Jnl.
Intellectual Property Law and Practice Advance Access published September 18, 2009
Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice, 2009
Copyright exhaustion in India and the USA: a
comparative critique
Navajyoti Samanta, and Shameek Sen*
Controversy and confusion arise when an IP owner
tries to control or restrict the use or movement of
goods containing his IP after it has been sold for the
first time in the market, invoking the contentious prin-
ciple of exhaustion or first sale doctrine.1 The ration-
ale is that the IPR owner, having sold the product, has
obtained the benefit of exclusive commercial exploita-
tion rights bestowed by the IPR regime and should no
longer control its distribution beyond the first sale2
since that would lead to anti-competitive effects.3
Other relevant concepts are international exhaustion
(distribution of a work, after the first sale of a particu-
lar copy, anywhere in the world) and parallel importa-
tion (where a non-counterfeit product is imported
without the permission of the IP owner). The first-sale
doctrine rejects post-sale restrictions on IP or down-
stream marketing and has been predominantly a court-
developed doctrine with little or no positive statutory
framework. It stipulates that the first authorized
vending of an article within the scope of a patent extin-
guishes any right to subsequently assert the patent
against that article.4
This article offers a comparative jurisdictional analy-
sis of the content and controversy surrounding the
principle of exhaustion in various fields of IPR, revol-
ving around the moot issue as to whether the owner
of an IP can, by means thereof, restrict the use made of
a device manufactured under the patent or any other
IP, after the device/product has passed into the hands
* Navajyoti Samanta is a Research Assistant and Shameek Sen is an
Assistant Professor in the National University of Juridical Sciences. Email:
navajyoti86@gmail.com
1 The long-standing doctrine of patent exhaustion provides that the initial
authorized sale of a patented item terminates all patent rights to that
item, as mentioned in Quanta v LGE, 76 USLW 4375.
2 T Papadopoulos, The First-sale doctrine in international intellectual
property law: trade in copyright related entertainment products (2003) 2
(Summer) Entertainment Law 50. This idea was succinctly put forward in
Motion Picture Patents Co. v Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 US 502, 511
(1917), where the Court noted that the primary purpose of patent laws
is not the creation of private fortunes for the owners of patents but is to
promote the progress of science and useful art. The concept of an
appropriate amount of compensation is based on the idea that IP
creators invest their time and money with an eye toward obtaining the
# The Authors (2009). Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.
ARTICLE 1 of 6
Key issues
There are variations in the extent of copyright
exhaustion in jurisdictions across the world, and
so it would be important to juxtapose the laws
of two diverse countries on the issue of copy-
right exhaustion.
Copyright exhaustion stops anti-competitive
effects and at the same time ensures that the
creator of the IP does not get adversely affected;
however, recent court rulings are tilting the
balance slowly towards the creator of IP.
This article reviews the current judicial stand on
copyright exhaustion in the USA and compares
the legislative position of India and the USA on
the same issue, thereby trying to bring forth an
analysis as to the differences and similarities of
laws, and thus ventures into the probable cause
for such disparity.
of a purchaser in the ordinary channels of trade, and
full consideration paid therefor and whether an IP
owner can, merely by a license notice attached to a
device made under the patent, and sold in the ordinary
channels of trade, place an enforceable restriction on
the purchaser thereof as to the use to which the pur-
chaser may put the device.5
compensation provided by the principal sale. See M Barrett, The United
States doctrine of exhaustion: parallel imports of patented goods (2000)
27 N Ky L Rev 911, 913 914. Subsequent sales are presumed to be
outside of the creators view.
3 Dissenting opinion of Justice Black in General Talking Pictures Corp. v
Western Electric Co., Inc., 305 US 124 (1938).
4 United States v Univis Lens Co., 316 US 241, 250 (1942).
5 General Talking Pictures Corp. v Western Electric Co., Inc., 305 US 124
(1938), where the court said: . . . neither question should be answered.
For we find that, while the devices embody the inventions of the patents
in suit, they were not manufactured or sold under the patents and did
not pass into the hands of a purchaser in the ordinary channels of trade.
Thus the judges created a contractual exception to overrule patent
exhaustion against which Justices Black and Reed vigorously dissented.
