A.M. No.

03-05-01-SC

ADOPTING THE NEW CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

FOR THE PHILIPPINE JUDICIARY

WHEREAS, at the Round Table Meeting of Chief Justices held at the Peace Palace, The
Hague, on 25-26 November 2002, at which the Philippine Supreme Court was represented
by the Chief Justice and Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, the Bangalore Draft of the Code
of Judicial Conduct adopted by the Judicial Group on Strengthening Judicial integrity was
deliberated upon and approved after incorporating therein several amendments;

WHEREAS, the Bangalore Draft, as amended, is intended to be the Universal Declaration of

Judicial Standards applicable in all judiciaries;

WHEREAS, the Bangalore Draft is founded upon a universal recognition that a competent,
independent and impartial judiciary is essential if the courts are to fulfill their role in upholding
constitutionalism and the rule of law; that public confidence in the judicial system and in the
moral authority and integrity of the judiciary is of utmost importance in a modern democratic
society; and that it is essential that judges, individually and collectively, respect and honor
judicial office as a public trust and strive to enhance and maintain confidence in the judicial
system;

WHEREAS, the adoption of the universal declaration of standards for ethical conduct of
judges embodied in the Bangalore Draft as revised at the Round Table Conference of Chief
Justices at The Hague is imperative not only to update and correlate the Code of Judicial
Conduct and the Canons of Judicial Ethics adopted for the Philippines, but also to stress the
Philippines solidarity with the universal clamor for a universal code of judicial ethics.

NOW, THEREFORE, the Court hereby adopts this New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary:

CANON 1
INDEPENDENCE

Judicial independence is a pre-requisite to the rule of law and a fundamental guarantee of a

fair trial. A judge shall therefore uphold and exemplify judicial independence in both its
individual and institutional aspects.

SEC. 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently on the basis of their
assessment of the facts and in accordance with a conscientious understanding of the law,
free of any extraneous influence, inducement, pressure, threat or interference, direct or
indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.

SEC. 2. In performing judicial duties, judges shall be independent from judicial colleagues in
respect of decisions which the judge is obliged to make independently.

SEC. 3. Judges shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or
dispute pending before another court or administrative agency.

SEC. 4. Judges shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial
conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the
private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are
in a special position to influence the judge.

SEC. 5. Judges shall not only be free from inappropriate connections with, and influence by,
the executive and legislative branches of government, but must also appear to be free
therefrom to a reasonable observer.

SEC. 6. Judges shall be independent in relation to society in general and in relation to the
particular parties to a dispute which he or she has to adjudicate.

SEC. 7. Judges shall encourage and uphold safeguards for the discharge of judicial duties in
order to maintain and enhance the institutional and operational independence of the judiciary.

1
SEC. 8. Judges shall exhibit and promote high standards of judicial conduct in order to
reinforce public confidence in the judiciary, which is fundamental to the maintenance of
judicial independence.

CANON 2
INTEGRITY

Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the
personal demeanor of judges.

SEC. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is
perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.

SEC. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the peoples faith in the integrity of
the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.

SEC. 3. Judges should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against lawyers or
court personnel for unprofessional conduct of which the judge may have become aware.

CANON 3
IMPARTIALITY

Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to the
decision itself but also to the process by which the decision is made.

SEC. 1. Judges shall perform their judicial duties without favor, bias or prejudice.

SEC. 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and
enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of
the judge and of the judiciary.

SEC. 3. Judges shall, so far as is reasonable, so conduct themselves as to minimize the

occasions on which it will be necessary for them to be disqualified from hearing or deciding
cases.

SEC. 4. Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before or could come before them,
make any comment that might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of such
proceeding or impair the manifest fairness of the process. Nor shall judges make any
comment in public or otherwise that might affect the fair trial of any person or issue.

SEC. 5. Judges shall disqualify themselves from participating in any proceedings in which
they are unable to decide the matter impartially or in which it may appear to a reasonable
observer that they are unable to decide the matter impartially. Such proceedings include, but
are not limited to, instances where

(a) The judge has actual bias or prejudice concerning a party or personal knowledge of
disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings;

(b) The judge previously served as a lawyer or was a material witness in the matter in
controversy;

(c) The judge, or a member of his or her family, has an economic interest in the outcome of
the matter in controversy;

(d) The judge served as executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or lawyer in the case or
matter in controversy, or a former associate of the judge served as counsel during their
association, or the judge or lawyer was a material witness therein;

(e) The judges ruling in a lower court is the subject of review;

(f) The judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth civil
degree or to counsel within the fourth civil degree; or

2
(g) The judge knows that his or her spouse or child has a financial interest, as heir, legatee,
creditor, fiduciary, or otherwise, in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the
proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the
proceedings;

SEC. 6. A judge disqualified as stated above may, instead of withdrawing from the
proceeding, disclose on the records the basis of disqualification. If, based on such disclosure,
the parties and lawyers, independently of the judges participation, all agree in writing that the
reason for the inhibition is immaterial or unsubstantial, the judge may then participate in the
proceeding. The agreement, signed by all parties and lawyers, shall be incorporated in the
record of the proceedings.

CANON 4
PROPRIETY

Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities
of a judge.

SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.

SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that
might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly.
In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of
the judicial office.

SEC. 3. Judges shall, in their personal relations with individual members of the legal
profession who practice regularly in their court, avoid situations which might reasonably give
rise to the suspicion or appearance of favoritism or partiality.

SEC. 4. Judges shall not participate in the determination of a case in which any member of
their family represents a litigant or is associated in any manner with the case.

SEC. 5. Judges shall not allow the use of their residence by a member of the legal profession
to receive clients of the latter or of other members of the legal profession.

SEC. 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief,
association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct
themselves in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the
impartiality and independence of the judiciary.

SEC. 7. Judges shall inform themselves about their personal fiduciary and financial interests
and shall make reasonable efforts to be informed about the financial interests of members of
their family.

SEC. 8. Judges shall not use or lend the prestige of the judicial office to advance their private
interests, or those of a member of their family or of anyone else, nor shall they convey or
permit others to convey the impression that anyone is in a special position improperly to
influence them in the performance of judicial duties.

SEC. 9. Confidential information acquired by judges in their judicial capacity shall not be used
or disclosed for any other purpose related to their judicial duties.

SEC. 10. Subject to the proper performance of judicial duties, judges may

(a) Write, lecture, teach and participate in activities concerning the law, the legal system, the
administration of justice or related matters;

(b) Appear at a public hearing before an official body concerned with matters relating to the
law, the legal system, the administration of justice or related matters;

(c) Engage in other activities if such activities do not detract from the dignity of the judicial
office or otherwise interfere with the performance of judicial duties.

SEC. 11. Judges shall not practice law whilst the holder of judicial office.

3
SEC. 12. Judges may form or join associations of judges or participate in other organizations
representing the interests of judges.

SEC. 13. Judges and members of their families shall neither ask for, nor accept, any gift,
bequest, loan or favor in relation to anything done or to be done or omitted to be done by him
or her in connection with the performance of judicial duties.

SEC. 14. Judges shall not knowingly permit court staff or others subject to their influence,
direction or authority, to ask for, or accept, any gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to
anything done or to be done or omitted to be done in connection with their duties or functions.

SEC. 15. Subject to law and to any legal requirements of public disclosure, judges may
receive a token gift, award or benefit as appropriate to the occasion on which it is made,
provided that such gift, award or benefit might not reasonably be perceived as intended to
influence the judge in the performance of judicial duties or otherwise give rise to an
appearance of partiality.

CANON 5
EQUALITY

Ensuring equality of treatment to all before the courts is essential to the due performance of
the judicial office.

SEC. 1. Judges shall be aware of, and understand, diversity in society and differences arising
from various sources, including but not limited to race, color, sex, religion, national origin,
caste, disability, age, marital status, sexual orientation, social and economic status and other
like causes.

SEC. 2. Judges shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct, manifest
bias or prejudice towards any person or group on irrelevant grounds.

SEC. 3. Judges shall carry out judicial duties with appropriate consideration for all persons,
such as the parties, witnesses, lawyers, court staff and judicial colleagues, without
differentiation on any irrelevant ground, immaterial to the proper performance of such duties.

SEC. 4. Judges shall not knowingly permit court staff or others subject to his or her influence,
direction or control to differentiate between persons concerned, in a matter before the judge,
on any irrelevant ground.

SEC. 5. Judges shall require lawyers in proceedings before the court to refrain from
manifesting, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based on irrelevant grounds, except such
as are legally relevant to an issue in proceedings and may be the subject of legitimate
advocacy.

CANON 6
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE

Competence and diligence are prerequisites to the due performance of judicial office.

SEC. 1. The judicial duties of a judge take precedence over all other activities.

SEC. 2. Judges shall devote their professional activity to judicial duties, which include not
only the performance of judicial functions and responsibilities in court and the making of
decisions, but also other tasks relevant to the judicial office or the courts operations.

SEC. 3. Judges shall take reasonable steps to maintain and enhance their knowledge, skills
and personal qualities necessary for the proper performance of judicial duties, taking
advantage for this purpose of the training and other facilities which should be made available,
under judicial control, to judges.

SEC. 4. Judges shall keep themselves informed about relevant developments of international
law, including international conventions and other instruments establishing human rights
norms.

4
SEC. 5. Judges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions,
efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness.
SEC. 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be
patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with
whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal
representatives, court staff and others subject to their influence, direction or control.

SEC. 7. Judges shall not engage in conduct incompatible with the diligent discharge of
judicial duties.

DEFINITIONS

In this Code, unless the context otherwise permits or requires, the following meanings shall
be attributed to the words used:

Court staff includes the personal staff of the judge including law clerks.

Judge means any person exercising judicial power, however designated.

Judges family includes a judges spouse, son, daughter, son-in-law, daughter-inlaw, and
any other relative by consanguinity or affinity within the sixth civil degree, or person who is a
companion or employee of the judge and who lives in the judges household.

This Code, which shall hereafter be referred to as the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary, supersedes the Canons of Judicial Ethics and the Code of Judicial
Conduct heretofore applied in the Philippines to the extent that the provisions or concepts
therein are embodied in this Code: Provided, however, that in case of deficiency or absence
of specific provisions in this New Code, the Canons of Judicial Ethics and the Code of
Judicial Conduct shall be applicable in a suppletory character.

This New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary shall take effect on the first
day of June 2004, following its publication not later than 15 May 2004 in two newspapers of
large circulation in the Philippines to ensure its widest publicity.

Promulgated this 27th day of April 2004. The Code took effect on June 1, 2004.

5
Report proper.

CANON 3: IMPARTIALITY

Impartiality defined.

Impartiality, also called evenhandedness or fair-mindedness, is a principle of

justice holding that decisions should be based on objective criteria, rather than on the
basis of bias, prejudice, or preferring the benefit to one person over another for
improper reasons. (Wikipedia)

With respect to judicial impartiality, it implicitly refers to pursuing objectivity

based on the evidence and truth of the facts, maintaining an equivalent distance from
the parties, their lawyers and avoiding any type of conduct which could indicate
favoritism, bias or prejudice. (Law dictionary)

Impartiality must not refer only to the decision itself but also to the
processes, in and out of court, undergone before arriving at the decision.

Section 1. Judicial duties free from bias.

Judges shall perform their judicial duties without favor, bias or prejudice.

A judge, like any other public officer, enjoys presumption of regularity unless
proven otherwise. Anyone who alleges partiality, bias and prejudice against a judge
has the responsibility to prove it.

To sustain a claim of bias or prejudice, the resulting opinion must be based

upon an extrajudicial source: that is, some influence other than the facts and law
presented in the courtroom. In the United States, this is known as the Extra-Judicial
Source Rule.

Because allegations of bias are quite serious, the person bringing the
allegation must prove bias sufficient to require inhibition (also called recusal or
disqualification) with clear and convincing evidence. Bare allegations of partiality and
prejudgment will not suffice. [Dimo Realty & Dev. Inc. v. Dimaculangan (2004)]

A judge's conduct must be clearly indicative of arbitrariness and prejudice

before it can be stigmatized as biased and partial. [Cruz v. Iturralde, (2003)] The
general rule is that a judge is not liable administratively, civilly or criminally when he
acts within his legal powers and jurisdiction. A judge cannot be subjected to liability-
civil, criminal or administrative- for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous,
so long as he acts with good faith. The remedy of the aggrieved party is to elevate the
error to the higher court for review. To hold a judge accountable for every erroneous
ruling or decision he renders, assuming that he erred, would be nothing short of
harassment and that would be intolerable. He may, however, be held liable criminally,
civilly, or administratively, for malfeasance and misfeasance in office.

Section 2. Promote confidence and impartiality.

Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct both in and out of court,
maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and
litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary.

No judge should handle a case in which he might be perceived, rightly or

wrongly, to be susceptible to bias and impartiality. His judgment must not be tainted
by even the slightest suspicion of improbity or preconceived interest. The rule is
aimed at preserving at all times the faith and confidence in courts of justice by any
party to the litigation. [Urbanes, Jr. v.CA (2001)]
A judge should behave at all times in a way that promotes public confidence
in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. The appearance of bias or prejudice

6
can be as damaging to public confidence and the administration of justice as actual
bias or prejudice. [Montemayor v. Bermejo, Jr. (2004)]

In disposing of a criminal case, a judge should avoid appearing like an

advocate for either party. It is also improper for the judge to push actively for amicable
settlement against the wishes of the complainant. A judges unwelcome persistence
makes the judge vulnerable to suspicions of favoritism. [Montemayor v. Bermejo, Jr.
(2004)]

To promote clarity and prevent confusion in the proceedings, a trial judge

may ask questions during direct or cross-examination, but only rarely and sparingly.
The underlying principle of every trial is to promote justice, in which clarity is an
important ingredient. He may only ask clarificatory or classificatory questions, not
leading ones.

Section 3. MINIMIZE INSTANCES OF DISQUALIFICATIONS

Judges shall, so far as is reasonable, so conduct themselves as to

minimize the occasions on which it will be necessary for them to be disqualified from
hearing or deciding cases.

Judges may, in their exercise of sound discretion, restrict themselves

voluntarily from sitting in a case, but such a decision should be based on good, sound
or ethical grounds, or for just and valid reasons. It is not enough that a party casts
some tenuous allegations of partiality at the judge. No less than imperative is that it is
the judge's sacred duty to administer justice without fear or favor.

The majority view is that the rule of disqualification of judges must yield to
demands of necessity, otherwise known as the rule of necessity. Simply stated, the
rule of necessity means that a judge is not disqualified to sit in a case if there is no
other judge available to hear and decide the case. For example, members of the
Supreme Court were entitled to adjudicate the validity of a statue placing a limit of 5
percent in the costs of living increase for judges, where it was apparent that all state
judges had at least an involuntarily financial interest in the case.

Actual disqualification of a member of a court of last resort will not excuse

the member from performing his official duty if failure to do so would result in a denial
of a litigant's constitutional right to have a question, properly presented to the court,
adjudicated. In other words, when all judges would be disqualified, disqualification will
not be permitted to destroy the only tribunal with power in the premises. The doctrine
operates on the principle that a basic judge is better than no judge at all. Under such
circumstances, it is the duty of the disqualified judge to hear and decide the
controversy, however disagreeable it may be. [Parayno v. Meneses, (1994)]

The remedy for erroneous rulings, absent any extrinsic evidence of malice or
bad faith, is not the outright disqualification of the judge. The courts will close shop if
we disqualify judges who err, for we all err. [Webb, et.al. v. People (GR 127262,
1997)]

Section 4. PUBLIC COMMENTS; PENDING AND IMPENDING CASE

Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before or could come

before them, make any comment that might reasonably be expected to affect the
outcome of such proceeding or impair the manifest fairness of the process. Nor shall
judges make any comment in public or otherwise that might affect the fair trial of any
person or issue.

Judges should avoid side remarks, hasty conclusions, loose statements or

gratuitous utterances that suggest they are prejudging a case. Judges should be
aware that the media might consider them a good and credible source of opinion or
ideas, and therefore should refrain from making any comment on a pending case. Not
only is there danger of being misquoted, but also of compromising the rights of the
litigants in the case.

7
 The Supreme Court has recently held that judges and justices are not
disqualified from participating in a case simply because they have written legal articles
on the law involved in the case. [Chavez v. Public Estates Authority (2003)]

Opinions formed in the course of judicial proceedings, although erroneous,

as long as they are based on the evidence presented and conduct observed by the
judge, do not prove personal bias or prejudice on the part of the judge. As a general
rule, repeated rulings against a litigant, no matter how erroneous and vigorously and
consistently expressed, are not a basis for disqualification of a judge on grounds of
bias and prejudice. Extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice
or corrupt purpose, in addition to the palpable error which may be inferred from the
decision or order itself. [Webb, et.al. v. People (GR 127262, 1997)]

Section 5. DISQUALIFICATIONS

Judges shall disqualify themselves from participating in any proceedings in

which they are unable to decide the matter impartially or in which it may appear to a
reasonable observer that they are unable to decide the matter impartially. Such
proceedings include, but are not limited to, instances where:

(a) The judge has actual bias or prejudice concerning a party or personal knowledge
of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings;
(b) The judge previously served as a lawyer or was a material witness in the matter in
controversy;
(c) The judge, or a member of his or her family, has an economic interest in the
outcome of the matter in controversy;
(d) The judge served as executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or lawyer in the
case or matter in controversy, or a former associate of the judge served as counsel
during their association, or the judge or lawyer was a material witness therein;
(e) The judge's ruling in a lower court is the subject of review;
(f) The judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth
civil degree or to counsel within the fourth civil degree; or
(g) The judge knows that his or her spouse or child has a financial interest, as heir,
legatee, creditor, fiduciary, or otherwise, in the subject matter in controversy or in a
party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by
the outcome of the proceedings.

