Petitioner Norberto Feria y Pacquing has been under detention
since May 21, 1981, up to present[1] by reason of his conviction
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 122954. February 15, 2000]
NORBERTO FERIA Y PACQUING, petitioner, vs. THE COURT
OF APPEALS, THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF
CORRECTIONS, MUNTINLUPA, METRO MANILA (IN PLACE
OF THE JAIL WARDEN OF THE MANILA CITY JAIL), THE
PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH II, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF MANILA, and THE CITY PROSECUTOR, CITY OF
MANILA, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
The mere loss or destruction of the records of a criminal case
subsequent to conviction of the accused will not render the
judgment of conviction void, nor will it warrant the release of
the convict by virtue of a writ of habeas corpus. The proper
remedy is the reconstitution of judicial records which is as much
a duty of the prosecution as of the defense.
Subject of this petition for review on certiorari are (1) the
Decision dated April 28, 1995, of the Eighth Division of the
Court of Appeals, which affirmed the dismissal of the petition
for habeas corpus filed by petitioner, and (2) the Resolution of
the Court of Appeals dated December 1, 1995, which denied the
Motion for Reconsideration. As hereafter elucidated, we sustain
the judgment of respondent appellate court.
Based on the available records and the admissions of the
parties, the antecedents of the present petition are as follows:
of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, in Criminal Case No.
60677, by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 2, for the
jeepney hold-up and killing of United States Peace Corps
Volunteer Margaret Viviene Carmona.
Some twelve (12) years later, or on June 9, 1993, petitioner
sought to be transferred from the Manila City Jail to the Bureau
of Corrections in Muntinlupa City, [2] but the Jail Warden of the
Manila City Jail informed the Presiding Judge of the RTC-Manila,
Branch 2, that the transfer cannot be effected without the
submission of the requirements, namely, the Commitment
Order or Mittimus, Decision, and Information.[3] It was then
discovered that the entire records of the case, including the
copy of the judgment, were missing. In response to the inquiries
made by counsel of petitioner, both the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Manila and the Clerk of Court of Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 2 attested to the fact that the records of
Criminal Case No. 60677 could not be found in their respective
offices. Upon further inquiries, the entire records appear to have
been lost or destroyed in the fire which occurred at the second
and third floor of the Manila City Hall on November 3, 1986. [4]
On October 3, 1994, petitioner filed a Petition for the Issuance
of a Writ of Habeas Corpus[5] with the Supreme Court against
the Jail Warden of the Manila City Jail, the Presiding Judge of
Branch 2, Regional Trial Court of Manila, and the City Prosecutor
of Manila, praying for his discharge from confinement on the
ground that his continued detention without any valid judgment
is illegal and violative of his constitutional right to due process.
In its Resolution dated October 10, 1994, [6] the Second Division
of this Court resolved -
" x x x (a) to ISSUE the Writ of Habeas Corpus; (b)
to ORDER the Executive Judge of the Regional
 Trial Court of Manila to conduct an immediate
RAFFLE of this case among the incumbent judges
thereof; and (c) to REQUIRE [1] the Judge to
whom this case is raffled to SET the case for
HEARING on Thursday, October 13, 1994 at 8:30
A.M., try and decide the same on the merits and
thereafter FURNISH this Court with a copy of his
decision thereon; [2] the respondents to make a
RETURN of the Writ on or before the close of
office hours on Wednesday, October 12, 1994 and
APPEAR PERSONALLY and PRODUCE the person of
Norberto Feria y Pa[c]quing on the aforesaid date
and time of hearing to the Judge to whom this
case is raffled, and [3] the Director General,
Philippine National Police, through his duly
authorized representative(s) to SERVE the Writ
and Petition, and make a RETURN thereof as
provided by law and, specifically, his duly
authorized representative(s) to APPEAR
PERSONALLY and ESCORT the person of Norberto
Feria y Pa[c]quing at the aforesaid date and time
of hearing."
The case was then raffled to Branch 9 of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, which on November 15, 1994, after hearing, issued
an Order[7] dismissing the case on the ground that the mere loss
of the records of the case does not invalidate the judgment or
commitment nor authorize the release of the petitioner, and
that the proper remedy would be reconstitution of the records
of the case which should be filed with the court which rendered
the decision.
Petitioner duly appealed said Order to the Court of Appeals,
which on April 28, 1995, rendered the assailed
Decision[8] affirming the decision of the trial court with the
modification that "in the interest of orderly administration of
justice" and "under the peculiar facts of the case" petitioner
may be transferred to the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa
City without submission of the requirements (Mittimus, Decision
and Information) but without prejudice to the reconstitution of
the original records.
The Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order having
been denied for lack of merit, [9] petitioner is now before us
on certiorari, assigning the following errors of law:[10]
I. WHETHER OR NOT, UNDER THE PECULIAR
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE, WHERE THE
RECORDS OF CONVICTION WERE LOST, THE
PETITIONERS CONTINUED INCARCERATION IS
JUSTIFIED UNDER THE LAW.
COROLLARY TO THIS, WHETHER OR NOT THE
COURT OF APPEALS RESOLUTION, AFFIRMING THE
DENIAL OF HEREIN APPELLANTS PETITION FOR
HABEAS CORPUS IS, IN CONTEMPLATION OF LAW,
A JUDGMENT OR A SUBSTITUTE JUDGMENT,
WHICH CAN BE UTILIZED AS A SUFFICIENT BASIS
FOR HIS INCARCERATION.
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE RECONSTITUTION OF
OFFICIAL RECORDS LOST/DESTROYED SHOULD BE
INITIATED BY THE GOVERNMENT AND ITS
ORGANS, WHO ARE IN CUSTODY OF SUCH, OR BY
THE PRISONER, WHOSE LIBERTY IS RESTRAINED.
Petitioner argues that his detention is illegal because there
exists no copy of a valid judgment as required by Sections 1
and 2 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, [11] and that the evidence
considered by the trial court and Court of Appeals in the habeas
corpus proceedings did not establish the contents of such
judgment. Petitioner further contends that our ruling in Gunabe
v. Director of Prisons, 77 Phil. 993, 995 (1947), that
"reconstitution is as much the duty of the prosecution as of the
defense" has been modified or abandoned in the subsequent Based on the records and the hearing conducted by the trial
case ofOrdonez v. Director of Prisons, 235 SCRA 152, 155 court, there is sufficient evidence on record to establish the fact
(1994), wherein we held that "[i]t is not the fault of the of conviction of petitioner which serves as the legal basis for his
prisoners that the records cannot now be found. If anyone is to detention. Petitioner made judicial admissions, both verbal and
be blamed, it surely cannot be the prisoners, who were not the written, that he was charged with and convicted of the crime of
custodians of those records." Robbery with Homicide, and sentenced to suffer imprisonment
"habang buhay".
In its Comment,[12] the Office of the Solicitor General contends
that the sole inquiry in this habeas corpus proceeding is In its Order dated October 17, 1994, the RTC-Manila, Branch 9,
whether or not there is legal basis to detain petitioner. The OSG made the finding that -[16]
maintains that public respondents have more than sufficiently
shown the existence of a legal ground for petitioners continued "During the trial and on manifestation and
incarceration, viz., his conviction by final judgment, and under arguments made by the accused, his learned
Section 4 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the discharge of a counsel and Solicitor Alexander G. Gesmundo
person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment is not who appeared for the respondents, it appears
authorized. Petitioners remedy, therefore, is not a petition clear and indubitable that:
forhabeas corpus but a proceeding for the reconstitution of
judicial records. (A) Petitioner had been charged
with Robbery with Homicide in
The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus, whose origin is Criminal Case No. 60677, Illegal
traced to antiquity, was devised and exists as a speedy and Possession of Firearm in Criminal
effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and Case No. 60678 and Robbery in
as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. [13] It Band in Criminal Case No.
secures to a prisoner the right to have the cause of his 60867. ... In Criminal Case No.
detention examined and determined by a court of justice, and 60677 (Robbery with
to have the issue ascertained as to whether he is held under Homicide) the accused admitted
lawful authority.[14] Consequently, the writ may also be availed in open Court that a decision
of where, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a) there was read to him in open Court
has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the by a personnel of the
restraint of a person, (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose respondent Court (RTC Branch
the sentence, or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as II) sentencing him to Life
such sentence is void as to such excess. [15] Petitioners claim is Imprisonment (Habang
anchored on the first ground considering, as he claims, that his buhay)..." (emphasis supplied)
continued detention, notwithstanding the lack of a copy of
a validjudgment of conviction, is violative of his constitutional Further, in the Urgent Motion for the Issuance of Commitment
right to due process. Order of the Above Entitled Criminal Case dated June 8, 1993,
[17]
petitioner himself stated that -
 "COMES NOW, the undersigned accused in the
above entitled criminal case and unto this
Honorable Court most respectfully move:
1. That in 1981 the accused was charge of
(sic) Robbery with Homicide;
2. That after four years of trial, the court
found the accused guilty and given a Life
Sentence in a promulgation handed down in
1985; (emphasis supplied)
3. That after the sentence was promulgated, the
Presiding Judge told the councel (sic) that
accused has the right to appeal the decision;
4. That whether the de oficio counsel appealed
the decision is beyond the accused
comprehension (sic) because the last time he saw
the counsel was when the decision was
promulgated.
5. That everytime there is change of Warden at
the Manila City Jail attempts were made to get
the Commitment Order so that transfer of the
accused to the Bureau of Corrections can be
affected, but all in vain;"
Petitioners declarations as to a relevant fact may be given in
evidence against him under Section 23 of Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court. This rule is based upon the presumption that no man
would declare anything against himself, unless such declaration
were true,[18] particularly with respect to such grave matter as
his conviction for the crime of Robbery with Homicide. Further,
under Section 4 of Rule 129, "[a]n admission, verbal or written,
made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same
case, does not require proof. The admission may be
contradicted only by a showing that it was made through
palpable mistake or that no such admission was made."
Petitioner does not claim any mistake nor does he deny making
such admissions.
The records also contain a certified true copy of the Monthly
Report dated January 1985[19] of then Judge Rosalio A. De Leon,
attesting to the fact that petitioner was convicted of the crime
of Robbery with Homicide on January 11, 1985. Such Monthly
Report constitutes an entry in official records under Section 44
of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, which is prima
facie evidence of facts therein stated.
Public respondents likewise presented a certified true copy of
Peoples Journal dated January 18, 1985, page 2, [20] issued by the
National Library, containing a short news article that petitioner
was convicted of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and was
sentenced to "life imprisonment." However, newspaper articles
amount to "hearsay evidence, twice removed" [21]and are
therefore not only inadmissible but without any probative value
at all whether objected to or not, [22] unless offered for a purpose
other than proving the truth of the matter asserted. In this case,
the news article is admissible only as evidence that such
publication does exist with the tenor of the news therein stated.
As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint by the
respondent rests on the petitioner who attacks such restraint. In
other words, where the return is not subject to exception, that
is, where it sets forth process which on its face shows good
ground for the detention of the prisoner, it is incumbent on
petitioner to allege and prove new matter that tends to
invalidate the apparent effect of such process.[23] If the
detention of the prisoner is by reason of lawful public authority,
the return is considered prima facie evidence of the validity of
the restraint and the petitioner has the burden of proof to show
that the restraint is illegal. Thus, Section 13 of Rule 102 of the
Rules of Court provides:
"SEC. 13. When the return evidence, and when
only a plea.If it appears that the prisoner is in
custody under a warrant of commitment in
pursuance of law, the return shall be considered
prima facie evidence of the cause of restraint, but
if he is restrained of his liberty by any alleged
private authority, the return shall be considered
only as a plea of the facts therein set forth, and
the party claiming the custody must prove such
facts."
Public respondents having sufficiently shown good ground for
the detention, petitioners release from confinement is not
warranted under Section 4 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court
which provides that -
"Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge
authorized. - If it appears that the person alleged
to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of
an officer under process issued by a court or
judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a
court of record, and that the court or judge had
jurisdiction to issue the process, render the
judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be
allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the
writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged
by reason of any informality or defect in the
process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in
this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a
person charged with or convicted of an offense in
the Philippines, or of a person suffering
imprisonment under lawful judgment."
In the case of Gomez v. Director of Prisons, 77 Phil. 458 (1946),
accused was convicted by the trial court of the crime of rape,
and was committed to the New Bilibid Prison. Pending appeal
with the Court of Appeals, the records of the case were, for
reasons undisclosed, completely destroyed or lost. Accused
then filed a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas
corpuswith the Supreme Court. The Court denied the petition,
ruling thus:
"The petition does not make out a case. The
Director of Prisons is holding the prisoner under
process issued by a competent court in
pursuance of a lawful, subsisting judgment. The
prisoner himself admits the legality of his
detention. The mere loss or destruction of the
record of the case does not invalidate the
judgment or the commitment, or authorize the
prisoners release."
Note further that, in the present case, there is also no showing
that petitioner duly appealed his conviction of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide, hence for all intents and purposes, such
judgment has already become final and executory. When a
court has jurisdiction of the offense charged and of the party
who is so charged, its judgment, order, or decree is not subject
to collateral attack by habeas corpus.[24] Put another way, in
order that a judgment may be subject to collateral attack
by habeas corpus, it must be void for lack of jurisdiction.
[25]
Thus, petitioners invocation of our ruling in Reyes v. Director
of Prisons, supra, is misplaced. In the Reyes case, we granted
the writ and ordered the release of the prisoner on the ground
that "[i]t does not appear that the prisoner has been sentenced
by any tribunal duly established by a competent authority
during the enemy occupation" and not because there were no
copies of the decision and information. Here, a copy of
the mittimus is available. And, indeed, petitioner does not raise
any jurisdictional issue.
The proper remedy in this case is for either petitioner or public Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr.,
respondents to initiate the reconstitution of the judgment of the JJ., concur.
case under either Act No. 3110, [26] the general law governing
reconstitution of judicial records, or under the inherent power of
courts to reconstitute at any time the records of their finished
cases in accordance with Section 5 (h) of Rule 135 of the Rules
of Court.[27] Judicial records are subject to reconstitution without
exception, whether they refer to pending cases or finished
cases.[28] There is no sense in limiting reconstitution to pending
cases; finished cases are just as important as pending ones, as
evidence of rights and obligations finally adjudicated.[29]