2 of 6 ARTICLE
Part I: Copyright exhaustion: the
bare law
Copyright offers some basic protection to authors of
an original intellectual creation or a work of art. The
exclusive rights generally made available to owners of
copyright are its reproduction in various forms, such
as printed publication or sound recording; its public
performance, as in a play or musical work; recordings
of it, for example, in the form of compact discs, cas-
settes or videotapes; its broadcasting, by radio, cable or
satellite; its translation into other languages, or its
adaptation, such as a novel into a screenplay.6 In the
USA, the Copyright Act 1976, section 106 provides rel-
evant copyright protection to the owner of copyright:
The owner of copyright has the exclusive rights to do and
to authorize any of the following: (1) to reproduce the
copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; (2) to
prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted
work; (3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the
copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of
ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; (4) in the case of
literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pan-
tomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual
works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly; (5) in
the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural
works, including the individual images of a motion picture
or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work
publicly; and (6) in the case of sound recordings, to
perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a
digital audio transmission.
The corresponding Indian provision can be found
under section 14 of the Indian Copyright Act, 1955:
copyright means the exclusive right subject to the pro-
visions of this Act, to do or authorise the doing of any of
the following acts in respect of a work or any substantial
part thereof, namely,
(a) in the case of a literary, dramatic or musical work,
not being a computer program,(i) to reproduce the
work in any material form including the storing of it in
any medium by electronic means; (ii) to issue copies of the
work to the public not being copies already in circulation;
(iii) to perform the work in public, or communicate it to
the public; (iv) to make any cinematograph film or sound
recording in respect of the work; (v) to make any trans-
lation of the work; (vi) to make any adaptation of the
work; (vii) to do, in relation to a translation or an adap-
tation of the work, any of the acts specified in relation to
the work in sub-clauses (i) to (vi);
6 WIPO Copyright Treaty at http://www.wipo.int/copyright/en/faq/faqs.
htm#rights (last visited on 25 July 2009).
7 As understood from studying 17 USC 109 which operatively states the
owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title,
Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice, 2009
(b) in the case of a computer program,(i) to do any
of the acts specified in clause (a); (ii) to sell or give on
commercial rental or offer for sale or for commercial
rental any copy of the computer program: Provided: that
such commercial rental does not apply in respect of com-
puter programs where the program itself is not the essen-
tial object of the rental.
(c) in the case of an artistic work,(i) to reproduce the
work in any material form including depiction in three
dimensions of a two dimensional work or in two dimen-
sions of a three dimensional work; (ii) to communicate
the work to the public; (iii) to issue copies of the work to
the public not being copies already in circulation; (iv) to
include the work in any cinematograph film; (v) to make
any adaptation of the work; (vi) to do in relation to an
adaptation of the work any of the acts specified in relation
to the work in sub-clauses (i) to (iv);
(d) in the case of a cinematograph film,(i) to make a
copy of the film, including a photograph of any image
forming part thereof; (ii) to sell or give on hire, or offer for
sale or hire, any copy of the film, regardless of whether such
copy has been sold or given on hire on earlier occasions; (iii)
to communicate the film to the public;
(e) in the case of a sound recording(i) to make any
other sound recording embodying it; (ii) to sell or give on
hire, or offer for sale or hire, any copy of the sound recording,
regardless of whether such copy has been sold or given on
hire on earlier occasions; (iii) to communicate the sound
recording to the public.
Explanation: For the purposes of this section, a copy
which has been sold once shall be deemed to be a copy
already in circulation
However, whatever rights have been guaranteed to the
owner are in the intellectual creation and does not
limit any other right of the copyright owner outside
the ambit of the statutory provision to owners of
copies of the IP. This is the baseline of the doctrine of
first sale, which allows the purchaser to transfer, sell, or
give away a particular lawfully made/obtained copy of
the copyrighted work without permission once it has
been obtained.7 Thus the copyright owner will not
have any control over the downstream movement of an
article incorporating his IP beyond the first sale.
While lack of control is statutorily provided under
the US Copyright law, section 109, in India we can
infer it from a harmonious reading of the explanation
to section 14 together with sections 14(a)(ii) and
14(c)(iii), which states that rights provided to the
copyright owner include the right to issue copies of
artistic work, literary, dramatic, or musical work, not
or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the
authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the
possession of that copy or phonorecord.