Corollary to this section, the Rules of Court supplements the grounds for
disqualification and inhibition of judges:

Grounds for Disqualification and Inhibition of Judges under the Rules of

Court Mandatory or Compulsory Disqualification. (a) He or his wife or his child is
pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise; (b) Relation to either
party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity or to counsel within the 4th
civil degree (c) When he has been an executor, guardian, administrator, trustee or
counsel; (d) When he has presided in an inferior court where his ruling or decision is
subject to review. [Rule 131]

Voluntary Inhibition. A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion disqualify
himself, for just and valid reasons other than those mentioned above. [Rule 137,
Section 1]

A critical component of due process is a hearing before an impartial and

disinterested tribunal. We have ingrained the jurisprudence that every litigant is
entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge for all the other
elements of due process, like notice and hearing, would be meaningless if the
ultimate decision would come from a partial and biased judge. [Webb, et.al. v. People
(GR 127262, 1997)]
This leaves the discretion to the judge to decide for himself questions as to
whether he will desist from sitting in case for other just and valid reasons with only his
conscience to guide him, unless he cannot discern for himself his inability to meet the
test of the cold neutrality required of him, in which event the appellate court will see to
it that he disqualifies himself.

8
 A decision to disqualify himself is not conclusive and his competency may be
determined on application for mandamus to compel him to act. Judges decision to
continue hearing a case in which he is not legally prohibited from trying
notwithstanding challenge to his objectivity may not constitute reversible error.

The filing of an administrative case against a judge does not disqualify him
from hearing a case. The court has to be shown other than the filing of administrative
complaint, act or conduct of judge indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before the
latter being branded as the stigma of being biased or partial. [Lorenzo v. Marquez
(1988)]

Section 6. REMITTAL OF DISQUALIFICATIONS

A judge disqualified as stated above may, instead of withdrawing from the

proceeding, disclose on the records the basis of disqualification. If based on such
disclosure, the parties and lawyers independently of the judge's participation, all
agree in writing that the reason for the inhibition is immaterial or unsubstantial, the
judge may then participate in the proceeding. The agreement signed by all parties
and lawyers shall be incorporated in the record of the proceedings.

The decision to continue hearing the case, despite the existence of reasons
for disqualification should be:
(a) coupled with a bona fide disclosure to the parties-in-litigation; and
(b) subject to express acceptance by all the parties of the cited reason as not material
or substantial. Absent such agreement, the judge may not continue to hear the case.

The judge should disclose on the record the basis for his voluntary
disqualification. Perhaps prompted by a cultural sense of delicadeza, some
magistrates state only "personal reasons" as the ground for inhibiting themselves.
However, such vague reasoning is not acceptable, as it would effectively place
voluntary disqualification at the whim of the judge. This kind of latitude is not the
intended effect of the rule. The first paragraph of Rule 137, Section 1 of the Rules of
Court is the rule on voluntary disqualification. Disqualification of a judge is mandatory
if any of the listed grounds in Rule 131 of the Rules of Court exists. [Parayno v.
Meneses, (1994)]

9
RELATIVE CASES

THIRD DIVISION

10
 [G.R. No. 130991. March 11, 2004]
DIMO REALTY & DEVELOPMENT, INC. AND LUZ M. DIZON, petitioners,
vs.
LEONARDO P. DIMACULANGAN, respondent.

DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, assailing the Decision[1] dated March 20, 1997 and the
Resolution[2] dated October 10, 1997, both rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 40963, Dimo Realty & Development Inc., and Spouses Gregorio and Luz Mojares Dizon
vs. Hon. Pedro T. Santiago, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City, Branch 101, and Leonardo P. Dimaculangan.
The factual antecedents as borne by the records are:
On February 14, 1995, Leonardo P. Dimaculangan, respondent, filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon City, a complaint for specific performance against Dimo
Realty & Development, Inc. (Dimo Realty) and spouses Gregorio and Luz Mojares Dizon,
petitioners, docketed as Civil Case No. Q95-23006.
The complaint alleges that sometime in 1967 to 1968, petitioners engaged the services
of respondent as geodetic surveyor to subdivide (into subdivision lots) two (2) parcels of land
situated in Barrio Namuco, Rosario, Batangas covered by Transfer Certificate of Titles (TCT)
Nos. T-25972 and T-24294 of the Registry of Deeds of that province. As payment for
respondents services, petitioner agreed to give him one (1) subdivision lot (Lot 19, Block 17
covered by TCT No. T-25972) at Villa Luz Subdivision and pay him P9,200.00 in cash. After
the completion of respondents work, petitioners paid him P9,200.00 in installments and
delivered to him possession of the lot. However, despite respondents demands, petitioners
failed to deliver the title of the lot, prompting him to file with the RTC a complaint for specific
performance and damages.
Instead of filing an answer, petitioners, on March 27, 1995, filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint on the following grounds: (1) the cause of action has prescribed or is barred by the
statute of limitations; (2) venue was improperly laid considering that the trial court has no
jurisdiction over the subject property situated in Batangas; (3) the claim is unenforceable
under the provisions of the statute of frauds; and (3) the complaint fails to state a sufficient
cause of action.
On June 27, 1995, the trial court issued an Order dismissing the complaint for
improper venue.
Respondent then filed a motion for reconsideration with motion for inhibition.
In an Order dated July 11, 1995, the trial court granted the motion for inhibition, hence,
the case was re-raffled to Branch 101 of the same RTC at Quezon City. On August 21, 1995,
this Branch issued an Order granting respondents motion for reconsideration of the
Order dismissing the complaint, thus:

A close scrutiny of the allegations in the complaint indubitably show that the above-captioned
case is one for specific performance, and therefore, a personal action. The complaint seeks
not the recovery of the lot as plaintiff is already in possession thereof, but the peaceful
delivery of the title covering said lot. Even assuming for the sake of argument that plaintiff
likewise seeks the recovery of real property, this is, however, merely an incident to the
principal personal action which is for the enforcement of the agreement between the parties.

Hence, the above-captioned case being a personal action, the court in the place where the
plaintiff resides, i.e. Quezon City, is the proper venue of the action.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the plaintiff
being impressed with merit is hereby GRANTED.

SO ORDERED.

From the said Order, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration.

11
 Meanwhile, petitioner Dimo Realty filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) at Rosario,
Batangas two (2) separate complaints for unlawful detainer and forcible entry against Jose
Matibag and spouses Benjamin and Zenaida Dela Roca (lot buyers), docketed as Civil Cases
Nos. 796 and 797, respectively. This prompted respondent to file with the trial court (Branch
101) a motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a preliminary
injunction against petitioner Dimo Realty and the MTC of Rosario, Batangas. Acting thereon,
the trial court, in an Order dated October 2, 1995, issued a TRO and subsequently, a writ
of preliminary injunction enjoining petitioner and the MTC from proceeding with Civil
Cases Nos. 796 and 797 pending hearing x x x.
Immediately, petitioners filed with the trial court a motion to lift the TRO and the writ of
preliminary injunction and an urgent motion for inhibition, but were denied in an Order dated
October 20, 1995.
On October 30, 1995, petitioners filed consolidated motions for reconsideration and for
resolution but were denied in an Order dated June 5, 1995. In the same Order, the trial court
set the case for pre-trial on July 3, 1996.
As a consequence, on June 18, 1996, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus (with prayer for issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction) seeking (1) to nullify the trial courts Order dated August 21, 1995
granting respondents motion for reconsideration; Order of October 20, 1995 denying
petitioners motion to lift the TRO and the writ of preliminary injunction and motion for
inhibition; and Order dated June 5, 1996 denying petitioners consolidated motions for
reconsideration and for resolution; (2) to prohibit the trial court from hearing Civil Case No.
Q95-23006; and (3) to dismiss the complaint for improper venue.
On March 20, 1997, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, the following orders are hereby ordered PARTIALLY NULLIFIED:

1. October 20, 1995 Order only insofar as it ordered the issuance of the temporary restraining
order, and subsequently, the preliminary injunction;

2. June 5, 1996 Order only insofar as it ordered the setting of the case for pre-trial;

Consequently, as an incident to item number 2 above, the respondent judge is hereby

ordered to DESIST from further proceedings with Civil Case Q 95-23006, except to ISSUE an
order directing the petitioners herein to file their answer to the complaint. Until then, or after
such time for filing the answer has expired, the respondent judge may not as yet proceed with
the case.

On the other hand, the rest of the petitioners prayers are hereby ordered DENIED for lack of
merit.

SO ORDERED.
The Court of Appeals ratiocinated as follows:

After a careful study of the orders assailed in this petition, we conclude that the respondent
judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion insofar as the order dated August 21,
1995 is concerned. Thus, we agree with his findings that the case filed by Dimaculangan is a
personal action involving as it does the mere delivery of the title to Lot 19, Block 17, which
he, undisputably, already holds possession thereof. It does not, in any way, involve the issue
of ownership over the particular property, as this is not disputed by the petitioners, that the
same property belongs to Dimaculangan.

In an attempt to put in issue the ownership over the particular property, the petitioners
continuously rely on the doctrine in the case of Espineli v. Santiago. In Espineli, the issue is,
who as between Mrs. Ramirez, on the one hand, and the Espinelis on the other, has a better
right to the aforementioned Lot 34. Clearly, the ownership over the property has been put in
issue. However, in the case at bar, the petitioners do not deny the fact that Dimaculangan is
already in possession of the property. Thus, Espineli is somewhat misplaced. The case at bar
is one for specific performance for the delivery of the title to the property. As such, it is a
personal action. Consequently, venue has been property laid in the court of Quezon City, it
being the residence of Dimaculangan.

12
Likewise, we do not find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge
when he issued the October 20, 1995 Order, at least insofar as the issue of inhibition is
concerned.

Verily, a judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, inhibit himself voluntarily from
sitting in a case, but it should be based on good, sound or ethical grounds, or for just and
valid reasons. It is not enough that a party throws some tenuous allegations of partiality at the
judge. No less than imperative is that it is the judges sacred duty to administer justice without
fear or favor.

However, we find that insofar as he ordered the issuance of a preliminary injunction in the
October 20, 1995 Order, the respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction. It must be noted that
the injunction was directed against DIMO Realty and any other persons acting in their behalf,
as well as the MTC, Rosario, Batangas, Fourth Judicial Region, enjoining and restraining
them from proceeding with Civil Cases 796 and 797 pending before the MTC, Rosario,
Batangas, Fourth Judicial Region, pending hearing and resolution on whether a preliminary
injunction should issue. On the other hand, the regional trial court where the judge sits is
located in Quezon City, and as such, properly belongs to the National Capital Judicial
Region. This being the case, it is clear that the respondent judge has exceeded his
jurisdiction because an injunction issued by him may only be enforced in any part of the
region. Consequently, the temporary restraining order, and subsequently, the preliminary
injunction issued by the respondent judge are hereby ordered nullified, having been issued in
excess of his jurisdiction.

But such error of the respondent judge does not necessarily warrant his inhibition in the
case. At most, it is only correctible by certiorari, as in this particular petition.

Similarly, we do not find grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge insofar
as he denied in his Order of June 5, 1996, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the
spouses and DIMO Realty. As we mentioned in the earlier part of this decision, we agree with
the findings of the respondent judge insofar as it ruled that the case filed by Dimaculangan is
a personal action. Hence, the respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion
when it denied the Motion for Reconsideration. We therefore uphold the validity of this Order.

With regard to the order of the respondent judge setting the case for pre-trial, we find that the
same was issued in grave abuse of his discretion. We agree with the observation made by
the petitioner that the issues have not yet been joined as the petitioners herein have not yet
filed an answer. On this score, the writs prayed for must be granted. The respondent judge
must order the petitioners herein to file their answer. Until then, or after such time for filing the
answer has expired, the respondent judge may not as yet proceed with the case.

From the said Decision, both parties filed their motions for reconsideration but were
denied.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
For our resolution are the twin issues of whether the Court of Appeals erred (1) in holding
that respondents complaint is a personal action; and (2) in sustaining the trial courts Order
denying petitioners motion for inhibition.
Basic as a hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is
conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a
concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of
action. In Deltaventures Resources, Inc. vs. Cabato,[3] we held:

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined upon the allegations made in the
complaint, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled or not entitled to recover upon the
claim asserted therein a matter resolved only after and as a result of the trial.

The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is
determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of
whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted
therein.[4]
Let us examine respondents allegations in his complaint. The pertinent allegations are
quoted as follows:

xxx

13
2. Sometime in 1967 to 1968, the services of plaintiff as geodetic surveyor was hired by the
defendants to subdivide into subdivision lots parcels of lands located at Rosario, Batangas, in
the name of defendant spouses which is covered by TCT T-25972 of the Registry of Deeds of
Batangas and TCT T-24294 in the name of Ruperto Rodelas x x x:

xxx

3. It was the agreement of the parties that plaintiffs services will be paid with one (1) lot of the
subdivision now called VILLA LUZ SUBDIVISION and originally covered by TCT T-25972,
designated as Lot 19, Block 17 of the subdivision plan plus the additional amount of
P9,200.00 to be paid in cash with the understanding that upon accomplishment of the
subdivision plan and full payment of the agreed price, the corresponding title to said lot
already transferred in the name of the plaintiff be delivered to the plaintiff.

xxx

4. On several occasions from 1968 to 1975, plaintiff paid the additional amount of P9,200.00
by installments.

xxx

5. Plaintiff has been making verbal demands upon defendants, every now and then, for the
delivery of the title to Lot 19, Block 17 of the subdivision already named VILLA LUZ
SUBDIVISION but defendant spouses have been giving the plaintiff a runaround.

xxx

8. Verbal demands have been made upon defendants to deliver the title of the lot in question
but defendants refused and continued to refuse to deliver said lot to the plaintiff without any
valid reason at all.

x x x.

From the above allegations, it can easily be discerned that respondent is asserting that
petitioners violated the contract of services by refusing to deliver the title of the subject lot to
him and is thus demanding that they comply with their obligation.
It bears emphasis that respondent does not allege in his complaint that he is seeking to
recover the lot from petitioners. This is because he has been in possession thereof. In fact,
petitioner Dimo Realty even filed with the MTC of Rosario, Batangas two (2) separate
complaints for unlawful detainer and forcible entry against respondents buyers. It is thus clear
that what is being claimed by respondent is simply the delivery of the title to him as payment
for his services.
It follows that the complaint below is not a real action, but a personal action.
Sections 1 and 2, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provide:

SECTION 1. Venue of real actions. Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or
interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over
the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.

x x x.

SECTION 2. Venue of personal actions. All other actions may be commenced and tried
where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of
the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be
found, at the election of the plaintiff. [5]

Considering that respondents complaint, being one for specific performance, we agree
with the Court of Appeals that the venue is in the RTC of Quezon City since respondent (then
plaintiff) resides at No. 8 Cavite Street, West Avenue, Quezon City.
Petitioners further claim that the Appellate Court should not have sustained the trial
courts denial of petitioners motion for inhibition.
Suffice it to state that whether judges should inhibit themselves from a case rests on their
own "sound discretion." Otherwise stated, inhibition partakes of voluntariness on the part of

14
the judges themselves. This Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly
indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of being
biased or partial.[6] In a catena of cases, we held that bias and prejudice, to be considered
valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of judges, must be proved with clear and convincing
evidence. Bare allegations of partiality and prejudgment will not suffice. These cannot be
presumed, especially if weighed against the sacred obligation of judges whose oaths of office
require them to administer justice without respect to person and to do equal right to the poor
and the rich.[7]
Here, petitioners merely alleged the arbitrary issuance of a temporary restraining order
without however showing bias or prejudice on the part of the trial judge. In fact, the Court of
Appeals held that such error of the respondent judge does not necessarily warrant his
inhibition in the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated March 20, 1997 and
the Resolution dated October 10, 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 40963 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, (Chairman), Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.

[1]
Annex A, Petition, Rollo at 26-34.
[2]
Annex B, id. at 46.
[3]
G.R. No. 118216, March 9, 2000, 327 SCRA 521, 528, citing Multinational Village Homeowners Ass., Inc. vs.
CA, 203 SCRA 104 (1991); Gochan vs. Young, 354 SCRA 207 (2001).
[4]
Intestate Estate of Alexander T. Ty vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112872, April 19, 2001, 356 SCRA 661, 666-
667, citing Serdoncillo vs. Benolirano, 297 SCRA 448 (1998); Tamano vs. Ortiz, 291 SCRA 584 (1998);
and Citibank, N.A. vs. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 390 (1998).
[5]
While the complaint was filed on February 14, 1995, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, not the
Revised Rules of Court, applies considering that remedial laws have retroactive effect (Zulueta vs. Asia
Brewery, Inc., G.R. No. 138137, March 8, 2001, 354 SCRA 100).
[6]
Extended Explanation of J. Panganiban in Estrada vs. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001, 353
SCRA 452, 581, citing Gabol vs. Riodique, 65 SCRA 505 (1975).
[7]
Ibid. at 582-583, citing Go vs. CA, 221 SCRA 397 (1993); People vs. CA, 309 SCRA 705
(1999); and Soriano vs. Angeles, 339 SCRA (2000).

