Response

WhyStateConstitutionsMatter

ROBERTF.WILLIAMS

I
wanttothankProfessorLawrenceFriedmanandtheNewEnglandLaw
ReviewfororganizingthisPaperSymposiumonmynewbook,TheLaw
of American State Constitutions. Also, many thanks to the authors who
tookthetimetoreadthebookandwriteaboutitandassociatedtopicsof
state constitutional law. I have learned a good deal from all of them, as
wellasthereadersofthisPaperSymposium.
Stateconstitutionsarebecomingmoreandmorerelevantbothlegally
and politically. In November 2010, voters in Iowa, Michigan, Maryland,
and Montana voted, in automatic, periodic referenda, on whether to call
stateconstitutionalconventions.1TheMarylandvotewasveryclose,butall
four failed. Such votes also failed in 2008 in Illinois, Connecticut, and
Hawaii. New Yorkers voted against a constitutional convention in 1997.
Similar automatic referenda will take place in 2012 in Alaska, New
Hampshire, and Ohio. A major move for constitutional revision is taking
place in Pennsylvania,2 and similar efforts regularly arise in Alabama,3
California,4NewYork,5andotherstates.
Inthe2011Wisconsinstandoff,Democraticlegislatorsleftthestateto

Distinguished Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law, Camden; Associate
Director,CenterforStateConstitutionalStudies,camlaw.rutgers.edu/statecon.
1JohnDinan, The Political Dynamics of Mandatory State Constitutional Convention
Referendums:Lessonsfromthe2000sRegardingObstaclesandPathwaystoTheirPassage,71MONT.
L.REV.395,398(2010).
2The Pennsylvania Bar Association has set up a commission on constitutional revision.

PENN.B.ASSNCONST.REV.COMMISSION,http://www.pabarcrc.org/(lastvisitedMay16,2011).
3See Sue Bell Cobb, Book Review and Response: Robert F. Williamss The Law of American

StateConstitutions,45NEW.ENG.L.REV.803(2011).
4SeeBruceE.Cain&RogerG.Noll,MalleableConstitutions:ReflectionsonStateConstitutional

Reform,87TEX.L.REV.1517,1526(2009).
5SeeGeraldBenjamin, TheConstitutionalConventionCatch22inNewYork,115PENN ST. L.

REV.(forthcoming2011).

901
902 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|901

defeat a quorum for a bill repealing public sector unions collective

bargaining rights.6 This was made possible by a state constitutional
provisionrequiringathreefifthsquorumtoenactfiscallegislation.The
standoffendedwhentheRepublicansdeletedthefiscalprovisionfromthe
bill, and it could be enacted without the Democrats under the normal
quorum rule. The law was enjoined, however, based on a statutory open
meetingsclaim.7
Virtually all of the activity on samesex marriage, as pointed out by
Robert Peck and Indiana Chief Justice Randall Shepard, has taken place
under state constitutions,8 including Californias Proposition 8.9 So has
litigation concerning equal and adequate school finance,10 eminent
domain,11 free speech on private property,12 challenges to tort reform
measures,13 and recall of public officials such as that leading to Arnold
SchwartzeneggerselectionasgovernorofCalifornia.14Acampaign,fueled
byoutofstatemoney,succeededtounseatallthreeoftheIowaSupreme
Court justices up for retention (as required by the state constitution) who
voted to strike down, under the state constitution, the ban on samesex
marriage.15 Similar challenges have been made to state judges who
interpretedstateconstitutionstoinvalidatevarioustortreformmeasures.16
TheupcomingdecennialredistrictingoftheU.S.HouseofRepresentatives

6See Tim Johnson, The Seeds for a Compromise?, MILWAUKEE J.SENTINEL, Feb. 23, 2011,

http://www.jsonline.com/news/opinion/116773954.html.
7Patrick Marley & Lee Bergquist, Judges Order May Delay Union Law for Nearly 2 Months,

MILWAUKEE J.SENTINEL, April 1, 2011, http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/1190597

14.html.
8SeeRobertS.Peck,ForTrailblazers,WhentheU.S.ConstitutionisNotEnough,45NEW. ENG.

