ADRIAN WILSON INTERNATIONAL G.R. No.

162608
ASSOCIATES, INC.,
Petitioner, Present:

CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,

VELASCO, JR.,
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
DEL CASTILLO, and
PEREZ, JJ.
TMX PHILIPPINES, INC., Promulgated:
Respondent. July 26, 2010
x-------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A claimant is entitled to be compensated reasonably and commensurately for what he or she has lost as a
result of anothers act or omission, and the amount of damages to be awarded shall be equivalent to what
have been pleaded and adequately proven. Should the claimant fail to prove with exactitude the extent of
injury he or she sustained, the court will still allow redress if it finds that the claimant has suffered due to
anothers fault.
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner Adrian Wilson International Associates, Inc. (AWIA)
assails the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated August 14, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 49272 which
affirmed with modification the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 150 by
further ordering AWIA to pay to respondent TMX Philippines, Inc. (TMX) the amount of P1,546,084.00
representing the reimbursement of salaries of TMXs employees. AWIA now pleads that we reinstate the
RTC Decision or reduce the amount of actual damages representing the reimbursement of the salaries of
the TMX employees.
Factual Antecedents
TMX engaged the services of AWIA for the construction of its watch assembly plant located in the EPZA [3]-
run Mactan Export Processing Zone in Cebu (composed of twin modules and another separately designed
module).[4] Their Agreement[5] dated December 29, 1978 provided that AWIA would provide basic and
detailed architectural designs, plans, and specifications, as well as structural, mechanical, and electrical
engineering services.
Specifically, one of AWIAs duties was construction administration, i.e., to guard TMX from defects and
deficiencies during the construction phase by determining the progress and quality of the work of the
general contractor, P.G. Dakay Construction Company (P.G. Dakay). This is to ensure that this contractor
works in accordance with the directed specifications.
Construction began in 1979 and was completed in 1980. After five years, however, TMX noticed numerous
cracks and beam deflections (vertical shifting) [6] along the roof girders and beams in columns B, C, F, and G
of the twin modules. TMX, opining that the problem may have been due to design errors, informed AWIA of
the situation.
In its report dated April 24, 1985,[7] AWIA, thru its project manager Anthony R. Stoner, maintained that its
structural roof design of the building was correct and that the building was not in danger of collapsing.
AWIA attributed the existing cracks along column line G to the marginal strength of the concrete that was
poured during a heavy rainfall on July 18, 1979. This was based on a construction report dated July 19,
1979, furnished to TMX, of TMXP 2 Project Inspector/AWIA site representative Engr. Gavino Lacanilao (Engr.
Lacanilao).[8] In his report, Engr. Lacanilao narrated that the night before, the concrete pouring operations
on lines F and G of Bays 11-16, Section C of TMXs main building were temporarily suspended due to the
following mistakes committed by the contractor in the pouring of concrete: a) the presence of rainwater
that diluted the concrete; b) the failure to apply grout as a binder, and c) the use of concrete that was
mixed for more than 45 minutes. To AWIA, these mistakes had cost the quality of the roofs concrete
strength. AWIA thus suggested measures to correct the roof problem, one of them being the installation of
a lally column using steel pipe sections.
TMX also sought the opinion of two architectural consultancy firms, the Fletcher-Thompson, Inc. (Fletcher-
Thompson) and C.N. Ramientos and Associates. Both concluded that the cracks and displacements of the
roofs structural system were due to AWIAs errors in the design calculations and in the factoring of live and
dead load and concrete strengths.[9]
Similar to the suggestion of AWIA, Fletcher-Thompson recommended the installation of lally columns. Thus,
as preventive and corrective measure, TMX shored up the beams and girders with 118 steel lally columns
in all the buildings modules.
The major construction work was done in December 1985, during which TMX was forced to stop its
operations from December 1-18, 1985, putting its employees on forced leave with pay. All in all, TMX
spent P3,931,583.00,[10] i.e., P2,385,499.00 for shoring expenses,[11] and P1,546,084.00, representing
wages of its employees for the period December 1-18, 1985.[12]
Laying the blame on AWIA for the roof defects, TMX sought reimbursement of everything it had spent for
the corrective work by suing AWIA for damages before the RTC of Makati. The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 16587 and raffled to Branch 150.[13]
In its Answer, AWIA insisted on the correctness of its design and that the same was approved by TMX. It
stressed that it faithfully complied with its obligation of administering the construction contract and was
not responsible for whatever mistakes the contractor made. According to AWIA, TMX has its own staff who
supervised the construction and to whom AWIAs inspectors submitted their reports. Conversely, AWIA
blamed TMX for the cracks, alleging that the latters supervising staff ignored the July 19, 1979 construction
report of Engr. Lacanilao[14] and that TMX refused to conduct an in-place testing of the concrete.Defending
itself against the monetary claims of TMX, AWIA averred that the latter overreacted when it installed 118
lally columns, instead of only 11 columns as recommended by Fletcher-Thompson. [15]

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

After weighing the evidence submitted by the parties, the trial court noted that TMX apparently was
satisfied with AWIAs services because after the completion of the Mactan assembly plant in 1980, TMX
rehired AWIA four years later for the design of two more separate extensions of the building. All of AWIAs
documents, designs, drawings, plans and specifications of the building were subject to TMX and its parent
companys approval, which both relayed their comments and instructions to AWIA. During the construction
phase, TMX had its own engineering team which actively participated in the project. The trial court
concluded that AWIA complied faithfully with its obligations in all phases indicated in the Agreement. [16]
The court a quo found that only 11 shoring columns on the roof girders were necessary to remedy the
cracks and deflections in lines B and G, and thus reduced the shoring expenses AWIA incurred on a pro-
rate basis. It was also noted that the defects were not solely attributable to AWIA, because TMX ignored
Engr. Lacanilaos July 19, 1979 construction report on the pouring of diluted concrete. Thus:
This Court finds that there was no necessity at all for plaintiff TMX to have installed 118 shoring columns
all over its building. Except for the bare allegation of TMX president Rogelio Lim that this was done upon
the recommendation of Engr. Ramientos and its U.S.-based consultant Fletcher-Thompson, plaintiff has not
shown that it was necessary to put up more than one hundred columns at all beam intersections with
sophisticated designs using expensive materials. Admittedly, cracks and deflections appeared in some
beams and roof girders after five (5) years from the buildings completion. The subject building or any part
thereof has not collapsed nor has ever fallen down. As a matter of fact, it was plaintiffs own consultant
Fletcher-Thompson in its Beam Deflection Check (Exhibits 5 to 5-J) who recommended the installation of
eleven (11) shoring columns on the roof girders which had failures (T.S.N., July 3, 1990, pp. 27-34). Even
plaintiffs complaint mentions cracks and deflections only on column lines B and G. To allow plaintiff
reimbursement for putting up 118 columns all over the building would unduly favor plaintiff TMX. Only
eleven (11) columns would have been necessary to correct the crackings and deflections in column lines B
and G. Any excess of that would be considered as a renovation or added improvement of which the
defendant should not be made to shoulder.
Thus, the defendant should reimburse TMX only for eleven (11) shoring columns as its just and equitable
share in the expenses incurred by plaintiff. Taking the ratio of 11 and 118 columns and applying the same
to the total amount of P2,385,499.00, the expenses for installing 11 columns would be P222,377.00.
 As regards the claim for reimbursement of P1,546,084.00 representing the salaries and wages that
plaintiff allegedly paid its employees during the work stoppage from December 1 to 18, 1985, the same
should be denied.
As testified by defendants witness, Engineer Labrador, it was agreed that the 11 shoring columns will be
put up late December since admittedly the last two (2) weeks of December up to the first week of January
was plaintiffs scheduled production shutdown as its employees usually go on vacation during those
days. Moreover, it is observed that plaintiff failed to present during the hearing of this case the pertinent
payroll documents to substantiate its claim. What it produced were only computer printouts of the salaries
allegedly paid to its employees for the period in question.
xxxx
The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment as follows:
1. Defendant is ordered to pay plaintiff TMX the amount of P222,377.00 as compensatory damages;
2. Defendant is ordered to pay P80,000.00 to plaintiff TMX as attorneys fees and litigation expenses;
3. The complaint of plaintiff EPZA against defendant is DISMISSED.
4. The counterclaim of defendant is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Both parties appealed to the CA but AWIA later withdrew its appeal leaving TMX to contest the judgment
of the trial court.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA agreed with the RTC that AWIA is responsible for the payment of only 11 shoring
columns. However, the CA differed as to the RTCs finding that AWIA completely abided by its
obligations. To the CA, AWIA failed to promptly and adequately notify its principal of the quality and
progress of the work, including the defects and deficiencies in the construction and a determination of how
these will be rectified by the contractor. It said:
To excuse AWIA from any liability for the contractors failure to carry out the work in accordance with the
contract documents, it is required, under their Agreement, to have kept the OWNER currently
and adequately informed in writing of the progress and quality of the work. In the case at bar, We hold
that the written report given by AWIA to TMX of the incident could not be the proper notice contemplated
in the Agreement. Notably, the report merely contains statements and account of events that transpired
during such pouring operations. It did not contain any warning or recommendation as to put TMX on notice
that something has to be done. Nor did it inform TMX that said incident threatened the strength of
concrete or structural integrity of the roof. For this, AWIA is liable. x x x[19]
The CA further modified the RTCs Decision by ordering AWIA to reimburse TMX the amount
of P1,546,084.00 representing the salaries TMX had paid to its employees during the involuntary work
stoppage. The appellate court found the check vouchers and financial schedule of payments as sufficient
proofs.

Issues
Hence, AWIA filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari, raising the following issues: a) whether AWIA
properly discharged its duty as construction administrator and b) whether there is a valid basis for the
reimbursement of the salaries paid to the employees of TMX.

Petitioners Arguments
AWIAs arguments are summed up as follows:
a) It complied with its obligation to keep TMX adequately informed about the progress and quality
of the work of the contractor. Engr. Lacanilao, AWIAs site representative, even delayed the pouring of the
concrete and rejected the concrete that had been mixed for more than 45 minutes during the July 18,
1979 incident. These actions were immediately reported to TMX the following day. TMXs staff of engineers
however found no cause for alarm to take remedial measures after being informed. On the contrary, TMX
accepted the work done on the building without objections and considered Engr. Lacanilaos report as
sufficient compliance with AWIAs responsibility of submitting a report.
b) Assuming that AWIA failed to keep TMX adequately informed of the ill-effects of the July 18,
1979 incident, still, AWIA cannot be held liable for all the salaries allegedly paid to TMX employees during
December, 1985. The factory shutdown for the whole month of December cannot be solely attributed to
AWIAs inadequate reporting of weak cement mixture, but was also due to TMXs decision to install 118
permanent shoring columns instead of only 11 columns as recommended by Fletcher-Thompson.
Moreover, AWIA contends that TMX failed to prove its claim of payment of alleged salaries during the
shutdown period because the pieces of evidence it presented are mere summaries of salaries paid and
vouchers for checks deposited in a bank for the alleged salaries. There are no proofs that TMX employees
actually received their salaries during said shutdown period. And even if it could be held responsible for
reimbursing the employees salaries, AWIA claims that it should not be held liable for the TMX employees
salaries during the entire period of installation. Had only 11 columns been installed, the period of
shutdown due to remedial work would have been shorter. AWIA thus asks for a reduction of the award,
computed at a formula used by the trial court as basis for awarding TMX the cost of installing only 11
columns. Hence, the salary should be computed at 11/118 of P1,546,084.00, or P144,210.37.

Respondents Arguments
On the other hand, TMX maintains that:
a) AWIA can no longer challenge the finding of the RTC and the CA of its liability. The fact that the
trial court ordered the payment of the costs of the 11 columns is an implicit recognition that AWIA was
responsible for the roof damage. AWIA did not appeal this judgment and thus this decision had become
final and executory. At most, AWIA can only challenge the CA Decision insofar as the additional award of
reimbursement of the employees salaries is concerned.
b) The CA was correct in its finding that AWIA breached the Agreement. The report of Engr. Lacanilao
had misled TMX into believing that no problem existed and that nothing was to be rectified when it was
AWIAs duty under the Agreement to notify and promptly alert TMX of remedial measures that must be
taken when there are defects in the work of the contractor.
c) The breach warrants a full reimbursement of salaries TMX claims. AWIA cannot use as defense
the adequacy of Engr. Lacanilaos report when this contradicts its own answer to the complaint, stating
therein that the cause of the roof failure was the marginal strength of the concrete during a rainfall. The
construction and repair of certain portions of the roof system forced TMX to undergo work stoppage and
pay its employees wages during the repair period, the ultimate cause of which was AWIAs failure to warn
TMX of the possible consequences of the July 18, 1979 incident. Furthermore, the pieces of documentary
evidence TMX submitted to support a claim of reimbursement, which included the names of employees,
their gross pay and deductions, were never contested during the trial and were appreciated by the CA. The
evidence, coupled by the testimony of TMX President Rogelio Lim that the amounts stated in the
documents were actually paid to the employees, constituted competent and admissible evidence.
TMX also contends that it was baseless and speculative for AWIA to assume that the time necessary to
install 11 columns would not require a period of two weeks, considering that the construction work for
installing permanent shoring columns was disruptive. Certain factors, such as pre-installation activities
(e.g. careful individual packing of hundreds of TMXs sensitive equipment and materials necessary for
watch-making and the painstaking excavation of areas where the new columns were to be attached, which
may take long depending on the difficulty and the location), and faster pace of work as time progresses,
should be taken into account. Nonetheless, for TMX, AWIAs proposed computation of 11/118 multiplied by
the amount of salaries claimed was erroneous, because AWIA assumed that all the 118 columns had been
installed from December 1-18, 1995, when the installation was completed in four weeks. Even if it would
be assumed that AWIAs mathematical formula was correct, and assuming that half of the 118 columns
were installed from December 1-18, 1995, the proper calculation should be 11/50 multiplied
by P1,546,084.00, or P288,253.00.