15
 THIRD DIVISION
[A.M. RTJ No. 03-1775. April 30, 2003]

Dr. ISAGANI A. CRUZ, complainant,

vs.
Judge PHILBERT I. ITURRALDE, Regional Trial Court, Antipolo City,
Branch 72, respondent.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Not every erroneous act will subject a judge to disciplinary sanctions. Only judicial errors
tainted with bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance or deliberate intent to do an injustice
will be administratively sanctioned.

The Case

In a verified Complaint[1] filed before the Office of Court Administrator (OCA), Dr. Isagani
C. Cruz charges Judge Philbert I. Iturralde of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City
(Branch 72) with gross misconduct, dishonesty, gross ignorance of the law, bias and partiality.

The Facts

On April 18, 2001, Dr. Isagani C. Cruz filed against his Swiss wife, Yolande L. Cruz, a
Complaint for Injunction under Article 72 of the Family Code. The case, docketed as Civil
Case No. 01-6139, was assigned to Branch 72 of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City,
the designated Family Court in that area. As Branch 72 had no presiding judge at the time,
the hearings were conducted by Executive Judge Mauricio M. Rivera. After several
negotiations, the parties filed a Joint Motion to Suspend Proceedings with Prayer for a Hold-
Departure Order on Mrs. Cruz. Judge Rivera granted the Motion for the suspension of the
proceedings, but denied the request for the issuance of a hold-departure order.
On September 21, 2001, Mrs. Cruz filed a Motion asking the court to allow her and her
two children to take a vacation to Switzerland and to compel complainant to return her travel
documents. Shortly thereafter, on October 19, 2001, respondent assumed office as the new
presiding judge of Branch 72.
At a hearing on November 26, 2001, complainant filed his Opposition to the Motion filed
by his wife. He also asked the court to issue a hold-departure order and/or a writ of
preliminary injunction to prevent her from leaving the country. During the same hearing,
respondent expressed his predisposition to grant her Motion. His declaration supposedly
constituted partiality, which showed that he had already prejudged the incidents of the case.
Consequently, complainant filed a Motion to inhibit respondent from further hearing the
case. The latter denied this Motion in an Order dated February 28, 2002.[2]
Earlier, on January 9, 2002, complainants counsel received, simultaneously by mail,
respondents Orders dated November 26, December 7 and December 18, 2001.
The December 18, 2001 Order denied the application of complainant for the issuance of
a hold-departure order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction and compelled him to surrender
all the travel documents of his wife and children.
He claims that the simultaneous mailing of the three Orders had a very insidious
effect. He argues that he could have moved for the amendment or correction of the two
earlier ones, had these been served on him ahead of the December 18, 2001 Order. He
insinuates that the last Order was either antedated or properly dated but mailed very late.
According to him, either of these acts renders respondent liable for gross negligence of
duty. Furthermore, in ordering him to return the travel documents of his wife and denying his
application for a hold-departure order/injunction respondent allegedly committed either gross
ignorance or deliberate misapplication of the law.

16
 Complainant also submitted a verified Supplemental Complaint [3] dated February 26,
2002, accusing respondent of plagiarism. In his February 28, 2002 Order, the latter
purportedly copied several paragraphs from an article written by Atty. Raul J. Palabrica in the
January 27, 2002 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer. The word-for-word reproduction of
portions of the article supposedly constituted an act of dishonesty that should be dealt with
administratively.
In an Indorsement[4] dated March 4, 2002, the OCA required Judge Iturralde to comment
on the foregoing Complaints. In his Comment,[5] he stated that, contrary to what had been
alleged in the verified Complaint, he could not find any specific act of dishonesty, gross
misconduct, or gross ignorance of the law and procedure on his part. If at all, he might have
been perceived as biased because of his Orders that were unfavorable to
complainant. Allegedly, in denying the Motion to issue hold-departure order/writ of preliminary
injunction and ordering complainant to surrender his wifes passport and other travel
documents, respondent might have irked the former. In his defense, the latter maintains that
he merely upheld Executive Judge Riveras earlier Order.
On the Motion to Inhibit, respondent avers that he first met the parties and their
respective counsels only during the November 26, 2001 hearing, and that none of them had
been known to him personally or otherwise prior to that date. Moreover, he believed he could
decide the case on the merits -- without bias, prejudice, fear or favor. Thus, he found no
justifiable reason to inhibit himself from hearing it. He claims that he even advised the parties
to appeal his Orders by way of a petition for certiorari, if they believe his rulings were
erroneous.
As to the allegation of plagiarism, he argues that there is nothing wrong in adopting or
citing a newspaper article containing the legal views of Atty. Palabrica, who is a seasoned
and respected member of the bar. He adds that, even granting without admitting that his acts
amounted to plagiarism, complainant is not the proper party to assert such cause of action.
Respondent maintains that while there is a constitutional guarantee for the litigants right
to air their legitimate grievance through legal action, they should be enjoined to do so only
after thorough circumspection and exhaustion of all other available remedies. He claims that
the instant administrative case was resorted to, only to intimidate, harass and pressure him to
inhibit himself from hearing the civil case.

Report and Recommendation of the OCA

After a thorough study of the verified Complaint and respondents Comment, the OCA
submitted to this Court its evaluation and recommendation as follows:

EVALUATION: There is nothing in the records of this case which shows that respondent
Judge should be held administratively liable for the charges lodged against him as the issues
are clearly judicial in character. Complainants proper recourse is to avail himself of the
remedies set forth under the Rules of Court. It is well-entrenched that when the matter
complained of is judicial in nature, complainant should not seek redress in the form of [an]
administrative complaint.

The established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions
against Judges are not complementary or suppletory [to], nor a substitute for, judicial
remedies. Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of
judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding, are pre-requisites for the taking of other
measures against the persons of the judges concerned, whether civil, administrative [or]
criminal [in] nature. It is only after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted and
the appellate tribunals have spoken with finality, that the door to an inquiry into [the] criminal,
civil or administrative liability [of judges] may be said to have opened or closed.

We deem it best not to discuss the allegation that respondent prejudged the pending
incidents as the same is unsubstantiated. Bare allegations do not constitute substantial
evidence.

RECOMMENDATION: Respectfully submitted for the consideration of the Honorable Court is

our recommendation that the instant case be DISMISSED[,] the issues raised being judicial in
character.[6]

The Courts Ruling

17
 We agree with the OCA.

Administrative Liability of Respondent

Settled is the rule in administrative cases that complainants bear the onus of establishing
their averments by substantial evidence.[7] After a careful scrutiny of the evidence and the
arguments of the parties, we find no sufficient basis to hold respondent administratively
liable. The accusations of dishonesty, neglect of duty and gross ignorance of the law are
bereft of factual bases. Furthermore, they pertain to alleged errors he committed in the
exercise of his adjudicative functions. Such errors cannot be corrected through administrative
proceedings, but should instead be assailed through appropriate judicial remedies.
As complainant admitted in a Letter[8] dated October 22, 2002, the questioned rulings of
respondent judge are the subject of a certiorari case still pending before the Court of Appeals.
[9]
To say the least, a decision on the propriety of the latters rulings in this administrative
proceeding would be premature. Indeed, where sufficient judicial remedies exist, the filing of
an administrative complaint is not the proper recourse to correct a judges allegedly erroneous
act.
Disciplinary proceedings against judges do not complement, supplement or substitute
judicial remedies. Thus, any inquiry into their administrative liability arising from judicial acts
may be made only after other available remedies have been settled. [10] Parties-litigants abuse
court processes by prematurely resorting to administrative disciplinary action, even before the
judicial issues involved have been finally resolved.[11]
As to the allegation of bias and partiality, complainant apparently got that impression
when respondent declared during the November 26, 2001 hearing that the latter was inclined
to grant the Motion of Mrs. Cruz to allow her and her children to travel to Switzerland. The
suspicion of respondents supposed preferential leanings might have been fortified by the
subsequent denial of complainants Motion for the issuance of a hold-departure order.
It is important to note that Supreme Court Circular No. 39-97[12] explicitly provides that
hold-departure orders may be issued only in criminal cases:

In order to avoid the indiscriminate issuance of Hold-Departure Orders resulting in

inconvenience to the parties affected, the same being tantamount to an infringement on the
right and liberty of an individual to travel and to ensure that the Hold Departure Orders which
are issued contain complete and accurate information, the following guidelines are hereby
promulgated:

1. Hold-Departure Orders shall be issued only in criminal cases within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts. (Emphasis supplied)

On the basis of this Circular, it is not surprising that respondent judge expressed his
predisposition to deny the issuance of a hold-departure order, considering that the subject
case is not criminal in nature.
The terms and conditions for the issuance of a hold-departure order are clear and
unmistakable. They leave no room for any other interpretation and proscribe no deviation
from their mandate. Had respondent ruled otherwise, he would have been guilty of gross
ignorance of the law and/or willful violation of the aforesaid Circular.
On the denial of his Motion for Inhibition, complainant has not shown any evidence that
would indicate a predisposition on the part of respondent to decide the case in favor of one
party or the other. As the latter averred in his Comment, he did not know any of the parties or
their respective counsels personally or otherwise. When he assumed his post as presiding
judge of RTC Branch 72 of Antipolo City, the case was already proceeding in due
course. Besides, he had no previous knowledge or information about the subject case or its
incidents prior to his assignment to that branch.
In no way can respondent be faulted for denying the Motion for Inhibition filed by
complainant, considering that the latters allegation of partiality has not been reasonably
established. Verily, the test to determine the propriety of the denial of a motion to inhibit is
whether the movant was deprived of a fair and impartial trial. [13] A ruling not to inhibit oneself
cannot be overturned in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge.[14]
It is settled that mere suspicion of partiality is not enough. There should be hard
evidence to prove it, as well as a manifest showing of bias and partiality stemming from an
extrajudicial source or some other basis.[15] To be sure, a judges conduct must be clearly

18
indicative of arbitrariness and prejudice before it can be stigmatized as biased and partial.
[16]
In this case, the truth of such allegations cannot be presumed or deduced from the
circumstances stated by complainant in his verified Compliant.[17]
The allegation of plagiarism does not contain a cause of action. Neither has complainant
shown his legal standing to pursue this accusation.
As a matter of public policy, not every error or mistake committed by judges in the
performance of their official duties renders them administratively liable. In the absence of
fraud, dishonesty or deliberate intent to do an injustice, acts done in their official capacity,
even though erroneous, do not always constitute misconduct.[18]
Only errors that are tainted with fraud, corruption or malice may be the subject of
disciplinary action.[19] For administrative liability to attach, respondent must be shown to have
been moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other motive. [20] Indeed, judges may not
be held administratively liable for any of their official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long
as they acted in good faith.[21]
In Sarmiento v. Salamat,[22] this Court declared that while imposing discipline on erring
court members is a primordial responsibility of the High Tribunal, it will nonetheless protect
the innocent ones from the thoughtless importunings of disgruntled litigants. The Court
explained as follows:

Let it be known that this Court will never tolerate or condone any conduct, act or omission
that would violate the norm of public accountability or diminish the peoples faith in the
judiciary. However, when an administrative charge against a court personnel holds no basis
whatsoever in fact or in law, this Court will not hesitate to protect the innocent court employee
against any groundless accusation that trifles with judicial processes.

As a final note, this Court will not shirk from its responsibility of imposing discipline upon
employees of the judiciary, but neither will it hesitate to shield them from unfounded suits that
only serve to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of justice.[23]

WHEREFORE, the Complaint is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.

[1]
Dated February 7, 2002; rollo, pp.1-26.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 158-161.
[3]
Id., pp. 154-157.
[4]
Id., p. 163.
[5]
Id., pp. 164-169.
[6]
OCA Report and Recommendation dated July 25, 2002; rollo, p. 190. Signed by Deputy Court Administrator
Jose P. Perez and Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco Jr.
[7]
Barbers v. Laguio Jr., 351 SCRA 606, February 15, 2001.
[8]
Rollo, p. 188.
[9]
The case is docketed as CA-GR SP No. 69728.
[10]
Caguioa v. Lavia, 345 SCRA 49, November 20, 2000.
[11]
Ibid.
[12]
Dated June 19, 1997.
[13]
Te v. Court of Appeals, 346 SCRA 327, November 29, 2000.
[14]
People v. Gako Jr., 348 SCRA 334, December 15, 2000.
[15]
Soriano v. Angeles, 339 SCRA 366, August 31, 2000.
[16]
Abdula v. Guiani, 326 SCRA 1, February 18, 2000.
[17]
Saylo v. Rojo, 330 SCRA 243, April 12, 2000.
[18]
Enojas Jr. v. Gacott Jr., 322 SCRA 272, January 19, 2000; Rallos v. Gako Jr., 328 SCRA 324, March 17, 2000.
[19]
Tolentino v. Camano Jr. 322 SCRA 559, January 20, 2000.
[20]
Daracan v. Natividad, 341 SCRA 161, September 27, 2000.

19
[21]
Chavez v. Escaan, 343 SCRA 170, October 16, 2000.
[22]
364 SCRA 301, September 4, 2001.
[23]
Id., p. 310, per Panganiban, J.

THIRD DIVISION

20
 [G.R. No. 112884. August 30, 1994.]

PLACIDO O. URBANES, JR., Petitioner,

vs.

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and NATIONAL POWER

CORPORATION, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

VITUG, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari, assails the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R.
CV No. 34524 for, among other things, having been penned by Justice Eduardo G.
Montenegro who, it is averred, should have disqualified himself from sitting and participating
in said case pursuant to Rule 137 of the Rules of Court. Justice Montenegro, prior to his
appointment to the Court of Appeals, was the Acting Solicitor General who, in that capacity,
had represented herein respondent National Power Corporation ("NPC") in the case.

Civil Case No. 47216 was filed, on 18 February 1986, by petitioner Placido Urbanes, Jr.,
against respondent NPC for injunction and damages. Urbanes had contracts of security
services for NPCs various installations. His two contracts expired on 01 January and 16
February 1985, respectively, but, according to Urbanes, he was asked by NPC to stay on
until he would have been properly relieved.li: red

On 24 January 1986, Urbanes was finally advised by NPCs management of the termination
of his contracts. In his complaint for injunction and damages, with a prayer for preliminary
injunction, Urbanes asserted that, there having been timely action from either of the
contracting parties to terminate the contracts, the same were deemed "automatically
renewed" in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the two agreements. He also
contended that NPCs management lacked authority to end his security services on the
ground that only NPCs Board of Directors had the sole prerogative to terminate the
contracts.

On 10 March 1986, the lower court issued an order granting the application of Urbanes for a
writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the parties to observe status quo ante. NPCs motion
for reconsideration was denied.

On 23 April 1986, NPC filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition
seeking to annul and set aside the 10th march 1986 order of the court a quo. In a resolution
penned by Justice Ricardo P. Tensuan, promulgated on 19 December 1986, the petition was
dismissed by the Court of Appeals.

On 24 August 1987, NPC filed with the court a quo an "Urgent Motion to Dissolve Preliminary
Injunction and/or Motion to Dismiss."cralaua1aw library

On 22 September 1987, Urbanes filed a "Motion for Leave to File an Amended Supplemental
Complaint," claiming that the action of the NPC Board banning Urbanes from participating in
future public biddings for security service requirements of NPC was unjust and illegal, and he,
again, thus prayed for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.

On 14 December 1987, the trial court denied NPCs urgent motion to dissolve the preliminary
injunction and deferred resolution on its motion to dismiss the case until after trial on the
merit. The court admitted the amended and supplemental complaint of Urbanes. vi
On 13 January 1988, NPC filed its answer to the amended and supplemental complaint.

On 22 January 1988, the trial court granted the application of Urbanes (in his
amended/supplemental complaint) for a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction and,
accordingly, ordered NPC to cease and desist from implementing the order of the Board of
Directors banning Urbanes from participating in future biddings for any security service
contract with NPC.

21
On 18 April 1988, the trial court, on motion of NPC, dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction
of 10 March 1986 upon the filing by NPC of the counterbond in the sum of P100,000.00 but
denied the motion for reconsideration of the order admitting the amended supplemental
complaint and granting the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction therein prayed for. NPC
filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with the Supreme Court which it
referred to the Court of Appeals. The petition questioned, among other things, the trial courts
order, dated 14 December 1987, denying NPCs motion to dissolve the writ of preliminary
injunction and admitting the amended and supplemental complaint of Urbanes, as well as the
lower courts order, dated 22 January 1988, granting his application for preliminary prohibitory
injunction.

On 18 May 1989, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, holding that the court a quo did
not abuse its discretion in issuing its questioned orders. The decision was elevated to the
Supreme Court via a petition for certiorari. In a resolution, dated 06 November 1989, this
Court denied the petition for lack of merit.