Navajyoti Samanta and Shameek Sen . Copyright exhaustion in India and the USA
being a computer program, but that the copyright
owner has no control over copies already in circulation.
However, sections 14(d)(ii) and 14(e)(ii) allow the
copyright owner of cinematograph film and sound
recordings to sell or give on hire, or offer for sale or
hire, any copy regardless of whether such copy has
been sold or given on hire on earlier occasions. In this
instance, therefore, Indian copyright law does not allow
the doctrine of first sale to take effect and copyright
exhaustion in India would apply only for artistic
works, literary, dramatic, or musical works, not being a
computer program, but not for cinematograph films
and sound recordings. Copyright exhaustion in India
does not affect non-commercial rights such as moral
rights.8
Part II: The judicial pronouncements
Numerous US judicial pronouncements have enhanced
the ambit and depth of copyright exhaustion in the
USA.9 Also, since the realm of copyright, which initially
covered only printed material and phonorecords,
gradually increased to embrace first cinematograph
films and later on computer software, any case analysis
of the US position would lead us through several dis-
tinct areas of copyright law.
The first case where the US Supreme Court upheld
the validity of the doctrine of copyright exhaustion was
Bobbs-Merrill Co. v Straus. 10 In this case, the appellant
sold books to the respondent at wholesale prices. Those
books contained a notice:
[t]he price of this book at retail is $1 net. No dealer is
licensed to sell it at a less price, and a sale at a less price
will be treated as an infringement of the copyright.
The respondent sold the books below the notice price;
the appellant brought an action both for copyright
infringement and for breach of licence. The court held
that
[i]n our view the copyright statutes, while protecting the
owner of the copyright in his right to multiply and sell his
production, do not create the right to impose, by notice,
such as is disclosed in this case, a limitation at which the
book shall be sold at retail by future purchasers, with
whom there is no privity of contract.
8 Indian Copyright Act, 1957, 57.
9 Bobbs-Merrill Co. v Straus 210 US 339 (1908), Sony Corp. v Universal City
Studios, Inc. 464 US 417 (1984), Vault Corporation v Quaid Software
Limited 847 F.2d 255, Step-saver Data Systems, Inc. v Wyse Technology and
the Software Link, Inc. 939 F.2d 91 (1991), United States v Wise 550 F.2d
1180, 1187 (9th Cir. 1977), Adobe Sys. Inc. v One Stop Micro, Inc. 84
F. Supp. 2d 1086 (N.D. Cal. 2000), Novell v Stargate Software 216
F. Supp. 2d 1051, Microsoft Corp. v Harmony Computers & Elecs. Inc. 846
ARTICLE 3 of 6
Next came Sony Corp. v Universal City Studios, Inc.11
(the Betamax case). By the mid-1970s, Betamax video
tape recorders (VTRs), patented by Sony, allowed users
to copy television programmes. Universal alleged that
that some individuals had used Betamax VTRs to
record copyright-protected works that had been exhib-
ited on commercially sponsored television and con-
tended that those individuals had infringed the
copyrights. Universal further maintained that Sony was
liable for the copyright infringement allegedly com-
mitted by Betamax consumers following Sonys market-
ing of the Betamax VTRs.
Universal sought no relief against Betamax consu-
mers. Instead, they sought money damages and an
equitable account of profits from Sony, as well as an
injunction against the manufacture and marketing of
Betamax VTRs. Many users of the VTR had compiled
libraries of recorded TV programmes and Universal
argued that there was a high probability of further
copyright infringement in future.
The District Court held that copying for private pur-
poses is covered by fair use and that, if the persons
who had copied the programmes later wanted to sell
the tapes, they could do so on the basis of exhaustion
of rights after first broadcast by Universal. The court,
declining to hold Sony liable, held that
[s]elling a staple article of commercee.g., a typewriter, a
recorder, a camera, a photocopying machinetechnically
contributes to any infringing use subsequently made
thereof, but this kind of contribution, if deemed sufficient
as a basis for liability, would expand the theory beyond
precedent and arguably beyond judicial management. . . .
