Professional Documents
Culture Documents
BA7T bE EXPERIENCES
No. 61 9 OCT 1944
'Battle m e r i e n o e e * are published r e g u l a r l y by t h i s headquarters t o anable
unlts i n t r a i n i n g t o p m f i t f r o m the l a t e s t combst emeriencea of our t m o p e nor
f i g h t i n g t h e G e m i n Burope. Although t h e experiences of c e r t a i n u n i t s a t a
p a r t i c u l a r looation are not necessarily applicable t o a l l u n i t s i n a l l s i t u a t i o l u .
t h e item8 published w i l l be those based on p r a c t i c a l experienoe and are reoormmtnded
f o r c a r e f u l consideration by u n i t s which may e n m u t e r s i m i l a r problems. Reports
of corroborative o r contrary elperiencas a r e p a r t i o u l a r l y desired i n oraer t h a t t h e
v a l i d i t y of t h e indicated b a t t l e lesson may be determined.
8. h m u d t i o n s w ~ 1 ~'Co . sup dumps were maintained one block i n rear of' as-
s a u l t units, because f r o n t l i n e u n i t s could not nonnally c a r r y a f u l l day'n a p .
BATTLE EXPERIENCES
C. R. IommN
Colonelo fiD
Adgutant General
0-----0_----_-_------------------------------------a--------------------------a--a---
1 DIGGING IN P A D QFF
2. I p w carrualty rate. The area covered by the barrage was approximately 15QO
yda i n width and 1000 yds i n depth and vaa occupied by approximately 200 men, Only
eight men were k i l l e d o r wounded during t h e barsage and the m u t e r a t t a c k t h a t f o l -
lowed* The low caeualbty r a t e is a t t r i b u t e d t o thoroughly prepared defensive p ~ a i t i o n e
including deep and w e l l covered foxholes, W e e positions had been continually im-
proved during the few days we had occupied the defensive area,
mtei PJc;Oe and pvts of Go PC, 11th Inf' made the following mmrmntsa
hhse muaced a %CR 438 i n my jeep and have corn ahtb everybody j8nclud.t~n y
erty b ~ l a E l i k e i t b e t t e r than the SCF4 284,B--C89 9th h f Re&,
rn
TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
BATTLE EXPERENCES
By canmand of L i e u t e n a t General
C-R*'J%Kdid
WLgy:
We UNION
C e
Colonel, AGD
Ad jut a n t General
s P - m _ - ~ - - - - _ - - - - - - - ~ ~ ~ - - ~ - - - - - - - - ~ - - - ~ - - ~ - ~ ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
I ~ ~ n Y - T ACTION
~ - ICN THE
~ SWFRPKD
~ . IJ?&
P. Source, %ginning om 17 Sep the 3rd Armd Croup, composed of the 74nst and
747th t k b m , w?s attached t o t h e 28th Inf Div which used it a s part or a t e s k f a r c e
having t h e mission of widening a gap which had been made ir the S i e g f k i e d Line. 'rhe
comments below are e x t r a c t e d f r m a m p s r t s f t h e t k group comdr t o t h e CG F i r s t kmy.
k c b m e our t a c t i ~
5. Vlms ~ were then drawn up f o r a coordinated a t t a c k by
tm i d C O ~ Ofr reinforced tk co and o n g r s working i n teams on a group of p i l l b o x e s
abut 2060 meters from t h e l o c a t i o o sf t h e previoua a t t a e k ,
6 , glmnina, and operation. "he teams were w e f u l l y briefed and rebriefed as
to a i s s i o n s , routes, s i g n a l e , e t a . on large-acale maps, a e r i a l pRoto8 and a c t c a l l y on
t h e ground. b r i e f in@ rere all a t joint meetin@ which were held over a period
af t h e e days.
8. The main attack. 'The main a t t a c k jumped off a t 0930 and i n the beginning
drew alrJlost m f i r e a s a r e s u l t , i t i s believed, of t h e deceptive methods employed.
he a s s a u l t teams were composed of a sqd of inf supported by two tka and s u f f i c i e n t
engrs t o destroy t h e pillboxes when taken. In s i x hour8 eleven pillboxes were cap-
tured and 31 p r l a o w r s taken i n a s t r o q l y defended area.
BATTLE EXPERIENCES
-
No. 6 4 13 OCT 1946
%a t t l e m p e r i e n c e s * a r e p u b l i s h e d r e g u l a r l y by t h i s h e a d q w t e r s t o e n a b l e
m i t e i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t f r u n t h e l a t e s t cambat e x p e r i e n c e s of our troops now
f i g h t i n g t h e Germans i n Xurope. Although t h e e x p e r i e n c e s of c e r t a i n blnits a t a
p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n a r e not n e c e s s a r i l y applicable t o a l l u n i t s i n a l l s i t u a t i o n s ,
t h e items p u b l i s h e d w i l l be t h o s e based on p r a c t i c a l e x p e r i e n c e and a r e r e c w n e n d e d
Por c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n by u n i t s which , m y e n c o u n t e r sinilar problems. R e p o r t s
of c o r r o b c r a t i v e or c o n t r a r y e x p e r i e n c e s ake p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n a r d e r t h a t t h e
v a l i d i t y of t h e i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e l e s s o n rnay be d e t e r m i n e d ,
By command of L i e u t a n a n t General i 3 W L E Y :
c.W*
C. R. U i O h
C o l o n e l , AGD
Ad j u t a n t General
-------------------------------------------------------------------------.------------
I !EWGPOHTING AIV UdTANFRY H E ; G I i E i t T .
Note t The f o l l o w i n g s o l u t i o n t o t r a n s p o r t i n g en i n f r
2 u s i n g o n l y t h e T of a t e h d cam-
b a t u n i t 8 was worked o u t by t h e 1 8 t h Ia% Regt,
BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 65 14 OCT 1944
* B a t t l e Experiences* a r e published r e g u l a r l y by t h i s h e a d q u a r t e r s t o e n a b l e
u n i t s i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t f r a n t h e l a t e s t c a s b a t e x p e r i e n c e s of our t r o o p s n o r
f i g h t i n g t h e Germans i n Europe. Although t h e e x p e r i e n c e s of c e r t a i n u n i t s a t a
particular location are not necessarily applicable t o a l l units i n a l l situations,
the i t e m s published w i l l be t h o s e based on p r a c t i c a l e x p e r i e n c e and a r e r e c a m e n d e d
f o r c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n by wits which may e n c o u n t e r s i m i l a r problems. R e p a r t s
of c o r r o b o r a t i v e o r c o n t r a r y e x p e r i e n c e s a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n o r d e r t h a t t h e
v a l i d i t y of t h e i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e l e s s o n may be determined.
