD-100, including increased support for the Contras and
expanded U.S. military activities and exercises were yet another component o f the Reagan
low intensity conflict. As a result o f this directive, U.S. military bases were established in
Honduras and were meant primarily to provide training grounds for Contras and for the
Salvadoran army. In addition, naval military exercises took place quite regularly off the
coasts o f Nicaragua and Honduras. The exercises, at times involving up to 30,000 U.S.
personnel, were designed, writes Harold Molineu, as a form of psychological warfare
against the Sandinistas.441
In the autumn of 1983, Reagan once again upped the ante by signing yet another
presidential finding on CIA covert operations in Nicaragua. This time around, Reagan
expanded the role to be played by the CIA on two fronts. First, the president agreed to have
the CIA cooperate with other governments to: provide support, equipment, and training
assistance to Nicaraguan paramilitary resistance groups as a means to induce the Sandinistas
and Cubans and their allies to cease their support for insurgencies in the region. Second, the
president directed the CIA to continue the program until such time as it could be verified
that:
100), 28 July 1983, National Security Archive, Nicaragua Collection, Docum ent# N I01781.
441 Molineu, U.S. Policy Toward Latin America p.210.
225
(a) The Soviets, Cubans, and Sandinistas have ceased providing through
Nicaragua arms, training, command and control facilities and other logistical
support to military or paramilitary operations in or against any other country in
Central America, and;
(b) The Government o f Nicaragua is demonstrating a commitment to provide
amnesty and nondiscriminatory participation in the Nicaraguan political process
by all Nicaraguans.442
In addition to supporting the covert war against the Sandinistas, Reagan decided to
increase economic pressure even further on the Nicaraguan government, another formidable
tool used by the president to carry out his policy of low intensity conflict. In a presidential
proclamation in September 1983, Reagan decided to reduce U.S. imports of sugar from
Nicaragua to six thousand tons and reallocated the remainder o f the original sugar quota to
El Salvador, Honduras and Costa Rica, all of which, not surprisingly, were U.S. allies in the
443
region.
Despite the continued level of U.S. activism, the president by 1984 had failed to
meet his stated objectives in Nicaragua. Moreover, the growing price tag of the war, along
with the president's desire to escalate the conflict, all played key roles in increasing the level
o f public and Congressional dissatisfaction with his policy.444 In response, Reagan tried to
442 Presidential Finding on CIA Covert Operations in Nicaragua, 19 September 1983, National Security Archive, Iran-Contra
443 Modification o f Country Allocations o f Quotas on Certain Sugars, Sirups, and Molasses, 27 September 1983, National Security
Archive, Nicaragua Collection, D ocument# NIO1834.
444 For a detailed analysis o f the battles between the president and Congress over funding for the Contras consult James M. Scott,
Deciding to intervene: The Reagan Doctrine and American Foreign Policy (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996) Chapter 6.
2 26
win over Congress and public opinion by appointing a bi-partisan commission, led by
former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, to reexamine the American role in Nicaragua
and the roots of the crisis. The commission's finding, released in January 1984, served only
to reaffirm the existing U.S. policy.445
After the release o f the findings, the president began to take active steps to try to get
Congress to pass the commissions recommendations. In two memorandums to his leading
national security advisors, the president stated that a concerted effort must be made by
administration officials to obtain from Congress the necessary funds to continue with U.S.
support for the Contras, a program Reagan suggested was a matter o f highest priority.446
With that said, the president directed both Secretary of State Schulz and CIA Director
William Casey to play the lead role in convincing members o f Congress to support the
presidents request for additional funding for the Contras. In his memo, the president
suggested: increased resources o f $14 million for this endeavor are essential to continue
these activities and prevent a major foreign policy reversal. I am determined that this
program should continue.447
Despite the presidents best efforts, criticism of the Contra war continued, especially
when it was discovered that the CIA was now involved directly in the fighting. On 8
September 1983, with Reagans approval, the CIA ordered naval assaults on Nicaraguan
See also William LeoGrande, et al. "Grappling With Central America: From Carter to Reagan," in Morris Blachman, ed.. Confronting
Revolution (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986) pp.317-319.
445 The Report o f the President's National Bipartisan Commission on Central America (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company,
1984)
446 A dditictrl Funding for Nicaraguan Democratic Opposition Forces, January 1984, National Security Archive, Iran-Contra
Collection, Document # 1C00322.
447 Central American Legislative StrategyAdditional Funding for Nicaraguan Democratic Opposition Forces, 21 February 1984,
National Security Archive, Nicaragua Collection, Document # NI01986.
227
port facilities. The idea to attack these facilities originated with Duane Clarridge, the
CIAs Latin American division chief, who presented the plan to CIA Director William
Casey. Casey, in turn, writes Bob Woodward: knew how to handle the White House. He
presented the plan to the President and to national-security advisor Clark as the next logical
step under the finding that had been sold to the Congress. 448
In their attack, the CIA utilized contract operatives from El Salvador, called UCLA's
(unilateral controlled Latino assets) for the job o f conducting the bombing raids on
Nicaraguan harbors. Caseys motivation behind the decision was to make the Sandinistas
"sweat." "Let's make the bastards sweat," the CIA chief told Clarridge after he received the
presidents approval to go-ahead with the mission. On October 11, the UCLAs conducted a
series o f predawn raids on the Port o f Corinto, blowing up five oil storage depots.449
By December 1983, Reagan had authorized the CIA to once again go on attack and
to expand the Contra forces. As a result, the CIA-directed Contra forces engaged in at least
twenty-two attacks against various ports, power plants, bridges, and other Nicaraguan
facilities. These events culminated in the mining of Nicaraguan harbors on 6 January 1984,
which came on direct orders from the president after a National Security Council Planning
Group Meeting 450 The domestic and international response to the mining was one of
outrage. Congress shortly thereafter refused to grant additional lethal aid to the Contras.
Within Latin American, the response was equally critical. In September 1983,
leaders from four Latin American countries met to discuss ways to bring an end to the crises
engulfing Central America. The result o f this meeting was the creation of the Contadora
448 Bob Woodward, VEIL:The Secret fVars o f the CIA, 1981-1987 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987) p. 281.
449 Ibid.
450 James M. Scott, Deciding to Intervene, pp. 167-168.
228
Treaty, which called upon all the disputants in the region to agree to the following terms:
1) the removal of foreign military advisors; 2) a reduction in troop levels; 3) an end to
subversion; 4) respect for human rights; and 5) a movement toward democracy. By January
1984, the Sandinista government agreed to the principles laid out in the treaty. And, by
September 1984, all five Central American states were on board.451
Ronald Reagan, by contrast, was extremely skeptical of any regionally negotiated
agreement, especially one that involved the Sandinistas, but even more so, one that involved
the United States and the Nicraraguan government in a bilateral accord. Regarding the
prospects for negotiations with the Sandinistas, the president told the New York Times in
November 1983: I havent believed anything theyve been saying since they got in
charge.452 And, although Reagan did at times suggest in his public addresses that the
United States was willing to support the Contadora peace process, his underlying motive
was to use the possibility o f negotiations as a sop for Congress. This sentiment was
clearly expressed at a 1984 National Security Planning Group Meeting: If we are talking
about negotiations with Nicaragua, that is so farfetched to imagine that a Communist
government like that would make any reasonable deal with us, but if it is to get Congress
to support the anti-Sandinistas, then that can be helpful.453 Just prior to making this
statement, in an effort to smooth over some differences in opinion between his advisors
on the usefulness o f supporting the Contadora peace process, the president noted: With
4 5 1 For a insightful discussion o f the Contadora process cosuit Morris J. Blachman, William LeoGrande, and Kenneth Sharpe, eds..
Confronting Revolutions (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986) pp. 271-292.
452 New York Times, 4 November 1983.
453 National Security Planning Group Meeting, 25 June 1984, National Security Archive, Tran-Contra Collection, Document #
IC00463.
229
respect to your differences on negotiating, our participation is important from the
standpoint to get support from Congress.454
Cynthia Amson captures the Reagan foreign policy team s view concerning the
prospects for negotiating any type o f settlement to the crisis:
What appeared to unite these policymakers was not only the conviction that little
had been accomplished in Central America, but also an assumption that
communist powers only negotiated to gain tactical advantage, while they amassed
the power to pursue their objectives by force. Negotiations, therefore, disarmed
democratic states while allowing communist ones to buy time 455
Thus, negotiations, for Reagan, were valuable only insofar as they were able gain
additional support in Congress for his foreign policy agenda.
As mentioned above, Congress, by 1984, had effectively cut off funding for the
Contras. As a result, Reagan and his foreign policy advisors now had to devise alternative
means for supplying the resistance. From 1986-1988, this support would take two forms.
First, Reagan made a series o f agreements with a number of foreign governments, namely,
Brunei, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Guatemala, to see if they would fund the Nicaraguan
insurgents while the president tried to convince Congress to once again appropriate funds
for the war effort. Second, Reagan allegedly agreed to a plan designed by a small group of
his national security advisors to use profits from the sale of arms to Iran as additional funds
454 Ibid.
455 Cynthia Amson, Crossroads: Congress, the President, and Central America, 1976-1993 (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State
University Press, 1993) p. 118.
230
to supply and train the Contras. In the end, in accepting these two plans either directly or
tacitly, Reagan decided it was better to disavow U.S. laws than to leave the Contras without
financial and military support. These two means o f financing the war effort, it should be
noted, would be successful in acquiring $80 million for Contra forces. The war would
continue with this funding, but it was winding down.456
The clandestine aid program for the Contras did, however, allow Reagan to buy time
in order to convince members of Congress of the worthiness of his cause. In June 1985,
Congress finally agreed to a $27 million non-lethal aid package. Congress initially placed
restrictions on the use of the funds, however. The main stipulation was that the CIA was to
narrow its activities in Nicaragua to intelligence gathering operations.
The president applauded the decision, calling it an important element in our overall
effort to assist neighboring countries to defend themselves against Nicaraguan attack and
subversion. Reagan did warn, though, that the provision unduly and unnecessarily
restricts efficient management and administration o f the program.457 One year later,
Congress approved an additional $100 million aid package that lifted the earlier restrictions
on CIA activities. "For the first time, U.S. legislators unequivocally endorsed the
administration's strategy of low intensity warfare against the Sandinista government," writes
Peter Kombluh.458
Moreover, in a presidential determination made in December, Reagan declared that
efforts to find a peaceful settlement to the crisis in Nicaragua via the Contadora peace
456 Peter Kombluh, "The Covert War," p. 32.