L. REV. 855 (2011);RandallT.Shepard,StateConstitutionalRemediesandJudicialExitStrategies,

45NEW.ENG.L.REV.879(2011).
9Vikram David Amar, California Constitutional ConundrumsState Constitutional Quirks

ExposedBytheSameSexMarriageExperience,40RUTGERSL.J.741,742(2009).
10Peck,supranote8.
11SeegenerallyDavidSchultz,EconomicDevelopmentandEminentDomainAfterKelo:Property

Rights and Public Use Under State Constitutions, 11 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK J. 41 (2006)
(discussingpublicuseadjudicationunderstateconstitutions).
12SeegenerallyJenniferA.Klear,ComparisonoftheFederalCourtsandtheNewJerseySupreme

CourtsTreatmentsofFreeSpeechonPrivateProperty:WhereWontWeHavetheFreedomtoSpeak
Next?, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 589 (2002) (discussing the potential to expand free speech rights on
private property); Gregory C. Sisk, Uprooting the Pruneyard, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 1145 (2007)
(exploringthestateconstitutionalbasesbehindthePruneyarddecision).
13Peck, supra note 8, at 86673; Symposium, Tort Reform and State Constitutional Law, 32

RUTGERSL.J.897(2001).
14ROBERTF.WILLIAMS,THELAWOFAMERICANSTATECONSTITUTIONS7(2009).

15SeeVarnumv.Brien,763N.W.2d862,906(Iowa2009).

16Peck,supranote8,at86673.
2011 Why State Constitutions Matter 903

and state legislatures will take place primarily under state constitutions.17
Florida and California recently amended their state constitutions to
prohibittheirredistrictingcommissionsfromprovidingpartisanadvantage
ordisadvantage.Thecurrentstateandlocalfiscalandpublicpensioncrises
directlyimplicatestateconstitutionsbalancedbudgetmandatesandlimits
onborrowingandtaxation.18
In 2002, Florida amended its state constitution to provide detailed
requirementsforthetreatmentofpregnantpigs.19Thiswastheresultofa
nationalcampaignbyanimalrightsactivists,whotargetedFloridabecause
of the relative ease of amending its constitution.20 Then, in 2010, South
Carolina amended its constitution to guarantee the rights of hunters, in
responsetoperceivedthreatstohuntingbyanimalrightsgroups.21
Finally, in 2010, state constitutional amendments were adopted in a
few states (Arizona, Oklahoma, and Missouri) in an attempt, likely
unsuccessful,toblockfederalhealthcareandlaborlawreformmeasures,
and in Oklahoma to ban the use of international and Islamic law.22 The
Oklahoma provision has already been enjoined,23 and the Acting General
CounseloftheNationalLaborRelationsBoardhaswrittentotheAttorneys
General of Arizona, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Utah, informing
them that their state constitutional amendments purporting to guarantee
allemployeesasecretballotunionelectionconflictswithfederallaborlaw
and is therefore preempted.24 Interestingly, as a number of these issues
reflect,wehaveseenanationalizationofstateconstitutionallawissues,with
outofstateinterestandmoneyflowingonhotbuttonissuesperceivedas

17JamesA.Gardner,Foreword:RepresentationWithoutParty:LessonsfromStateConstitutional

AttemptstoControlGerrymandering,37RUTGERSL.J.881,886(2006).SeegenerallyDavidSchultz,
RedistrictingandtheNewJudicialFederalism:ReapportionmentLitigationUnderStateConstitutions,
37 RUTGERS L.J. 1087 (2006) (discussing the use of statecourt authority to assist in the
redistrictingprocess).
18See, e.g., David Gamage, Preventing State Budget Crises: Managing the Fiscal Volatility

Problem, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 749, 763 (2010); David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118
HARV.L.REV.2544,2606(2005).
19FLA.CONST.art.X,21.

20Elizabeth R. Springsteen, A Proposal to Regulate Farm Animal Confinement in the United

StatesandanOverviewofCurrentandProposedLawontheSubject,14DRAKEJ.AGRIC.L.437,440
42(2009).
21JeffreyOmarUsman, TheGameisAfoot:ConstitutionalizingtheRightstoHuntandFishin

theTennesseeConstitution,77TENN.L.REV.57,8283(2009).
22John Dinan, Subnational Constitutional Amendment Processes and the Safeguards of

Federalism:TheU.S.inComparativeContext,115PENNST.L.REV.(forthcoming2011).
23Awadv.Ziriax,CIV101186M,2010WL4814077,at*89(W.D.Okla.Nov.29,2010).