By canruand of L i e u t e n a n t General B W I E Y I
0.8-
C. H a W ~ N
C o l o n e l r Am
Adjutant General
1. C o n s t r u c t i o n . a m e p i l l b o x c o n s i s t e d of a 1 2 @s t e e l dane s e t on a c o n c r e t e em-
placement approximately 3 0 D i n diameter. The s t e e l extended 6 ' below ground t o t h e roof
of t h e c o n c r e t e emplacement. There were 6 f i r i n g embrasure8 each w i t h a 12' s t e e l door.
The p i l l b o x was on a k n o l l and had a r e a r e n t r a n c e with s t e e l doors.
IV NO CIVILIAN IX515TUCE.
S e c t i o n 11 of B a t t l e Experiences KO. 49, dated 26 Sept 44, s t a t e d t h a t the 3d
Armd Div had r e p o r t e d s t u b b a r n r e s i s t a n c e frau enemy c i v i l i a n s and s o l d i e r s on 17 j e p t
44. A l e t t e r j u s t r e c e i v e d frcm t h e d i v c a n d r s t a t e s t h a t no c i v i l i a n r e s i s t a n c e was
observed by o r r e p o r t e d t o him and he considers t h e r e p o r t e r r o n e o w .
TWELFTH ARMY CROUP
BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 66 19 OCT 1944
~Frittlc:mperienoaam a r e p u b l i s h e d r e g u l a r l y by t h i s h e a d q u a r t e r s t o e n a b l e
u n i t s i n t r a i n i w t o p r o f i t from t h e l a t g s t combat e q , e r i e n c e s of our t r o o p 3 now
f i g h t l n r t h e r s r m a n s i n m r o p e . Although t h e ex;leriences o f c e r t a i n u n i t s a t a
p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n are n o t n e c e s s a r i l y a ~ p l i c a b l et o a l l u n i t s i n a l l s i t u a t i o n s ,
t h e i t e m s p u b l i s h e d w i l l he t h o s e b a s e d on p r a c t i c a l e x p e r i e n ~ c e and a r e recommended
f o r c s r s f u ? c c n s i d e r a t i o n by u n i t s which may e n c o u n t e r s i m i l a r p r o b l e m s , Rerlorts
of c o r r o b o r a t i v s o r c o n t r a r y e q e r i e n c e s a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n o r d e r t h a t t h e
v a l i d i t y of t h e i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e l e s s o n may be d e t e r m i n e d .
Ry command of L i e u t e n a n t G e n e r a l BRil9Z.EY:
C . R. IAKDON
C o l o n e l , AGD
~d j u t a n t G e n e r a l
v C u r d i v , i n I t s y r e ; : a r a t i o n f o r t h e a s s a u l t on S i e g f r i e d f o r t i f i c a t i o n s , h a s made
? f ' e c t i v ? u s e o f t h e Maginot Une.. R i f l e p l a t s have been p u t t h r o u g h l r o b l e m s i n t h e
a t t n c k of f o r t i f i e d p o s i t i o n s u s i n g t h e a r e a s w i t h w i r e and p i l l b o x e s ns t h e t r a i n i n g
grcund. 1'Ve have found t h e t r a i n i n g v a l u a b l e as i t & e m i t s d e t a i l e d p l a n n i n g . and p r a c -
tice f ~ r n ~ , ; a u l t t e r n s a 3 w e l l as e x e r c i s e s i r l v o l v i n p c o o r d i n a t i o n o f a l l arenu.*--
:$, 82d Div.
BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 67 18 OCT 1944
* B a t t l e E x p e r i e n c e s * a r e p u b l i s h e d r e g u l a r l y by t h i s h e a d q u a r t e r s t o e n a b l e
u n i t s i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t f r u n t h e l a t e s t ccmbat e x p e r i e n c e s of our t r o o p s now
f i & t i n g t h e Germans i n Europe. d t h o u g h t h e e x p e r i e n c e s of c e r t a i n u n i t s a t a
p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n a r e not n e c e s s a r i l y a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l u n i t s i n a l l s i t u a t i o n s ,
t h e i t e m s p u b l i s h e d w i l l be t h o s e based on p r a c t i c a l e x p e r i e n c e and a r e r e c a m e n d e d
f o r c a r e f l i l c o n s i d e r a t i on by units which may encounter s i m i l a r problems. R e p o r t s
of c o r r o b o r a t i v e o r c o n t r a r y e x p e r i e n c e s a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n o r d e r t h a t t h e
v a l i d i t y of t h e i n d i c a t e d k e t t l e l e s s o n may be determined.
By c a m a n d of L i e u t e n e n t General BUilLEYt
C ,R , . X L - d
C. h. LANUQN
C 0 1 0 l E 1 , AGD
Ad j u t a n t General
.....................................................................................
1. m u n i t i o n f o r M-10. * I n p l a n n i n g f o r woods f i g h t i n g i t is e s s e n t i a l t h a t t h e
b a s i c l o a d of 3" am f o r t h e LI-10 TD be modified t o i n c l u d e a m a j o r i t y of kP o r APC.
The use of HE i s g r e a t l y l i m i t e d by t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of t r e e bursts on f r i e n d l y t r s ,
BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 68 19 OCT 1944
c.fl-
C. fie Lmoni
Colonel, AGD
Ad j u t a n t General
---------.----------------------------------------------------------------------------
I WmHI
P EPISODE.
n A r e i n f o r c i n g p l i t e ofan
m m r on t h e belttom of t h e M-8 ermd c a r , i n s t a l l e d by
o u r o r d c o , has proved of v a l u e , I n one i n s t a n c e one of t h e s e c a r s , p a r t i a l l y reio-
f o r c e d , r a n o v e r a mine with t h e r e s u l t thilt t h e two men i . ;-dnt p r o t e c t e d by t h i s
a m r were o n l y s l i g h t l y i n j u r e d , whereas t h e two t u r r e t m- w i t h no added pro-tez=
t i o n , were killed.#--C0 5 t h Hcn Tr.
R NAZI ANTITANK TACTICS.
\\'
DISMOUNTED LEAD VEHICLES
POINT
+ WHEN FIRED UPON
b e e
B
0 . .
61 0
x X
a OF OUR
AXISADVANCE
-.
3
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//I
BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 69 2 0 OCT 1944
* B a t t l e Experiences. a r e published r e g u l a r l y by t h i e headquarters t o enable
u n i t s i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t f r a n the l a t e s t canbat experience8 of our t r o o p s now
f i g h t i n g t h e Germans i n Europe. lllthough t h e experiences of c e r t a i n units a t a
p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n a r e not n e c e s s a r i l y a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l u n i t s i n a l l s i t u a t i o n s ,
, the item published w i l l be those based on p r a c t i c a l experience and a r e recaumended
f o r c a r e f u l iconsideration by u n i t s nhich may encounter s i m i l a r problems. Report8
of c m r o b a r a t i v e o r c o n t r a r y experiences a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n order t h a t t h e
v a l i d i t y of the i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e l e s s a n may be determined.
C. R. LANDON
Colonel. AGD
Adjutant General
I Porn I u m F 6 H I P .