457 Statement on Signing the Supplemental Appropriation Acts, 1985, 16 August 1985, National Security Archive, Iran-Contra
458 Kombluh, The Covert War, p. 35.
231
process had been ineffective and that there is no reasonable prospect o f achieving such
agreement.. .without additional assistance to the Nicaraguan democratic assistance.459
Reagan therefore called upon his Secretary o f State to work with Congress to obtain even
further assistance for the Contras. Taken together, then, Congress provision of additional
assistance as well as the aforementioned presidential determination meant that the war in
Nicaragua was again about to heat up.
This would be the United States' "last hurrah" for the Contras, however. Despite the
increased aid, the Contras still could not mount a legitimate challenge to the Nicaraguan
government, failing to capture a single province, city, or town in 1986. The Nicaraguan
Popular Army repelled counter revolutionary forces at every juncture. Moreover, the
corruption within Contra ranks served only to weaken their cause.
Occurring alongside the war on the ground was the continued use of the economic
tools of intervention by President Reagan. On 1 May 1985, Ronald Reagan in an executive
order officially declared a national emergency with respect to Nicaragua, proclaiming: I,
Ronald Reagan, President o f the United States of America, find that the policies and actions
o f the Government o f Nicaragua constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the
national security and foreign policy of the United States and hereby declare a national
emergency to deal with that threat.460 The Reagan response to the perceived national
emergency was to impose full economic sanctions against Nicaragua, which resulted in,
among other things, the banning o f nearly all exports to and imports from Nicaragua, with
459 Presidential Determination No. 87-6: Further Assistance to the Nicaraguan Democratic Assistance, 27 December 1986, National
Security Archive, Nicaragua Collection, Document # NI02964.
460 Ronald Reagan Declares National Emergency and Imposes Economic Sanctions on Nicaragua, I May 1985, National Security
Archive, Nicaragua Collection, Document # NI02464.
232
the exception o f goods and services being sent to the Contras, and effectively ended air
and sea travel to and from Nicaragua and the United States. President Reagan would
continue to apply the economic sanctions against Nicaragua during his remaining years in
office, as would his successor. The economic sanctions were discontinued only when the
Sandinistas had been voted out o f office in February 1990.
The not-so-secret war against the Nicaraguan government would continue for the
next three years, but the Contra movement was disintegrating from within. By 1987, many
o f its key leaders were dropping out. Arturo Cruz had left the movement, as did Joaquin
Chamorro. General Bermudez took a no-compromise position, which even upset
Washington.461 The war effort appeared to be going backwards as funding from Washington
became uncertain. The end was quickly approaching.
When the "great communicator" left office, the Contra war was essentially over as
well. Making peace would be left to his successor. President Reagan came to office on a
mission to roll back the Sandinistas revolution; he left office feeling the same way. Five
years after taking office, the fire still burned in the belly:
Nicaragua is a country held captive by a cruel clique o f deeply committed
Communists at war with God and man from their very first days.. ..Of all the nations
o f Central America, only Nicaragua suspends all civil rights; only Nicaragua
suppresses political parties and refuses any dialog with its opponents; only
Nicaragua murders political dissenters and indoctrinates children with class hatred;
only Nicaragua persecutes the Catholic Church, humiliates its Cardinal and the
4 6 1 Harold Molineu, U.S. Policy Toward Latin America, p. 209.
233
Pope, and tortures believers of other religions, from Mormons to Evangelicals to
Miskito Indians. Above all, only Nicaragua has become a wedge o f aggression that
intimidates and undermines its neighbors.462
Or, as Reagan announced in his last major address on U.S. policy toward Nicaragua and the
need to offer continued support to the Contras:
Even today, with the spotlight of world opinion focused on the peace process, the
Sandinistas openly boast that they are arming and training Salvadoran guerrillas. We
know the Sandinistas, who talk of revolution without borders reaching to Mexico.
Imagine what theyll do if the pressure is lifted. What will be our response as the
ranks o f the guerrillas in El Salvador, Guatemala, even Honduras and unarmed
Costa Rica, begin to swell and those fragile democracies are ripped apart by the
strain?.. .Our goal in Nicaragua is simple: peace and democracy. Our policy has
consistently supported the efforts of those who seek democracy throughout Central
America and who recognize that the freedom fighters are essential to that process.
So, my fellow Americans, there can be no mistake about this vote: It is up or down
for Central America. It is win or lose for peace and freedom. It is yes or no to
Americas national security.463
462 Aid to the Contras, 8 March 1986, National Security Archive, Nicaragua Collection, Document # NI02696.
463 Address to the Nation on Aid to the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance, 2 February 1988, The Public Papers o f the Presidents
o f the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1981-1989.
234
These statements clearly reflect Reagans deeply held beliefs concerning the nature o f
the Sandinista regime and that of its internal foes, the Contras. Ronald Reagan would leave
office in January 1989. What he left behind for the people of Nicaragua were painful
memories of war and increasing poverty. These memories would greatly affect the internal
political structure o f Nicaragua in the years ahead and represented yet another example o f
unwanted U.S. intervention.
Why wasn't a military option selected in El Salvador or Nicaragua?
A valid question can be raised concerning why Ronald Reagan did not opt for an
active military solution to the crises in El Salvador and Nicaragua (Option 4). In other
words, given the fact that he viewed the events taking place within the region as
externally directed by the Soviet Union and Cuba, and given the fact that he wanted to
reassert U.S. supremacy in the region, why Reagan did not send in U.S. Marines either to
attack the problem at its source, viz., Cuba & Nicaragua, or to use U.S. forces to defeat
the FMLN and secure an allied government in power? The answer, which is some
respects lends credence to those who argue that domestic political considerations are a
vital determinant o f U.S. foreign policy, is that the president realized the political dangers
involved in taking such a course of action.464 Even though Reagan may have been quite
464 For a good example o f this argument consult Robert Pastor, "The United States and Central America: Interlocking Dramas, in
Peter Evans and Robert Putnam, eds., Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining a n d Domestic Politics (Berkeley, CA:
235
sympathetic to a military response, he still kept firmly in mind that public opinion
would probably be strongly against such a course o f action and Congress would not ante
up the funds necessary to support such a decision.
Alexander Haig suggests that in the early meetings held to discuss the crises in
Central America, he championed the cause o f putting pressure on Cuba because he
believed that Castro was behind most o f the mischief in the region. He also notes that the
president appeared to agree with this line of argument. However, he suggests that within
the National Security Council and especially within the White House, the president "was
buffeted by the winds of opinion and tugged by the advice o f those who doubted the
wisdom o f a decisive policy" based mainly on strategic considerations.465 Favorable
public opinion was something that Reagan and his key domestic policy advisors took
very seriously and they knew that the American public saw the potential U.S.
involvement in a ground war in the jungles o f Central America as another Vietnam.466
In Congress, the president also knew that support for a direct military invasion
would be limited at best. Even though the president continued to couch the crisis in terms
o f an East-West showdown and interpreted the rebellion in El Salvador and the
government o f Nicaragua as threats to U.S. national security, the president would
consistently emphasize that he was not going to send American soldiers into combat. The
University o f California Press, 1993) See also, Cynthia J. Amson, Crossroads: Congress, the President, and Central America. 1976-
1993.
465 A1 Haig, Caveat, p. 127. Haig sees the domestic policy troika o f Edwin Meese, James Baker, and Michael D eaveras members o f
the Reagan team who were perhaps the most influential and the most cautious when it came to making policy decisions that would
adversely affect public opinion.
466 For an outstanding analysis of how Reagan and his advisors, along with the general public, viewed the events in El Salvador as
another potential Vietnam and, accordingly, drew very different policy conclusions, consult George Herring, "Vietnam, El Salvador,
and the Uses o f History," in Kenneth Coleman and George Herring, eds.. The Central American Crisis and the Failure o f U.S. Policy
(Wilmington, DL: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1985) pp. 263-282.
236
president realized that he would need Congressional support for his policy of low
intensity conflict, which would require incredible amounts o f military and economic
assistance that he saw as necessary to prevent a leftist takeover in El Salvador and to
support the counter-revolutionaries in Nicaragua. Thus, the president was willing to
sacrifice a full-scale military option in both countries on the basis o f political expediency.
Another interesting question, as applied to El Salvador, concerns Reagan's
willingness to support Christian Democratic candidate Jose Napoleon Duarte over
ARENA party candidate Roberto D'Aubuisson in the 1984 presidential elections. If the
primary goal of the administration was to defeat the insurgents militarily, then it would
stand to reason that Washington should have supported D'Aubuisson, who was intimately
linked with the upper echelons o f the Salvadoran army and, if elected, would have
vigorously pursued the extermination of all leftist forces in El Salvador. However, this
ignores the fact that in order for the United States to contribute to the defeat of the
communists in El Salvador, Congressional and public support would be needed. And, it
was quite clear that Congress and the American people did not have the stomach to
financially support a Salvadoran president who was historically responsible for some o f
the most gruesome death squad activity in El Salvador's history, including the murder o f
U.S. citizens.
These choices o f a less militant option in both El Salvador and Nicaragua along
with the decision to support Duarte in 1984 illustrates the pragmatic side to Reagans
foreign policy. The president realized that foreign policy decision-making required the
interaction between the executive and legislative branches of government, especially as it
related to the appropriation o f funds. It should be noted that internal domestic pressures
237
did indeed influence the direction o f his policy, but it would not determine the policy.
Therefore, one can find partial support for the hypothesis that links domestic political
pressure with changes in foreign policy
Perhaps Reagan would have preferred to use the direct application o f U.S. force to
defeat the FMLN and the Sandinistas and to have supported D Aubuisson in 1984, and
that domestic political forces precluded these options. But, if domestic forces were the
determining factors shaping administration policies, then one would also expect that
Reagan would have only pursued interventionist option 2 (the provision o f aid contingent
upon improvements in human rights and an active effort for a negotiated settlement) in
the former case and would have supported Duarte from the beginning. Instead, Reagans
beliefs regarding the proper role to be played by the United States coupled with his
images o f allies and adversaries and the nature of the international arena, influenced his
choice o f a low intensity conflict rather than simply granting provisional economic and
military assistance. Additionally, in the 1984 elections, Reagan began to support Duarte
only after their preferred candidate had placed third in the first round o f voting.
In the final analysis, when Ronald Reagan became president, he needed to decide
on a course of action that would guide U.S. policy in Central America, at least in the
short term, and, as it turned out, ultimately for the entire period o f his presidency.
Because of public and congressional opposition, however, a possibly preferred course of
action, a direct U.S. military response, was precluded. Instead, Reagan chose to adopt a
policy o f low intensity conflict- a massive and coordinated economic and military
assistance program coupled with the introduction o f U.S. military advisors to help retrain
the Salvadoran army in the art o f counterinsurgency warfare and to raise, train, and
238
support the Contra forces in Nicaragua. In addition, an intensive public relations
campaign to win over domestic and international opposition began. Ronald Reagan had
what he believed to be an effective counter to Soviet encroachment into the Western
Hemisphere.
Bush Takes Command
When Ronald Reagan left office in January 1989 and retired to the Rancho del
Cielo in California, the problems that engulfed nearly all o f Central America did not end
with his departure from Washington. In many respects these problems would intensify. El
Salvador was once again about to experience large-scale revolutionary turmoil and
President Bush would need to devise o f a course of action in response to these events.
The FLMN, at the close of 1989, would launch a major offensive against the Salvadoran
government. In Nicaragua, the Contras were fighting a rearguard battle to maintain
themselves as a viable challenger to the Sandinista regime. It would be up to the new
president to fashion a U.S. policy for the region.
George Bush approached U.S.-Central American affairs from a vantage point that
was quite distinct from Ronald Reagan's. Although, as vice-president, Bush was involved
in most o f the key foreign policy decisions regarding U.S. policy toward Central America
during the Reagan years, he remained somewhat in the middle ideologically between the
hard-liners who were consistently advocating a military solution to the crises and the
more moderate factions who were advancing the cause o f a diplomatic settlement. Ronald
Reagan, by contrast, tended to side on most issues with the hard-liners in his cabinet
239
during policy debates, but at times needed to project a more moderate image in public
so as to gain Congressional support for his policies. Bush, on the other hand, was above
all a pragmatic man (see Chapter 4). And, regarding the instability enveloping Central
America, he would, likewise, seek a pragmatic solution.
Upon taking over the presidency, Bush appointed individuals to key foreign
policy posts who shared his prudent worldview. For Secretary o f State, he chose James
A. Baker, a close personal friend and former chief-of-staff under Reagan. Baker, as
mentioned above, consistently supported a more middle-of-the-road approach toward
Central America during the Reagan presidency. One o f his main priorities as Reagans
first Chief of Staff was to ensure that the presidents domestic revolution did not get
sidetracked. Baker, along with Ed Meese and Michael Deaver, the policy troika, simply
did not want to distract the president's attention and potentially threaten his domestic
policy reforms by having him focus his attention on the turmoil brewing in Central
America.
For Chairman o f the Joint Chiefs o f Staff, Bush gave the nod to Colin Powell, a
highly cautious military bureaucrat who strongly believed that U.S. forces should not be
committed abroad unless there was a clear and obtainable objective as well as widespread
public support for the use o f force. Powell, like Baker, was a holdover from the Reagan
years, serving as the president's sixth and final national security advisor. As for Bush's
own national security advisor, he chose General Brent Scowcroft, who had previously
served in the same capacity for President Gerald Ford. All these men, including the
president, comments Howard Wiarda, came from the center o f the Republican Party. And
all o f them, unlike Reagan and his closest advisors, held moderate, pragmatic views
240
concerning how the United States should respond to events taking place in El
Salvador and Nicaragua.
George Bush perceived the United States as he perceived himself, a fortunate
nation that had been bestowed with certain benefits. It was therefore incumbent upon the
United States to help others. How would the president assist others in Central America?
Simply by working with these war-torn nations to bring peace to their homelands. But,
George Bush, one must remember, was also a very cautious leader; he was the
embodiment o f the American Tory (see Chapter 4). Therefore, the way he would assist
these countries would be by taking a slow, incremental approach in helping them solve
their problems. Unlike Reagan, Bush would respond to changes taking place around him,
he would not lead them. This would be an approach that would emphasize maintaining
stability above all else.
The Bush Agenda fo r El Salvador
The set of issues that George Bush would need to tackle regarding the events
taking place in El Salvador were very similar to those that were faced by President
Reagan throughout the 1980s. Three issues in particular were especially salient. The first
was whether the United States should actively support the Salvadoran government
verbally, economically, and militarily. The second was what stance the president should
take toward the FMLN. The third was how much support should be given to potential
negotiations between the Salvadoran government and the rebels.
241
The options that Bush could have chosen from are given in diagram 3. As
required by the congruence model, I have once again selected four possible options that
could have been chosen by President Bush. To reiterate, the logic behind the congruence
model is to arrive at all the possible courses o f actions and then deduce which o f these
most logically would follow from the foreign policy beliefs held by the decision-maker.
(Diagram 3 here)
242
DIAGRAM 3: BUSHS POLICY CHOICES FOR EL SALVADOR, 1989-1992
(NOT CHOSEN)
Not consistent with-> Option 4
Military
invasion
(ORIGINALLY CHOSEN)
Also consistent with-> Option 3
Low intensity
conflict
George Bushs
Foreign Policy B elief System
(LATER CHOSEN)
Consistent with-^ Option 2
Contingent
Military and
Economic
Aid; Support
Democracy
Promotion of
the use of
peace
negotiations;
Work with
allies
(NOT CHOSEN)
Do nothing
243
The first option was to have the United States back away from the crises in El Salvador.
In other words, the U.S. would stand pat and allow the Salvadoran government and the
FMLN to deal with their internal crisis by themselves. The United States would decrease
assistance drastically, if not end it altogether, and bring all U.S. military advisors home.
In short, Bush would be practicing a modern-day isolationism. The second option was to
promote negotiations between the government and the guerrillas. The United States
would use economic and military assistance to prod both parties to seriously pursue a
diplomatic end to the civil war. The third option was a replay o f the Reagan policy:
supply the Salvadoran government with vast quantities of military and economic
assistance so that the Salvadoran army could either emerge victorious in the armed
struggle or, at the very least, prevent the rebels from winning. This option, as under
Reagan, would include not only aid, but also the stationing o f U.S. military advisors in El
Salvador, along with regional military exercises. The final option was to up the ante:
direct use of U.S. military forces to finally defeat the FMLN on the battlefield and to
secure a regional ally in power.
As was the case for Reagan, the first and fourth options were not politically
feasible for President Bush to even consider seriously. Abandoning the Salvadoran
government would mean that eight years of U.S. support, at the cost o f over $3 billion
and the loss of over a dozen American lives, would all have been for naught. Likewise,
increasing the level of force to the point of actually introducing U.S. troops on the ground
did not fly in the Reagan administration, and most certainly would not be accepted by a
Democratic majority in both chambers o f Congress. In short, Congressional opposition
244
and opposition in the halis of public opinion would preclude the choice o f this option.
Thus, Bush was left with options 2 & 3: a continuation o f Reagan's low intensity conflict
or a new course that would use diplomacy/negotiations/ and U.S. financial assistance to
bring peace to El Salvador. George Bush started o ff using option 3, but later shifted gears
and adopted option 2. The result o f the shift in policy was that it helped to end El
Salvador's and Nicaraguas bloody and costly civil conflict.
One o f the first orders o f business for George Bush regarding El Salvador was
how he was going to respond to the end o f Christian Democratic rule. After the February
1989 presidential elections were held and the votes were tallied, ARENA candidate
Alfredo Cristiani had won the election with nearly 54% o f popular support as compared
to 37.7% for the PDCs candidate, Fidel Chavez Mena. Despite some early apprehension
regarding the prospects of having a right-wing party take over power in El Salvador,
Bush began to support the newly elected president in public, claiming: "ARENA had
transformed itself into a genuinely democratic party and that Cristiani was a sincere
moderate who had real control as party leader."467
After the elections were over, Bush told a gathering o f reporters that despite some
of the criticism concerning the Salvadoran elections: You dont hear it from me because
I want to give Cristiani a chance. Those elections were certifiably free Democrats and
Republicans on our commission going down there and saying that. So, we will treat the
Salvadoran winner on his word: that he wants to continue the democracy.
467 Carothers, In the Name o f Democracy, p. 37.