On 29 June 1991, the trial court finally issued its decision in Civil Case No. 47216 upholding
the complaint against NPC, making permanent the writ of injunction and awarding damages
to Urbanes.

From the above decision, NPC appealed to the Court of Appeals.

On 30 September 1993, the Court of Appeals 1 issued its decision, penned by Justice
Eduardo G. Montenegro, modifying the decision of the trial court, thus:

"WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED.
Paragraph 1 of the dispositive portion making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction
issued March 19, 1986 per Order dated march 10, 1986 enjoining defendant NPC from
implementing the letters of defendant dated January 24, 1986 terminating plaintiffs security
service contracts and paragraph 2 of the same dispositive portion ordering NPC to pay
plaintiff-appellee the sum of P500,000.00 as moral, actual and exemplary damages and
P200,000.00 as attorneys fees are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Paragraph 2 of the
dispositive portion reinstating and making permanent the writ of preliminary prohibitory
injunction dated February 11, 1988 issued pursuant to the order dated January 22, 1988,
directing defendant NPC to cease and desist from implementing the Order of the Board of
Directors banning plaintiff and his related companies from participating in future biddings for
any security service contracts with NPC is AFFIRMED. There is no pronouncement as to
costs.

"SO ORDERED."cralua1aw library

Urbanes filed a motion for reconsideration, which the appellate court denied. On 09
November 1993, he filed a motion for the inhibition of Justice Montenegro on the ground that
before he became an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, he had acted as counsel for
NPC in his then capacity as Acting Solicitor General. On 17 December 1993, Justice
Montenegro inhibited himself from the case and forthwith caused to be set aside the
resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.ch

On 07 January 1994, the Court of Appeals, through Justice Minerva P. Gonzaga-Reyes, 2

ultimately denied the motion for reconsideration.

Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari which raises, which raises, among other
issues, the following assignment of error:

"The Hon. Court of Appeals erred in promulgating a decision in this case with the participation
of Justice Eduardo G. Montenegro who is disqualified under the rules to participate in
deciding this case."cralaw virtua1aw library

We agree with petitioner on the above submission. The Rules of court (Disqualification of
Judges) has truly called for the total inhibition of Justice Montenegro from the case. Section 1
of Rules 137 provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges. No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in
which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise,
or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or
to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in
which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has

22
presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the
written consent of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them
and entered upon the record."cralaw virtua1aw library

The intendment of the above provision of the Rules of Court is not difficult to find. Its rationale
is predicated in the long standing precept that no judge should handle a case in which he
might be perceived, rightly or wrongly, to be susceptible to bias and partiality. His judgment
must not be tainted by even the slightest suspicion of improbity or reconceived interest. The
rule is aimed at preserving at all times the faith and confidence in courts of justice by any
party to the litigation (see Gutierrez v. Santos, 112 Phil. 184; Geotina v. Gonzalez, 41 SCRA
66; Umale v. Villaluz, 51 SCRA 84; Pimentel v. Salanga, 21 SCRA 160).chanrobles law library
: red

Considering that Justice Montenegro had so represented the National Power Corporation in
CA G.R. CV No. 34524 in his then capacity as the Acting Solicitor General, he should have
really begged off from any participation in the decision process by, indeed from being the
ponente for, the appellate court. In all fairness to Justice Montenegro, however, he explained
such failure to promptly inhibit himself as one of mere inadvertence and oversight on his part,
and when reminded that he, in fact, had acted as counsel for respondent NPC as the then
Acting Solicitor General, he then forthwith disengaged himself from further involvement in the
disposition of the case.

With the required inhibition of Justice Montenegro from taking part in the disposition of C.A.
G.R. CV No. 34524, the presence of the two remaining Justices of the appellate courts First
Division neither would be enough to constitute a quorum for its due deliberation on the case
nor would allow a judgment to be promulgated thereon. The pertinent provision of Section 4
of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals, as amended, provides;

"Sec. 4. Quorum and Affirmative Vote. . . .

"a. The presence of all members of a Division shall constitute a quorum and their unanimous
vote shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a decision or resolution, otherwise the
Chairman shall ask the Raffle Committee to designate by raffle two additional members of the
Court to constitute a special division of five members."cralaw virtua1aw library

WHEREFORE, CA G.R. CV No. 34524 is hereby REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for
appropriate action conformably with the foregoing opinion. No costs.chanrobles virtual
lawlibrary

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

[1]
Rollo, pp. 52-53.
[2]
Ibid., pp. 74-75.
[3]
Id., p. 91.
[4]
Id., p. 105.
[5]
Id., p. 73.
[6]
Manila Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 187 SCRA 138 (1998).
[7]
Olalia v. Hizon, 196 SCRA 665 (1991).
[8]
Sto. Tomas University Hospital v. Surla, 294 SCRA 382 (1998).
[9]
La Vista Asso., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 278 SCRA 498 (1997).
[10]
BF Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 288 SCRA 267 (1998); National Fed. of Labor v. NLRC, 283 SCRA 275
(1997); Building Care Corp. v. NLRC, 268 SCRA 666 (1997).
[11]
Fortich v. Corona, 289 SCRA 624 (1998).
[12]
Philippine Tuberculosis Society, Inc. v. National Labor Union, 294 SCRA 567 (1998); Premiere Development
Bank v. NLRC, 293 SCRA 49 (1998); Jamer v. NLRC, 278 SCRA 632 (1997).
[13]
Chua v. Court of Appeals, 271 SCRA 546 (1997).
[14]
Cuison v. Court of Appeals, 289 SCRA 159 (1998); Esguerra v. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 380 (1998).
[15]
Lalican v. Vergara, 276 SCRA 518 (1997).

23
[16]
Saulog v. Court of Appeals, 262 SCRA 51 (1996); Searth Commodities Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 207 SCRA
622 (1992); S & A Gaisano, Inc. v. Judge Hidalgo, 192 SCRA 224 (1990).
[17]
Santos v. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 162 (1992).
[18]
Van Twest v. Court of Appeals, 230 SCRA 42 (1994).

SECOND DIVISION

24
 [A.M. No. MTJ-04-1535. March 12, 2004]

DR. CONRADO T. MONTEMAYOR, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE JUAN O. BERMEJO, JR., Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 3,
Manila, respondent.

RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:

The instant administrative case traces its roots from an unlawful detainer case [1] filed by
Benjamin and Desmond T. Montemayor against Lolita Marco. The case was raffled to
Metropolitan Trial Court[2] Judge, Hon. Juan O. Bermejo, Jr. (Judge Bermejo), the respondent
herein.
The records reveal that the pre-trial conference was held on May 20, 2002. Finding no
possibility of settlement, Judge Bermejo issued a Pre-Trial Order of even date defining the
issues submitted for decision and the stipulations agreed upon, and directing the parties to
submit their respective position papers within 10 days from receipt of the Order, after which,
the case shall be deemed submitted for decision.[3]
Accordingly, the plaintiffs submitted their Position Paper on June 13, 2002. More than a
month later, they filed a Motion for Early Resolution dated July 30, 2002. The defendant, on
the other hand, submitted her Position Paper only on August 14, 2002.
The plaintiffs then filed another Motion for Early Resolution on September 6,
2002. Acting on this motion, Judge Bermejo issued an Order dated September 23, 2002
declaring the case submitted for decision.
On October 10, 2002, Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs. Copies thereof
were sent by registered mail to the parties and their respective counsels on October 16,
2002.
On December 12, 2002, the plaintiffs filed their first Motion for Execution and set the
same for hearing on December 16, 2002. However, the motion was not included in the court
calendar because December 16, 2002 apparently was not a motion day.
On December 20, 2002, the defendant filed a Notice of Appeal.
Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed a Second Motion for Execution dated December 26,
2002 and set the same for hearing on January 3, 2003. Concomitantly, Dr. Conrado T.
Montemayor (Dr. Montemayor), the complainant herein and the plaintiffs attorney-in-fact, also
filed on December 26, 2002 a Motion to Require Defendants Counsel to Inform the Court the
Date He Received a Copy of the Judgment [4] and set the same for hearing on January 3,
2003. Judge Bermejo did not act on either motion.
In his Order[5] dated January 6, 2003, the respondent Judge gave due course to the
defendants appeal and required the latter to post a supersedeas bond in the amount
of P587,500.00 within 10 days from receipt thereof.
On January 21, 2003, the plaintiffs filed their Third Motion for Execution. On the same
day, Dr. Montemayor filed a Second Motion to Require Defendants Counsel to Inform the
Court the Date He Received a Copy of the Judgment. [6] Both motions were heard on January
31, 2003, during which, Judge Bermejo directed the plaintiffs to submit to the court
an Affidavit of Service to the defendant of the pending motions.
Accordingly, the plaintiffs filed a Compliance and Manifestation[7] on February 4, 2003
stating, among other things, that the defendant was served copies of the Motion for
Execution, on December 12, 2002; Second Motion for Execution, on December 26,
2002; Motion to Require Defendants Counsel to Inform the Court the Date He Received a
Copy of the Judgment, on December 26, 2002; Third Motion for Execution, on January 21,
2003; Second Motion to Require Defendants Counsel to Inform the Court the Date He
Received a Copy of the Judgment, on January 22, 2003; and Compliance and
Manifestation, on February 3, 2003.
The plaintiffs also filed on February 24, 2003 an Ex-Parte Motion to Resolve All Pending
Incidents of even date. Resolving this motion, Judge Bermejo issued an Order dated March

25
12, 2003, stating that the Motion for Execution dated December 12, 2002, was not resolved
because the day it was set for hearing, i.e., December 16, 2002, was not a motion day and
because there was no proof that the defendant had already received a copy of
the Judgment dated October 10, 2002. Further, the Second Motion for Execution dated
December 26, 2002, was not acted upon considering the Notice of Appeal filed by the
defendant and the courts own Order dated January 6, 2003, requiring the former to post
a supersedeas bond. Anent the Motion to Require Defendants Counsel to Inform the Court
the Date He Received a Copy of the Judgment, the same was not acted upon because the
court was then conducting a semestral inventory of its pending cases. Finally, the Third
Motion for Execution dated January 31, 2003 was deemed submitted for resolution.
On April 24, 2003, the defendant filed an Urgent Motion for Extension[8] dated April 23,
2003 claiming that she only had until April 21, 2003 within which to post a supersedeas
bond and praying for an extension of 10 days, or until May 1, 2003, to post the bond. In
an Order dated April 24, 2003,[9] the respondent Judge granted the motion and gave the
defendant until May 5, 2003 within which to post a supersedeas bond.
Upon the defendants posting of a supersedeas bond, Judge Bermejo issued
an Order[10] dated May 5, 2003 directing the Branch Clerk of Court to transmit the entire
records of the case to the Regional Trial Court for further proceedings in connection with the
defendants appeal.
Incensed by the foregoing proceedings, Dr. Montemayor filed with the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) the instant Administrative Complaint[11] charging Judge Bermejo with
gross incompetence and inefficiency, gross negligence, gross ignorance of the law, gross
misconduct, and/or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
In the instant complaint, Dr. Montemayor asserts that the respondent Judge failed to
decide the case within the period provided under Section 11, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure (Rules of Court). He alleges that Judge Bermejo did not bother to check
defendants preposterous claim that she received a copy of the Judgment only on December
5, 2002, even if it was released more than forty-five (45) days earlier on October 16, 2002.
[12]
He stresses that even if the defendant received a copy of the Judgment on December 5,
2002, still, Judge Bermejo should have reckoned the period to appeal from the time the
defendants counsel received a copy of the Judgment and not when the defendant received it
herself. What is more, the registry return card showing the date the defendants counsel
received a copy of the Judgment was missing from the records.
Dr. Montemayor adds that the Order dated January 6, 2003 giving due course to the
defendants appeal and requiring the latter to post a supersedeas bond within 10 days from
receipt thereof was released by registered mail more than one month later on February 11,
2003,[13] and personal service thereof was made on April 9, 2003, or more than three months
after the issuance thereof. The motive for the belated service was purportedly to give the
defendant more time to post a supersedeas bond. Dr. Montemayor also faults the respondent
Judge for granting the defendants Urgent Motion for Extension to post a supersedeas bond in
violation of Section 13, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, Judge Bermejo did not resolve the three (3) Motions for Execution and two (2)
Motions to Require Defendants Counsel to Inform the Court the Date He Received a Copy of
the Judgment.
Dr. Montemayor also avers that Judge Bermejo prevented the transmittal of the records
of the case to the appellate court within 15 days from the perfection of the appeal in violation
of Section 6, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court. According to him, it was only after the respondent
Judge received the defendants supersedeas bond that the former issued the Order dated
May 5, 2003 directing the Branch Clerk of Court to transmit the records of the case to the
appellate court.[14]
Required to comment, Judge Bermejo vigorously disputes Dr. Montemayors allegations.
In his Comments[15] dated August 11, 2003, he explains that he did not act on the
plaintiffs Motion for Early Resolution dated July 30, 2002 because there was yet no proof that
the defendant already received the Orderof May 20, 2002 requiring the parties to submit their
respective position papers, the affidavits of their witnesses and other documentary
evidence. Indeed, after the defendant filed her Position Paper on August 14, 2002, he issued
an Order on September 23, 2002 declaring the case submitted for decision. Hence,
the Judgment rendered on October 10, 2002 was well within the prescribed period of 30 days
under the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure (Rule on Summary Procedure).
Judge Bermejo says that he did not act on the first Motion for Execution because the
court had not yet received the registry return receipts of the service of judgment at that
time. Furthermore, December 16, 2002, the hearing date the plaintiffs requested, was not a

26
motion day. He also did not act upon the Second Motion for Execution and the Motion to
Require Defendants Counsel to Inform the Court the Date He Received a Copy of the
Judgment both filed on December 26, 2002 because at that time, the court was conducting a
semestral inventory of pending cases, and also because the defendant had already filed
a Notice of Appeal on December 20, 2002.
Judge Bermejo denies that he did not act on the Third Motion for Execution and
the Second Motion to Require Defendants Counsel to Inform the Court the Date He Received
a Copy of the Judgment which were set for hearing on January 31, 2003. He claims that he
issued an Order on the same date requiring Dr. Montemayor to submit to the court an
Affidavit of Service of said motions on the defendant. He further claims that he even advised
Dr. Montemayors counsel in open court to find out the registry receipt number of the
registered mail containing the courts Judgment addressed to the defendants counsel to
enable Dr. Montemayor to secure a certification from the Philippine Postal Office regarding
the date the defendants counsel received a copy of the Judgment. In any event, the
respondent Judge asserts that he resolved the plaintiffs Ex-Parte Motion to Resolve All
Pending Incidents in the Order dated March 12, 2003.
Judge Bermejo also denies that the registry return card indicating the date the
defendants counsel received a copy of the Judgment was missing from the records. He says
that at the time the defendant filed her Notice of Appeal, the court had not yet received the
registry return card.
Respondent Judge admits that he gave due course to the Notice of Appeal of the
defendant in an Order dated January 6, 2003 and required the latter to post a supersedeas
bond within 10 days from receipt of the same. He alleges that to ensure that the defendant
would receive a copy of the Order, he even required the Sheriff to personally serve it to the
defendant, and ordered another copy to be sent by registered mail. The respective counsels
of the parties were also furnished copies of the said Order both by personal service and by
registered mail. The Judge does not deny, however, that when Dr. Montemayor filed
the Compliance and Manifestation on February 4, 2003, the court was still waiting for the
defendant to post a supersedeas bond.
Judge Bermejo rationalizes the granting of the defendants Urgent Motion for
Extension of time to post a supersedeas bond since the bond had already been processed
and was ready for signature, but the signatories and approving officials of the bonding
company were not available because of the Lenten season. He maintains that the
said motion for extension is not a prohibited pleading under the Rules of Court, and that the
granting thereof was made in good faith and in the interest of justice.
He further denies that he prevented the transmittal of the records of the case to the
appellate court. Given that the defendant had not yet posted the supersedeas bond, and
there was no proof to convince him that the latter had already received a copy of
the Order requiring her to file the bond, the court could not transmit the records.
In his Reply dated August 21, 2003, Dr. Montemayor points out that copies of
the Judgment were sent to the parties by registered mail on October 16, 2002, as certified by
the Branch Clerk of Court, and not on October 11, 2002, as claimed by Judge Bermejo.[16]
He also disputes the respondent Judges claim that he did not act on the first Motion for
Execution because there was yet no proof of receipt of the Judgment by the defendants
counsel. Dr. Montemayor highlights the fact that the first Motion for Execution was already
pending at the time the Notice of Appeal was filed. He also notes that while Judge Bermejo
required the plaintiffs to submit an Affidavit of Service relative to the Second Motion to
Require Defendants Counsel to Inform the Court the Date He Received a Copy of the
Judgment, he did not require the same of the defendant when she filed her Notice of
Appeal. Finally, Dr. Montemayor denies that Judge Bermejo resolved all pending incidents in
the Order dated March 12, 2003, because the Judge did not act on the plaintiffs Third Motion
for Execution.
On September 11, 2003, the respondent Judge filed a Rejoinder maintaining
that Judgment was rendered well within the 30-day period required under the Rule on
Summary Procedure. Thereafter, he filed a Manifestation asking that the present
administrative case be submitted for resolution without further argument from the parties.
In his Reply to Rejoinder, Dr. Montemayor submits a Certification from the Manila Central
Post Office stating that the defendant received the mail matter containing a copy of
the Judgment on October 17, 2002.[17]Another Certification from the Makati Central Post
Office[18] stating that the defendants counsel received a copy of the Judgment on October 18,
2002, Dr. Montemayor claims, contradicts Judge Bermejos allegation that the court received
no proof that the defendants counsel had received a copy of the Judgment.