24SeeSeth Borden,AttorneysGeneralinFourStatesRespondtoNLRB RegardingSecretBallot

Laws, LAB. REL. TODAY (Jan. 28, 2011, 2:39 PM), http://www.laborrelationstoday.com/2011/01
/articles/statelocalissues/attorneysgeneralinfourstatesrespondtonlrbregardingsecret
ballotlaws/.
904 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|901

affectingnationallyorientedinterestgroups.
State constitutional developments are carefully reviewed by Dr. John
DinanintheBookoftheStates,inwhichhealsoincludesimportantdataon
thefiftystateconstitutions.25Anyintelligentdiscussionoftheseprocesses
andissuesrequiresanunderstandingofstateconstitutionsthemselvesand
the variety of ways in which they differ from the more familiar Federal
Constitution. State constitutions are, however, lowvisibility constitutions
and are not well understood.26 This leads to an interesting paradox in
American constitutionalism. The Federal Constitution is much more
familiar in our country, but it is in fact remote and out of reach for any
significant public involvement. State constitutions, on the other hand, are
much closer to the people and are realistically accessible to popular
involvement through a number of avenues. However, as noted, state
constitutionsarenotwellunderstoodbythepublicorevenmanylegalor
politicalprofessionals.
Many people will assume a familiarity with their state constitutions
becauseofsurfacesimilaritieswiththeFederalConstitution.Theyareboth
calledconstitutions,buttherearemanydifferences,aswell.Onewayto
buildunderstandingofstateconstitutionsistocompareandcontrastthem
withthemorefamiliarFederalConstitution.27Stateconstitutions,asnoted
byJusticeScottKafker,performdifferentfunctions(generallylimitplenary
powers rather than grant enumerated powers),28 have different origins
(fromthepeoplethemselves),29and,asdescribedbyAlabamaChiefJustice
Sue Bell Cobb, have a different (longer and more detailed) form.30 The
content and quality of state constitutions is also very different, with state
constitutions containing many more policyoriented provisions, built up

25JohnDinan,StateConstitutionalDevelopments,inTHEBOOKOFTHESTATES3(2009).

26WILLIAMS,supranote14,at12.

27Foranexcellentandaccessiblesinglevolumeexplainingstateconstitutions,seegenerally

G.ALANTARR,UNDERSTANDINGSTATECONSTITUTIONS(1998).
28WILLIAMS, supranote14,at27;seealsoScottL.Kafker,AmericasOtherConstitutions:Book

ReviewofTheLawofAmericanStateConstitutions,45NEW.ENG.L.REV.835,839(2011):
The functions of the state and federal government, and therefore
their respective constitutions, are also different. As James Madison
explained in The Federalist Number 45, the powers of the national
government set out in the Federal Constitution are enumerated and
limited. In contrast, the powers which are to remain in the State
governmentsarenumerousandindefinite....[and]willextendtoallthe
objectswhich,intheordinarycourseofaffairs,concernthelives,liberties,
and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and
prosperityoftheState.
Id.(quotingTHEFEDERALISTNo.45,at262(JamesMadison)(Am.BarAssned.2009)).
29WILLIAMS,supranote14,at2526.

30Id.at2830;Cobb,supranote3,at805.
2011 Why State Constitutions Matter 905

overtime,aswellasprovisionsconcerningthecharacter,virtue,andeven
moralityofthestatespeople.31
In fact, state constitutions are more democratic than the Federal
Constitution in that they involve the citizenry in approving their
amendmentandrevision,votingtoapproveborrowing,andinsomestates,
approvingnewformsofgambling.Inmanystates,likeIowa,forbetteror
worsethereispopularparticipationthroughelectingorretainingjudges.32
Further,becauseofthemanywavesofrevisionofstateconstitutionsover
the years, they reflect the input of the alternative voices of African
Americans, Hispanics, Native Americans and womenvoices that had
little impact on the Federal Constitution.33 Finally, these waves of state
constitutional revision have reflected a continuing dialogue about
fundamental matters of governmental structure and function that cannot
take place under the difficulttoamend Federal Constitution.34 Such
differences can obscure one of the most fundamental aspects of state
constitutions:thesignificantimpactthatanumberofthemwereadopted
before the Federal Constitution had on the framing of our Federal
Constitution.35
Oneofthemorerecentdevelopmentsthathashelpedcreatearebirth
instateconstitutionalstudyandpracticeisthegrowthofwhatisknownas
the New Judicial Federalism (NJF), in which attorneysand others mine
stateconstitutionsforinterpretationsthatoffermoreprotectiverightsthan
similar provisions of the Federal Constitution.36 The initial thrust of this
development, as described by Justice Robert Cordy, was in the area of
criminal procedure, where constitutional defenses were expanded from
just federal claims to include state constitutional arguments.37 An early

31Williams,supranote14,at2123,3031.