468 Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session at a W hite House Luncheon for Journalists, 3 1 March 1989, The Public Papers o f
245
This newfangled support by Washington for ARENA was also evident in the
willingness o f Congress to continue to fund the Salvadoran government at the behest o f
the president. After some early skepticism, Congress, in early 1989, passed the
president's request for nearly $90 million, with very few restrictions attached. 469 These
decisions by the president- to support the new Salvadoran government verbally and
financially and to continue to station U.S. military advisors in the country- amounted to a
continuation o f Reagan's low intensity conflict strategy, but with a twist. Whereas
Reagan granted aid to assist the Salvadoran army to defeat the rebels militarily, which
admittedly was a part of the Bush rationale, the new president firmly believed and desired
a movement toward democracy in El Salvador.
This does not mean that President Reagan did not support democratization at ail
for El Salvador- he certainly did. His administration vigorously pushed for elections in
1982 and in 1984. However, as was illustrated above, Reagans call for a democratic
solution were considered in many quarters as simply a to way gain the support of
Congress. They were meant in large part to gain additional resources for the Salvadoran
government and army who were trying to win the war on the ground.
1989 was a critical year for internal Salvadoran politics. ARENA had replaced the
Christian Democrats, the political wing of the armed left finally entered the political fray
by competing in the presidential elections under the Democratic Convergence Party, and
the rebels were relatively quiescent. Cristiani thus decided that this type o f political
climate augured well for possible negotiations with the rebels. Responding to hints by the
469 LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, pp. 566-567. The only certification requirements attached were that the president verify that the
Salvador government was making progress in its human rights record and that it was pursuing a negotiated end to the crisis.
246
FMLN in January that they would like to resume negotiations, Cristiani agreed to
open talks in September. However, as in the previous meetings in 1984, 1986, and 1987,
the government demanded that the FMLN agree to enter the political arena, put down
their arms, and compete for control o f the government via elections, rather than
negotiating a power-sharing formula. The result, as in each o f the previous negotiating
sessions, was a refusal by both sides to budge from their original positions.
Because o f the deadlock over needed reforms, the FMLN ended the talks and less
than two months later launched their largest military offensive to date. The offensive was
considered by some criteria to be a failure in that it did not cause a countrywide uprising
that the FMLN had been counting on and it did not assist the FMLN in actually taking
over governmental authority. However, the November offensive was a success in that it
did demonstrate to the Salvadoran government, as well as to the international community,
that the struggle was far from over.470
The response on the part o f the Cristiani government to the rebel offensive was to
unleash a reign o f terror reminiscent o f earlier periods in the civil war. Death squads
resurfaced, linked once again to the army and security forces. A massive crack down on
leftists began. One particularly gruesome incident, which rankled in the U.S. Congress,
who at the time the incident occurred were debating whether to extend financial
assistance to the Salvadoran government, was the bmtal execution-style murders o f six
Jesuit priests and two others at the Central American University at the hands o f a U.S.-
trained Salvadoran army battalion. In response, Congress began an investigation o f the
murders to see who was ultimately responsible, and to determine if U.S. aid should be
470 Karl, "El Salvadors Negotiated Revolution," pp. 148-150.
247
cancelled in the future. The Congressional investigation later revealed that the
Salvadoran high command had been responsible for giving the order for the executions.
Yet, despite their reluctance to continue to support a highly repressive government, both
the House and Senate in November did not cancel the planned delivery o f military
assistance for El Salvador for 1990, which would amount to $85 million.471
President Bush, at first, not wanting to abandon an ally facing internal pressure,
responded to the pleas of the Cristiani government by ordering an emergency delivery of
weapons. Once the immediate crisis had settled down, however, President Bush began to
reconsider his options for dealing with the crisis. Facing pressure from Congress that
future aid requests might not be granted if improvements were not made in the
government's human rights record, realizing that a military victory over the rebels might
in fact be impossible with the current levels o f assistance, and realizing that the
institutionalization of democracy in El Salvador was not likely if the civil war continued,
the president for the first time developed a sincere two-track policy that blended a low
intensity conflict option (Option 3) with promoting a negotiated settlement to the crisis
(Option 2).
This new policy fit quite well within the context of Bushs foreign policy beliefs.
The presidents national self-image o f the United States was one that perceived the U.S.
as a country that should assist others. And what better way to assist others than to give a
helping hand in trying to work out a regional solution to the crisis. Moreover, Bush
tended to respond to change in a cautious manner. Allowing regional actors to take the
lead in an effort to bring peace to Central America appeared to offer a pragmatic solution
471 LeoGrande, Our Ov/n Backyard, pp. 570-571
248
to the crisis. Bush reasoned that once the Central American states had worked out a
verifiable agreement that did not threaten U.S. national interests, he could then lend them
a helping hand by making sure the agreement was successfully implemented. Thus, Bush
would have the United States involved in the peace process, but not leading the way.
In January, Assistant Secretary o f State for Inter-American Affairs, Bernard
Aronson told Congress: El Salvador needs peace, and the only path to peace is at the
negotiating table.. .Let both sides commit to come to the bargaining table.. .and stay and
negotiate in good faith until the war is over.472 Secretary o f State Baker later announced
the official change to Congress in early February 1990: "We believe this is the year to
end the war through a negotiated settlement which guarantees safe political space for all
Salvadorans." This decision to stop pushing for a FMLN military defeat, comments Terry
Lynn Karl, "marked a decisive reversal o f U.S. policy."473
An additional factor that helped to convince Bush that a new policy toward
Central America was needed was the collapse of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe. On
11 November 1989 the fall o f the Berlin Wall marked the beginning o f the end to the
Cold War. It was becoming quite apparent to President Bush that the Soviets would be
focusing most o f their attention (emphasis added) on handling the transformations that
were taking place in the Eastern Bloc and at home. Thus, the international dimension to
the crises that had played such an important role in shaping how Ronald Reagan handled
these events slowly began to fade away.
472 U.S. House o f Representatives, Congress and Foreign Policy 1989, pp. 72-73.
473 Karl, op. cit. p. 149.
249
Slowly, however, is the key word. In the immediate aftermath o f the changes
in Eastern Europe, Bush would remain highly suspicious o f the Soviets. In reflecting
upon his planning for the December 1989 meeting with Gorbachev at Malta, Bush
comments:
I knew I had to push Gorbachev at Malta to stop meddling in Central America.
Incidents at the end o f November (emphasis added), such as the crashing in El
Salvador o f a Nicaraguan plane filled with Soviet ground-to-air missile and other
weapons and munitions, did not help matters. A further sour note was the Soviet
shipment o f MIG-29 fighters to Cuba. This was an interceptor aircraft which
could be configured to deliver nuclear weapons.474
At the Malta conference, Bush writes that he raised the topic o f Central America
with Gorbachev, calling it the most contentious issue between our two countries. And,
in response to a comment made by Gorbachev that the Sandinistas had nothing to do with
Marxism, Bush replied:
I am convinced they are exporting revolution. They are sending weapons. I dont
care what they have told you, they are supporting the FMLN [the leftist insurgent
forces in El Salvador]. I am convinced there is a new shipment o f helicopters
going from the Soviet Union to Nicaragua.475
474 George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York:Vintage, 1998) p. 155
475 Ibid. pp. 163, 166.
250
Meanwhile, on the ground in El Salvador in the wake o f the FM LNs "Tet
Offensive," President Cristiani realized that some flexibility on the part o f his
government was necessary to bring the guerrillas to back to the negotiating table. Talks
between the two sides began in earnest in April 1990. However, a big problem remained.
Right-wing elements within the Salvadoran army were fundamentally opposed to dealing
with the rebels. Consequently, Cristiani and others who were supporting a negotiated
peace plan needed to find a way to put pressure on the right wing to go along with the
peace talks.
A solution was found in having the Bush administration work closely with the
Cristiani government to convince recalcitrant members o f the Salvadoran armed forces
that U.S. military assistance in the future would be contingent upon their agreement not
to scuttle the negotiations (option 2). This strategy was supported by the U.S. Congress,
who in June 1990 decided to cut the foreign aid appropriation for El Salvador from $85
million to $42.5 million, marking the first time since the civil war began in 1980 that
Congress significantly cut the amount o f military assistance headed for San Salvador.476
From this time forward, the Salvadoran military could not be absolutely certain that
Washington would back them, even in a pinch.
Within the Bush administration itself, pressure was being brought to bear against
the Salvadoran army. In June 1991, Bernard Aronson and Chairman o f the Joint Chiefs o f
476 LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, pp. 573-574. Congress justified its decision to cut U.S. military aid in h alf by arguing that the
Salvadoran military refused to bring to justice those responsible for the murder o f the Jesuit priests. Congress also threatened to cut the
rest o f the funds if they continued to escape justice. Bush, in a brief turnabout restored military aid to the army in early 1991 when the
FMLN downed a helicopter that contained 3 U.S. servicemen. See, Karl, op. cit.
251
Staff, Colin Powell, visited with both Cristiani and Salvadoran military chief General
Rene Emilio Ponce, reminding them "that the U.S. Congress could refuse military aid for
next year's budget if they appear too intransigent" in their negotiating positions.477
In the meantime, the peace talks between the Cristiani government and the rebels
continued and slowly began to bear fruit. The April & M ay 1990 meetings in Geneva
and Caracas resulted in a mutual agreement to deal first with broad political issues and
later an agreement on a final cease-fire. After a series o f meetings were held between
June 1990 and April 1991, the main areas o f disagreement still dividing the two sides
concerned military and constitutional reforms. Initially, the government agreed to reduce
the size of the military and to transfer some security functions within the bureaucracy, but
the government adamantly refused to purge the military o f all officers who were
suspected of human rights violations. As for the Constitution, the FMLN demanded that
changes be made in the electoral and judicial systems. In spite o f these early
disagreements, smaller agreements were worked out in July 1990 and October 1990,
which allowed the United Nations to play a greater role in investigating human rights
violations and to act as a mediator in the dialogue that was taking place.478
The impasse over constitutional and military reform was finally broken in three
key meetings held in April, September, and December 1991. The April meeting tackled
the problem o f Constitutional reform. Agreements were reached that changed the
jurisdiction of the military courts and altered the way Supreme Court justices were
selected. In addition, an electoral tribunal was created that gave political parties a more
477 Quoted in Martha Cottam, Images and Intervention, p. 135.

