Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Villanuevas
argument
not
really
based
on
res
judicata
but
splitting
a
single
COA
R2S3
(
A
party
may
not
institute
more
than
one
suit
for
a
single
cause
of
action.)
&
R2S4
(If
two
or
more
suits
are
instituted
on
the
basis
of
the
same
cause
of
action,
1the
filing
of
one
or
2a
judgment
upon
the
merits
in
any
one
6.
MG
filed
foreclosure
proceedings
&
sold
land,
but
Blossom
able
to
redeem.
7.
No
deliveries
from
July
1920
to
March
1926
(when
SC
affirmed
judgment
for
damages
of
P26K).
8.
March
1926
MG
offered
to
resume
&
Blossom
accepted
deliveries,
but
under
protest
&
w/
reservation
because
at
much
higher
prices.
9.
1927-03-03
Blossom
filed
complaint
for
breach
of
contract.
10.
MG
filed
demurrer
but
overruled.
Parties
stipulated
court-appointed
referee
to
take
evidence
&
report
findings
to
court.
11.
MG
filed
amended
Answer
w/
affirmative
defense
complaint
does
not
state
facts
sufficient
to
constitute
a
COA
because
1prior
adjudication
has
been
had
for
all
issues
in
this
action
2Blossom
had
recovered
damages
in
previous
case
for
the
same
COA.
12.
Referee
found
that
Blossom
entitled
to
P57K
damages,
but
trial
court
awarded
only
P2K.
ISSUE:
Is
the
prior
judgment
a
bar
to
another
action
to
recover
damages
for
the
remainder
of
the
contract?
HELD:
Yes.
(1)
As
a
general
rule,
a
contract
to
do
several
things
at
several
times
=>
is
divisible,
and
a
judgment
for
a
single
breach
of
a
continuing
contract
=>
is
not
a
bar
to
a
suit
for
a
subsequent
breach.
Rule
on
Anticipatory
Breach
of
Contract
But
where
1the
contract
is
entire,
and
2the
breach
total,
=>
there
can
be
only
one
action
in
which
plaintiff
must
recover
all
damages.
(2)
When
the
defendant
terminated
a
continuing
contract
by
absolute
refusal
in
bad
faith
to
perform,
=>
a
claim
for
damages
for
a
breach
is
an
indivisible
demand,
and
where
a
former
final
judgment
was
rendered,
=>
it
is
a
bar
to
any
damages
which
plaintiff
may
thereafter
sustain.
(3)
In
an
indivisible
contract
plaintiff
should
prove
in
the
first
action
1not
only
such
damages
as
it
has
then
actually
sustained,
2but
also
such
prospective
damages
as
it
may
be
legally
entitled
to
recover
by
reason
of
the
breach.
RTC
ratio:
1.
No
novation
but
mere
modification.
2.
R10S5
-
a
complaint
w/c
states
no
COA
may
be
cured
by
evidence
presented
w/o
objection.
3.
Hegerty
&
Infante
not
personally
liable,
merely
acted
in
representation
of
Swagman.
6.
2003-09-05
CA
denied
Swagman
appeal
&
affirmed
RTC.
7.
2003-12-04
CA
denied
Swagman
MR.
8.
Swagman
files
w/
SC
a
petition
for
review
on
certiorari
of
CA
decision
&
resolution.
ISSUE:
May
a
complaint
that
lacks
a
COA
at
the
time
it
was
filed
be
cured
by
the
accrual
of
a
COA
during
the
pendency
of
the
case?
No.
HELD:
(1)
Essential
elements
of
a
COA:
1.
A
right
in
favor
of
the
plaintiff
by
whatever
means
and
under
whatever
law
it
arises
or
is
created;
2.
An
obligation
on
the
part
of
the
named
defendant
to
respect
or
not
to
violate
such
right;
and
3.
Act
or
omission
on
the
part
of
such
defendant
in
violation
of
the
right
of
the
plaintiff
or
constituting
a
breach
of
the
obligation
of
the
defendant
to
the
plaintiff
for
which
the
latter
may
maintain
an
action
for
recovery
of
damages
or
other
appropriate
relief.
(2)
Amendments
of
pleadings
are
allowed
under
Rule
10
in
order
that
the
actual
merits
of
a
case
may
be
determined
in
the
most
expeditious
and
inexpensive
manner
without
regard
to
technicalities,
and
that
all
other
matters
included
in
the
case
may
be
determined
in
a
single
proceeding,
thereby
avoiding
multiplicity
of
suits.
Sec
5
thereof
applies
to
situations
wherein
evidence
not
within
the
issues
raised
in
the
pleadings
is
presented
by
the
parties
during
the
trial,
and
to
conform
to
such
evidence
the
pleadings
are
subsequently
amended
on
motion
of
a
party.
Thus,
a
complaint
which
fails
to
state
a
cause
of
action
may
be
cured
by
evidence
presented
during
the
trial.
[Example:
If
a
complaint
failed
to
allege
the
fulfillment
of
a
condition
precedent
upon
which
the
cause
of
action
depends,
evidence
showing
that
such
condition
had
already
been
fulfilled
when
the
complaint
was
filed
may
be
presented
during
the
trial,
and
the
complaint
may
accordingly
be
amended
thereafter.]
(3)
However,
the
curing
effect
under
R10S5
is
applicable
only
if
a
cause
of
action
in
fact
exists
at
the
time
the
complaint
is
filed,
but
the
complaint
is
defective
for
failure
to
allege
the
essential
facts.
(4)
A
complaint
whose
cause
of
action
has
not
yet
accrued
=>
cannot
be
cured
or
remedied
by
an
amended
or
supplemental
pleading
alleging
the
existence
or
accrual
of
a
cause
of
action
while
the
case
is
pending.
(5)
A
person
should
not
be
summoned
before
the
public
tribunals
to
answer
for
complaints
which
are
immature.
There
are
reasons
of
public
policy
why
there
should
be
no
needless
haste
in
bringing
up
litigation.
An
action
prematurely
brought
is
a
groundless
suit.
(6)
Unless
plaintiff
has
a
valid
and
subsisting
cause
of
action
at
the
time
his
action
is
commenced,
the
defect
cannot
be
cured
or
remedied
by
the
acquisition
or
accrual
of
one
while
the
action
is
pending,
and
a
supplemental
complaint
or
an
amendment
setting
up
such
after-accrued
cause
of
action
is
not
permissible.
DECISION:
Petition
granted;
CA
1decision
affirming
RTC
decision
&
2resolution
denying
Swagmans
MR
reversed
&
set
aside;
Complaint
dismissed
for
lack
of
cause
of
action.
R2-4
Ada,
Adanza,
Flora
Baylon
et
al
v
Florante
Baylon
(2012)
ACTION:
R45
petition
for
review
on
certiorari
of
CA
decision
reversing
&
setting
aside
RTC
decision
rescinding
donation
inter
vivos.
;
Rescission
&
partition
(Rule
69)
FACTS:
Spouses
Baylon
+
Rita
+
Victoria
+
Luz
B
Adanza
Dolores
+
Panfila
Ramon
+
----------
Flora
Florante
Ramon
Jr,
Remo,
Jose,
Eric,
Florentino,
Ma
Ruby
Lilia
Ada
1.
1996-07-03
Petitioners
filed
w/
RTC
Complaint
for
partition,
accounting
&
damages
vs
Florante,
Rita
&
Panfila.
Petitioners
claim
Rita
took
possession
of
43
parcels
of
land
owned
by
Spouses
Baylon
appropriated
for
herself
the
income
from
them
used
income
to
buy
2
parcels
of
land
(Lots
4709
&
4706)
refused
to
effect
partition
of
said
parcels
of
land
Defendants
Answer:
Defendants
&
Petitioners
co-owned
22
of
43,
Rita
owns
10,
11
owned
by
Florante,
Lilia,
2
Adanzas,
Adalia,
Mendez
2
lots
acquired
by
Rita
w/
her
own
money
denied
Rita
appropriated
no
objection
to
partition
but
only
wrt
co-owned
parcels
2.
1997-07-06
During
pendency
of
case,
Rita
conveyed
2
lots
to
Florante
via
Deed
of
Donation
3.
2000-07-16
Rita
died
intestate
&
w/o
any
issue
4.
2002-02-06
Upon
learning
of
donation
inter
vivos,
Petitioners
filed
Supplemental
Pleading
praying
that
donation
be
rescinded
per
NCC
Art
1381(4);
alleged
Rita
was
sick
&
very
weak,
couldnt
have
consented
Florante
&
Panfila
opposed
rescission,
asserting
that
Art
1381(4)
applies
only
when
there
is
already
a
prior
judicial
decree
on
who
between
the
contending
parties
actually
owned
the
properties
under
litigation.
5.
2005-10-20
RTC
rendered
decision:
declared
existence
of
co-ownership
over
20
lots
&
directed
partition
among
heirs
of
Sps
Baylon
declared
existence
of
co-ownership
over
over
10
lots
owned
by
Rita
&
directing
partition
among
her
heirs
(plaintiffs
&
defendants)
rescinded
donation
inter
vivos
&
directing
2
lots
be
included
in
estate
of
Rita
to
be
partitioned
excluded
9
lots
from
co-ownership
6.
Florante
sought
recon
of
rescission
denied.
7.
2007-10-26
CA
reversed
&
set
aside
RTC
decree
of
rescission
&
inclusion
of
2
lots
in
Ritas
estate;
remanded
to
RTC
for
determination
of
ownership.
CA
held:
1that
before
the
petitioners
may
file
an
action
for
rescission,
they
must
first
obtain
a
favorable
judicial
ruling
that
the
2
lots
actually
belonged
to
the
estate
of
Spouses
Baylon
and
not
to
Rita.
Until
then,
an
action
for
rescission
is
premature.
2Action
for
rescission
cannot
be
joined
with
the
action
for
partition,
accounting
and
damages
through
effecting
in
one
action
a
complete
determination
of
all
matters
in
controversy
and
litigation
between
the
parties
involving
one
subject
matter,
and
2to
expedite
the
disposition
of
litigation
at
minimum
cost.
The
provision
should
be
construed
so
as
to
avoid
such
multiplicity,
where
possible,
without
prejudice
to
the
rights
of
the
litigants.
Objective
of
R2S5(b)
The
variance
in
the
procedure
1in
the
special
civil
action
of
partition
and
2in
the
ordinary
civil
action
of
rescission
precludes
their
joinder
in
one
complaint
or
their
being
tried
in
a
single
proceeding
to
avoid
confusion
1in
determining
what
rules
shall
govern
the
conduct
of
the
proceedings
as
well
as
2in
the
determination
of
the
presence
of
requisite
elements
of
each
particular
cause
of
action.
(2)
A
supplemental
pleading
may
raise
a
new
cause
of
action
as
long
as
it
has
some
relation
to
the
original
cause
of
action
set
forth
in
the
original
complaint.
A
supplemental
pleading
only
serves
to
bolster
or
add
something
to
the
primary
pleading.
Its
usual
office
is
to
set
up
new
facts
which
justify,
enlarge
or
change
the
kind
of
relief
with
respect
to
the
same
subject
matter
as
the
controversy
referred
to
in
the
original
complaint.
The
purpose
of
the
supplemental
pleading
is
to
bring
into
the
records
new
facts
which
will
enlarge
or
change
the
kind
of
relief
to
which
the
plaintiff
is
entitled;
hence,
any
supplemental
facts
which
further
develop
the
original
right
of
action,
or
extend
to
vary
the
relief,
are
available
by
way
of
supplemental
complaint
even
though
they
themselves
constitute
a
right
of
action.
The
fact
that
the
supplemental
pleading
technically
states
a
new
cause
of
action
should
not
be
a
bar
to
its
allowance
but
only
a
matter
that
may
be
considered
by
the
court
in
the
exercise
of
its
discretion.
DECISION:
Petition
partially
granted;
CA
decision
modified;
RTC
rescission
reinstated,
case
remanded
to
RTC
for
determination
of
ownership.
NOTES:
(1)
Kinds
of
rescissible
contracts
according
to
reason
for
their
susceptibility
to
rescission:
1because
of
lesion
or
prejudice
2on
account
of
fraud
or
bad
faith
3by
special
provisions
of
law
R3-1
Banda
+
66,
petitioners
v
Ermita
et
al,
respondents
(2010)
ACTION:
R65
petition
for
certiorari
&
prohibition
FACTS:
1.
GMA
issued
EO
378
removing
NPOs
exclusive
jurisdiction
over
printing
services
reqt
of
govt
agencies
&
instrumentalities
(i.e.,
opened
to
bidding).
2.
67
of
549
(12%)
NPO
employees
filed
class
action
suit
re
constitutionality.
ISSUE:
Does
the
petition
qualify
as
a
class
suit?
No.
HELD:
(1)
Board
of
Optometry
v
Colet
held
that
courts
must
exercise
utmost
caution
before
allowing
a
class
suit,
which
is
the
exception
to
the
requirement
of
joinder
of
all
indispensable
parties.
For
while
no
difficulty
may
arise
if
the
decision
secured
is
favorable
to
the
plaintiffs,
a
quandary
would
result
if
the
decision
were
otherwise
as
those
who
were
deemed
impleaded
by
their
self-appointed
representatives
would
certainly
claim
denial
of
due
process.
(2)
Ibaes
v
Roman
Catholic
Church)
held
that
where
the
interests
of
the
plaintiffs
and
the
other
members
of
the
class
they
seek
to
represent
are
diametrically
opposed,
=>
the
class
suit
will
not
prosper.
Of
67
petitioners:
32
executed
Affidavits
of
Desistance
(1
of
them
is
President
of
NPO
Workers
Assn)
1
signed
a
letter
denying
ever
signing
the
petition
67
signed
Verification/CAFS,
only
20
mentioned
in
jurat
as
having
subscribed
before
notary
public
=>
only
20
(<4%)
effectively
instituted
the
case.
(3)
R3S12
-
Requisites
of
a
class
suit
are:
1.
the
subject
matter
of
controversy
is
one
of
common
or
general
interest
to
many
persons;
2.
the
parties
affected
are
so
numerous
that
it
is
impracticable
to
bring
them
all
to
court;
and
3.
the
parties
bringing
the
class
suit
are
sufficiently
numerous
or
representative
of
the
class
and
can
fully
protect
the
interests
of
all
concerned.
(4)
MVRS
Publications
v
Islamic
Dawah
In
determining
the
question
of
fair
and
adequate
representation
of
members
of
a
class,
the
court
must
consider
(a)
whether
1the
interest
of
the
named
party
is
coextensive
with
2the
interest
of
the
other
members
of
the
class;
(b)
the
proportion
of
1those
made
a
party,
as
it
so
bears,
to
2the
total
membership
of
the
class;
and
(c)
any
other
factor
bearing
on
the
ability
of
the
named
party
to
speak
for
the
rest
of
the
class.
DECISION:
Petition
dismissed.
NCC
Art
487.
Any
one
of
the
co-owners
may
bring
an
action
in
ejectment.
Upheld
in
Navarro
v
Escobido
because
co-owners
won.
Rejected
in
Bacalso
v
Padigos
because
defendants
won
&
9
vs
20
R3-2
Navarro,
lessee-petitioner
v
J.
Escobido,
Karen
Go/Kargo
Enterprises,
lessor-respondent
(2009)
CONCEPTS:
spouses,
unknown
defendant,
representative,
indispensable
&
necessary
parties
ACTION:
R45
petition
for
review
on
certiorari
of
CA
decision
&
resolution
FACTS:
1.
1998-09-12
Karen
filed
2
complaints
for
replevin
&/or
sum
of
money
vs
Navarro
&
John
Doe;
prayed
that
RTC
issue
writs
of
replevin
for
seizure
of
2
MVs
in
Navarros
possession.
1st
Complaint:
1997-08-08
Contract
of
lease
w/
option
to
purchase
crane
truck
between
lessee
Navarro
&
lessor
Kargo,
represented
by
Manager/Husband
Glenn;
4th
&
5th
rental
payment
checks
bounced.
2nd
Complaint:
1997-10-01
Same
contract
for
2nd
truck;
3rd
PDC
bounced.
2.
1998-10-12
&
10-14
RTC
issued
writs
of
replevin;
Sheriff
seized
2
trucks
&
delivered
to
Karen.
3.
Navarros
Answer
alleged
as
special
affirmative
defense
2
complaints
stated
no
COA
since
Karen
is
not
a
party
to
the
lease
agreements
(actionable
documents)
4.
1999-12-13
On
Navarros
motion,
both
cases
consolidated.
5.
2000-05-08
RTC
order
dismissed
case
on
ground
that
complaint
did
not
state
a
COA.
6.
2000-07-26
Upon
Karens
MR,
RTC
issued
order
setting
aside
order
of
dismissal.
RTC
presumed
leasing
business
is
conjugal
=>
Karen
had
sufficient
interest
to
file
action.
Karen
should
have
included
husband
Glenn
in
complaint
per
R3S4
=>
ordered
Karen
to
file
motion
for
inclusion
of
Glenn
as
co-plaintiff
7.
2001-03-07
RTC
denied
Navarros
MR.
8.
Navarro
filed
petition
for
certiorari
before
CA
A
complaint
w/c
failed
to
state
a
COA
could
not
be
converted
into
one
w/
a
COA
by
mere
amendment
or
supplemental
pleading.
9.
2001-10-16
CA
denied
Navarro
petition
&
affirmed
RTC
order
10.
2002-05-29
CA
resolution
denied
Navarro
MR.
11.
Navarro
filed
R45
petition
for
review
on
certiorari:
(1)Even
if
lease
in
name
of
KarGo,
since
it
did
not
have
requisite
juridical
personality
to
sue
=>
actual
parties
are
himself
&
Glenn.
Since
it
was
Karen
who
filed
complaint
&
not
Glenn
=>
she
was
not
a
RPI
&
complaint
failed
to
state
a
COA.
(2)
Inclusion
of
Glenn
as
co-plaintiff
drastically
changed
the
theory
of
the
complaint,
to
his
great
prejudice.
ISSUE:
Is
Karen
a
RPI?
Yes.
Is
Glenn
an
indispensable
party?
No.
HELD:
(R3S3)
Glenn
signed
as
representative.
(Case)
In
sole
proprietorships,
doing
business
as
XXX
may
be
added
to
the
title
of
the
case,
as
is
customarily
done.
(R3S2)
As
the
registered
owner
of
Kargo,
Karen
is
the
party
who
will
directly
benefit
from
or
be
injured
by
a
judgment
in
this
case
=>
Karen
is
the
RPI.
(FC
Art
93
on
ACP)
By
law,
all
property
acquired
during
the
marriage,
whether
the
acquisition
appears
to
have
been
made,
contracted
or
registered
in
one
or
both
spouses,
=>
is
presumed
to
be
conjugal
unless
the
contrary
is
proved.
vs
only
Navarros
bare
allegation
that
paraphernal
(FC
Art
124)
The
administration
and
enjoyment
of
the
conjugal
partnership
property
shall
belong
to
both
spouses
jointly.
=>
either
Karen
or
Glenn
may
speak
&
act
w/
authority
in
managing
their
conjugal
property
KarGo.
(FC
Art
108)
The
conjugal
partnership
shall
be
governed
by
the
rules
on
the
contract
of
partnership
in
all
that
is
not
in
conflict
with
what
is
expressly
determined
in
this
Chapter
(Conjugal
Partnership
of
Gains)
or
by
the
spouses
in
their
marriage
settlements.
I.e.,
CGP
>
marriage
settlement
>
Partnership
(NCC
Art
1811
on
Partnership)
A
partner
is
a
co-owner
with
the
other
partners
of
specific
partnership
property.
The
incidents
of
this
co-ownership
are
such
that:
(1)
A
partner,
subject
to
the
provisions
of
this
Title
and
to
any
agreement
between
the
partners,
has
an
equal
right
with
his
partners
to
possess
specific
partnership
property
for
partnership
purposes;
xxx
(NCC
Art
487
on
Property)
Any
one
of
the
co-owners
may
bring
an
action
in
ejectment.
(Case:
covers
all
kinds
of
action
for
the
recovery
of
possession)
=>
Only
one
of
the
co-owners,
namely
the
co-owner
who
filed
the
suit
for
the
recovery
of
the
co-owned
property,
=>
is
an
indispensable
party
thereto.
The
other
co-owners
are
not
indispensable
parties.
They
are
not
even
necessary
parties,
for
a
complete
relief
can
be
accorded
in
a
suit
even
without
their
participation,
since
the
suit
is
presumed
to
have
been
filed
for
the
benefit
of
all
co-owners.
=>
since
Glenn
is
not
strictly
an
indispensable
party
in
the
action
to
recover
possession
of
the
leased
vehicles,
=>
he
only
needs
to
be
impleaded
as
a
pro
forma
party
to
the
suit,
based
on
R4S4
(Husband
and
wife
shall
sue
or
be
sued
jointly,
except
as
provided
by
law).
(R3S11)
Even
assuming
that
Glenn
is
an
indispensable
party,
SC
held
in
a
number
of
cases
that
the
misjoinder
or
non-joinder
of
indispensable
parties
in
a
complaint
is
not
a
ground
for
dismissal
of
action.
=>
RTC
order
requiring
Karen
to
join
Glenn
as
co-plaintiff
is
in
order.
DECISION:
Navarros
petition
denied.
NOTES:
NCC
Art
44
The
following
are
juridical
persons:
(1)
The
State
and
its
political
subdivisions;
(2)
Other
corporations,
institutions
and
entities
for
public
interest
or
purpose,
created
by
law;
their
personality
begins
as
soon
as
they
have
been
constituted
according
to
law;
(3)
Corporations,
partnerships
and
associations
for
private
interest
or
purpose
to
which
the
law
grants
a
juridical
personality,
separate
and
distinct
from
that
of
each
shareholder,
partner
or
member.
R3-3
Bacalso
+
8,
defendants/-petitioners
v
Padigos
+
19,
plaintiffs/-respondents
(2008)
ACTION:
R45
Petition
for
review
on
certiorari
of
CA
decision.
FACTS:
Padigos
are
heirs
of
co-owners;
Bacalsos
are
heirs
of
Alipio
Sr.
1.
Padigos
filed
before
RTC
a
complaint
vs
2
Bacalso/s
for
1quieting
of
title,
2declaration
of
nullity
of
documents,
3recovery
of
possession,
&
4damages.
Complaint
alleged:
1.
Alipio
Bacalso
Sr
secured
Tax
Declarations
w/o
legal
basis.
2.
Rosendo
&
Rodrigo
Bacalso
leasing
portions
of
lot
to
persons
who
built
houses
thereon.
3.
Rosendo
living
in
a
house
built
on
a
portion
of
lot.
4.
Demands
to
vacate
&
efforts
at
conciliation
futile.
R&R
Bacalsos
Answer:
1.
Alipio
Sr
purchased
via
deed
of
sale
some
shares.
2.
Alipio
Sr
acquired
other
shares
by
extraordinary
acquisitive
prescription
through
continuous,
open,
peaceful,
and
adverse
possession
thereof
in
concept
of
owner
since
1949.
Padigos
Reply
&
Answer:
1.
Deed
of
sale
spurious;
&
assuming
not,
laches
had
set
in.
2.