Petitioner belabors the fact that no initiative was taken by the

Government to reconstitute the missing records of the trial
court. We reiterate, however, that "reconstitution is as much the
duty of the prosecution as of the defense." [30] Petitioners
invocation of Ordoez v. Director of Prisons, 235 SCRA 152
(1994), is misplaced since the grant of the petition for habeas
corpustherein was premised on the loss of records prior to the
filing of Informations against the prisoners, and therefore "[t]he
government has failed to show that their continued detention is
supported by a valid conviction or by the pendency of charges
against them or by any legitimate cause whatsoever." In this
case, the records were lost after petitioner, by his own
admission, was already convicted by the trial court of the
offense charged. Further, the same incident which gave rise to
the filing of the Information for Robbery with Homicide also
gave rise to another case for Illegal Possession of Firearm, [31] the
records of which could be of assistance in the reconstitution of
the present case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit, and the

decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 95939. June 17, 1996]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. FLORENTINO BRACAMONTE y ABELLAR,
MANUEL REGINALDO y SAPON, and ERNIE LAPAN y
CABRAL alias ERNING BULAG, defendants-
appellants.
DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
Alibi, the plea of having been elsewhere than at the scene
of the crime at the time of the commission of the felony, is a
plausible excuse for the accused. Let there be no mistake about
it. Contrary to the common notion, alibi is in fact a good
defense. But, to be valid for purposes of exoneration from a
criminal charge, the defense of alibi must be such that it would
have been physically impossible for the person charged with
the crime to be at the locus criminis at the time of its
commission, the reason being that no person can be in two
places at the same time. The excuse must be so airtight that it
would admit of no exception. Where there is the least possibility
of accused's presence at the crime scene, the alibi will not hold
water.
Appellant Florentino Bracamonte y Abellar, Manuel
Reginaldo y Sapon, and Ernie Lapan y Cabral alias Erning Bulag,
stand charged with the crime of Robbery with Double Homicide
under the following Information, dated October 6, 1987:
"The undersigned 2nd Asst. City Fiscal for the City of Cavite
accuses Florentino Bracamonte y Abellar, Manuel Reginaldo y
Sapon and Ernie Lapan y Cabral alias Erning Bulag of the crime
of Robbery with Double Homicide, committed as follows:
That on or about September 23, 1987, in the City of Cavite,
Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating together and mutually helping each other, with
intent to gain did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously enter the house of one Violeta Sayaman Parnala,
and once inside, by means of violence and intimidation, rob,
take and carry away a necklace worth P600.00 and ring worth
P440.00 belonging to one Jay Vee Parnala Custodio, son of
Violeta Sayaman Parnala, without the consent of the said owner
and to his damage and prejudice in the total amount of
P1,100.00, Philippine Currency and that on the occasion of the
said robbery, and in pursuance of their conspiracy, the above-
named accused, with intent to kill, did, then and there, wilfully
unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack, scald and stab Jay
Vee Parnala inflicting upon Jay Vee Parnala Custodio 3 incised
and 15 stab wounds and upon Teresita Minorca Rosalinas 1
incised and 6 stab wounds on the different parts of their body,
which ultimately caused their deaths.
Contrary to law.''[1]
Ernie Lapan y Cabral was tried and convicted of the crime
in a Decision of the court a quo, dated February 13, 1989, and
his case is on appeal with this Court. Manuel Reginaldo y Sapon
is at large.
Appellant Bracamonte had been at large until his arrest on
October 27, 1989. He had been in hiding for more than two
years.
 The present appeal deals solely with the conviction by the
court a quo of herein appellant Bracamonte.
Arraigned on November 13, 1989, appellant pleaded "not
guilty" to the crime charged.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City, Branch
XVII, rendered judgment on September 21, 1990 finding
appellant guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of the
judgment reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the
accused Florentino Bracamonte y Abellar guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Double Homicide
and he is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA, to
indemnify the heirs of Jay Vee Parnala and Teresita Rosalinas the
amount of P30,000 each and to pay unto Violeta Parnala
P1,100.00 corresponding to the value of the articles lost without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the
cost."[2]
Hence, appellant interposed the present appeal, assigning
the following errors:
I door and saw a man, prompting her to shout, "magnanakaw,
"x x x IN GIVING CREDENCE TO PROSECUTION WITNESS'
DECLARATION CONCERNING THE POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AS ONE OF THE THREE (3) MEN WHO
ALLEGEDLY EMERGED FROM THE GARAGE DOOR OF THE
VICTIM'S HOUSE AND SPRINTED AWAY THEREFROM ALMOST
IMMEDIATELY.
II
x x x IN APPRECIATING THE THEN EXTANT CIRCUMSTANTIAL
EVIDENCES AS INDICATIVE OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S GUILT.
III
x x x IN ITS PRONOUNCEMENT THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT
EVADED ARREST BY HIDING AFTER HIS ALLEGED COMMISSION
OF THE HEINOUS CRIME IMPUTED AGAINST HIM.
IV
x x x IN DISREGARDING COMPLETELY THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI
PUT UP BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT."[3]
At the trial in the court a quo, the following facts appear to have
been proven:
On September 23, 1987, at about 8:30 in the evening,
Violeta Parnala and her common-law husband, Clark Din, arrived
home from the Kingdom Hall of Jehovah's Witnesses. She rang
their doorbell and when she got no response, she pounded on
the garage door while her husband went to the back of their
house and stoned the window of their son's room. Then, she
heard somebody trying to remove the padlock of the garage
magnanakaw." After the door was opened, three (3) men rushed
out, one after the other, whom she recognized as appellant
Bracamonte, Ernie Lapan and Manuel Reginaldo.
Upon hearing his wife shouting, Clark Din rushed to her and
saw a man about to turn at the other street. He ran after him
but could not catch up. He thus proceeded back to their
house.By this time, some of their neighbors, roused by the
shouting of Violeta, came out of their houses, among whom
were Pat. Sahagun and Pat. Punzal. The two (2) policemen went
with Clark Din inside the house and saw the television set
on. Din turned on the lights and started to look for his son. He
tried the bathroom but it was locked. He then went to their
room, got the keys and opened the bathroom where he saw
their maid, Teresita M. Rosalinas, hands tied with her mouth
gagged, and bathed in her own blood. Thereafter, he saw their
son, Jay Vee Parnala, in the dirty kitchen, his head and body
immersed in a pail of water, dead.
Dr. Regalado Sosa, City Health Officer of Cavite City,
conducted an autopsy on the cadavers of Jay Vee and
Rosalina. His findings disclosed that Rosalina sustained six (6)
stab wounds and one (1) incised wound, while Jay Vee sustained
thirteen (13) stab wounds and three (3) incised wounds on
different parts of the body.[4] In the case of Rosalina, the most
fatal wounds were wounds Nos. 6 and 7 while in the case of Jay
Vee, almost all of the wounds were fatal due to his age. [5] Jay
Vee was only six years old at the time of his death.
Appellant Florentino Bracamonte denied the charge and
interposed the defense of alibi. According to him, he was not in
Cavite City at the time the crime was committed, but was then
in the premises of the RM Motor Works located in Paraaque,
Metro Manila. This shop is owned by Rafael Diaz. Appellant
worked as an all around employee, alternating as a mechanic
and shopkeeper of Rafael Diaz.
We affirm the conviction of the herein appellant.
The defense of alibi is a handy but shabby excuse which
indictees never seem to tire of. [6] At the risk of sounding like a
broken record, we reiterate once more the oft-repeated rule that
the defense of alibi is worthless in the face of positive
identification.[7] In the case at bench, Violeta Parnala, witness
for the prosecution and mother of one of the victims, positively
testified that she saw appellant Bracamonte, together with
Manuel Reginaldo and Ernie Lapan, come out of their garage
door, obviously immediately after the incident in question. The
situation was that the accused were still inside the Parnala
residence when the spouses Parnala arrived thereat. This
circumstance and the fact that the three accused left Violeta in
a hurried manner and without paying their respects to the
house owner as would have been the case if their presence in
the Parnala house were legitimate, constitute circumstantial
evidence of their culpability. Violeta clearly saw the three (3)
men because they were only about an arm's length from where
she was when they scampered out of the garage door. As they
came out, they were practically facing her. Moreover, although
the light coming from the electric post, admittedly, was dim,
there was additional illumination coming from the houses
nearby sufficient to enable her to identify the
malefactors: Thus:
"Q: Following your testimony, you were outside the
small door knocking, then these three persons
came out from the garage?
A: They were still in the garage when suddenly they
opened the door of the garage. I thought he is our
maid and I told him that I was knocking here for a
long time already why did you wake up just now.
Q: And the distance between you and the place where
they came out was very short distance?
A: Yes, Ma'am.
Q: What is the distance?
A: About an arm (sic) length.
Q: And you said they walked very fast?
A: Not so fast. When they were already outside they A: The house nearby have also light. The place was
ran so fast. also lighted by the houses of the neighbor which
has a light."[8]
Q: Mrs. Witness, is there a lighting facilities (sic) in your
door? Violeta Parnala was unswerving in her identification in open
court of appellant Bracamonte as one of the felons who
A: There is an electric post that has a light. emerged from their house, considering that the latter used to
drive her son to school. As further recounted by Violeta, viz:
Q: And would it be 8 to 10 meters from the door of your
garage? Q: In your direct testimony when you were asked this
question. Q: Why do you know the accused? A:
A: It could be not so far (sic) because our house is at Because my son used to ride in his jeepney on his
the corner. way to school. How young was your son Jay Vee
Parnala Custodio when the incident happened?
Q: Page 35 of your transcript of stenographic notes
shows it is about 8 to 10 meters. What is the kind A: He was six years old?
of light?
xxx xxx xxx
A: Electric bulb.
Q: And during those times when this Teresita Rosalinas
Q: Not the fluorescent? and your son Jay Vee Parnala Custodio were going
to school, you do not mind who the driver was of
A: Bulb. the jeepney they were taking?

Q: And it was about how high? A: I also looked at him.

A: The height of an electric post. Q: But your concern was merely to reach their
destination, not to identify the driver of the
jeepney?
Q: It could be about 20 feet?