478 Karl, op. cit., pp. 155-156.
252
prominent role over voter registration and in organizing elections. Third, a national
police force under civilian control was created and the mission of the armed forces was
redefined. Finally, a "Truth Commission," consisting o f three foreign jurists would be
responsible for investigating human rights abuses.
The September meeting, which took place in New York, settled the remaining
questions over military reforms. Government negotiators agreed to reduce the size o f the
military by half as well as to accept the creation o f an ad hoc commission to investigate
and punish those responsible for human rights violations. As a quid-pro-quo, the FMLN
agreed to participate in a new civilian police force rather than being incorporated into the
Salvadoran army. A third meeting was set for December, again in New York City, to
finalize the peace accords. Facing the potential cancellation of economic and military
assistance from the U.S. Congress, President Cristiani and Defense Minister Ponce
attended the meeting in person and jointly with FMLM negotiators announced that the
two sides had reached a final agreement. 479
On 16 January 1992 President Alfredo Cristiani and the five key commanders o f
the FMLN put pen to paper and officially ended El Salvador's twelve-year civil war. With
the help o f the President Bush, the U.S. Congress, and others from the international
community, negotiations and compromise accomplished what the use o f military force
could not. Peace had finally come to El Salvador, but at an enormous cost: in over the
twelve years o f fighting 75,000 Salvadoran citizens had unfortunately lost their lives.
479 Ibid. pp. 157-160.
253
The Continuing Saga o f Nicaragua
George Bush entered office in a period o f tremendous international change. And,
change for traditional conservatives like George Bush, is not always looked upon
favorably. By 1989, U.S.-Soviet relations had improved markedly since the beginning of
the decade. During the Reagan years, a nuclear arms control agreement had been reached
which eliminated intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF Treaty) from the two
superpowers arsenals, an arms reduction treaty was being negotiated (START I), and the
two once bitter rivals had m et at a series o f summit conferences in an effort to try to iron
out a number of their m ajor differences. The frigid climate o f the Cold War was
beginning to thaw. Yet a great deal of skepticism about the Soviets remained. Both Bush
and his National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft were deeply concerned over the
Soviet decision to continue to pour aid into a number o f developing countries. As they
note in their memoirs: "their [the Soviet] behavior in the Third World seemed to be mired
in the Cold War."480 This was especially true regarding Nicaragua where, since 1987, the
Soviets had been sending nearly $800 million per year to the Sandinista regime.481
Skepticism concerning the Soviets was matched with skepticism regarding the
Sandinistas, who Bush continually perceived as being untrustworthy (see Chapter 4).
And, yet, George Bush also possessed a deeply held self-image o f the United States that
480 George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Vintage Books, 1998) pp. 134-135
4 8 1 Don Oberdorfer, The Turn: From the Cold War to a New Era (New York: Poseidon Press, 1991) pp. 340-341.
254
was linked to helping others solve their problems. Thus, Bush's foreign policy
decisions with respect to Nicaragua would combine caution with service.
As was the case in responding to events in El Salvador, and sticking to the
requirements o f the congruence model, the four possible policy options that Bush could
choose from in responding to events taking place in Nicaragua are given in diagram 4.
(Diagram 4 here)
255
DIAGRAM 4: BUSHS POLICY CHOICES FOR NICARAGUA, 1989-1992
(NOT CHOSEN)
Military
invasion
(INITIALLY CHOSEN)
Low intensity
conflict
George Bushs
(LATER CHOSEN)
Support
Democracy
Limited
assistance for
Contras;
Promotion o f
the use of
peace
negotiations;
work with
allies
(NOT CHOSEN)
Not consistent with Option 1
Do nothing
256
The first option was to replace U.S. activism in Nicaragua with isolationism. In other
words, President Bush would end all support for the Contras and allow the two warring
parties to resolve their differences without U.S. interference. The second option was to
promote negotiations between the disputants and to push for a democratic solution to the
crisis. The United States would combine verbal support for elections with a continuation
o f financial support to the Contras in order to ensure that the Nicaraguan government
followed through with its promises for presidential elections. The third option was to
continue Reagan's policy o f low intensity conflict by providing the counter-revolutionary
forces with large-scale military aid and training in order to wrestle control from the
current ruling party. The final option was to send in the Marines to overthrow the
Sandinistas.
As was the case with Bush's response in El Salvador, options 1 and 4 were neither
reflective o f the presidents core beliefs, nor were they feasible politically. Bush believed
that the U.S. should lead, but not necessarily dominate (See Chapter 4). Getting out or
sending in the troops was perceived as either a much too passive approach or much too
militant response. Moreover, Congress, throughout the Reagan years, had cut o ff military
assistance to the Contras beginning as early as 1982. The national legislature was simply
not in the mood in 1989 either to commit U.S. forces to Nicaragua, or to appropriate
hundreds o f millions o f dollars to support what they believed to be a losing cause.
In many respects, Congressional obstinacy would soon negate the choice of
option 3. Admittedly, Bush could use emergency powers as Reagan did on numerous
257
occasions to provide the Contras with funding, but the amount certainly would not be
enough to lead to a military victory.
Thus, Bush was left with option 2, which interestingly enough fit both his beliefs
and jelled nicely with the sentiments prevailing in the U.S. Congress and in the American
public at the time. This policy option, unlike Reagans choice o f low intensity conflict,
included the important criteria o f supporting negotiations between the Sandinistas and the
United States to promote democratic elections in Nicaragua. Once again, this option
would combine Bushs sense o f service on the part o f the United States with a cautious
approach for bringing about democracy in Nicaragua. Bush, by March 1989, was willing
to break away from Reagans Central American policy, admitting that U.S. policy toward
Nicaragua would henceforth commit the United States to a concerted diplomatic effort
A Q J
to bring peace to Central America.
As noted above, bi-lateral negotiations with the Sandinistas, even to promote
democracy, was something that Ronald Reagan would not countenance. Reagans
position regarding the possibility o f negotiations with the Nicaraguan government was
summed up by Undersecretary o f Defense, Fred Ikle, who stated: We can no more
negotiate an acceptable solution with these people...than the social democrats in
revolutionary Russia could have talked to Lenin into giving up Totalitarian
Bolshevism.483 Put plainly, Ronald Reagan did not trust the Sandinistas and therefore
refused to engage in any serious bi-lateral negotiations with the Nicaraguan government.
482 Los Angeles Times, New U.S. Policy on Contras Told, 25 March 1989.
483 Fred Ikle, U.S. Policy for Central America-can we succeed? News Release, 12 September 1983, (Washington: Office o f the
Assistant Secretary o f Defense for Public Affairs, 1983)
258
With respect to U.S. support for the Nicaraguan resistance, Bushs objective
would be to continue to have Congress support the Contras in some form, but unlike his
predecessor, the president would also promote the Central America peace initiatives that
began midway through the Reagan administration. The goal was to bring peace and
democracy to Nicaragua.
The process began very early on in the administration when President Bush asked
Secretary o f State James Baker to meet with congressional leaders to hammer out a
bipartisan accord for Central America. The prevailing view within the administration,
writes Baker, was that trying to remove the Sandinistas from power via the Contras was a
lost cause. "Even with military aid (which Congress would never approve anyway), the
Contras were no match for the Sandinista Army. In this view the best that might be
managed was a policy o f containment that kept the Sandinistas from exporting their
Marxism to neighboring democracies."484 By March 1989, Baker, reflecting on the
Reagan administrations truculent approach toward Nicaragua, suggested: We all have
to admit that the policy basically failed.485 Clearly, Baker and Bush had learned from the
mistakes o f their predecessors. However, the learning that was accomplished also fit well
within the foreign policy beliefs held by the president. All told, Bush would take a much
less militant course o f action in Nicaragua due to the changed international environment,
potential legislative opposition, learning from past mistakes, and because o f different
foreign policy beliefs on how to respond to change.
484 James A. Baker III with Thomas M. DeFrank, The Politics o f Diplomacy: Revolution. War and Peace, 1989-1992 (New York:
G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1995) p. 48.
485 Los Angeles Times, New U.S. Policy on Contras Told," 25 March 1989.
259
Even though Bush would not select President Reagans quasi-military policy
toward Nicaragua, selling out the Contras was not acceptable either. So, on March 2,
Baker began to meet with Congressional leaders to work out an agreement that would
ensure that the Contras received non-lethal assistance so that they could sustain themselves,
while announcing that the administration was abandoning a military solution to the crisis
and would actively support regional peace initiatives. After twenty days o f intense
negotiations, and, in many ways, eight years of bitter disagreement on the correct course of
action for U.S. policy toward Central America, a mutually acceptable agreement was finally
struck between the White House and Capitol Hill. The Contras would receive nearly $4.5
million per month from March until the presidential elections were held in Nicaragua, which
were scheduled to take place on 26 February 1990. This financial assistance would be used
to help the Contras reintegrate or relocate within Nicaragua. A provision was also added that
stated that in the event the Contras violated the cease-fire, the assistance would end. In
return, President Bush would back the Central American peace process. The "Bipartisan
Accord on Central America" was announced to the American public on 24 March 1989,
with the president proclaiming proudly:
The executive and the Congress are united today in support o f democracy, peace,
and security in Central America. The United States supports the peace and
democratization process and the goals of the Central American Presidents embodied
in the Esquipulas Accord. The United States is committed to working in good faith
260
with the democratic leaders o f Central America and Latin America to translate
the bright promises of Equipulas II into concrete realities on the ground.486
The bipartisan accord presented a fundamental transformation in U.S. foreign policy
toward Nicaragua. Bush was now signaling a quiet retreat from the direct use o f military
force as an instrument for political change in Nicaragua...the U.S. government tacitly
acknowledged that the struggle to promote regime change had shifted from the military to
political-electoral terrain," writes Kenneth Roberts 487 After the agreement was made, Bush
< no
noted that the United States no longer had any right to order the politics o f Nicaragua.
Some might argue that this shift in U.S. policy was a result of policy learning, rather
than the result of different foreign policy beliefs held by two U.S. presidents. The argument
is that Bushs beliefs in part changed as a result of the transformations that took place in the
domestic and external environments and he therefore learned that his predecessors policies
would not be acceptable in this new international and domestic environment. It was
therefore the changes in these environments and subsequent policy learning that led to an
alteration in beliefs; consequently, it is the environment, and not beliefs, that is the real
cause o f the change. Is this a valid argument? Undoubtedly. There is no denying the fact that
domestic and international factors played a tremendously important role in the change in
U.S. policy toward El Salvador and Nicaragua. However, did these constraints lead to a
change in Bushs beliefs, or, for that matter, his key foreign policy advisors, regarding the
486 "Bipartisan Accord on Central America," 24 March 1989, Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States: George Bush
1989-1993 " (Washington: Federal Register Division, National Archives and Records Service, General Services Administration)
487 Kenneth Roberts, "Bullying and Bargaining: the United States, Nicaragua, and Conflict Resolution in Central America" International
Security, Vol. 15 (Fall 1990) pp. 67-102.
488 Quoted in Cynthia Amson, Crossroads, p. 233
261
correct course o f action for the U.S. to take in responding to events taking place in
Central America? I would suggest that it was one factor among several.
Bushs beliefs regarding how to respond to international change remained relatively
constant. Throughout the Reagan and Bush documents, one is hard pressed to find Bush
championing a militant solution to the crisis that was taking place in Nicaragua. Admittedly,
Bush was a loyal vice-president and one that always publicly supported President Reagans
truculent policies. However, loyalty to Reagan does not mean that Bush would
automatically continue his predecessors full-fledged low-intensity conflict against the
Nicaraguan government once he, himself, was president. Bush was, above all, a
conservative and pragmatic politician. Working with Congress to forge a new bipartisan
consensus on U.S. policy toward the region, and one that fit within his set o f beliefs,
appeared to be the prudent thing to do. Continuing to assist the Contras with humanitarian
aid fit well within Bushs service-like national self-image, just as allowing the Central
American states to push forward with promoting elections in Nicaragua fit well within his
beliefs on how to respond to change in a cautious manner.
Likewise, it should be noted that one o f Bushs key foreign policy advisors, James
Baker, consistently expressed the need to pursue a non-military solution in Nicaragua. As
Reagans chief-of-staff, it was Baker, along with Michael Deaver and Edwin Meese, who
tried to sway Reagan away from focusing too much attention on foreign affairs, especially
the unpopular civil wars in Central America. And, as Bushs Secretary of State, it would be
Baker who would continue to support Bushs foreign policy proclivities by advocating the
use o f diplomacy to secure U.S. interests in Nicaragua by promoting the case for a
regionally led democratization effort.
262
In May, the president established official U.S. policy toward Nicaragua and the
Nicaraguan resistance by signing National Security Directive 8 (NSD- 8). Couched in terms
o f preventing Soviet and Cuban domination of Nicaragua and to reduce the threat that the
Sandinista regime posed to overall regional stability, President Bush suggested that the
United States had five goals that it would pursue with respect to Nicaragua. The first was to
prevent Soviet strategic use o f Nicaragua, to include withdrawal o f Soviet and Cuban
military presence and sharp reduction of Soviet bloc assistance. The second was to reduce
the threat posed by Nicaragua to its neighbors and other countries in Latin America by
ending Nicaraguan subversion. The third was to reduce the size and capability o f the
Nicaraguan military to levels commensurate with Central American stability.489 The final
two goals were to promote democracy in Nicaragua and to assist in regional-wide economic
development in order to prevent long-term instability throughout Central America 490
Besides laying out the objectives of U.S. policy toward Nicaragua, NSD-8 also
indicated how the president planned to obtain them. The first priority of the United States,
wrote Bush, would be to engage in active diplomacy on a sustained basis for a democratic
opening in Nicaragua. Quite interestingly, and unlike any position adopted by President
Reagan, Bush suggested that bilateral negotiations with Nicaragua should not be excluded.
Second, the president expressed the need to put pressure on the Soviet Union to end their
military relationship with Nicaragua and to let Moscow know that the status o f U.S.-Soviet
relations would be contingent upon improvements being made in this area. Third, Bush
stressed the need to take a carrot-and-stick approach with the Sandinista government, which
489 National Security Directive 8, I May L989, Copy provided by the George Bush Library, College, Station, Texas.
490 Ibid.
263
would include the use of trade, economic development, and bilateral discussions in an
effort to prod the Nicaraguan government toward meeting their commitments concerning
democratization. Fourth, the president emphasized that U.S. support for the Contras and for
internal political opponents should continue up until democratic elections are held, hoping
that this would act as a disincentive for the Sandinistas to not renege on their promises for
future elections. Finally, Bush argued that the United States, and not regional or
international actors, would be responsible for determining whether the Sandinistas were
fulfilling the aforementioned promises.491
By late 1989, it became clear that the United States was looking for a face saving
way out o f the Central American quagmire. The means to accomplish this end would come
through a series of peace initiatives begun and carried out by a number o f Latin America
states, and ultimately implemented with the blessing o f the Bush administration.
During the Reagan years, a variety of countries from Latin America and the
Caribbean Basin became increasingly worried about the fighting taking place in Central
America. They believed that the high level of tension generated between the United States
and Nicaragua might escalate into a full-scale regional war which might engulf them within
its midst. Keeping these fears in mind, the foreign ministers o f Venezuela, Colombia,
Mexico, and Panama met and ironed out a set of principles that later became known as the
Contadora Peace Plan. As noted above, by September 1984, all five Central American
nations signed the agreement and were willing to adhere to the following conditions: 1) an
end to all support of any insurgency within the region; 2) a reduction o f foreign military
advisors leading to a complete elimination of foreign military bases in Central America; 3) a
491 Ibid.
264
reconciliation between the conflicting political groups within each country. President
Reagan, it should be noted, publicly supported the plan, but worked behind the scenes to get
El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica to withdraw from the agreements, an effort that
eventually succeeded. The Contradora Process, at least during the early part of the Reagan
presidency, had became a dead letter.492
After his 1986 electoral victory, Costa Rican president Oscar Arias decided to revive
the peace process. By 1987, the Arias peace plan, also known as the Esquipulas Plan, was
completed. The plan called for a cease-fire to all the insurgencies then taking place
throughout the region, democratization and free elections, and amnesty for political
opponents. Ail five Central American states endorsed the plan, with Nicaragua being one o f
the initial signatories. The Reagan administration tried to avoid endorsing the plan, but was
forced to praise it in public once President Arias won a Nobel Peace Prize for his valiant
efforts to bring an end to the various civil wars within the region.
Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega took advantage o f the Axias plan and began to
make a number of conciliatory steps to end the fighting in his country. First, he agreed to
have international observers monitor the presidential elections scheduled for November
1990. Then, he decided to release 1,800 former National Guardsmen held in Nicaraguan
prisons, followed closely thereafter by a suspension o f the military draft until after the 1990
elections. In February 1989, as part of the Tesoro Beach agreement, the Sandinistas agreed
to alter their Constitution and to reschedule the presidential elections for February 1990. By
492 Hany E. Vanden and Thomas Walker, "The Reimposition o f U.S. Hegemony over Nicaragua," Coleman and Herring, eds..
Understanding the Central American Crisis (Boulder, CO: Wcstview Press, 1991)
265
August, Ortega had agreed to major electoral reforms with the political opposition,
which would allow for "fair and free" presidential elections.
A bump in the road to peace, however, occurred in October 1989 when Ortega
announced at the Pan-American summit that his government was unilaterally ending the
cease-fire that had been in place for the previous nineteen months. President Bush was able
to use this decision by the Nicaraguan government to persuade Congress to continue to
provide the Contras with humanitarian aid up until the 1990 elections.493 Despite this rock
on the road to peace, the stage was now set for the electoral showdown in Managua.
At first, the Bush administration believed that Ortega's acceptance o f "free" elections
was merely "a sham."494 Later, administration officials came to believe that an
internationally supervised election might possibly be a win-win situation after all. If Ortega
did not allow for fair and free elections and rigged them in favor of the Sandinistas, it would
demonstrate to Congress and to the international community at large the repressive nature of
Nicaraguan government. Bush, if he desired, could then ask Congress for additional lethal
aid for the Contras. In addition, if Ortega went ahead with the elections, the political
opposition might actually win and democracy could take root in Nicaragua.
Yet Bush still hedged on giving his full support for the scheduled elections. The
president questioned whether the Sandinistas would peacefully accept defeat In September,
Bush signed National Security Directive 25 (NSD-25), thus establishing official
administration policy toward the February 1990 Nicaraguan presidential elections. In the
directive, the president ordered that three actions be taken. First, Bush prohibited the
493 LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, pp. 555-558.