32Id.at31;seeKafker,supranote28,at848.

33Williams,supranote14,at3435.

34See
generally JOHN DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION (2006)
(addressingtheimportanceofconstitutionaldebatesatthestatelevel).
35WILLIAMS,supranote14,at3771.
36Id.at11334;Kafker,supranote28,at841;Peck,supranote8,at858.
37Robert J. Cordy, Criminal Procedure and the Massachusetts Constitution, 45 NEW. ENG. L.

REV.815,83233(2011):
AstheU.S.SupremeCourtcontinuesalongapathofcloselydivided
opinions on the meaning and application of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments to the myriad factual situations confronting state court
criminal judges, it is likely that the trend toward NJF, so evident in the
dozensofcasesnotedinthisbriefArticle,willcontinue.Defensecounsel
hasbecomemoreadeptatlookingtotheMassachusettsConstitutionfor
the protections and explication of the rights of their clients, and the
jurisprudence on the subject has accordingly increased in its depth and
breadth.
906 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|901

commentator referred to these as evasion cases.38 U.S. Supreme Court

Justice William Brennan helped energize this movement when, quoting
JusticeBrandeis,hecalledstateslaboratoriesofdemocracy.39Thisraises
thepotentialfordual,ordueling,claimsofrightsinstateandfederalcourt,
which implicate a number of methodology issues, including the
sequencing of arguments and development of criteria for recognizing
rightsbeyondthefederalminimumstandards.40Toomanystatecourtsfail
to acknowledge the possible differences between state and federal rights
protections, and as Professor Lawrence Friedman states, others engage in
lockstepping, in which they purport to prejudge future cases by
announcingthat,inthefuture,thestateandfederalrightsprovisionswill
be interpreted identically or similarly.41 Both approaches are problematic.
Also, the NJF has given rise to state constitutional amendments aimed at
overrulingstateconstitutionalrulingsprovidingmorerightsthanrequired
by the Federal Constitution.42 Proposition 8 in California, overturning the
samesexmarriagedecision,isthemostrecentexample.43Now,ofcourse,
Californias explicit state constitutional ban on samesex marriage is the
subjectofafederalconstitutionalchallenge,whichhassucceededatthetrial
level.44
A critical area in which state constitutional law is distinguished from
federal doctrine is the separation or distribution of powers. The Federal
Constitution does not mandate any particular arrangement of

Id.
38DonaldE.Wilkes,Jr.,TheNewFederalisminCriminalProcedure:StateCourtEvasionofthe

BurgerCourt,62KY.L.J.421,425(1974).
39See generally William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual

Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977) ([T]he trend of recent Supreme Court civil liberties
decisionsshouldpromptareappraisalof[]strategy);Peck,supranote8,at85658.
40WILLIAMS, supra note 14, at 13592; see also NEW FRONTIERS OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW: DUAL ENFORCEMENT OF NORMS (James A. Gardner & Jim Rossi eds., 2011) [hereinafter
NEWFRONTIERSOFSTATECONSTITUTIONALLAW].
41WILLIAMS, supra note 14, at 193232; Lawrence Friedman, The Once and Future

ConstitutionalLaw:OnTheLawofAmericanStateConstitutions,74ALB. L. REV. (forthcoming

2011).
42NEW FRONTIERSOF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supranote40,at12829;seeJohnDinan,

Foreword:CourtConstrainingAmendmentsandtheStateConstitutionalTradition,38RUTGERS L.J.
983,984(2007).
43SeeAmar,supranote9.

44Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1003 (N.D. Cal. 2010). On appeal the

California Attorney General refused to defend Proposition 8. The U.S. Court of Appeals for
theNinthCircuitissuedanorderinearlyJanuary2011,certifyingaquestiontotheCalifornia
Supreme Court as to whether the proponents of Proposition 8 had standing to appeal the
district courts decision striking down Proposition 8. See Order Certifying a Question to the
SupremeCourtofCalifornia,628F.3d1191(2011).
2011 Why State Constitutions Matter 907

governmental powers in the states except that they be republican.45 In

contrast to provisions involving individual rights, the Federal
Constitutions separationofpowers doctrine has not been determined to
constrain the states. Therefore, federal separationofpowers doctrines
should be even less persuasive in state courts than federal constitutional
rights interpretation.46 The states constitutional distributionofpowers
arrangements,however,alsodiffergreatlyfromstatetostate.Somestates
elect their judges, while others follow the appointment system. Judicial
remediesutilizedbystatecourtsmaybedifferentfromfederalremedies.47
Somestateshavestrong,singleexecutives,whereasothershaveanumber
of statewide elected executive officials. One state (Nebraska) has a one
house legislature, and others have parttime legislatures, term limits,
initiative and referendum, etc. Most state constitutions, in contrast to the
FederalConstitution,containextensiveprocedurallimitsandrequirements
for the process of exacting statutes.48 Therefore, it is important to apply a
statespecific separationofpowers analysis based on a states specific
arrangements.49
A final significant area of difference between state constitutions and
the Federal Constitution is the mechanisms of amendment or revision.

45SeeWILLIAMS,supranote14,at24042.

46Id.

47Shepard,supranote8,at880:

Selectingtherightremedycanoftenbethegreatestcomplicationin
state constitutional work. Remedies are particularly difficult in state
constitutional cases because, unlike their federal counterparts, state
constitutions are full of positive commands and mandates. A federal
constitutional violation can often be remedied simply by ordering the
offendingpartytorefrainfromengagingintheunconstitutionalbehavior.
Stateremedies,bycontrast,oftenrequireapartytotakesomeaffirmative
action, and that party is often a member of another coequal branch of
government.Onceastateconstitutionalviolationisidentified,courtsare
stuck with the difficult task of fashioning a remedy that is feasible and
willcorrecttheviolation.Judgesandclaimantsfrequentlyunderestimate
theimportanceanddifficultyofthistask.
Id.SeealsoHelenHershkoff&StephenLoffredo,StateCourtsandConstitutionalSocioEconomic
Rights:ExploringTheUnderutilizationThesis,115PENNST.L.REV.(forthcoming2011).
48Friedman,supranote41:

Many state constitutions provide specific instructions and rules on how

lawmaking can be accomplished. Disputes about whether a state
legislature honored these procedural requirements raise concerns about
the judiciarys role in interpreting and enforcing these kinds of
constitutional provisionsprovisions that have no analogue in the
federalconstitution.
Id.
49WILLIAMS,supranote14,at23840.
908 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|901

While there is but one, relatively difficult, way to amend the Federal
Constitution (another constitutional convention has never been called),
amendments or revisions of state constitutions can be accomplished
throughlegislative,constitutionalconvention(evenlimitedconventions)or
constitutional commission proposals, as well as by initiative in some
states.50 State constitutions are therefore much more malleable and have
been changed at a fairly rapid pace over the years. Indeed, state
constitutionalchangeisoneofthetoolsoflawmaking,oftenresortedtofor
policymaking by interest groups such as those opposed to samesex
marriageorhighertaxes.
There are substantial political difficulties today with state
constitutional amendment and revision, including popular distrust of
constitutionalconventionsandotherconstitutionmakingprocessesasjust
moregovernmentasusual.51Approvingaconstitutionalconventionisa
leapoffaith,ordesperation,andcertainlyfaithingovernmentalprocesses
is in very short supply. To some extent, limited state constitutional
conventions that take certain hot button issues off the table and targeted
advisorycommissionscanengenderabitmorefaith.52
Further, there is extensive judicial involvement in litigation
considering the substance and procedure of state constitutional
amendment and revision. Some processes of state constitutional change
canonlybeutilized,forexample,toamendthestateconstitutionbutnotto
reviseit.53ThiswasthebasisoftheunsuccessfulchallengetoProposition8
inCalifornia.54Moststatesrequireproposedamendmentstocontainonlya
single subject when presented to the voters.55 Several of the single
amendments banning both samesex marriage and civil unions were
unsuccessfullychallengedincourtonthisbasis.56
Interestinstateconstitutionallawhascontinuedtoincreaseinthelegal
academy, demonstrated by Jim Gardners important book,57 as well as in

50Id.at38097.
51Id.at388.
52Id. at 39297; G. Alan Tarr & Robert F. Williams, Foreword: Getting from Here to There:

TwentyFirst Century Mechanisms and Opportunities in State Constitutional Reform, 36 RUTGERS

L.J.1075,108592(2005).
53WILLIAMS, supra note 14, at 40305; Daniel B. Rodriguez, Revision, Amendment, and the

DynamicsofStateConstitutionalChange,115PENNST.L.REV.(forthcoming2011).
54SeeAmar,supranote9,at74243.