Our Ruling
AWIA failed in its duty to guard TMX against the contractors work deficiencies
 AWIA persistently faults TMX for its alleged neglect of Engr. Lacanilaos report. But according to the parties
Agreement, the duty of alerting TMX of the problems in the construction of the building behooves entirely
on AWIA. The following provisions in the December 29, 1978 Agreement state what AWIAs specific
responsibilities are in contract administration:
CONSTRUCTION PHASE ADMINISTRATION OF THE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT
xxxx
1.1.14. The CONSULTANT, shall make periodic and regular visits to the site to determine the progress and
quality of the Work and to determine if the Work is proceeding in accordance with the Contract
Documents. On the basis of his on-site observations as a CONSULTANT, he shall guard the OWNER against,
and shall promptly notify the OWNER in writing of, defects and deficiencies in the Work of the Contractor
and non-compliance with the Contract Documents. The CONSULTANT shall be required to make such on-
site inspections as may be reasonably determined by the OWNER to be necessary. Provided that the
CONSULTANT shall have kept the OWNER currently and adequately informed in writing of the progress and
quality of the work, the CONSULTANT shall not be responsible for construction means, methods,
techniques, sequences or procedures, or for safety precautions in connection with the Work, and he shall
not be responsible for the Contractors failure to carry out the Work in accordance with the Contract
Documents.
1.1.15 Based on such observations at the site and on the Contractors Applications for Payment, the
CONSULTANT shall determine the amount owing to the Contractor and shall issue Certificates for Payment
in such amounts. The issuance of a Certificate for Payment shall constitute a representation by the
CONSULTANT to the OWNER, based on the CONSULTANTs observations at the site as provided in
Subparagraph 1.1.14 and on the data comprising the Application for Payment, that the Work has
progressed to the point indicated; that to the best of the CONSULTANTs knowledge, information and belief,
the quality of the Work is in accordance with the Contract Documents (subject to an evaluation of the Work
for conformance with the Contract Documents upon Substantial Completion to the results of any
subsequent tests required by the Contract Documents, to minor deviations from the Contract Documents
correctable prior to completion, and to any specific qualifications stated in the Certificate for Payment);
and that the Contractor is entitled to payment in the amount certified. By issuing a Certificate for Payment,
the CONSULTANT shall not be deemed to represent that he has made any examination to ascertain how
and for what purpose the Contractor has used the moneys paid on account of the Contract Sum.
1.1.16 The CONSULTANT shall be, in the first instance, the interpreter of the requirements of the Contract
Documents and the impartial judge of the performance thereunder by the Contractor. The CONSULTANT
shall make decisions on all claims of the Contractor relating to the execution and progress of the Work and
all other matters or questions related thereto.
1.1.17 The CONSULTANT shall have authority to reject Work which does not conform to the Contract
Documents. Whenever, in his reasonable opinion, he considers it necessary or advisable to insure the
proper implementation of the intent of the Contract Documents, he will have authority, with the OWNERs
approval, to require special inspection or testing of any Work in accordance with the provisions of the
Contract Documents whether or not such Work be then fabricated, installed or completed.
xxxx
1.1.20 The CONSULTANT shall conduct inspections to determine the Dates of Substantial Completion and
final completion, shall receive and review written guarantees and related documents assembled by the
Contractor, and shall issue a final Certificate for Payment. The CONSULTANT shall use its best efforts to
enforce warranties and guarantees furnished by the Contractor or by suppliers of materials or equipment
to the extent of assisting OWNER in any arbitration or court action if necessary.
1.1.21 The CONSULTANT shall not be responsible for the acts or omissions of the Contractor, or any
Subcontractors, or any of the Contractors or Subcontractors agents or employees, or any other persons
performing any of the Work but will promptly inform OWNER thereof in writing and determine how such
acts or omissions will be rectified by the Contractor prior to issuing a final Certificate of Payment.
x x x x[21]
As can be inferred from the contract, TMX could solely and absolutely rely on the assessments and
recommendations of AWIA. Under the aforementioned provisions, AWIA was tasked to guard TMX against
construction problems and to ensure the quality of P.G. Dakays performance. It also had the authority to
approve or reject the contractors work, and it could issue certificates of payments for the progress billings
of the contractor only if it found the latters job as covered by each of the billings satisfactory. Thus, it is
irrelevant whether TMX has its own engineering staff to evaluate the reports about the construction
work. Taking together Sections 1.1.14 and 1.1.21, AWIA is not liable for the contractors construction errors
on the following conditions: a) that it promptly and adequately informs TMX of whatever defects and
deficiencies in the construction are and b) that it determines how these problems could be repaired. AWIA
should not release a final certification of payment in favor of the contractor unless these had been done.
The July 19, 1979 report[22] of Engr. Lacanilao is quoted below:
TO MR. ROGELIO Q. LIM
FROM GAVINO S. LACANILAO
DATE 19 JULY 1979
TMXP 2, General Manager TMXP 2, Project Inspector
SUBJECT HEAVY RAINS DURING THE POURING
Last night at 22:45 hours while we were continuously pouring (Monolythic Concreting) on lines F and G of
Bays 11 to 16 Section C of Main Building a signal for heavy rains coming was noted, so all the personnel
involved in the pouring covered the newly poured concrete with polyethylene (Plastic) sheets to protect
from the rain. When the rain started the newly poured concrete were protected.
During the heavy rain the pouring was temporarily suspended. Since I was the only one who has a rain
coat, I inspected the whole top area and found out that rain water accumulated which was approximately
thirteen (13) inches deep, because the water line was just below one (1) inch of my rubber boots.
So I removed all the temporary plugs of the C.I. downspouts to prevent accumulated rain water from
destruction, and that was the only time that the water dispersed little by little.
When the rain stopped, Engineers Ramon Aseniero and E. Gahi told me that they will continue the
pouring. I advised that they must first remove the water on top of both the plastic sheets and the newly
poured concrete so that the concrete to be poured will not be diluted.
While men working between bays 15 and 16 were busy applying air pressure on the surface of the fresh
concrete with water and the forms to be poured, I suddenly saw the contents in the bucket of one of the
overhead cranes was about to be poured out on the newly poured concrete. So I ran and told Engr. E. Gahi
why he is already pouring the concrete in the bucket while the rain water is still there? And Engr. Gahi told
me that he was just following the order of Mr. John Y. Lim who just arrived and without assessing the
situation and asking my decision being the inspector of the project.
So I approached Mr. Lim and asked him why he gave the order of pouring the concrete? He told me right
away and pointing at the stopped poured concrete is already sitting. So I told him that if he continue [sic]
pouring the concrete, I will go out of the construction site or I will not certify the said area. That was the
time our argument stopped.
The following are my reasons why I delay the pouring:
*The poured concrete before the rain was with standing water.
*All the forms to be concreted were covered with water.
Note: If they will pour concrete on the above reasons, the mixed concrete will be diluted too much with
water that it will lessen the strength of the roofing slab.
*They were pouring the concrete without first applying grout to act as binder on the surface of the washed
concrete.
*They [sic] concrete they were trying to pour was already more than 45 minutes in the mixer, because the
rain stopped at 01:15 hrs of July 20, 1979.
Specification manual page 02800-6 Section 1.04.04 truck mixing second to the last paragraph says:
Concrete not in place within 45 minutes from the time the ingredients were charged into the mixing drum
or that has developed initial sitting should not be used. No exemption. So I rejected the two (2) batches.
Respectfully,
(Signed) G.S. LACANILAO
TMXP 2, Project Inspector
The subject report is merely a narration of what Engr. Lacanilao had done and the justifications why he
delayed the pouring of concrete and why he rejected two batches of concrete mix. Engr. Lacanilao
explained that P.G. Dakays representative did not proceed with the pouring of the substandard concrete
mix, after he was informed that he (Engr. Lacanilao) would not certify the area. TMX then was led to
believe that this incident was no cause for alarm since apparently, Engr. Lacanilao had prevented a
possible problem. The report did not in any way warn TMX that the quality of the roof may be in jeopardy
and that it had to be rectified. AWIA even approved all of P.G. Dakays progress billings and issued a final
certification of payment, an assurance that it found no problems at all with the construction
work. Ironically though, when the cracks and deflections in certain sections of the roof had appeared, AWIA
cited the marginal strength of the concrete as a result of the July 18, 1979 incident as the most probable
cause of the cracks in TMXs roof.
AWIAs failure to adequately inform TMX of the possible implications of the contractors mistake in the
concrete pouring was a crucial factor that had cost the former to spend for the repairs.
AWIA breached its responsibility to inform TMX of the contractors mistake. TMX may demand for damages
duly proven as a natural consequence of the roof failures it has suffered. If the amount it claims cannot be
proven with certainty, temperate damages may be awarded instead.
In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall
be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation. [23]
Both the trial court and the CA held AWIA liable for the cost of 11 shoring columns. AWIA no longer
challenged this ruling when it withdrew its appeal to the appellate court, rendering the judgment final and
executory.[24] We also found that AWIA had breached its duty of contract administration. Had the effects on
the marginal strength of the concrete been promptly disclosed to TMX, the cracks and deflections could
have been rectified by the contractor before it was issued its final certification of payment and the owner
could have been spared from further expenses. There is a causal connection between AWIAs negligence
and the expenses incurred by TMX. The latter was compelled to shutdown the plant during the workdays in
December to repair the roof. In the process, it incurred expenses for the repairs, including the salaries of its
workers who were put on forced leave, for which it can ask for reimbursement as actual damages.
Actual damages puts the claimant in the position in which he had been before he was injured. The award
thereof must be based on the evidence presented, not on the personal knowledge of the court; and
certainly not on flimsy, remote, speculative and nonsubstantial proof. [25] Under the Civil Code, one is
entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved.
[26]