A: Of course when my child leaves the house, I used to

A: I am not sure.
see who was the driver because I have much
concern about my son in case something might
Q: And you will agree with me that that light was not happen.
sufficient enough to be able to clearly see the
faces of the persons going out of the garage?
xxx xxx xxx
 Q: What is in the driver taking your son to school (sic)
or the distinguishing feature that made you say
that you came to know the accused because he
used to ride in the jeepney of his?
A: Of course the feature of his face and the built of his
body.
Q: Was there any distinguishing feature in his face or in
his body, what is it?
A: His face a little bit round.
Q: If that accused is in the courtroom today, will you be
able to identify him?
A: Yes, Ma'am (He is there, witness pointing to the
accused.)
Q: How many times more or less did your son Jay Vee
and Teresita Rosalinas ride in this jeepney being
driven by this Bracamonte?
A: I cannot remember already how many times but
I could see them very often riding in the jeepney.
Q: And this accused Bracamonte is not living in your
neighborhood?
A: He is also living in that place but a little bit far from
our place."[9]
Appellant countered, however, that witness Violeta could
not have known him personally since her son and maid rode
coincidentally on appellant's jeepney only on occasions
whenever he passed by the witness' house in the course of
regular work. Their relationship was impersonal, not conducive
to close and regular relationship thereby ruling out intimate
knowledge of each other.[10] The implication is that Violeta could
not have positively identified him as one of those who emerged
from the garage door of the victims' house, they being
complete strangers to each other.
This averment is of no consequence, because nowhere in
the testimony of Violeta did she claim that she knows the
appellant personally. What she testified to was that she used to
see her son and maid ride in appellant's jeepney very often,
[11]
which is the reason why she became familiar with appellant's
physical appearance. There is nothing in law and jurisprudence
which requires, as a condition sine qua non, that in order for
there to be a positive identification by a prosecution witness of
a felon, he must first know the latter personally. If this were the
case, the prosecution would rarely get any conviction since, in
most instances, the perpetrator of the crime is unrelated to the
victim. No further requirement is imposed by law on the
prosecution than that the identification made by its witness be
direct, firm, unequivocal, and, most importantly, credible. The
witness' degree of closeness or familiarity with the accused,
although may be helpful, is by no means an indispensable
requirement for purposes of positive identification.
To corroborate his defense of alibi, appellant presented
Rafael Diaz, owner of RM Motor Works in Paraaque, where
appellant used to work as an all around employee and where he
allegedly spent the night on September 23, 1987, the time
when the crime was committed. Diaz' testimony contributed
very little, if at all, to his defense. The direct examination of
Diaz reveals the following:
"Q: Please recall the specific date of September 23,
1987, have you gone to your shop?
 A: As far as I know, I cannot remember. At that date Q: You are not sure he did not leave?
because of too long to recall (sic) but what can say
is that I know that he stayed in the shop. He sleep A: Yes, Your Honor, I am not sure.[13]
(sic) in the shop.
The above testimony, whose purpose is to corroborate
xxx xxx xxx appellant's defense of alibi, failed to serve its purpose for it was
hardly clear and convincing. Thus, the trial court did not commit
Q: Now, you said that you used to visit, inspect your any error in refusing to give probative value to this piece of
shop usually in the morning. Now, tell us Mr. evidence. Settled is the doctrine that the trial court's evaluation
Witness have you done that in September 1987? of the credit-worthiness of the testimony given before it by
witnesses must be accorded great respect. [14] It has been said
A: Yes, sir. that the defense of alibi is inherently weak since it is very easy
to concoct. In order that this defense may prosper, it must be
Q: In your doing such inspection, where was Florentino established clearly and convincingly not only that the accused
Bracamonte? is elsewhere at the time of the commission of the crime, but
that likewise it would have been physically impossible for him to
A: He was in the shop. be at the vicinity thereof. [15] In the instant case, appellant
Bracamonte tragically failed to show, by clear and convincing
proof, that it was physically impossible for him to be at the
Q: For the whole month of September 1987?
victims' house at the time the crime was committed, apart from
his self-serving declaration that he was at RM Motors Works in
A: Yes, sir.[12] Paraaque on the fateful night of September 23, 1987, seconded
by the discredited testimony of his alleged employer, Rafael
However, on cross-examination, Diaz became more Diaz.
ambivalent:
With marked relevance is the fact that there appears to be
"Q: And you are definite that on September 23, 1987 as no motive on the part of Violeta Parnala to falsely accuse
you mentioned earlier you did not know if the appellant, other than her sincere desire to seek justice for the
accused left your shop or not? deaths of her son and maid. Appellant himself admitted that he
was not aware of any reason or motive why Violeta should
A: In the afternoon. testify falsely against him.[16] Positive identification by an
independent witness who has not been shown to have any
Q: On September 23, 1987? reason or motive to testify falsely must prevail over simple
denials and the unacceptable alibi of the accused.[17]
A: I am not sure.
Appellant insists that, as proof of his innocence, he did not
COURT: escape nor evade arrest after the commission of the crime
imputed against him. He contends that he stayed in his place of
employment in Paraaque, Metro Manila, from 1986 to 1989,
regularly performing his job, when he was apprehended on the
strength of a warrant of arrest.
This is contrary to the finding of the court a quo which held
that:
"Accused Florentino Bracamonte y Abellar also stayed at large
until his arrest on October 27, 1989 after more than two years
of hiding to evade the scales of justice.
xxx xxx xxx
x x x [A]ccused chose to flee from the scene of the crime and to
stay beyond the clutches of the law x x x, thus spotlighting the
legal maxim 'the guilty fleeth while the innocent stands fast,
bold as a lion."'[18]The evidence on record does not warrant
reversal of this finding by the trial court. It is this Court's
bounden duty to refrain from reviewing findings of fact by the
lower court, considering that it has all the opportunity to
directly observe the witnesses and to determine by their
demeanor on the stand the probative value of their testimonies.
[19]
In any case, assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that appellant's
claim of non-flight is true, there is no law or principle which
guarantees that non-flight per se is proof, let alone conclusive
proof, of one's innocence and, as in the case of alibi, such a
defense is unavailing when placed astride the undisputed fact
that there is positive identification of the felon.[20]
Finally, appellant claims that the evidence against him is
purely circumstantial which is insufficient to sustain his
conviction. He submits that there is no solitary piece of
evidence directly linking him to the commission of the crime
imputed against him, hence he should be acquitted.
This argument is specious. Circumstantial evidence is that
evidence which indirectly proves a fact in issue. [21] In this
jurisdiction, direct evidence is not only the basis upon which the
guilt of an accused may be proved; it may also be established
through circumstantial evidence.[22] Under the Revised Rules on
Evidence, circumstantial evidence will support and justify a
conviction if the following requisites concur:
(1) There is more than one circumstance;
(2) The facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and
(3) The combination of all the circumstances is such as
to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. [23]
In the case at bench, the circumstances pointing to
accused-appellant's guilt are as follows:
(1) He was not an inmate of private complainant's
house and so, his presence therein at a late hour in
the evening indicate his and his companions' evil
designs.
(2) He and his cohorts were seen coming out of the
victims' house immediately after the crime of
robbery with homicide was perpetrated.
(3) After coming out, the culprits immediately fled.
(4) He and Sapon went into hiding for more than two
(2) years. Bracamonte was arrested on October 27,
1989.
 The above circumstances, highlighted by the testimony of
Violeta Parnala which was straightforward and clear as to the
identity of the appellant as one of the malefactors, clearly point
to appellant Bracamonte's guilt. Thus was overcome, by proof
beyond reasonable doubt, the presumption of innocence in
appellant's favor.
In contrast, appellant merely relies on denial and alibi,
weak defenses, to support his claim of innocence, which
defenses were overthrown by the prosecution.
hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed
shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua."
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED, with the modification that the conviction is for
robbery with homicide, and the indemnity for the heirs of the
two victims is hereby increased from P30,000 to
P50,000[30] each.
SO ORDERED.

The Court notes that appellant, together with his two (2) Padilla, Bellosillo, Vitug, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
other co-accused, were charged and convicted of robbery with
double homicide. The charge and the corresponding conviction
should have been for robbery with homicide only although two
persons were killed.[24] In this complex crime, the penalty
prescribed in Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code is not
affected by the number of killings accompanying the robbery.
[25]
The multiplicity of the victims slain, though, is appreciated as
an aggravating circumstance.[26]

Although Republic Act No. 7659 reimposed the death

penalty for certain heinous crimes, including robbery with
homicide,[27] the capital punishment could not be imposed in the
case at bench. The crime here was committed way back in
September 23, 1987, while R.A. No. 7659 took effect only on
December 31, 1993.[28] To impose upon appellant the death
penalty would violate the basic rule in criminal law that, if the
new law imposes a heavier penalty, the law in force at the time
of the commission of the offense shall be applied, [29] which in
this case is Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code sans the
death penalty clause by virtue of Section 19 (1), Article III of the
1987 Constitution which provides, viz:

"x x x Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for

compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress
Republic of the Philippines On March 5, 1970 a criminal complaint for violation of section 4
SUPREME COURT of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against the respondent
Manila Feliciano Co in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac. On March 10
Judge Jose C. de Guzman conducted a preliminary investigation
EN BANC and, finding a prima facie case against Co, directed the
Government prosecutors to file the corresponding information.
The twice-amended information, docketed as Criminal Case No.
27, recites:
G.R. Nos. L-32613-14 December 27, 1972
That on or about May 1969 to December 5, 1969,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, in the Municipality of Capas, Province of Tarlac,
vs. Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
HON. SIMEON. FERRER (in his capacity as Judge of the Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused,
Court of First Instance of Tarlac, Branch I), FELICIANO CO feloniously became an officer and/or ranking
alias LEONCIO CO alias "Bob," and NILO S. TAYAG alias leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines,
Romy Reyes alias "Taba,"respondents. an outlawed and illegal organization aimed to
overthrow the Government of the Philippines by
means of force, violence, deceit, subversion, or
Solicitor R. Mutuc for respondent Feliciano Co.
any other illegal means for the purpose of
establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian
Jose W. Diokno for respondent Nilo Tayag. regime and placing the government under the
control and domination of an alien power, by
being an instructor in the Mao Tse Tung
University, the training school of recruits of the
CASTRO, J.:p New People's Army, the military arm of the said
Communist Party of the Philippines.
I. Statement of the Case
That in the commission of the above offense, the
Posed in issue in these two cases is the constitutionality of the following aggravating circumstances are present,
Anti-Subversion to wit:
Act, 1 which outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines and
other "subversive associations," and punishes any person who (a) That the crime has been committed in
"knowingly, willfully and by overt acts affiliates himself with, contempt of or with insult to public authorities;
becomes or remains a member" of the Party or of any other
similar "subversive" organization. (b) That the crime was committed by a band; and
afford impunity.
 (c) With the aid of armed men or persons who
insure or afford impunity.
Co moved to quash on the ground that the Anti-Subversion Act
is a bill of attainder.
Meanwhile, on May 25, 1970, another criminal complaint was
filed with the same court, sharing the respondent Nilo Tayag
and five others with subversion. After preliminary investigation
was had, an information was filed, which, as amended, reads:
The undersigned provincial Fiscal of Tarlac and
State Prosecutors duly designated by the
Secretary of Justice to collaborate with the
Provincial Fiscal of Tarlac, pursuant to the Order
dated June 5, above entitled case, hereby accuse
Nilo S. Tayag, alias Romy Reyes alias TABA,
ARTHUR GARCIA, RENATO (REY) CASIPE,
ABELARDO GARCIA, MANUEL ALAVADO, BENJAMIN
BIE alias COMMANDER MELODY and several JOHN
DOES, whose identities are still unknown, for
violation of REPUBLIC ACT No. 1700, otherwise
known as the Anti-Subversion Law, committed as
follows:
That in or about March 1969 and for sometime
prior thereto and thereafter, in the Province of
Tarlac, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, and elsewhere in the Philippines, the
above-named accused knowingly, willfully and by
overt acts organized, joined and/or remained as
offices and/or ranking leaders, of the KABATAANG
MAKABAYAN, a subversive organization as defined
in Republic Act No. 1700; that BENJAMIN BIE and
COMMANDER MELODY, in addition thereto,
knowingly, willfully and by over acts joined and/or
remained as a member and became an officer
and/or ranking leader not only of the Communist
Party of the Philippines but also of the New
People's Army, the military arm of the Communist
Party of the Philippines; and that all the above-
named accused, as such officers and/or ranking
leaders of the aforestated subversive
organizations, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, did then and there
knowingly, willfully and feloniously commit
subversive and/or seditious acts, by inciting,
instigating and stirring the people to unite and
rise publicly and tumultuously and take up arms
against the government, and/or engage in
rebellious conspiracies and riots to overthrow the
government of the Republic of the Philippines by
force, violence, deceit, subversion and/or other
illegal means among which are the following:
1. On several occasions within the province of
Tarlac, the accused conducted meetings and/or
seminars wherein the said accused delivered
speeches instigating and inciting the people to
unite, rise in arms and overthrow the Government
of the Republic of the Philippines, by force,
violence, deceit, subversion and/or other illegal
means; and toward this end, the said accused
organized, among others a chapter of the
KABATAANG MAKABAYAN in barrio Motrico, La Paz,
Tarlac for the avowed purpose of undertaking or
promoting an armed revolution, subversive
and/or seditious propaganda, conspiracies, and/or
riots and/or other illegal means to discredit and
overthrow the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines and to established in the Philippines a
Communist regime.
 2. The accused NILO TAYAG alias ROMY REYES
alias TABA, together with FRANCISCO PORTEM
alias KIKO Gonzales and others, pursued the
above subversive and/or seditious activities in
San Pablo City by recruiting members for the New
People's Army, and/or by instigating and inciting
the people to organize and unite for the purpose
of overthrowing the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines through armed revolution,
deceit, subversion and/or other illegal means, and
establishing in the Philippines a Communist
Government.
That the following aggravating circumstances
attended the commission of the offense: (a) aid of
armed men or persons to insure or afford
impunity; and (b) craft, fraud, or disguise was
employed.
On July 21, 1970 Tayag moved to quash, impugning the validity
of the statute on the grounds that (1) it is a bill of attainder; (2)
it is vague; (3) it embraces more than one subject not
expressed in the title thereof; and (4) it denied him the equal
protection of the laws.
Resolving the constitutional issues raised, the trial court, in its
resolution of September 15, 1970, declared the statute void on
the grounds that it is a bill of attainder and that it is vague and
overboard, and dismissed the informations against the two
accused. The Government appealed. We resolved to treat its
appeal as a special civil action for certiorari.
II. Is the Act a Bill of Attainder?
Article III, section 1 (11) of the Constitution states that "No bill
of attainder or ex port facto law shall be enacted." 2A bill of
attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without
trial. 3 Its essence is the substitution of a legislative for a judicial
determination of guilt. 4 The constitutional ban against bills of
attainder serves to implement the principle of separation of
powers 5 by confining legislatures to
rule-making 6 and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of
the judicial function. 7 History in perspective, bills of attainder
were employed to suppress unpopular causes and political
minorities, 8 and it is against this evil that the constitutional
prohibition is directed. The singling out of a definite class, the
imposition of a burden on it, and a legislative intent, suffice to
stigmatizea statute as a bill of attainder. 9
In the case at bar, the Anti-Subversion Act was condemned by
the court a quo as a bill of attainder because it "tars and
feathers" the Communist Party of the Philippines as a
"continuing menace to the freedom and security of the country;
its existence, a 'clear, present and grave danger to the security
of the Philippines.'" By means of the Act, the trial court said,
Congress usurped "the powers of the judge," and assumed
"judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CCP without
any of the forms or safeguards of judicial trial." Finally,
according to the trial court, "if the only issue [to be determined]
is whether or not the accused is a knowing and voluntary
member, the law is still a bill of attainder because it has
expressly created a presumption of organizational guilt which
the accused can never hope to overthrow."
1. When the Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen
that it does not specify the Communist Party of the Philippines
or the members thereof for the purpose of punishment. What it
does is simply to declare the Party to be an organized
conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for the
purposes of the prohibition, stated in section 4, against
membership in the outlawed organization. The term
"Communist Party of the Philippines" issued solely for
definitional purposes. In fact the Act applies not only to the
Communist Party of the Philippines but also to "any other
organization having the same purpose and their successors." Its
focus is not on individuals but on conduct. 10
This feature of the Act distinguishes it from section 504 of the
U.S. Federal Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959 11 which, in U.S. vs. Brown, 12 was held to be a bill of
attainder and therefore unconstitutional. Section 504 provided
in its pertinent parts as follows:
(a) No person who is or has been a member of
the Communist
Party ... shall serve
(1) as an officer, director, trustee, member of any
executive board or similar governing body,
business agent, manager, organizer, or other
employee (other than as an employee performing
exclusively clerical or custodial duties) of any
labor organization.
during or for five years after the termination of
his membership in the Communist Party....
(b) Any person who willfully violates this section
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.
This statute specified the Communist Party, and imposes
disability and penalties on its members. Membership in the
Party, without more, ipso facto disqualifies a person from
becoming an officer or a member of the governing body of any
labor organization. As the Supreme Court of the United States
pointed out:
Under the line of cases just outlined, sec. 504 of
the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act plainly constitutes a bill of attainder. Congress
undoubtedly possesses power under the
Commerce Clause to enact legislation designed
to keep from positions affecting interstate
commerce persons who may use of such
positions to bring about political strikes. In
section 504, however, Congress has exceeded
the authority granted it by the Constitution. The
statute does not set forth a generally applicable
rule decreeing that any person who commits
certain acts or possesses certain characteristics
(acts and characteristics which, in Congress'
view, make them likely to initiate political strikes)
shall not hold union office, and leaves to courts
and juries the job of deciding what persons have
committed the specified acts or possessed the
specified characteristics. Instead, it designates in
no uncertain terms the persons who possess the
feared characteristics and therefore cannot hold
union office without incurring criminal liability
members of the Communist Party.
Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control
Board, 367 US 1, 6 L ed 2d 625, 81 S CT 1357,
lend a support to our conclusion. That case
involved an appeal from an order by the Control
Board ordering the Communist Party to register
as a "Communist-action organization," under the
Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, 64 Stat
987, 50 USC sec. 781 et seq. (1958 ed). The
definition of "Communist-action organization"
which the Board is to apply is set forth in sec. 3 of
the Act:
[A]ny organization in the United States ... which
(i)is substantially directed, dominated, or
controlled by the foreign government or foreign
 organization controlling the world Communist
movement referred to in section 2 of this title,
and(ii) operates primarily to advance the
objectives of such world Communist movement...
64 Stat 989, 50 USC sec. 782 (1958 ed.)
A majority of the Court rejected the argument
that the Act was a bill of attainder, reasoning that
sec. 3 does not specify the persons or groups
upon which the deprivations setforth in the Act
are to be imposed, but instead sets forth a
general definition. Although the Board has
determined in 1953 that the Communist Party
was a "Communist-action organization," the Court
found the statutory definition not to be so narrow
as to insure that the Party would always come
within it:
In this proceeding the Board had found, and the
Court of Appeals has sustained its conclusion,
that the Communist Party, by virtud of the
activities in which it now engages, comes within
the terms of the Act. If the Party should at
anytime choose to abandon these activities, after
it is once registered pursuant to sec. 7, the Act
provides adequate means of relief. (367 US, at
87, 6 L ed 2d at 683)
Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it would
be totally unnecessary to charge Communists in court, as the
law alone, without more, would suffice to secure their
punishment. But the undeniable fact is that their guilt still has
to be judicially established. The Government has yet to prove at
the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly, willfully
and by overt acts, and that they joined the Party, knowing its
subversive character and with specific intent to further its basic
objective, i.e., to overthrow the existing Government by force
deceit, and other illegal means and place the country under the
control and domination of a foreign power.
As to the claim that under the statute organizationl guilt is
nonetheless imputed despite the requirement of proof of
knowing membership in the Party, suffice it to say that is
precisely the nature of conspiracy, which has been referred to
as a "dragneet device" whereby all who participate in the
criminal covenant are liable. The contention would be correct if
the statute were construed as punishing mere membership
devoid of any specific intent to further the unlawful goals of the
Party. 13 But the statute specifically required that membership
must be knowing or active, with specific intent to further the
illegal objectives of the Party. That is what section 4 means
when it requires that membership, to be unlawful, must be
shown to have been acquired "knowingly, willfully and by overt
acts." 14 The ingredient of specific intent to pursue the unlawful
goals of the Party must be shown by "overt acts." 15 This
constitutes an element of "membership" distinct from the
ingredient of guilty knowledge. The former requires proof of
direct participation in the organization's unlawful activities,
while the latter requires proof of mere adherence to the
organization's illegal objectives.
2. Even assuming, however, that the Act specifies individuals
and not activities, this feature is not enough to render it a bill of
attainder. A statute prohibiting partners or employees of
securities underwriting firms from serving as officers or
employees of national banks on the basis of a legislative finding
that the persons mentioned would be subject to the temptation
to commit acts deemed inimical to the national economy, has
been declared not to be a bill of attainder. 16 Similarly, a statute
requiring every secret, oath-bound society having a
membership of at least twenty to register, and punishing any
person who becomes a member of such society which fails to
register or remains a member thereof, was declared valid even
if in its operation it was shown to apply only to the members of
the Ku Klux Klan. 17
In the Philippines the validity of section 23 (b) of the Industrial
Peace Act, 18 requiring labor unions to file with the Department
of Labor affidavits of union officers "to the effect that they are
not members of the Communist Party and that they are not
members of any organization which teaches the overthrow of
the Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional
method," was upheld by this Court. 19
Indeed, it is only when a statute applies either to named
individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in
such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial
trial does it become a bill of attainder. 20 It is upon this ground
that statutes which disqualified those who had taken part in the
rebellion against the Government of the United States during
the Civil War from holding office, 21 or from exercising their
profession, 22 or which prohibited the payment of further
compensation to individuals named in the Act on the basis of a
finding that they had engages in subversive activities, 23 or
which made it a crime for a member of the Communist Party to
serve as an officer or employee of a labor union, 24 have been
invalidated as bills of attainder.
But when the judgment expressed in legislation is so universally
acknowledged to be certain as to be "judicially noticeable," the
legislature may apply its own rules, and judicial hearing is not
needed fairly to make such determination. 25
In New York ex rel. Bryant vs. Zimmerman, 26 the New York
legislature passed a law requiring every secret, oath-bound
society with a membership of at least twenty to register, and
punishing any person who joined or remained a member of such
a society failing to register. While the statute did not specify the
Ku Klux Klan, in its operation the law applied to the KKK
exclusively. In sustaining the statute against the claim that it
discriminated against the Ku Klux Klan while exempting other
secret, oath-bound organizations like masonic societies and the
Knights of Columbus, the United States Supreme Court relied on
common knowledge of the nature and activities of the Ku Klux
Klan. The Court said:
The courts below recognized the principle shown
in the cases just cited and reached the conclusion
that the classification was justified by a difference
between the two classes of associations shown by
experience, and that the difference consisted (a)
in a manifest tendency on the part of one class to
make the secrecy surrounding its purpose and
membership a cloak for acts and conduct inimical
to personal rights and public welfare, and (b) in
the absence of such a tendency on the part of the
other class. In pointing out this difference one of
the courts said of the Ku Klux Klan, the principal
association in the included class: "It is a matter of
common knowledge that this organization
functions largely at night, its members disguised
by hoods and gowns and doing things calculated
to strike terror into the minds of the people;" and
later said of the other class: "These organizations
and their purposes are well known, many of them
having been in existence for many years. Many of
them are oath-bound and secret. But we hear no
complaint against them regarding violation of the
peace or interfering with the rights of others."
Another of the courts said: "It is a matter of
common knowledge that the association or
organization of which the relator is concededly a
member exercises activities tending to the
prejudice and intimidation of sundry classes of
our citizens. But the legislation is not confined to
this society;" and later said of the other class:
"Labor unions have a recognized lawful purpose.
The benevolent orders mentioned in the
Benevolent Orders Law have already received
legislative scrutiny and have been granted
special privileges so that the legislature may well
consider them beneficial rather than harmful
agencies." The third court, after recognizing "the
potentialities of evil in secret societies," and
observing that "the danger of certain
organizations has been judicially demonstrated,"
meaning in that state, said: "Benevolent
orders, labor unions and college fraternities have
existed for many years, and, while not immune
from hostile criticism, have on the whole justified
their existence."
We assume that the legislature had before it such
information as was readily available including the
published report of a hearing, before a committee
of the House of Representatives of the 57th
Congress relating to the formation, purposes and
activities of the Klu Klux Klan. If so it was advised
putting aside controverted evidence that the
order was a revival of the Ku Klux Klan of an
earlier time with additional features borrowed
from the Know Nothing and the A. P. A. orders of
other periods; that its memberships was limited
to native-born, gentile, protestant whites; that in
part of its constitution and printed creed it
proclaimed the widest freedom for all and full
adherence to the Constitution of the United
States; in another exacted of its member an oath
to shield and preserve "white supremacy;" and in
still another declared any person actively
opposing its principles to be "a dangerous
ingredient in the body politic of our country and
an enemy to the weal of our national
commonwealth;" that it was conducting a
crusade against Catholics, Jews, and Negroes,
and stimulating hurtful religious and race
prejudices; that it was striving for political power
and assuming a sort of guardianship over the
administration of local, state and national affairs;