Other
shares
cannot
be
acquired
through
laches
or
prescription.
2.
Padigos,
w/
leave
of
court,
filed
Amended
Complaint
impleading
A
Srs
other
heirs
as
additional
defendants;
Later
filed
a
2nd
Amended
Complaint,
w/
leave
of
court,
impleading
as
additional
plaintiffs
other
heirs
of
a
co-owner.
Bacalsos
Answer
to
2nd
Amended
Complaint:
2AC
s/b
dismissed
for
failure
to
implead
other
heirs
of
the
other
registered
owners
of
the
lot
who
are
indispensable
parties.
3.
Padigos
filed
3rd
Amended
Complaint,
w/
leave
of
court,
impleading
remaining
heirs
as
additional
plaintiffs.
4.
RTC
ruled
in
favor
of
Padigos:
1.
Declared
Padigos
entitled
to
ownership
&
possession.
2.
Declared
Deed
of
Sale
void.
3.
Ordered
Bacalsos
to
pay
damages,
attys
fees,
litigation
expenses
&
costs
of
suit.
5.
On
Padigos
Motion
for
Execution
Pending
Appeal,
RTC
issued
writ
of
execution,
demolished
houses.
6.
On
Bacalsos
appeal,
CA
affirmed
RTC
decision.
7.
Bacalso
files
w/
SC
R45
Petition
for
review
on
certiorari
Bacalsos
faulted
CA
for
impliedly
sanctioning
RTC
order
of
demolition
of
houses
belonging
to
old
lessees
who
were
not
even
joined
as
parties
in
the
case.
Well
taken
by
SC
but
may
not
consider
any
grant
of
relief,
lessees
not
being
parties
to
the
case.
Respondents
contend
that
the
omission
did
not
deprive
RTC
of
jurisdiction
because
per
NCC
Art
487
any
of
the
co-owners
may
bring
an
action
in
ejectment.
ISSUE:
Are
all
of
the
co-owners
indispensable
parties?
HELD:
Yes.
SC
rejected
Padigos
invocation
of
NCC
Art
487.
The
action
is
for
quieting
of
title,
declaration
of
nullity
of
documents,
recovery
of
possession
and
ownership,
and
damages.
(Arcelona
v
CA,
1997)
R3S7
Indispensable
parties
are
parties-in-interest
w/o
whom
there
can
be
no
final
determination
of
an
action.
As
such,
they
must
be
joined
either
as
plaintiffs
or
as
defendants.
The
general
rule
re
the
making
of
parties
in
a
civil
action
requires
1the
joinder
of
all
necessary
parties
where
possible,
and
2the
joinder
of
all
indispensable
parties
under
any
and
all
conditions,
their
presence
being
a
sine
qua
non
for
the
exercise
of
judicial
power.
It
is
precisely
when
an
indispensable
party
is
not
before
the
court
(that)
the
action
should
be
dismissed.
The
absence
of
an
indispensable
party
=>
renders
all
subsequent
actions
of
the
court
null
and
void
for
want
of
authority
to
act,
1not
only
as
to
the
absent
parties
2but
even
as
to
those
present.
The
fishpond
is
undivided;
it
is
impossible
to
pinpoint
w/c
specific
portion
of
the
property
is
owned
by
NOTE:
(1)
Failure
to
implead
indispensable
parties
aside,
the
resolution
of
the
case
hinges
on
a
determination
of
the
authenticity
of
the
documents
on
which
petitioners
in
part
anchor
their
claim
to
ownership
of
the
lot.
SC
ruled
genuine
&
authentic
based
on
evidence.
(2)
Respondents
guilty
of
laches.
Petitioners
tilling
land
since
1950.
While,
by
express
provision
of
law,
no
title
to
registered
land
in
derogation
of
that
of
the
registered
owner
shall
be
acquired
by
prescription
or
adverse
possession,
it
is
an
enshrined
rule
that
even
a
registered
owner
may
be
barred
from
recovering
possession
of
property
by
virtue
of
laches.
DECISION:
Bacalsos
petition
granted;
CA
decision
reversed
&
set
aside;
RTC
case
dismissed.
NOTE:
(Arcelona
v
CA,
1997)
Formerly,
Art
487
of
the
old
Civil
Code
provided
that
any
one
of
the
co-
owners
may
bring
an
action
in
ejectment.
It
was
subsequently
held
that
a
co-owner
could
not
maintain
an
action
in
ejectment
without
joining
all
the
other
co-owners.
Former
CJ
Moran
explains:
xxx.
As
held
by
the
SC,
were
the
courts
to
permit
an
action
in
ejectment
to
be
maintained
by
a
person
having
merely
an
undivided
interest
in
any
given
tract
of
land,
=>
a
judgment
in
favor
of
the
defendants
would
not
be
conclusive
as
against
the
other
co-owners
not
parties
to
the
suit,
and
=>
thus
the
defendant
in
possession
of
the
property
might
be
harassed
by
as
many
succeeding
actions
of
ejectment,
as
there
might
be
co-owners
of
the
title
asserted
against
him.
The
purpose
of
this
provision
was
to
prevent
multiplicity
of
suits
by
requiring
the
person
asserting
a
right
against
the
defendant
to
include
with
him,
either
as
co-plaintiffs
or
as
codefendants,
all
persons
standing
in
the
same
position,
so
that
the
whole
matter
in
dispute
may
be
determined
once
and
for
all
in
one
litigation.
R3-4
Valdez-Tallorin,
defendant-petitioner
v
Heirs
of
Tarona
+
2,
plaintiff-respondents
(2009)
ACTION:
R45
petition
for
review
on
certiorari
of
CA
decision.
FACTS:
2/98
Heirs
filed
before
RTC
action
for
cancellation
of
Tallorins
&
2
other
womens
(not
impleaded)
Tax
Declaration
over
a
parcel
of
land.
Heirs
alleged:
1.
Assessors
Ofc
cancelled
TD
in
the
name
of
their
father
Juanito.
a.
cancellation
based
on
unsigned
but
notarized
Affidavit
that
Juanito
executed
in
favor
of
Tallorin
&
2
Valdezs
(tenancy
rights)
b.
Assessors
Ofc
issued
TD
in
favor
of
the
3
women.
c.
Affidavit
missing,
no
copy
found
in
Assessors
Ofc.
2.
W/o
affidavit
=>
Juanitos
TD
illegally
cancelled
&
Tallorins
+2
TD
illegally
issued.
3/98
Heirs
filed
motion
to
declare
Tallorin
in
default
for
failing
to
Answer
w/in
allowed
time.
Before
RTC
could
act,
Tallorin
filed
a
belated
Answer
alleging:
1.
She
has
copy
of
Affidavit;
Juanito
a
mere
agricultural
tenant
who
surrendered
&
waived
in
Affidavit
his
occupation
&
tenancy
rights
to
Tallorin
et
al
for
P29K.
2.
Affirmative
defense
of
1noncompliance
w/
reqt
of
conciliation
proceedings
&
2prescription.
3/98
RTC
set
Tallorins
defense
for
hearing;
Heirs
sought
recon;
RTC
denied
MR
(because
it
received
Answer
before
it
could
issue
a
default
order)
Heirs
filed
certiorari
w/
CA
w/c
ruled:
1.
RTC
committed
GAD
in
admitting
Tallorins
late
Answer
in
the
absence
of
motion
to
admit
it.
2.
Even
if
Tallorin
had
filed
her
late
Answer,
RTC
should
have
heard
Taronas
motion
to
declare
Tallorin
in
default.
3.
Remand
case
to
RTC
RTC
1heard
&
granted
Taronas
motion
to
declare
Tallorin
in
default,
&
2directed
Taronas
to
present
evidence
ex
parte.
1/02
RTC:
1.
Annuled
TD
in
name
of
Tallorin
et
al.
2.
Reinstated
TD
in
name
of
Juanito.
3.
Ordered
issuance
of
new
TD
in
names
of
Heirs
4.
Juanitos
Affidavit
not
binding
because
unsigned.
Tallorin
appealed
to
CA,
alleging:
1.
Land
titled
in
her
name
+
2
co-owners
2.
Juanitos
affidavit
only
dealt
w/
surrender
of
his
tenancy
rights
&
did
not
serve
as
basis
for
canceling
TD
in
his
name.
3.
Although
Juanito
did
not
sign
the
Affidavit,
he
thumbmarked
and
acknowledged
the
same
before
a
notary
public.
4.
RTC
erred
in
not
dismissing
the
Complaint
for
failure
to
implead
Valdezes
who
were
indispensable
parties
in
the
action
to
annul
Juanitos
Affidavit
&
the
TD
in
their
favor.
5/06
CA
affirmed
RTC
decision,
but
notably
did
not
address
issue
of
non-joinder
of
indispensable
parties.
ISSUE:
Did
CA
err
in
failing
to
dismiss
Taronas
Complaint
for
not
impleading
Valdezes
in
whose
names
the
annulled
TD
had
been
issued?
Yes.
HELD:
(1)
Indispensable
parties
are
those
with
such
an
interest
in
the
controversy
that
a
final
decree
would
necessarily
affect
their
rights,
so
that
the
courts
cannot
proceed
without
their
presence.
Joining
indispensable
parties
into
an
action
is
mandatory,
being
a
requirement
of
due
process.
Without
their
presence,
the
judgment
of
the
court
cannot
attain
real
finality.
(2)
Judgments
do
not
bind
strangers
to
the
suit.
The
absence
of
an
indispensable
party
renders
all
subsequent
actions
of
the
court
null
and
void.
Indeed,
it
would
have
no
authority
to
act,
not
only
as
to
the
absent
party,
but
as
to
those
present
as
well.
And
where
does
the
responsibility
for
impleading
all
indispensable
parties
lie?
It
lies
in
the
plaintiff.
(3)
But
the
Taronas
action
cannot
be
dismissed
outright.
As
the
Court
held
in
Plasabas
v
CA,
the
non-
joinder
of
indispensable
parties
is
not
a
ground
for
dismissal.
R3S11
prohibits
the
dismissal
of
a
suit
on
the
ground
of
non-joinder
or
misjoinder
of
parties
and
allows
the
amendment
of
the
complaint
at
any
stage
of
the
proceedings,
through
motion
or
on
order
of
the
court
on
its
own
initiative.
Only
if
plaintiff
refuses
to
implead
an
indispensable
party,
despite
the
order
of
the
court,
may
it
dismiss
the
action.
DECISION:
Petition
granted;
CA
&
RTC
decisions
set
aside;
case
remanded
to
RTC,
directed
to
have
Valdezes
impleaded
by
plaintiffs
as
party-defendants.
R5-1
Miguel,
petitioner-complainant-creditor
v
Montaez,
respondent-defendant-debtor,
2012-01-25
FACTS:
1.
2001-02-01
Montaez
secured
P143K
loan,
payable
in
1
yr,
gave
his
H&L
as
collateral.
2.
Montaez
defaulted;
Miguel
filed
complaint
w/
Lupon
in
Rizal;
Parties
entered
into
a
settlement
(Kasunduang
Pag-aayos)
where
Mon
will
pay
P2K
per
month
3.
Montaez
still
failed
to
pay;
2004-12-13
Lupon
issued
Certification
to
file
action
in
court
4.
2005-04-07
Miguel
filed
w/
Makati
MeTC
complaint
for
collection
of
sum
of
money;
Montaez
in
Answer
w/
CC
raised
defense
of
improper
venue
(Miguel
resides
in
Caloocan)
5.
2006-08-16
MeTC
decision
ordered
Montaez
to
pay
P148
(principal
+
legal
int
from
maturity
date)
+
P10K
atty
fees/costs;
On
appeal
RTC
affirmed.
6.
Montaez
appealed
to
CA,
alleged:
1.
Venue
improperly
laid,
2.
KP
effectively
novated
orig
loan
agreement
7.
CA
reversed
RTC:
Dismissed
complaint,
w/o
prejudice
to
Miguels
right
to
file
action
to
enforce
KP;
No
novation,
only
change
in
terms
of
payment,
KP
merely
supplemented
orig
loan
agreement;
KP
has
force
&
effect
of
court
judgment,
w/c
per
LGC
Sec
417
may
be
enforced
1.
by
execution
w/in
6
mos
from
date
of
settlement
by
the
Lupon
or
2.
by
court
action
after
lapse
of
such
time
=
>
remedy
of
Miguel
was
to
file
an
action
for
execution
of
KP
in
court,
not
for
collection
of
sum
of
money
=>
CA
deemed
it
unnecessary
to
resolve
issue
on
venue.
ISSUE:
Is
complaint
for
sum
of
money
the
proper
remedy,
notwithstanding
the
KP?
HELD:
Yes.
1.
Because
Montaez
failed
to
comply
with
the
terms
of
KP,
said
agreement
is
deemed
rescinded
per
NCC
Art
2041,
&
Miguel
can
insist
on
her
original
demand.
2.
LGC
Sec
417,
is
only
applicable
if
the
parties
have
not
repudiated
such
settlement
w/in
10
days
from
the
date
thereof
per
Sec
416.
If
the
amicable
settlement
is
repudiated
by
1
party,
either
expressly
or
impliedly,
the
other
party
has
2
options,
namely,
to
enforce
the
compromise
per
LGC
or
ROC
as
the
case
may
be,
or
to
consider
it
rescinded
and
insist
upon
his
original
demand.
3.
LGC
Sec
417
uses
may
=>
merely
optional
DECISION:
CA
decision
set
aside,
RTC
affirmed
NOTES:
1.
Art
2041.
If
1
of
the
parties
fails
or
refuses
to
abide
by
the
compromise,
the
other
party
may
either
enforce
the
compromise
or
regard
it
as
rescinded
&
insist
upon
his
original
demand.
2.
Art
2037.
A
compromise
has
upon
the
parties
the
effect
and
authority
of
res
judicata;
but
there
shall
be
no
execution
except
in
compliance
with
a
judicial
compromise.
R6S7
Sps
Antonio
v
Vda
de
Monje
(2010)
HELD:
(1)
A
compulsory
counterclaim
is
any
claim
for
money
or
any
relief,
which
a
defending
party
may
have
against
an
opposing
party,
which
at
the
time
of
suit
arises
out
of,
or
is
necessarily
connected
with,
the
same
transaction
or
occurrence
that
is
the
subject
matter
of
the
plaintiffs
complaint.
It
is
compulsory
in
the
sense
that
it
1is
within
the
jurisdiction
of
the
court,
2does
not
require
for
its
adjudication
the
presence
of
third
parties
would
entail
substantial
duplication
of
time
and
effort
by
the
parties
and
the
court;
2when
the
multiple
claims
involve
the
same
factual
and
legal
issues;
or
3when
the
claims
are
offshoots
of
the
same
basic
controversy
between
the
parties.
(2)
Non-compliance
w/
verification
or
a
defect
therein
does
not
necessarily
render
the
pleading
fatally
defective.
The
court
may
order
its
submission
or
correction
or
act
on
the
pleading
if
the
attending
circumstances
are
such
that
strict
compliance
with
the
Rule
may
be
dispensed
with
in
order
that
the
ends
of
justice
may
be
served
thereby.
(3)
Verification
is
deemed
substantially
complied
with
1when
one
who
has
ample
knowledge
to
swear
to
the
truth
of
the
allegations
in
the
complaint
or
(4)
Non-compliance
w/
certification
or
a
defect
therein,
unlike
in
verification,
is
generally
not
curable
by
its
subsequent
submission
or
correction
thereof,
unless
there
is
a
need
to
relax
the
Rule
on
the
ground
of
1substantial
compliance
or
2presence
of
special
circumstances
or
compelling
reasons.
(5)
The
CAFS
must
be
signed
by
all
the
plaintiffs
or
petitioners
in
a
case;
otherwise,
those
who
did
not
sign
will
be
dropped
as
parties
to
the
case.
Under
reasonable
or
justifiable
circumstances,
however,
as
when
all
the
plaintiffs
or
petitioners
share
a
common
interest
and
invoke
a
common
cause
of
action
or
defense,
the
signature
of
only
one
of
them
in
the
CAFS
substantially
complies
with
the
Rule.
(6)
The
CAFS
must
be
executed
by
the
party-pleader,
not
by
his
counsel.
If,
however,
for
reasonable
or
justifiable
reasons,
the
party-pleader
is
unable
to
sign,
he
must
execute
a
SPA
designating
his
counsel
of
record
to
sign
on
his
behalf.
(7)
Relationship
between
Coop
&
TACOR
more
of
a
JV,
not
a
job
contracting
arrangement.
DFI
/
TACOR
/
Dole
cannot
be
held
solidarily
liable
w/
Coop.
DECISION:
Petition
dismissed.
NOTES:
(1)
SC
by
Resolution
reqd
Dole
Phils
to
show
cause
why
it
should
not
be
held
in
contempt
for
its
failure
to
heed
the
Courts
directive
to
file
required
comment
w/in
10
days
from
notice.
DPI
stated
its
Davao
City
received
Resoln
but
addressed
to
DAP
(non-SEC
regd).
Petitioners
commented
that
DPI
raised
the
matter
for
1st
time
even
if
received
all
pleadings
&
court
processes
from
inception.
SC
found
DPIs
posturingdoes
not
lieDPI
is
intended
recipient,
there
is
no
doubt.
(2)
Instead
of
remanding
to
CA,
SC
deemed
it
more
practical
to
decide
the
substantive
issue
raised
in
the
petition
so
as
not
to
further
delay
disposition
of
the
case
(deviated
from
general
rule
that
factual
Qs
are
not
entertained
in
PRs
on
certiorari
of
CAs
decision).
R7S5
Bondagjy
v
Artadi,
2008
HELD:
As
for
the
omission
by
respondent
to
include
in
the
certification
the
dismissal
of
the
annulment
case
she
filed
with
the
RTC
of
Muntinlupa
City,
it
is
not
fatal.
An
omission
in
the
certificate
of
non-forum
shopping
about
any
event
that
would
not
constitute
res
judicata
and
litis
pendencia
is
not
fatal
as
to
merit
the
dismissal
and
nullification
of
the
entire
proceedings,
given
that
the
evils
sought
to
be
prevented
by
the
said
certification
are
not
present
(Roxas
v
CA,
2001)
R10-1
PPA,
petitioner-defendant
v
William
Gothong
&
Aboitiz,
Inc,
respondent-plaintiff
(2008)
ACTION:
R45
PR
on
certiorari
of
CA
decision
&
resolution
FACTS:
1.
WGA
leased
from
PPA
the
Marine
Slip
Way
port
area
from
2001-01-01
to
06-30
or
until
PPA
turns
over
operation
to
winning
bidder
for
North
Harbor
modernization.
1a.
Later
(after
6-30)
PPA
asked
WGA
to
vacate
&
turn
over
improvements;
PPA
denied
WGA
letter
to
reconsider.
2.
11-28
WGA
sued
for
Injunction
before
RTC,
claimed
PPA
unjustly,
illegally
&
prematurely
terminated
lease
contract.
Prayer
for
TRO
to
arrest
evacuation,
recovery
of
damages
for
breach
of
contract
&
attys
fees.
3.
12-11
1st
Amended
Complaint
(
after
13
days,
matter
of
right?)
same
denomination
(Injunction)
&
prayer
(TRO),
but
added
statement
that
PPA
estopped
from
denying
lease
period
untilturned
over
to
winning
bidder;
+3rd
COA
addl
relief
in
prayer
that
should
WGA
be
forced
to
vacate,
it
should
be
refunded
the
value
of
improvements
it
introduced
to
the
leased
property.
3a.
2002-01-23
PPA
Answer;
1-16
RTC
denied
TRO;
2-11
WGA
MR
on
TRO
denial
4.
Shortly
after
2-11
WGA
filed
Motion
to
Admit
2nd
Amended
Complaint
Injunction
with
Prayer
for
TRO
&/or
WPI
and
damages
&/or
Reformation
of
Contract;
+4th
cause
of
action
&
addl
relief
in
prayer
reformation
of
contract
(because
it
failed
to
express
or
embody
true
intent
of
parties).
4a.
PPA
strongly
opposed
Motion
-
reformation
sought
by
WGA
a
substantial
amendment,
w/c
if
granted,
will
substantially
alter
WGAs
COA
&
theory
of
the
case.
4b.
3-22
RTC
Order
denied
WGAs
Motion;
4-26
denied
WGAs
MR
5.
WGA
filed
Petition
for
certiorari
w/
CA
to
nullify
RTC
Order
5a.
10-24
CA
granted
P4C;
directed
RTC
to
admit
2nd
Amended
Complaint
per
R10S3;
2003-05-15
denied
PPA
MR
ISSUE:
Did
CA
err
in
ruling
that
RTC
committed
GAD
when
it
denied
admission
of
2AC?
No.
HELD:
Under
(1997)
R10S3,
the
amendment
may
(now)
substantially
alter
the
cause
of
action
or
defense.
This
should
only
be
true,
however,
when
despite
a
substantial
change
or
alteration
in
the
cause
of
action
or
defense,
the
amendments
sought
to
be
made
shall
serve
the
higher
interests
of
substantial
justice,
and
prevent
delay
and
equally
promote
the
laudable
objective
of
the
rules
which
is
to
secure
a
just,
speedy
and
inexpensive
disposition
of
every
action
and
proceeding.
DECISION:
PPC
Petition
denied;
CA
Decision
&
Resolution
affirmed.
R10-2
Swagman
Hotels
&
Travel
Inc,
petitioner
v
CA
&
Christian,
respondents
(2005)
See
R2-3
R14-1
EB
Villarosa
&
Partner
Co
Ltd,
petitioner-defendant
v
J.
Benito
&
Imperial
Devt
Corp,
respondent-plaintiff
CODAL:
R14S11
Service
upon
domestic
private
juridical
entity;
R14S20
Voluntary
appearance
ACTION:
Petition
for
Certiorari
&
Prohibition
w/
Prayer
for
issuance
of
TRO
&/or
WPI
seeking
to
annul
&
set
aside
the
8-05
&
11-20
Orders
of
RTC
&
Prayer
that
RTC
desist
from
further
proceeding
with
Civil
Case.
FACTS:
1.
Deed
of
Sale
w/
Devt
Agreement
-
Ltd
Partnership
Villarosa
to
develop
IDCs
CDO
parcels
of
land
into
low-cost
housing
subdivision.
2.
1998-04-03
IDC
filed
complaint
(Civil
Case)
for
Breach
of
Contract
&
Damages
vs
Villarosa
before
Makati
RTC
(per
Agreement)
because
no
substantial
devts
other
than
a
few
unfinished
houses.
3.
Summons
w/
complaint
served
upon
Villarosa
through
its
CDO
Branch
Manager.
4.
6-09
Villarosa
filed
Special
Appearance
w/
M2D
on
ground
of
improper
service
of
summons
(Branch
Manager
not
one
of
those
named
in
R14S11)
&
lack
of
jurisdiction
over
person
of
defendant.
5.
6-10
IDC
filed
Motion
to
Declare
Defendant
in
Default
(M2DDD)
for
Villarosas
failure
to
file
Answer
despite
receipt
of
Summons
&
Complaint
6.
6-22
IDC
filed
Opposition
to
M2D
on
grounds
that
Villarosa
actually
received
summons
&
purpose
of
the
rule
is
to
bring
home
to
the
corporation
notice
of
the
filing
of
the
action.