Examples of good l e a d e r s h i p have been presented i n previoue i s s u e s of B a t t l e Experiences,
The following i n c i d e n t s , i l l u s t r a t i v e of poar l e a d e r s h i p . rere r e p o r t e d by an i n f bn
car& and may be of equal value i n the f armation of a p i c t u r e of t h a t q u l i ty.
.
1, p i e ~ l a c e m e n t .We have adapted t h e procedure of digging new gun p o s i t i o n s
before d i s p l a c i n g the gun, I n f a t mooing e i t u a t i o n s t h i s r e impractical but when
there i a time, half the sqd goes t o the new p o s i t i o n , l ~ s r i n gthe other h a l f t o man
the gun, Time f c r emplacing is thus c u t t o a minimum.
2. s i t i q g . .AT guns ehould always be placed a e r e r a l hundred yda from the road
they a r e covering t o obtain f l a n k i n g f i r e , b e t t e r camouflage, and s a f e t y fran Gennar,
a r t y f i r e which usually f a l l s along the road..--C0, AT Co. 115th I n f .
END
- 2 -
TWELFTH ARMY CROUP
BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 7 0 21 OCT 1944
Colonel, AGD
ka j u t ant General
11 mRWm OBSERVERS
2 2 OCT 1944
6. R. ISLNWN
Colonel, AGD
Ad j u t a n t General
I COMPANY ADMUJISTRATION
V ATTACE;ITG T O E S I N WOODS
VII SALVAGE
We have s e t u? a r e c l a m a t i o n sqd which s e a r c h e s o u r z o of~ a c~t i o n a f t e r w e have
passed through. A s a r e s a l t we h w e reclaimed more t h a n enough m a t e r i a l of a l l c l a s s e s
t o make up f o r t h e b a t t l e l o s s e s , not i n c l u d i n g damaged m a t e r i a l , - t h s t we s u s t a i n m n - -
R e g t l r;x 0 , 7 3 t h I n f Dive
BATTLE EXPERIENCES
1, The bean can. An ordinary iuo. 2 @an was loaded with t h e e pounds of dynamite
pressed aa hard a s p o s s i b l e with 6Dd n a i l s a l o n g t h e i n s i d e edge of t h e can, The c e n t e r
of t h e c a n was kspt c l e a r of n a i l s t o permit i m e r t i n g the f i r i n g device. These were
d e t o n a t e d with a No. 8 b l a s t i n g c a p , t r i p wire and a p u l l - t y p e f w e . The t r i p wire is
i n e f f e c t i v e i f over 15 f e e t long. This same t y p e waa made w i t h C - 2 canpound which proved
m o r e , e f f e c t i v e t h a n dynamite.
1. ye i s a *duimkoof * .
R e s u l t s proved that t h e German s o l d i e r i a p o o r l y t r a i n e d
a g a i n s t mine8 and booby t r a p a and a n e a s y prey t o t h e quick-thinking and i r u a g i n a t i w
American i n a b a t t l e of wits.
2. H e i a c a r e l e s e . On 18 S e p a mine, a t t a c h e d t o a g e t e s o t h a t opening of t h e
g a t e would e e t i t o f f , was blown. The Csmaan s o l d i e r ~ sl e g was broken and s h r a p n e l p i e r c e d
h i s body. A n e w mine w a s immediately pleced i n a s l . i & t l y d i f f e r e n t p o s i t i o n and a s h o r t
time l a t e r two G e r m a n s t r i e d t h e sane gate. One was k i l l e d and the o t h e r s e v e r e l y wounded.
3 . He is u n h e a l t h i l y a ~ n e s s i v e . A n e n g i n e e r p a r t y , o u t l o o k i n g for l o c a t i o n s f a r
a d d i t i o n a l t r a p s , met a Cerman g a t r o l and had a f i r e f i g h t with them l a s t i n g about a n
hour. During t h e f i r i n g t h e y s e t up t h e i r mines w i t h t r i p - w i r e s and then withdrew.
About t e n minutes a f t e r t h e y had withdrawn they h e a d one of t h e i r mines explode. Upan
r e t u r n i n g they found one German dead and t h e o t h e r w i t h a broken l e g and s h r a p n e l wound8
i n l e g s and arms.
C. R e lAIuDOB
C o l o ~ L ,AGD
Ad j u t a n t General
+.;
*On 'one o c c a e i o n when our a r t y used r e d sruoke t o mark a t a r g e t f a r our f i g h t e r - b a n b e r s ,
t h e enemy immediately r e t u r n e d t h e f i r e w i t h mort s h e l l s of t h e same type. These s h e l l s
landed a t l e a s t 500 yds i n r e a r of our forward elernents. The f a c t t h a t t h e s e r a n d s
Tere f i r e d i n t o our l i n e s only a few seconds a f t e r o u r s had landed i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e
enemy may have used r a d i o illtercept.*--G-2, 2d itl-md Div. ( ~ o t e : Scme u n i t s have r e p a r t e d
t h a t when air a i r c r a f t a r e i n c l o s e s u p p o r t t n e q u s e a n a r t y 0 P p l a n e t o watch f o r and
inunediutely r e p o r t t h i s enemy t a c t i c . )
2.
0-Ua C d v ~ b S 1 \ s
.
4. Watch t h e n o i s e . "When advancing t o t k a t t a c k keep t h e r o i s e down. P r i s o n e r s
have t o l d u s t h a t w e l o s e s u r p r i s e e f f e c t ~y ama n d ~ s gapprcadh t o t h e i r p o s i t i o n s .
5. Help t h e new men, "Work hard with iaiaxperienced men. They w i l l h e l p yau i n b a t -
t l e i f you h e l p them i n t r a i n i n g . Don't f a r g e t extrs. hours on t h e d r i l l f i e l d s s a v e l i v e s
on t h e battlefield. #--T/'~gt Benjamin Frisbmr "c
VT I .v.13CE;LWiE .
7.Y9%hI n f Re&.
T e l ~ t y p efrom -,
9 t h &rmd Bn, 6 t h
'The use of
t a k e s a p e ~ lto a d o f f our t e l e p h o
.':'. F,.?*,,:l:!
?%
. ?;.: -2s sscls.ines frim c o r p s a r t y hq t o ms
p s Arty
TWELFTH ARMY CROUP
BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 74 24 OCT 1944
battle m e r i e n c e e s a r e published r e g u l a r l y by t h i s headquarters t o enable
u n i t e i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t from t h e l a t e s t combat experiences of our t r o o p s now
f i g h t i n g t h e German8 i n Europe. Although t h e experiences of c e r t a i n u n i t s a t a
p a r t i c u l a r location a r e not necessarily applicable t o a l l unite i n a l l situations,
t h e i t e m s published w i l l be those based on p r a c t i c a l experience and are recommnded
f o r c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n by u n i t e which may encounter similar problems. Reports
of c o r r o b o r a t i v e o r c o n t r a r y experiences a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n o r d e r t h a t t h e
v a l i d i t y of t h e i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e l e s s o n may be determined.