494 Stephen E. Ambrose, Rise to Clobaiism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938. (New York: Penguin Books, 1993) p. 357.
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provision o f covert assistance to political or other oppositional groups in Nicaragua.
Second, the president directed that the Department of State undertake a vigorous overt
program to support a free and fair election process. And, that every effort be made,
consistent with U.S. law, to assist the democratic opposition to compete effectively with
the Sandinista regime.495 Third, Bush stated that if the Sandinistas blocked overt U.S.
assistance, then the Secretary of State and the DCI (Director o f Central Intelligence) should
seek rapid consideration o f other options.496
The means that Bush would use to support the democratic opposition would be to
offer them over eight million dollars o f overt assistance via the National Endowment for
Democracy. Specifically, the money went to help support the National Opposition Union,
led by Violeta Chamorro.497 When the elections came, Washington received its long awaited
prize: the Sandinistas had lost power.
On 25 February 1990, the Nicaraguan electorate cast their ballots in one of the most
heavily observed elections in Central American history. To nearly everyone's surprise, the
National Opposition Coalition (UNO) candidate Violeta Chamorro received over fifty-four
percent of the popular vote to less than forty-one percent for the Sandinista candidate Daniel
Ortega. Needless to say, President Bush was thrilled about the outcome.
Prior to the elections, Bush and Gorbachev had worked out an agreement that
offered to end Soviet military aid to the Sandinistas in return for Washingtons agreement to
495 National Security Directive 25,22 September 1989, Copy received by request from the George Bush Library, College Station,
Texas.
496 Ibid.
497 Harry Varden and Thomas Walker, op. ciL, p. 173.
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abide by the election results, regardless o f the outcome.498 When Chamorro won the
presidential elections, President Bush was able to have its cake and eat it too: Soviet military
assistance had ended and the Sandinistas were voted out of power 499
The voter turnout for the elections was an impressive 86 percent. The UNO had
claimed its right to the Nicaraguan presidency. Contrary to what Washington expected,
Daniel Ortega accepted defeat gracefully. He congratulated Chamorro on her victory and
wished her, the very best in the future. His goodwill was evident when he told the newly
elected president: "You know that I respect and love you, and congratulate you on your
victory."500 In the end, Stephen E. Ambrose is in part correct when he states that "the credit
for democracy in Nicaragua goes...most o f all to Daniel Ortega and the Sandinistas."501 By
peacefully accepting defeat, Ortega and the Sandinistas set a precedent for the peaceful
transition to democracy in Nicaragua.
Overall, though, it should be emphasized that the Nicaraguan citizens were the ones
who turned the tide. Since 1981, the Nicaraguan people had probably suffered as much as, if
not more, than any other people during this time period. These were years o f "war,
destruction, and economic destabilization," writes E. Bradford Bums.502 With the election
o f Violeta Chamorro, nine years o f U.S. intervention came to an end. Just as in the Cold
War, the United States had "won." But the costs had been enormous. The covert war led to
498 Jan Adams, A Foreign Policy in Transition: M oscow's Retreatfrom Central America and the Caribbean. 1985-1992 (Durham,
NC: Duke University Press, 1992) pp. 123-127.
499 Don Oberdorfer, The Turn, p. 341.
500 Harry Anderson, "A No Vote for Ortega" Newsweek: 12 March 1990, p. 34.
501 Stephen E. Ambrose, op. cit., p. 358.
502 Varden and Walker, op. cit. p. 173.
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over 40,000 Nicaraguan deaths; over one hundred twenty thousand Nicaraguans were
displaced; health care facilities and schools were destroyed, leaving the country in social
turmoil. The economy was also set back nearly four billion dollars.503 It goes without
saying that the Nicaraguan people suffered the greatest damage o f all. The pain still lingers
on today and will continue to be felt for a long time to come.
In departing Nicaragua, George Bush continued an American tradition. Robert
Pastor compares this tradition to a "whirlpool."504The essence o f his argument is that U.S.
activity in Latin America and the Caribbean can be represented by a cycle of fixation and
inattention. In times o f crisis, the United States is sucked to the center o f the whirlpool and
Latin America suddenly becomes a vital national interest. Whereas in times of peace and
stability, the United States lingers off to the periphery, leaving Latin America to deal with its
own problems. Unfortunately for Central American states, especially Nicaragua and El
Salvador, the end of armed civil conflict did not mean that Washington would now help to
rebuild the countries that it helped to destroy throughout the 1980s. Rather, U.S.-Central
American relations have once again returned to a period o f benign neglect.
Jfc SfC 3|C J f : SfC
What comparisons can be made concerning the influence o f presidential foreign
policy beliefs on U.S. foreign policy toward El Salvador and Nicaragua during the Reagan
and Bush presidencies? The rationale behind U.S. foreign policy for both men was very
503 E. Bradford Bums, At War in Nicaragua., p. 62,
504 Robert A. Pastor, Whirlpool: US. Foreign Policy Towards Latin America and the Caribbean, p. 20-41.
269
similar: to prevent the expansion o f Communism in the region. The means that were
used to accomplish this end, however, were quite different.
The Reagan approach to the crises in El Salvador and Nicaragua was based on a few
very simple premises that were ail linked to his active approach for directing/leading
change. First among these was the belief that the Soviet Union and its proxies were the
driving force behind all the regional turmoil. The second was that the United States
presented the "last, best, hope of mankind" to fend of communist tyranny. The third premise
was that within a world order characterized as zero-sum, the United States needed to and
could be effective in drawing the line against Soviet encroachments in the Western
Hemisphere. The resulting policy, then, was one that emphasized large-scale economic and
military assistance for allies in the region to defeat either rebel insurgents or an already
entrenched Marxist-Leninist regime and an aversion to negotiations. The tools that were
used to accomplish this task would be much more than simply increased aid, however.
Astronomical amounts o f financial assistance would be coupled with U.S. military training,
large-scale military maneuvers, the provision of logistical support for covert operations, and
a public relations campaign, all nicely packaged under the concept o f low intensity conflict.
Standing in the background was also the ever-present threat that the United States might
resort to the direct use o f its military forces, as occurred in Grenada in October 1983.
George Bush, by contrast, started from a different set o f premises that reflected his
core foreign policy beliefs and resulted in a much more cautious approach to responding to
change. Admittedly, the Soviet Union was still perceived to be a contributing cause to the
crises in El Salvador and Nicaragua. The United States' role in the region, however, was not
to prevent left-wing governments from coming to power to any cost. President Bush did not
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attempt to solve these two countries problems for them; instead, he would help them
deal with their problems on their own, so long as their solutions did not threaten vital U.S.
interests. Bush, above all, would manage the problems by assisting regional actors in
pursuing negotiated settlements to their respective crises. This was the major difference
between the foreign policies o f the Reagan and Bush presidencies toward El Salvador and
Nicraragua. Without a doubt, George Bush believed that the United States needed to act, but
he perceived that an effective way to end the crisis was working with, not against other
Central American actors. George Bushs cautious approach to dealing with change led him
in this direction. Thus, the resulting policy was one that moved away from the use of low
intensity conflict to a policy o f actively supporting a diplomatic solution to the crisis and the
use o f economic and military assistance to push the peace process along.
The effectiveness of the two different policies in meeting the goal o f minimizing
instability could not have been more different. After eight years of Reagans low intensity
conflict, the FMLN was still a formidable threat to the Salvadoran government, while the
Sandinistas were still entrenched in power. During the Bush presidency, the two civil wars
had ended. The Salvadoran rebels finally agreed to lay down their arms and enter the
political arena in January 1992. And, in Nicaragua, the Sandinistas, in February 1990,
accepted peacefully the results o f a democratic election that handed over the reins of
government authority to the opposition. Indeed, the differences in the outcomes are a
sobering lesson that should be learned by all future U.S. policy makers.
Occurring alongside these shifts in U.S. policy were the incredible changes that were
taking place internationally, especially in Eastern Europe and within the Soviet Union.
Moscow and other Eastern Bloc countries, albeit slowly, were finally ending their
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involvement in Central American affairs and turning inward to solve some o f their own
problems. The Salvadoran rebels and the Nicaraguan government were losing their most
powerful international supporters. Negotiations and elections appeared to be a viable way
out o f the crisis. In the final analysis, then, it was the different approaches taken by the two
superpowers along with the willingness o f regional actors to work together that helped bring
to an end one of the most tragic periods in Central American history.
What about Panama?
Prior to moving on to the concluding chapter, an important question needs to be
answered. If a key difference between Ronald Reagans and George Bushs foreign policy
toward El Salvador and Nicaragua, and in Central America overall, was that Bush was more
inclined to use diplomatic means to find solutions to the prevailing crises, namely, through
his support for negotiations, and that he tended to make foreign policy decisions slowly and
incrementally, then what explains President Bushs decision to authorize the invasion of
Panama with 25,000 U.S. military forces in December 1989? Bushs decision to invade
Panama, it should be noted, represented the single largest commitment o f U.S. military
forces abroad since the Vietnam conflict. Clearly, this decision does not fit very well within
the argument presented above that George Bush tended to seek diplomatic solutions to the
crises in Central America. Does this decision therefore cast doubt on the validity o f the
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central hypothesis of this dissertation: that different foreign policy beliefs held by
Reagan and Bush contributed to changes in U.S. foreign policy toward Central America in
the 1980s? The answer, in short, is that it does casts some doubt on the strength o f the
hypothesis, but does not entirely falsify it.
The causes behind the decision to invade Panama were varied. Stephen Ropp
suggests that the final choice of a large-scale military intervention and the timing o f the
actual invasion occurred because of a confluence of factors.505 Internationally, changes
taking place in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union paralleled the Panamanian crisis.
The end of the Cold War, Ropp suggests, actually made the use of force more attractive to
policy makers in Washington because it made the possibility o f a confrontation with the
Soviets much less likely. Domestically, it is argued that a new foreign policy consensus had
emerged regarding the utility of the limited use of force in well-defined situations. On the
individual level, the argument is that Bush and his key foreign policy advisors had
personally experienced successes with the use of force in Grenada and Libya, which they in
turn used as analogies in deciding what could be done to resolve the crisis in Panama.
Additionally, Ropp contends that by 1989 a set of war-fighting commanders had come to
power who refined military contingency plans that were originally developed during the
Reagan years and made them more attractive as a potential option for the new president.506
505 Steven C. Ropp, "The Bush Administration and the Invasion o f Panama: Explaining the Choice and Timing o f the Military
Option," John D. Martz, ed., United States Policy in Latin America: A Decade o f Crisis and Challenge (Lincoln, NB: University of
Nebraska, 1995) pp. 80-109.
506 Ropp argues that in Washington the war-fighting commanders included Chairman o f the Joint Chiefs o f Staff Colin Powell and
Secretary o f Defense Dick Cheney. On the ground in Panama, Lt. General Max Thurman became Commander-in-Chief o f the U.S.
Southern Command in September 1989, replacing a much more cautious military official. General Frederick F. Woemer, Jr. This
argument concerning the importance o f the individuals who provided President Bush with information on a possible military solution
to the crisis is also dicussed in Bob Woodwards, The Commanders (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991) pp. 80-196.
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Ropp explains the timing o f the decision, December 1989, as a result o f two
domestic level constraints. The first was that the U.S. presidential elections in November
1988 forced the Reagan administration to put the military option aside for the time being.
The second was that Reagans Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral William Crowe, was
not in favor o f using military force to unseat General Noriega. Crowe wanted to ensure that
the damage done to the U.S. military in the aftermath of the Vietnam debacle, specifically as
it related to the militarys reputation, not be repeated. He believed that if military force was
used, and it failed, the U.S. military would be blamed for the failure, not the politicians who
had ordered the use o f force. Ropp points out that in the history o f U.S. foreign policy,
presidents will tend not to recommend the use of force when the nations top military
professionals oppose it. Thus the decision to go ahead and invade Panama would be delayed
until a new Chairman o f the Joint Chiefs was appointed, someone who would be more
favorably disposed toward using military force to secure political ends.507
This multi-level explanation for the decision to use force, and the timing o f the
action in Panama, is quite persuasive. It does a fine job in pointing out the various factors
that were at play in influencing Presidents Bush final decision to order U.S. troops into
action. What this and other analyses o f the Panamanian invasion often times fail to note,
however, is that Bushs final decision to commit U.S. forces was in fact made in an
incremental fashion, which was indicative of his set of beliefs regarding how the U.S.
should respond to change. President Bush did not set the United States on an entirely new
course of action in Panama; rather, his final decision was such that his first policy option
507 Ibid, pp. 92-94.
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failed and he ended up carrying out a set o f military plans that were created during the
Reagan years.
By December 1989, when the decision to use U.S. forces was made, President Bush
believed that the United States had exhausted every possible non-military option to obtain
its desired goal: the removal of General Manuel Noriega from power and the
reestablishment of democracy in Panama. As early as July 1987, the Reagan administration
decided to suspend U.S. aid programs to Panama, resulting in the loss of over $26 million in
economic and military assistance. Reagan officials also began suggesting that Noriega
should step down from power.508
Diplomacy was also used in late 1987. A plan was developed whereby Noriega
would leave office and in return he would not face indictment charges for drug trafficking in
the United States. Noriega turned down the offer.509
In early 1988, President Reagan imposed economic sanctions on Panama, including
cutting the quota for sugar imports into the United States. In addition, Reagan suspended
U.S. payments for the use of the Panama Canal and began placing restrictions on U.S. banks
that were conducting business with the Panamanian government. By February 1988, a
federal district count in Miami, Florida had indicted Noriega on twelve counts of drug
trafficking.510
After the indictments, negotiations were attempted once again. From April through
May 1988, representatives from the State Department worked out an agreement with
508 Harold Molineu, U.S. Policy Toward Latin America, pp. 245-246.
509 Martha Cottan, Images and Intervention, p. 148-150. See also Michael L. Conniff, Panama and the United States: The Forced
Alliance (Athens,GA: The University o f Georgia Press, 1992) p. 158.
510 Harold Molineu, U.S. Policy Toward Latin America, pp. 245-246.
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Noriega. The terms o f the new agreement were almost identical to the earlier attempt at
a negotiated settlement in 1987: Noriega would resign and U.S. would drop the federal
indictments. When the State Department set a deadline for signing the agreement, Noriega
balked. President Reagan ordered an end to the negotiations immediately after Noreigas
refusal to accept the terms o f the agreement. This decision marked the last major act of the
Reagan administrations policy toward Panama.511
George Bush began his presidency hoping that the elections scheduled for May 1989
in Panama would solve the Noriega problem once and for all. In an effort to help the
opposition prevail in the presidential elections, Bush signed a secret finding that ordered the
CIA to channel $10 million to the political opposition. The funding would be used mainly
for communications and psychological warfare, both of which would be directed by the
CIA.512 The elections were held on schedule (May 7th) and it appeared that the political
opposition, led by oppositional candidate Guillermo Endara, would emerge victorious. It
fact, Michael Conniff writes that based on pre-election surveys and Church conducted exit
polls, the opposition claimed a 75 percent victory.513 However, before the official
counting of the ballots was completed, Noriega dispatched paramilitary forces to take
control of various polling places so that the ballots could not be counted. When the political
opposition and their followers protested publicly three days after the election, Noriega
ordered his supporters to violently crack down on the protesters. Noriega then officially
nullified the election results.
511 Cottam, Images and Intervention. P152-153.