7.
8-05
RTC
denied
Villarosas
M2D,
denied
IDCs
M2DDD,
gave
Villarosa
10
days
to
file
responsive
pleading;
since
the
summons
&
complaint
were
in
fact
received
by
the
corporation
through
its
Branch
Manager,
there
was
substantial
compliance
with
the
rule
on
service
of
summons
&
consequently,
it
validly
acquired
jurisdiction
over
the
person
of
the
defendant.
8.
8-19
Villarosa,
by
Special
Appearance,
filed
MR
1997
ROC
did
not
liberalize,
but
restricted
service
of
summons
(see
NOTES).
9.
8-27
IDC
files
Opposition
to
MR:
Villarosas
Branch
Manager
did
bring
home
to
the
corporation
the
notice
of
the
filing
of
the
action
&
by
virtue
of
w/c
M2D
was
filed;
&
that
it
was
1
month
after
receipt
of
the
summons
&
complaint
that
Villarosa
chose
to
file
a
M2D.
10.
9-04
Villarosa,
by
Special
Appearance,
filed
Reply,
contending
changes
in
1997
ROC
substantial,
not
just
general
semantics.
11.
11-20
RTC
denied
Villarosas
MR,
hence
Villarosas
Petition
for
Certiorari
ISSUE:
(1)
Did
RTC
acquire
jurisdiction
over
person
of
Villarosa
upon
service
of
summons
on
its
Branch
Manager?
(2)
Is
Villarosas
inclusion
in
M2D
of
other
grounds
aside
from
LJ/PD
deemed
a
voluntary
appearance?
HELD:
(1)
No.
The
designation
of
persons
or
officers
who
are
authorized
to
accept
summons
for
a
domestic
corporation
or
partnership
is
now
limited
&
more
clearly
specified
in
R14S11.
A
strict
compliance
with
the
mode
of
service
is
necessary
to
confer
jurisdiction
of
the
court
over
a
corporation.
The
purpose
is
to
render
it
reasonably
certain
that
the
corporation
will
receive
prompt
and
proper
notice
in
an
action
against
it
or
to
insure
that
the
summons
be
served
on
a
representative
so
integrated
with
the
corporation
that
such
person
will
know
what
to
do
with
the
legal
papers
served
on
him.
In
other
words,
to
bring
home
to
the
corporation
notice
of
the
filing
of
the
Action.
The
liberal
construction
rule
cannot
be
invoked
and
utilized
as
a
substitute
for
the
plain
legal
requirements
as
to
the
manner
in
which
summons
should
be
served
on
a
domestic
corporation.
(2)
No.
Per
R14S20,
The
inclusion
in
a
motion
to
dismiss
of
other
grounds
aside
from
lack
of
jurisdiction
over
the
person
of
the
defendant
shall
not
be
deemed
a
voluntary
appearance.
(vs
old
Rule
says
Yes)
DECISION:
Petition
granted;
RTC
Orders
annulled
&
set
aside;
RTC
declared
w/o
jurisdiction
to
take
cognizance
of
Civil
Case
&
all
its
orders
&
issuances
in
connection
therewith
annulled
&
set
aside.
NOTES:
Changes
in
1997
R14S11:
president;
added
managing
partner;
manager
general
manager;
secretary
corporate
secretary;
cashier
treasurer;
removed
agent
&
any
director,
added
in-house
counsel.
R14-2
Sps
Galura,
petitioners-defendant
v
Math-Agro
Corp,
respondent-plaintiff,
2009-08-14
CODAL:
R14S7
Substituted
service;
R47
Annulments
of
Judgments
or
Final
Orders
&
Resolutions
ACTION:
R45
petition
for
review
on
certiorari
w/
prayer
for
issuance
of
WPI
&/or
TRO.
Petition
challenges
the
2005-01-25
&
2005-02-28
Resolutions
of
the
CA.
FACTS:
1.
1997-03
Sps
Dante
&
Teresa
Galura
purchased
broiler
starters
&
finishers
worth
P426K
from
MAC,
paid
P72.5K,
but
despite
several
demands,
failed
to
pay
P353.5K
unpaid
balance.
2.
2000-06-21
MAC
filed
Complaint
w/
Malolos
RTC,
stated
addresses
of
Galuras
in
Tarlac
&
Sta
Mesa
Heights,
QC.
3.
2000-08-15
RTC
Clerk
issued
summons
4.
2000-09-17
Process
Server
(P/S)
went
to
Sta
Mesa
Heights,
but
told
by
Dantes
father
that
Galuras
presently
reside
in
Tandang
Sora,
QC.
5.
2000-09-22-
P/S
went
to
Tarlac,
but
learned
property
has
been
foreclosed
&
Galuras
no
longer
reside
there.
6.
2000-09-26
P/S
went
to
Tandang
Sora
&
served
summons
on
Teresas
sister.
7.
Galuras
failed
to
file
their
Answer.
8.
2001-01-23
RTC
Order
declared
Galuras
in
default
&
allowed
MAC
to
present
evidence
ex
parte.
9.
2001-06-27
RTC
ruled
in
favor
of
MAC;
ordered
Galuras
to
pay
unpaid
balance,
P30K
attys
fees,
litigation
expenses,
legal
interest
from
date
of
1st
demand
letter;
RTC
believes
failure
of
Galuras
or
their
refusal
to
file
any
Answer
to
the
Complaint
is
a
clear
admission
on
their
part
of
their
obligation
to
MAC.
It
may
even
be
safely
presumed
that
by
their
inaction,
Galuras
have
no
valid
defense
against
the
claim
of
the
MAC
such
that
under
the
circumstances,
RTC
has
no
other
alternative
but
to
pass
judgment
on
the
issues
based
on
the
evidence
on
record.
10.
2004-11-10
RTC
issued
W/X
to
implement
2001
decision
11.
2004-12-13
Galuras
received
copy
of
2004-11
Order
12.
2005-01-06
Galuras
filed
w/
CA
R47
PAJ/FO,
with
Prayer
for
issuance
of
WPI
or
TRO.
Grounds
were
(1)
RTC
failed
to
acquire
jurisdiction
over
their
persons
because
substituted
service
of
summons
invalid
&
(2)
there
was
extrinsic
fraud
because
MAC
made
them
believe
it
would
not
file
a
case
vs
them.
13.
2005-01-25
CA
Resolution
dismissed
petition
for
lack
of
merit;
valid
SSS
14.
2005-02-14
Galuras
filed
MR;
CA
denied
on
02-28;
Galuras
petition
SC
ISSUES:
(1)
Valid
SSS?
(2)
Extrinsic
fraud?
(3)
Should
Galuras
have
availed
1st
of
ordinary
remedies
of
new
trial,
appeal
or
petition
for
relief?
HELD:
(1A)
No.
Per
Sandoval
II
v
HRET:
Requisites
of
a
valid
substituted
service:
(a)
service
of
summons
within
a
reasonable
time
is
impossible;
(b)
the
person
serving
the
summons
exerted
efforts
to
locate
the
defendant;
(c)
the
person
to
whom
the
summons
is
served
is
of
sufficient
age
and
discretion;
(d)
the
person
to
whom
the
summons
is
served
resides
at
the
defendants
place
of
residence;
&
(e)
pertinent
facts
showing
the
enumerated
circumstances
are
stated
in
the
return
of
service.
P/S
did
not
state
(a),
(c)
&
(d)
in
his
return
of
service.
(1B)
Impossibility
of
prompt
service
should
be
shown
by
stating
1the
efforts
made
to
find
the
defendant
personally
and
2the
fact
that
such
efforts
failed.
This
statement
should
be
made
in
the
proof
of
service.
This
is
necessary
because
substituted
service
is
in
derogation
of
the
usual
method
of
service.
It
has
been
held
that
this
method
of
service
is
in
derogation
of
the
common
law;
it
is
a
method
extraordinary
in
character,
and
hence
may
be
used
only
as
prescribed
and
in
the
circumstances
authorized
by
statute.
Thus,
under
the
controlling
decisions,
the
statutory
requirements
of
substituted
service
must
be
followed
strictly,
faithfully
and
fully,
and
any
substituted
service
other
than
that
authorized
by
the
statute
is
considered
ineffective.
(3)
No.
If
R47
PAJ/FO
of
RTC
is
grounded
on
lack
of
jurisdiction
1over
the
person
of
the
defendant
or
2over
the
nature
or
subject
of
the
action,
the
petition
need
not
allege
that
the
ordinary
remedy
of
NT
or
MR
of
J/FO
or
appeal
therefrom
are
no
longer
available
through
no
fault
of
her
own.
This
is
so
because
a
judgment
rendered
or
final
order
issued
by
the
RTC
without
jurisdiction
is
null
and
void
and
may
be
assailed
any
time
either
collaterally
or
in
a
direct
action
or
by
resisting
such
judgment
or
final
order
in
any
action
or
proceeding
whenever
it
is
invoked,
unless
barred
by
laches.
DECISION:
Petition
granted;
CA
Resolutions
set
aside;
2005-04-27
TRO
made
permanent;
2001-06
&
2004-11
RTC
Orders
set
aside.
R14-3
Citizens
Surety,
petitioner
v
J.
Herrera,
Sps
Santiago
&
Josefina
Dacanay,
respondents,
1971-03-31
CODAL:
ACTION:
Petition
to
review
an
order
of
the
CFI
FACTS:
1.
Surety
issued
2
surety
bonds
for
P5K
each
to
guarantee
payment
of
2
PNs
executed
by
Santiago.
In
consideration,
Dacanays
executed
Indemnity
Agreements
binding
themselves
solidarily
to
indeminify
Surety
for
any
losses,
costs
&
expenses,
w/
12%
int
pa;
as
addl
security
Dacanays
mortgaged
their
Baguio
land
to
Surety.
2.
PNs
not
paid;
Surety
paid;
Dacanays
failed
to
reimburse;
Surety
caused
XJ
foreclosure
of
mortgage;
Surety
highest
bidder
at
P2K,
seeks
to
recover
balance
of
P11K,
+10%
atty
fees,
&
costs.
3.
At
Suretys
request,
CFI
caused
summons
to
be
made
by
publication
in
a
newspaper,
but
Dacanays
did
not
appear
w/in
60
days
from
publication.
4.
Surety
asked
that
Dacanays
be
declared
in
default,
but
instead
CFI
asked
them
to
show
cause
why
action
should
not
be
dismissed,
suit
being
in
personam
&
defendants
not
having
appeared;
1970-05-16
CFI
dismissed.
ISSUE:
In
an
action
strictly
in
personam,
may
a
court
validly
acquire
jurisdiction
on
a
non-appearing
defendant
absent
a
personal
service
of
summons
within
the
forum?
HELD:
No.
(1a)
In
an
action
strictly
in
personam,
personal
service
of
summons,
within
the
forum,
is
essential
to
the
acquisition
of
jurisdiction
over
the
person
of
the
defendant,
who
does
not
voluntarily
submit
himself
to
the
authority
of
the
court.
Summons
by
publication
cannot
consistently
with
the
due
process
clause
confer
upon
the
court
jurisdiction
over
said
defendants.
(1b)
Although
a
state
legislature
has
more
control
over
the
form
of
service
on
its
own
residents
than
nonresidents,
it
has
been
held
that
in
actions
in
personam
*
*
*
service
by
publication
on
resident
defendants,
who
are
personally
within
the
state
and
can
be
found
therein
is
not
due
process
of
law,
and
a
statute
allowing
it
is
unconstitutional.
DECISION:
CFI
Order
of
dismissal
set
aside;
proceedings
ordered
suspended
until
Citizens
succeeds
in
ascertaining
whereabouts
of
defendants
&/or
locating
their
property
to
enable
proper
summons.
NOTES:
(1)
The
proper
recourse
for
a
creditor
in
the
same
situation
as
petitioner
is
to
locate
properties,
real
or
personal,
of
the
resident
defendant
debtor
with
unknown
address
and
cause
them
to
be
attached
under
R57S1f,
in
which
case,
the
attachment
converts
the
action
into
a
proceeding
in
rem
or
quasi
in
rem
and
the
summons
by
publication
may
then
accordingly
be
deemed
valid
and
effective.
(2)
The
tolling
of
the
period
of
prescription
for
as
long
as
the
debtor
remains
in
hiding
would
properly
be
a
matter
of
court
record,
and
he
can
not
emerge
after
a
sufficient
lapse
of
time
from
the
dismissal
of
the
case
to
profit
from
his
own
misdeed
and
claim
prescription
of
his
just
debt.
R14-4
Santos,
petitioner-defendant
v
PNOC
Exploration
Corp,
respondent-plaintiff
(2008)
FACTS:
1.
2002-12-23
PNOC
filed
a
Complaint
for
a
sum
of
money
vs
Santos
in
RTC
P700K
balance
of
car
loan
advance
to
Santos
when
he
was
Corps
Board
Director.
1a.
Service
in
person
failed
because
he
could
not
be
located
in
his
last
known
address
despite
earnest
efforts.
1b.
On
PNOCs
Motion,
RTC
allowed
service
by
publication.
1c.
2003-05-20
PNOC
caused
publication
of
summons
in
a
newspaper
of
general
circulation
in
the
Phils;
submitted
affidavit
of
publication
&
affidavit
of
service
by
registered
mail
to
Santos
last
known
address.
1d.
Santos
failed
to
Answer;
PNOC
moved
that
case
be
set
for
reception
of
evidence
ex
parte;
9-11
Motion
granted
1e.
PNOC
ex
parte
presentation
&
formal
offer
of
evidence;
10-15
case
deemed
submitted
for
decision.
1f.
10-28
Santos
filed
Omnibus
MR
(of
9-11
Order)
&
to
Admit
Answer
alleged
(a)
PNOCs
affidavit
of
service
failed
to
comply
w/
R14S19
because
it
was
not
executed
by
the
Clerk
of
Court
&
(b)
he
was
denied
due
process
as
he
was
not
notified
of
9-11
Order
1g.
2004-02-06
RTC
denied
MR
(a)
R14S19
did
not
require
the
affidavit
of
complementary
service
by
registered
mail
to
be
executed
by
the
Clerk
of
Court,
(b)
due
process
observed,
Order
mailed
to
Santos
last
known
address;
denied
Motion
to
Admit
Answer
filed
way
beyond
reglementary
period
2.
Santos
filed
Petition
for
Certiorari
of
9-11
&
2-6
RTC
Orders
(a)
lack
of
J
due
to
improper
service
of
summons,
(b)
no
notice
of
Orders
&
Processes,
(c)
technicality
over
equity
&
justice
1h.
During
pendency
RTC
rendered
Decision
ordering
Santos
to
pay
P700K
+
legal
int
+
costs
of
suit
2a.
9-22
CA
Decision
sustained
9-11
&
2-6
RTC
Orders;
denied
MR
3.
Santos
filed
PR
on
Certiorari
of
CA
Decision
&
Resolution
claims
R14S14
on
service
by
publication
applies
only
to
actions
in
rem,
not
actions
in
personam
ISSUE:
Proper
service
of
summons
by
publication?
Yes.
Did
the
RTC
acquire
jurisdiction
over
the
person
of
Santos?
Yes.
Denial
of
due
process?
No.
HELD:
R14S14
Where
the
defendant
could
not
be
personally
served
with
summons
despite
diligent
efforts
to
locate
his
whereabouts,
he
may
properly
be
served
with
summons
by
publication.
In
rem/in
personam
distinction
was
significant
under
the
old
rule
because
it
was
silent
as
to
the
kind
of
action
to
which
the
rule
was
applicable
but
this
has
been
changed
it
now
applies
to
any
action,
whether
in
personam,
in
rem
or
quasi
in
rem.
R14S19
The
service
of
summons
by
publication
is
complemented
by
service
of
summons
by
registered
mail
to
the
Defendants
last
known
address;
While
the
trial
court
ordinarily
does
the
mailing
of
copies
of
its
orders
and
processes,
the
duty
to
make
the
complementary
service
by
registered
mail
is
imposed
on
the
party
who
resorts
to
service
by
publication.
R14S20
RTC
acquired
jurisdiction
over
the
person
of
Santos
by
his
own
voluntary
appearance
in
the
action
when
he
filed
the
Omnibus
MR
&
to
Admit
Answer
equivalent
to
service
of
summons.
Equity
is
available
only
in
the
absence
of
law,
not
as
its
replacement.
Equity
may
be
applied
only
in
the
absence
of
rules
of
procedure,
never
in
contravention
thereof.
DECISION:
Petition
denied.
NOTES:
(1)
2-6
RTC
Order
Santos
effectively
in
default
RTC
could
not
validly
do
as
an
Order
of
Default
can
be
made
only
upon
motion
of
claiming
party
(2)
Re
no
notice
when
whereabouts
unknown,
nemo
tenetur
ad
impossibile.
The
law
obliges
no
one
to
perform
an
impossibility.
R14-5
Rapid
City
Realty,
petitioner-plaintiff
v
Spouses
Villa,
respondents-defendants
(2010)
CODAL:
R14S20
Voluntary
appearance
FACTS:
1.
2004
Rapid
filed
Complaint
for
declaration
of
nullity
of
subdivision
plans
vs
some
defendants
incl
Villas.
1a.
Process
Server
failed
once
at
personal
service
of
summons;
resorted
to
substituted
service
upon
Villas
2
Househelps
who
did
not
acknowledge
receipt
&
refused
to
divulge
names.
1b.
Villas
did
not
Answer;
2005-05-03
RTC
granted
Rapids
M2DDD.
1c.
2006-01-27
(8+
mos
later)
Villas
filed
Motion
to
Lift
Order
of
Default
they
officially
received
all
papers
on
1-27,
denied
existence
of
2
helpers
&
even
if
true
had
no
authority
to
receive
docs.
1d.
7-17
RTC
set
aside
Order
of
default
&
gave
Villas
5
days
to
answer;
No
Answer.
1e.
2007-02-21
RTC
grants
Rapids
2nd
M2DDD.
1f.
Villas
filed
Omnibus
MR
of
2nd
OD
&
to
vacate
proceedings
claimed
RTC
did
not
acquire
J
over
their
persons
due
to
invalid
service
of
summons.
1g.
5-22
RTC
denied
Omnibus
&
proceeded
to
receive
ex
parte
evidence
for
Rapid.
2.
Villas
filed
w/
CA
Certiorari
of
RTCs
Orders.
1h.
9-4
RTC
Decision
rendered
in
favor
of
Rapid.
2a.
2008-04-29
CA
annulled
RTCs
2nd
OD
Villas
never
raised
any
other
defense
in
avoidance
of
Rapids
claim,
and
instead
focused
all
their
energies
on
questioning
RTCs
jurisdiction.
The
latter
motion
clearly
stated
prefatorily
their
counsels
reservation
or
special
appearance
to
question
jurisdiction
over
the
persons
of
the
Villas;
8-12
CA
denied
Rapids
MR.
3.
Rapid
files
w/
SC
PR
on
certiorari
Villas,
in
filing
1st
MLOD,
voluntarily
submitted
themselves
to
J
of
court.
ISSUE:
Was
Villas
filing
of
1st
MLOD
deemed
voluntary
submission
to
jurisdiction
of
court?
Yes.
HELD:
PCIB
v
Sps
Dy
(2009)
one
who
seeks
an
affirmative
relief
is
deemed
to
have
submitted
to
the
jurisdiction
of
the
court.
X
X
X
the
filing
of
motions
to
admit
answer,
for
additional
time
to
file
answer,
for
reconsideration
of
a
default
judgment,
and
to
lift
order
of
default
with
MR,
is
considered
voluntary
submission
to
the
courts
jurisdiction.
This,
however,
is
tempered
by
the
concept
of
conditional
appearance,
such
that
a
party
who
makes
a
special
appearance
to
challenge,
among
others,
the
courts
jurisdiction
over
his
person
cannot
be
considered
to
have
submitted
to
its
authority.
X
X
X
It
is
thus
clear
that:
(1)
Special
appearance
operates
as
an
exception
to
the
general
rule
on
voluntary
appearance;
(2)
Accordingly,
objections
to
the
jurisdiction
of
the
court
over
the
person
of
the
defendant
must
be
explicitly
made,
i.e.,
set
forth
in
an
unequivocal
manner;
and
(3)
Failure
to
do
so
constitutes
voluntary
submission
to
the
jurisdiction
of
the
court,
especially
in
instances
where
a
pleading
or
motion
seeking
affirmative
relief
is
filed
and
submitted
to
the
court
for
resolution.
DECISION:
Petition
granted;
CA
Decision
reversed
&
set
aside;
Records
remanded
to
RTC.
R14-6
Palma,
petitioner-plaintiff
v
J.
Galvez
&
Agudo,
respondent-defendant
(2010)
CODAL:
R14S16
Residents
temporarily
out
of
the
Philippines;
R14S20
Voluntary
appearance
ACTION:
R65
Petition
for
Certiorari
FACTS:
1.
2003-07-28
Palma
filed
w/
RTC
a
Complaint
for
damages
vs
Phil
Heart
Center,
Drs
Giron
&
Cruz,
alleged
defendants
committed
professional
fault,
negligence
&
omission
(removed
her
right
ovary);
Defendants
filed
respective
Answers.
1a.
Palma
filed
Motion
for
Leave
to
Admit
Amended
Complaint,
prayed
to
implead
additional
defendants,
all
PHC
nurses
including
Agudo;
Summons
issued.
1b.
2004-02-17
Process
Servers
Return
stated
alias
summons
served
upon
Agudo
thru
her
husband
Alfredo
who
received
&
signed
as
she
was
out
of
the
country.
1c.
3-1
Agudos
counsel
filed
Notice
of
Appearance
&
Motion
for
Extension
of
Time
to
File
Answer
1d.
3-15
Counsel
filed
Motion
for
Another
Extension
of
Time
to
File
Answer,
prayed
for
another
20
days.
1e.
3-30
Agudo
filed
M2D
RTC
had
not
acquired
jurisdiction
over
her
as
she
was
not
properly
served
w/
summons
per
R14S16;
Palma
filed
Opposition
-
substituted
service
of
summons
on
Agudos
husband
valid
&
binding
on
her;
service
of
summons
under
R14S16
not
exclusive
&
may
be
effected
by
other
modes
of
service,
i.e.,
by
personal
or
substituted
service.
1f.
5-7
RTC
granted
M2D
&
denied
Palmas
MR
service
of
summons
by
publication
(only)
per
R14S16
Wrong!
ISSUES:
Valid
service
of
summons?
Yes.
Did
RTC
acquire
jurisdiction
over
person
of
Agudo
when
her
counsel
entered
her
appearance
w/o
qualification
&
filed
2
Motex?
Yes.
HELD:
(1)
Montefalcon
v
Vasquez
(2008)
we
said
that
because
R14S16
uses
the
words
may
and
also
it
is
not
mandatory.
Other
methods
of
service
of
summons
allowed
under
the
Rules
may
also
be
availed
of
by
the
serving
officer
on
a
defendant
resident
who
is
temporarily
out
of
the
Philippines.
Thus,
if
a
resident
defendant
is
temporarily
out
of
the
country,
any
of
thefollowing
modes
of
service
may
be
resorted
to:
1R14S7
substituted
service;
2personal
service
outside
the
country,
with
leave
of
court;
3service
by
publication,
also
with
leave
of
court;
or
4in
any
other
manner
the
court
may
deem
sufficient.