Commerce would indeed be hampered if manufacturers of
staple items were held liable as contributory infringers
whenever they constructively knew that some purchasers
on some occasions would use their product for a purpose
which a court later deemed, as a matter of first impression,
to be an infringement.
After the Court of Appeals reversed the District Courts
findings on fair use and exhaustion, Sony appealed to
the Supreme Court, where the majority refused to
impose vicarious liability on Sony for contributory
copyright infringement. That court further held that
time-shifting is not necessarily copyright infringement.
The majority judgment remained silent on the issue of
F. Supp. 208 (EDNY 1994), Krause v Titleserv, Inc. 402 F.3d 119 (2d Cir.
2005), Softman Prods. Co. v Adobe Sys. Inc. 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075 (N.D.
Cal. 2001), Novell, Inc. v Network Trade Ctr., Inc. 25 F. Supp. 2d 1218 (D.
Utah 1997), Quality King Distribs., Inc. v LAnza Research Intl, Inc. 523
US 135 (1998).
10 Above note 9.
11 Above note 9.
4 of 6 ARTICLE
exhaustion by broadcasting to a paying audience where
no notice or restrictive licence was issued. The dissent-
ing opinion held that copying of copyright work is an
infringement of copyright, be it for home use or a
single copy, or anything else. It also held that time-
shifting is not fair use as it inversely affected potential
market for the Studios copyright works. The dissent-
ing opinion also agreed with the Court of Appeals that,
if off-the-air recording infringed, Sony had induced
and materially contributed to the infringing conduct of
Betamax owners. The dissenting opinion also did not
mention anything about exhaustion. Thus, although
the future of copying devices was secured, the court
missed an opportunity to widen the ambit of copyright
on programmes viewed once by paid audiences.
The next wave of copyright exhaustion cases came in
the mid-1980s, in the early days of the information tech-
nology boom. In 1988, in Vault Corporation v Quaid
Software Limited,12 the Federal Circuit court held that
transient copies on a random access memory would not
infringe copyright. As software was increasingly sold
over networks, the courts found it increasingly difficult
to evolve with the restrictive licence agreements.13 A
pioneer case on the legality of boxwrap, shrinkwrap, and
browsewrap contracts was Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc.
v Wyse Technology, and the Software Link, Inc.14 There
the court had to determine the validity of a box-top
licence, which was purportedly entered into when Step-
Saver obtained several copies of the Multilink Advanced
program from Wyse (TSL). The box-top licence
required the customer to confirm that he had not pur-
chased the software itself, but merely obtained a per-
sonal, non-transferable licence to use it, disclaiming all
expressed and implied warranties except for a warranty
that the disks contained in the box were free from
defects; it further provided that the sole remedy avail-
able to a purchaser of the program was to return a defec-
tive disk for replacement; the licence excluded liability
for damages, direct or consequential, caused by the use
of the program. It also contained an integration clause,
12 Above note 9.
13 DR Cahoy, Oasis or Mirage?: Efficient breach as a relief to the burden of
contractual recapture of patent and copyright limitations 17 Harv JL &
Tech 135.
14 Above note 9.
15 Case no. C07-1189RAJ, in Seattle District Court.
16 Notwithstanding the provisions of 106 [17 USCS 106], it is not an
infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program to make or
authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of that computer
program provided [that the owner meets two conditions].
17 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993), the court considered a software licence that
controlled the use of the software, and declared that any possession of
the software not expressly authorized under this License is prohibited, at
517 n 3. The court considered whether use of the software by an
Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice, 2009
which provided that the box-top licence was the final
and complete expression of the terms of the parties
agreement. The box-top licence concluded:
[o]pening this package indicates your acceptance of these
terms and conditions. If you do not agree with them, you
should promptly return the package unopened to the
person from whom you purchased it within fifteen days
from date of purchase and your money will be refunded to
you by that person.
Step-Saver wanted to recover damages caused by mal-
functioning TSL software, while TSL claimed that the
licence agreement gave it immunity. On the facts, the
court concluded that TSL did not clearly express its
unwillingness to proceed with the transactions unless
its additional terms were incorporated into the parties
agreement. The box-top licence did not, therefore, con-
stitute a conditional acceptance. However, the court
did not give any outright opinion as to whether such
limiting licence agreements are valid under the US
Uniform Commercial Code.