55WILLIAMS, supra note 14, at 40508. For a thoughtful and indepth consideration of the

singlesubject rule in the context of Florida constitutional law, see generally Patrick O.
Gudridge,FloridaConstitutionalTheory(ForCliffordAlloway),48U.MIAMIL.REV.809(1994).
56See,e.g.,Perduev.OKelly,632S.E.2d110,113(Ga.2006)(upholdinganamendmentto

theGeorgiaConstitutionbanningsamesexmarriageandcivilunions).
57See JAMES A. GARDNER, INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS: A JURISPRUDENCE OF

FUNCTIONINAFEDERALSYSTEM(2005).
2011 Why State Constitutions Matter 909

thelegalprofession.Inaddition,theRutgersCenterforStateConstitutional
Studies completed a threevolume work on State Constitutions for the
TwentyFirstCentury.58
Professor Robert Schapiro published a thoughtful book on federalism
moregenerallybutalsotouchedinsignificantwaysonstateconstitutional
law.59 In 2008, Professor Jeffrey Shaman published a comprehensive book
onstateconstitutionalequalityandlibertyguarantees.60
Inanextremelyimportant2010development,theConferenceofChief
Justicesadoptedaresolutionencouragingalllawschoolstooffercoursesin
stateconstitutionallaw.TheresolutionisincludedhereasanAppendixto
this Response. This reflects a notable recognition by the highest judges in
the fifty states that further education on state constitutional law is
necessary.
ManyarefamiliarwiththeGreenwoodPressseriesReferenceGuidesto
StateConstitutions.Thisseries,currentlyincludingvolumesonfortysixof
the fifty states, edited by Dr. G. Alan Tarr, has now been purchased by
OxfordUniversityPress.Thisnewpublisherplanstocompletetheseriesas
TheOxfordCommentariesontheStateConstitutionsoftheUnitedStates,reissue
existing volumes, publish updates, and put the series online.61 This is a
tremendousboosttostateconstitutionalresearch.
The past year has seen the publication of additional, important new
booksinthefieldofstateconstitutionallaw.Afteranumberofyearswhere
my casebook was the only national teaching resource on state
constitutional law,62 a welcome new casebook has been published by
JusticeRandyJ.HollandofDelaware,ProfessorStevenR.McAllisterofthe
University of Kansas School of Law, Professor Jeffrey M. Shaman of
DePaul College of Law, and Judge Jeffrey S. Sutton of the U.S. Court of

58See 1 STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY: THE POLITICS OF STATE

CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION (G.AlanTarr&RobertF.Williamseds.,2006);FRANK P. GRAD &

ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, 2 STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY: DRAFTING
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, REVISIONS AND AMENDMENTS (2006); 3 STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE
TWENTYFIRST CENTURY: THE AGENDA OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM (G. Alan Tarr &
RobertF.Williamseds.,2006).
59ROBERT
A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF
FUNDAMENTALRIGHTS(2009).
60See generally JEFFREY M. SHAMAN, EQUALITY AND LIBERTY IN THE GOLDEN AGE OF STATE

CONSTITUTIONALLAW(2008).
61See The Oxford Commentaries on the State Constitutions of the United States, OXFORD U.

PRESS, http://www.oup.com/us/catalog/general/series/OxfordCommentariesontheStateCons/?
view=usa (last visited May 16, 2011) (providing information on publication of this series,
whichwaseditedbyG.AlanTarr).
62ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASESAND MATERIALS (4thed.2006).

