PAKISTAN V.

OPLE
G.R. No. 61594 September 29, 1990
(190 SCRA 90)
FACTS:
Pakistan International Airport (PIA), petitioner, executed two (2) separate contracts
for employment with Ethelynne Farrales and Maria Moonyeen Mamasig, respondents,
which took effect on 9 January 1979, the pertinent portion of which is quoted as
follows:
5. DURATION OF EMPLOYMENT AND PENALTY
This agreement is for a period of three (3) years, but can be extended by the mutual
consent of the parties
6. TERMINATION
Notwithstanding anything to contrary as herein provided, PIA reserves the right to
terminate this agreement at any time by giving the EMPLOYEE notice in writing in
advance one month before the intended termination or in lieu thereof, by paying the
EMPLOYEE wages equivalent to one month's salary.
10. APPLICABLE LAW
This agreement shall be construed and governed under and by the laws of Pakistan,
and only the Courts of Karachi, Pakistan shall have the jurisdiction to consider any
matter arising out of or under this agreement.

On August 2, 1980, about 1 year and 4 months prior to the expiration of the contracts
of employment, PIA sent separate notice of termination to Mamasig and Farrales
advising them that their contracts will be terminated on September 1, 1980 pursuant
to clause 6 of the said agreement. Aggrieved, respondents filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal before the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE). On January 22, 1991,
the Regional Director ordered the reinstatement of private respondents with full
backwages or, in the alternative payment of the unexpired portion of the contracts
for employment. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1) Whether paragraphs 5 and 6 of its contract with private respondents was governed
by the provisions of its contract rather than the general provisions of the Labor Code.
2) Whether Philippine Law should govern over paragraph 10 of the Agreement.

AVON v. LUNA
(511 SCRA 376)
FACTS:
Leticia Luna, respondent, was a supervisor of Beautifont Incorporated. Thereafter,
Avon Cosmetics took over the management and operations of Beautifont.
Subsequently, Avon and Luna entered into a Supervisors Agreement where she
became the independent sales force of petitioner Avon. On paragraph 5 of the
Agreement it was agreed: That the Supervisor shall sell or offer to sell, display or
promote only and exclusively products sold by the Company. Luna then was invited
by a former Avon employee to sell products of Sandre Philppines. Sometime in1998,
Luna sought a legal opinion from a law firm as to the legal consequence of the
Supervisiors Agreement with Avon. In response to her query, the counsel explained
that the said Agreement was contrary to law and public policy. Subsequently, the
General Manager of Avon notified Luna of the termination or cancellation of her
Supervisors Agreeement for violation of paragraph 5 thereof.
ISSUE: Whether or not paragraph 5 is void for being violative of law and public policy.
HELD:
No, In business parlance, this is commonly termed as the exclusivity clause.This is
defined as agreements which prohibit the obligor from engaging in business in
competition with the oblige. In this case, Luna violated paragraph 5 of the Agreement
by engaging or promoting the products of Sandre. Moreover, public policy is that
principle of the law which holds that no subject or citizen can lawfully do that which
has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good.

Sps Mamaril v. BSP

TOPIC: Relativity of Contracts
FACTS:
Sps. Mamaril are jeepney operators, they would park their passenger jeepneys every
night at the Boy Scout of the Philippines (BSP) for a fee of P300 per month for each
unit. However, the following morning, one of the vehicles was missing and was never
recovered. According to security guards Pea and Gaddi of AIB Security Agency with
whom BSP had contracted for its security and protection, a male person took the
subject vehicle out of the compound. The spouses prayed that Pea and Gaddi,
together with AIB and BSP be held liable for the value of the subject vehicle.
ISSUE:

Limketkai v. CA
FACTS:
Philippine Remnants entrusted BPI to manage, administer and sell its real
property situated at Pasig. BPI then authorized Pedro Revilla, a real estate
broker, to sell the lot for P1000 per square meter. Revilla contacted Alfonso
Lim who agreed to purchase the land. Lim and Albino Limketkai went to
BPI to confirm the sale and both finally agreed that the land would be sold
for P1000 per square meter. Notwithstanding the agreement, Alfonso
asked BPI if it was possible to pay in terms provided that in case the term
is disapproved, the price shall be paid in cash.

Two or three days later, petitioner learned that its offer to pay on terms had
been frozen. Alfonso Lim went to BPI and tendered the full payment of
P33,056,000.00 to Albano but, the payment was refused because Albano
stated that the authority to sell that particular piece of property in Pasig had
been withdrawn from his unit.

An action for specific performance with damages was thereupon filed on

August 25, 1988 by petitioner against BPI. In the course of the trial, BPI
informed the trial court that it had sold the property under litigation to NBS