(2)
Montalban
v
Maximo
(1968)
we
held
that
substituted
service
of
summons
under
the
present
R14S7
in
a
suit
in
personam
against
residents
of
the
Philippines
temporarily
absent
therefrom
is
the
normal
method
of
service
of
summons
that
will
confer
jurisdiction
on
the
court
over
such
defendant.
(3)
The
filing
of
motions
seeking
affirmative
relief
such
as
to
admit
answer,
for
additional
time
to
file
answer,
for
reconsideration
of
a
default
judgment
and
to
lift
order
of
default
with
motion
for
reconsideration
are
considered
voluntary
submission
to
the
jurisdiction
of
the
court.
DECISION:
Petition
granted.
RTC
Orders
set
aside;
Agudo
directed
to
file
Answer.
NOTES:
R41S1
no
appeal
may
be
taken
from
(g)
a
judgment
or
final
order
for
or
against
one
or
more
of
several
parties
or
in
separate
claims,
counterclaims,
crossclaims
and
third-party
complaints,
while
the
main
case
is
pending,
unless
the
court
allows
an
appeal
therefrom;
R14-7
Chu,
petitioner-defendant
v
Mach
Asia
Trading
Corp,
respondent-plaintiff
(2013)
FACTS:
1.
Chu
purchased
heavy
equipments
from
MATC
3.
Installment
check
payments
bounced.
MATC
sent
formal
demand
letter.
2.
1999-11-11
MATC
filed
Complaint
before
RTC
for
sum
of
money,
replevin,
attys
fees
&
damages.
Prayer
for
P1.66M
unpaid
balance,
25%
of
total
amt
to
be
recovered
as
attys
fees,
litigations
expenses
&
costs.
2a.
11-29
RTC
Order
allowing
issuance
of
writ
of
replevin
(W/R).
2b.
12-9
Sheriff
went
to
Chus
address
to
serve
summons,
complaint,
W/R
&
bond.
Chu
wasnt
there,
so
Sheriff
resorted
to
substituted
service
received
by
Security
Guard.
2c.
Chu
failed
to
file
any
responsive
pleading;
MATC
moved
to
declare
Chu
in
default;
2000-01-12
RTC
issued
Order
declaring
Chu
in
default,
&
thereafter
allowed
MATC
to
present
evidence
ex
parte.
2d.
12-15
RTC
ruled
against
Chu
Ownership
&
possession
of
3
heavy
equipments
to
MATC,
25%
attys
fees,
P15K
litigation
expenses,
P11K
premium
of
replevin
bond.
3.
Chu
petitions
CA
substituted
service
not
valid.
3a.
2007-07-25
CA
affirmed
RTC,
reduced
attys
fees
to
10%
in
the
interest
of
fairness,
process
servers
neglect
or
inadvertence
in
the
service
of
summons
should
not
unduly
prejudice
MATCs
right
to
speedy
justice;
Chu
failed
to
set
up
a
meritorious
defense;
2008-08-28
CA
denied
Chus
MR.
4.
Chu
files
w/
SC
PR
on
certiorari
on
CA
Decision
&
Resolution.
ISSUE:
Improper
substituted
service
of
summons?
Yes.
HELD:
(1)
As
a
rule,
summons
should
be
personally
served
on
the
defendant.
It
is
only
when
summons
cannot
be
served
personally
within
a
reasonable
period
of
time
that
substituted
service
may
be
resorted
to.
(2)
Casimina
v
Legaspi
In
case
of
substituted
service,
there
should
be
a
report
indicating
that
the
person
who
received
the
summons
in
the
defendants
behalf
was
one
with
whom
the
defendant
had
a
relation
of
confidence,
ensuring
that
the
latter
would
actually
receive
the
summons.
(3)
It
was
not
shown
that
the
security
guard
who
received
the
summons
in
behalf
of
the
petitioner
was
authorized
and
possessed
a
relation
of
confidence
that
petitioner
would
definitely
receive
the
summons.
This
is
not
the
kind
of
service
contemplated
by
law.
Thus,
service
on
the
security
guard
could
not
be
considered
as
substantial
compliance
with
the
requirements
of
substituted
service.
(4)
The
service
of
summons
is
a
vital
and
indispensable
ingredient
of
due
process.
As
a
rule,
if
defendants
have
not
been
validly
summoned,
the
court
acquires
no
jurisdiction
over
their
person,
and
a
judgment
rendered
against
them
is
null
and
void.
DECISION:
Petition
granted;
CA
Decision
&
Resolution
reversed
&
set
aside;
12-15
RTC
Decision
null
&
void;
RTC
ordered
to
validly
serve
summons
to
Chu.
NOTES:
CA
if
Chu
had
actually
received
the
summons
through
his
security
guard,
the
requirement
of
due
process
would
have
nevertheless
been
complied
with.
x
x
x.
Based
on
the
presumption
that
a
person
takes
ordinary
care
of
his
concerns,
the
security
guard
would
not
have
allowed
the
sheriff
to
take
possession
of
the
equipments
without
the
prior
permission
of
Chu;
otherwise
he
would
be
accountable
to
Chu
for
the
said
units.
Chu,
for
his
part,
would
not
have
given
his
permission
without
being
informed
of
the
fact
of
the
summons
and
the
writ
of
replevin
issued
by
the
lower
court,
which
permission
includes
the
authority
to
receive
the
summons
and
the
writ
of
replevin.
SC
said
based
merely
on
conjectures
&
surmises.
R14-8
Robinson,
petitioner-defendant
v
Miralles,
respondent-plaintiff
(2006)
FACTS:
1.
2000-08-25
Miralles
filed
w/
RTC
a
Complaint
for
sum
of
money
vs
Robinson.
Miralles
alleged
Robinson
borrowed
$20K
per
1-12
MOA.
1a.
Summons
served
but
per
Sheriffs
2001-03-05
return,
Robinson
no
longer
resides
at
address.
1b.
7-20
RTC
issued
alias
summons
to
be
served
at
Robinsons
new
address
in
Muntinlupa.
1c.
Summons
could
not
be
served.
Per
Sheriffs
return,
subdivision
Security
Guard
on
2
occasions
refused
entry
to
him
(despite
explanations)
per
Robinsons
instructions
not
to
let
anybody
proceed
to
her
house
if
she
is
not
around.
Sheriff
served
summons
by
leaving
copy
w/
Guard
who
refused
to
sign
the
original.
1d.
Miralles
moved
to
declare
Robinson
in
default
for
failure
to
Answer
seasonably
despite
service
of
summons.
1e.
2003-02-28
RTC
granted
Motion
declared
Robinson
in
default
&
allowed
Miralles
to
present
evidence
ex
parte
1f.
6-20
RTC
Order
in
favor
of
Miralles
-
$20K
+
stipulated
interest,
P100K
moral
damages,
P50K
+
1.5K/appearance
attys
fees,
costs
of
suit;
copy
of
Order
sent
to
Robinson
by
registered
mail
at
new
address
1g.
8-8
RTC,
upon
Miralles
Motion,
issued
Writ
of
Execution.
2.
9-26
Robinson
filed
Petition
for
Relief
from
Judgment
by
Default
claimed
improper
service
of
summons
2a.
2004-02-11
RTC
denied
Petition;
5-11
denied
Robinsons
MR
3.
Robinson
filed
w/
SC
PR
on
certiorari
of
RTC
Resolutions
-
claims
service
of
summons
upon
the
subdivision
security
guard
is
not
in
compliance
with
R14S7
since
he
is
not
related
to
her
or
staying
at
her
residence.
Moreover,
he
is
not
duly
authorized
to
receive
summons
for
the
residents
of
the
village.
Hence,
the
substituted
service
of
summons
is
not
valid
and
that
the
trial
court
never
acquired
jurisdiction
over
her
person.
ISSUE:
Valid
substituted
service
of
summons?
Yes.
HELD:
(1)
We
have
ruled
that
the
statutory
requirements
of
substituted
service
must
be
followed
strictly,
faithfully,
and
fully
and
any
substituted
service
other
than
that
authorized
by
the
Rules
is
considered
ineffective.
However,
we
frown
upon
an
overly
strict
application
of
the
Rules.
It
is
the
spirit,
rather
than
the
letter
of
the
procedural
rules,
that
governs.
(2)
It
was
impossible
for
the
sheriff
to
effect
personal
or
substituted
service
of
summons
upon
petitioner.
We
note
that
she
failed
to
controvert
the
sheriffs
declaration.
Nor
did
she
deny
having
received
the
summons
through
the
security
guard.
Considering
her
strict
instruction
to
the
security
guard,
she
must
bear
its
consequences.
DECISION:
Petition
denied.
RTC
Orders
affirmed.
R16-1
Figueroa,
petitioner-accused
v
People,
respondent-plaintiff
(2008)
FACTS:
1.
Bus
driver
Figueroa
hit
&
killed
Lopez;
2.
1994-07-08
Info
for
reckless
imprudence
resulting
in
homicide
filed
vs
Figueroa
before
RTC;
2a.
1998-08-19
RTC
found
Figueroa
guilty;
3.
Figueroa
on
appeal
before
CA
questioned
for
1st
time
RTCs
jurisdiction;
3a.
CA
held
Figueroa
actively
participated
in
the
trial
and
belatedly
attacked
the
jurisdiction
of
the
RTC
=>
already
estopped
by
laches
from
asserting
RTCs
lack
of
jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Estopped
by
laches?
No.
HELD:
(1)
The
general
rule
should
be,
as
it
has
always
been,
that
the
issue
of
jurisdiction
may
be
raised
at
any
stage
of
the
proceedings,
even
on
appeal,
and
is
not
lost
by
waiver
or
by
estoppel
estoppel
by
laches,
to
bar
a
litigant
from
asserting
the
courts
absence
or
lack
of
jurisdiction,
only
supervenes
in
exceptional
cases
similar
to
the
factual
milieu
of
Tijam
v
Sibonghanoy.
(2)
Wisdoms
Admr
v
Sims
Delay
alone,
though
unreasonable,
will
not
sustain
the
defense
of
estoppel
by
laches
unless
it
further
appears
that
the
party,
knowing
his
rights,
has
not
sought
to
enforce
them
until
the
condition
of
the
party
pleading
laches
has
in
good
faith
become
so
changed
that
he
cannot
be
restored
to
his
former
state,
if
the
rights
be
then
enforced,
due
to
1loss
of
evidence,
2change
of
title,
3intervention
of
equities,
and
4other
causes.
(3)
Estoppel,
being
in
the
nature
of
a
forfeiture,
is
not
favored
by
law.
It
is
to
be
applied
1rarely,
2only
from
necessity,
and
3only
in
extraordinary
circumstances;
When
misapplied,
the
doctrine
of
estoppel
may
be
a
most
effective
weapon
for
the
accomplishment
of
injustice.
DECISION:
Criminal
case
dismissed
without
prejudice.
R16-2
Soliven,
petitioner-plaintiff
v
Fast
Forms
Phils
Inc,
respondent-defendant
(2004)
FACTS:
1.
1993-06-02
P170K
loan
from
Soliven
to
FF;
FF
defaulted;
2.
1994-05-20
Soliven
filed
Complaint
before
Makati
RTC
for
P195K
actual
damages,
200K
moral,
100K
exemplary,
100K
atty
fees,
&
costs
of
suit.
2a.
1995-07-03
RTC
held
in
favor
of
Soliven,
but
awarded
no
moral
&
exemplary
2b.
FF
filed
for
MR
on
ground
of
lack
of
jurisdiction
because
amount
does
not
exceed
P200K
2c.
10-11
RTC
denied
MR:
1It
has
jurisdiction
because
totality
of
claim
>
P200K
()
&
2FF
estopped
()
3.
1999-02-08
CA
reversed
RTC:
1claim
only
P195K
&
w/in
MeTC
jurisdiction
(),
&
2FF
may
assail
jurisdiction
anytime
3a.
6-17
CA
denied
Solivens
MR.
ISSUES:
(1)
Which
Court
has
jurisdiction?
MeTC.
(2)
Is
Fast
Forms
estopped?
Yes.
HELD:
(1)
The
exclusion
of
the
term
damages
of
whatever
kind
in
determining
the
jurisdictional
amount
under
BP
129
Sec
19(8)
&
Sec
33(1)
applies
to
cases
where
the
damages
are
merely
incidental
to
or
a
consequence
of
the
main
cause
of
action.
However,
in
cases
where
the
claim
for
damages
is
the
main
cause
of
action,
or
one
of
the
causes
of
action,
the
amount
of
such
claim
shall
be
considered
in
determining
the
jurisdiction
of
the
court.
Here,
the
main
cause
of
action
is
for
the
recovery
of
sum
of
money
amounting
to
only
P195K.
The
damages
being
claimed
by
petitioner
are
merely
the
consequences
of
this
main
cause
of
action.
Hence,
they
are
not
included
in
determining
the
jurisdictional
amount.
=>
MeTC
has
jurisdiction.
(2)
A
party
cannot
invoke
the
jurisdiction
of
a
court
to
secure
affirmative
relief
against
his
opponent
and
after
obtaining
or
failing
to
obtain
such
relief,
repudiate
or
question
that
same
jurisdiction.
DECISION:
Petition
granted;
CA
reversed;
RTC
affirmed.
R16-3
HSBC,
plaintiff-appellee
v
Aldecoa,
defendants-appelants
&
Urquhart,
intervener-appelant
(1915)
CODAL:
R16S1(e)
Litis
pendencia
FACTS:
a.
1903
Defendant
Isabel
emancipated
her
2
sons
Joaquin
&
Zoilo
w/
their
consent
&
acceptance.
b.
J
&
Z
participated
in
management
of
Aldecoa
&
Co
as
partners
c.
1906
Aldecoa
obtained
P450K
credit
from
HSBC;
mortgaged
property
d.
1906-12-31
Aldecoa
went
into
liquidation
on
account
of
expiration
of
term
for
w/c
it
was
organized;
Urquhart
elected
liquidator
e.
1908-10
Joaquin
&
Zoila
filed
for
annulment
of
mortgage
on
ground
that
the
emancipation
by
their
mother
was
null
&
void
&
therefore
they
were
minors
incapable
of
creating
a
valid
mortgage;
CFI
dismissed
Complaint
as
to
Joaquin
(ratification
after
becoming
of
age),
but
annulled
mortagages
wrt
Zoilo.
f.
1911
-
HSBC
successfully
sued
for
recovery
of
money,
CFI
ordered
Aldecoas
mortgage
foreclosed
ISSUE:
Litis
pendencia?
No.
HELD:
(1)
The
principle
upon
which
a
plea
of
another
action
pending
is
sustained
is
that
the
later
action
is
deemed
unnecessary
and
vexatious.
(2)
Watson
v
Jones
Requisites
of
litis
pendencia:
1There
must
be
the
asame
parties,
or
at
least
such
as
represent
the
bsame
interests.
2There
must
be
the
asame
rights
asserted
and
the
bsame
relief
prayed
for.
3This
relief
must
be
founded
on
the
asame
facts,
and
the
title
or
bessential
basis
of
the
relief
sought
must
be
the
same.
4The
identity
in
these
particulars
should
be
such
that
if
the
pending
case
had
already
been
disposed
of,
it
could
be
pleaded
in
bar
as
a
former
adjudication
of
the
same
matter
between
the
same
parties.
(3)
A
plea
of
the
pendency
of
a
prior
action
is
not
available
unless
the
prior
action
is
of
such
a
character
that,
had
a
judgment
been
rendered
therein
on
the
merits,
such
a
judgment
would
be
conclusive
between
the
parties
and
could
be
pleaded
in
bar
of
the
second
action.
The
rule
is
applicable,
between
the
same
parties,
only
when
the
judgment
to
be
rendered
in
the
action
first
instituted
will
be
such
that,
regardless
of
what
party
is
successful,
it
will
amount
to
res
adjudicata
against
the
second
action.
(4)
A
pending
action
to
annul
a
mortgage
is
not
a
bar
to
an
action
for
foreclosure
of
the
same
mortgage,
for
the
reason
that,
although
the
parties
are
or
may
be
the
same,
the
rights
asserted
and
the
relief
prayed
for
in
the
two
actions
are
entirely
dissimilar.
DECISION:
CFI
Order
of
foreclosure
affirmed.
R16-4
Tijam
et
al,
plaintiffs-appellees
v
Sibonghanoy
et
al,
defendants
&
Manila
Surety,
defendant-appellant
1968
DOCTRINE:
Laches
Exception
to
the
rule
that
jurisdiction
over
the
subject
matter
may
be
raised
at
any
stage
of
the
proceedings;
FACTS:
1.
7-19
(1
month
after
effectivity
of
1948
Judiciary
Act)
Sps
Tijam
sued
Sps
Sibonghanoy
before
CFI
for
recovery
of
P1,908.
a.
As
prayed
for,
Writ
of
Attachment
issued
vs
Sibonghanoys
property,
but
soon
dissolved
upon
filing
of
counter-
bond
by
Sibonghanoy
&
Manila
Surety.
b.
Sibonghanoys
filed
Answer
w/
some
admissions
&
denials,
&
interposed
counterclaim;
Tijams
answered.
c.
CFI
ruled
in
favor
of
Tijams;
Writ
of
Execution
vs
Sibonghanoys
returned
unsatisfied;
d.
Tijams
moved
for
IWX
vs
Surety
e.
Surety
opposed
on
ground
of
failure
to
prosecute
&
lack
of
demand,
&
prayed
for
affirmative
relief
(from
liability
under
counter-bond).
f.
Tijams
MIWX
denied
for
lack
of
demand;
later
made
demand,
then
filed
2nd
MIWX
vs
counter-bond.
g.
Surety
moved
to
extend
time
to
answer
but
still
failed;
CFI
granted
Motion
&
issued
W/X
h.
Surety
moved
to
quash
writ
on
ground
it
was
issued
w/o
reqd
summary
hearing
i.
CFI
denied
Suretys
M2Q
&
MR;
2.
Surety
appealed
to
CA
from
CFIs
denial
of
its
M2Q
&
MR;
1962-12-11
CA
affirmed
CFI
Orders;
a.
1963-01-08
Surety
moved
to
extend
time
to
file
MR;
1-10
granted
b.
1-12
Surety
filed
M2D
on
ground
of
CFIs
lack
of
jurisdiction
per
1948
Judiciary
Act
(P2K
jurisdictional
amount).
c.
CA
required
Tijams
to
answer
M2D,
but
Tijams
failed
to
do
so.
d.
5-20
CA
set
aside
its
Decision
&
certified
case
to
SC
SC
has
the
exclusive
appellate
jurisdiction
over
all
cases
in
which
the
jurisdiction
of
any
inferior
court
is
in
issue.
ISSUE:
May
a
M2D
on
ground
of
lack
of
jurisdiction
over
subject
matter
be
barred
by
laches?
Yes.
HELD:
(1)
The
rule
is
that
jurisdiction
over
the
subject
matter
is
conferred
upon
the
courts
exclusively
by
law,
and
as
the
lack
of
it
affects
the
very
authority
of
the
court
to
take
cognizance
of
the
case,
the
objection
may
be
raised
at
any
stage
of
the
proceedings.
However,
considering
the
facts
and
circumstances
of
the
present
case,
a
party
may
be
barred
by
laches
from
invoking
this
plea
for
the
first
time
on
appeal
for
the
purpose
of
annulling
everything
done
in
the
case
with
the
active
participation
of
said
party
invoking
the
plea.
(2)
Laches,
in
a
general
sense,
is
failure
or
neglect,
for
an
unreasonable
and
unexplained
length
of
time,
to
do
that
which,
by
exercising
due
diligence,
could
or
should
have
been
done
earlier;
it
is
negligence
or
omission
to
assert
a
right
within
a
reasonable
time,
warranting
a
presumption
that
the
party
entitled
to
assert
it
either
has
abandoned
it
or
declined
to
assert
it.
(3)
The
doctrine
of
laches
or
of
stale
demands
is
based
upon
grounds
of
public
policy
which
requires,
for
the
peace
of
society,
the
discouragement
of
stale
claims
and,
unlike
the
statute
of
limitations,
is
not
a
mere
question
of
time
but
is
principally
a
question
of
the
inequity
or
unfairness
of
permitting
a
right
or
claim
to
be
enforced
or
asserted.
(4)
It
is
not
right
for
a
party
who
has
affirmed
and
invoked
the
jurisdiction
of
a
court
in
a
particular
matter
to
secure
an
affirmative
relief,
to
afterwards
deny
that
same
jurisdiction
to
escape
penalty.
We
frown
upon
the
undesirable
practice
of
a
party
submitting
his
case
for
decision
and
then
accepting
the
judgment,
only
if
favorable,
and
attacking
it
for
lack
of
jurisdiction,
when
adverse.
DECISION:
CFI
Orders
affirmed;
M2D
denied.
NOTES:
Kinds
of
estoppel
in
pais;
by
deed
or
by
record;
by
laches.
R17-1
Shimizu,
petitioner-plaintiff
v
Magsalin,
FGU
IC,
respondents-defendants
CODAL:
R17S3
Motu
propio
dismissal
on
the
ground
of
non
prosequitur
FACTS:
1.
Shimizu
alleged
Magsalin
(Karens
Trading)
breached
subcontract
for
supply
&
install
of
tiles
in
condo
&
refused
to
return
unliquidated
advance
payment.
Shimizu
sent
notice
to
Surety
FGU
demanding
damages
per
surety
&
performance
bonds
it
issued
for
the
subcontract.
2.
2002-04-30
Shimizu
filed
complaint
with
Makati
RTC
vs
Magsalin
&
FGU,
seeking
P2.3M
in
actual
damages.
3.
FGU
duly
served
with
summons
but
Magsalin
could
not
be
located
at
their
given
address,
new
address
could
not
be
determined.
4.
2002-08
FGU
filed
M2D,
Shimizu
filed
opposition;
M2D
&
ensuing
MR
denied;
FGU
obliged
to
file
Answer.
5.
2002-10
Shimizu
filed
M4L
to
serve
summons
on
Magsalin
by
publication
6.
2003-01
Shimizu
filed
Reply
to
FGUs
Answer
7.
2003-02
FGU
filed
M4L
to
file
3PC
vs
Baetiong
&
Garcias
as
counter-guaranties;
RTC
admitted
3PC
&
denied
Shimizus
M4L
to
serve
summons
by
publication
on
ground
that
action
is
in
personam.
8.
2003-05
RTC
issued
notice
setting
hearing
for
2003-06-20,
FGU
filed
motion
to
cancel
on
ground
that
3rd
party
defendants
had
not
yet
filed
Answer,
motion
granted.
9.
2003-06
Baetiong
filed
Answer
denying
personal
knowledge;
Garcias
could
not
be
located
at
their
given
addresses.
10.
Shimizu
claims
(a)
it
was
not
served
w/
copy
of
Baetiongs
Answer,
(b)
FGU
failed
to
exert
efforts
to
serve
summons
to
Garcias
&
should
have
filed
motion
to
serve
summons
by
publication,
(c)
RTC
should
have
scheduled
hearing
to
determine
status
of
summons
to
3rd
party
defendants.
11.