512 Kevin Buckley, Panama: The Whole Story (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991) p. 169.
513 Michael ConnifT, op. cit. p. 160.
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Needless to say, President Bush was not pleased with the Panamanian leaders
audacious behavior. To a gathering o f the White House Press Corps on 13 May 1989, Bush,
in response to a question about whether he was advocating a Panamanian Defense Force
(PDF) coup or even a popular revolution against Noriega stated: I would love to see them
get him out. Wed like to see him out o f there.. .The will of the people should not be
thwarted by this man and a handful o f Doberman thugs.. .514
Five months after the president made this statement, a group o f junior officers in the
PDF tried to unseat Noriega. Bush and his leading foreign policy advisors, however,
believed that the coup was not well-organized and offered only minimal support. Without
full U.S. backing, the coup attempt failed. And when it was revealed in the press that Bush
had done very little to facilitate the coup, he was criticized heavily by both Democrats and
Republicans in Congress.515 In addition, after the coup was put down, Noriega began to
taunt President Bush publicly for his ineffective efforts to remove him from power. This
ridicule, when added to the aforementioned congressional criticism, caused the Bush
wimp factor once again to resurface. In response, Bush began to send more U.S. military
personnel and equipment into Panama. It appeared the president was gearing up for more
forceful actions.
On 15 December 1989, Noriega had the National Assembly declare that Panama
was in a state of war with the United States as long as U.S. military forces continued to try
to intimidate the Panamanian government. Noriega also had the national legislature declare
him maximum leader for national liberation. One day after these provocative decrees were
514 Interview with members o f the White House Press Corps on the Situation in Panama, 13 May 1989, The Public Papers o f the
515 The Congressional criticism that Bush faced is covered in Woodwards, The Commanders, pp. 127-128.
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issued, PDF forces fired upon four U.S. servicemen after they failed to stop at a
roadblock in Panama City. One o f these men, Lieutenant Robert Paz, died at a local hospital.
That same day, PDF forces detained a U.S. naval officer and his wife who had witnessed the
shooting. Both were subsequently harassed and beaten. It appeared that the situation on the
ground in Panama was bordering on chaos.
It was within this context that George Bush gave the go-ahead for a military invasion
o f Panama on 17 December 1989, utilizing a plan that had been developed during the
Reagan administration and later refined by Bushs key military advisors. U.S. forces would
go into action on 20 December 1989. 25,000 military personnel would be used to protect
U.S. citizens, defeat the PDF, restore the democratically elected government o f Guillermo
Endara, and to capture General Manuel Noriega.
The decision that Bush made to commit U.S. troops, therefore, was one that
followed a number of failed non-military attempts to obtain the United States objective in
Panama. President Bush did not actively seek a military solution to the crisis. Rather, he
proceeded slowly in responding to events, as he did in El Salvador and Nicaragua,
sometimes at great political cost to himself. At first, Bush considered elections as a viable
means to secure U.S. objectives. The president believed that perhaps individual choices in a
free electoral contest could secure a desired end as effectively as the use o f military force.
His initial policy toward Panama was thus strikingly similar in many ways to his policy
toward Nicaragua: the provision o f U.S. assistance to the political opposition. The goal was
to help the political opposition win in the upcoming presidential elections. In Nicaragua, as
noted above, Bush would provide over $8 million to the political opposition through the
National Endowment for Democracy. In Panama, the presidents secret finding authorized
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the CIA to provide the political opposition to Noriega with S10 million. Both programs
in part help turn the tide in favor o f the political opposition in the elections. Unfortunately,
in the case of Panama, General Noriega nullified the election results. In contrast, following
the 1990 Nicaraguan elections, the Sandinistas abided by the results and peacefully gave up
power to the National Opposition Union. It was in the aftermath o f the election debacle in
Panama, that Bush began to seriously consider more militant courses of action.
Once it became evident that elections would not do the trick in Panama, Bush had to
reassess U.S. policy. The president could reflect back on his predecessors policies and see
that Reagan had tried to use various economic tools as well as negotiations to convince
Noriega to leave office. These efforts were ineffective. Moreover, Bush had tried to use
elections to wrestle control away from Noriega. This, too, had failed. The only recourses
left, then, were to support an internal coup or to use U.S. military forces directly to
overthrow Noriega. And, when the October coup attempt did not pan out, it appeared that a
U.S. military invasion was only option remaining.
Perhaps in the aftermath of the October coup attempt, Bush could have extended an
olive branch to Noriega by offering to negotiate a settlement to the crisis along the same
lines as were worked out under Reagan. However, once Noriega began to taunt the U.S.
president in public, the political fallout that would follow from such an action was much too
great to consider seriously. Democrats and Republicans were already criticizing President
Bush for not providing the coup plotters with enough support. Therefore, when it appeared
that U.S. lives were now in danger and that his advisors believed they had a plan that would
work, Bush ordered the invasion.
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In the final analysis, President Bushs decision to order the invasion o f Panama
does represent somewhat o f an anomaly to a central point being developed in this
dissertation: that George Bush was more likely than Ronald Reagan to believe that
negotiations should be used to promote U.S. objectives in Central America. To authorize the
use o f 25,000 U.S. troops to invade another nation-state is certainly not a diplomatic
solution to a crisis. However, it must also be acknowledged that President Bush chose this
option when it appeared that all other reasonable courses of action had failed. What was
absent in Panama that was present in El Salvador and Nicaragua was a government actor(s)
who was willing to compromise and cooperate with the United States to bring a peaceful
end to the conflict. If Noriega had abided by the election results, as the Sandinistas had in
Nicaragua, or if Noriega was willing to negotiate a solution to the crisis as the FMLN was
willing to do in El Salvador, then the decision to invade Panama would more than likely not
have been made and countless lives would have been saved.
R e p ro du ced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
280
Conclusion
Presidential foreign policy beliefs are important because they can potentially
influence the decision-making process in a number of critical ways. First, the beliefs held
by presidents can influence his assessment o f incoming information. Presidents often
possess preconceived notions that can contribute to their exclusion o f information that
rims counter to their already held preconceptions. Second, beliefs can shape a president's
definition o f the situation that he is facing and helps him to identify its most salient
features. The major point being that presidents can define reality in radically different
ways and these varied interpretations can lead to different behavioral outcomes. Finally,
the beliefs held by a president can influence his identification and evaluation of options,
and the promotion of options among his advisors.
In this dissertation, I have tried to uncover the foreign policy belief system of
Presidents Reagan and Bush through a qualitative content analysis o f the their public
speeches, personal memoirs and internal administration correspondences, along with an
analysis o f the autobiographies o f their leading foreign policy advisors. The purpose of
examining a presidents belief system is to deduce from these beliefs certain foreign
policy proclivities, and then see if these beliefs match-up with subsequent changes in
U.S. foreign policy behavior. The value o f using this analytic tool can be determined by
comparing how this approach helps us to understand change in U.S. foreign policy as
compared to other potential analytical models.
This concluding chapter will point to some o f the advantages and disadvantages
o f relying solely on system-level and domestic-level arguments for explaining change in
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U.S. foreign policy. I will show why including beliefs is a necessary condition for
gaining a fuller understanding o f the shifting nature o f U.S. foreign policy.
The System-Level Explanation
The main system-level interpretation o f change in U.S. foreign policy begins with
the premise that U.S. activism in various regions of the world is geared toward meeting
actual or perceived threats to American interests by powerful extra-regional state actors.
Simply stated, neo-realists argue that the structure of the international system constrains
state behavior in very specific ways. Because o f the anarchical nature o f the international
system, states need to emphasize security, and when a powerful outside actor tries to
make in-roads into a region that another state considers its "sphere o f influence," the
natural response, so the argument goes, is for the challenged state to balance against the
potentially threatening adversary. Thus, U.S. foreign policy in Central America
throughout the 1980s is explained by neo-realists as a direct outgrowth o f the need for the
United States to balance against the perceived Soviet threat to the region.
Clearly, this argument possesses a great deal of validity. As mentioned in
Chapters 3 and 4, both Presidents Reagan and Bush shared a common set of beliefs about
the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union as the core issue in their
respective foreign policies. The neo-realist interpretation is indeed quite accurate in
predicting that given a perceived threat to Central America by the Soviets, the United
States would act. However, the exact nature o f the U.S. response is something that neo
realists cannot confidently predict. And although neo-realist scholars would be quick to
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point out that they make no actual claims in being able to specify a particular type o f
response, a belief system model can be used to make reasonable predictions concerning
this very question.
In the two cases analyzed above, both Reagan and Bush possessed very positive
self-images o f the United States that stressed the need for an active foreign policy. Yet
the two presidents held a vastly different set of beliefs regarding how the United States
should respond to changes taking place around the world and, in particular, the changes
taking place in Central America. When Ronald Reagan entered the White House, he
believed that the United States should attempt to roll back Soviet gains, especially in
Central America. Logically, this belief foreshadowed a very active foreign policy for the
United States in Central America. In practice, a policy of low intensity conflict was
adopted, which favored the inflow o f U.S. advisors into the region and the influx of
massive amounts o f U.S. military and economic assistance to support allied governments
and counter-revolutionary forces who were fighting against a rising Marxist-Leninist tide
in Central America.
President Bush, on the other hand, firmly believed in the necessity o f responding
cautiously to a changing world order. If the Reagan motto for Central America was: "act
quickly and decisively," then the Bush motto was: "do no harm." Assuming these beliefs,
one can be reasonable confident in predicting that the Bush administration would take a
much less active approach in responding to the events taking place in El Salvador and
Nicaragau. In terms o f policy output, President Bush eventually abandoned the use of low
intensity conflict in favor o f provisional economic and military assistance and an active
promotion o f the cause o f democratization for the region.
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What's quite interesting about this shift in policy is that it significantly
decreased the role that the United States would play in guiding the changes that would
eventually occur in the region, a shift that fits quite nicely within the framework of
a'Tory-like" U.S. president, but conflicts with his national self-image concerning the
need for an active United States in foreign affairs. By contrast, a decreased role for the
United States under Reagan would appear to be out o f sync with his set o f beliefs
regarding how to handle change, as well as out o f sync with his almost religious
conception o f the proper international role for the United States.
One might argue that the change in policy from Reagan to Bush was a mere
reflection o f the changing international balance o f power. By the early 1990s the Soviet