and that at times it was taking into its own hands
the punishment of what some of its members
conceived to be crimes.27
In the Philippines the character of the Communist Party has
been the object of continuing scrutiny by this Court. In 1932 we
found the Communist Party of the Philippines to be an illegal
association. 28 In 1969 we again found that the objective of the
Party was the "overthrow of the Philippine Government by
armed struggle and to establish in the Philippines a communist
form of government similar to that of Soviet Russia and Red
China." 29 More recently, in Lansang vs. Garcia, 30 we noted the
growth of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the
organization of Communist fronts among youth organizations
such as the Kabataang Makabayan (KM) and the emergence of
the New People's Army. After meticulously reviewing the
evidence, we said: "We entertain, therefore, no doubts about
the existence of a sizeable group of men who have publicly
risen in arms to overthrow the government and have thus been
and still are engaged in rebellion against the Government of the
Philippines.
3. Nor is it enough that the statute specify persons or groups in
order that it may fall within the ambit of the prohibition against
bills of attainder. It is also necessary that it must apply
retroactively and reach past conduct. This requirement follows
from the nature of a bill of attainder as a legislative adjudication
of guilt. As Justice Frankfurter observed, "frequently a bill of
attainder was ... doubly objectionable because of its ex post
factofeatures. This is the historic explanation for uniting the two
mischiefs in one
clause 'No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto law shall be
passed.' ... Therefore, if [a statute] is a bill of attainder it is also
an ex post facto law. But if it is not an ex post facto law, the
reasons that establish that it is not are persuasive that it cannot
be a bill of attainder." 31
Thus in Gardner vs. Board of Public Works, 32 the U.S. Supreme
Court upheld the validity of the Charter of the City of Los
Angeles which provided:
... [N]o person shall hold or retain or be eligible
for any public office or employment in the service
of the City of Los Angeles, in any office or
department thereof, either elective or appointive,
who has within five (5) years prior to the effective
date of this section advised, advocated, or
taught, or who may, after this section becomes
effective, become a member of or affiliated with
any group, society, association, organization or
party which advises, advocates or teaches or has
within said period of five (5) years advised,
advocated, or taught the overthrow by force or
violence of the Government of the United States
of America or of the State of California.
In upholding the statute, the Court stressed the prospective
application of the Act to the petitioner therein, thus:
... Immaterial here is any opinion we might have
as to the charter provision insofar as it purported
to apply restrospectively for a five-year period to
its effective date. We assume that under the
Federal Constitution the Charter Amendment is
valid to the extent that it bars from the city's
public service persons who, subsequently to its
adoption in 1941, advise, advocate, or reach the
violent overthrow of the Government or who are
or become affiliated with any group doing so. The
provisions operating thus prospectively were a
reasonable regulation to protect the municipal
service by establishing an employment
qualification of loyalty to the State and the United
States.
... Unlike the provisions of the charter and
ordinance under which petitioners were removed,
the statute in the Lovett case did not declare
general and prospectively operative standards of
qualification and eligibility for public employment.
Rather, by its terms it prohibited any further
payment of compensationto named individuals or
employees. Under these circumstances, viewed
against the legislative background, the
statutewas held to have imposed penalties
without judicial trial.
Indeed, if one objection to the bill of attainder is thatCongress
thereby assumed judicial magistracy, them it mustbe
demonstrated that the statute claimed to be a bill of
attainderreaches past conduct and that the penalties it
imposesare inescapable. As the U.S. Supreme Court
observedwith respect to the U.S. Federal Subversive Activities
ControlAct of 1950:
Nor is the statute made an act of "outlawry" or of
attainderby the fact that the conduct which it
regulates is describedwith such particularity that,
in probability, few organizationswill come within
the statutory terms. Legislatures may act tocurb
behaviour which they regard as harmful to the
public welfare,whether that conduct is found to
be engaged in by manypersons or by one. So
long as the incidence of legislation issuch that the
persons who engage in the regulated conduct,
bethey many or few, can escape regulation
 merely by altering thecourse of their own present
activities, there can be no complaintof an
attainder. 33
This statement, mutatis mutandis, may be said of theAnti-
Subversion Act. Section 4 thereof expressly statesthat the
prohibition therein applies only to acts committed"After the
approval of this Act." Only those who "knowingly,willfully and by
overt acts affiliate themselves with,become or remain members
of the Communist Party of thePhilippines and/or its successors
or of any subversive association"after June 20, 1957, are
punished. Those whowere members of the Party or of any other
subversive associationat the time of the enactment of the law,
weregiven the opportunity of purging themselves of liability
byrenouncing in writing and under oath their membershipin the
Party. The law expressly provides that such renunciationshall
operate to exempt such persons from penalliability. 34 The
penalties prescribed by the Act are thereforenot inescapable.
III. The Act and the Requirements of Due Process
1. As already stated, the legislative declaration in section 2 of
the Act that the Communist Party of the Philippinesis an
organized conspiracy for the overthrow of theGovernment is
inteded not to provide the basis for a legislativefinding of guilt
of the members of the Party butrather to justify the proscription
spelled out in section 4. Freedom of expression and freedom of
association are sofundamental that they are thought by some to
occupy a"preferred position" in the hierarchy of constitutional
values. 35 Accordingly, any limitation on their exercise mustbe
justified by the existence of a substantive evil. This isthe reason
why before enacting the statute in question Congressconducted
careful investigations and then stated itsfindings in the
preamble, thus:
... [T]he Communist Party of the Philippines
althoughpurportedly a political party, is in fact an
organized conspiracyto overthrow the
Government of the Republic of the Philippinesnot
only by force and violence but also by deceit,
subversionand other illegal means, for the
purpose of establishing in thePhilippines a
totalitarian regime subject to alien dominationand
control;
... [T]he continued existence and activities of the
CommunistParty of the Philippines constitutes a
clear, present andgrave danger to the security of
the Philippines;
... [I]n the face of the organized, systematice and
persistentsubversion, national in scope but
international in direction,posed by the Communist
Party of the Philippines and its activities,there is
urgent need for special legislation to cope
withthis continuing menace to the freedom and
security of the country.
In truth, the constitutionality of the Act would be opento
question if, instead of making these findings in enactingthe
statute, Congress omitted to do so.
In saying that by means of the Act Congress has assumed
judicial magistracy, the trial courd failed to takeproper account
of the distinction between legislative fact and adjudicative fact.
Professor Paul Freund elucidatesthe crucial distinction, thus:
... A law forbidding the sale of beverages
containingmore than 3.2 per cent of alcohol
would raise a question of legislativefact, i.e.,
whether this standard has a reasonable relationto
public health, morals, and the enforcement
problem. Alaw forbidding the sale of intoxicating
beverages (assuming itis not so vague as to
 require supplementation by rule-making)would
raise a question of adjudicative fact, i.e., whether
thisor that beverage is intoxicating within the
meaning of the statuteand the limits on
governmental action imposed by the Constitution.
Of course what we mean by fact in each case is
itselfan ultimate conclusion founded on
underlying facts and oncriteria of judgment for
weighing them.
A conventional formulation is that legislative facts
those facts which are relevant to the legislative
judgment will not be canvassed save to
determine whether there is a rationalbasis for
believing that they exist, while adjudicativefacts
those which tie the legislative enactment to
the litigant are to be demonstrated and found
according to the ordinarystandards prevailing for
judicial trials. 36
The test formulated in Nebbia vs. new York, 37 andadopted by
this Court in Lansang vs. Garcia, 38 is that 'if laws are seen to
have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and
are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of
due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that
effect renders a court functus officio." The recital of legislative
findings implements this test.
With respect to a similar statement of legislative findingsin the
U.S. Federal Subversive Activities Control Actof 1950 (that
"Communist-action organizations" are controlledby the foreign
government controlling the worldCommunist movement and
that they operate primarily to"advance the objectives of such
world Communist movement"),the U.S. Supreme Court said:
It is not for the courts to reexamine the validity of
theselegislative findings and reject them....They
are the productof extensive investigation by
Committes of Congress over morethan a decade
and a half. Cf. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.502,
516, 530. We certainly cannot dismiss them as
unfoundedirrational imaginings. ... And if we
accept them, as we mustas a not unentertainable
appraisal by Congress of the threatwhich
Communist organizations pose not only to
existing governmentin the United States, but to
the United States as asovereign, independent
Nation. ...we must recognize that thepower of
Congress to regulate Communist organizations of
thisnature is
extensive. 39
This statement, mutatis mutandis, may be said of thelegislative
findings articulated in the Anti-Subversion Act.
That the Government has a right to protect itself
againstsubversion is a proposition too plain to require
elaboration.Self-preservation is the "ultimate value" of society. It
surpasses and transcendes every other value, "forif a society
cannot protect its very structure from armedinternal attack,
...no subordinate value can be protected" 40 As Chief Justice
Vinson so aptly said in Dennis vs. United States: 41
Whatever theoretical merit there may be to the
argumentthat there is a 'right' to rebellion against
dictatorial governmentsis without force where the
existing structure of government provides for
peaceful and orderly change. We rejectany
principle of governmental helplessness in the
face of preparationfor revolution, which principle,
carried to its logical conclusion,must lead to
anarchy. No one could conceive that it isnot
within the power of Congress to prohibit acts
 intended tooverthrow the government by force
and violence.
2. By carefully delimiting the reach of the Act to conduct (as
explicitly described in sectin 4 thereof), Congressreaffirmed its
respect for the rule that "even throughthe governmental
purpose be legitimate and substantial,that purpose cannot be
pursued by means that broadly stiflefundamental personal
liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved." 42 The
requirement of knowing membership,as distinguished
from nominalmembership, hasbeen held as a sufficient basis for
penalizing membershipin a subversive organization. 43 For, as
has been stated:
Membership in an organization renders aid and
encouragement to the organization; and when
membership is acceptedor retained with
knowledge that the organization is engaged inan
unlawful purpose, the one accepting or retaining
membershipwith such knowledge makes himself
a party to the unlawfulenterprise in which it is
engaged. 44
3. The argument that the Act is unconstitutionallyoverbroad
because section 2 merely speaks of "overthrow"of the
Government and overthrow may be achieved
by peaceful means, misconceives the function of the
phrase"knowingly, willfully and by overt acts" in section 4.
Section 2 is merely a legislative declaration; the definitionsof
and the penalties prescribed for the different acts prescribedare
stated in section 4 which requires that membershipin the
Communist Party of the Philippines, to be unlawful, must be
acquired "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts." Indeed, the
first "whereas" clause makes clear thatthe overthrow
contemplated is "overthrow not only by forceand violence but
also be deceit, subversion and other illegalmeans." The absence
of this qualificatio in section 2 appearsto be due more to an
oversight rather than to deliberateomission.
Moreover, the word "overthrow' sufficiently connotesthe use of
violent and other illegal means. Only in a metaphoricalsense
may one speak of peaceful overthrow ofgovernments, and
certainly the law does not speak in metaphors.In the case of the
Anti-Subversion Act, the use ofthe word "overthrow" in a
metaphorical sense is hardlyconsistent with the clearly
delineated objective of the "overthrow,"namely, "establishing in
the Philippines a totalitarianregime and place [sic] the
Government under thecontrol and domination of an alien
power." What thisCourt once said in a prosecution for sedition
is appropos: "The language used by the appellant clearly
imported anoverthrow of the Government by violence, and it
should beinterpreted in the plain and obvious sense in which it
wasevidently intended to be understood. The word
'overthrow'could not have been intended as referring to an
ordinarychange by the exercise of the elective franchise. The
useof the whip [which the accused exhorted his audience to
useagainst the Constabulary], an instrument designed toleave
marks on the sides of adversaries, is inconsistentwith the mild
interpretation which the appellant wouldhave us impute to the
language."45
IV. The Act and the Guaranty of Free Expression
As already pointed out, the Act is aimed against conspiracies to
overthrow the Government by force, violence orother illegal
means. Whatever interest in freedom of speechand freedom of
association is infringed by the prohibitionagainst knowing
membership in the Communist Party ofthe Philippines, is so
indirect and so insubstantial as to beclearly and heavily
outweighed by the overriding considerationsof national security
and the preservartion of democraticinstitutions in his country.
The membership clause of the U.S. Federal Smith Actis similar
in many respects to the membership provision ofthe Anti-
Subversion Act. The former provides:
Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to
organize anysociety, group, or assembly of
persons who teach, advocate, orencourage the
overthrow or destruction of any such
governmentby force or violence; or becomes or is
a member of, or affiliatedwith, any such society,
group or assembly of persons, knowingthe
purpose thereof
Shall be fined not more than $20,000 or
imprisoned notmore than twenty years, or both,
and shall be ineligible for emplymentby the
United States or any department or
agencythereof, for the five years next following
his conviction.... 46
In sustaining the validity of this provision, the "Court said
in Scales vs. United States: 47
It was settled in Dennis that advocacy with which
we arehere concerned is not constitutionally
protected speech, and itwas further established
that a combination to promote suchadvocacy,
albeit under the aegis of what purports to be a
politicalparty, is not such association as is
protected by the firstAmendment. We can discern
no reason why membership, whenit constitutes a
purposeful form of complicity in a group
engagingin this same forbidden advocacy, should
receive anygreater degree of protection from the
guarantees of that Amendment.
Moreover, as was held in another case, where the problemsof
accommodating the exigencies of self-preservationand the
values of liberty are as complex and intricate as inthe situation
described in the legislative findings stated inthe U.S. Federal
Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950,the legislative
judgment as to how that threat may best bemet consistently
with the safeguards of personal freedomsis not to be set aside
merely because the judgment of judgeswould, in the first
instance, have chosen other methods. 48 For in truth, legislation,
"whether it restrains freedom tohire or freedom to speak, is
itself an effort at compromisebetween the claims of the social
order and individual freedom,and when the legislative
compromise in either case isbrought to the judicial test the
court stands one step removedfrom the conflict and its
resolution through law." 49
V. The Act and its Title
The respondent Tayag invokes the constitutional commandthat
"no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than
one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill." 50
What is assailed as not germane to or embraced in thetitle of
the Act is the last proviso of section 4 which reads:
And provided, finally, That one who conspires
with anyother person to overthrow the
Government of the Republic ofthe Philippines, or
the government of any of its political
subdivisionsby force, violence, deceit, subversion
or illegal means,for the purpose of placing such
Government or political subdivisionunder the
control and domination of any lien power, shallbe
punished by prision correccional to prision
mayor with allthe accessory penalties provided
therefor in the same code.
It is argued that the said proviso, in reality, punishes notonly
membership in the Communist Party of the Philippinesor similar
associations, but as well "any conspiracyby two persons to
overthrow the national or any local governmentby illegal
means, even if their intent is not to establisha totalitarian
regime, burt a democratic regime, evenif their purpose is not to
place the nation under an aliencommunist power, but under an
alien democratic power likethe United States or England or
Malaysia or even an anti-communistpower like Spain, Japan,
Thailand or Taiwanor Indonesia."
The Act, in addition to its main title ("An Act to Outlawthe
Communist Party of the Philippines and SimilarAssociations,
Penalizing Membership Therein, and forOther Purposes"), has a
short title. Section 1 providesthat "This Act shall be known as
the
Anti-Subversion Act."Together with the main title, the short title
of the statuteunequivocally indicates that the subject matter is
subversionin general which has for its fundamental purpose the
substitutionof a foreign totalitarian regime in place of
theexisting Government and not merely subversion by
Communistconspiracies..
The title of a bill need not be a catalogue or an indexof its
contents, and need not recite the details of the Act. 51 It is a
valid title if it indicates in broad but clear termsthe nature,
scope, and consequences of the proposed lawand its
operation. 52 A narrow or technical construction isto be avoided,
and the statute will be read fairly and reasonablyin order not to
thwart the legislative intent. We holdthat the Anti-Subversion
Act fully satisfies these requirements.
VI. Conclusion and Guidelines
In conclusion, even as we uphold the validity of theAnti-
Subversion Act, we cannot overemphasize the needfor
prudence and circumspection in its enforcement, operatingas it
does in the sensitive area of freedom of expressionand belief.
Accordingly, we set the following basic guidelines to be
observed in any prosecution under the Act.The Government, in
addition to proving such circumstancesas may affect liability,
must establish the following elementsof the crime of joining the
Communist Party of the Philippinesor any other subversive
association:
(1) In the case of subversive organizations other thanthe
Communist Party of the Philippines, (a) that thepurpose of the
organization is to overthrow the presentGovernment of the
Philippines and to establish in thiscountry a totalitarian regime
under the domination of aforeign power; (b) that the accused
joined such organization;and (c) that he did so knowingly,
willfully and byovert acts; and
(2) In the case of the Communist Party of the Philippines,(a) that
the CPP continues to pursue the objectiveswhich led Congress
in 1957 to declare it to be an organizedconspiracy for the
overthrow of the Government by illegalmeans for the purpose of
placing the country under thecontrol of a foreign power; (b) that
the accused joined theCPP; and (c) that he did so willfully,
knowingly and byovert acts.
We refrain from making any pronouncement as to thecrime or
remaining a member of the Communist Party ofthe Philippines
or of any other subversive association: weleave this matter to
future determination.
ACCORDINGLY, the questioned resolution of September15, 1970
is set aside, and these two cases are herebyremanded to the
court a quo for trial on the merits. Costs de oficio.
Makalintal, Zaldivar, Teehankee, Barredo and Esguerra, JJ.,
concur.
Concepcion, C.J., concurs in the result.