After an exhaustive perusal of the records pertaining to the claim of the salaries covering December 1-18,
1985 allegedly paid to TMX employees, we find that TMXs pieces of evidence do not substantiate such plea
for the full reimbursement of the salaries. To prove that salaries have been paid, TMX has the burden to
show that payments have actually been made to its employees. However, the documents it submitted
were composed only of a master list of daily and monthly paid employees, summarized and itemized lists
and computations of payroll costs during the covered period of shoring installation, salary structures, and
vouchers prepared by the accounting department. These pieces of evidence, as well as the bare assertion
of the TMX President, do not show a reasonable degree of certainty of actual payment to and actual receipt
by its workers but only reflect the list of disbursements. No other witnesses who could corroborate the
actual payment of the salaries of the employees during the shutdown period were presented. Vouchers are
not receipts. A receipt is a written and signed acknowledgment that money has been received or goods
have been delivered, while a voucher is documentary record of a business transaction. [27] Hence, the RTC
correctly preferred the payroll documents (which contain the signatures of employees), implying that these
are the primary/best evidence of payment, or that which [afford] the greatest certainty of the fact in
question.[28]
While TMX failed to prove the exact amount of the salaries it had paid, we however acknowledge that TMX
had to pay its employees during the shutdown and had suffered pecuniary loss for the structural
problem. Moreover, we concede to AWIAs stance that the installation of only 11 shoring columns, instead
of 118, would significantly reduce the number of days allotted for the repairs. As a matter of equity,
therefore, a relief to TMX in the form of temperate damages[29] is warranted. We find the amount
of P500,000.00 reasonable and sufficient under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 49272 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award ofP1,546,084.00 as part of
actual damages is deleted, and in lieu thereof, temperate damages amounting to P500,000.00 are
awarded. Costs against AWIA.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179497 January 25, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
RENANDANG MAMARUNCAS, Piagapo, Lanao del Sur; PENDATUM AMPUAN, Piagapo, Lanao del
Sur; Appellants,
BAGINDA PALAO (at large) Alias "Abdul Wahid Sultan", Accused.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The assessment of the credibility of witnesses by the trial court is the center of this controversy. The well-
known rule, though subject to certain recognized exceptions, is that findings of facts and assessment of
credibility of witnesses are matters best left to the trial court. Hence, "[u]nless certain facts of substance
and value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, the trial courts
assessment must be respected."1
Assailed in the present appeal is the June 30, 2006 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 00196 which affirmed with modification the July 19, 1999 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Iligan City, Branch 06 in Criminal Case No. 06-6150 convicting Renandang Mamaruncas
(Mamaruncas) and Pendatum Ampuan (Ampuan) (appellants) of the crime of murder.
On February 9, 1996, the following Information4 for murder was filed against Mamaruncas, Baginda Palao
(Palao) alias Abdul Wahid Sultan and Ampuan.5
That on or about February 1, 1996, in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, except for others whose cases are still under preliminary investigation,
conspiring with and confederating together and mutually helping each other, armed with deadly weapon,
to wit: a caliber .45 pistol, by means of treachery and evident premeditation, and with intent to kill, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, shoot and wound one Baudelio R. Batoon,
thereby inflicting upon him the following physical injuries, to wit:
Cardio respiratory arrest
Hypovolemic shock
Multiple gunshot wound
which caused his death.
Contrary to and in violation of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code with the aggravating circumstances of
treachery and evident premeditation.
Only Mamaruncas and Ampuan appeared at the scheduled arraignment on May 20, 1996. Their co-
accused, Palao alias Abdul Wahid Sultan (Abdul), remains at large. Appellants pleaded not guilty 6 and trial
proceeded against them.
Factual Antecedents
The facts of the case, as summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in its brief and
substantiated by the transcripts of stenographic notes of the proceedings, are as follows:
Around noontime on February 1, 1996, Baudelio Batoon, Richard Batoon, Juanito Gepayo and a certain
"Nito" were working on vehicles inside Baudelio Batoons auto repair shop situated along the highway in
Tubod, Baraas, Iligan City.
Baginda Palao then entered the shop accompanied by appellants Renandang Mamaruncas and Pendatum
Ampuan. Baginda Palao wore desert camouflage fatigues; while his two (2) companions wore Philippine
Army tropical green fatigues. Baginda Palao showed Baudelio Batoon an arrest warrant and told the latter
he was serving it against Batoon.
The arrival of Baginda Palaos group prompted Juanito Gepayo and Richard Batoon to stop their work and
observe what was happening.
Baudelio Batoon told Baginda Palao to just wait awhile, as they would settle the matter after he [Batoon]
[finishes] tuning-up an engine he had been working on.
Baginda Palao reacted by slapping the victims stomach and pointing a .45 caliber pistol at him. Baudelio
Batoon then tried to grab Palaos gun, causing the two of them to grapple for the same. As these two
wrestled for control of the gun, Renandang Mamaruncas, who was behind Baudelio Batoon, shot from
behind Batoons right thigh with a .38 cal. homemade gun. Pendatum Ampuan, who was also standing
behind Baudelio Batoon, followed up by shooting Batoons left arm pit with a .45 cal. [homemade] pistol.
Baudelio Batoon fell to the ground and Baginda Palao finished [him off] with a single .45 cal. shot to the
back. Juanito Gepayo and Richard Batoon saw the entire scene, stunned and unable to do anything. From
their vantage points three (3) to four (4) meters away, these witnesses had a clear and unobstructed view
of the entire incident.
Meanwhile, Police Inspector Graciano Mijares, then Commanding Officer of the Iligan City PNP Mobile Force
Company, was riding a civilian car along the highway, heading towards Iligan City proper. He was
accompanied by his driver, SPO3 William Yee, and SPO3 George Alejo. They heard the gunshots emanating
from the auto repair shop at Baraas, prompting Inspector Mijares to order his driver to stop the car. They
alighted and proceeded to the source of the gunshots. At the repair shop, they saw three (3) men in
camouflage gear with guns drawn and pointed at a person already lying on the ground. Inspector Mijares
group shouted at the camouflaged gunmen to stop what they were doing and to drop their firearms, at the
same time announcing that they (Mijares group) were policemen.
The camouflaged gunmen reacted by firing at the policemen. The latter fired back. During the exchange of
gunfire, Baginda Palao ran behind the Batoon house, while Renandang Mamaruncas and Pendatum
Ampuan ran towards the road and a nearby car. Inspector Mijares was able to hit Mamaruncas and
Ampuan, while SPO3 Yee likewise hit Ampuan. Mamaruncas, who managed to get inside the car, and
Ampuan were then captured by the policemen. The lawmen also gave chase to Baginda Palao; but he
escaped.
Other responding policemen brought Mamaruncas and Ampuan to the hospital for treatment and they
were eventually placed under detention. Baudelio Batoon was brought to the hospital by his wife; but he
was pronounced dead on arrival.
Based on the necropsy examination of the victims body, Dr. Leonardo Labanen established that the three
(3) gunshot wounds found on the body of Baudelio Batoon (i.e., at the right thigh, left armpit and back)
were inflicted at close range due to the presence, or at least traces, of gunpowder burns. 7
Only appellants testified for their defense. Their testimonies, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows:
Accused Renandang Mamaruncas testified that he is 34 years old, married, carpenter and a resident of
Piagapo, Lanao del Sur. On the morning of February 1, 1996, he was in Marawi City. He decided to come
down to Iligan City to see a movie. He left Marawi at 7:00 a.m. and upon arrival at the Tambacan terminal
in Iligan City, he went to the house of his cousin. Later, he changed his mind about going to a movie and
returned to the Tambacan terminal in order to go back to Marawi City. At about 11:30 a.m., Abdul Wahid
Sultan arrived with Pendatum Ampuan on board a car driven by Aminola. Abdul Wahid invited him to go
with them because he will collect some money and afterwards they will have some enjoyment. He agreed
and sat at the rear seat behind the driver. Abdul Wahid was at the front seat with Pendatum behind at the
back seat. They drove to Baraas. They stopped at a crossing and Abdul Wahid and Pendatum Ampuan
alighted. Before walking away, Abdul Wahid handed to Renandang a .38 cal[.] revolver with instructions to
remain in the car and [keep] watch. At first he refused but Abdul Wahid insisted so he accepted the gun.
Abdul Wahid and Pendatum walked to the shop leaving the rear right door open. About ten minutes later,
he heard three gunshots. He moved to the rear seat where the door was open and saw policemen, who
arrived and surrounded the car. He placed the gun on the seat and raised his hands as a sign of surrender.
Then with his right hand, he closed the car door. Just as the door closed, the policemen shot him on the
forearm and chest below the right nipple. He lost consciousness and regained it only at the hospital.
He further testified that Abdul Wahid Sultan is an old friend. He is also known as Baginda Palao. Pendatum
Ampuan is not known as Abdul Wahid Sultan.
He also declared that the statement of Juanito Gepayo that only Abdul Wahid Sultan and Pendatum
Ampuan entered the shop and shot Baudelio Batoon is true and that the testimony of P/Insp. Mijares that
he also shot the victim is not true. He denied any part in the shooting to death of Baudelio Batoon.
Accused Pendatum Ampuan testified that he is 20 years old, single, student and a resident of Piagapo,
Lanao del Sur. On January 31, 1996 at about 6:00 a.m., he left Marawi City for Iligan City on board a
passenger Armak jeepney. He alighted at the terminal behind the Gaisano Superstore and at exactly 7:00
a.m., he entered the store and went to the upper storey to shop. When he came out, he met a friend
name[d] Bessah. Together they walked to the Maharlika Theater but then Bessah expressed the intention
to go home to Marawi City. He accompanied Bessah to the Tambacan terminal. Then he proceeded to the
house of his Uncle Ali in Cabaro. (This is a place North of the city and at the opposite side from Tambacan
which is South of the city). He arrived there at noon. He stayed overnight at his Uncle Alis house. At about
9:00 a.m., the following day, February 1, 1996, he left the house of his uncle. Outside, he met Baginda
Palao, who was looking for a certain Baser, a policeman. He wanted the latter to help him collect a debt.
They went to the terminal at the back of Gaisano store but did not find Baser. Baginda told him to wait
while he will look for Baser inside the Gaisano store. Baginda returned without having found Baser and
once again he told him to wait while Baginda will look for a car. A little later, Baginda returned on board a
car driven by one Aminola Basar. They went to the Tambacan terminal but again did not find Baser.
Instead, they saw Renandang Mamaruncas. Baginda invited the latter to go with them to Baraas to collect
a debt. Renandang entered the car and they proceeded to Baraas. The car stopped at a place near a shop.
Baginda instructed him and Renandang to remain in the car because he was going out to collect the debt.
Baginda left the car and entered the shop. About ten minutes later, he heard shouting followed by gunfire.
He stepped out of the car to verify and saw Baginda Palao [shoot] the victim. He retreated to the car as the
police led by Capt. Mijares arrived. They confiscated the car key and arrested them except Baginda Palao
who escaped. They were taken to the hospital due to injuries. In his case, the sustained wounds when
mauled by the children of the victim but in another breath he admitted that his injury was a gunshot
wound when he was caught in the cross fire as the police shot Renandang Mamaruncas. He was inside the
car when he was hit. He further admitted that Baginda Palao is known as Abdul Wahid Sultan. He denied
shooting Baudelio Batoon.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC debunked appellants defense of denial and held them guilty as principals by direct participation
in the killing of Baudelio Batoon (Baudelio). It gave full faith and credence to the evidence of the
prosecution especially on the presence of conspiracy among the malefactors and rendered a verdict of
conviction, thus:
WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused Renandang Mamaruncas and Pendatum Ampuan GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of murder qualified by treachery defined and penalized in Art.
248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, without the presence of any other aggravating circumstances
and hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA with the corresponding
accessory penalties attached thereto by law and to indemnify the Heirs of Baudelio Batoon the sums of:
1. P10,200,000.00 for and as loss of support;
2. P66,904.00 for and as actual damages;
3. P50,000.00 as death indemnity and
4. P100,000.00 for and as moral damages
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Cost against the accused.
Having been under preventive detention since February 1, 1996, the period of such detention shall be
credited in full in favor of said accused in the service of their respective sentences.
SO ORDERED.9
In view of the Notice of Appeal10 filed by the appellants, the RTC forwarded the records of the case to this
Court. By Resolution11 dated January 31, 2000, the Court resolved to accept the appeal. In view thereof,
appellants were required to file their brief. 12 Appellants thus filed their brief on November 20, 200013 while
the OSG submitted the Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellee 14 on May 2, 2001. Later, however, consonant with this
Courts pronouncement in People v. Mateo15 the case was transferred to the CA for appropriate action and
disposition.16
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
By Decision17 promulgated on June 30, 2006, the appeals court affirmed with modification the RTC
Decision. Said court ruled that the inconsistencies in the prosecution witnesses testimonies pointed out by
the appellants pertain only to minor and collateral matters which do not dilute the probative weight of said
testimonies. Regarding the erroneous designation of appellant Ampuans name in the Information, the
court went on to hold that such error was only a formal defect and the proper correction of which was duly
made without any objection on the part of the defense. The CA likewise held that treachery attended the
commission of the crime.
The decretal portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the questioned Judgment dated
July 19, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellants Renandang
Mamaruncas and Pendatum Ampuan are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of murder as defined in
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 and are hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The appellants are to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of
Baudelio Batoon the amount of P50,000.00 by way of civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages,
and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages and P66,904.00 as actual damages.
SO ORDERED.18
Disgruntled, appellants are now again before this Court in view of their Notice of Appeal 19 from the
Decision of the CA.
By Resolution20 dated November 19, 2007, this Court notified the parties that they may file their respective
supplemental briefs within 30 days from notice. In their respective manifestations, the parties opted to
adopt the briefs they earlier filed as their supplemental briefs. 21
In their brief, appellants assign the following errors:
i. That the trial court erred in convicting [them] when they should have been acquitted for failure of
the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt; and
ii. The information filed before the trial court was substantially defective. 22
The basic thrust of appellants first assignment of error is the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
Appellants contend that the trial court anchored its finding and conclusion on the testimonies of witnesses
Juanito Gepayo (Gepayo), Richard Batoon (Batoon) and P/Sr. Insp. Graciano Mijares (Mijares), who appear
to be inconsistent in their stand and whose credibility is therefore assailable. They question the
prosecution witnesses identification of Abdul and Ampuan as one and the same person and aver that the
same only leads to the logical conclusion that said witnesses were perjured witnesses. They argue that
Ampuan failed to grasp the information read to him as he was arraigned as "Abdul Wahid Sultan alias
Pendatum Ampuan".
On the other hand, the OSG in praying for the affirmance of the appealed Decision, opines that
inconsistencies on minor and collateral matters in the testimony of a prosecution eyewitness do not affect
his credibility. It also contends that whatever defect the information subject of appellant Ampuans
arraignment has had been cured with the latters consent during the trial.
Our Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
In support of their quest for acquittal, appellants tried to cast doubt on the credibility of witness Gepayo
anchored on the following grounds: (1) there was serious inconsistency in his testimony on whether he
knew Ampuan before the incident; (2) his actuation of just watching the incident without giving any
assistance to his fallen employer as well as his immediate return to work thereafter is contrary to human
nature and experience; (3) while he testified that appellant Mamaruncas was one of the wounded suspects
during the encounter, he failed to identify him in court; and, (4) in his affidavit, he identified Abdul and
Ampuan as one and the same person but later on testified to the contrary.
Credibility of witnesses not affected by minor inconsistencies.
The perceived inconsistency on whether Gepayo knows Ampuan even before the incident is
inconsequential as to discredit the credibility of Gepayos testimony. The inconsistency pointed out by
appellants pertains only to collateral or trivial matters and has no substantial effect on the nature of the
offense. In fact, it even signifies that the witness was neither coached nor was lying on the witness stand.
What matters is that there is no inconsistency in Gepayos complete and vivid narration as far as the
principal occurrence and the positive identification of Ampuan as one of the principal assailants are
concerned.23 "The Court has held that although there may be inconsistencies in the testimonies of
witnesses on minor details, they do not impair their credibility where there is consistency in relating the