Union had virtually withdrawn its active support for both the Sandinista government and
for revolutionary groups operating throughout the region. Revolutionary events were
taking place in Eastern Europe beginning in late 1989 and the Soviet regime began to
turn inward to try to deal with its own faltering political and economic system. These
changes in the degree o f Soviet interference in this hemisphere therefore meant that the
United States no longer needed to be overly concerned with the events taking place in El
Salvador and Nicaragua. There was simply no longer a need to try to balance against
potential Soviet gains. Thus, Bush quite logically stepped back from having the United
States take an active role in trying to solve the problems of the region.
Yet how valid is this argument? The key problem with the neo-realist explanation
can be seen by subjecting it to a counter-factual test.516 Suppose that the Cold War did
516 F ora very persuasive argument on the benefits o f using counter-factuals to discover causal chains in international politics consult:
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History (New York: Addison, Wesley,
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not end in the late 1980s and that the structure o f the international system remained
bi-polar during the Bush administration. Would George Bush have continued the Reagan
policy o f actively propping up the government o f El Salvador and the funding and
training o f the Contras in Nicaragua? Neo-realists would answer: probably. However, a
belief system model would suggest that Bush would respond in a much different fashion.
Prior to becoming president, and even while president, Bush possessed a cautious and
conservative personality. It seems highly unlikely that Bush, like Reagan, would be bent
on actively pursuing a victory over communism in Central America at virtually any cost.
Instead, it is much more likely that Bush would have responded to events in the region as
he later responded to the changes in Central Europe: slowly and incrementally, taking a
wait-and-see approach as he tried out various policy options.
The problem with the use o f a counter-factual test is that empirical evidence can
not really be brought to bear in order to test the validity o f this assertion. However, if
subsequent responses to international events teach us anything at all, it seems reasonable
to assume that Bushs policies toward El Salvador and Nicaragua would have been
similar to his policies toward the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc.
In the end, then, structural explanations are on target in predicting a change in
U.S. foreign policy in response to shifts in the international distribution o f power. But,
this approach can and should be complemented with a belief system model if one wants
to make reasonable predictions concerning the type o f response that ultimately will be
chosen.
Longman: 2000,3rd edition) pp. 47-50. See also, Philip Tetlock and Arone Belkin, eds., Counterfactual Thought Experiments in
World Politics: Logical. Methodological, and Psychological Perspectives (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996)
285
Domestic-level Explanations
The two most frequently used domestic-level explanations for analyzing change
in U.S. foreign policy focus on the interplay between the executive and legislative
branches for control o f the direction o f U.S. foreign policy and the competition between
internal bureaucratic actors within the executive branch for control over the foreign
policy agenda. The first approach assumes that Congress can tie the president's hands in
meeting his foreign policy objectives by controlling the purse strings. The second
approach assumes that the internal bureaucratic group that has the president's ear can
shape his subsequent foreign policy decisions by controlling the type and amount of
information that is provided to the chief executive. Both schools o f thought, it should be
noted, have a great deal o f empirical evidence that can be brought to bear to support their
claims. Yet each explanation is problematic in certain ways and can be improved by
incorporating some of the findings of belief system theory.
For the entire period o f their respective presidencies, Ronald Reagan and George
Bush faced a domestic political environment where the Republican political party was in
the minority in either one or both houses of Congress. Needless to say, Ronald Reagan's
ability to wage a policy o f low intensity conflict in El Salvador and in Nicaragua was
limited by Congressional restrictions. With respect to El Salvador, for most o f the period
from 1981 until 1989, Congress mandated that President Reagan certify that the
government in San Salvador was making progress in its human rights record and that it
286
was pursuing a negotiated end to the civil war. These certifications were required
before Congress would agree to any increase in the level o f military and economic
assistance.
With respect to Nicaragua, Congress was even more committed to staying the
president's hand. First in 1982 and later in 1984, a Democratic-dominated House of
Representatives attached a series o f amendments to the foreign aid appropriations bill that
severely limited the use of U.S. funds to assist in the overthrow o f the Sandinista
government.
Admittedly, both sets o f restrictions played an important role in shaping the types
of policies that Reagan could use. However, they did not necessarily determine the
policies that he ultimately did select. President Reagan abided by the certification
requirements, albeit in a minimal fashion. As for restrictions on U.S. aid to the Contras,
when the Congressional amendments were put into place, the president and his advisors
began to accept both legal and illegal sources o f funding, which ultimately culminated in
the Iran-Contra debacle.
When President Bush entered office, adherents to this school believed that the
president-elect was faced with a legislative branch that was unwilling to continue
Reagan's not-so-secret war in Central America. George Bush was thus put in a
predicament. He could expend an enormous amount of political capital on the Hill in an
effort to continue an activist course for the United States in Central America, which
might or might not have led to a successful outcome. Or, he could agree to Congressional
demands to promote regional peace initiatives, and thus be assured o f the national
287
legislature's support in other areas o f concern for U.S. foreign policy. Bush, it is
argued, logically choose the latter.
The question that needs to be asked is whether Bush chose a different course o f
action than Ronald Reagan in Central America because of Congressional pressure or
because it fit within the context o f his own set o f foreign policy beliefs. I believe that the
answer is a little o f both. By 1989, Congress was in no mood to continue pumping into
the region the same amount o f aid as it had the previous eight years. For Congress, the
Reagan years demonstrated what could go wrong in U.S. foreign policy if they did not
keep a watchful eye on the president. In the immediate post-Reagan years, Congress was
going to be very careful in monitoring the funds that they appropriated. Bush would have
to, and indeed did, work very hard to obtain any additional assistance for the Salvadoran
government and the Contras in 1989-1990. But, the desire to move beyond a military
solution to the crisis was also, in part, a manifestation of George Bush's cautious
personality. Bush believed that responding to change should be done prudently. Working
with regional actors to bring peace to Central America appeared to be a pragmatic and
politically astute maneuver. Bush reasoned that he could possibly achieve two objectives
at once: democratization for Central America, while at the same time re-establishing a
sense o f bi-partisanship in U.S. foreign policy that, the president believed, would be
needed to respond to the larger transformations taking place internationally.
Another domestic-level explanation for change in U.S. foreign policy attempts to
establish a correlation between presidential decisions and the advisors who provide the
chief executive with information and advice. In short, the basic argument suggests that
presidential foreign policy decisions will tend to mirror the preferences o f the advisors in
288
the bureaucracy who hold the president's confidence and provide him with
information. Within the context o f U.S.-Central American policy in the 1980s, the
argument is that any shifts in U.S. policy that took place over this time period reflected
the shifting correlation o f power within the executive branch. For example, the shift in
administration policy in late 1981, whereby the United States announced that aid to the
Salvadoran government would be contingent on human rights improvements and that the
U.S. was pushing for wide-scale political reforms, is explained as a victory by moderate
elements within the executive branch over their more ideological and hard-line
opponents. Likewise, the major shift in U.S. policy in the Reagan to Bush transition is
also explained as a reflection of which advisors held sway within the executive branch. In
this case, it is argued that Bush's moderate foreign policy advisors fundamentally
influenced the president's foreign policy direction.
It goes without saying that the advice and information which advisors present to
their president will indeed influence the final choice that he makes. However, what those
o f a bureaucratic politics persuasion often fail of point out is that the president relies most
heavily on advisors who usually share similar core beliefs. It is no coincidence, for
example, that Ronald Reagan most frequently consulted Edwin Meese, Casper
Weinberger, Jeane Kirkpatrick, William Casey and W illiam Clark for advice on foreign
policy. Ail these individuals held similar ideological viewpoints as the president. And
when Reagan did heed the advice o f more moderate advisors, such as Thomas Enders
from the State Department, and the suggested policy appeared to fail, the president
became all the more likely to rely on those who held similar ideological viewpoints (see
chapter 5).
289
Likewise, George Bush tended to trust the advice o f men who shared some o f
his conservative beliefs, such as Secretary of State James Baker and National Security
Advisor Brent Scowcroft. The point is that although the bureaucratic politics argument is
very useful in acknowledging the importance that advisors and bureaucratic agencies play
in the creation and implementation o f U.S. foreign policy, it is also quite true that
bureaucratic winners and losers are often determined by how well they match-up with the
beliefs held by the president.
As was the case for the structural argument presented above, domestic-level
explanations are very useful in helping to uncover some o f the constraints that a president
faces in selecting certain foreign policy options. Presidents do not make policy decisions
in a vacuum. Opposition from the legislative branch and competition within the
bureaucracy will influence presidential decision-making. What one must also keep in
mind, however, is that these are simply constraints. And, it must be acknowledged that
constraints do not determine policy, they merely influence it. A full understanding o f the
nature o f change in U.S. foreign policy therefore requires an examination not only o f
structural and domestic limitations, but also the beliefs held by U.S. presidents.
290
: j(c jfc :fc sfe sfe sfe
Overall, I believe this study has added a new dimension to the study o f U.S.-
Central American relations and has helped fill some o f the theoretical lacunas in the field.
The central hypothesis for the study that presidential beliefs are correlated with changes
in U.S. foreign policy can be considered confirmed, albeit with reservations. Presidential
beliefs are certainly not sufficient for an explanation o f change in U.S. foreign policy.
Beliefs need to be coupled with an examination of system and domestic-level variables.
Despite these reservations, it is still true that the role o f presidential belief systems
on the conduct o f U.S. foreign policy has not nearly received the attention that it
deserves. Perhaps no one expressed the need to bring the individual back to center o f
analysis better than did James Barber. In his most frequently cited book, Barber writes:
To the grand theorists o f social movements and the engineers of systems
and structures- some o f whom see human choice as determined by forces
outside the control o f human being- I can only express puzzlement.
Shuffle the system as you will, there is still at its center the person, and it
is his initiative and responses that steer the ship.517
In U.S. foreign affairs the most important decision-maker remains the president. Indeed,
it is often his decisions that have the greatest weight in determining the course this
country will take in the global arena. It is my hope that this dissertation has helped not
517 James D. Barber, The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall,
1977). p. xi.
only to shed light on the importance that a president's foreign policy belief system has
had on the changing nature o f U.S.-Central American relations, but has also helped to
improve our overall understanding o f the causes behind change in all o f U.S. foreign
policy.
292
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INFORMATION TO U SE R S