2003-12-16
RTC
tersely
ordered
case
dismissed
for
failure
of
Shimizu
to
prosecute;
denied
Shimizus
MR.
12.
RTCs
order
of
dismissal
did
not
state
if
it
was
issued
upon
respondents
motion
so
SC
assumed
motu
propio.
13.
Shimizu
filed
R41
P4R
w/
CA;
FGU
moved
for
dismissal
on
ground
of
lack
of
jurisdiction
because
the
appeal
raised
pure
Q
of
law;
Shimizu
insists
it
involves
Qs
of
facts
based
on
the
records
of
the
case
(i.e.,
need
to
examine
all
pleadings
&
orders
of
lower
court
to
determine
if
there
was
failure
to
prosecute.
14.
CA
dismissed
appeal
&
subsequent
MR;
Shimizu
filed
R45
petition
for
review
on
certiorari.
ISSUE:
Valid
dismissal
order?
No.
HELD:
(1)
Dismissal
order
null
&
void
for
violation
of
due
process;
Shimizus
appeal
to
challenge
dismissal
order
properly
filed
under
R41;
Dismissal
for
failure
to
prosecute
not
supported
by
facts/records
of
the
case.
(2)
When
a
complaint
is
dismissed
for
failure
to
prosecute
and
the
dismissal
is
unqualified,
the
dismissal
has
the
effect
of
an
adjudication
on
the
merits.
(3)
A
trial
court
should
always
specify
the
reasons
for
a
complaints
dismissal
so
that
on
appeal,
the
reviewing
court
can
readily
determine
the
prima
facie
justification
for
the
dismissal.
(4)
A
void
decision
is
open
to
collateral
attack.
SC
is
vested
with
ample
authority
to
review
an
unassigned
error
if
it
finds
that
consideration
and
resolution
are
indispensable
or
necessary
in
arriving
at
a
just
decision
in
an
appeal.
(Shimizu
did
not
raise
validity
of
dismissal
order
wrt
R36S1.)
(5)
The
fundamental
test
for
non
prosequitur
is
whether,
under
the
circumstances,
the
plaintiff
is
chargeable
with
want
of
due
diligence
in
failing
to
proceed
with
reasonable
promptitude.
There
must
be
unwillingness
on
the
part
of
the
plaintiff
to
prosecute.
DECISION:
Petition
granted;
CA
reversed
&
set
aside;
RTC
order
null
&
void;
Complaint
reinstated
R19-1
Metrobank,
petitioner-plaintiff
v
Pres.
Judge,
RTC
Manila
Br
39,
CA,
&
Raycor
Aircontrol,
respondent-
defendant,
1990-09-21
FACTS:
1.
Good
Earth
Emporium
executed
chattel
mortgage
in
favor
of
Metrobank
over
A/C
units
installed
in
GEE
bldg;
Uniwide
&
BPI-Consortium
acquired
bldg
in
auction
sale.
RTC:
2.
Metro
filed
complaint
for
replevin
vs
Uni/BPI
for
recovery
of
possession
of
A/Cs
or
for
Uni/BPI
to
solidarily
pay
unpaid
obligations
on
the
A/Cs;
alleged
loan
of
4.9M
(4.25M
Raycor
A/C
System
+
625K
installation
cost).
3.
1986-07
Uni/BPI
filed
Answer.
4.
1986-07-17
Raycor
filed
M4L
to
intervene,
alleged
it
has
a
direct
and
immediate
interest
on
the
subject
matter
of
the
litigation
such
that
it
will
either
gain
or
lose
by
the
direct
legal
operation
and
effect
of
the
judgment.
(Raycor
seeks
150K
from
the
625K
sought
by
Metro
as
installation
cost.)
5.
1986-08-08
RTC
admitted
intervention
complaint
after
no
opposition.
6.
1986-11-19
Metrobank
filed
Answer
to
Intervention
Complaint.
7.
1987-08-03
RTC
set
case
for
trial
on
merits
on
09-15,
but
on
09-07
Metro
&
Uni/BPI
filed
motion
for
postponement
&
asked
for
30
days
within
w/c
to
submit
compromise
agreement.
8.
1988-03-15
Metro
&
BPI
filed
joint
M2D
9.
1988-03-18
RTC
issued
order
dismissing
case
with
prejudice.
10.
1988-04-19
Raycor
filed
MR
of
dismissal
order,
claimed
it
was
not
furnished
copy
of
JM2D
&
that
it
received
dismissal
order
only
on
04-04.
11.
1988-06-02
RTC
issued
order
granting
Raycors
MR.
12.
1988-08-02
Raycor
filed
motion
to
admit
amended
complaint
&
attached
Amended
Intervention
Complaint.
13.
Metro
filed
opposition;
Raycor
filed
Reply;
Metro
filed
Rejoinder
14.
1989-01-11
RTC
issued
order
admitting
amended
complaint
in
intervention.
15.
1989-02-09
Metro
filed
Motex
for
15
days
to
file
Answer
to
AIC;
02-17
Raycor
filed
opposition
to
Motex
&
motion
to
declare
Metro
in
default
on
the
AIC;
RTC
granted
Motex;
02-18
Metro
filed
Answer
to
ACI
w/
Counterclaim.
CA:
16.
1989-04-14
Metro
filed
petition
for
certiorari
&
mandamus
w/
CA,
contended
RTC
committed
GADALJ
in
allowing
intervention
suit
to
survive
despite
dismissal
of
main
action
&
in
admitting
ACI.
17.
1989-07-19
CA
found
no
merit
&
dismissed
petition.
ISSUES:
(A)
GAD
in
reversing
dismissal
order?
(B)
GAD
in
admitting
ACI?
HELD:
(A)
No.
(1)
There
is
here
no
final
dismissal
of
the
main
case.
The
1988-06-02
RTC
order
has
the
effect
not
only
of
allowing
the
intervention
suit
to
proceed
but
also
of
vacating
its
previous
order
of
dismissal.
The
reinstatement
of
the
case
in
order
to
try
and
determine
the
claims
and
rights
of
the
intervenor
is
proper.
The
joint
motion
of
therein
plaintiff
and
the
original
defendants
to
dismiss
the
case,
without
notice
to
and
consent
of
the
intervenor,
has
the
effect
of
putting
to
rest
only
the
respective
claims
of
the
said
original
parties
inter
se,
but
the
same
cannot
in
any
way
affect
the
claim
of
intervenor
Raycor
which
was
allowed
by
the
court
to
intervene
without
opposition
from
the
original
parties.
(2)
Intervention
is
a
proceeding
in
a
suit
or
action
by
which
a
third
person
is
permitted
by
the
court
to
make
himself
a
party,
either
(a)
joining
plaintiff
in
claiming
what
is
sought
by
the
complaint,
or
(b)
uniting
with
defendant
in
resisting
the
claims
of
plaintiff,
or
(c)
demanding
something
adversely
to
both
of
them;
the
act
or
proceeding
by
which
a
third
person
becomes
a
party
in
a
suit
pending
between
others;
the
admission,
by
leave
of
court,
of
a
person
not
an
original
party
to
pending
legal
proceedings,
by
which
such
person
becomes
a
party
thereto
for
the
protection
of
some
right
of
interest
alleged
by
him
to
be
affected
by
such
proceedings.
(3)
A
person
may,
before
or
during
a
trial,
be
permitted
by
the
court,
in
its
discretion,
to
intervene
in
an
action
when
he
is
so
situated
as
to
be
adversely
affected
by
a
distribution
or
other
disposition
of
property
or
has
a
legal
interest
in
the
matter
in
litigation.
The
intervenor
in
a
pending
case
is
entitled
to
be
heard
like
any
other
party.
A
claim
in
intervention
that
seeks
affirmative
relief
prevents
a
plaintiff
from
taking
a
voluntary
dismissal
of
the
main
action.
Where
a
complaint
in
intervention
was
filed
before
plaintiffs
action
had
been
expressly
dismissed,
the
intervenors
complaint
was
not
subject
to
dismissal
on
the
ground
that
no
action
was
pending,
since
dismissal
of
plaintiffs
action
did
not
affect
the
rights
of
the
intervenor
or
affect
the
dismissal
of
intervenors
complaint.
An
intervenors
petition
showing
it
to
be
entitled
to
affirmative
relief
will
be
preserved
and
heard
regardless
of
the
disposition
of
the
principal
action.
(4)
To
require
Raycor
to
refile
another
case
for
the
settlement
of
its
claim
will
result
in
unnecessary
delay
and
expenses
and
will
entail
multiplicity
of
suits
and,
therefore,
defeat
the
very
purpose
of
intervention
which
is
to
hear
and
determine
at
the
same
time
all
conflicting
claims
which
may
be
made
on
the
subject
matter
in
litigation,
and
to
expedite
litigation
and
settle
in
one
action
and
by
a
single
judgment
the
whole
controversy
among
the
persons
involved.
(B)
No.
(1)
Granting
of
leave
to
file
an
amended
pleading
is
a
matter
particularly
addressed
to
the
sound
discretion
ofvthe
trial
court
and
that
discretion
is
broad,
subject
only
to
the
limitations
that
the
amendments
should
not
substantially
change
the
cause
of
action
or
alter
the
theory
of
the
case
or
that
it
was
made
to
delay
the
action.
The
amended
complaint
in
intervention
shows
that
it
merely
supplements
an
incomplete
allegation
of
the
cause
of
action
stated
in
the
original
complaint
so
as
to
submit
the
real
matter
in
dispute.
Contrary
to
Metros
contention,
it
does
not
substantially
change
intervenors
cause
of
action
or
alter
the
theory
of
the
case,
hence
its
allowance
is
in
order.
(2)
In
determining
whether
a
different
cause
of
action
is
introduced
by
amendments
to
the
complaint,
what
is
to
be
ascertained
is
whether
the
defendant
shall
be
required
to
answer
for
a
liability
or
legal
obligation
wholly
different
from
that
which
was
stated
in
the
original
complaint.
An
amendment
will
not
be
considered
as
stating
a
new
cause
of
action
if
the
facts
alleged
in
the
amended
complaint
show
substantially
the
same
wrong
with
respect
to
the
same
transaction,
or
if
what
are
alleged
refer
to
the
same
matter
but
are
more
fully
and
differently
stated,
or
where
averments
which
were
implied
are
made
in
expressed
terms,
and
the
subject
of
the
controversy
or
the
liability
sought
to
be
enforced
remains
the
same.
(3)
Leave
of
court
may
be
refused
if
it
appears
that
the
motion
was
made
with
intent
to
delay
or
that
the
cause
of
action
is
substantially
altered.
The
courts
should
be
liberal
in
allowing
amendments
to
pleadings
to
avoid
multiplicity
of
suits
and
in
order
that
the
real
controversies
between
the
parties
are
presented,
their
rights
determined
and
the
case
decided
on
the
merits
without
unnecessary
delay.
This
liberality
is
greatest
in
the
early
stages
of
a
lawsuit,
especially
in
this
case
where
the
amendment
to
the
complaint
in
intervention
was
made
before
trial
of
the
case
thereby
giving
petitioner
all
the
time
allowed
by
law
to
answer
and
to
prepare
for
trial.
DECISION:
Petition
denied;
CA
affirmed.
R37-1
NEYPES,
et
al,
petitioners-plaintiffs
v
CA,
Heirs
of
Bernardo,
Land
Bank,
respondents-defendants
(2005)
ACTION:
Annulment
of
judgment
&
titles
of
land
&/or
reconveyance
&/or
reversion
w/
preliminary
injunction
FACTS:
1.
Heirs
filed
M2D
on
the
ground
of
prescription;
97-5-16
RTC
denied
M2D;
Heirs
filed
MR;
98-2-12
RTC
dismissed
complaint
on
ground
of
prescription;
3-3
Neypes
received
order
of
dismissal;
3-18
(+15
days)
Neypes
filed
MR;
7-1
RTC
dismissed
Neypes
MR;
07-22
Neypes
received
order
of
dismissal
of
MR;
2.
07-27
(+5
days)
Neypes
filed
notice
of
appeal;
8-3
paid
appeal
fees;
8-4
RTC
denied
appeal,
filed
8
days
late;
8-31
Neypes
received
order
denying
appeal;
filed
MR;
9-3
RTC
denied
MR;
3.
Neypes
filed
R65
certiorari
&
mandamus
before
CA
reglementary
period
started
to
run
on
7-22
(receipt
of
order
of
dismissal
of
MR);
CA
dismissed
15-day
period
s/b
reckoned
from
3-3
(receipt
of
order
of
dismissal
of
complaint);
Neypes
filed
MR;
CA
denied
MR
4.
Neypes
files
R45
petition
for
review
ISSUE:
Did
Neypes
appeal
on
time?
Yes.
What
is
final
order
in
R41S3?
Ans.
Order
denying
MR
HELD:
(1)
The
right
to
appeal
is
neither
a
natural
right
nor
a
part
of
due
process;
It
is
merely
a
statutory
privilege
and
may
be
exercised
only
in
the
manner
and
in
accordance
with
the
provisions
of
law.
(2)
An
appeal
should
be
taken
within
15
days
from
the
notice
of
judgment
or
final
order
appealed
from.
Per
jurisprudence
=>
final
order
is
order
denying
MR.
Intramuros
Tennis
Club
v
Philippine
Tourism
Authority:
A
final
judgment
or
order
is
one
that
finally
disposes
of
a
case,
leaving
nothing
more
for
the
court
to
do
with
respect
to
it.
It
is
an
adjudication
on
the
merits
which,
considering
the
evidence
presented
at
the
trial,
declares
categorically
what
the
rights
and
obligations
of
the
parties
are;
or
it
may
be
an
order
or
judgment
that
dismisses
an
action.
(3)
Perfection
of
an
appeal
in
the
manner
and
within
the
period
permitted
by
law
is
not
only
mandatory
but
also
jurisdictional,
except
substantial
justice,
extraordinary
situations.
(4)
Fresh
Period
Rule
or
NEYPES
RULE
Court
deems
it
practical
to
allow
a
fresh
period
of
15
days
within
which
to
file
the
notice
of
appeal
in
the
RTC,
counted
from
receipt
of
the
order
dismissing
a
motion
for
a
new
trial
or
motion
for
reconsideration
to
standardize
the
appeal
periods
provided
in
the
Rules;
(2b)
The
question
of
whether
evidence
is
newly
discovered
has
two
aspects
1a
temporal
one,
ie
when
was
the
evidence
discovered,
and
2a
predictive
one,
ie
when
should
or
could
it
have
been
discovered.
(2c)
It
is
contrary
to
human
experience
to
have
overlooked
an
evidence
which
was
decisively
claimed
to
have
such
significance
that
might
probably
change
the
judgment.
DECISION:
Petition
dismissed.
R37
Cansino
v
CA,
2003
HELD:
(1)
R135S5(g)
provides
that
courts
have
the
inherent
power
to
amend
their
decisions
to
make
them
conformable
to
law
and
justice.
This
prerogative,
however,
is
not
absolute.
The
rules
do
not
contemplate
amendments
that
are
substantial
in
nature
(Unidad
v
CA,
GR
129201,
2003).
They
merely
cover
formal
changes
or
such
that
will
not
affect
the
crux
of
the
decision,
like
the
correction
of
typographical
or
clerical
errors.
Courts
will
violate
due
process
if
they
make
substantial
amendments
in
their
decisions
without
affording
the
other
party
the
right
to
contest
the
new
evidence
presented
in
a
motion
for
reconsideration.
(2)
It
is
implicitly
clear
from
Rule
37
that
a
motion
for
reconsideration
cannot
be
used
as
a
vehicle
to
introduce
new
evidence.
(3)
For
newly
discovered
evidence
to
warrant
a
new
trial,
(a)
it
must
have
been
discovered
after
trial,
(b)
it
could
NOT
have
been
discovered
or
produced
at
the
trial
despite
reasonable
diligence,
(c)
it
must
be
material
and
not
merely
collateral,
cumulative,
corroborative
or
purely
for
impeaching
a
witness,
merely
important
evidence
being
not
enough,
and
(d)
if
presented,
would
probably
alter
the
result
of
the
action.
(Pantig
v
Baltazar,
191
SCRA
830,
1990).
R37
People
v
Del
Mundo,
1996
HELD:
(1)
While
the
NBI
Medico
Legal
report
cannot
be
considered
new
and
material
evidence
which
accused
could
not
with
reasonable
diligence
have
discovered
and
produced
at
the
trial,
we
grant
the
motion
for
NEW
TRIAL
on
the
broader
ground
of
substantial
justice,
taking
into
account
the
variance
in
the
two
aforesaid
reports.
It
is
the
sense
of
this
Court
that
such
serious
discrepancy
raised
substantial
doubt
as
to
the
guilt
of
the
accused-appellant.
Furthermore,
the
penalty
imposed
on
accused-appellant
is
death.
Here
is
a
situation
where
a
rigid
application
of
the
rules
must
bow
to
the
overriding
goal
of
courts
of
justice
to
render
justice
to
secure
to
every
individual
all
possible
legal
means
to
prove
his
innocence
of
a
crime
of
which
he
is
charged.
(2)
The
rule
for
granting
a
motion
for
NEW
TRIAL,
among
others,
should
be
liberally
construed
to
assist
the
parties
in
obtaining
a
just
and
speedy
determination
of
their
rights.
Court
litigations
are
primarily
for
the
search
of
truth,
and
a
liberal
interpretation
of
the
rules
by
which
both
parties
are
given
the
fullest
opportunity
to
adduce
proofs
is
the
best
way
to
ferret
out
such
truth.
The
dispensation
of
justice
and
vindication
of
legitimate
grievances
should
not
be
barred
by
technicalities.
R37
Cuenca
v
CA,
1995
HELD:
(1)
Although
in
Goduco
v
CA
(14
SCRA
282
[1965])
decided
some
twenty
(20)
years
ago,
this
Court
ruled
that
it
is
not
authorized
to
entertain
a
motion
for
reconsideration
and/or
new
trial
predicated
on
allegedly
newly
discovered
evidence
the
rationale
of
which
being:
The
judgment
of
the
Court
of
Appeals
is
conclusive
as
to
the
facts,
and
cannot
be
reviewed
by
the
Supreme
Court.
Accordingly,
in
an
appeal
by
certiorari
to
the
Supreme
Court,
the
latter
has
no
jurisdiction
to
entertain
a
motion
for
new
trial
on
the
ground
of
newly
discovered
evidence,
for
only
questions
of
fact
are
involved
therein,
the
rule
now
appears
to
have
been
relaxed,
if
not
abandoned,
in
subsequent
cases
like
Helmuth,
Jr.
v
People
and
People
v.
Amparado.
R37
People
v
Amparado,
1987
HELD:
While,
as
contended
by
the
Solicitor,
the
testimony
of
Violeta
Amparado
could
not
be
considered
as
newly-
discovered
nor
could
it
materially
affect
the
judgment,
said
testimony
being
merely
cumulative
in
character,
We
find
the
proposed
testimonies
of
Antonio
Cachin,
Jr.,
and
Manuel
Henry
Auza
to
be
newly
discovered
and
of
sufficient
weight
and
character
as
to
alter
the
outcome
of
the
case.
DECISION:
Accuseds
motion
for
NEW
TRIAL
granted.
R37
Helmuth
v
People,
1982
HELD:
While
an
affidavit
of
a
co-accused
(subsequently
acquitted)
executed
after
trial
has
no
probative
value
as
to
the
conviction
below
based,
on
circumstantial
evidence,
of
the
petitioner,
the
Supreme
Court
may
brush
aside
technicalities
and
consider
the
existence
of
said
affidavit
as
basis
for
NEW
TRIAL.
R37
PAL
v
Salcedo,
1967
HELD:
(1)
Where1the
testimony
is
newly
discovered
and
2respondents
were
not
negligent
in
securing
the
same,
=>
grant
of
NEW
TRIAL
was
proper.
(2)
The
granting
or
denial
of
a
NEW
TRIAL
is
addressed
to
the
sound
discretion
of
the
trial
court.
R38
Redea
v
CA,
2007
HELD:
(2)
Petition
for
relief
under
Rule
38
of
the
Rules
of
Court
is
of
equitable
character,
allowed
only
in
exceptional
cases
as
when
there
is
no
other
available
or
adequate
remedy.
Hence,
a
petition
for
relief
may
not
be
availed
of
where
a
party
has
another
adequate
remedy
available
to
him,
which
is
either
a
motion
for
new
trial
or
appeal
from
the
adverse
decision
of
the
lower
court,
and
he
is
not
prevented
from
filing
such
motion
or
taking
the
appeal.
The
rule
is
that
relief
will
not
be
granted
to
a
party
who
seeks
to
be
relieved
from
the
effect
of
the
judgment
when
the
loss
of
the
remedy
at
law
is
due
to
his
own
negligence,
or
a
mistaken
mode
of
procedure;
otherwise,
the
petition
for
relief
will
be
tantamount
to
reviving
the
right
of
appeal
which
has
already
been
lost
either
because
of
inexcusable
negligence
or
due
to
a
mistake
in
the
mode
of
procedure
taken
by
counsel.
R39-1
DE
LEON
v
Public
Estates
Authority/Paraaque
(2010,
GR181970)
R45
PR/C
of
CA
decision
PEA/Paraaque
v
J.
Alaras
&
De
Leon
(GR182678)
R65
Certiorari
FACTS:
93-1-15
De
Leon
filed
w/
Makati
RTC
a
Complaint
for
Damages
w/
Prayer
for
PI
vs
PEA
hinged
on
alleged
unlawful
destruction
of
De
Leons
fence
&
houses.
He
prayed
that/for
(a)
lawful
possession
of
land
be
awarded
to
him,
(b)
PEA
be
ordered
to
pay
damages;
(c)
injunctive
relief
to
enjoin
PEA
from
violating
his
lawful
&
peaceful
possession.
2-8
RTC
granted
De
Leons
application
for
WPI
=>
PEA
filed
w/
SC
R65
Certiorari,
prayer
for
RO;
SC
referred
to
CA.
9-30
CA
denied
PEAs
Certiorari
=>
PEA
appealed
to
SC
via
R65
Certiorari
(GR112172)
lot
was
salvage
zone
until
reclaimed
thru
government
efforts
in
82;
De
Leons
documentary
evidence
procured
only
in
92
negating
claim
of
occupation
since
time
immemorial.
00-11-20
SC
ruled
lot
was
public
land;
reversed
CA;
dismissed
De
Leons
Complaint
w/
RTC.
=>
No
MR
filed
by
De
Leon
=>
SC
decision
became
Final
&
Executory
=>
PEA
moved
for
issuance
of
WX
praying
that
De
Leon
vacate
&
surrender
possession.
04-9-15
RTC
issued
WX
=>
De
Leon
filed
MR
&
Quashal
of
WX
w/
RTC
it
deviated
from
00-11-20
SC
Decision
which
did
not
categorically
direct
him
to
surrender
possession.
05-4-29
RTC
denied
De
Leons
motions.
05-7-1
De
Leon
filed
(2nd?)
MR
w/
RTC;
05-7-27
RTC
denied
MR.
=>
De
Leon
filed
R65
Certiorari
w/
CA
(90328)
assailing
RTC
Orders
(issue
WX,
deny
1st
MR);
also
filed
Urgent-
Emergency
Motion
for
TRO
&
Issuance
of
WPI
but
was
denied
on
06-4-24.