27
 Required to evaluate the complaint, the OCA submitted its Report and
Recommendation on November 11, 2003 finding merit in the complaint and recommending
that Judge Bermejo be fined in the amount of P5,000.00 for failing to decide the case within
the period fixed by law.
The respondent Judge maintains that he is not liable for delay in the rendition of
judgment. In essence, he argues that since the Order deeming the case submitted for
resolution was issued on September 23, 2002, the rendition of judgment on October 10, 2002
was made within the mandatory 30-day period.
The Court is not persuaded.
Section 11, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides a period of 30 days for the court to
render judgment in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases. This period shall be counted
from the receipt of the affidavits and position papers, or the expiration of the period for filing
the same.
Section 11, Rule 70 echoes Section 10 of the Rule on Summary Procedure which
governs unlawful detainer cases, among others.[19] The latter provision similarly mandates the
resolution of such cases within 30 days after receipt of the last affidavits and position papers,
or the expiration of the period for filing the same.
Clearly, the reckoning point from which the mandatory period for rendition of judgment
should be computed is the receipt of the last affidavits and position papers of the parties, or
the expiration of the period for filing the same, as provided by the Rules, not from the
issuance of the order by the judge deeming the case submitted for resolution. The reckoning
point is fixed by law, not by the judge. A judge cannot by himself choose to prolong the period
for deciding cases beyond that authorized by the law.[20]
The records do not reveal when the parties received Judge Bermejos Order requiring
them to submit their respective affidavits and position papers. Assuming, however, that the
court received the defendants Position Paper on August 14, 2002, as respondent Judge
claims, judgment should have been rendered on September 13, 2002. Instead, the decision
was dated October 10, 2002, or nearly a month after the lapse of the mandatory period for
rendition of judgment and almost two months from the receipt of the defendants Position
Paper. Plainly, Judge Bermejo is guilty of delay and, thus, administratively liable.
Rule 1.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires judges to administer justice without
delay. Rule 3.05 of the same Code admonishes all judges to dispose of the courts business
promptly and decide cases within the required periods. The failure to decide a case within the
required period is not excusable, constitutes gross inefficiency[21] and is a ground for the
imposition of administrative sanctions against the defaulting judge.[22]
Delay in the rendition of judgment, however, is the least of Judge Bermejos
administrative transgressions.
Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, states: If judgment is rendered against the
defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon motion, unless an appeal has been
perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved
by the Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages,
and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from. The judgment is
executed immediately in favor of the plaintiff, as a matter of right, to prevent further damage
arising from the loss of possession.[23]
The respondent Judge, however, can only offer feeble excuses for his inaction on the
plaintiffs Motions for Execution. He claims that the first Motion for Execution prayed that
hearing be set on a date that was not a motion day. Judge Bermejo forgets that while the
Rules of Court requires all motions to be scheduled for hearing on Friday afternoons, or if
Friday is a non-working day, in the afternoon of the next working day, the same Rules
provides an exception for motions requiring immediate action. [24] Perhaps, as a judgment in
favor of the plaintiffs in an unlawful detainer case is immediately executory, the plaintiffs
believed that their motion came under the exception. However, if the respondent Judge did
not share this view, he could have simply set the motion for hearing on the next motion
day. Instead, he untenably ignored the motion.
Judge Bermejo also rationalizes his failure to act on the motion on the ground that there
was no proof yet that the defendants counsel had received notice of the Judgment. In this
connection, Dr. Montemayor alleges that the registry return card indicating the defense
counsels notice of judgment is missing from the records, a charge that respondent Judge
vehemently denies. By doing so, he placed himself in a Catch-22. His denial exposes his
liability, as the succeeding discussion shows.

28
 Copies of the Judgment were transmitted to the parties on October 16, 2002 by
registered mail. The plaintiffs filed their first Motion for Execution almost two months later on
December 12, 2002. The fact that the registry receipts of the service of judgment had not yet
returned at this point would have been cause for apprehension for any responsible judge. Yet
Judge Bermejo has not conveyed any semblance of anxiety. He did not inquire from, nor
inform, the Clerk of Court about the absence of the receipts two months after copies of
the Judgment were sent to the parties. Instead, he found the lack of registry receipts a
convenient reason for tarrying on the motion.
Questioning the timeliness of the defendants Notice of Appeal, Dr. Montemayor
subsequently filed two separate motions to require the defense counsel to inform the court of
the date of his receipt of a copy of the Judgment. This is a strange request since that fact
could have been easily verified from the registry return receipts, if indeed they were extant
from the records. But Judge Bermejo did not act on either motion. Stranger still, he admits to
advising Dr. Montemayor to secure the registry receipt number of the notice of judgment to
the defendants counsel to establish the latters date of receipt when, to repeat, all the
respondent Judge had to do was look into the records.
These circumstances may lead a sophisticated mind to conclude one of two things.
One, the registry receipts are indeed missing from the records but Judge Bermejo is
denying it to cover up such loss. This conclusion is buttressed by the odd fact that, despite
the seriousness of Dr. Montemayors allegations, the respondent Judge has not offered in
these administrative proceedings any evidence of the existence of the registry receipts. An
obvious disregard of keeping records is evidence of incompetence and lack of
professionalism. The Court has held that:

A judge is charged with exercising extra care in ensuring that the records of the cases and
official documents in his custody are intact. There is no justification for missing records save
fortuitous events This Court reiterates that judges must adopt a system of record
management and organize their dockets in order to bolster the prompt and efficient dispatch
of business. It is, in fact, incumbent upon him to devise an efficient recording and filing
system in his court because he is after all the one directly responsible for the proper
discharge of his official functions.[25]

Two, Judge Bermejo is suppressing proof of the registry return receipts, in which case,
he is not only guilty of dragging his feet in the resolution of the motions but, worse, bias in
favor of the defendant. On such receipts hinge the answer to Dr. Montemayors question: Did
the defendant file her Notice of Appeal on time? A negative answer would have dire
consequences for the defendant since it would preclude any stay in the execution of the
adverse judgment.
Other circumstances support the theory of bias. Judge Bermejo provides a flimsy
justification for his inaction on Dr. Montemayors Second Motion for Execution. According to
the respondent Judge, the court was undertaking its semestral inventory when the motion
was filed. Even if the Court were to admit the adequacy of this obvious pretext, Judge
Bermejo, at the very least, should have set the motion for hearing on the next motion day
after the inventory. But again, he disregarded the second motion.
Next, under Section 19, Rule 70, supra, in case the defendant does not file any
supersedeas bond or did not make any monthly deposit, the plaintiff would be entitled as a
matter of right to the immediate execution of the inferior courts judgment. In such a case the
execution is mandatory.[26] In Fernandez v. Espaol, the Court held:

. . . . Considering these principles, respondent judge should simply have ascertained from the
records the allegations in complainants motion for execution and, on that basis, resolved the
motion. Had she done this, she could not have failed to notice that the defendant had not
given a supersedeas bond to stay immediate execution of the judgment and had not paid the
current rents as they fell due. The defendants failure to comply with these requisites entitled
the complainant to the immediate execution of the judgment. The courts duty was simply to
order such execution.[27]

In this case, Judge Bermejo did not order the immediate execution of the Judgment. On
the contrary, he even ordered defendant to file a supersedeas bond, which, in any event,
should have been posted within the period to file an appeal. In Chua v. Court of Appeals,
[28]
the Court declared:

As a general rule, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately

executory, in order to prevent further damage to him arising from the loss of possession of

29
the property in question. To stay the immediate execution of the said judgment while the
appeal is pending, the foregoing provision requires that the following requisites must
concur: (1) the defendant perfects his appeal; (2) he files a supersedeas bond; and (3) he
periodically deposits the rentals which become due during the pendency of the appeal. The
failure of the defendant to comply with any of these conditions is a ground for the outright
execution of the judgment, the duty of the court in this respect being ministerial and
imperative. Hence, if the defendant-appellant perfected the appeal but failed to file a
supersedeas bond, the immediate execution of the judgment would automatically
follow. Conversely, the filing of a supersedeas bond will not stay the execution of the
judgment if the appeal is not perfected. Necessarily then, the supersedeas bond should
be filed within the period for the perfection of the appeal. [Emphasis supplied.]

The records show that on January 6, 2003, Judge Bermejo granted the defendant 10
days from receipt of the Order giving due course to the Notice of Appeal to post a
supersedeas bond. Assuming that the defendant received a copy of the Judgment only on
December 5, 2002, the period granted was way beyond the 15-day period for perfecting an
appeal.
More than three months after, the defendant filed an Urgent Motion for
Extension alleging that she had until April 21, 2003 to file her supersedeas bond and asking
for 10 more days to post the same. [29] How service of the Order of January 6, 2003 took so
long was not sufficiently explained. Moreover, the Urgent Motion for Extension was filed only
on April 24, 2003[30] or three days after her alleged last day to post the bond on April 21,
2003,[31] in violation of the rule that motions for extension must be filed prior to the expiration
of the period sought to be extended.[32] Compounding the erroneous admission of said motion
for extension, Judge Bermejo, on the same day, issued an Order allowing the defendant an
additional extension of 15 days, more than the 10 days she initially asked for, and in further
violation of the rule enunciated in Chua, supra. In the meantime, the transmittal to the
appellate court of the cases records was deferred to await the posting of the supersedeas
bond.
Actions for forcible entry or unlawful detainer involve perturbation of social order which
must be resolved as promptly as possible and, accordingly, technicalities or details of
procedure which may cause unnecessary delay should carefully be avoided. [33] This rule lost
all significance in the plaintiffs unlawful detainer case. Not only did they suffer delay in the
resolution of the action and in the execution of the decision in their favor, but likewise delay in
the appeal process.
The Court is not prepared to rule that Judge Bermejo is guilty of the loss of the registry
receipts proving the date of receipt by the defendants counsel of the notice of judgment in the
absence of the records of Civil Case No. 171824-CV before us.
Neither is the Court quick to hold respondent Judge guilty of bias and prejudice in the
absence of any showing that his acts stem from an extrajudicial source resulting in an opinion
in the merits on some basis other than what the respondent Judge learned from his
participation in the case.[34] Judge Bermejo claims that he was moved by good faith and the
interest of justice, particularly in granting the defendant her motion for extension to post a
supersedeas bond, considering that the bond was ready for signing anyway. The Court is
inclined to give respondent Judge the benefit of the doubt, especially in light of
his Judgment in the unlawful detainer case, which was in favor of the plaintiffs.
However, by countenancing, permitting, and even creating the many delays in obvious
disregard of the letter and the spirit of the Rules of Court and the Rule on Summary
Procedure, Judge Bermejo has put in question his partiality. It bears reminding him that a
judge must at all times not only be impartial but maintain the appearance of impartiality.
[35]
Thus, under Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge should avoid impropriety
and appearance of impropriety in all activities. Specifically, under Rule 2.01 of the Code, a
judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary. The appearance of bias or prejudice can be as damaging to public
confidence and the administration of justice as actual bias or prejudice.[36]
ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds respondent Judge Juan O. Bermejo, Jr., of Branch 3 of
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila guilty of delay in the rendition of judgment in violation of
Rules 1.02 and 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct for which he is fined the amount
of P5,000.00. Respondent Judge is also declared guilty of impropriety in violation of Canon 2
of said Code and is fined the amount of P10,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, (Acting Chairman), Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Puno, J., on leave.

30
[1]
Civil Case No. 171824-CV.
[2]
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch III.
[3]
Rollo, p. 36.
[4]
Id. at 22.
[5]
Id. at 18.
[6]
Id. at 24.
[7]
Id. at 59-62.
[8]
Id. at 19.
[9]
Id. at 21.
[10]
Id. at 27.
[11]
Id. at 1.
[12]
Id. at 2.
[13]
Id. at 2.
[14]
Id. at 27.
[15]
Id. at 31.
[16]
Id. at 77.
[17]
Id. at 96, Annex S-Reply to Rejoinder.
[18]
Id. at 97, Annex T-Reply to Rejoinder.
[19]
1991 REVISED RULE ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE, Sec. 1.
[20]
Saceda v. Gestopa, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1303, December 13, 2001, 372 SCRA 192.
[21]
Farrales v. Camarista, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1184, March 2, 2000, 327 SCRA 84.
[22]
Alfonso-Cortes v. Maglalang, A.M. No. RTJ-88-170, November 8, 1993, 227 SCRA 482.
[23]
San Manuel Wood Products, Inc. v. Judge Tupas, 319 Phil. 594 (1995).
[24]
1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 15, Sec. 7.
[25]
Beso v. Judge Daguman, 380 Phil. 544, citing Sabitsana v. Villamor, 202 SCRA 435 (1991); Bernardo v. Judge
Amelita A. Fabros, AM No. MTJ-99-1189, 12 May 1999; OCA v. Judge Francisco D. Villanueva 279
SCRA 267 (1997); OCA v. RTC Judge Amelita DK Benedicto, 296 SCRA 62 (1998); Mamamayan ng
Zapote I, Bacoor, Cavite v. Balderian, 265 SCRA 360 (1996); Celino v. Abrogar, 245 SCRA 304 (1995).
[26]
De Laureano v. Adil, G.R. No. L-43345, July 29, 1976, 72 SCRA 148; Philippine Holding Corp. v. Valenzuela,
G.R. No. L-55972, May 13, 1981, 104 SCRA 401; Hualam Construction and Devt. Corp. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 85466, October 16, 1992, 214 SCRA 612.
[27]
Fernandez v. Espaol, A.M. No. MTJ-98-1150, April 15, 1998, 289 SCRA 1.
[28]
G.R. No. 113886, February 24, 1998, 286 SCRA 437.
[29]
Supra, note 3 at 19.
[30]
Id. at 68, Annex O of Respondent Judge.
[31]
Ibid.
[32]
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 57079, September 29, 1989, 178
SCRA 94, citing Galima, et al. v. CA, No. L-21046, January 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 140 and Tuason v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. L-32682, February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 664.
[33]
Torno v. Intermediate Appellate Court, L-72622, October 28, 1988, 166 SCRA 742; De Papa v. Camacho, G.R.
No. L-28032, September 24, 1986, 144 SCRA 281.
[34]
Soriano v. Angeles, G.R. No. 109920, August 31, 2000, 339 SCRA 366.
[35]
De Guzman, Jr. v. Sison, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1629, March 26, 2001, 355 SCRA 69.
[36]
Re: Release by Judge Manuel T. Muro, RTC, Br. 54, Manila, of an Accused in a Non-Bailable Offense, A.M. No.
00-7-323-RTJ, October 17, 2001, 367 SCRA 285.

31
 THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 112684 April 26, 1994]

RODOLFO E. PARAYNO, CLEMARTIN B. ARBOLEDA, EDUARDO R. PEREZ, CASIMIRO

C. CARANCHO, DIOSDADO T. SAMSON, MAXIMO G. SUMERA and MARCELINO M.
DELA CRUZ, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ILUMINADO MENESES, Presiding Judge, Branch 49, Regional Trial Court, First
Judicial Region, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, LORENZO M. MATEO, ARTURO ESTRADA,
NORMA LUSTINA and PABLO MERCADO, respondents.

Arnold A. Savella & Associates for petitioners.

Simplicio M. Sevilleja for respondents Mateo, Estrada, Lustina and Mercado.

RESOLUTION

VITUG, J.:

Petitioner Rodolfo Parayno is the incumbent municipal mayor of Urdaneta, Pangasinan. The
other petitioners, namely, Clemartin Arboleda, Eduardo Perez, Casimiro Carancho, Diosdado
Samson, Maximo Sumera and Marcelino Dela Cruz, are members of the Sangguniang Bayan
of the municipality who, along with Parayno, are the protestees in separate election protests
now still pending with the court a quo.

This petition for certiorari seeks to set aside the orders, dated 22 October 1993 1 and 16
November 1993, 2 of respondent Judge Iluminado Meneses of Branch 49, Regional Trial
Court, of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, voluntarily inhibiting himself from hearing the election cases
and denying petitioners' motion for the reconsideration thereof.

The mayoralty protest (docketed Case No. U-5346), involving Parayno, was originally raffled
and assigned to Branch 45 of the Regional Trial Court, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, presided over
by Judge Manuel Villanueva. The councilors' protest (docketed Case No. U-5347), involving
the other petitioners, was assigned to Branch 49 of the Regional Trial Court, also sitting in
Urdaneta, Pangasinan, with respondent Judge Iluminado Meneses presiding.

On 22 October 1992, a motion for the inhibition of Judge Villanueva was filed by petitioner
Parayno, which the court promptly granted. After the records of Case No. U-5346 were thus
forwarded to Executive Judge Romulo Abasolo, the latter, in an order, dated 26 October
1992, directed the assignment of the case to Branch 46 of the court but only after its
presiding Judge, Hon. Roger Domagas, agreed to hear and try the case. Claiming
impropriety in the assignment of the case, petitioner Parayno assailed before this Court the
order of the Executive Judge. The Court issued a temporary restraining order and promptly
remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition. The appellate court set
aside the questioned order of 26 October 1992, and it directed the Executive Judge to
instead include the case in the regular raffle for re- assignment.