principal occurrence and positive identification of the assailant." 24
It could be true that Gepayo did not retreat to a safer place during the shooting incident and did not render
assistance to his wounded employer. To appellants, this reaction is contrary to human nature. We believe
otherwise. This imputed omission, to our mind, does not necessarily diminish the plausibility of Gepayos
story let alone destroy his credibility. To us, his reaction is within the bounds of expected human behavior.
Surely, he was afraid that they might kill him because the malefactors were then armed with guns. 25 Thus,
he would not dare attempt to stop them and stake his life in the process. At any rate, it is settled "that
different people react differently to a given situation or type of situation, and there is no standard form of
human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange or startling or frightful experience.
Witnessing a crime is an unusual experience which elicits different reactions from the witnesses and for
which no clear-cut standard form of behavior can be drawn."26
The failure of Gepayo to identify Mamaruncas in court does not bolster appellants cause. As the CA
correctly pointed out:
x x x We agree with the prosecutions observation that although he did not positively identify appellant
Mamaruncas as one of the shooters, he was however, able to point out that there was a third person who
accompanied assailants Palao and Ampuan in approaching the victim during the incident. This is also
bolstered by Insp. Mijares[] testimony that he saw three assailants pointing their guns at the victim who
was already lying prostrate on the ground.27
In any event, even without Gepayos identification of Mamaruncas, the unrebutted testimony of another
prosecution eyewitness, Batoon, clearly points to Mamaruncas as one of the assailants. Thus:
Q: After these three persons rather Abdul Wahid together with two companions, presented the warrant of
arrest to your father, what happened thereafter?
A: They pulled their guns and pointed [them at] my father.
Q: Who pulled out .45 caliber gun [and pointed it at] your father?
A: Abdul Wahid, Sir
Q: And what happened after the .45 pistol [was] pointed [at] your father?
A: My father tried to [grab] the .45 caliber from Abdul Wahid, Sir.
Q: What happened after?
A: My father was shot by one of his companion[s], Sir.
Q: Who [first shot] your father?
A: (Witness pointing to a person. [W]hen he was asked x x x his name[,] he answered that he is Renandang
Mamaruncas)
xxxx
Q: After this Renandang Mamaruncas shot your father, what happened thereafter?
A: The other companion fired the next shot (witness pointing to a person sitting at the bench inside the
Courtroom and when he was asked x x x his name, he answered that he is Pendatum [Ampuan].) 28
Undoubtedly, the testimonies of eyewitnesses Gepayo and Batoon on material details are straightforward
and consistent with each other. They personally saw appellants at the scene of the crime at the time it was
committed. Their combined declarations established beyond reasonable doubt the identities of both
appellants, along with their co-accused Abdul, as the perpetrators of the crime.
As to the contention that Gepayo referred to Abdul Wahid Sultan and Pendatum Ampuan as one and the
same person in his affidavit29 and yet later on testified to the contrary, this Court finds the same
inconsequential and will not outrightly justify the acquittal of an accused. In a very recent case, 30 this Court
reiterated that as between an affidavit executed outside the court and a testimony given in open court, the
latter almost always prevails. It emphasized therein that:
Discrepancies between a sworn statement and testimony in court do not outrightly justify the acquittal of
an accused. Such discrepancies do not necessarily discredit the witness since ex parte affidavits are often
incomplete. They do not purport to contain a complete compendium of the details of the event narrated by
the affiant. Thus, our rulings generally consider sworn statements taken out of court to be inferior to in
court testimony (citation omitted).
The evidence at hand, moreover, clearly points out that it was the police officers who supplied the names
of the suspects in Gepayos affidavit.31
Any alleged defect in the Information deemed waived.
Anent the second assigned error, appellants aver that the Information filed before the trial court was
substantially defective considering that it accuses Abdul and Ampuan as one and the same person when in
fact they were identified as different persons. As such, Ampuan was not able to comprehend the
Information read to him.
The Court cannot accord merit to this argument. It is well to note that appellants failed to raise the issue of
the defective Information before the trial court through a motion for bill of particulars or a motion to quash
the information. Their failure to object to the alleged defect before entering their pleas of not guilty
amounted to a waiver of the defect in the Information. "Objections as to matters of form or substance in
the [I]nformation cannot be made for the first time on appeal."32 Records even show that the Information
was accordingly amended during trial to rectify this alleged defect but appellants did not comment
thereon, viz:
FISCAL ROBERTO ALBULARIO:
Per manifestation and admission of this witness, the Information be amended from [Renandang]
Mamaruncas and the word and, it should be Bagindo [sic] Palao alias Abdul Wahid Sultan and the alias
Pendatum Ampuan be erased as corrected.
COURT:
Any comment from the accused.
ATTY. FIDEL MACAUYAG:
No comment, Your Honor.33
Treachery correctly appreciated.
From the evidence and as found by the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court, the facts sufficiently
prove that treachery was employed by appellants. The attack on Baudelio was so swift and unexpected,
affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no opportunity to resist or defend himself. As
ruled by the trial court:
In the above situation, treachery was considered to exist. More so in this case when the victim was
completely without any weapon from the inception of the assault. At the moment when Pendatum Ampuan
and Renandang Mamaruncas shot him, Baudelio Batoon was not in any position to defend himself. And
when Abdul Wahid shot him while lying wounded on the ground, he was utterly defenseless. 34
Hence, both lower courts correctly found appellants guilty of murder in view of the presence of treachery.
Conspiracy was duly proven.
We also sustain the finding of conspiracy. Conspiracy exists "when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Direct proof of previous
agreement to commit a crime is not necessary x x x [as it] may be shown through circumstantial evidence,
deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the
accused themselves when such lead to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of
interest."35
In this case, conspiracy was clearly established. All three accused entered the shop of Baudelio at the
same time. Ampuan shot Baudelio from behind, hitting the latter at his left armpit while Mamaruncas shot
Baudelio on the thigh. When Baudelio fell to the ground face down, Abdul shot him at the back. These
consecutive acts undoubtedly showed appellants unanimity in design, intent and execution. They
performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to unmistakably indicate a common
purpose and design in the commission of the crime.
The Court thus sees no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the RTC and the CA considering that they
are based on existing evidence and reasonable
conclusions drawn therefrom. It has been held time and again that factual findings of the trial court, its
assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies and the
conclusions based on these factual findings are to be given the highest respect. As a rule, the Court will
not weigh anew the evidence already passed on by the trial court and affirmed by the CA. 36 Though the
rule is subject to exceptions, no such exceptional grounds obtain in this case.
Against the damning evidence adduced by the prosecution, appellants could only muster mere denial. As
ruled in various cases by the Court, denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence is
inherently a weak defense as it is negative and self-serving. "As between the categorical testimony that
rings of truth on one hand, and a bare denial on the other, the former is generally held to prevail." 37
The Penalty
Undoubtedly, the crime committed is murder in view of the attending aggravating circumstance of
treachery. Murder, as defined under Article 24838 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, is the unlawful
killing of a person which is not parricide or infanticide, provided that treachery, inter alia, attended the
killing. The presence of any one of the enumerated circumstances under the aforesaid Article is enough to
qualify a killing as murder punishable by reclusion perpetua
to death. Since only the qualifying circumstance of treachery is found to be present, both the RTC and the
CA properly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.
Moreover, Section 3 of Republic Act No. 934639 provides:
Section 3. Persons convicted of offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or whose sentences will be
reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103
otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.
Pursuant to the above provision, appellants are therefore not eligible for parole.
Awards of Damages
The Court modifies the award of civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00. In line with prevailing
jurisprudence,40said award is increased to P75,000.00. Anent the award of moral damages, the CA correctly
imposed the amount of P50,000.00.41 These "awards are mandatory without need of allegation and proof
other than the death of the victim, owing to the fact of the commission of murder or homicide." 42
Anent the award of actual damages, the victims widow testified that the family spent a total of P66,904.00
relative to the wake and burial of the victim. However, the claim for said amount is supported merely by a
list of expenses43personally prepared by the widow instead of official receipts. To be entitled to an award of
actual damages, "it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty,
premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable x x x." 44 "A list of expenses cannot
replace receipts when the latter should have been issued as a matter of course in business
transactions."45 Thus the Court deletes the lower courts award of actual damages. Nonetheless, since
entitlement of the same is shown under the facts of the case, temperate damages in the amount
of P25,000.0046 should be awarded in lieu of actual damages to the heirs of the victim pursuant to Article
2224 of the Civil Code which provides that temperate damages "may be recovered when the court finds
that pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with
certainty."
The CA correctly deleted the indemnity for loss of earning capacity awarded by the trial court.lawphi1 Such
indemnity cannot be awarded in the absence of documentary evidence except where the victim was either
self-employed or a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws.
As testified to by the widow, Florenda Batoon, the victim was earning a monthly income of P20,000.00
and P90,000.00 as an auto repair shop and a six-wheeler truck operator, respectively. The trial court made
a conservative estimate of P500.00 a day as the net income from the truck alone after making reasonable
deductions from its operation. Thus, ranged against the daily minimum wage then prevailing in Region X
which is P137.00 per day pursuant to Wage Order No. RX-03, this case undoubtedly does not fall under the
exceptions where indemnity for loss of earning capacity can be given despite the lack of documentary
evidence.
The Court sustains the award of exemplary damages in view of the proven qualifying circumstance of
treachery. The CA however awarded exemplary damages to the heirs of the victim in the amount
of P25,000.00. To conform with prevailing jurisprudence, the Court increases this amount to P30,000.00.47
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the June 30, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 00196 which found appellants Renandang Mamaruncas and Pendatum Ampuan guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder is AFFIRMED with further MODIFICATIONS as follows:
1. Appellants are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole;
2. The award of civil indemnity is increased to P75,000.00;
3. The award of P66,904.00 as actual damages is deleted;
4. P25,000.00 as temperate damages is awarded in lieu of actual damages;
5. The award of exemplary damages is increased to P30,000.00; and
6. Appellants are further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim interest on all damages awarded at the
legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 122477. June 30, 2000]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDISON ARELLANO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 19, in Criminal
Case No. 19-656,[1] sentencing appellant Edison Arellano to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the
crime of murder.
The conviction of the appellant stemmed from an information reading as follows:
The undersigned Provincial Prosecutor, accuses EDISON ARELLANO and ROMEO TINDENILLA, of the crime
of MURDER, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about the 25th day of July, 1993, in the municipality of Cabatuan, province of Isabela,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conspiring, confederating
together and helping one another, with evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill suddenly and unexpectedly and without giving him chance to
defend himself, assault, attack and stab with a pointed bladed instrument one Andres Ventura inflicting
upon him a stab wound of the right side of the body, which directly caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
At their arraignment, both accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. [3] Trial on the merits ensued
with the prosecution presenting three witnesses, namely: Roberto Morales, Antonio Cordova and Lilia
Ventura. The testimonies of said prosecution witnesses may be summed as follows:
Roberto Morales, an auto mechanic at the Victory Rice Mill, testified that on July 25, 1993, at around 7:00
p.m., he was at a sari-sari store beside said rice mill at Cabatuan, Isabela. He was there drinking beer with
Gaudencio Pagon, Romeo Tindenilla, rice mill security guard Arellano, Antonio Cordova, Rudy and the
victim Andres Ventura. An hour later, the storeowner named Riza requested Andres to gather the empty
bottles of beer. Romeo resented the act of Andres of getting the bottles in front of him, thus, a verbal
tussle ensued. This heightened into a fistfight between Andres and Romeo. Because of the punches
received from Andres, Romeo fell. Suddenly, Arellano approached Andres and stabbed the latter on the
right side with a pointed double-bladed instrument. Andres then attempted to chase Arellano but failed as
the latter was able to escape into the compound of the Victory Rice Mill. Andres sat down, held his side and
shouted for help. Seeing Andres serious wound, he (Morales) and the others brought him to the Bucag
Hospital. It was there that Andres died an hour later.[4]
Antonio Cordova corroborated Morales testimony. Also a laborer at the Victory Rice Mill, Cordova narrated
that on the night of the alleged crime, he was at Rizas store with Roberto Morales, Rudy Senias, Gaudencio
Pagon, Romeo Tindenilla alias Nonoy and Andres Ventura. They were there since 5:00 in the afternoon as
they were waiting for their wages. After they had each consumed a bottle of beer, the storeowner asked
Andres to gather the empty bottles. While Andres was gathering the bottles, an argument broke out
between Andres and Romeo. The two then started exchanging blows. As Romeo fell, Arellano emerged
from the rear right side of Andres and stabbed Andres with a double-bladed weapon, hitting the latter
below the right nipple. Andres then sat down, held the right side of his body and told people around that
his body was painful. Arellano, on the other hand, fled to the rice mill.
Antonio reported the incident to the police. Together with Morales, Gaudencio and another person, he
brought Andres to the Bucag hospital in Cauayan in a police car. It was Antonio who told the victims
mother about the incident.[5]
The prosecution also submitted in evidence the medical certificate issued by Dr. Eduardo Bucag. Despite
the absence of a medico-legal testimony, the contents of the same were admitted by the defense without
objection.[6] The medical certificate reveals that Ventura died as a result of a stab wound on the upper right
side of his body:
This is to certify that Ventura Andres 18 y/o, male from Cabatuan, Isabela was admitted on 7-25-93
because of stab wound at the upper quadrant of the abdomen. On admission he was hypotensive & pale.
Immediate resuscitation was done thru an emergency exploratory laparotomy that was performed. In the
operative findings showed massive blood within the peritoneal cavity, stomach and small bowel. About 3-4
liters of blood was evacuated. There was transection of the hepatic artery and or postal vein, penetrating
wound at the duodenum and pancreas. Intraoperatively he went into cardio respiratory failure and was
revived. Around 30 minutes from the time he was out of the operating room he went into cardio respiratory
arrest and was pronounced dead at 1:15 a.m. (7-26-93)[7]
The prosecution having rested its case, counsel for the defense made an oral demurrer to evidence and
moved for the dismissal of the case as far as accused Tindenilla was concerned on the ground that the
prosecution failed to show complicity between the two accused persons. [8] The prosecution concurred in
this motion. Hence, the trial court promulgated a partial decision acquitting accused Tindenilla of the crime
charged on the grounds that the injury inflicted by appellant on the victim "was the product of his sole
initiative" and that the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy between accused-appellant and Tindenilla. [9]
For his part, the appellant interposed alibi and denial as defenses. Witness Romeo Tindenilla testified that
he arrived at Rizas store between 8:00 and 8:30 p.m. on July 25, 1993. Already there were Andres,
Roberto, Antonio, Gaudencio and Rudy. Andres told Romeo that he would box him. Romeo asked Andres
why, picked up the bottle of beer he was drinking, and turned his back with the intention of leaving. Andres
nonetheless boxed Romeo on his back, causing the latter to fall down and lose consciousness. When
Andres told Romeo that he would box him, Arellano was no longer around as he had gone to the compound
of the rice mill. In fact, when Romeo arrived at the store, Arellano, who had gone from the store, was
already entering said compound. They met each other on the road outside the store. Romeo was still "not
fully conscious" when the police brought him to the headquarters. He only learned at dawn that Andres
had been stabbed.[10]
Testifying for his own defense, Arellano swore that at 7:30 p.m. on July 25, 1993, he was in Calaocan,
Cabatuan, Isabela to pay respect to the dead grandfather of his friend, Arthur Corpuz. He stayed there with
Arthur for ten minutes. Riding on a motorcycle, he and Arthur returned to Cabatuan, arriving there at 8:00
p.m. Arellano went directly to the Victory Rice Mill. Upon alighting from the motorcycle, Roberto Morales,