=>
De
Leon
filed
2nd
R65
Certioari
w/
CA
(90984)
seeking
to
annul
&
set
aside
RTC
Orders
(WX,
deny
1st/2nd
MR).
06-7-26
PEA
filed
Very
Urgent
Motion
for
Issuance
of
Writ
of
Demolition
praying
that
RTC
issue
a
Special
Order
directing
De
Leon
to
remove
all
improvements
&,
in
case
of
failure
to
remove,
that
a
Special
Order
&
WD
be
issued
directing
the
Sheriff
to
remove
&
demolish
the
said
improvements.
06-10-11
RTC
issued
Order
holding
in
abeyance
resolution
of
PEAs
MWD.
=>
PEA
filed
MR,
but
denied
by
RTC
on
07-1-12.
07-2-27
PEA
filed
Omnibus
Motion
to
Dismiss
or
in
the
alternative,
Resolve
Petitions
in
CA
90328
&
90984.
07-3-21
CA
dismissed
De
Leons
90984
Petition
on
the
ground
of
forum
shopping.
07-11-21
CA
dismissed
De
Leons
90328
Petition
earlier
SC
Decision
holding
De
Leon
has
no
title
&
legal
right
to
property
has
already
attained
finality;
De
Leons
MR
denied
on
08-3-4.
=>
PEA
filed
Urgent
Motion
to
Resolve
MWD.
07-12-28
RTC
issued
Order
holding
in
abeyance
resolution
of
PEAs
Motion
to
Resolve
MWD
pending
receipt
of
entry
of
Judgment
re
CA90328;
PEA
filed
MR,
denied
on
08-3-4.
08-4-23
De
Leon
filed
R45
PR/C
(GR181970)
assailing
07-11-21
CA
Decision
(finality)
08-5-15
PEA
filed
R65
Certiorari
(GR182678)
questioning
07-12-28
&
08-3-4
RTC
Orders
(2nd
abeyance)
09-10-14
SC
granted
2-25
Motion
for
Substitution
by
PEA
&
Paraaque.
De
Leons
Arguments:
(1)
he
can
only
be
removed
through
ejectment
proceedings;
(2)
SC
Decision
in
GR112172
merely
dismissed
his
Complaint
for
Damages;
(3)
Even
if
not
owner
&
w/o
title,
mere
prior
possession
is
only
requirement
to
establish
his
right.
PEAs
Claim:
RTC
committed
GAD
in
holding
in
abeyance
resolution
of
MWD?
ISSUE:
Has
the
question
of
ownership
&
rightful
possession
been
settled
in
GR112172
SC
Decision?
YES.
HELD:
(1)
General
Rule:
A
Writ
of
Execution
should
conform
to
the
dispositive
portion
of
the
decision
to
be
executed;
=>
an
execution
is
void
if
it
is
in
excess
of
and
beyond
the
original
judgment
or
award.
A
WX
must
conform
strictly
to
every
essential
particular
of
the
judgment
promulgated,
and
may
not
vary
the
terms
of
the
judgment
it
seeks
to
enforce,
nor
may
it
go
beyond
the
terms
of
the
judgment
sought
to
be
executed.
(2)
Exception:
Possession
is
an
essential
attribute
of
ownership.
Where
the
ownership
of
a
parcel
of
land
was
decreed
in
the
judgment,
=>
the
delivery
of
the
possession
of
the
land
should
be
considered
included
in
the
decision,
it
appearing
that
the
defeated
partys
claim
to
the
possession
thereof
is
based
on
his
claim
of
ownership.
Furthermore,
=>
adjudication
of
ownership
would
include
the
delivery
of
possession
if
the
defeated
party
has
not
shown
any
right
to
possess
the
land
independently
of
his
claim
of
ownership
which
was
rejected.
(3)
A
judgment
for
the
delivery
or
restitution
of
property
is
essentially
an
order
to
place
the
prevailing
party
in
possession
of
the
property.
If
the
defendant
refuses
to
surrender
possession,
=>
the
sheriffshould
oust
him.
No
express
order
to
this
effect
needs
to
be
stated
in
the
decision;
nor
is
a
categorical
statement
needed
in
the
decision
that
in
such
event
the
sheriff
shall
have
the
authority
to
remove
the
improvements
on
the
property
if
the
defendant
fails
to
do
so
within
a
reasonable
period
of
time.
The
removal
of
the
improvements
on
the
land
under
these
circumstances
is
deemed
read
into
the
decision,
subject
only
to
the
issuance
of
a
special
order
by
the
court
(4)
A
judgment
is
not
confined
to
what
appears
upon
the
face
of
the
decision,
but
also
those
necessarily
included
therein
or
necessary
thereto.
R39S47(c)
(5)
R65S7
provides
the
general
rule
that
the
mere
pendency
of
a
special
civil
action
for
certiorari
commenced
in
relation
to
a
case
pending
before
a
lower
court
or
court
of
origin
does
NOT
stay
the
proceedings
therein
in
the
absence
of
a
WPI
or
TRO;
It
is
true
that
there
are
instances
where,
even
if
there
is
no
WPI
or
TRO
issued
by
a
higher
court,
it
would
be
proper
for
a
lower
court
or
court
of
origin
to
suspend
its
proceedings
on
the
precept
of
judicial
courtesy,
but
this
principle
of
judicial
courtesy
remains
to
be
the
exception
rather
than
the
rule.
Go
v
Abrogar
the
precept
of
judicial
courtesy
should
not
be
applied
indiscriminately
and
haphazardly
if
we
are
to
maintain
the
relevance
of
R65S7.
(Note:
Amendment
re
last
par
of
R65S7
re
administrative
charge
against
Judge
for
failure
to
proceed
with
principal
case
not
yet
effective
at
the
time.)
(6)
The
Order
of
the
RTC
holding
in
abeyance
the
resolution
of
PEAs
Motion
for
the
Issuance
of
a
Writ
of
Demolition
appears
to
be
a
circumvention
of
the
provisions
of
R58S5,
which
limit
the
period
of
effectivity
of
restraining
orders
issued
by
the
courts.
(7)
The
Court
does
not
allow
the
piecemeal
interpretation
of
its
Decisions
as
a
means
to
advance
a
case.
To
get
the
true
intent
and
meaning
of
a
decision,
no
specific
portion
thereof
should
be
isolated
and
read
in
this
context,
but
the
same
must
be
considered
in
its
entirety.
PEAs
right
to
possession
of
the
subject
property,
as
well
as
the
removal
of
the
improvements,
fully
follows
after
considering
the
entirety
of
the
Courts
decision
in
PEA
v
CA.
This
is
consistent
with
R39S10
pars
(c)
&
(d)
which
provide
for
the
procedure
for
execution
of
judgments
for
specific
acts.
(8)
This
case
has
been
dragging
for
more
than
15
years
and
the
execution
of
this
Courts
judgment
in
PEA
v
CA
has
been
delayed
for
almost
10
years
now
simply
because
De
Leon
filed
a
frivolous
appeal
against
the
RTCs
order
of
execution
based
on
arguments
that
cannot
hold
water.
As
a
consequence,
PEA
is
prevented
from
enjoying
the
fruits
of
the
final
judgment
in
its
favor.
Every
litigation
must
come
to
an
end
once
a
judgment
becomes
final,
executory
and
unappealable.
Just
as
a
losing
party
has
the
right
to
file
an
appeal
within
the
prescribed
period,
the
winning
party
also
has
the
correlative
right
to
enjoy
the
finality
of
the
resolution
of
his
case
by
the
execution
and
satisfaction
of
the
judgment,
which
is
the
life
of
the
law.
To
frustrate
it
by
dilatory
schemes
on
the
part
of
the
losing
party
is
to
frustrate
all
the
efforts,
time
and
expenditure
of
the
courts.
It
is
in
the
interest
of
justice
that
this
Court
should
write
finis
to
this
litigation.
DECISION:
In
favor
of
PEA.
De
Leons
Petition
denied
(CA
Decision
&
Resolution
affirmed);
PEAs
Petition
granted
(RTC
Orders
annulled
&
set
aside);
RTC
directed
to
hear
&
resolve
PEAs
MWD
with
utmost
dispatch.
R39-2
Spouses
NOCEDA,
petitioner-defendant
v
Arbizo-DIRECTO,
respondent-plaintiff
(2010)
FACTS:
1.
86-9-16
Directo
filed
w/
Iba,
Zambales
RTC
Br71
(CC
RTC-354-I)
a
Complaint
for
Recovery
of
Possession
&
Ownership
and
Rescission/Annulment
of
Donation
against
her
nephew
Noceda;
alleged
that
she
donated
a
portion
of
Lot
1121
to
Noceda
but
he
occupied
a
bigger
area,
claiming
ownership
since
Sep
1985.
1a.
91-11-6
Br71
ruled
in
favor
of
Directo:
(a)
declared
extrajudicial
partition
valid,
(b)
revoked
Deed
of
Donation,
(c)
ordered
Noceda
to
vacate
Lot
2
&
reconvey,
(d)
ordered
Noceda
to
remove
house
at
his
expense
or
pay
rental.
1b.
Noceda
appealed
to
CA.
2.
95-1-5
Sps
Dahipon
filed
Complaint
for
Recovery
of
Ownership
&
Possession
and
Annulment
of
Sale
and
Damages
against
Sps
Noceda
&
Directo
w/
Iba
RTC
Br70
(CC1106-I);
alleged
they
were
registered
owner,
Nocedas
&
Directo
purchased
lot
w/o
paying
full
amount.
2a.
Dahipons
&
Nocedas
entered
into
Compromise
Agreement
=>
Deed
of
Absolute
Sale
executed,
TCT
issued
in
name
of
Nocedas.
2b.
Directo
filed
adverse
claim
questioning
Dahipons
alleged
ownership.
1c.
95-3-31
CA
affirmed
Br71
decision
&
ordered
Nocedas
to
vacate
Lot
C
portion
of
Lot
1121.
1d.
Nocedas
filed
Petition
for
Review
w/
SC;
1e.
99-9-2
SC
denied
(Nocedas
act
is
an
act
of
usurpation
&
ingratitude);
1f.
SC
decision
became
final
&
executory;
01-3-6
RTC
issued
Writ
of
Execution.
3.
03-12-4
Nocedas
instituted
action
for
quieting
of
title,
admitted
losing
in
CC
RTC-354-I
but
claimed
that
disputed
land
therein
was
the
same
parcel
owned
by
Dahipon
from
whom
they
purchased
a
portion
with
TCT
issued
in
their
name;
prayed
for
(a)
issuance
of
Writ
of
Preliminary
Injuction
to
enjoin
implementation
of
01-3-6
Writ
of
Execution,
&
(b)
declaration
that
Lot
2
was
formerly
part
of
Lot
1121
covered
by
TCT
in
the
name
of
Dahipon.
3a.
Directo
filed
Motion
to
Dismiss
on
ground
of
res
judicata;
averred
that
Nocedas
aware
of
defeat
in
Br71,
surreptitiously
negotiated
w/
Dahipons
for
sale
of
land
&
sued
to
subvert
execution.
3b.
RTC
denied
Directos
Motion
to
Dismiss
no
identity
of
Cause
of
Action.
3c.
06-1-25
After
Nocedas
presented
evidence,
Directo
filed
Demurrer
to
Evidence
claim
of
O&P
of
Nocedas
on
basis
of
Dahipons
title
already
raised
in
CC354-I.
3d.
06-2-22
RTC
granted
Demurrer;
CA
affirmed.
ISSUE:
Does
res
judicata
or
conclusiveness
of
judgment
apply?
YES.
HELD:
(1)
R39S47(b)
Bar
by
Former
Judgment:
The
judgment
or
decree
of
a
court
of
competent
jurisdiction
on
the
merits
=>
1concludes
the
litigation
between
the
parties
and
their
privies
and
2constitutes
a
bar
to
a
new
action
or
suit
involving
the
same
cause
of
action
whether
or
not
the
claims
or
demands,
purposes,
or
subject
matters
of
the
two
suits
are
the
same.
(2)
Calalang
v
Register
of
Deeds
of
QC
The
concept
of
conclusiveness
of
judgment
states
that
a
fact
or
question
which
1was
in
issue
in
a
former
suit
and
2was
there
judicially
passed
upon
and
determined
by
a
court
of
competent
jurisdiction,
=>
1is
conclusively
settled
by
the
judgment
therein
as
far
as
the
parties
to
that
action
and
persons
in
privity
with
them
are
concerned
and
2cannot
be
again
litigated
in
any
future
action
=>
a
former
judgment
between
the
same
parties
or
their
privies
will
be
final
and
conclusive
in
the
second
3if
that
same
point
or
question
was
in
issue
and
adjudicated
in
the
first
suit.
(Nabus
v
CA)
Identity
of
cause
of
action
is
not
required
but
merely
identity
of
issue.
(3)
Smith
Bell
&
Co
(Phils.),
Inc.
v
CA
The
general
rule
precluding
the
relitigation
of
material
facts
or
questions
which
were
in
issue
and
adjudicated
in
former
action
=>
are
commonly
applied
to
all
matters
essentially
connected
with
the
subject
matter
of
the
litigation.
Thus,
it
extends
to
questions
necessarily
implied
in
the
final
judgment,
although
no
specific
finding
may
have
been
made
in
reference
thereto
and
although
such
matters
were
directly
referred
to
in
the
pleadings
and
were
not
actually
or
formally
presented.
Under
this
rule,
1if
the
record
of
the
former
trial
shows
that
the
judgment
could
not
have
been
rendered
without
deciding
the
particular
matter,
=>
it
will
be
considered
as
having
settled
that
matter
as
to
all
future
actions
between
the
parties
and
2if
a
judgment
necessarily
presupposes
certain
premises,
=>
they
are
as
conclusive
as
the
judgment
itself.
(4)
SC
in
previous
case
held
Nocedas
have
no
right
of
ownership
or
possession.
Under
the
principle
of
conclusiveness
of
judgment,
such
material
fact
becomes
binding
and
conclusive
on
the
parties.
1When
a
right
or
fact
has
been
judicially
tried
and
determined
by
a
court
of
competent
jurisdiction,
or
2when
an
opportunity
for
such
trial
has
been
given,
=>
the
judgment
of
the
court,
as
long
as
it
remains
unreversed,
should
be
conclusive
upon
the
parties
and
those
in
privity
with
them.
Thus,
petitioners
can
no
longer
question
respondents
ownership
over
Lot
1121
in
the
instant
suit
for
quieting
of
title.
Simply
put,
conclusiveness
of
judgment
bars
the
relitigation
of
particular
facts
or
issues
in
another
litigation
between
the
same
parties
on
a
different
claim
or
cause
of
action.
DECISION:
Petition
denied;
CA
affirmed
in
toto.
R39-3
INFANTE,
petitioner-defendant
v
ARAN
BUILDERS,
respondent-plaintiff
(2007)
CODAL:
R39S6
FACTS:
01-6-6
Aran
Builders
(Makati
resident)
filed
w/
Muntinlupa
RTC
an
action
for
revival
of
judgment
(CC
01-
164)
rendered
by
Makati
RTC
in
an
action
for
specific
performance
&
damages
(CC
15563)
w/c
became
final
&
executory
on
94-11-16
(6+
years),
and
prayed
for
issuance
of
a
Writ
of
Execution.
Makati
RTC
judgment:
ordered
Infante
(Paraaque
resident)
to
deliver
various
documents
(plans,
power
of
attorney,
RE
tax
clearance,
etc);
execute
Deed
of
Sale
of
lot
(located
in
Munti)
in
favor
of
Aran
Builders;
pay
CGT
&
doc
stamp
taxes
re
sale;
secure
written
conformity
of
Ayala
Corp
to
sale;
register
Deed
w/
RD
&
deliver
TCT
to
Ayala
Corp.;
Infante
filed
Motion
to
Dismiss
action
for
revival
on
ff
grounds:
(a)
Munti
RTC
has
no
jurisdiction
over
the
persons
of
the
parties
&
(b)
improper
venue.
01-9-4
Munti
RTC
denied
Motion
to
Dismiss
Makati
decision
rendered
when
there
was
still
no
Munti
RTC.
01-9-28
Infantes
MR
denied,
files
R65
petition
for
certiorari
with
CA.
Infante
claims
complaint
before
Makati
RTC
is
a
personal
action,
thus
venue
s/b
Makati
or
Paraaque.
Aran
Builders
claim
action
for
revival
of
judgment
is
quasi
in
rem
because
it
involves
or
affects
vested
or
adjudged
right
on
real
property,
thus
venue
lies
in
Munti.
02-8-12
CA
ruled
in
favor
of
Aran
Builders
since
the
judgment
sought
to
be
revived
was
rendered
in
an
action
involving
title
to
or
possession
of
real
property,
or
interest
therein,
the
action
for
revival
of
judgment
is
then
an
action
in
rem.
03-1-7
CA
denied
MR.
ISSUE:
Action
in
rem
or
in
personam?
In
rem.
HELD:
(1)
The
proper
venue
in
an
action
for
revival
of
judgment
depends
on
the
determination
of
whether
the
present
action
for
revival
of
judgment
is
a
real
action
or
a
personal
action.
If
the
action
for
revival
of
judgment
affects
title
to
or
possession
of
real
property,
or
interest
therein,
=>
then
it
is
a
real
action
that
must
be
filed
with
the
court
of
the
place
where
the
real
property
is
located.
If
such
action
does
not
fall
under
the
category
of
real
actions,
=>
it
is
then
a
personal
action
that
may
be
filed
with
the
court
of
the
place
where
the
plaintiff
or
defendant
resides.
(2)
The
allegations
in
the
complaint
for
revival
of
judgment
determine
whether
it
is
a
real
action
or
a
personal
action;
Where
the
sole
reason
for
action
to
revive
is
the
enforcement
of
adjudged
rights
over
a
piece
of
realty,
the
action
falls
under
the
category
of
a
real
action
for
which
the
complaint
should
be
filed
with
the
RTC
of
the
place
where
the
realty
is
located.
(3)
A
branch
of
the
RTC
shall
exercise
its
authority
only
over
a
particular
territory
defined
by
the
SC.
(4)
Aldeguer
v
Gemelo
(1939)
x
x
x
an
action
upon
a
judgment
must
be
brought
either
in
the
same
court
where
said
judgment
was
rendered
or
in
the
place
where
the
plaintiff
or
defendant
resides,
or
in
any
other
place
designated
by
the
statutes
which
treat
of
the
venue
of
actions
in
general.
DECISION:
Petition
denied;
CA
decision
&
resolution
affirmed.
NOTES:
The
doctrine
of
res
judicata
has
no
application
where
the
latter
action
is
for
revival
of
a
prior
judgment.
(Caia
v
CA,
[1994])
R39-4
FLORES,
petitioner-plaintiff-mortgagee
v
Spouses
LINDO,
respondents-defendants-morgagors
(2011)
CODAL:
R2S3,
R39S47;
ACTION:
R45
Petition
for
Review
on
Certiorari
of
CA
decision
and
resolution
FACTS:
95-10-31
Edna
Lindo
obtained
a
P400K
loan
from
Flores
payable
on
Dec
1,
secured
by
REM
in
the
name
of
Edna
&
husband
Enrico.
Edna
signed
the
Deed
of
REM
&
PN
for
herself
&
for
Enrico
as
his
atty-in-fact.
Edna
issued
3
checks,
all
dishonored
for
insufficiency
of
funds.
Flores
filed
Complaint
for
Foreclosure
of
Mortgage
w/
Damages,
raffled
to
Manila
RTC
Br33.
03-9-30
RTC33
ruled
Flores
not
entitled
to
judicial
foreclosure
of
mortgage
Deed
executed
without
consent
&
authority
of
Enrico
whose
SPA
was
dated
only
on
95-11-4
(+4
days
after
Deed);
Flores
not
precluded
from
recovering
loan,
he
could
still
file
a
personal
action,
but
Br33
has
no
jurisdiction
(should
be
place
where
Flores
or
Edna
resides
per
R4S2);
denied
Flores
MR.
Lindos
win,
no
foreclosure.
04-9-8
Flores
filed
Complaint
for
Sum
of
Money
w/
Damages,
raffled
to
Manila
RTC
Br42.
Sps
Lindo
in
Answer
admitted
Loan
but
for
only
P340K;
alleged
Enrico
not
party
to
Loan;
prayed
for
dismissal
on
grounds
of
improper
venue,
res
judicata
&
forum
shopping
invoking
RTC33
decision;
05-3-7
Lindos
filed
Motion
to
Dismiss
on
grounds
of
res
judicata
&
lack
of
cause
of
action.
05-7-22
RTC
Br42
denied
Lindoss
Motion
to
Dismiss
-
res
judicata
will
not
apply
to
rights,
claims
or
demands
which,
although
growing
out
of
the
same
subject
matter,
1constitute
separate
or
distinct
causes
of
action
(wrong!)
and
2were
not
put
in
issue
in
the
former
action;
06-2-8
denied
Lindo
MR.
Flores
wins,
no
res
judicata,
may
sue
for
collection
Lindos
filed
before
CA
a
Petition
for
Certiorari
and
Mandamus
with
Prayer
for
WPI
and/or
TRO
08-5-30
CA
set
aside
RTC42
decision
&
resolution
RTC42
acted
w/
GAD
in
denying
Lindos
Motion
to
Dismiss
Per
R2S3
Flores
had
only
one
COA
vs
Edna
for
her
failure
to
pay
&
he
could
not
split
the
single
COA
by
filing
separately
a
foreclosure
proceeding
&
a
collection
case;
08-8-4
CA
denied
Flores
MR.
Lindos
win,
Flores
barred
by
res
judicata
Edna
also
filed
an
action
for
declaratory
relief
before
San
Pedro,
Laguna
RTC
Br93
which
declared
that
Deed
of
REM
is
void,
but
principal
loan
subsists.
ISSUE:
Did
CA
commit
reversible
error
in
dismissing
the
complaint
for
collection
of
sum
of
money
on
the
ground
of
multiplicity
of
suits?
Yes.
HELD:
(1)
The
rule
is
that
a
mortgage-creditor
has
a
single
cause
of
action
against
a
mortgagor-debtor,
that
is,
to
recover
the
debt.
The
mortgage-creditor
has
the
option
of
either
1filing
a
personal
action
for
collection
of
sum
of
money
or
2instituting
a
real
action
to
foreclose
on
the
mortgage
security.
=>
the
interested
party
may
ask
the
court
to
modify
or
alter
the
judgment
to
harmonize
the
same
with
justice
and
the
facts.
(2)
Candelario
v
Caizares
1After
a
judgment
has
become
final,
2if
there
is
evidence
of
an
event
or
circumstance
R39S3
Diesel
Construction
v
Jollibee,
2000
HELD:
(1)
Petitioner
argues
that
under
R39S3,
the
discretionary
power
to
order
a
stay
of
execution
is
compartmentalized
in
the
court
that
granted
execution
pending
appeal.
Petitioner
further
contends
that
when
it
filed
its
Motion
for
Issuance
of
Premature
Execution,
it
effectively
asked
the
CA
to
perform
a
ministerial
duty
to
implement
the
trial
courts
Special
Order.