Makasiar and Antonio, JJ., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines Municipality of Batangas, Province of Batangas,
SUPREME COURT Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Manila Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a
person not authorized by law, did then and there
SECOND DIVISION wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously keep in his
possession, custody and direct control a revolver
Cal. .22, RG8 German Made with one (1) live
ammunition and four (4) empty shells without
G.R. No. L-30061 February 27, 1974 first securing the necessary permit or license to
possess the same.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellees,
vs. At the arraignment on September 11, 1964, the accused
JOSE JABINAL Y CARMEN, defendant-appellant. entered a plea of not guilty, after which trial was accordingly
held.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor
Antonio M. Martinez for plaintiff-appellee. The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in
possession of the revolver and the ammunition described in the
complaint, without the requisite license or permit. He, however,
Pedro Panganiban y Tolentino for defendant-appellant.
claimed to be entitled to exoneration because, although he had
no license or permit, he had an appointment as Secret Agent
from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment
as Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial Commander, and
ANTONIO, J.:p the said appointments expressly carried with them the authority
to possess and carry the firearm in question.
Appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas
(provincial capital), Batangas, in Criminal Case No. 889, finding Indeed, the accused had appointments from the above-
the accused guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm mentioned officials as claimed by him. His appointment from
and Ammunition and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate Governor Feliciano Leviste, dated December 10, 1962, reads:
penalty ranging from one (1) year and one (1) day to two (2)
years imprisonment, with the accessories provided by law, Reposing special trust and confidence in your
which raises in issue the validity of his conviction based on a civic spirit, and trusting that you will be an
retroactive application of Our ruling in People v. Mapa. 1 effective agent in the detection of crimes and in
the preservation of peace and order in the
The complaint filed against the accused reads: province of Batangas, especially with respect to
the suppression of trafficking in explosives,
That on or about 9:00 o'clock, p.m., the 5th day jueteng, illegal cockfighting, cattle rustling,
of September, 1964, in the poblacion, robbery and the detection of unlicensed firearms,
you are hereby appointed a SECRET AGENT of the
undersigned, the appointment to take effect
immediately, or as soon as you have qualified for
the position. As such Secret Agent, your duties
shall be those generally of a peace officer and
particularly to help in the preservation of peace
and order in this province and to make reports
thereon to me once or twice a month. It should be
clearly understood that any abuse of authority on
your part shall be considered sufficient ground for
the automatic cancellation of your appointment
and immediate separation from the service. In
accordance with the decision of the Supreme
Court in G.R. No. L-12088 dated December 23,
1959, you will have the right to bear a firearm,
particularly described below, for use in
connection with the performance of your duties.
By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon
the performance of your duties by taking your
oath of office and filing the original thereof with
us.
Very truly
(Sgd.) ground
Provincial Governor
FIREARM AUTHORIZED TO CARRY:
Kind: ROHM-Revolver
Make: German
SN: 64
Cal: .22
On March 15, 1964, the accused was also appointed by the PC
Provincial Commander of Batangas as Confidential Agent with
duties to furnish information regarding smuggling activities,
wanted persons, loose firearms, subversives and other similar
subjects that might affect the peace and order condition in
Batangas province, and in connection with these duties he was
temporarily authorized to possess a ROHM revolver, Cal. .22
RG-8 SN-64, for his personal protection while in the
performance of his duties.
The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of
his above-mentioned appointments as Secret Agent and
Confidential Agent, with authority to possess the firearm subject
matter of the prosecution, he was entitled to acquittal on the
basis of the Supreme Court's decision in People vs.
Macarandang 2 and People vs. Lucero. 3 The trial court, while
conceding on the basis of the evidence of record the accused
had really been appointed Secret Agent and Confidential Agent
by the Provincial Governor and the PC Provincial Commander of
Batangas, respectively, with authority to possess and carry the
firearm described in the complaint, nevertheless held the
accused
yours, in its decision dated December 27, 1968, criminally
liable for illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition on the
that the rulings
FELICIANO of the Supreme Court in the cases
LEVISTE
of Macarandang
and Lucero were reversed and abandoned
in People vs. Mapa, supra. The court considered as mitigating
circumstances the appointments of the accused as Secret Agent
and Confidential Agent.
Let us advert to Our decisions in People v. Macarandang, supra,
People v. Lucero, supra, and People v. Mapa, supra.
In Macarandang, We reversed the trial court's judgment of
conviction against the accused because it was shown that at
the time he was found to possess a certain firearm and
ammunition without license or permit, he had an appointment
from the Provincial Governor as Secret Agent to assist in the
maintenance of peace and order and in the detection of crimes,
with authority to hold and carry the said firearm and
ammunition. We therefore held that while it is true that the
Governor has no authority to issue any firearm license or
permit, nevertheless, section 879 of the Revised Administrative
Code provides that "peace officers" are exempted from the
requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess
firearms; and Macarandang's appointment as Secret Agent to
assist in the maintenance of peace and order and detection of
crimes, sufficiently placed him in the category of a "peace
officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police
who under section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code are
exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of
license to possess firearms. In Lucero, We held that under the
circumstances of the case, the granting of the temporary use of
the firearm to the accused was a necessary means to carry out
the lawful purpose of the batallion commander to effect the
capture of a Huk leader. In Mapa, expressly abandoning the
doctrine in Macarandang, and by implication, that in Lucero, We
sustained the judgment of conviction on the following ground:
The law is explicit that except as thereafter
specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any
person to ... possess any firearm, detached parts
of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any
instrument or implement used or intended to be
used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of
firearms, or ammunition." (Sec. 878, as amended
by Republic Act No. 4, Revised Administrative
Code.) The next section provides that "firearms
and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to
officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine
Constabulary, guards in the employment of the
Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial
governors, lieutenant governors, provincial
treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal
mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and
jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in
possession of such officials and public servants
for use in the performance of their official duties."
(Sec. 879, Revised Administrative Code.)
The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is
made for a secret agent. As such he is not
exempt. ... .
It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent
by the Provincial Government in 1962, and Confidential Agent
by the Provincial Commander in 1964, the prevailing doctrine
on the matter was that laid down by Us in People v.
Macarandang (1959) and People v. Lucero (1958). Our decision
in People v. Mapa reversing the aforesaid doctrine came only in
1967. The sole question in this appeal is: Should appellant be
acquitted on the basis of Our rulings
in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in
view of the complete reversal of
the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? The Solicitor
General is of the first view, and he accordingly recommends
reversal of the appealed judgment.
Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are
nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, and this is the
reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code "Judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution
shall form a part of the legal system ... ." The interpretation
upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law
as of the date that law originally passed, since this Court's
construction merely establishes the contemporaneous
legislative intent that law thus construed intends to effectuate.
The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a
restatement of legal maxim "legis interpretatio legis vim
obtinet" the interpretation placed upon the written law by a
competent court has the force of law. The doctrine laid down
inLucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence
of the law, of the land, at the time appellant was found in
possession of the firearm in question and when he arraigned by
the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in
the Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of this Court is
overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine
should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties
who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith
thereof. This is especially true in the construction and
application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that the
punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance
of society.

It follows, therefore, that considering that appellant conferred

his appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent and
authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing
doctrine enunciated in Macarandang andLucero, under which no
criminal liability would attach to his possession of said firearm
in spite of the absence of a license and permit therefor,
appellant must be absolved. Certainly, appellant may not be
punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not
to be punishable.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed,

and appellant is acquitted, with costs de oficio.