By the early 1990s, after most software IP litigation
and debate shifted to the domain of patents, copyright
exhaustion came to be dominated again by copyright
in items such as printed material and CDs, which had
physical existence. Then, in 2008, a significant question
on software resale right arose in Timothy Vermor v
Autodesk 15 before the District Court of the Western
District of Washington, Seattle, as a copyright rather
than a patent issue. In this case, Vermor had lawfully
acquired legal copies of software produced by Autodesk
from a previous lawful owner. Like USC 17, section
109, which stipulates copyright exhaustion post-first
sale, section 11716 provided for exhaustion in computer
software. However, most of the software was sold with
a licence to use that was very restrictive. The ninth
circuit faced conflicting opinions on the issue. While in
MAI Sys. Corp. v Peak Computer, Inc.,17 Triad Sys. Corp.
v Southeastern Express Co.,18 and WallData Inc. v Los
Angeles County Sheriff s Dept 19 the court had held that
a restrictive licence is no sale, in United States v Wise 20
unlicenced repair service infringed copyright. In a single footnote,
without analysis or explanation, the court declared that [S]ince MAI
licensed its software, [its] customers do not qualify as owners of the
software and are not eligible for protection under 117 at 519 n 5.
18 64 F.3d 1330, 1333 (9th Cir. 1995), the court assumed that licencees
could not invoke 117. The panel conceded that customers to whom the
plaintiff had sold its software outright could rely on 117, but implied
that licencees could not. Id (finding licences, not sales, in contract
banning duplication of software or use by third parties and in contract
requiring users to pay a fee on selling their software copies).
19 447 F.3d 769, 785 (9th Cir. 2006) ([I]f a software developer retains
ownership of every copy of software, and merely licenses the use of those
copies, 117 does not apply).
20 Above note 9.
Navajyoti Samanta and Shameek Sen . Copyright exhaustion in India and the USA
it was held that mere restrictive licensing does not
per se exclude the question of sale, but depends on
the nature of such a licence; even if there are restric-
tive conditions but salvaging rights and/or right to
destroy are provided and no question or requirement
of return is provided, then it is sale. In Vermor, the
AutoCAD software had in their licence agreement a
salvaging clause,21 and so the District Court applied
Wise and refused to apply Mai trio. 22 Across the USA,
several other circuit courts are laying their own stan-
dards. Many reach results favourable to Autodesk like
Adobe Sys. Inc. v One Stop Micro, Inc.,23 Novell v
Stargate Software,24 and Microsoft Corp. v Harmony
Computers & Elecs. Inc.25 Many others reach results
that favour Vernor like Krause v Titleserv, Inc.,26
Softman Prods. Co. v Adobe Sys. Inc.,27 and Novell,
Inc. v Network Trade Ctr., Inc.28 But all agree that
valid post-sale restrictions can be implemented
through licensing and in all the cases the final
decision, whether the transfer is a sale, is determined
by an analysis of the licence agreement. Vermor also
lays down that a licence agreement will not bind sub-
sequent buyers after the first sale, as no such term
has been mentioned in the licence agreement.
Next we address the problem of parallel importa-
tion in copyright products in the USA. USC 17 section
602(a) provides that
Importation into the United States, without the authority
of the owner of copyright under this title, of copies or
phonorecords of a work that have been acquired outside
the United States is an infringement of the exclusive right
to distribute copies or phonorecords under section 106,
actionable under section 501 . . . .
A literal reading of this section leads us to believe that
parallel importation is not permissible under US law.
However, the US Supreme Court in Quality King Dis-
tribs., Inc. v LAnza Research Intl, Inc. 29 gave that pro-
vision a dynamic interpretation. LAnza, a shampoo
manufacturer, supplies its products across the USA and
exported them to the EU. They also invested a huge
21 The AutoCAD licence agreement required to destroy the software in the
event that the consumer purchased a software upgrade.
22 Mai Trio refers to a group of three cases namely MAI Sys. Corp. v Peak
Computer, Inc. (1993), Triad Sys. Corp. v Southeastern Express Co. (1995)
and WallData Inc. v Los Angeles County Sheriff s Dept (2006) where the
Ninth Circuit had consistently held that a restrictive licence is no sale.