We
disagree.
The
CA
may
not
be
compelled
to
enforce
a
Special
Order
issued
by
the
trial
court
(R135S6).
The
CA
has
its
own
separate
and
original
discretionary
jurisdiction
to
grant
or
to
stay
execution
pending
appeal,
except
in
civil
cases
decided
under
the
Rules
on
Summary
Procedure
and
in
other
cases
when
the
law
or
the
Rules
provide
otherwise
(R51S11,
R42S8).
This
writ
of
execution
is
similar
to
that
which
a
RTC
may
issue
for
the
protection
and
the
preservation
of
the
parties
rights
that
do
not
involve
any
matter
being
litigated
in
the
appeal
pursuant
to
R39S2
(R42S8(a)).
R39S2(a)
&
S3
mean
that
after
the
perfection
of
the
appeal
and
the
transmittal
of
the
records,
the
trial
court
loses
jurisdiction
over
the
case.
Henceforth,
it
may
no
longer
grant
a
motion
for,
or
issue
a
writ
of
immediate
execution
(cases
cited);
to
do
so
would
be
an
abuse
of
discretion.
(2)
The
execution
of
a
judgment
before
its
finality
must
be
founded
upon
good
reasons.
The
yardstick
remains
the
presence
or
the
absence
of
good
reasons
consisting
of
exceptional
circumstances
of
such
urgency
as
to
outweigh
the
injury
or
damage
that
the
losing
party
may
suffer,
should
the
appealed
judgment
be
reversed
later.
Good
reason
imports
a
superior
circumstance
that
will
outweigh
injury
or
damage
to
the
adverse
party
(Sanz
Maceda,
Jr.
v.
DBP,
GR
135128,
August
25,
1999).
In
the
case
at
bar,
petitioner
failed
to
show
paramount
and
compelling
reasons
of
urgency
and
justice.
(3)
DCCIs
alleged
financial
distress,
by
itself,
is
not
a
compelling
reason
to
order
immediate
execution.
On
the
other
hand,
mere
filing
by
JFC
of
a
supersedeas
bond
does
not
automatically
entitle
it
to
a
stay
of
execution.
R39S4
La
Campana
Development
v
Ledesma,
2010
HELD:
=>
On
appeal
the
appellate
court
(CA)
may
STAY
the
writ
of
execution
issued
by
the
RTC
should
circumstances
so
require
even
if
RTC
judgments
in
unlawful
detainer
cases
are
immediately
executory,
=>
preliminary
injunction
may
still
be
granted.
R39S6
Heirs
of
Miranda
v
Miranda,
2013
HELD:
An
action
for
revival
of
judgment
is
a
new
and
independent
action.
It
is
different
and
distinct
from
the
original
judgment
sought
to
be
revived
or
enforced.
As
such,
a
party
aggrieved
by
a
decision
of
a
court
in
an
action
for
revival
of
judgment
may
appeal
the
decision,
but
only
insofar
as
the
merits
of
the
action
for
revival
is
concerned.
The
original
judgment,
which
is
already
final
and
executory,
may
no
longer
be
reversed,
altered,
or
modified.
R39S6
RCBC
v
Serra,
2013
HELD:
(1)
A
final
and
executory
judgment
may
be
executed
by
motion
within
5
years
from
the
date
of
its
entry
or
by
an
action
after
the
lapse
of
five
years
and
before
prescription
sets
in.
Court,
however,
allows
EXCEPTIONS
when
execution
may
be
made
by
motion
even
after
the
lapse
of
5
years.
These
exceptions
have
one
common
denominator:
the
delay
is
caused
or
occasioned
by
actions
of
the
judgment
obligor
and/or
is
incurred
for
his
benefit
or
advantage.
(2)
The purpose of prescribing time
limitations
for
enforcing
judgments
is
to
prevent parties
from
SLEEPING
on
their
rights.
Far
from
sleeping
on its
rights,
RCBC
has
pursued
persistently
its
action
against
Serra
in
accordance
with
law.
On
the
other
hand,
Serra
has continued
to
evade
his
obligation
by
raising
issues
of technicality.
While
strict
compliance
with
the
rules
of procedure
is
desired,
liberal
interpretation
is
warranted
in cases
where
a
strict
enforcement
of
the
rules
will
not
serve the
ends
of
justice.
R39S47
Sps
Antonio
v
Vda
de
Monje
(2010)
HELD:
(1)
Res
judicata
is
defined
as
a
matter
adjudged;
a
thing
judicially
acted
upon
or
decided;
a
thing
or
matter
settled
by
judgment
(Sps
Torres
v
Medina,
GR
166730,
2010).
According
to
the
doctrine
of
res
judicata,
an
existing
final
judgment
or
decree
rendered
1on
the
merits,
and
2without
fraud
or
collusion,
3by
a
court
of
competent
jurisdiction,
4upon
any
matter
within
its
jurisdiction,
=>
is
conclusive
of
the
rights
of
the
parties
or
their
privies,
in
all
other
actions
or
suits
in
the
same
or
any
other
judicial
tribunal
of
concurrent
jurisdiction
on
the
points
and
matters
in
issue
in
the
first
suit.
A
final
judgment
or
decree
on
the
merits
by
a
court
of
competent
jurisdiction
is
conclusive
of
the
rights
of
the
parties
or
their
privies
in
all
later
suits
on
all
points
and
matters
determined
in
the
former
suit
(Agustin
v
Delos
Santos,
GR
168139,
2009)
(2)
There
is
bar
by
prior
judgment
when,
as
between
the
first
case
where
the
judgment
was
rendered
and
the
second
case
that
is
sought
to
be
barred,
there
is
identity
of
parties,
subject
matter,
and
causes
of
action.
In
this
instance,
the
judgment
in
the
first
case
constitutes
an
absolute
bar
to
the
second
action.
Otherwise
put,
the
judgment
or
decree
of
the
court
of
competent
jurisdiction
on
the
merits
concludes
the
litigation
between
the
parties,
as
well
as
their
privies,
and
constitutes
a
bar
to
a
new
action
or
suit
involving
the
same
cause
of
action
before
the
same
or
other
tribunal.
(3)
But
where
there
is
identity
of
parties
in
the
first
and
second
cases,
but
no
identity
of
causes
of
action,
the
first
judgment
is
conclusive
only
as
to
those
matters
actually
and
directly
controverted
and
determined
and
not
as
to
matters
merely
involved
therein.
This
is
the
concept
of
res
judicata
known
as
conclusiveness
of
judgment.
Stated
differently,
any
right,
fact
or
matter
in
issue
directly
adjudicated
or
necessarily
involved
in
the
determination
of
an
action
before
a
competent
court
in
which
judgment
is
rendered
on
the
merits
is
conclusively
settled
by
the
judgment
therein
and
cannot
again
be
litigated
between
the
parties
and
their
privies
whether
or
not
the
claim,
demand,
purpose,
or
subject
matter
of
the
two
actions
is
the
same.
(Agustin
v
Delos
Santos)
(4)
Stated
differently,
conclusiveness
of
judgment
finds
application
when
a
fact
or
question
has
been
squarely
put
in
issue,
judicially
passed
upon,
and
adjudged
in
a
former
suit
by
a
court
of
competent
jurisdiction.
(Hacienda
Bigaa
v
Chavez,
GR
174160,
2010)
(5)
The
fact
or
question
settled
by
final
judgment
or
order
binds
the
parties
to
that
action
(and
persons
in
privity
with
them
or
their
successors-in-interest),
and
continues
to
bind
them
while
the
judgment
or
order
remains
standing
and
unreversed
by
proper
authority
on
a
timely
motion
or
petition;
the
conclusively-settled
fact
or
question
cannot
again
be
litigated
in
any
future
or
other
action
between
the
same
parties
or
their
privies
and
successors-in-interest,
in
the
same
or
in
any
other
court
of
concurrent
jurisdiction,
either
for
the
same
or
for
a
different
cause
of
action.
Thus,
only
the
identities
of
parties
and
issues
are
required
for
the
operation
of
the
principle
of
conclusiveness
of
judgment.
(Hacienda
Bigaa
v
Chavez)
(6)
The
Court
has
previously
employed
various
TESTS
in
determining
whether
or
not
there
is
identity
of
causes
of
action
as
to
warrant
the
application
of
the
principle
of
res
judicata.
One
test
of
identity
is
the
ABSENCE
of
INCONSISTENY
test
where
it
is
determined
whether
the
judgment
sought
will
be
inconsistent
with
the
prior
judgment
(Sps
Torres
v
Medina).
If
no
inconsistency
is
shown,
=>
the
prior
judgment
shall
NOT
constitute
a
bar
to
subsequent
actions.
(Agustin
v
Delos
Santos)
(7)
The
more
common
approach
in
ascertaining
identity
of
causes
of
action
is
the
SAME
EVIDENCE
test,
whereby
the
following
question
serves
as
a
sufficient
criterion:
would
the
same
evidence
support
and
establish
both
the
present
and
former
causes
of
action?
If
the
answer
is
in
the
affirmative,
=>
then
the
prior
judgment
is
a
bar
to
the
subsequent
action;
conversely,
=>
it
is
not.
(Agustin
v
Delos
Santos)
(8)
Aside
from
(6)
and
(7),
we
have
also
ruled
that
=>
a
previous
judgment
operates
as
a
bar
to
a
subsequent
one
when
it
had
touched
on
a
matter
already
decided,
or
if
the
parties
are
in
effect
litigating
for
the
same
thing.
(Agustin
v
Delos
Santos)
R39S47
Tumbokon
v
Legaspi
(2010)
FACTS:
Legaspi
raised
ownership
as
defense,
but
found
guilty
of
qualified
theft.
Tumbokon
later
lost
in
civil
complaint
to
recover
ownership
and
possession,
appeal
grounded
on
res
judicata.
HELD:
(1)
Bar
by
prior
judgment
is
not
applicable
because
the
causes
of
action
in
the
civil
and
the
criminal
actions
were
different
and
distinct
from
each
other.
The
civil
action
is
for
the
recovery
of
ownership
of
the
land
filed
by
the
petitioners,
while
the
criminal
action
was
to
determine
whether
the
act
of
the
respondents
of
taking
the
coconut
fruits
from
the
trees
growing
within
the
disputed
land
constituted
the
crime
of
qualified
theft.
(2)
Conclusiveness
of
judgment
is
not
also
applicable.
The
petitioners
themselves
commenced
both
actions,
and
fully
and
directly
participated
in
the
trial
of
both
actions.
Any
estoppel
from
assailing
the
authority
of
the
CA
to
determine
the
ownership
of
the
land
based
on
the
evidence
presented
in
the
civil
action
applied
only
to
the
petitioners,
who
should
not
be
allowed
to
assail
the
outcome
of
the
civil
action
after
the
CA
had
ruled
adversely
against
them.
(3)
Moreover,
the
doctrine
of
conclusiveness
of
judgment
is
subject
to
EXCEPTIONS,
such
as
1where
there
is
a
change
in
the
applicable
legal
context,
or
2to
avoid
inequitable
administration
of
justice
(Kilosbayan
Inc
v
Morato,
1995).
Applying
the
doctrine
of
conclusiveness
of
judgments
to
this
case
will
surely
be
iniquitous
to
the
respondents
who
have
rightly
relied
on
the
civil
case,
not
on
the
criminal
case,
to
settle
the
issue
of
ownership
of
the
land.
This
action
for
recovery
of
ownership
was
brought
precisely
to
settle
the
issue
of
ownership
of
the
property.
In
contrast,
the
pronouncement
on
ownership
of
the
land
made
in
the
criminal
case
was
only
the
response
to
the
respondents
having
raised
the
ownership
as
a
matter
of
defense.
R39S47
BE
San
Diego
Inc
v
CA,
Matias
(2010)
HELD:
(1)
R39S47(c)
Matias
can
no
longer
question
the
identity
of
the
property
it
seeks
to
recover
when
she
invoked
res
judicata
as
ground
to
dismiss
the
accion
publiciana
that
is
the
root
of
the
present
petition.
An
allegation
of
res
judicata
necessarily
constitutes
an
admission
that
the
subject
matter
of
the
pending
suit
(the
accion
publiciana)
is
the
same
as
that
in
a
previous
one
(the
ejectment
case).
That
Matias
never
raised
the
discrepancy
in
the
location
stated
in
B.E.
San
Diegos
title
and
the
actual
location
of
the
subject
property
in
the
ejectment
suit
bars
her
now
from
raising
the
same.
Thus,
the
issue
of
identity
of
the
subject
matter
of
the
case
has
been
settled
by
Matias
admission
and
negates
the
defenses
she
raised
against
B.E.
San
Diegos
complaint.
(2)
R39S47(b)
The
judgment
in
the
ejectment
suit
that
B.E.
San
Diego
previously
filed
against
Matias
is
NOT
determinative
of
this
issue
and
will
NOT
prejudice
B.E.
San
Diegos
claim.
While
there
may
be
identity
of
parties
and
subject
matter,
there
is
NO
identity
of
cause
of
action
between
the
two
cases;
An
action
for
ejectment
and
accion
publiciana,
though
both
referring
to
the
issue
of
possession,
differ
in
the
following
manner:
1forcible
entry
should
be
filed
within
1
year
from
the
unlawful
dispossession
of
the
real
property,
while
accion
publiciana
is
filed
a
year
after
the
unlawful
dispossession
of
the
real
property.
2forcible
entry
is
concerned
with
the
issue
of
the
right
to
the
physical
possession
of
the
real
property;
in
accion
publiciana,
what
is
subject
of
litigation
is
the
better
right
to
possession
over
the
real
property.
3an
action
for
forcible
entry
is
filed
in
the
MTC
and
is
a
summary
action,
(2)
A
compromise
agreement
which
is
not
contrary
to
law,
public
order,
public
policy,
morals
or
good
customs
is
a
valid
contract
which
is
the
law
between
the
parties
themselves.
It
has
upon
them
the
effect
and
authority
of
res
judicata
even
if
NOT
judicially
approved,
and
cannot
be
lightly
set
aside
or
disturbed
except
for
vices
of
consent
and
forgery.
(3)
The
LGC
provides
for
a
two-tiered
mode
of
enforcement
of
an
amicable
settlement,
to
wit:
(a)
by
execution
by
the
Punong
Barangay
which
is
quasi-judicial
and
summary
in
nature
on
mere
motion
of
the
party
entitled
thereto;
and
(b)
an
action
in
regular
form,
which
remedy
is
judicial.
However,
the
mode
of
enforcement
does
not
rule
out
the
right
of
rescission
under
NCC
2041.
(4)
A
compromise
settlement
is
NOT
an
admission
of
liability
but
merely
a
recognition
that
there
is
a
dispute
and
an
impending
litigation
(Servicewide
Specialists
v
CA,
1996)
which
the
parties
hope
to
prevent
by
making
reciprocal
concessions,
adjusting
their
respective
positions
in
the
hope
of
gaining
balanced
by
the
danger
of
losing.
(Genova
v
De
Castro,
2003)
R39S47
Lee
Bun
Ting
v
Aligaen,
1977
HELD:
(1)
A
case
that
has
become
final
and
executory
cannot
be
re-opened
on
account
of
a
decision
of
the
Supreme
Court
subsequently
promulgated
enunciating
a
different
doctrine
regarding
the
effects
of
a
sales
of
lands
to
aliens.
(2)
Posterior
changes
in
the
Supreme
Courts
doctrine
cannot
be
applied
retroactively
to
nullify
a
prior
final
ruling.
(3)
Said
1987
decision
cannot
be
applied
to
the
instant
case
where
there
had
been
already
a
final
and
conclusive
determination
some
twelve
years
earlier.
While
a
doctrine
laid
down
in
previous
cases
may
be
overruled,
the
previous
cases
themselves
cannot
thereby
be
reopened.
The
doctrine
may
be
changed
for
future
cases
but
it
cannot
reach
back
into
the
past
and
overturn
finally
settled
cases.
R39S48
Fujiki
v
Marinay
(2013)
HELD:
(1)
The
effect
of
a
foreign
judgment
is
NOT
automatic.
To
extend
the
effect
of
a
foreign
judgments
in
the
Philippines,
Philippine
courts
must
determine
if
the
foreign
judgments
is
consistent
with
domestic
public
policy
and
other
mandatory
laws.
(NCC
Art
17).
Article
15
of
the
Civil
Code
provides
that
[l]aws
relating
to
family
rights
and
duties,
or
to
the
status,
condition
and
legal
capacity
of
persons
are
binding
upon
citizens
of
the
Philippines,
even
though
living
abroad.
This
is
the
rule
of
lex
nationalii
in
private
international
law.
Thus,
the
Philippine
State
may
require,
for
effectivity
in
the
Philippines,
RECOGNITION
by
Philippine
courts
of
a
foreign
judgment
affecting
its
citizen,
over
whom
it
exercises
personal
jurisdiction
relating
to
the
status,
condition
and
legal
capacity
of
such
citizen.
(2)
R39S48(b)
=>
Philippine
courts
exercise
LIMITED
REVIEW
on
foreign
judgments.
Courts
are
NOT
allowed
to
delve
into
the
merits
of
a
foreign
judgment.
Once
a
foreign
judgment
is
admitted
and
proven
in
a
Philippine
court,
it
can
only
be
repelled
on
grounds
external
to
its
merits,
ie,
want
of
jurisdiction,
want
of
notice
to
the
party,
collusion,
fraud,
or
clear
mistake
of
law
or
fact.
The
rule
on
limited
review
embodies
the
policy
of
efficiency
and
the
protection
of
party
expectations,1
as
well
as
respecting
the
jurisdiction
of
other
states.2
1Mijares
v
Raada,
Otherwise
known
as
the
policy
of
PRECLUSION,
it
seeks
to
protect
party
expectations
resulting
from
previous
litigation,
to
safeguard
against
the
harassment
of
defendants,
to
insure
that
the
task
of
courts
not
be
increased
by
never-ending
litigation
of
the
same
disputes,
and
in
a
larger
sense
to
promote
what
Lord
Coke
in
the
Ferrers
Case
of
1599
stated
to
be
the
goal
of
all
law:
rest
and
quietness.
2Mijares
v.
Raada,
The
rules
of
comity,
utility
and
convenience
of
nations
have
established
a
usage
among
civilized
states
by
which
final
judgments
of
foreign
courts
of
competent
jurisdiction
are
reciprocally
respected
and
rendered
efficacious
under
certain
conditions
that
may
vary
in
different
countries.
(3)
In
the
recognition
of
foreign
judgment,
Philippine
courts
are
incompetent
to
substitute
their
judgment
on
how
a
case
was
decided
under
foreign
law.
They
cannot
decide
on
the
family
rights
and
duties,
or
on
the
status,
condition
and
legal
capacity
of
the
foreign
citizen
who
is
a
party
to
the
foreign
judgment.
Thus,
Philippine
courts
are
limited
to
the
question
of
whether
to
extend
the
effect
of
a
foreign
judgment
in
the
Philippines.
In
a
foreign
judgment
relating
to
the
status
of
a
marriage
involving
a
citizen
of
a
foreign
country,
Philippine
courts
only
decide
whether
to
extend
its
effect
to
the
Filipino
party,
under
the
rule
of
lex
nationalii
expressed
in
Article
15
of
the
Civil
Code.
R39S48
Asiavest
Merchant
Bankers
v
CA
&
PNCC,
2001
FACTS:
HELD:
(1)
in
the
absence
of
a
special
compact,
no
sovereign
is
bound
to
give
effect
within
its
dominion
to
a
judgment
rendered
by
a
tribunal
of
another
country;
however,
the
rules
of
comity,
utility
and
convenience
of
nations
have
established
a
usage
among
civilized
states
by
which
final
judgments
of
foreign
courts
of
competent
jurisdiction
are
reciprocally
respected
and
rendered
efficacious
under
certain
conditions
that
may
vary
in
different
countries.
(2)
A
foreign
judgment
is
presumed
to
be
valid
and
binding
in
the
country
from
which
it
comes,
until
a
contrary
showing,
on
the
basis
of
a
presumption
of
regularity
of
proceedings
and
the
giving
of
due
notice
in
the
foreign
forum.
In
addition,
under
R131S3(n),
a
court,
whether
in
the
Philippines
or
elsewhere,
enjoys
the
presumption
that
it
was
acting
in
the
lawful
exercise
of
its
jurisdiction.
Hence,
once
the
authenticity
of
the
foreign
judgment
is
proved,
the
party
attacking
a
foreign
judgment,
is
tasked
with
the
burden
of
overcoming
its
presumptive
validity.
(3)
The
recognition
to
be
accorded
a
foreign
judgment
is
not
necessarily
affected
by
the
fact
that
the
procedure
in
the
courts
of
the
country
in
which
such
judgment
was
rendered
differs
from
that
of
the
courts
of
the
country
in
which
the
judgment
is
relied
on
mmatters
of
remedy
and
procedure
such
as
those
relating
to
the
service
of
summons
or
court
process
upon
the
defendant,
the
authority
of
counsel
to
appear
and
represent
a
defendant
and
the
formal
requirements
in
a
decision
are
governed
by
the
lex
fori
or
the
internal
law
of
the
forum.
(4)
It
is
not
for
the
party
seeking
the
enforcement
of
a
foreign
judgment
to
prove
the
validity
of
the
same
but
for
the
opposing
party
to
demonstrate
the
alleged
invalidity
of
such
foreign
judgment,
otherwise
a
contrary
rule
would
render
meaningless
the
presumption
of
validity
accorded
a
foreign
judgment.
R41
Calderon
v
Roxas
(2013)
FACTS:
Calderon
challenged
dismissal
of
her
appeal
re
support
in
arrears.
HELD:
(1)
Unlike
a
final
judgment
or
order,
which
is
appealable,,
an
interlocutory
order
may
NOT
be
questioned
on
appeal
except
only
as
part
of
an
appeal
that
may
eventually
be
taken
from
the
final
judgment
rendered
in
the
case.
(Investments,
Inc.
v
CA,
G.R.
No.
L-60036,
January
27,
1987,
147
SCRA
334)15
(2)
Whether
an
order
or
resolution
is
final
or
interlocutory
is
NOT
dependent
on
compliance
or
noncompliance
by
a
party
to
its
directive.
Petitioners
theory
that
the
assailed
orders
have
ceased
to
be
provisional
due
to
the
arrearages
incurred
by
private
respondent
is
therefore
untenable.
R41
CDCP
v
Cuenca
(2005)
HELD:
The
plaintiff
in
the
main
action
may
not
be
regarded
as
a
party
to
the
third-party
complaint,
nor
may
the
third-party
defendant
be
regarded
as
a
party
to
the
main
action;
If
only
the
third-party
defendant
files
an
appeal,
=>
the
decision
in
the
main
case
becomes
final.
Plaintiff
(Main
Action)
Defendant
3P
Plaintiff
(3P
Complaint)
3P
Defendant
R41
GSIS
v
Phil
Village
Hotel
(GR
150922,
2004)
HELD:
A
partial
summary
judgment
does
not
finally
dispose
of
an
action.
Our
pronouncements
in
Guevarra
v
CA
(124
SCRA
297,
August
30,
1983)
and
Province
of
Pangasinan
v
CA
(220
SCRA
726,
March
31,
1993.)
were
categorical:
a
PARTIAL
summary
judgment
is
merely
an
interlocutory
order,
not
a
final
judgment.