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality o f the

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced

ProQuest Information and Learning

I hereby certify that Paul Labedz has passed the Final

Examination for the degree o f Doctor o f Philosophy on

Dissertation Research Committee:

Cynthia McClintock, Professor o f Political Science and

Explaining Transitions in U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Central America

During the Reagan and Bush Years

B.A. June 1989, The State University o f New York at Buffalo

Columbian College of Arts and Sciences

August 31, 2001

All rights reserved.

Bell & Howell Information and Learning Company

Changing Beliefs and Changing Policies: Explaining Transitions

independent variable that must be considered together with system-level and

domestic-level variables in order to understand the causes behind changes in U.S.

foreign policy was investigated through an examination o f a specific foreign policy

Reagan and Bush presidencies.

consisted of the presidents national self-image, images o f allies and adversaries, as

change. To assess the impact o f a presidents beliefs on foreign policy behavior, I

were selected rather than others.

The central hypothesis o f this dissertation linking presidential foreign policy

two presidents different beliefs concerning the usefulness o f diplomatic negotiations

use and Bush being generally open to them.

CHAPTER 1: EXPLANATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY TOWARD CENTRAL 27

CHAPTER 2: FOREIGN POLICY, U.S. INTERVENTION, 50

CHAPTER 3: THE REAGAN BELIEF SYSTEM 75

CHAPTER 4: THE BUSH BELIEF SYSTEM 127

TABLE 1: DEGREES OF INTERVENTION 52

DIAGRAM 1: REAGANS POLICY CHOICES FOR EL SALVADOR, 190

DIAGRAM 2: REAGANS POLICY CHOICES FOR NICARAGUA, 216

DIAGRAM 3: BUSHS POLICY CHOICES FOR EL SALVADOR, 242

DIAGRAM 4: BUSHS POLICY CHOICES FOR NICARAGUA, 255

What contributes to change in a state's foreign policy behavior? This dissertation

international environment is filtered. It represents a hierarchical organization of political

Nicaragua in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Unfortunately, the predominant explanatory models in the study o f international

relations tend to de-emphasize the impact o f beliefs on foreign policy behavior. In

general, system-level explanations, such as those offered by neo-realist and dependency

power considerations and economic interests, respectively, in explaining changes in

greater emphasis on a number of alternative independent variables, such as the role of

presidents respond to these internal constraints in different manners. Proponents o f the

image-based political-psychology school have developed a persuasive argument linking

however, this approach is weakened by its neglect o f a leader's national self-image,

my contention that the existing literature needs to be complemented by a new approach

structural and domestic-level determinants.

policy behavior will be investigated through an examination o f a specific foreign policy

practices deemed anathema by the Reagan administration. As will be pointed out in

subsequent chapters, it was their positions on the usefulness o f negotiations as a viable

differentiated Ronald Reagan and George Bush.

among U.S. presidents?

More specifically, it tests whether:

particularly relating to intervention in the internal affairs of other states. A qualitative

public addresses, personal memoirs, internal correspondences, autobiographies, and

actors and events taking place in El Salvador and Nicaragua.

or degrees of intervention), it is necessary to select cases on the basis o f what Przeworski

technique centers on cross-country comparisons, the same logic can be applied to

common with respect to a particular empirical phenomenon that the investigator is

seeking to explain. These shared characteristics or variables are then considered

on the selected dependent variable.