ProfessorLawrenceFriedmanwillbejoiningmeasacoauthoronthiscasebook.
910 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|901

AppealsfortheSixthCircuit.63
Professors Jim Gardner and Jim Rossi have edited an important new
book on the dual enforcement of state constitutional norms.64 The
contributions in this new book are by leading figures in the field of state
constitutional law, and they advance the field by analyzing state
constitutionallawasnotseparatefrom,butratherinterrelatedwith,federal
constitutionallaw.
Theclassic1966bookeditedbyMerrillD.Peterson,Democracy,Liberty,
and Property: The State Constitutional Conventions of the 1820s, has been
reissuedbytheLibertyFund,withanexcellentnewforewordbymylong
timecolleague,AlanTarr.65Dr.Tarrsforewordshedsimportantlighton
these early debates about, and revisions of, state constitutions, together
withtheircurrentrelevance.
RutgersLawJournal,forwellovertwentyyears,hasdevotedoneissuea
year to state constitutional law. The invited forewords, as well as other
articles,havebuiltupaninvaluablecomponentofscholarshipinthisarea.
These issues also include, every year, a number of excellent student
Commentsonthemostimportantstateconstitutionalcasesdecidedinthe
pastyear.TheseCommentsreflectawiderangeofissuesthatariseinstate
constitutional law, together with the variety of interpretation techniques
utilized by state courts. Less detailed coverage of other cases is included
online.66
Given the increased focus on state constitutions over the past
generation, both as sources of enhanced rights through litigation in state
courts and as avenues for policymaking by entrenching rules about such
matters as samesex marriage, eminent domain, and taxation in a states
highest law, people generally, and drafters of state constitutional
amendmentsandrevisionsspecifically,needtobecomemorefamiliarwith
our littleunderstood, other American constitutions.67 In fact, we are even
comingtorecognizethattheremaybevaluablelessonstobelearnedfrom
a comparative study of state (subnational) constitutions in other
countries that are based on constitutional federalism.68 Perhaps, with

63RANDYJ.HOLLANDETAL.,STATECONSTITUTIONALLAW:THEMODERNEXPERIENCE(2010).

64NEWFRONTIERSOFSTATECONSTITUTIONALLAW,supranote40.

65See G. Alan Tarr, Foreword to DEMOCRACY, LIBERTY, AND PROPERTY: THE STATE

CONSTITUTIONALCONVENTIONSOFTHE1820S,ix(MerrillD.Peterson,ed.,1966)(2010).
66These State Constitutional Law Case Summaries can be accessed directly on the

Rutgers Law Journal website. See Journal Summaries, RUTGERS L.J., http://camlaw.rutgers.
edu/summaries/(lastvisitedMay16,2011).
67GRAD&WILLIAMS,supranote58.

68See,
e.g., Robert F. Williams, Teaching and Researching Comparative Subnational
ConstitutionalLaw,115PENNST.L.REV.(forthcoming2011);G.ALANTARRETAL.,FEDERALISM,
SUBNATIONALCONSTITUTIONS,ANDMINORITYRIGHTS(2004).
2011 Why State Constitutions Matter 911

greater understanding that state constitutions do matter, we can make

progress in addressing the many problems in our state governments
through state constitutional amendment and revision in the public
interest.69

69See,e.g.,DanielB.Rodriguez,StateConstitutionalFailure,2011U.ILL.L.REV.(forthcoming

2011).
912 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|901

APPENDIX

ConferenceoftheChiefJustices
Resolution1
EncouragingtheTeachingofStateConstitutionalLawCourses

WHEREAS,alllawyerstakeanoathtosupporttheUnitedStates
ConstitutionandtheConstitutionoftheirstate;and

WHEREAS, although all law schools offer a course in

constitutional law, the overwhelming majority of those courses
aretaughtfromtheperspectiveofthefederalConstitution;and

WHEREAS,theUnitedStatesConstitutioncreatesadualsystem
of government with two sets of sovereigns whereby all powers
not delegated to the federal government are reserved to the
states;and

WHEREAS, state constitutions contain different structures of

government, unique provisions, and substantive provisions or
declarations of rights that are often greater than federally
guaranteedindividualrightsandliberties;and

WHEREAS, being a competent and effective lawyer requires an

understanding of both the Federal Constitution and state
constitutionallaw;

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the Conference of

ChiefJusticesencouragesalllawschoolstoofferacourseonstate
constitutionallaw.

ConferenceofChiefJustices,EncouragingtheTeachingofStateConstitutionalLawCourses,
10M1, (2010), http://ccj.ncsc.dni.us/LegalEducationResols.html (follow Encouraging the
Teaching of State Constitutional Law Courses hyperlink) (adopted as proposed by the
Professionalism and Competence of the Bar Committee at the Conference of Chief Justices
2010MidyearMeeting).