C. R. J d u m N
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General
............................................
I LEaDWSHIP EPISODE.
If SALVAGE AND W N T E T J M C E .
1, Axma r e p a i r crew. #The grouping of r i f l e bn a r t i f i c e r s i n t h e s e r v i c e co t r a i n
under t h e supervision of t h e r e g t l munitions 0 and h i s a s s i s t a n t has proved e f f e o t i v e .
It has speeded up t h e r e t u r n of both i n d i v i d u a l and crew served wpns t o t h e l i n e and has
r e l i e v e d t h e load on t h e d i v ord co. Resulta: Since D-day w e haven't r e q u i s i t i o n e d a
s i n g l e M-1 r i f l e .
2. Salvage crew. "A salvage crew of one 0, one NCO and f o u r men w i t h t h e d u t i e s of
c l e a r i n g t h e a r e a s of a l l s a l v a g e , evacuating t h e dead, and handling t h e a f f e c t s of cas-
u a l s , has made i t p o s s i b l e t o r e c l a i m and r e i s s u e l a r g e q u a n t i t i e s of o r d and i n d i v i d u a l
c l o t h i n g and equipment.
.
have d e t e c t e d minor d e f i c i e n c i e s t h a t might soon have become m r e serious.*--S-4, 1 1 5 t h fnf
Regt
BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 75 2 5 QCT I944
" B a t t l e m e r i e n c e s m a r e published r e g u l a r l y by t h i s headqw-ters t o enable
u n i t e i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t f ~ c r nt h e l a t e s t cambat experiences of our troops now
f i g h t i n g t h e ~ r m a n si n Europe. Blthough t h e experiences of c e r t a i n u n i t s a t a
p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n a r e not n e c e s e a r i l y a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l u n i t s i n a l l s i t u a t i o n s ,
t h e item published w i l l be those based on p r a c t i c a l experience and are recanmended
f o r c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n by units which may encounter s i m i l a r p r o b l ~ m e . Reports
of c o r r o b o r a t i v e o r c o n t r a r y e x p e r i e n c e s a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n o r d e r t h a t t h e
v a l i d i t y of t h e i n d i o a t e d b a t t l e l e s s o n may be determined.
C. R. LANWN
Colonel, AGD
Ad jut a n t General
11 ANI'ITANK COMPANY.
" m y was used t o ahoot medical s u p p l i e s t o t h e 3d Bn, 120th Inf, when it was c u t
o f f from more normal methods of supply i n t h e Mortain a r e a i n August. None of t h e plasma
.
got through i n t a c t but bandages, t a p e and some morphine were recovered."--After Action
Report 120t h Inf
BI T
- OF BN?'ITANK GUNS ON PIUBOXEZ.
"Excellent r e s u l t s have been obtained with 3* HE am with d e l a y fuze a g a i n s t small
pillboxes. P r i s o n e r s removed f r a small emplacements s o a t t a c k e d have had bloody noses,
out f a c e s , and o t h e r wounds. Inspection of aorne of t h e captured boxes i n d i c a t e s t h a t
t h e concussion caused s p l i n t e r i n g of t h e concrete i n s i d e the pillbox."--AT 0 , V Corps.
BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 76 2 5 OCT 1944
a t t l e m e r i e n c e s * a r e published r e g u l a r l y by t h i s headquarters t o enable
u n i t s i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t f r a n t h e l a t e s t combat experiences of our t r o o p s now
f i g h t i n g t h e ~ e r m a n si n =ope, g l t h o u g h , t h e experiences of c e r t a i n u n i t s a t a
p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n a r e n o t n e c e s s a r i l y a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l u n i t s i n a11 s i t u a t i o n s ,
t h e items published w i l l be those based on p r a c t i c a l experience and a r e recanrmended
f o r c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n by u n i t s which may encounter similar problems, Beports
of c o r r o b o r a t i v e o r c o n t r a r y experiences a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n o r d e r t h a t t h e
v a l i d i t y o f t h e i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e ieason may be determined..
C. R. LBNDrn
Colonel, AGD
~ d j u t a n tGeneral
...........................................
Note: The following m a t e r i a l i s e x t r a c t e d from a r e p o r t of Hq E 1 1 Corps an8 i s a study
of t h e methods employed and t h e technique developed by t h r e e inf diva. Other d i s c u s s i o n s
of t h i s e u b j e a t were published i n B a t t l e Experiences No..50 and 61,
10. I n t e r p r e t e r s , 'The uee of men who could speak German t o c a l l 1 upon small group8
t o surrender proved extremely valuable. One s g t s s a b i l i t y t o speak German r e s u l t e d i n
nany p r i s o n e r s being taken. A hundred and twenty men came o u t i n answer t o h i s c a l l s i n
two days and many smaller groups were s i m i l a r i y taken.
IV ' 2 U A R ~ W
TIPS
~
EM)
TWELFTH ARMY CROUP
BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No.78 27 OCT 1944
n g a t t l e Experiencesn a r e published r e g u l a r l y by t h i s h e a d q u a r t e r s t o e n ~ b l e
u n j t s i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t from t h e l t i t e s t combat experiences of our t r o o p s now
f i g h t i n g t h e Cernans i n m o p e . Although t h e e x c e r i e n c e s of c e r t t i i n u n i t s et a
p a r t i c u l a r 1oct:tion a r e not n e c e s s a r i l y a p ~ l i c a b l et o a l l u n i t s i n e l l s i t u a t i o n s ,
t h e items published w i l l be those based on p r a c b i c u l experience anci a r e reco=~ended
f o r c a r e f u l c ~ n s i d e r a t i o nby u n i t s ochich m y encounter similar problems. Reports
of c o r r o b o r a t i v e o r c o n t r a r y e x k e r i e n c e s a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n o r d e r t h a t t h e
v a l i d i t y of t h e i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e l e s s o o may be c e t e r a i n e d .
C. R. M:WN:
Colonel, AGD
Ad j u t a t General
-
remote c o n t r o l phone t o t h e sCR 608 a t bn, one phone f o r use with any s u ~ p o r t i n go r
atchd a r t y , two l i n e s t o t h e bn switchboard, one t o the d i v a r t y FX and one t o the cn
co f o r use v:hen a c t i n g a s an a r t y btry. Atchd t o the s i x phones t h a t a r e used t h e
most is a s m a l l bulb t h o t l i g h t s when t h e phone r i n g s , t h u s simplifying t h e i d e n t i f i -
c a t i o n of +he incoming c a l l . The wires from t h e 12 phones run through a 1 2 c i r c u i t
c a b l e of s h o r t length t o t h e o u t s i a e of t h e t e n t where they a r e atchd t o a terminal
s t r i p . A f i v e p a i r csble r u n s from the t e r m i n a l s t r i p t o the bn switchboard l i n k i n g
t h e t h r e e oimplexed phones and t h e two d i r e c t l i n e s . Radio o p e r a t o r s a t c h t h e i r own
remote c o n t r o l wires t o t h e t e r m i n a l s t r i p .
BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 7 9 31 OCT 1944
2. P a r a s s i n g f i r e s . .PW r e p a r t s i n d i c a t e t h a t i n t e r m i t t e n t h a r a s s i n g f i r e had l i t t l e
e f f e c t on t r o o p s grovided with adequate c o v e r , even when t h e f i r e pons f r a n heavy a r t y .
A s soon a s t h e t r o o p s were convinced t h a t t h e i r cover was adequate occasional rouuds d i d
not d i s t u r b t h e i r n o m l routine.
.
n e a r l y a l l p i l l b o x e s , a r e ebout two f e e t square and p l a s t e r e d over s o a s t o be s c a r c e l y
noticeable
.
3 1,Yelding embrasure openinas with therrni t e menades. *By c l o s i n g the door and
p l a c i n g t h e grenade on t h e slideway a mass i s farvled which prevents the door being opened.
The door i t s e l f i s not welded but i s j m e d by the o b s t r u c t i o n i n the slideway. m e
grenade is s u f f i c i e n t f o r smll doors but two should oe used on l a r g e doors with a r n o r
p l a t e t h i c k e r than two inches. I f the grenade cannct be placed i n t h e slideway a trough
of fr i n c h m e t a l may be used t o cause molten m i t e r i a l t o r u n i n t o the slideway. The s u r -
face on which the weld i s t o be made should be clean and dry. Doors t h a t work on h i ~ e s
cannot be welded with t h e r m i t e grenades a s t h e molten m a t e r i a l cannot be c o n t r o l l e d suf -
f i c i e n t l y t o make a s t r o n g band between the doar and the f r a m . * - - ~ s s t G-3, V Curps.
BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 80 31 OCT 1944
WBattle'meriencesH are published r e g u l a r l y by t h i s headquarters t o enable
u n i t s i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t from t h e l a t e s t ccabat experiences of our troops now
f i g h t i n g the Germans i n Europe. Althcugh the expsriences of c e r t a i n u n i t s a t a
p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n a r e not n e c e s s a r i l y a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l u n i t s i n a l l s i t u a t i o n s ,
t h e items published w i l l be those based on p r a c t i c a l experience and a r e recommended
f o r c a r e f u l consideration by u n i t s which may encounter s i m i l a r problems. Reports
of c o r r o b o r a t i v e o r c o n t r a r y experiences a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n o r d e r t h a t t h e
v a l i d i t y of t h e i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e l e s s o n may be determined.
C. R. LANDON
Colonel, AGD
Ad jut a n t General
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - I - - P - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
4. Enemy f i r e . the enemy covered a l l avenues of approach with AT guns and used
h i s t k s and Sps as roving guns i n c o n s t a n t l y changing p o s i t i o n s . Their 120mm morts
were used e f f e c t i v e l y a t 400 yds and were d i f f i c u l t t o locate.8--C0, 26th Inf Regt.
*Valuable road and bridge information can be obtained quickly by simply changing
the c r y s t a l i n t h e SCR 510 on the rcn p l a t i - t o n so it cos conununicate with t h e a r t y
In plane.#--3rd ~ r m dInf En.
V INFANTRY-TANK COOPW;rTION.
amp loyment of ~ p n s
d,
.
c. "Using tka t o draw f i r e along r o u t e s which offered no place f o r maneuver and
BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 81 31 OCT 1944
C. R . L A h W J
Colorlel, S L j
Adjutant General
...........................................
I DESTRUCTION OF P U q Y I S BY 1551vE GUN S T , M-12.
-
1. Method of a t t a c k . #Our bn a t t a c k e d 43 p i l l b o x r s by s h o r t range NU2 f i r e . 'Se
a d j u s t e d v l t h d e l a y f u z e s chancing t o f u z e T105 on obtaininc; a h i t , Evidence of Iene-
t r a t i o n was obtained on a l l t a r g e t s .
I1 b a M YOUR W W O M COUNT.
* w i n g 'rest p e r i o d s ' wpns & r e rnzeroed and a l - pervonnel nse t r a i n e d with the
bazooka if p o s s i b l e . ~t 200 yds with a r i f l e and 75 yds with a bazooka our boys c a n
handle anything Terry can o f f e r . Longer ranges t o s often a r e a t t e n ~ t e i iwhen p a t i e n c e
would mean a c e r t a i n ' k f l l ' ,a--53d A r m d Inf 31,4 t h krmd Div,
Cmssee of v i t a l ord c a t e r i n 1 can be reylticed i n 75% less tirce i f the loasez are
r e p o r t e d t o t h e d i v ord 0 by t h e f a s t e s t means a v a i l a b l e . We u s e r a d i o when wire i s
'
not a v a i l ~ b l e . we a l e 0 f i n d t h a t Sup s g t s can keep b e t t e r infonosd on ',he sup st:?tus
- 1 -
by t r a v e l i n g with t h e i r u n i t e r a t h e r than with t h e trainor--53d &rPd 1n.f Bn, 4 t h drmd D~V.
.
and b e t t e r prepared t o f i r e . F a ~ tmovement a t t r a c t s a t t e n t i o n and eauses considerable
noim
BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 82 2 NOV 1944
* B a t t l e Brperiencesm a r e published r e g u l a r l y by t h i s headquarters t o e n a b l s
u n i t s i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t from t h e l a t e s t combat experiences of our troops now
f l g h t l n g t h e Germane i n Europe. Although t n e experiences of c e r t a i n u n i t s a t a
p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n a r e not n e c e s s a r i l y a ~ p l i c a b l et o a l l u n i t s i n a l l s i t u a t i o n e ,
t n e items published K i l l be tnose based on 1 , r a c t i c a l experience and a r e recommended
f o r c a r e f u l considerat i o n by u n i t s which may encounter s i m i l a r problems. R e ~ o r t s
of corroborative o r c o n t r a r y e m e r i e n c e s a r e p%rticularly d e s i r e d i n o r d e r t h a t t h e
v a l i d i t y o r t h e i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e l e s s o n may tie determined.
2. E3nploymer:r; by j u i o r i n f a n t r y o f f i c e r s . l S e n i o r i n f 0 s g e n e r a l l y understand
t n e c o r r e c t use of TD but j u n i o r 0 s sometimes do not r e a l i z e t h e i r c a p a b i l i t i e s and
l i m i t a t i o n s . For example, a s e c t i o n of T3s atchd t o an ~ n fp l a t was oruered i n t o im-
p o s s i b l e t e r r a i n where the- v e h i c l e s became hopelessly bogged d o ~ n . ~ - - C O ,b34th TD En.
'Dense woods u s u a l l y were l e s s heavily defended than roads and more open t e r r a i n .