who was at the canteen three meters away from the gate of the rice mill, called him. Roberto offered him a
bottle of beer. At the canteen were Gaudenio Pagon and Rudy Senias aside from Roberto. Andres Ventura
was not there. Arellano stayed in the canteen for only ten minutes and then he proceeded to the Victory
Rice Mill. On his way to the rice mill, Arellano met Romeo who was going out of the rice mill to go to the
canteen. The security guard on duty at that time was Mario Guillermo. Arellano was having his dinner when
a laborer in the rice mill named Randy informed him that Romeo was mauled and that Andres was stabbed.
Andres was shocked to learn from Randy that he (Arellano) had been pinpointed as the person who
stabbed Andres. A few minutes later, the police arrested him. He and Tindenilla were transported to the
police station in the same vehicle that brought the victim to the hospital. [11]
Mario Guillermo, the security guard on 24-hour duty at the rice mill, narrated that on the night of July 25,
1993, at around 8:30 in the evening, he was inside the Victory Rice Mill compound when he heard some
people quarreling outside. He took a peek and, from a distance of about fifteen meters from the gate, he
saw the victim saying, "Adda tamak, adda tamak," meaning "I am injured, I am injured." Initially, he
testified that it was at that precise moment that he saw Arellano entering the Victory Rice Mill. Although
later he changed his testimony and stated that around five minutes had elapsed after Arellano had entered
the gate when he heard someone shouting outside. Guillermo had opened the small opening in the big
gate after hearing Arellano knock at the gate three times.[12]
Based on the evidence presented, on November 23, 1994, the trial court rendered a decision finding
Arellano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. It found that Arellanos defense of alibi
could not succeed considering his positive identification by credible witnesses as the author of the killing of
Andres Ventura. It ruled out the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation as there was no proof
that the incident was planned. Neither was motive for the killing established. In concluding that treachery
qualified the killing to murder, the trial court said:
xxx However, the Court believes that the crime was attended with treachery. The victim never know (sic)
that he will be attacked by the accused. No previous altercation took place between them so as to warn
the victim of any impending attack by the accused. The evidence clearly shows that the victim and Romeo
Tindenilla were having a fist fight and when the latter was knocked down, the accused coming from behind
suddenly and unexpectedly stabbed the victim without any warning or giving him a chance to defend
himself. Then he (accused) cowardly ran inside the compound of the Rice Mill. The crime committed is,
therefore, murder.[13]
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing considerations and finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of murder, judgment is hereby rendered sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P100,000.00 as compensatory damages
and P13,000.00 as medical and funeral expenses, and to pay the costs.
Thus, appealing before this Court, appellant raises the following assignment of errors:
A
THE DECISION WAS PURELY BASED ON THE SPECULATION THAT DEFENSE WITNESS MARIO GUILLERMO
MUST HAVE LIED.
B
THE DECISION OVERLOOKED IF NOT TOTALLY IGNORED THE TESTIMONY OF DEFENSE WITNESS ROMEO
TINDENILLA.
C
THERE WAS MORE THAN ENOUGH DOUBT AS TO THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
D
THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES ARE NOT FREE FROM DOUBT.
The above errors raised by the appellant boil down to the issue of the credibility of witnesses.
The prosecution and the defense presented contradictory accounts of the events leading to the death of
Andres Ventura. And this Court has invariably held, the opinion of the trial court as to which version of the
commission of the crime should be believed is entitled to great respect. The oft-repeated rationale born of
judicial experience is that the trial judge who heard the witnesses testify and had the occasion to observe
their demeanor on the stand was in a vantage position to determine who of the witnesses deserve
credence.[14] A close examination of the records reveals no justification to depart from the trial courts
findings on the issue of credibility.
Appellant asserts that the testimonies of prosecution witnesses are "not free from doubt." He stresses that
Roberto Morales and Antonio Cordova had been drinking beer for two and a half hours and, therefore, their
"observation of the event could have been faulty or mistaken."[15] The credibility of said witnesses could
have been adversely affected had there been proof as to how drunk they were. However, appellant failed
to show that intoxication had so debilitated their senses to the point of negating their claim of having seen
Andres attacker,[16] hence, the credibility of said witnesses remain untarnished.
Appellant, likewise, failed to show any ill-motive on the part of witnesses Roberto Morales and Antonio
Cordova for testifying against him. There being no showing of improper motive on the part of Roberto and
Antonio for identifying the accused as the perpetrator of the crime, the presumption is that they were not
so actuated and their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit. [17]
Both prosecution witnesses clearly identified accused-appellant as the person who stabbed the victim.
Both Roberto Morales and Antonio Cordova worked at the Victory Rice Mill where appellant was a security
guard, hence, they were familiar with each other. Both were categorical in their declaration that it was
appellant who stabbed Andres Ventura. Roberto Morales testified, thus:
Q....What was the cause of the altercation between Romeo Tindenilla and Andres Ventura, if you know?
A....Because Romeo resented the act of Andres in getting the bottles in front of Romeo and a verbal hustle
(sic) followed, sir.
Q....After that what happened next?
A....They had a fist fight and Romeo Tindenilla fell down, sir.
Q....When Romeo Tindenilla fell down, do you know what happened?
A....Then immediately Arellano came near them and stabbed Andres Ventura at his side of his body, sir.
(Witness pointing at his right side of his body parallel to the arm just above the waist).
Q....Who is this Arellano whom you referred who immediately got near Andres Ventura and stabbed him at
his right side?
A....The security guard, sir.
Q....Is he the same person whom you pointed earlier as Edison Arellano?
A....Yes, sir.
xxx.[18]
Q....And only one fist blow was given by Tindenilla to Ventura, is that what you mean?
A....Yes, sir.
Q....And when Ventura retaliated that blow was the one which felled (sic) Tindenilla, is that what you
mean?
A....Yes, sir.
Q....And before Andres Ventura was stabbed where was Edison Arellano?
A....He was behind the victim, sir
COURT:
....Proceed.
ATTY. FORONDA:
Q....If you say that Andres Ventura was stabbed by Edison Arellano, did you actually see Edison Arellano
stabbed (sic) Andres Ventura?
A....Yes, sir.
Q....What hand did Arellano use, right or left in stabbing Andres Ventura?
A....Right hand, sir (Witness swinging his right hand from his side going to the direction of the left).
Q....Where did the weapon came (sic) from?
A....I do not know, sir, when I saw him he (w)as already holding the weapon. [19]
Corroborating Morales testimony, Antonio Cordova testified on cross-examination as follows:
Q....You said that Edison Arellano stabbed Andres Ventura, at what point after Romeo Tindenilla was struck
down did the stabbing occur?
A....Less than one minute, sir.
Q....When Romeo Tindenilla was being helped to his feet, was Andres Ventura already been stabbed?
A....Yes, sir.
COURT:
Q....Where did the security guard Edison Arellano come from before he stabbed Andres Ventura?
A....From the rear, sir, of Andres Ventura.
Q....Who were Andres Ventura facing when he was stabbed by the security guard Arellano?
A....Berting, I and Gaudencio, sir.
Q....And in relation to Ventura, where was the fallen body of Nonoy?
A....In front of Andres, sir.
COURT:
....Proceed.
ATTY. FORONDA:
Q....Did you actually see Edison Arellano stab Andres Ventura?
A....Yes, sir.
Q....You said that the assailant "biglang sumulpot" or suddenly appeared, you mean to say you did not see
the assailant prior to his sudden appearance?
A....I saw him, sir.
Q....What do you mean by "biglang sumulpot"?
A....He immediately attacked, sir, the victim (biglang sumugod). [20]
Positive identification, where categorical and consistent without any showing of ill-motive on the part of
the eyewitnesses testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial which if not substantiated by clear
and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. [21]
The witnesses having positively identified the appellant, the latters defense of alibi cannot hold water. No
jurisprudence in criminal cases is more settled than the rule that alibi is the weakest of all defenses, and
the same should be rejected when the identity of the accused has been sufficiently and positively
established by eyewitnesses to the crime.[22]
Appellant, however, insists that Guillermo was a credible witness, hence, the trial court should have given
more weight to his testimony. After a careful examination of Guillermos testimony, we fail to see how the
same, even if we were to give it full weight and credit, can rebut the prosecutions version as to the killing
of Andres. In fact, said testimony is consistent with the narration of the prosecution witness Morales that
after stabbing Ventura, Arellano escaped into the rice mill and that Ventura tried to catch him but failed
due to the injury sustained:
ATTY. FORONDA:
Q....What did you do when you heard people quarreling outside?
A....I peeped from the place where I was on duty, sir.
Q....When (sic) did you see when you peeped?
A....I saw the victim saying, "Adda tamak, adda tamak," (meaning, "I am injured, I am injured"), sir.
COURT:
Q....Why, was the place where the victim was shouting lighted?
A....It was dark, your Honor.
Q....How far is the place where he was shouting from the place where you peeped?
A....About fifteen meters, your Honor.
COURT:
....Proceed.
ATTY. FORONDA:
Q....When you saw this person shouting, "Adda tamak," meaning, "I am injured," do you know where
Edison Arellano was at that point in time?
A....He was already inside the Victory Rice Mill, sir.
PROSECUTOR CACATIAN:
....May we please spread (sic) on record the Ilocano words used by the witness, your Honor.
COURT:
.... All right, you quote the Ilocano words "Sumbrek idin idiay Victory Rice Mill," meaning, he was already
entering the Victory Rice Mill."[23]
As corrected by the trial court, the translation of Guillermos Ilocano testimony that accused-appellant was
entering the rice mill when Guillermo heard the victims remark that he was injured, only implies that the
interval of time between that remark and accused-appellants entering the compound of the rice mill
was immediate. That translation supports the prosecutions theory that, after stabbing the victim,
accused-appellant ran to the rice mill.
Neither does Tindenillas testimony create any doubt as to the culpability of the appellant. Appellant harps
on the trial courts failure to appreciate Romeo Tindenillas testimony that appellant was no longer at the
sari-sari store when the fist fight started:
Q: ....When Andres Ventura told you that he will box you until the time he actually boxed you, was Edison
Arellano within the vicinity of the sari-sari store?
A: ....He was no longer there, sir.
Q: ....Where was he then, if you know?
A: ....He went inside the compound, sir
Q: ....How do you know that he was already inside the compound?
A: ....Because when I arrived at the store, I saw him entering the compound of the Victory Rice Mill, sir. [24]
However, it must be remembered that at the time Ventura was stabbed, Tindenilla, as he himself admits,
was already unconscious. His testimony that Arellano had already gone to the rice mill is of no moment.
Considering the short distance between the rice mill and the sari-sari store, Arellano could have easily
shuttled between the two places. In fact, this is consistent with witness Cordovas statement that when the
fistfight ensued between Tindenilla and Ventura, the appellant was not in the vicinity, and it was only when
Tindenilla fell to the ground that appellant appeared from nowhere and stabbed Ventura.
All told, this Court is of the opinion that the prosecution was able to establish appellants culpability for the
death of Ventura.
However, we agree with the recommendation of the Solicitor General that accused-appellant should be
convicted of the crime of homicide, not murder, as the qualifying circumstance of treachery had not been
established. The Solicitor General points out that "appellants decision to stab the victim was done on an
impulse when he saw Tindenilla knocked down unconscious" and that "appellant was probably trying to
retaliate for the serious harm done to Tindenilla or he could be trying to protect Tindenilla from further
injury." As appellant did not consciously adopt the means of attack, treachery cannot be appreciated.
While it is true that the essence of treachery is the suddenness and unexpectedness of the assault without
the slightest provocation on the part of the person attacked, [25] the conditions set by law for the
appreciation of treachery do not concur. These conditions are: (1) the means, method and form of
execution employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2)
such means, method or form of execution was deliberately and consciously adopted by the accused. [26] By
swiftly attacking the victim from behind when he was engaged in a fight with another person, accused-
appellant certainly did not give the victim an opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate. The victim least
expected the assault upon his person as his attention was focused on the fallen Tindenilla with whom he
had exchanged fist blows.
However, the subjective element of treachery, i.e., the deliberate choice of the method of assault with the
special view of accomplishing the act without risk to the assailant from any defense that the party assailed
might have made,[27] was not established by the prosecution. For treachery to be appreciated as
aggravating circumstance, there must be proof that the accused consciously adopted a mode of attack to
facilitate the perpetration of the killing without risk to himself. [28] By the facts established in this case,
accused-appellant could not have committed the crime without the risk that he could be physically harmed
as a consequence thereof. The victim was not alone and, hence, the probability of his co-workers and
drinking buddies pouncing upon accused-appellant was not remote. Neither was there proof that accused-
appellant made some preparations to kill the victim in such a manner as to ensure the execution of the
crime or to make it impossible or hard for the person attacked to defend himself. [29] What appears on
record is that accused-appellant, upon seeing Tindenilla fallen, decided at the spur of the moment to act
impulsively. A killing done at the spur of the moment is not treacherous. [30]
In the absence of any qualifying circumstance, the crime committed is homicide which is penalized
with reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. Inasmuch as no mitigating or
aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the crime, the penalty should be imposed in its
medium period.[31] Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused-appellant should serve the penalty
of seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum penalty.
As regards the monetary award, the trial court failed to explain the basis of its award of P100,000.00 as
civil indemnity. While the heirs of the victim did not expressly claim an amount representing the deceaseds
loss of earning capacity nor present evidence thereon, such failure does not necessarily prevent recovery
of damages considering that there is sufficient basis on record upon which the court may determine a
reasonable and fair estimate of such damages.[32] In accordance with Article 2206 of the Civil Code,[33] an
award of compensatory damages representing Alfredos loss of earning capacity is due the heirs of the
victim.
The amount of loss of earning capacity is based mainly on two factors. [34] These are (1) the number of
years of which the damages shall be computed; and (2) the rate at which the losses sustained by the
respondent should be fixed. Factor number one in this ruling shall be computed by using the formula based
on the American Expectancy Table of Mortality or 2/3 x [80 age of the victim at the time of death] = life
expectancy in terms of years. Applying this formula, Andres life expectancy is 2/3 x (80 18) = 41.33.
Factor number two is arrived at by multiplying the life expectancy by the earning of the deceased. As has
been settled in the case of Villa Rey Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[35] and a long list of cases[36]the
computation of the rate of loss of earnings should be based on the net earnings.
In this case, Andres Ventura was eighteen years of age at the time of his death with a life expectance of 41
years. The undisputed claim of the victims mother was that Andres was "employed" as a laborer at the
Victory Rice Mill at the rate of P100.00 a day,[37] which was, likewise, admitted by the defense.[38] The crime
was committed on a Sunday after the victim and his co-workers had finished their work for the day. [39] The
victim should, therefore, be presumed to have worked everyday including Sundays or rest days, special
days and regular holidays. As such, under the "1999 Handbook on Workers Statutory Monetary
Benefits" outlining the minimum legal requirements concerning workers monetary and non-monetary
benefits that was approved by DOLE Secretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma on December 14, 1999, the victim
is deemed to have worked a total of 391.50 days a year [40] with total wages in the amount of P39,150.00
per annum (P100/day x 391.50 days). One half of this amount would be considered as his necessary living
expenses. The victims loss of earning capacity should, therefore, be computed as follows:
41.33 x P19,575.00 = P809,034.75
Likewise, civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 is automatically granted to the heirs of the victim
without need of any evidence other than the fact of the commission of the crime. [41] The heirs of the victim
should also be awarded actual damages in the total amount of P13,000.00 as the defense admitted that
the victims family incurred funeral expenses of P6,000.00 and medical expenses of P7,000.00.
[42]
Ordinarily, receipts should support claims of actual damages. However, since the defense did not
contest that claim, it should be granted.
WHEREFORE, the herein appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the following modifications:
1.....Appellant Edison Arellano is, hereby, convicted for the crime of homicide and is to suffer the
indeterminate sentence of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor to seventeen (17) years and
four (4) months of reclusion temporal, and
2.....Appellant is, hereby, liable to pay the heirs of the victim civil indemnity of P50,000.00, actual damages
of P13,000.00, and damages representing the victims loss of earning capacity of P809,034.75.
SO ORDERED.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Appellee, G.R. No. 178771
Present:

- versus - CORONA, C.J.,*

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
ALBERTO ANTICAMARA y CABILLO and MENDOZA, JJ.
FERNANDO CALAGUAS FERNANDEZ
Promulgated:
a.k.a. LANDO CALAGUAS,
June 8, 2011
Appellants.
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00556, affirming
the trial court's judgment finding appellants Fernando Calaguas Fernandez (Lando) and Alberto Cabillo
Anticamara (Al) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder in Criminal Case No. 4498-R and of
the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention in Criminal Case No. 4481-R.
Lando, Al, Dick Taedo (Dick), Roberto Taedo (Bet), Marvin Lim (Marvin), Necitas Ordeiza-Taedo (Cita), and
Fred Doe are charged with the crimes of Murder and of Kidnapping/Serious Illegal Detention in two
separate Informations, which read:
For Murder (Criminal Case No. 4498-R)
That on or about the early morning of May 7, 2002, in Sitio Rosalia, Brgy. San Bartolome, Municipality of
Rosales, Province of Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, being then armed with a hand gun, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another,
with intent to kill, with treachery, evident premeditation and superior strength, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take Sulpacio Abad, driver of the Estrellas, hog tied (sic) him, brought (sic) to a
secluded place, shoot and bury in a shallow grave, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim.
Contrary to Article 248, Revised Penal Code.
For Kidnapping/Serious Illegal Detention (Criminal Case No. 4481-R)
That on or about the 7th day of May 2002, more or less 3:00 o'clock in the early morning, at the Estrella
Compound, Brgy. Carmen East, Municipality of Rosales, Province of Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, who are private persons, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, armed with firearms, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
kidnap Sulpacio Abad and AAA,[2] both employees of the Estrellas, thereby depriving them of their liberty,
all against their will for a period of twenty-seven (27) days.
That in the course of the kidnapping, Sulpacio Abad was killed and buried in Brgy. Carmen, Rosales,
Pangasinan and AAA was raped for several times by her abductors.
Contrary to Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to RA 7659.
When arraigned of the aforementioned crimes, Lando, Al and Cita all pleaded not guilty, while Dick, Bet,
Marvin and Fred Doe remained at-large. Thereafter, a joint trial ensued.
As summarized in the People's brief, the facts as established by the evidence of the prosecution are as
follows:
About 3 o'clock in the early morning of May 7, 2002, househelper AAA and driver Abad Sulpacio were
sleeping in their employers' house located in Barangay Carmen East, Rosales, Pangasinan. Their
employers, Conrado Estrella and his wife, were out of the house at that time (TSN, December 4, 2002, pp.
4-7). Momentarily, AAA was jolted from sleep when she heard voices saying, We will kill her, kill her now
and another voice saying, Not yet! Hiding under her blanket, AAA later heard someone saying, We only
need money, we only need money. Thereafter, she heard someone talking in Ilocano which she could not
understand.Then she heard somebody say, Cebuana yan, Cebuana yan, kararating lang galing Cebu. AAA
heard the persons conversing which she estimated about four to five meters away (TSN, ibid., pp. 11-12).
Thereafter, AAA observed about six (6) persons enter the house, who she later identified as accused Dick
Taedo, Marvin Lim, Bert Taedo, a certain Fred and appellants Alberto Anticamara alias Al Camara, and
Fernando Fernandez alias Lando Calaguas. One of the intruders approached her and told her not to move
(TSN, ibid., p. 8).
Later, when AAA thought that the intruders were already gone, she attempted to run but to her surprise,
someone wearing a bonnet was watching her. Someone, whom she later recognized as Dick Taedo, tapped
her shoulder. AAA asked Taedo, Why Kuya? Taedo replied, Somebody will die. After a brief commotion,
appellant alias Lando Calaguas asked the group saying, What shall we do now? They then decided to tie
AAA. Later, AAA was untied and led her outside the house. Outside, AAA saw Abad, who was also tied and
blindfolded, seated inside a vehicle (TSN, April 26, 2004, pp. 6-10).
The group later brought AAA and Abad to the fishpond owned by their employers. AAA saw Cita Taedo
there. The group brought Abad outside the vehicle and led him away (TSN, December 2, 2002, pp. 13-18;
TSN, February 17, 2003, pp. 5-8).
Later, alias Fred returned telling the group, Make the decision now, Abad has already four bullets in his
body, and the one left is for this girl. When Cita Taedo made a motion of cutting her neck, appellant alias
Lando Calaguas and Fred boarded the vehicle taking along with them AAA. They later proceeded towards
San Miguel Tarlac, where Lando Calaguas resided. They stayed in Lando's house where they kept AAA from
May 7 to May 9, 2002 (TSN, December 4, 2002, pp. 18-22; TSN, February 17, 2003, pp. 7-9).
On May 9, 2002, appellant Lando Calaguas told AAA that Fred and Bert Taedo would kill her. Lando then
brought AAA to a hotel in Tarlac, telling AAA that he would leave her there as soon as Fred and Bert Taedo
leave the place. However, once inside the hotel room, appellant Lando Calaguas sexually molested AAA.
Lando told AAA to follow what he wanted, threatening her that he would turn her over to Fred and Bert
Taedo. After Lando raped AAA, he brought her back to his house. Later, Fred, Bert Taedo and Lando
Calaguas transferred AAA to Riles, Tarlac (TSN, ibid., pp. 9-13).
AAA was brought to the residence of Fred's niece, a certain Minda, where Fred kept AAA as his wife. At
nighttime, Fred would repeatedly ravish AAA, threatening her that he would give her back to appellant
Lando Calaguas who, AAA knew, killed Abad Sulpacio. She was afraid Lando might also kill her (TSN, ibid.,
pp. 14-16).
On May 22, 2002, Fred brought AAA to Carnaga (should be Kananga), Leyte, together with his wife Marsha
and their children. AAA stayed in the house of Marsha's brother Sito, where she was made as a house
helper (TSN, ibid., p. 17).
On June 4, 2002, AAA escaped from the house of Sito. She proceeded to Isabel, Leyte and sought the help
of her friend Susana Ilagan. After hearing AAA's plight, Susana called AAA's brother in Cebu, who later
fetched AAA in Isabel, Leyte and brought her to Mandaue City. When they arrived in Mandaue City, they
immediately reported the incident to the police authorities. On June 23, 2002, AAA executed a Sworn
Statement (Exh. D, TSN, ibid., pp. 18-20).
Meanwhile, Dr. Ronald Bandonil, Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI),
conducted an autopsy on the cadaver of Sulpacio Abad. Dr. Bandonil prepared Autopsy Report No. N-T2-23-
P (Exh. A) which contains the following findings, to wit:
x Remains placed in a sealed metal coffin, wrapped in two (2) layers of black, plastic garbage bags, and
covered in (sic) a red-stripped cotton blanker. A thick layer of lime embeds the whole torso.
x Remains in a far advanced state of decomposition, with the head completely devoid of soft tissue. A
cloth is wrapped around the eyesockets and tied to the back of the skull. The skull does not show any signs
of dents, chips nor fractures. The other recognizable body part is the chest area which retained a few soft
tissues and skin, but generally far advanced in decomposition. The whole gamut of internal organs have
undergone liquefaction necrosis and have been turned into grayish-black pultaceous masses. Worn on top
of the remaining chest is a sando shirt with observable holes at the left side, both front and back. A large
hole is seen at the area of the left nipple, with traces of burning at its edges and inward in direction. A tied
cloth is also observable at the remnants of the left wrist.
x At the upper chest, which is the most recognizable, remaining and intact part of the torso, a hole, 1.0
cm. x 2.0 cms., with signs of burning, edges inverted, is seen at the left anterior axillary line just below the
left nipple. Another hole is seen 1.5 cms. x 2.5 cms. in diameter, edged averted (sic) at the right chest,
along the right anterior axillary line, 5.0 cms. below the right nipple. A 3 rd hole, almost unrecognizable is
seen at the left groin area.
x The other parts of the cadaver are too far advanced in decomposition to have remarkable findings.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
GUNSHOT WOUNDS, TRUNK[3]
In his defense, Lando denied having committed the crimes charged and interposed alibi as a defense. He
claims that at the time of the incident on May 7, 2002, he was in Barangay Maligaya, San Miguel, Tarlac,
with his family. He denied ever going to the Estrella farm in Sitio Rosalia, Barangay San Bartolome,
Rosales, Pangasinan.
Al claimed that he acted as a lookout and was tasked to report to his companions if any person or vehicle
would approach the house of the Estrellas. He said that he was forced to follow what was ordered of him
and did not report the matter to the police because he was threatened to be killed, including the members
of his family who were in Cebu.
On August 23, 2004, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Rosales, Pangasinan, Branch 53, rendered its
Decision,[4] the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