Zaldivar (Chairman), Barredo, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ.,

concur.

Fernando, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines Two letter-complaints were filed on October 28, 1986 and
SUPREME COURT December 9, 1986, with the Tanodbayan by Teofilo Gelacio, a
Manila political leader of Governor Valentina Plaza, wife of
Congressman Democrito O. Plaza of Agusan del Sur, shortly
EN BANC after the private respondent had replaced Mrs. Plaza as
OIC/provincial governor of Agusan del Sur in March 1986 (p.
235, Rollo). Gelacio's complaint questioned the issuance to
Governor Paredes, when he was still the provincial attorney in
G.R. No 101724 July 3, 1992 1976, of a free patent title for Lot No. 3097-8, Pls. 67, with an
area of 1,391 sq. m., more or less, in the Rosario public land
subdivision in San Francisco, Agusan del Sur.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN and CEFERINO S. PAREDES, On February 23, 1989, the tanodbayan referred
JR., respondents. the complaint to the City Fiscal of Butuan City
who subpoenaed Governor Paredes. However, the
subpoena was served on, and received by, the
Station Commander of San Francisco, Agusan del
Sur, who did not serve it on Paredes. Despite the
GRIO-AQUINO, J.: absence of notice to Paredes, Deputized
Tanodbayan/City Fiscal Ernesto M. Brocoy
Assailed in this petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules conducted a preliminary investigation ex-parte.
of Court is the resolution promulgated on August 1, 1991 by the He recommended that an information be filed in
Sandiganbayan which granted the private respondent's motion court. His recommendation was approved by the
to quash the information for violation of the Anti-Graft and Tanodbayan who, on August 10, 1989, filed the
Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) on the ground of following information in the Sandiganbayan
prescription of the crime charged. where it was docketed as TBP Case No. 86-03368:

That on or about January 21, 1976, or sometime

prior or subsequent thereto, in San Francisco,
Agusan del Sur, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, a public officer, being then the
Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur, having
been duly appointed and qualified as such, taking
advantage of his public position, did, then and
there, wilfully and unlawfully persuade, influence
and induce the Land Inspector of the Bureau of
 Lands, by the name of Armando L. Luison to
violate an existing rule or regulation duly
promulgated by competent authority by
misrepresenting to the latter that the land subject
of an application filed by the accused with the
Bureau of Lands is disposable by a free patent
when the accused well knew that the said land
had already been reserved for a school site, thus
by the accused's personal misrepresentation in
his capacity as Provincial Attorney of Agusan del
Sur and applicant for a free patent, a report
favorably recommending the issuance of a free
patent was given by the said Armando L. Luison,
land inspector, thereby paving the way to the
release of a decree of title, by the Register of
Deeds of Agusan del Sur, an act committed by
the accused, in outright prejudice of the public
interest. (pp. 3-4, Rollo.)
Paredes was arrested upon a warrant issued by the
Sandiganbayan. Claiming that the information and the warrant
of arrest were null and void because he had been denied his
right to a preliminary investigation. Paredes refused to post bail.
His wife filed a petition for habeas corpus praying this Court to
order his release (Paredes vs. Sandiganbayan, 193 SCRA 464),
but we denied her petition because the proper remedy was for
Paredes to file a bail bond of P20,000 fixed by the
Sandiganbayan for his provisional liberty, and move to quash
the information before being arraigned.
On April 5, 1991, Paredes filed in the Sandiganbayan "An Urgent
Motion to Quash Information and to Recall Warrant of Arrest"
alleging that:
1. he is charged for an offense which has
prescribed:
2. the preliminary investigation, as well as the
Information prepared by the Tanodbayan and the
Warrant of Arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan
were invalid for lack of notice to him of the
preliminary investigation conducted by Deputized
Tanodbayan Ernesto M. Brocoy and Tanodbayan
Prosecutor Josephine Z. Fernandez; and
3. his constitutional right to due process had
been violated by the long delay in the termination
of the preliminary investigation.
After the parties had filed their written arguments, the
Sandiganbayan issued a resolution on August 1, 1991 granting
the motion to quash on the ground of prescription of the offense
charged. The Sandiganbayan's ratiocination of its resolution is
quoted below:
The crime charged is alleged to have been
committed "on or about January 21, 1976" when
the accused allegedly misrepresented to a Lands
Inspector of the Bureau of Lands that the land
subject of the herein movant's Application for a
Free Patent was disposable land. This
misrepresentation allegedly resulted in the
issuance of a Torrens Title under a Free Patent to
the herein accused-movant. This, the Information
avers, was prejudicial to the public interest
because the land in question had been reserved
for a school site and was, therefore, not
disposable.
Thus, the charge is for the violation of Sec. 3(a) of
R.A. No. 3019 because the accused had allegedly
persuaded, induced and influenced the Public
Lands Inspector to violate existing law, rules and
regulations by recommending approval of the
free patent application.
The accused asserts that since at the time of the
alleged commission of the crime (January 21,
1976) the period of prescription was ten (10)
years under Sec. 11 of R.A. No. 3019, the crime
should have prescribed in 1986. The prosecution
seems to agree with the movant's statement as
to the term of the prescriptive period with the
qualification that the period of prescription should
have commenced to run from March 28, 1985,
when the complaint was allegedly filed by the
Republic for the cancellation of the title.
xxx xxx xxx
The question then is this: when should the period
of prescription have commenced to run as to the
alleged misrepresentation which persuaded,
influenced and induced the Lands Inspector of the
Bureau of Lands resulting in the approval of the
application of the accused for a free patent?
xxx xxx xxx
The Supreme Court has clearly stated that even
in the case of falsification of public documents,
prescription commences from its recording with
the Registry of Deeds when the existence of the
document and the averments therein
theoretically become a matter of public
knowledge.
xxx xxx xxx
The Sandiganbayan could not abide the fact that the Lands
Inspector (Luison) who was supposedly induced by Paredes to
The matter of improper inducement, persuasion
or influence upon the Lands Inspector allegedly
applied by the accused through his
misrepresentation may have been unknown to
others besides the two of them because their
interaction would presumably have been private.
The fact of the improper segregation of the piece
of land in question and the grant thereof to the
accused, however, became, presumptively at
least, a matter of public knowledge upon the
issuance of a Torrens Title over that parcel of non-
disposable public land.
xxx xxx xxx
4. Notice to the whole world must be presumed at
the very latest on May 28, 1976 when the
Register of Deeds of Agusan del Sur issued
Original Certificate of Title No. 8379 in the name
of the accused as a result of the grant of the
patent on the school site reservation;
5. The act of filing the approved free patent with
the Registry of Deeds is notice duly given to the
various offices and officials of the government,
e.g., the Department (Ministry) of Agriculture and
the Bureau of Lands, who are affected thereby
specially because it is the Bureau of Lands which
files the approved patent application with the
Registry of Deeds. If the land in question was
indeed reserved for as school site, then the
Department (Ministry) of Education would also
know or would be presumed to know. (pp. 28-
33, Rollo.)
violate the law, and who did violate it by recommending
approval of Paredes' free patent application was not charged
with a crime. The Sandiganbayan concluded:
It would seriously strain credulity to say that
while the violation of law, rules or regulation by
the Lands Inspector was obvious and public
(since the school site had been titled in the name
of the alleged inducer Pimentel **), the
beneficiary thereof could not have been
suspected of having induced the violation itself. It
would be grossly unfair and unjust to say that
prescription would run in favor of the Lands
Inspector who had actually violated the law but
not to the public official who had benefitted
therefrom and who may have, therefore,
instigated the favorable recommendation for the
disposition of non-disposable land.
In view of all the foregoing, the Motion to Quash
the Information is granted. (p. 36, Rollo.)
The Sandiganbayan further observed that since R.A. No. 3019 is
a special law, the computation of the period for the prescription
of the crime of violating it is governed by Section 29 of Act No.
3326 which provides as follows:
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the
day of the commission of the violation of the law,
and if the same be not known at the time, from
the discovery thereof and the institution of
judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when
proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person, and shall begin to run again if the
proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy.
The Sandiganbayan correctly observed that "the date of the
violation of the law becomes the operative date for the
commencement of the period of prescription" (p. 34, Rollo).
Assuming that Paredes did induce Lands Inspector Luison to
recommend approval of his application for free patent (which
both of them denied doing), the date of the violation, for the
purpose of computing the period of prescription, would be the
date of filing his application on January 21, 1976.
The theory of the prosecution that the prescriptive period
should not commence upon the filing of Paredes' application
because no one could have known about it except Paredes and
Lands Inspector Luison, is not correct for, as the Sandiganbayan
pointedly observed: "it is not only the Lands Inspector who
passes upon the disposability of public land . . . other public
officials pass upon the application for a free patent including the
location of the land and, therefore, the disposable character
thereof" (p. 30, Rollo). Indeed, practically all the department
personnel, who had a hand in processing and approving the
application, namely: (1) the lands inspector who inspected the
land to ascertain its location and occupancy: (2) the surveyor
who prepared its technical description: (3) the regional director
who assessed the application and determined the land
classification: (4) the Director of Lands who prepared the free
patent: and (5) the Department Secretary who signed it, could
not have helped "discovering" that the subject of the
application was nondisposable public agricultural land.
The Sandiganbayan correctly observed that the "crime" whether
it was the filing of Paredes application for a free patent in
January 1976 or his supposedly having induced Luison to
recommend its approval, prescribed ten (10) years later, on
January 21, 1986. Gelacio's complaint, dated October 28, 1986,
was filed late.
The reason for the extinction of the State's right to prosecute a
crime after the lapse of the statutory limitation period for filing
the criminal action, is that:
Statutes of Limitation are construed as being acts
of grace, and as a surrendering by the sovereign
of its right to prosecute or of its right to prosecute
at its discretion, and they are considered as
equivalent to acts of amnesty. Such statutes are
founded on the liberal theory that prosecutions
should not be allowed to ferment endlessly in the
files of the government to explode only after
witnesses and proofs necessary to the protection
of accused have by sheer lapse of time passed
beyond availability. They serve, not only to bar
prosecutions on aged and untrustworthy
evidence, but also to cut off prosecution for
crimes a reasonable time after completion, when
no further danger to society is contemplated from
the criminal activity. (22 CJS 573-574.)
In the absence of a special provision
otherwise, the statute of limitations begins to run
on the commission of an offense and not from
the time when the offense is discovered or when
the offender becomes known, or it normally
begins to run when the crime is complete. (22 CJS
585; Emphasis supplied.)
Even if the ten-year prescriptive period commenced to run from
the registration and issuance of the free patent title by the
Register of Deeds on May 28, 1976, registration being
constructive notice to the whole world, the prescriptive period
would have fully run its course on May 28, 1986, or five (5)
months before Gelacio filed his complaint, and more than
thirteen (13) years before judicial proceedings were initiated in
the Sandiganbayan on August 10, 1989 by the filing of the
information therein.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 which was approved on March 16,
1982, amending Section 11 R.A. No. 3019 by increasing from
ten (10) to fifteen (15) years the period for the prescription or
extinguishment of a violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, may not be given
retroactive application to the "crime" which was committed by
Paredes in January 1976 yet, for it should be prejudicial to the
accused. It would deprive him of the substantive benefit of the
shorter (10 years) prescriptive period under Section 11, R.A.
3019, which was an essential element of the "crime" at the time
he committed it.
Protection from prosecution under a statute of
limitation is a substantive right. Where the
statute fixes a period of limitation as to a
prosecution for a particular offense, the limitation
so fixed is jurisdictional, and the time within
which the offense is committed is a jurisdictional
fact, it being necessary that the indictment or
information be actually filed within the time
prescribed. (22 CJS 574.)
Fact that the statute of limitations is jurisdictional
necessarily determined that a prosecution within
the period specified is an essential element of the
offense. (People vs. Allen, 118 P 2d, 927,
Emphasis supplied.)
Unless statutes of limitation are clearly
retrospective in their terms, they do not apply to
crimes previously committed (22 CJS 576; People
 vs. Lurd, 12 Hun 282; Martine vs. State, 24 Tex relation to the offense or its consequences, alters
61; Emphasis ours.) the situation of a person to his disadvantage.
Wilensky v. Fields, Fla., 267 So. 2d 1, 5. (Black's
To apply B.P. Blg. 195 to Paredes would make it an ex post Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, p. 520.)
facto law for it would after his situation to his disadvantage by
making him criminally liable for a crime that had already been Since an ex post facto law is proscribed by our Constitution
extinguished under the law existing when it was committed. (Sec. 22, Article 111, 1987 Constitution), the Sandiganbayan
Anex post facto law is defined as: committed no reversible error in ruling that Paredes may no
longer be prosecuted for his supposed violation of R.A. 3019 in
A law passed after the occurrence of a fact or 1976, six (6) years before B.P. Blg. 195 was approved on March
commission of an act, which retrospectively 16, 1982. The new prescriptive period under that law should
changes the legal consequences or relations of apply only to those offense which were committed after the
such fact or deed. By Art. I, Sec. 10 of U.S. Const., approval of B.P. 195.
the states are forbidden to pass "any ex post
facto law". Most all state constitutions contain WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.
similar prohibitions against ex post facto laws. The resolution dated August 1, 1991 of the Sandiganbayan in
Crim. Case No. 13800 is AFFIRMED. No costs.
An "ex post facto law" is defined as a law which
provides for the infliction of punishment upon a SO ORDERED.
person for an act done which, when it was
committed, was innocent; a law which aggravates Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin,
a crime or makes it greater than when it was Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo,
committed; a law that changes the punishment or JJ., concur.
inflicts a greater punishment than the law
annexed to the crime when it was committed; a
law that changes the rules of evidence and
receives less or different testimony than was
required at the time of the commission of the
offense in order to convict the offender; a law
which, assuming to regulate civil rights and
remedies only, in effect imposes a penalty or the
deprivation of a right which, when done, was
lawful; a law which deprives persons accused of
crime of some lawful protection to which they
have become entitled, such as the protection of a
former conviction or acquittal, or of the
proclamation of amnesty; every law which, in
SECOND DIVISION Angelitas house in Tondo, Manila, but did not find them
there. Angelitas maid told Bienvenida that her employer went
[G.R. No. 125901. March 8, 2001] out for a stroll and told Bienvenida to come back later. She
returned to Angelitas house after three days, only to discover
EDGARDO A. TIJING and BIENVENIDA R. that Angelita had moved to another place.Bienvenida then
TIJING, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS complained to her barangay chairman and also to the police
(Seventh Division) and ANGELITA who seemed unmoved by her pleas for assistance.
DIAMANTE, respondents.
Although estranged from her husband, Bienvenida could
DECISION not imagine how her spouse would react to the disappearance
of their youngest child and this made her problem even more
QUISUMBING, J.: serious. As fate would have it, Bienvenida and her husband
reconciled and together, this time, they looked for their missing
son in other places. Notwithstanding their serious efforts, they
For review is the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
saw no traces of his whereabouts.
March 6, 1996, in CA-G.R. SP No. 39056, reversing the decision
of the Regional Trial Court in a petition for habeas corpus of
Edgardo Tijing, Jr., allegedly the child of petitioners. Four years later or in October 1993, Bienvenida read in a
tabloid about the death of Tomas Lopez, allegedly the common-
law husband of Angelita, and whose remains were lying in state
Petitioners are husband and wife. They have six
in Hagonoy, Bulacan. Bienvenida lost no time in going to
children. The youngest is Edgardo Tijing, Jr., who was born on
Hagonoy, Bulacan, where she allegedly saw her son Edgardo,
April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife and registered nurse
Jr., for the first time after four years. She claims that the boy,
Lourdes Vasquez in Sta. Ana, Manila. Petitioner Bienvenida
who was pointed out to her by Benjamin Lopez, a brother of the
served as the laundrywoman of private respondent Angelita
late Tomas Lopez, was already named John Thomas Lopez.
Diamante, then a resident of Tondo, Manila. [1]
She avers that Angelita refused to return to her the boy
despite her demand to do so.
According to Bienvenida in August 1989, Angelita went to
her house to fetch her for an urgent laundry job. Since
Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for habeas
Bienvenida was on her way to do some marketing, she asked
corpus with the trial court in order to recover their son. To
Angelita to wait until she returned. She also left her four-month
substantiate their petition, petitioners presented two witnesses,
old son, Edgardo, Jr., under the care of Angelita as she usually
namely, Lourdes Vasquez and Benjamin Lopez. The first
let Angelita take care of the child while Bienvenida was doing
witness, Vasquez, testified that she assisted in the delivery of
laundry.
one Edgardo Tijing, Jr. on April 27, 1989 at her clinic in Sta. Ana,
Manila. She supported her testimony with her clinical records.
When Bienvenida returned from the market, Angelita and [2]
The second witness, Benjamin Lopez, declared that his
Edgardo, Jr., were gone. Bienvenida forthwith proceeded to brother, the late Tomas Lopez, could not have possibly fathered
John Thomas Lopez as the latter was sterile. He recalled that
Tomas met an accident and bumped his private part against the
edge of a banca causing him excruciating pain and eventual
loss of his child-bearing capacity. Benjamin further declared that
Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only an
adopted son and that he and Angelita were not blessed with
children.[3]
For her part, Angelita claimed that she is the natural
mother of the child. She asserts that at age 42, she gave birth
to John Thomas Lopez on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife
Zosima Panganiban in Singalong, Manila. She added, though,
that she has two other children with her real husband, Angel
Sanchez.[4] She said the birth of John Thomas was registered by
her common-law husband, Tomas Lopez, with the local civil
registrar of Manila on August 4, 1989.
On March 10, 1995, the trial court concluded that since
Angelita and her common-law husband could not have children,
the alleged birth of John Thomas Lopez is an impossibility. [5] The
trial court also held that the minor and Bienvenida showed
strong facial similarity. Accordingly, it ruled that Edgardo Tijing,
Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person who is
the natural child of petitioners.The trial court decreed:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby
rendered GRANTING the petition for Habeas Corpus, as such,
respondent Angelita Diamante is ordered to immediately
release from her personal custody minor John Thomas D. Lopez,
and turn him over and/or surrender his person to petitioners,
Spouses Edgardo A. Tijing and Bienvenida R. Tijing, immediately
upon receipt hereof.
Branch Sheriff of this Court, Carlos Bajar, is hereby commanded
to implement the decision of this Court by assisting herein
petitioners in the recovery of the person of their minor son,
Edgardo Tijing Jr., the same person as John Thomas D. Lopez.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Angelita seasonably filed her notice of appeal.
[7]
Nonetheless, on August 3, 1994, the sheriff implemented the
order of the trial court by taking custody of the minor. In his
report, the sheriff stated that Angelita peacefully surrendered
the minor and he turned over the custody of said child to
petitioner Edgardo Tijing.[8]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the
decision rendered by the trial court. The appellate court
expressed its doubts on the propriety of the habeas corpus. In
its view, the evidence adduced by Bienvenida was not sufficient
to establish that she was the mother of the minor. It ruled that
the lower court erred in declaring that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and
John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person, [9] and
disposed of the case, thus:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the lower court
dated March 10, 1995 is hereby REVERSED, and a new one
entered dismissing the petition in Spec. Proc. No. 94-71606, and
directing the custody of the minor John Thomas Lopez to be
returned to respondent Angelita Diamante, said minor having
been under the care of said respondent at the time of the filing
of the petition herein.
SO ORDERED.[10]
Petitioners sought reconsideration of the abovequoted
decision which was denied. Hence, the instant petition alleging:
I
THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT DECLARED THAT THE PETITIONERS
ACTION FOR HABEAS CORPUS IS MERELY SECONDARY TO
 THE QUESTION OF FILIATION THAT THE PETITIONERS HAD
LIKEWISE PROVEN.
II
THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS AND
DIRECTING THAT THE CUSTODY OF THE MINOR JOHN
THOMAS LOPEZ WHO WAS PROVEN TO THE SAME MINOR
AS EDGARDO R. TIJING, JR., BE RETURNED TO THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENT.[11]
In our view, the crucial issues for resolution are the
following:
(1) Whether or not habeas corpus is the proper
remedy?
(2) Whether or not Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas
Lopez are one and the same person and is the son of
petitioners?
We shall discuss the two issues together since they are
closely related.
The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his
liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled thereto. [12] Thus, it is the
proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of
a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third
person of his own free will. It may even be said that in custody
cases involving minors, the question of illegal and involuntary
restraint of liberty is not the underlying rationale for the
availability of the writ as a remedy. Rather, it is prosecuted for
the purpose of determining the right of custody over a child.
[13]
It must be stressed too that in habeas corpus proceedings,
the question of identity is relevant and material, subject to the
usual presumptions including those as to identity of the person.
In this case, the minors identity is crucial in determining the
propriety of the writ sought. Thus, it must be resolved first
whether the Edgardo Tijing, Jr., claimed by Bienvenida to be her
son, is the same minor named John Thomas Lopez, whom
Angelita insists to be her offspring. We must first determine who
between Bienvenida and Angelita is the minors biological
mother. Evidence must necessarily be adduced to prove that
two persons, initially thought of to be distinct and separate from
each other, are indeed one and the same. [14] Petitioners must
convincingly establish that the minor in whose behalf the
application for the writ is made is the person upon whom they
have rightful custody. If there is doubt on the identity of the
minor in whose behalf the application for the writ is made,
petitioners cannot invoke with certainty their right of custody
over the said minor.
True, it is not the function of this Court to examine and
evaluate the probative value of all evidence presented to the
concerned tribunal which formed the basis of its impugned
decision, resolution or order.[15] But since the conclusions of the
Court of Appeals contradict those of the trial court, this Court
may scrutinize the evidence on the record to determine which
findings should be preferred as more conformable to the
evidentiary facts.
A close scrutiny of the records of this case reveals that the
evidence presented by Bienvenida is sufficient to establish that
John Thomas Lopez is actually her missing son, Edgardo Tijing,
Jr.
First, there is evidence that Angelita could no longer bear
children. From her very lips, she admitted that after the birth of
her second child, she underwent ligation at the Martinez
Hospital in 1970, before she lived with Tomas Lopez without the
benefit of marriage in 1974. Assuming she had that ligation
removed in 1978, as she claimed, she offered no evidence she
gave birth to a child between 1978 to 1988 or for a period of
ten years. The midwife who allegedly delivered the child was
not presented in court. No clinical records, log book or discharge
order from the clinic were ever submitted.
Second, there is strong evidence which directly proves that
Tomas Lopez is no longer capable of siring a son. Benjamin
Lopez declared in court that his brother, Tomas, was sterile
because of the accident and that Tomas admitted to him that
John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son. Moreover, Tomas
Lopez and his legal wife, Maria Rapatan Lopez, had no children
after almost fifteen years together.Though Tomas Lopez had
lived with private respondent for fourteen years, they also bore
no offspring.
Third, we find unusual the fact that the birth certificate of
John Thomas Lopez was filed by Tomas Lopez instead of the
midwife and on August 4, 1989, four months after the alleged
birth of the child.Under the law, the attending physician or
midwife in attendance at birth should cause the registration of
such birth. Only in default of the physician or midwife, can the
parent register the birth of his child.The certificate must be filed
with the local civil registrar within thirty days after the birth.
[16]
Significantly, the birth certificate of the child stated Tomas
Lopez and private respondent were legally married on October
31, 1974, in Hagonoy, Bulacan, which is false because even
private respondent had admitted she is a common-law wife.
[17]
This false entry puts to doubt the other data in said birth
certificate.
Fourth, the trial court observed several times that when the
child and Bienvenida were both in court, the two had strong
similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head
shapes. Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is
competent and material evidence to establish parentage.
[18]
Needless to stress, the trial courts conclusion should be
given high respect, it having had the opportunity to observe the
physical appearances of the minor and petitioner concerned.
Fifth, Lourdes Vasquez testified that she assisted in
Bienvenidas giving birth to Edgardo Tijing, Jr., at her
clinic. Unlike private respondent, she presented clinical records
consisting of a log book, discharge order and the signatures of
petitioners.
All these considered, we are constrained to rule that subject
minor is indeed the son of petitioners. The writ of habeas
corpus is proper to regain custody of said child.
A final note. Parentage will still be resolved using
conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and
scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility
and expertise in using DNA test[19] for identification and
parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural
Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory
has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short
tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact
that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy
from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from
the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to
establish parentage.[20] Of course, being a novel scientific
technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to
challenge.[21] Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts
should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA
evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of
science when competently obtained in aid of situations
presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress.
[22]
Though it is not necessary in this case to resort to DNA
testing, in future it would be useful to all concerned in the
prompt resolution of parentage and identity issues.
 WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr.,
assailed DECISION of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and JJ., concur.
decision of the Regional Trial Court is REINSTATED. Costs against
the private respondent.

SO ORDERED.