Frequently t a e en- has f a i l e d t o continue t h e l i n e of dragon's t e e t h tnrough woods
which appeared too dense f o r t k movement. I n most such c a s e s , t k s , w i t h i n f s u ~ p o r t ,
have been a b l e t o move through t h e woods. The e f f e c t i v e n e s s of' t k HE f i r e i s increased
by the number of t r e e b u r s t s 0bta:ned.l--Report of 1st Div.
I I1 TANKS I N VILLAGE FLGHTINC.
2. Within t h e v i l l a g e . a. # I t i s n o t n e c e s s a r y f o r i n f t o 'precede t h e t k a i n t o
small villages, b u t t h e y s h o r ~ l dremain a b r e a s t of or c l o s e behind them t o provide AT
protection.
b e * I f more t h a n one s t r e e t is a v a i l a b l e , p a r a l l e l a t t a c k 3 should be made. Narrow
s t r e e t s s h o u l d be a v o i d e d , as only t h e f i r e power of t h e l e a d i r g t k can be employed i n
them.
c. *Hand grenades were f m n d t o be of g r e a t value a s t k c a n d r s could throw them
through windows without l e a v i n g t h e t k , and scmeti~nescause t h e enemy t o e v a c u a t e b u i l d -
in8s. This t k am and i s l e s s dangerous t o our i n f t h a n use of t h e t k arpns.
d. *';P can be of g r e a t value i n v i l l a g e f i g h t i n g but a d e f i n i t e p l a n f o r i t s use
must be made before t h e a t t a c k b e g i n s , and e x p l a i n e d t o a l l elements. i'vF rounds should
h i t i n o r behind b u i l d i n g s . I f t h e y h i t i n f r a t t h e enemy can escape i n t h e smoke
t h e bui l d i ng .
without b e i n g seen. A round of 'NP w i l l u s u a l l y cause t h e enemy t o s u r r e n d e r o r l e a v e
By cammand of L i e u t e n a n t G e n e r a l BRADLEY:
@. R. U a D O N
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant G e n e r a l
- - _ - - - = - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
.
randum of 4 t h I d Div. P a r a g r a p h s e i g h t , n i n e and t e n were t a k e n Pram a r e p o r t of t h e
3 1 4 t h Inf Regt
-
3. s e c u r i t y measures. a. #Roads, trails, c l e a r i n g s and b u i l d i n g s must & avoided
as t h e y u s u a l l y are included i n t h e enemy's p r e p a r e d f i r e p l a n ,
b. *Overhead c o v e r should be p r o v i d e d whenever p o s s i b l e . When h o l t i a g t e m p o r a r i l y
eagh man s h o u l d g e t c l o s e t o a large t r e e as t n i a a f f o r d s some g r o t e c t i o n from t r e e
b u r s t s , The d a n g e r from t r e e b u r s t s is somewhat l e s s e n e d by t h e enemy's l a c k of obsn.
4. Antitank guns. nEnemy c o u t e r a t t a c k s can be expected a l o n g t h e r o u t e s t h o u g h
i ~ h i c hh i s r e s e r v e m r can be employed. AT guns should be leap-frogged forward t o
cover t h e s e probable r o u t e s of approach and n o t held i n r e s e m coupled t o t h e i r prime
movers. AT guns snould be emplaced s o a s t o ~ e r m i tf i r i n g w h i l e under m t y o r mrt
f i r e themselves.
BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 84 6 NOV 1944
" B a t t l e m e r i e n c e s n a r e published r e g u l a r l y by t h i s h e a d q u a r t e r s t o enable
u n i t s i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t from t h e l a t e s t canbat experiences of our t r o o p s nor
f i g h t i n g t h e Germans i n Europe. Although t h e experiences of c e r t a i n u n i t s a t a
p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n are not n e c e s e a r i l y a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l u n i t s i n all s i t u a t i o n s ,
t h e item publisned w i l l be t h o s e bamd on p r a c t i o a l experience and a r e recamreended
f o r c e m f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n by u n i t s which may encounter s i m i l a r probleas. Repcrts
of c o r r o b o r a t i m o r c o n t r a r y experiences are p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r a d i n order t h a t t h e
v a l i d i t y of t h e i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e l e s s o n may be determined,
C. R. LANDON
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General
- L _ Q - - - - O - P - - s - - - - - _ _ O O - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
* I n s t r u c t i o n i n t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t a c t i c a l d o c t r i n e s f o r f u t u r e o p e r a t i o n s is
f a c i l i t a t e d i n t h e 7 0 t h Tk En, by r e q u i r i n g p l a t l e a d e r s t o make simple a f t e r a c t i o n
r e p o r t s a s soon as p o s s i b l e a f t e r a n engagement w i t h t h e enerqy, These r e p o r t s ,
u s u a l l y accompanied by a rough s k e t c h , a r e turned i n t o t h e S-3, and used during
a f t e r a c t i o n d i s c u s s i o n s . * - - 0 s of 7 0 t h Tk En.
q e p r o d u c e d by E n p r R e p r o Det 12 A G O
TWELFTH ARMY CROUP
BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 85 6 NOV 1944
" B t t l e Exi;eriencesW a r e published r e g u l a r l y by t h i s h e a d q u a r t e r s t o e n a b l e
u n i t s i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o t ' i t from t h e l a t e s t combat e x p e r i e n c e s of o u r t r o o p s now
f i g h t i n g t h e Germans i n m o p e . - d l t h o u g h t h e e x p e r i e n c e s of c e r t a i n units a t a
p a r t i c u l a r l o c u t i o n a r e not n e c e s s a r i l y a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l u n i t s i n a l l s i t u a t i o n s ,
t h e i t e m s p u b l i s h e d w i l l be t h o s e based on practical e x p e r i e n c e and a r e recanmended
f o r c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n by u n i t s whlch may e n c o u n t e r s i m i l a r problems. R e p o r t s
of c o r r o b o r a t i v e o r c o n t r a r y e x p e r i e n c e s a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n o r d e r t h a t t h e
v a l i t i l t y of t h e i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e l e s s o n m y be determined.
9 y comnnd of L i e u t e n a n t G e n e r a l B W L W :
C. R . LCLUDON
C o l o n e l , AGD
A d ~ u t a n t General
NOTE: n r e s u l t e d i n i n c r e a s e d emphasis on
The r e c e n t c a n p a r a t l v e i y s t a t i c s i ~ u a ~ l oheis
c o u n t e r m o r t a r measures. Following a r e e x t r a c t s f r o n a r e p o r t decaling with t h e 4 t h Inf
Div a c t i v i t i e s a l o n g t h i s l i n e . S i m i l a r proceuures i n t h e k d i t e r r a n e a n Theater a r e
d i s c u s s e d i n p a r a g r a p h 6.