I. In Criminal Case No. 4498-R for Murder:

A. Accused Nicetas Cita Taedo is hereby acquitted of the crime charged for insufficiency of evidence;
B. Accused Fernando Calaguas Fernandez (alyas Lando Calaguas) and Alberto Anticamara (alyas Al
Camara) are hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principal, of the crime of Murder qualified by
treachery, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. Considering the presence of
aggravating circumstance of pre-meditation, with no mitigating circumstance to offset the same, the
penalty of DEATH is hereby imposed upon the two (2) accused Fernando Calaguas Fernandez (Lando
Calaguas) and Alberto Anticamara (Al Camara). They are also ordered jointly and severally [to] pay the
heirs of the victim Abad Sulpacio the following:
1) Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages;
2) Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as indemnity for the death of the victim;
3) Fifty-Seven Thousand One Hundred Twenty-Two Pesos and Thirty Centavos (P57,122.30) as actual
damages; and
4) The cost of suit.
II. Criminal Case No. 4481-R for Kidnapping/Serious Illegal Detention:
A) Accused Nicetas Cita Taedo is hereby acquitted of the crime charged for insufficiency of evidence;
B) Accused Fernando Calaguas Fernandez (alyas Lando Calaguas) and Alberto Anticamara (alyas Al
Camara) are hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principal, of the crime of Kidnapping/Serious
Illegal Detention of the victim AAA as charged, defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659. Considering that the victim AAA was raped during her detention,
the maximum penalty of DEATH is hereby imposed upon the two accused, Fernando Calaguas Fernandez
(Lando Calaguas) and Alberto Anticamara (Al Camara). The two accused are also ordered to pay, jointly
and severally, the victim AAA the amount of:
1) One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as moral damages;
2) Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as exemplary damages; and
3) Cost of suit.

As to the rest of the accused who are still at-large, let this case be set to the archives until they are
apprehended.
SO ORDERED.[5]
 In light of the Courts ruling in People v. Mateo,[6] the records of the cases were forwarded by the RTC to the
CA for its review. The CA rendered a Decision dated December 15, 2006, affirming the decision of the RTC
in Criminal Case Nos. 4498-R and 4481-R. However, in view of the abolition of the death penalty pursuant
to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9346, which was approved on June 24, 2006, the appellants were sentenced
to reclusion perpetua.
On January 9, 2007, Lando, through the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), appealed the Decision of the CA to
this Court. Lando had assigned the following errors in his appeal initially passed upon by the CA, to wit:

I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CONSPIRACY EXISTED BETWEEN AND AMONG THE
ALLEGED PERPETRATORS OF THE CRIME.
II
ASSUMING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS GUILTY, THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING
HIM OF THE CRIME OF MURDER INSTEAD OF HOMICIDE.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING UPON THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT THE SUPREME PENALTY
OF DEATH FOR THE CRIME OF KIDNAPPING/SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION, AGGRAVATED BY RAPE, IN SPITE
OF THE FACT THAT THE CRIME OF RAPE WAS NOT DULY PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING SCANT CONSIDERATION TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WHICH IS MORE CREDIBLE THAN THAT OF THE PROSECUTION
V
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RENDERING A VERDICT OF CONVICTION DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE
GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. [7]
On January 9, 2007, Al, through the PAO, appealed the Decision of the CA to this Court. Al had assigned
the following errors, to wit:

I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF
KIDNAPPING/SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION IN SPITE OF THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT HE CONSPIRED WITH HIS CO-ACCUSED TO COMMIT THE CRIME
CHARGED.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING UPON THE ACCUSED THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH
FOR THE SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIME OF KIDNAPPING/SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION WITH RAPE, IN SPITE OF
THE FACT THAT HE HAD NO PARTICIPATION IN THE COMMISSION OF [TWO] SEXUAL ABUSES AGAINST THE
VICTIM.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF
MURDER IN SPITE OF THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT
HE CONSPIRED WITH HIS CO-ACCUSED TO COMMIT THE SAME.[8]

In capsule, the main issue is whether the appellants are guilty of the crimes charged.

In Criminal Case No. 4498-R for Murder:

Circumstantial Evidence
The trial court found that although there was no direct eyewitness in the killing of Sulpacio in the early
morning of May 7, 2002 at Sitio Rosalia, Barangay San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan, the prosecution
adduced sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish with moral certainty the identities and guilt of the
perpetrators of the crime.
Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of
the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience .[9]Circumstantial evidence is
sufficient to sustain conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; (c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[10] A judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be
sustained when the circumstances proved form an unbroken chain that results in a fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator. [11]
In this case, the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution, when analyzed and taken
together, lead to the inescapable conclusion that the appellants are responsible for the death of Sulpacio.
The Court quotes with approval the lower court's enumeration of those circumstantial evidence:
The testimony of AAA had clearly established the following facts:
1. At about 3:00 in the early morning of May 7, 2002, while she and the victim Abad Sulpacio were
sleeping inside the house of the Estrella family in Barangay Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan several persons
entered to rob the place;
2. Inside the house, she saw and recognized the accused Lando Calaguas and Dick Taedo, and heard the
latter uttering somebody will die;
3. Bringing her outside the house, Lando pushed her into the Revo where she saw inside Abad Sulpacio
who was blindfolded and with his hands tied;
4. Inside the Revo, she recognized the accused Dick Taedo, Lando Calaguas, Marvin Lim, Roberto Taedo,
Alberto Anticamara and Fred;
5. The Revo then proceeded towards the fishpond owned by the Estrellas in Sitio Rosalia, Brgy. San
Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan;
6. The last time that she saw Abad Sulpacio was when he was dragged out from the vehicle by Lando,
Fred, Marvin and Al upon reaching Sitio Rosalia. At that, time Dick Taedo stayed with her in the vehicle;
7. Thereafter, when Fred returned to the vehicle, she heard him uttered (sic): Make a decision now. Abad
has already four (4) bullets in his body, and the one left is for this girl. [12]
In addition to these circumstances, the trial court further found that AAA heard Fred utter Usapan natin
pare, kung sino ang masagasaan, sagasaan. (Our agreement is that whoever comes our way should be
eliminated). Moreover, NBI Agent Gerald V. Geralde testified that on June 23, 2002, appellant Al admitted
his participation as lookout and naming his companions Dick, Lando, Fred, Marvin and Bet as the ones who
took AAA and Sulpacio from the house of the Estrellas and brought them to the fishpond. Al also pointed
and led the authorities to a shallow grave in Sitio Rosalia, Barangay San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan,
where the remains of Sulpacio were buried. The autopsy conducted on the body, prepared by the Medico
Legal Officer Dr. Bandonil, shows that several holes were found on various parts of the body of the victim
and Dr. Bandonil concluded that the cause of the victim's death was the gunshot wounds. The report also
indicates that a piece of cloth was found wrapped around the eye sockets and tied at the back of the skull,
and another cloth was also found tied at the remnants of the left wrist.
In the case at bar, although no one directly saw the actual killing of Sulpacio, the prosecution was able to
paint a clear picture that the appellants took Sulpacio away from the house of the Estrellas, tied and
blindfolded him, and brought him to another place where he was repeatedly shot and buried.
Conspiracy
Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning a felony and decide to commit it. It may be inferred from the acts of the accused
before, during or after the commission of the crime which, when taken together, would be enough to
reveal a community of criminal design, as the proof of conspiracy is frequently made by evidence of a
chain of circumstances.[13] To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of the execution; he
need not even take part in every act or need not even know the exact part to be performed by the others
in the execution of the conspiracy. Each conspirator may be assigned separate and different tasks which
may appear unrelated to one another but, in fact, constitute a whole collective effort to achieve their
common criminal objective. Once conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators. The
precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators
are principals.[14]
 In the present case, prior to the commission of the crime, the group met at the landing field in Carmen,
Pangasinan and discussed their plan to rob the house of the Estrellas with the agreement that whoever
comes their way will be eliminated.[15] Appellant Al served as a lookout by posting himself across the house
of the Estrellas with the task of reporting any movements outside. Fred then climbed the old unserviceable
gate of the Estrella compound and then opened the small door and the rest of the group entered the house
of the Estrellas through that opening.[16] After almost an hour inside the house, they left on board a vehicle
with AAA and Sulpacio. AAA and Sulpacio were brought to Sitio Rosalia, Brgy. San Bartolome, Rosales,
Pangasinan. In that place, Sulpacio was killed and AAA was brought to another place and deprived of her
liberty. These circumstances establish a community of criminal design between the malefactors in
committing the crime. Clearly, the group conspired to rob the house of the Estrellas and kill any person
who comes their way. The killing of Sulpacio was part of their conspiracy. Further, Dick's act of arming
himself with a gun constitutes direct evidence of a deliberate plan to kill should the need arise.
Appellant Al attempts to evade criminal liability by alleging that he was only forced to participate in the
commission of the crime because he and his family were threatened to be killed. Al's defense fails to
impress us. Under Article 12[17] of the Revised Penal Code, a person is exempt from criminal liability if he
acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, or under the impulse of anuncontrollable fear of equal or
greater injury, because such person does not act with freedom. [18] To avail of this exempting circumstance,
the evidence must establish: (1) the existence of an uncontrollable fear; (2) that the fear must be real and
imminent; and (3) the fear of an injury is greater than, or at least equal to, that committed. [19] For such
defense to prosper, the duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and
of such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be
done. A threat of future injury is not enough.[20]
There is nothing in the records to substantiate appellant Al's insistence that he was under duress from his
co-accused while participating in the crime that would suffice to exempt him from incurring criminal
liability. The evidence shows that Al was tasked to act as a lookout and directed to station himself across
the house of the Estrellas. Al was there from 7:30 p.m. to 1:00 a.m.[21] of the following day, while the rest of
the group was waiting in the landing field. Thus, while all alone, Al had every opportunity to escape since
he was no longer subjected to a real, imminent or reasonable fear. However, he opted to stay across the
house of the Estrellas for almost six (6) hours,[22] and thereafter returned to the landing field where the
group was waiting for his report. Subsequently, the group proceeded to the Estrellas house. When the
group entered the house, Al stayed for almost one (1) hour outside to wait for his companions. Later, when
the group left the house aboard a vehicle, Al rode with them in going to Sitio Rosalia, Brgy. San Bartolome,
Rosales, Pangasinan, bringing with them Sulpacio and AAA. [23] Clearly, appellant Al had ample opportunity
to escape if he wished to, but he never did. Neither did he request for assistance from the authorities or
any person passing by the house of the Estrellas during the period he was stationed there. Clearly, Al did
not make any effort to perform an overt act to dissociate or detach himself from the conspiracy to commit
the felony and prevent the commission thereof that would exempt himself from criminal liability.
[24]
Therefore, it is obvious that he willingly agreed to be a part of the conspiracy.