23 Above note 9.
24 Above note 9.
25 Above note 9.
26 Above note 9.
27 Above note 9.
28 Above note 9.
29 Above note 9.
ARTICLE 5 of 6
amount in aggressive marketing in the USA, while
there was no or little marketing in the EU. The price in
the EU was 40 per cent less than that in the USA.
Quality King imported several tonnes of LAnza
shampoo from Malta, whereupon LAnza sued for
copyright infringement and violation of USC 17
section 602(a). Justice Stevens, delivering the unani-
mous opinion of the court, said:
It is significant that this provision [USC 17 602(a)] does
not categorically prohibit the unauthorized importation of
copyrighted materials. Instead, it provides that such
importation is an infringement of the exclusive right to
distribute copies under section 106. Like the exclusive
right to vend that was construed in Bobbs-Merrill, the
exclusive right to distribute is a limited right. The intro-
ductory language in 106 expressly states that all of the
exclusive rights granted by that sectionincluding, of
course, the distribution right granted by subsection (3)
are limited by the provisions of 107 through 120. One of
those limitations, as we have noted, is provided by the
terms of 109(a), which expressly permit the owner of a
lawfully made copy to sell that copy [n]otwithstanding the
provisions of section 106(3).30
Thus the court concluded that importation by Quality
King was not illegal as USC 17 accepts the concept of
international exhaustion.31
In India, there has been no case on general copy-
right exhaustion except for certain cases on parallel
imports, where some booksellers have tried to export
Student Price Editions to US/EU markets, but most
of the cases are settled outside court.32 The doctrine
of copyright exhaustion in India is limited by moral
rights of authors as guaranteed under section 57 of
the Copyright Act 1957. Although the legislative
intent was to protect distortion or mutilation of orig-
inal works, courts in India have greatly widened the
ambit in Amar Nath Sehgal v Union of India 33 where
the right to destroy of the owner of the work has
been curtailed.
30 Above note 27 at 144.
31 The US Supreme Court reached a similar decision in K mart Corp. v
Cartier, Inc., 486 US 281 (1988).
32 John Wiley & Sons Inc. & others v Modern Exports & Others CS (OS) 840
of 2007.
33 (2005) 30 PTC 253. Amar Nath Sehgal was a sculptor who was
commissioned by the Union of India to make a mural, which was
exhibited in Vigyan Bhavan, a conference hall. However, during
modernization of the hall, the mural was transferred and kept in a
storehouse. During storage, the mural got damaged and the sculptor filed
a case for moral right violation. Court ordered Union Govt. to return the
mural and pay compensation of Rs. 5 lakhs to Amar Nath.
6 of 6 ARTICLE Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice, 2009

The inexplicable difference only the former two are covered by copyright exhaus-
tion in India, additional restrictions being imposed by
This article has, in the course of discussing the intri-
a moral rights regime that is somewhat abstract and
guing issue of exhaustion of IPRs, sought to emphasize
subjective to start with, often approaching arbitrariness.
the difference in approach that one needs to take when
It is this differential treatment between different kinds
exhaustion of different kinds of IPRs is concerned. The
of products of intellectual labour that this article dis-
legal frameworks in these different types of IPRs differ
cusses. The authors find absolutely no justification as
in the treatment of exhaustion. The reason for this dis-
to why the principle should apply with respect to
harmony may be attributed to, among other things, the
certain kinds of works and should not apply to the
nature of the subject matter of each of these types of
rest. Thus the authors have expressed the view that the
IPRs. While it is typically artistic or literary works,
principle should be brought into line with the US pos-
having not so much of an industrial value, that are
ition, consolidated and fortified by a wealth of relevant
protected under copyrights, patents deal with new
case law, serving as a ready reference to Indian judges
inventions or innovations with industrial potential
and lawmakers to follow, so that a harmony of
which may justify differential treatment.
approach towards the different constituent subjects, a
However, it seems inexplicable why there is a differ-
very basic determinant of consistency of the particular
ence in approach between India and the USA when it
law in question, can be achieved.
comes to the issue of copyright exhaustion. While in
the US copyright exhaustion applies to artistic, literary,
doi:10.1093/jiplp/jpp156
cinematographic works as well as sound recordings,