111 SECURITY.
-Em-2 R e p r o d u c e d by E n p r R e p r o G e l 12 D G D
TWELFTH ARMY CROUP
BATTLE EXPERIENCES
Na 86 7 NOV 1944
3* V.jnq the SCR 90Q. .TIMI SCR 300 provides adequate l a t e r a l a m t a c t i f the
country i 8 not t o o wooded, but ns like t o kmep i t off the sir as much as poeaiblo,,
6- of adjoining bne or r e g t a maintain IateraP contact daring an a t t a a k by obtaining
the f h q w n ~ yof the adjacent bn, and making cantact thraugb the bn ca&dreb rho often
have an additionab SCa( 300 r a d i o far thb p \ t r p o ~ ~ ~ = - C
313th
O , Inf and R e c Q, 314th
Infe
R e c r o d u c e C by E n p r H e p r o D c f 12 A G p
TWELFTH ARMY CROUP
BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 87 8 NOV 1944
" B a t t l e EXperiencesl a r e published r e g u l a r l y by t h i s h e a d q u a r ~ e r st o enable
u n i t s i n t r a i n l n g t o p r o f i t from t h e l e t e s t combat e x k e r i e n c e s of our t r c o p s now
f i g h t i n g t h e Gernans i n Europe. Although tile experiences of c e r t a l n u n i t s a t a
p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n a r e not n e c e s s a r i l y a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l u n i t s i n a l l s a t u a t i o n s ,
t h e ir;ems p u b l i s n e d w l l l be those based on, p r a c t i c h l ex;,erience and a r e recommended
f o r e m e f u l consideration by u n i t s which may e n c a u n t e r similar problems. Reports
of c o r r o b o r a t i v e o r conbrary e x p e r i e n c e s a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n order t h a t the
v a l i d i t y of t h e i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e l e s s o n may be uetermined.
C. R e M r n N
C o l o u e l , ;LCJ)
A d j u t a n t General
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
I COORDIEA'L'El3 ATTACK OM A PILLBOX m.
NCl-E: The f o l l o w i n g description of a coordinated a t t d c k by an l n f r i f l e co relnfo-rced
by one m d i u m t k p l a t , e p l a t of TDs a ~ i da p l a t of e x g r s , tlnd supported by a r t y , is
e x t r a c t e d from a r e p o r t by t h e CO 634th TD Bn t o t h e CG, 1st Dlv.
3 . F i r s t d a y q 8 evacuation. A B midnight
~ 10-11 S e p t , 120 c a s e s had been e v a c u a t e d .
Evacuation was by l i t t e r t o t h e r i v e r , b y boat a c r o s s t h e r i v e r , t h e n a g a i n by l i t t e r
from t h e n e a r s h o r e , Ecross a m a l l c a n a l by f o o t b r i d g e t o t h e ambulances. Same l i t t e r
h a u l s were a s m c h a s 2000 yds. It was not u n t i l dawn 11 .%pt that t h e f i r s t l i t t e r
jeep was f e r r i e d a c r o s s .
t o be evacuated by t h e 1 0 t h Inf' f e r r y . . t h i s t i m e t h e l i t t e r b e a r e r s o f t h e f i r s t bn
t o c r o s s were n e a r l y exhausted and i t became n e c e s s a r y t o send them a l l remaining l i t t e r
bearers. B.J t h e end of' t h e morning a l l l i t t e r j e e p s of t h e f i r s t two bns had been
f e r r i e d a c r o s s , e a s l n g t h e problem somewhat. On t h e n e a r s h o r e t h e c o n d i t i o n was a l s o
r e l i e v e d by w i n g j e e p s frm t h e s h o r e t o t h e ambulance.
BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 88
w m t t l e m ~ e r i e n c e s *a r e p u u l l u h e d r e g u l a r l y by t h i s h e a d q u a r t e r s t o e n a b l e
U n i t s i n t r a i n i n g t o p r t r i t f r o m t h e l a t e s t combat e x p e r i e n c e s of our t r o o p s now
f l g h t i w t n e German2 I n Euro1,e. Although t h e e x p e r i e n c e s of c e r t a l n u n l t s a t a
p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n a r e not n e c e s s a r i l y a p 3 l i c a b l e t o a l l u n i t s i n a l l s i t u a t i o n s ,
t h e ir;ems p u b l i s n e d w i l l be t h v s e based on p r a c t i c a l e x p e r i e n c e nrd a r e r e c a m e n d e d
f o r c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n by u n i t s which nay encounber s i m i l a r problems, R e p o r t s
of c o r r o b o r a t i v e o r c o n t r a r y e x p e r i e n c e s a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e u i n o r d e r t h a t t h e
v a l i u i t j r of' t h e indicclted b a 5 t l e l e s s o n m y be a e t e r m i n e d .
C. 2. h ? \ W N
C o l o n e l , ASD
Adjutant General
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I MRTA!! FIRE.
1. Eighteen-mortar b a t t e r y . nWe f i r e 81nn m o r t s a s bn b t r y s , m l p l o y i r g c o n t r o l
s i m i l a r t o t h a t u s e d by a r t y . T h i s h a s made p o s s i b l e t h e s i m u l t a n e o u s u s e of t h e
m o r t s of a l l t h r e e brls on r e g t l t a r g e t s .
2. W e s o r f i r e . "The t y p e s of f i r e employed a r e 6 s f o l l o w s :
a , n l b r t r r t i m e on t a r g e t ( h ~ ~ v p )i ,n n h i s h a l l rounds s t r i k e a s e l e c t e d t a r g e t a t
t h e same time.
b. nmrtar time on l i n e (MToE)~ i n which a l l rounds s t r i k e a l o n g t h e same l i n e
simultaneously.
c . "P'lortar t l n e on area (hTO!,), I n which e a c h bn b t r y f i r e s on a bn l i n e , e a c h bn
a t a d i f f e r e n t r a n g e , g l v i n g s i n u l t o n e o u s a r e a coverage.
d. r g o l l i n g b a r r a g e , which e n p l o y s e l t ' h e r LFOL o r W O A f i r e , increasing t h e r a n g e
f o r e a c h s u c c e e d i n g round.