Alibi and Denial

Appellant Lando denied having committed the crime charged and interposed alibi as a defense. He claims
that at the time of the incident he was in his house at Tarlac, together with his family. On the other hand,
the appellants were positively identified by AAA, as two (2) of the six (6) malefactors who forcibly took her
and Sulpacio from the Estrella house in the early morning of May 7, 2002. Both the trial court and the CA
found the testimony of AAA credible. The Court gives great weight to the trial courts evaluation of the
testimony of a witness because it had the opportunity to observe the facial expression, gesture, and tone
of voice of a witness while testifying; thus, making it in a better position to determine whether a witness is
lying or telling the truth.[25]
Between the categorical statements of the prosecution witness, on one hand, and the bare denial of the
appellant, on the other, the former must perforce prevail. An affirmative testimony is far stronger than a
negative testimony especially when it comes from the mouth of a credible witness. Alibi and denial, if not
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of
weight in law. They are considered with suspicion and always received with caution, not only because they
are inherently weak and unreliable but also because they are easily fabricated and concocted. [26] Denial
cannot prevail over the positive testimony of prosecution witnesses who were not shown to have any ill-
motive to testify against the appellants.[27]
As to the defense of alibi. Aside from the testimony of appellant Lando that he was in Tarlac at the time of
the incident, the defense was unable to show that it was physically impossible for Lando to be at the scene
of the crime. Basic is the rule that for alibi to prosper, the accused must prove that he was somewhere else
when the crime was committed and that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of
the crime. Physical impossibility refers to the distance between the place where the appellant was when
the crime transpired and the place where it was committed, as well as the facility of access between the
two places.[28] Where there is the least chance for the accused to be present at the crime scene, the
defense of alibi must fail.[29] During the trial of the case, Lando testified that the distance between his
house in Brgy. Maligaya, San Miguel, Tarlac to the town of Rosales, Pangasinan is only around forty (40)
kilometers. Such distance can be traversed in less than 30 minutes using a private car and when the travel
is continuous.[30] Thus, it was not physically impossible for the appellant Lando to be at the locus criminis at
the time of the incident. In addition, positive identification destroys the defense of alibi and renders it
impotent, especially where such identification is credible and categorical. [31]

Qualifying and Aggravating Circumstances

In convicting the appellants, the courts a quo appreciated treachery in qualifying the killing to murder and
evident premeditation in imposing the penalty of death. There is treachery when the offender commits any
of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and specially to ensure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense that the
offended party might make.[32] Two conditions must concur for treachery to exist, namely, (a) the
employment of means of execution gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to
retaliate; and (b) the means or method of execution was deliberately and consciously adopted. [33]
In the case at bar, it was proven that when AAA boarded the vehicle, she saw Sulpacio tied and
blindfolded. Later, when they reached the fishpond, Sulpacio, still tied and blindfolded, was led out of the
vehicle by the group. When the remains of Sulpacio was thereafter found by the authorities, the autopsy
report indicated that a piece of cloth was found wrapped around the eye sockets and tied at the back of
the skull and another cloth was also found tied at the left wrist of the victim. There is no question
therefore, that the victim's body, when found, still had his hands tied and blindfolded. This situation of the
victim when found shows without doubt that he was killed while tied and blindfolded; hence, the qualifying
aggravating circumstance of treachery was present in the commission of the crime. In People v. Osianas,
[34]
the Court held that:
x x x In the case at bar, the means used by the accused-appellants to insure the execution of the killing of
the victims, so as to afford the victims no opportunity to defend themselves, was the act of tying the hands
of the victims. Teresita saw the accused-appellants hog-tie the victims and take them away with them.
Later that night, Dionisio Palmero saw the victims, still hog-tied, walking with the accused-appellants. The
following day, the victims were found dead, still hog-tied. Thus, no matter how the stab and hack wounds
had been inflicted on the victims in the case at bar, we are sure beyond a reasonable doubt that Jose,
Ronilo and Reymundo Cuizon had no opportunity to defend themselves because the accused-appellants
had earlier tied their hands. The fact that there were twelve persons who took and killed the Cuizons
further assured the attainment of accused-appellants' plans without risk to themselves. [35]
The aggravating circumstance of superior strength cannot be separately appreciated because it is
absorbed by treachery.[36]
The circumstance of evident premeditation requires proof showing: (1) the time when the accused
determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his
determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him to
reflect upon the consequences of his act.[37] The essence of premeditation is that the execution of the act
was preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a
space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.[38] From the time the group met at the landing field at
around 6:30 p.m. of May 6, 2002, and discussed the possibility of killing anyone who stands on their way,
up to the time they took Sulpacio away from the Estrellas house and eventually killed him thereafter at
around past 3:00 a.m., more than eight hours had elapsed sufficient for the appellants to reflect on the
consequences of their actions and desist from carrying out their evil scheme, if they wished to. Instead,
appellants evidently clung to their determination and went ahead with their nefarious plan.

In Criminal Case No. 4481-R for Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention.
The Court finds appellant Lando guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention with rape, defined in and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. The elements of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code [39] are: (1) the
offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner deprives the
latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the commission of the
offense, any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than
3 days; or (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; or (c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted
upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or
detained is a minor, female, or a public officer.[40]
The crime of kidnapping was proven beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution. Appellants Lando and
Al, both private individuals, forcibly took AAA, a female, away from the house of the Estrellas and held her
captive against her will. Thereafter, appellant Lando brought AAA to his house in San Miguel Tarlac,
whereby she was deprived of her liberty for almost one month. It is settled that the crime of serious illegal
detention consists not only of placing a person in an enclosure, but also in detaining him or depriving him
in any manner of his liberty.[41] For there to be kidnapping, it is enough that the victim is restrained from
going home.[42] Its essence is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of
the intent of the accused to effect such deprivation.[43] Although AAA was not confined in an enclosure, she
was restrained and deprived of her liberty, because every time appellant Lando and his wife went out of
the house, they brought AAA with them. The foregoing only shows that AAA was constantly guarded by
appellant Lando and his family.
The crime of rape was also established by the prosecution. Appellant Lando succeeded in having carnal
knowledge of AAA through the use of threat and intimidation. AAA testified that on May 9, 2002, appellant
Lando brought her to a hotel to hide her from Fred and Bert, who intended to kill her. Appellant Lando told
her to follow his orders, otherwise, he will give her to Fred and Bert. While in the hotel, appellant Lando
raped her.[44] Clearly, for fear of being delivered to Fred and Bert and of losing her life, AAA had no choice
but to give in to appellant Lando's lustful assault. In rape cases, the credibility of the victim's testimony is
almost always the single most important factor. When the victim's testimony is credible, it may be the sole
basis for the accused's conviction.[45] This is so because owing to the nature of the offense, in many cases,
the only evidence that can be given regarding the matter is the testimony of the offended party. [46]
The last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code provides that if the victim is killed or dies as a
consequence of the detention, or is raped or subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum
penalty shall be imposed. In People v. Larraaga,[47] this provision gives rise to a special complex
crime. Thus, We hold that appellant Lando is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime
of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with rape in Criminal Case No. 4481-R.
However, the Court does not agree with the CA and trial court's judgment finding appellant Al liable for
Rape in Criminal Case No. 4481-R. In People v. Suyu,[48] We ruled that once conspiracy is established
between several accused in the commission of the crime of robbery, they would all be equally culpable for
the rape committed by anyone of them on the occasion of the robbery, unless anyone of them proves that
he endeavored to prevent the others from committing rape.[49] Also, in People v. Canturia,[50] the Court held
that:
x x x For while the evidence does convincingly show a conspiracy among the accused, it also as
convincingly suggests that the agreement was to commit robbery only; and there is no evidence that the
other members of the band of robbers were aware of Canturia's lustful intent and his consummation
thereof so that they could have attempted to prevent the same. x x x
The foregoing principle is applicable in the present case because the crime of robbery with rape is a
special complex crime defined in and penalized under Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code,
and the crime of kidnapping with rape in this case is likewise a special complex crime as held in the case
of People v. Larraaga.[51] There is no evidence to prove that appellant Al was aware of the subsequent
events that transpired after the killing of Sulpacio and the kidnapping of AAA. Appellant Al could not have
prevented appellant Lando from raping AAA, because at the time of rape, he was no longer associated with
appellant Lando. AAA even testified that only Fred and appellant Lando brought her to Tarlac, [52] and she
never saw appellant Al again after May 7, 2002, the day she was held captive. She only saw appellant Al
once more during the trial of the case.[53] Thus, appellant Al cannot be held liable for the subsequent rape
of AAA.

The Penalties
In Criminal Case No. 4498-R, the attendant circumstance of treachery qualified the killing to murder. The
penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death. Since the
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation was alleged and proven, the imposable penalty upon
the appellants is death, pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code. [54] In view,
however, of the passage of R.A. No. 9346,[55] prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty of
death is reduced to reclusion perpetua,[56] without eligibility for parole.[57]
In Criminal Case No. 4481-R, the penalty for the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention with rape is death. In view of R.A. No. 9346, the penalty of death is reduced to reclusion
perpetua,[58] without eligibility for parole.[59] Accordingly, the imposable penalty for appellant Lando
is reclusion perpetua.
As to appellant Al, the prescribed penalty for serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance in the
commission of the offense, the proper penalty to be imposed is reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Article
63[60] of the Revised Penal Code.

The Damages
In Criminal Case No. 4498-R, the award of civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the
victim without need of proof other than the commission of the crime. [61] In People v. Quiachon,[62] even if
the penalty of death is not to be imposed because of the prohibition in R.A. 9346, the civil indemnity
of P75,000.00 is proper, because it is not dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty but on
the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the
commission of the offense. As explained in People v. Salome,[63] while R.A. No. 9346 prohibits the
imposition of the death penalty, the fact remains that the penalty provided for by law for a heinous offense
is still death, and the offense is still heinous. Accordingly, the award of civil indemnity in the amount
of P75,000.00 is proper.
Anent moral damages, the same are mandatory in cases of murder, without need of allegation and proof
other than the death of the victim.[64] However, consistent with recent jurisprudence on heinous crimes
where the imposable penalty is death but reduced to reclusion perpetua pursuant to R.A. No. 9346, the
award of moral damages should be increased from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00.[65]
The award of exemplary damages is in order, because of the presence of the aggravating circumstances
of treachery and evident premeditation in the commission of the crime. [66] The Court awards the amount
of P30,000.00, as exemplary damages, in line with current jurisprudence on the matter. [67]
Actual damages is also warranted. Modesta Abad, the spouse of victim Sulpacio, incurred expenses in the
amount of P57,122.30, which was duly supported by receipts. [68]
In Criminal Case No. 4481-R, AAA is entitled to civil indemnity in line with prevailing jurisprudence that
civil indemnification is mandatory upon the finding of rape. [69] Applying prevailing jurisprudence, AAA is
entitled to P75,000.00 as civil indemnity.[70]
In addition, AAA is entitled to moral damages pursuant to Article 2219 of the Civil Code, [71] without the
necessity of additional pleadings or proof other than the fact of rape. [72] Moral damages is granted in
recognition of the victim's injury necessarily resulting from the odious crime of rape. [73] Such award is
separate and distinct from the civil indemnity.[74] However, the amount of P100,000.00 awarded as moral
damages is reduced to P75,000.00, in line with current jurisprudence.[75]
The award of exemplary damages to AAA in the amount of P50,000 is hereby reduced to P30,000.00 in
accordance with recent jurisprudence.[76]
As to appellant Al. In the absence of conspiracy, the liability of the accused is individual and not collective.
[77]
Since appellant Al is liable only for the crime of serious illegal detention, he is jointly and severally liable
only to pay the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity. For serious illegal detention, the award of civil
indemnity is in the amount of P50,000.00, in line with prevailing jurisprudence.[78]
Along that line, appellant Al's liability for moral damages is limited only to the amount of P50,000.00.
[79]
Pursuant to Article 2219 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be recovered in cases of illegal
detention. This is predicated on AAA's having suffered serious anxiety and fright when she was detained
for almost one (1) month.[80]

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00556
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as follows:
(a) In Criminal Case No. 4498-R, appellants Fernando Calaguas Fernandez alias Lando and Alberto Cabillo
Anticamara alias Al are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and are sentenced
to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, without eligibility of parole, and to pay, jointly and severally,
the heirs of Sulpacio Abad the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral
damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P57,122.30 as actual damages.
(b) In Criminal Case No. 4481-R, appellant Fernando Calaguas Fernandez alias Lando is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention with rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, without eligibility of
parole, and to pay the offended party AAA, the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as
moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. Appellant Alberto Cabillo Anticamara alias Al is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention and is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. He is also directed to pay, jointly and severally, with
appellant Fernando Calaguas Fernandez alias Lando, the victim AAA the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.