The case was thereupon re-raffled to Branch 49, where the councilors' protests were then
pending. The Committee on Revision in Case No. U-5346 (the mayoralty protest) terminated
its work on 07 October 1993 but prior to the submission of its report, a "Motion to Use
Revision Committee Report Blank Form" was filed by protestant Lorenzo Mateo (herein
private respondent). In the afternoon of 21 October 1993, while the revision of ballots in Case
No. U-5347 (councilors' protest) was in progress, private respondent Mateo, the Revisor for
the protestants-councilors in the Revision Committee, manifested: 3

. . . . I would like also to make of record that the Trial Presiding Judge of
Branch 49 is the same Trial Judge of this Electoral Protest Case U-5346,
Parayno versus Mateo (sic) and therefore the Protestant look at it that there

32
 seems to be a certain degree of greater sympathy of the Trial Presiding Judge
to the Protestee. . . . (Verceles Transcript of Stenographic Notes, Civil Case
No. U-5347, revision of Ballots on October 21, 1993, 1:45 p.m., pp. 6-7)

The following day, respondent judge issued the assailed order inhibiting himself from further
hearing the two cases. The motion for a reconsideration of the order was denied by the
judge.

Hence, this petition for certiorari.

We see merit in the petition.

Section 1, Rule 137, of the Rules of Court reads:

Sec. 1. Disqualification of judges. No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any

case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee,
or creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth
degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree,
computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been
executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has
presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of
review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and
entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from
sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.

The underlying reason for the above rule is obviously to ensure that a judge, sitting in a case,
will at all times be free from inclinations or prejudices and be well capable to render a just and
independent judgment. A litigant, we often hear, is entitled to nothing less than the cold
neutrality of a judge. 4 Due process requires it. Indeed, he not only must be able to so act
without bias but should even appear to so be. 5 Impartiality is a state of mind; hence, the
need for some kind of manifestation of its reality. 6

Verily, a judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, inhibit himself voluntarily from
sitting in a case, but it should be based on good, sound or ethical grounds, 7 or for just and
valid reasons. 8 It is not enough that a party throws some tenuous allegations of partiality at
the judge. No less than imperative is that it is the judge's sacred duty to administer justice
without fear or favor. 9

We take note that the electoral protests here involved have remained unresolved for quite
some time now. Any further delay in the disposition of the cases, particularly election protests
where public interest is heavily involved, 10 cannot be countenanced.

All told and given the circumstances, we view the call for judge's inhibition, and his acceding
thereto, in this particular instance to be bereft of legal basis and improper.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Orders of the respondent Judge are
SET ASIDE and he is directed to proceed with dispatch in resolving the election protests at
bar. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

1.
Annex "M", Petition, Rollo, 53-54.

2.
Annex "K", Petition, Rollo, 47-49.

3.
Rollo, 44.

4.
Castillo vs. Juan, 62 SCRA 124, 126 /1975/.

33
5.
Conde vs. Superable, Jr., 29 SCRA 727, 735 /1969/.

6.
Fernandez vs. Presbitero, 79 SCRA 61, 64 /19 77/.

7.
Del Castillo v. Javelona, 6 SCRA 146, 150 /1962.

8.
Geotina v. Gonzalez, 41 SCRA 66, 74 /19 71.

9.
Concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Claudio Teehankee in Beltran v. Garcia, supra., 177.

10.
Tatlonghari vs. Commission on Elections, 199 SCRA 8 49/1991/; Duremdes vs. Commission
on Elections, 178 SCRA 7 46/1989/.

34
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 127262. July 24, 1997]

HUBERT WEBB, ANTONIO LEJANO, HOSPICIO FERNANDEZ, MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ,

PETER ESTRADA and MICHAEL GATCHALIAN petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE HONORABLE AMELITA G. TOLENTINO, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch 274, and LAURO
VIZCONDE, respondents.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:

Petitioners Hubert Webb, Antonio Lejano, Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter
Estrada and Michael Gatchalian[1] assail the decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 21,
1996 in C.A. G.R. SP No. 39839[2] and C.A. G.R. SP No. 39840,[3] as well as its resolution
dated November 15, 1996 insofar as it denied the petition for the inhibition of respondent
Judge Amelita G. Tolentino in Criminal Case No. 95-404 [4] pending before Branch 274 of the
Regional Trial Court of Paranaque.[5]
The antecedent facts show that on August 8, 1995, petitioners were charged with the
crime of rape with homicide for allegedly raping Carmela Vizconde and on the occasion
thereof, killing Carmela herself and her mother, Estrellita, and her sister, Jennifer. The crime
was committed in the evening of June 29 up to the early morning of June 30, 1991 at the
Vizconde residence in BF Homes, Paraaque.[6]
The case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 95-404, was raffled to Branch 274 of the
Regional Trial Court of Paraaque presided by respondent judge.
Prior to their arraignment, petitioner Webb and his co-accused, Gerardo Biong, had
sought the disqualification of respondent judge in Criminal Case No. 95-404. In his motion of
August 21, 1995, petitioner Webb relied on the ground that respondent judge allegedly told
the media that "failure of the accused to surrender following the issuance of the warrant of
arrest is an indication of guilt." Respondent judge denied the motion. Two days later, on
August 23, 1995, petitioner Webb filed a second motion to disqualify respondent judge as the
latter allegedly told the media that the accused "should not expect the comforts of home,"
pending the resolution of his motion to be committed to the custody of the Philippine National
Police at Camp Ricardo Papa, Bicutan, Paraaque. Respondent judge again denied the
motion to inhibit. On September 4, 1995, Gerardo Biong filed another motion to disqualify
respondent judge on the ground of bias and partiality. This was likewise denied by
respondent judge.
The petitioners were arraigned on September 4, 1995. They then filed separate petitions
for bail.
On September 21, 1995, petitioner Webb filed an Urgent Motion for Hospitalization. He
alleged that he was sick of dermatitis or asthma of the skin which aggravated due to his
continuous commitment at the Paraaque Municipal Jail. The motion was denied by
respondent judge on October 16, 1995.
On October 9, 1995, the hearing on petitioners' petitions for bail commenced. The
prosecution presented its "star witness," Jessica Alfaro, who identified petitioners as the
perpetrators of the crime. During the cross-examination, the defense counsel tried to
impeach Alfaro's credibility by asking her questions regarding the contents of an affidavit she
executed at the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on April 28, 1995. The defense tried to
show that some of her statements in said affidavit are inconsistent with her statements in a
subsequent affidavit executed on May 21, 1995 and with her testimony in court. The

35
prosecution objected and moved that all questions relating to the contents of Alfaro's April 28
affidavit be expunged from the records for being inadmissible in evidence under Article III
Section 12(1) and (3) of the 1987 Constitution. [7] Respondent judge sustained the objection
and on October 30, 1995, she issued an order holding that Alfaro cannot be cross examined
on the contents of her April 28 affidavit because said affidavit was inadmissible in evidence
as it was not executed in the presence of a counsel.[8]
The defense also tried to prove Alfaro's motive in testifying against petitioners. She was
questioned about her brother, Patrick Alfaro, and her uncle, Roberto Alfaro. Jessica Alfaro
allegedly admitted that her brother, Patrick, was a drug addict and was arrested once by the
NBI for illegal possession of drugs and that he is presently in the United States. When
defense counsel inquired about the circumstances of Patrick's departure for the United
States, the prosecution objected to the questions on the ground of irrelevancy. Respondent
judge sustained the objection.
The defense also cross-examined Alfaro on her educational attainment to show that she
lied in her direct testimony. The defense presented her transcript of records to prove that she
only enrolled for a year and earned nine (9) academic units, contrary to her claim that she
finished second year college. The prosecution again objected on the ground that Alfaro's
educational attainment was irrelevant. Respondent judge sustained the objection.
On November 9, 1995, petitioners filed a motion to disqualify or inhibit respondent judge
due to bias and prejudice. Respondent judge denied the motion for lack of merit on
November 28, 1995.[9]
On November 15, 1995, petitioners filed two separate petitions with this
Court. Petitioners Webb, Lejano, Fernandez, together with their co-accused, Gerardo Biong,
filed a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside (1) the order of respondent judge dated
October 16, 1995 denying petitioner Webb's motion for hospitalization and (2) the order of
respondent judge dated October 30, 1995 disallowing the defense to cross-examine Alfaro on
the contents of her April 28 affidavit.[10] Petitioners Gatchalian and Estrada filed a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus assailing respondent judge's order prohibiting the cross-
examination of Alfaro on the contents of her April 28 affidavit.[11]
On December 8, 1995, petitioners filed with this Court a supplemental petition to set
aside the November 28, 1995 order of respondent judge denying their motion for inhibition.
In a resolution dated January 22, 1996, we referred both petitions and the supplemental
petition to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition.
In the meantime, the hearing on petitioners' petitions for bail continued. The prosecution
presented Mila Gaviola, a former maid at the Webb residence, who testified that she saw
petitioner Webb in their house in the early morning of June 30, 1991. On December 5, 1995,
respondent judge, over the objection of the petitioners, ordered an ocular inspection of the
former Webb residence in BF Homes, Paraaque to verify Gaviola's testimony about a secret
door through which she peeped to see petitioner Webb.
On January 12, 1996, petitioner Webb filed a motion for deposition of witnesses residing
in the United States who shall testify on his presence in the United States on the date of the
commission of the crime.[12] On February 6, 1996, respondent judge denied the motion for the
reason that petitioner Webb failed to allege that the witnesses do not have the means to go to
the place of the trial.[13] Hence, on January 12, 1996, petitioner Webb filed another
supplemental petition to the Court of Appeals challenging the said order.
Petitioners made their Formal Offer of Evidence upon conclusion of the hearings on the
petitions for bail. On September 25, 1995, the prosecution filed its Comment/Objection to the
Formal Offer of Evidence. On October 1, 1996, respondent judge ruled on petitioner's formal
offer of evidence. She admitted only ten (10) out of the one hundred forty two (142) exhibits
offered by petitioner.[14]
On October 11, 1996, respondent judge denied petitioners' petitions for bail.[15]
On June 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision on the various petitions
and supplemental petitions. It reversed respondent judge's ruling refusing to admit Alfaro's
April 28 affidavit but denied all the other reliefs prayed for by petitioners. [16] It also denied
petitioners' motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated November 15, 1996.[17]
On December 12, 1996, petitioners filed the present petition contending:
I
The Court of Appeals erred in declaring that no sufficient ground exists for the
disqualification of the respondent judge.

36
 A. Respondent judge has consistently and repeatedly shown bias and hostility
against petitioners.
B. The rejection of the 132 of 142 exhibits not only paved the way for the denial of
bail but also sets irreversibly the eventual conviction of all the accused.
C. The reported trip to the Vizconde residence by the respondent judge exposes her
propensity to consort with the complainant on the pending issues.
II
The Court of Appeals erred in not honoring that the right to a fair trial requires that
the case be tried by an impartial judge.
On February 5, 1997, petitioners filed a supplemental petition. It alleged, among others,
that during the trial on the merits, respondent judge allowed prosecution witness Atty. Pedro
Rivera to testify on the character of the accused although the defense had not put his
character in issue; that respondent judge disallowed the defense to impeach the credibility of
Atty. Rivera by the presentation of an earlier statement executed by him because such
statement was immaterial; and that respondent judge struck off from the record the proffer of
oral evidence made by defense counsel Atty. Vitaliano Aguirre after ruling that the proffer was
improper on cross-examination.[18]
The core issue is whether respondent judge should inhibit herself from hearing Criminal
Case No. 95-404 on the ground of bias and prejudice.
We rule in the negative.
The Bill of Rights guarantees that "(n)o person shall be held to answer for a criminal
offense without due process of law."[19] A critical component of due process is a hearing
before an impartial and disinterested tribunal. We have ingrained the jurisprudence that every
litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge for all the other
elements of due process, like notice and hearing, would be meaningless if the ultimate
decision would come from a partial and biased judge.[20] Hence, the Rules of Court allows a
judge to voluntarily inhibit himself from hearing a case for "just or valid reasons" other than
those referring to his pecuniary interest, relation, previous connection, or previous rulings or
decisions. Section 1 Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court states:
SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges. -- No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any
case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee,
creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree
of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed
according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor,
administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any
inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written
consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in
a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
Under the second paragraph, a party has the right to seek the inhibition or disqualification of
a judge who does not appear to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent in
handling the case. This right must be weighed with the duty of a judge to decide cases
without fear of repression. Hence, to disqualify a judge on the ground of bias and prejudice
the movant must prove the same by clear and convincing evidence. This is a heavy burden
and petitioners failed to discharge their burden of proof.
To prove bias and prejudice on the part of respondent judge, petitioners harp on the
alleged adverse and erroneous rulings of respondent judge on their various motions. By
themselves, however, they do not sufficiently prove bias and prejudice to disqualify
respondent judge. To be disqualifying, the bias and prejudice must be shown to have
stemmed from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis
other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case. Opinions formed in the
course of judicial proceedings, although erroneous, as long as they are based on the
evidence presented and conduct observed by the judge, do not prove personal bias or
prejudice on the part of the judge. [21] As a general rule, repeated rulings against a litigant, no
matter how erroneous and vigorously and consistently expressed, are not a basis for
disqualification of a judge on grounds of bias and prejudice.[22] Extrinsic evidence is required
to establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose, in addition to the palpable error which
may be inferred from the decision or order itself. Although the decision may seem so
erroneous as to raise doubts concerning a judge's integrity, absent extrinsic evidence, the
decision itself would be insufficient to establish a case against the judge. [23] The only

37
exception to the rule is when the error is so gross and patent as to produce an ineluctable
inference of bad faith or malice.
A perusal of the records will reveal that petitioners failed to adduce any extrinsic
evidence to prove that respondent judge was motivated by malice or bad faith in issuing the
assailed rulings. Petitioners simply lean on the alleged series of adverse rulings of the
respondent judge which they characterized as palpable errors. This is not enough. We note
that respondent judge's rulings resolving the various motions filed by petitioners were all
made after considering the arguments raised by all the parties. It is true that the respondent
judge erred in some of her rulings such as her rejection of petitioners' one hundred thirty two
(132) pieces of evidence. It appears, however, that respondent judge reversed this erroneous
ruling and already admitted these 132 pieces of evidence after finding that "the defects in
(their) admissibility have been cured through the introduction of additional evidence during
the trial on the merits."[24]This correction diminishes the strength of petitioners' charge that
respondent judge is hopelessly biased against them. To be sure, the respondent judge did
not score a complete cipher in her rulings against the petitioners. Just last June 11, 1997, the
Third Division of this Court dismissed an administrative complaint against the respondent
judge on the ground that "x x x it is within the respondent judge's right to conduct an ocular
inspection since it is an exercise of her judicial prerogative x x x." [25] There is still another
reason why we should observe caution in disqualifying respondent judge. The trial of the
petitioners is about to end and to assign a new judge to determine the guilt or innocence of
petitioners will not be for the best interest of justice. The records of the case at bar run into
volumes. These voluminous records cannot capture in print the complete credibility of
witnesses when they testified in court. As the respondent judge observed the demeanor of
witnesses while in the witness chair, she is in the best position to calibrate their
credibility. The task of evaluating the credibility of witnesses includes interpreting their body
language and their meaningful nuances are not expressed in the transcripts of their
testimonies.
We hasten to stress that a party aggrieved by erroneous interlocutory rulings in the
course of a trial is not without remedy. The range of remedy is provided in our Rules of Court
and we need not make an elongated discourse on the subject. But certainly, the remedy for
erroneous rulings, absent any extrinsic evidence of malice or bad faith, is not the outright
disqualification of the judge. For there is yet to come a judge with the omniscience to issue
rulings that are always infallible. The courts will close shop if we disqualify judges who err for
we all err.
We again remind respondent judge of our counsel in the first Webb case [26] "x x x that our
ability to dispense impartial justice is an issue in every trial, and in every criminal prosecution,
the judiciary always stands as a silent accused. More than convicting the guilty and acquitting
the innocent, the business of the judiciary is to assure fulfillment of the promise that justice
shall be done and is done - and that is the only way for the judiciary to get an acquittal from
the bar of public opinion."
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, (Chairman), Romero, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Torres, Jr., J., on official leave.

