Doctrine:

The law is a legitimate exercise of police power, which, similar

to the power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its
object. Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but
has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its
comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide
enough room for an efficient and flexible response to
conditions and circumstances, thus assuring the greatest
benefits. Accordingly, it has been described as "the most
essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending
as it does to all the great public needs." It is "the power vested
in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and
establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws,
statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not
repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the
good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of
the same."
CARLOS SUPERDRUG CORP. v. DSWD

Topic: Police Power; Validity of the Senior Citizens Act;

Ruling of the Court:

Petition is dismissed. The Senior Citizens Act was enacted
primarily to maximize the contribution of senior citizens to
nation-building, and to grant benefits and privileges to them for
their improvement and well-being as the State considers them
an integral part of our society. The law is a legitimate exercise
of police power, which, similar to the power of eminent domain,
has general welfare for its object. For this reason, when the
conditions so demand as determined by the legislature,
property rights must bow to the primacy of police power
because property rights, though sheltered by due process,
must yield to general welfare.
 goods and services in the course of trade or business but only
identified such person with particularity, namely, the
wholesaler, distributor or dealer (Section 15), and the retailer
(Section 17), all the taxes being imposed on the privilege of
doing business in the City of Manila in order to make the
taxpayers contribute to the citys revenues were imposed on
the same subject matter and for the same purpose. Secondly,
the taxes were imposed by the same taxing authority (the City
of Manila) and within the same jurisdiction in the same taxing
period (i.e., per calendar year). Thirdly, the taxes were all in
the nature of local business taxes.

Doctrine:
Double taxation means taxing the same property twice when it
should be taxed only once; that is, taxing the same person
twice by the same jurisdiction for the same thing. It is
obnoxious when the taxpayer is taxed twice, when it should be
but once. Otherwise described as direct duplicate taxation,
NURSERY CARE CORP. v. ACEVEDO the two taxes must be imposed on the same subject
matter, for the same purpose, by the same taxing authority,
Topic: Double Taxation; within the same jurisdiction, during the same taxing
period; and the taxes must be of the same kind or
Ruling of the Court: character.
The imposition of the tax under Section 21 of the Revenue
Code of Manila constituted double taxation. The Court holds
that all the elements of double taxation concurred upon the
City of Manilas assessment on and collection from the
petitioners of taxes for the first quarter of 1999 pursuant to
Section 21 of the Revenue Code of Manila. Firstly, because
Section 21 of the Revenue Code of Manila imposed the tax on
a person who sold goods and services in the course of trade
or business based on a certain percentage of his gross sales
or receipts in the preceding calendar year, while Section 15
and Section 17 likewise imposed the tax on a person who sold

REPUBLIC v. HEIRS OF SATURNINO BORBON
Topic: Power of Eminent Domain; Circumstances which may
warrant taking; Expropriation
Ruling of the Court:
Supreme Court ruled that the dismissal of the expropriation
procedure is proper, but, must be upon such terms as the
court deems just and equitable. The court points out that
NAPOCOR entered the property without consent and without
payment of just compensation. Neither was there any deposit
as required by law. NAPOCOR also destroyed some fruit trees
and plants without payment, divided the property into 3 lots as
its transmission lines passed through the center of the
property, thereby rendering the land inutile for future use, it
would be unfair if NAPOCOR will not be liable. There will be no
payment of just compensation as there was no taking. Instead,
NAPOCOR should compensate respondents for the
disturbance of their property rights at the time of the entry in
1993, by paying them actual or other compensatory damages.
Doctrine:
The exercise of the power of eminent domain is not unlimited,
it has two mandatory requirements which are; (1) that it is for a
particular public purpose; and (2) that just compensation is
paid. The court said that the element of public use must be
maintained throughout the proceeding for absence of which,
the expropriator must return the property to the owner, if the
latter so desires it, citing the case of Mactan-Cebu
International Airport Authority v Lozada Sr.
Public use is the fundamental basis for the action for
expropriation; hence, NAPOCORs motion to discontinue the
proceedings is warranted and should be granted.
As discussed in the case of Metropolitan Water District vs. De
Los Reyes:
The fundamental basis then of all actions brought for the
expropriation of lands, under the power of eminent domain, is
public use. That being true, the very moment that it
appears at any stage of the proceedings that the
expropriation is not for a public use, the action must
necessarily fail and should be dismissed, for the reason
that the action cannot be maintained at all except when
the expropriation is for some public use. That must be
true even during the pendency of the appeal or at any
other stage of the proceedings.
It is notable in that case that it was made subject to several
conditions in order to address the dispossession of the
defendants of their land, and the inconvenience, annoyance
and damages suffered by the defendants on account of the
proceedings. Accordingly, the Court remanded the case to the
trial court for the issuance of a writ of possession ordering
Metropolitan Water District to immediately return possession of
the land to the defendants, and for the determination of
damages in favor of the defendants, the claims for which must
be presented within 30 days from the return of the record to
the court of origin and notice thereof. In this case, NAPOCOR
seeks to discontinue the expropriation proceedings on the
ground that the transmission lines constructed on the
respondents property had already been retired. Verily, the
retirement of the transmission lines necessarily stripped the
expropriation proceedings of the element of public use. To
continue with the expropriation proceedings despite the
definite cessation of the public purpose of the project would
result in the rendition of an invalid judgment in favor of the
expropriator due to the absence of the essential element of
public use.
Topic: Power of Taxation; Uniformity of Taxation; Exception;

Ruling of the Court:

The SC ruled in favor of Ormoc Sugar Company. The
ordinance is discriminatory for it taxes only centrifugal sugar
produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc.
and no other. At the time of the taxing ordinances enactment,
Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. was the only sugar central in the
city of Ormoc. The classification, to be reasonable, should be
in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing
ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude
any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class
as plaintiff, from the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if
later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the
tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc
Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.

Doctrine:
General Rule: The power to tax operates with the same force
and effect in every place where the subject of it is found. This
is called geographical uniformity.
Exception: The rule on uniformity does not prohibit
classification for purposes of taxation, provided the requisites
for valid classification are met.
NICOLAS-LEWIS v. COMELEC

Topic: Right to Suffrage; R.A. No. 9189Overseas Voting Law;

Ruling of the Court:

There is no provision in the RA 9225 requiring duals to actually
establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines first
before they can exercise their right to vote. Congress enacted
RA 9189 pursuant to Sections 1 and 2 of Article V of the
Constitution, identifying in its Section 4 of the said Act who can
vote under it, among others, are Filipino immigrants and
permanent residents in another country opens an exception
and qualifies the disqualification rule under the Section 5(d) of
the same Act.
By applying the doctrine of necessary implication,
Constitutional Commission provided for an exception to actual
residency requirement of Section 1, Article 5 of 1987
Constitution, with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. Filipino
immigrants and permanent residents in another country may
be allowed to vote even though they do not fulfill the residency
requirement of said Sec 1 Art V of the Constitution.
Doctrine:
Overseas Filipinos qualified to vote under the R.A. No. 9189
need not have one-year actual physical residence in the
Philippines to exercise their right of suffrage.