What
the
rules
contemplate
is
that
the
appeal
from
the
partial
summary
judgment
shall
be
taken
together
with
the
judgment
that
may
be
rendered
in
the
entire
case
after
a
trial
is
conducted
on
the
material
facts
on
which
a
substantial
controversy
exists.
(Guevarra
v
CA)
R44-0
DE
LIANO
v
CA
(2001)
on
Rule
44
Sec
13
CONTENTS
of
Appellants
Brief
HELD:
(1)
The
SUBJECT
INDEX
is
intended
to
facilitate
the
review
of
appeals
by
providing
ready
reference,
functioning
much
like
a
table
of
contents
the
subject
index
makes
readily
available
at
ones
fingertips
the
subject
of
the
contents
of
the
brief
so
that
the
need
to
thumb
through
the
brief
page
after
page
to
locate
a
partys
arguments,
or
a
particular
citation,
or
whatever
else
needs
to
be
found
and
considered,
is
obviated.
(2)
An
ASSIGNMENT
of
ERRORS
in
appellate
procedure
is
an
enumeration
by
appellant
or
plaintiff
in
error
of
the
errors
alleged
to
have
been
committed
by
the
court
below
in
the
trial
of
the
case
upon
which
he
seeks
to
obtain
a
reversal
of
the
judgment
or
decree
it
is
in
the
nature
of
a
pleading,
and
performs
in
the
appellate
court
the
same
office
as
a
declaration
or
complaint
in
a
court
of
original
jurisdiction.
Such
an
assignment
is
appellants
complaint,
or
pleading,
in
the
appellate
court,
and
takes
the
place
of
a
declaration
or
bill;
an
appeal
without
an
assignment
of
errors
=>
would
be
similar
to
a
suit
without
a
complaint,
bill,
or
declaration.
The
assignment
is
appellants
declaration
or
complaint
against
the
trial
judge,
charging
harmful
error,
and
proof
vel
non
of
assignment
is
within
the
record
on
appeal.
xxx
The
object
of
such
pleadings
is
to
point
out
the
specific
errors
claimed
to
have
been
committed
by
the
court
below,
in
order
1to
enable
the
reviewing
court
and
the
opposing
party
to
see
on
what
points
appellant
or
plaintiff
in
error
intends
to
ask
a
reversal
of
the
judgment
or
decree,
and
2to
limit
discussion
to
those
points.
The
office
of
an
assignment
of
errors
is
not
to
point
out
legal
contentions,
but
only
to
inform
the
appellate
court
that
appellant
assigns
as
erroneous
certain
named
rulings;
the
function
of
the
assignment
is
to
group
and
bring
forward
such
of
the
exceptions
previously
noted
in
the
case
on
appeal
as
appellant
desires
to
preserve
and
present
to
the
appellant
(?)
(3)
A
STATEMENT
of
the
CASE
gives
the
appellate
tribunal
an
overview
of
the
judicial
antecedents
of
the
case,
providing
material
information
regarding
1the
nature
of
the
controversy,
2the
proceedings
before
the
trial
court,
3the
orders
and
rulings
elevated
on
appeal,
and
4the
judgment
itself.
These
data
enable
the
appellate
court
to
have
a
better
grasp
of
the
matter
entrusted
to
it
for
its
appraisal.
(4)
The
STATEMENT
of
FACTS
comprises
the
very
heart
of
the
appellants
brief.
The
facts
constitute
the
backbone
of
a
legal
argument;
they
are
determinative
of
the
law
and
jurisprudence
applicable
to
the
case,
and
consequently,
will
govern
the
appropriate
relief.
Appellants
should
remember
that
the
Court
of
Appeals
is
empowered
to
review
both
questions
of
law
and
of
facts.
Otherwise,
where
only
a
pure
question
of
law
is
involved,
appeal
would
pertain
to
this
Court.
An
appellant,
therefore,
should
take
care
to
state
the
facts
accurately
though
it
is
permissible
to
present
them
in
a
manner
favorable
to
one
party.
The
brief
must
state
1the
facts
admitted
by
the
parties,
as
well
as
2the
facts
in
controversy.
To
laymen,
the
distinction
may
appear
insubstantial,
but
the
difference
is
clear
to
the
practitioner
and
the
student
of
law.
1Facts
which
are
admitted
require
no
further
proof,
whereas
2facts
in
dispute
must
be
backed
by
evidence.
Relative
thereto,
the
rule
specifically
requires
that
ones
statement
of
facts
should
be
supported
by
PAGE
REFERENCES
to
the
record.
Indeed,
disobedience
therewith
has
been
punished
by
dismissal
of
the
appeal.
Page
references
to
the
record
are
not
an
empty
requirement.
If
a
statement
of
fact
is
unaccompanied
by
a
page
reference
to
the
record,
=>
it
1may
be
presumed
to
be
without
support
in
the
record
and
2may
be
stricken
or
disregarded
altogether.
(5)
STATEMENT
of
the
ISSUES
-
When
the
appellant
has
given
an
account
of
the
case
and
of
the
facts,
he
is
required
to
state
the
issues
to
be
considered
by
the
appellate
court.
The
statement
of
issues
is
not
to
be
confused
with
the
assignment
of
errors:
they
are
not
one
and
the
same,
for
otherwise,
the
rules
would
not
require
a
separate
statement
for
each.
The
statement
of
issues
puts
forth
the
questions
of
fact
or
law
to
be
resolved
by
the
appellate
court.
X
X
X
As
distinguished
from
a
question
of
law
which
exists
when
the
doubt
or
difference
arises
as
to
what
the
law
is
on
certain
state
of
facts
there
is
a
question
of
fact
when
the
doubt
or
difference
arises
as
to
the
truth
or
the
falsehood
of
alleged
facts;
or
when
the
query
necessarily
invites
calibration
of
the
whole
evidence
considering
mainly
the
credibility
of
witnesses,
existence
and
relevancy
of
specific
surrounding
circumstances,
their
relation
to
each
other
and
to
the
whole
and
the
probabilities
of
the
situation.
(6)
Thereafter,
the
appellant
is
required
to
present
his
ARGUMENTS
on
each
assigned
error.
An
appellants
arguments
go
hand
in
hand
with
his
assignment
of
errors,
for
the
former
provide
the
justification
supporting
his
contentions,
and
in
so
doing
resolves
the
issues.
It
will
not
do
to
impute
error
on
the
part
of
the
trial
court
without
substantiation.
The
mere
elevation
on
appeal
of
a
judgment
does
not
create
a
presumption
that
it
was
rendered
in
error.
The
appellant
has
to
show
that
he
is
entitled
to
the
reversal
of
the
judgment
appealed,
and
he
cannot
do
this
unless
he
provides
satisfactory
reasons
for
doing
so.
It
is
therefore
essential
that
x
x
x
[A]s
far
as
possible,
the
errors
and
reasons
assigned
should
be
supported
by
a
citation
of
authorities.
The
failure
to
do
so
has
been
said
to
be
inexcusable;
and,
although
a
point
made
in
the
brief
is
before
the
court
even
though
no
authorities
are
cited
and
may
be
considered
and
will
be
where
a
proposition
of
well
established
law
is
stated,
the
court
is
not
required
to
search
out
authorities,
but
may
presume
that
counsel
has
found
no
case
after
diligent
search
or
that
the
point
has
been
waived
or
abandoned,
and
need
not
consider
the
unsupported
errors
assigned,
and
ordinarily
will
not
give
consideration
to
such
errors
and
reasons
unless
it
is
apparent
without
further
research
that
the
assignments
of
errors
presented
are
well
taken.
R47-0
Sps
Galura,
petitioners-defendant
v
Math-Agro
Corp,
respondent-plaintiff,
2009-08-14
CODAL:
R47S2
Grounds
for
PAJ/FO&R
ACTION:
R45
petition
for
review
on
certiorari
w/
prayer
for
issuance
of
WPI
&/or
TRO.
Petition
challenges
the
2005-01-25
&
2005-02-28
Resolutions
of
the
CA.
FACTS:
1.
1997-03
Sps
Dante
&
Teresa
Galura
purchased
broiler
starters
&
finishers
worth
P426K
from
MAC,
paid
P72.5K,
but
despite
several
demands,
failed
to
pay
P353.5K
unpaid
balance.
2.
2000-06-21
MAC
filed
Complaint
w/
Malolos
RTC,
stated
addresses
of
Galuras
in
Tarlac
&
Sta
Mesa
Heights,
QC.
3.
2000-08-15
RTC
Clerk
issued
summons
4.
2000-09-17
Process
Server
(P/S)
went
to
Sta
Mesa
Heights,
but
told
by
Dantes
father
that
Galuras
presently
reside
in
Tandang
Sora,
QC.
5.
2000-09-22-
P/S
went
to
Tarlac,
but
learned
property
has
been
foreclosed
&
Galuras
no
longer
reside
there.
6.
2000-09-26
P/S
went
to
Tandang
Sora
&
served
summons
on
Teresas
sister.
7.
Galuras
failed
to
file
their
Answer.
8.
2001-01-23
RTC
order
declared
Galuras
in
default
&
allowed
MAC
to
present
evidence
ex
parte.
9.
2001-06-27
RTC
ruled
in
favor
of
MAC;
ordered
Galuras
to
pay
unpaid
balance,
P30K
atty
fees,
litigation
expenses,
legal
interest
from
date
of
1st
demand
letter;
RTC
believes
failure
of
defendants
or
their
refusal
to
file
any
answer
to
the
complaint
is
a
clear
admission
on
their
part
of
their
obligation
to
the
plaintiff.
It
may
even
be
safely
presumed
that
by
their
inaction,
defendants
have
no
valid
defense
against
the
claim
of
the
plaintiff
such
that
under
the
circumstances,
RTC
has
no
other
alternative
but
to
pass
judgment
on
the
issues
based
on
the
evidence
on
record.
10.
2004-11-10
RTC
issued
W/X
to
implement
2001
decision
11.
2004-12-13
Galuras
received
copy
of
2004-11
Order
12.
2005-01-06
Galuras
filed
w/
CA
R47
PAJ/FO,
with
prayer
for
issuance
of
WPI
or
TRO.
Grounds
were
(1)
RTC
failed
to
acquire
jurisdiction
over
their
persons
because
substituted
service
of
summons
invalid
&
(2)
there
was
extrinsic
fraud
because
MAC
made
them
believe
it
would
not
file
a
case
vs
them.
13.
2005-01-25
CA
Resolution
dismissed
petition
for
lack
of
merit;
valid
SSS
14.
2005-02-14
Galuras
filed
MR;
CA
denied
on
02-28;
Galuras
petition
SC
ISSUES:
(1)
Extrinsic
fraud?
(2)
Should
the
Galuras
have
availed
1st
of
ordinary
remedies
of
new
trial,
appeal
or
petition
for
relief?
HELD:
(1)
No.
SC
did
not
address
extrinsic
fraud
but
CA
held:
The
Galuras
claim
of
extrinsic
fraud
because
they
had
an
existing
payment
arrangement
with
their
creditor,
Math-Agro,
that
the
latter
would
not
resort
to
judicial
action
for
as
long
as
payments
are
being
made
by
them
and
that
they
had
been
paying
their
obligation
until
July
2004
is
but
a
bare
and
vagrant
allegation
without
any
visible
means
of
support
for
nowhere
in
their
petition,
as
well
as
in
their
joint
affidavit
of
merit,
did
they
attach
copies
of
the
corresponding
receipts
of
their
payments.
(2)
No.
If
R47
PAJ/FO
of
RTC
is
grounded
on
lack
of
jurisdiction
over
the
person
of
the
defendant
or
over
the
nature
or
subject
of
the
action,
the
petition
need
not
allege
that
the
ordinary
remedy
of
NT
or
MR
of
J/FO
or
appeal
therefrom
are
no
longer
available
through
no
fault
of
her
own.
This
is
so
because
a
judgment
rendered
or
final
order
issued
by
the
RTC
without
jurisdiction
is
null
and
void
and
may
be
assailed
any
time
either
collaterally
or
in
a
direct
action
or
by
resisting
such
judgment
or
final
order
an
any
action
or
proceeding
whenever
it
is
invoked,
unless
barred
by
laches.
DECISION:
Petition
granted;
CA
Resolutions
set
aside;
2005-04-27
TRO
made
permanent;
2001-06
&
2004-11
RTC
Orders
set
aside.
R47-1
Islamic
Dawah
COUNCIL
of
the
Phils,
petitioner
v
CA,
Heirs
of
Araneta,
respondents
(1989)
FACTS:
(1)
84-2-15
REM
over
TCT30461
between
mortgagors
Da
Silvas
&
mortgagee
Council.
1a.
Council
filed
Q43746
Foreclosure
case
vs
Da
Silvas;
85-2-5
compromise,
2-12
RTC
approved
=>
new
TCT328021
issued
to
Council.
(2)
8-8
Araneta
filed
with
RD
notice
of
lis
pendens
re
Ejectment
case
Q47989
Council
v
Araneta
(converted
to
collection
of
rentals,
later
withdrawn).
2a.
8-13
Araneta
filed
with
RD
affidavit
of
adverse
claim
re
Case
Q43469
Da
Silva
v
Araneta
for
Recovery
of
Possession.
2b.
Notice
of
lis
pendens
&
adverse
claim
annotated
at
back
of
TCT328021.
(3)
10-9
Case
Q46196
Council
v
Araneta
Quieting
of
Title,
Recovery
of
Possession,
Damages
with
PMI;
praying
for
cancellation
of
all
annotations
at
back
of
TCT328021.
(4)
87-7-6
While
Quieting
case
pending,
Heirs
filed
with
CA
petition
to
annul
judgment
in
Foreclosure
case
a.
Araneta
true
owner,
elder
Da
Silva
employee-trustee
TCT30461
in
Da
Silvas
name,
but
owners
duplicate
copy
kept
by
Araneta.
b.
63-1-31
Araneta
&
Da
Silva
terminated
trust;
but
RD
refused
to
register
Deed
of
Sale
because
Da
Silva
conjugal
property.
c.
84-3-24
Case
Q2772
alleging
copy
lost/destroyed,
heirs
of
Da
Silva
obtained
new
copy
of
owners
duplicate
copy
to
TCT30461;
Araneta
learned,
moved
to
re-open
proceeding;
12-7
Aranetas
Motion
granted:
Da
Silvas
ordered
to
return
copy
&
to
not
enter
into
any
transaction.
d.
85-11-11
Da
Silvas
manifested
before
LRC
that
title
to
property
transferred
to
Council
per
Foreclosure.
e.
On
Heirs
motion,
Judge
of
Q2772/Q43469
consolidated
with
Quieting
case
but
latters
Judge
refused.
4a.
Heirs
claim
fraud
by
&
collusion
between
Council
&
Da
Silva
(Council
knew
of
Aranetas
claim
of
ownership
because
its
Sec
Gen
is
lawyer
of
Da
Silvas
in
case
vs
Aranetas);
pray
to
annul
judgment
in
Foreclosure
case
&
for
TRO
to
enjoin
Quieting
proceedings.
4b.
87-11-10
CA
issued
TRO
enjoining
trial
of
Quieting;
parties
ordered
to
appear
for
PTC.
4c.
Council
filed
MR
of
TRO,
later
filed
Supplement
to
MR
with
Motion
to
Dismiss
on
following
grounds:
a.
CA
has
no
jurisdiction
to
hear
Petition
to
Annul
a
Judgment
already
executed
b.
lack
of
cause
of
action
because
Heirs
not
valid
claimants
of
the
property
c.
Heirs
not
parties
to
Foreclosure
case
=>
no
legal
capacity
to
sue
d.
litis
pendencia
because
of
pendency
of
Quieting
case
e.
abandonment,
waiver
&
unenforceablity
under
Statute
of
Frauds
4d.
12-2
CA
denied
MR
for
lack
of
merit;
12-03
CA
denied
Supplemental
Motion
&
Motion
to
Dismiss.
(5)
Council
files
Petition
for
Certiorari
claims
that:
1.
CA
should
not
hear
PAJ
because
fully
executed
already;
2.
Heirs
have
no
right
to
question
decision
because
they
are
non-parties
to
the
REM;
3.
Heirs
have
another
remedy
in
Quieting
case.
ISSUES:
(1)
Which
court
has
jurisdiction?
CA.
(2)
Who
may
institute
a
petition
for
annulment
of
judgment?
Even
non-party.
(3)
May
judgment
already
executed
still
be
annulled?
Yes.
HELD:
(1)
CA
has
exclusive
jurisdiction
over
actions
for
annulment
of
judgments
of
RTCs
per
BP
129
Sec
9(2).
(2)
A
person
who
is
not
a
party
to
the
judgment
=>
may
sue
for
its
annulment
provided
1that
he
can
prove
that
the
judgment
was
obtained
through
fraud
and
collusion,
and
2that
he
would
be
adversely
affected
thereby.
DARAB
Rules
of
Procedures
provide
for
an
appeal
to
DARAB
from
decision
of
PARAD.
Fraginals
did
not
avail
of
this
remedy.
Nothing
in
DARAB
Rules
allow
for
a
petition
for
annulment
of
a
final
PARAD
decision.)
DECISION:
Petition
denied.
NOTES:
(1)
Doctrine
of
Finality
of
Judgments
No
doctrine
is
more
sacrosanct
than
that
judgments
of
courts
or
awards
of
quasi-judicial
bodies,
even
if
erroneous,
must
become
final
at
a
definite
time
appointed
by
law.
This
doctrineis
the
bedrock
of
every
stable
judicial
system.
However,
the
doctrinepermits
certain
equitable
remedies*;
and
one
of
them
is
a
petition
for
annulment
under
Rule
47.
*The
other
remedies
are
1petition
for
relief
from
judgment
under
Rule
38,
2a
direct
action
such
as
a
petition
for
certiorari
under
Rule
65,
and
3a
collateral
attack
against
a
judgment
that
is
void
on
its
face.
(2)
The
remedy
of
annulment
of
judgment
is
extraordinary
in
character
and
will
not
so
easily
and
readily
lend
itself
to
abuse
by
parties
aggrieved
by
final
judgments.
Secs
1 and 2 of Rule
47 impose strict conditions for recourse to it.
(3)
Rule
47
is
a
new
provision
(1997)
albeit
the
remedy
has
long
been
given
imprimatur
by
the
courts.
*first
recognized
in
Banco
Espaol-Filipino
v
Palanca
(1918),
(4)
Macalalag
v
Ombudsman.
An
action
for
annulment
of
judgment
is
a
remedy
in
law
independent
of
the
case
where
the
judgment
sought
to
be
annulled
is
rendered.
The
concern
that
the
remedy
could
so
easily
be
resorted
to
as
an
instrument
to
delay
a
final
and
executory
judgment,
has
prompted
safeguards
to
be
put
in
place
in
order
to
avoid
an
abuse
of
the
rule.
Thus,
1the
annulment
of
judgment
may
be
based
only
on
the
grounds
of
extrinsic
fraud
and
lack
of
jurisdiction,
and
2the
remedy
may
NOT
be
invoked
(1)
where
the
party
has
availed
himself
of
the
remedy
of
new
trial,
appeal,
petition
for
relief
or
other
appropriate
remedy
and
lost
therefrom,
or
(2)
where
he
has
failed
to
avail
himself
of
those
remedies
through
his
own
fault
or
negligence.
(5)
The
right
to
appeal
is
a
mere
statutory
privilege.There
must
then
be
a
law
expressly
granting
such
right.
Thisis
even
more
true
in
actions
for
annulment
of
judgments
which
is
an
exception
to
the
rule
on
finality
of
judgments.
Macalalag
v
Ombudsman.
(6)
Fraginals
excuse
for
failing
to
avail
of
Rule
65
time
constraint
&
lack
of
counsel.
R57
Traders
Royal
Bank
v
IAC
1984
FACTS:
It
is
further
argued
that
since
private
respondent
La
Tondea,
Inc.,
had
voluntarily
submitted
itself
to
the
jurisdiction
of
the
Pasay
Court
by
filing
a
motion
to
intervene
in
Civil
Case
No.
9894-P,
the
denial
or
dismissal
thereof
constitutes
a
bar
to
the
present
action
filed
before
the
Bulacan
Court.
HELD:
We
cannot
sustain
the
petitioners
view.
Intervention
as
a
means
of
protecting
the
third-party
claimants
right
in
an
attachment
proceeding
is
not
exclusive
but
cumulative
and
suppletory
to
the
right
to
bring
an
independent
suit.
The
denial
or
dismissal
of
a
third-party
claim
to
property
levied
upon
cannot
operate
to
bar
a
subsequent
independent
action
by
the
claimant
to
establish
his
right
to
the
property
even
if
he
failed
to
appeal
from
the
order
denying
his
original
third-party
claim.
R58
La
Campana
Development
v
Ledesma,
2010
HELD:
=>
On
appeal
the
appellate
court
(CA)
may
STAY
the
writ
of
execution
issued
by
the
RTC
should
circumstances
so
require
even
if
RTC
judgments
in
unlawful
detainer
cases
are
immediately
executory,
=>
preliminary
injunction
may
still
be
granted.
R59
Talag
v
CA,
1990
HELD:
As
it
is
now,
the
question
of
title
and
possession
to
the
fishponds
cannot
be
determined
nor
is
there
any
clear
indication
one
way
or
the
other.
Hence,
the
appointment
of
a
receiver
is
improper
and
has
no
basis.
The
power
to
appoint
a
receiver
should
not
be
exercised
when
it
is
likely
to
produce
irreparable
injustice
or
injury
to
private
rights,
or
when
it
will
injure
the
interests
of
others
whose
rights
are
entitled
to
as
much
consideration
from
the
court
as
the
movant.
Before
the
remedy
is
granted,
the
consequences
or
effects
thereof
should
be
considered
or
established
in
order
to
avoid
causing
irreparable
injustice
or
injury
to
others
who
are
entitled
to
as
much
consideration
as
those
seeking
it.
(Lanson
v.
Araneta,
64
Phil.
549
(1937);
R60
Sapugay
v
CA,
1990
HELD:
A
replevin
bond
is
simply
intended
to
indemnify
the
defendant
against
any
loss
that
he
may
suffer
by
being
compelled
to
surrender
the
possession
of
the
disputed
property
pending
the
trial
of
the
action.
He
cannot
recover
on
the
bond
as
for
a
reconversion
when
he
has
failed
to
have
the
judgment
entered
for
the
return
of
the
property.
Nor
is
the
surety
liable
for
payment
of
the
judgment
for
damages
rendered
against
the
plaintiff
on
a
counterclaim
or
punitive
damages
for
fraudulent
or
wrongful
acts
committed
by
the
plaintiffs
and
unconnected
with
the
defendants
deprivation
of
possession
by
the
plaintiff.
Indeed,
even
where
the
judgment
was
that
the
defendant
was
entitled
to
the
property,
but
no
order
was
made
requiring
the
plaintiff
to
return
it
or
assessing
damages
in
default
of
a
return,
it
was
declared
that
until
judgment
was
entered
that
the
property
should
be
restored,
there
could
be
no
liability
on
the
part
of
the
sureties.