[1]
The Original Petition filed with this Court included Gerardo Biong as one of the petitioners, but on December 19,
1996, petitioners filed a Manifestation of Partial Withdrawal dropping Gerardo Biong from the petition as
the latter is independently pursuing a separate remedy for the same cause of action (Rollo, pp. 259-260).
[2]
Entitled Hubert J.P. Webb, et al. v. The Honorable Amelita G. Tolentino, Presiding Judge, RTC-Paranaque
Branch 274 and the People of the Philippines.
[3]
Entitled Michael A. Gatchalian and Peter Estrada v. The Honorable Amelita G. Tolentino, Presiding Judge, RTC-
Paranaque and the People of the Philippines.
[4]
Entitled People of the Philippines v. Hubert Webb, et al.
[5]
The Decision and the Resolution were penned by Justice Ricardo P. Galvez with the concurrence of Justice
Antonio M. Martinez and Justice Hilarion L. Aquino.
[6]
Information, Annex "D" to the Petition, Rollo, pp.138-140.
[7]
SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed
of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

38
 xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him.
[8]
Annex "E" to the Petition, Rollo, pp. 142-150.
[9]
Annex "F" to the Petition, Rollo, pp. 151-161.
[10]
Docketed as G.R. No. 122488.
[11]
Docketed as G.R. No. 122504.
[12]
Annex "G" to the Petition, Rollo, pp. 162-171.
[13]
Annex "H" to the Petition, Rollo, pp. 172-176.
[14]
Annex "J" to the Petition, Rollo, pp. 190-196.
[15]
Annex "K" to the Petition, Rollo, pp. 197-199.
[16]
Annex "A" to the Petition, Rollo, pp. 51-68.
[17]
Annex "C" to the Petition, Rollo, pp. 82-89.
[18]
Rollo, pp. 263-271.
[19]
Section 14(1) Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
[20]
Tan, Jr. v. Gallardo, 73 SCRA 306 (1976); Castillo v. Juan, 62 SCRA 124 (1975); Mateo v. Villaluz, 50 SCRA 18
(1973); Garcia v. Executive Secretary, 6 SCRA 1 (1962).
[21]
People v. Massarella, 400 N.E. 2d 436; United States v. International Business Machine, 475 F. Supp. 1372
(1979); Smith v. Danyo, 441 F. Supp. 171 (1977); King v. United States, 434 F. Supp. 1141 (1977).
[22]
United States v. International Business Machines, 475 F. Supp. 1372 (1979); People v. Massarella, 400 N.E. 2d
436; United States v. Gallagher, 576 F. 2d 1028 (1978); Miller v. Richardson, 623 P. 2d 1317 (1981).
[23]
Annotation: Scope of the Constitutional Independence of Judges, 240 SCRA 163 (1995).
[24]
See Order dated June 18, 1997 in Crim. Case No. 95-404, People vs. Webb, et al, RTC, NCR, Paraaque,
Metro Manila, Br. 274.
[25]
Resolution dated June 11, 1997 of the Third Division in Adm. Matter OCA I.P.I. No. 97-293-RTC, Singson, et
al. vs. Judge Tolentino, etc.
[26]
247 SCRA 692-693.

39
 EN BANC
[G. R. No. 133250. May 6, 2003]

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,

vs.
PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.

RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:

For resolution of the Court are the following motions: (1) Motion to Inhibit and for Re-
Deliberation filed by respondent Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation (Amari for
brevity) on September 13, 2002; (2) Motion to Set Case for Hearing on Oral Argument filed by
Amari on August 20, 2002; (3) Motion for Reconsideration and Supplement to Motion for
Reconsideration filed by Amari on July 26, 2002 and August 20, 2002, respectively; (4)
Motion for Reconsideration and Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration filed by
respondent Public Estates Authority (PEA for brevity) on July 26, 2002 and August 8, 2002,
respectively; and (5) Motion for Reconsideration and/or Clarification filed by the Office of the
Solicitor General on July 25, 2002. Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez filed on November 13,
2002 his Consolidated Opposition to the main and supplemental motions for reconsideration.
To recall, the Courts decision of July 9, 2002 (Decision for brevity) on the instant case
states in its summary:

We can now summarize our conclusions as follows:

1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now
covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the
public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not
sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only
sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the
1987 Constitution and existing laws.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable
natural resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable
lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The
government can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has
reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as
agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only natural resources the
government can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares of
submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man.
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation,
ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for
being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain.
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156
hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being
contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the
alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.
PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can
classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them

40
 no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable
lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind
of alienable land of the public domain.

Clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. Under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts whose object or purpose is
contrary to law, or whose object is outside the commerce of men, are inexistent and void from
the beginning. The Court must perform its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution, and
therefore declares the Amended JVA null and void ab initio.

Amari seeks the inhibition of Justice Antonio T. Carpio, ponente of the Decision, on the
ground that Justice Carpio, before his appointment to the Court, wrote in his Manila
Times column of July 1, 1997, I have always maintained that the law requires the public
bidding of reclamation projects. Justice Carpio, then a private law practitioner, also stated in
the same column, The Amari-PEA reclamation contract is legally flawed because it was not
bid out by the PEA. Amari claims that because of these statements Justice Carpio should
inhibit himself on the grounds of bias and prejudgment and that the instant case should be re-
deliberated after being assigned to a new ponente.
The motion to inhibit Justice Carpio must be denied for three reasons. First, the motion
to inhibit came after Justice Carpio had already rendered his opinion on the merits of the
case. The rule is that a motion to inhibit must be denied if filed after a member of the Court
had already given an opinion on the merits of the case, [1] the rationale being that a litigant
cannot be permitted to speculate upon the action of the Court xxx (only to) raise an objection
of this sort after a decision has been rendered. Second, as can be readily gleaned from the
summary of the Decision quoted above, the absence of public bidding is not one of the ratio
decidendi of the Decision which is anchored on violation of specific provisions of the
Constitution. The absence of public bidding was not raised as an issue by the parties. The
absence of public bidding was mentioned in the Decision only to complete the discussion on
the law affecting reclamation contracts for the guidance of public officials. At any rate, the
Office of the Solicitor General in its Motion for Reconsideration concedes that the absence of
public bidding in the disposition of the Freedom Islands rendered the Amended JVA null and
void.[2] Third, judges and justices are not disqualified from participating in a case just because
they have written legal articles on the law involved in the case. As stated by the Court
in Republic v. Cocofed,[3] -

The mere fact that, as a former columnist, Justice Carpio has written on the coconut levy will
not disqualify him, in the same manner that jurists will not be disqualified just because they
may have given their opinions as textbook writers on the question involved in a case.

Besides, the subject and title of the column in question was The CCP reclamation project and
the column referred to the Amari-PEA contract only in passing in one sentence.
Amaris motion to set the case for oral argument must also be denied since the pleadings
of the parties have discussed exhaustively the issues involved in the case.
The motions for reconsideration reiterate mainly the arguments already discussed in the
Decision. We shall consider in this Resolution only the new arguments raised by
respondents.
In its Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration, Amari argues that the Decision should
be made to apply prospectively, not retroactively to cover the Amended JVA. Amari argues
that the existence of a statute or executive order prior to its being adjudged void is an
operative fact to which legal consequences are attached, citing De Agbayani v. PNB,[4] thus:

x x x. It does not admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged
legislative or executive act must have been in force and had to be complied with. This is so
as until after the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is entitled to
obedience and respect. Parties may have acted under it and may have changed their
positions. What could be more fitting than that in a subsequent litigation regard be had to
what has been done while such legislative or executive act was in operation and presumed to
be valid in all respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its
existence as a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect awareness that precisely
because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a
legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can
exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to
deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what
had transpired prior to such adjudication.

41
In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: "The actual existence of a statute,
prior to such a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new
judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be
considered in various aspects, - with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate,
and particular conduct, private and official." This language has been quoted with approval in
a resolution in Araneta v. Hill and the decision in Manila Motor Co., Inc. v. Flores. x x x.

xxx

x x x That before the decision they were not constitutionally infirm was admitted expressly.
There is all the more reason then to yield assent to the now prevailing principle that the
existence of a statute or executive order prior to its being adjudged void is an operative fact
to which legal consequences are attached.

Amari now claims that assuming arguendo that Presidential Decree Nos. 1084 and 1085, and
Executive Order Nos. 525 and 654 are inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution, the limitation
imposed by the Decision on these decrees and executive orders should only be applied
prospectively from the finality of the Decision.
Amari likewise asserts that a new doctrine of the Court cannot operate retroactively if it
impairs vested rights. Amari maintains that the new doctrine embodied in the Decision cannot
apply retroactively on those who relied on the old doctrine in good faith, citing Spouses
Benzonan v. Court of Appeals,[5] thus:

At that time, the prevailing jurisprudence interpreting section 119 of R.A. 141 as amended
was that enunciated in Monge and Tupas cited above. The petitioners Benzonan and
respondent Pe and the DBP are bound by these decisions for pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil
Code "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part
of the legal system of the Philippines." But while our decisions form part of the law of the
land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which provides that "laws shall have
no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided." This is expressed in the familiar legal
maxim lex prospicit, non respicit, the law looks forward not backward. The rationale against
retroactivity is easy to perceive. The retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that
have already become vested or impairs the obligations of contract and hence, is
unconstitutional (Francisco v. Certeza, 3 SCRA 565 [1961]).

The same consideration underlies our rulings giving only prospective effect to decisions
enunciating new doctrines. Thus, we emphasized in People v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607 [1974]
"x x x when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new
doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who had relied on
the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.

There may be special cases where weighty considerations of equity and social justice will
warrant a retroactive application of doctrine to temper the harshness of statutory law as it
applies to poor farmers or their widows and orphans. In the present petitions, however, we
find no such equitable considerations. Not only did the private respondent apply for free
agricultural land when he did not need it and he had no intentions of applying it to the noble
purposes behind the law, he would now repurchase for only P327,995.00, the property
purchased by the petitioners in good faith for P1,650,000.00 in 1979 and which, because of
improvements and the appreciating value of land must be worth more than that amount now.

The buyers in good faith from DBP had a right to rely on our rulings
in Monge and Tupas when they purchased the property from DBP in 1979 or thirteen (13)
years ago. Under the rulings in these two cases, the period to repurchase the disputed lot
given to respondent Pe expired on June 18, 1982. He failed to exercise his right. His lost right
cannot be revived by relying on the 1988 case of Belisario. The right of petitioners over the
subject lot had already become vested as of that time and cannot be impaired by the
retroactive application of the Belisario ruling.

Amaris reliance on De Agbayani and Spouses Benzonan is misplaced. These cases

would apply if the prevailing law or doctrine at the time of the signing of the Amended JVA
was that a private corporation could acquire alienable lands of the public domain, and the
Decision annulled the law or reversed this doctrine. Obviously, this is not the case here.
Under the 1935 Constitution, private corporations were allowed to acquire alienable
lands of the public domain. But since the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, private
corporations were banned from holding, except by lease, alienable lands of the public

42
domain. The 1987 Constitution continued this constitutional prohibition. The prevailing law
before, during and after the signing of the Amended JVA is that private corporations cannot
hold, except by lease, alienable lands of the public domain. The Decision has not annulled or
in any way changed the law on this matter. The Decision, whether made retroactive or not,
does not change the law since the Decision merely reiterates the law that prevailed since the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution. Thus, De Agbayani, which refers to a law that is
invalidated by a decision of the Court, has no application to the instant case.
Likewise, Spouses Benzonan is inapplicable because it refers to a doctrine of the Court
that is overruled by a subsequent decision which adopts a new doctrine. In the instant case,
there is no previous doctrine that is overruled by the Decision. Since the case of Manila
Electric Company v. Judge Castro-Bartolome,[6] decided on June 29, 1982, the Court has
applied consistently the constitutional provision that private corporations cannot hold, except
by lease, alienable lands of the public domain. The Court reiterated this in numerous cases,
and the only dispute in the application of this constitutional provision is whether the land in
question had already become private property before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution.
[7]
If the land was already private land before the 1973 Constitution because the corporation
had possessed it openly, continuously, exclusively and adversely for at least thirty years since
June 12, 1945 or earlier, then the corporation could apply for judicial confirmation of its
imperfect title. But if the land remained public land upon the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution, then the corporation could never hold, except by lease, such public land.
Indisputably, the Decision does not overrule any previous doctrine of the Court.
The prevailing doctrine before, during and after the signing of the Amended JVA is that
private corporations cannot hold, except by lease, alienable lands of the public domain. This
is one of the two main reasons why the Decision annulled the Amended JVA. The other main
reason is that submerged areas of Manila Bay, being part of the sea, are inalienable and
beyond the commerce of man, a doctrine that has remained immutable since the Spanish
Law on Waters of 1886. Clearly, the Decision merely reiterates, and does not overrule, any
existing judicial doctrine.
Even on the characterization of foreshore lands reclaimed by the government, the
Decision does not overrule existing law or doctrine. Since the adoption of the Regalian
doctrine in this jurisdiction, the sea and its foreshore areas have always been part of the
public domain. And since the enactment of Act No. 1654 on May 18, 1907 until the effectivity
of the 1973 Constitution, statutory law never allowed foreshore lands reclaimed by the
government to be sold to private corporations. The 1973 and 1987 Constitution enshrined
and expanded the ban to include any alienable land of the public domain.
There are, of course, decisions of the Court which, while recognizing a violation of the
law or Constitution, hold that the sale or transfer of the land may no longer be invalidated
because of weighty considerations of equity and social justice.[8] The invalidation of the sale
or transfer may also be superfluous if the purpose of the statutory or constitutional ban has
been achieved. But none of these cases apply to Amari.
Thus, the Court has ruled consistently that where a Filipino citizen sells land to an alien
who later sells the land to a Filipino, the invalidity of the first transfer is corrected by the
subsequent sale to a citizen.[9] Similarly, where the alien who buys the land subsequently
acquires Philippine citizenship, the sale is validated since the purpose of the constitutional
ban to limit land ownership to Filipinos has been achieved. [10] In short, the law disregards the
constitutional disqualification of the buyer to hold land if the land is subsequently transferred
to a qualified party, or the buyer himself becomes a qualified party. In the instant case,
however, Amari has not transferred the Freedom Islands, or any portion of it, to any qualified
party. In fact, Amari admits that title to the Freedom Islands still remains with PEA. [11]
The Court has also ruled consistently that a sale or transfer of the land may no longer be
questioned under the principle of res judicata, provided the requisites for res judicata are
present.[12] Under this principle, the courts and the parties are bound by a prior final decision,
otherwise there will be no end to litigation. As the Court declared in Toledo-Banaga v. Court
of Appeals,[13] once a judgement has become final and executory, it can no longer be
disturbed no matter how erroneous it may be. In the instant case, there is no prior final
decision adjudicating the Freedom Islands to Amari.
There are, moreover, special circumstances that disqualify Amari from invoking equity
principles. Amari cannot claim good faith because even before Amari signed the Amended
JVA on March 30, 1999, petitioner had already filed the instant case on April 27, 1998
questioning precisely the qualification of Amari to acquire the Freedom Islands. Even before
the filing of this petition, two Senate Committees[14] had already approved on September 16,
1997 Senate Committee Report No. 560. This Report concluded, after a well-publicized
investigation into PEAs sale of the Freedom Islands to Amari, that the Freedom Islands are

43
inalienable lands of the public domain. Thus, Amari signed the Amended JVA knowing and
assuming all the attendant risks, including the annulment of the Amended JVA.
Amari has also not paid to PEA the full reimbursement cost incurred by PEA in
reclaiming the Freedom Islands. Amari states that it has paid PEA
[15]
only P300,000,000.00 out of the P1,894,129,200.00 total reimbursement cost agreed upon
in the Amended JVA. Moreover, Amari does not claim to have even initiated the reclamation
of the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas covered in the Amended JVA, or to have started
to construct any permanent infrastructure on the Freedom Islands. In short, Amari does not
claim to have introduced any physical improvement or development on the reclamation
project that is the subject of the Amended JVA. And yet Amari claims that it had already spent
a whopping P9,876,108,638.00 as its total development cost as of June 30, 2002. [16] Amari
does not explain how it spent the rest of the P9,876,108,638.00 total project cost after paying
PEA P300,000,000.00. Certainly, Amari cannot claim to be an innocent purchaser in good
faith and for value.
In its Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration, PEA claims that it is similarly situated
as the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA) which under R.A. No. 7227 is
tasked to sell portions of the Metro Manila military camps and other military reservations.
PEAs comparison is incorrect. The Decision states as follows:

As the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects nationwide,

with authority to sell reclaimed lands, PEA took the place of DENR as the government agency
charged with leasing or selling reclaimed lands of the public domain. The reclaimed lands
being leased or sold by PEA are not private lands, in the same manner that DENR, when it
disposes of other alienable lands, does not dispose of private lands but alienable lands of the
public domain. Only when qualified private parties acquire these lands will the lands become
private lands. In the hands of the government agency tasked and authorized to dispose
of alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, these lands are still public, not
private lands.