- 2 - Q e p - o d u c e d by Enpr R e c r o Del 12 A G p
T W ~ L F T H ARMY CR~UP
BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 89 10 NOV 1944
XI C I T Y FIGtI'l'ING
2, Bie defense. 'One method used by t h e Germans f o r obtaining close contact han
been the m e of reverae slope t a c t i c s i n defense. Only a few of the defending f a r c e
are placed oa tho f o r r a r d slope near the creet. Ihe bulk of the f o r c e w i t h 8uppqrtiag
upns is r r s l l dug i n on t h e reverse slope. Any f a r c e a t t a c h n g such a p o s i t i o n f i n d s
l i t t l e trouble reaching t h e c r e e t of the h i l l , but once i t start8 a c r o s s the c r e e t i t
c a m s under heavy f i r e a t short ranges $ran a mass of automatic wpm, including M G s *
4
. Founterinu the counterattack. "The German caunterattack is almost ~~~~tic
and uaually hits a f l a n k j u s t aa the a t t a c k approaches i t s climax ar immediately a f t e r
i t succeeds and before r e a r g a n i z a t i o n can be effected. TBe beet pssthod of countering
the counterattack i a by a r e e e r r e canposed of tkm and inf s o disposed aa t o permit h i t -
t i n g the counterattacking force i n i t s flank. Defensirs ax=@fims t o m s i e t i n breaking
the c m t e r a t t a c k should be planned before tihe a c t i o n startss
BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 9 0 I I NOV 1944
' B a t t l e m e r i e n c e s * a r e p u b l i s h e d r e g u l a r l y by t h i s h e a d q u a r t e r s t o e n a b l e
u n i t s i n t ~ a i n i n gt o p r o f i t from t h e l a t e s t combat e x p e r i e n c e s of our t r o o p s now
f i g h t i n g t h e Germans i n Euroge. s l t h o u g h t h e e x p e r i e n c e s of c e r t a i n u n i t s a t a
p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n are n o t n e c e s s a r i l y a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l u n i t s i n a l l s i t u ~ t i o n s ,
t h e i t e m s p u b l i s h e d w i l l be t h o s e based on p r a c t i c a l e x p e r i e n c e and a r e recarnrcended
f o r c t l r e f u l consideration by u n l t s which may e n c o u n t e r s i m i l a r problems. Reports
of c o r r o b o r a t i v e o r c o n t r a r y e x p e r i e n c e s are p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n o r d e r t h a t t h e
v a l i d i t y of t h e i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e l e s s o n may be determined.
C. R. LfLFaDON
Colonel, AGD
~d j u t a n t General
-
NO.
A d m i n i s t r ~ ~ t i o (See
n S t d f Procedure)
A e r i a l Photography . 3 2 , 66.
A n t i a i r c r a f t mt i l l e r y
Against Ground T a r g e t s 159 23, 419 75* 77.
General 33, 63.
~ i Supgort
r
m o r 22, 3 6 , 38, 42, 45.
Infantry 6 , 13, 14, 3 1 9 34, 35, 73, 82, U 8 .
~nt it ank Weapons ( I n f ) 3 0 , 409 69, 75, 83.
Artillery (Field)
A i r OPS 20, 22, 29, 31, 3 2 , 34,
389 44* 45, 4 6 , 66, 679 77.
CQmfdunicoti o n s 21, 329 84.
Forward Observers 5, 17, 31, 40, 45* 46, 7 0 , 73, 77, 84.
Inf-Tank-~rty '/* 57.
Medium A r t i l l e r y 18, 81, 88,
She1l r e p s 5, 22, 79, 86.
-
NO.
k t i a l e r y ( ~ i e l d ) ( c a t 'deB
Tac ti crs
Techni que
Fraining
~ ~ U l l i t as d
Air Suaport
Attack
f i g h t i n g in Toma
C%neral
Inf - T m k T e a m
2~&'?e~&-Arty Tea;-&
hec a u a i 3saocs
_?&vex Cr(msi@gs
&oke, L7ae of
3:-ec$ ( C i t y ) Fighting
S a r ; r i s ~ , E l e m e n t sf
-&
1 ~ c ; Eof
$j &$ti E,g
3 0 ~ 8
A i t r z t i c F i P l o (aAm)
B&) ~ a e %aEl%adt
7-
~ S Z O ~ ~
Booby Traps
Ci :y (Straet) fighting*
Civilians
Csslnsn (Lacantry)
-
Problem
l?ai mi ng
3 i r e and Te%apBom
SUBJZCT %+ -
NO* ,
Enemy, I n f o r m a t i o n Concerning
A t t a c k Methods
Usf erne Methods
Organization ( I n f Cos)
Snipers
T a c t i c s , General
Tricks
We apona
Engineer Operations
Equipment, I n d i v i d u a l
F o r t i f i e d P a s i t i o n s , A t t a c k of
F i r e D i a t r i b u t i o n and D i s c i p l i n e
F i r e and Movement
Feeding
G e r m a n Army (see Enemy, Information
of
Grenades
Hedgerows
A t t a c k With Tanks
A t t a c k Without Tanka
German Defense of
House, V i l l a g e and S t r e e t F i g h t i n g
(See C i t y F i g h t i n g )
Infantry
Air Support of
Inf-Tank-Arty Teams
Reconnaissance
S c o u t i n g and Pa t r o l l i n g
T r a i ni ng
Liaison Planes
Leadership
Machine CUM
Maintenana
Ordnance
Miscellaneous
Medical O p e r a t i o m
hIilitary Polico
Mines
Mortars
Chemical (4.2)
C o u n t e m o r t a r ffiissions
Motor Movement and T r a f f i c Control
k d e r a , Issuence sf
Panels
Personnel
Reconditioning
Replacement8
P r i s o n e r s of W a r
Radio (See ~ o m r u ~ m i c a t i o n s )
Reconditioning (personnel)
R e c onnai a s a c e
Raplacemerits ( P e r s a n n e l )
Rifle, M-l
R i v e r Crossings
S c o u t i n g and P a t r o l l i n g
Security
S i e g f r i e d Lines Attack of
Smoke
White Wospharoua
-.
Snipers -
~ h f Ef k o c s d u n and Administref i o n
C a s u a l t y and Strength R e p o r t s
CP Locatione
Evacuation
InP-tio~~ D i s s e d m t l o n of
Oraers, Ieauance of
Periodic Reports
Personal E f f e c t s
P r i s o n e r s of War
S t r e e t (City) Fighting
Submachnne Gun
Supply
C l a s s e s d'
Discipline
SUBJXCT -
NO.
Task Forces
Telephone (See ( ; m u i c a t i o n s j
T r a f f i c Control and Motor Moveinent
Trai n i ng
Artillery
Canmunicationa
Infantry
Intelligence
Reconditioning PersonmP
Replacements
Truckheads
V i l l a g e F i g h t i n g (See C i t y F i g h t i n g )
Weapons
Anti-Tank ( I n f ) 30, 40, 69, 75s a3m
BAR 13.
Bazooka 1 2 s 35s 5 1 s 52. 56, 81.
Cannon (Xnf) 54. 58. 45, 411.
G r e nade s 12, 35.
Machina Guns 14, 27s 5 4 , 58, 59s 85s 890
M o r t a r s (Inf) 69 no, 1 2 , ' a s 23, 250 T I , 280 34,
37s 46, 5 2 s 54. 58, 7 3 s 86, 88.
Mortars (4.2 chemical) 2s 19, 24, 3 3 , 40, 51, 66s 88.
R i f l e 16-1 6.
Sub-Machim Gun 27.
Use of 56, 85, 89
White Phospharoua Sin& 3, 20. 35s 73s 83.
Wire and Telephone ( h e C a n m u n i -
catione)
Woods F i g h t i n g
END
-5 - R e p r o d u c e d by E n g r Repro D e l 12 G G P