PEA is the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation

projects nationwide. PEA took the place of Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR for brevity) as the government agency charged with leasing or selling all
reclaimed lands of the public domain. In the hands of PEA, which took over the leasing
and selling functions of DENR, reclaimed foreshore lands are public lands in the same
manner that these same lands would have been public lands in the hands of DENR.
BCDA is an entirely different government entity. BCDA is authorized by law to
sell specific government lands that have long been declared by presidential proclamations
as military reservations for use by the different services of the armed forces under the
Department of National Defense. BCDAs mandate is specific and limited in area, while PEAs
mandate is general and national. BCDA holds government lands that have been granted to
end-user government entities the military services of the armed forces. In contrast, under
Executive Order No. 525, PEA holds the reclaimed public lands, not as an end-user entity,
but as the government agency primarily responsible for integrating, directing, and
coordinating all reclamation projects for and on behalf of the National Government.
In Laurel v. Garcia,[17] cited in the Decision, the Court ruled that land devoted to public
use by the Department of Foreign Affairs, when no longer needed for public use, may be
declared patrimonial property for sale to private parties provided there is a law authorizing
such act. Well-settled is the doctrine that public land granted to an end-user government
agency for a specific public use may subsequently be withdrawn by Congress from public use
and declared patrimonial property to be sold to private parties. R.A. No. 7227 creating the
BCDA is a law that declares specific military reservations no longer needed for defense or
military purposes and reclassifies such lands as patrimonial property for sale to private
parties.
Government owned lands, as long they are patrimonial property, can be sold to private
parties, whether Filipino citizens or qualified private corporations. Thus, the so-called Friar
Lands acquired by the government under Act No. 1120 are patrimonial property[18] which even
private corporations can acquire by purchase. Likewise, reclaimed alienable lands of the
public domain if sold or transferred to a public or municipal corporation for a monetary
consideration become patrimonial property in the hands of the public or municipal
corporation. Once converted to patrimonial property, the land may be sold by the public or
municipal corporation to private parties, whether Filipino citizens or qualified private
corporations.
We reiterate what we stated in the Decision is the rationale for treating PEA in the same
manner as DENR with respect to reclaimed foreshore lands, thus:

44
To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as
private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations
from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. PEA will simply turn
around, as PEA has now done under the Amended JVA, and transfer several hundreds of
hectares of these reclaimed and still to be reclaimed lands to a single private corporation in
only one transaction. This scheme will effectively nullify the constitutional ban in Section 3,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which was intended to diffuse equitably the ownership of
alienable lands of the public domain among Filipinos, now numbering over 80 million strong.

This scheme, if allowed, can even be applied to alienable agricultural lands of the public
domain since PEA can acquire x x x any and all kinds of lands. This will open the floodgates
to corporations and even individuals acquiring hundreds, if not thousands, of hectares of
alienable lands of the public domain under the guise that in the hands of PEA these lands are
private lands. This will result in corporations amassing huge landholdings never before seen
in this country - creating the very evil that the constitutional ban was designed to prevent.
This will completely reverse the clear direction of constitutional development in this country.
The 1935 Constitution allowed private corporations to acquire not more than 1,024 hectares
of public lands. The 1973 Constitution prohibited private corporations from acquiring any kind
of public land, and the 1987 Constitution has unequivocally reiterated this prohibition.

Finally, the Office of the Solicitor General and PEA argue that the cost of reclaiming
deeply submerged areas is enormous and it would be difficult for PEA to accomplish such
project without the participation of private corporations. [19] The Decision does not bar private
corporations from participating in reclamation projects and being paid for their services in
reclaiming lands. What the Decision prohibits, following the explicit constitutional mandate, is
for private corporations to acquire reclaimed lands of the public domain. There is no
prohibition on the directors, officers and stockholders of private corporations, if they are
Filipino citizens, from acquiring at public auction reclaimed alienable lands of the public
domain. They can acquire not more than 12 hectares per individual, and the land thus
acquired becomes private land.
Despite the nullity of the Amended JVA, Amari is not precluded from recovering from
PEA in the proper proceedings, on a quantum meruit basis, whatever Amari may have
incurred in implementing the Amended JVA prior to its declaration of nullity.
WHEREFORE, finding the Motions for Reconsideration to be without merit, the same are
hereby DENIED with FINALITY. The Motion to Inhibit and for Re-Deliberation and the Motion
to Set Case for Hearing on Oral Argument are likewise DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Austria- Martinez, Carpio-
Morales, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., please see separate opinion, concurring and dissenting.
Puno, J., please see separate opinion.
Ynares-Santiago, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., please see dissenting opinion.
Corona, J., I dissent.
Azcuna, J., I take no part.

[1]
Limpin, Jr. v. IAC, 161 SCRA 83 (1988); Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368 (1949).
[2]
Motion for Reconsideration of the Office of the Solicitor General, p. 3.
[3]
En Banc Resolution of February 26, 2002.
[4]
38 SCRA 429 (1971).
[5]
205 SCRA 515 (1992).
[6]
114 SCRA 799 (1982).
[7]
Republic v. CA and Iglesia ni Cristo, and Republic v. Cendaa and Iglesia ni Cristo, 119 SCRA 449 (1982);
Republic v. Villanueva and Iglesia ni Cristo, 114 SCRA 875 (1982); Director of Lands v. Lood, 124 SCRA
460 (1983); Republic v. Iglesia ni Cristo, 128 SCRA 44 (1984); Director of Lands v. Hermanos y
Hermanas de Sta. Cruz de Mayo, Inc., 141 SCRA 21 (1986); Director of Lands v. IAC and Acme Plywood
& Veneer Inc., 146 SCRA 509 (1986); Republic v. IAC and Roman Catholic Bishop of Lucena, 168 SCRA
165 (1988); Natividad v. CA, 202 SCRA 493 (1991); Villaflor v. CA and Nasipit Lumber Co., 280 SCRA
297 (1997). In Ayog v. Cusi, Jr., 118 SCRA 492 (1982), the Court did not apply the constitutional ban in
the 1973 Constitution because the applicant corporation, Bian Development Co., Inc., had fully complied
with all its obligations and even paid the full purchase price before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution,
although the sales patent was issued after the 1973 Constitution took effect.
[8]
Spouses Benzonan v. Court of Appeals, note 5.

45
[9]
United Church Board for World Ministries v. Sebastian, 159 SCRA 446 (1988); Sarsosa Vda. de Barsobia v.
Cuenco, 113 SCRA 547 (1982); Godinez v. Pak Luen, 120 SCRA 223 (1983); Vasquez v. Giap and Li
Seng Giap & Sons, 96 Phil. 447 (1955).
[10]
Lee v. Republic, G.R. No. 128195, October 3, 2001; Yap v. Maravillas, 121 SCRA 244 (1983); De Castro v.
Teng, 129 SCRA 85 (1984).
[11]
Amaris Motion for Reconsideration, p. 10.
[12]
Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101115, August 22, 2002; Firestone Ceramics v. Court of Appeals, 313
SCRA 522 (1999); Herrera v. Canlas, 310 SCRA 318 (1999); Peoples Homesite and Housing
Corporation v. Mencias, 20 SCRA 1031 (1967); Galvez v. Tuason, 10 SCRA 344 (1964).
[13]
302 SCRA 331 (1999).
[14]
Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, and Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers and Investigations.
[15]
Amaris Motion for Reconsideration, p. 49.
[16]
Ibid., p. 50.
[17]
187 SCRA 797 (1990); See also Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335 (1960); Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene
Co., Inc. v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481 (1975).
[18]
Central Capiz v. Ramirez, 40 Phil. 883 (1920); Jacinto v. Director of Lands, 49 Phil. 853 (1926); Pugeda v.
Trias, 4 SCRA 849 (1962); De la Cruz v. De la Cruz, 130 SCRA 666 (1984).
[19]
OSGs Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 22-24; PEAs Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration, p.12.

46
 EN BANC

Adm. Matter No. MTJ-87-123 June 27, 1988

MERCEDITA G. LORENZO, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE PRIMO L. MARQUEZ, respondent.

Adm. Matter No. MTJ-88-141 June 27, 1988

NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE PRIMO L. MARQUEZ, respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

In a sworn statement dated October 11, 1987 executed by Mercedita G. Lorenzo and in an
indorsement of December 2, 1987 of the Chief State Prosecutor transmitting the report of the
National Bureau of Investigation dated November 5, 1987, the herein respondent Judge
Primo L. Marquez of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sariaya, Quezon is charged on three
counts, namely: (1) harassment in failing to indorse the reappointment of complainant
Mercedita G. Lorenzo as Municipal Trial Court Aide; (2) for violation of Section 1, Rule 137 of
the Rules of Court in deciding Civil Case No. 1202 entitled Kilusang Bayan Pampananalapi
ng Sariaya vs. Gilda Balid, et al., when he was the former counsel of the plaintiff; and (3) for
issuing a subpoena for the appearance of Jose D. Obosa, a prison inmate of the National
Bilibid Prisons (NBP) to appear before him when said person has no case pending before
him nor is he a witness in any pending case therein.

The respondent was required to file an answer to said complaint and after his answer was
filed a formal investigation was conducted by the Deputy Court Administrator, Meynardo A.
Tiro, by authority of the Court, wherein evidence was adduced by the complainant and
respondent. On May 27, 1988, said official submitted his report and recommendation to the
Court.

On the first charge of harassment, the respondent explained that he did not recommend the
reappointment of complainant Mercedita G. Lorenzo because she was inefficient. Such
reluctance of the respondent must be because she was a protegee of the respondent's
predecessor, former Judge Jose Parentela, Jr., who reportedly exposed the illegal issuance
of the subpoena to Obosa by the respondent. Nevertheless, it is the privilege of the
respondent as presiding judge of his court to recommend the employee with whom he will
work. If he did not choose to have said complainant reappointed, he cannot thereby be held
administratively liable.

47
Under the second charge, there is no question that the respondent was the counsel for the
plaintiff in Civil Case No. 1202 entitled "Kilusang Bayan Pampananalapi ng Sariaya (KBPS)
vs. Gilda Balid, et al." filed in the Municipal Trial Court of Sariaya, Quezon. The complaint
was filed by Crisostomo L. Luna, president and board chairman of the plaintiff, who is his
uncle. 1 The respondent was then a member of the board of directors of the plaintiff. 2 In an
order of November 28, 1986, Judge Parentela declared defendants in default for failure to file
their answer. When the respondent assumed office he issued an order on February 10, 1987
requiring plaintiff to secure the services of another counsel in his place and he set the case
for hearing. On March 9, 1987, he issued an order considering the case submitted for
decision. on April 2, 1987, he rendered a decision favorable to the plaintiff, the dispositive
part of which reads as follows:

Judgement is hereby rendered in favor of the above-named plaintiff and

against the above-named defendants, whereby defendants are hereby
directed to pay jointly and severally plaintiff the following, to wit:

1. Principal amount of P4,676.00 plus one (1%) percent interest on the unpaid
balance and the two (2%) percent penalty interest per month until the entire
obligation is fully paid

2. Attorney's fees equivalent to ten (10%) percent the total amount due and
collectible, plus litigation expenses in the amount of P460.00 and cost of suit,

An appeal therefrom was interposed by the defendants to the Regional Trial Court of Lucena
City.

Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court provides as follows:

Section 1. Disqualification of judges. No judge or judicial officer shall sit in

any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily. interested as heir,
legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within
the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth
degree computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has
been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has
presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of
review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and
entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from
sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.

From the foregoing provision of the rules, a judge cannot sit in any case in which he was a
counsel without the written consent of all the parties in interest, signed by them and entered
upon the record. The respondent alleged that since there was no objection from any of the
parties, he proceeded to preside over the case and to decide it. This is a clear violation of the
law. The rule is explicit that he must secure the written consent of all the parties, not a mere
verbal consent much. less a tacit acquiescence. More than this, said written consent must be
signed by them and entered upon the record.

The failure of the respondent to observe these elementary rules of conduct betrays his
unusual personal interest in the case which prevailed over and above his sworn duty to
administer the law impartially and without any fear or favor.

The third charge is even more serious. The record of Criminal Case No. 8924, entitled
"People of the Philippines vs. Cesar Salamat" for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, shows that on July
24, 1987, the respondent issued a subpoena, addressed to prison inmate Jose Obosa, who
was then a convict in the NBP at Muntinlupa, Rizal, requiring him to appear before his court
on July 27, 28 and 29, 1987 at 8:30 A.M. and then and there to testify in the above entitled
case. There is a notation at the top thereof "For Conference. 3

On August 18, 1987, the respondent issued an order and on the basis thereof issued another
subpoena for Obosa to appear for a conference on August 28, 1987 at 8:30 A.M. 4 There was

48
no reason for respondent to subpoena Obosa to testify in said case as the accused had not
yet been arrested and thus the case could not be set for hearing.

Respondent, however, explained that the reason he subpoenaed Obosa was due to his
interest in having the accused Salamat arrested as he was still at large. He stated that during
one of his speaking engagements in San Narciso, Quezon, he met a certain Rivera who told
him that Obosa was a friend of Salamat who may be able to tell the respondent about the
whereabouts of Salamat. Respondent added that it was the complainant Maximino Torres
who requested the issuance of said subpoena for Obosa.

Torres, however, testified that he did not know Obosa and that it was the respondent who
drafted a letter dated August 14, 1987 and caused him to sign the same by going to his
house, nine kilometers away from the courtroom. The said letter-request was made long after
the first subpoena was issued by respondent on July 24, 1987. This discrepancy reveals the
questionable motive of the respondent.

Because of the subpoena issued by the respondent, Obosa appeared at past 12:00 noon on
July 28, 1987 in the house of the respondent at Sariaya, Quezon, not in the courtroom, with
two prison escorts and yet the respondent did not ask him about the whereabouts of
Salamat. Respondent stated Obosa was to appear before him in court but there was no court
hearing as yet as the accused had not been apprehended.

Again, on July 29, 1987, Obosa appeared in his house at past noon but likewise respondent
did not inquire about the whereabouts of Salamat. The excuse of the respondent is that was
the time he had to bring his sick daughter to the hospital.

Atty. Salvador Ranin, the agent of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) who investigated
the case, testified that from July 28, 1987, up to August 2, 1987, Obosa did not return to his
quarters at the NBP although there was an entry in the logbook of the NBP that Obosa
returned to his quarters allegedly on August 2, 1987 at 2:10 in the afternoon. The well
publicized murder of Local Government Secretary Jaime Ferrer occurred at 6:45 P.M. of the
same day. Ranin stated that during the incident, three (3) school children saw a man with a
gun running towards La Huerta, Paranaque. Incidentally, the residence of Obosa is in
Paranaque.

Ranin went to Muntinlupa and he photographed Obosa while taking a bath. He blew up the
picture and showed it to the witnesses and the children and they positively Identified Obosa
as the man running away from the scene of the crime. Later fifteen (15) persons were lined
up at the NBI headquarters in Manila together with Obosa and the witnesses pointed to
Obosa as the one fleeing after the commission of the offense. Ranin emphasized that in their
opinion the marginal entry in the logbook of the NBP as to the alleged return of Obosa to his
quarters on August 2, 1987 at 2:1 0 P.M. is a false entry.

There are now two criminal cases pending before the RTC, Makati, Metro Manila, namely:
Criminal Case No. 011, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Nieves Constancio, Ruel
Villahermosa y Fernandez, Jose Obosa y Tutaan and Victoriano Tutaan, prison
superintendent, for the murder of Secretary Ferrer; and Criminal Case No. 012 against the
same accused for the murder of Jesus T. Calderon, driver of Secretary Ferrer. The
respondent is not accused in the said criminal cases.

No doubt the respondent is guilty of the charge against him. There was no reason for him to
require the appearance of Obosa in his court, even for a conference. The criminal case
pending before him was not yet ready for trial as the accused was at large. If truly respondent
was impelled with the desire to locate the whereabouts of accused Salamat so that he could
be arrested, all that he could have done was to have a policeman or court employee go to
Muntinlupa for the purpose, or he himself could have done so.

Under Section 3, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, a subpoena shall be signed by the clerk of
court or by the judge, if the court has no clerk, under the seal of the court. The respondent
had a clerk of court, Miss Gloria Lorenzo, and yet he himself issued and signed
the subpoena. His undue interest to bring out Obosa from his confinement allegedly to
appear before him is obvious.

49
Respondent did not even consider that Circular No. 6 dated December 5, 1987 of this Court
specifically directs that no maximum security prisoner could be taken out of the NBP to serve
as witness in a case and testify therein without the permission of this Court and unless the
same is absolutely necessary. The respondent failed to secure such authority from this Court
before issuing a subpoena for Obosa. His lame excuse is that he has not read said circular.

In causing Jose Obosa to get out of the NBP allegedly to appear before him, the respondent
wittingly or unwittingly, furnished Obosa the opportunity to participate in the commission of a
crime or crimes. In fact, Obosa is now being held to account as a principal in the murder of
Secretary Ferrer and his driver.

The respondent committed grave and serious misconduct in the performance of his duty. He
demonstrated his unfitness to be a judge as in fact by his behavior he has placed the
judiciary in disrepute. 5 He abused the great powers of his office so that he should not stay a
moment longer as a member of the judiciary.

WHEREFORE, while respondent is cleared of the charge of harassment filed by Mercedita G.

Lorenzo, he is hereby found guilty of grave and serious misconduct for deciding Civil Case
No. 1202, entitled Kilusang Bayan Pampananalapi ng Sariaya (KBPS) vs. Gilda Balid, et al.,
wherein he was a former counsel for plaintiff in violation of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules
of Court, and for having illegally issued a subpoena for the appearance of prison inmate Jose
T. Obosa of the NBP before him in Criminal Case No. 8924, entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Cesar Salamat;" and as penalty thereof, the respondent it is hereby
DISMISSED from the service with prejudice to reinstatement in the government and forfeiture
of his retirement benefits, if any, but without prejudice to the payment of his accrued leave or
salaries already earned.

SO ORDERED.

Yap, C.J., Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1
Exhibit 7.

2
Exhibit K-1.

3
Exhibit "C"-Exhibit 2.

4
Exhibit 6-Exhibit "B."

5
Lim v. Judge Sixto Seguiban, AM Case No. B-612P-MTJ, March 10, 1988.

50